The Career of Causal Analysis in American Sociology Author(s): Christopher Bernert Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.

34, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 230-254 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590737 . Accessed: 03/10/2011 04:26
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Bernert* Christopher

The careerof causalanalysisin sociolo t American gY

ABSTRACT

The visibility of causalterminologyin Americansociology, from philosophies 1895 to the 1960s, has variedaccordingto changing of science and patterns of scientific communication.Successive generationsdifferedin their receptivityto the diffusion of causal concepts from traditions other than sociology. After briefly period, reviewingthe status of causality in the pre-sociological causal terminologyis observedacross four successivecohorts of sociologists.The first generation,1890 to 1910, spoke freely of in 'causes'until the second generation, commandof methodusing Englishstatistics until the 1930s, made talk of causesanathema. Following theorists called for a return to causal interpretations which commencedin the 1950s as new methods attuned to the philosophyof science were importedto sociology from prevailing other disciplines.
INTRODUCTION

Few terms have sufferedeither the infamy or the taken-for-grantedness of 'cause'. The word has often been deemed extreme and treated in kind. It has been overdefined,overly praised,and just as often misunderstood. Whatever the vagaries of terminology, however, causal inference is well known as the working tool of those seeking a 'because'to 'why' questions.Causalityin sociology has proved to be a fragile core-concept.Its discussionhas passed from uncriticaladulationwith young optimismto completerejection utilization.l The variationsin this careerof and eventual pragmatic applications an idea cannot be explainedby everydaycommonsense into the jargon.Neither does of 'cause-talk'workingsurreptitiously internalrigourin logic or technology completely clarify the passage to acceptability.The innovatorshave alwaysbeen on the periphery
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or outside of the discipline;to the extent that they were successful impinging upon traditionsthey openedthe audienceto the possibility of causalanalysis.For that reasonthis inquiryfocuseson the agents and channelsof diffusionas well as the receptivityof sociologists.2
CURRENT PRACTICE AND DAVID HUME

It would be misleadingto suggest that the idea of causationhas ceased to be controversial.That just the opposite is the case is demonstrated many excellent discussions by tacklinga heavyburden of epistemologicaland ontologicalproblems.3Whatis the status of causality in modern day sociology? One answeris to considerit a part of everyone's'background knowledge'that in scienceis pressed into service as provisionalheuristic bridgingtheory and practice. Causal laws, following leading model theorists HermanWold and HubertM. Blalock,are workingassumptions the scientistinvolving of hypotheticalstatementsof the if-thenvariety.4Theselaws can never be demonstratedempirically,with the result that causalinferences belong to a theoreticallevel of science, while actual research(both experimentaland nonexperimental) can only establishcovariations and temporal sequences. Causalassertionsrely on the assumption that all the relevantvariables have been controlledor can safely be ignored. For lack of unanimity in the scientific community the causalconcept is best understoodby the rulesof use regulating it. The rules of use-such as association, asymmetry, or lack of spuriousness-rest on a philosophical platform which variously postulatesa hypotheticalreality,thematizes interpretive an procedure by the investigator, or otherwise covers itself against attacks of determinismby some sort of ceterzsparibus disclaimer.In other words, causalstatementscarryno connotationsof lawlikenecessity. They are always tentativeand only the productof hesitantscientific acceptance which allows their use even though causes in the invariant sense can never be empiricallyconfirmed or verified. The historical record shows sociologists most unresponsivecompared to other disciplines where '. . . the philosophical problems have remainedin the background, stimulating argument a penetrating and examinationof the inferentialprocess but not holdingup development.'5 Sociologicalmeeknessfollows from past misuseamidhighly chargedattacks on causality.As Bungepointed out the concept has been declareda 'fetish' (KarlPearson) the 'relic of a bygone age' (Bertrand Russell), a 'superstition' (Ludwig Wittgenstein)and a 'myth' (StephenToulmin).6 The most important contributionto the subject of causality in modern philosophy was made by David Hume who, in 1748, maintained that (1) any talk of efficacy or necessity said to exist in a

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cause is meaningless, and (2) experienceof regularities succession of allow us to discovercauses and make inferences.Priorto Hume the notion of causality had passed from ancient animistic meanings, through Greek philosophy with Aristotle's four senses of cause, to the deterministic and theologlcally grounded first-causeideas of Bacon, Descarte,Locke, Spinoza,and others. The adventof western science and a Galileanworld-viewgave rise to a search for 'laws of causation' which postulated the possibility of discoveringand confirming invariable, unconditional, and necessary causal laws. That, said Hume, was a fruitlesssearchsince the belief in causation stemmed not from divine or naturalreason accessibleto logic but from 'habit' derivedfromrepeatedexperienceand 'felt expectation'. Hume, it should be remembered, not discreditrelationsof cause did and effect by his injunction against necessary causation;he only swept out of the picture the classicalfaith in man's ability to unequivocallyand absolutelyknow them.
PRECURSORS AND FOREIGN DIFFUSION: MILL AND GERMAN EMPIRICISM

Talk of causes under the letterheadof 'sociology'harkensback to AugusteComte andJohn StuartMill. Yet the tracksof terminology to the AmerscanJournal of Sociology ( 1896) appearinga halfcentury later were quite indirect.A numberof intellectualtraditions filtered through the Americanclimate of thought to fit the idea of causation to the needs of a new discipline. Comte and Mill are importantbecausethey were recognizedas spokesmen.Theirstanding was subsequently questioned by the English philosophersof sciencefollowingMill.7 Comte'spositive philosophy,for all its concern with 'laws',quite accuratelydrew a line between the world of theory and empirical observation declaredthe searchfor causescompletelyunfruitful. but The positive approach,with its stresson 'reasoning observation, and duly combined', did not ask why but how?8 Whatever meritsmay be alleged for Comte's position the semanticalsidestep with its rejection of causal terminology was not well-received.His best American audiencewas comprisedof clergy ready to marchreligion to waragainstscience. The early appeal of John Stuart Mill is easy to understand. Mill attempted circumvent Humean to the problemthroughhis philosophy of experienceand association.In his hands this philosophyallowed thatthe uniformitypresupposed nature,and its corollary,the law in ofcausation, couldbe confirmed. The causallaws of this deterministic world could, in principle,be known.9 Mill'scontribution towardfurthering that goal was an experimental

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method reminiscentof Bacon that would both discoverand demonstrate causal relationships.His five canons of inductiveinferenceagreement,difference, residues,agreementand difference,and concomitantvariation-were even claimedby theirauthorto have been for responsible the discoveryof everycausallaw thus far known.l With William Stanley Jevons as the leading exponent of the hypothetic-deductivemethod, attention was tumed from Mill's justification of inductive inference to deductive confirmation of hypotheses. Much of his opposition to Mill (for whom he had an almost pathologicalanimosity)centredon the idea of 'cause'which, once spoken, 'may thus act as a spell, and throwthe clearestintellect into confusion'.ll of Even though KarlPearson'sThe Grammar Science (1892) was thanJevons's majorworkit was morewidely far less thorough-going read becauseof its simplicityand becauseit was addressedto social scientists. Pearson maintainedthat it was pushing the concept of causationpast acceptablelimits to declareabsolute causalrelations. Instead one had to identify causes proportionateto the viewed statisticalvariationand thereforehad to deal with 'The categoryof causation'.l2 association,as replacing When we vary the cause, the phenomenon changes, but not always to the same extent; it changes, but has variationin its change. The less the variation in that change the more nearly the cause defines the phenomena, the more closely we assert the association or the correlationto be. It is this conception of correlationbetween two occurrencesembracingall relationto ships from absoluteindependence completedependence,which is the wider category by which we have to replace the old idea of causation.l3 He then proceeded to discuss various measuresof variation and association,many of which he created or discovered(i.e. standard product moments). Pearson'sauthority deviation, correlation-ratio, sociology), (he wasnot impugned wasin fact readilycited in American but the line of thought he representeddid not immediatelyprevail impressfrom Germany. againstthe methodological As many as seventy per cent of the leading members of first generationin Americansociology studied in Germanyfor an average of one and a half years apiece.l4 As might be expected the imprint from such a wholesale exposure was reflected in the endeavourof the first sociologiststo differentiatetheir disciplineand identify the subject and object of their inquiry. It showed in the concern with the ethnologicalmaterialsand Volkerpsychologae, so-called'ethical' approach, and not least, a particularkind of social statistics. The studentspickedup in Germanystatisticalorientationthe American with its attendant causal terminology-explains much of the first

