RegulatingCommerce:WilltheSupreme CourtStrikeDowntheAffordableCareActs MinimumCoverageProvisionandother EconomicRegulation?

TheConstitutionataCrossroads

Introduction

Powerfulandingeniousminds,taking,aspostulates,thatthepowersexpressly grantedtothegovernmentoftheUnion,aretobecontractedbyconstruction, intothenarrowestpossiblecompass,andthattheoriginalpowersoftheStates areretained,ifanypossibleconstructionwillretainthem,may,byacourseof welldigested,butrefinedandmetaphysicalreasoning,foundedonthese premises,explainawaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,a magnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat,buttotallyunfitforuse. ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallinGibbonsv.Ogden AsthisquotefromChiefJusticeJohnMarshallintheSupremeCourtsfirstmajor opinioninterpretingtheConstitutionsCommerceClausemakesclear,thefundamentalissueof thescopeofthefederalgovernmentspowerhasbeendebatedsincethefoundingofour Republic.Italsoshowsthat,throughoutournationshistory,opponentsofbroadfederal powerhavereliedonanarrowconstructionoftheConstitutioninattemptstoimposelimits uponCongressspowersundertheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause threatening,perhaps,toexplainawaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,a magnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat,buttotallyunfitforuse.1 ThelatestskirmishinthisdebateistheconstitutionalchallengetothePatient ProtectionandAffordableCareAct(ACA),particularlyitsminimumcoverageprovision,which requiresAmericanswhocanaffordittoeitherpurchaseaminimumlevelofhealthinsuranceor payapenalty.Tothepowerfulandingeniousmindsofthelawschallengers,theACAisa novelexpansionoffederalpowerthatgoesbeyondwhatwascontemplatedorpermittedby theFounders.Toothers,2thehealthcaremandateisaregulationofcommercethatisclearly constitutionalunderthetextoftheCommerceandNecessaryandProperClausesandSupreme

Gibbons,22U.S.1,222(1824). See,TestimonyofCharlesFried,BeforetheSenateCommitteeontheJudiciaryHearingonTheConstitutionality oftheAffordableCareAct,February2,2011.

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www.theusconstitution.org

CourtinterpretationsofthesetextsinearlydecisionssuchasGibbonsandMcCullochv. Maryland.3Althoughoneconservativecommentatorinitiallypredictedthatthereisaless than1%chancethatcourtswillinvalidatetheindividualmandateasexceedingCongresss ArticleIpower,4thelowercourtshavesplitonthisquestion,andnowsomearepredictingthat anideologicallydividedSupremeCourtwillstrikethemandatedown. Thechallengerstothemandaterelyheavilyuponaseriesofideologicallydividedrulings issuedoverthepast15yearsinwhichtheCourtsconservativeblocarticulatednewlimitson CongressspowerundertheCommerceClause.Mostsignificantly,inUnitedStatesv.Lopez5 andUnitedStatesv.Morrison,6theCourtinvalidatedtheGunFreeSchoolZonesActandpartof theViolenceAgainstWomenAct,holdingthatthesefederallawsdidnotregulateactivities sufficientlytiedtointerstatecommerce. WhilethesecasesformthebasisfortheattacksontheAffordableCareAct,twomore recentcasesjustifythepredictionthatthehealthcarechallengeswillbeeasilydisposedofby theCourt.InGonzalesv.Raich,7JusticesAntoninScaliaandAnthonyKennedyjoinedtheir liberalcolleaguestoupholdfederalregulationofmedicinalmarijuana,evenifgrownina backyardforpersonalconsumption,inaccordancewithlocallaw.InUnitedStatesv. Comstock,8ChiefJusticeJohnRobertsandJusticesKennedyandSamuelAlitoagreedwiththe CourtsliberalwinginholdingthattheNecessaryandProperClausepermittedCongressto enactafederallawallowingthegovernmenttoholdmentallyill,sexuallydangerousfederal prisonersbeyondthedatetheywouldotherwisebereleasedfromprison.9Thequestionleftby RaichandComstockiswhetherthesecasesareaccuratereflectionsorrefinementsoftheviews oftheseconservativeJusticesaboutthescopeoffederalpowers,ormoreareflectionofthe conservativepolicygoalsregulatingdrugsandsexuallydangerouscriminalsatissueinthese cases. Whatisclear,however,isthatwithachallengetothemostimportantlegislative achievementoftheObamapresidencypendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,theConstitutions CommerceClauseanditsNecessaryandProperClauseareatacrossroads.

