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in domestic and transnational levels
Mr. Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira (Doctoral Student in International Relations, Nuffield College, University of Oxford) (E-mail: email@example.com) Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference (WISC) University of Porto, Porto, Portugal, 20th August, 2011 Section: Domestic constraints in foreign policy Word Count: 10,737 (without bibliography)
Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market, Civil Society, and State Actors
1. Introduction The world has been witnessing since the 1980s three major phenomena in political terms: 1) an increasing interconnection and interdependence among states in a context in which non-state actors play an increasing role in politics; 2) the rise of identity as a relevant factor in public life as much as class is; and 3) the emergence of powers out of the West, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the BRICs.1 Each phenomena posits a theoretical question: 1) how domestic structures change vis-à-vis foreign influences; 2) how noneconomic factors interplay with economic ones in shaping national preferences; and 3) what are the sources of empowerment of countries in world where many see states as losing importance in comparison to non-state actors located in the market and the civil society? Current theories of International Relations (IR) face limitations in explaining these complex interactions, insofar as the linkages between the state and the societal actors in both domestic and international realms are either ignored or not fully taken into account. These accounts remain state-centred or economic-centred. Power, however, is not only economic or political. Power is essentially symbolic, bounded by conceptions of society—sets of constitutive norms related to existence, focused on identity, and survival, with aims to organise economic production. These conceptions, however, are not shaped and reshaped as states and societal actors—economic and non-economic—want. Moreover, power also has a social component. Such a fact limits the explanations of the origins of policy-making in times of change, such as the post-Cold War period. During these periods of change, societal actors are not in constant, well-defined positions, forming stable interest groups. They may transit across diverse identities to which they are linked in order to either increase or preserve power in economic and social terms and, therefore, increase their chances to have political leverage to legitimize their views of the world through discourses and material capabilities.
BRICs is an acronym that refers to the fast-growing developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. It was coined by the bank Goldman Sachs in 2001. These countries now have regular meetings and, in the end of 2010, invited South Africa to join them, forming the BRICS.
Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market, Civil Society, and State Actors
In this paper, I intend to develop an analytical framework that can be generalizable to situations in which countries became more powerful and, therefore, due to their changing systemic position, changed or adapted their foreign policy. The framework is based on the sociological notion of fields/arenas2 and seeks to explain how systemic transformations affect—in economic and associational terms—societal actors located within countries, and eventually impact policy-making and international regimes. In the development of the framework, I confront my theoretical concerns with major works of main schools of thought in IR that sought to integrate domestic and systemic independent (causal) variables. None of those schools—Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, and Constructivism—suffice because they either ignore contexts in which societal actors are influenced by multiple identities or, in considering identity issues, does not frame them in clear analytical units and leaves out economic/productive factors, considering them only in the sphere of discourses. Therefore, in being a theoretical tool that allows the combination of production and identity issues, the notion of fields can contribute to bridge the divide rationalism-constructivism in IR. The paper is organised as follows: first, I discuss the ontological assumptions and epistemological implications of IR theories and the limitations they present in accounting for phenomena in periods of systemic transformation. Afterwards, I introduce the notion of fields to IR, defining the fields (arenas of production, association, and redistribution, as well as the state-as-government in the domestic arena only) that compose both domestic and international spaces and how societal actors located in both operate bounded by conceptions of existence and of survival, interacting between different fields. In this stage, to consolidate my argument, I bring elements of the theoretical accounts that I criticized earlier. The conclusion revaluates the arguments presented and discusses the trade-offs the framework implies in terms of empirical research. Whenever it is possible, I illustrate my theoretical
Bourdieu 1991, 185.
Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market, Civil Society, and State Actors
arguments with concrete cases, especially from Brazil and India, two of the BRICs whose foreign policy and systemic position changed after economic liberalisation in the 1990s. 2. Ontological assumptions, epistemological implications, and general limitations In epistemological terms, IR research has largely been framed by the agent-structure positivist opposition, which considers both choices and constraints actors face in a given environment. Although some constructivists (namely the non-post-modernist ones)3 buy into this assumption to develop their research, rational-choice scholars have been the most engaged in this dichotomy. Nonetheless, as Snidal says, the rational-choice approach ―might seem ineffective for studying change. The concept of equilibrium is inherently static since it is defined as the absence of any tendency to change.‖4 More flexible than rational-choice scholarship, constructivist approaches—even when they work in terms of agents and structure—do not consider the possibility of detaching actors from the environment where they are located. Such assumption, however, has not been used as an advantage over rationalism, including on this rational-choice, to provide better tools to understand continuity and change in the international system. This fault-line—from both rationalist and constructivist approaches—derives from a common ontological problem: the idea that anarchy is at the origin of the international system even when, as it is in the case of constructivism, processes of socialization takes place and bounds actors together. On the one hand, the anarchical assumption makes rationalists to overemphasize—due to different reasons according to the approach—systemic constraints (anarchy itself in the case of structural realists and international regimes as means to deal with anarchy in the case of Neoliberals). On the other, the same assumption leads
Smith (2000, 391) defines three variants of social-constructivism: neo-classical, based on intersubjective meaning; naturalistic, which derives from scientific realism, being, thus, closer to rationalist scholarship; and post-modernist, that proposes a break with scientific epistemology. 4 Snidal 2002, 82.
Economic and social exchanges used to happen between political units prior to the Westphalia Treaty. To put it simply. 8 Lake and Powell 1999. 873. So the statesystem was created upon a network of material and social-cultural exchanges.6 In fact. 30-31. 7 Ruggie 1998. including international politics‖. thus. unlike Lake and Powell assume. ideas are tools through which we interpret both capabilities. 137. Secondly. and Marxism miss the same point: identities play a role in production and. of policy-making and shifts in conceptions of existence and survival. it is needed to go beyond traditional political economic approaches and to bring in identities and norms as explicit analytical elements. bounded by a given set of ideas.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. 58. 5 6 Fearon and Wendt 2002. therefore. the strategic setting in which choices are made depends not only on information asymmetries. and State Actors 5 constructivists to deny the fact that constructions (norms and institutions) over anarchy are not random or only historically-contingent.‖5 The latter can also be either causal mechanisms or constitutive parts of the social world. as Ruggie says. they frame material capabilities. thus. 9 For a non-systematic account of this argument.. in economic foreign policy. Liberalism. Civil Society. they frame social capabilities.7 Ideas. material factors matter at the limit. In dealing with the opposition agency-structure. nation-states were not created on a tabula rasa. No consciously organized realm of human activity is imaginable without them.. As Fearon and Wendt argue. Lastly. but how they matter depends on ideas. . To understand the dynamic of redistribution in critical junctures and. please read Sterling-Folker 2009. Thus. Realism. Ibid. ―‗material‘ is not the same thing as ‗objective‘. ―constitutive rules are the institutional foundation of international life. like group identities.8 but also on the cognition of the available information.9 and have more importance in preference formation in times of change since distribution of power among societal actors is likely to be in flux. have at least three roles in human life: firstly.. 60. such as the value we attribute to goods.
