This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
FIRE & EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR E&P OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
Prepared By FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT
OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS TH 7 FLOOR, NEW DELHI HOUSE, 27, BARAKHAMBA ROAD, CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI – 110001
OISD publications are prepared for use in the oil and gas industry under Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India. These are the property of Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas and shall not be reproduced or copied and loaned or exhibited to others without written consent from OISD. Though every effort has been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in these documents, OISD hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility for loss or damage resulting from their use. These documents are intended to supplement rather than replace the prevailing statutory requirements.
The oil industry in India is nearly 100 years old. As such a variety of practices have been in vogue because of collaboration/association with different foreign companies and governments. Standardization in design philosophies and operating and maintenance practices at a national level was hardly in existence. This, coupled with feedback from some serious accidents that occurred in the recent past in India and abroad, emphasized the need for the industry to review the existing state of art in designing, operating, and maintaining oil and gas installations. With this in view, Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) was established in 1986 staffed from within the industry in formulating and implementing a series of self regulatory measures aimed at removing obsolescence, standardizing and upgrading the existing standards to ensure safer operations. Accordingly, OISD constituted a number of functional committees comprising of experts nominated by the industry to draw up standards and guidelines on various subjects. The present document on ―Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for E&P Offshore Installations‖ is the first edition of the document prepared by the Functional Committee on ―Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for E&P Offshore Installations". This document is prepared based on the accumulated knowledge and experience of industry members and the various national and international codes and practices. It is expected that the provision of this document will go a long way to improve the safety and reduce fire incidents in Offshore Oil and Gas Industry.
This document will be reviewed periodically for improvements based on the new experiences and better understanding. Suggestions may be addressed to:-
The Coordinator Committee on 'Fire Protection System‘ Oil Industry Safety Directorate th 7 Floor, New Delhi House, 27, Barakhamba Road, Connaught Place, New Delhi – 110001
review and finalization of this document. Mumbai Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Sheikh Shri H. New Delhi _______________________________________________________________________ In addition to the above.S. New Delhi 4 .FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE (First Edition : JANUARY 2011) _______________________________________________________________________ Name Organization _______________________________________________________________________ Convenor Shri P.Taneja Co-coordinator Shri Arshad Hussain Oil Industry Safety Directorate.C. New Delhi Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Engineers India Limited.Bhutda Shri Sanjeev Kapoor Shri Maroof A. Duliajan Members Shri R. S. Narayanan Oil India Limited. New Delhi Oil Industry Safety Directorate. several other experts from industry contributed in the preparation.
0 2.0 9.FIRE & EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR E&P OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS Contents Section 1.0 12.0 11.13 Ship Collision Protection 9.1 Safety system 9.14 Unmanned Platform Floating production facilities design (with respect to fire and explosion protection) Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) design (with respect to fire and explosion protection) Fire and gas detection and control methods 12.10 Emergency power 9.9 Helicopter fueling facilities 9.1 5.3 5.12 Control of spill 9.1 Detection system 12.0 Fire and explosion management philosophy Fire and explosion risk categories Fire and explosion strategies Fire prevention approach Fire and explosion hazard identification Fire and explosion risk management process Functional requirements for fire and explosion risk management Production Installation design (with respect to fire protection) 9.7 Combustible gas detection 9.4 6.8 Bulk storage 9.0 5.0 5 .2 5.0 7.0 3.0 4.11 Control of ignition 9.5 Fire barriers 9.0 Description Introduction Scope Codes. Standards & Approvals Definitions Fire and explosion management 5.6 Electrical protection 9.2 Equipment arrangement 9.3 Control actions 10.4 Hot surface protection 9.0 8.3 Ignition prevention devices 9.2 Alarm system 12.
7 Kitchen cooking appliances and hood protection 14.2 Foam system 14. 3.13.3 Dry chemical fixed systems 14.4 Dual agent suppression system 14.0 15.2 Emergency communication 18. 10. 5.2 Blow down system Active fire protection 14.0 19. 9. 2. 6.0 17. 4.0 21.1 Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system 13. maintenance and testing Fire prevention Emergency preparedness 18.0 Emergency shut-down and blow-down system 13.4 Emergency lighting Training Product Service Support References 14. Summary of methods of controlling fire Typical Safety Critical Elements Topsides issues during conceptual design stage Recommended number and distribution of portable extinguishers on MODU Typical applications of fire/gas detectors Selection of AFP systems on typical areas Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installation Typical fire integrity requirements for fire barriers Typical fire integrity requirements for load-bearing structures Typical protection criteria for critical equipment Typical description 6 .6 Co2 based system 14. 11.0 18. 7.0 Annexure 1.5 Clean agent system 14.9 Portable fire extinguisher Passive Fire protection Inspection.8 Helideck fire protection 14.1 Fire water system 14.1 Emergency action plan 18.3 Emergency evacuation 18. 8.0 16.0 20.
The requirement of fire fighting facilities. The recommended practices can be applied to new or existing installations: For new installations it shall start during conceptualisation and feasibility studies and be fully developed during detailed design. The results shall then be communicated to personnel operating the installation to ensure that they know the purpose and capability of all the systems. IMO Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 7 . described in the following sections is based on the consideration that the fire fighting services from other sources will not be immediately available.0 Codes. The recommended practices are based on an approach where the selection of control & mitigation measures for fires and explosions is determined by an evaluation of hazards on the offshore installation. The methodologies used in this assessment and the resultant recommendations will differ depending on the complexity of the facility. As per requirements of Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules. Focus should be on following priority: Safety of personnel Protection of the environment Protection of assets / minimization of financial consequences of fires and explosions. Standards & Approvals The latest edition of following codes & standards as applicable shall be followed: NFPA standards SOLAS.e. UK (Fire and Explosion guidelines).0 Introduction Offshore oil gas installations are self contained units and have compact layout. For an existing installation the process shall be applied to current arrangements. These should be assessed to determine if the high level performance standards are achieved and that risks are as low as is reasonably practicable. and the environmental conditions associated with the area of operation. FSA CODE and IMO Resolutions NORSOK Standard Oil &Gas. These types of events should be designed out or very high integrity preventative measures should be provided to minimize the likelihood.Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for E&P Offshore Installations 1. 24 and 27) the operator shall establish a safety management system and shall ensure that risk assessment is carried out. open or enclosed). type of facility (i. 3. which will provide the necessary basis for taking decisions to give due consideration to health. can operate them properly and that adequate maintenance schemes are in place.0 Scope These recommended practices cover the design criteria and minimum requirements of fire protection and mitigation systems to be provided at E&P offshore installations. 2008 (Rules 23. 2. safety and environment. It is impractical to control catastrophic fires. manning levels. and during modifications. The process of evaluation and risk management is key element of safety management system. Usual requirement of an effective fire protection system is to prevent emergencies from developing into major threat to these installations.
Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities The above standards outline the basic requirements of the fire protection equipment and systems. system shall be tested and listed / approved by the approval agencies as a complete operating engineered system. Design. Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms RP 14G . shall not be permitted. escape and rescue (EER): Results of the process that uses information from the evaluation of events. where approved components are available. to determine the measures required to manage these hazardous events and role of these measures 8 . Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production platforms . All systems shall be in place and functional for the life cycle of the installation. Third party approval agencies shall be internationally recognized in the field of Marine fire protection approvals / by the maritime administration.requirements and guidelines (ISO. ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable Assembly point: evacuation alarm. The equipment / systems shall be installed and commissioned by qualified person. Fire and explosion strategy (FES): Results of the process that uses information from the fire and explosion risk assessment.Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type Offshore Production Platforms RP 14J . and severity of fire and explosion hazard scenarios.0 Definitions Active fire protection: Any fire protection system or component which requires the manual or automatic detection of fire and initiation of consequential response. 4. Evacuation. To ensure system integrity. the components shall be built to the recognized international standards. Fire and explosion risk assessment: Analytical study of likelihood. volatile or gaseous fire extinguishing agent that does not leave a residue upon evaporation and meets the requirements given in the latest NFPA 2001 on clean agent fire extinguishing systems. to determine the measures required and the role of these measures. Substitution of alternative components. Pressurised containers wherever installed must have approval from PESO (Petroleum & Explosives Safety Organization) The equipment and system shall be of sustainable and proven technology.Analysis. trained and certified by the manufacturer. which may require EER. All equipment / components / engineered systems supplied shall be as far as possible UL/FM approved. Technical. Where components are supplied not covered by third party approvals. operational and service manuals shall be provided both in hard and soft copies by the manufacturer for all equipment / components / systems supplied. The equipment / components / systems shall be suitable for marine application and should be approved by maritime administration (or third party authorized by the maritime administration) of country of origin. Area where mustering shall take place in the event of general and/or Clean agent: Electrically non-conductive. 1998) UL / FM/ US MIL RP 14C . ISO 13702.
Provide escape to temporary refuge (TR). For medium risk and high risk installations. rather than on prescriptive requirements. and the ability to evacuate to a safe location should not be compromised. TR should provide refuge on the installation for as long as required for evacuation of the installation . from the effects of a fire and explosion event. 5. Safety critical elements (SCE): Such parts of an installation. Likely fire and explosion scenarios have been considered and corresponding accidental loads have been determined. plays an inactive role in the protection of personnel and property from damage by fire and functions independently without requirement of any human. knotted manropes. purpose of which is to prevent. 9 . emergency response. or has been used. means of evacuation should be available at all times. and to shelter safely. Plant and equipment minimises escalation (personnel within the TR do not continue to be threatened by the incident.1 Fire and explosion risk management philosophy The overriding requirements for the fire and explosion risk management philosophy are: Minimize injuries and fatalities from the initial event. ladders. or other devices of approved construction. All large off-site inventories should be isolated during all design fire and explosion events. and the failure of which would cause or contribute substantially to major fire and explosion incident. Offshore installation: A mobile or fixed installation including any pipeline attached thereto. while standing or stationed in relevant waters with a view to explore or exploit petroleum and natural gas. Protect personnel in the TR. Personnel are able to escape to a safe location. the performance based approach presents a more specific prediction of potential fire and explosion hazards for a given system or process. Ability of personnel to escape from. blow down or other means).2 Fire and explosion risk categories Complexity in the fire and explosion risk management process shall be based on the risk level. mechanical or other intervention to initiate consequential response. which is or is to be. 5.0 Fire and explosion risk management The fire and explosion risk management shall start very early in the design stage and shall be used as basis for hazards management during all life cycle stages of an installation. one escape route to the TR should remain functional at all times. Solutions are supported by a fire and explosion hazard identification and risk assessment. 5. for a predetermined period. away from the hazard. Passive fire protection : Any fire protection system or component which by it‘s inherent nature. for low risk installations. and evacuation preplanning are undertaken. until such time as the hazard has dissipated to a safe level via shutdown. This approach provides solutions. Prescriptive design against the fire and explosion hazards can be an acceptable alternative. based on performance. The philosophy shall ensure that: The hazard scenarios are addressed. TR and its supports should be compatible and maintain their integrity during all design fire and explosion events. passages of non-combustible construction or portable flexible ladders. Temporary refuge (TR): Place provided where personnel can take refuge.Provide other means of escape / evacuation. or limit the effect of fire and explosion incident. Should: Indicates that requirement is recommendatory as per good engineering practices.Means of escape: Fixed stairways. Shall: Indicates provisions that are mandatory in nature. at the same time as investigations. This method is based on standardized guidance or requirements based on industry practices. measured against the chosen performance standards.
there are a wide range of issues which should be considered to ensure that the measures selected are capable of performing their function when required to do so. reliability and availability of the system. utilities and control areas which are located on a separate structure. required to manage these hazards. Where there is doubt regarding the category. This may typically be characterized by a bridge connected process. The level of detail in the strategy will vary. necessitating permanent manning but with low escalation potential to quarters. a medium consequence installation may be a processing platform. utilities. escape and rescue strategy (EERS) The production and manning philosophy Human factors. The identification of safety critical elements (SCEs) and corresponding performance standards. The equipment count would probably be low. For the FES. radiation levels are predicted to be relatively low and immediate and delayed consequences are also low. The survivability of the system under the emergency conditions which may be present when it is required to operate. A medium risk (consequences) installation would be typically a platform or compartment. In developing functional requirements. where the congestion and confinement exceeds that defined for the low consequence case.Determining installation risk category: Low risk (consequences) installation examples are. whenever there is a change to the installation. and For setting performance standards by identification of safety critical elements and their functional requirements. into which an installation should fall. personnel and procedures. The dependency on other systems which may not be available in an emergency. the following should be considered: The functional requirements of the particular system. 5. which may affect the management of the fire and explosion hazardous events. A high risk (consequences) installation would encompass remaining installations and compartments where there is significant processing on board leading to significant congestion and potential confinement with populated areas. The fire and explosion strategies should describe the role and functional requirements for each of the systems required to manage possible hazardous events on the installation. depending on the scale of the installation and the stage in the installation life cycle when the risk management process is undertaken. it is recommended that the category with next higher consequence / likelihood shall be used. living quarter and well platform (with or without rig) or installation with quarters on the same structure as the process. where the overpressure level is predicted to be relatively low.3 Fire and explosion strategies Fire and explosion strategies are developed to manage each fire and explosion hazards: To identify plant / equipment. This should be a statement of the purpose and essential duties that the system is expected to perform. The integrity. Alternatively. 10 . In developing the fire and explosion strategies (FES). these issues include: Initiating events which may lead to fire and explosion The nature of the fires and explosions which may occur The risks of fires and explosions The marine environment The nature of the fluids to be handled The anticipated ambient conditions The temperature and pressure of fluids to be handled The quantities of flammable materials to be processed and stored The amount. complexity and layout of equipment on the installation The location of the installation with respect to external assistance/support The evacuation. Fire and explosion strategies (FES) shall be updated.
in order of priority are: Prevent or minimise fires at source Detect fires early Control fires Mitigate against effect of fires The following steps are typically involved 1. duration.assess the fire risk. The fire and explosion hazards may be identified by formal processes such as: Hazard identification studies (HAZIDs) Hazard and operability reviews (HAZOPs) Layout review / hazardous area review Safety studies like FRA. the steps of the fire and explosion strategy. Prevent or minimize fires at source Methods for prevention or minimization of fires at source considered at design stage are: Minimise inventories Optimise layout Minimise the potential for loss of containment events Minimise the time to ESD and blow down Minimise ignition sources Providing an inert environment On existing installations. Methods of detection include gas detection and fire detection. Fire and explosion risk assessment includes . reduces complexity and requirement for human intervention. it may be possible to identify ways of reducing the risks through changes in operational practices. reliability or availability. the evaluation of these events may be part of an overall installation evaluation or may be treated as a separate process which provides information for the overall evaluation.should demonstrate that FES fulfils the requirements of Rule 77 (main safety functions) of Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules. 5. 2. Control fires The control methods commonly used for offshore are tabulated in Annexure -1. EERA etc 11 . 4. 2008. Detect fires early Fires that have not been prevented should be detected and then controlled to reduce the size. The performance standard should define the item‘s functionality. 6. Inherently safe design approach.0 Fire and explosion hazard identification The starting point for risk assessment is the systematic identification of the hazards and effects which may arise from offshore activities. assess the explosion risk and manage accordingly. 3. survivability and measures of interaction with other safety systems. In the context of fires and explosions. and escalation potential of the fire. resulting in a simpler and robust system.4 Fire prevention approach When fire hazard cannot be eliminated by inherently safer design. Mitigate against effect of fires Mitigating measures for fires are passive fire protection methods and active fire protection methods.