17U.S.316(1819) OrinKerr,WhatAretheChancesthattheCourtsWillStrikeDowntheIndividualMandate?,TheVolokh Conspiracy,availableat: http://volokh.com/2010/03/22/whatarethechancesthatthecourtswillstrikedowntheindividualmandate/ ProfessorKerrprognosticatesthatheexpectsa90(orpossibly81)votetoupholdtheindividualmandate. 5 514U.S.549(1995). 6 529U.S.598(2000). 7 545U.S.1(2005). 8 130S.Ct.1949(2010). 9 130S.Ct.at1954;id.at1965(Kennedy,J.,concurring);id.at1968(Alito,J.,concurring).
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TheTextandHistoryoftheCommerceandNecessaryandProperClauses
ThedebateoverthescopeoffederalpowerwascentraltoAmericasFoundingandhas continuedthroughoutournationshistory.In1783,soonaftertheRevolutionaryWarwaswon, GeorgeWashingtonwrotetoAlexanderHamiltonthatunlessCongresshavepowers competenttoallgeneralpurposes,thatthedistresseswehaveencountered,theexpenceswe haveincurred,andthebloodwehavespiltinthecourseofanEightyearswar,willavailus nothing.10ReferringtothefailedArticlesofConfederationwhichplacedthenations foundationsuponamereleagueoffriendshipamongthethirteenindependentstates WashingtonexpressedtoHamiltonthat[n]omanintheUnitedStatesis,orcanbemore deeplyimpressedwiththenecessityofareforminourpresentConfederationthanmyself.11 Inthesummerof1787,delegatesconvenedinPhiladelphiatoholdaConstitutional Convention,andthequestionofthescopeoffederalpowerwasacentralissuefordebate.On onesidewasJamesMadisonandtheVirginiaPlan,whichproposedgreatlyexpandingfederal power.OntheotherwasWilliamPattersonandtheNewJerseyPlan,whichadvocatedfora weakernationalgovernment.JamesWilson,oneofonlysixmentohavesignedboththe DeclarationofIndependenceandtheConstitution,explainedthatundertheVirginiaPlan,the Natl.LegislatureistomakelawsinallcasesatwhichtheseparateStatesareincompetent, whileundertheNewJerseyPlanthepowersofCongresswouldnotbeexpandedmuchbeyond whattheywereundertheArticlesofConfederation.12Withtheexperienceofthefailed ArticlesofConfederationfreshintheirminds,thedelegatesoverwhelminglyapprovedthe VirginiaPlan.13 WiththeprinciplesoftheVirginiaPlanasaguide,thedraftersoftheConstitution createdalistofenumeratedpowersprovidedtoCongressinArticleI,Section8,includingthe CommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause.TheCommerceClausegranted CongressthePower...ToregulateCommercewithforeignNations,andamongtheseveral States,andwiththeIndianTribes.14AndtheNecessaryandProperClauseprovidedCongress thePower...TomakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryinginto ExecutiontheforegoingPowers,andallotherPowersvestedbythisConstitutioninthe GovernmentoftheUnitedStates.15 ThedebateovertheappropriatescopeoffederalpowerintensifiedasAntiFederalist opponentsofratificationexpressedconcernsthattheproposedConstitutiontippedthebalance toofarinfavoroffederalpowerandclosertotheimperialBritishruletheyhadfoughtagainst intheRevolutionaryWar.Theproponentsofratification,ledbyJohnJay,AlexanderHamilton

18TheWritingsofGeorgeWashington490(JohnC.Fitzpatrick,ed.1931)(LettertoAlexanderHamilton,March 4,1783)(emphasisinoriginal). 11 Id.at505. 12 1TheRecordsoftheFederalConventionof1787252,277(MaxFarranded.,rev.ed.1966). 13 Id.at322. 14 U.S.Const.art.1,8,cl.3. 15 U.S.Const.art.I,8,cl.18. Crossroads:CommercePower Page|3

