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INTRODUCTION: THE UNION OF THE CROWNS, THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS

This book is about the political consequences caused when reality fails to meet great expectations, when promise is not met and when leaders are blamed for causing this gap between the real and the imagined. The 1603 Union of the Crowns, in which James VI of Scotland inherited the thrones of England and Ireland, was a watershed moment in British history. The union laid the foundation for the future formation of the British state, the forging of the British Empire and the emergence of Britain as a world power. However, to those living in the period 160342 these historical events were in the distant future. When many contemporaries thought about the meaning of the union they often considered it in confessional terms. For those with a militant Protestant mindset the union was pregnant with the potential to create a Protestant superpower, one that was capable of both protecting fellow Protestants on the European continent and providing a counterbalance to militarized and reinvigorated post-Tridentine Catholicism. However, as the decades progressed it became clear that the reality of the situation was quite different. Britain was not a Protestant superpower. In fact, for most of the period, a time when Europe was frequently at war, Britain was neutral, and the times it did attempt to intervene in Continental affairs ended in abject failure. That there was a serious disjuncture between what many thought Britain should be a Protestant and Continental power and what it was in reality formidable enough to avoid invasion but prone to neutrality and failure created serious tensions between the early Stuart kings and a significant portion of the body politic. Therefore, as will be argued throughout, militant Protestantism and the militant Protestant conceptualization of British identity reveal a great deal about both oppositional politics under the early Stuarts and the origins of the British Civil Wars. Not only were militant Protestants frequently disappointed that their great expectations of what Britain should be did not match the reality of what it actually was, they were also frequently willing to voice their
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disappointment in a public manner whether this was in Parliament, in the pulpit, in print or in circulated manuscripts. The early Stuart monarchs, for their part, understood these frustrations and often sympathized with them, but for various reasons were never able to offer a satisfactory reconciliation between militant Protestants hopes for the potential of Britain and the perceived failure to meet this potential. This perceived failure to reach the militant potential of the Union of Crowns was not only a significant failure of leadership; it was also a failure of vision and communication. For the Stuarts British identity needed to be centred first and foremost on their dynasty, with confessional interests often made secondary. This is not to suggest that confessional interests were not important to the early Stuarts after all, James I and Charles I were committed Protestants but time and time again they showed that the security and future of the Stuart dynasty trumped confessional interests. Perhaps this was because, unlike Elizabeth I, their claim was not dependant on Protestantism, but based on their bloodline and, as they increasingly argued, divine favour. Because the needs of the Stuart state and dynasty were prioritized, the Stuarts often showed a willingness to engage with Catholic powers that often made their militant Protestant subjects uncomfortable. At no time was this more apparent than when James I chose to negotiate a marriage treaty for his son to a Spanish Catholic princess despite the fact that Continental Protestants, including his daughter, son-in-law and grandchildren, appeared in imminent danger at the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in the early 1620s. This, as will be argued in Chapter 2, was a significant transitional moment when many militant Protestants began to take their disappointments public in open opposition to the king. As conceptualized here, militant Protestantism was the belief that the world was divided into two camps the false church of Antichrist (the Roman Catholic Church) and the true church of Christ (Protestantism). Central to this mindset was the belief that a violent clash between these two camps was inevitable. Militant Protestants believed that those who belonged to the camp of the true church needed to be vigilant because they had to be prepared for the inevitable attacks that would come from the false church, and, if necessary, they needed to be prepared to go on the offensive. Perhaps most importantly, militant Protestants believed that the true church knew no boundaries: it was an internationalist perspective that imbued within its adherents the belief that Protestants everywhere needed to protect one another, to take up arms in each others defence and to attack their common enemies. As an ideology, militant Protestantism pre-dated the Union of Crowns and its formulation had both domestic and international contexts. In England, militant Protestantism was shaped by the mid-Tudor tumults and the hegemony of the Foxean martyrological narrative in the Elizabethan era. English Protes-

