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Presented by Bronius Cikotas at The 24 th Annual Doctors for Disaster Preparedness Meeting, Portland
Presented by Bronius Cikotas at The 24 th Annual Doctors for Disaster Preparedness Meeting, Portland
Presented by
Bronius Cikotas
at
The 24 th Annual Doctors for Disaster Preparedness Meeting,
Portland Oregon, 6 August 2006
Most of the Phenomenology Data Supplied by
Dr. William Radasky of Metatech

NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES

Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES
Data Supplied by Dr. William Radasky of Metatech NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND POST EMP COMMISSION ISSUES

Outline

Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure
Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure
Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure
Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure
Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure
Outline • High Altitude EMP • Threat Delivery Capabilities • US EMP Commission • Infrastructure

High Altitude EMP

Threat Delivery Capabilities

US EMP Commission

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Consequences

Post EMP Commission Issues

Recommendations

Commission • Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Consequences • Post EMP Commission Issues • Recommendations 2
Commission • Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Consequences • Post EMP Commission Issues • Recommendations 2
Commission • Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Consequences • Post EMP Commission Issues • Recommendations 2
Commission • Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Consequences • Post EMP Commission Issues • Recommendations 2
3
3
3
3
3
3

High-Altitude EMP (HEMP)

High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward
High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward
• • • • •
High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward
High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward
High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward
High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) • • • • • Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward

Gamma-ray pulse emitted by burst propagates radially outward at speed of light.

Gammas scatter off of air atoms and generate energetic Compton electrons, primarily between ~ 20 to 40 km altitude.

Compton electrons are turned by Earth’s magnetic field. Turning action generates transverse current that radiates EMP pulse.

Gamma pulse and EMP pulse both propagate at speed of light, so they stay in phase. – EMP pulse grows as gamma pulse weakens.

Scattered gammas and neutrons also contribute to HEMP signal.

in phase. – EMP pulse grows as gamma pulse weakens. Scattered gammas and neut rons also

Large Yield HEMP E1 Detonation

HOB= 480 km at 42.00N, 96.00W
HOB= 480 km at 42.00N, 96.00W
55N Juneau 60N E Peak % of peak Canada Churchill 50N 50W 100% St. John's
55N
Juneau 60N
E Peak
% of peak
Canada
Churchill
50N
50W
100%
St. John's
99%
Edmonton
96%
45N
90%
Seattle
United States
Winnipeg
80%
Quebec
50%
130W
30%
40N
10%
60W
35N
San Francisco
Omaha
New York
Washington DC
3%
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
Bermuda
30N
Atlanta
25N
Houston
Miami
20N
San Juan
120W
110W
100W
90W
80W
70W
Mexico City
1400 kilometers
Bermuda 30N Atlanta 25N Houston Miami 20N San Juan 120W 110W 100W 90W 80W 70W Mexico
Bermuda 30N Atlanta 25N Houston Miami 20N San Juan 120W 110W 100W 90W 80W 70W Mexico
Bermuda 30N Atlanta 25N Houston Miami 20N San Juan 120W 110W 100W 90W 80W 70W Mexico
Bermuda 30N Atlanta 25N Houston Miami 20N San Juan 120W 110W 100W 90W 80W 70W Mexico
Bermuda 30N Atlanta 25N Houston Miami 20N San Juan 120W 110W 100W 90W 80W 70W Mexico

HEMP Characteristics

HEMP Characteristics A 100 km burst will produce significant HEMP fields over a ground radius of
A 100 km burst will produce significant HEMP fields over a ground radius of 1100
A 100 km burst will produce significant HEMP
fields over a ground radius of 1100 km
A 500 km burst will produce HEMP over the
entire U.S.
km A 500 km burst will produce HEMP over the entire U.S. • Given the high
km A 500 km burst will produce HEMP over the entire U.S. • Given the high
km A 500 km burst will produce HEMP over the entire U.S. • Given the high
km A 500 km burst will produce HEMP over the entire U.S. • Given the high

Given the high altitude of detonation and the fact that the EM signals typically are line of sight, the area coverage is large

While the HEMP terminology implies a single pulse, in fact there are a series of pulses that last from microseconds to hundreds of seconds

implies a single pulse, in fact there are a series of pulses that last from microseconds