20. 16 Ibid. which focuses on decision-making process rather than only on foreign policy outputs. dominated at that time by the Neorealism-Neoliberalism debate. two major trends emerged within Pluralist Theory. preferences are take for granted. the relative bargaining power of important governments. perhaps because most of his empirical 10 Among the foundational works in FPA. prior to domestic pluralism. and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. 14 The second unites economic interest with constraints given by institutions15 and asymmetries of information within the state and market and between these two arenas. its parsimonious design ignores complex interactions between the state-as-government. one more focused on economic factors and other that attributed to institutional constrains more leverage. 15 Keohane and Milner 1996. an argument derived from Neoclassical Economics. however.13 In the subsequent years. Civil Society. it is worth mentioning Snyder. 14 Frieden and Rogowski 1996.‖17 Integration advanced while and when there was convergence among the negotiating parts. . coped with political ones. the market.16 Eventually. 12 Among other references. 3. Bruck.11 which represented an advance within the Positivist school. as in Moravcsik‘s analysis of the process of European integration. The first explains changes in domestic coalitions as related mainly to shifts in the international prices.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. and the civil society—the major units of analysis in contemporary politics. the Pluralist-Liberal literature would suffice for this analysis. 11 Putnam 1988. for a summary of this debate please read Nye 1988. 13 Hurrell 2007. 244 and 251. please see Milner 1988. In this case. and Sapin 1954. 17 Moravcsik 1998. such the access to state institutions. of a literature that tried to unfold the domestic-international links. and State Actors 6 If one takes for granted that economic factors. In spite of the existence. For an earlier version of this argument.10 the most substantial contribution to the field emerged in the end of the 1980s.12 However.. particularly changing prices. He argues that this process reflected ―patterns of commercial advantage. with Putnam‘s two set level game metaphor. mainly through Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). what prevail are economic interests. however. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. 29.
14. 23. The former corresponds to the market. less vulnerable to critical junctures and. in accounting for domestic politics. and information asymmetries. there is still no consensus on how to define relevant domestic factors. Civil Society. Their overlap corresponds to the political arena. Firstly. I propose the division of society—in both domestic and international levels—into two major fields: an arena of production and other of association. and State Actors 7 case took place during a time of predominance of an economic paradigm—Keynesianism— and in a region of the world that is the part of the core of the system.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.19 Finally. Nonetheless. it is logic to hypothesize that identity issues play a role in the process of transfer of power among economic societal actors. Pluralism offers a comprehensive and relatively parsimonious account of the links between preference formation and decision-making in foreign policy. Therefore. and information does not have a clear theory of the international environment. Such hypothesis reiterates the argument that those actors cannot be conceived only in economic terms. such as firms and sectors. which in the domestic realm needs a fourth arena to coordinate redistribution and regulate the exchange domesticinternational: the state-as-government. in focusing on price variations. whereas the latter is civil society. institutional constraints. likely to face more stability.. where identities are reproduced and discourses of appropriation of the social world are consolidated. For analytical purposes. Ibid. Nonetheless. thus. such accomplishments do not eliminate the pitfalls of that approach. Insofar as neither in market nor in civil society actors 18 19 Moravcsik 1993. therefore. institutions. where commoditised flows and monetary accumulation talks place. those actors could be equated to interest groups. being. pluralism that focuses on markets. That said. but also in what concerns identities.18 Secondly. the links between grassroots movements in non-economic issues and economic foreign policy still have to be better explored in analytical terms. in order to conceive them in flux. .
and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. given the pattern of state-as-government‘s dominance over societal actors. he considers preferences and actors as stable.. in his analysis of European integration. 18. Historical-Sociological works and Neo-Marxist ones.‖21 However. . they turn to the state-as-government. and State Actors 8 always reach a consensus on how production should be appropriated and association should be organized. state-centric approaches could suffice to explain national preferences in periods without significant transformations. there is no notice that the empirical cases were located in the periphery or semi-periphery of the world-system. Other works already consider civil society as an analytical unit that interacts with the state and the market. In his own words. not 20 21 Moravcsik 1998. are within civil society too and have access to the state-as-government.20 Also. which assumes a redistributive role in both material and identity terms. Such a fact is enough to argue for the pursuit of analytical models that fit better in non-Western societies. Furthermore. Civil Society. For instance. leaving aside the possibility that the co-relation between economic and identity power might be in flux. ―…European integration can best be explained as series of rational choices made by national leaders. 22. and tertiary (services). It means that sectors traditionally conceived only in economic terms.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. the relative power of each state in the international system. In those societies. Ibid. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents. as long as Moravcsik aims to explain policy outcomes—something that by now does not exist in the Doha Round—. secondary (industry). such as primary (raw materials). he establishes clear links among actors in domestic and international levels. despite the fact that Moravcsik and others had already explored the linkages domesticinternational under Pluralist lenses. Moravcsik uses the word civil society to describe the place where all interest groups—either economic or non-economic—are located.
however. 25 Krasner 1978. and Taliaferro 2009. a factor that does not suffice to explain Brazil‘s and India‘s cases due to the same reasons domestic pluralism does not either. in turn. when they consider the domestic arena. implies in distinct interests from political actors. For Neo-Marxists. seem to provide a good account of this dynamic. systemic trends ultimately prevail. insofar as it addresses how one hegemon establishes dominance not only through material capabilities. 24 Lobell. 25. That is.24 also leaves aside civil society as an arena relatively autonomous from economic interests and where non-economic interests arise. Ripsman. 13. there is Gilpin 1981. Nonetheless. Such a critique is further elaborated ahead. Marxist approaches.22 Brooks and Wohlforth consider that. which tries to integrate both systemic and unit-level variables. Among these categories. 98. ideas and norms have a role in processes of change and continuity in both domestic and systemic terms. and State Actors 9 to mention the Realist tradition with a clear theory of the state. but also in entailing common values that holds the units of the international system together. 208. economy became disentangled from the political arena.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. 27 Gramsci 1971. Brooks and Wohlforth 2008. which is considered an extension of the bourgeoisie power. 26 Arrighi 1993.26 This is a Neo-Marxist approach. 22 23 Among the major works of this tradition. and Krasner 1978. there is civil society. such as political parties and those located within the state and economic ones23. In following State-Centric Realist premises. under capitalist markets. Arrighi‘s account of successive worldhegemonies advances this question. also tend to focus on the state.25 Only class identity is taken into account.‖27 serving as the locus of resistance and legitimation of the system through informal norms and collective actors. Neoclassical Realism. . which. which stands ―[b]etween the economic structure and the state with its legislation and its coercion. Civil Society. which is based upon analytical categories defined by Gramsci to overcome the materialist excesses of original Marxism. they do not mention if a relative detachment from the political arena happened with the arena of association.