e. Basic steps in fire and explosion risk management process are: 1. Based on the selected concept. reduction of the probability of occurrence).Fire and explosion hazard sources can be: Reservoir hazard: direct release from the reservoir may occur due to well intervention during drilling or work-over operations. There may be overlaps and iterations between the various stages of the design. Typical fire and explosion events Pool fire (combustion of a flammable liquid pool) Jet fire (combustion of high pressure gas or liquid) Spray fire (combustion of a pressurized liquid release) 12 2. to acquire an extensive understanding of potential hazards. detection. The process of selecting risk reduction measures. intervention. Initiating events (causes of a release) may be plant and equipment failures such as exceeding design conditions / parameters. reduction of the consequences). Investigate the hazard with a view of: prevention.e. During concept selection process. vibration. oil and gas separators. Everyone involved in the design. to reduce the frequency and severity of the hazard. together with the probabilities that these measures will be initiated. rather than a series of discrete steps. including operational personnel. vessel collision. gas compression including condensing and knockout. Import and export risers. wherever practicable. Preventative measures. Mitigation effectiveness will depend on detection. limiting the extent and duration of a hazardous event) and mitigate the effects (i. detection. Process hazard: release from any section of process operations including production manifolds (well manifolds). plant and equipment. commissioning and operational phases. Where any conflict exists between explosion and fire management it is the latter which will tend to take priority. maintenance and modification of the installation should have sufficient knowledge of the fire and explosion hazards and their contribution to the overall risks. 7. commissioning. should be involved in this fire and explosion hazard identification process. extreme environmental conditions. to eliminate or reduce hazards to the ALARP level. and operational regime. should predominantly lead to the use of sound engineering judgments. as necessary. and human or procedural error. The personnel from relevant disciplines. Principles of inherent safety should be applied early in the conceptualization and design stage. control and mitigation. oil pressurising for export. inventory isolation and deluge activation. Fire and explosion risks include both the risks from the initiating event and subsequent escalation. Safety systems shall be selected based on the hierarchy of prevention. water. control incidents (i. with review and revision of earlier decisions. high pressure gas export including gas lift and gas injection. however the optimum solution should generally be a balance between the two.0 Fire and explosion risk management process Fire and explosion risk management is a continuous process. control and mitigation. fatigue. Personnel carrying out this process shall be suitably trained or experienced in the hazard identification methods to be used.e. dropped objects. 3. identify which codes and standards will be used (in case of new installation) to design the structure. Re-confirm that all fire and explosion hazards have been identified. stabilising and dewatering. gas drying. Risk reduction measures should include which prevent incidents (i. fire and explosion hazards should be identified and this information should be utilised for optimising layout and hydrocarbon processing methods. oil and gas metering etc. such as using inherently safer designs and ensuring asset integrity should be emphasized. . The results of the hazard identification process should be used both to evaluate the consequences of hazardous events and to determine appropriate risk reduction measures. operation.
hub type flanges. e. Wind: The direction of wind will have significant affects on the behavior of fire and smoke generation which will affect escape. thereby preventing escalation.e. Therefore. blow-down may reduce the consequences of the fire scenario by depressurizing a vessel or pipework onto which a fire is impacting. paper. duration and dynamic pressures. of a large release and ignition. Determine the explosion loads (including escalation analysis due to fire and explosion) to be used in design. Blow-down: Similar to ESD operation. for example. Pyrogenic materials Condensate fire with invisible flame Vent fire due to lightening Metal fires or radioactive materials Factors affecting fire behavior Emergency shutdown (ESD): Assuming the ESD operates. this could result in a transient release rate. A liquid spillage may start as a pool fire on the installation but drainage of the spill may ultimately lead to a pool fire on the sea. it is important that a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) considers the potential sequence of fire events and that a fully representative set of events is analyzed. Some special types of flange tend to have lower leak frequencies associated with them. Passive fire protection (PFP): The use of passive fire protection may not affect the nature of the fire but will affect the response of objects subjected to fire attack and delay or prevent incident escalation. evacuation and rescue. valves. a fire occurring in a confined space may lead to increasing fire severity with time and the movement of the flame through the vent may produce external flaming.) Electrical equipment fire. For typical list of safety critical elements refer Annexure-2. when the fire moves through the ventilation openings. Blowout (wellhead spray or jet fire) Flash fire (combustion of a flammable gas where the flame propagates at a speed insufficient to result in damaging overpressures) Explosion (combustion of flammable gas/ vapour in which confinement and/or flame velocities are sufficient to result in damaging overpressure) BLEVE (rapid ignited release of flammable pressurized contents of a heated vessel resulting in blast overpressure. etc. valves or pipework. The likelihood of a significant fire will depend upon the likelihood of occurrence. for example. for example. 13 . Additionally. the number of flanges. the volume of the isolatable volumes will affect the duration of the larger leak scenarios and result in a transient fire size. on the structure and other safety critical elements. Deluge: Depending on the fire type. Similarly. The following parameters will influence the potential likelihood of a fire: Hazardous inventory complexity. some fire scenarios may lead to incident escalation and result in a different fire event occurring as a direct consequence. 4. a jet fire impacting onto a pressurized vessel may lead to vessel failure and a BLEVE fireball event. become progressively more severe as ‗external flaming‘ occurs.g. Confinement: Fires in confined areas with limited ventilation may change over time. such as wood. The type of flanges. compressors and other potential leak sources. reducing with time. missile fragments and fireball) Cellulosic fire (fire involving material. Transition between fire scenarios Some fire scenarios may change with time. active water deluge systems (area specific / equipment dedicated) may affect both the nature of fire and the thermal loading to engulfed objects and in most cases will be beneficial to escaping personnel. The QRA should be supported by a thorough HAZID with input from people with experience of the existing or similar plant or processes. i. overpressure.
In the case of shortcomings. Inherent safety avoids this potential. The escalation analysis is an important aspect. are high. dynamic pressures. Where it is possible to reduce the reliance on engineered (active or passive) safety systems or operational procedures. Where practicable designs cannot be achieved. Similarly identify personnel and escape routes. The structure and other SCEs shall be designed for the identified fire and explosion scenario design load cases. to be damaged in a hazardous event. it may be possible to identify ways of reducing the risks though changes in operational practices. where the consequences of process release or system failure. Define the role and functionality. and plan for future verification. In case of existing installations. It is particularly important to follow inherently safe design principles. strong shock and missiles. and at each escalation stage. to eliminate or reduce the hazards. manning and competence requirements for procedural systems. The number of ignition sources within the flammable region of a potential spray release. including the safety systems at each stage of escalation and how these affect subsequent event progression. During this process. Determine the response of the structure and other SCEs to fire and explosion loads including overpressure. UK (2007)‘. Identify plant and equipment. alternative means of fire and explosion mitigation must be sought. 7. gas or vapour cloud. 14 . Develop procedural safety systems at existing installations: assessment of existing procedures should be done to ensure that operation and maintenance of systems meet their functional requirements. which can fail due to fire and explosion. to ensure that design codes are suitable for severity of hazardous events. by aiming for prevention rather than protection and the preference for passive protection over active systems. time to impairment and impairment frequency. either design codes can be changed. availability and survivability for engineered (hardware) systems. The effects on the key facilities or systems such as the temporary refuge (TR) and evacuation escape and rescue (EER) facilities in terms of impairment. review layout and process design. 5. severity. The fatality levels associated with each scenario. additional specific preventive measures should be provided. Verification shall be done. There is always the potential for the systems. special attention should be provided to escalation scenarios. by establishing performance standards. which are vulnerable to fire and explosion hazards. For detailed guidance on explosion loads and fire loadings refer API RP 2FB. especially its size. duration and frequency. in order to reduce the magnitude or risk of exceeding design load scenarios (the structure and other SCEs shall be able to accommodate these design loads). For new installations. or operating parameters. The contribution of safety systems in reducing the consequences and the probability of their successful operation. Escalation analysis should consider: The location and description of the initial event. The ventilation regime. These include establishing effective operational. The means by which the initial event may escalate. procedural system can be changed. Design the hardware to meet the requirements. to meet the performance standards. The equipment reliability and the maintenance philosophy. reliability. 6. Define the role. of fire and explosion hazard identification and risk assessment. The effects of the events on the installation. the corresponding probability and time to escalation. If required. ‗Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading‘ and ‗Fire and Explosion Guidance: Oil and Gas. this should be done.
Inherent safety practices must be maintained throughout the life of the installation. All causes of hazards have been identified. The maintenance considers the likely failure modes (especially un-revealed failures) of the components. reliability and availability. specified in the performance standard (functional requirements). The operating limits for the whole facility have been identified and there are clear instructions for the continued operation of the facility or use of additional controls whenever operating limits are exceeded. for example changes in the produced fluids from the reservoir. The characteristics of those hazards which may require evacuation have been carefully analyzed to reduce the severity and potential for escalation. by adherence to effective inspection and maintenance regimes and by ensuring that management systems and related procedures are followed. For detailed guidance on failure modes ISO 14224 should be referred. continuing through the operational phase. and ensuring that performance standards are met. During the life of the installation. The maintenance being carried out is compatible with the reliability and availability. 15 .maintenance and test procedures. The results of the evaluation process and the decisions taken with respect to the need for. 9. 8. Alternatively a safety system may deteriorate. Evaluation . changes may take place. any risk reduction measures should be recorded so that they are available for those who operate the installation and for those involved in any subsequent change to the installation. All changes should be assessed to determine the effects on the performance standards and. where necessary. setting maintenance and test frequencies. documented and implemented. This also includes carrying out periodic function testing. and identification of training and competence requirements. hazardous events and safety systems provided to manage them. so that the engineered and procedural systems continue to meet. installed and commissioned. and how each hazard is handled. against the appropriate performance standards to demonstrate that ALARP has been achieved. and role of. The SCEs procured. understood and sufficient effective prevention measures have been implemented. Verifications should check that: The initial design of the safety critical system /element is appropriate for the hazard. A practical strategy to manage each of the hazards has been identified.0 Functional requirements for fire and explosion risk management The following goals should be considered for setting functional requirements for fire and explosion management: All fire and explosion hazards have been identified. The fire and explosion risk management process should be documented and communicated to operational personnel so that they have adequate information about the hazards.analyse results of response analysis. Ensure that personnel are trained and competent to operate. Verify that systems are effective and reliable. so that it is unlikely to continue to achieve its intended functional performance. The identified fire and explosion hazards should be compiled in hazard register. with a part to play in their management. Strategy takes into account sensitivity of the installation‘s overall risk profile to fire and explosion hazards and the mitigation and control measures accordingly. their causes. analysed and understood by everyone. still achieve their required function. 8. This requires continuous maintenance and operation of the facility. throughout lifecycle of the installation. their original intent as developed during the design and initial assessment process. maintain and test engineering systems: and implement procedural systems. listing all hazards. improvements should be considered to the systems‘ provision.
Where the effects of failure could overwhelm the installation and require evacuation. the prevention of escalation and evacuation. ―Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production installations — Requirements and guidelines‖ and NORSOK standard S001 (edition 4.0 Production installation design (with respect to fire and explosion protection) Design and layout of installation shall ensure adequate firefighting access. processes and engineering systems have been documented. Appropriate combinations of prevention. to take the changes into account. A minimum provision of routes. operation and maintenance of the fire and explosion risk management systems are undertaken by competent personnel. which may affect the likelihood or consequences of fires and explosions. these measures have been specifically identified and are of high integrity. under the effects of every incident. emergency shutdown system and blow down. and inspection. fire and gas systems. This section describes critical specific issues / items which should be considered during design of production installations for effective management of fire and explosion risk. The systems provided to detect fires. Location of personnel at installation is such that their exposure to fire and explosion hazards is minimized. For guidance on functional requirements of installation layout. are suitable for the hazard types and the environmental conditions. emergency power system. 9. without personnel being exposed to hazards. All reasonably practical steps to reduce the risks from fires and explosions have been taken. and are maintained throughout the lifecycle of the installation. control of ignition. shall remain viable. systems and arrangements to allow evacuation. testing and maintenance: ISO 13702. assessed and the systems revised. Effective isolation of all major external sources of hydrocarbons. who understand their responsibilities in the management of the hazards and possible hazardous events. These isolations have been designed to survive all reasonably foreseeable fire and explosion hazards on the facility. All of these measures: including people.1 Safety systems Safety systems play an important role in preventing fires and minimizing their effect. are identified. including pipelines and the reservoir is ensured. to implement the chosen strategies. Any changes to the installation. as necessary. active fire protection. February 2008) ―Technical Safety‖ should be referred. 9. concentrating first on prevention and thereafter on control. and also segregation of facilities to extent possible so as to minimize fire risk to the adjacent facilities. Areas required to shelter personnel from fire effects and their supports shall remain viable until either the incidents have been brought under control or full controlled evacuation has taken place. explosion protection and mitigation system. The design. control of spills. control and mitigation measures have been put in place.thereby minimizing the need for evacuation. have clear ownership and have functional requirements. The primary action normally initiated by 16 . Fire detection systems provide sufficient information to warn personnel and allow an assessment of the hazards to be undertaken. passive fire protection. means of escape in case of fire. The primary purpose of a safety system is to detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate action to prevent situations that could result in an accidental fire. evacuation escape and rescue. which may require them. detection.
operation. so blockage should be reduced. For details on ventilation refer API RP 500/ ISO 15138. In this respect. 9. 9. API RP 14C (for equipment and machinery component) and API RP 14E (for piping) should be consulted for guidance. 9. The amount of venting available and the degree of congestion in the process area significantly influence the severity of an explosion. Recommended safety systems for fired components are presented in API RP 14C. completion. and heaters. The design. 9.0 on passive fire protection. and surfaces in excess of 900°F (482°C) should be protected from combustible/flammable gases and vapors.the safety system is to shut off process flow. Guidelines for the arrangement of production equipment are presented in API RP 14J. the following points should be considered: Long and narrow modules containing pressurized hydrocarbon systems should be avoided. Particular consideration should be given to the location of fired process vessels and the placement of temporary equipment during work over.7 Combustible gas detection The concentration of a combustible gas can be determined by detection devices that may initiate alarms or shutdowns. risers/pipelines. are given in Annexure-3. as large distance between possible ignition points and the vent can contribute to high over pressures. structures and supports. consideration shall be given to maximizing so far as is reasonable the separation by distance of the temporary refuge (TR). Explosion pressure is dependent on blockage. The safety system may also shut down potential ignition sources such as engines. Topsides issues (mainly locations) during conceptual design stage for fire consideration in items like wells.4 Hot surface protection Surfaces with a temperature in excess of 400°F (204°C) should be protected from liquid hydrocarbon spillage and mist. vent openings along the wall with the repeated obstacles should be provided.2 Equipment arrangement In developing the layout of the installation. process & piping. 9.6 Electrical protection Protection from ignition by electrical sources should be provided by designing and installing electrical equipment in accordance with API RP 14F/ API RP 14FZ considering the area classification as per API RP 500/ API RP 505. escape and rescue (EER) facilities from areas containing equipment handling hydrocarbons. 9. thus eliminating the major fuel source on a platform. compressors. and construction activities. If this cannot be achieved. The usual practice is to activate an alarm at a low gas concentration and to initiate action to shut off the gas source and/or ignition source if the concentration reaches a 17 . accommodation and evacuation. and maintenance of these safety systems are addressed in API RP 14C and ISO 10418. Repeated obstacles should be avoided.3 Ignition prevention devices Natural draft components should be equipped with spark and flame arrestors to prevent spark emission. fire protection etc.5 Fire barriers Barriers constructed from fire resistant materials are primarily meant to provide a heat shield and may be helpful in special situations to prevent the spreading of forces. Locations of fire barriers should be reviewed carefully due to the possibility that the fire barriers may impede natural ventilation to such an extent that hydrocarbon vapors and gases may accumulate. Fire barriers are covered in detail in section 9.
by providing releasing mechanism. F&G system. etc. for dumping ATF storage tank into sea.0 on fire and gas detection and control methods. or deck drains. other parts of the platform. identification lights and navaids. ESD systems etc. Provision should be made. include: emergency and escape lighting. The essential safety systems. fire and gas detection and protection systems. condensate. The fuel transfer pump should be equipped so that it can be shut down from the fueling station. Cables with suitable integrity from land or other installations. emergency communications. Tanks should be adequately vented or equipped with a pressure or pressure/vacuum relief valve and should be electrically grounded. etc. installation of visual and audible alarms. telecommunication equipment. as far as practical. sick bays and other areas necessarily manned in an emergency. The drain system should be designed with provisions to prevent vapor return. vent and obstruction warning lighting. ventilation/cooling for the equipment contained in this list. which may be experienced. should be designed to cater for the emergency conditions. or falling on. The helicopter fuel hose should be of a type recommended for aircraft fuel service and should be equipped with a static grounding device and a ―deadman‖ type nozzle. methanol. or some combinations of these.8 Bulk storage The inventories of flammable/combustible fluids should be consistent with operational needs and should be minimized to the extent practical. Helicopter landing areas with fueling facilities located above living quarters should be constructed so as not to retain flammable liquids and to preclude these liquids from spreading to. Installation mains power generation provided it can reliably provide power under emergency conditions. Recommended practices for permanent bulk storage (crude oil. diesel. drip pans. away from the ignition sources and should also be protected from damage (lifting operations. embarkation areas. to prevent liquid accumulation. Tanks should be enclosed by curbs. ESD systems.). The helicopter should be bonded with self-releasing or spring-clamp bond cables (same potential as hose). Suitable storage should be provided for the fueling hose. 9.10 Emergency power Emergency electrical power may be provided by one of the following systems: An emergency generator. The design of the emergency electrical power system should consider providing automatic-start arrangements to avoid the need for manual intervention during emergency condition. Gas detection system is covered in detail in section 11.9 Helicopter fueling facilities Recommended practices for helicopter fueling facilities include the following: Fire extinguishing equipment should be adequate and readily accessible to the helicopter fueling area. in the event of fire on ATF tank. The duration of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to systems such as the emergency lighting. public address equipment and intercom systems. Where UPS systems are selected they should 18 . which may require emergency power. 9. 9.preset limit below the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL).) include the following: Tanks should be installed. jet fuel. Battery systems.