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andJamesMadisoninTheFederalistPapers,answeredthoseargumentswithtwopoints.First, theylaidoutthecaseforthebroadpowersgrantedtothefederalgovernment,emphasizing theimportanceoftheircontinuingfirmlyunitedunderonefederalgovernment,vestedwith sufficientpowersforallgeneralandnationalpurposes.16Second,theystatedthatthepowers grantedtothefederalgovernmentundertheConstitutionwerefewanddefined,whilethe powerswhicharetoremainintheStategovernmentsarenumerousandindefinite.17 Theprecisescopeofthosefewanddefinedpowersquicklyprovedcontroversial,with twoprominentmembersofPresidentGeorgeWashingtonscabinetTreasurySecretary AlexanderHamiltonandSecretaryofStateThomasJeffersonclashingsharplyoverwhether theConstitutionpermittedCongresstoestablishanationalbank.PresidentWashingtonsided withHamiltonandcreatedthebank,leadingtotheSupremeCourtsunanimousrulingin McCullochv.Maryland,18upholdingthecreationofthebankagainstaconstitutionalchallenge. AsdidtheauthorsofTheFederalistPapers,ChiefJusticeMarshallrecognizedin McCullochthatthefederalgovernmentisoneofenumeratedpowers.Marshallmadethis pointevenmoreforcefullyinMarburyv.Madison,19inwhichheopinedthat[t]hepowersof thelegislaturearedefined,andlimited;andthatthoselimitsmaynotbemistaken,or forgotten,theconstitutioniswritten.20ButmostofMcCullochisdevotedtoarticulatingthe broadscopeofthoseenumeratedpowers:inordertoformamoreperfectunion,itwas deemednecessarytochangethisallianceintoaneffectivegovernment,possessinggreatand sovereignpowers.21EvokinglanguagefromHamiltonsadvisoryopiniontoWashington,Chief JusticeMarshallupheldtheestablishmentofanationalbankundertheNecessaryandProper Clause,stating[l]ettheendbelegitimate,letitbewithinthescopeoftheconstitution,andall meanswhichareappropriate,whichareplainlyadaptedtothatend,whicharenotprohibited, butconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheconstitution,areconstitutional.22 ChiefJusticeMarshallsimilarlyunderstoodtheCommerceClauseasprovidingabroad grantofauthoritytoCongress,asheexpressedinhisdecisionfortheCourtinGibbonsv. Ogden.23Onceagain,asastartingpoint,ChiefJusticeMarshallacknowledgedthatCongresss powerwasnotunlimited,explainingthattheenumerationofpowersintheConstitution presupposessomethingnotenumerated.24Butagain,heemphasizedthebroadscopeof

TheFederalistPapers,No.3,at36(Jay)(ClintonRossiter,ed.1999). TheFederalistPapersNo.45,at289(Madison). 18 17U.S.316(1819) 19 1Cranch137(1803). 20 Id.at176. 21 Id.at403. 22 Id.at421.HamiltonwrotetoWashington,Iftheendbeclearlycomprehendedwithinanyofthespecified powers,andifthemeasurehaveanobviousrelationtothatend,andisnotforbiddenbyanyparticularprovision oftheconstitution;itmaysafelybedeemedtocomewithinthecompassofthenationalauthority.ThePapersof GeorgeWashingtonDigitalEdition(TheodoreJ.Crackel,ed.2008)(LetterfromAlexanderHamiltontoGeorge Washington,OpinionontheConstitutionalityofanActtoEstablishaBank,1791). 23 22U.S.1(1824). 24 Id.at195.
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theseenumeratedpowers.Herejectedanarrowconstruction,whichwouldcripplethe government,andrenderitunequaltotheobjectforwhichitisdeclaredtobeinstituted,andto whichthepowersgiven,asfairlyunderstood,renderitcompetent.25InMarshallsview, [c]ommerce,undoubtedly,istraffic,butitissomethingmore:itisintercourse.26Marshall emphasizedthat[t]hepowerovercommerce...wasoneoftheprimaryobjectsforwhichthe peopleofAmericaadoptedtheirgovernment,andmadeclearthattheattempttorestrictit comestoolate.27UnderChiefJusticeMarshallsexpansiveviewoftheCommerceClause, [t]hewisdomandthediscretionofCongress...andtheinfluencewhichtheirconstituents possessatelections,are...thesolerestraintsonwhichtheyhaverelied,tosecurethemfrom itsabuse.28

