This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
INTRODUCTION TO PART1
This parl consists of two chapters, presenting a general introduction to the thesis and a brief review of risk assessment methodologies. Of these, Chapter 2 is a pre-print of our paper, Techniques and methodologies for risk analysis in chemical process industries due to appear in Journal of Loss Prevention in Process industries.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND LEAD-UP TO THE PRESENT WORK
The history of chemical process industries is replete with major accidents. Such accidents have had catastrophic implications, causing massive losses of property, human lives, and environmental quality. The reverberations of the worst such disaster which happened in Bhopal in 1984, are being still felt even though over a decade has passed. Even as Bhopal gas tragedy was catastrophic in its dimensions--leading to a death toll that is by far the worst ever in the history of industrial accidents -- it is by no means an isolated instance. Indeed several serious industrial accidents have taken place before and after Bhopal gas tragedy in lndia as well as abroad. Indeed, in lndia itself such accidents keep occurring with frightening regularity. Indeed the biggest industrial accident of the 1990s -the 'HPCL Disastei (also known as 'The Vishakhapatnam Disaster') has also occurred in lndia on 14 September 1997 at the HPCL (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) refinery near the city of Vishakhapatnam, India. It brought into sharp focus the destructive potential of domino effect vis a vis industrial accidents. It was this effect (also variously called 'cascading effect' or 'chain of accidents') which was responsible for a single failure in the HPCL refinery with limited damage potential to escalate into a series of major accidents, eventually claiming over 60 lives, causing damage to property worth over Rs.600 million ($ 20 million), and terrorising a sprawling city of over 2 million inhabitants (The Hindu, 1997; Subramanian, 1997) The death toll which eventually crossed 60 would have been higher had the fire started half-an-hour later than it did, when the first shift staff would have come in to relieve the night shift. And Sunday being a holiday, the administrative personnel, who number over 200, were saved as they were not on duty (The Hindu,1997; Subrarnanian, 1997).
or fires occur all of a sudden leaving no chance for impacted people to escape. Even those industries which were earlier set up in remote areas away from human dwellings now find themselves being enveloped by residential colonies. let alone control the accident. In order to prevent or at least reduce the frequency of occurrence of such accidents. hazard management and emergency prepareGness. Unlike the normal release of gaseous. b) c) Increasing the gamut of RA study The existing RA techniques either do not account for. PRA. checklist. Techniques such as frequency prediction. or solid wastes from industrial process which take place slowly and are controllable accidental toxic releases. and lack of adequate emergency planning. getting such highly reliable data is difficult and even a small inaccuracy in the data may lead to great inaccuracy in the results. Yet there is significant scope of advancement in terms of the following:- - - Reduction in experts' time and computational costs Techniques such as hazard and operability problem (HAZOP). This realisation and the increased public awareness towards this issue. and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) need huge resource inputs in terms of expert-time and computational costs. this mar the effectiveness and applicability of the forecasts to some extent. . improper safety management. failure mode effect analysis (FMEA). and quantitative risk assessment (QRA) can be made more accurate and realistic. Increase in the accuracy and precision of the forecasts a) Quantitative techniques such as consequence analysis. liquid. further the accident scenarios generated by them can be made more precise and sophisticated. remains the same as before. The risk posed by industrial accidents is thus increasing even in situations where the quantities of the hazardous materials being handled. has prompted techniques development of new process to carry out risk assessment (RA) and safety evaluation of chemical process industries. several methodologies have been developed for qualitative as well as quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. effect of surrounding industries on dominolcascade effects. major efforts are needed towards raising the safety level. detailed maximum credible accident analysis (MCAA).The compulsions of increasing population and developmental needs keep putting ever increasing pressure on available land space. handling phenomsna such as the effects of heavy gas dispersion. and fault tree analysis (FTA) demand highly accurate and precise data of the components. or not very strong in. Moreover the results obtained by these techniques are largely qualitative in nature. explosions. Most of the techniques ignore site characteristics. or the manner in which they were being handled. These methodologies (reviewed in Chapter 2) have served very useful purpose. indices. singly or in combinations (as they exist in chemical complexes). Over the last few years.
Subramanian. We hope that the thesis which presents a multi-module system of methodologies and software packages wou\d contribute some new knowledge to the subject and would stimulate further work in the area of risk assessment. These efforts have resulted in software MOSEC and HAZDIG. CONTENTS OF THE PhD THESIS The contents of the PhD thesis are summarised in Figure 1. Chennai.(1997).41-43. These have also led us to develop a new model based on modification in plume path theory for studying the dispersion of heavy gases and evolving damage control strategies when such gases are released in large quantities. Major fire in Visag refinery. and sophistication in risk analysis. This methodology has been coded in software package MAXCRED. A software package DOMIFFECT has been developed over this. Developing application of risk analysis during design stage to make plants inherently safer. process conditions and site characteristics. 2. . The Hindu. * The applicability of the methodologies and the software packages has been tested with real-life case studies. Chennai. Developing a conceptual model for the simulation of chain of accidents (dominolcascading effects) and forecasting their consequences. and Developing better tools for quantitative risk assessment based on more precise and accurate forecasting of the nature and impacts of accidents.Improving the reliability o f rapid risk assessment The existing rapid risk assessment techniques such as indices and MCAA have limitations in terms of identification and assessment of hazards relating to types of operations. The Hindu Publications. The techniaues have been Packaged as . September 15. a Developing a combination of techniques for qualitative hazard assessment and ~robabilistic hazard assessment. T S. ~OPHAZOP PROFAT. states of processes. REFERENCES 1. The Hindu Publications. THE PRESENT WORK We have made a few humble efforts towards introducing improvements in the various RA techniques and methodologies. We have also developed software packages aimed at user-friendliness. larger coverage. swiftness. 0 Developing methodology for rapid risk assessment. October 17. Close call. (1997). 1. Attempts have been made towards Developing a more reliable indexing technique for hazard identification and ranking in process industries.
Content of thesis Genonl Inlrgdudbn and Inlrodudon R*YIw 01 b m d q w r - Part Ill QusnUbUve m m o d r of risk asses~nmnbl Canleauanca analyslt Tho p d a p MOSEC Y Pan IV Quanlmwe malhodr of risk ~ssessmnt.r p a p r r publlshw abwh .l1 Rapld risk ~ss~esm*nt T k padraw MAXCRED ApplimWn of MAXCRED Plrl v Ouanl~u~e rnslhodr olnsk asse6smnl-111 ProbablDsUc risk a~$essmnl The packap PROFAT l-l d i a l of L f Mcdols lor domino oRed I! - Rnklnp A new m m o d o t w WI Panvlll bpl#-LK)n 01 risk analp15 In W M design A n w rnsmcddo~ HlRA Inhemnl ula aasm Pgwndlwa I Figure 1. The struckure of the thesis 0th.
Accidents in such units caused either by material failure (such as crack in the storage vessels). and Vishakhapatnam-1997) in which the death toll would have been as high as in Bhopal if the areas where the accidents took place were not less densely populated(Less. Key words: Risk assessment. conduits and storage vessels in which hazardous substances are handled at elevated temperatures andlor pressures. Mumbai-1995. . quantitative risk assessment. Antwerp-1987.Chapter 2 TECHNIQUES AND METHODOLOGIES FOR RISK ANALYSIS IN CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRIES' This paper presents a state-of-art-review of the available techniques and methodologies for carrying out risk analysis in chemical process industries. 1987). Marshall. - - Along with the rapid growth of industrialisation and population the risk posed by ' Accepted for publication in Journal ofLoss Prevention in Process Industries. Panipat-1993. It also presents a set of methodologies developed by the authors to conduct risk analysis effectively and optimally. process safety assessment INTRODUCTION Chemical process industries often involve reactors. industrial hazard assessment. 1996. Pasadena-1989. operational mistakes (such as raising the pressures temperaturelflow-rate beyond critical limits). UK (kindly see page Al). Basel-1986.000 persons but there have been numerous other accidents (Flixborough-1974. The most gruesome example of such an accident is the Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984 which killed or maimed over 20. or external perturbation (such as damage caused by a projectile) can have serious often catastrophic consequences. hazard assessment.