Different Time Phases of HEMP

Different Time Phases of HEMP E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10
Different Time Phases of HEMP E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10
Different Time Phases of HEMP E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10
Different Time Phases of HEMP E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10
Different Time Phases of HEMP E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10
E2 E1 E3 INTERMEDIATE- EARLY-TIME LATE-TIME TIME 4 PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL 10 SCATTERED GAMMA SIGNAL 2
E2
E1
E3
INTERMEDIATE-
EARLY-TIME
LATE-TIME
TIME
4
PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL
10
SCATTERED GAMMA SIGNAL
2
NEUTRON GAMMA SIGNAL
10
0
10
MHD SIGNAL
10 -2
-4
10
10 -10
10 -8
10 -6
10 -4
10 -2
10 0
10 2
10 4
Time (s)
E(t) (V/m)
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6
SIGNAL 10 0 10 MHD SIGNAL 10 -2 -4 10 10 -10 10 -8 10 -6

HEMP Threat Discussion - E1

HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a
HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a
HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a
HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a
HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a
HEMP Threat Discussion - E1 • The early-time HEMP rises on th e order of a

The early-time HEMP rises on the order of a few ns and decays between 0.1 and 1 microseconds

Strongest frequency content is between 1 and 1000 MHz

Peak fields vary between a few and many 10s of kV/m

Former Russian General officers meeting with the US EMP Commission in 2003 indicated the EMP threat levels up to 200 kilovolts per meter should be considered for the EMP threat.* That is significantly above the levels we have been working with

Coupling is efficient to any metallic conductor

Peak currents vary between tens and thousands of amperes

High frequency fields can be shielded, however non-metallic buildings offer little protection

thousands of amperes – High frequency fields can be shielded, however non-metallic buildings offer little protection

E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues

E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution
E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution
E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution
E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution
E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution
E1 HEMP Network Coupling Issues • Power network – E1 can create flashover on the distribution

Power network

E1 can create flashover on the distribution power line insulators which can produce grid failure

E1 can also impact the power system control electronics leading to grid failure

Telecom network

E1 can affect switching equipment in Central Offices leading to loss of connectivity for extended periods of time

– E1 can affect switching equipment in Central Offices leading to loss of connectivity for extended
10
10
10
10
10
10
11
11
11
11
11
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HEMP Threat Discussion - E3

HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in
HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in
HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in
HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in
HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in
HEMP Threat Discussion - E3 • Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in

Late-time HEMP rises in a few seconds and decays in hundreds of seconds

Frequency content is below 1 Hz (quasi-DC)

Peak fields vary from a few to many 10s of V/km

Coupling is very efficient to long conductors

Main concern is distribution and transmission power systems and long metallic telecom lines (> 1 km)

“DC” currents of hundreds of amperes may flow in power system lines and tens of amperes in telecom lines

Under severe threat-level conditions, possible loss of power and telecom services within large regions of the U.S.

Under severe threat-level conditions, possible loss of power and telecom services within large regions of the

Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP

Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between
Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between
Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between
Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between
Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between
Geomagnetic Storms vs. E3 HEMP • Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between

Recent studies by Metatech have indicated a strong similarity between geomagnetic storms (produced by solar activity) and the late-time HEMP

Similar rise and decay times for geomagnetic field disturbances and E3 HEMP

Lower levels of peak fields from geomagnetic disturbances

The EMP Commission found that the 100 year storm can have peak fields equivalent to E3 HEMP

Some dramatic effects have occurred on the transmission power grids due to geomagnetic storms

Collapse of power grid (Hydro-Quebec in March 1989)

Damage to large transformers

due to geomagnetic storms – Collapse of power grid (Hydro-Quebec in March 1989) – Damage to

Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure

Great Geomagnetic Storm of March 13, 1989

Internal Damage - Hot Enough to Melt Large Copper Secondary Winding Leads 14
Internal Damage - Hot Enough to Melt
Large Copper Secondary Winding Leads
14

External - Single Phase

of March 13, 1989 Internal Damage - Hot Enough to Melt Large Copper Secondary Winding Leads

FSU Example of HEMP Effects on Systems

FSU Example of HEMP Effects on Systems • The Soviet Union performed 3 high-altitude nuclear tests

The Soviet Union performed 3 high-altitude nuclear tests in 1962 over Kazakhstan

3 high-altitude nuclear tests in 1962 over Kazakhstan • In June 1994 at the EUROEM Conference

In June 1994 at the EUROEM Conference in Bordeaux, France, a summary briefing of HEMP effects was provided by General Vladimir Loborev, Director of the Central Institute of Physics and Technology (CIPT) near Moscow Following chart annotated by Radasky in June 1994 summarizes the HEMP effects discussed