Introduction

tant identity was forever transformed by the Marian persecutions and found its apotheosis in John Foxes Book of Martyrs (1563), a book that could be found, alongside the Bible, in nearly every English parish after 1570.1 Foxes book was full of detailed accounts of the martyrdom of adherents of the true church at the hands of Papists, pagans and other enemies of true Christianity. The Foxean narrative established that the true church was the uncorrupted apostolic church which gradually, over the centuries, became corrupted by popish innovations. Thus the visible, institutional church became the corrupted church of the papal Antichrist, but in the meantime there remained a core group of adherents to the invisible, true church. The Reformation, in this account, was seen as Gods divine intervention which allowed the true church, in certain places like England, to once again become the visible church, while in other places, like Spain, the institutional church remained the corrupt church of the papal Antichrist. Foxes narrative was radical, as it maintained that a small group, often in opposition to secular authority, had maintained the true church throughout the centuries.2 This radicalism was diminished in England by the fact that the true church was made the institutional church by royal fiat, creating the notion of the Godly prince a ruler that fostered and protected the true church. The connection between Godly prince, the true church and the people was a major source for cooperation and collaboration between monarch and people in England, especially in the forging of a Protestant identity for the English nation, under Elizabeth I and into the reign of James I, as the Foxean narrative was frequently used to bolster the authority and image of the monarchy, especially in times of crisis, such as 1588 and 1605, when the monarch was under threat from Catholic intrigue. Nevertheless, Foxes narrative retained its radical potential and was used by those who criticized the but half reformed status of the English church among vocal Puritans and Presbyterians. Scottish Protestants equally adhered to the Foxean narrative of Protestant history, but their version of Protestant identity sharply veered from the English when it came to the role of the monarch.3 In England the Reformation was brought about by king (and eventually queen) and Parliament, while in Scotland it was the product of rebellious noblemen in collaboration with Parliament. This independence of the origins of Scottish Protestantism from the Crown was an important part of the forging of Scottish Protestant identity and a major source of contention between kirk and king as James VI came of age in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. There were other significant differences between the two churches. One prominent group within the Scottish kirk, nominally headed by Andrew Melville, were proponents of the two kingdoms theory that the kirk should be separate from secular authority. The division between the Crown and the Melvillians was political in nature and the two sides shared a basic adherence to Calvinist theology. Following his accession to the English

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throne James ushered through a series of reforms in the episcopacy, the General Assembly and introduced the Five Articles of Perth in an attempt to bring the churches of his two kingdoms into a greater convergence, even if Jamess enforcement of these innovations was haphazard and almost nonexistent. To be sure, despite Jamess attempt to create convergence, there were still significant religious differences between England and Scotland. First, there was a difference in ecclesiastical polity: episcopacy remained in place in England while Scotland was a mixed polity of Presbyterian and episcopacy. Second, there was a liturgical difference between the two churches: the English church had a prayer book and was characterized by a set liturgy, while the Scottish church placed more emphasis on extemporaneous prayer and preaching. Scholars have typically focused on these differences to suggest that the two kingdoms were very far apart in their religious practices during this period and that perhaps the gulf between the two was unbridgeable.4 However, the differences between English and Scottish Protestant identity and practice are less glaring when the two churches are placed in an international context. The era of the Second Reformation an era that saw the rise of Calvinism, the Catholic Reformation and increasingly militant and violent confessional divisions had a significant impact on the formulation of militant Protestant identity in Britain. Indeed, it was the international nature of Calvinism that provided an important point of contact between the formulations of Protestant identity in England and Scotland. Internationalism was important during the initial years of Calvinist expansion, and during his life Calvin endeavoured to make his church an international church.5 From his base in Geneva Calvin himself kept an active correspondence with adherents to his movement from Scotland and England to the Low Countries to Hungary. Calvins works were translated into French, Dutch, English, Italian, Spanish, German, Czech and Polish. Geneva, as the centre of early international Calvinism, was home to Protestant refugees from all over Europe. And even after Calvins death in 1564 his church retained its international character. Calvinist territories from the Palatinate, to Bohemia, to Poland took up collections for Geneva whenever it was threatened with invasion by the Duke of Savoy.6 The Synods of Tonneins (1614) and Dort (161819) and the Harmony of Confessions (1581) were all attempts at creating greater international Calvinist solidarity. The Geneva Bible, with its marginal commentary and references to various Calvinist catechisms further helped to create a sense of doctrinal solidarity. The international composition of the student bodies at Reformed universities in Heidelberg, Ghent, Sedan, Leiden and Geneva fostered an international intellectual exchange amongst Calvinists. Both the English and Scottish churches blended aspects of Calvinism or the Reformed tradition with particularities that often reflected domestic political developments. Such national particularities, however, did not prohibit

