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Sugaring the Pill: Assessing Rhetorical Strategies Designed to Minimize Defensive Reactions to Group Criticism
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Matthew J. Hornsey1,*, Erin Robson1, Joanne Smith1, Sarah Esposo1, Robbie M. Sutton2 Article first published online: 4 JAN 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.2007.00314.x Issue

Human Communication Research Volume 34, Issue 1, pages 7098, January 2008 Additional Information(Show All) How to CiteAuthor InformationPublication History 1. This article was accepted under the editorship of Jim Dillard. SEARCH
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Abstract
People are considerably more defensive in the face of group criticism when the criticism comes from an out-group rather than an in-group member (the intergroup sensitivity effect). We tested three strategies that out-group critics can use to reduce this heightened defensiveness. In all studies, Australians received criticism of their country either from another Australian or from a foreigner. In Experiment 1, critics who attached praise to the criticism were liked more and agreed with more than were those who did not. In Experiment 2, out-group critics were liked more and aroused less negativity when they acknowledged that the problems they identified in the target group were shared

also by their own in-group. In both experiments, the ameliorative effects of praise and acknowledgment were fully mediated by attributions of constructiveness. Experiment 3 tested the strategy of spotlighting; that is, of putting on the record that you intend your comments to apply to just a portion of the group rather than to the whole group. This strategywhich did not directly address the attributional issues that are presumed to underpin the intergroup sensitivity effectproved ineffective. Practical and theoretical implications for intergroup communication are discussed.

Rsum
valuation des stratgies visant minimiser les ractions dfensives face une critique de groupe : Dorer la pilule Les gens sont considrablement plus dfensifs face une critique de groupe lorsque cette critique provient dun membre hors-groupe plutt que dun membre intra-groupe (leffet de sensibilit inter-groupe). Nous avons test trois stratgies que les critiques hors-groupes peuvent utiliser afin de rduire cette attitude dfensive exacerbe. Dans chaque tude, des Australiens ont reu des critiques de leur pays formules par un autre Australien ou par un tranger. Dans lexprience 1, les critiques ayant attach des loges la critique furent plus apprcis et appuys que ceux qui ne le firent pas. Dans lexprience 2, les critiques hors-groupes furent plus apprcis et soulevrent moins de ngativit lorsquils reconnurent que les problmes identifis dans le groupe cible taient aussi partags par leur propre groupe. Dans les deux expriences, les effets avantageux de lloge et de la reconnaissance furent compltement mdiatiss par lattribution dune volont constructive. Lexprience 3 a test la stratgie de focalisation, cest--dire dindiquer que vos commentaires visent ne sappliquer qu une portion du groupe plutt qu tout le groupe. Cette stratgie (qui ne traitait pas directement des questions dattribution prsumes soutenir leffet de sensibilit inter-groupes) sest rvle inefficace. Les implications pratiques et thoriques pour la communication inter-groupes sont discutes.

Abstract
Die Bewertung von Strategien zur Minimierung defensiver Reaktionen auf Gruppenkritik: Wie man eine bittere Pille verst. Menschen reagieren wesentlich defensiver, wenn sie mit der Kritik einer Person aus der Outgroup verglichen mit einer Person aus der Ingroup konfrontiert werden (Intergruppensensitivittseffekt). Wir testeten drei Strategien, die Outgroup-Kritiker nutzen knnen, um diese erhhte Defensivitt zu minimieren. In allen Studien wurden Australier von einem Australier oder einem Auslnder mit Kritik am eigenen Land konfrontiert. Im ersten Experiment zeigte sich, dass Kritiker, deren Kritik mit Lob verbunden war, mehr gemocht wurden und grere Zustimmung erfuhren als solche, die dies nicht taten. Im zweiten Experiment zeigte sich, dass ein Outgroup-Kritiker mehr gemocht wurde und weniger Ablehnung erfuhr, wenn er einrumte, dass das Problem, dass er angesprochen hat auch in seiner Ingroup existiert. Beide Experimente verdeutlichen den frderlichen Effekt von Lob und Anerkennung, der gnzlich durch Konstruktivitt moderiert wurde. Experiment 3 testete die Scheinwerfer-Strategie; das heit, die Strategie, einen Kommentar so zu formulieren, dass er nur einen Teil der Gruppe betrifft und nicht die gesamte Gruppe. Diese

Strategie die nicht direkt das Thema angesprochen hat, dass den Intergruppensensitivittseffekt befrdern sollte erwies sich allerdings als ineffektiv. Praktische und theoretische Schlussfolgerungen fr Kommunikation zwischen Gruppen werden diskutiert.

Resumen
Evaluando las Estrategias Destinadas a Minimizar las Reacciones Defensivas hacia las Crticas de Grupo: Endulzando la Pldora La gente es considerablemente ms defensiva hacia la crtica de grupo cuando esta crtica proviene de un grupo al que no se pertenece, que cuando proviene de un miembro del grupo de pertenencia (el efecto de sensibilidad intergrupal). Pusimos a prueba 3 estrategias que las crticas de grupos de no pertenencia pueden usar para reducir este mecanismo de incrementado. En todos los estudios, unos australianos recibieron la crtica a su propio pas de otro australiano de un extranjero. En el experimento 1, aquellos que hicieron una crtica junto con elogios fueron ms preferidos y concordaron ms que aquellos que no hicieron elogios. En el experimento 2, los crticos del grupo de no pertenencia fueron ms preferidos y despertaron menos negatividad cuando admitieron que los problemas que ellos identificaron en el grupo meta eran compartidas tambin por su propio grupo. En ambos experimentos, los efectos de alivio de los elogios y de reconocimiento fueron mediados por completo por las atribuciones constructivas. El experimento 3 puso a prueba la estrategia de llamar la atencin; esto es, de poner como antecedente que la persona intentaba aplicar sus comentarios solo a una porcin del grupo y no al grupo en su totalidad. Esta estrategia que no se dirigi directamente a los asuntos de atribuciones supuestos para mantener el efecto de sensibilidad intergrupalcomprob ser ineficiente. Las implicaciones prcticas y tericas sobre comunicacin intergrupal son tambin discutidas.

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In literature on interpersonal and small group communication, researchers hold an ambivalent approach toward criticism. On one hand, there is an acknowledgment that criticism can be destructive. Poor use of criticism, for example, is perceived to be a major cause of conflict in organizations (Baron, 1988) and perceptions that ones

spouse is critical of you is a major predictor of relapse among depressives (Hooley & Teasdale, 1989). Personal criticism is seen as a dysfunctional strategy for dealing with conflict (e.g., Hocker & Wilmot, 1991), whereas absence of criticism is seen to be a relational maintenance strategy (Canary & Stafford, 1992). In his work on marital relationships, Gottman (1994; Gottman & Levenson, 1992) showed that criticism of ones partner contributes to cascades of isolation and withdrawal and is a key factor that characterizes distressed couples. Gottman concluded that to achieve marital stability, five positive behaviors should be communicated for every one negative behavior. Despite this, it is also clear that people occasionally need criticism to grow and to develop. As Winston Churchill said: Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfills the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things. Criticism helps signpost weaknesses and potentially provides a map for how to correct them. Providing negative feedback about past and current behavior is a cornerstone of many performance interventions; for example, performance appraisals in the workplace, feedback on assignments, and reviews of scholarly articles. Even in intimate relationships, it might on occasion be functional to highlight aspects of a partners behavior that need addressing. Indeed, whereas conflict engagement negatively predicts marital happiness when measured concurrently, there is evidence that conflict engagement predicts improvement in marital satisfaction in the long run (Gottman & Krokoff, 1989). Criticism can be directed at people as individuals (e.g., you are racist) or it can be directed at peoples groups (e.g., Australians are racist). In the current paper, we examine the second form of criticism. Specifically, we examine how people respond when, for example, they receive negative comments about their country, or their profession, or their religion. Like criticism of individuals, criticism of groups can be a prerequisite for reform. Where a nation, for example, is out of touch with international norms of environmental responsibility, or military conduct, or respect for human rights, then criticism from within and outside the country can be a catalyst for positive change. If received defensively, however, criticism can lead to disharmony, schism, conflict, and denial. This paper examines some of the strategies that can be used to reduce resistance to criticism of groups. In examining this question, we first review the limited research that has been conducted to date on when and why people respond in a defensive versus an open-minded fashion to group criticism. We then describe and test three strategies for reducing resistance. Although all three are intuitively appealing strategies, we argue (and show) that only two of these strategies help overcome the active ingredient that promotes defensiveness: suspicious attributions about motive. Throughout, we acknowledge points of contact between the research on group criticism and the research on interpersonal criticism but maintain that insights that can be drawn from one arena cannot be translated unproblematically into the other. One phenomenon that helps illustrate the unique nature of intergroup criticism is the intergroup sensitivity effect.