the dispersion distances for such leaks. If the integrity of the air supplies cannot be guaranteed. which provides an ignition source and is unacceptably close to release sources. Ignition sources that may be present in offshore installations are: Chemical reaction Electric sparks and arcs Mechanical sparks Lightning Static electrical sparks Flame and radiation heat Hot surfaces Heat of compression To minimize ignition sources following points should be considered: a. heating equipment etc in ‗safe‘ open locations around the installation.provide power for a period considerably longer than the TR endurance time to cater for those events where immediate evacuation is unnecessary or not practical. Electrical equipment outside the TR and control station.g. from which the hazardous zones are calculated. and will. Equipment.11 Control of ignition Ignition occurs when sufficient heat is present to cause combustion. through fire seals. the need to power an air compressor from the emergency generator should be considered. The design of drainage systems should make allowance for possible blockage which may restrict the capacity of the system. b. 19 . The design of the open drain shall limit the spread of a spill and route the spill away to avoid escalation. should either be located inside an enclosure with ventilation ducts that close off automatically on detection of gas. 9. temporary pump skids. The integrity of physical barriers between hazardous and non-hazardous areas is important to prevent gas migration to non-hazardous areas. it should be designed to prevent burning fuel spreading fire to other areas. A gas cloud from a medium or large leak can. e. The hazardous drain collection tank shall be purged. Therefore caution must be exercised in locating unclassified equipment such as generator sets. In a major gas emergency. cooling of hot surfaces. Hazardous and non-hazardous open drains shall be physically separated to prevent back flow of hydrocarbons from a hazardous to a non-hazardous area. should be suitable for operation in a flammable gas atmosphere. 9. d. resulting in the loss of the instrument air compressor(s). This may include isolation of non-suitable electrical components. The capacity of the drainage system should be sufficient to handle credible spill coincident with deluge and/or firefighting activities. c. possibly. or be provided with some alternative form of protection. The purpose of the open drain system is to provide measures for containment and proper disposal of liquids including handling of FW. Diesel engines in non-hazardous areas powering essential safety systems should be provided with protection such that the diesel engine can continue to operate if gas can realistically reach the area in an emergency. Similar requirements are to be considered for hydraulic systems also. e. f. which is required to operate during a gas emergency. mains power generation may stop. Installation should be suitably earthed and all operators trained in awareness of offshore static spark risks (a recurring cause of fires). over-speed protection and. g. drift outside hazardous area limits.12 Control of spill Control of spills is fulfilled through the open drain system. This is to cater for ‗fugitive‘ leaks in accordance with hazardous area design codes. do not cater for major accident releases. All electrical equipment shall be suitable for use in the area in which it is installed. However. When a drainage system is provided.
less volatile will stabilize easily in comparison to more volatile (higher risk). on the floating facilities.0 Floating production facilities design (with respect to fire and explosion protection) The floating production facilities can be: Floating production system (FPS) Floating production storage and offloading system (FPSO) Spar (also called Deep draft floating structures) Tension leg platform (TLP) Semi-submersible Special features having impact on fire and explosion risks. Nature of crude.14 Unmanned platform Protection against fire and explosion on unmanned platforms should be based on FES considering both scenarios – when it is unmanned and when it is temporarily manned. Fire and explosion risks which may impact topside evacuation.Separate larger drainage systems may be necessary to control major releases and any associated firewater. and temporary refuge. In areas where there is no likelihood of oil spill. 9. with the following specific considerations.0.0: a. 10. living quarters. 20 . The radar system shall be equipped with proximity alarm to warn the observer of an approaching vessel with time to closest point of approach. rescue. station keeping. riser guard) shall be provided to reduce the risk for ship collision. Fire and explosion risk management on floating production facilities should include: Fire and explosion risks which may impact integrity of floating structure (structural integrity of hull. stability of structure. Fire and explosion risk management process shall be similar to section 6.).13 Ship collision protection The ship collision avoidance system and protection (such as barge bumper. it may be acceptable to provide firewater drains which discharge fire-water directly to the sea. include: The geometry of the layout Methods of construction Compartmentalisation Operations Fire and explosion scenarios Response characteristics of marine construction to fires and explosions Special features associated with the motion. Storage arrangements for movable containers of flammable liquids or gases should take account of the possibility of leaks or spills and measures for handling these should be in place. marine systems etc. Consideration should be given to the need to prevent fires spreading to sea level where they may affect the integrity of the installation-supporting structure and impede evacuation. Tie-in of satellite wells will increase the risk due to increased production throughput. The radar system shall be able to register the vessel‘s course & speed including plotting facilities and have function to transmit the signal unit responsible for surveillance. station keeping. 9. Kerbs or drip-pans should be provided around vessels. b. in addition to the applicable issues / items brought out in section 8. pumps and other potential sources of leakage to limit the spread of small spills. marine systems and stability of the structure.
Fire and explosion in engine room. the turret contains a large number of swivel joints in order to function. storage tanks and pump room Spar moon pool machinery or storage spaces inside hull The layout of surface and sub-sea facilities should be carefully considered early in the design to account for the following shipping related hazards: Passing ships and fishing boats Supply and maintenance vessels with respect to anchoring or dropped objects Anchor mooring patterns of drilling rigs during positioning and rig moving (in case drilling or well servicing is envisaged) 21 k. with increased potential for explosion event. The vessels are often located in difficult or remote places and will generally be designed to be ―self-sufficient‖ for extended periods in the event that supply vessels cannot reach them. . The layout should consider these additional hazards and the design should take these into consideration to maintain levels of safety. in the areas such as: FPSO turret. j. toxic products of combustion will be distributed downwind. e. In case of turret-moored FPSO with weathervaning capability. Potential of confinement of gas. and the systems associated with these functions must be protected from fire hazards. High consequence events with possibility of losing the facility are: Stability of the facility may be compromised during fire and/ or explosion events (escalation events should also be considered) Loss of buoyancy due to significant leakage from riser and subsea equipment underneath floating facility Flooding of a riser resulting in reduced buoyancy of hull. based on risk assessment). stability and station-keeping must be maintained at all times. due to the weathervaning effects (either due to wind or current and their effects on the superstructure height and hull draft) the fires can escalate downwind and at the very least. Non-process hydrocarbon inventories.c. the floating facility requires substantial stores of diesel to maintain station. d. i. TLP and Spar Segregation to avoid escalation of a fire can be achieved by separation of modules and sometimes separated by fire barriers (if required. g. h. These are often at the highest process pressure and pass the reservoir fluids prior to any cleaning or conditioning and are therefore subject to most onerous process duty. f. process and utilities power demands plus other life-support systems. Equipment spacing and layout variations: Spread out spacing between equipment and utilities on tanker type FPSO Closer equipment spacing on semi-submersible. Potential for large fire and explosion events: Storage tanks of crude oil on the facility may present hazards in the form of either large scale storage of stabilized crude or with empty storage tanks containing potentially explosive mixtures (possibility of accumulation of gas cloud from vent pipes). This will generally be from the turret outwards. Potential of hydrocarbon releases: FPSO swivel connections are source of releases. FPSO storage tanks Piping due to hogging and sagging of deck structure Potential for spread of fire to multiple decks or compartments: Layouts having proximity of process area with living quarters Presence of grated decks Considerable movement of floating structure has potential of contributing to spreading of pool fires. process area. The top decks should be designed to follow a hazard gradient from the most hazardous area (with respect to fires and explosions) to the least hazardous. Buoyancy.
derived by means of a risk assessment study. Floating production facility shall be equipped with emergency shutdown and release equipment that will allow the vessels to part in the event of an emergency on one vessel. m. The design of piping in hull compartments shall be suitable to eliminate potential for spreading damage to multiple compartments. design considerations may include provision 22 . Purging should be carried out before introducing air into the tank to ensure that atmosphere will never enter the flammability zone. it is required to continuously vent hydrocarbon vapors. for the operations of tankers. p. the atmosphere should be maintained in a non-explosive condition. The space provided also allows jet fires from the underside of the process to reach other process or utility modules without any impingement to reduce the effect of the flame. The adopted loading procedures should minimise VOC emissions. The process decks on floating production facility are often lifted clear of the cargo storage tank roof for several design and operational reasons. Safe access (approach the production facility. Though the gaps provide other risk reducing and operational benefits but steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of jet fires by careful layout and orientation of the higher pressure equipment. Offloading to shuttle tankers is a regular event and poses a significant risk both on the floating production facility and the shuttle tanker. The hull compartment design shall consider potential for containing damage within the same compartment and eliminate the chain of events leading to spreading the damage to the adjacent compartments or to deck. load their cargo. o. During the offloading operation. Correct fire-pump sizing and firewater-main hydraulic analyses shall be required to ensure adequate pressure at deluge points. Specific Design issues for floating production facilities are: The design of hull against explosion overpressure shall ensure that the hull sustains only local damage. n. which is not detrimental to the integrity of complete facility at least for the period of evacuation. Volatile organic compounds (VOC) return lines and their use during offloading is also an important hazard. Design for escape (over long distances) during incidents and incident escalation shall take these into consideration. consideration should be given for the high temperatures the vents may experience during venting at maximum production rates and / or possible process upsets. q. hoses and monitors. avoiding interference with other moorings. the shuttle tanker and floating production facility are in relative proximity and the risks of fire and explosion on either vessel are compounded by increased potential for escalation to another vessel. Escape routes and piping runs may be very long and personnel may be required to pass the origin of the incident to reach the temporary refuge. During loading. Fire water mains may be extensive and distant from the fire pumps in the process area. The risks comprise the breakage or leakage of the transfer hoses and the potentially flammable mixing of hydrocarbon and air in the storage holds of floating production facility and shuttle tanker. The compartments with potential for initiating or escalating fire or explosion events shall be designed accordingly. flow lines and risers as well as other field operations. The key considerations are identified maneuvering areas and weather limits. moor. venting system should be designed to accommodate the maximum volume of VOCs vented from storage. so that significant loss of buoyancy and instability of the complete facility and failure of the mooring system is not compromised. In storage tanks. unmoor and proceed to open waters) by off take tankers. l. Measures which may be taken during design phase to reduce risks from fire and explosion events associated with specific features of floating structures are controlled through various rules and regulations of certifying agencies as well as SOLAS. Also.
The upper hull design shall account for impact of fire events from topsides or moon pool with potential of deteriorating structural capacity of the hull and thereby reducing stability. fire mains. 12. Parts 1 to 7 of IEC 61508 should be referred for guidance on requirements for electrical. Open drain systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all sea states in which the hydrocarbon inventory is present in the process system. MODUs have to meet the requirements of Conventions and Codes of International Maritime Organisation (IMO). service and working spaces Arrangements in machinery and working spaces Fire detection and alarm system Gas detection and alarm system Fireman‘s outfit Provisions for helicopter facilities Fire control plan Ensuring fit for purpose status of fire extinguishing appliances (operational readiness and maintenance is detailed in MODU Code 2009) Number and type of portable extinguishers provided on the MODU should be based on the fire hazards for the spaces protected. Special attention shall be given to concentrated load areas such as topsides connection. which includes MODU code.4. or mooring chain-jack foundation. Loss of power or key input signals should be considered in determining the reliability of the F&G system. Following issues have been taken into consideration by MODU code: Structural fire protection layout plan for decks and bulkheads Protection of accommodation spaces. Fire and explosion risk management at MODU can be ensured by meeting the requirements of these codes. Additional fire and explosion risk assessment on MODU should include hazards from the wells including well testing operations.0 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) design (with respect to fire and explosion protection) MODU includes both jack up drilling rigs and floating drilling rigs. service spaces and control stations Means of escape Fire pumps.0 Fire and gas detection and control methods F&G detection systems should be designed in accordance with recognized codes and standards (such as NFPA 72 and/or EN54) applicable to the area of operation to achieve the level of performance stated in the fire and explosion strategies (FES). hydrants and hoses Fire extinguishing systems in machinery spaces and in spaces containing fired processes Portable fire extinguishers in accommodation. 23 . as generic guidance (based on the requirements of IMO MODU code) is placed at Annexure. 11. electronic and programmable electronic system.of ‗pipe chamber‘ or ‗pipe chute‘ to limit damage and eventual flooding of multiple damaged compartments. Following fire and explosion hazards related to wells should be considered: Subsea shallow gas blow out Shallow gas blow out in cellar deck Blow out from well at drill floor Subsea well blowout HC gas release / ignition in mud processing area Fire and explosion in well testing areas Well programmes shall be designed considering the anticipated hazards out of the above mentioned hazards. FSS code. Requirement of portable extinguishers on MODU.
Where provided, the F&G system should be designed to perform the following functions: a) Monitoring to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases/oil mist; where considered necessary, to detect leaks (e.g. near pump seals); to detect fires at an early stage; to detect ingress of smoke and flammable gas into places where they may present a hazard; to permit manual initiation of alarm. b) Alarm to indicate the location of any fire or hazardous accumulation of flammable gaseous or oil mist; to immediately alert people of possible fire or gas incident. c) Control action to immediately initiate appropriate control actions. F&G System shall receive and display the status and any alarm signals from fire and gas detectors, manual call points (manual stations for initiation of ESD) and fixed fire protection systems on fire zone basis. The system shall also be capable of monitoring continuously the status of associated self contained systems such as HVAC fan and fire dampers, fire water ring main, fire water pumps, and gaseous extinguishing systems Providing the controls for the fire water distribution system, fire water pumps and gaseous extinguishing systems.
The F&G system shall operate as an independent system. F&G detection safety instrumented functions shall be functionally and physically segregated from other systems or functions. Equipment used for fire and gas detection, and control shall be listed/ approved by independent international certification agency namely UL/ FM. Where systems are supplied, such systems shall be listed / approved by the above mentioned agency as a complete operating system. Substitution of alternative components, where approved components are available shall not be permitted. Equipment, if any, which is not listed / approved by UL/ FM, shall be certified by a reputed third party who is recognized in the field of fire protection of offshore installation. New technologies, if introduced, shall have UL/FM approval before acceptance/introduction for field application and shall have proven record of service in a similar environment.
Detection system F&G detection shall be accomplished by the following automatic and manual methods: Detection of flammable gas Detection of heat Detection of flame Detection of smoke Detection of toxic gases Manual alarm call point
These detection circuits shall be fault monitored continuously, and shall provide early warning of an outbreak of fire or gas release in an area. Automatic detection system whether electric or pneumatic, shall have provision to detect failure of equipment or loss of supervising air pressure or failure of power supply. Typical applications of fire/gas detectors excluding toxic gases are tabulated in Annexure - 5. Toxic gas detectors shall be provided in all areas where potentially toxic gas concentrations may be present or be formed. 24
F&G detectors shall be subject to a regular maintenance and testing programme. The design of the F&G system field devices should consider the requirements for maintenance in order to minimize the need to provide special access arrangements for calibration, cleaning or testing. Fire and gas detection system shall be designed to testing without interrupting other system onboard. Faults of detection systems should, once detected, raise an alarm at a control station. Temporary removal or isolation of the F&G system, or part of the system, is acceptable provided that adequate alternative arrangements are ensured. Placing of detectors shall be based on relevant scenarios, hazard analysis, simulations and tests. Electric automatic detection equipment and it‘s auxiliary electric equipment in hazardous areas shall be designed and certified for use in such areas.
Fire detectors shall, except for fusible plugs, be of resettable type such that after activation they can be restored to normal surveillance without the renewal of any component. For automatic operation of system, adequate and reliable source of power supply shall be provided. The need for an alternate power supply shall be determined considering criticality of the facility to be protected. 12.2 Alarm system Where automatic operation of F&G System is provided, an alarm condition shall remain until manually reset. The detection system shall activate a local alarm as well as an alarm at a constantly attended location. The detection system‘s alarms shall also be actuated when the system is operated manually. An alarm system comprises: manual alarm input devices input lines from detector and shutdown systems alarm central unit receiving and evaluating input signals and creating output signals to alarm sounding devices alarm sounding devices such as bells, flashing lights and/or loudspeakers power supply. Alarms initiation from the following systems shall be provided, as applicable: general emergency (ESD) or muster fire detection hydrocarbon gas detection toxic gas (e.g. Hydrogen Sulphide) detection fire extinguishing medium release (CO2 or other gases with lethal concentrations) power-operated watertight door closing machinery fault detection. All alarms shall be indicated visually and audibly in the control room. An alarm philosophy shall be established ensuring that the alarms are simple and unambiguous. The philosophy shall define which alarms are to be broadcasted to the entire unit or installation and whether this should occur automatically or not. The unit or installation shall be equipped with a public address system. The alarm system may be combined with the public address system, provided that: alarms automatically override any other input volume controls are automatically set for alarm sounding all parts of the public address system (e.g. amplifiers, signal cables and loudspeakers) are made redundant redundant parts are located or routed separately all loudspeakers are protected with fuses against short circuits. The number of alarms during abnormal conditions shall be assessed and reduced as far as practicable by alarm processing/suppression techniques in order to have operator attention on the most critical alarms that require operator action. 25
The alarms shall be clearly audible at all locations on the unit or installation, and shall be easily distinguishable. If noise in an area prevents the audible alarm being heard a visible means of alarm shall be provided.