Such consequence analysis fulfils two objectives:- - * it helps in sitting of industries and management of sites so as to minimise the damage if accident does occur. it provides feedback for other exercises in accident forecasting and disaster management. Pasadena-1989 and recently Vishakhapatnam-1997 are examples of such disasters(Hindu. which has emerged in recent years with ever increasing importance being attached to it. hazard relates to the source of harm. society or environment. 1997). has prompted techniques development of new process to carry out risk assessment and safety evaluation of chemical process industries. singly or in combinations (as they exist in chemical complexes). Some of the past experience like Mexico-1984. 1996. hazard management and emergency preparedness. In this context risk analysis can be defined as an exercise. However. 1991). TECHNQUES AND METHODOLOGIES FOR RlSK ASSESSMENT Several techniques and methodologies have been proposed from 1970 onwards for risk and safety study. c) Development of managerial strategies for 'emergency preparedness' and 'damage minimisation'. - The resulting science of risk assessment. which includes both qualitative and quantitative determination of risk and its multidimensional impacts. where hazard is defined as the degree of h a m to the human beings. Further it is common to find 'industrial areas' or 'industrial complexes' where groups of industries are situated in close proximity to one another. deals with the following key aspects of accidents in chemical process industries a) b) Development of techniques and tools to forecast accidents. probable accidents also 'mntinues to rise. Development of techniques and tools to analyse consequences of likely accidents. In the authors' opinion risk may be defined as a combination of hazard and probability of hazard occurrence. Greenberg and Crarner. . property. A brief review of the important ones is presented here. The growth in the number of such industrial areas and in the number of industries contained in each of the areas gives rise to increasing probabilities of 'chain of accidents' or cascadingldomino effects wherein an accident in one industry may cause another accident in a neighbouring industry which in turn may trigger another accident and so on. Antwerp-1987. 1974. RlSK ASSESSMENT The terms hazard and risk are sometimes used interchangeably by the processlenvironrnental engineer or safety personnel. while risk is the probability of the harm being experienced(Lees. This is particularly so in the third world where population densities are very high and industrial areas which are surrounded by dense clusters of neighbourhoods. Checklist Checklist represents the simplest method used foi hazard identification (Balemans. In order to prevent or at least reduce the frequency of occurrence of such accidents major efforts are needed towards raising the level safety.. This realisation and the increased public awareness towards this issue.
The checklist has to be maintained during the life of project and should be updated after each modification.. CIA. Oyeleye and Kramer. it continues to be used(Eiey. 1980. + + + Due to above mentioned drawbacks this technique is not recommended for detailed risk analysis. 1974. A list of guide words and their definitions is given in Table 1. 1974. In a typical HAZOP study. pressure). 1991.1985. 1985. 1992.. but it can also be based on codes and standards(Hess1an and Rubin. Lawley. Checklist is primarily based on the prepares' prior experience. 1991. heat transfer. operation. It had been developed at Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 1974 and later went through several modifications(lCi. maintenance and other areas of concern to verify that various requirements have been fulfilled and nothing is neglected or overlooked.Rose et a/. It merely provides the status of each item in terms of 'Yes' or 'No'. Hessian and Rubin. 1983. Although checklist development requires trained and experienced personnel. 1982. Freeman. 1990). 1994. PFD. even relatively untrained personnel can use it effectively. Ozog and Stickles. it is only as good as the ability and prior experience of the person preparing it. 1991). 1995). operation and maintenance of the process plant. Sherrod and Early. a checklist can focus only on a single item at a time. The basic principle of a HAZOP study is that normal and standard conditions are safe. 1991.. with no insights into the system. 1988. Knowlton. The salient features of HAZOP study are: . so it can't identify hazards as a result of interaction among different units or components (equipment). and any mis-operation (leak or excess heat generation etc. it is unable to identify hazard due to the type of unit operation (reaction. HAZOP is considered by a multi-disciplinary team of experts who have extensive knowledge of design. Medermid et a/. 1988). However. 1976.). To cover all the possible malfunctions in the plant the imagination of the HAZOP team members is guided systematically with a set of guide words for generating the process variable deviations. severity of operating conditions (temperature. McKelvey. storage etc. Abnormal causes and adverse consequences for all possible deviations from normal operation that could arise are identified for each unit of plant. ILO. 1978. Kletz. and hazards occur only when there is a deviation from normal conditions. material flow diagrams. There is always a significant probability of some critical item being neglected. 1988). and operating manuals) are examined systematically by a group of experts. Kletz. HAZOP HAZOP is a simple yet structured methodology for hazard identification and assessment(lCI. A checklist is a list of questions about plant organisation. The main limitations of this methodology are: + it takes long time to develop a checklist but it yields only qualitative results. 1977. Andow et al. design and operation documents (PI&D's. It is a procedure that allows its user to make intelligent geniuses in the identification of hazard and operability problems. 1988: Montague.). 1974. Venkatasubramanian and Vaidyanathan. Oyeleye and Kramer.1989. Knowlton. and after every major outage when equipment is replaced or modified substantially. 1991.
Table 1 Guide words and their physical significance .Qualitative increase Other Than Complete substation . Guide Word None Less Meaning Parameter Deviation Negation intention Quantitative decrease Flow Level Flow Level Temperature Pressure Concentration Flow Level Temperature Pressure Concentration Flow Pressure Concentration Flow Level Concentration of impurity Temperature of substance Level of impurity Pressure of substance Flow of impurity Concentration of desired substance Level of desired substance Flow of desired substance No flow Zero level Low Low Low Low Low flow rate level temperature pressure concentration flow rate level temperature pressure concentration More Quantitative increase High High High High High Reverse Part of Logical opposite Qualitative decrease Reverse flow rate Reverse pressure Concentration decrease Flow decrease Level decrease Concentration increase Temperature increase Level increase Pressure increase Flow increases Concentration zero Level zero Flow rate zero As As Well.
Cummings et al. This may reduce the work load of team members and increase the efficiency and reliability of the study lnspite of its limitations HAZOP remains the most favoured technique for hazard identification and assessment. 1976. 1987. Parmer and Lees (1987) . The method assumes that the design has been carried out in accordance with the appropriate codes. in its original. + + + A number of applications of HAZOP in Chemical process industries (PI) have been reported in literature. 1993. Greenberg and Cramer. Pully (1993). initially it was applied in the aerospace industry. Rauzy. etc. FTA was developed in 1960's by Bell Laboratories ddring the Polaris missile project. Piccinini and Levy (1984). can enable determination of the frequency of occurrence of an accidental event. it is presupposed that the design is appropriate for the requirements of normal operating conditions. 1988). The other kind of limitation is one which is neither intended.. it indicates some ways to mitigate the hazards. but is inherent in the method. inherently well-suited to deal with spatial features associated with plant layout and their resultant effects. CCPS. Mulvihill (1988) . and Khan and Abbasi (1997a) have made suggestions to increase the effectiveness and reliability of HAZOP. McKelvey (1989). The first kind arises from the assumptions underlying the method and is a limitation (perhaps intended) of scope. 1996. their causes. Kolodji (1993) Shafagi and Cook (1988) . Mulvihill (1988). 1983. Hauptmanns and Yllera. any lacunae in manpower selection or performance can seriously harm the success of any HAZOP. Later its use was extended to nuclear and chemical industries(Less. as HAZOP only tries to identify deviations from these supposedly ideal situations. 1991. Ulerich . it provides a basis for subsequent steps in the total risk management program. and consequences. For example HAZOP is not.+ + it gives an idea of priorities basis for detailed risk analysis. 1979. FTA. these iimitations are of two kinds. 1989. nor desirable. As the efficiency and accuracy of study is fully dependent on the experience and sincerity of the expert team members. 1983. it provides first hand information of the potential hazards. Sweeney (1993). Furthermore HAZOP needs large inputs of time and expert manpower. Freeman eta/. along with component failure data and human reliability data. HAZOP has some limitations. Hauptmanns. it can be performed at the design stage as well as operational stage. 1979. Lapp and Powers. For example. and thus far widely used form. (1992). Lapp and Powers. According to them the duration of the study can be reduced drastically using automated systems to study the commonly occurring equipment. Montague (1990). Fault tree analysis (FTA) Fault tree(FTA) is an analytical tool that uses deductive reasoning to determine the occurrence of a n undesired event analysis(Parmer and Lees.