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generation'suse of 'causes'as well as the laggardinfluence of the more sophisticated statisticaltechnologyofferedby Pearson. The Americanstudentshad first-hand exposureto theMethodenstreit ('battle over methods which resembled the debate taking ') P ace m iqnganc at the same time between proponentsof Mill's inductive method and Jevons's deductive method.l5 On one side was GustavSchmoller,spokesmanfor the youngerhistoricalschool, arguing for concrete-inductive-empirical study againstKarl Menger (co-discovererof marginalutility analysiswith Jevons and Walras) who spoke for Austrianeconomists and abstract-deductive theory. By dominance in the Germanuniversitysystem Schmollerwould have been the winner had the debate not proven so wastefulwith its familiarfalse antitheses.Most Americanseither did not care or were not duped and assignedsome legitimacy to both methods of logic for science.l6 The end result, in any case, was a triumphfor Schmollerfor Americansociologists. They returnedwith admirationfor his unbridledempiricism born of historicalcase study. In their minds and notebooks Schmoller's 'technique', heavy on data collection, light on inference, and infamousfor advocacy,becamesynonymouswiththe proper'positivity' befitting a social science.l7 The actual determination causesfrom of mountainsof dataseemedmorea problemof conceptualorganization than methodological import. The empiricalbent that so fascinatedAmericansociologistswas learned in centres less innovativethan the renownedexperimental psychologylaboratoryof Wilhelm Wundt.Sociologistswereattracted to the professorsof the historicalschool takingup the SozEale Frage (the 'Social Question')ratherthan the exactingwork of Lexis, von Kries,Ludwig, Fechner, and who were teachersof the first instructors of statisticsin the USA (FranzBoas, HenryP. Bowditch,J. Cattell, and R. Falkner).Their style of statisticalinquirywas slantedmore toward historical statistics than the 'moral statistics of Quetelet ' (promotedby von Mayr).l8
. .

SOCIAL DARWINISM AND THE FIRST GENERATION

The founders of Americansociology began out of step with other disciplines.Whilekindredsocial sciencesincorporated new statistical means to their empiricalends the sociologistswere hobbled by the elusive techniquethey selectedfor a model. RichmondMayo-Smith's 1902 textbook for sociologists was a classic in historical school tradition beginningColumbia'sempiricalreputation.19He seemed convinced of the ability of researchers establishstatisticaland to sociological laws of cause and effect but he proposed little more than his 'reflectiveanalysis'as a path to that goal.

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An explanation of this phase of sociologicalmethod returnsto Comte and Mill whose inductivelegacy reliedon historicalevidence. Schmoller's data base took an encyclopedic plunge in the same direction. Even FranklinGiddings, at the peak of his leadership, upheld the position that the discernmentof causes was to be accomplished within the temporal frameworkprovided by history (whereinone performedunspecifiedinductiveoperations).Speaking of causes in the conventionof historianswas more thanjust a case of terminological residuefrompast practice. Sociologists joined the 'institutional' analyses of the German historical school with the remnantsof AmericanSocial Darwinism, in orderto establishindependenttraditionsand to define their own competence,method and purpose.20The milieu of those influenced by foreign traditions was one embroiled in the merits of Social Darwinism where, among other themes, the adequacy of causal analysis was in hot debate. Foremost among the opponents was WilliamJames who was as adamant as witty in his denunciation of the movement'sunilinear,natural-law, determinism.21 The antiSocial Darwinist critique of the principle of causality, for all its statistical and logical merits, was neverthelesspoorly received in sociological circles. Few noted the perseverancemore succinctly than Thorstein Veblen. In his view, evolutionary science held to a 'spiritualpoint of view' that was 'unwillingto depart from the test of causal relaxation or quantitative sequence'. Sociologists tended to embrace this quantitativeanimism though they lacked the methodsto actually'test' causalrelations.22 The persistent attacks eventually exacted a toll in caution as sociologists found analogic retreats in physical metaphors such as 'forces', 'controls',and 'energies'. Indcedthe 'socialforces'formulation popularizedby E. A. Westermarck, Patten, and L. Ward S. becamesynonymouswith cause.23 The intellectual sweep of Social Darwinismwas over by the last decade of the nineteenthcenturywhen American sociologyemerged as a strugglingprofessionalgroup. Lester Wardhad administered telling blows againstindividualism while 'collectivist'arguments for social reform-another product of German training-spelled the end of laissez-faire politics. Not discardedwas the belief in progress and humanevolution. Sociologistscontinuedto clothe theirvocabulary in terms of biology and the social organism.When it became apparentthat the explanatoryvalue had been exhausted(as Stephen Toulminputs it, SocialDarwinism 'generating packof pernicious was a over-simplifications'), abandonment was complete.24The associated causalterminologyall but disappeared. By 1901 what went by the name 'sociology'could boast of fifty full-time professorsand course offerings in about 400 colleges and universities.25An early show of successfulinstitutionalizationwas

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successwhen it cameto defining approaching by rivalled anything not discipline.Albion intellectual content or method of the new the competingChicagoand and Small FranklinGiddings,leadersof theexplicit in their talk of style Columbia of sociology, were equally analysisin sociology. causal its largest scope, and It was Small's opinion that 'Sociology, in philosophyconscious its on methodologicalside, is merely a moral knowledge of cause and its of task, and systematicallypursuing Small wanted within this process of moral evolution'. What 'Just what effect was: question for sociologists see to as the over-riding [sic] are there betweenantecedentsand consequents of kinds nexus Like the historical human experience?'It was, by fiat, causal. a kind of historical in was he school emulated,causalinferencefor Smalldatahad been gathered glanceonce enormousamountsof backwaral Giddpigeonholes.26 and together classifiedinto logical, conceptualwas built on practicreputationas quantitativemethodologist ings's what Smallhad preached. ing meant to be a textHis InductiveSociology (1909) was originally introductionto page on book socializationbut he added a thirty all about.27 After of society was what the scientific study define are historical that the fundamentalmethods of sociology claiming known that scientificinduction Giddingslet it be comparative, and and of 'lead to causation'. Mill's method of agreement how, would find out allowed us 'to induce a cause' and to Marx, Spencer, difference Comte, Durkheim, referredthe readerto Giddings help for a definition of andTarde, without offering substantive causality. againstperceived A lack of definitionwas no obstacle to defence Though Durkheim was highly dissenterslike Emile Durkheim. for Frenchsociology visibleand recognizedas foremost spokesman of suicide and of His study he did not receive a warm welcome. attackedearly by G. Tosti TheRules of SociologicalMethod were criticism.28One of who subjected his 'social causation' to severe first major analysis students, CharlesGehlke, wrote the Giddings's theory where a critical of Durkheim'scontributionsto sociologicalSocial Causation'.29 A Facts and chapterwas devoted to 'Social came reasoning 's final discreditingblow to Durkheim fallacious Goldenweiser. in 1917 with critiquesby Alexander respect. Rowntree, Sociologists in Englandwere accordedmore somethingof an he was for example, discussed 'causes of poverty'; from these immediatedeterminates exception for he differentiated the whole social to raise 'ultimatecauses'which, he said, 'would be reform was a movingforce behind the heralded question'.30Social care turningdata work of CharlesBooth, but one had to exercise the Sociological launching to political ends. L. T. Hobhouse, when dealt with facts and not Review, said 'relationsof cause and effect