Alarm to areas which are not regularly manned may be covered by procedural precautions, e.g. using portable radios. Activation of the general alarm shall be possible from the main control stations, including navigation bridge and radio room. In addition to the alarm systems, a two-way communication system shall be provided for transmittal of alarm, instructions and information between those who may require them. Manual alarm call points (MCP) should be provided at convenient locations around the installation, to allow personnel to initiate an alarm of a hazardous situation and allow rapid initiation of any necessary control actions. Where-ever applicable, MCP shall be designed and certified for use in hazardous areas.
Control actions Control actions initiated by F&G system shall include isolation of the installation from the reservoir and pipeline, initiation of emergency depressurization, isolation of electrical equipment to prevent further development of electrical fires shutdown of ventilation system to minimize ingress of smoke or flammable gas; isolation of electrical equipment and other potential ignition sources upon detection of flammable gas to minimize the risk of ignition; initiation of AFP systems where these have been provided to control or mitigate hydrocarbon fires;
Emergency shut-down and blow-down system Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system The Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system provides the means of isolating the installation from import and export pipelines, in order to control the topsides inventory in an emergency or quickly terminate export in the case of a pipeline or riser leak. The blow down system rapidly transfers the gas or oil inventory to the vent, flare or reservoir in a controlled manner, in order to reduce the potential for further escalation in the case of a fire or leak. Pressure relief devices are provided on process systems to prevent rupture of pressure vessels and leakage of pipework joints under applied pressure arising from faults in the process control system or as a result of fire. The isolation systems enable safe and secure isolation of key inventories and components to enable draining and purging of fluids prior to maintenance or inspection.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems should be designed to initiate appropriate shutdown, isolation and blow down actions to prevent escalation of abnormal conditions into a major hazardous event and to limit the extent and duration of any such events which do occur. An ESD system shall be provided, in accordance with the requirements of the FES, in order to: a. Isolate the installation from the major hydrocarbon inventories within pipelines and reservoirs which, if released on failure, would pose an intolerable risk to personnel, environment and the equipment. Where appropriate, sectionalize topside inventory to limit the quantity of material released on loss of containment. Control potential ignition sources such as fired units, engines and non-essential critical equipment. 26
h. i. at the centre or each end of a bridge connecting two platforms. When manual initiation is required. high liquid level in a flare system. pneumatic and hydraulic tubing. ESD valves shall remain in safe position during dimensioning event. helicopter decks. Stations for manual activation of the ESD system shall be located in strategic positions. b. all control actions required by the ESD system shall occur automatically. Emergency shutdown system shall be in addition to systems for management and control and other safety systems e. e. Where appropriate.g. other locations as needed to provide stations accessible to all platform areas. the systems shall be simple to operate and shall not require operators to make complex or non-routine decisions. The design of an ESD system may be for manual or automatic initiation or both based on FES. control room. be readily accessible. j. ESD stations at boat landings may utilize a loop of breakable synthetic tubing in lieu of a valve or electric switch. for instance low air pressure. boat landings. There shall be a provision to activate functions manually from the central control room in such a manner that the facility is brought to a safe condition in the event of failure in the programmable parts of the system. including the closing of all pipeline SDVs. near arriving/departing pipelines. Riser ESD valves shall be located in easily accessible. depressurize hydrocarbon inventory and vent it to a safe place. The ESD system may also be initiated automatically when process conditions indicate a loss of control which requires ESD. Equipment that is critical for the effectuation of system actions shall be protected against mechanical damage and accidental loads until shut down sequence is complete.d. electrical cables. all connected systems shall default to the safest condition for the unit or installation. failures or single incidents in these systems. Upon failure of the shutdown system. Activation of the ESD system should result in the termination of all production activity on the platform. An ESD system shall provide adequate information at a control station so that personnel involved in managing an emergency have required information to effectively execute the required actions in an emergency. This includes ESD valves. The system may include a number of independent process shutdown systems that can also be actuated separately. c. if an ESD valve is connected to the process control system. well-ventilated areas. The ESD system should be designed to permit continued operation of electrical power generating stations and fire-fighting systems when needed in an emergency. emergency evacuation stations. near the driller's console during drilling and work over operations. Manual stations for initiation of ESD for complete platform shutdown should be installed at the following locations of a platform: a. accumulators. explosion and mechanical impact. f. Control subsurface safety valve(s). the process control function shall be performed completely separate from the ESD functions. d. near the main exits of living quarters. near well bay. e. k. The emergency shutdown system may have an interface with other systems if it cannot be adversely affected as a consequence of system failures. Once initiated. exit stairway landings at each deck level. open. 27 . well-marked and protected against unintentional activation. to avoid damage from wave impact and dimensioning accidental events such as fire. g.
More complex methods can allow for heat transfer to the contents. Blow down shall be at a safe location with respect to personnel. which might affect only a small area of the vessel. Vents on atmospheric vessels. The ESD system should be designed to permit continued operation of electrical power generating stations and fire-fighting systems when needed in an emergency. The consequences of ignited vent pipes should be considered. The ESD system of the satellite platform shall not be able to be taken out of service from the main platform and shall be in operation when the platform is unmanned. These may be a reduction in blow down time. Compare this to the actual pressure vessel versus time for the required blow down time. While designing blow down system. Estimate the time to vessel rupture. and designed such that the heat radiation for maximum foreseeable flaring (or ignited venting) rate does not pose a hazard to escape and evacuation. should be provided with adequate flame arrestors. 28 . 14. very small topsides process). Calculate the rate of heat input appropriate to that type of fire. the size and complexity of the installation. jet. availability of external fire-response equipment. then design changes may be necessary to improve the vessel protection. or changes to the plant layout to reduce the fire exposure. If the time to rupture does not meet the established safety criteria (such as time to evacuate).Because of key role of ESD system in the safety system. define the type of fire (pool. e. In developing the fire and explosion strategies (FES). In case of unmanned platforms.g. there are a wide range of considerations that influence the selection of AFP systems. This simplification is appropriate for jet or other fires. or application of fire protection insulation.2 Blow down system Rapid blow down or draining of topsides process inventories in order to prevent escalation of a fire situation should be provided unless there are specific good reasons for not doing so (e. ESD point shall have provision for self illumination. partial or total engulfment) likely to affect it. Calculate the rate of temperature rise of the vessel wall neglecting heat transfer to the contents. Activation of the ESD system should result in the termination of all production activity on the platform. which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside explosion pressure. all ESD components used should be of high quality and be corrosion-resistant. 13. From this temperature-time profile prepare a yield – stress-time profile and a corresponding rupture pressure-time profile. Emergency shutdown and operational shutdown of the satellite platform (associated well platforms) shall be able to be carried out locally on the satellite platform as well as from the main platform. the nature of the operations. bearing in mind the likelihood of spurious blow down events as well as real emergency events. The ESD system shall contain facilities for testing of both input/output devices and internal functions. manual depressurization of all pressurized systems should be possible from the platform when it is manned.0 Active fire protection Fire and explosion strategies developed to manage fire and explosion hazards should ensure that the measures selected are capable of performing their function by setting performance standards (functional requirements) of safety critical elements. following approach should be considered: For each item of equipment. and the fire-response strategy adopted by the operator. Blow down should be designed in the light of the specific escalation times for each fire scenario and generally be as fast as feasible once activated.g. including the closing of all pipeline SDVs.
water curtain. as the main components. monitors. water fog. For these purposes. water spray.) sufficient to meet the role of these systems as defined in the FES. if any. The means of activation will depend on the expected location. based on FES: Water Based System Foam Based System Dry Chemical Based System Water cum foam Spray System Dual agent suppression system ( DCP and Foam) Clean Agent System Carbon Dioxide Based System Kitchen Cooking Appliances and Hood Protection System Portable Fire Extinguishers Selection of active fire protection systems for typical areas on offshore installations is given in Annexure . which is not listed / approved/ certified by UL/ FM. water in appropriate form should be used such as water jet. and the fire-response strategy for the installation. such systems shall be listed / approved by the above mentioned agency as a complete operating system. For automatically initiated systems. New technologies. Final selection of types and quantities/rates should be based on FES. manual or both. shall be certified by a reputed third party who is recognized in the field of fire protection of offshore installation. The fire-water pump system should be selected to deliver the pressure and flow required for the operation of water based AFP systems (deluge water spray. sprinkler system. fire control. a manual release station shall be provided and conveniently located outside the protected area. where approved components are available shall not be permitted. materials. hydrants and monitors. deluge system. Sea water is used for fire extinguishments. Objectives of active fire protection system are: To control fires and limit escalation. Equipment. and systems. Various Active fire protection systems applicable in offshore are covered below: 14. Effects of the marine environment offshore shall be considered in the selection of equipment. etc. shall have UL/FM listing/approval/ certification before acceptance/introduction for field application and shall have proven record of service in a similar environment. To extinguish the fire where it is considered safe to do so. The manufacturer of equipment/system shall confirm to provide after sales service support including supply of spares during life cycle of the equipment. if introduced. This will typically be the single largest 29 . size and type of fire. To reduce the effects of a fire to allow personnel to undertake emergency response activities or to evacuate. To limit damage to structures and equipment. Substitution of alternative components. hoses. The active fire protection system shall be provided on the offshore installation. hose reels.1 Fire water system Fire water system shall comprise of fire water pumps and distribution piping network along with. cooling of equipment and for exposure protection of equipment/personnel from heat radiation. Where systems are supplied. out of the following.6 for initial design.Initiation of AFP systems may be automatic. and for foam making. Equipment used for active fire prevention shall be listed/ approved/ certified by independent international certification agency namely UL/ FM.
where appropriate. Suitable arrangements should be provided to allow verification of fire-water pump system performance over the full range of the fire-water pump curve. plus any anticipated manual firefighting demand (monitors/hose streams). The speed of response of the fire-water pump unit should be selected so that fire-water is made available to the systems which use fire-water in time for them to fulfill their function. If not running continuously. On normally manned installations this may require at least two independent pump units. any alarms from pump monitoring systems should not automatically stop the fire pump. Pump inlets should be separated such that in the event of an incident rendering a pump inoperative. If more than one fire-water pump is provided. their prime movers and starting arrangements should be designed so as to operate for a minimum period sufficient for them to fulfill their functions. Such devices should reset automatically once the excess pressure has been relieved. This should consider situations such as when a fire-water pump unit is unavailable due to maintenance or breakdown. Water treatment may be necessary to prevent marine growth from impairing fire-water system performance. Fire-water pumps should normally have two different means to start the pump automatically. allowance should be made to cope with escalation of the fire to adjacent areas. Firewater pump systems shall be self-contained.1 Fire water pump selection The fire-water pumps. Except during testing.2 of API RP 14G (4 edition. For further guidance on fire water system section 5. 30 . The requirements for inlet filtration should be considered where debris may damage the pump. The provision of relief devices or other arrangements may be required at the pumps to prevent damage to pipe work due to high operating pressures or surge. Sufficient instrumentation (both local and.credible fire area (if deluge/ water spray systems are installed). In addition. If the connection to the control room is lost. Protection against damage of associated power cables. hydraulic/piping and control circuits should be considered. Fire-water pump units required to operate when gas is present should be designed to be suitable for such operation. Where required in the FES. Fire-water pump stop should be local only. th 14. so that it is able to supply water in a fire emergency. the fire-water pumps should start automatically. facilities should be provided for local and remote manual start of the pumps.1. fire-water pump units should be designed to minimize the risk of common mode failures occurring during emergencies. The fire-water pump system should be located. the other pump unit(s) will not be affected. The FES should identify the number of fire-water pumps required and the arrangement necessary to provide a reliable supply of fire-water. It shall be possible to start the fire water system even if no other systems on the platform are operational. the system should be designed to start automatically in a fire emergency. or protected. 2007) should be referred. remote) should be provided to enable personnel to ascertain the operational status of any pump unit. Fire detection at the fire-water pump should not stop the pump or inhibit the start of the fire-water pump driver.
provide cooling of equipment and structures not impinged by jet fires( in case of jet fire. Fire water mains of steel pipes. The design should consider whether arrangements are necessary to provide adequate fire protection when a section of the fire mains is isolated due to damage or maintenance. pipes made of composite materials should be used. provide a means to apply foam to extinguish hydrocarbon pool fires. 14. equipment protection designed to provide dedicated coverage of critical equipment such as vessels and well heads.1. cupronickel (or copper-nickel). 31 b) c) .1.Fire water pumps shall be exclusively used for firefighting purpose only.2 Fire water mains Fire water mains are the means by which water for fire-fighting is transmitted from the fire-water pumps to the points of use. Liquid filled pressure gauges shall be fitted at prominent locations to indicate pressure in fire water network. assessment should be carried out whether deluge will contribute for fire control). Consideration should be given to protecting deluge pipe work against the effects of fires and explosions The fire-water mains should be provided with suitable arrangements to permit testing of the pump units and the firewater mains under full operating conditions to determine any deterioration in efficiency. fire-water mains should be routed or protected to avoid such damage. Fire water mains should be designed using a recognized technique for the hydraulic analysis of these systems. limit effects of fires to facilitate emergency response and EER activities.3 Deluge system Fixed deluge systems should be provided to: control pool fires and thus reduce the likelihood of escalation. Where necessary. The four broad types of deluge protection include: a) area protection designed to provide non-specific coverage of pipe work and equipment within hydrocarbon handling areas. incidents which could result in damage to the fire mains should be considered. structural protection designed to provide dedicated coverage of structural members. Alternately. glass reinforced epoxy coated or pipes made of material suitable for the quality of water should be used. Easy access for operation of these valves should be provided. The composite material to be used as per API 15LR / API 15HR 14. NFPA 20 ―Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection‖ should be consulted as guideline for design and installation of fire water pumps. The fire-water mains should be designed to provide an adequate amount of water to the discharge points at the required pressure. In developing the FES. Piping should be designed to be robust and should be adequately secured and supported. The fire water mains should be suitable for the marine environment. Fire-water mains should be equipped with an adequate number of shut-off valves to allow sections of the mains and branches from the mains to be isolated. The effects of surge should be considered.
The deluge valve should be of globe pattern design with material of construction suitable for sea water service. to reduce fire and smoke damage and to provide alarm at a control station. Once initiated sprinkler systems can be effective to control fire spread. Piping should be designed to be robust and should be adequately secured and supported.g. deluge valve open/closed) is indicated. The speed of response required for a deluge system to fulfill its function should be determined and the system should be engineered accordingly. Facility for both pneumatic and electrical operation from Control Rooms must be provided. Fixed deluge systems should be designed using a recognized technique for the hydraulic analysis of these systems. For systems where local manual initiation is unlikely to be adequate. Area deluge or local cooling system should be fully operational as soon as possible after the receipt of an initiating signal. Self-draining design is an important feature in this respect. Piping material should be suitable for sea water application. Isolation of any automatically operated deluge system should be possible by means of a manually operated valve located outside the protected area. Fixed deluge protection should be considered for temporary equipment such as modular rigs. It shall be possible to manually activate deluge valve locally. They are not normally suitable for extinguishing fires in flammable liquid spills which can spread rapidly over large areas and exceed the capacity of the sprinkler system. The types of deluge nozzle selected and the location of these nozzles should be suitable to fulfill the role of the system during the fire events and the environmental conditions which may occur.4 Sprinkler system Automatic sprinkler systems are typically used in areas where fires are expected to involve cellulosic fuels (living quarters). The effects of surge should be considered. NFPA 15 ―Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection‖ should be referred for design and installation of deluge systems. The water pressure available at the inlet to the system or an individual section should be sufficient for the efficient operation of all nozzles in that system or section under design flow conditions. The sizes of nozzle and associated pipe work should be selected to avoid blockage caused by corrosion products or build-up of salt deposits after operation and testing. Means should be provided to enable the testing of deluge valve performance without discharging fire-water through the pipe-work and nozzles. Where an automatic sprinkler system is connected to an unpressurized main. Limit switches should be provided for monitoring opening and closing of the valve.1.d) water curtains to reduce thermal radiation and to control the movement of smoke in order to provide protection to personnel during escape and evacuation. Due account should be taken of the effects of obstructions and air movements on the stream of droplets. The design of the installation fire-water pumping system should consider the needs of any anticipated temporary deluge systems 14. from control room and at release stations located along the escape routes outside the fire area itself. and where slow fire growth is expected. The deluge valve should be pneumatically opened and locked. Automatic sprinkler systems should be connected to a pressurized water supply so that the system is capable of immediate operation and no action by personnel is necessary. it should have a reliable supply of water available with sufficient capacity to provide protection until the main is 32 . Consideration should be given to protecting deluge pipework against the effects of fires and explosions. The location and orientation of deluge nozzles should be defined so that the required quantity of water will impinge on surfaces to be protected. remote operation should be provided from a control station at which the operating status of the system (e.