FMEA involves following steps: 1) identification of each failure mode. 1981. (1986). its causes and effects. 1977.. 1995. O'Mara. To cope with this problem associated with the assignment of exact numerical values to failure probabilities. of the sequence of events associated with it.. Yllera (1988) and Lai. Klaassen and Van Pepper. et a/. 1991. etc. 5) 6) providing the analyst with genuine insights into system behaviour. 1987). This problem is likely to arise in dynamically changing environments or in systems in which accidents occur so frequently that reasonable failure data are not available. and Camarinopoulous (1985) to dilute FTA's dependency on reliability data and cut short the time of analysis using Fuzzy mathematics. it is not foolproof and. Lapp and power (1976. Khan and Abbasi. . 2) it points out the aspects of the system which are relevant to an understanding of the mechanism of likely failure. In many real-world applications. 1) it directs the analyst to ferret out failures deductively. quantitative). Guymer et el. Although it is the best tool available for a comprehensive analysis. estimates of failure probabilities are customarily supplied by personnel familiar with the operation of the system. vessels. Failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) FMEA is an examination of individual component such as pumps. 1996. MIL. allowing the analyst to concentrate on one particular system failure at a time. valves. to identify the likely failures which could have undesired effects on system operation( Lees.et a/. According to them FTA is a sophisticated form of reliability assessment and requires considerable time and effort by skilled analysts.. Henevely and Kumanoto. and Rauzy (1993). 1989. it itself does not does assure of detection of all failures. 4) providing avenues for system reliability analysis (qualitative . which seems to be useful. it may be difficult to assign exact values to the probabilities of occurrence of the fundamental events.. modifications have been suggested by Lai et a/. Lapp (1991) and Bossche (1991) have proposed algorithms for computer aided fault tree design and analysis.. In the absence of genuine probability data. such persons are otherwise not associated with system design changes. FTA has the following advantages. in particular. Usually they prefer to express their knowledge in general terms and find it extremely difficult to specify the exact numerical values that are required in conventional fault tree analysis. 1988. The accuracy of prediction is limited and depends upon the reliability and failure data of components of the fault tree. (1986) have drawn attention to the difficulties associated with FTA. Greenberg and Cramer.1979). especially common cause failures. 3) it provides a graphical aid enabling those responsible for system management to visualise the hazard. 1991). FTA yields both qualitative as well as quantitative information.
system functional structure representation. FMEA is assisted by the preparation of a list of the expected failure modes in the light of ( I ) the use of the system. 1996. system boundary. and compensating and operating provisions. system environment. FMEA is good for generating the failure data and information at component level(Henevely and Kumanoto. system functional structure. including deductibility. while actual hazard may start at sub-component level (failure of transmission line. (4) the operation specification. j) FMEA is a qualitative inductive method and is easy to apply. item replaceability. system software. 1993). FTA serves as complementary deductive method to FMEA and is needed where analysis of complex failure logic is required. 1989). system intimation. It works best where the failure logic is essentially a serial one. of a system. FMEA is restricted up to component level. Klaassen and Van Pepper. FMEA is unable to deal with the interaction among different components and needs highly expert team with sufficient experience and time to carry out the study. testability. Klaassen and Van Pepper. What-If analysis The What if method involves asking a series of questions beginning with what if as a means of identifying hazards(CCPS. control and maintenance. (5) the time constraints and (6) the environment. system structure. What if analysis is possibly the oldest method of hazard identification and is still . (3) the mode of operation. It has been recommended for use as a hazard identification technique mainly to the systems dealing with lowlmoderateiy hazardous operations and the ones which cannot support expensive and time taking HAZOP study(AICHE.). failure of temperature transducer.2) classification of each failure mode by relevant characteristics. in essence FMEA is an inductive method. Zoller and Esping. It is much less suitable where complex logic is required to describe system failure(Lees. FMEA is an efficient method of analysing elements which can cause failure of the whole. It has been stated that FMEA can be a laborious and inefficient process unless judiciously applied. operation. failure of controller etc. IChemE. diagnosabllity. and Typical information required for an FMEA includes : a) b) c) d) e) 9 g) h) i) failure significance and compensating provisions. 1985). 1989). 1981. 1989. system modelling. or of a large part. block diagrams. More seriously. (2) the elements involved. Apart from checklists.
1992. gives only qualitative results with no numerical prioritisation The major disadvantages are : 3) it is not as systematic as HAZOP. 1992). The fifth edition described a new framework for making the risk evaluation. the heavy reliance on the experience and intuition of the study team both to develop questions imaginatively and to get the answer implies that any lacunae in this aspect of the study can render the study totally useless (worse still misleading). In the first three editions the methods of determining the index values were developed and ' refined. It also included improvements in the method of calculating the index and several other new features loss control credits and maximum probable days outage. Dow lndex It is by far the most widely used of hazard indices. 1994). often using a checklist. the Mond lndex and the IFAL Index. These include the Dow Index. The Dow Guide. AlChE (1985) and lChEM have recommended this technique only when other two . other phrases may also be used. The method essentially involves a review of the entire design by a team using questions of this type.1994a: Scheffler. I) II) Ill) 1) 2) no specialised technique or computational tool is required. Hazard indices A number of indices have been developed to provide measures of hazards in different context. it thus has disadvantages (in terms of expert available and costs) similar to HAZOP. 4) Due to these disadvantages what if analysis is considered inferior to HAZOP and FTA. It was developed by Dow Chemical Company for fire and explosion hazards. What if analysis is performed with questions such as: What if the pipe leaks? What if the flow controller fails? The questions need not necessarily start with What if. Kavianian et a/.HAZOP and FMEA are not applicable or the cost of study is the main consideration. a - . In the sixth edition. Buck. was originally published in 1964 and has gone through seven editions(Dow chemical company. 1985. once the questions have been developed they can be used throughout the life of the project with slight modifications. provide a simple tabular summary.. it requires a team of experts to perform the study.popular(AIChE. 1964. CCPS (1989). and FMEA. In the fourth edition a simplified version of the index was described and NO new features were introduced: the maximum probable property damage (MPPD) and a toxicity index. The advantages of this technique are. describing the Dow index.