Introduction

both churches from the influence of international Calvinism. Under Edward VI (154753) England became a place of refuge for leading reformers from the Continent, such as Vermigli, Bucer and a Lasco, seeking refuge after Emperor Charles Vs victory over the Schmalkaldic League at Muhlenberg. Likewise, Edwardian England was a destination for Scottish Protestant refugees, such as John Knox. During the Marian restoration of Catholicism both English and Scots reformers fled to the Continent where they often congregated together, as in Frankfurt. While the Frankfurt community split because Scottish proposals for a more Calvinist discipline were rejected by the English as too austere, it was used by English exiles in Geneva.7 Therefore, while these differences over ecclesiology and liturgy certainly existed, too much should not be made of them they were not impediments to cohesion in worldview. It is important to remember that both English and Scottish reformers alike experienced the cycles of reform, repression and exile that went into shaping their narrative of the visible and invisible, true and false churches of Christ and Antichrist. Significant reformers in both kingdoms spent time on the Continent and shared English translations of the works of Continental reformers. Indeed, the fact that there was no language barrier between England and Lowland Scotland (the heart of the reform movement) should not be overlooked. Works translated in England were read in Scotland and vice versa. English and Scottish connections to the Continent continued after the initial years of reform through the end of the sixteenth century. Because Calvinism was an international movement its adherents were spread all over Europe. Different Calvinists found themselves in very different political situations. Some, as those in Scotland, began as a minority movement but eventually found themselves under a Calvinist church and king. Others, as those in France, began as a minority as well but continued to struggle for recognition from a staunchly Catholic monarchy. Still others, as in the Palatinate, were princes who converted to Calvinism and conducted a top-down conversion of their realms. This diversity of political situations meant that those kingdoms where the monarch and the majority of the people were Calvinist found themselves in a position where it was possible to aid, either monetarily or militarily, their co-religionists who were in the minority or struggling to gain independence, as in the Low Countries, or recognition, as in France, from Catholic monarchs. Scholars of Calvinism have labelled the militant pro-Protestant foreign policies employed by such Continental figures as Count Johan Casimir of the Palatinate, Christian of Anhalt and the Earl of Leicester in England, political Calvinism.8 Political Calvinism was primarily a form of anti-popery and therefore it did not necessarily exclude the possibility of a closer defensive alliance with Lutherans and did not depend on theological cohesion between the two confessions. To be sure, there were significant divisions between Lutherans and Calvinists in the age of the Second Reformation over the Eucharist, soteriology and so on.

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The Formula of Concord (1577) patched up divisions in Lutheranism between Gnesio-Lutherans (those who subscribed to the original doctrines of Martin Luther on predestination and the Eucharist) and the Phillipists (the followers of Melanchthon who tended to agree with Calvin on the Eucharist) but it also further codified the differences between Lutheran and Reformed.9 However, the Formula caused some consternation within Lutheranism, as the Danish King Frederick II refused to sign it believing that it would only cause discord within Protestantism at a time when militant Catholicism was on the upswing.10 Calvinists made concerted efforts to bridge the gaps between Lutheran and Reformed as well. Irenic works produced by German Calvinists such as of Zacharius Ursinuss Admonitio (1581) and David Pareuss Irenicum (1614) attempted to win [Lutherans] over by persuasion and stress the points of agreement between Reformed and Lutheran.11 In this way the Calvinist irenic movement was an attempt to gain concessions within the empire by the Reformed church and be brought under the rubric of the Peace of Augsburg. It was also an attempt to lay the groundwork for a defensive alliance in the face of fears of a militant postTridentine Catholic Church. These movements crossed the Channel where they made a significant impact on British Protestant identity. The Elizabethan regime laboured to aid Protestants on the Continent financially and diplomatically while seeking liberty of conscience for them if they lived under Catholic rulers.12 The Elizabethan policy shifted from diplomacy to military intervention in 1585 with an expedition to the Netherlands led by the Earl of Leicester. Various treatises advocating both Protestant unity and aggressive anti-popery were printed in England around the time of this shift in foreign policy. Closer examination of these works shows a strong emphasis on the international aspects of Protestantism, a desire to lay aside all doctrinal differences and focus on the things that united them, such as a strong dislike of the papacy and a common interest in stemming the tide of the aggressive Catholic Reformation. Johan Casimirs justification to the French king for supporting the Huguenots appeared in an English translation in 1579.13 The works of Danish Lutheran Niels Hemmingsen presented a desire for Protestant unification. The treatise The Faith of the Church Militant appeared in a version translated by Thomas Rogers in 1581. In the translators preface Rogers relates that the reason he translated Hemmingsons work was to prove that Protestants are not so, as the Papists give out, at variance among themselves. For this work, with infinite other good books of foraine writers in our English tongue, doth shew, that touching the substance of Religion we varie not.14 Hemmingsen had attracted the ire of several German Gnesio-Lutherans, especially August of Saxony, for his views on the Eucharist because they veered too closely to Calvinism.15 Hemmingsen was no Calvinist, but as a prototypical Phillipist he represented the branch of Lutheranism that was more willing to reach out