Former Russian General officers meeting with the US EMP Commission indicated the EMP threat levels up to 200 kilovolts per meter should be considered for the EMP threat.* That is significantly above the levels that we have been working with

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(June 1994) Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications – Disconnection and Damage Diesels found damaged,
(June 1994)
Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications –
Disconnection and Damage
Diesels found
damaged, “later”
Long line problems due
to EMP “long tail”
After Tests – Invested in
protection devices.
Distinguished work by
Kurchatov, Khariton,
Sakharov
Loss of
Communications –
Many Examples
Note: Ranges were given as kilometers

Note: Red text based on Loborev’s spoken words as documented by Radasky

Note: Ranges were given as kilometers Note: Red text based on Loborev’s spoken words as documented

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Examples of Observed System Anomalies During Testing

Examples of Observed System Anomalies During Testing • Aircraft – Upset of on-board computers and weapon
Examples of Observed System Anomalies During Testing • Aircraft – Upset of on-board computers and weapon
Examples of Observed System Anomalies During Testing • Aircraft – Upset of on-board computers and weapon
Examples of Observed System Anomalies During Testing • Aircraft – Upset of on-board computers and weapon

Aircraft

Upset of on-board computers and weapon launch control systems

Garbled messages

Permanent damage to electronics

Inadequate EMP hardening protection (high frequency coupling through shields, filters and isolation devices, arcing across filters and isolation devices)

Ground-Based Systems

lters and isolation devices) – • Ground-Based Systems – Communication component failures (upsets and perm

Communication component failures (upsets and permanent damage of ICs)

False fault indications

Telephone handset failure (permanent damage)

Printer failures (permanent damage and upset)

Data terminal failures

Power supply failures

Vehicle ignition system failures

Damage of power grid distribution components (Transformers, generators, relays, insulators)

Missiles

Catastrophic Upset

Permanent damage of discrete semiconductors and ICs

Capacitor and resistor damage

Premature firing of EEDS

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Global Shield: Hardening at Facility Level Heat Exchanger Security TV Microwave Diesel Exhaust Air Vent

Global Shield: Hardening at Facility Level

Heat Exchanger Security TV Microwave
Heat
Exchanger
Security TV
Microwave
Diesel Exhaust Air Vent HF Waveguide Coax Sewer (PVC) Waveguide Below Cut-Off Structure Personnel Fuel
Diesel
Exhaust
Air
Vent
HF
Waveguide
Coax
Sewer (PVC)
Waveguide
Below Cut-Off
Structure
Personnel
Fuel T ank
Entry
Water (PVC)
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Personnel Fuel T ank Entry Water (PVC) Natural Gas Interface Protection Hardening Interface EQ 01898 WD

Interface Protection

Hardening Interface

EQ 01898 WD 29

3φ +N

Phone

Lines

Global “Faraday” cage welded steel or brazed copper) Electrical penetration treatments Personnel entrance and aperture control

cage welded steel or brazed copper) • Electrical penetration treatments • Personnel entrance and aperture control
cage welded steel or brazed copper) • Electrical penetration treatments • Personnel entrance and aperture control
cage welded steel or brazed copper) • Electrical penetration treatments • Personnel entrance and aperture control
cage welded steel or brazed copper) • Electrical penetration treatments • Personnel entrance and aperture control

Threat Delivery

Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the
Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the
Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the
Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the
Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the
Threat Delivery • Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the

Russia and China have the capability to launch a HEMP attack against the US

A SCUD launch off our coasts from a trawler/other that could cover a significant part of either coast with HEMP must be considered and evaluated as a threat

The development of North Korea and Iran as credible threats to CONUS for in-country ICBM launches depends largely on the progress of their programs and the effectiveness of US NMD program

in-country ICBM launches depends largely on the progress of their programs and the effectiveness of US

Third World Nuclear Capabilities

(Notional only, unofficial sources)

Ballistic Nuclear APOGEE (km) Country Missile RANGE (km) Weapons (Minimum Energy) Systems 290 Strategic JL-2
Ballistic
Nuclear
APOGEE (km)
Country
Missile
RANGE
(km)
Weapons
(Minimum Energy)
Systems
290 Strategic
JL-2 (SLBM)
8000
---
China
Weapons
DF-31
8000
---
500
120
Israel
70-200 Weapons
1500
320
2000
Possibly material
for 2 Weapons
Jericho 1
Jericho 2
Taepo Dong 1
Nodong 1 / 2
Scud C
450
North Korea
1000 / 1500
230 / 320
550
127
India
60-125 Weapons
Agni 2
2500
600
South Africa
Had 6 Weapons
Arniston
1500
320
Hatf2 and M11
Ghauri
Ghauri 2
300
70
Pakistan
10-25 Weapons
1300
300
2300
530
CSS-8
160
37
Iran
Actively Seeking
Scud C
500
120
Shahab-3
1300
300
Scud B
300
70
Had Active
Iraq
Al Hussein
650
150
Program
Badr 2000
900
210