the maximum probable days outage (MPDO) and the business interruption (81) loss(AIChE.. to derive the base MPPD. vapour fires. unit toxicity index. 1994). f) g) IFAL index The instantaneous fractional annual loss (IFAL) index was developed by the Insurance Technical Bureau (1981). unconfined vapour cloud explosions. The main hazards considered in the index are a) pool fires. The original version was described by Lewis (1979). Whitehouse. confined vapour cloud explosions. Mond index The Mond fire. It involves considering the plant as set of blocks and examining each major item of process equipment in turn to assess its contribution to the index. to determine the actual MPPD. This index was developed at the Mond Division of ICI. U K. The procedure is to calculate the fire and explosion index (F&EI) and to use this to determine fire protection measures and. in 1981 primarily for insurance assessment purposes(Singh and Munday. but taking into account additional hazard considerations. The potential hazard is expressed in terms of the initial value of a set of indices for fire. Other accounts have been given by Tyler (1982) and Tyler et a/. These include: a) b) c) d) e) fire load index. aerial explosion index. . b) c) d) e) In contrast to the Dow and Mond Indices. the IFAL index is too complex for manual calculation and needs a computer. explosion and toxicity. 1981). explosion and toxicity index is an extension of the Dow Index. internal explosions. (1994). Procedure for the calculation of the index is described in the IFAL Factor workbook (1981) (Insurance Technical Bureau. was introduced. and overall risk rating. overall index. but includes no major conceptual changes. 1979.risk analysis package. explosion index. in combination with a damage factor. The Mond method involves making an initial assessment of hazard in a manner similar to that used in the Dow index. The overall structure of the methodology is shown in Figure 1. including business interruption and a toxicity penalty to reflect emergency responses. The seventh edition up-dates the sixth edition with respect to codes and good practice. in combination with the loss control credits. major toxicity incident index. 1985). This is then used.
1996) . Procedure for calculating the Dow Fire and Explosion Index and other quantities (Lees.process unit Calculate F1 general process hazards special process hazards factor factor F3 = Fl'F2 1 4 Determine F&El F&EI = FB'Material factor I Calculate loss control credit factor = CI*C2*C3 4 Determine area of exposure 4 Determine replacement value in exposure area 4 Determine base MPPD v Determine damage factor 4-1 I 4 Determine actual MPPD Determine MPDO i I I 77 Determine BI I Figure 1.
While this provision is not available in QRA and to estimate the same parameters using Dow's index andlor Mond's index it needs extra information and calculations. and FTNETA have been recommended for this step. Extremely Hazardous Substance (EHS 1987). 1988. 1991). The consequence analysis step is to estimate the damage potential using standard mathematical expressions. may lead to wrong conclusions. On the basis of the storage or handiing situations in the industry. and 3) quantification of risk. The hazard identification step identifies and assesses hazards based on the chemical properties. capacity. development of credible accident scenarios. The first step identifies the hazards in any process industry on the basis of properties and capacities of the chemicals and by employing different indices such as System of Hazard Identification (SYHI. 1993). may be misled into by passing causes of hazards and frequency of their occurrence. 1985. The scheme consist of three-steps procedure (Figure 2). The next step . unless helshe is very well-versed with the techniques and tools of risk assessment. Khan and Abbasi.PROPOSED SCHEMES OF RISK VARIOUS TECHNIQUES WHO ASSESSMENT BASED ON COMBlNATlON OF World Health Organisation (WHO) and International Labour Office (ILO) have jointly proposed a scheme for conducting hazard assessment(1984). comprises of three steps 1) hazard identification. These being crucial inputs for any risk assessment study. assessment of damages likeiy to be caused in each scenario using mathematical models. ISGRA This scheme.. thus saving the efforts and duration going to wasted in studying nonlless hazardous units. representing plausible accidental events. As most of the constituent techniques are quantitative in nature this procedure is not as amenable to quantification as some other procedures described below are. Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) MCAA is an approach to forecast the damage likely to be caused if an accident takes place in a chemical plant(AIChE. different accident scenarios are generated. and National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) index( National Fire Protection Association. MCAA comprises of the following main steps: i) study of the plant to identify hazardous materials. The frequency of occurrence is estimated based on the past history of similar accidents. 1997b). the nonlless-hazardous unit easily. and ii) iii) iv) delineation of the maximum credible accident scenario. The last step quantification of risk is based on the frequency of occurrence of an accident and its damage consequences. - The use of this scheme. API. authored by International Study Group on Risk Analysis(iSGRA. and deviation in operating parameters. HAZOP. FMEA. 1992. 2) consequence analysis. 1985) .the consequence assessment step estimates the consequences of each accident scenario in terms of likely . Mallikarjunan et al.
analysis . Failure Accident sequence effect Accident consequence analysis Figure 2. W' s hazard a-nt procedure .L= ?I ldentif icat ion of k e s s a z n t of h a w d s .
consequence analysis) have been recommended for this step. the application of QRA in the PI is much more difficult than in the nuclear industry. ETA (event tree analysis) and CCA (cause . The third step of consequence analysis aims to quantify the negative impacts of the likely events. Finally. Safety analysis can be extenaea to of r~src analysis. 3) 4) The first step seeks answer to the question: what can go wrong? This is the most ~mportantstep because hazards that are not identified will not be quantified. although they could also be measured in terms of number of injuries or value of . the scope of a QRA is defined. The techniques used for hazard identification include HAZOP studies. 1990b. This is followed by identification of different accidents and their causes. CMA. and fixing risk-redclcing measures. and Checklists . 1994). Unfortunately. 1384: S~okas. Van Sciever (1990). MCAA has been extensively used in risk assessment and forms the basis of QRA (quantitative risk assessment) schemes proposed and applied by Arendt (1990a. FTA may be used for third purpose. Answering this question involves quantification of the probability of each accident scenario. FTA (fault tree analysis). The consequences are normally measured in terms of the number of fatalities. esrimat~on risk. It forms one of the key steps in any elaborate risk assessment exercise but necessitates the use of other techniques for identifying causes of hazards and estimating frequency of likely accidents. 1990). CCPS. This is because of the greater diversity of processes. This diversity requires continuous addition of new capabilities in QRA(CCPS. FMEA. The procedure starts with identification of hazards using HAZOP and FMEA. The procedure can be extended to the use in risk analysis by incorporating the consequence analysis step. A typical QRA comprises of four steps (Figure 3). based on the probability of occurrence and damage potential. frequency estimation. Van Sciver. and Khan and Abbasi (1997b). leading to an underestimated riskvan Sciver. The second step involves another key question how likely is occurrence of each accident?. hazardous materials. equipment types and control schemes in the PI.1990b. 'What If Analysis. Before its use in the chemical process industries (PI). it was used extensively in the nuclear industry.1990b). modelling sequence of potential accidents. Tne various steps involved ~nsafety analysis(Kafka. Quantitative risk analysis Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) has been in existence for many years. 1985.extent of damage. Arendt. 1990. 1) 2) hazard identification. After the hazards are identified. 1989. consequence analysis and measure of risk. the worst disaster scenario is identified. ICI. 1988) are presented in Figure 3. This logical model is later analysed for further results (frequency and loss in terms of economic and fatal). 1982. Safety analysis Safety analysis is defined as a systematic examination of structure and function of a system aiming to identify accident contributors.