Intergroup sensitivity effect

It is only very recently that researchers have systematically examined the psychology of responses to group-directed criticism. One factor that has been shown to have a profound effect on how people respond to group criticism is the group membership of the critic. Put simply, when criticism of a group is delivered by outsiders (otherwise known as out-group members), the criticisms arouse more defensiveness than when the very same comments are delivered by insiders (or in-group members). This phenomenon is labeled the intergroup sensitivity effect. This effect appears to be robust, having now been demonstrated across at least eight different intergroup contexts, each using different criticisms, and using participants from both collectivist and individualist cultures (see Hornsey, 2005, for a review). Furthermore, the effect is relatively large: Criticisms that might be cautiously accepted when delivered by an in-group member are aggressively denied if delivered by an out-group member (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002; Sutton, Elder, & Douglas, 2006). With its focus on group identities, influence, and threat, the intergroup sensitivity effect can be located within the language and meta-theoretical umbrella of the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1991). Selfcategorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), for example, argues that the more strongly people identify with a salient group, the more they shift their self-definition from the personal to the collective level. This depersonalization around the group prototype is accompanied by a perceptual enhancement of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences, a process that is assumed to underpin conformity and group-mediated attitude change (Turner, 1991). One consequence of this is that people are more likely to embrace messages from in-group members than from out-group members. There are two reasons, however, to believe that the intergroup sensitivity effect is not merely a specific example of this tendency for people to be cognitively predisposed to embrace in-group messages more readily than out-group messages. First, proponents of the social identity approach would not argue that members would assimilate around the attitudes of any group member; indeed, researchers in this field typically argue that in-group deviants and dissenters face exaggerated levels of hostility as the group tries to preserve its positive distinctiveness (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005). Second, the tendency to accept in-group comments more than out-group comments does not apply when people make positive comments about the group. When participants read praise of their university (Hornsey et al., 2002, Study 1b) or of their country (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey et al., 2002, Study 1a), they do not rate the speaker or the comments differently depending on whether they are attributed to an in-group or an outgroup member. This suggests that the intergroup sensitivity effect is specific to criticisms and not a more generalized tendency to cognitively assimilate to in-group members (see Hornsey, 2006, for a deeper discussion of the points of similarity and dissimilarity between the intergroup sensitivity effect and the social identity perspective). Heightened defensiveness in the face of criticism from outsiders is a concern because there are times when it is important that groups listen to criticism. If a group is not criticized, it can become complacent and stagnant as maladaptive, corrupt, or inefficient practices continue unchallenged. Indeed, a lack of dissent and criticism has been shown to lead to suboptimal decision making (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001), the consequences of which can be disastrous (Janis, 1982). Furthermore, there are times when negative feedback needs to come from outside the group because in-group members are unwilling or unable to recognize the problems within their own culture. In short,

groups occasionally need a nudge along from outsiders to help them pick up their game and reform their culture. And yet research on the intergroup sensitivity effect suggests that such pleas for change face heightened resistance. One intuitive way that outsiders could guard themselves against defensiveness is to engage in credentialing; that is, to equip themselves with a great deal of knowledge and experience of the target group (see Cupach & Metts, 1994, for a discussion of this strategy in the context of interpersonal conflict). Interestingly, however, this strategy does not appear to work. Hornsey and Imani (2004) designed studies in which experience and group membership could be manipulated independently of each other. In these studies, Australians received an extract from an interview with a person who criticized Australians for being uncultured and racist. These comments were attributed either to another Australian, a foreigner who had spent many years living in Australia, or a foreigner with no experience of Australia. The consistent finding was that in-group critics aroused less defensiveness than outsiders and that experience did not help the outsiders. In other words, critics who had spent large chunks of their life in Australia were treated no differently from critics who had never set foot in the country. This suggests that perceptions of epistemic authority did not underpin the intergroup sensitivity effect and that outsiders cannot reduce defensiveness merely by boosting and communicating their credentials as experienced judges.

Using language to overcome the intergroup sensitivity effect

The failure of credentialing to overcome the intergroup sensitivity effect poses the question of what outsiders can do to neutralize or overcome defensiveness in the face of group criticism. One possibility is to adjust the language they use. Before engaging in (interpersonal) communications that might be considered argumentative or aggressive, people edit their arguments before uttering them (Hample & Dallinger, 1988). Arguments are tailored and so is the language used to express them. Communicators use disclaimers (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975), equivocations (Bavelas, Black, Bryson, & Mullett, 1988), and ingratiation tactics (Berscheid & Walster, 1978) to maximize the effectiveness of their message and to conform to rules about politeness and maintenance of face (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Cupach & Carson, 2002; Cupach & Metts, 1990, 1994; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Rogan & Hammer, 1994; Ting-Toomey, 1988). Like any communication, criticisms can be delivered well and they can be delivered poorly, depending on the sensitivity and skill with which critics tailor their language to deliver the message (Baron, 1988; Tracy, van Dusen, & Robinson, 1987). Although research on this question is surprisingly scarce, certain principles can be intuited: Criticism should be specific, should be oriented toward the future rather than the past, should avoid attributing poor performance to internal causes, should be clear, and should avoid being biting or sarcastic (Baron, 1988; Ogilvie & Haslett, 1985). The research question examined in this paper is: What strategies are available to the outsider who wishes to promote change in another group? To answer this question, we sought a theoretical base that went beyond intuitive notions of respectfulness, specificity, and so forth, and could grapple with the emergent processes that govern intergroup as opposed to interpersonal criticism. To achieve this, it is necessary to engage with the deeper question of what it is about a critics out-group status that arouses so much defensiveness in the first place. Only by coming to a theoretical

understanding of what drives the intergroup sensitivity effect, can we generate predictions about which strategies should work and which should not. The literature to date has shown quite consistently that at the heart of the intergroup sensitivity effect is an attributional bias. Attributions play a central role in communication theories, having been found to influence responses to excuses (Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987), resistance to compliance requests (Wilson, Cruz, Marshall, & Rao, 1993), relational disengagement (Cody, Kersten, Braaten, & Dickson, 1992), rejection (e.g., Folkes, 1982), bad news (e.g., Bies & Sitkin, 1992), and conflict (e.g., Bradbury & Fincham, 1990). With respect to group-directed criticism, Hornsey (2005) argues that people look past the content of the words and make judgments about the integrity of the critics motives; in other words they ask themselves the question: Why would they say that? If they perceive that the critic has relatively sinister or destructive motives, then this provides an opportunity to dismiss the message, and heightens negativity toward the speaker and his or her comments. However, if they can see no reason to assume that the speaker has destructive motives, they are free to assess the content of the message on its merits. When making this judgment about motive, receivers of criticism factor in a number of considerations, not least of which is the group membership of the critic. In short, when in-group members criticize the group, people are more likely to assume that they are motivated by constructive reasons than when the same comments are delivered by an outsider, and these differing perceptions of motive drive the effect. This is consistent with much evidence showing that people expect in-group members to look after them and to show reciprocity of favors (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Tanis & Postmes, 2005; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), whereas they expect out-group members to have hostile and competitive intentions (e.g., Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, & Muller, 2005; Vivian & Berkowitz, 1993). Evidence for this attributional explanation includes mediational analyses demonstrating that the intergroup sensitivity effect tends to disappear when attributions of constructiveness are controlled for (e.g., Hornsey & Imani, 2004). There is also experimental evidence reinforcing the notion that it is attributions of constructiveness that are the most proximal driver of the effect. For example, if participants are led to believe that the in-group critic is not committed to the groupeither because they are a low identifier (Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004) or because they are a newcomer to the group (Hornsey, Grice, Jetten, Paulsen, & Callan, 2007)they arouse just as much defensiveness as outsiders. Figure 1 provides a summary of the attributional model of responses to group criticism. Figure 1. Responses to group criticism: An attributional model.