33 . The very small water droplets allow the water mist to control or extinguish fires by cooling of the flame and fire plume. A water mist system is a fire protection system using very fine water sprays (i. NFPA 750 ―Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems‖ should be referred for guidance. Over board test line shall be provided to fully function test the sprinkler system without spraying water in the protected area. The number and position of hydrants/hose reels should be sufficient to permit effective fire-fighting by the emergency response team in the intended areas. if needed for the particular system. Hoses. There shall be a pressure sensor downstream of each sprinkler valve and a flow indicator upstream of each area indicating in which area release is taking place. oxygen displacement by water vapor. they should be prevented from impinging directly on to equipment used for heating cooking oil or fat. Hydrants and hose reels should not be supplied from the same section of a fire main as a deluge or sprinkler. Automatic supply from a pressurized fire main or deluge main which activates upon drop of pressure in the sprinkler system may be an acceptable water supply arrangement.e. nozzles. and radiant heat attenuation. etc.1. the size of the protected area and the degree of congestion.. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. 14. Considerations which should be addressed in evaluation of the use of water-mist systems include: suitability of the system for the particular application. Nozzles should be of robust construction. This can be done by use of suitably located test sprinkler using fresh water. Fire-water mains should be equipped with hydrants to which hoses can be connected and/or provided with fixed hose reels. Electrical power supply to the galley should be switched off automatically in the event that the sprinkler system is operated. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. provision of a suitable water supply and air supply. valve keys.5 Water mist system Water-mist systems are an alternative to gaseous systems in some applications. consideration should be given to dividing the system so that each section can be monitored to indicate which section has operated. Facilities should be provided to enable each part of the sprinkler system to be drained and tested and to remove all air from water-filled systems. the fuel type and the nature of the fires which may be experienced. the effect on electrical and other sensitive equipment within the area of water-mist application. 14.6 Hydrants and hose reels & nozzles Nozzles and hoses (and portable foam equipment if used) should be located in the most suitable positions considering the probable direction of approach of fire teams. Couplings should be standard throughout the installation. NFPA 13 ―Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems‖ should be referred for design of sprinkler system. For large sprinkler systems.pressurized. water mist).1. should be stored adjacent to hydrants. Where appropriate. Indication in the control room shall be provided. easy to operate and made of materials suitable for the intended duty. If sprinklers are provided in cooking areas. enclosures should be provided to protect this equipment against mechanical damage and against the environment. The system should be designed so that the maximum pressure possible in the line is less than the rated working pressure of the equipment.
When dry chemical and foam extinguishing agents are expected to be used at the same location.2. or may be applied as a premixed solution of concentrate and water. The foaming agent may be applied directly by introducing foam concentrate into the firewater system in fixed proportions. capable of being put into operation rapidly and located/protected so that it will be able to operate when required. unless the monitor is also automatically/remotely operated. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. should be considered. of density lower than water or oil. Medium. its sources of power supply. Where foam concentrate is injected into the fire-water main it should be of a type which is compatible with sea water. NFPA 11 ―Standard for Low. Foams are ineffective for fires such as pressurized oil/gas jet fires where smothering effects cannot be achieved. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection.1 Monitors Fire-water monitors may be used to provide water-spray coverage or apply water-foam solution. arrangement of control valves. 14. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. wherever applicable. size of supply piping. Minimum pressure for system required shall be ensured at the remotest location of the hydrant. foam concentrate and means of controlling the system should be readily accessible. and High Expansion Foam‖ should be consulted for design and installation of foam systems. They may also be provided to supplement fixed deluge systems. th and High Expansion Foam‖ and section 5. For further guidance on Foam Extinguishing Systems refer NFPA 11 ―Standard for Low. the method of proportioning should provide sufficient accuracy so that the required performance is obtained over the full range of flows and pressures which may occur in the fire-water system.2007). The foam concentrate should conform to UL. fixed systems. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. US MIL-F-24385 standards and should be suitable for use and storage at anticipated ambient temperatures. The design of monitors should consider location. Monitors arranged for local operation should be provided with an access route. Medium.NFPA 14 ―Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems‖ should be referred for installation of hydrants and hose reels. cooling the liquid and forming an air-excluding. the foam pump. Where foam concentrates are introduced directly into the fire-water system. continuous blanket to seal volatile combustible vapours from access to air. 34 . Central foam systems should not be utilized as the primary source of supply of foam solution to hand-held equipment as accurate proportioning cannot be guaranteed at low flow rates. in the expected environmental conditions. compatibility should be confirmed. Remote operation of monitor(s). Where provided. simple to operate. which is remote from the part requiring protection and so sited as to protect the operator from the effects of radiant heat.2 Foam system Foam-forming additives can significantly increase the effectiveness of water in controlling liquid hydrocarbon pool fires. Foams may be employed using hose stations. having a tenacious ability for covering and clinging to horizontal or inclined surfaces. It has the capability of flowing freely over a burning liquid surface. Firefighting foam is a stable aggregation of small bubbles. portable extinguishers or fixed monitors.3 of API-RP-14G ( 4 edition. 14. The foam concentrate selected should be suitable for use on the flammable liquids present in the protected area.
4 Dual agent suppression system Dual agent suppression system is self contained system utilizing simultaneous or sequential use of dry chemical powder and foam. Dry chemical powder and its delivery systems (equipment) shall be approved by certifying agency. testing and maintenance as per NFPA.11. and the flow characteristics depend upon the particular dry chemical. Each monitor should be capable of discharging under jet and spray conditions.11. and the foam blankets the fuel with a thick film there by preventing escape of flammable vapours and also ensures cooling. Minimum pressure for system required shall be ensured at the remotest location of the monitor. To cover several areas with a single supply of agent. recommended by the manufacturer of the equipment and approved by certifying agency. There should be means for locking the monitor in position. if the unit malfunctions or is damaged. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. A major advantage is their self-contained feature which provides for protection without reliance upon an external energy source. 14. Typical description of dry chemical fixed systems is given in Annexure.3 Dry chemical fixed systems Dry chemical fire-fighting systems can provide an effective means for extinguishment by chain breaking mechanism. Monitor should be capable of discharging foam also. when designing the piping. 14. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. Typical description of Foam Water Hose Reel Unit is given in Annexure. The locations and discharge characteristics of the monitor should be selected to suit the role and exposure protection required from the monitors and the local environmental conditions. 35 . testing and maintenance as per NFPA. Local manual override controls should be provided. The discharge of dry chemical and expellant gas is a two-phase flow. it is important to use the manufacturers‘ data. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. expellant gas and equipment being used. Therefore several smaller units may be considered. Dry chemical from fixed systems may be applied from hand hose line or fixed nozzle systems. hand hose lines with local actuators may be connected by rigid piping to a single dry-chemical supply. NFPA 17 ―Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems‖ should be consulted for design and installation of dry chemical systems.2. 14. Nitrogen gas shall be utilized as expellant. A single large supply unit is likely to lose fire fighting capabilities. Therefore. which have been established by investigation and tests. The nature of potential fires should be carefully considered in selecting and sizing the type of dry chemical and equipment. Monitors which can be remotely actuated should be arranged so that they cannot cause injury or impede escape routes when operated. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. Type of dry chemical used in the system shall not be changed unless proven to be changeable by a testing laboratory.2 Foam Water Hose Reel Unit Foam water hose reels are ideal means of fighting small oil and gas fires on E & P platforms.Each monitor should have sufficient movement in the horizontal and vertical planes to permit the monitor to be brought to bear on any point of the part protected by that monitor. Large Class B fires requires rapid knockdown and suppression of flaming liquid which can be achieved using dry chemical powder.
chemical or other damage. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. discharge nozzles and operated through the control panel.Dry chemical powder used in dual agent suppression system shall be compatible with foam. 100% standby containers shall be considered for each protected hazard. Clean agent based system as per Montreal and Kyoto Protocol shall be installed for new installation and as replacement to existing Halon system. as minimum. Each hazard area to be protected by the protection system shall have an independent system. The system should be capable of the being recharged at site.5 Clean agent system Gaseous systems may be used to extinguish fires or. dual actuating system. The Gaseous clean agent system should have. The company should obtain a long term replacement warranty (10 years or more) from the OEM in case the clean agent is found to be environmentally unsustainable within this period. Use of Halon has been banned for new systems due to their detrimental effect on atmospheric ozone and causing global warming. bank of cylinders filled with the agent under pressure. the time needed to obtain the gas for replacement to restore the systems shall be considered as a governing factor in determining the reserve supply needed. Gaseous agent system shall have the approval of certifying agency. Storage containers shall be located as near as possible to hazard area but shall not be exposed to fire. The unit shall be capable of operation by one person. safe disposal of Halon must be carried out either by destruction using Plasma Arc technology as per EPA guidelines or to be handed over to Authorized Governmental Agency for Halon banking. Nitrogen gas shall be utilised as expellant. HFCs are green house gases having large global warming potential can also pose health risk to personnel if exposed to extinguishing concentrations and should be avoided. 14. 100% redundancy should be provided in bank of cylinders. at higher concentrations. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. Clean agent system shall also have on line monitoring and display system for pressure of cylinders at control room. The clean agent should also comply with the 36 . Selection and design of clean agent system shall be in line with the NFPA 2001 ―Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems‖. All the components of the system shall be capable of withstanding heat of fire and severe weather condition. to inert a space and prevent ignition. The skid unit shall be hydraulically designed to achieve balanced flow rates of dry powder and foam. Storage containers shall be carefully located so that they are not subjected to mechanical. The dry chemical powder and foam concentrate shall also conform to the standards of certifying agency. Both dry chemical powder and foam shall be stored in separate tanks. Where existing Halon system are to be replaced. Onsite refilling of gaseous agent should be preferred. Over and above this. piping network.
sufficient monitors should be provided. persons in confined area. Before CO2 flooding system is operated. 14.7 Kitchen cooking appliances and hood protection Where kitchens are installed in conjunction with accommodation facilities to provide food services. Helidecks should comply with the standards of any authority having jurisdiction for the helideck. local dedicated foam systems and foam monitors connected to the fire main. Government of India. Central foam systems may be used if foam is immediately available for induction at the helideck foam system. should be evacuated. unless it can be shown that the delay in the firewater/ foam solution reaching the helideck foam monitors is acceptable. if any. crash incidents or fuelling activities should be provided. 14. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. however. the size of facility. The CO2 snuffing system normally consists of amount of CO 2 gas in cylinders which are manifolded and are located at easily accessible area. Typically on manned installations. should the dedicated helideck foam system be unavailable. be used as a back-up system for protection of the helideck. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection. Where foam is applied by means of fixed monitors.6 Carbon Dioxide (CO2) based System Fixed CO2 system shall be designed in accordance with NFPA-12. testing and maintenance as per NFPA.2000. Portable fire extinguishers suitable for K Class of fire shall be provided for response to small fires without discharging the main system. Such a central foam system may. Suitable safeguard shall be provided to ensure prompt evacuation of personnel and prompt rescue of any trapped person. CO2 snuffing system: For fighting the fire occurring at cold flare/cold vent boom where it is difficult to approach. Fire-extinguishing equipment should be readily accessible at the helideck. CO2 is generally not used for protection of spaces that can be occupied by personnel due to suffocation risk. Ministry of Environment & Forests. as well as International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).requirements of ―Ozone Depletion Substances Regulation & Control Rules . spaced at approximately equal distances around the helideck. the kitchens should be protected with appropriate fixed pipe protection of the cooking appliances and exhaust duct systems. a system employing the phenomena of dilution by CO 2 snuffing system are commonly provided. location of fire-water pump start facilities should be considered at each helideck emergency response location. Agents for kitchen shall be wet chemical suitable for K Class fires as per NFPA 10. the manning arrangements and the area of operation. A central foam system which injects foam concentrate into the fire-water mains at the fire pump discharge should not normally be used as the primary means of helideck protection. 37 .8 Helideck fire protection Protection requirements may vary depending on helicopter types. testing and maintenance as per NFPA. AFP systems suitable for fires involving aircraft engines. Where fire-water is required. CO 2 snuffing system shall be designed and installed in accordance to NFPA 12. 14. and the supply arrangements should ensure that there will be no interruption in firewater supply during firefighting. Existing practices include portable fire extinguishers.The helideck fire protection should be designed to deal with fires on the helideck without placing helideck crew in undue danger.
to large mobile units. If mobile extinguishers are located indoors. gas and electrical fires anticipated on the offshore installations would generally be classified as Class B and C fire risk which can be controlled by dry chemical powders and CO2 fire extinguishers. Extinguishers should be clearly marked. where the container must basically remain in place and the extinguishing medium discharged through a long hose. Particular attention should be paid to the distribution. either by itself or under expected conditions of use. Oil. Within the various types of extinguishing mediums. The actual placement of fire extinguishers should be based on a physical survey of the area to be protected. Fire extinguishers are most effectively utilized when they are readily available in sufficient number and with adequate extinguishing capacity for use by persons familiar with their operation. which provides for protection without reliance on an external source of energy. gives off toxic gases in such quantities as to endanger persons should not be used. Reserve supplies of dry chemical should be stored in a dry area in containers designed to prevent entry of moisture. While selecting the location for mobile extinguishers. Suitable shades or covers should be provided to protect extinguishers in the open from excessive heat. carbon dioxide & clean agent type. to identify the extinguishing medium contained. Hence. which can be transported to the fire quickly and easily. and the type of fire for which it is suitable. Fire extinguishers containing an extinguishing medium which. The hose should not be of such length as to preclude efficient discharge of the extinguisher's contents.14. rains or corrosive environment. dry chemical. Suitable arrangements should be made for mobile extinguishers to accommodate the hose so that the hose will not kink and can be handled quickly. 38 . class of fire anticipated shall be considered while selecting the right type of fire extinguisher. Where such shades or covers are provided. Procedures should be established so that expended extinguishers can be immediately recharged or replaced. cold. Extinguishers also vary significantly in size ranging from very small hand portables. Mobile extinguishers should be fitted with discharge hoses of length sufficient to reach any part of the protected area. there are differences between the specific extinguishing medium and the methods by which the medium is expelled. Suitable extinguishers should be provided such that personnel in an area have ready access to permit rapid intervention while fires are still in their incipient stage. A major advantage of fire extinguishers is their self-contained feature. they should be designed so that the removal of extinguishers is not hampered in the event of fire. The fire extinguisher should be light weight and of compact design with considerations of reliability and ease of refilling. The extinguisher body and components shall be designed for marine environment. Fire extinguishers should be simple to operate and be designed in accordance with a recognized standard which is suitable for anticipated environmental conditions. consideration for their mobility in the area should be carefully considered. the size of the doorways and passages should be sufficient for easy movement of extinguisher.9 Fire extinguishers Mobile (wheeled) and handheld fire extinguishers are intended as a first line of defense against fires of limited size and should be provided even when other fixed firefighting systems are provided. The various types of fire extinguishers available are water. Extinguishers should be provided with suitable means for mounting. siting and visibility of extinguishers in order that they are accessible and can be clearly distinguished.
unprotected vessels could BLEVE with devastating consequences. PFP is preferred over deluge in such situations since it is immediately available and has no moving parts to fail and prevent operation. Water cooling is possible but not as reliable and requires large amounts of water. and testing of Portable fire extinguishers. The main concern with PFP on vessels is that it makes NDT of the vessel difficult.0 Passive fire protection Passive fire protection (PFP) comes in many forms. pipework. Water tightness in case of risers is a key issue when the PFP goes down to the splash zone. PFP on structures and structural supports One of the functional requirements of the passive fire protection system is to protect the critical structural members. Fire walls Firewalls are often provided for area segregation. All PFP systems should be designed according to the specific fire scenarios based on FES. 15. Firewalls are usually composite items consisting of a structural part and an insulating part. Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installations is placed at Annexure-7. structural members. PFP for risers and safety critical equipment Typical protection criteria for critical equipment are provided in Annexure-10. It is no use protecting a specific item of safety-related equipment if escalation will then take place 39 . maintenance. it must be emphasized that PFP integrity must be sufficient to prevent the ingress of water and subsequent corrosion under the insulation and that the application of inspection or access points must not degrade the ―water-tightness‖ of the PFP. If the fire exposure is severe. both parts need to retain their integrity for the life of the installation. H-60 and H-120 class division). which may be used as guidance in determining the PFP requirement of critical equipment in order to allow it to fulfil its function in an emergency. On many installations combined fire and blast rated walls divide the process areas from the wellbay and the wellbay from the utilities and accommodation areas giving multi-barrier protection across the platform from the high hazard process end to the low hazard accommodation end. Modern design philosophy is to identify specific areas or items of concern (usually structure or piping which on failure would escalate the initial event) and target these items for PFP application. but the objective is always to provide some sort of heat insulating barrier between the fire and the item to be protected. inspection. However. Typical fire integrity requirements given at Annexure-9 may be used as guidance in determining the PFP for structural members required to support the protected area including its external boundaries. Based on fire risk analysis appropriate class division is selected (like A-60.Extinguishers should be located to minimize the possibility of damage from a fire or explosion and be provided in sufficient number that the overall fire control capability is not seriously impaired by a single fire. boundary walls or individual items of safety critical equipment. All PFP applications must take account of the need for periodic inspection of key parts of the underlying structure. PFP on process vessels PFP is the preferred method of protecting vessels from heating up and failing when exposed to fire.11. installation. This can be catered for by providing inspection hatches. Typical fire integrity requirements given in Annexure-8 may be used as guidance in determining the PFP requirements (fire barrier) for the protected area. Typical description of CO2 and dry chemical powder fire extinguishers are given in Annexure. NFPA 10 ―Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers‖ should be referred for selection. PFP should be designed for use on vessels.