FromtheLochnerEratotheRobertsCourt
JudicialdeferencetocongressionalactionundertheCommerceClausewastherulefor Americasfirstcentury.ButasCongressbegantakingamoreactiveroleinregulatingthe growingAmericaneconomyduringandaftertheIndustrialRevolution,theCourtstartedto pushback,takingamuchnarrowerviewoftheCommerceClause.Whilethisperiod,knownas theLochnerera,ismostoftenassociatedwiththeSupremeCourtsinvocationofsubstantive DueProcesstooverturnstatelaborregulationsbasedonanewfoundlibertyofcontract, equallyfarreachingwereitsdecisionsoverturningfederallawsbasedonarestrictive understandingoftheCommerceClause.CreatingcategoricalexceptionsincasessuchasUnited Statesv.E.C.KnightCo.29andCarterv.CarterCoalCo.,30theCourtruledthatproduction, manufacturing,andminingfelloutsideCongressspowersbecausetheCourtdidnotbelieve thattheseactivitiesfellwithinthedefinitionofcommerce.TheCourtalsoinvalidatedfederal childlaborlawsandfederalwageandhourlawsonthegroundthatCongresscouldnot regulateactivitiesthathadonlyanindirecteffectoninterstatecommerce.31 TheLochnereraendedin1937,withtheCourtjettisoningbothitssubstantiveDue ProcessassaultonstatelaborregulationsanditsrestrictivereadingoftheCommerceClause.32 Withashifttowardanationaleconomydrivenbyincreasinglyrapidtechnologicalchange,the Courtsdoctrinebegantoallowforgreaterfederalcontrols.Theresultwasareturntothe broadCommerceClausepowersaffirmedbyChiefJusticeMarshallandjudicialdeference towardtheelectedbranches.

Id.at188. Id.at189. 27 22U.S.at190. 28 Id.at197. 29 156U.S.1(1895). 30 298U.S.238(1936). 31 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (federal child labor laws); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,295U.S.495(1935)(federalwageandhourlaws). 32 SeeWestCoastHotelCo.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937)(upholdingstateminimumwagelaws);NLRBv.Jones& LaughlinSteelCrop.,301U.S.1(1937)(upholdingNationalLaborRelationsActagainstCommerceClause challenge).
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ThenewpostLochnerdoctrineofdeferencetowardCongresssCommerceClause powersreachedwhatsomeconsideritshighwatermarkinCourts1942decisioninWickardv. Filburn.33Here,thequestionwaswhetherCongresscouldaddressthenationalproblemof volatilityinthepriceofwheatbyregulatingwheatgrownonafamilyfarmforprivate consumptionaspartofabroaderregulatoryscheme.WhiletheCourtconcededthatthe impactoftheindividualfamilyfarmerwassmall,itupheldCongresssuseofitsCommerce Clausepowerbecause,intheaggregate,theeconomicimpactofallsuchactivitiesisfarfrom trivial.34TheCourtslogicwasthatwhetherthewheatwasintroducedtomarketorusedfor privateconsumption,itwouldhavetheeffectofsuppressingthepriceofwheat.35Evoking ChiefJusticeMarshall,theCourtrespondedtothecriticismthatCongresswasforcingfarmers intothemarketinordertostabilizepricesbyrecognizingthat[t]heconflictsofeconomic interestbetweentheregulatedandthosewhoadvantagebyitarewiselyleftunderoursystem toresolutionbytheCongressunderitsmoreflexibleandresponsiblelegislativeprocess,since [s]uchconflictsrarelylendthemselvestojudicialdetermination.36 FormorethanfiftyyearsaftertheendoftheLochnerera,theCourtdidnotstrikedown asinglefederallawasexceedingCongresssauthorityundertheCommerceClauseorthe NecessaryandProperClause.Then,inthemid1990s,adeeplydividedCourtstruckdownthe federalGunFreeSchoolZonesActandpartoftheViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA)as exceedingCommerceClausepowers.InUnitedStatesv.Lopez,afiveJusticeconservative majorityobservedthatthebanongunsinschoolzoneswasacriminalstatute,that,unlike theregulationofwheatinWickard,isnotanessentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomic activity.37DecliningtoexpandfurthertheCourtsdeferencetowardCongress,theCourt refusedtopileinferenceuponinferenceinordersustaincongressionalaction,arguingthatto dosowouldfundamentallybluranydistinctionbetweenwhatistrulynationalandwhatis trulylocal.38Importantly,theLopezCourtdidnotoverruleanypriorprecedent,citing approvinglytotheentirepostLochnerlineofcases.39Nonetheless,theLopezCourtclearly meanttodrawalineinthesand,emphasizingthatitwasunwillingtoconvertcongressional authorityundertheCommerceClausetoageneralpolicepower.40TheLopezmajority concludedthatbyenumeratingfederalpowerintheConstitution,ourfoundingcharter withhold[s]fromCongressaplenarypolicepowerthatwouldauthorizeenactmentofevery typeoflegislation.41 InUnitedStatesv.Morrison,thesamefiveJusticesfromtheLopezmajoritystruckdown VAWAscivilremedyprovision,notingthatgendermotivatedcrimesarenot,inanysenseof