In devising and testing strategies for reducing resistance to group criticism, we were guided by this attributional account of the intergroup sensitivity effect. If it is true that heightened levels of defensiveness in the face of out-group criticisms are driven by suspicions about the motives of the out-group speaker, then any strategy used by out-group speakers to minimize distrust with regard to their motives should be particularly useful in reducing defensiveness. One such strategy might be to preface criticism with positive feedback (sweetening). An alternative strategy available to out-group critics might be to acknowledge the failings of their own group as well as the target group (sharing; e.g., we also are racist). In each case, the out-group members are presenting the criticisms in such a way as to disarm peoples expectations that they are making the criticism as part of a wider intergroup competition for prestige and status. With these suspicions assuaged, in-group members might be better positioned psychologically to focus on the content of the message in a balanced and nondefensive way. These two strategies are tested in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Experiment 3 tests an alternative strategy that has powerful intuitive appeal but does not address the attributional concerns that have been argued to be the primary driver of defensiveness: namely, putting on the record that you intend your comments to apply to just a portion of the group rather than to the whole group (spotlighting). If attributions of constructiveness really do underpin the intergroup sensitivity effect, we should see the first two strategies work, whereas the third strategy should not.

Experiment 1
It is commonly assumed that the strategic use of praise (sweetening) can help soften responses to negative feedback; for example, in our department, tutors are advised to sandwich their negative feedback between pieces of praise when marking assignments. This common wisdom has filtered into textbooks and manuals, but there have been surprisingly few controlled empirical tests of whether the strategy actually works. Descriptive evidence for the power of praise emerged in a study by Tracy et al. (1987), in which participants were asked to recall examples of good and bad criticism they had received in the past. In 19% of cases of well-delivered criticism, the specific negative comments were framed in a broader positive context. Of the examples of poorly delivered criticism, only 2% did so. To our knowledge, experimental tests of the use of praise as a buffer to criticism are rare. One exception is a study by Cohen, Steele, and Ross (1999), who exposed Black and White students to negative evaluations of a written task from a White teacher. In one condition, the criticism was unbuffered; in another condition, it was buffered by praise. Evidence for the buffering effect of praise was mixed. Black (but not White) students were marginally more task motivated when the criticism was buffered by praise than when it was not. On a measure of whether participants identified with their writing task (e.g., How would you rate your overall competence as a writer?), praise had no effect for either Black or White participants. One final experiment of note was conducted by Davies and Jacobs (1985), who tested the sandwiching approach described earlier using 28 attendants at a 2hour self-development workshop. Participants who received the sandwich rated the feedback as more desirable and credible (but no more emotionally positive) than those who received other permutations of positive and negative

feedback. However, it was not possible to compare the effectiveness of praise per se because praise was present in all conditions. In summary, there has been surprisingly little empirical research examining whether praise can buffer the effects of criticism (and certainly none from an intergroup perspective). Of the research that has been conducted, the evidence for praise is mixed. Where effects have been found, there has been no examination of what might mediate the effects. Experiment 1 was designed to respond to these limitations. From the perspective of research on the intergroup sensitivity effect, it is reasonable to expect that praise might help reduce defensiveness toward group criticism. Our argument is that, when responding to criticism of their groups, people draw hypotheses about what is going on in the heart and mind of the critic: Do they care about us? Are they trying to be constructive? If praise is attached to the criticism, it might be that recipients would be more likely to answer these questions in the affirmative. The more generous attributions associated with praise should then flow on to reduced levels of defensiveness. One potential problem with sweetening, however, is that the strategy might be seen by a skeptical in-group audience as an overly transparent attempt to soften criticism. This could result in the praise simply being dismissed, or even worse, it could result in group members feeling as though the speaker is being overaccommodating or patronizing. Even in the absence of skepticism about the motives for the praise, it could be that the praise would not be processed or remembered, given that it is potentially overshadowed by the more threatening and ego-involving criticism. Indeed, social theorists have long recognized the tendency for some people to selectively attend to negative experiences and to discount positive experiences when receiving feedback from the social world, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the negativity effect (Fiske, 1980), negativity bias (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), or mnemic neglect (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2005). Consistent with this, an analysis of student reactions to teacher feedback revealed that bad feedback had a much stronger effect on perceptions than good feedback (Coleman, Jussim, & Abraham, 1987). Although good feedback was seen to be more credible, bad feedback was seen to be more diagnostic of what the teacher really thought. Thus, despite the assumed consensus that praise is helpful in softening the blow when delivering negative feedback, there are theoretical reasons to test this assumption empirically. In Experiment 1, Australian participants read criticisms of their group that were attributed either to another Australian (in-group critic) or to a non-Australian (out-group critic). Depending on condition, the criticism was either contextualized with praise or it was not. Consistent with the intergroup sensitivity effect, we predicted that out-group critics would be liked less than in-group critics and that their comments would arouse more negativity and less agreement than the in-group critics comments. We also predicted that, when praise was attached to the criticism, levels of interpersonal liking and agreement would increase and levels of negativity would decrease relative to when praise was not used. If we were to obtain effects of praise, it was expected that these effects would be mediated by attributions of constructiveness.

Method
Participants and design
Participants were 107 undergraduate psychology students (79 females, 28 males, M = 21.61 years) who participated in the study in return for course credit. Assuming a moderate effect size of .30, we needed only 90 participants to achieve acceptable power (80%); thus, the current sample size was considered sufficiently powerful. Participants were randomly allocated to the four conditions of a 2 (speaker type: in-group vs. out-group) 2 (strategy: praise vs. no praise) between-groups design. Participants were only included if they nominated Australia as their primary national identity.

Materials and procedure

To reduce the transparency of the experiment, participants were told that the study was interested in how people make personality evaluations on the basis of minimal information. They were told that they would be given an extract from an interview with someone who would talk a little about themselves and a little about what they think of Australia. They would be asked to read these extracts and to evaluate both the speaker and his or her comments. Before starting the questionnaire, participants recorded the extent to which they agreed with the following statements: Being an Australian is an important part of my self-image,I have a lot in common with other Australians, and I identify as an Australian. These items were combined to form a single measure of national identification (= .87).

Manipulation of speaker
This section of the questionnaire consisted of a biography of the speaker and was intended to manipulate speaker type. A summary of the speakers demographic information was provided, including name (J. Benson), country of birth (Australia or United States), current residence (Brisbane or Washington), and age (22). In response to the question, Tell us a little bit about yourself, the speaker answered: My parents own their own landscaping business. Ive got two older brothers and an older sister. I enjoy hanging out with my friends and reading. In response to the question, What country are you from? the speaker said I was born in Australia (or America, depending on condition) and Ive lived here all my life. To accentuate this condition, the national flag of Australia or the United States (depending on condition) was pasted next to the biographical information. Participants then rated the extent to which they thought the speaker was intelligent, trustworthy, friendly, openminded, likeable, respected, interesting, and nice (Time 1 trait evaluations; = .90). Trait ratings of the speaker were measured before the criticisms were read by the participants in order to assess preexisting differences in trait evaluations of in-group and out-group members. These measures can be used as a baseline against which postcriticism trait evaluations can be compared.