SOURCES: Center for Defence and International Security Studies (website (5/11/2000); Center for Strategic and International Studies (website 9/5/2000); Arms Control Association website Jun 2001); Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 Sep. ’99; Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace (website 2/27/02); Federation of American Scientists (website 12/20/2001); "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (Jan - Jun 2001)," CIA, 30 Jun 02

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The US EMP Commission

The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its
The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its
The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its
The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its
The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its
The US EMP Commission • Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its

Formed in 2002 by Congress to assess the EMP threat, its effects on the nation’s DoD and civilian infrastructures

Estimate the resultant effects on the population, national security, and economy

Recommend options to deal with the threat

Executive summary published

Report on critical infrastructures has not been released for publication

threat • Executive summary published • Report on critical infrastructures has not been released for publication
threat • Executive summary published • Report on critical infrastructures has not been released for publication

Quote from US EMP Commission Executive Report

Quote from US EMP Commission Executive Report “ EMP is one of a small number of

EMP is one of a small number of threats

“ EMP is one of a small number of threats

that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. It has the capability to produce significant damage to critical infrastructures and thus to the very fabric of our US society as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence and military power.”

as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence
as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence
as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence
as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence
as well as to the ability of the United States and Western nations to project influence

House Armed Services Committee Hearing July 2004

House Armed Services Committee Hearing July 2004 • Congressman Kurt Weldon Vice Chairman of the HASC:
House Armed Services Committee Hearing July 2004 • Congressman Kurt Weldon Vice Chairman of the HASC:

House Armed Services Committee Hearing July 2004 • Congressman Kurt Weldon Vice Chairman of the HASC:

Congressman Kurt Weldon Vice Chairman of the HASC: Summarized the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are largely unprepared.”

the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are
the hearing with the statement “The EMP threat is real, it is significant and we are

Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63

Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and
Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and
Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and
Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and
Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and
Critical National Infrastructures - PDD-63 • Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and

Acknowledges and raises national concern about the vulnerability and interdependencies of our infrastructures

Acknowledges the severity of the threat and the difficulty of threat containment, elimination or defense against it

Directs selected government agencies to address government infrastructure protection and to present a plan of implementation

Requires selected government agencies to work with the private sector to motivate the private sector to address their infrastructure vulnerabilities and protection

the private sector to motivate the private sect or to address their infrastructure vulnerabilities and protection

THE PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM Even after 9-11, the concept that the survival of our infrastructures, our society and
THE PROBLEM Even after 9-11, the concept that the survival of our infrastructures, our society and

Even after 9-11, the concept that the survival of our infrastructures, our society and our way of life can be threatened by nation states or hidden external forces, and that its protection to a large extent against these threats is dependent on the private sector and not on the government has not been understood The government (federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than 90%

(federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than
(federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than
(federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than
(federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than

(federal, state and local) owns less than 10% of critical infrastructures the private sector more than

THE PROBLEM (Continued)

THE PROBLEM ( C ontinued) • Until this concept is understood and the responsibility accepted by

Until this concept is understood and the responsibility accepted by the private sector, no effort by the government, short of legislative action is going to significantly move the private sector to act to protect our critical infrastructures beyond their financial interests. Liability is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is going to be there to pay or collect?

is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is
is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is
is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is
is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is
is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is
is not a driver against major threats like nuclear war or EMP. After all who is

INFRASTRUCTURE

DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES

INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES/INTERDEPENDENCIES • Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both

Transportation needs fuel, fuel needs transportation, power needs both and everything/everyone needs power, water, food, fuel telecommunications, etc.

Because of interdependencies and resultant cascading effects, we need to ask what are the interdependencies and what are the elements within critical infrastructures that can cause them to spiral out of control bringing other infrastructures down with it.