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317U.S.111(1942). Id.at128. 35 Id. 36 Id.at129. 37 514U.S.549,561(1995). 38 Id.at56768. 39 Id.at55561. 40 Id.at567. 41 Id.at566. Crossroads:CommercePower Page|6

thephrase,economicactivity.42TheMorrisonmajority,consideringthefederallawscivil remedyprovision,concludeditcouldthinkofnobetterexampleofthepolicepower,which theFoundersdeniedtheNationalGovernmentandreposedintheStates.43Again,the majoritybalkedatquestioningpriorprecedent,butreinforceditsstatementinLopezthat[t]he Constitutionrequiresadistinctionbetweenwhatistrulynationalandwhatistrulylocal.44 ThedissentingJusticesinLopezandMorrisonbelievedtheCourtshouldgiveCongress greaterdeferenceindeterminingwhetheraregulatedactivityhasasubstantialeffecton interstatecommerce.45Inthedissentersview,theCourtsdistinctionbetweeneconomic activityandnoneconomicactivitywascontrarytopriordecisions,whichhadonlyemphasized anactivityseffectoninterstatecommerce.46Suchcategoricalexclusionshaveprovenas unworkableinpracticeastheyareunsupportableintheory,accordingtothedissenters,and harkenedbacktothediscreditedLochnerera.47Tothedissenters,theappropriatesafeguard forfederalisminthisareawasnotthecourts,but,asChiefJusticeMarshallhademphasized, thepoliticalstructuresestablishedbytheConstitution.48Citingtheamicicuriaebrieffromthe 36StatecoalitioninsupportofVAWA,thedissentinMorrisonobservedthatitisnottheleast ironyofthesecasesthattheStateswillbeforcedtoenjoythenewfederalismwhetherthey wantitornot.49 LopezandMorrisonweredecidedduringadecadelongperiodknownasthe FederalismRevolutionoftheRehnquistCourt.Duringthisperiod,theCourtimposeda numberofotherrestrictionsontheuseoftheCommerceClause.InSeminoleTribev.Florida,50 theCourtheldthatCongressdoesnothavepowerundertheCommerceClausetoabrogate statesovereignimmunityaffordedtothestatesundertheEleventhAmendment.InNewYork v.UnitedStatesandPrintzv.UnitedStates51theCourtstruckdownfederallawsthatrequired stateofficialstoparticipateinfederalregulatoryefforts,holdingthattheCommerceClause couldnotbeusedtocommandeerstateandlocalofficials.Finally,inSolidWasteAgencyof NorthernCookCountyv.UnitedStates52andRapanosv.UnitedStates,53theCourttwiceused