Introduction

to the Reformed church. Amongst Protestant irenicists in Britain there was a sense that moderate Phillipists represented the best opportunity for Protestants to unify while the rigid Lutherans, as Edwin Sandys described them, seemed to be more inclined to join with the Catholics to root out Calvinism.16 Perhaps no work better exemplifies transcultural and transnational influences on British militant Protestantism and British Protestant identity than the Huguenot anti-tyrant treatise Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. The fourth section of the treatise was translated into English and printed in 1588 under the title A Short Apologie for Christian Soldiers. Printed in connection to an English campaign of support of Henry IV and the French Huguenots, the treatise posed the question as to whether it was lawfull for neighbouring princes to send ayde to the subjects of another prince who were either afflicted for Religion, or oppressed with tyrannie. The significance of this section of Vindiciae appearing in English lies in its enunciation of resistance theory as a concept that spans borders and overrides particular polities. Other sections of the treatise addressed the sacred tripartite covenant between people, king and God and implied that only a part of a specific commonwealth the subjects of a particular king could lawfully rebel in order to maintain the covenant between God and people. These sections were nowhere to be found in A Short Apologie, as the arguments made in them were certain to have made Elizabeth uncomfortable. Instead A Short Apologie included only the section of the Vindiciae that justified military intervention against a tyrant who was an enemy of the true church. In this way, resistance theory during the Elizabethan period was transformed from something concerning the rights of inferior magistrates within a constitutional framework to something that extended to members of the true church throughout Christendom. According to Quentin Skinner, the Huguenot theory of resistance, as represented by Vindiciae, represented a more radical theory of resistance than theories articulated by British Calvinists such as Knox, Goodman, Ponet and Buchanan.17 The introduction of Huguenot resistance theory also represents the internationalization of resistance theory in Britain. When Knox called upon the Scottish nobility to rebel in his Appellation, it was a call to arms specific to Scotland.18 Buchanans theories of resistance were framed within the laws of Scottish kingship. What the Vindiciae showed, through A Short Apolgie, was that the tyrant was not necessarily someone who violated the covenant between God and the people over which he ruled, but he could be any prince who oppressed the true religion anywhere. The central tenet of A Short Apologie was that it is manifest that the church of God is one, that Christ is the head of the church, whose members are so knitte and ioyned together, that the least of them cannot suffer violence, but that the whole must also greeve and sorrowe with it.19 It was incumbent upon all members of the true church to aid those other members who were afflicted by tyranny

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all members should taste the cuppe of bitternesse together with their brethren. Those who refused to aid their afflicted brethren were as guilty of violating Gods commandments and committing a grievous sin as the tyrants themselves. The tract was vague as to the definition of the true church there were no references to specific reformer or specific confessions in all probability a reflection of the original purpose of the tract, to secure broad support for the Huguenot cause. A Short Apolgie may represent an extreme interpretation of objectives and justifications of late Elizabeth foreign policy, but the notion that the true church required assistance from foreign monarchs, coupled with actual military intervention, would survive in the militant Protestant mindset well into the Stuart era. As will be argued in Chapter 1, Protestant internationalism and militant Protestantism was prevalent in both England and Scotland and was especially enhanced by the Union of the Crowns. Just as historians have emphasized religious differences between England and Scotland, they have also emphasized political and cultural differences as obstacles prohibiting the formation of a cohesive British identity. British identity is typically seen as an eighteenth-century phenomenon that occurred in the course of forging an empire and fighting the French.20 Those who study British identity in the early Stuart period have recognized that while James VI and I and other members of the aristocratic elite saw themselves as the rulers and governors of a British kingdom, this did not trickle down below the elite level.21 Indeed, there is enough evidence to suggest that, despite the Union of Crowns, the two kingdoms remained very separate. Jamess attempts to form a perfect union between his kingdoms were eventually rejected by the English Parliament in 1607, leaving the two kingdoms united in sovereignty, but separate in laws, churches and political institutions. It was up to James himself to style himself King of Great Britain, a move that caused a great deal of consternation among those, especially lawyers of common law, who believed that this might abrogate all previous laws made under the separate kingdoms of England and Scotland. Furthermore, the long tradition of antagonism between the two kingdoms made the forging of a single British identity out of separate English and Scottish identities difficult. Britain itself was a term used by the kings of England dating back to the thirteenth century in reference to the Brutus myth of Galfridian lore as a way of asserting English hegemony over the entire island, relegating Scotland to the status of a vassal kingdom.22 Therefore, from a Scottish perspective Britain was not necessarily a neutral term, but one that conjured centuries of English military aggression towards Scotland. As late as 1630 during a dispute with England over fishing rights the Scottish Privy Council complained to Charles I of the prejudice whiche this kingdome susteanes by suppressing the name of Scotland in all the infestments, patents, writs and records thairof passing under his Majesties name and confusing the same under the name Great Britain.23 When Scottish

