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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No.

56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15375

limited; however, the meeting site is proposed amendment would not (1) proceeding must file a written request
located adjacent to the White Flint involve a significant increase in the for a hearing and a petition for leave to
Station on the Metro Red Line. probability or consequences of an intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: accident previously evaluated; or (2) petition for leave to intervene shall be
Theodore S. Sherr, Office of Nuclear create the possibility of a new or filed in accordance with the
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. different kind of accident from any Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, accident previously evaluated; or (3) Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10
Washington, DC 20555, telephone: (301) involve a significant reduction in a CFR part 2. Interested persons should
415–7190, e-mail tss@nrc.gov. margin of safety. The basis for this consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714
proposed determination for each which is available at the Commission’s
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 16th day
amendment request is shown below. Public Document Room, the Gelman
of March, 2000.
The Commission is seeking public Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. comments on this proposed Washington, DC, and electronically
Theodore S. Sherr, determination. Any comments received from the ADAMS Public Library
Chief, Licensing and International Safeguards within 30 days after the date of component on the NRC Web site, http:/
Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and publication of this notice will be /www.nrc.gov (the Electronic Reading
Safeguards, NMSS. considered in making any final Room). If a request for a hearing or
[FR Doc. 00–7102 Filed 3–21–00; 8:45 am] determination. petition for leave to intervene is filed by
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P Normally, the Commission will not the above date, the Commission or an
issue the amendment until the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
expiration of the 30-day notice period. designated by the Commission or by the
NUCLEAR REGULATORY However, should circumstances change Chairman of the Atomic Safety and
COMMISSION during the notice period such that Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
failure to act in a timely way would request and/or petition; and the
Biweekly Notice; Applications and result, for example, in derating or Secretary or the designated Atomic
Amendments to Facility Operating shutdown of the facility, the Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
Licenses Involving No Significant Commission may issue the license notice of a hearing or an appropriate
Hazards Considerations amendment before the expiration of the order.
I. Background 30-day notice period, provided that its As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a
final determination is that the petition for leave to intervene shall set
Pursuant to Public Law 97–415, the amendment involves no significant forth with particularity the interest of
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission hazards consideration. The final the petitioner in the proceeding, and
(the Commission or NRC staff) is determination will consider all public how that interest may be affected by the
publishing this regular biweekly notice. and State comments received before results of the proceeding. The petition
Public Law 97–415 revised section 189 action is taken. Should the Commission should specifically explain the reasons
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as take this action, it will publish in the why intervention should be permitted
amended (the Act), to require the Federal Register a notice of issuance with particular reference to the
Commission to publish notice of any and provide for opportunity for a following factors: (1) The nature of the
amendments issued, or proposed to be hearing after issuance. The Commission petitioner’s right under the Act to be
issued, under a new provision of section expects that the need to take this action made a party to the proceeding; (2) the
189 of the Act. This provision grants the will occur very infrequently. nature and extent of the petitioner’s
Commission the authority to issue and Written comments may be submitted property, financial, or other interest in
make immediately effective any by mail to the Chief, Rules Review and the proceeding; and (3) the possible
amendment to an operating license Directives Branch, Division of Freedom effect of any order which may be
upon a determination by the of Information and Publications entered in the proceeding on the
Commission that such amendment Services, Office of Administration, U.S. petitioner’s interest. The petition should
involves no significant hazards Nuclear Regulatory Commission, also identify the specific aspect(s) of the
consideration, notwithstanding the Washington, DC 20555–0001, and subject matter of the proceeding as to
pendency before the Commission of a should cite the publication date and which petitioner wishes to intervene.
request for a hearing from any person. page number of this Federal Register Any person who has filed a petition for
This biweekly notice includes all notice. Written comments may also be leave to intervene or who has been
notices of amendments issued, or delivered to Room 6D22, Two White admitted as a party may amend the
proposed to be issued from February 26, Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, petition without requesting leave of the
2000, through March 10, 2000. The last Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to Board up to 15 days prior to the first
biweekly notice was published on 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of prehearing conference scheduled in the
March 8, 2000 (65 FR 12286). written comments received may be proceeding, but such an amended
examined at the NRC Public Document petition must satisfy the specificity
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L requirements described above.
Amendments to Facility Operating
Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing Not later than 15 days prior to the first
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
of requests for a hearing and petitions prehearing conference scheduled in the
Hazards Consideration Determination,
for leave to intervene is discussed proceeding, a petitioner shall file a
and Opportunity for a Hearing supplement to the petition to intervene
below.
The Commission has made a By April 21, 2000, the licensee may which must include a list of the
proposed determination that the file a request for a hearing with respect contentions which are sought to be
following amendment requests involve to issuance of the amendment to the litigated in the matter. Each contention
no significant hazards consideration. subject facility operating license and must consist of a specific statement of
Under the Commission’s regulations in any person whose interest may be the issue of law or fact to be raised or
10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation affected by this proceeding and who controverted. In addition, the petitioner
of the facility in accordance with the wishes to participate as a party in the shall provide a brief explanation of the

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15376 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

bases of the contention and a concise for a hearing will not be entertained changed. No provisions of the license or the
statement of the alleged facts or expert absent a determination by the technical specifications are modified or
opinion which support the contention Commission, the presiding officer or the relaxed.
and on which the petitioner intends to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that Therefore, the proposed amendment does
nor create the possibility of a new or different
rely in proving the contention at the the petition and/or request should be kind of accident from any previously
hearing. The petitioner must also granted based upon a balancing of evaluated.
provide references to those specific factors specified in 10 CFR Does the change involve a significant
sources and documents of which the 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d). reduction in the margin of safety?
petitioner is aware and on which the For further details with respect to this No assumptions are changed for any
petitioner intends to rely to establish action, see the application for analysis as a result of this amendment. No
those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner amendment which is available for system, structure, or component is changed
must provide sufficient information to public inspection at the Commission’s by this amendment. This amendment does
show that a genuine dispute exists with Public Document Room, the Gelman not change the results of accident and
the applicant on a material issue of law transient analyses previously evaluated.
Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to Washington, DC, and electronically not involve a significant reduction in the
matters within the scope of the from the ADAMS Public Library margin of safety.
amendment under consideration. The component on the NRC Web site, http:/
contention must be one which, if /www.nrc.gov (the Electronic Reading The NRC staff has reviewed the
proven, would entitle the petitioner to Room). licensee’s analysis and, based on this
relief. A petitioner who fails to file such review, it appears that the three
a supplement which satisfies these Commonwealth Edison Company, standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
requirements with respect to at least one Docket No. 50–237, Dresden Nuclear satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
contention will not be permitted to Power Station, Unit 2, Grundy County, proposes to determine that the
participate as a party. Illinois requested amendment involves no
Those permitted to intervene become Date of amendment request: April 30, significant hazards consideration.
parties to the proceeding, subject to any 1999. Attorney for licensee: Ms. Pamela B.
limitations in the order granting leave to Description of amendment request: Stroebel, Senior Vice President and
intervene, and have the opportunity to The proposed amendment would revise General Counsel, Commonwealth
participate fully in the conduct of the the expiration date of the operating Edison Company, P.O. Box 767,
hearing, including the opportunity to license to allow 40 years of operation Chicago, Illinois 60690–0767.
present evidence and cross-examine from the original date of issuance. NRC Section Chief: Anthony J.
witnesses. Basis for proposed no significant Mendiola.
If a hearing is requested, the hazards consideration determination: Commonwealth Edison Company,
Commission will make a final As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Docket Nos. 50–237 and 50–249,
determination on the issue of no licensee has provided its analysis of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2
significant hazards consideration. The issue of no significant hazards and 3, Grundy County, Illinois
final determination will serve to decide consideration, which is presented
when the hearing is held. below: Date of amendment request: February
If the final determination is that the 21, 2000.
Does the change involve a significant
amendment request involves no Description of amendment request:
increase in the probability of occurrence or
significant hazards consideration, the consequences of an accident previously The proposed amendments would
Commission may issue the amendment evaluated? change the condensate storage tank
and make it immediately effective, The programs to detect incipient failures or (CST) low level setpoint to prevent
notwithstanding the request for a degraded performance such as Inservice entrainment of air in the high pressure
hearing. Any hearing held would take Inspection, Inservice Testing, and coolant injection (HPCI) pump suction
place after issuance of the amendment. Environmental Qualification programs, for line when taking suction from the CST.
example, remain in place and unchanged. The amendments would also revise the
If the final determination is that the
The thermal cycles and reactor vessel
amendment request involves a surveillance requirements for the CST
toughness are within the 40-year design
significant hazards consideration, any margin and will remain within those margins level instruments.
hearing held would take place before for the total operating period proposed by the Basis for proposed no significant
the issuance of any amendment. amendment. No equipment is added, hazards consideration determination:
A request for a hearing or a petition modified, or removed as a result of this As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
for leave to intervene must be filed with amendment. Therefore there is no increase in licensee has provided its analysis of the
the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. the probability of an occurrence. No changes issue of no significant hazards
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are made to the assumptions on which the consideration, which is presented
UFSAR accident and transient analyses are below:
Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:
based. Therefore, there is no reason for an
Docketing and Services Branch, or may increase in the consequences of any of the Does the change involve a significant
be delivered to the Commission’s Public analyzed conditions which could lead to an increase in the probability or consequences
Document Room, the Gelman Building, increase in Onsite or Offsite dose of an accident previously evaluated?
2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by consequences. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) water
the above date. A copy of the petition Therefore, this proposed amendment does level and the installation of new pressure
should also be sent to the Office of the not involve a significant increase in the type switches are not precursors to accidents
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear probability of occurrence of consequences of or transients described in the Updated Final
an accident previously evaluated. Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The
Regulatory Commission, Washington, proposed changes will maintain the
Does the change create [the] possibility of
DC 20555–0001, and to the attorney for a new or different kind of accident from any operability of the High Pressure Coolant
the licensee. previously evaluated? Injection (HPCI) system, thus the HPCI
Nontimely filings of petitions for No systems, structures, or components are system will continue to function as designed.
leave to intervene, amended petitions, changed by this amendment. No procedures Any failure of the new switches will still
supplemental petitions and/or requests that operate, maintain, or surveil them are cause realignment of the HPCI suction from

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15377

the CST to the Torus as currently designed. Description of amendment request: ensure that 99.9% of the fuel rods avoid
Therefore, the proposed changes in water The proposed amendments would boiling transition.
level and the installation of a new type increase the Technical Specification The MCPR Safety Limit is changing for
switch will not result in a significant increase safety limit for the Minimum Critical LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 to support
in the probability or consequences of an Cycle 8 operation at uprated power
accident previously evaluated.
Power Ratio from 1.08 for two loop conditions. Changing the MCPR Safety Limit
Does the change create the possibility of a operation and 1.09 for single loop does not introduce any physical changes to
new or different kind of accident from any operation to 1.11 and 1.12 respectively. the plant, alter the processes used to operate
accident previously evaluated? The revised safety limits will the plant, or change allowable modes of
For a system to create the possibility of a conservatively bound the current operation. Therefore, no new or different
new and different accident, the proposed LaSalle Unit 2 operating cycle for an kind of accident is created that is different
changes would have to require the system to anticipated 5 percent power uprate. from any accident previously evaluated.
operate in a mode or configuration that is Basis for proposed no significant 3. Do the proposed changes involve a
different from the original design. The hazards consideration determination: significant reduction in a margin of safety?
installation of the new switches does not The MCPR Safety Limit provides a margin
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
alter the current logic configuration. The new of safety by ensuring that less than 0.1% of
switches will continue to function and licensee has provided its analysis of the the fuel rods are predicted to be in boiling
initiate a transfer from the CSTs to the Torus issue of no significant hazards transition. The proposed changes increase
as the suction source as originally designed. consideration, which is presented the two loop operation MCPR Safety Limit
The proposed changes to the Technical below: from 1.08 to 1.11 and the single loop
Specifications (TS) will ensure that the HPCI 1. Do the proposed changes involve a operation MCPR Safety Limit from 1.09 to
suction transfer will occur before any air is significant increase in the probability or 1.12. A larger value for the MCPR Safety
entrained into the pump suction line. This is consequences of an accident previously Limit is conservative and bounding for the
accomplished by ensuring that the water evaluated? current LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 Cycle
level in the CSTs does not reach the vortex The proposed changes increase the two 8 core at the current licensed power level,
limit before the transfer of the HPCI pump loop operation Minimum Critical Power because compliance with a MCPR Safety
suction from the CSTs to the Torus is Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit from 1.08 to 1.11 Limit equal to or greater than what is
complete. No new functional failure modes and the single loop operation MCPR Safety calculated will ensure that less than 0.1% of
will be introduced upon implementation of Limit from 1.09 to 1.12. MCPR Safety Limits the fuel rods experience boiling transition.
the proposed changes. Therefore, the have been established consistent with NRC- Additionally, the proposed changes are being
possibility of a new or different kind of approved methods to ensure that fuel submitted prior to completion of the detailed
accident has not been created. performance is acceptable. These changes do calculations for Cycle 8 power uprate.
Does the change involve a significant not affect the operability of plant systems, However, based on preliminary calculations,
reduction in a margin of safety? nor do they compromise any fuel these revised limits are anticipated to bound
The proposed changes to the CST Level- performance limits. Therefore, the Unit 2 Cycle 8 operation at uprated
Low trip setpoint and installation of the new probability of an accident will not be conditions.
pressure switches provide assurance that air changed based on these proposed changes. Therefore, the margin of safety will
entrainment and vortexing will be prevented The MCPR Safety Limit is set such that no
during HPCI operation. By maintaining an not be reduced.
fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit
increased volume in the CSTs, the The NRC staff has reviewed the
is not violated. A larger value for the MCPR
probability of a HPCI system malfunction due Safety Limit is conservative and bounding for licensee’s analysis and, based on this
to air entrainment or vortexing is decreased. the current LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, review, it appears that the three
The installation of the new pressure type Cycle 8 core at the current licensed power standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
switches does not change the current logic level, because compliance with an MCPR satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
configuration. The new switches will be Safety Limit equal to or greater than the proposes to determine that the
calibrated at a frequency to ensure that the calculated value will ensure that less than requested amendments involve no
probability of unacceptable instrument drift 0.1% of the fuel rods experience boiling significant hazards consideration.
is maintained at an acceptable level. transition. The MCPR Safety Limit does not Attorney for licensee: Ms. Pamela B.
Therefore, the proposed change does not impact the source term or pathways assumed
involve a significant reduction in the margin in accidents previously evaluated. Therefore,
Stroebel, Senior Vice President and
of safety. these proposed changes do not increase the General Counsel, Commonwealth
consequences of an accident previously Edison Company, P.O. Box 767,
The NRC staff has reviewed the evaluated. Chicago, Illinois 60690–0767.
licensee’s analysis and, based on this Additionally, operational MCPR limits will NRC Section Chief: Anthony J.
review, it appears that the three be applied that will ensure the MCPR Safety Mendiola.
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are Limit is not violated during all modes of
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff operation and anticipated operational Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos.
proposes to determine that the occurrences in accordance with the Core 50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear
requested amendments involve no Operating Limits Report (COLR), which will Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg
significant hazards consideration. be implemented prior to operation at uprated County, North Carolina
power. The MCPR Safety Limit ensures that
Attorney for licensee: Ms. Pamela B. less than 0.1% of the fuel rods in the core Date of amendment request:
Stroebel, Senior Vice President and are expected to experience boiling transition. November 23, 1999.
General Counsel, Commonwealth Therefore, the probability or consequences of Description of amendment request:
Edison Company, P.O. Box 767, an accident will not increase. The proposed amendments would
Chicago, Illinois 60690–0767. 2. Do the proposed changes create the revise Technical Specification 5.5.11—
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. possibility of a new or different kind of Ventilation Filter Testing Program,
Mendiola. accident from any accident previously which provides the test requirements for
evaluated? charcoal filters, to assure compliance
Commonwealth Edison Company, Creation of the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident would require the
with the requirements of American
Docket Nos. 50–373 and 50–374, LaSalle
creation of one or more new precursors of Society for Testing and Materials
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle
that accident. Changing the MCPR Safety (ASTM) D3803–1989.
County, Illinois Basis for proposed no significant
Limit does not alter or add any new
Date of amendment request: February equipment or change modes of operation. hazards consideration determination:
28, 2000. The MCPR Safety Limit is established to As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the