Id.at613. Id.at618. 44 Id.at613,617. 45 Lopez,514U.S.at61617(Breyer,J.,dissenting)(CourtsmustgiveCongressadegreeofleewayindetermining theexistenceofasignificantfactualconnectionbetweentheregulatedactivityandinterstatecommerceboth becausetheConstitutiondelegatesthecommercepowerdirectlytoCongressandbecausethedetermination requiresanempiricaljudgmentofakindthatalegislatureismorelikelythanacourttomakewithaccuracy.); Morrison,529U.S.at628(Souter,J.,dissenting)(Thefactofsuchasubstantialeffectisnotanissueforthecourts inthefirstinstance,butfortheCongress,whoseinstitutionalcapacityforgatheringevidenceandtakingtestimony farexceedsours.). 46 Lopez,514U.S.at628(Breyer,J.,dissenting). 47 529U.S.at639,64244(Souter,J.,dissenting). 48 Id.at64849. 49 Id.at654. 50 517U.S.44(1996). 51 521U.S.898(1997). 52 531U.S.159(2001). 53 547U.S.715(2006).
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theprincipleofconstitutionalavoidancetolimitthescopeoftheCleanWaterActandthus avoidCommerceClauseconcerns FearsthatLopezandMorrisonwouldcascadeintoanevenbroaderjudicialreviewof federallegislationweresomewhatstaunchedbytheCourts2005decisioninGonzalesv.Raich, whichupheldCongressspowertoregulatemedicinalmarijuanagrownforpersonal consumption,inaccordancewithlocallaw.54SixJusticesvotedtoupholdCongresssuseofits CommerceClausepower,withJusticeAnthonyKennedysigningoninfulltothemajority opinionandJusticeAntoninScaliaconcurringseparately.Asastartingpoint,themajority opinionobservedthat[t]heCommerceClauseemergedastheFramers'responsetothe centralproblemgivingrisetotheConstitutionitself:theabsenceofanyfederalcommerce powerundertheArticlesofConfederation.55Addressingpriorprecedent,itexplainedthat [o]urcaselawfirmlyestablishesCongresspowertoregulatepurelylocalactivitiesthatare partofaneconomicclassofactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstate commerce.56 JusticeScaliaconcurredseparatelyinRaichtoemphasizethatCongress'sregulatory authorityoverintrastateactivitiesthatarenotthemselvespartofinterstatecommerce (includingactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce)derivesfromthe NecessaryandProperClause.57DistinguishingLopezandMorrison,Scaliaexplainedthat Congressmayregulateevennoneconomiclocalactivityifthatregulationisanecessarypartof amoregeneralregulationofinterstatecommerce.58CitingtoMcCulloch,Scaliaexplainedthat theNecessaryandProperClause...empowersCongresstoenactlawsineffectuationofits enumeratedpowersthatarenotwithinitsauthoritytoenactinisolation.59Applyingthese principlestothecaseathand,ScaliaagreedthatCongresscouldreasonablyconcludethatits objectiveofprohibitingmarijuanafromtheinterstatemarketcouldbeundercutifthose activitieswereexceptedfromitsgeneralschemeofregulation.60Dissenting,JusticeSandra DayOConnor,joinedbyChiefJusticeWilliamRehnquistandJusticeClarenceThomas,found thecasemateriallyindistinguishablefromLopezandMorrison.61 WhileJusticeScaliapresentedabroadunderstandingoftheNecessaryandProper ClauseinRaich,thelimitsofhisviewwerehighlightedbyhisdissentinUnitedStatesv. Comstock,62inwhichtheCourt,bya72vote,upheldundertheNecessaryandProperClausea