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morality'.3l Still, sociology was in search of 'laws' according to Hobhouseas he followedthe American exampleinflatingthe scientific statusof sociology.
ENGLISH STATISTICS AND THE SECOND GENERATION

Confidencequickly gave way to statisticalcaution with the second generation,gatekeepers method until the mid-thirties. dearth of The of measurementtechniques, the inability to control for outside factors or rarely even deal with more than two variablesat a time made statistical generalizationto causes painfully impossible.The first generationhad used causal terminology in the spirit of Mill filtered through Germanteachersand a carapaceof Social Darwinism; their students workedin the shadowof Mill'sdetractors, beginning with Jevons. Where the first generationblithely avoided an operationalizedconcept of causality the second shied away from interpreting generalizing and from theirempirical results. The greater the exposure to the theory or history of statistics the less the talk of causes.WhenF. H. HankinsdiscussedQuetelet's types of causes-constant, variable,and accidental-he reminded his readers that Quetelet simple formulationson the study of 's causal relationshad been taken over or 'advanced' a method of to 'quantitativelymeasuringthe correlationof two variableelements throughout their distribution'.32 William F. Ogburn went further in his 1912 dissertation child-labour on legislation.His was not a study to determinecauses,but it is hoped that it may be used as a basisfor a study of causes.It is anecessarystudyin description and measurements, preliminaryto an investigationof the forces underlying child-labor legislation.33 For two decades following it was a rare work that made it beyond the 'preliminaries'. Ogburn'scase they consisted of more than In 90 tablesleft uninterpreted. Hankins and Ogburn were representativeof a new caelre of sociologists more enthused by English statistics than the task of maintainingdisciplinaryboundaries.Despite decreasedchauvinis-m and greaterreceptivity to 'outsider'ideas the new sociologistswere conservative. Most did not stay abreastof developments statistical in theory. Until SamuelStouffer, at the end of the 1920s, therewas no direct intermediary England,the undisputedcentre for statistical to innovation. There the classical inductivemodel for demonstrating causes had been subordinate to methods of statistical inference pioneered by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. Around these eminent geneticists and biometriciansgathereda criticalnucleus of statisticians who revolutionized tools of theirtrade. the

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throughthe Journalof The fruits of their labours were diffused Biometrika.They had, Society and their own Royal Statastical the in London, positions addition, their own statistical laboratory of the world-wide in the renown the in leading universities, and began with movement (initiatedby Pearson).Their focus 'eugenics' evolution.34 won an immediate CharlesDarwin'sOriginsof Species (1859) 1869 published his Galton who in in convert his cousin Francis Contromanner'. articleon problemsof heredity'in a statistical first Mendelian pitted over his book Natural Inheritance (1889) Darwinists who versy Bateson against championed by William views had a Darwinist, followed less placed faith in mutation.KarlPearson, the opposition with his method and became the leaderof Galton's they founded George Udney Yule. With other followers, student the viewsconcerning causes in Biometrika 1901 to air unfashionable method spread to the ofevolution. Their seedbed of statistical G. U. Yule, F. Y. States via James M. Cattell,A. L. Bowley, Persons,Henry United R. CharlesSpearman, A. Fisher,Warren Edgeworth, Moore,andmany others.35 L. when Pearson Sociologists had been alerted to the thematic The accent on their field under the branchof biology. disciplinesat subsumed method stemmed from teachers in other statistical Englishauthors.The first and Columbia Chicagoand textbooks by in 1901. Giddingsand of these, by Arthur L. Bowley, appeared reprint.An elementary studentswelcomedit and the immediate then, in 1915, came his and textfor a wider audiencefollowed (1910) of the Measurementof and Purpose the much used The Nature to disseminatestatistical SocialPhenomena. Bowley's intent was to the enterprise-as method but 'causes' had their connection 'connection'. is to define or The general problem of sociological statistics attributesand to specify delimitate [sic] and enumerateclasses, relations and causal describe their variation, and to discover the Englishstatistics. ColumbiaUniversity served as portal for were L. Thorndike, On the faculty there or at Teacher'sCollege familiarwith and often F. Boas, H. L. Moore,and others who were FranklinGiddingsin visited the statistical laboratoryin London. ever master the meththe Sociology Departmentdid not himself its pursuit. The odology of the new statistics but encouraged Chaddock, Rice, Gillin, Columbiagraduateslike Ogburn,Chapin, random sampling, and Gehlke introduced regression analysis, and other techniques.Theirimpact correlation,confidenceintervals, of a section and was formally recognized by the 1924 formation at the annual Ogburn committee on social research chaired by
connections.36

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association meeting. (In 192 7 Ogburnwas recruited by Chicago where his decisive influence was felt by Burgess,Stouffer, Hauser, and Duncan.)The competitionat Chicagohad also made its unique contributionto newstylesof research. knownwere the ecological Best studies of the city promotedby R. Parkand the case study-method which blossomed after W.I. Thomas, in collaborationwith Florian Znaniecki, published The Polzsh Peasant (1918-19) just after his dismissal from Chicago. But before the arrivalof Ogburn,James Field in the EconomicsDepartmenttaught the ideas of the English statisticians from the end of WorldWarOne.37 At both Columbiaand Chicagothe social surveymethod, still an indulgence of fact-mongering meliorists (and consideredby many to be a less scientifictype of case study) was rapidlybeingdeveloped into a majortool of sociologists.Most surveyswereoriginally defined geographically,later in reference to special problems, and often faiSedto expend much effort on quantitativeanalysis.38Many of the first ones, such as W. E. B. I)ubois's study of The Philadelphia Negro (1899) were directly inspiredby Booth. Rowntree'swork on poverty and Jane Addams'sChicago-based Hull House publications were also influential.The growth of the surveymethod is indicated by the volume (over 2,800) of such studiescited in the 1928 Russell SageBibliography SocialSurveys. of 39 The decade of the 1920s could be characterized the period as ushering in a tardy equivalentto the GermanMethodenstreit.Renewed debate began on the subject matter of sociology. Explicit discussions of causality and its status in sociologicalinquiry were rare at this time. Stress was laid to interpretingstatisticalresults with reserve.40 Texts by Chapin(1920), Odumand Jocher (1929), and Gillin and Blackmar (1930) had few words for causalityusually a reiteration of Pearson'sdisplacementof the terms with
'correlation'.4l

StuartA. Rice (1928) wasanotherfollowerof Pearson's philosophy for furtheringthe 'statisticalview of a perceptual world'.But he was well awareof its limitations. Scientific method conceptualizesthe perceptualdata and treats them as if they were real and exact entities. This methodological process, like a great deal more of scientific method, is essentially fictional. Its justification is to be found in the results to which it leads.42 The use of causal terminologywas, however,incipientlydistortive. Again, in Methods in Social Science (1931), which Rice edited, all discussionsof causationwere relegatedto the section dealingwith historicalstudies. The problem with causationfor G. A. Lundberg (1929), as for Rice, was the connotation of law-like determinism. Causes (efficient or final) were 'a pretensionwhich no scientist has