Criticisms
The scripts used to present the criticisms were similar to those used by Hornsey and colleagues (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey et al., 2002, 2004). In response to the question, What do you think of Australians? the critic said:

I think of them as being fairly racist. Theyre racist towards Aborigines, and theyre intolerant of Asians. Also, my understanding of Australia is that, on the whole, theyre not as cultured as most societies. The script was identical in both in-group and out-group conditions, except in the in-group conditions they used inclusive pronouns (i.e., us and we rather than them and they). This is consistent with all previous research on the intergroup sensitivity effect. In the no-praise condition, there was no further text. In the praise condition, the negative comments were contextualized with three positive comments: Having said that, I think Australians are generally fairly friendly and warm people. I also think theyre a very educated society. And they seem to have a good sense of humor. They can see the funny side to things which is good. The comments used in the scripts were based on a pilot study in which Australians were asked to rate the extent to which various negative and positive statements applied to Australians. The traits used in the scripts were used because we found some consensus that Australians themselves believed them to be true (see Hornsey et al., 2002, for details). The order of the praise relative to the criticism was counterbalanced, such that half of the time the praise came before the criticism and half the time the praise came after the criticism.

Dependent measures
All subsequent items were measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The first part of the questionnaire was designed to test the extent to which the positive and negative comments were salient to participants. Participants were reminded of each of the three criticisms and were asked after each to indicate the extent to which, when reading the script, this particular comment had stuck in their mind and the extent to which it had stood out from the rest in their mind. For participants in the praise condition, they repeated the exercise in relation to each of the pieces of praise. The responses for the pieces of criticism (= .70) and for the pieces of praise (= .88) were combined into scales of salience. The rest of the questionnaire measured the key dependent variables. Constructiveness was measured by asking the extent to which the participants believed the speakers comments were intended to be constructive, were intended to be destructive (reverse scored), and were made with Australias best interests at heart (= .80). Negativity toward the criticisms was measured by asking the extent to which the participants felt the criticisms of Australia were disappointing, irritating, offensive, judgmental, and insulting (= .93). Following this, participants completed the same trait evaluation scale used at Time 1 (Time 2 trait evaluations; = .92). Agreement with the criticisms was measured by asking the extent to which the participants agreed with the speakers criticisms about Australia, and the extent to which they felt the criticisms were true (r = .93). To determine whether constructiveness, negativity, agreement, and likeability represent discrete scales, a factor analysis was conducted on these items using principal components extraction with oblimin rotation. A three-factor solution emerged, with the first factor comprising both the likeability items (Time 2) and the constructiveness items

(eigenvalue = 10.05, 55.81% of variance explained). The second factor comprised the negativity items (eigenvalue = 2.45, 13.61% of variance explained), and the third factor comprised the agreement items (eigenvalue = 1.15, 6.40% of variance explained). Although the likeability and constructiveness items are clearly highly correlated, on face value, we were confident that these constructs were separate, given that the former represents a set of trait evaluations of the critic and the latter represents attributions of motive. It should also be noted that in Experiments 2 and 3 (reported later), factor analysis of the same items reveals a perfect four-factor solution.

Results
Preliminary analyses
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant main effects of sex on any measures and that sex did not interact with speaker type or strategy. Analysis of the identification measure showed that participants identified strongly with their national identity overall (M = 5.66) and that levels of identification were statistically equivalent across all conditions. For participants in the praise condition, independent t tests were conducted to see if the order of the praise relative to the criticism had any effect on the dependent measures. None of the t tests were significant (all ps > .32), meaning that it did not matter whether praise was delivered before or after the criticism. Consequently, the data for the praise conditions were collapsed across order. To test how salient the praise was relative to the criticisms, we conducted a 2 (speaker type) 2 (praise vs. criticism) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the salience scales. The only significant effect was that criticisms on the whole were more salient to participants (M = 5.34) than the praise (M = 4.26), F(1, 53) = 31.75, p < .001, 2= .38. Speaker type had no effect on salience, either as a main effect (p = .91) or as an interaction (p = .42).

Main analyses
Results for constructiveness, negativity, and agreement were analyzed using a series of 2 (speaker type: in-group vs. out-group) 2 (strategy: praise vs. no praise) between-groups ANOVAs. Results for Time 2 likeability were analyzed using a 2 2 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with Time 1 likeability scores entered as a covariate. All effect sizes reported here and in subsequent studies are partial 2. Means and standard deviations are summarized in Table 1. Australian (In-Group Critic) Measure Praise 1. No Praise Praise No Praise Non-Australian (Out-Group Critic)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Means that do not share a subscript are significantly different according to

Duncan posthoc test (p < .05). Means for Time 2 likeability are adjusted after having covaried out Time 1 likeability. Constructiveness Time 2 likeability Negativity Agreement 4.87c (1.28) 4.40c (1.30) 3.81a (1.65) 4.50c (1.85) 3.63b (1.18) 3.68b (1.08) 4.14ab (1.64) 3.60ac (1.87) 3.58b (1.02) 3.92bc (1.21) 4.89bc (1.35) 3.39ab (1.52) 2.54a (0.96) 3.06a (1.22) 5.47c (1.16) 2.87a (1.46)

Table 1. Effects of Sweetening on Responses to Criticism: Experiment 1

As predicted, main effects of speaker type emerged on constructiveness, F(1, 103) = 30.00, p < .001, 2= .23, negativity, F(1, 103) = 18.01,p < .001, 2= .15, Time 2 likeability, F(1, 102) = 6.49, p = .012, 2= .06, and agreement, F(1, 103) = 7.98, p = .006, 2= .07. Consistent with the intergroup sensitivity effect, in-group critics were liked more (M = 4.04), were attributed more constructive motives (M = 4.28), and were agreed with more (M = 4.08) than were out-group critics (Ms = 3.49, 3.06, and 3.13, respectively). In-group critics also aroused less negativity (M = 3.97) than did out-group critics (M = 5.18). Main effects of praise also emerged on constructiveness, F(1, 103) = 27.70, p < .001, 2= .21, Time 2 likeability, F(1, 102) = 13.26, p < .001, 2= .12, and agreement, F(1, 103) = 4.74, p = .032, 2= .04. Critics who used praise were liked more (M = 4.16), were attributed more constructive motives (M = 4.24), and were agreed with more (M = 3.95) than critics who did not praise (Ms = 3.37, 3.06, and 3.22, respectively). The tendency for critics who praised (M = 4.34) to arouse less negativity than those who did not praise (M = 4.83) was nonsignificant, F(1, 102) = 2.55, p = .11, 2= .02. On none of the measures did strategy significantly interact with speaker type (all ps > .64).

Why does praise help? The role of constructiveness

In summary, attaching praise to criticism helped critics overcome defensiveness on measures of agreement and likeability. It was predicted that the reason for this would be that critics who praised would be attributed more constructive motives for their criticism than those who did not praise. To test for mediation, a series of regressions was conducted with strategy dummy-coded such that 0 =no praiseand 1 =praise. Consistent with the strategy for conducting the ANOVAs, when conducting regressions on Time 2 likeability, Time 1 likeability scores were controlled for at the first stage. When included in a regression along with strategy, constructiveness significantly predicted both agreement (= .59, p < .001) and likeability (= .68, p < .001), thus satisfying a key condition for mediation. Furthermore, after including constructiveness in the model, significant effects of strategy on agreement (= .21, p = .031) and likeability (= .31, p < .001) were reduced to nonsignificance (agreement: =.04, p = .64; likeability: = .03, p = .65). In each case, this represented a significant drop in variance according to the Sobel test (agreement: z = 3.89, p < .001; likeability: z = 3.81, p < .001). In sum, there was evidence that attributions of constructiveness fully mediated the effects of praise on agreement and likeability.