Introduction

jurist Thomas Craig travelled to England to serve on the Commission on Union in 1604 he was shocked by the amount of anti-Scottish prejudice that greeted him. One English lawyer told him that he believed there were no educated men in Scotland and no universities while a member of Parliament referred to Scots as treacherous and bloodthirsty.24 While many English expressed reverence for their new Scottish king they could not let go of their old stereotypes of the Scots as poor and beggarly. This was expressed in a poem:
God save our King James and keep him from evil And send al such Scotchmen away to the devil Or else into Scotland there stil to remaine Send home with a vengeance these Scotsmen againe.25

The English were not the only ones to hold negative stereotypes. In 1633 Scottish travel writer William Lithgow portrayed the English court as a place of rampant effeminacy, where the native martial prowess and masculinity of young Scotsmen was corrupted to the point that many doubt, if they bee Mayds or Men.26 Such examples are but a small sample of the kinds of negative stereotypes that remained prevalent well after the Union of Crowns. Because of the survival of these long-held stereotypes and traditional national antagonisms, many historians have not fully explored the formation of British identity under the early Stuarts, aside from recognizing that the king and certain members of his court saw themselves as British while at the same time the vast majority maintained their traditional, and separate, identities as Scottish or English.27 Focusing on these traditional national antagonisms has obscured the fact that there was a significant group of English and Scots in this period who thought with a British mindset, especially when their thoughts turned to the conduct of foreign policy. Despite the persistence of these traditional antagonisms it was inevitable that certain aspects of the multiple-kingdom inheritance began to converge after 1603. Perhaps most significantly, the sharing of a king meant that the kingdoms had to share a foreign policy. As the purview of the king, foreign policy was often British in conceptualization and composition the monarch could not have separate foreign policies for each of his kingdoms. If the King of Great Britain were to go to war, he would need to take all of his kingdoms with him. For James VI and I and Charles I diplomacy always prioritized dynastic interests over confessional. This meant that foreign relations had to benefit the Stuart dynasty first and foremost. As a result the early Stuarts appeared to frequently change tack in their diplomatic pursuits at times they sought entente with Catholic powers such as Spain and the Imperial Habsburgs and at other times they sought outright alliance, such as during the period of the negotiations for the Spanish match. There were other periods when the Stuarts pursued a policy of war against Catholic powers, as during the years 16249 when there

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were wars against both Spain and France. No matter whether they were pursuing neutrality or war with Catholic powers, the Stuarts always considered securing the stability and future of their dynasty first. This meant that at times they could appear indifferent or even hostile towards Protestant powers, as was the case when Jamess son-in-law Frederick V, Elector Palatine lost both Bohemia and the Upper and Lower Palatinates in quick succession in 1620 while James seemingly looked on. This apparent aloofness to the international Protestant situation caused individuals in both Scotland and England to sharply criticize Stuart foreign policy. These critics believed that Britain needed to conduct foreign policy in a way that prioritized confessional alliances. It is this clash between the dynastic and confessional visions of Britain that is at the centre of this book. Therefore, this militant Protestant British identity, forged as it was around the conceptualization of the ideal foreign policy and the disputes it engendered, can tell us something very important about the early Stuart era: there was a significant number of English and Scots who saw themselves as British and who had conceptualized opposition to Crown policy in British terms. If Anglo-Scottish collaboration brought an end to Charles Is personal rule in 1640 and if the English and Scots collaborated to remove military authority from Charles I in 16412 both of which were factors in the causing of the Civil Wars then the history of Anglo-Scottish collaboration needs to be understood. It will be argued that this collaboration did not emerge overnight in response immediate problems (as many revisionist historians have argued). Several decades of militant Protestant thought about Britain provided the language and the wherewithal necessary for militant Protestant elements in both England and Scotland to collaborate in order to bring an end to Charles Is prerogative rule. While it has been suggested above that militant Protestantism emphasized the confessional aspects of the Union of Crowns over the dynastic, it must be noted that they were in no way mutually exclusive. Dynastic politics, especially when they were cast in a confessional light, could have a significant influence on militant Protestantism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the influence the Palatinate lobby had in British politics during this period. In many ways the winter of 161213 from the death of Prince Henry in November to the marriage of Princess Elizabeth to Frederick V, Elector Palatine in February was one of the most important moments of the era. It made Charles heir to the three thrones and Elizabeth and her potential progeny his successors. A Palatinate succession was not entirely far-fetched, given that Charles had been a sickly child and his older brother had died at a tender age. Therefore throughout the rest of the 1610s it was not impossible to envision a future in which the three kingdoms, the Upper and Lower Palatinate and an Electoral title could be vested in a single person. This possibility must have been enticing to militant Protestants, as it would have in combining Britain and the Palatinate created the largest Prot-