Systems should be maintained at all times. These intervals and standards should be determined after taking into account the required reliability or the criticality of the system. 16. Emergency shutdown and blow down systems: operational tests should be performed annually. maintenance & testing of fire protection system. known causes of failure. After sales service support shall be provided by such supplier with assurance of spares availability for at least 10 years. Mesh screens These reduce heat radiation on escape routes by approximately 50 %. any corrective action taken or required with the name and initial of person carrying out inspection should be retained. tested and maintained to NFPA. Fire and gas detectors. heat. General alarm: alarms initiated from the fire and gas detection system should be regularly (at least monthly) tested. 40 . It has potential for external corrosion. an holistic view of the whole module. The company shall be responsible for the establishment of health. explained and communicated to him in writing for role clarity. They are frequently used to protect open stairways. PFP wrapping Wrapping jackets for protection of valves and critical piping sections may be considered which are easy to install and remove for inspection. following an established procedure. which should be monitored when removed for inspection. All systems for fire and explosion management shall be inspected. The frequency of testing detectors will be dependent upon the type. In designing any PFP system. as recommended by the manufacturer. general alarms. safety and environment procedures covering all activities during servicing and maintenance. ESD and blow down system Fire and gas control panel: functional checks at regular interval (at least quarterly) should be conducted to ensure that detectors annunciate correct zones and initiate the appropriate alarms or extinguishing systems. the systems should be inspected thoroughly at least annually. agents and consumables shall be as per manufacturer‘s requirements and standards to maintain the system integrity and original approvals. maintenance and testing Inspection. Any major repair shall be conducted by the Manufacturer‘s representative or a person appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to be done. Periodic inspections and servicing. scope of inspection. reflecting the role and importance of the system in managing fires and explosions. must be taken. Detectors (flame.through failure of the pipework on either side of the fire protected equipment. A competent fire officer /safety officer shall be made responsible for inspection. testing and maintenance frequencies should be determined as part of the FES development. the environmental conditions and taking into consideration OEM recommendations. Records of inspection reports showing date of inspection. SOLAS Regulation and manufacturer‘s guidelines at predetermined intervals by competent personnel.0 Inspection. The duties of fire officer shall be clearly defined. provided the flame is not actually impinging on the route. to substantiate the integrity of the entire system. historical information on the likelihood of failure. These intervals will be determined by the required probability that the equipment will not have an unrevealed fault (e. smoke and gas): should be tested (at least quarterly) for operation and recalibrated if required. would not start or continue to operate when required). Spares.g. Design of protection for just ‗safety critical‘ items in isolation can lead to inefficient safety spends. shall be conducted under direct supervision of the company‘s fire officer / safety officer in accordance with instructions/ procedures provided by the manufacturer.
3. biological fouling or other foreign objects. Inspection and tests: drivers and pumps should be regularly started (at least weekly) and operated for a period sufficient to establish normal operating conditions. Maintenance: engines should be kept clean.g. defects. smooth operation and lubricated once in a month. 41 .Fire-water pump systems: 1.g. At a frequency dictated by flow test and experience. Where installed. all fire hoses should be tested (at least annually) subjecting them to the maximum fire-water system operating pressures. They should be regularly tested (at least quarterly). damage and corrosion and records maintained. Nozzles should function-tested (at least monthly) for proper operation. After each use. Deluge and sprinkler systems: Deluge systems may be susceptible to plugging due to corrosion. An effective means (e. fire-water pump start) should be possible from deluge/sprinkler systems. hose reels. It is recommended that the established procedures allow for verification (at least annually) of the integrity of the system. The ring mains. Pressure-gauge readings on fuel-gas lines should be checked during engine tests to verify the fuel gas delivery pressure. Diesel fuel tanks should be checked after each engine run to assure an adequate (at least 30 minutes running) fuel supply exists. hose reel and hydrants closed to get the maximum pressure. Cotton-jacketed hoses should carefully cleaned and dried after use. by be be be Hydrants and monitors should be physically inspected periodically to ascertain any leakage or damage and should be function tested quarterly. Pressure testing of piping system should meet the requirements of NFPA-13. testing) should be established to verify that the system has the capability to function as designed. sprinkler system water-flow alarms should be tested (at least monthly) for correct operation. to qualitatively verify the integrity of pump and water delivery system. submerged pumps should be lifted to inspect for corrosion and/or wear which could cause failure when required to function during an incident. hydrants. The automatic-charging feature of a battery charger is not a substitute for proper maintenance of the battery and the charger. They should start reliably and run smoothly at rated speed and load. All valves on the ring mains. fire hoses should inspected for damage and returned to their storage device. monitor & deluge/sprinkler header valves shall be visually inspected (at least monthly) for any missing accessories. Correct oil and coolant levels should be maintained. hydrant. monitors & deluge/sprinkler headers shall be checked for leaks. At least monthly water should be discharged simultaneously from minimum two discharge points. Hydrants. lubricated and in good operating condition. Batteries and charger systems: storage batteries should be kept in charged conditions at all times. Periodic inspection is required to ensure that the charger is operating correctly. Fire water mains The ring main shall be checked for leaks (at least once in a year) by operating fire pump & keeping the monitor. to determine the condition of the battery cells. inspection. Testing of alarms/actions (e. 2. nozzles and monitors: Where necessary to confirm integrity. Pump performance (flow volume and discharge pressure) should be tested (at least annually) to ensure the pumping system satisfies the fire-water system functional requirements. Fuel-gas scrubber vessels on natural-gas fuel engines should be drained before and after any engine run.
Gaseous systems (including water-mist systems): Systems should be thoroughly inspected and tested (at least annually) by competent personnel for proper operation. recharged or replaced. periodic 42 . Deficiencies. Foam system At least annually. compaction of powder or other impairments. the dry chemical in the system storage container should be sampled from the top centre and near the wall. compaction of powder to be checked at the time of refill or based on shelf life of the powder.Fixed dry chemical systems: All dry-chemical extinguishing systems and other associated equipment should be inspected and checked (at least annually) for proper operation by competent personnel. if any. to ensure that they have not been activated or tampered with and to detect any obvious physical damage. The operation shall include performance evaluation of the foam concentrate or premix solution quality or both. as appropriate. extinguishers should be thoroughly examined. Extinguishers out of service for maintenance or recharging should be replaced by an extinguisher(s) having the same classification and at least equal rating. In case of stored pressure type of extinguishers. After use. All expellant gas containers should be checked (at least quarterly) by pressure or mass against required minimums. in the extreme. Manufacturer's recommendations with respect to cleanliness and dryness should be followed for refilling extinguishers. Deficient extinguishers should be repaired. Passive fire protection Generally. The weight and pressure should be recorded on the tag attached with the container. Extinguishers should only be refilled with the same type powder originally contained in the unit. However. hoses and piping should be cleared of residual dry chemical. resulting. shall be rectified as per requirements of NFPA 11. Fire extinguishers should be hydrostatically tested in accordance with a NFPA 10. Each extinguisher should have a permanently attached identification tag indicating the maintenance or recharge date and the initials or name of the person who performed the work. all foam systems shall be thoroughly inspected and checked for correct operation. Nitrogen cylinders used for inert gas storage and used as an expellant for wheeled extinguishers should be hydrostatically tested by competent personnel in accordance with recognized standards. Except for stored pressure systems. All stored dry-chemical pressure containers should be checked (at least quarterly) by pressure and mass against specified data. The mixing of different powders can cause a corrosive mixture and abnormal pressures to develop. corrosion. Any cylinder which shows evidence of corrosion or mechanical damage should be hydrostatically tested to ensure its integrity. At regular intervals (at least annually). Manufacturer's recommendations with respect to cleanliness and dryness should be followed for refilling extinguishers. All stored pressure containers should be checked (at least semiannually) by pressure and mass against specified data (allowable weight loss is 5% or pressure loss is 10%). Mobile and hand portable fire-fighting equipment: Extinguishers should be visually inspected frequently (at least monthly) to ensure that they are in the designated location. Discharge of the system during function-testing should not be required. Any samples which contain lumps that will not be friable when dropped from a height of 100 mm shall result in the replacement of the chemical. passive fire protection systems have few maintenance demands. in explosion of the extinguisher.
OIM shall also review with each employee those parts of the fire prevention plan necessary for self-protection. 3. potential ignition sources and their control. Procedures to control accumulations of flammable and combustible waste materials.visual inspections are recommended. 18. 5. The name or job title of employees responsible for maintaining equipment to prevent or control sources of ignition or fires. either in the top coating or the fireproofing itself. 17. including type of evacuation and exit route assignments. with repairs to damaged areas as appropriate. A fire prevention plan must include: 1.1 Emergency action plan An emergency action plan must include as a minimum: 1.0 Emergency preparedness The emergency (support) systems provided for the management and control of an incident include the communications systems. 43 . power generation system(s) and explosion protection (vents/suppression system). Procedures for emergency evacuation. Procedures for regular maintenance of safeguards installed on heat-producing equipment to prevent the accidental ignition of combustible materials. Periodic functional tests of these systems should be performed. proper handling and storage procedures for hazardous materials. Specific test procedures should be in accordance with equipment manufacturer's recommendations. For guidance on emergency preparedness refer OISD-GDN-227. establish a corrosion cell and become a source of corrosion. All employees shall be informed upon initial assignment to a job. Procedures for reporting a fire or other emergency. Repairs should be carried out in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. If partial debonding of the fireproofing coating has occurred and there are surface cracks in the area of the debonding. of the fire hazards to which they are exposed. escape and evacuation arrangements. These periodic inspections are important in order to maintain the integrity of the fireproofing coating and to provide early detection of corrosion. 4. to substantiate the integrity of each system. A list of all major fire hazards. and the type of fire protection equipment necessary to control each major hazard. moisture may migrate to the base surface. and The name or job title of employees responsible for the control of fuel source hazards. This corrosion potential highlights the need to have a fireproofing coating application procedure. 2. which ensures that a proper bond is established between the fireproofing compound and the base surface. 2. Emergency response plan of the offshore installation should include response plans for fire and explosion incidents. The inspections should identify damage such as cracks or voids.0 Fire prevention There should be fire prevention plan based on FES. They should include the following: 18.
The PA system. if applicable. 8. Co-operation procedures and agreements. Description of field(s) and facility(s) and potential areas impacted by acute pollution. The alarms shall be routed to central control room. the audible alarm shall be supplemented with visual signals. Radio frequency radiation from antennas shall be in compliance with the requirements of authority having jurisdiction. Description of installation resources. area resources. The PA & alarm system shall be divided into two independent systems. when the plan is developed or the employee is assigned initially to a job. number. 11. Alarm Signals & Codes Alarm system with announcer in the galley and push buttons in the field shall be installed. alarms & emergency communication system shall have emergency power supply from emergency generators & UPS. 6. Description of purpose. The emergency action plan must be reviewed with each employee covered by the plan. Internal Emergency Communication System The platform shall be provided with page phones and/or intercoms so that Central Control Room (CCR) may be easily contacted during emergency and CCR operators shall also be able to contact with operators anywhere on the platform. 44 . In areas where noise level is up to 85 dB and above. 5. mobilization and communication. Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate critical plant operations and firefighting before they evacuate. alarms and emergency communication system shall be located and protected from the effects of fire/explosion to ensure their continuous operation. Description of organization. scope and responsibility. 18. when the employee's responsibilities under the plan change. Procedures to account for all employees after evacuation. 9. 10. 12. for co-ordination with other participants. 4.3. Public Address System The location. type and sounds from alarms shall be easily recognizable in any area where alarm is required. regional resources and external resources and equipment. alerts. Procedures to be followed by employees performing rescue or medical duties.2 Emergency Communication The PA system. The alarm shall be heard in an area where noise level is up to 85 dB. Instructions for emergency preparedness personnel. The code of alarm signals shall be as per the uniform policy of the company. The emergency communication shall be in accordance with hazardous areas classification. The name or job title of every employee who may be contacted by employees who need more information about the plan or an explanation of their duties under the plan. and when the plan is changed. 7.
Maritime VHF/UHF radio. Marking should distinctly show the direction of escape. Escape routes should be so arranged and constructed as to minimize the possibility of blockage by any one fire or other emergency condition. The refuge or safe areas for evacuation should be designated. In some cases where the emergency is very grave. The alarm and communication system shall be powered from the main power system and from a monitored Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). identified and clearly marked in the plan. ship and operators on deck.Two way portable VHF/UHF radio sets shall be provided for use by emergency response team. The escape routes should preferably be provided on the outside along the periphery of the platform and shall be part of the daily used passageways. Driller‘s intercom function shall provide two way communication in drilling areas between the driller and drilling personnel. The systems shall be suitable to provide instructions for emergency response. The communication system shall be able to communicate with other installations. Escape routes shall be clearly marked with photo luminescent signs. which have been planned in order to provide assurance of their safety from fire or other emergencies. Communication and alarm systems shall be provided to alert all personnel on board. 18. The crane operator shall be able to communicate with CCR. PA loudspeaker and telephone shall be located in the crane cabin. Alternative Emergency Control Room Emergency response plan should designate an emergency response control center (incident command center) with alternate center for each installation. total and immediate evacuation of all employees is necessary. multi support vessels. Employees must be sure that they know what is expected of them in all such emergency possibilities. life boats and life raft stations. if main power supply fails. The escape routes should have emergency power supply and lighting to ensure safe and fast escape & evacuation.1 Means of Escape The platform shall be provided with at least one safe escape route to enable maximum personnel on board to reach assembly point from any part of the platform following a platform abandon alarm. External Emergency Communication System The platform shall be provided with satellite phones and UHF/VHF sets for communication with external emergency response teams. In other emergencies.3. Intercom function shall provide two way communication between radio room and critical areas. 18. The escape routes shall be planned such that they lead to assembly point. offshore supply vessels.3 Emergency evacuation At the time of an emergency. employees should know what type of evacuation is necessary and what their role is in carrying out the plan. helicopter deck. life rafts and shore. Exterior refuge or safe areas may be locations which are away from the site of the emergency and which provide sufficient space to accommodate the employees. only those employees in the immediate area of the fire may be expected to evacuate or move to a safe area such as when a local application fire suppression system discharge alarm is sounded. lifeboats. There shall be at least two exits to escape routes outside living quarters and offices leading in different directions. 45 . a partial evacuation of nonessential employees with a delayed evacuation of others may be necessary for continued plant operation. In some cases. helicopter. of an emergency. at any location.
no. ventilation and emergency power supply. hot liquids or falling objects. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where only three persons are there for a short time.etc. On deck grating. number of personnel onboard for each escape route on either side . of fixed davit launch life boats in the main evacuation area shall be sufficient for the maximum no. risk of exposure of assembly point and escape route towards this area. Government of India. Escape route outside the area shall be designed and protected so that at least one route of escape is available for the required time considering possible search & rescue operations. The number. The steel should be the preferred material for escape routes including handrails and stairs. Lift shall not be considered as a part of escape route. protection. If use of lift is necessary to ensure adequate and effective escape. 100% redundancy shall be maintained in means of evacuation through life boats or/and life rafts The total capacity of throw overboard life raft shall as a minimum be sufficient for maximum. On loss of main power supply. conforming to the latest SOLAS Regulations and National Maritime Regulatory Authority and tested in accordance with latest IMO Resolution as applicable. However.2 Means of Evacuation The safe evacuation should be met by using a combination of helicopter. Escape routes on deck should be provided with a non-skid oil resistant coating in yellow. Escape routes shall be arranged from the drill floor to adjacent modules and also down the substructure. fixed davit launch life boats and throw overboard life rafts. including visitors. Escape routes leading to higher or lower level should be provided by stairways. the bridge may be considered as the primary means of evacuation. florescent arrows and/or directional lighting to indicate correct escape direction. Personnel shall be able to use the escape routes without being exposed to excessive toxic fumes.The escape routes shall be of appropriate dimensions to facilitate easy transport of injured personnel on stretcher. The distance between life boats and platform structure shall be sufficient to ensure a safe drop of the life boats. smoke. it shall be possible to escape from the lift and the hoist way with the lift/hoist way at any elevation. One additional evacuation system in the far end of the installation should be installed. 46 . Wherever installations are connected by bridge to other installations. excessive heat loads.3. 18. size and location of evacuation means shall be decided based on manning. of personnel 100% on board. if escape to the main evacuation area is impossible. The protection of these escape routes from heat exposure shall be considered and it shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a wellhead area. Escape routes in the living quarters shall be provided with low level self glow. two parallel 10 cm wide yellow lines shouldl be painted with photo luminescent paint indicating the width of escape route. The min. the lift shall satisfy the requirements concerning transport of injured personnel on stretcher. lift shall automatically go to next floor level and stop. Life boats and throw overboard life rafts shall be type approved by the Maritime Administration in the country of origin and accepted / approved by the Directorate General of Shipping.