Discussion
There has been limited empirical research examining whether negative feedback is more likely to be absorbed if the criticisms are contextualized by praise, either at the interpersonal level or the intergroup level. Although such a strategy is intuitively appealing, there are theoretical reasons to challenge the assumed link between praise and responses to criticism that make empirical scrutiny of the relationship important. If praise is recognized as simply a strategy to reduce defensiveness toward the criticisms, then people might dismiss or gloss over the positive feedback and focus exclusively on the more diagnostic, threatening, and ego-involving criticisms, rendering the praise

ineffectual. Indeed, in our sample, we found that people who were exposed to both praise and criticism of Australia were far more likely to cognitively focus on the negative than the positive feedback. Despite this, there was some evidence that praise could help reduce defensiveness toward group criticism. The effects of praise were most marked on ratings of how likeable the critic was seen to be: Critics who used praise were seen to be much more likeable than those who did not. A weaker but still reliable effect emerged on agreement: When praise was used participants agreed with the criticisms more than when praise was not used. On negativity, however, praise had no reliable effect at all. Despite the mixed picture, the overall conclusion is that it is better to praise than to not praise, particularly if being liked is important to you. In addition to testing the effects of praise on reducing defensiveness, another aim of the current study is to examine why praise might help reduce defensiveness. Our mediation analysis showed evidence consistent with our argument that attributions underpin responses to group-directed criticism. Specifically, critics who used praise were assumed to be motivated by more constructive reasons than did those who did not praise, and this led to higher ratings on likeability and agreement. Thus, the current study does not just provide an early attempt to empirically assess the merits of praise, it also provides clues as to the psychological mechanisms through which praise might work. It should be noted that in all cases, the effects of praise need to be interpreted against the backdrop of a robust intergroup sensitivity effect. In all cases, out-group critics aroused more defensiveness than did in-group critics. The effects of praise worked equally for in-group and out-group critics, so this strategy should be seen as a way of reducing defensiveness per se rather than a way of reducing the intergroup sensitivity effect. Inspection of effect sizes shows that the effect of group membership was greater than the effect of praise on ratings of agreement and negativity. Indeed, across all the measures, an out-group critic who used praise aroused just as much defensiveness as an in-group member who did not use this strategy. This helps reinforce the uphill battle that people face when directing negative feedback at out-groups.

Experiment 2
We have seen in Experiment 1 that praise can help outsiders reduce defensiveness toward criticism, at least on dimensions of agreement and likeability. An alternative strategy is for out-group critics to acknowledge the failings of their own group as well as the in-group with regard to the criticism (sharing). As described earlier, the social identity perspective suggests that people gain and maintain self-esteem through membership in groups that offer positive distinctiveness. Thus, when an out-group member criticizes a group to which we belong, we might be quick to assume that their comments are simply part of this ongoing struggle for intergroup supremacy. If, however, an outgroup critic also articulates the shortcomings of his or her own group, it would help defuse the notion that the outgroup critic is motivated by a need to demonstrate his or her groups superiority. In the absence of this explanation for

the criticisms, the in-group members might be more likely to rely on an alternative explanation: that the person is making these comments with the best interests of the group in mind. These attributions of constructiveness might then flow on to lower levels of negativity, more positive evaluations of the critic, and a greater willingness to embrace the truth within the criticisms. To our knowledge, there have been no empirical tests of whether such a strategy would work, either in the context of interpersonal or intergroup criticism. It is important, however, not to automatically assume that sharing would work solely because it promotes more positive attributions about motive. An alternative and equally plausible explanation is that critics who acknowledge problems within their own group are seen to be less hypocritical than those who do not, which leads to a more positive attitude toward the comments. Indeed, qualitative research on persuasion has shown that perceptions of hypocrisy in others are a key reason for resisting messages stemming from schools and wider society (e.g., BoothButterfield, Anderson, & Williams, 2000; Flacks, 1967). It seems reasonable, then, to test whether any effects of acknowledgment are driven by constructiveness over and above perceptions of hypocrisy. In Experiment 2, Australian participants read what they believed to be an extract from an interview in which a person criticized Australians for being racist toward indigenous people and Asians. In the in-group condition, the criticisms were attributed to another Australian. In the out-group conditions, the criticisms were attributed to a foreigner. Three versions of the out-group criticism were included in the study. In the acknowledgment condition, the out-group critic acknowledged the failings of his or her own country in regard to racism and in the no-acknowledgment condition they did not. We also included a control condition in which the out-group critic acknowledged racism existed in other countries but did not mention his or her own (other-group acknowledgment). By including this condition, we were able to disentangle the unique effects of own-group acknowledgment from the effects of merely diffusing criticism across multiple groups. In line with the intergroup sensitivity effect, it was expected that the in-group critic would arouse less defensiveness than the out-group critics who did not acknowledge similar problems within their own country (the noacknowledgment and the other-group acknowledgment conditions). It was expected that the out-group critic who acknowledged the failings of his or her own group would arouse less defensiveness than the other out-group critics, resulting in attenuation or even elimination of the intergroup sensitivity effect. Furthermore, it was expected that the effects of acknowledgment would be mediated by constructiveness, over and above perceptions of hypocrisy. Specifically, it was expected that the out-group critic who acknowledged his or her own groups failings would be attributed more constructive motives than would the out-group critic who did not use acknowledgment and that this difference in attribution would underpin the effects of acknowledgment on likeability, agreement, and negativity.

Method
Participants and design

Participants were 160 undergraduate student volunteers (118 females, 42 males, M = 21.26 years) who nominated Australia as their primary national identity. Assuming a moderate effect size of .30, we needed only 128 participants to achieve acceptable power (80%); thus, the current sample size was considered sufficiently powerful. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four between-groups conditions: in-group criticism, out-group criticism with no acknowledgment, out-group criticism with acknowledgment of another groups flaws, and out-group criticism with acknowledgment of own groups flaws.

Procedure
The cover story and procedure were similar in most respects to that used in Experiment 1. After completing demographic details and the three-item measure of national identification (= .86), participants read details about the target speaker. The demographic descriptions of the speaker were the same as those used in Experiment 1, except this time three out-group nationalities were used: speakers were described as being either citizens of the United States, New Zealand, or Canada (out-group nationality was counterbalanced within each out-group condition). As in Experiment 1, the speakers gave a small amount of information about their hobbies, their families, and the fact that they had lived in their country of birth all their life. After receiving this information, participants completed the Time 1 likeability items described earlier (= .91). Participants then read the speakers response to the question What do you think of Australians? In the in-group condition and the out-group/no-acknowledgment condition the response read: When I think of Australians I think of us (them) as fairly racist. Were (Theyre) racist toward Aborigines and intolerant of Asians. In the condition where the out-group speaker acknowledged similar flaws in other countries, the following sentences were added: But I think this is something other countries struggle with too. For instance, (members of X country) are racist towards their indigenous people and towards Asian people. In this condition, the speaker always referred to members of another out-group; for example, a New Zealander might say that Canadians are also racist, or a Canadian might say that U.S. citizens are also racist. In the condition where the out-group speaker acknowledged similar flaws in his or her own country, these sentences were replaced with the following: But I think this is something we struggle with too. For instance, I also think we are racist towards our indigenous people and towards Asian people. To account for ratings of hypocrisy, participants rated the extent to which they found the criticisms to be hypocritical. They also completed the same measures of constructiveness (= .85), Time 2 likeability (= .95), negativity (= .92), and agreement (r = .90) used in Experiment 1. This time, a factor analysis with oblimin rotation revealed a four-factor solution corresponding perfectly to the four key-dependent measures.