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All accomplished'.43 advanced,and which no science has ever ever were relations contingent. were winds of the philosophyof the socialsciences The prevailing R. Cohen, who combined to brought bear on sociology by Morris the Methodenstreit, from lessons studies of logic, statisticalmethod, said,paraphrasing he Sociologists, the and past naiveteof sociologists. by engaging could not beg off definingtheirsubjectmatter led to the Poincare, Such a tactic had entirely in their method. themselves the social and polemics about the differences between behaviourists wasteful were the sciences.At one end of the extremes natural physical events and the that arguing all social phenomena were biologic and genetic and Darwinists historicists overemphasizing were teleologists with their at explanations; the other extremity shake off the burden of explanations who couldn't causal final speak of social evaluations.If the social scientist was to distortive the quantitativeadjustments he causation needed 'a knowledgeof effect'.44 This the factors necessary to produce a desired large,one is ofall being seldom attainable,and the variationsoften work'. Cohen was being 'guess in left the final analysiswith interpretive causation'so long as it opposed to speakingin terms of 'social one of the ubiquitous not in not did imply 'provencauses'or was masked 'control'. 'socialforces'or like metaphors misleading but
THE '-TRICIANS' DISCONTINUITIES:DIFFUSION FROM

its reached low mark,nearelimination, ebb The of causalterminology tide turnedtowarda re-issuewhen sociologists the in early1930s. The the division in their beganto seriously concern themselveswith it Gradually was between theorists and empiricalresearchers. allow a union ranks could determinedthat the philosophy of science was acceptable to where causal inquiry between the two realms an understanding. to both.Therewas a majorprerequisite such believe that the alleged incommensurability Sociologists had to couched as deduction vs. between theory and research-formerly generation,for all their induction-could be overcome. The first without method; the were theorists support of data-gathering, hadmethodbut lackedtheory.Thenext generation, secondgeneration in', were in search of while hearing calls to 'bring the men back methods more attuned to theory more amenable to researchand had to look outside the the state of the art. For the latter one make causal inquiry discipline where the new vehicles that would viableweregainingacceptability. path analysis With considerabletime-lagssociologists imported from psychometricians,and from biometricians, factor analysis In each case the path and modellingtheory from econometricians

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time-lagto sociology varied.A cursoryreviewof their development independentof sociology shows that the diffusion of innovationis regulated by social factors-receptivity of the audience, agents, channels-beyond the merit of the technique.45It also shows that the tardinessof causality'sre-entryto sociologyrepresented marked discontinuities communication in over fences betweendisciplines. Biometricians Statisticians Americans already and had profitedfrom K. Pearson'sviews on the philosophy of science and throughBiometrikawere providedwith the most advancedworkyet to be done in tlle theory and method of statistics as he, Edgeworth,Galton, and Yule added their contributions to the literature.Few in the USA, besides statisticianslike Franz Boas at Columbiawere able to deal with the complicated mathematicalequations. Yule was able to somewhat remedy the discomfort with a text on statistical theory appearing 1911. in By 1918 the Darwinist/Mendelian conflict was well on the way to resolutionby a synthesisof the arguments aboutnaturalselection vs. heredity through the mathematicaland experimentalwork of R. A. Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and Sewall Wright.46 Fisher established his fame, after correspondence with W.S. Gosset ('Student'), by solving the problem raised by Pearson of the reliability of a correlation coefficient derived from a sample of a much larger population. He later used the same data as Pearsonto arriveat an opposite conclusion granting some legitimacy to the Mendelian posltlon on lnherltance. About the same time Sewall Wrightwas becoming a recognized authority for articles treating 'deductions of properties of populations on the hypothesis of Mendelianheredity'. In 1917, writing 'On the Nature of Size Factors', he laid the foundation of path analysis. Wright'smethod was designed to estimate the degree to which a given effect was determinedby each of a numberof causes.In this case he treatedcauses,namely,factorswhichaffected general size and factorswhich affectedparts,as independent.47 From this work came the first formulationof path coefficients. In 1921, under the title 'Correlationand Causation',he elaborated the theory by treating correlatedcauses, nonadditivefactors, and non-linearrelations.Despite some majordisputesthe workof Fisher and Wrightunited in Haldane'sThe Causesof Evolution (1932) to dispel the opposition between Darwin and Mendel. The result was the study of populationgenetics. Psychometricians and Education Statisticians At the turn of the century most statisticscoursesin Americanuniversities were taught

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by psychologists who also worked in the field of education. The AmericanJournal of Psychology founded in 1887 by G. Stanley Hall, declaredthere would be a statisticalfuture for the discipline and numerous psychology laboratorieslent corroborationto his
. * a

predlctlon.

The Americaninterest in individualdifferences(resembling but not a spin-off from Galton's studies) markeda major break from German psycho-physics and experimentalpsychology influencing Americans.James McKeen Cattell initiated the formalizationin 1896 with his course on 'MentalMeasurement' ColumbiaUniverat sity. There the influence on Cattell and Boas convergedon E. L. Thorndike whose Notes on Child Study (1901) was followed by the sophisticatedIntroduction to Mental and Social Measurements (1904). Through this book and his students Thorndikeassumed a central position in the diffusion of statistical methods (e.g. Strayer's introduction of the Pearson Coefficient of Correlation in his dissertation City School Expenditures on (1905)). Charles Spearman,trained by WilhelmWundt and inspired by FrancisGalton, contributedto the American Journalof Psychology 'GeneralIntelligenceObjectivelyDeterminedand Measured' (1904) wherein the idea of factor analysiswas first clearlyenunciated.An earlier article on the proof of measurementof association had already aroused the American audience. From his home base in London Spearmanreceived the support of Yule and Pearson;in the USA he secured a prominent place in Thorndike mental 's measurement text. The growing debate in the 1920s on Spearman'ssingle-factor method led to L. L. Thurstone's multiple-factoranalysis which was the subject of his 1933 presidentialaddressto the American Psychological Association. Thurstone was close to the founders of Psychometrika( 1936) who came together to foster the quantitative development of psychology. The psychometricians,from Cattell on, paved a considerableportion of the road toward a resurgenceof causal analysisby extending and defining the limits of statistical practice. R. A. Fisher's revolution in samplingand analysisof variancetheoriesandhis StatisticalMethodsfor Research Methods(1925), found a receptiveaudienceamongthem. Econometricians Astronomersseeking to understand displacethe ment and movementsof heavenlybodies were the first to carefully analyze time series for the discoveryof causalrelations.The study of data observed successivelyin time was early applied (Augustin Cournot's 1838 work on supply and demandcurvesis an example) to economics for forecastingand studying trends. Economic regularitiesin cycles over time had its counterpart the study of crises. in The correlationbetween sunspotsand periodicbusinessfluctuations

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occupiedSir William Herschelin 1801, his sonJohn (who anticipated much of the philosophic basis for modelling theory), and W. S. Jevons who bestowed a 'connection as cause and effect' upon the
relation.48