Constructivism and other approaches that emphasize ―processes of socialisation‖— among which I include the Historical-Sociological literature—have analytical elements to understand the interplay between economic and non-economic issues. Civil Society. lies in the fact that it is still unclear how ―rump materialism‖ interacts with socially-built beliefs. 31 Drulák 2006. Furthermore. those approaches cannot explain how ideas interact with material factors. please read Copeland 2006. 160. 173.31 Under this account. systemic accounts would predict a further liberalisation than actually happened and. Actors.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. There is ―rump materialism‖. but it leaves aside identity issues as domestic pluralism does. Those accounts only say why that interaction happens: material-identity exchange is a matter of fact because we live in a socially constructed world. International Political Economy. could attain analytical concerns with non-economic factors. and State Actors 28 10 which complicates the detachment of those trends from local shifts. 30 Wendt 1999. a residual category of elements that. constituting them in a mutual relationship. through acts of social will. This requires theorizing how the Wendtian conceptions of self that states have 28 29 Teschke 2008. in spite of being socially shared. due to the lack of clear units of analysis. In the Brazilian and Indian cases. in spite of the fact that Constructivism sets up processes of change. can. Wendt recognizes that ideas are not ―alone‖ in the social world. which combines the ―…interplay between the power and wealth motive (microlevel) or between international capitalism and its political organization (macro-level)…‖29. . ideational structures have more than a regulative effect on actors‘ behaviour. However. the mechanisms through which they operate remain under-theorized. are not based on culture.30 The problem. 32 For a summary of this argument. 130-1 and 136. change structures. such as geographical and natural factors. Nonetheless. a foreign policy more cooperative with the West. thus. therefore. though. Guzzini 1998.32 What is still missing is how constraints to reframe the world operate even in nonstatic periods. such as reflexivity (social learning).
the how question remains unanswered. the social genesis and maintenance of identity has not been systematized either. does not mean pure power. however. Also. According to Fligstein. to a less extent. . but their analytical units remain fuzzy and with unclear distinctions between the domestic and international realms. 215. either in the institutions or in the agents. 35 Bourdieu 1991. 15. as long as it presupposes that each field composes a set of norms. Furthermore. but specifically to refer to the international 33 34 Bourdieu 1991.‖33 Following other Constructivist works. Moreover. Civil Society.‖34 This. the first author who has applied Bourdieu‘s concept to markets. while a broad conception of international identity explains preference-formation in the analysed cases (a why question). which defines relations between actors within it. Up to date. ―fields contain collective actors who try to produce a system of domination in that space. Mann‘s and Tilly´s Historical-Sociology attempted to do so. In his own words. this is a political-cultural approach. 185. 3. ―[t]he field as a whole is defined as a system of deviations on different levels and nothing. in which the market and the civil society are missed as analytical units. and State Actors 11 are changed. as long as a field is ―…an autonomous universe. Fligstein 2001. Structured as a critique of Neorealism and. the acts or the discourses they produce. a kind of arena in which people play a game which has certain rules. Defining fields in International Relations The concept of fields was created by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.‖35 Mann also employs the term arena in his social theories. by virtue of the interplay of oppositions and distinctions. the lack of clear analytical units generates a contradiction within Constructivism. Constructivism preserves the rationalist state-centrism. to Neoliberalism. has meaning except relationally. but also rules.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. rules which are different from those of the game that is played in the adjacent space. there is no notice of systematic account of Constructivism in economic factors.
Mann never defines it. . However. abstract/theoretical representations of social domains of action—lack clear rules. which. 132. Unlike in the agent-structure dichotomy. but. Civil Society. and the state-as-government as fields that are bounded by conceptions of existence and survival. although suggests that it is a place for competition and conflict—similar to the Bourdieuan idea of fields. For now. there are grey zones. is influenced by relationships of power and norms in contiguous fields and subfields. These identities. the model considers how capital/capabilities (material and social conditions to exercise power) and the interpretation of those capabilities of a given country change vis-à-vis its own constraints and those of the world-system and how those both constraints changed. however. The peripheral areas—which are not necessarily geographical. in an analytical model based on fields the description of both domestic and international arenas is not static. power prevails there. the political arena. 185. In the international 36 37 Hobden 1998. it suffices to say that. Conceptions of existence and of survival set limits to societal action. Those definitions and dynamics will be explored ahead. as happens in illegal activities. Each field37 is a political-cultural construction. societal groups try less to maximise their interests than to survive materially and in terms of identity vis-à-vis each other. Bourdieu 1991. as collective societal actors might be conceived. as the other arenas above described. In each arena. shape national trajectories38 and might be influenced by conceptions that come from outside the domestic realm. More than nothing. expressed in conceptions of existence and survival. in conceiving the market. in turn. not directly legitimized by the state-asgovernment (figure 1).36 The mechanisms which Constructivism misses can be unpacked once the constitution of the fields I defined above and the patterns of relationships among them are clarified. and State Actors 12 realm. the civil society.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. particularly in what concerns the process of reframing fields. located at the periphery of these arenas. 38 Zysman 1994. In this model. as Hobden argues.
33. ranging from state policies to the action of epistemic communities40—frame fields. which is better understood if conceived as a society. composing a dimension of norms that enables different degrees of collective action in productive. associational. given not only by the rules and power distribution within each arena and the connections with societal actors in other fields. These long-term narratives correspond to conceptions of existence and survival. . 39 40 Bull 1995. Civil Society. Figure 1 Fields and transversal subfields/sectors – domestic and international arenas Domestic arena International arena Source: Own elaboration. and redistributive terms.1. 402. Conceptions of existence and conceptions of survival Actors cannot reframe fields as they want.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.39 and are legitimised in the international political arena through acts of consent and power in which hegemons and international organisations play a central role. There are limitations. 3. Finnemore and Sikkink 2001. and State Actors 13 sphere. Long-term narratives—which emerge through multi-causal processes. these conceptions hold together the system. based on Rodrigues Vieira 2010.
44 Rodrigues Vieira 2008. and State Actors 14 Conceptions of existence. 45 Katzenstein. To use Mann‘s definition. those nationalist discourses aimed to incorporate—at least in symbolic terms—into the nation any person who were born in. meaning to societal units of organisation. which eventually set norms of behaviour. and Mehta 2001. 120. Nonetheless. 41 42 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. Both. An example is the discourses on racial democracy44 and on secularism45 which framed ideas about national identity and both social and state action during most of the 20th Century in Brazil and India. however. respectively. it is an ideological power. Among these conceptions. which became its own national creed after the Weimar Republic. such as ethnic groups. 891. conceptions of existence may be replaced by new ones in times of social disruption. These conceptions are always historically structured. Kothari. religions. are what constructivists would call constitutive norms. fictions with real effects. 43 Hobden 1998. as it was the case of Nazism in Germany. Brazil‘s and India‘s territory. In both Brazilian and Indian cases. across history. being more applicable to asynchronic links. no matter their ethnic or religious background. They are meta-paradigms that eventually structure power and rules (regulative norms)42. or suddenly broken apart in revolutionary situations that create tabula rasa contexts. Civil Society. 43 In studies within IR.41 Conceptions of existence tie together different eras based on foundational myths in order to attribute. historical narratives. however. last longer than conceptions of survival because they are less linked to practical issues. The most relevant conception of existence in an IR study is nationalism. there are nationalist discourses. although might be incrementally changed through shifts in the distribution of productive and associational capabilities. Ibid. respectively.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. conceptions of existence are relevant as long as they contribute to bind together societal actors in attributing them a collective identity that conforms and is conformed to micro-identities that emerge from subfields. . in 1930s. philosophies of life.
from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. . For now. those conceptions of existence provided—and. Keynesianism and ISI supported stateinterventionism. For instance. reforms in Brazil and India sought to dismantle the inward-looking development strategy that had been in place since the 1930s.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.46 This is evidence that the change in the mainstream conception of survival in the world economy. As conceptions of survival. stimulating less state-centric solutions. Conceptions of survival structure immediate actions of societal actors through framing patterns of production and association with immediate focus in economic organisation. which does play a role in creating markets and promoting de-regulation. interventionism became fashionable again. In spite of losing relative economic leverage. generating expectations among entrepreneurs on state-relief. Kohli 2009.48 They tend to last for a shorter time and are less stable than conceptions of existence because they are more susceptible to external junctures and have an 46 47 Bresser-Pereira 2009. groups can resist or at least adapt themselves to process of change if they are more linked to mainstream conceptions of existence in the country. to some extent. 48 Polanyi 2001. while Neoliberalism emphasises competition. it suffices to keep on mind that conceptions of existence constrain changes in conceptions of survival even in times of critical junctures. The hypothetical mechanisms through which it happens will be detailed ahead. 47 faced limits in Brazil and India thanks for the conceptions of existence existent in each nation-state and which were more suitable for state interventionism than for economic laissez-faire. in the 1990s. Civil Society. including in material/economic terms as the ISI experience shows. without meaning a smaller role for the state. Hall 1986. If. later in the decade and more clearer in the 2000s. and State Actors 15 Also. still provide— most of the acceptable limits for institutional reforms. Racial Democracy in Brazil and Secularism in India implied in nationally-based projects of development.