545U.S.1(2005). Id.at16. 56 Id.at17. 57 Id.at34(Scalia,J.,concurring). 58 Id.at37.AsScaliaexplained,LopezandMorrisondonotdeclarenoneconomicintrastateactivitiestobe categoricallybeyondthereachoftheFederalGovernment.NeithercaseinvolvedthepowerofCongresstoexert controloverintrastateactivitiesinconnectionwithamorecomprehensiveschemeofregulation.Id.at389. 59 Id.at39.Although,evenwhentheendisconstitutionalandlegitimate,themeans...maynotbeotherwise prohibitedandmustbeconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheconstitution.Id.(quotingMcCulloch,17U.S. at421). 60 Id.at42(quotingLopez,514U.S.at561). 61 Id.at45(OConnor,J.,dissenting,joinedbyRehnquist,C.J.,Thomas,J.). 62 130S.Ct.1949(2010).
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federallawallowingthegovernmenttoinstitutecivilcommitmentproceedingsagainst mentallyill,sexuallydangerousfederalprisonersbeyondthedatetheywouldotherwisebe releasedfromprison.Inupholdingthelaw,themajorityopinion,whichChiefJusticeRoberts joinedinfull,recognizedthattheConstitutionaddresse[s]thechoiceofmeansprimarily... tothejudgmentofCongress.63ReferencingChiefJusticeMarshallsdecisioninMcCulloch,the majorityemphasizedhow[t]heFramersdemonstratedconsiderableforesightindraftinga Constitutioncapableofsuchresiliencethroughtime.64 Indissent,JusticeThomas,joinedbyJusticeScalia,arguedforamorenarrow understandingoftheNecessaryandProperClausethatwouldlimititsscopetotheexecutionof Congresssenumeratedpowers.BecauseintheviewsofJusticesThomasandScaliathe challengedfederalstatutedoesnotexecuteanyenumeratedpower,theywouldhavefound itoutsideCongressspower.65JusticeKennedy,inaseparateconcurrence,pushedbackagainst thisunderstandingthattheNecesssaryandProperClausecanbenomorethanonestep removedfromanenumeratedpower.66Instead,[w]hentheinquiryiswhetherafederallaw hassufficientlinkstoanenumeratedpowertobewithinthescopeoffederalauthority,the analysisdependsnotonthenumberoflinksinthecongressionalpowerchainbutonthe strengthofthechain.67Kennedybrokewiththemajority,however,inhisemphasisonthe importanceofwhetheressentialattributesofstatesovereigntyarecompromisedbythe assertionoffederalpowerundertheNecessaryandProperClause,somethinghewouldweigh onthesideofconcludingthatthepowerisnotoneproperlywithinthereachoffederal power.68

TheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClauseata Crossroads
WiththechallengestotheAffordableCareActpendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,the CommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClauseareatasignificantcrossroads.While casesasoldasMcCullochandGibbonsandasnewasRaichandComstockstronglysupportthe constitutionalityoftheminimumcoverageprovision,casesfromCarterCoaltoMorrisonalso indicatethataconservativemajorityontheCourtismorethancapableofimposingnewlimits onthepowersofthefederalgovernmentwhenitchoosestodoso.

130S.Ct.1949,1957(2010)(quotingBurroughsv.UnitedStates,290U.S.534,54748(1934)). Id.at1955. 65 Id.at1974(Thomas,J.,dissenting,joinedbyScalia,J.).ThomasunderscoredhisbeliefthattheCourtsopinion breathesnewlifeintotheNecessaryandProperClause,whichhecalledthelast,besthopeofthosewhodefend ultravirescongressionalaction.Id.at1983(quotingPrintzv.UnitedStates,521U.S.898,923(1997)). 66 Id.at196566(Kennedy,J.,concurring);seealsoid.at196970(Alito,J.,concurring)(acknowledginglegitimacy offederalpowermorethanonestepremovedfromenumeratedpower). 67 Id.at1966. 68 Id.at196768.

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TheCourtsrulingontheACAcasewillbealandmarkrulingnomatterhowitcomes out.AnopinionupholdingtheAct,joinedbyoneormembersoftheCourtsconservativebloc, couldgoalongwaytoending,onceandforall,therecurringquestionofwhetherthefederal governmenthasthepowersrequiredtosolveproblems,likeaccesstohealthcare,whichare trulynationalinscope.ArulingstrikingdowntheActwouldbeahugestepbacktowardthe Lochnerera,withaprogressivePresidentatwarwithaconservativeSupremeCourt.Notsince CarterCoalhastheSupremeCourtstruckdownanypieceoflegislationnearthescopeand scaleoftheAffordableCareActasbeyondCongressspowersundertheCommerceClauseand theNecessaryandProperClause. Nearly200yearsago,ChiefJusticeMarshallwarnedaboutthosewhowouldexplain awaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,amagnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat, buttotallyunfitforuse.Giventhatsomeoftherulingsauthoredorjoinedbyconservative membersoftheRobertsCourtsupportabroadinterpretationoffederalpower,itdoesnot seemthattheconservativeblocconsistentlyholdsasapostulatethatthepowersexpressly grantedtothefederalgovernmentaretobegiventhenarrowestpossibleconstruction.That said,itisunclearwhethertheconservativeJusticeswhovotedinsupportoffederalpowerin RaichandComstockwilldosotoupholdanexerciseofcongressionalpowerthatdoesnotfitas wellwiththeirpolicypreferences.TheAffordableCareAct,andmanyotherfederallaws,hang inthatbalance.

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