Results
Preliminary analyses
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant main or interactive effects of sex on any measures. Again, participants identified strongly with their national identity (M = 5.28), and an ANOVA revealed that levels of

identification were equivalent across all conditions (p = .22). A series of ANOVAs was run among the participants in the out-group conditions to check whether ratings of negativity, likeability, agreement, and constructiveness differed depending on which out-group participants were exposed to. Results showed that ratings were equivalent regardless of whether the out-group critic was a New Zealander, a Canadian, or a U.S. citizen (all ps > .19). Thus, we felt comfortable collapsing these groups together.

Main analyses
Analyses were conducted using one-way between-groups ANOVAs with four levels. When analyzing Time 2 likeability, Time 1 likeability was entered as a covariate. Significant main effects were followed up with Duncans posthoc tests. Means and standard deviations are summarized in Table 2. Out-Group Critic In-Group Critic None 1. Acknowledgment of Group Failings Other Group Own Group

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Means that do not share a subscript are significantly different according to

Duncan posthoc test (p < .05). Means for Time 2 likeability are adjusted after having covaried out Time 1 likeability. Constructiveness Time 2 likeability Negativity Agreement 4.32c (1.30) 4.18b (0.90) 3.71a (1.45) 4.25 (1.62) 2.69a (1.04) 3.46a (1.06) 5.31d (1.12) 3.78 (1.47) 3.31b (1.28) 3.60a (1.08) 4.69bc (1.49) 3.66 (1.54) 3.98c (0.94) 4.13b (0.86) 4.18ab (1.34) 3.97 (1.47)

Table 2. Effects of Sharing on Responses to Criticism: Experiment 2 Unexpectedly, no effects of condition emerged on ratings of agreement, F(3, 156) = 1.11, p = .35, 2= .02. However, as predicted, main effects of condition emerged on constructiveness, F(3, 156) = 15.73, p < .001, 2= .23, likeability, F(3, 155) = 6.59, p < .001, 2= .11, and negativity, F(3, 156) = 10.11, p < .001, 2= .16. For ratings of constructiveness, posthoc analysis revealed that the highest ratings of constructiveness occurred when the critic was an in-group member and when an out-group critic acknowledged similar problems within his or her own country (these conditions did not differ from each other). Ratings of constructiveness in these conditions were significantly higher than when an out-group critic acknowledged similar problems in another group, which in turn were higher than when out-group critics did not use acknowledgment at all. For ratings of negativity a similar pattern emerged: Least negativity emerged when the critic was an in-group member and when an out-group critic acknowledged similar problems within his or her own country (these conditions did not differ from each other). Ratings of negativity were significantly lower in the in-group condition than in the condition where out-group critics acknowledged similar problems in other groups. Negativity in the out-group/noacknowledgment condition was significantly higher than in all other conditions. Finally, posthoc analyses on the Time 2 likeability scores showed that the highest likeability ratings occurred when the critic was an in-group member and when an out-group critic acknowledged similar problems within his or her own

country (these conditions did not differ from each other). Ratings of likeability were significantly higher in these conditions than when an out-group critic acknowledged similar problems in another group, or did not use acknowledgment at all (these last two conditions also did not differ from each other).

Why does acknowledgment help? The role of constructiveness

By acknowledging similar problems within ones own country, out-group critics could reduce defensiveness on likeability and negativity to the point where the intergroup sensitivity effect was eliminated. Consistent with the attributional arguments presented here, it was predicted that these effects would be mediated by attributions of constructiveness. To test this, we selected only participants in the out-group/no-acknowledgment and the outgroup/own-group acknowledgment conditions. This way we were able to reduce our four-level IV into a dichotomous variable that could be used in regression. This variable was dummy coded such that the no-acknowledgment condition was coded 0 and the own-group acknowledgment condition was coded 1. When conducting the regressions on Time 2 likeability, ratings of likeability at Time 1 were included at the first step as a control. When included in a regression along with condition, constructiveness significantly predicted both negativity (=.41, p < .001) and likeability (= .51, p < .001). After including constructiveness into the model, significant effects of condition on negativity (=.42, p < .001) and likeability (= .32, p < .001) were reduced to being either marginally significant (negativity: =.19, p = .090) or nonsignificant (likeability: = .04, p = .63). In each case, this change in variance explained was significant according to the Sobel test (negativity: z =3.08,p = .002; likeability: z = 4.06, p < .001). This suggests that acknowledgment helped the out-group critic because acknowledgment increased attributions of constructiveness.

Why does acknowledgment help? The role of hypocrisy

Despite the mediation analyses reported above, it is important also to test whether perceptions of hypocrisy play a mediating role. ANOVA on the hypocrisy ratings confirmed that out-group critics who did not acknowledge (M = 4.68) or who acknowledged the failings of groups other than their own (M = 5.14) were seen to be more hypocritical than those who acknowledged failings in their own group (M = 3.80), who in turn were seen to be more hypocritical than in-group speakers (M = 3.02), F(3, 156) = 15.19, p < .001, 2= .23. To test whether acknowledgment aroused less defensiveness in part because it reduced perceptions of hypocrisy, we repeated the regressions reported above, but this time with hypocrisy included alongside constructiveness as a mediator. When entered together with strategy, both constructiveness and hypocrisy proved to be significant predictors of negativity and likeability (all ps < .001). Subsequent regressions were performed without constructiveness in the model to see if perceptions of hypocrisy on their own could mediate the effects. In each case, however, the effects of strategy remained highly significant after controlling for hypocrisy (negativity: =.25, p = .003; likeability: = .22, p = .011). Thus, there is little evidence that hypocrisy is playing a unique role in explaining the effects of acknowledgment.

Discussion

Overall, the data suggest that acknowledgment (or sharing) is an effective strategy for reducing defensiveness. When claiming that Australians were racist, out-group critics were liked more and aroused less negativity when they acknowledged that their own country had problems with racism than when they did not. The positive effect of acknowledgment was strong enough to eradicate the intergroup sensitivity effect on these measures. Furthermore, we were able to gain insights into the psychological underpinnings of the effects. Consistent with our theoretical focus on attributions, out-group critics who acknowledged problems within their own group were seen to be motivated by more constructive reasons than were those who did not acknowledge, and it was this shift in attributions that explained the effect. Although acknowledgment also helped reduce perceptions that the comments were hypocritical, there was no evidence that perceptions of hypocrisy were playing a mediating role. Although the data broadly conformed to expectations, there were two unexpected results. First, although the means trended in a direction that mirrored the other dependent measures, the manipulations had no significant effect on agreement. This includes a failure to find the intergroup sensitivity effect on agreement; that is, there is no significant difference between the in-group and the out-group/no-acknowledgment condition. This noneffect is particularly surprising given that the intergroup sensitivity effect has proven very reliable in the past and that sizeable intergroup sensitivity effects emerged on the other dependent measures of the current experiment. Furthermore, an intergroup sensitivity effect emerged on this measure in Experiment 1 and (as will be seen later) in Experiment 3, which used almost identical methods to the current experiment. Regardless of the reason for the noneffect, it should be noted that no conclusions can be drawn with regard to the power of acknowledgment to increase levels of agreement with critical messages. A second unexpected effect was that acknowledging failings in groups other than your own succeeded in reducing defensiveness (relative to a no-acknowledgment condition) on some measures. The effect of other-group acknowledgment was not as strong as own-group acknowledgment; for example, it did not eliminate the intergroup sensitivity effect on any of the measures and it had no reliable effect at all on ratings of likeability. But it does seem to be the case that when critics diffused the negative feedback across multiple out-groups, participants were more likely to see the critic as being driven by constructive motives and felt less negatively toward the criticisms in general. In other words, acknowledging that similar problems exist in groups other than the target group is more effective than not acknowledging at all. This raises the question of whether in-group critics can benefit from such a strategy. For example, if in-group critics criticized their country, but contextualized the criticisms by saying that the problems were shared by other groups as well, it might be that this would also help reduce defensiveness. Further research is needed to clarify some of the nuances associated with the power of other-group acknowledgment to reduce defensiveness.