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estant power in Europe, strategically placed as both a maritime Atlantic power (the better to check Spain and France) and in the heart of the Holy Roman Empire (the better to check the Habsburgs and France). A Palatinate succession remained a very real possibility for seventeen years; it was not until 1630 that Charles I produced an heir (the future Charles II), at which point Elizabeth and Frederick had already produced eight children of which five were male.28 It is in the light of this that the Palatinate crisis must be understood. When Frederick V was elected King of Bohemia in 1619 it added yet another piece and a fourth crown at that to the potential Palatinate succession. The fact that James seemed to disavow his son-in-laws action was perplexing to many, because the Bohemian accession potentially created a Protestant power to rival the Habsburgs. When Frederick lost Bohemia, the Upper and Lower Palatinate and his Electoral title in one fell swoop in 1620, it was a serious blow to these militant Protestant ambitions. That Britain seemingly sat on the sidelines or at least responded with half-measures was a cause of deep concern for militant Protestants. That James seemed to think that the solution to this problem was to marry Charles to a Spanish princess and create a potential situation where Britain would not become the centre of a Protestant and Continental imperial Crown but rather become absorbed into the Habsburg imperium was shocking to many. Not only this, but if there was a Palatinate succession Britain would not be adding the rulers Palatinate and Bohemia it would be ruled by a dynasty that had been forced to live in exile, essentially begging for subsidies from friends, relatives and allies to survive. If there was a Palatinate succession after 1620 it would certainly have meant that the three kingdoms would have been dragged into war on the Continent to regain Frederick V and his childrens patrimony. The more time passed, the more difficult it would have become to regain the Palatinate, let alone Bohemia. So if Britain was potentially going to war anyway, why wait? The hopes of a Protestant empire had been dashed, James I appeared unwilling to do anything about it and Britain was at a serious strategic disadvantage the longer it waited to respond. This is what made 1620 such a serious crisis not only did the ambitions of militant Protestants disappear in a flash but Stuart inactivity, or half-heartedness, seemed to put Britain at a strategic disadvantage should a war come and many believed that a war was inevitable. The responses to the crisis were both emotional and tactical, and as a result the Palatinate family had no shortage of people in Britain courtiers, commoners and the like who were willing to speak to their interests and lobby the king to remember the cause of his sister, brother-in-law and their children. These included prominent diplomats like Thomas Roe, noblemen like the Duke of Hamilton and prominent lawyers such as Sir Richard Cave. At times members of the Palatinate family themselves were present in England to lobby the king in person, as when Charles Louis and Rupert the two eldest surviving sons of Elizabeth and Frederick spent two

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years in the mid-1630s at Charles Is court. Therefore, there was a near constant presence around the king reminding him of the Palatinate cause. Charles I was sympathetic to their plight, but he was not willing to risk too much for their restoration besides, by 1635 he had two sons and two daughters and a Palatinate succession seemed remote. Charles was willing to listen to various proposals for restoring his nephews, but the most he seemed willing to try was naval engagements with the Spanish in the Caribbean he was certainly not willing to risk a costly overland expedition to the Palatinate. Attacks on Spanish shipping would never have been enough to bring a full restoration, so the Palatinate lobby was often willing to take its case to the public through print, manuscript and other means. This campaign appealed to militant Protestants because it appealed to their sense of Protestant internationalism. But it also reminded them of the pain of their lost Protestant empire, made them nostalgic for their past ambitions and reminded them that the Stuarts had failed to lead Britain to its full military potential. It is safe to say that the Palatinate lobby did not intend to cause a rebellion (many of them, like Richard Cave and the princes Rupert and Maurice, ended up on the Royalist side of the Civil Wars), their only goal was to get a more solid commitment to the Palatinate Cause from Charles I, but in the course of taking their case to the public they created new dissents and dredged up old ones. As will be shown, especially in Chapters 5 and 6, the Palatinate lobby was a significant presence in the Long Parliament and played a major role in the widening gulf between Charles I and his supporters. Charles Louis himself was present in both England and Scotland for most of 1641 and was with the king when he attempted to arrest the Five Members in January 1642, and may have played a role in warning them, albeit an indirect one. Yet perhaps the most important way the Palatinate cause influenced the course of events in 1641 had to do with a manifesto on the Palatinate issued by Charles I that July. The manifesto declared that Charles I was willing, after so many years, to raise an army and restore his nephews by force if necessary. This was the most militant statement on the Palatinate issued by Charles in many years. Most significantly the issuing of the manifesto brought the possibility of raising an army. Charles I had shown that he could not be trusted with an army. Certainly he had shown this in the short-term, as revisionists have emphasized, by plotting with army leadership to overthrow Parliament the so-called Army Plot of 1641. But he had also shown this in the long-term by failing to properly and fully support the Palatinate cause. To the many militant Protestants in the Long Parliament, the possibility of an army for the Palatinate also presented the opportunity to seize control of military matters and prevent another Stuart failure. Again, if the most immediate cause of the Civil War was the attempt to remove military authority from Charles I, then this attempt cannot be understood properly outside the context of the long history of the Palatinate cause