1. . Function s stem rulationszip .i. . I d e n t i t i c a t i o n of plant o n r a t r n g s t a g e ~:i.n event . Huun e r r o r p m b a b i l i tu . Dispemion models .ii. Assessment of doses . Event sequence m d e l l i n g . I n i t i a t i n g events . Steps of probabilistic safety analysis in cherical procett industries . Dose lvsponse models IMEWLIIIIOW O RESULT F I I Figure 3. ACCIDMl SmUMCE PUAMIFlCIlIlON Deteruination of accident sequence Boolean reduction H Z R O S SUBSTAKE W S E UITEGORIC ASSESSltan AAD U Outflow w d r l Evawration nodel Meather conditions Relation of plant h g e s t a t e 1 n l e l s e categoPy COWSEQUMCE ASSESSKmI . . Huun p e r f o m c e analysis . Sceeningn og tevent lnrtlatl I ! . Svstew modelling . Conwnrnt f a i l u r r data ACCIDm SEPUXE IIODELIMG I I . .
cutting short the time of each step (use of already developed information base) would bring down the cost of study drastically and thus make the study optimal in all respect (cost. In particular. Greenberg and Cramer. 1992) (Figure 4). This is done by estimating the areas that are at risk. lnspite of being lengthy (needs large time for implementation). and needs sophisticated tools and data. and the extent of that risk. the plant model built in the second step is quantified using the parameter values estimated in the third step. Hazardous substance release categories assessment 2elease categories of the hazardous substance are defined in order to streamline the calculation of the consequences of the accidents and the associated frequencies. The model includes each and every ~nitiator potential accidents and the response of the installation to these initiators. Accident sequence quantification This step quantifies the accident sequences. a framework for a systematic analysis of hazards and quantification of the corresponding risks. (1987). 5. Data acquisition end parameter estimation Parameters which must be estimated include the frequencies of the initiating events. 1991. that calculates their frequency of occurrence. The last step of a QRA is to calculate the actual risk. 1.l996. high cost of implementation (due to the need of highly expert professionals of various discipline for longer duration). The analysis of consequences in the PI is very complex due to the great variety of materials. Improvements in terms of reducing the duration of the implementation of various steps by screening the non-hazardous units. Popazoglou et a/. 4. it is the most favoured and presently most frequently used scheme for the risk analysis of chemical process industries(Lees. Probabilistic safety analysis in subsequent years Guymer et al. (1992). Hazard identification The main potential sources of hazardous substance releases are identified and the initiating events that can cause such releases are determined. chemical reactions. Consequence assessment .d). 2.1993). The methodology and the procedures followed for the PSA of a typical chemical installation involved in handling a hazardous substance can be outlined in the following seven major steps(Popazoglou et a/. 6. a basis for supporting safety-related decision-making. PSA provides.c. Consequence analysis is the aspect of QRA that is growing most rapidly.. have proposed a combination of different techniques for probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) in chemical process industries. Accident sequence modelling A logical model for the installation is developed. It also provides.the property lost. duration and reliability of results). of 3. and Kafka (1991. component unavailability and probabilities of human actions. Khan and Abbasi. and technologies involved. 1997b.
due to spCcialf(khavlor of unrt Y Figure 4. o p W P study procedure .Dividr the plant into various study nodes o r Take one unit or unit of Inforrution Ease INFOWIIITION BASE hdd or rrmvc causes and conse cnces.
the application of PSA is limited to the operational stage as because many of its steps (data acquisition and parameter estimation. immediate health effects can be estimated by calculation of the atmospheric dispersion of the released substance. costly. These efforts have led to the following: i) ii) iii) iv) vi) vii) viii) HlRA optHAZOP TOPHAZOP PROFAT MOSEC DOMIFFECT MAXCRED Hazard identification and ranking : HlRA HlRA (Hazard Identification and Ranking Analysis) is a technique proposed by these authors to conduct the very first step of risk analysis (hazard identification and ranking). the conventional RA procedures become tedious. and some other such as FMEA. Moreover. As some of them such as HAZOP. For the same level of accuracy PSA takes about 50% more time than QRA. HAZOP is a powerful technique for identifying and assessing hazards qualitatively. and surroundings (degree of conjunction. the assessment of the dose an individual would receive at each point around the site. THE PRESENT WORK It emerges from the foregoing review that several of the existing methodologies are useful in conducting one or other aspect of risk analysis. location of other hazardous units etc.are cumbersome and costly. and by establishing a doselresponse model. 1997e). capacity. If the hazardous substance is toxic. operating conditions. which are available only during operation.). For example. It considers hazard potential in a unit as function of material. 7. The output .5 and 6. developed in steps 4. Integration of results Integrating the models and the associated results. and accident sequence quantification) need precise operational data. and prone to serious errors (when precise basic data is required but is not available). while MCAA is widely applicable in consequence analysis. - - - We have tried to improve the situation modifying some of the conventional methodologies and strengthening some others in terms of enhancing their analytical and computational capabilities. type of unit operation. All conventional risk analysis procedures require a combination of these methodologies. Beckjord et e l (1990) have reported a few applications of PSA in chemical process industries. The objective of this step is to identify the chemicals and unit operations that constitute potential hazard. HlRA is based on a multi-attribute hazard identification and ranking method and detailed elsewhere(Khan and Abbasi.FTA require extensive reliability data which might not be easy to obtain.Undesirable consequences and associated probabilities are calculated for each release category. results in the establishment of the range of possible consequences and the associated uncertainties.
The knowledge-base has been developed in two segments: process general knowledge. Probabilistic hazard assessment : PROFAT Fault tree analysis involves identification of causes of an accident. It drastically minimises the need of expert time. TOPHAZOP is a knowledge-based user-friendly software for conducting HAZOP study in a comprehensive. TOPHAZOP optHAZOP. 1997f. the procedure is shown in Figure 5. TOPHAZOP overcomes several major limitations (time. most of the hazards should be identified and assessed. and Monte-Carlo simulation technique(Rauzy. consists of several steps.g). It incorporates process units. 1983) with fuzzy set theory(Tanaka et al. 1988). effort. 19979. and process specific knowledge. 1997f).. We have made attempts to overcome these limitations by incorporating a combination of analytical method(Hauptmanns. better efficiency. whereas the process general knowledge segment handles general information about process unit. .of HlRA gives two indices. Hauptmanns.) of the existing HAZOP procedure. the most crucial one requires use of a knowledge-based software tool which would significantly reduce the requirement of expert man-hours and speed up the work of the study team. good reliability of results. and the time of applicability should be such that the recommendations made by the study can be followed easily and economically(Khan and Abbasi. Along with the use of knowledge it also suggests a few recommendations to reduce the time of discussion and produces effective and reliable results(Khan and Abbasi. etc. 1983. and requirement of large expert time. and contribution of each cause to the accident. This knowledge-base is a large collection of facts. described above. The availability of on-line help and graphical user-interface enhances its user-friendliness so that even an inexperienced professional can utilise the software with relative ease. fire and explosion damage index (FEDI) for fire and explosion hazard. This study procedure uses an already developed expert knowledge-base. 19979). The process specific knowledge segment handles information specific to a particular process unit in a particular operation. The software has an in-built knowledge-base which is extensive and dynamic. TOPHAZOP (Tool for Optimizing HAZOP) has been developed to fulfil this need(Khan and Abbasi. frequency of occurrence of an accident. repetitious work. Qualitative hazard assessment : optHAZOP and TOPHAZOP optHAZOP The optimal and effective HAZOP (optHAZOP) signifies the application of hazard study in such a way that the duration of the study should be optimum. To fulfil the above objective a systematic procedure along with various recommendations has been developed. and toxic damage index (TCI) for toxic release and dispersion hazard. At present the knowledge-base incorporates information pertaining to 15 different process units including their characteristics and modes of failures. It is a useful methodology but is besieged with the same types of limitations which we find with other methodologies such as: need of large volumes of precise data. effective. and efficient manner within a short span of time. and works out numerous modes of faiiure for certain input operational conditions. rules and information regarding various components of process plant. This procedure has been named as the optHAZOP study procedure(Khan and Abbasi.l993.
w DO(YIWIAT1oN RESULTS Figure 5. Simplified blodr diagrar shwing win steps of different risk and safety a m n t procedures .