Experiment 3

In Experiment 3, we assess a third strategy for reducing defensiveness that possesses a similar intuitive appeal to the first two but would not be likely to change attributions of constructiveness. This is the strategy of spotlighting; that is, of putting on the record that you intend your comments to apply to just a portion of the group rather than to the whole group. If our attributional explanation of defensiveness is correct, then we should find that this strategy has little or no effect on responses to criticism. Despite the fact that spotlighting does not directly address the attributional bias that drives the intergroup sensitivity effect, there are at least three reasons why it might be otherwise expected to work. First, spotlighting seems consistent with the principle of specificity that researchers on interpersonal criticism consider important when presenting feedback (Baron, 1988). Second, research suggests that people disapprove of individuals who make generalizations about groups, even if the generalizations apply to ostensibly positive traits (Mae & Carlston, 2005). Thus, critics who are careful not to make their generalizations about the group overly sweeping (i.e., by spotlighting) might be seen as less objectionable and their comments might subsequently seem more palatable. A third possible reason that spotlighting might work is that it helps reduce any threat to personal identity associated with group criticism. When somebody criticizes a group to which we belong, this undoubtedly represents a challenge to our social or group identity. However, it is ambiguous whether this also represents a criticism of our values as an individual. Imagine if your country was criticized for being racist using the kind of language used in the scripts of the current experiments; it is unclear in this situation whether the critic sees these values in all, most, or some of your compatriots. But our assumptions about this might have an impact on the degree of threat we feel. If we assume that the critic only intended the criticism to apply to some of our compatriots, we might feel relaxed in the knowledge that the critic would not automatically assume that we were racist individuals, and that he or she would probably exonerate us from this allegation if the critic were to meet us. In this case, the criticism represents a threat to our social identity without representing a threat to our personal or individual identity. But if we assume that the critic were to believe that all or most of our compatriots share this quality, then this potentially adds another stratum of threat to the situation; not only is this a criticism of the values of our country but also is a criticism of our own personal values. This might result in a heightened degree of defensiveness. There is reason to believe that any anxieties associated with feeling lumped together in the face of group criticism might be particularly strong when being criticized by an out-group member. Research shows that people typically have a more homogenized view of out-groups than they do of their own groups (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992), partly because they have more experience with their own group (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) and partly because they have more concrete representations of in-group exemplars (Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991). If people have nave theories in line with this out-group homogeneity effect, then they would probably assume that criticisms from out-group members were intended to apply to the majority of the group. In contrast, when we hear criticisms from in group members, we would assume that the in-group critic would be aware of the high degree of variation that exists within the group in terms of attitudes and behaviors. In short, it could be that criticisms from outsiders are seen to be more overly generalized than criticisms from insiders, and that this might help contribute to the intergroup sensitivity effect independent of any attributions about whether or not the critic intended the comments to be constructive. One way for

an out-group critic to overcome this perception is to make it clear that the criticisms do not apply to everyone, but rather to a portion of the group population. In Experiment 3, Australian participants received criticism of their country from either an in-group or an out-group member. The critic either used spotlighting or did not. We predicted an intergroup sensitivity effect, such that outgroup members would elicit more defensiveness than in-group members. Given the lack of previous research on generalizations with regard to criticism, it was not possible to make strong predictions with regard to the effects of spotlighting. On the basis of the logic outlined above, we might expect that spotlighting would result in less defensiveness than a control condition and that the ameliorative effects of spotlighting might be particularly noticeable for out-group criticisms. However, if we are to take seriously the notion that attributions of constructiveness play a central role in driving defensiveness, we might expect that spotlighting will have no reliable effect on responses to criticism.

Method
Participants and design
Eighty-two undergraduate psychology students (62 females, 20 males, M = 20.87 years) participated in the study in return for course credit. Participants were randomly allocated to the four conditions of a 2 (speaker type: in-group vs. out-group) 2 (strategy: spotlighting vs. no spotlighting) between-group design. Participants were only included if they nominated Australia as their primary national identity. Prospective power analyses revealed that this sample gave us a 76.5% chance of detecting a moderate effect size.

Materials and procedure

The cover story, materials, and questionnaire were similar to those used in Experiment 2. In the no-spotlighting condition, the speaker said: When I think of Australians I think of them (us) as being fairly racist. Theyre (Were) racist towards Aborigines and intolerant of Asians. In the spotlighting condition the speaker said: When I think of Australians I think some of them (us) are fairly racist. Some of them (us) are racist towards Aborigines and intolerant of Asians. Of course not all Australians are like that, but many are. These comments were either attributed to an in-group member (an Australian) or an out-group member (a U.S. citizen). Immediately after the scripts, participants were asked: How many Australians do you think J. Benson believes his comments are true of? Participants could circle one option from an 11-point scale, which began with 0% and

increased by 10% integers until reaching the maximum (100%). This measure was included as a check on the manipulation of strategy. Scales of likeability (Time 1 = .94; Time 2 = .96), constructiveness (= .84), negativity (= .93), and agreement (r = .92) were the same as those used in Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, factor analysis of all the items using oblimin rotation revealed a four-factor solution corresponding perfectly to the constructs described above.

Results
Preliminary analyses
Because some of the conditions did not include more than one male, it was not possible to run the full design crossed with participant sex. However, a series of 2 (participant sex) 2 (strategy) ANOVAs revealed no significant main or interactive effects of sex on any measures. Given that sex in the previous studies was shown not to interact with speaker type, we felt comfortable collapsing the data across sex. Given the small representation of male participants, it should be noted that caution should be exercised before generalizing the current results to males. As in previous studies, our sample reported strong identification with Australia (M = 5.59). Unexpectedly, a 2 (speaker type) 2 (strategy) ANOVA on identification revealed a main effect of strategy, F(1, 78) = 4.50, p = .037, 2= .05, and a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 78) = 4.21, p = .044, 2= .05. Follow-up analyses revealed unusually low levels of identification in the in-group/spotlighting condition (M = 5.00) relative to the in-group/no-spotlighting condition (M = 6.00). Because identification scores were measured prior to the manipulation of both independent variables, this effect can only be attributed to chance variation in participant assignment to conditions. To ensure that the effects of the independent variables are not confounded by identification, all analyses below were conducted using 2 (speaker type) 2 (strategy) ANCOVAs, with identification included as a covariate. It should be noted that the pattern of results remained the same even when identification was not controlled for. Consistent with the policy used in Experiments 1 and 2, Time 1 likeability was included as an additional covariate when conducting analyses on Time 2 likeability. Adjusted means and standard deviations for all measures are reported in Table 3. Australian (In-Group) Spotlighting 1. No Spotlighting Non-Australian (Out-Group) Spotlighting No Spotlighting

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Means with different subscripts are significantly different according to Dun

posthoc test (p < .05). Means for all measures are adjusted after having covaried out national identification. Means for Time 2 likeability a adjusted after also having covaried out Time 1 likeability. Constructiveness Time 2 likeability Negativity Agreement 4.85c (1.03) 3.86b (1.10) 3.78a (1.43) 4.07b (1.68) 4.42c (1.28) 4.50c (1.19) 3.95a (1.35) 4.21b (1.65) 3.01b (0.90) 3.27a (1.33) 4.92b (1.53) 2.90a (1.56) 2.51a (0.96) 3.15a (1.13) 5.11b (1.56) 2.86a (1.71)

Table 3. Effects of Spotlighting on Responses to Criticism: Experiment 3

Manipulation check
A 2 2 ANCOVA on the manipulation check revealed only a main effect of strategy, F(1, 77) = 4.11, p = .046, 2= .05. Participants in the no-spotlighting condition believed that the critic intended their comments to apply to more Australians (M = 60.49) than did participants in the spotlighting condition (M = 50.73). Thus, the manipulation was successful.