The Life rafts shall be provided with SOLAS ‗B‘ Pack. 18. Both the equipment should be serviced every year at DG Shipping approved Service Station. The winches shall be designed for full load recovery including personnels and should be fed by main power. Personnel to don the life jackets before entering the lifeboat/throw overboard life raft. Repairs and replacement of parts should be carried out in accordance with Manufacturer‘s requirements and standards. Weekly & monthly inspections and routine maintenance of lifeboat launching appliance and on load release gear shall be carried out as per manufacturer‘s guidelines under direct supervision of safety officer. The life boat shall be designed for min. The Life rafts shall be annually serviced as per manufacturer‘s guidelines and certified by party duly authorized by the D G Shipping and provided with manufacturer‘s original log card. All other inspection. Two way communication shall be provided between the installation and the lifeboat by means of approved VHF Radio (GMDSS).3. The launching appliance should be capable of recovering the lifeboat with full complement of loads in up to 2 m wave height. fitted with water activated lithium battery light. Sufficient no. water spray system and fitted with approved inboard engine and on load release mechanism. The engine exhaust shall not act as source of ignition.3 Life Boats & Launching Appliances Life boats should be totally enclosed. 30 mtrs.18. The davit structure and life boat shall be so designed that they are easily approachable for operation and maintenance. servicing and repair should be conducted by the manufacturer‘s representative or a person appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to be done. Cabinet housing should be provided for winches and consoles. Life jackets and lifebuoys shall be periodically inspected for any deterioration/damage. The hoisting speed for recovery should be min.3. PLB to be serviced annually at D G Shipping approved service station. Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) should be provided to each personnel before boarding the life saving appliances. The Liferaft shall be stowed in a suitable cradle provided with strap and sen-house slip such that it is easily launched.5 Life Jackets & Lifebuoys Sufficient no. fire protected with self contained air support system. of lifebuoys shall be provided. Access ways should be provided with antiskid coating. 47 .4 Life Rafts Life rafts shall be throw over board type and construction of the liferaft shall be as per the SOLAS LSA Code latest edition with stowage height of min. of life jackets shall be available at embarkation point. Main power should be available for charging of life boat batteries.3. The disconnection point should be in the vicinity of life boat and disconnection shall be automatic when dropping or lowering the life boat. 10 minute running in a gas cloud or fire on sea. Every life boat should be provided with approved EPIRB (Emergency Position indicating Radar Beacon) and SART (Search and Rescue Transponder). 3 m/min. whistle and other requirements conforming to the SOLAS LSA code. 18.
All offshore going personnel shall undergo Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET) to gain understanding and awareness of emergency response to helicopter emergencies that may occur during boarding. access routes and exit points shall be marked and illuminated so they are readily identifiable in an emergency.6 SCBA & EEBD Based on FES. HUET should be able to provide trainees ability to efficiently and safely exit from a helicopter which has come down in the sea and has flooded. Muster areas. sufficient number of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and emergency escape breathing device (EEBD) shall be provided. Personnel should repeat the trainings at regular intervals to develop and maintain confidence. launching arrangements and the sea below lifesaving appliances shall be adequately illuminated by emergency lighting 19. They should also be instructed as to the various alarms and to their meaning. training. The escape or response plan will set forth the special duties and duty stations of each member of the personnel in the event of an emergency. embarkation areas. Refresher training should include the use of equipment expected to be used and practice in combating staged emergency scenarios similar to what may be expected. and that they know their assignment. They should be instructed in the response and escape plans for platforms where they are working. and how to report a fire alarm. The SCBA and EEBD shall be serviced (at least annually) as per the manufacturer‘s guidelines. This training should include practice in combating staged gas and oil fires similar to what would be expected on an offshore platform.4 Emergency lighting All manned areas on the unit or installation shall be equipped with emergency lighting. They should be given actual experience in handling the equipment on small practice fires simulating actual situations as closely as possible. should be maintained 48 . Equipment / system supplier should impart training for inspection. HUET should meet the requirements of OPITO guidelines on the subject. Each session should include defensive fire response and operation of all the equipment personnel are expected to use. including reading of signs and layouts. Practice scenario drills should be held including the announced walk-through type as well as the unannounced type. and the escape or response plan at his work place. Each employee should know the location of incipient stage fire equipment. sea survival techniques and effective use of life saving appliances. traveling to and from offshore installation and disembarking. Escape routes. how to use it.0 Training New employees should receive training in alarm recognition and fire protection soon after deployment to an installation.18. service and operation of the fire fighting equipment / system Documentation covering fire drills. Offshore going personnel shall also undergo sea survival training to achieve understanding and awareness of risks and its management which they are exposed to. The illumination level shall be sufficient to ensure that necessary emergency response actions. Planned drills should be used to ensure that each employee is familiar with the alarm signal systems. 18. which is supplied from the emergency source of power.3. Platform visitors and contractors should be instructed and trained upon boarding the platform in the response and escape plans they are expected to perform in an emergency. etc. can take place efficiently. All operating personnel and other personnel who go to offshore frequently should have fire-fighting training. Person‘s competence and confidence in his ability to handle an emergency situation depends on how much practice he has had in using the equipment. Effective training and procedures should be provided for the personnel to escape and survive at sea.
5. 49 . 14. 13. Selection. Zone 1 and Zone 2 Locations‖ API RP 14 G ―Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Fixed Opentype Offshore Production Platforms‖ API RP 14 J ―Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities‖ API RP 500 ―Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I. 17. and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms‖ API RP 14 E ―Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore Production Platform Piping Systems― API RP 14 F ―Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and Class I. and Zone 2‖ API RP 520 ―Sizing. launching appliances and on-load release gear‖ IMO Fire Safety Systems (FSS) Code. Installation. 7. Division 1 and Division 2 Locations‖ API RP 14 FZ ―Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and Class I. Zone 0. 11. Designing. Zone 0. 9.2007 Edition International Life-Saving Appliances Code (LSA Code) 6. and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries‖ ‗Fire and Explosion Guidance: Oil and Gas.0 References 1. 16. UK (2007) IEC 61508 ―Functional safety of electrical. The equipment / system supplier shall confirm to provide after sales service support including supply of spares during the lifetime cycle of the equipment.1093 ―Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats. 12. 21. 8. 15. Division 1 and Division 2‖ API RP 505―Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I. These consulting services shall be provided by factory trained and authorized technicians of the supplier.0 Product Service Support Equipment / system supplier shall technical support/after sales service support for a period of 10 years or more after handover of the system. 2. Zone 1. API RP 2 FB ―Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading‖ API RP 2 FPS ―Recommended Practice for Planning. 4. and Constructing Floating Production Systems‖ API RP 14 C ―Recommended Practice for Analysis. Design. 10. 3.20. electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems‖ IMO MODU Code IMO MSC/Circ.
31. 23.Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment‖ ISO 13702 ―Petroleum and natural gas industries -.2008 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 22. 32. petrochemical and natural gas industries -. ISO 14224 ―Petroleum. 26. and High Expansion Foam‖ NFPA 12 ―Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems‖ NFPA 13 ―Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems‖ NFPA 14 ―Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems‖ NFPA 15 ―Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems NFPA 16 ―Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems‖ NFPA 17 ―Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems‖ NFPA 20 ―Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection‖ NFPA 25 ―Standard for the Inspection. Medium. 28. 25. 30. 37. and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems‖ 19. NFPA 72 ―National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code‖ NFPA 750 ―Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems‖ NFPA 2001 ―Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems‖ OISD-GDN-227 “Emergency Response Preparedness in E&P Industry‖ ―Ozone Depletion Substances Regulation & Control Rules .Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production installations -. Government of India Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules.18. Testing. 36. 27. 21. Ministry of Environment & Forests. 20.2000. 1974 50 . 35.Requirements and guidelines‖ ISO 10418 ―Petroleum and natural gas industries —Offshore production installations Basic surface process safety systems‖ NFPA 10 ―Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers‖ NFPA 11 ―Standard for Low. 24. 34. 29. 33.
Escape and Rescue EER Strategy Emergency Shutdown Fire and Explosion Strategy Factory Mutual Global Safety Critical Elements Shutdown valve Fire and Gas System Hydrocarbon Heating. Ventilation and Air Conditioning International Maritime Organization Jet Fire Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation Process Area Passive Fire Protection Programmable Logic Controllers Sub-Surface Safety Valve Temporary Refuge Utility Area United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association Underwriters Laboratories Uninterruptable Power Supply Wellhead Area 51 .Abbreviations AB AFP ALARP API BA BOP CCR CF CFR CS EDP EEBD EER EERS ESD FES FM SCE SDV F&G HC HVAC IMO JF MODU OPITO PA PFP PLC SSSV TR UA UKOOA UL UPS WH Accommodation Block Active Fire Protection As Low As Reasonably Practicable American Petroleum Institute Breathing Apparatus Blowout Preventer Central Control Room Cellulosic Fire Code of Federal Regulations Control Station Emergency Depressurization Emergency Escape Breathing Device Evacuation.
In fire situations several ESDVs plus adjacent pipe work may be engulfed at one time. Riser ESDVs – (Topsides and subsea) Automatic – isolates platform from pipeline inventories at the topsides. Well head and downhole isolation valves. Locate the valve such that uncontrolled events just the far side of the SSIV will not pose a radiation problem for the installation. Regular test of process ESDVs often neglected. Locate away from process fire areas wherever possible. Always consider benefits of subsea pipeline isolation. unless this endangers helicopter operations and pre-warning not feasible. Protect valve and exposed riser sections against foreseeable fire scenarios. . these divisions then match the designated fire areas and their associated firewater coverage. smaller. OIM and deputies must understand escalation mechanisms and time frames for all emergency scenarios in order to be able to make competent decisions. Where no such boundary isolations are in place. Oil and Gas UK] Control method Process Emergency Shut Down Valves (ESDVs) Control mechanism Automatic – Reduces inventory available to leak or fire by isolating process into separate. ESDVs are frequently used at module boundaries to prevent inventories from one module feeding a fire in another. segments. General Platform Alarm (GPA) Automatic – Isolates platform from reservoir inventories Automatic – Removes people to place of relative safety Any prolonged fire necessitates evacuation as a precaution. 52 Blowdown and blowdown valves (BDVs) Automatic or manual – Removes gases to flare or cold vent. Justify and record basis of decision. Locate away from supply vessel routes. it becomes possible for hydrocarbon which is stored in one module to be released into another module and fuel escalation of further fires. releasing several inventories to prolong fire. Sub-sea Isolation Valves (SSIVs) Automatic – Isolates platform from pipeline inventories at a defined distance. Specify and justify test interval and acceptable leak rate as part of design. incoming jack-ups and other potential sources of dropped objects or dragging anchors. Topsides valves to fail close. even a simple NRV may provide significant risk reduction. Fire related design considerations Ease of testing and maintenance. distances are often of the order of about 250-350m. Surface and downhole valves to fail close on confirmed fire or gas release event. Record in performance standard documentation. Topsides valves to fail close. BDVs to be fail-open.Annexure – 1 Summary of methods of controlling fire [Source: Fire and explosion guidance (2007).
Consider time required for draining Appropriate for very small fires – Immediate intervention on discovery of small fire can prevent fire taking hold. Suitable for contained liquid fires. Effectiveness depends on understanding of installation-specific fire and escalation scenarios and plus realistic offshore exercises. All personnel trained for small fire intervention. Usually manual facility Consider vulnerability of dump line route. or extinguishing pool fire.g. Appropriate blowdown time to be developed from escalation scenarios. extinguishers etc. Prevents fire from starting / taking holds by rendering the atmosphere inert – clean agent. Note that even with training. CO2 etc. Control spread releases of liquid Bunds Drains Remove liquid and deluge Only effective for fugitive (very small) leak scenarios. Remote manual fire fighting Inerting agents Initiation of fixed or oscillating fire monitors. Creates film / foam to prevent oxygen reaching liquid fuel thus reducing. Disperses very small leaks to prevent flammable cloud build-up. System shuts down during major release scenarios. May be affected by strong winds. they can also concentrate a fire around the equipment in the bund and should be used in conjunction with foam.g. remote spaces difficult to access in fire situations (e. Comparative risk issues must be understood and precise criteria defined to limit fire fighting team‘s exposure. fire fighting teams that remain to fight a fire will be at greater risk. to not introduce any ignition sources and also not move the fuel / air mixture to other areas hitherto safe within the context of the originating accident. Static discharge may ignite atmosphere. Provides air exchange within an enclosed area to prevent or slow flammable cloud build-up. Foam application Dirivent systems Other HVAC systems Reduces evaporation of vapours. System needs special attention to be able to provide adequate air flow rates and be safe. Small releases are usually within drain system 53 . fire hoses. Inerted atmosphere may not be breathable so warnings and pre-discharge alarms required. not effective on jet fires. Useful in enclosed. with or without foam. foam monitors. causing explosion – check potential with vendor. Less effective on running pool fires. Often used on helideck or open upper or weather decks.e. equipment cooling and helideck fire control only possible where trained fire teams available. Any manual arrangements need clear and detailed instructions for operation to offshore staff.Automatic facility recommended. Fire fighting. While bunds can contain a liquid release / fire. Design must ensure deluge does not cause bund overflow by being sized for maximum foreseeable liquid volume release. cellar deck surge tanks) Manual fire intervention with hydrants. Process drain facility Manual fighting fire Automatic or Manual – Removes main liquid inventories from vicinity of fire to a safer location (e. i. pump rooms in semi sub or ship hulls).
release to drain system. capacity. 54 . In emergency scenarios environmental issues become secondary to preservation of life. The drain capacity needs to be capable of removing maximum foreseeable liquid volume release although the effects of burning liquids in the drain system must be checked. Sea-fire possibilities and consequences need checking.
Vent lines. Hydrocarbon Containment – Topsides Process Facilities Hydrocarbon Containment – Wells Fie & Gas Detection System Riser Shutdown System Topsides Shutdown System Wellhead Shutdown System Ignition Prevention Platform Sub-structure Topsides Structure Uninterrupted Power Supply Emergency Lighting Evacuation & Escape Systems Rescue & Recovery Telecommunications Navigational Aids Personal Protective Equipment Helideck Escape Routes Temporary Refuge 55 .Annexure . Oil and Gas UK] Hydrocarbon Containment – Pipelines.2 Typical Safety Critical Elements [Source: Fire and Explosion Guidance (2007). Risers. firewater pipework.