For an example of how international organisation‘s projects may be totally unfit for local realities and lack understanding of conceptions of existence and survival. Civil Society. Brazil and India ―resisted‖ to liberalisation until almost 20 years after the first challenges to Keynesianism.50 However. Crises in production.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. such as the international one. An example is the collapse of Keynesianism in the 1970s as both a set of economic ideas and a set of policies for social organisation. In fact. it is not a coincidence that states-as-territories where societal actors within the arena of association and the state as government lack internal cohesiveness and a coherent and legitimate discourse that binds them together are more vulnerable to foreign pressures. 12. to structural-adjustment programs which later revealed to be unfit to local realities. although there is no consensus on that. which opened room for the development of deregulatory policies based on the Neoliberal economic paradigm that had been acquiring respectability among academics in the previous years. That said. as it was the case of just-born African states that in the 1980s onwards were submitted by international organisations. evidence suggests that one can talks about systemic junctures—important facts that cannot be defined a priori— that impacts systemic units up to a point that they face a critical juncture51—as it was the case 49 50 Hall 2010. may require new paradigms that will be converted into policies and. and State Actors 16 immediate character. The literature on historicalinstitutionalism has devoted some attention to achieve a better definition and a better tool to define a critical juncture. So it is inevitable to ask whether these empirical facts challenge the notion of critical juncture as a period of systemic transformation that affects all members of a given system. please see Ferguson 1990. as it is the case of the field of association and the state as government. in turn. for instance.49 On the other hand conceptions of existence are much more dependent on arenas that in which the flows tend to be more national/endogenous-based. 51 Pierson 2004. reframe societal action. .
3. Fields of societal action To employ a Hegelian metaphor. conceptions of existence and survival are the superstructure/constitutive dimension that ―shapes‖/―conforms‖ the ―base. Societal actors organise themselves in subfields that are transversal to each arena. in the presented model. This legitimacy. Due to economic crisis. and redistribution. ultimately corresponds to symbolic 52 Bresser-Pereira 2009. on the coherence and legitimacy of conceptions of existence among the constituencies of a given country. Jenkins 1999. Power. in turn. and the political arena. On the other hand. the civil society. In the domestic arena—or state-as-territory—there is a fourth arena: the state-as-government. the conception of existence is undermined. thus. on the one hand. in current times. first. by three major arenas: production. to the market. derives from the balance of economic and social power within countries. Imbalances. the dominant conception of survival and. Civil Society. I contend that the resilience of conceptions of survival depends. association. both countries embraced liberalisation amid confidence crisis from the international society and deficits in the balance of payments.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.2. These fields exist in both national and transnational levels. undermine. and State Actors 17 of Brazil and India in the beginning of the 1990s. if this conception is not adapted to produce a new balance in productive and associational terms. The ability to have power—hereby defined as the capacity of shaping a given field or fields according to one‘s interests—in any field is given by the leverage of each societal actor in terms of production and association. . this balance impacts the process of continuous legitimation of the conceptions. such as inequality and sudden changes in a given status quo through critical junctures. Another possible outcome is the corruption of the conception to the limit that the society that organises itself upon that same conception can still recognise itself as distinct from others.52 Therefore.‖ the practical realm. respectively correspondent. composed.
and State Actors 18 power—the power to influence the frame and reframe conceptions of existence. See Fligstein 2001. Firstly. the need to conceptualise civil society in transnational terms demands its redefinition.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. 170. which comprises economic and social capital. Also. insofar as there is no authority similar to states to conform it in the international arena. thus. In his framework. This model resembles Gramsci‘s ideas on civil society. . of survival. I define the arena of production. 208. and processes of redistribution in the political arena and within the state as government. I define the state-as-government in a Neo-Weberian fashion. whereas the market corresponds to the economic sphere. It is not enough to have economic leverage without associational power53 and. services and assets. Symbolic capital. the overlapping between both corresponds to the arena of redistribution. Finally. in the proposed framework. 55 Gramsci 1971. the market and the state. Nonetheless. is equal to power under this equation. I frame the discussion on the literature on IR that seeks somehow to integrate the domestic and 53 54 As suggested by Bourdieu 1991. which can be defined as the arena where individuals and firms exchange goods. followed by a discussion on the arena of association. thus. civil society does not stand between the market and the state: it is a distinctive arena. It has an autonomous dynamic that eventually contributes to its legitimation and to the legitimation of the entire domestic arena: what happens in the market also contributes to the formation of conceptions of existence and survival and. where political disputes take place in both domestic and international arenas. without linkages with the prevailing conceptions of existence and survival in a given country. to overall legitimation. In all steps. therefore. As mentioned before. Civil Society. 54 the civil society serves as the locus of resistance and legitimation of the system55 through informal norms and collective actors (which I have been calling societal groups) that operate based on those norms.
challenging the existence of universal rational behaviour in economics and the Neoclassical view that predicts convergence in market organisations as a result of the pursuit for efficiency. such as the case of Brazil and India.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. production precedes to the formation of the interstate system. Civil Society. as mentioned before. With the development of capitalism and multiplication of economic actors. and 3) more than maximisation of 56 57 North 1981. especially in what concerns the ultimate focus of this thesis— formulation of economic foreign policy. in some cases. however. exclusive markets abroad through colonisation. the field of production gained leverage vis-à-vis the state as government. The creation of nation-states and their consolidation enhanced further the development of production as long as they established markets through institutions with the aim to reduce transaction costs56. 58 Ibid. . In fact. such as a common currency. Its roots—which can be found on medieval trade networks—precede the formation of the state-system. with commercial exchanges among Europe. economic sociologists imply that 1) markets are political-cultural creations. Markets have already been conceptualised as fields. 59 Granovetter 1985. The trend. Fligstein 2001. and State Actors 19 international realms.58 2) they are embedded in other social relationships. 68. Asia. Arena of production: The contemporaneous capitalist market corresponds to the arena of production in both domestic and international scales. 57 In conceiving markets as fields. was that economic actors were subordinated to state-based projects even when colonisation enterprises guaranteed significant freedom for private actors.59 such as the ones that seek redistribution (politics) and association (civil society). it is more evident than in the core of the system. and North Africa. and conquered. In the cases of colonised countries.