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15378 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

licensee has provided its analysis of the South Church Street, Charlotte, North generated. Consequently, plant accident
issue of no significant hazards Carolina 28201–1006. analyses will not be affected by these
consideration, which is presented NRC Section Chief: Richard L. Emch, changes.
below: Jr. 3. Does this change involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety?
1. Does the change involve a significant Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos. No. The proposed changes are consistent
increase in the probability or consequences 50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear with the current licensing basis for the
of an accident previously evaluated? Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg McGuire Nuclear Station, the setpoint
No. The proposed changes will ensure that methodologies used to develop the Trip
the Technical Specification 5.5.11, Section c,
County, North Carolina
Setpoints, the McGuire Safety Analyses, and
required testing of charcoal filters in McGuire Date of amendment request: January current station calibration procedures and
ventilation systems designed to meet the 6, 2000. practices. Margin of safety is related to the
guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Description of amendment request: confidence in the ability of the fission
Revision 2, are performed as per ASTM The proposed amendments would product barriers to perform their design
D3803–1989. This will ensure that these revise Technical Specifications (TS) functions during and following accident
filters are capable of performing their design conditions. These barriers include the fuel
function to maintain offsite and control room
3.3.1—Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation, TS 3.3.2—Engineered cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the
operator doses within the limits of 10 CFR containment system. The performance of
100, Subpart A and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Safety Feature Actuation System
these barriers will not be degraded by the
GDC [General Design Criteria] 19, following (ESFAS) Instrumentation, TS 3.3.5— proposed changes. Consequently, plant safety
a LOCA [Loss-of-Coolant Accident] or a Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start analyses will not be affected by these
postulated fuel handling accident. (LOP) Instrumentation, and TS 3.3.6— changes.
Consequently, the proposed changes only Containment Purge and Exhaust
deal with the performance of these systems Isolation (VP) Instrumentation. The The NRC staff has reviewed the
during an accident and have no impact on
proposed revisions will facilitate licensee’s analysis and, based on this
accident probabilities. In addition, since the review, it appears that the three
proposed changes help ensure the capability treatment of the applicable RTS, ESFAS,
LOP, and VP Instrumentation TS Trip standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
of the subject ventilation systems to perform satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
their design function, there will be no Setpoints as nominal values. In
reduction in the ability of these systems to addition, proposed changes to the proposes to determine that the
minimize the consequences of a previously applicable TS Bases further define the amendment request involves no
evaluated accident. TS Trip Setpoints as nominal values. significant hazards consideration.
2. Does the change create the possibility of Basis for proposed no significant Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lisa F.
a new or different kind of accident from any hazards consideration determination: Vaughn, Duke Energy Corporation, 422
accident previously evaluated? South Church Street, Charlotte, North
No. The proposed changes only help
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the Carolina 28201–1006.
ensure the performance of the subject NRC Section Chief: Richard L. Emch,
ventilation systems during an accident and issue of no significant hazards
have no impact on accident possibilities. No consideration, which is presented Jr.
changes are being made to actual plant below: Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
hardware or the way in which the plant is 313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1,
1. Does the change involve a significant
being operated. Therefore, no new accident
increase in the probability or consequences Pope County, Arkansas
causal mechanisms will be generated.
of an accident previously evaluated?
Consequently, plant accident analyses will
No. The proposed changes are consistent Date of amendment request:
not be affected by these changes. November 23, 1999, as supplemented by
with the current licensing basis for the
3. Does this change involve a significant letter dated February 24, 2000
McGuire Nuclear Station, the setpoint
reduction in a margin of safety?
methodologies used to develop the Trip Description of amendment request:
No. Margin of safety is related to the
Setpoints, the McGuire Safety Analyses, and The proposed amendment would
confidence in the ability of the fission
current station calibration procedures and incorporate the use of American Society
product barriers to perform their design
practices. The Reactor Trip System and for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
functions during and following accident
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
conditions. These barriers include the fuel D3803–1989, ‘‘Standard Test Method for
are not accident initiating systems; they are
cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the accident mitigating systems. Therefore, these Nuclear-Grade Activated Carbon,’’ into
containment system. The performance of proposed changes will have no impact on the Technical Specifications (TSs).
these barriers will not be degraded by the any accident probabilities. Accident Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) is
proposed changes. In addition, the proposed consequences will not be affected, as no submitting this proposed amendment as
changes to the maximum methyl iodide changes are being made to the plant which a complete response to Nuclear
requirements to accommodate planned will involve a reduction in reliability of these
changes in filter efficiencies will not result in Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic
systems. Consequently, any previous Letter (GL) 99–02, ‘‘Laboratory Testing
any degradation in the capability of the evaluations associated with accidents will
affected charcoal filters to perform their of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal.’’
not be affected by these changes.
design function. As a result of the above, 2. Does the change create the possibility of
The February 24, 2000, supplement
plant safety analyses will not be affected by a new or different kind of accident from any proposes additional changes to the TSs
the changes proposed in this LAR [License accident previously evaluated? to ensure that ventilation system
Amendment Request]. No. The proposed changes are consistent velocity requirements are established in
The NRC staff has reviewed the with the current licensing basis for the accordance with the standards of ASTM
licensee’s analysis and, based on this McGuire Nuclear Station, the setpoint D3803–1989. This application was
review, it appears that the three methodologies used to develop the Trip previously noticed in the Federal
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are Setpoints, the McGuire Safety Analyses, and Register on March 8, 2000 (65 FR
current station calibration procedures and 12291).
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff practices. No changes are being made to
proposes to determine that the actual plant hardware which will result in
Basis for proposed no significant
amendment request involves no any new accident causal mechanisms. Also, hazards consideration determination:
significant hazards consideration. no changes are being made to the way in As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lisa F. which the plant is being operated. Therefore, licensee has provided its analysis of the
Vaughn, Duke Energy Corporation, 422 no new accident causal mechanisms will be issue of no significant hazards

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15379

consideration, which is presented The NRC staff has reviewed the modification to plant components or systems.
below: licensee’s analysis and, based on this Implementing the proposed actions act to
review, it appears that the three ensure the operability of the remaining
Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant system, eliminate the reliance on automatic
Increase in the Probability or Consequences standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are actuation where applicable, and ensure that
of an Accident Previously Evaluated satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff any active failure will be readily detected.
Deleting portions of applicable ANO–1 proposes to determine that the The proposed changes, therefore, are not
[Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1] TSs that amendment request involves no relevant to creating new or different kinds of
reference system design velocity criteria for significant hazards consideration. accidents than those previously evaluated.
activated charcoal medium testing requires Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. The proposed actions are in addition to those
no physical change to plant design. NRC GL Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, currently required by the ANO–2 TSs.
99–02, in support of the ASTM D3803–1989 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC Therefore, this change does not create the
standard, requires licensees to utilize possibility or a new or different kind of
20005–3502. accident from any previously evaluated.
charcoal testing methods that will ensure the NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
current license basis, as it relates to General Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant
Design Criterion (GDC) 19, is maintained. Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– Reduction in the Margin of Safety
The existing criterion within the affected 368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, The inclusion of additional actions within
ANO–1 TSs is less restrictive than that of Pope County, Arkansas the ANO–2 TSs associated with the control
ASTM D3803–1989 standard and, therefore, room emergency ventilation and air
is being proposed for deletion. The testing of
Date of amendment request: January
conditioning systems during the handling of
charcoal mediums has no impact on the 27, 2000.
irradiated fuel act to ensure the operability of
probability of an accident occuring. However, Description of amendment request: the remaining system, eliminate the reliance
the charcoal mediums do act to reduce The proposed amendment would revise on automatic actuation where applicable, and
radioiodines released to the environment the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 ensure that any active failure will be readily
during and following an accident. Testing the (ANO–2) technical specifications (TS) detected. The proposed changes, therefore,
charcoal mediums to a more restrictive by providing actions associated with act to maintain the margin of safety by
standard, however, does not increase the inoperable control room emergency ensuring the operability of redundant
consequences of an accident since such ventilation or cooling systems during equipment that is required to protect control
testing ensures the current analyses remain room personnel in the event of a fuel
movement of irradiated fuel during
valid. handling accident. The proposed actions are
shutdown modes of operation, when in addition to those currently required by the
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a signficant increase in the
allowed outage times associated with ANO–2 TSs and, therefore, are more
probability or consequences of any accident these systems are not met. restrictive.
previously evaluated. Basis for proposed no significant Therefore, this change does not involve a
hazards consideration determination: significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility
of a New or Different Kind of Accident from
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the The NRC staff has reviewed the
any Previously Evaluated licensee has provided its analysis of the licensee’s analysis and, based on this
issue of no significant hazards review, it appears that the three
As stated previously, the proposed changes
to the ANO–1 TSs do not result in any
consideration, which is presented standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
physical change to plant design, nor does the below: satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
testing of charcoal mediums act to create a Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant proposes to determine that the
new or different accident than that Increase in the Probability or Consequences amendment request involves no
previously analyzed. The existing criterion of an Accident Previously Evaluated significant hazards consideration.
within the affected ANO–1 TSs is less The inclusion of additional actions within Local Public Document Room
restrictive than that of ASTM D3803–1989 the ANO–2 TSs associated with the control location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas
standard and, therefore, is being proposed for room emergency ventilation and air Tech University, Russellville, Arkansas
deletion. Testing criteria governing the conditioning systems during the handling of 72801.
operability of charcoal mediums is not irradiated fuel does not require any physical Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S.
considered an accident initiator of new, modification to plant components or systems.
different, or previously analyzed accidents. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn,
Implementing the proposed actions act to
The charcoal mediums act solely to reduce ensure the operability of the remaining 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC
radioiodines released to the environment system, eliminate the reliance on automatic 20005–3502.
during and following accident scenarios. actuation where applicable, and ensure that NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not any active failure will be readily detected. Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
create the possiblity of a new or different The proposed changes, therefore, act to
kind of accident from any previously ensure [that] the consequences of a fuel
368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2,
evaluated. handling accident are mitigated and have no Pope County, Arkansas
Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant impact on the probability [of] a fuel handling Date of amendment request: February
Reduction in the Margin of Safety accident occurring. The proposed actions are 24, 2000.
in addition to those currently required by the Description of amendment request:
Testing of charcoal mediums to more ANO–2 TSs and, therefore, are more
restrictive criteria acts to better ensure that The proposed amendment would revise
restrictive. Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.11 on
these mediums will perform their design Therefore, the proposed changes do not
function during and following accidents that involve a significant increase in the
reactor coolant system vent flow
result in a release of radioiodines. No probability or consequences of any accident verification, TS 4.6.1.1.a on
reduction in the margin to safety can be previously evaluated. containment penetration closure
construed based on the new testing criteria. verification (non-automatic), and TS
The charcoal mediums will continue to Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility
of a New or Different Kind of Accident from 4.6.3.1.2 on containment isolation valve
remove radioiodines as originally designed actuation verification. These TS
and approved by the NRC during and any Previously Evaluated
following accidents involving radioactive The inclusion of additional actions within
surveillances require testing to be
release. the ANO–2 TSs associated with the control performed during Modes 5 and/or 6.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not room emergency ventilation and air The proposed change will eliminate
involve a significant reduction in the margin conditioning systems during the handling of unnecessary mode restrictions on these
of safety. irradiated fuel does not require any physical surveillance requirements.

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15380 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Basis for proposed no significant activities in the absence of the irradiated fuel that contains sufficient fission
hazards consideration determination: aforementioned mode restrictions proposed products to require operability of accident
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the for deletion. Therefore, the proposed changes mitigation systems to meet the accident
are considered to be administrative in nature analysis assumptions. The alternative source
licensee has provided its analysis of the
and do not significantly affect the plant or term changes affect the definitions and the
issue of no significant hazards personnel safety. The margin to safety specifications for the Control Room Fresh Air
consideration, which is presented remains unchanged since the licensee System, MSIV [main steam isolation valve]
below: currently is required to properly plan and leakage surveillance, Standby Gas Treatment
Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant execute surveillance tests, even within System surveillance, and revises a license
Increase in the Probability or Consequences specific modes of operation. Other activities condition to increase the allowable control
of an Accident Previously Evaluated presently ongoing during the currently room inleakage. The specifications affected
Current regulation requires the licensee to specified operational modes could result in by the relaxation of the shutdown controls
responsibly plan, schedule, and perform an unexpected or unforseen transient or include those for the Control Room HVAC
testing of station equipment. Furthermore, condition if surveillance testing is not [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning]
the philosophies of the RSTS [Revised properly planned and executed given the system, and the electrical AC [alternating
Standard Technical Specifications] do not other activities in progress and current plant current] Sources, DC [direct current] Sources
restrict surveillance performance to specific conditions. Since the responsibility of the and Distribution Systems during shutdown.
modes of operation or other plant conditions. licensee in these matters remains unchanged The Commission has provided standards
Deletion of the mode restrictions will not by the proposed changes, no significant for determining whether a no significant
relinquish licensee responsibility from reduction in the margin to safety is evident. hazards consideration exists as stated in
prudent planning, scheduling, and Therefore, the proposed changes do not 10CFR50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an
performance of testing activities and may involve a significant reduction in the margin operating license involves a no significant
provide the licensee lower-risk periods of of safety. hazards consideration if operation of the
opportunity for test performance. Because of facility in accordance with the proposed
this, the proposed changes are considered to The NRC staff has reviewed the amendment would not: (1) involve a
be administrative in nature and do not licensee’s analysis and, based on this significant increase in the probability or
significantly affect the plant or personnel review, it appears that the three consequences of an accident previously
safety. Modes in which surveillances are standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a
performed are not analyzed in association satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff new or different kind of accident from any
with accident probability or the proposes to determine that the accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve
consequences of an accident. The proposed amendment request involves no a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
changes reduce unnecessary restrictions on Entergy Operations, Inc. has evaluated the
significant hazards consideration. no significant hazards considerations in its
the licensee and provide consistency with
the philosophies of the RSTS. Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. request for a license amendment. In
Therefore, the proposed changes do not Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, accordance with 10CFR50.91(a), Entergy
involve a significant increase in the 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC Operations, Inc. is providing the analysis of
probability or consequences of any accident 20005–3502. the proposed amendment against the three
previously evaluated. NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm. standards in 10CFR50.92(c). A description of
Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility the no significant hazards considerations
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy determination follows:
of a New or Different Kind of Accident from
any Previously Evaluated
Resources, Inc., South Mississippi 1. The proposed changes do not
Electric Power Association, and Entergy significantly increase the probability or
The licensee will continue to be Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50–416, consequences of an accident previously
accountable for proper and prudent planning, evaluated.
scheduling, and performance of surveillance
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1,
Claiborne County, Mississippi The alternative source term does not affect
activities in the absence of the the design or operation of the facility; rather,
aforementioned mode restrictions proposed Date of amendment request: January once the occurrence of an accident has been
for deletion. Therefore, the proposed changes 21, 2000. postulated the new source term is an input
are considered to be administrative in nature to evaluate the consequences. The
Description of amendment request:
and do not significantly affect the plant or implementation of the alternative source
personnel safety. The probability of a new or Entergy Operations, Inc. requests
revision of the Grand Gulf Nuclear term has been evaluated in revisions to the
different kind of accident being created analyses of the limiting design basis
remains unchanged since the licensee Station licensing basis and Technical
accidents at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
currently is required to properly plan and Specifications to utilize the alternative Based on the results of these analyses, it has
execute surveillance tests, even within accident source term described in been demonstrated that, even with the
specific modes of operation. Other activities NUREG–1465. requested Technical Specification and
presently ongoing during the currently Basis for proposed no significant Operating License changes, the dose
specified operational modes could result in
hazards consideration determination: consequences of these limiting events are
an unexpected or unforseen transient or
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the within the regulatory guidance currently
condition if surveillance testing is not
licensee has provided its analysis of the proposed by the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory
properly planned and executed given the
issue of no significant hazards Commission] for use with the alternative
other activities in progress and current plant
consideration, which is presented source term. This guidance is presented in
conditions. Since the responsibility of the
NUREG–1465, in the draft rulemaking for
licensee in these matters remains unchanged below:
by the proposed changes, the possibility of a 10CFR50.67, and in the associated draft
new or different kind of accident being This proposed amendment to the Grand Regulatory Guide DG–1081.
created also remains unchanged. Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Technical A new term to describe irradiated fuel is
Therefore, the proposed changes do not Specifications (TS) revises those used to establish operational conditions
create the possibility of a new or different specifications affected by the implementation where specific activities represent situations
kind of accident from any previously of the alternative source term concepts in where significant radioactive releases can be
evaluated. accordance with NUREG–1465. In addition, postulated. These operational conditions are
based on the alternative source term, changes consistent with the design basis analysis.
Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant are proposed to selected specifications Because the equipment affected by the
Reduction in the Margin of Safety associated with handling irradiated fuel in revised operational conditions is not
The licensee will continue to be the primary or secondary containment and considered an initiator to any previously
accountable for proper and prudent planning, CORE ALTERATIONS. Specifically, the analyzed accident, inoperability of the
scheduling, and performance of surveillance proposal uses a new term to describe equipment cannot increase the probability of