Riser vulnerability to passing and attendant vessel collision especially during cranes operations. accessibility and vulnerability of automatic and manual isolation valves in fire situations. Future risers. Consider impairment of TEMPSC loading area and helideck access routes. Location of air supply ducts.Annexure . escape and evacuation routes For potential fire scenarios: Consider egress routes. Consider time to escalation Vs time to muster. appraise and evacuate. blow down and flare and/or vent lines Number and rough location of process ESDVs and BDVs Location of overboard discharge lines or atmospheric vents (in worst case process upset condition) with respect to ignition points. Consider location of escape routes to sea. gas lift risers or other proposed tie-ins. Risers / pipelines Riser and riser isolation valve locations – vulnerability to fire attack. checking for trap points or need for protected muster point alternative to TR.g.g. Egress. TR and alternate protected muster points Vulnerability to heat / smoke 56 . Structures and supports Points of ignition Location of tall structures or structural supports vulnerable to fire attack with severe consequences. Process & piping Location of major inventories Location of relief. instrumentation and safety critical elements) in closed or open module designs needs the consideration. Oil and Gas UK] Item Wells Fire considerations Location and segregation for all anticipated types of well operation (including drilling and work over) and maintenance during field life.3 Topsides issues during conceptual design stage [Source: Fire and explosion guidance (2007). inventories (including down hole gas lift inventories) and isolation. Consider ignition potential for all release scenarios Especially consider the location of all non-certified equipment with respect to releases and associated gas plumes (e. Risers and Pipelines as source of release and potential for escalation. Location of artificial lift arrangements. cranes and generator or motor enclosures). Location. Location of fuel-gas piping and potential for fires / explosions outside main process locations (especially turbine enclosures) Exposure of personnel and equipment (including piping. e.
Location of back-up supply lines. Discharge location for oil and firewater drained to sea in fire incident.Vulnerability of TR supports to fire scenarios. 57 . Vulnerability of deluge piping inside module and supply lines. Communicatio ns UPS Fire Protection Location and vulnerability of any critical communications hardware Check for vulnerability to fire Location of firewalls and PFD Vulnerability of fire pumps and ring-main to damage in fire scenarios.
A portable fire extinguisher placed outside near the entrance to that space may also be considered as satisfying the provisions for the space in which it is located.9 l capacity. In addition to the above requirement. Foam. Mud processing areas Minimum number of extinguishers 1. and 1 additional extinguisher suitable for electrical fires when main switchboards are arranged in the space 0 2 (1 in cab and 1 at exterior of engine compartment) 2 (1 at each exit) In accordance with section 9. Minimum size should be: DCP and CO2 . Cranes (With electric motors/ hydraulics) : 02 number C class extinguishers 2. Mud processing areas : 01 number B class extinguisher for each enclosed space 58 .Annexure – 4 Recommended number and distribution of portable extinguishers on MODU [Source: MODU Code 2009] Type of space Space containing the controls for the main source of electrical power Cranes: With electric motors/ hydraulics Cranes: With internal combustion engine Drill floor Helidecks Machinery spaces of category A Machinery spaces of category A which are periodically unattended Main switchboards Mud pits.5 kg capacity.16 of MODU code 2009 In accordance with section 9. Class of extinguisher is as per NFPA 10. 2. A portable extinguisher provided for that space may be located outside near the entrance to that space. (Travel distance to an extinguisher not to exceed 10 m for open space) Class(es) of extinguisher(s) A and/or C B C B B B C B 1. 3. the following additional requirements shall be considered: 1.8 of MODU code 2009 2 in the vicinity 1 for each enclosed space. Drill floor : 02 number B and/or C class extinguishers 3. Mud pits.8 of MODU code 2009 At each entrance in accordance with 2 section 9.
wellhead utilities areas. process. wellhead.Annexure . engine rooms. wellhead. ESD. escape routes. start of fire pumps 59 . TRs Alarm. active fire protection Electric Flame Smoke Turbine hoods. Emergency Depressurization (EDP). stores. EDP. engine Rooms (Only for rooms containing essential safety systems) Air intakes Alarm. isolate power Alarm. muster points. isolate power Flammable gas Alarm. EDP. Emergency Shutdown (ESD). ESD. isolate power. EDP. utilities Process. EDP. ESD. wellhead utilities. EDP. gas turbines Control rooms. active fire protection Alarm. closure of the SSSV. computer rooms. isolate power. workshops. ESD ventilation system Oil mist Enclosed areas handling low GOR liquid hydrocarbons Manual call point All areas. utilities Typical actions Alarm. ESD. active fire protection (if present) Alarm. electrical rooms. ESD.5 Typical applications of fire/gas detectors [Source: ISO 13702] Hazard Fire Type of detector Heat Pneumatic Typical application Process. isolate ventilation Alarm. generators. active fire protection Alarm. accommodation Air intakes to TR and control stations Process.
Only if FES shows role for this system Drillers cabin Degasser room Shale shaker room Active mud tank room Sack/bulk storage room Mud lab Cementing unit room Control station Central control room(CCR) Instrument room adjacent to CS/CCR Local equipment room False floor and ceiling in CS/CCR and instrument rooms Turbine hall Turbine hood Switch board room None Deluge/foam Deluge/foam Deluge/foam None Clean Agent Watermist/deluge/foam Clean Agent Clean Agent Clean Agent Clean Agent 10 10 10 Provided that no flammable materials stored 10 To be confirmed in developing FES To be confirmed in developing FES To be confirmed in developing FES Lifting gear for floor hatches.Annexure . affecting adjacent wellheads. if the methanol area is small 10 400 Only if FES shows role for this system The objective is to prevent fires on one well.6 Selection of AFP systems on typical areas [Source: ISO 13702 and Fire and explosion guidance (2007). Foam if area contains significant flammable liquids Where gas jet is large in comparison with size of module. affecting adjacent wellheads and derrick floor. Deluge is suitable provided pool fire is not a spray. deluge may provide limited benefit. if gaseous To be confirmed in developing FES 60 . Oil and Gas UK] Area/room Type of protection in addition to portable Typical minimum water application rates 2 l/min/m 10 (or 400l/min/well) Remarks Wellhead*/manifold area Deluge/foam/dry chemical Process areas Deluge/foam/dry chemical 10 Pumps/compressors Gas treatment area Deluge/foam Deluge/dry chemical 20 10 Methanol area Water-injection treatment area Drill floor BOP area Alcohol-resistant foam or deluge None. Addition of foam is beneficial. Key items such as vessels with BLEVE potential should be protected by other means such as PFP or equipment specific deluge. Foam if area contains significant flammable liquids Portable foam units. Addition of foam is beneficial. if no HC risk Deluge Deluge/foam 10 The objective is to prevent fires on one wellhead. Deluge Clean Agent water-mist Clean Agent or 10 Dedicated system only if flammable inventories within the hall Interlock access to hood. General area deluge may not be suitable for protection of specific items against impinging jet fires. Deluge is suitable provided pool fire is not a spray fire.
61 . water-mist for diesel drives 6 10 60 10 Unless flammable liquid present 10 2 (4 l/min/m for horizontal) 2 15 l/min/m to 2 45 l/min/m 45 / m i n / m Water curtain *For wellheads.Battery room Emergency generator room Fire pump room HVAC room Mechanical workshop Instrument workshop Storage of gas bottles Paint store Accommodation** Vent extract from galley General galley area Galley cooking appliances and range Crane cabin Crane engine room Helideck Hangar Chain locker Ballast control room Turret area Pump room in column Vertical and horizontal structures Escape and evacuation routes Clean Agent Watermist/foam/deluge Watermist/foam/deluge Clean Agent Sprinkler Sprinkler Water-mist/sprinkler Sprinkler Agent Sprinkler / Clean 10 10 Effect of water on equipment in the room should be evaluated Effect of water on equipment in the room should be evaluated 6 6 Provided stored externally and not exposed to radiant heat 6 Section flammable materials to limit fuel at risk Operated locally in galley Kitchen Hood Systems None Wet Chemical System None Portable/water-mist Foam/dry chemical Sprinkler/foam/dry chemical Water None Deluge/foam None Deluge According to supplier recommendation Deluge. accomodation should have following fixed firefighting systems: a. Water hose reels strategically located near or inside the living quarters. water requirement should be 760-920 l/min/well. **As per requirements of API-RP-14G. Sprinkler or water mist system b. as per API RP 2030.
Electric motors ( 3.) Radio room or other enclosed areas containing a significant concentration of electrical equipment or controls Galleys Internal combustion or gas turbine engine installed in an enclosed area Internal combustion or gas turbine engines installed in open areas Electric motors ( 3. B and C B 1 for three engines 1 for each 2 motors 1 for each 2 generators 1 for each boiler or heater 1 on or in the vicinity of each crane B C C B B 1. Internal combustion or gas turbine engine installed in open areas : 03 number B class extinguishers for three engines 5. The maximum travel distance from any point on the platform deck area having a potential for fire to an extinguisher should not exceed 50 ft (15.Annexure – 7 Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installation [Source: API RP 14 G] Type of space Main corridor of building Stairway living quarter Minimum number of extinguishers 1 1 within 10 ft of each stairway on each deck level 1 1 C Class(es) of extinguisher(s) A B A Sleeping accommodations (Where occupied by more than 4 persons. In addition to the above requirement. B and/or C class extinguishers 2. Wheeled dry chemical extinguishers provide more capacity and range than hand portable units. This factor and the nature of potential fires must be carefully considered in selecting the size and number of extinguishers. 2.2 m). Crane : 01 number B class extinguisher in the vicinity of each crane 9. C extinguishers are not recommended for installation in the process areas of production platforms. Gas or Oil fired boilers or heater : 01 number B class extinguisher for each boiler or heater 8.75 KW or greater) : 01 number C class extinguisher for each motor 6. Internal combustion or gas turbine engine installed in an enclosed area : 01 number B class extinguisher for each engine 4. Class of extinguisher is as per NFPA 10. Main corridor of living quarter building : 03 number A .75 KW or greater) Electric generators Gas or Oil fired boilers or heater Crane 1 for each engine A. 4. Hand portable fire extinguishers with less than B-20 kg rating or multipurpose Class A. Electric generators : 03 number C class extinguishers for each two generators 7. Radio room : 01 number C class extinguisher 3. Control room/ Data room/server room : 02 number C class extinguishers for each compartment 62 . the following additional requirements shall be considered: 1. B. 3.
is 200 C). a. Fire area Accommodation blocks (AB/TR) 63 . Likewise. 1/JF-‗x‘ indicates requirements to maintain stability and integrity against jet fires for one hour with insulation requirements for x minute. in hours/ Type of Fire for protection/insulation requirements. Note 3 Critical temperature is the temp. Type of fire: HC =Hydrocarbon pool fire. ‗HC‘ type of fire may be appropriate if the evaluation of the fires likely in the area indicates that ‗JF‘ is not a credible basis for the design of the passive fire protection. Accommodation blocks (AB/TR) ‗HC‘ type of fire may be appropriate if the evaluation of the fires likely in the area indicates that ‗JF‘ is not a credible basis for the design of the passive fire protection.Annexure – 8 Typical fire integrity requirements for fire barriers [Source: ISO 13702] Adjacent protected area NonWellhead areas Process areas including Control hazardous and drilling areas Gas compression areas Stations utility areas (WH) (PA) (CS) (UA) 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 Not to be adjacent 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 1/CF-0 1/CF-0 1/CF-0 1/CF-0 a a a a Not to be adjacent 1/JF -0 1/JF -0 1/JF -0 1/JF -0 a a a a a 1/JF -120 1/JF -60 1/JF -0 1/JF -0 1/JF -0 1/CF-80 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 1/CF-60 Rating is specified as: Endurance duration. Fire area AB UA WH PA CS Note 1 Note 2 Note 3 a. Annexure – 9 Typical fire integrity requirements for load-bearing structures [Source: ISO 13702] Area relying on structure in fire area for integrity Non-hazardous Wellhead areas Process areas Control utility areas and drilling areas including Stations (UA) (WH) Gas compression (CS) areas (PA) AB/TR 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 Not applicable Not applicable 1/CF/400 UA 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 a a a a a WH 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 a a a a a PA 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 1/JF /400 CS 1/CF/400 1/CF/400 Not applicable Not applicable 1/CF/400 o Note 1 Rating is specified as: Period of resistance (hours)/ Type of fire / critical temperature ( C). o in minutes. JF=Jet fire. to reach 139 C above ambient temperature on the non exposed surface. (400 C has been used as a typical value for structural steel. at which yield stress is reduced to the minimum allowable stress under o operational loading conditions. JF=Jet fire. CF=Cellulosic fire. For Alo uminium the corresponding temp. 1/CF-x indicates requirements to maintain stability and integrity against cellulosic fires for one hour with insulation requirements for x minute. CF=Cellulosic fire. Note 2 Type of fire: HC =Hydrocarbon pool fire.
In the absence of any knowledge as regards the relative location of the fire on the riser. As a result. b. Or the minimum time period considered sufficient for a complete evacuation of the installation. the ESD valves and the contents of the riser. c. 200 C has been used as the default surface temperature for the riser sections to ensure the integrity of the ESD valves. PFP may be provided to prevent temperature in the enclosure containing this equipment rising to these levels when subjected to an external fire. it has been assumed that the fire is near the ESD valves and o the riser is filled with liquid hydrocarbon.Annexure – 10 Typical protection criteria for critical equipment [Source: ISO 13702] Protection criteria Surface temperature Protection period o C min a Riser sections < 200 60b Riser supports < 400 60b b Riser topside SDV < 200 60 Fire pumps < 200 60 Emergency generators < 200 60 c UPS systems 40 30 c Control panels for SSIV/SSSV/BOP 40 15 a. 64 .
The dry chemical powder selected shall be free flowing. water repellant. The Dry Chemical Powder should have chemical pigment added which changes the colour. Hose of 23 mtr length fitted with 1 ½ ― of fixed 95 GPM flow at 100 psi brass/ gun metal nozzle capable of giving jet spray & foam and shut off function shall be provided. powder storage tank (as per ASME section – VIII) with relief mechanism. High tensile steel 10-B-C Type B C size II 24 sq.ft and above 9. High tensile steel 10-B-C Type B C Size II 24 sq. The system shall be provided with close couple hose reels either skid mounted or located remotely. The hose reel shall be provided with actuator and one piece spun nitrogen cartridge in accordance with US DOT 3A 800. should be of stainless steel. The powder shall be compatible with AFFF foam concentrate as per MIL –F-24385 F. Inline Brass Educator 1 ½ ― of 95 GPM capacity at 100 psi suitable for sea water shall be connected to the hose reel with suitable SS foam and waterline ball valves. nitrogen expellant system including nitrogen cylinders (conforming to US DOT 3AA 2400 or equivalent). The hose reel shall be fitted with 150 ft.8 Kgs 6 ft. CO2 Extinguishers: The Cylinder body should be steel and the valve should be squeeze grip type and should be of forged brass chrome plated. Visual seal must be provided to help prevent unwanted discharge of contents. rubber hose as per UL 92. Dry Chemical fixed system The Dry Chemical powder fire fighting system shall as a minimum include common welded structural frame mounting the primary system components and inter-connection pipe work. Typical technical parameters of the fire extinguishers shall be as under: Capacity Effective Range Discharge Time Shell UL Rating USCG Rating Suppression capability 2 Kgs 6 ft. non abrasive. Slide bearing systems should be provided for horizontal movements. potassium bicarbonate. actuator system..Annexure – 11 Typical description Foam Water Hose Reel Unit The unit should consist of SS foam tank of 230 ltr capacity with SS hose reel.ft and above 6. and above Less than 12 secs. hose bands etc should be stainless steel / aluminum. recharge and maintenance. The special tools required for operations and maintenance should be provided with each system. hose bands etc. the monitor shall be fitted with flame proof electric motor and remote controlled with joystick operation for both the movement of the monitor and the control of the nozzle. The Extinguisher shall be external cartridge operated type containing 65 . for identification purposes. pull pins. levers. High tensile steel 5-B-C Type B C size I 12 sq.2 kgs 6 ft. Monitor Monitor should be of dual water way design with integral nozzle and light weight in construction. bursting disc.ft and above Dry Chemical Powder Extinguishers The Extinguisher body shall be steel and the handles. and above Less than 12 secs. Pins. and above Less than 14 secs. Where remote controlled monitors are installed. UL listed /FM approved for application with the equipment. discharge devices and all other items necessary for safe and proper system operation.
0mm thk Passed 2000 hrs salt spray test with min. total paint thickness 3-6 MIL Less than 202 kgs 320-B-C Type B C Size IV 750 sq.ft and above 45 kgs 25 ft and above Less than 55 secs.9mm thk Passed 2000 hrs salt spray test with min. total paint thickness 3-6 MIL Less than 10 kgs 60-B-C Type B C size II 140 sq. Carbon steel minm 1.ft and above Charge Weight UL Rating USCG Rating Suppression capability 66 .non corrosive cartridge. total paint thickness 3-6 MIL Less than 24 kgs 120-B-C Type B C Size IV 280 sq. potassium bicarbonate (Purple K) as the extinguishing agent with CO2 expellant Typical technical parameters of the fire extinguishers shall be as under: Capacity Effective Range Discharge Time Shell Corrosion Resistance 4 kgs 30 ft and above Less than 20 secs.ft and above 12 kgs 45 ft and above Less than 30 secs. Carbon steel minm 2.5mm thk Passed 2000 hrs salt spray test with min. Carbon Steel minm 1.