60 and try to use the state to keep and develop rules and policies to attain such a goal. Frieden and Rogowski demonstrate that. 67-68. when ―[u]nstable supplies and prices can upset the general functioning of the economy and strain on the political system.64 Domestic Pluralism sides more with the profit-maximizing rationale. in spite of the prospective expansion of exports of primary goods with the openness of agricultural markets. seek stability in order to survive. however. whereas groups in the domestic arena attempt to organise economic relations to increase their relative share in the national surplus. An example is the Realist tradition that recognizes the role of economic factors in IR. 39. 70. particularly firms. 64 Narlikar 2010. IR scholarship that seeks to integrate market actors and factors to explain transnational links has. of its relations with actors based within other fields. . a more restricted view of the market and.‖63 It could explain why Brazil. in his study of U. particularly those in the state-as-government. Krasner. 21. identifies that such supply is important not only for military purposes. Civil Society. does not defend the profit-maximising principle. actors. Gilpin 1975. government‘s role in the supply of raw materials for the American economy. but also in times of peace. although some authors within this tradition provide a clearer account of the interactions between actors in production and the state. therefore. a reciprocal relationship between economics and politics:61 economic factors influence state behaviour and changes in the political arena. For instance.62 Other Realists. during most of the negotiations at the Doha Round. to make further concessions in industrial tariffs. 62 Gilpin 1981. and State Actors 20 profits. there is a trend that sectors whose production and profits increase will support further openness in 60 61 Fligstein 2001. at least in the modern world. with liberalisation. 63 Krasner 1978. in general. Gilpin considers that there is.S.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. resisted. emphasising the idea of stability that the market-asfields approach defends.
such as Wallerstein‘s world-systems. 29. it is the field where both individual and collective actors gather in groups to claim for participation in the outcomes of production and for a given pattern of redistribution. whereas the increase in economic leverage is likely to correspond to an increase of political power. beneficiaries of a process of change in economy will try to deepen it through political means.68 although at least they work with the concept of civil society. These claims may happen indirectly. In this process. Rogowski 1989.66 a process that will be further discussed ahead. Milner 1988. through the structuration of new conceptions of existence and survival with the aim to replace 65 66 Frieden and Rogowski 1996. For him. eventually the dominant class captures the state to make it work on its behalf. in considering the system as the unit of analysis. Neo-Marxists face the same limitation. and State Actors 21 economy. whereas segments harmed by the process will seek protection from the state. systemic Structural-Marxist theories. In bringing politics into market. 15. Therefore. Rogowski takes a step towards an institutional approach. this approach misses the dynamics of change that may emerge within countries and empower them. 173. suffices in explaining overall patterns of integration of the periphery into the world economy. as state-as-government is conceptualised. Marxism in IR considers that struggle of classes is at the centre in the dispute for power in the market.65 This happens because. 67 Wallerstein 2007 68 Teschke 2008.67 However. Civil Society. even when a government keeps the national economy relatively closed.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. the departing point to overcome economic-centred accounts of the links between societal actors and the state. the shifts in income will be translated into disputes to influence the policy-making. a facilitation of trade thanks for technological changes (such as in transportation) impact domestic economies. An example can be the increasing influence of the agricultural sector over Brazilian government after the liberalisation. . Arena of association: known in current times as civil society. In transnational terms.
. As in the arena of production. arising from non-economic patterns of interaction. between 1930 and 1950. these patterns of association were linked to forms of political power. such as the Catholic Church in Western Europe during the Middle Age. the autonomy from the state is not constant. It is notorious that authoritarian regimes reframe. such as religions and ethnic groups. Also. with the atomisation of individuals. the arena of association already existed. It happened in Latin American corporatist states. although was not analytically relevant. Those groups are not necessarily derived from production relationships.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. composing part of the arena of association. With the expansion of civil and political rights. 221. even when countries followed primarily the logic of sovereignty and controlled its population strictly to extract resources for war. such as Getúlio Vargas´s presidency in Brazil (1930-1945). Within Social Sciences. and State Actors 22 the dominant ones. such as the ones based on religion and ethnicity. as it is argued 69 70 Diamond 1999. there are conceptions of existence. societal actors within the arena gained more freedom to organise themselves. Nonetheless. Rodrigues Vieira 2008. the fact that these arenas that initially were polities does not exclude other: those patterns of association remained as historical legacies or were re-elaborated through conceptions of existence that compete with national identities. co-optation of civil society may also happen due to its disintegration. However.69 Among those set of values. the organisation of civil society to back their policies. Civil Society. the basic constitutive elements of the arena of association precede the formation of the international system. In most cases. given the low degree of freedom of its members. there were transnational identities. Prior to the state system. civil society—as an analytical unit—usually corresponds to the space of social life open and autonomous from the state and in which actors share a set of values that enable them to act collectively.70 Likewise. through the state apparatus. when labour unions could only operate as extensions of authoritarian regimes.
302. The theoretical roots of this relationship lies in Toqueville´s Democracy in America. Thus it is not possible to precisely talk about social capital of a society.73 Bourdieu. a ‗credential‘ which entitles them to credit. as one defines the economic capital of a firm or an economic sector. Toqueville‘s notion of civil society can be left aside if on assumes that trust is 71 72 Tocqueville 1835. ―[s]ocial capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition … which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital. According to him. I assume that a societal actor‘s social capital is high if the most important identities it is attached to are entrenched with the predominant conceptions of existence and survival in the country where the actor is based. nonetheless. Usually the degree of autonomy of civil society is co-related to the degree of democracy. 173.72 Putnam expanded this concept. . trust and the density of networks among societal actors in order to develop co-ordinated actions. 74 Bourdieu 1986. as factors of high social capital.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. offers a different definition of social capital. political theorists and social scientists enriched the idea of civil society with the concept of social capital. Coleman 1990. more useful as a theoretical tool to understand interactions within the arena of association. this kind of capital corresponds to norms and expectations related to economic activities that do not arise from strict economic patterns.‖74 Considering this last definition. but only of the social capital of each of its groups. which establishes a causal link between independent/autonomous association among people and the strength of democracy and government accountability. According to Coleman. Furthermore. 73 Putnam 1993. and State Actors 23 to have happened in the interwar period in Germany with social disruption and the rise of Nazism. Civil Society. including. 71 Later.
Arena of redistribution: The combination of societal groups‘ capabilities in production and association is directed correspondent to their potential strength (capital) in the arena of redistribution. . and State Actors 24 not the most important factor for social cohesiveness.75 This separation makes evident the existence of noneconomic factors and its influence over public policies—including international economic negotiations—whose main target is the production becomes more evident. Thus. what enables a societal actor to defend its standpoint. is that political disputes always impact power distribution. According to him. it is worth to bring in Bourdieu‘s expanded definition of this kind of capital. I argue that the essence of politics is redistribution.76 In this context. therefore going beyond economic and organisational strength based on rational-choice assumptions. the political arena. Civil Society.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. as well as their impact in policy-making. of whatever kind. The key to persuade constituencies and hold power—in either democratic or non-democratic regimes— lies in having some degree of symbolic capital. when it is perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the 75 76 The classic statement on this conception of interest groups comes from Olson 1971. although in social science this concept is often associated to left-wing parties. Analytically. there is a gain to separate association from production rather than fusing both concepts in a wider definition of interest groups that includes social capital. Bourdieu 1986. It can be enhanced from the state-asgovernment or through redistributive arrangements. in spite of the fact that a power-holder hardly assumes that is working on the expansion of inequality. The fact. however. Now it is needed to mention a caveat about the separation of the social space of a country into three distinct arenas. shifts in non-economic arrangements are better recognisable. Reification of production and association through the static notion of interest groups ignore these dynamics. symbolic capital is ―…nothing other than capital. that is.