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15381

any previously evaluated accident. The proposed regulatory guidance. Safety margins Entergy has evaluated this proposed
proposed requirements bound the conditions and analytical conservatisms have been Technical Specification change and has
of the current design basis fuel handling evaluated and are well understood. The determined that it involves no significant
accident analysis which concludes that the analyzed events have been carefully selected hazards consideration. This determination
radiological consequences are within the and margin has been retained to ensure that has been performed in accordance with the
acceptance criteria of NUREG–0800, Section the analyses adequately bound all postulated criteria set forth in 10CFR50.92. The
15.7.4 and General Design Criteria [GDC] 19. event scenarios. The dose consequences of following evaluation is provided for the three
As noted above, with the alternative source these limiting events are within the categories of the significant hazards
term implementation, the acceptance criteria acceptance criteria also found in the latest consideration standards:
are also being revised. The results of the regulatory guidance. This guidance is 1. Does the change involve a significant
revised Fuel Handling Accident demonstrate presented in NUREG–1465, in the approved increase in the probability or consequences
that the dose consequences are within the rulemaking for 10CFR50.67, and in the of an accident previously evaluated?
currently proposed NRC regulatory guidance. associated draft Regulatory Guide DG–1081. This change would require additional fuel
This guidance is presented in NUREG–1465, The proposed changes continue to ensure oil to be stored in each of the Division 1, 2,
in the draft rulemaking for 10CFR50.67, and that the doses at the exclusion area and low and 3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage
in the associated draft Regulatory Guide DG– population zone boundaries as well as Tanks. The amount of diesel fuel required to
1081. control room, are within the corresponding be kept in the storage tanks, which has been
Therefore, the proposed changes do not regulatory limit. In a similar way, the results determined by Calculation MC–Q1P75–
significantly increase the probability or of the existing analyses demonstrated that the 90190 Revision 2 and Calculation MC–
consequences of any previously evaluated dose consequences were within the Q1P81–90188 Revision 2, is well within the
accident. applicable NRC-specified regulatory limit. maximum capacity of the Diesel Generator
2. The proposed changes would not create Specifically, the margin of safety for these Fuel Oil Storage Tanks. As stated in UFSAR
the possibility of a new or different kind of accidents is considered to be that provided [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report]
accident from any previous[ly] analyzed. by meeting the applicable regulatory limit, Section 9.5.4.3 (Safety Evaluation for the
The alternative source term does not affect which, for most events, is conservatively set diesel fuel storage subsystem) ‘* * * the tank
the design, functional performance, or below the 10CFR100 limit. With respect to level will be above the ‘‘seven-day capacity’’
operation of the facility or of any equipment the control room personnel doses, the margin required level and will be kept as near the
within the facility. Similarly, it does not of safety is the difference between the top as practical.’’ Other fuel oil storage
affect the design or operation of any 10CFR100 limits and the regulatory limit subsystem components, such as the transfer
equipment or systems involved in the defined by 10CFR50, Appendix A, Criterion pumps, are similarly designed, as a
mitigation of any accidents. The proposed 19 (GDC 19). minimum, for the storage tanks being filled
changes to the Technical Specifications and Therefore, because the proposed changes to maximum capacity. The Diesel Generator
the Operating License, while they revise continue to result in dose consequences Fuel Oil Storage Tanks continue to meet the
certain performance requirements, do not within the applicable regulatory limits, they original design requirements as described in
involve any physical modifications to the are considered to not result in a significant the UFSAR. The proposed change will
plant. Therefore, the proposed changes reduction in a margin of safety. provide adequate fuel for diesel generator
associated with the alternative source term Based on the above evaluation, operation operation at the Technical Specification
do not create the possibility of a new or in accordance with the proposed amendment surveillance testing capacity for Division 1
different kind of accident from any involves no significant hazards and 2 Diesel Generators, 5740 KW, and the
previous[ly] analyzed. considerations. nameplate rating for Division 3 Diesel
The new term to describe irradiated fuel is Generator, 3300 KW, rather than the lower
used to establish operational conditions The NRC staff has reviewed the post-LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] load
where specific activities represent situations licensee’s analysis and, based on this profiles previously assumed. Therefore,
where significant radioactive releases can be review, it appears that the three increasing the quantity of fuel oil required to
postulated. These operational conditions are standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are be maintained, will not increase the
consistent with the design basis analyses. satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff probability of the diesel generators becoming
The relaxation of selected shut down controls proposes to determine that the an initiator for any previously evaluated
has been modeled in revised analyses. The accident. Furthermore, since the proposed
proposed changes do not introduce any new
amendment request involves no change increases the fuel oil inventory it
modes of plant operation and do not involve significant hazards consideration. should enhance the ability of the diesel
physical modifications to the plant. Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. generators to respond to an accident and as
Therefore, the proposed changes related to Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, such the change does not increase the
shutdown controls based on the alternative 1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Washington, consequences of any previously analyzed
source term do not create the possibility of DC 20005–3502. accident.
a new or different kind of accident from any NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm. 2. Does the change create the possibility of
previous[ly] analyzed. a new or different kind of accident from any
Therefore, the proposed changes do not Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy accident previously evaluated?
create the possibility of a new or different Resources, Inc., South Mississippi Electric The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil subsystem
kind of accident from any accident Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, design and operation will not change except
previously analyzed. Inc., Docket No. 50–416, Grand Gulf Nuclear for the incorporation of increased fuel oil
3. The proposed changes do not involve a Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, inventory requirements. This proposed
significant reduction in a margin of safety. Mississippi increase remains within the maximum
The changes above are basically associated Date of amendment request: January 24, capacity of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
with the implementation of a new licensing 2000. Storage Tanks. Existing analyses and
basis for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Description of amendment request: Entergy evaluations, concerning the fuel oil storage
Approval of the basis change from the Operations, Inc. requests revisions to the tanks, are not adversely impacted by this
original source term in accordance with TID– Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Technical increase in the required fuel oil inventory.
14844 to the new alternative source term of Specifications which specify the minimum Other fuel oil storage subsystem components,
NUREG–1465 is requested by this submittal. useable fuel oil inventories to be maintained such as the transfer pumps, are similarly
The results of the accident analyses revised in the Division 1, 2, and 3 Diesel Generator designed, as a minimum, for the storage tanks
in support of this submittal, and considering Fuel Oil Storage Tanks. being filled to maximum capacity. The
the requested Technical Specification and Basis for proposed no significant hazards subsystem continues to meet the original
Operating License changes, are subject to consideration determination: As required by design requirements. The proposed increased
revised acceptance criteria. These analyses 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its fuel oil inventory cannot adversely affect any
have been performed using conservative analysis of the issue of no significant hazards other equipment. Therefore, since the
methodologies as outlined in the currently consideration, which is presented below: proposed change only increases the fuel oil

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15382 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

inventory requirements and does not result issue of no significant hazards have adequate margin to ensure their safety
in any change in the response of any consideration, which is presented functions can be met with an ultimate heat
equipment to an accident, the proposed below: sink water temperature of 77°F. In addition,
change does not create the possibility of a safe shutdown capability has been
new or different kind of accident from any In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 NNECO demonstrated for an UHS water temperature
previously analyzed accident. [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] has as high as 77°F.
3. Does this change involve a significant reviewed the proposed change and has The proposed change will have no adverse
reduction in a margin of safety? concluded that it does not involve a effect on plant operation or equipment
Existing Technical Specification 3.8.3 significant hazards consideration (SHC). The important to safety. The plant response to the
bases state the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil basis for this conclusion is that the three design basis accidents will not change and
Storage Tank minimum level is sufficient to criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are not the accident mitigation equipment will
operate the respective Diesel Generator for compromised. The proposed change does not continue to function as assumed in the
seven days while supplying maximum post- involve a SHC because the change would not: design basis accident analysis. Therefore,
LOCA demands. The proposed change 1. Involve a significant increase in the there will be no significant reduction in a
increases the quantity of fuel oil required to probability or consequences of an accident margin of safety.
be maintained in each of the Division 1, 2, previously evaluated. The proposed change does not alter the
and 3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage The proposed change will allow plant design, function, or operation of the
Tanks. The proposed change will provide operation to continue for an additional 12 equipment involved. The impact of the
adequate fuel for diesel generator operation hours with the temperature of the UHS up to proposed change has been analyzed, and it
at the Technical Specification surveillance 2°F above the Technical Specification limit has been determined it does not involve a
testing capacity for Division 1 and 2 Diesel of 75°F. This increase in UHS temperature significant increase in the probability or
Generators, 5740 KW, and the nameplate will not affect the normal operation of the consequences of an accident previously
rating for Division 3 Diesel Generator, 3300 plant to the extent which would make any evaluated, does not create the possibility of
KW, rather than the lower post-LOCA load accident more likely to occur. In addition, a new or different kind of accident from any
profiles previously assumed. The amount of there exists adequate margin in the safety accident previously evaluated, and does not
diesel fuel required to be kept in the storage systems and heat exchangers to assure the involve a significant reduction in a margin of
tanks, which has been determined by safety functions are met at the higher safety. Therefore, NNECO has concluded the
Calculation MC–Q1P75–90190 Revision 2 temperature. An evaluation has confirmed proposed change does not involve a SHC.
and Calculation MC–Q1P81–90188 Revision that safe shutdown will be achieved and
maintained for a loss of coolant accident The NRC staff has reviewed the
2, is well within the maximum capacity of
the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks. (LOCA) with a loss of normal power (LNP) licensee’s analysis and, based on this
Therefore, since the proposed change and a single active failure with an UHS water review, it appears that the three
increases the fuel oil inventory it should temperature as high as 77°F. standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
enhance the ability of the diesel generators to The proposed change will have no adverse satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
respond to an accident and as such the effect on plant operation, or the availability proposes to determine that the
change does not decrease any margin of or operation of any accident mitigation amendment request involves no
safety previously assumed. equipment. The plant response to the design
significant hazards consideration.
basis accidents will not change. In addition,
The NRC staff has reviewed the the proposed change can not cause an
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M.
licensee’s analysis and, based on this accident. Therefore, there will be no Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel,
review, it appears that the three significant increase in the probability or Northeast Utilities Service Company,
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are consequences of an accident previously P.O. Box 270, Hartford, Connecticut.
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff evaluated. NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
proposes to determine that the 2. Create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident PECO Energy Company, Docket Nos.
amendment request involves no 50–352 and 50–353, Limerick
previously evaluated.
significant hazards consideration. Generating Station, Units 1 and 2,
The proposed change will allow plant
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. operation to continue for an additional 12 Montgomery County, Pennsylvania
Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, hours with the temperature of the UHS up to
1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Date of amendment request: May 26,
2°F above the Technical Specification limit
Washington, DC 20005–3502. of 75°F. This will not alter the plant
1999.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm. configuration (no new or different type of Description of amendment request:
equipment will be installed) or require any The proposed amendments would
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et new or unusual operator actions. The relocate Technical Specification (TS)
al., Docket No. 50–336, Millstone proposed change will not alter the way any Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.5.b,
Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New structure, system or component functions regarding the performance of channel
London County, Connecticut and will not significantly alter the manner in functional test and channel calibration
Date of amendment request: January which the plant is operated. There will be no of certain control rod scram
adverse effect on plant operation or accident accumulator instrumentation, to the
27, 2000.
mitigation equipment. The proposed change
Description of amendment request: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
does not introduce any new failure modes.
The proposed amendment would allow Also, the response of the plant and the and would revise TS 3.1.3.5 to allow an
operation of the facility for a period of operators following these accidents is alternate method for verifying whether a
up to 12 hours with the temperature of unaffected by the change. In addition, the control rod drive pump is operating.
the ultimate heat sink (UHS) between 75 UHS is not an accident initiator. Therefore, Basis for proposed no significant
and 77°F, provided water temperature is the proposed change will not create the hazards consideration determination:
verified below 77°F at least once per possibility of a new or different kind of As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
hour. Currently the temperature limit is accident from any previously analyzed. licensee has provided its analysis of the
75°F and is verified at least once per 6 3. Involve a significant reduction in a issue of no significant hazards
margin of safety. consideration, which is presented
hours when the temperature is above The proposed change will allow plant
70°F, or once per 24 hours below 70°F. operation to continue for an additional 12
below:
Basis for proposed no significant hours with the temperature of the UHS up to 1. The proposed Technical Specifications
hazards consideration determination: 2°F above the Technical Specification limit (TS) changes do not involve a significant
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the of 75°F. An evaluation has been performed increase in the probability or consequences
licensee has provided its analysis of the which demonstrates that the safety systems of an accident previously evaluated.

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15383

The first proposed change relocates control 2. The proposed TS changes do not create Attorney for licensee: J. W. Durham,
rod drive (CRD) instrumentation the possibility of a new or different kind of Sr., Esquire, Sr. V.P. and General
requirements from the TS to the UFSAR and accident from any accident previously Counsel, PECO Energy Company, 2301
plant procedures. The second proposed evaluated. Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.
change adds an alternate method for Neither the mechanism for initiating nor
verifying operation of a control rod drive
NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
for carrying out a scram is modified by either
pump in the TS action statement. of these proposed changes. These proposed Power Authority of the State of New
Regarding the first proposed change, changes do not: York, Docket No. 50–333, James A.
operability of the accumulators is determined (1) Create a means by which the scram FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant,
by verifying that the pressure in each function could be impeded or prevented.
accumulator is greater than or equal to 955 Oswego County, New York
(2) Involve a physical plant alteration or
psig. TS 4.1.3.5.a requires weekly verification change the methods governing normal plant Date of amendment request: February
of accumulator pressure. The local pressure operation. 3, 2000.
indicator for each accumulator is the normal (3) Impose or eliminate any requirements Description of amendment request:
means of satisfying this surveillance. This or change the controls for maintaining the The proposed amendment would
proposed change does not affect or alter the requirements. change the Technical Specifications
requirements associated with this There are no other malfunctions that need
instrumentation. If the local pressure (TSs) by revising the reactor water level
to be considered since failure of a significant
indicator is not functioning or pressure is setpoint for the Anticipated Transient
number of control rods to scram is analyzed
less than 955 psig, the accumulator will still in Section 15.8 of the UFSAR. This is the Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip
be declared inoperable. bounding analysis for multiple control rod (ATWS–RPT) function and the Alternate
Operability of the accumulator pressure or malfunctions or severe degradation of control Rod Injection (ARI) functions (Table
water level alarm and indication function rod scram performance. This event is 3.2–7).
provided by the Reactor Manual Control mitigated by safety systems not directly Basis for proposed no significant
System (RMCS) is not critical to the ability related to the CRD system including the hazards consideration determination:
to insert control rods because: scram accumulators. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
(1) The rods can be inserted with normal Therefore, these proposed changes do not
charging water pressure if the accumulator is
licensee has provided its analysis of the
create the possibility of a new or different issue of no significant hazards
inoperable; kind of accident from any accident
(2) A controlled shutdown or scram would previously evaluated.
consideration, which is presented
occur before the accumulator would lose its 3. The proposed TS changes do not involve below:
full capability to insert the control rod, if it a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in
is found that no control rod drive pumps are The first proposed change relocates CRD accordance with the proposed amendment
operating according to existing procedural instrumentation requirements from TS to the would not involve a significant hazards
and TS controls placed on the plant; and UFSAR and plant procedures. The proposed consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92,
(3) The subject instruments’ alarm and change will not reduce a margin of safety, since it would not:
indication function are part of routine because it has no impact on any safety 1. Involve a significant increase in the
operational monitoring and are not analysis. * * * [Therefore, the proposed probability or consequences of an accident
considered in the plant safety analysis. change does not involve a significant previously evaluated.
[Therefore, the removal of the accumulator reduction in a margin of safety.] The proposed TS change deals only with
pressure or level indication does not impact The second proposed change adds an an instrumentation setpoint which initiates
the consequences or probability of an alternate method for verifying operation of a the ATWS–RPT/ARI function. The system is
accident previously evaluated. The control rod drive pump in the TS action intended to provide a mitigation function
operational monitoring of the accumulator statement. This proposed change does not during a postulated ATWS event and does
alarms and indication system affords reduce a margin of safety because the not provide any other plant control function.
operating personnel the status of system proposed change does not: However, if the ATWS–RPT/ARI system were
condition and the opportunity to initiate (1) Affect the maximum allowable control to fail, the result would be a trip of the
appropriate actions if deemed necessary.] rod scram times, recirculation pumps, or reactor scram, both
The second proposed change simply adds (2) Change the maximum allowable of which are currently evaluated. The design
an alternate method for verifying operation of number or minimum separation of inoperable of the system includes a one-out-of-two-twice
a control rod drive pump. This check control rods, or logic, which ensures that a single failure in
provides an equivalent method of verifying (3) Modify any of the instrument setpoints the system cannot cause or inhibit the
that inoperable control rod accumulators or functions. ATWS–RPT/ARI function. Therefore, the
were not caused by a control rod drive pump The proposed change will either maintain probability of an inadvertent recirculation
trip. In addition: the present margin of safety or increase it, by pump trip or inadvertent reactor scram is not
(1) The assumed control rod reactivity reducing the need for unnecessary challenges changed from the event as currently
insertion rate is not changed; to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and described in the JAFNPP UFSAR [James A.
(2) The maximum number of inoperable resulting plant shutdown, while still FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated
accumulators and control rods is not maintaining the capability to complete a Final Safety Analysis Report].
changed; reactor scram. FitzPatrick specific analyses were
(3) The TS actions to be taken in the event Therefore, these proposed TS changes do performed by General Electric Company with
that a control rod drive pump is not not involve a significant reduction in a NRC approved methods for postulated ATWS
operating remain unchanged; and margin of safety. events (Reference 1 [‘‘James A. FitzPatrick
(4) The instrumentation for accumulator Nuclear Power Plant Anticipated Transient
leakage a pressure detection will continue to The NRC staff has reviewed the Without Scram Analysis, for Recirculation
be maintained and calibrated. licensee’s analysis and, based on this Pump Trip Setpoint Changes,’’ General
A RMCS failure does not change the failure review, it appears that the three Electric Company, NEDC–32616P, July 18,
modes or the reliability of the control rod standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 1996, Previously Docketed with NRC]). The
function as described and evaluated in the satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff specific events evaluated include the Main
UFSAR. The CRD system will continue to be proposes to determine that the Steamline Isolation Valve closure event,
available to safely shutdown the plant as Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve, and
amendment request involves no
described and evaluated in the UFSAR. the Loss of Feedwater. For these events, the
Therefore, these proposed changes do not significant hazards consideration. following acceptance criteria were
involve a significant increase in the Local Public Document Room established:
probability or consequences of an accident location: Pottstown Public Library, 500 Peak Reactor Pressure (maximum 1 SRV
previously evaluated. High Street, Pottstown, PA 19464. out of service)—< 1500 psig