Jevons's work was followedby the BritishphysicistJ. H. Poynting in 1884 and by R. H. Hooker in 1901, each of whom contributed to the idea of serialcorrelation.49 Herethe work of Galton,Pearson, and Yule was freely employed as they too publishedon problemsof serialrelations.These Britonswere closely studiedin the USA after 1910 by economistslike Warren Persons,H. L. Moore,E. F. Gay, M. and Alvin Johnson. Closer relations between the two countries during World War One and the 'institutional'school of Thorstein Veblen led by WesleyC. Mitchellkept the study of economiccycles vigorousin both theory andresearch. As with psycholotgy,sophistication in statistical methods supplemented forays into causal inference. H. L. Moore's Economic Cycles: TheirLaw and Cause (1914) was a classicwork seekingto incorporatecausal terminology into statisticalanalyses.The economists were well-equippedto deal with the problems that arose. Not only did some of the most eminent statisticiansof the time become involvedin their problem-solving (such as Yule on the issue of spurious or 'nonsense' correlations),but the economists were unrivalled contributors statisticaltheory amongthe socialsciences. to Econometrics acquired its identity during the twenties primarily throughthe efforts of RagnarFrischand IrvingFisher.Its objective, according Frisch,was to to promote studies that aim at a unification of the theoreticalquantitativeand the empirical-quantitative approachto economic problems and that are penetrated by constructiveand rigorous thinkingsimilarto that whichhas come to dominatein the natural sciences.50 Econometrica(1933) became the organfor articlesby T. Haavelmos, HaroldHotelling, E. Slutzky, T. Koopmans,and others who were to carefully employ 'randomcauses' and 'chainsof causality' in their inquiries.5lA significantstep was taken by HermanWold in 1938 when his Study in the Analysis of StationaryTime Series marked the beginningof a long list of pioneeringcontributionsto modelling theory. Wold, a keen follower of literaturein the philosophy of science, thematized the hypothetical character of the population from which causal inferenceswere drawn.He thereby avoided the inductive quandaryplaguingnaive statisticianshoping to infer causes from particularsample populations where high correlationsexisted. In DemandAnalysis,A Study in Econometrics (1952) Wold supplied a pivotal position on causalityat the critical time of a sociologicalturnto modellingtheory.52

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THE RE-ISSUE OF CAUSAL TERMINOLOGY: 1930-1950

Causalanalysisdid not appearin sociology until the 1950s although considerableground-breaking the use of causal terminologyfor in the two decadesprecedinghelped clear the way. Withthe exception of work by Paul F. Lazarsfeld innovators the mediatedor built upon the work of the '-tricians'.What RichardVon Mises said in 1934 held true: over the centuries causality has 'undergone transformations in accordancewith the developmentof science. It is like a receptaclewhich is filled from time to time with a new content'.53 The new content was made workable by transformedmethods channelledinto sociology at a pace set by ongoingnegotiationbetween the poles of theory and empirical research. The pace was slow. By the end of the twenties it was abundantlyclear that the new professionalideology of sociologists was the one propoundedby advocates of quantitative techniques. Presidential addresses by Gillin (1926) and Ogburn (1929) confidently foretold the future where 'every sociologist will be a statistician'. The expectation seemedassured.54 An indication of increasedstatisticalsophisticationin sociology was apparentby the earlythirtieswhen C. C. Peters(1933) criticized FrankA. Ross'smisconceptionof statisticalsignificance. the same In volume of the AmertcanJournal of Sociology Samuel A. Stouffer offered the most advanced application of statistical method yet published in a sociology journal. Stouffer and Dorothy Swaine Thomasstudied in Englandand were the earliestagentsof diffusion for the work of econometricians, statisticians,and especiallyR. A. Fisher's positions on the null hypothesis, significancetests, and probability inference where uncontrollable elements might be randomized. With some hesitation (Stouffer was strong on replication) they alleviatedthe severeshortageof depth on the theoretical side of sociologicalstatisticsbut this alone was insufficientto renew discussions causality.55 of The reluctance of statisticiansto directly confront the issue of 'social causation' was among the reasons R. M. MacIver's1930 presidentialaddress, 'Is Sociology a NaturalScience?'was a reply to Ogburn and his followers. MacIverbecame the leader in the movement to reintegratethe terminologyof causal analysiswithin the boundaries socialscientificmethod. of The serviceof statisticalmethods in the study of social causation is to preparethe way, to revealmore precirelythe natureof the factors involved, to isolate quantitativeindices of aspectsof the situationand to show the degreeof theircoherence.56 The study of the social does not preclude'ourstudy of "causation" where conclusions are readily given as "approximations", the in

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discovery of negative correlationsand of meaningfulpositive correlations'.57 It perhaps seems ironic that a new advent for causality should come from the author of the sdynamicassessment'and one with little methodological expertise. MacIver, however, was reactive; he was alarmedby dangersof statistical mystification.The same concern was apparent TheMethodof Sociology (1934) by Florian in Znaniecki, another continental scholar of like mind and measure in the 'humanisticcoefficient'.MoreradicalthanMacIver, Znaniecki warned againstthe dangerof withdrawing'into the realm of pure mathematical concepts'.S8 The dangerof stiflingintellectualcuriosity by overemphasizing technique had to be avoided. Yet instead of posing inquiry in terms of causal statements(but 'workablepostulates' since Mill) he proposedhis own methodof 'analyticinduction' for the 'discovery of exact laws'.59 Both MacIverand Znaniecki lamentedthe deleterious consequences speaking of only of association in lieu of causes. Similarreactionscame from other quarters where, as at MacIver's Columbia,'accident of tradition'had assigneda lower or minority status to theorists. From a marginalposition at Harvard, Talcott Parsons was guided, in part, toward the final-causal elements embodied in his The Structure of Social Action (1937) by a belief in the maladaptabilityof physical efficient-causalexplanationsin popularuse by behaviourists.60 keynote introductionaddressing His 'theory and empiricaifact' eventuallyled to Max Weber'smethod of causalimputation.6l A confusing array of causal vocabularyentered the jumble of debate where causality was but one of a host of issues tailing the call for relevance.AlexanderGoldenweiser's articleon 'TheConcept of Causality in the Physical and Social Sciences' in the American SociologzoalReview (1938) did a good job of adding to the confusion while Hans Kelsen's excellent historical account of the idea of causation ( 1943) attracted little attention.62 Receptivity remained selective and largely confined to topical boundariesprescribedby sociologicaldiscussion.63 llobert MacIver's SoczalCausation(1942) sufferedfrom repeated strawmanattacks on mathematics and, at times, fallacious reasoning, but his earlierpoints were deliveredwith more impact. The kinds of answers sociologists were producing-statistical ones-had a disjoint relation to the questions that prompted them. As sociologists sought 'becauses'to varioustypes of the question 'why' they often stopped at simple correlationsor, following Mill, ended by demonstratingnon-causality. While he didn't know how to go about it MacIverargued that for sociological insight one had to reinstate causal investigation.There was certainlyno techniquefor verificationin sociologybut this did not deny 'causalattribution'.

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causation could be WhatMacIveraccomplishedby publicizingflailing at statistics. of as construed an unintended consequence fully deal with the 'into failed of Avictim his own net, MacIver moreor less metaphysical, principlesof a non-empirical, terpretative One criticwrote: character'. dynamic a kind of pragThe nearestwe can come to a solution is through the empirical, adopt matism. For 'practical'purposes.. .we must and describview; causalityis a matterof discoverable descriptive able orderin phenomena.64 agencycould be analysiswas possiblenot becausethe causal the investigator Causal (which indeed it could not) but because confirmed from his 'attributes', or 'imputes' the causal relation 'ascribes', established scientific platform which acknowledges normatively takesplace. act an that interpretative by the investigator an informed method first to supply Paul F. Lazarsfeldwas the formula (first pretothe imputation process. His 'elaboration' (1947)) enabledsociolin sented Hans Zeisel's Say it with Figures analysis previously to ogists proceed into a kind of multivariate Lazarsfeldspoke little beyond two-variablerelations. When interpretation. taken involved a of causalrelationhe alwaysstressedthat it a causal relation was imputed only Inhis elaborationprocedure that it was not spuriousor, in other it after had been demonstrated not words, non-causal. factorsto introduce, Of course, we can alwaysthink of additional a causalrelation. establish we and empirically, will neverdefinitelyas it survives test after one plausible seem increasingly It will only relationis causalif it another.To put it anotherway: a bivariateexplored by an everis non-spurious,a fact which can only be longerseriesof elaborations.65 had the elaborations It was up to the investigatorto decide when of spuriouscorbugbear beentaken far enough to get around the causalimputation. and relations justify the of causality. The There was no efficacy to the pronouncement 'accountingscheme' an relevantvariables were incorporatedinto operations After the methodological arbitrary. whichwas admittedly Thus or 'discernment'. werecomplete there was a causal'assessment' or jettison causal ignore Lazarsfeldand his students refused to deterministic arguments terminologysimply because it conjuredup the inabilityof science of the past or worriedpurists who stressed to conform. causalterminology was WhyLazarsfeld the firstin sociologyto put question. Each innovatorhad to work in analysisis an interesting but those he sharedwith following a unique set of circumstances of the factors affecting pioneers of causal analysisillustratesome