‖78 With this capital.‖77 The field of production of symbolic power was never well defined by Bourdieu. 80 Bourdieu 1991. Civil Society. is that power is essentially symbolic. This combined capital can be converted into political capital with aims to influence or control the state-as-government. 79 Hobden 1998. Likewise. 238. Symbolic power matters because redistribution gains legitimacy according to conceptions of existence and survival. the more likely it is to gain economic and associational leverage.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. is capital. on the one hand. 121.80 In fact. and State Actors 25 incorporation of the structure of its distribution. however. in so far as its credit and credibility.‖79 which includes the legitimation of conceptions of existence and survival through the state. is a form of symbolic capital and ―…the product of subjective acts of recognition and. insofar as it creates the social world. The more a societal group buys into dominant conceptions of existence and survival. says Bourdieu. That is. The obvious point one can derive from his theoretical framework. the more a group improves its position in productive and associational terms. Ibid. which has an economic (productive) and social (identity) dimension. 192. . and to the distribution of power/capabilities in association and productive terms.. under this logic. exists only in and through representation. and redistribution. because they have the power to mobilise.190. Political capital. Bourdieu‘s concept of struggle over representation and identity—particularly in ethnic and 77 78 Bourdieu 1991. although not necessarily it will convert its economic-social capital into political power. here. production. in and through trust. The currency for power. actual symbolic power derives from the combination of strength in association. are essential. the larger is its ability to influence patterns of redistribution. Ideas. one can have access to the ―centralised regulation of social relations. belief and obedience.
81 These processes aim to bring societal actors into the state-as-government to either control or influence it. these societal actors may move from the arena of production—as it is the case of firms—and from the arena of association—as it is the case of labour unions and business associations—to use their power and defend a given pattern of redistribution. Kothari. 84 Ross-Schneider 2009. therefore.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. labour unions. it is worth mentioning that. appropriation and redistribution that compose the domestic arena. which establishes a symbolic and territorial domain over the parts of the arenas of production.. All states-as-territories have a state-as-government. aristocracy. such as social movements83 or even family-controlled firms. This last case deserves a point of clarification: some actors usually conceived as interest groups. or even large firms are not essentially located in the political arena.84 to link societal actors in the arena of redistribution with the state-as-government. For instance. the institutional design of the political arena varies from country to country. although it varies in 81 82 Ibid. . 221. and interest groups. specifically in the case of Brazil and India. and State Actors 26 regional terms—is twofold: involves mental images and social demonstrations that manipulate those images. there are political parties. Nonetheless. to impact public policies. 83 Gowda and Sridharan 2007. For the Brazilian case.82 although need to be complemented by other subfields. It is the case in Brazil and India. where political parties are now stable. and. Before the advent of democracy. please see Katzenstein. please read Power 2010. since the end of the 1970s at least there is a fourth relevant actor that transits constantly between civil society and the political arena: social movements. and Mehta 2001. under representative democracy. Civil Society. state-society councils. redistribution operated mainly through other means besides what is known as politics. oligarchy—all of which may have residual effects even up to nowadays. Also. As in any other field. such as business associations. such as war. State-as-government: it is also a field. rent-seeking. On India.
have no political appointees but the head of ministry. especially in federal systems. despite their bureaucratisation. 89 King and Lieberman 2009. On Brazil.90 a reaction to the theoretical models that emphasised domestic pluralism and 85 86 King and Lieberman 2009. the fact is that the state. remain partially subjected to rentseeking. Evans 1995. who is selected by the head of government. such as the Brazilian and the Indian.89 These notions on the Brazilian and Indian states are affiliated to the Neo-Weberian tradition. 87 On India. Also. 547–88. according to the literature on the topic. .87 bureaucracies with more autonomy and internal coherence than most of both Brazilian and Indian states. please read Narlikar 2008. They have multidimensional functions and tools. 90 The most famous work on this is Evans. however. it is the Ministry of Foreign Relations (known as Itamaraty). 88 In fact. Both are. remains as a strong gatekeeper for societal demands. stateness is a negotiated process with domestic actors. and Skocpol 1985. Rueschemeyer. Brazil and India are seen as inchoate states. Kohli 2004. through the ministry. please see Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007. Itamaraty and MoC for instance. as mentioned in the introduction. In the case of Brazil. states-as-government are not necessarily unique entities. the most relevant section of the state-asgovernment is the one that is responsible for international trade negotiations. 277. such as the qualification of professionals as well as their commitment to work. 88 Narlikar 2008.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. Civil Society. has linkages with internal societal actors.86 As far as this work is concerned. which. 558. and State Actors 27 terms of institutional design and linkages between the sections of the other arenas that are part of either the domestic or international realm. That said.85 It may have specific bureaucracies (clusters) that are more effective in designing and implementing public policies than others thanks for specific institutional characteristics. with complete internal coherence. MoC. whereas in India the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoC) designs the strategies at the WTO. In the literature on states in the developing world. from firms to business groups.
The goals sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of private desires. what actually matters is state power. 139. it is restricted to FPA. Thirdly. For this. but rather a unit with some degree of autonomy from other societal actors.94 As Krasner summarises. Secondly. Civil Society.92 Historical-Sociology has analytical tools to connect Neo-Weberianism with IR through Realism. it still faces at least five problems. . and Taliaferro 2009. ―a statist paradigm views the state as an autonomous actor. please read Hobden‘s (1998. its structure defines what is national interest and power. insofar as it has no understanding of the market and the civil society. 91 92 An example of such approach is Risse-Kappen 1995. First of all. 95 Krasner 1978. Ripsman.91 Unlike in the Marxist models.93 Insofar as the state—conceived as an autonomous actor—formulates foreign policy. in doing so. 9 and 187. 93) analysis of Theda Skocpol‘s States and Social Revolutions. These objectives can be called appropriately the national interest. Historical-Sociology disagrees with anarchical systemic assumptions. Lastly. as long as it ―…builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of Neorealism about the constraints of the international system. and State Actors 28 interdependence based on non-state actors. as a consequence. as in domestic pluralism. 5-6. it cannot clearly explain challenges to the state from non-state actors. rather than putting state decisions into a bigger picture in times of change. under NeoWeberianism the state is not a product of class relations. but overlaps with State-Centred Realist accounts on how the state-as-government interacts with societal actors in both domestic and international level. it still offers no account of the mechanics of the relationships within the state and the nation-state.‖96 However. it overemphasizes security issues over economic ones. the role of identities that emerge from civil society remains untheorised. 13. 96 Lobell.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.97 Fourthly. 94 Zakaria 1998. 97 The principles of this approach can be found at Moravcsik 1997.‖95 Neoclassical Realism tries to integrate these assumptions to systemic dynamics. 93 Hobden 1998. Thus.
the outcome depends on steps B and C. and C) changes in redistribution to changes in public policies. while grasping causal mechanisms of change. which encompass both the independent (distribution of economic and social capital among societal actors) and the intervening (access of societal actors to bureaucracy. Thanks for the more openness of economic than of non-commoditized flows. Simmons and Elkins argue that choices for picking up liberalising economic foreign policy tools ―…are influenced by the choices of other governments as much as they are by .3. However. a caveat is necessary. leads to changes in foreign policy (the dependent variable). Interactions among fields The theoretical gain in conceiving social arenas as fields lies in the fact that they allow us to make macro and micro analysis of social processes depending on the research focus. A systemic factor (an international juncture) is always the contextual variable that. as well as its internal organisation) variables of the model. This model is potentially applicable to explain shifts in power in the international system unless the analysed state is a hegemon. the extent to which conceptions of survival in the domestic scale adapt themselves to the international one is given by the conceptions of existence and if they are linked to the strongest sectors in both production and associational arenas. with historical legacies manifested through conceptions of existence. However. conceptions of survival are more likely to be challenged than conceptions of existence. All these movements impact conceptions of existence and survival. Civil Society. Movement A: The international-domestic movement happens when new conceptions of existence and/or survival emerge and gain predominance in the international arena. and State Actors 29 3. For analytical purposes. B) domestic changes in production and association to domestic changes in redistribution. Before detailing each movement.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. I define three basic movements in the interaction between the arenas: A) international junctures to domestic changes in production and association.