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and the role of the Palatinate lobby in reminding the public of these failures. Furthermore, the Palatinate cause was a British cause. Both Scots and English showed concern for the Palatinate; both Scots and English agreed that Charles I was a military failure; and both Scots and English collaborated to remove him from military authority. Hence the Palatinate story is a British story. In many ways this book is a study of ideas, ideals and the language of politics. The focal point is the way public discourse and debate in this case the discourse about the meaning of Britain and its ideal role in the wider world shaped political reality. As Colin Kidd has stated, British political thought should be understood as political thought about the entity or entities which comprise the British Isles.29 First and foremost, the main consideration here is what certain people, mostly hot Protestants, thought and said about Britain after 1603. Much of this thought centred on religion both in domestic context and international contexts. Often these things were not mutually exclusive and they shaped and influenced each other in significant ways. This emphasis on ideology and discourse is intended to provide a counterbalance to the concept of the British problem as conceptualized by Conrad Russell and other scholars of the revisionist school of thought. For Russell the challenges facing the early Stuart monarchs stemmed from the difficulties associated with ruling a composite monarchy where the affairs of one kingdom impinged on those of others and dissidents in one kingdom could provide a model for like-minded dissidents in another, leading to a polarising of the politics of all three.30 Russells approach stems from the ideas of J. G. A. Pocock and what has been labelled the New British History that is, attempts to integrate those portions of the Atlantic Archipelago that were previously seen as peripheral, such as Scotland, Wales and Ireland, into the centre of the analysis.31 The New British History, as well as Russells and other revisionists approach to the British problem, has been criticized for various reasons, among them that it could easily lead down the path of enriched history, where the internal conditions in one kingdom, such as Scotland, are deemed important only when they can reveal more about the internal conditions in another kingdom, such as England. The nuances and complexities inherent to outside kingdom are deemed important only in so far as they enhance knowledge of the inside kingdom. Both Keith Brown and John Morrill have argued that enriched history can relegate the other kingdoms to the periphery, thereby not really solving the original problem of creating a more integrated history.32 This book is intended to remedy, therefore, the deus ex machina role that revisionists, like Sharpe and Russell, have ascribed to Scotland. In their conceptualisation of the origins of the English Civil War, Covenanter-led Scotland, radicalized by its tradition of resistance theory and anti-Erastianism, inserted this radical language into an English political culture that was otherwise peace-

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ful, copacetic and consensual. The most glaring problem with this notion is that it assumes Scotland existed in a vacuum and that when it came to radical ideas England was a tabula rasa for the Scots to write their radicalism upon. It will be argued below, especially in chapter four, that post-1603 there was a common language of criticism of the monarchs policies in England and Scotland that the Covenanters could draw upon in their efforts to convince an English public that your grievances are ours. To counter this enriched, Anglocentric version of the British problem as favoured by revisionists, many scholars with a more Scoto-centric perspective have posited that Scotland spent much of this period deflecting the Stuart monarchs attempts to place a supranational British identity (or perception as Alan MacInnes calls it) over their entrenched Scottish identity.33 Morrill, in later writings, has challenged this by calling for a more holistic approach to the British problem by investigating the dialectical processes that went into creating Britain. He argues that historians of Ireland, Scotland and Wales have framed their history as a reaction and resistance to English military and economic superiority and the process of Anglicization. National histories, according to Morrill, are often guilty of understating the degree to which each native culture did not so much heroically resist acculturation and integration as interact one with another so as to experience profound change and adaptation.34 It is by keeping this in mind that a more nuanced approach to the formation of notions of Britishness after the Union of Crowns can be discerned. This is not to suggest that there were not aspects of Scottish political culture that remained uniquely Scottish, or that there were not political developments, as will be shown in Chapter 3, that had more Scottish character than British. Ethan Shagan has further argued that Russells British problem and other revisionists approach to the Civil War is too mechanical in that it provides a structural framework and short-term explanations for the collapse of the Stuart monarchy in a political atmosphere that was devoid of ideological division or long-term problems.35 Shagan, Tim Harris and others have argued a greater understanding of ideological conflict and division can be gained by paying close attention to news, propaganda and print aspects of the political culture that were often ignored by revisionists.36 Shagan and Harris were, in many ways, making an argument about the public sphere without necessarily labelling it as such. Perhaps one of the most important articulations of the implication of the public sphere for understanding politics in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England/Britain has come from Peter Lake and Steve Pincus.37 They have argued that the public sphere has been used to move away from the revisionist conceptualization of English politics as court-centered, elitist and consensual and their methodology that favoured manuscript over print source material because it was believed manuscripts told what really happened as opposed to print, which only