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15384 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Peak Suppression Pool Temperature—< for any reduction in the margin of safety basis accident initiators. The operation of
190°F established in the JAFNPP UFSAR for the mechanical vacuum pump at power levels ≤
Fuel Remains Cooled—Coolant Level > primary fission product barriers. 5% will not increase the probability of
TAF [Top of Active Fuel] occurrence of a main condenser air removal
The NRC staff has reviewed the
The analyses demonstrate that all criteria system leak or failure of the line leading to
were adequately met with the proposed TS licensee’s analysis and, based on this the steam jet air ejector (SJAE) near the main
change implemented, further ensuring no review, it appears that the three condenser. Additionally, the design and
increase in the consequences of the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are operation of the condenser off-gas system is
postulated events. satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff not impacted. Moreover, MVP operation will
The basis for changing the ARI initiation proposes to determine that the not increase the probability of occurrence of
setpoint on reactor level to be consistent with amendment request involves no a CRDA or any other design basis accident.
that proposed for the ATWS RPT is significant hazards consideration. Consequently, this proposal does not
documented in Reference 2 [JAF–ICD–NBI– Attorney for licensee: Mr. David E. increase the probability of an accident
;03998, Rev. 0—Alternate Rod Insertion previously evaluated.
Blabey, 1633 Broadway, New York, New
Setpoint (an internal FitzPatrick interface The engineering calculation performed to
document)]. The ARI initiation point is not York 10019. assess the impact of the use of the MVPs
specified in the Technical Specification. NRC Section Chief: Marsha demonstrated that the radiological
2. Create the possibility of a new or Gamberoni, Acting. consequences of a CRDA coincident with
different kind of accident from any accident Public Service Electric & Gas Company, MVP operation increase but remain well
previously evaluated. within the 10CFR100 guidelines and meet
The proposed TS change deals only with
Docket No. 50–354, Hope Creek SRP [Standard Review Plan] Section 15.4.9,
a reactor water level instrumentation Generating Station, Salem County, New Appendix A, acceptance criteria.
setpoint, which initiates the ATWS–RPT/ARI Jersey Additionally, the calculation demonstrated
function. The existing level transmitters and Date of amendment request: February that the radiological consequences of a CRDA
wiring will be used, and new analog trip 24, 2000. coincident with MVP operation are within
units will be incorporated which are Description of amendment request: the GDC [General Design Criterion] 19
identical to existing low-low reactor water guidelines for control room personnel and
The proposed amendment would
level trip units currently shared with HPCI plant operators and remain bounded by the
[High Pressure Coolant Injection] and RCIC approve a revision to the Hope Creek loss of coolant accident analysis for on-site
[Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] initiation. Generating Station Updated Final Safety personnel. Therefore, although the proposal
These new analog trip units are of a different Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect the does increase the consequences of a CRDA,
design (General Electric) than those used in use of the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps the proposal does not significantly increase
the Reactor Protection System (Rosemount) (MVPs) to evacuate the condenser the consequences of an accident previously
and therefore, the diversity requirement of 10 during plant startup at power levels less evaluated.
CFR 50.62 (c)(3) remain[s] satisfied. This than or equal to 5%. These revisions are 2. The proposed change does not create the
allows the HPCI and RCIC setpoints to required to make the UFSAR accident possibility of a new or different kind of
remain the same while only lowering the accident from any accident previously
analyses associated with a Control Rod
ATWS–RPT/ARI setpoint. The sensing, logic evaluated.
and actuation of the ATWS–RPT/ARI design Drop Accident (CRDA) consistent with The proposal involves crediting manual
is not modified. This includes the use of the actual plant operation. Public Service action to trip the MVPs; however, PSE&G has
existing one-out-of-two-twice logic, which Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) has evaluated this operator action against the
ensures that a single failure in the circuit will performed an engineering calculation criteria in NRC Information Notice 97–78 and
not cause or inhibit the ATWS–RPT/ARI that demonstrates that there is an has concluded that adequate controls are in
function. There are no new signals required increase in the radiological place to ensure that the subject manual
as input, and the trip function is consequences of a CRDA coincident action is taken. In addition, the proposal does
accomplished with the existing RPT breakers with MVP operation. Nuclear not change monitor setpoints, affect
and existing scram pilot air header solenoid equipment qualification, or otherwise create
Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval
valves. The system does not provide input to an accident initiator not previously
any other plant function. The plant will not of the proposed UFSAR changes is considered. Consequently, this proposal does
operate in any new mode nor are there any required, in accordance with Title 10 of not create the possibility of an accident of a
new operational requirements as a result of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 different type from any previously evaluated.
the proposed change. Therefore, it is not CFR) Section 50.59, since these changes 3. The proposed change does not involve
considered possible for the ATWS–RPT/ARI involve an unreviewed safety question. a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
system to fail in any new or different way Basis for proposed no significant The Condenser Air Removal System has no
from those events currently evaluated in the hazards consideration determination: safety-related function. Failure of the system
JAFNPP UFSAR. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the does not jeopardize the function of any
3. Involve a significant reduction in a licensee has provided its analysis of the safety-related system or component or
margin of safety. prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.
The ATWS–RPT/ARI function protects the
issue of no significant hazards The radiological activity evaluated in this
fuel, reactor and containment from failure consideration, which is presented proposal does not result in scenarios that
during a postulated ATWS event. The fuel below: could impact 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, 10 CFR
cladding barrier is protected via adequate 1. The proposed changes do not involve a 20, or 40 CFR 190 release criteria. Post-scram
cooling, provided by ensuring that the core significant increase in the probability or shutdown or startup condition MVP
remains covered throughout the entire event. consequences of an accident previously operation in accordance with plant operating
The reactor coolant system boundary is evaluated. procedures will not degrade the original
protected by ensuring compliance with the The Condenser Air Removal System has no design for the Condenser Air Removal
ASME [American Society of Mechanical safety-related function and its failure does System.
Engineers] emergency class pressure limit of not jeopardize the function of any safety- An engineering calculation was prepared
120% of design pressure. The containment is related system or component or prevent a that demonstrated that the radiological
protected by ensuring the suppression pool safe shutdown of the plant. Neither the consequences of a CRDA coincident with
temperature limits are met. MVPs, nor other components associated with MVP operation remain well within the 10
FitzPatrick specific ATWS analyses were the Condenser Air Removal, Gaseous CFR 100 guidelines and that the
performed by postulating events that Radwaste Off-Gas, Process Radiation consequences meet SRP Section 15.4.9,
challenge each of these limits (Reference 1). Monitoring, or Turbine Building HVAC Appendix A, acceptance criteria.
With the proposed TS change considered, [Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning] Additionally, the engineering calculation
each of these limits were met without a need systems or the South Plant Vent are design demonstrated that the radiological

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15385

consequences of a CRDA coincident with No. The proposed option to the Low Power manipulation which is materially different
MVP operation are within GDC 19 guidelines Physics Test (LPPT) program will involve from those of the existing program.
for control room personnel and plant performance of rod worth measurements of Furthermore, the number of manipulations
operators and remain bounded by the loss of typically six of eight full-length control and duration of Special Test Exceptions are
coolant accident analysis for on-site element assembly (CEA) groups each significantly reduced. The proposed LPPT
personnel. refueling, rather than performance of rod program option relies entirely on
Since no design bases are degraded, the worth measurements of all eight CEA groups conventional boration and dilution rod worth
Technical Specifications operating limits, each refueling. Thus, the LPPT option will measurement test methods which have been
that provide sufficient operating range such result in a reduction in the number of plant industry standards. The methodology used to
that the acceptance limits are not exceeded manipulations required for LPPT. Inverse measure IBW, if performed, does not
during plant operations and analyzed Boron Worth (IBW) is not required in the introduce any new evolutions during LPPT
transients, are not [ ] affected. Since the proposed LPPT program option, but it may be and cannot create a new or different type of
acceptance limits are not exceeded, determined during the performance of a accident.
implementation of this proposal does not boration or dilution, which is already a part Therefore, the proposed LPPT program
reduce the margin of safety as described in of the present LPPT program. The option does not create the possibility of a
the basis for any Technical Specifications. manipulations which will be performed are new or different kind of accident from any
a subset of the evolutions which are accident previously evaluated.
The NRC staff has reviewed the performed in the existing test sequence. (3) Does this amendment request involve a
licensee’s analysis and, based on this Therefore, the LPPT testing option does not significant reduction in a margin of safety?
review, it appears that the three carry any increased risk of any accident No. The proposed LPPT program option
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are evaluated in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final fully achieves objectives of the reload test
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Since the program by validating fuel fabrication, core
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff reassembly, CEA worths, mechanical
proposes to determine that the number and duration of manipulations are
reduced, there would actually be a small integrity and reliability, performance of
amendment request involves no reduction in accident potential. physics design codes and consistency with
significant hazards consideration. The proposed test program option will not design and safety analysis expectations with
Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, compromise the technical objectives of the the same effectiveness as is achieved in the
Esquire, Nuclear Business Unit—N21, LPPT program. Fuel fabrication, core and current program. As a result, all assumptions
reactor internals reassembly, CEA worths, made in support of UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ Analyses regarding CEA performance remain
08038. NRC Section Chief: James W. mechanical integrity and reliability,
valid.
Clifford. performance of core physics design codes
The effectiveness of the SONGS 2 & 3
and consistency with design and safety
Reload Test program, including LPPT and
Southern California Edison Company, et analysis expectations will remain validated
Power Ascension Testing, has been evaluated
al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, with the same effectiveness as is achieved in
and shown to be uncompromised by the
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, the current program. In addition, the reduced proposed LPPT option. Specific testing
Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, duration of operation in the LPPT Special requirements imposed by the Nuclear
California Test Exception of the Technical Regulatory Commission are captured in
Specifications has a positive impact on Technical Specification Surveillance
Date of amendment requests: nuclear safety. Requirements. The proposed LPPT program
February 23, 2000 (PCN 508). Therefore, the proposed LPPT program option is fully compliant with existing
Description of amendment requests: option does not involve a significant increase Technical Specification Surveillance
in the probability of an accident previously Requirements and validates the core physics
The amendment application is a request evaluated.
to allow an option regarding the models regarding core performance,
The proposed test program option will reactivity control and proper core reassembly
methodology for measuring the eliminate CEA exchange measurements and to an extent equivalent to that of the present
reactivity worth of control element determine CEA worth by dilution/boration program.
assembly (CEA) groups for San Onofre measurements. Measurement of CEA worth The proposed LPPT program option is also
Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) by the dilution/boration methods achieves consistent with the recently modified ANSI/
Units 2 and 3 during low-power physics typically higher quality results than the CEA ANS 19.6.1–1997 standard for Pressurized
testing following a refueling. The Exchange method. Water Reactor reload testing, with the
proposed option involves measuring the The proposed LPPT program option does exception of the requirement and
not include the requirement to measure methodology to determine IBW. The ANSI/
worth of approximately three-fourths of inverse boron worth. However, a measured ANS standard was developed with
the full-length CEA groups each initial critical boron concentration and participation from industry and NRC
refueling cycle rather than the present measured CEA group worths that match representatives and represents an expert
methodology, which measures the predicted values within acceptance criteria panel assessment of what is appropriate for
worth of all full-length CEA groups each are sufficient to verify adequate core physics an LPPT program. A measured initial critical
refueling cycle. Measured CEA groups modeling without a separate IBW boron concentration and measured CEA
would be rotated such that each full- measurement. group worths that match predicted values
length group would be measured at least Since the proposed test sequence option within acceptance criteria are sufficient to
continues to ensure that core operation and verify adequate core physics modeling, and
every other refueling. The licensee has infer that the IBW value is within standard
reactivity control are consistent with design
determined this change to involve an expectations, the proposed LPPT option will acceptance critieria, without a separate IBW
unreviewed safety question. not involve a significant increase in the measurement.
Basis for proposed no significant consequences of an accident previously Therefore, the proposed LPPT program
hazards consideration determination: evaluated. option does not involve a significant
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Therefore, the proposed LPPT program reduction in a margin of safety.
licensee has provided its analysis of the option does not involve a significant increase The NRC staff has reviewed the
issue of no significant hazards in the probability or consequences of an licensee’s analysis and, based on this
consideration, which is presented accident previously evaluated. review, it appears that the three
(2) Does the amendment request create the
below: possibility of a new or different kind of
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
(1) Does the proposed amendment involve accident from any accident previously satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
a significant increase in the probability or evaluated? proposes to determine that the
consequences of an accident previously No. The proposed LPPT program option amendment requests involve no
evaluated? does not create any plant condition or significant hazards consideration.