Otherwise. embeddedness Source: Own elaboration A civil society committed to the predominant conceptions of existence and survival.g. compose the core of what I 98 99 Simmons and Elkins 2004. Ibid. Figure 2 Movement A: Interaction conception of survival and sovereignty/intl. has a civil society deeply linked to the conception of existence that is dominant. especially in those of countries that are culturally-similar.‖98 As the proportion of countries that adopt a given policy— in this case liberalisation—increases. the reputational costs of being attached to ―oldfashioned‖ conceptions of survival increase as well. . Figure 2 exemplifies this process in a critical juncture. 236. however.: ethnicity and religion) correspondent to conceptions of existence that dispute primacy with national ideals. such an outcome is less likely to happen if the arena of association is pervaded by strong transnational links (e.. According to him. 176. 172. there is a learning process based on other experiences.99 This ideational side of economic reform dovetails with Bourdieu‘s account of how the social world is built.‖100 If a country. ―…the structuring principles of the world view are rooted in the objective structures of the social world and because the relations of power are also present in people‘s minds in the form of the categories of perception of those relations. as well as an economy that is not sensitive to exogenous shocks.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. Also. 100 Bourdieu 1991. the harder it will be to accept international junctures without local adaptation. and State Actors 30 exogenously given domestic institutions or preferences that can be traced back to domestic political or economic structures. Civil Society.
Therefore. considering that economic capital ―…is at the root of all the other types of capital‖102. as contemporaneous global civil society theorists argue in the naïve claim that opposes social movements and non-governmental organisations to capitalists. the ability of a domestic arena to control exogenous influences. From these assumptions. I derive proposition 1: The higher the degree of sovereignty and international embeddedness of a state. shifts in income will be translated into disputes to influence policy-making. a high degree of embeddedness in the international system enables a country to potentially benefit from the exchange with other systemic units. distribution of associational power is likely to change as well in such a context. therefore. Production is not in opposition to association.101 Therefore. however. and State Actors 31 call sovereignty. Movement B: Changes in conceptions of survival originated in hegemonic poles—at it was the case with Neoliberalism—matter because they impact prices through economic liberalisation. The means through which these disputes take place and their 101 102 Here I follow Bull 1995 definition of international society. This is linked to the aforementioned domestic pluralist arguments that seek to integrate domestic and international arenas.103 All sectors/subfields/societal groups have an economic and an identity dimension. what is impossible for any member of the international society. the higher the possibility that it will adapt itself to emerging conceptions of survival in the international arena and keep credibility in the international society amid autonomy. . 103 An example of this account is Smith 2008. the world-wide distribution of power (capital) in the arena of production. The links between changing prices and politics were already explored by Rogowski. And. Civil Society. would demand autarchy.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. Total sovereignty. Bourdieu 1986. His conclusions imply that beneficiaries of a process of change in economy will try to deepen it through political means. the increase in economic leverage is likely to correspond to an increase of political power. Also.
however.. have three roles: 1) blocking price signals from the foreign markets that may produce realignments in the domestic arena. such as economic and social. . it is not the only factor that determines the leverage of a societal actor vis-à-vis others in the internal arena. and 3) undermining the control of government over macropolicy. 107 Bourdieu 1991. and 3) channelling political responses to changing prices. The position of a given societal actor. Information also matters in explaining outcomes in both negotiation and interest formation processes. Civil Society. Furthermore. cannot be taken for granted in states such as the Brazilian and the Indian ones. 106 Ibid.104 In any of these contexts. in turn. political institutions.107 It means that groups that have production and associational 104 105 Keohane and Milner 1996. 244. 20. Such divide. 2) triggering domestic economic and political crises. 2) freezing coalitions and policies. 251. and State Actors 32 consequences depends on the structure of state and society liberalisation finds and reshapes. where foreign policy making is centralised in the hands of the head of government and a stable bureaucratic body.. Milner and Keohane consider that there are three major pathways through which international economic changes affect the domestic arena: 1) creation of policy preferences and coalition. as long as policy-formation depends on interest convergence within different branches of government. if economic capital has primacy over other manifestations of power. Milner argues.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.105 All these facts mean that different domestic institutions give rise to distinct patterns of liberalisation. says Bourdieu.106 Generally the executive power tends to have more information about relevant issues for negotiations than the legislative and the electorate. depends on the position it occupies in different fields in terms of power that is reflected in different kinds of capital. 231. Institutions. as asymmetries creates inefficiencies and political advantages. should not only be employed as an analytical category in state-society relations. Ibid. but also within the state itself.
Snyder 1991. and Sudarshan 2007. please read Zysman 1994. such as the European ones. as it is in the US. 111 For trajectories of development. 148. These are relevant differences from the empirical cases from which liberal theorists derived their conclusions. Sectors traditionally conceived as purely economic are in fact transversal: they hold positions in associational terms as well. . For instance. export-led agriculture remains dominant in regions where values of complex urban societies have not arrived yet.111 The degree of adaptability of a sector to changes in the conception of survival depends on its attachment to identities linked to the conception of existence (figure 3). triggering a national trajectory. Figure 3 Adaptation of a sector in terms of economic and social capital after a juncture Source: Own elaboration 108 109 Kaur. mainly lower-caste Hindus. Civil Society. and State Actors 33 capabilities not strongly linked to the conceptions of existence and survival tend to face more difficulty in striving in a changing context.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. India‘s rice processing industry has workers of different non-economic groups. Gosh. already shaped by the ―iron cage‖ of capitalism.108 In Brazil. different combinations of productive and associational powers are the root of different varieties of capitalism:110 a given conception of survival fuses with the predominant domestic conception of existence. or heterogeneous societies where logrolling led to constrain differences in times of prosperity. 110 Hall and Soskice 2001.109 In fact. Their models were based on homogeneous societies.
Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. which implies in balancing winners and losers in terms of power. . Also. Contemporaneous times offer plenty of examples of how state crisis impact other domestic arenas. Civil Society. An imbalance between both variables can cause a rupture or mistrust between government and societies. Embeddeness and autonomy also affect the level of legitimacy of the state. When 112 113 Evans 1995. even if defined by elites. 277. Originally. A pair of variables defines a state such as this: social embeddedness—its connections with societal actors—and autonomy—its ability to preserve independent interests. 114 Jacobs and King 2009. state has to have a minimum of internal coherence. legitimacy does not arise mainly from redistribution to promote equality or at least to attenuate inequality. 235. which. However. Movement C: the trade-off between a Weberian state and a strong civil society does not seem to be applicable either empirically or theoretically. Legitimacy is conquered based on stability of the overall domestic arena. A strong state is perfectly suitable to a strong civil society and a strong market. are not corporatist. strong linkages to the conception(s) of existence predominant in a given domestic arena. therefore.114 Embeddeness may take place through different means. Unlike authors such as Jacobs and King suggest. Hobson 1997.113 They argue that state strength (at least within specific bureaucracies) results from autonomy from private interests and linkages with society. and State Actors 34 All this leads to proposition 2: an economic sector gains strength amid critical junctures when it is able to absorb innovations that arise from new conceptions of survival while keeping leverage in the arena of association and. which include formal and informal institutions. being the mostly recent the Great Recession in the US. eventually. embeddeness and autonomy were defined by Evans 112 and Hobson. the best adjective here to describe a stateas-government that does not constrain the creative forces of societal actors is not strong. but represent the national interest.
were replaced in power by coalitions that—at least rhetorically—were more aligned with state-centred practices. as Tilly and Hobson among others argue. For instance. however.and even Janata-led governments that went into power after the second half of the 1990s. Civil Society. in India. the comparatively weak administrative capacity of the state has been susceptible to the demands and interests of the financial sector. Originally.g. Fernando Henrique Cardoso‘s PSDB presidency (1995-2003). the empowerment of the state vis-à-vis society happens.115 This legitimacy. first. and State Actors 35 embeddeness fails in terms of representation. A similar process took place in Brazil and India in the 1990s. in the US. due to the extraction of resources. For instance. and. the clashes over health care reform in the US derives at least in part from the fact that it challenges principles that bounds the American national character (e. such conversion depends on the degrees of embeddeness and autonomy of the state-as-government. when liberal reforms in economy had a more ambitious scope in the beginning than in the outcome. mainly through taxation to 115 Ibid. In both cases. after. and. . Socio-economic capital is not always converted into political power. As figure 4 shows. as it is the case of Lula da Silva‘s PT in Brazil and Congress. the state becomes more vulnerable to rentseeking activities and in failing to produce internal stability—even amid lack of redistribution to reduce inequality—loses legitimacy. has to be kept into the boundaries set by conceptions of existence and survival. health has been commoditised in the US since its foundation as a nation and as a market. the governments that conducted the initial phase of institutional reform—in Brazil.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.: a Locke an conception of liberty that implies in a reduced role of the state amid civil society) and the organisation of the economy—unlike in Continental Europe. led to constrain its ambitions to keep partially the nationalist legacy of the ISI years. Narashima Rao‘s Congress-led coalition (1991-1995)—were.
Figure 4 Conversion of economic and symbolic capital into political power Source: Own elaboration All this brings to proposition 3: the ability of powerful actors in economic and associational terms to influence. the state will always seek 116 117 Tilly 1975. Nonetheless. as the ultimate intervening variable that processes a critical juncture. required the improvement of human capabilities. For a discussion on human capabilities and empowerment. as defined by Foucault. Civil Society. in turn. Hobson 1997. This fact leads to proposition 4: the more autonomous a given bureaucracy within the state-as-government. based firstly on class. actors within the state-as-government will have the final word in decision-taking.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. However.116 With the expansion of capitalism. public policies and discourses to legitimise new conceptions of existence and survival or to re-affirm old ones depends on the degree of embeddedness of the state-as-government in the internal arena. Rather than sovereignty. after a juncture.118 The reverse side of this coin is the empowerment of civil society: its actors no longer need the state mediation to organise themselves and to establish linkages abroad. the arena of production gained more autonomy. please read Drèze and Sen 2002. 118 Foucault 2010. states start to employ governmentality—techniques of indirect control of society.117 This led to diversification of interests and society. which have been facilitated thanks for the new technologies of information. and State Actors 36 wage war. the less susceptible to societal demands it will be in taking a decision. concurrent forms of association. which. .
has the final decision on the elaboration of public policies and legitimation of new conceptions of society. the limits to reframe them are not only the co-relation of forces in domestic and international arenas. but also the long-standing conceptions of existence that constrain societal action as a whole in the domestic arena. will be able to resist to changes in the conception of survival. adaptations to shifts in economic organisation also matters insofar as power. insofar as its leverage determines the strength to which a given set of societal actors is attached to the predominant conceptions of existence and. which is always symbolic. therefore. however. societal actors can participate in a more decisive way in the arena of redistribution and influence the state-as-government. Social capital also matters. are employed to constrain new conceptions of society if there is the perceived risk of disruption within the fields of the domestic arena. Old conceptions of existence. it is possible to . However. issues regarding the international context and related to sovereignty and international embeddeness at the time of policy elaboration play a role as well. 4. Conclusion The theoretical gain in conceiving arenas of social action as fields lie in the fact that this analytical tool allows to measure different dimensions of power without reifying sectors that are traditionally conceived as purely economic. As the liberalising experience of Brazil and India suggest at a first glance. which filters the impact of critical junctures posed by new conceptions of survival in the international system. constraining—through modified conceptions of existence and survival—the final preferences chosen as national ones by the state-as-government. in the elaboration of an issue in economic foreign policy.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market. Civil Society. Thus. and State Actors 37 stability within the internal arena and coherence with the dominant domestic conception of existence and conception of survival unless the coalition in power has a reformist program. which. as it is the case in negotiation preferences in WTO. That said. involves productive and associational leverage. nonetheless. With productive and associational power.
it addresses process of systemic change and its impacts in the domestic level and foreign-policy with clear analytical units. in turn. such conception latter is constrained and reframed as long as. in the pursuit of internal stability by societal groups and the state. However. falling. This theoretical framework is clearly ambitious and not parsimonious. can be a theory frame that allows the study of both macro and micro processes. the operationalization of these concepts can hardly be done in large-N research designs. one can consider the development of cross-national datasets to measure all these concepts. However. insofar as there are not cross-country data-sets with ready-hand data to measure production and association and embeddedness and autonomy. That said. fields still unpacks the ―black box‖ of the international system and frames anarchy in units of analysis beyond the nation-state or the state-as-government in a sociological fashion. and State Actors 38 resist to junctures through the mechanisms outlined above up to some point in which liberalisation happens and a new conception of survival wins. If this goal cannot be achieved. given the ad-hoc characteristics that these variables show in each country. the prescriptions the new conception of survival produces winners and losers in economic and social capital. although does not contain a priori a group of hypothesis. such as State-Centred Realism and Domestic Pluralism. After such refinement. the idea of fields can be refined119 through small-N cases that mix quantitative (for transnational flows) and qualitative methods (for internal dynamics. which is less ambitious than the aim of building a general theory of continuity and change in systemic terms and in foreign-policy. . in special for embeddedness and autonomy). Rueschemeyer 2009. fields. 17. Nonetheless. Civil Society. 531. leading. the doors to 119 120 Adcock and Collier 2001.Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market.120 In this case. However. as far as simplicity is concerned. to new indigenous values that arises from the combination with local cultures that translates conceptions of existence. behind more synthetic accounts. as it already happens in economic sociology. Theory frames are analytical tools guide hypothesis formation.
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