There is a common assumption that our infrastructures are so vast and robust that there is no way, short of a direct nuclear attack, to take them down – EMP or a 100 year solar storm can do it.

there is no way, short of a direct nuclear attack, to take them down – EMP

Just in Time Manufacturing Delivery and Use

Just in Time Manufacturing Delivery and Use • The competitive market has driven many industries throughout

The competitive market has driven many industries throughout the world to just in time operations, pushing many infrastructures to operate close to the edge with minimal backup

to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can
to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can
to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can
to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can
to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can
to operate close to the edge with minimal backup • It is not something that can

It is not something that can be changed without affecting our competitive edge amongst our industries and on the world market

As a result, I believe that the burden/cost of protecting our critical infrastructures, public and private will fall on the government. A way will need to be found to get the private sector and the government to protect critical infrastructures

A way will need to be found to get the private sector and the government to

CHALLENGES

CHALLENGES • To a large extent both the government and private sector do not adequately understand
CHALLENGES • To a large extent both the government and private sector do not adequately understand

To a large extent both the government and private sector do not adequately understand the EMP vulnerability, the interdependencies of our critical infrastructures and the potential cascading effects, which can result from an EMP attack. This understanding is necessary for planning and allocation of resources for infrastructure protection, as well as consequence management.

Major education effort needs to be initiated by the government for the public and the private sector on the severity of the threat, its implications to the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to deal with it

the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to
the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to
the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to
the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to
the nation, the international community and the need for joint private sector and government planning to

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30

Power

Telecommunications

Transportation

Fuel

Water

Food

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • Power • Telecommunications • Transportation • Fuel • Water • Food 30

CONSEQUENCES

CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE

YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE IT

CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE
CONSEQUENCES • YOU DO NOT WANT TO KNOW AND ESPECIALLY YOU DO NOT WANT TO EXPERIENCE

Post EMP Commission Issues

Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a
Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a
Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a
Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a
Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a
Post EMP Commission Issues • EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures • EMP a

EMP a newly realized threat to civilian infrastructures

EMP a “new” threat to national security (DoD dependence on civilian infrastructures)

Threat basically not understood or recognized by Congress or the public

Significant commitment and 10’s of Billions needed to protect the population and our way of life

Both attack prevention and consequence management/life sustainment need to be primary goals

and our way of life • Both attack prevention and consequence management/life sustainment need to be

Post EMP Commission Issues Cont.

Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the
Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the
Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the
Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the
Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the
Post EMP Commission Issues Cont. • We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the

We are vulnerable and so is Europe, Japan and the rest of the modern world and they appear not to appreciate the severity of the threat

Prevalent false perception that EMP is a relatively benign threat that could be used as a show of intent, intimidation, economic/political attack and would result in minimal casualties.

An EMP attack on the US is an attack on the world. It would sink the US economy and world economies would follow with major consequences for the modern and third world countries indirectly resulting in significant loss of life.

with major consequences for the modern and third world countries indirectly resulting in significant loss of

Recommendations

Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •
Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •
Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •
Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •
Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •
Recommendations • Most Important – Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation •

Most Important Attack prevention and consequence management planning and implementation

Planning should include hardening of selected sectors of critical infrastructures, reallocation of and pre- positioning of critical resources ( i.e. food, water, fuel, generation capacity etc.). Assigning organizational responsibilities for preparation, emergency operations, recovery, training and exercises

Continue the EMP Commission to provide assistance, guidance and oversight in dealing with the EMP threat

• Continue the EMP Commission to provide assistance, guidance and oversight in dealing with the EMP
• Continue the EMP Commission to provide assistance, guidance and oversight in dealing with the EMP

Recommendations Continued

Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies
Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies
Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies
Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies
Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies
Recommendations Continued • Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencie s, interdependencies

Initiate programs to understand critical infrastructure dependencies, interdependencies and resource needs for extended operations and recovery.

Initiate R&D programs in EMP hardening to optimize hardening efficiency and costs particularly in light of emerging technologies in electronics miniaturization, optics, distributed power generation, materials etc.

light of emerging technologies in electronics miniaturization, optics, distributed power generation, materials etc. 35

Recommendations Continued

Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close
Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close
Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close
Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close
Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close
Recommendations Continued • Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close

Expand the National Missile Defense program to deal with surprise launches from close in to our coasts and borders to include terrorist launches from within CONUS

Share threat consequence information, planning and resources with our allies for world wide attack prevention and consequence management

Initiate treaty agreements with allies for consequence management and assistance in case of HEMP attack.

• Initiate treaty agreements with allies for consequence management and assistance in case of HEMP attack.
• Initiate treaty agreements with allies for consequence management and assistance in case of HEMP attack.