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15386 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Attorney for licensee: Douglas K. relays will not be significantly affected by the significant hazard as defined by the criteria
Porter, Esquire, Southern California decreased surveillance frequency. set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 is shown in the
Edison Company, 2244 Walnut Grove Therefore, the proposed changes do not following discussions addressed to each
involve a significant reduction in a margin of criterion:
Avenue, Rosemead, California 91770.
safety. (1) Does the change involve a significant
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek. increase in the probability or consequences
The NRC staff has reviewed the of an accident previously evaluated?
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, licensee’s analysis and, based on this During the limiting design-basis steam-
Inc., et al., Docket Nos. 50–424 and 50– review, it appears that the three line-break (SLB) event, South Texas Project
425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are (STP) Unit 2 steam generator tube burst
Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff criteria are inherently satisfied for marginally
Date of amendment request: August proposes to determine that the degraded (primarily axially-oriented ODSCC
amendment request involves no [outer diameter stress corrosion cracking])
24, 1999, as supplemented on December tube spans at certain tube support plate (TSP)
29, 1999. significant hazards consideration.
intersections.
Description of amendment request: Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H. Steam generator tubes pass through holes
The proposed amendments would Domby, Troutman Sanders, drilled in the TSP. The inside diameter (ID)
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 of the drilled holes closely approximates the
3.3.2 ‘‘Engineered Safety Feature Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia outside diameter (OD) of the tubes.
Actuation System (ESFAS) 30308–2216. Generally, the TSP precludes those tube
NRC Section Chief: Richard L. Emch, spans within the drilled holes from
Instrumentation’’ to relax the slave relay
Jr. deforming beyond the diameters of the
test frequency from quarterly to a drilled holes, thus, precluding tube burst in
refueling frequency. STP Nuclear Operating Company, the restrained regions. However, design basis
Basis for proposed no significant Docket No. 50–499, South Texas Project, SLB events may vertically displace a TSP,
hazards consideration determination: Unit 2, Matagorda County, Texas removing its support from the tube spans
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the passing through it. For TSP C through M,
Date of amendment request: February maximum displacement during a postulated
licensee has provided its analysis of the
21, 2000. SLB event is less than 0.15 inch. Because
issue of no significant hazards Description of amendment request:
consideration, which is presented TSP C through M remain essentially
STP Nuclear Operating Company stationary during all conditions, tube spans
below: proposes to amend the South Texas included within the drilled holes are
1. Does the change involve a significant Project (STP), Unit 2 technical restrained during the limiting SLB event.
increase in the probability or consequences specifications (TS) so that steam Thus, the tube burst margin for intersections
of an accident previously evaluated? generator tube eddy-current inspection of tube hot-legs and TSP C through M is
The results of WCAP–13878 demonstrate independent of voltage related growth rates
indications of less than or equal to 3.0
that slave relays are highly reliable. WCAP– and the proposed 3-volt ARC [alternate repair
13878 also provides guidance to assure that volts can be left in service if found at criteria] is compliant with RG [Regulatory
slave relays remain highly reliable. The aging intersections of tube hot-leg tube- Guide] 1.121 [Bases for Plugging Degraded
assessment concludes that the age/ support-plates C through M (3.0-volt PWR Steam Generator Tubes] criteria.
temperature-related degradation of all ND alternate repair criteria). The new Given a TSP displacement of < 0.15 inch,
relays, and NE relays produced after 1992, is alternate repair criteria would apply tube hot-leg spans enclosed within TSP C
sufficiently slow such that a refueling only until the Unit 2 Model E steam through M have a negligible tube burst
frequency surveillance interval will not generators are replaced during the probability of less than 10¥10 for a single
significantly increase the probability of slave outage currently scheduled to tube. This is eight orders of magnitude less
relay failures. Finally, the evaluation of the than the 10¥2 probability-of-burst criterion
commence in fall of 2002. STP Nuclear
auxiliary relays actuated during slave relay specified by GL [Generic Letter] 95–05
testing has concluded that based on the tests Operating Company also proposes to [Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for
of the auxiliary relays performed during amend the STP, Unit 2 TS to make an Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes
other equipment testing, reasonable editorial correction to Note 1 and Note Affected by Outside Diameter Stress
assurance is provided that failures will be 2, on page 3/4–16a to align the notes Corrosion Cracking] and represents negligible
identified if the associated slave relays are with the preceding paragraph. STP axial tube burst probabilities for tube hot-leg
tested on a refueling frequency. Nuclear Operating Company also spans intersecting TSP C through M. Thus,
Therefore, the proposed changes do not provided, for information only, changes repair limits to preclude burst are not needed
involve a significant increase in the to the Bases for TS 3/4.4.5 to provide and tube repair limits may be based primarily
probability or consequences of an accident on limiting leakage to acceptable levels
the structural margins and
previously evaluated. during accident conditions.
2. Does the change create the possibility of Westinghouse topical report references Cracks that include cellular corrosion may
a new or different kind of accident from any used as the bases for the use of the 3.0- yield to axial loads, resulting in tensile
accident previously evaluated? volt alternate repair criteria. tearing of the tube at that location. A tensile
The proposed changes do not alter the Basis for proposed no significant load requirement to prevent this establishes
performance of the ESFAS mitigation hazards consideration determination: a structural limit for the tube expansion
systems assumed in the plant safety analysis. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the based plugging criterion. In order to establish
Changing the interval for periodically licensee has provided its analysis of the a lower bound for the structural limit, tensile
verifying ESFAS slave relays (assuring issue of no significant hazards tests were used to measure the force required
equipment operability) will not create any consideration, which is presented to separate a tube that exhibits cellular
new accident initiators or scenarios. corrosion. Additionally, pulled tubes with
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
below: cellular and/or inter-granular attack (IGA)
create the possibility of a new or different In accordance with the criteria set forth in tube wall degradation were evaluated and the
kind of accident from any accident 10 CFR 50.92, the STP Nuclear Operating tensile strength of the tube conservatively
previously evaluated for VEGP. Company (STPNOC) has evaluated these calculated from the remaining non-corroded
3. Does the change involve a significant proposed Technical Specification changes cross-section of the tube. This calculation
reduction in a margin of safety? and determined they do not represent a assumes that the degraded portions
The proposed changes do not affect the significant hazards consideration. contribute nothing to the axial load carrying
total ESFAS response assumed in the safety Conformance of the proposed amendment to ability of the tube. Data from these tests
analysis since the reliability of the slave the standards for a determination of no shows that circumferential cracks exhibiting

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15387

bobbin-coil-probe-indication-voltages greater AE–000228, Response to NRC Request for confirmed to allow no more than the
than 35 volts require tube-pressure- Additional Information related to STP Unit 2 acceptable primary-to-secondary leakage rate
differentials well above the operating limit of Amendment No. 83]). STPNOC TS impose a during all plant conditions and not adversely
3-times-normal differential pressure in order normal leak rate limit of 150 gpd (0.1 gpm) affect radiological dose consequences. For
to produce circumferential ruptures (i.e., per steam generator to minimize the potential the limiting SLB event, STPNOC will
axial separation at the plane of the crack). for excessive leakage during all plant
conditions. The 150 gpd limit provides calculate leak rates as free-span leakage for
This proposal specifies a structural limit of
17 volts (safety factor of 2) to ensure added margin to accommodate contingent ODSCC indications at tube and TSP
conservative results for repairs at leakage should a stress corrosion crack grow intersections. The calculations will use GL
intersections of tubes with TSP C through M. at a greater than expected rate or extend 95–05 leak rate methods with an additional
GL 95–05 states that licensees must outside the TSP. Leakage trending consistent component for potentially overpressurized
perform SLB leak rate and tube burst with EPRI Report TR–04788, ‘‘PWR Primary- indications [discussed in detail in the Safety
probability analyses before returning to to-Secondary Leak Guidelines’’ has been Evaluation section of the licensee’s February
power from outages during which they established for South Texas Project Unit 2. 21, 2000, application under the heading
perform steam generator inspections. Since steam generator tube integrity will
‘‘SLB Leak Rate and Tube Burst Probability
Licensees must include the results in a report meet GL 95–05 requirements and be
confirmed through in-service inspection and Considerations’’].
to the NRC within 90 days after restart. If an
primary-to-secondary leakage monitoring, the Inspections conducted in accordance with
analysis reveals that leak-rate or burst-
probability exceeds limits, the licensee must proposed license amendment does not create RG 1.83, Rev. 1 [In Service Inspection of
report it to the NRC and assess the safety the possibility of a new or different kind of Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator
significance of this finding. Model E steam accident from any accident previously Tubes], using 3-volt ARC for intersections of
generator SLB leak rates are calculated for evaluated. tube hot-legs with TSP C through M, and
indications found at intersections of tube hot- (3) Does this change involve a significant using 1-volt ARC at remaining hot-leg and
legs and TSP. Both SLB leak rate and tube reduction in a margin of safety? cold-leg intersections will be supplemented
burst probability are calculated for tube hot- RG 1.121 describes a method for meeting
by:
leg intersections with FDB [flow distribution GDC 14, 15, 31, and 32 by reducing the
probability or consequences of steam- (1) enhanced eddy current inspection
baffles], hot-leg intersections with TSP N procedures to achieve consistency in voltage
through R, and indications found at generator tube-rupture through application of
criteria for removing degraded tubes from normalization,
intersections of tube cold-legs with any TSP.
service. These criteria set limits of (2) eddy current inspection of 100% of
It has been established that the design basis
main SLB outside of containment and degradation for steam generator tubing tubes found, using inspection of a 20% tube
through in-service inspection. Analyses show sample, to have ODSCC at intersections with
upstream of the MSIV [main steam isolation
that tube integrity will remain consistent TSP, and
valves] produces the limiting radiological
with the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.121 (3) a required RPC [rotating pancake coil]
consequence from any tube leakage that may
after implementation of the proposed 3-volt
be postulated to exist at the initiation of an inspection of the larger indications to
ARC. Even under the worst case ODSCC
accident. With use of 3-volt ARC, STPNOC confirm that the principal degradation
occurrence at TSP elevations, 3-volt ARC will
[STP Nuclear Operating Company] will not cause or significantly increase [the] mechanism continues to be ODSCC.
calculate the maximum primary-to-secondary probability of a steam-generator tube-rupture Plugging steam generator tubes reduces
leakage for the last day of the coming steam event. RCS flow margin. As previously noted,
generator service-cycle and use this value to In addressing combined LOCA [loss-of- increasing repair limits for indications found
calculate the radiological consequence of the coolant accident] + SSE [safe-shutdown at TSP intersections will reduce the number
limiting SLB event. This methodology will earthquake] effects on steam generator
ensure that site boundary doses for this of tubes that must be plugged. Thus, 3-volt
components as required by GDC 2, analysis ARC will conserve RCS flow margin,
accident remain within an acceptable has shown that tube collapse may occur in
fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines and preserving operational and safety benefits
certain regions of the steam generators of
that doses to the control room operators that would otherwise be reduced by
some plants. This collapse is caused by TSP
remain within GDC 19 [10 CFR Part 50, plastic deformation in the region of the TSP unnecessary plugging.
Appendix A, General Design Criterion] wedge supports. Plastic deformation occurs Therefore, the proposed license
limits. when TSP experience large lateral loads amendment does not result in a significant
Based on the above, STPNOC concludes concentrated at wedge support points on the increase in dose consequences represented in
that operation of South Texas Project Unit 2 periphery of a TSP undergoing combined the current licensing basis, and does not
in accordance with the proposed license loading effects of a LOCA rarefaction wave involve a significant reduction in margin of
amendment does not involve a significant and SSE. Deformation impinges on TSP safety.
increase in the probability or consequences apertures through which tubes pass,
of an accident previously evaluated. deflecting tube walls inward. The resulting The NRC staff has reviewed the
(2) Does the change create the possibility pressure differential across deformed tube licensee’s analysis and, based on this
of a new or different kind of accident from walls may cause some tubes to collapse.
any accident previously evaluated?
review, it appears that the standards of
There are two issues associated with steam 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. The staff
Use of the proposed steam generator tube generator tube collapse. First, collapse of
3-volt ARC does not significantly change steam generator tubing reduces RCS [reactor
also reviewed the proposed editorial
circumstances or conclusions assumed by the coolant system] flow. RCS flow reduction change for no significant hazards
plant design basis. Application of the 3-volt increases resistance to heat flow from the consideration. The proposed editorial
ARC does not significantly increase the core during a LOCA, increasing Peak Clad correction does not affect the design or
probability of either single or multiple tube Temperature (PCT). Second, partial through- operation of the facility and satisfies the
ruptures. Steam generator tube integrity wall tube-cracks could become full through- three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c).
remains adequate for all plant operating wall tube-cracks during tube deformation or Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
conditions. collapse. Tubes in regions affected by this
STPNOC has confirmed that the allowed
determine that the request for
phenomenon are usually excluded from
post-accident primary-to-secondary leakage evaluation under 3-volt ARC. STP Model E
amendments involves no significant
rate for SLB events results in the limiting steam generator design does not produce this hazards consideration.
offsite and control room doses for South plastic deformation, thus is not subject to Attorney for licensee: Jack R.
Texas Project Unit 2. A projected SLB leak tube collapse. No STP Unit 2 tubes are Newman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis &
rate of 15.4 gpm is calculated to produce excluded, for this reason, from application of Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW.,
doses 90% of the currently licensed South the proposed 3-volt ARC.
Texas Project Unit 2 dose limits (Reference End of Cycle (EOC) distribution of crack
Washington, DC 20036–5869.
2 [STPNOC letter dated July 15, 1998, NOC– indications at affected TSP elevations will be NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.

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15388 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Virginia Electric and Power Company, change in a method of system operation. The stringent requirements for establishing the
Docket Nos. 50–280 and 50–281, Surry adoption of the 1989 edition of ASTM D3803 capability of new and used activated carbon
Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, for methyl iodide testing conforms with to remove methyl iodide from air and gas
approved guidance for testing of nuclear- streams. The results of this test provide a
Surry County, Virginia more conservative estimate of the
grade activated charcoal. This provides
Date of amendment request: assurance that testing of ventilation systems performance of nuclear-graded activated
November 29, 1999. is being performed with a suitable standard carbon used in nuclear power plant HVAC
Description of amendment request: to ensure that charcoal adsorbers are capable [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning]
The proposed changes will modify the of performing their required safety function systems for the removal of methyl iodide.
Technical Specifications (TS) in Section and that the regulatory requirements Testing of the charcoal adsorbers’ efficiency
regarding onsite and offsite dose for removing elemental iodine is performed
3.23 for the Main Control Room and in accordance with the 1979 version of
consequences continue to be satisfied. The
Emergency Switchgear Room changes do not create an unreviewed safety ASTM D3803 since the 1989 version does not
Ventilation and Air Conditioning question. address elemental iodine removal
Systems; TS Surveillance Requirement (a) The proposed changes modify efficiencies. The laboratory test acceptance
Sections 4.20, Basis 4.20.A.7, and surveillance testing requirements and do not criteria contain a safety factor to ensure that
4.20.B.4 for the Control Room Air affect plant systems or operation and the efficiency assumed in the accident
Filtration System; and TS Surveillance therefore do not increase the probability or analysis is still valid at the end of the
Requirement Sections 4.12.A.6, the consequences of an accident previously operating cycle.
4.12.A.7, 4.12.A.8, 4.12.B.7, and 4.12 evaluated. The proposed surveillance The NRC staff has reviewed the
Basis for the Auxiliary Ventilation requirements adopt ASTM D3803–1989, with licensee’s analysis and, based on this
qualification, as the laboratory method for
Exhaust Filter Trains. The proposed review, it appears that the three
testing samples of the charcoal adsorber for
changes will revise the above methyl iodide removal efficiency in response standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Surveillance Requirements for the to NRC’s Generic Letter 99–02. This method Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
laboratory testing of the carbon samples of testing charcoal adsorbers has been determine that the amendment request
for methyl iodide removal efficiency to approved by the NRC as an acceptable involves no significant hazards
be consistent with American Society for method for determining methyl iodide consideration.
Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard removal efficiency. Since the charcoal Attorney for licensee: Mr. Donald P.
D3803–1989, ‘‘Standard Test Method for adsorbers are used to mitigate the Irwin, Esq., Hunton and Williams,
Nuclear-Graded Activated Carbon,’’ consequences of an accident, the more Riverfront Plaza, East Tower, 951 E.
accurate the test, the better assurance we Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219.
with qualification, as the laboratory
have that we remain within our accident NRC Section Chief: Richard L. Emch,
testing standard for both new and used analysis assumptions. Testing of the charcoal
charcoal adsorbent used in the Jr.
adsorbers’ efficiency for removing elemental
ventilation system. iodine is performed in accordance with the Previously Published Notices of
Basis for proposed no significant 1979 version of ASTM D3803 since the 1989 Consideration of Issuance of
hazards consideration determination: In version does not address elemental iodine Amendments to Facility Operating
10 CFR 50.92, three criteria are provided removal efficiencies. The laboratory test Licenses, Proposed No Significant
to determine whether a proposed acceptance criteria contain a safety factor to
Hazards Consideration Determination,
license amendment involves a ensure that the efficiency assumed in the
accident analysis is still valid at the end of and Opportunity for a Hearing
significant hazards consideration. No
significant hazards consideration is the operating cycle. There is no change in the The following notices were previously
method of plant operation or system design. published as separate individual
involved if operation of the facility with (b) The proposed changes modify
the proposed amendment would not: (1) notices. The notice content was the
surveillance testing requirements and do not same as above. They were published as
Involve a significant increase in the impact plant systems or operations and
probability or consequences of an therefore do not create the possibility of an
individual notices either because time
accident previously evaluated; or (2) accident or malfunction of a different type did not allow the Commission to wait
Create the possibility of a new or than evaluated previously. The proposed for this biweekly notice or because the
different kind of accident from any surveillance requirements adopt ASTM action involved exigent circumstances.
accident previously evaluated; or (3) D3803–1989, with qualification, as the They are repeated here because the
Involve a significant reduction in a laboratory method for testing samples of the biweekly notice lists all amendments
charcoal adsorber for methyl iodide removal issued or proposed to be issued
margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR efficiency. This change is in response to
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its involving no significant hazards
NRC’s request in Generic Letter 99–02. consideration.
analysis of the issue of no significant Testing of the charcoal adsorbers’ efficiency For details, see the individual notice
hazards consideration, which is for removing elemental iodine is performed
in the Federal Register on the day and
presented below: in accordance with the 1979 version of
ASTM D3803 since the 1989 version does not page cited. This notice does not extend
Virginia Electric and Power Company has the notice period of the original notice.
reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 address elemental iodine removal
as they relate to the proposed changes for efficiencies. There is no change in the Consumers Energy Company, Docket
Surry Units 1 and 2 and determined that a method of plant operation or system design.
There are no new or different accident
No. 50–255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren
significant hazards consideration is not County, Michigan
involved. The proposed Technical scenarios, transient precursors, nor failure
Specification changes adopt the nuclear- mechanisms that will be introduced. Date of amendment request: February
grade charcoal testing requirements of ASTM (c) The proposed changes modify 18, 2000.
D3803–1989, with qualification, for methyl surveillance test requirements and do not Brief description of amendment
iodide removal efficiency and the impact plant systems or operations and request: The amendment changes
requirements of ASTM D3803–1979, with therefore do not significantly reduce the current Technical Specification (TS)
qualification, for elemental iodine removal margin of safety. The revised surveillance
requirements adopt ASTM D3803–1989, with
4.9a.2 and improved TS 3.7.5 and its
efficiency. The method of testing nuclear-
grade activated charcoal does not affect the qualification, as the laboratory method for associated bases to remove requirements
design or operation of the plant. The changes testing samples of the charcoal adsorber for associated with the backup steam
also do not involve any physical methyl iodide removal efficiency. The 1989 supply to turbine-driven auxiliary
modification to the plant or result in a edition of this standard imposes very feedwater pump P–8B.