dispersion of heavier-than-air gases. more so in one of the units of an industry. 1983. and viii) vented explosion.Khan and Abbasi. mortality). vii) unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE). explosion and toxic load. operating conditions. Lastly toxic gas models are used to predict human response to different levels of exposures to toxic chemicals. iii) fire ball. 1985) and dispersion(Pasquil1 and Smith. ready-to-use output format. 1997h). iv) jet fire. accidentally or voluntarily (Khan and Abbasi. properties of chemicals. MOSEC comprises of state-of-the-art models to deal with : i) pool fire. DOMIFFECT Most of the risk analysis methodologies aeal with accidents in a single industry. The software has been developed in object-oriented programming environment using C++ as a coding tool. 1995. It is also easy to maintain and up-grade. Models for explosions and fires are used to predict the characteristics of explosions and fires. ii) flash fire. momentum release followed by dispersion. The contour drawing optlon has the facility for drawing various damagelrisk contours over the accident site. The data needed to run the models is easy to obtain and feed e. HAZDIG incorporate =L models for estimating atmospheric stability(Van Ulden and Hostlag. etc. 1995). It is capable of handling various types of release and dispersion scenarios: two phase release fol1owe.k). But it Is always possible that a major accident in one unit say an explosion or a fire can cause a secondary accident in a nearby unit which in turn - . MOSEC A software MOSEC (Modeling and Simulation of fire and Explosion in Chemical process industries) has been developed specifically to estimate the impacts of accidents involving explosion andlor fire(Khan and Abbasi. and Khan and Abbasi.l D) dispersion. and a few commonly available meteorological parameters. vi) confined vapour cloud explosion (CVCE). A database containing various proportionality constants and complex empirical data has been built into the system. Consequence Analysis : MOSEC HAZDIG and DOMIFFECT Consequence analysis involves assessment of likely consequences if an accident scenario does materialise. etc. 19971). Erbink.l997j. The modular structure of HAZDIG (developed in object oriented environment) enables swift processing of data and computation of result. caving of buildings) and toxic effects (chroniclacute toxicity. The impact intensity models are used to predict the damage zones due to fires.g. 1993. A sofhvare PROFAT (Probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis) has been developed on the basis of this recipe. ambient temperature. The consequences are quantified in terms of damage radii (the radius of the area in which the damage would readily occur). HAZDlG HAZDIG(Hazardous dispersion of gases) is a computer sofhvare specifically developed to estimate the consequences (damage potentials and risks) due to release of toxic chemicals. It has been made user-friendly by incorporating such features as graphics. on-line help. damage to property (shattering of window panes. Wrbink. The assessment of consequence involves a wide variety of mathematical models. The Graphics option enables the user to draw any industrial sitellayout using freehand drawing or using any already defined drawing tool. v) boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE). the degree of flashing. For example source models are used to predict the rate of release of hazardous material. and the rate of evaporation.
19971). 1997m). DOMIFFECT is menu driven and interactive. It often becomes necessary to conduct rapid risk assessment (RRA) to draw the same conclusions that a full fledged risk assessment would lead to. and iv) risk estimation.1997h). 19971. estimation of domino effect probability. The package is named MAXCRED (MAXimum CREDible rapid risk assessment)(Khan and Abbasi. Pasman et al. These steps of ORA and corresponding methodology to be used in each step are presented in terms of OR4 algorithm (Figure 6). the tool guides us towards strategies needed to prevent domino effects(Khan and Abbasi. Rapid risk analysis : MAXCRED A total risk assessment exercise covering all steps exhaustively from beginning to end is expensive in terms of time as well as monetary and personnel inputs(Greenberg and Cramer. b) if they do what would be the likely accident scenarios. AIChE. has the following attributes: i) ii) iii) it incorporates larger number of models to handle larger variety of situations useful in RRA. 1997h). OPTIMAL RISK ANALYSIS (ORA) We have combined the first seven of the methodologies described above into a framework. accurate.. Popazoglou. We have developed a computer automated methodology DOMIFFECT (DOMino efFECT) which enables one to know a) whether domino effects are likely to occur in a given setting. and the system of methodologies on which the package is based. We have proposed a software package. ORA involves four steps : i) hazard identification and screening. 1995. Suokas. iv) ability to forecast whether second or higher order accidents may occur. 1985. estimation of domino effect consequences. 1984. and recent models than handled by existing commercial packages. iii) quantification of hazards or consequence analysis.. it includes more precise. WHO. coded in C++. Finally. 1988. 1992). albeit with lesser (yet practicable) accuracy and precision(Khan and Abbasi.may trigger a tertiary accident(Khan and Abbasi. Khan and Abbasi. The package. capable of the following: + + + + estimation of all possible hazards from toxic release to explosion. CCPS. 1991. 1997m). 1989. for conducting RRA in chemical process industries. 1996. greater user-friendliness. Pasman et al. 1992. named ORA (Optimal Risk Analysis). and c) what would be the likely impacts of the different scenarios(Khan and Abbasi. ii) hazard assessment (both qualitative and probabilistic). The probability of such domino or 'cascading' effects occurrence is increasing day by day with more new industries coming up in already congested industrial areas(Khan and Abbasi. handling of interaction among different accidental events (generation of domino or cascading accident scenarios). . 1992).
Simplified block diagram showing various steps with techniques andlor tool to conduct optimal risk analysis .Modulerization of complete plant into manageable units Hazard identification HlRA technique aid to develop ' optHAZOP procedure TOPHAZOP tool Quantitative hazard assessment/ Consequence assessment MOSEC for Fire and explosions HAZDIG for toxic release and dispersion DOMIFFECT for cascading effects + Probabilistic hazard assessment PROFAT tool 6 Risk estimation Figure 6.
Int. (1992). REFERENCES 1. These findings would gain firm quantitative footing only after ORA has been extensively used by persons other than the authors.g). Experts in safety engineering were asked to give weightages on a scale of 0-10 to eight attributes of seven well-known methodologies (Table 2). F P.Chem. This makes it easy to screen various units in terms of their risk potential. fast. The features come to view when we consider the following:1) Use of HlRA in ORA gives directly applicable results: damage radii(radius of the area under the probability of 50% damages due to fire and/or explosion). American Petroleum institute. AiChE Technical manual LC 80-29237 :AIChE. The Provision for modelling the complex problem into smaller and simpler modules further enhances the ease and speed of computation. with following features: a) b) it is swifter.To compare the performance of O W with the other commonly used schemes we have conducted a preliminary Delphi. and reliable consequence assessment. by 2. . 1997f. 58. Andow.Ser. and overall duration of the study. For the present we can say that ORA appears to be a virtuous scheme. P K. MOSEC and DOMIFFECT (based on the state-of-the-art models) enables easy. C P. (1994). and the areas with high probability of lethal impacts.Sym. and Murphy. All-in-all ORA appears to be a head of the other seven methodologies. APi. AIChE. Washington D C. After second-round corrections and averaging the average weightage as obtained is presented in Figures 7 and 8. (1985). Management of Process Hazards. 4. Dow's Fire and Explosion Index classification guide. Conducting HAZOP by the computer-automated tools optHAZOP and TOPHAZOP saves about 45% of the time otherwise taken by the conventional HAZOP(Khan and Abbasi. but also increases the effectiveness of the results by doing the computations in fuzzy probability space. a state of the art reviews. New York. New York.Eng. without such a study no risk assessment exercise can be considered complete or 'safe'. Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures. 3. (1980). 2) 3) 4) DOMIFFECT enables study of the possibility and likely impacts of domino effects. 225. AiChE. prepared Baffle Columbus division : AIChE. less expensive. Use of HAZDIG. Of these Figure 7 compares seven of the older methodologies and Figure 8 compares QRA with O W . Use of PROFAT (based on combination of analytical method and Monte-Carlo simulation) saves not only computational time. c) as (or possibly more) accurate and precise. The propagation of faults in process plants. Recommended Practice 750. Lees.
Tabla 2 . this may lead persons not very well-versed to either waste time or bypass some crucial aspects Precision Applicability at various stage of project Covers most of the aspect of risk study Cumulative performance index of expert time/computational . Parameters used in the effectiveness study of various risk assessment schemes parameters Detailed description Quantitative results inexpensive to execute (in terms time/data requirement) Sequence of steps optimal In some steps numerous techniques have been clustered without giving criteria of which to choose in which situation.