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proficiency the careerof the idea. First,he combinedmethodological interestsin history,the philosophyof science,and with wide-ranging other disciplines (especially econometrics). This catholicity was further exhibited within his Columbiasocial circle where MacIver, Lynd, Lundberg,Stouffer, and his collaborationwith R. K. Merton provided the opportunity to bring theory and empiricalresearch together.66 Second, he followed Pearson'sdictum: 'After all, the higher statistics are only common sense reduced to numerical appreciation'.Lazarsfeldnever lost touch with the basic questions, perhaps in his case the result of simple and direct studies commissionedby public concerns. Although he had written a statistics text in Vienna while workingwith the Buhlershe avoideda host of semanticalproblems by never making the claim that what he did was 'science';the languageof social researchwas fitted to the audience. Third, Lazarsfeldtrained students. The strong institutional base afforded by Columbiawith rich resourcein students allowed navigation beyond establishedmethod to become a tradition-a school of thought-in its own right.
CAUSAL ANALYSIS

The precedent Lazarsfeldquietly set within sociology was soon Wold,HubertM. Blalock,Jr. matchedby HerbertA. Simon,Herman and later Otis Dudley Duncan, all of whom introducedadditional approachesto causal analysisfrom outside the discipline.Through their work and that of those building on the platformthey established, the careerof causalityin sociologyenteredits modernphase. As the lengthy lags in diffusion from the -triciansended, novel applicationsand recruits to what Nicholas Mullins has called the 'new model army' took that kind of analysisfrom back eddy to
mainstream.67

Jan Tinbergen in the mid-193Os moved econometriciansfrom unirelationalto multirelationalforecastingmodels by way of his causal chain systems; in 1943 Trygve Haavelmosintroducedinterdependent systems. The new domain known as 'simultaneous equations systems' was immediatelyembroiledin debate about the applicabilityand limits of new statisticalmethods for the analyses. Ragnar Frisch and Haavelmos,using the argumentof symmetry between variables(or implicitly the notion of causal reversibility), rejected estimation proceduresby ordinaryregressionand instead estimators. HermanWold entered relied on 'maximum-likelihood' each procedurewas coninto the polemics early on demonstrating sistent with the other when applied to causal chains and casting differencesin terms of recursive(causalchainswith directly observwith numerous able variables)versus nonrecursive(interdependent

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observablevariables)systems. He championedrecursive indirectly becauseof their as systems more amenableto causalinterpretation while TjallingKoopmans supplieda rationalefor the nonclarity that side recursive of the inquiry with his work on 'identification'was ordering numerousadherents.The question of causal attracted book on demand by addressed Wold in the 1952 Wold-Jureen Here Wold proposed treatingquestions of asymmetryby analysis. atwo-step definition of the causal relation: a stimulus-response of model experimentaldesign served as frameworkfor extending situations. to applications nonexperimental HerbertA. Simon worked from the same generalbody of knowlconedgeas his teachers Henry Schultz and T. Koopmansto his and causal ordering.Ragnar cernwith the issue of identifiability 'confluence analysis',J. Karschakon statistical inference Frisch's inmodel building, and econometricdistinctionsbetween endogento ousand exogenous variablesstimulated the insights beginning to sociology through his 1957 in appear 1952 and best known path Modelsof Man. Simon was familiar with Sewall Wright's use of the concept of causality. and impressedby Wold's analysis Agreaterinfluence stemmedfrom the Chicagoclassroomof Rudolf where Simon was drawn deeply into the philosophy of Carnap,
science.

His chapter on 'Causal Orderingand Identifiability'appearing the in Studies on Econometric Method (1953) carefully noted causality in the early 1950s. epistemologicalstatus' of 'unsavory to Humeanand determinist problems were irrelevant,however, of for hypothetical systems discussionof models. A real problem of was the abandonment causalterminologyfor synonyms equations condespitethe 'common sense' use of maskedcausalrelations.If . . models then 'the question. ditions of asymmetryoccurredin the of of whetherwe wish to retain the word "cause"in the vocabulary 'carefullyscrubbedfree' of any science'was affirmative.The term, philosophicaladhesions,can perform a useful function undesirable and should be retained.68 Simon did so by putting Lazarsfeld's linearequations, elaborationformulain terms of a set of recursive in of 'power' politicalscienceand speaking dealingwith the definition and to a diverseaudienceof statisticians philosophers.69 exhibited studentsof Lazarsfeld University at Meanwhile Columbia to come to gripswith the discipline'sinferan increasedwillingness test ential procedures.A case in point was the 'significance controfrom the mathematicalstatistics of Fisher. The versy' springing control through increasedaccuracythat accompaniedexperimental making the randomizationcould lead to increasedconfidence in such intellectual leap to causal interpretation.To the extent that tests use of statistical an intention was underlyinga non-rigorous of significanceHannan Selvin, in 1958, warned caution to those

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making an interpretative trespassacrossthe bordersof the classical hypothesis-testing design.70 Lazarsfeldhad likewise generatedconsiderableinterest in latent structure theory with speculationson the fit of manifest data to latent structuremodels. Dimensionscaling in factor analysisposed some conceptual difficulties. An attitude was not defined but inferred from the observed data. Inference concerningcausationin explanatory surveys, with a detailed treatment of 'elaboration', appeared H. H. Hyman'sSurvey in Design Analysas 1955. and in As sociologists in the 195Os began tooling their trade to the computer they confronted a formidable array of advances in statistical method and theory. Controversies previously remotesuch as that between Fisher and Pearson-Neyman estimation on -assumed new importance to a fast-growing group of specialists. Among them was Hubert M. Blalock,Jr. whose major in applied statisticsat North Carolina him well-versed multipleregression left in and the analysis of varianceand covariance.With the 1964 publication of Causal Inferences Non-experimental in Research Blalock became the undisputedleadingspokesman causalityin sociology. for Throughouthis careerBlalockrepeatedlyconfrontedthe problem of theory's relation to empiricalmeasurement and, with Simon, the operationalization terminologythat wouldallowthe interpretation of of data. Simon's 1954 paper, 'SpuriousCorrelations:a CausalInterpretation', provided the basis for a 'Simon-Blalocktradition' where causal inference from correlationsused a model of recursive linear equations by connecting them with known correlationsbetween manifestvariables.7lBy the early 1960s the causalmodelling of Wold (in preference to nonrecursivemodels) was incorporated into Blalock'sposition as he reliedmore directlyon the econometrics literature and began writing on causal models with measurement errors.The 'block recursive'work of FranklinM. Fisherbeginning in 1966, was an additional resourcefor Blalock, who stood with Otis Dudley Duncan at the centre of an ever expandingnetwork of sociologicalcausaltheoristsby 1970. A somewhat separateevolution of causal method culminatedin 0. Dudley Duncan'sintroductionof path analysis to sociology in 1966. What multiple regressionmethods could do in experimental situations, path-modelling with latent variables accomplished in nonexperimentalanalysis. Duncan turned sociologists to the path analysis of Sewall Wrightand the path regressionof John Tukey whose 'Causation,Regressionand Path Analysis'articlein 1954 had long been overlooked. Econometric path modelling had concentrated on manifestvariables; merging methodwith the factor by this analysis and error estimation of psychometricians, Duncan cleared obstacles to the treatment of latent variables.Raymond Boudon, in France,was independently workingin the samedirection.Seminal