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15389

Date of publication of individual The Commission has made appropriate AmerGen Energy Co., LLC, Docket No.
notice in Federal Register: March 1, 2000 findings as required by the Act and the 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear
(65 FR 11089) Commission’s rules and regulations in Station, Unit 1, Dauphin County,
Expiration date of individual notice: 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in Pennsylvania
Comment period expired March 14, the license amendment. Date of application for amendment:
2000; Notice period expires March 31, Notice of Consideration of Issuance of June 4, 1999, as supplemented
2000. Amendment to Facility Operating December 13, 1999.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. License, Proposed No Significant Brief description of amendment: The
50–390 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Hazards Consideration Determination, amendment modified the limiting
Rhea County, Tennessee and Opportunity for A Hearing in conditions for operation in the
connection with these actions was Technical Specifications (TSs) under
Date of application for amendments: published in the Federal Register as
February 25, 2000. which a reduction in the number of
indicated. means of decay heat removal (DHR)
Brief description of amendments: The Unless otherwise indicated, the
amendment revises Technical capability may occur by deleting two of
Commission has determined that these these conditions. The amendment also
Specification Table 3.3.2–1, amendments satisfy the criteria for
‘‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation makes related Bases changes and
categorical exclusion in accordance clarifies the DHR requirements for
System Instrumentation’’ to provide a with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant
one-time exception, until the next time redundancy.
to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental Date of issuance: February 28, 2000.
the turbine is removed from service, impact statement or environmental
from the requirement to perform Effective date: As of the date of
assessment need be prepared for these issuance to be implemented within 30
response time testing for the solenoid amendments. If the Commission has
valve 1–FSV–47–027. days.
prepared an environmental assessment Amendment No.: 220.
Date of publication of individual under the special circumstances
notice in the Federal Register: March 2, Facility Operating License No. DPR–50.
provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has This amendment revised the Technical
2000. made a determination based on that
Expiration date of individual notice: Specifications.
assessment, it is so indicated. Date of initial notice in Federal
March 16, 2000. For further details with respect to the Register: June 30, 1999 (64 FR 35207).
Union Electric Company, Docket No. action see (1) the applications for The December 13, 1999, letter withdrew
50–483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) a Bases change of the June 4, 1999,
Callaway County, Missouri the Commission’s related letter, Safety application and did not change the
Date of application for amendment: Evaluation and/or Environmental initial proposed no significant hazards
January 14, 2000, as supplemented by Assessment as indicated. All of these consideration determination or expand
letter dated February 17, 2000 (ULNRC– items are available for public inspection the amendment beyond the scope of the
04172 and –04187). at the Commission’s Public Document initial notice.
Brief description of amendment Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L The Commission’s related evaluation
request: The amendment would revise Street, NW., Washington, DC, and of the amendment is contained in a
several sections of the improved electronically from the ADAMS Public Safety Evaluation dated February 28,
Technical Specification (ITSs) to correct Library component on the NRC Web 2000.
14 editorial errors made in either (1) the site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic No significant hazards consideration
application dated May 15, 1997, (and Reading Room). comments received: No.
supplementary letters) for the ITSs, or AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket
(2) the certified copy of the ITSs that No. 50–461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear
was submitted in the licensee’s letters of 1, DeWitt County, Illinois Station, Unit 1 (TMI–1), Dauphin
May 27 and 28, 1999. The ITSs were County, Pennsylvania
issued as Amendment No. 133 by the Date of application for amendment:
staff in its letter of May 28, 1999, and March 1, 1999. Date of application for amendment:
will be implemented by the licensee to Brief description of amendment: The May 26, 1999.
replace the current TSs by April 30, amendment approves changes to the Brief description of amendment: The
2000. Updated Safety Analysis Report amendment authorized changes to
Date of publication of individual concerning design requirements for Chapters 5 and 14 of the Updated Final
notice in Federal Register: February 25, physical protection from tornado Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The
2000 (65 FR 10118). missiles. changes reflect the use of an Electric
Expiration date of individual notice: Date of issuance: February 29, 2000. Power Research Institute-developed
March 27, 2000. Effective date: February 29, 2000. Conservative Deterministic Failure
Amendment No.: 124. Margin methodology for seismic
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating License No. NPF–62: analysis of the portions of the nonsafety-
Facility Operating Licenses The amendment allows a change to the related auxiliary steam line piping
During the period since publication of Updated Safety Analyis Report located in the Auxiliary, Control, and
the last biweekly notice, the concerning tornado missile protection. Fuel Handling buildings at TMI–1.
Commission has issued the following Date of initial notice in Federal Date of issuance: March 10, 2000.
amendments. The Commission has Register: April 21, 1999 (64 FR 19558). Effective date: As of the date of
determined for each of these The Commission’s related evaluation issuance and shall be implemented
amendments that the application of the amendment is contained in a within 30 days.
complies with the standards and Safety Evaluation dated February 29, Amendment No.: 221.
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 2000. Facility Operating License No. DPR–50.
of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the No significant hazards consideration Amendment authorizes changes to the
Commission’s rules and regulations. comments received: No. UFSAR.

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15390 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Date of initial notice in Federal Facility Operating License No. DPR– Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: June 30, 1999 (64 FR 35207). 71: Amendment revises the Technical Register: June 16, 1999 (64 FR 32280).
The Commission’s related evaluation of Specifications. The October 21 and December 15, 1999,
the amendment is contained in a Safety Date of initial notice in Federal supplements did not change the initial
Evaluation dated March 10, 2000. Register: November 3, 1999 (64 FR proposed no significant hazards
No significant hazards consideration 59797). consideration determination.
comments received: No. The Commission’s related evaluation The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a of the amendments is contained in a
Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000. Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000.
Docket Nos. STN 50–528, STN 50–529, No significant hazards consideration No significant hazards consideration
and STN 50–530, Palo Verde Nuclear comments received: No. comments received: No.
Generating Station, Units Nos. 1, 2, and
3, Maricopa County, Arizona Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Commonwealth Edison Company,
Docket No. 50–325, Brunswick Steam Docket Nos. 50–254 and 50–265, Quad
Date of application for amendments: Electric Plant, Unit 1, Brunswick
June 8, 1999, as supplemented July 20 Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1
County, North Carolina and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois
and November 24, 1999.
Brief description of amendments: The Date of amendment request: Date of application for amendments:
amendments revise the Technical November 17, 1999. October 12, 1999.
Specifications to increase the storage Brief description of amendment: The Brief description of amendments: The
capacity of spent fuel in the fuel storage amendment changes the Technical amendments revised Technical
pools by allowing credit for soluble Specifications (TS) in response to the Specification (TS) 2.2, ‘‘Limiting Safety
boron and decay time in the safety licensee’s submittal dated September System Settings,’’ and TS 3/4.1.A,
analysis, and to increase the maximum 28, 1999. The amendment revises TS ‘‘Reactor Protection System,’’ to remove
radially averaged fuel enrichment from 2.1.1.2, ‘‘Reactor Core Safety Limits,’’ by an anticipatory reactor scram signal, the
4.3 weight percent to 4.8 weight changing the Minimum Critical Power turbine electro-hydraulic control (EHC)
percent. Ratio. low oil pressure trip, from the reactor
Date of issuance: March 2, 2000. Date of issuance: March 1, 2000. protection system trip function
Effective date: March 2, 2000. Effective date: March 1, 2000. requirements.
Amendment No.: 208. Date of issuance: January 28, 2000.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1–125, Unit
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
2–125, Unit 3–125. Effective date: Immediately, to be
71: Amendment revises the Technical
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– implemented within 30 days.
Specifications.
41, NPF–51, and NPF–74: The Date of initial notice in Federal Amendment Nos.: 193 & 189.
amendments revised the Technical Register: December 15, 1999 (64 FR Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
Specifications. 70080). 29 and DPR–30: The amendments
Date of initial notice in Federal The Commission’s related evaluation revised the Technical Specifications.
Register: September 20, 1999 (64 FR of the amendment is contained in a Date of initial notice in Federal
50835). The July 20 and November 24, Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000. Register: December 1, 1999 (64 FR
1999, letters provided additional No significant hazards consideration 67331).
clarifying information that was within comments received: No. The Commission’s related evaluation
the scope of the original application and of the amendments is contained in a
Federal Register notice and did not Commonwealth Edison Company, Safety Evaluation dated January 28,
change the staff’s initial proposed no Docket Nos. STN 50–454 and STN 50– 2000.
significant hazards consideration 455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, No significant hazards consideration
determination. The Commission’s Ogle County, Illinois; Docket Nos. STN comments received: No.
related evaluation of the amendment is 50–456 and STN 50–457, Braidwood
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will County, Commonwealth Edison Company,
March 2, 2000. Illinois Docket Nos. 50–254 and 50–265, Quad
Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1
No significant hazards consideration Date of application for amendments: and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois
comments received: No. March 23, 1999, as supplemented on
October 21, 1999, and December 15, Date of application for amendments:
Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., November 16, 1999.
Docket No. 325, Brunswick Steam 1999.
Brief description of amendments: The Brief description of amendments: The
Electric Plant, Unit 1, Brunswick
amendments approved the installation amendments change Technical
County, North Carolina
of new Boral high density spent fuel Specification Table 4.1.A–1, ‘‘Reactor
Date of amendment request: storage racks at Byron and Braidwood Protection System Instrumentation
September 28, 1999. stations. The amendments also Surveillance Requirements,’’ to modify
Brief description of amendment: The approved an increase in the spent fuel the surveillance requirements for
amendment changes the Technical pool storage capacity from 2,870 Functional Unit 3, ‘‘Reactor Vessel
Specifications (TS) in response to your assemblies to 2,984 assemblies at each Steam Dome Pressure—High,’’ to reflect
submittal dated September 28, 1999. station. replacement of the pressure switches
The amendment revises TS 2.1.1.2, Date of issuance: March 1, 2000. with analog trip units.
‘‘Reactor Core Safety Limits,’’ and TS Effective date: Immediately, to be Date of issuance: January 28, 2000.
5.6.5, ‘‘Core Operating Limits Report,’’ implemented within 30 days. Effective date: Immediately, to be
by removing safety limit restrictions Amendment Nos.: 112 and 105. implemented before startup from
which are no longer applicable. Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– Refueling Outage 16 for Unit 1 and
Date of issuance: March 1, 2000. 37, NPF–66, NPF–72 and NPF–77: The before startup from Refueling Outage 15
Effective date: March 1, 2000. amendments revised the Technical for Unit 2.
Amendment No.: 207. Specifications. Amendment Nos.: 194 & 190.

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15391

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– Amendment No.: 207. Date of issuance: March 2, 2000.
29 and DPR–30: The amendments Facility Operating License No. DPR– Effective date: As of the date of
revised the Technical Specifications. 26: Amendment revised the Technical issuance and shall be implemented
Date of initial notice in Federal Specifications. within 30 days from the date of
Register: December 15, 1999 (64 FR Date of initial notice in Federal issuance.
70082). Register: April 7, 1999 (64 FR 17023).
The Commission’s related evaluation The Commission’s related evaluation Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—191; Unit
of the amendments is contained in a of the amendment is contained in a 2—172.
Safety Evaluation dated January 28, Safety Evaluation dated February 29, Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
2000. 2000. 9 and NPF–17: Amendments revised the
No significant hazards consideration No significant hazards consideration Technical Specifications.
comments received: No. comments received: No. Date of initial notice in Federal
Consolidated Edison Company of New Duke Energy Corporation, et al., Docket Register: August 11, 1999 (64 FR 43772).
York, Docket No. 50–247, Indian Point Nos. 50–413 and 50–414, Catawba The November 24, 1999,
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York supplemental letter did not expand the
Westchester County, New York County, South Carolina scope of the application initially noticed
Date of application for amendment: Date of application for amendments: or change the proposed no significant
June 2, 1999, as supplemented August June 24, 1999, as supplemented by letter hazards consideration determination.
25, 1999. dated November 24, 1999. The Commission’s related evaluation
Brief description of amendment: The Brief description of amendments: The of the amendments is contained in a
amendment allows for the relocation of amendments revised the Technical Safety Evaluation dated March 2, 2000.
the Quality Assurance related Specifications by revising the minimum
administrative controls to the Quality No significant hazards consideration
reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate comments received: No.
Assurance Program Description in limit, the reactor coolant average
accordance with NRC Administrative temperature, and the pressurizer Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50–397,
Letter 95–06, ‘‘Relocation of Technical pressure limits, and by restricting WNP–2, Benton County, Washington
Specification Administrative Controls operation to a RCS flow deficit of no
Related to Quality Assurance.’’ Date of application for amendment:
more than one percent. October 13, 1999.
Date of issuance: February 25, 2000. Date of issuance: March 1, 2000.
Effective date: As of the date of Brief description of amendment: The
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance to be implemented within 30 amendment removes footnote (d) from
issuance and shall be implemented
days. Function 5, ‘‘RHR [residual heat
within 30 days from the date of
Amendment No.: 206. removal] SDC [shut down cooling]
Facility Operating License No. DPR– issuance.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—184; Unit System Isolation’’ of Technical
26: Amendment revised the Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.6.1–1,
Specifications. 2—176.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– ‘‘Primary Containment Isolation
Date of initial notice in Federal Instrumentation.’’ Footnote (d) states,
Register: November 3, 1999 (64 FR 35 and NPF–52: Amendments revised
the Technical Specifications. ‘‘Only the inboard trip system is
59799). required in Modes 1, 2, and 3, as
The August 25, 1999, letter provided Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: August 11, 1999 (64 FR 43770). applicable, when the outboard valve
clarifying information that did not
The November 24,1999, letter control is transferred to the alternate
change the initial proposed no
provided clarifying information that did remote shutdown panel and the
significant hazards consideration.
The Commission’s related evaluation not change the scope of the June 24, outboard valve is closed.’’ The outboard
of the amendment is contained in a 1999, application and the initial suction trip system valve, RHR–V–8, is
Safety Evaluation dated February 25, proposed no significant hazards no longer transferred to the alternate
2000. consideration determination. remote shutdown panel and is now
No significant hazards consideration The Commission’s related evaluation required during Modes 1, 2 and 3.
comments received: No. of the amendments is contained in a Therefore, footnote (d) is no longer
Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000. needed. Footnote (e) is relettered as
Consolidated Edison Company of New No significant hazards consideration footnote (d) for consistency.
York, Docket No. 50–247, Indian Point comments received: No Date of issuance: March 9, 2000.
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2,
Westchester County, New York Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos. Effective date: March 9, 2000, to be
50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear implemented within 30 days of
Date of application for amendment: Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg issuance.
February 29, 2000. County, North Carolina
Brief description of amendment: The Amendment No.: 161.
amendment revises Technical Date of application for amendments: Facility Operating License No. NPF–
Specification (TS) 3.7.D.1 to correct an June 24, 1999, as supplemented by letter 21: The amendment revised the
editorial error, TS 6.2.2 to change the dated November 24, 1999. Technical Specifications.
senior reactor operator license Brief description of amendments: The
Date of initial notice in Federal
requirement for the Operations amendments revise the minimum
Register: December 15, 1999 (64 FR
Manager, and TS 6.3.1 to modify the reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate
70082).
qualification requirement for the limit, reduce the reactor coolant average
Operations Manager. temperature and pressurizer pressure The Commission’s related evaluation
Date of issuance: February 29, 2000. limits, restrict operation to a RCS flow of the amendment is contained in a
Effective date: As of the date of deficit of no more than one percent, and Safety Evaluation dated March 9, 2000.
issuance to be implemented within 30 change the low RCS flow reactor trip No significant hazards consideration
days. setpoint. comments received: No.