H is defined in Table 2) . DB[Zlc L ~ O EDFBIG P ~ H D Figure 7. B.... Comparison of parameters for various scheme of risk assessment (legends A.WHO ISGRA MCAA SA QRA Lapp PSA Risk assessment schemes A .
Risk assessment schemes HA m~ C4c E ~ OE DFI D G BH Figure 8... B. H are explained In Table 2) . . Comparison of effectiveness of ORA over QRA (legends A.
Risk Analysis in the chemical industry. Dow chemical company. and Powers. quantitative risk analysis. (1990a). 29. New York. The advanced Gaussian model STACKS. (1992). (1993). An improved top-down algorithm combined with modularization as a highly efficient method for fault tree analysis. and BLEVEs. Tonbridge Printers Ltd. Eley. Plant'Operation Progress. Probabilistic Safety Assessment Development in the United States. Balemans. AIChE. Cummings. Washington DC. J.. J A. Manno. (1964). (1974). Rockville. Lapp. 93. AIChE. 97. (1989). Dow's Chemical Exposure Index. A F. thesis submitted to VRlJ University. Ph. chemical manufacturers association. . J J. (1990). J S. R-32. Dow chemical company . Environment Protection Act -40CFR pafi 355. checklist for hazardous chemicals. 715. 32. New York. Extremely hazardous substances. 140. (1992). L and Yllera.D. Work shop on Inter comparison of Advanced Practical Short range Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling. (1994). Midland. D L. Dow's Process Safety Guide. IEEE Transaction on Reliability. Turbulent diffusion model from tall stacks. (1987). (1977). Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 90. Procd. CIA. Compliance audit Hydrocarbon Process. (1985). (1990b). Bossche. flash fires. S A. Erbink. Strengthen process hazards reviews.Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Tonbridge. 71(8). C. Reliability Engineering. Using quantitative risk assessment in the Reliability Engineering and system safety.262-268. 39 (1993) 159-170. 133-149. (1991). CCPS. Arendt. 11 (2). (1983). J. A W M. Switzerland. 217-241. Loss Prevention and Safety Prornotion. Camarinpoulous. Guidelines for chemical process AIChE. (1995). CCPS. G J.Arendt. 4. Government Institute inc. 88(6).. Management of quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. Guidelines for evaluating the characteristics for vapor cloud explosions. J S. A guide to hazard and operability studies chemical industries association Ltd. MD. E S. Chemical Engineering Progress. Computer Aided Fault tree synthesis: system modeling and causal trees. of ERCOFTAC. New York.l. A. J J. Buck. 32. Fault tree construction: real time fault location. CPI. (1985). (1994a). Beckjord. The Netherlands.. Cunningham. CMA. M A and Murphy. Check-list. Erbink.
New York. Henevely. Major hazard control : a practical manual. Lee. J K and Brown. and Mckelvey. Chemical Engineering Progress. Freeman. New Jercy. Chemical Engineer. (1991). Risk analysis in the process industries. Major fire in Vizag refinery. 385. and Rubin. IL 0 Office. The Chemical Engineer. Safety and Health. Hindu.. (1983).Fault tree analysis for process industries : engineering risk and hazard assessment. (1988). Risk analysis in the process industries. G V. 155. EFCE publication series No 45. April. Hazard and operability studies. (1988). (1992). IChemE. P. (1984). J J. September 15. (1993). ISGRA. R T. J N. PlanVOperatlon Progress. G D. (1992). 25. 37-45. January. Guymer. ILO.Freeman. IChemE . Germany. U. Principal Division Lecture. H R. Greenberg. Probabilistic Safety assessment: Quantitative process to balance design. Inst. IFAL Factor Workbook. Kafka. Reliability engineering and risk assessment. Van Nostrand Reinholdm. of Training and Manpower Dev. 10(3). The 1984 European Major Hazards Conference. Kavianian. Kafka. (1981). PlanVOperation progress. Geneva. T. P. 90. Probabilistic risk assessment in the CPI. Hessian. The Hindu publication. Hauptmanns. Process Safety Report 2. (1974). (1991). Florida. Plan HAZOP studies with an expert system. insurance Technical Bureau. (ED: Greenberg and Creamer). Documentation of Hazards and operability studies. F L. July. M. Check list reviews. Englwood Cliffs. Risk assessment and risk management for the PI. London. Important issues using PSA technology for design of new system and plants. E J and Kumanoto.. update. (1991). Report. . and MeMarnara. ICi . Risk assessment and risk management for chemical process industries. Application of Hazard Evaluation Techniques to the Design of Potentially Hazardous Industrial Chemical Processes. R A. 1. Ohio. Kafka. Fault-tree evaluation by Monte. 63-67. P. The European chemical industry's view of major hazards legislation.Carlo simulation. London. 4(2). 355-367. Van Nostrand Reinhold. Rugby. Nat. (1991). (1997). Div. T C.. Chemical Engineering Progress. J. R.an iSGRt'. and Cramer. Imperial Chemical Industries. (Ed: Kandel and Avani). Cincinnati. Hauptmanns. . New York. U and Yllera. H R. Quantified Risk analysis in the process industries. (1985). Kaiser. August. London. Transactions SMiRT 7 I A Tokyo. . GRS mbH 85748 Garchirg. (1981). (1987). manufacturing and operation for safety of plant structures and systems. R A. Occup. CRC Press Inc.
and Abbasi. of Air Quality Management at an Urban. F I. S A. HAZDIG : Hazardous dispersion of gases. 91-100. (1997e). S A. (1997b). Sym. S A. F I. 338-344. (in press). Application of the recently modified plume path theory on the dispersion of some heavy gases. F I. 23-26 September. Hazard identification and Ranking : a multiattribute technique for hazard identification. J of Loss Prevention Process Industries (communicated). 191-204. S A. (1997f). S A. Khan. F I and Abbasi. Khan. F I. F I. Pondicherry. (1997k). Pondicherry. Regional. (1996). Process Safety Progress. S A. 3. and Abbasi. and Abbasi. Khan. F I. (19979). S A. (1997d). S A. and Abbasi. F I. 10(4). S A. J of Loss Prevention Process Industries. J of Industrial Pollution Control. F I. S A. Risk analysis of epichlohydrin manufacturing industry using new computer automated tool MAXCRED. Khan. 11(2). and Abbasi. TOPHAZOP: a knowledge based software tool for conducting HAZOP in a rapid. S A. MOSEC : Modeling and Simulation of fire and Explosion in Chemical process industries. Bahrain. 10(2). Analytical Simulation : a procedure to conduct FTA in chemical process industries. and Abbasi. November 17-19. and Abbasi. Indian J of Chemical Technology. J Loss Prevention Process Industries. J of Cleaner Production (in press). efficient yet inexpensive manner. (19973). 16(3). J of Loss Prevention in Process Industry. Istanbul. F I.Khan. Simulation of accidents in a chemical process industry using software MAXCRED. Khan. Research report CPCURA 22/97 Pondicherry University. Pondicherry University. Khan. Khan. and Abbasi. (1997h). Mathematical model for HAZOP study time estimation. CPCE/RA 072/95: Pondicherry University. (19971). 172-185. F I and Abbasi. (1997~). and Global Scale.Risk analysis of a cloralkali industry situated in densely populated area. Pondicherry. 89-98. (1995). Khan. 2nd International Speciality Conference on Environment Progress in the Petroleum 8 Petrochemical Industries. S A. and Abbasi. Khan. F I. S A. Risk analysis: a systematic method of hazard assessment and control. . and Abbasi. Rapid quantitative risk assessment of a petrochemical industry using a new software package MAXCRED. Khan. (1995). Khan. optHAZOP an optimal and effective procedure to conduct HAZOP study. and Abbasi. J Loss Prevention Process Industries. F I. Khan. 249. 10(3). F I. Modeling and simulation of heavy gases released by petrochemical industries. Research report CPCE/RA 21/97. and Abbasi. Khan. (1997a). S A.