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Goldberger, followed from Robert M. Hauser,Arthur Iterative contributions his NIPALS(Nonlinear Woldin 1972 with again and Herman model. LeastSquares) Partial of majortheorists aboveis but a scantoverviewof the position The analysisto the mid-1960s.Growth of the guiding development causal a whole has been so rapidand complex that it represents desire then since motivatedby the way new of thinking.The innovatorswere knowledge. Hypothetical tointegrate theoretical and empirical theoreticalstrategyusing served the purposesof deductive models reservedfor statistics. Methods that had formerly been to modelling inductive experimentaltest of hypotheses were introduced researchof the the door to as equations computer technology opened classicalspecifying assumptionswere scale or simulationthat such inferential procedures As met. never before respect was paid to the and philosophyof science.
CONCLUSION

has had terminology and the kind of analysisit represents Causal of use indicates, survey anadventurouscareerin sociology. As this of factorsproducing subject to a number theterminologyhas been visibility. its of the word. Causal Most important was the changingreferent strengthof John on the notionsin sociology first rose to acclaim touted far in excess of method which was Mill's eliminative Stuart method supplanted its capabilities. A reactive wave of statistical of philosophers science theold causalconcept and at the same time of the intractthemselves seemeddeterminedto once and for all rid declaringthe terminologyoff-limits.The ableHumeanproblem by limbo leadingto synonyms.A counterwas result a sort of inferential causality (minus Millsian reaction to statistical caution redressed pragma hypothetical of need and the in baggage) termsof interpretive was graduallyenhanced constructs.A fundamentallyaltered ideainference. in by new methodsand advances statistical the realmof statistical always rangedwithin Causalterminology by the descriptive possibility. Millsian induction was replaced use of correlation statisticsand then by the theory and systematizedwork,probability Fisher's of the Pearsonschool. In the wake of R. A. anew a role for deduction laws and methods of estimationbroached between inductive in experimentalresearch.The recurrentdivision now on the deductiveside-was and deductivereasoning-causality CharlesBooth once admitted first mitigated by econometricians.methods I seem to need both that 'As to deductive and inductive in my mind nor decide eternally and never could separate them capitalundermining which moved first'. Modelssupplieda working

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the question of which came first, the 'hen' of theorizingor the 'egg' of fact-finding. Causalanalysisbecame a specialprovinceof inquiryby virtue of receptivityto outside theory and methodology.Just as originalideas drewfrom of causalitywere diffusedinto sociology,latergenerations biometrics, psychometrics, and econometrics for innovation and legitimacy. Reconstituted causality was a synthesis convened as necessary to overcome the impasse of deduction vs. induction, theory vs. research. The use of causalterminologyin Americansociologyhas to some extent reflected sociology's self-image.The first generationprofited by associating their presumed method with that of the natural sciences. Theorists of the 1930s, a beleagueredminority, used the neglect of causality to amplify their voice. Although the causal notion weathered and disuseto becomea joint theoretic-empirical use concept, it currently is controlled by specialists in methodology. esoteric knowledge, Causaltheorists,with their specialvocabularies, and highly influential network of experts,72 could conceivably by develop too fast to be appreciated other traditionsin sociology. Chrtstopher Bernert Departmentof Sociology of State University New York at Stony Brook
NOTES

*The author was a graduate student in sociology at the State University of New York, Stony Brook during the mid-l9 70s, and more recently, with his father, a tug-boat captain on the Columbia river and its tributaries in the north-westernUSA. Mr Bernert (age 30) died as a consequence of exposure when his tug capsized in a storm on 26 May 1982. This article has been revised for publication by Dr Martin Bulmer of the London School of Economics. f The author thanks Hannan Selvin for suggestingthe theme of this study and Herman Wold for his continual support and wise counsel. 24n earlier draft was presented at the 1977 Cheiron Meeting, Boulder, Colorado. 1. Cf. chapter 9, 'New Causal Theory', in N. Mullins, Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary

American

Sociology, New York: Harper& Row, 1973. 2. Cf. J.J. Spengler, 'Notes on the Intetnational Transmission of Economic Ideas', History of Political Economy, vol. 2 (1970), pp. 133-50; H. C. Selvin, 'Durkheim, Booth, and Yule: The Non-Diffusion of an Intellectual Innovation', European Journal of Sociology, vol. 17, 1976, pp.39-52. 3. M. Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard

University Press, 1959; P. Suppes,

A Probabilistic Theory of Causality,

Amsterdam,North-HollandPublishing Co., 1970; G. H. Von Wright,Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca} Cornell University Press, 1971; H. Wold, 'Mergers of Economics and Philosophy of Science> Syntheses vol. 20, 1969, pp. 427-82. J. Weinburg,

252
'Causation', Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 1, New York, Scribners, 1973, pp. 270-8; H. A. Simon, 'Causation', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, New York, Macmillan and Free Press, pp. 35-6; H. Feigel and M. Brodbeck (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. 4. H. M. Blalock Jr, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, Chapel Hill NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1964; D. Lerner (ed.), Cause and Effect, New York, Free Press, 1965; J. L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Science, New York, Random House, 1969; G. Nettler, Explanation, New York, McGraw Hill, 1970. 5. M. G. Kendall, 'Statistics', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 15, Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, p. 231. Cf. N. Mullins, 'Theory Construction from Available Materials', Amefican Journal of Sociology, vol. 80, no. 1, 1975, p. 4 for a discussion of tactics dealing with causal terminology. 6. M. Bunge, op. cit., p. 333. 7. R. N. Soffer, 'The Revolution in English Social Thought, 1880-1914', American History Review, 75, no. 7, December, 1970, pp. 1938-64. 8. A. Comte, Auguste Comte and Positivism, G. Lenzer (ed.), New York, Harper & Row, 1975, p. 72. L. Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason, trans. N. Guterman, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1968, p. 54. 9.J. S. Mill, John Stuart Mill's of Scientific Method, Philosophy Ernest Nagel (ed.), New York, Hafner, 1950. 10. J. Losee, A IIistorical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, London, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 149. 11. W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science, orig. 1874, New York, Dover, 1958, p. 221. 12. K. Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 3rd ed., orig. 1892, London, A. & C. Black, 1911, p. 156. 13.Ibid., p. 157. 14. Mr Bernert's uncompleted Ph.D.

Bernert Chrtstopher
researchdealt with 'Die Wanderjahre: the mass movement of American students to German universities between 1870 and 1910' (editor). 15. The German Methodenstreit was not re-enacted on American shores except for thematic episodes within departments (as with Ashley at Harvard) and debates about marginal utility or the 'Institutional school' of Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell. A. Oberschall, Empirtcal Social Research in Germany, New York, Basic, 1965, pp. 10-13 provides the best synopsis of backgroundand issues. 16.J. Dorfman, 'The Role of the GermanHistoricalSchool in American Economic Thought', American Economic Review, vol. 45, no. 1, 1955, pp. 17-28. 17. Cf. A. Small, 'Technique as Approach to Science', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 27, 1922, p. 650. 18. W. F. Willcox, 'The Outlook for American Statistics', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 15, 1910, pp. 633-40. 19. R. Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Sociology, vol. I, New York, Macmillan, 1902. See also A. Oberschall, 'The Institutionalizationof American Sociology, in A. Oberschall (ed.), The Establishmentof Empirical Sociology, New York, Harper, 1973, pp. 187-251. 20. J. Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall,1971. One of the best studies of 'rules of conduct' is by R. N . Soffer, op. cit., p. 1956. 21. W. James, 'The Dilemma of Determinism', The Will to Believe, New York, Longmans Green, 1897 (orig. 1882), p.147. 22. T. Veblen, 'Why economics is not a science', 1898. 23. Pearson, op. cit., p. 32, was appalled by such use. See also S. Sherwood, 'The Philosophical Basis of Economics: A Wordto the Sociologists', Annals of AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science, vol. 10,January, 1897, pp.58-92.