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15392 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., and Entergy at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO– FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–458, 2). This change will reduce the limiting Company, et al., Docket No. 50–412,
River Bend Station, Unit 1, West condition for operation for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2,
Feliciana Parish, Louisiana maximum quantity of stored Shippingport, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: radioactivity per tank from 300,000 Date of application for amendments:
December 16, 1999. curies of noble gases as Xenon–133 (Xe– March 16, 1999.
Brief description of amendment: The 133) equivalent to 78,782 curies of noble Brief description of amendments: This
amendment authorizes the licensee to gases as Xe–133 equivalent at ANO–1, amendment revised TS 3/4.7.1.3 and
revise fuel handling accident (FHA) and 82,400 curies of noble gases as Xe– associated Bases for the Primary Plant
dose calculations for three scenarios 133 equivalent at ANO–2. Demineralized Water (PPDW) system to
described in the River Bend Station, Date of issuance: February 18, 2000. clarify that the minimum specified
Effective date: As of the date of
Unit 1, Updated Safety Analysis Report. volume of water in the PPDW Storage
issuance and shall be implemented
The first is an FHA in the fuel building, Tank is a usable volume. Additionally,
within 30 days from the date of
assumed to occur 24 hours post- the minimum usable volume of water in
issuance.
shutdown. A second FHA analysis was the PPDW Storage Tank is increased,
Amendment Nos.: ANO–1—204;
prepared to support Amendment 35 to and a clarifying footnote that the
ANO–2—211.
RBS Technical Specifications (TS) Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– specified value is an analysis value is
which assumed an FHA occurs in the 51 and NPF–6: Amendments revised the added. Finally, several editorial and
primary containment 80 hours post- Technical Specifications. administrative changes, such as revision
shutdown during local leakage rate Date of initial notice in Federal of action statement wording, addition of
testing (LLRT). A third analysis was Register: January 12, 2000 (65 FR 1921). license number to TS page, and addition
prepared in support of Amendment 85 The Commission’s related evaluation of clarifying information to the TS Bases
to the River Bend Station Technical of the amendments is contained in a regarding analysis assumptions are
Specifications which assumed the Safety Evaluation dated February 18, made.
containment is open at 11 days. These 2000. Date of issuance: February 28, 2000.
analyses are being updated to account No significant hazards consideration Effective date: As of the date of
for several changes that were comments received: No. issuance and shall be implemented
determined by the licensee to involve an within 60 days.
unreviewed safety question in Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– Amendment Nos.: 106.
accordance with Title 10 of the Code of 382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Facility Operating License No. NPF–
Federal Regulations, Section Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana 73: Amendment revised the Technical
50.59(a)(2)(i). Date of amendment request: July 29, Specifications.
Date of issuance: March 2, 2000. 1998, as supplemented by letters dated Date of initial notice in Federal
Effective date: The license July 29, October 28, and November 11, Register: April 21, 1999, (64 FR 19556).
amendment is effective as of its date of 1999 The Commission’s related evaluation
issuance and shall be implemented in Brief description of amendment: The of the amendments is contained in a
the next periodic update to the USAR in amendment replaces the existing Safety Evaluation dated February 28,
accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). reference to the Asea Brown Boveri- 2000.
Implementation of the amendment is Combustion Engineering, Inc. small No significant hazards consideration
the incorporation into the USAR update, break loss-of-coolant accident comments received: No.
the changes to the description of the emergency core cooling system FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
facility as described in the licensee’s performance evaluation model with the Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334
application dated December 16, 1999, revised model described in the topical and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power
and evaluated in the staff’s Safety report CENPD–137, Supplement 2, P–A, Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,
Evaluation attached to this amendment. April 1998. Shippingport, Pennsylvania
Amendment No.: 110. Date of issuance: March 7, 2000.
Facility Operating License No. NPF– Effective date: As of the date of Date of application for amendments:
47: The amendment authorized changes issuance and shall be implemented May 27, 1999.
to the Updated Safety Analysis Report. within 60 days from the date of Brief description of amendments: The
Date of initial notice in Federal issuance. amendments relocate the seismic
Register: January 26, 2000 (65 FR 4272). Amendment No.: 158. monitoring instrumentation
The Commission’s related evaluation Facility Operating License No. NPF– requirements contained in Technical
of the amendment is contained in a 38: The amendment revised the Specification (TS) 3/4.3.3.3 to the
Safety Evaluation dated March 2, 2000. Technical Specifications. Licensing Requirements Manual (LRM)
No significant hazards consideration Date of initial notice in Federal based on the guidance provided in
comments received: No. Register: December 15, 1999 (64 FR Generic Letter 95–10, ‘‘Relocation of
70085). Selected Technical Specifications
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. Requirements Related to
The July 29, October 28, and
50–313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear Instrumentation.’’ The Bases section for
November 11, 1999, letters provided
One, Units 1 and 2, Pope County, Specification 3/4.3.3.3 is also relocated
additional information that did not
Arkansas to the LRM. The appropriate Index
change the scope of the initial proposed
Date of amendment request: no significant hazards consideration pages, Table Index page (Unit No. 1
September 17, 1999. determination. only), TS pages and Bases pages are
Brief description of amendments: The The Commission’s related evaluation revised to reflect the removal of the
amendments modify TS 3.25.2, of the amendment is contained in a seismic monitoring instrumentation
‘‘Radioactive Gas Storage Tanks,’’ at Safety Evaluation dated March 7, 2000. specification from the TSs. An
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO–1) No significant hazards consideration additional TS page is added to reflect
and TS 3/4.11.2, ‘‘Gas Storage Tanks,’’ comments received: No. that TS Number 3/4.3.3.4 is not used.

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15393

This additional page also denotes the Brief description of amendment: This the last revision to the Physical Security
number of the following page. Finally, amendment revises the Technical Plan. Also, the phrase ‘‘Turkey Point
the Bases section is modified to denote Specifications to expand the present Plant, Units 3 and 4 Security Plan’’ was
that TS Number 3/4.3.3.4 is not used. spent fuel storage capability by 289 revised to ‘‘Turkey Point Physical
Date of issuance: February 28, 2000. storage locations by allowing the use of Security Plan.’’
Effective date: As of date of issuance spent fuel racks in the cask pit area Date of issuance: February 28, 2000.
and shall be implemented within 60 adjacent to the spent fuel pool. Effective date: February 28, 2000.
days. Date of issuance: February 29, 2000. Amendment Nos.: 204 and 198.
Amendment Nos.: 228 and 107. Effective date: February 29, 2000. Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– Amendment No.: 237. 31 and DPR–41: Amendments revised
66 and NPF–73: Amendments revised Facility Operating License No. NPF–3: the Operating Licenses.
the Technical Specifications. Amendment revised the Technical Date of initial notice in Federal
Date of initial notice in Federal Specifications. Register: December 29, 1999 (64 FR
Register: June 30, 1999 (64 FR 35203). Date of initial notice in Federal 73092).
The Commission’s related evaluation Register: July 8, 1999 (64 FR 36933). The Commssion’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a The supplemental information of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated February 28, contained clarifying information and Safety Evaluation dated February 28,
2000. did not change the initial no significant 2000.
No significant hazards consideration No significant hazards consideration
hazards consideration determination
comments received: No. comments received: No.
and did not expand the scope of the
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating original Federal Register notice. Florida Power Corporation, et al.,
The Commission’s related evaluation Docket No. 50–302, Crystal River Unit
Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334
of the amendment is contained in a No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus
and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power
Safety Evaluation dated February 29, County, Florida
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,
2000. Date of application for amendment:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania
No significant hazards consideration October 12, 1999.
Date of application for amendments: comments received: No. Brief description of amendment: The
May 27, 1999.
Florida Power and Light Company, et amendment revises the Technical
Brief description of amendments: The
al., Docket No. 50–389, St. Lucie Plant, Specifications, Appendix B,
amendments (1) revised the frequency
Unit No. 2, St. Lucie County, Florida ‘‘Environmental Protection Plan (Non-
for performing the CHANNEL
Radiological)’’ to incorporate the
FUNCTIONAL TEST of the manual Date of application for amendment: reasonable and prudent measures, and
initiation functional units specified in August 18, 1999. the terms and conditions, of the
the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Brief description of amendment: This
Incidental Take Statement in the
Nos. 1 and 2, Engineered Safety amendment decreases the surveillance
Biological Opinion issued by the
Features Actuation System (ESFAS) frequency, listed in the updated Final
National Marine Fisheries Service.
Instrumentation Technical Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), for Date of issuance: February 29, 2000.
Specifications (TSs) from monthly, with cycling steam valves in the turbine Effective date: February 29, 2000.
an accompanying footnote which allows overspeed protection system from Amendment No.: 190.
the manual initiation to be tested on a monthly to quarterly. Facility Operating License No. DPR–
refueling interval, to each refueling Date of Issuance: February 28, 2000. 31: Amendment revised the Technical
interval; (2) revise footnotes associated Effective Date: As of the date of its Specifications.
with TS ESFAS tables; (3) revise issuance, to be incorporated into the Date of initial notice in Federal
associated TS Bases. UFSAR at the time of its next update. Register: December 15, 1999 (64 FR
Date of issuance: February 28, 2000. Amendment No.: 108. 70090).
Effective date: As of date of issuance Facility Operating License No. NPF– The Commission’s related evaluation
and shall be implemented within 60 16: Amendment revised the UFSAR. of the amendment is contained in a
days. Date of initial notice in Federal Safety Evaluation dated February 29,
Amendment Nos.: 229 and 108. Register: September 22, 1999 (64 FR 2000.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– 51345). No significant hazards consideration
66 and NPF–73: Amendments revised The Commission’s related evaluation comments received: No.
the Technical Specifications. of the amendment is contained in a
Date of initial notice in Federal Safety Evaluation dated February 28, Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Register: June 30, 1999 (64 FR 35205). 2000. Docket Nos. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald
The Commission’s related evaluation No significant hazards consideration C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,
of the amendments is contained in a comments received: No. Berrien County, Michigan
Safety Evaluation dated February 28, Date of application for amendments:
Florida Power and Light Company, December 22, 1999.
2000.
Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey Brief description of amendments: The
No significant hazards consideration
Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, Dade County, amendments delete Technical
comments received: No.
Florida Specification 5.4.2, ‘‘Reactor Coolant
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Date of application for amendments: System Volume,’’ regarding the reactor
Company, Docket No. 50–346, Davis- December 1, 1999, as supplemented coolant system (RCS) volume
Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, December 15, 1999. information. Information concerning the
Ottawa County, Ohio Breif description of amendments: The RCS volume is included in the D. C.
Date of application for amendment: amendments revised License Condition Cook Updated Final Safety Analyses
May 21, 1999, as supplemented by 3.L for Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, Report (UFSAR), and any changes to the
submittals dated December 1, 1999, and Operating Licenses DPR–31 and DPR–41 information are controlled in
January 28, 2000. to reflect the December 1, 1999, date of accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

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15394 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Date of issuance: March 1, 2000. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et
Effective date: As of the date of Docket No. 50–220, Nine Mile Point al., Docket No. 50–245, Millstone
issuance and shall be implemented Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Oswego County, Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, New
within 30 days. New York London County, Connecticut
Amendment Nos.: 241 and 222. Date of application for amendment: Date of application for amendments:
August 26, 1999, as supplemented April 19, 1999, as supplemented August
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– December 17, 1999. 25, October 14, November 3, December
58 and DPR–74: Amendments revised Brief description of amendment: The 20, 1999, and February 29, 2000.
the Technical Specifications. amendment changes Technical Brief description of amendments: The
Date of initial notice in Federal Specification 3.2.3, ‘‘Coolant amendment replaces the current
Register: January 13, 2000 (65 FR 2199). Chemistry,’’ to support the Technical Specifications for fuel storage
The Commssion’s related evaluation implementation of noble metal chemical pool water lever, crane operability, and
of the amendments is contained in a addition. crane travel with a spent fuel cask with
Date of issuance: March 8, 2000. new Technical Specifications to reflect
Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000.
Effective date: As of the date of the permanently defueled status of the
No significant hazards consideration issuance to be implemented before the plant.
comments received: No. licensee first performs the noble metal Date of Issuance: March 7, 2000.
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket chemical addition. Effective date: As of the date of
Amendment No.: 169. issuance and shall be implemented
No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station, Facility Operating License No. NPF– within 90 days from the date of
Nemaha County, Nebraska 69: Amendment revises the Technical issuance.
Date of amendment request: October Specifications. Amendment No.: 107.
6, 1999, as supplemented February 9, Date of initial notice in Federal Facility Operating License No. DPR–
2000. Register: September 22, 1999 (64 FR 21: The amendment revised the
51347). Technical Specifications.
Brief description of amendment: The The licensee’s supplemental letter Date of initial notice in Federal
amendment addresses the following dated December 17, 1999, did not Register: June 30, 1999, (64 FR 35208).
changes to the Technical Specifications: change the Commission’s finding of no The August 25, October 14, November
(1) provisions for implementation of 10 significant hazards consideration. 3, December 20, 1999, and February 29,
CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, The Commssion’s related evaluation 2000, letters provided clarifying
(Technical Specification Task Force of the amendment is contained in a information that did not change the
(TSTF) Change 52, Revision 2) (2) Safety Evaluation dated March 8, 2000. scope of the original application and
extension of the required surveillance No significant hazards consideration proposed no hazards consideration
interval for the containment air lock comments received: No. determination.
interlock mechanism from 18 to 24 The Commission’s related evaluation
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,
months (TSTF Change 17, Revision 1), of the amendment is contained in a
Docket No. 50–410, Nine Mile Point
(3) clarification of the valve types Safety Evaluation dated March 7, 2000.
Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County,
requiring isolation time testing (TSTF No significant hazards consideration
New York
Change 46, Revision 1), and (4) comments received: No.
provisions for use of administrative Date of application for amendment:
October 25, 1999, as supplemented on Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et
means for verification of isolation
February 2 and 7, 2000. al., Docket Nos. 50–336 and 50–423,
devices that are locked, sealed or
Brief description of amendment: The Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit
otherwise secured (TSTF Change 269, Nos. 2 and 3, New London County,
Revision 2). amended Technical Specifications
permit use of the already-installed Connecticut
Date of issuance: March 3, 2000. Oscillation Power Range Monitor Date of application for amendment:
Effective date: March 3, 2000, to be system. November 23, 1999.
implemented within 30 days. Date of issuance: March 2, 2000. Brief description of amendment: The
Amendment No.: 180. Effective date: As of the date of amendment changes Technical
issuance to be implemented before Specification (TS) 4.0.5, ‘‘Limiting
Facility Operating License No. DPR– activation of the Oscillation Power Conditions for Operation and
46: Amendment revised the Technical Range Monitor System, but no later than Surveillance Requirements’’ by adding a
Specifications. August 31, 2000. biennial or 2-year surveillance interval
Date of initial notice in Federal Amendment No.: 92. and incorporating a required frequency
Register: December 29, 1999 (64 FR Facility Operating License No. NPF– for performing inservice testing
73092). The February 9, 2000, 69: Amendment revises the Technical activities of once per 731 days.
supplement provided clarifying Specifications. Date of issuance: March 8, 2000.
information that was within the scope of Date of initial notice in Federal Effective date: As of the date of
the October 6, 1999, application and the Register: December 1, 1999 (64 FR issuance, and shall be implemented
staff’s original Federal Register notice 67336). within 60 days.
and did not change the staff’s initial The February 2 and 7, 2000, letters Amendment Nos.: 241 and 178.
proposed no significant hazards provided clarifying information that did Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
consideration determination. not change the initial proposed no 65 and NPF–49: Amendment revised the
significant hazards consideration. Technical Specifications.
The Commssion’s related evaluation The Commission’s related evaluation Date of initial notice in Federal
of the amendment is contained in a of the amendment is contained in a Register: January 26, 2000 (65 FR 4286).
Safety Evaluation dated March 3, 2000. Safety Evaluation dated March 2, 2000. The Commission’s related evaluation
No significant hazards consideration No significant hazards consideration of the amendment is contained in a
comments received: No. comments received: No. Safety Evaluation dated March 8, 2000.