An introduction to hazard and operability studies. (1979). C M. Loss prevention in process industries. L T. (1986). Engineering Progress.. (1993). S A. (1989). Buffenuorths. (Engineering risk and hazard assessment. F I. The mond fire. (in press). Powers. S. DOMIFFECT: a user-friendly software for domino effect analysis. Process Safety Progress. C T. and Fan. Rugby. (1988). The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Major chemical hazards. Process Safety Progress.. Hazard and operability studies application in RLD. 12. (1976). Canada. IEEE Transactions on Reliability. ChemTech. R E. S A. Chemical Engineer. London. Chematics International Co. R E. Chemical Lees. J IEEE Transaction on Reliability. A risk evaluation system. explosion and toxicity index development of the Dow Index.. (Communicated). The guide word Kolodji. F I. (1985). . (1976). Hazard and operability studies: approach. and Abbasi. Marshall. 7. 12(2). M M. Lewis. (1991). (1997n). Knowlton.(1974). Hazard resolutions in sulfur plants form design through start up. Vancouver. S A. Lai. New York. (1988). V C. 1-8. Operability studies and hazard analysis. Shenoi. R E. J C L. R&D Management. HAZOP and HAZAN Notes on the assessment of hazards. An approach to Maximum Credible Accident Analysis of cluster of industries. 70 (4). Lapp. H G. G J. John Wiley & Sons. Eliminating potential process hazard. 700-704. Florida. 48. and Van Pepper. Lawley. Khan. Lapp. Chapman and Hall Inc. (1983). 72(4). Fuzzy fault tree analysis theory and applications. 37(2). Proceeding of Envirotech International Conference September 21-24. How to improve the effectiveness of hazard and operability analysis. System reliability concept and applications. Environmental Modeling & Software. Klaassen. T A. Ed:Kandei and Avni). (1979). F S. CRC press. Knowlton. S A. and Abbasi. 45-54. Kletz. F P. McKelvey. (1996). S A. K V and Pietersen. Vancouver. (19971). 1-3. Raghvan. Environmental Modeling and Software. Lapp. identification and Kletz. and Abbasi. Powers. T A. Chemical Engineering Progress. Bombay. 89. (1987). F I. K B. Chematics International Ltd. (in press). MAXCRED: a new software package rapid risk assessment. D J . 0 P. (1997m). R-28. G J. (1989). (1982). AlChE on Loss prevention (New York). Khan. New York. and their initial Knowlton. Models for domino effect analysis in chemical process industries. - a Mallikarjunan.Khan. 167-170. 127-731. S A.
New algorithms for fault tree analysis. Parmer. Improved fire and explosion classification. (1978). Ozog. (1991). 7. G. 214-2 18. (ED: Greenberg and Creamer) : Van Nostrand. Ethylene oxide reaction. 5(3). Piccinini. Duxbury. Canadian J. Utilization and results of Hazard and operabii~ty studies in a petroleum refinery. Dept. of Chemical Engineering. John whiley. Pumfrey. (1984).. A S. M.. MIL. and Yeats. (1977). (1990). and Bjordal. Wells. of Computer Science.(1995). Montague. Nivoliantiou. Schemer. index hazard . Helington. and Smith. and Lees. Process Safety Progress. R. New York. H A. Process Safety Progress. (1993). January. (1993). The propagation of faults in Process plants : Hazard identification. Design safety enhancement through the use of hazard and risk analysis. Hazardous chemical data. Procedure for performing a failure mode effect analysis. 1441. IEEE Transactions on Reliability. Reliability Engg. Report MIL-STD-1629A Washington DC. 547. N E. Popazoglou. National Fire Protection Association.what method to use ?. Pasquill. Oil and Gas Journal. 0 0 . B H. and Levy. H J. P. 29(1). Pasman. Qualitative simulation of chemical process system : steady state analysis. 106-110. 40. (1992). 27-33. New Jercy. (1988). 37(2). 149-153. and Fenelon. System Safety. Micholson. D F. (1991). J Loss Prevention Process Industries. 277 & 303. F. Journal of hazardous materials. (1994). A. 34(9). J C. and Stickles. Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer based systems. New York. F P. of Navy. 62. i3(4). 81-90. A guide to project procedure. J A. Atmospheric diffusion. R J. (third edition). Pully. R P. 203-21 1. Reliability Engg. (1991). Risk assessment and risk management for the CPI. D J. and Christou. Process Risk Evaluation . M A. J C. London. Probabilistic safety analysis in chemical installation. Reliability Engineering 8 System Safety.Medermid. Mulvihill. E M. Dept. 30. (1983). Process hazard management documents. F B. I A. University of York. H. AlChE Journal. practice compared. G L. Oyeleye. M. Major hazards in the process industries. and Rose. Institution of Chemical Engineers. NFPA code-325M. O'Mara. (1988). M. safety according to operability analysis. Achievements and challenges in loss prevention. Rauzy. 181-191 . Calculation of human reliability. 1-38. 12(2). (1992). and Kramer. A 0. (1987).
toxicity hazard index. H 8. XIII. 309.161-1 Sherrod. Engrs. Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology. ARC0 Chemical's HAZOP experience. A and Cook. IEEE Transaction on Reliability. W F.'On-Line Hazard Aversion and Fault-Diagnosis in Chemical Processes: The Digraph+Fault-tree Method'. and Munday. Doran. (1982). Accident 67-85. D C. Modularization methods for evaluating fault tree of complex technical system. (1993). London. Rugby. and Early. L and Esping. Quantitative risk analysis in the chemical process industries. New York.Use 'What if method for process hazard analysis. K. Hydrocarbon Processing. A P and Hostlag. F S.lEEE Transactions on 65. Van Sciver. Suokas. SYHI. (1988). Tyler. (1993). (1984). L T. The assessment and control of Major hazards : lnstn Chem. Analysis & Prevention. IFAL: a model for the evaluation of chemical process losses. T R. 4. Geneva. J.Van Nostrand Reinhold. Van Ulden. 12(2). WHO. Washington. Tyler. N. B J. 37(2). 37(2). (1994). R M. Ulerich. (1988). PlanVOperation Progress. (1979). J P . R-32/51. J. H. G R. Zoller. (1993). (Risk assessment and management in PI. (1985). Environment Protection Act CR-816735. Sweeny.132. 453-456. Using the Mond index to measure inherent hazards. Singh. - . J. V. A R. 55-68. Design 79 :lnstn Chem. Estimation of atmospheric boundary layer parameters for diffusion application. Chemical ranking for potential health and environmental impacts. Reliability Engg & System Safety.29. (1988). IEEE Transactions on Reliability. 72(1). (1988). A A.A knowledge frame work for automating HAZOP analysis. 351. Process Safety Progress. Lai. 40(3). A Hazards. Florida. (1994). Fan. 20(1). and Toguchi. Tanaka. P. B F.172.Application of a hazard and operability study to hazard evaluation of an absorption heat pump. Yllera.83-90.1196. (1990). and Grieg. Thomas. (1991).The role of safety analysis in accident prevention. (1983). Ed:Kandei and Avnij. IFAL a new risk analysis tool. Engrs. G . based Whitehouse.Shafagi. and Vaidyanathan. R. J C. International Labor Office. AlChE Journal. 8 J. Hazard and operability studies. 24. (Ed: Greenberg and Creamer) .(1985).Major Hazard Control : A practical manual. (Engineering risk and hazard assessment. Fault tree analysis by Fuzzy probability. Venkatasubramanian. 171. CRC Press Inc. Reliability.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.