Main analyses
Consistent with the intergroup sensitivity effect, main effects of speaker type emerged on constructiveness, F(1, 77) = 63.90, p < .001, 2= .45, negativity, F(1, 77) = 12.75, p < .001, 2= .14, Time 2 likeability, F(1, 76) = 17.92, p < .001, 2= .19, and agreement, F(1, 76) = 11.77, p< .001, 2= .13. In-group critics were liked more (M = 4.18), were attributed more constructive motives (M = 4.64), and were agreed with more (M = 4.14) than were out-group critics (Ms = 3.21, 2.76, and 2.88, respectively). In-group critics also aroused less negativity (M = 3.86) than did out-group critics (M = 5.01). In contrast, strategy had no significant main or interactive effects on any of the measures. There was a marginal main effect of strategy such that speakers who spotlighted tended to be attributed more constructive motives for their comments (M = 3.93) than those who did not spotlight (M = 3.47), F(1, 77) = 3.71, p = .058, 2= .05, but all other effects of strategy were emphatically nonsignificant (ps > .26, 2range from .00 to .02). Clearly, on the constructiveness measure, it is possible that more participants could have pushed the effect past the conventional level of significance. But it should be noted that the effect size ( 2= .05) compares unfavorably to the double-digit effect sizes found with respect to sweetening and sharing. Furthermore, power analyses revealed that at least 165 participants would have to be tested to achieve an 80% likelihood of detecting a significant effect on the basis of this effect size. On negativity, the effect size (partial 2) for the main effect and the interaction was .004. Posthoc power analyses revealed that at least 1,961 participants would have to be tested to achieve an 80% likelihood of detecting a significant effect on the basis of this effect size. On measures of Time 2 likeability and agreement, the means trended such that participants reported the critic to be less likeable and agreed with the critic less in the spotlighting condition than in the no-spotlighting condition. On the basis of the direction of the means, it is clear that extra statistical power would not uncover a beneficial effect of spotlighting on these measures.

Discussion
Consistent with the intergroup sensitivity effect, peoples responses to criticism were not just influenced by the content of the message but by the source of the message: In-group critics were liked more, were attributed more constructive motives, were agreed with more, and aroused less negativity than out-group critics. In this case, however, the strategy did not have any reliable effects on responses. Spotlighting had no significant effect on how people felt about the critic or the message.

Naturally, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting nonsignificant effects, but it is difficult in this case to attribute the null result to anything other than the fact that the strategy was ineffective. It cannot be attributed to a failed manipulation because the manipulation check worked: Those who spotlighted were assumed to be generalizing their comments to a smaller percentage of group members than those who did not spotlight. It cannot be attributed to unresponsive or insensitive measures because the same measures have yielded sizeable effects of group membership. Neither is it likely to be a question of statistical power, given that the effect sizes on negativity, likeability, and agreement were negligible. Furthermore, on likeability and agreement, the means trended nonsignificantly in the opposite direction to what would be expected if spotlighting were to work. It seems unlikely that increases in sample size would have changed the broad pattern of results. In sum, it appears that spotlighting simply does not help. On one hand, this might seem surprising because spotlighting is an intuitive and widely used strategy (Im not saying youre all like this ). From a theoretical point of view, the reason could be that the strategy does not significantly alter the attributions that people make about the motives for the criticism. Qualifying the comments does not substantially change whether the comments are motivated by constructive or destructive reasons and so does not help ease the suspicion that triggers defensiveness.

General discussion
There is a generalized tendency for people to feel more defensive when they receive group-directed criticism from an outsider than an insider. The three studies here reinforce this point: Out-group critics were liked less, agreed with less (In Experiments 1 and 3 only), and aroused more negativity than when the same comments were made by an ingroup member. The reason for this is that, in the absence of any other information, outsiders are attributed less constructive motives than insiders, which then promotes high levels of defensiveness. This finding on the one hand is relatively pessimistic because it suggests that outsiders face defensiveness because of something they cannot readily changetheir group membership. But it also offers a signpost as to how to overcome the problem posed by the intergroup sensitivity effect. If outsiders can defuse suspicion about the integrity of their motives, then theoretically defensiveness should be reduced. The studies reported here investigated three strategies that, on the basis of both intuition and theory, might be expected to be effective in reducing defensiveness in the face of group criticism. In Experiments 1 and 2, some encouraging signs emerged. If out-group critics contextualize their criticisms with praise, or if they acknowledge that similar problems exist in their own group, then defensiveness is reduced, at least on some measures. This suggests that, although out-group membership is an impediment to acceptance when it comes to criticism, this impediment can be overcome through the strategic use of language. This is not a trivial point. Identifying strategies to overcome the intergroup sensitivity effect is something that is potentially of applied relevance to members of oppressed minorities,

human rights groups, environmental groups, and other groups for whom collective action is a matter of trying to win over change from the outside. In this sense, reducing defensiveness in the face of out-group criticisms seems an important precondition for reform, reconciliation, and reinvention, and identifying strategies that can assist out-group members to be heard is an important applied research question. The news was less positive, however, with regard to the third strategy tested here. Spotlightingin the sense of putting on the record that the criticisms were not intended to apply to everyonehad no reliable effect on responses, either positive or negative. Although there are inevitable interpretational difficulties associated with drawing meaning out of a null result, from an attributional perspective it can be argued that spotlighting failed because it did not address the suspicion about motive that has previously been shown to work against outsiders who criticize. The paradigm we used here, in which participants read a handful of sentences from what are ostensibly extracts from an interview, was used because we felt it maintained a sensible balance between internal and external validity. Because participants believe the criticisms are real comments from a real person, we have succeeded in placing the participants in a potentially threatening and emotion-laden environment while simultaneously maintaining a level of experimental control that would not be possible if participants were to see a speaker or even to hear the comments by audiotape. Having said that, we acknowledge that it would be ideal in the future to examine the strategies in more naturalistic environments and potentially using longer scripts. We also consciously used the same target group (Australians) and the same criticisms across experiments so as to create a level playing field within which strategies could be meaningfully compared. If we had changed the target group and the criticisms across experiments, it would not be possible to determine if any differences observed across studies was due to the different strategies used or the different intergroup contexts invoked. As mentioned earlier, the intergroup sensitivity effect and the role of constructiveness in producing the effect has now been demonstrated across a range of contexts, including criticism of schools, university students, math science students, social science students, Queenslanders, allied health professionals, and Muslims (see Hornsey, 2005). Given that these effects have proven reliable and robust, it would be surprising if the strategies had dramatically different effects depending on target group or the content of the criticisms.

Summary and conclusions

Outsiders who criticize groups struggle to get an open-minded audience, but this is not to say they are doomed to face defensiveness. Criticisms are a communicative act framed in language, and we have shown here that strategic use of rhetoric can be effective in reducing hostile responses to legitimate group criticism. So it is not advised that outsiders simply let the content of their criticisms to speak for themselves; if they spend more time framing their criticisms with certain rhetorical flourishes, then this can pay off in terms of reducing hostility and winning acceptance of the message.

Although we have assessed only a limited number of strategies here, a pattern is beginning to emerge that helps predict which strategies will work and which will not. No matter how intuitively appealing, it seems that for strategies to work they need to be successful in defusing the suspicion about motive that underpins the intergroup sensitivity effect. This finding has theoretical import, in the sense that it helps lend support to our attributional model of defensiveness in the face of group criticism. It also serves a practical purpose in terms of providing a rudimentary how-to guide for people who are motivated or forced to engage in critical communication across group divides.

Acknowledgments
The research presented in this paper was supported by an Australian Research Council-Discovery grant.

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