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39. 'Statistical Method', Encyclo24. S . Toulmin, Human Understanding, vol. I, Princeton, Princeton pedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, University Press 1972, p. 321. For New York, Macmillan, 1934, pp. another perspective see H. Cravens, 366-71. 40. D. S. Thomas, while discussing The Triumph of Evolution, Univerthe use and limitations of statistics in sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1978. sociology in the American Journal of 25. A. Oberschall, op. cit., 1973, Sociology, 1929, p-. 17, supplied six p. 213. 26. A. Small, 'Some Contributions', procedural prerequisites designed to American Journal of Sociology, vol. counter the dangerous misuse of method. 28, 1923, p. 715. 41. F. S. Chapin, Field Work and 27. Giddings's 1895 Statistics and Social Research, New York, Century, Sociology is justly uncelebrated. 28. G. Tosti, 'The Delusions of 1920; H. W. Odum and K. Jocher, Durkheim's Sociological Objectivism', An Introduction to Social Research, New York, Henry Holt, 1929; J. L. pp. 171-7, and 'Suicide', pp. 464-78, American Journal of Sociology, vol. Gillin and F. W. Blackmar, Outlines of Sociology, 3rd ed., New York, 4, 1898. 's Macmillan,1930. 29. C. E. Gehlke, Emile Durkheim Methodsin Politics, 42. Quantitative Contribution to Sociological Theory, New York, Knopf, 1928, p . 24. 1915. 43. Social Research, New York, 30. B. S. Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life, New York, Longmans Green, 1942 (orig. 1929), Longrnans Green, 1922 (orig. 1901) . p. 13. 44. M. R. Cohen, 'The Social 31. 'Sociology, General, Special, and Scientific', 1906, cited in P. Sciences and The Natural Sciences', Abrams, The Origins of British in W. F. Ogburnand A. Goldenweiser Sociology, Chicago, University of (eds), The Social Sciences and their Interrelations, Cambridge,Cambridge Chicago Press, 1968, p. 252. 32. F . H. Hankins,A dolphe Quetelet UniversityPress, 1927, p. 464. 45. A good example, asking why as Statistician, New York, Longmans, the statistical ideas of Yule did not Green, 1908. 33. W. F. Ogburn, Progress and diffuse to Booth and Durkheim, is Legislation: found in Selvin, op. cit. Uniformityin Child-Labor 46. W. Provine, The Origins of A Study in Statistical Measurement, New York, AMS Press, 1968 (orig. Theoretical Population Genetics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1912), p. 24. 34. H. M. Walker, Studies in the 1971, p. 157. See also S. Wright, History of Statistical Method, Balti- 'Path Coefficients and Path Regressions', Biometrics, vol. 16, no. 2, more, Williams and Wilkins, 1929, June, 1960, p. 191. pp. 102-6. op. 47. H. Walker, cit., 161ff. 35. H. Walker, op. cit., pp. 151-62. 48. Cited in W. H. Hamilton (ed.), 36. A. L. Bowley, The Nature and Purpose of the Measurementof Social CurrentEconomic Problems, Chicago, Phenomena,London, P. S. King, 1915, University of Chicago Press, 1914, p. 256. p. 7. 49. H. T. Davis, The Analysis of 37. M. Bulmer, 'Quantification and Economic Time Series, Bloomington, Chicago Social Science in the 1920s: A Neglected Tradition', Journalof the Indiana, Principia Press, 1941, p. History of the Behavioural Sciences, 52. 50. R. Frisch,Econometrica,vol. 1, 17, 1981, pp. 312-31. 38. M. Jahoda, P. F. Lazarsfeld and 1933. thal, Chicago, Aldine51. H. T. Davis,op. cit., p. 36. H. Zeisel, Marien 52. See Lazarsfeld's reference to Atherton, 1971 (orig. 1933), pp. 99Wold in the Wold Festschrift, T. 125.

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Dalenius et al. (eds), Scientists at ence upon the causal thinking of Work,Uppsala, 1970, p. 78. sociologists was haphazard at best. 53. R. Von Mises and H. Pollaczek- These include (at different times) Geiringer, 'Probability', Encyclopedia physical anthropology, logic, Freudian of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, Mac- psychology and modern physics. millan, l 934, p. 43. 64. F. H. Knight, 'Review of Mac54. The first specifically 'sociologiIver's Social Causation', On the cal' statistics text did not arrive until History and Method of Economics, 1941 with the publication of Statistics Chicago, University of Chicago Press, for Sociologists by M.J. Hagood and 1956 (orig. 1943), p. 137. D. O. Price, New York, Holt, Rinehart 65. P. F. Lazarsfeld, A. K. Pasanella, & Winston. The authors noted soci- and M. Rosenberg, Continuitiesin the ology's lag behind other disciplines. Language of Social Research, New 55. The proportion of space devoted York, Free Press, 1972, p. 121. to 'methods' in the A mericanJournal 66. H. C. Selvin, 'On Formalizing of Sociology more than doubled in Theory', The Idea of Social Structure, the 1930s compared to the 1920s. Lewis A. Coser (ed.), New York, See E. Shanas, 'Through Fifty Years', Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, American Journal of Sociology, vol. pp. 339-54. 50, 1946, table 2, p. 526. 67. This section is based on personal 56. R. M. MacIver, Society: Its communications solicited by Hannan Structure and Changes, New York, Selvin and the author in the Autumn Long & Smith, 1931, p. 520. of 1975. Gracious replies by Herman 5 7. Ibid., p. 546. Wold, Sewall Wright, Herbert A. 58. F. Znaniecki, The Method of Simon, Hubert M. Blalock, and O. Sociology, New York, Farrar & Dudley Duncan were invaluable for Rinehart, 1934, p. 233. reconstructing paths of influence and 59. R. E. L. Faris, 'The Developcreativity. The transcript of Joan ment of Sociological Thought', in Gordon's (November 1961) interview R. E. L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of of P. F. Lazarsfeld in the Oral History Modern Sociology, Chicago, Rand Collection, Columbia University, proMcNally, 1964, p. 926. vided additional insights. 60. See T. Parsons, 'On Building 68. 'Causal Ordering and IdentifiSocial Systems Theory: A Personal ability', in Lerner, op. cit., p. 159. History', Daedalus, vol. 99, Fall, 69. Simon's application of Lazars1970,826-81. feld in 1954 is discussed by Lazarsfeld 61. T. Parsons, The Structure of in 'A Memoir in Honor of Professor Social A ction, 2nd ed., Chicago, Wold', in Scientists at Work,op. cit., Free Press, 1949. pp. 87-9. 62. H. Kelsen, Society and Nature, 70. D. E. Morrison and R. E. Henkel Chicago, University of Chicago Press, (eds), The Significance Test Contro1943. Kelsen addressed the field of versy, Chicago, Aldine. Jurlspruclence. 71. Lazarsfeld, Pasanella, and 63. This discussion does not treat Rosenberg, op. cit., p . 53. a number of disciplines whose influ72. Cf. Mullins, op. cit., ch. 9.
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