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15395

No significant hazards consideration Public Service Electric & Gas Company, not change the staff’s initial proposed
comments received: No. Docket No. 50–354, Hope Creek no significant hazards consideration
Generating Station, Salem County, New determination.
Northern States Power Company,
Jersey The Commission’s related evaluation
Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306, Prairie
Date of application for amendment: of the amendments is contained in a
Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units
August 26, 1999. Safety Evaluation dated February 29,
1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota
Brief description of amendment: This 2000.
Date of application for amendments: No significant hazards consideration
March 2, 1998, supplemented on amendment raises the condensate
comments received: No.
January 21, 2000. storage tank (CST) low level setpoint
Brief description of amendments: The and the corresponding allowable value Southern California Edison Company, et
amendments change the second in Technical Specification Tables 3.3.3– al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
paragraph of Technical Specification 2 and 3.3.5–2. The subject setpoint is San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
3.8.D, ‘‘Spent Fuel Pool Special associated with the automatic transfer of Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
Ventilation System,’’ to clarify the High Pressure Coolant Injection California
restrictions on movement of loads in the (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Date of application for amendments:
spent fuel pool enclosure with one train Cooling (RCIC) pump suctions from the April 11, 1996 (PCN 460), as
of spent fuel pool special ventilation CST to the suppression pool in the supplemented April 6, 1998, and March
system inoperable. event of low CST level. These changes 22 and July 29, 1999.
Date of issuance: February 17, 2000. are being made to address concerns Brief description of amendments: The
Effective date: As of the date of regarding potential vortexing in the amendments revise Technical
issuance and shall be implemented HPCI and RCIC suction flowpaths. Specification 3.6.3, ‘‘Containment
within 30 days. Date of issuance: March 6, 2000. Isolation Valves,’’ to specify that the
Amendment Nos.: 147 and 138. Effective date: As of the date of completion time for required action for
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– issuance, and shall be implemented certain containment isolation valves be
42 and DPR–60: Amendments revised within 60 days. in accordance with the applicable
the Technical Specifications. Amendment No.: 124. limiting condition for operation
Date of initial notice in Federal Facility Operating License No. NPF– pertaining to the engineered safety
Register: May 20, 1998 (63 FR 27763). 57: This amendment revised the
The Commission’s related evaluation features system in which they are
Technical Specifications. installed.
of the amendments is contained in a Date of initial notice in Federal
Safety Evaluation dated February 17, Date of issuance: March 9, 2000.
Register: September 22, 1999 (64 FR Effective date: March 9, 2000, to be
2000. 51348).
No significant hazards consideration implemented within 30 days of
The Commission’s related evaluation issuance.
comments received: No. of the amendment is contained in a Amendment Nos.: Unit 2–165; Unit
Northern States Power Company, Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 2000. 3–156.
Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306, Prairie No significant hazards consideration Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units comments received: No. 10 and NPF–15: The amendments
1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota Public Service Electric & Gas Company, revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of application for amendments: Docket Nos. 50–272 and 50–311, Salem Date of initial notice in Federal
November 6, 1996, supplemented April Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 Register: January 19, 2000 (65 FR 2993),
10 and October 1, 1997, and March 4, and 2, Salem County, New Jersey as corrected January 26, 2000 (65 FR
1998. 4265).
Date of application for amendments: The Commission’s related evaluation
Brief description of amendments: The July 29, 1999, as supplemented
amendments revise Technical of the amendments is contained in a
November 30, 1999. Safety Evaluation dated March 9, 2000.
Specification Section 5.0, ‘‘DESIGN Brief description of amendments: The
FEATURES,’’ by relocating certain No significant hazards consideration
amendments revise Technical comments received: No.
portions of the design features Specifications Surveillance
information to the Updated Safety Requirement 4.6.1.1 to clarify when Southern California Edison Company, et
Analysis Report, consistent with verification of primary containment al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
NUREG–1431, ‘‘Standard Technical integrity may be performed by San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Specifications, Westinghouse Plants,’’ administrative means and to change the Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
Revision 1. surveillance interval for verification of California
Date of issuance: February 29, 2000.
Effective date: As of the date of manual valves and blind flanges inside Date of application for amendments:
issuance and shall be implemented of containment. December 13, 1999, as supplemented
within 30 days. Date of issuance: February 29, 2000. February 24, 2000 (PCN–507).
Amendment Nos.: 148 and 139. Effective date: As of the date of Brief description of amendments: The
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– issuance, and shall be implemented amendments revise the license
42 and DPR–60: Amendments revised within 60 days. expiration dates for San Onofre Unit 2
the Technical Specifications. Amendment Nos.: 227 and 208. to February 16, 2022, and for San
Date of initial notice in Federal Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– Onofre Unit 3 to November 15, 2022,
Register: January 29, 1997 (62 FR 4338). 70 and DPR–75: The amendments thus extending the units’ periods of
The Commission’s related evaluation revised the Technical Specifications. operation to the full 40-year design-
of the amendments is contained in a Date of initial notice in Federal basis lifetime.
Safety Evaluation dated February 29, Register: September 22, 1999 (64 FR Date of issuance: March 9, 2000.
2000. 51349). Effective date: March 9, 2000, to be
No significant hazards consideration The November 30, 1999, letter implemented within 30 days of
comments received: No. provided clarifying information that did issuance.

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15396 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices

Amendment Nos.: Unit 2—166; Unit Specifications (TS) to delete the Brief description of amendment: The
3—157. necessity for time response testing amendment revises the main steam
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– various instrument transmitters based safety valve Technical Specification
10 and NPF–15: The amendments on historical records indicating (TS) Section 3.7.1 to provide a new
revised the Operating Licenses. satisfactory time responses in the past. requirement to reduce the power range
Date of initial notice in Federal Date of issuance: February 29, 2000. neutron flux-high reactor trip setpoints
Register: December 29, 1999 (64 FR Effective date: February 29, 2000. when two or more main steam safety
73098). Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—251; Unit valves (MSSVs) per steam generator are
The Commission’s related evaluation 2—242. inoperable.
of the amendments is contained in a Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– Date of issuance: March 7, 2000.
Safety Evaluation dated March 9, 2000. 77 and DPR–79: Amendments revise the Effective date: March 7, 2000.
No significant hazards consideration TS. Amendment No.: 19.
comments received: No Date of initial notice in Federal Facility Operating License No. NPF–
STP Nuclear Operating Company, Register: October 6, 1999 (64 FR 54381). 90: Amendment revises the TSs.
Docket Nos. 50–498 and 50–499, South The supplemental letter of January 13, Date of initial notice in Federal
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda 2000, did not expand the scope of the Register: August 11, 1999 (64 FR 43781).
County, Texas initial amendment request or change the The letter dated December 17, 1999
NRC staff’s initial proposed no provided clarifying information that did
Date of amendment request: significant hazards consideration not change the initial proposed no
September 30, 1998, as supplemented determination. significant hazards consideration
May 14 and October 21, 1999. The Commission’s related evaluation determination.
Brief description of amendments: The
of the amendment is contained in a The Commission’s related evaluation
amendments revise the South Texas
Safety Evaluation dated February 29, of the amendment is contained in a
Project, Units 1 and 2, offsite dose
2000. Safety Evaluation dated March 7, 2000.
licensing bases to account for (1)
No significant hazards consideration No significant hazards consideration
operation of the existing steam
comments received: No comments received: No
generators at reduced feedwater inlet
temperatures and (2) operation with the Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket TXU Electric, Docket Nos. 50–445 and
new replacement steam generators, also Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah 50–446, Comanche Peak Steam Electric
at a reduced feedwater temperature. The Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Somervell
changes revised calculated offsite doses County, Tennessee County, Texas
for four existing Updated Final Safety Date of application for amendments: Date of amendment request: February
Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 October 14, 1999 as supplemented 11, 1999, as supplemented by letters
accidents and added a discussion in February 23 and March 2, 2000. dated September 3 and December 20,
Chapter 15 of the radiological analysis Brief description of amendments: 1999.
for the voltage-based criteria for steam Revise Section 4.4 of the Technical Brief description of amendments: The
generator tubes. Specification (TS) surveillance testing amendments change the Technical
Date of issuance: March 2, 2000.
Effective date: March 2, 2000, to be requirements and their associated Bases Specifications to authorize an increase
implemented within 30 days. to incorporate an alternate repair criteria in the allowable spent fuel storage
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—124; Unit for axial primary water stress corrosion capacity and the crediting of soluble
2—112 cracking at dented tube support plate boron, in the spent fuel pool, for spent
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– intersections. fuel reactivity control.
76 and NPF–80: Amendments authorize Date of issuance: March 8, 2000. Date of issuance: February 24, 2000.
revisions to the UFSAR. Effective date: March 8, 2000. Effective date: As of the date of
Date of initial notice in Federal Amendment Nos.: Unit 1—252; Unit issuance and shall be implemented
Register: November 18, 1998 (63 FR 2—243. within 30 days from the date of
64124). Facility Operating License Nos. DPR– issuance.
The May 14 and October 21, 1999, 77 and DPR–79: Amendments revise the Amendment Nos.: 74.
supplemental letters provided clarifying TS. Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
information that was within the scope of Date of initial notice in Federal 87 and NPF–89: The amendments
the original Federal Register notice and Register: December 29, 1999 (64 FR revised the Technical Specifications.
did not change the staff’s initial 73100). The supplemental letters dated Date of initial notice in Federal
proposed no significant hazards February 23, and March 2, 2000, did not Register: May 12, 1999 (64 FR 25522).
consideration determination. expand the scope of the original The Commission’s related evaluation
The Commission’s related evaluation amendment request or change the initial of the amendments is contained in a
of the amendments is contained in a proposed no significant hazards Safety Evaluation dated February 24,
Safety Evaluation dated March 2, 2000. consideration determination. 2000.
No significant hazards consideration The Commission’s related evaluation No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No. of the amendment is contained in a comments received: No.
Safety Evaluation dated March 8, 2000.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
No significant hazards consideration
Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah Corporation, Docket No. 50–271,
comments received: No.
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station,
County, Tennessee Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. Vernon, Vermont
50–390 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Date of application for amendment:
Date of application for amendments:
Rhea County, Tennessee January 20, 2000.
August 30, 1999, as supplemented
January 13, 2000. Date of application for amendment: Brief description of amendment: The
Brief description of amendments: The June 25, 1999, as supplemented amendment redefines the functional
amendments revise the Technical December 17, 1999. testing criteria for the noble gas activity

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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 22, 2000 / Notices 15397

monitor instrumentation in the Virginia Electric and Power Company, et Amendment No.: 132.
Augmented Off-Gas system. al., Docket Nos. 50–338 and 50–339, Facility Operating License No. NPF–
Date of Issuance: March 6, 2000. North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 42. The amendment revised the
Effective date: As of its date of and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia Technical Specifications.
issuance, and shall be implemented Date of initial notice in Federal
Date of application for amendments:
within 30 days. Register: January 26, 2000 (65 FR 4292).
May 6, 1999, as supplemented June 22 The Commission’s related evaluation
Amendment No.: 184. and December 16, 1999.
Facility Operating License No. DPR– of the amendment is contained in a
Brief description of amendments: The
28: Amendment revised the Technical Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2000.
amendments revise the Technical No significant hazards consideration
Specifications. Specifications Sections 3.3.1.1; comments received: No.
Date of initial notice in Federal 4.3.1.1.1; 4.3.1.1.2; 4.3.1.1.3; 3.3.2.1;
Register: February 2, 2000 (65 FR 4999). 4.3.2.1.1; 4.3.2.1.2; 4.3.2.1.3; 3/4.3.1; 3/ Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day
The Commission’s related evaluation of March 2000.
4.3.2 and 6.8.4.9 and Tables 3.3–1; 4.3–
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
of this amendment is contained in a 1; 3.3–3 and 4.3–2 for Unit 1, and
Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 2000. John A. Zwolinski,
Sections 3.3.1.1; 4.3.1.1.1; 4.3.1.1.2;
No significant hazards consideration 4.3.1.1.3; 3.3.2.1; 4.3.2.1.1; 4.3.2.1.2; Director, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
comments received: No. 4.3.2.1.3; 3/4.3.1; 3/4.3.2 and 6.8.4.9 and Regulation.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Tables 3.3–1; 4.3–1; 3.3–3 and 4.3–2 for
[FR Doc. 00–6913 Filed 3–21–00; 8:45 am]
Corporation, Docket No. 50–271, Unit 2, to revise the surveillance
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, frequency for the Reactor Trip System
Vernon, Vermont (RTS) and the Engineered Safety
Features Actuation System (ESFAS) NUCLEAR REGULATORY
Date of application for amendment: analog instrumentation channels. In COMMISSION
February 11, 2000. addition, the allowed outage time and
Brief description of amendment: The action times for the RTS and ESFAS Draft Regulatory Guide; Issuance,
amendment deletes the requirement to analog instrumentation and the Availability
exercise the main steam isolation valves actuation logic are being modified.
(MSIVs) twice weekly by partial closure Date of issuance: March 9, 2000 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and subsequent re-opening. Testing of Effective date: As of the date of has issued for public comment a draft of
the MSIVs to demonstrate their safety issuance and shall be implemented a new guide in its Regulatory Guide
function will continue to be performed within 90 days from the date of Series. This series has been developed
on a quarterly basis in accordance with issuance. to describe and make available to the
the Vermont Yankee Inservice Testing Amendment Nos.: 221 and 202. public such information as methods
program, Technical Specifications (TSs), Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– acceptable to the NRC staff for
and applicable provisions of Section XI 4 and NPF–7. Amendments revised the implementing specific parts of the
of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Technical Specifications. NRC’s regulations, techniques used by
Code. The TS change is issued as a Date of initial notice in Federal the staff in evaluating specific problems
follow-up amendment to NOED 00–06– Register: June 16, 1999 (64 FR 32291). or postulated accidents, and data
01, which was orally granted on The letters of June 22 and December 16, needed by the staff in its review of
February 10, 2000. 1999, contained clarifying information applications for permits and licenses.
Date of Issuance: March 9, 2000 only, and did not change the initial no The draft guide, temporarily
significant hazards consideration identified by its task number, DG–1075
Effective date: As of the date of
determination. (which should be mentioned in all
issuance, and shall be implemented
The Commission’s related evaluation correspondence concerning this draft
prior to March 25, 2000.
of the amendments is contained in a guide), is titled ‘‘Emergency Planning
Amendment No.: 185
Safety Evaluation dated March 9, 2000. and Preparedness for Nuclear Power
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
No significant hazards consideration Reactors.’’ This guide is being
28: Amendment revised the Technical developed to propose guidance on
comments received: No.
Specifications. methods acceptable to the NRC staff for
Public comments requested as to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
complying with the NRC’s regulations
proposed no significant hazards Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf
for emergency response plans and
considerations: Yes (65 FR 8749) Creek Generating Station, Coffey preparedness at nuclear power reactors.
February 22, 2000. That notice provided County, Kansas This draft guide has not received
an opportunity to submit comments on Date of amendment request: complete staff approval and does not
the Commission’s proposed no December 15, 1999. represent an official NRC staff position.
significant hazards consideration Brief description of amendment: The Comments may be accompanied by
determination. No comments have been amendment modified the improved relevant information or supporting data.
received. The notice also provided for technical specifications (ITS) that were Written comments may be submitted to
an opportunity to request a hearing by issued in Amendment No. 123 on March the Rules and Directives Branch, Office
March 23, 2000, but indicated that if the 31, 1999, and implemented on of Administration, U.S. Nuclear
Commission makes a final no significant December 18, 1999. The changes expand Regulatory Commission, Washington,
hazards consideration determination the region of acceptable reactor coolant DC 20555. Copies of comments received
any such hearing would take place after pump (RCP) seal injection flow to each may be examined at the NRC Public
issuance of the amendment. RCP in Figure 3.5.5–1 and provides 10 Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.,
The Commission’s related evaluation editorial changes to the ITS. Washington, DC. Comments will be
of the amendment is contained in a Date of issuance: March 1, 2000. most helpful if received by May 22,
Safety Evaluation dated March 9, 2000. Effective date: March 1, 2000, to be 2000.
No significant hazards consideration implemented within 60 days of the date You may also provide comments via
comments received: No of issuance. the NRC’s interactive rulemaking

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