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told what contemporaries perceived or claimed to have happened or was mere propaganda.38 The public sphere was originally constructed by Jrgen Habermas in 1962 who saw it as an abstract space for rational-critical debate among private individuals. He linked the rise of the public sphere to the rise of the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century. Habermass public sphere has been reimagined by numerous scholars depending on periodization and theoretical construction. Historians of early modern England, Lake and Pincus among them, have argued that there was a burgeoning public sphere in the late sixteenth century during the reign Elizabeth I thanks to her regimes attempts to muster popular support for her religious programme. Lake and Pincus, and others, have argued that a single, monolithic public sphere did not exist instead there were multiple public spheres that were sporadic and only existed at times when there was a breakdown in consensus at the centre of a particular regime. These public spheres spaces for and modes of communication or making pitches in which appeals to a general audience were made through a variety of media, appealing to a notion of the public good (or religious truth) existed when some element within a regime believed that emergency measures were necessary to mobilize a public in order to convince the monarch to do or not do something. A prime example of this is when a public was mobilized to get Elizabeth I to execute Mary Queen of Scots or to prevent her from marrying the Duke of Anjou.39 In their conceptualization of the post-Reformation public sphere Lake and Pincus have argued that the public sphere was a series of exchanges not so much between the rulers and the ruled as between elements within the regime and their allies, clients and connections.40 This public sphere, they have argued, was legitimized by two prevalent and socially acceptable rhetorical forms. The first was counsel-giving: the right to petition the ruler and conduct activities generally accepted as good for the commonwealth. This form existed in the Middle Ages but was increasingly adopting classical rhetorical forms as Humanism became more prevalent. The second came from the tradition of religious disputation and controversy. These were accepted as legitimate because they were well-established and, as Lake and Pincus have pointed out, people in this period had a marked aversion to anything that could be construed as popular. While these rhetorical forms are certainly less court-centred forms of public discourse, they are nonetheless still elite. In Lake and Pincuss post-Reformation public sphere political discourse still emanates from the court and is directed towards the central figure of the court the monarch. This model works better for a monarch like Elizabeth I who was more of a cipher, who typically kept her feelings on a particular subject to herself and was often slow to act. Conversely, it does not work as well for more publicity savvy monarchs like the early Stuarts. James I often inserted himself into public debate through print and Charles I, as will be shown, especially in Chapter 5, understood public relations and often engaged in public campaigns. This is

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not to suggest that Elizabeth I was not a public monarch she most certainly was but her public engagements were often a mute reinforcement of monarchical authority through pageantry, and, as Lake and others have shown, political controversy was frequently done through surrogates in her reign. Elizabeth herself did not make a habit of putting herself in the middle of public debate. The early Stuarts, on the other hand, often inserted themselves into public debate, and thus making themselves the target for disagreement; perhaps this is traceable to their roots in Scottish politics where the monarch was typically more involved in factional disputes. Therefore, in many ways, the Stuart public sphere was about exchanges between rulers and ruled and yes, their proxies as well more so than under Elizabeth I. Therefore the post-Reformation public sphere would benefit from a more nuanced periodization. The Stuarts clearly brought something new to the public sphere that can help explain the turmoil not only under the early Stuarts but also of the entire Stuart century. The public discourse on the meaning and potential of the Union of Crowns, as envisioned in this book, is but one of the many public spheres or potential public spheres of the early Stuart period. The boundaries of this public were permeable and a variety of individuals shaped it to their own interests and perspectives. Through this, decidedly messy, process of public discourse something akin to consensus on the meaning of militant Protestantism and its role within the British and international polity began to emerge. This book traces the long process of militant Protestant public discourse and consensus formation over the course of the early Stuart period culminating in the collapse of Charles Is authority from 1638 to 1642. While militant Protestantism was not the sole contributor to this collapse, it certainly played an important role as it provided a common language of criticism that could be accessed in the process of forming political coalitions and articulating oppositional ideology.