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The United States PSYOP Organization in Europe During World War II

by Herbert A. Friedman & Franklin Prosser This article in an attempt to explore and study the psychological operations (PSYOP) organizations that were formed during World War II. It is a story in progress. As new organizations and connections between such organizations are found, the article will be updated. This article is mostly concerned with the war in Europe. A separate article will discuss US PSYOP in the Pacific. Many of the numbers of leaflets and newspaper printed are estimated. The number of printed products produced during World War II are in the billions, so it is difficult to be accurate. All the numbers mentioned in this article are from published references, but they do sometimes conflict. Civilian Organization of Propaganda
On 16 August 1940, Nelson Rockefeller was named Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), with responsibility for disseminating news, films, and radio to Latin America. CIAA retained its independent existence throughout World War II, despite the formation of several other information organizations.

General William Donovan On 11 July 1941, the Coordinator of Information (COI) was formed, headed by Colonel (later General) William ("Wild Bill") Donovan. COI’s responsibilities included the gathering of intelligence and the analysis and dissemination of information abroad, outside Latin America. COI was a predecessor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Foreign Information Service (FIS), with Robert Sherwood as director, was formed within COI. It dealt with news and white propaganda outside Latin America, and quickly behaved almost as an autonomous unit.

Elmer Davis

Robert Sherwood

On 13 June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was created with Elmer Davis as director, subsuming several other agencies including FIS (but not CIAA). FIS, under Sherwood, became the Overseas Branch of OWI, dealing in white propaganda. In this June 1942 reorganization, COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with Donovan, operating as code number 109, as director.

We will not discuss the OWI in any great depth because most of the items we will depict in this article were both printed and disseminated by the OSS or military PSYOP units. However an example of the importance of the OWI is discussed in a 13 December 1943 LIFE Magazine article entitled, “Psychological Warfare; OWI runs school for propagandists.” Hanging fire in the Senate last week was a $5,000,000 appropriation for the overseas branch of OWI. On its fate depends the expanding operations of a score of foreign outposts through which OWI, in collaboration with the Army, wages psychological warfare on the enemy. To fit men for this the OWI maintains a training center on Long Island from which more than 300 newsmen, radio and printing technicians, and public relations experts have been graduated to date.

The Davidson Press Workhorse of field operations, the Davidson Dual Duplicator, about 725 lbs., in weight and not much bigger than some office duplicating machines, can turn out both letterpress and color offset. These machines print newspapers, leaflets and posters on the spot in captured territories. The three-week course (for 30 to 40 students at a time) is intensive and ranges from study of the nature of the enemy to commando techniques. In the field these propagandists operate in “combat teams” of two to 10 men each. Mobile equipment for frontline operations includes trucks carrying printing and broadcasting units, photographic dark rooms, and electrical generators and supplies. Four men have already been killed in line of duty. Of the value of psychological warfare there can be little doubt. Approximately 80% of Italian prisoners questioned in Sicily had PWB (Psychological Warfare Branch) leaflets in their possession or had read them. When the Italian fleet surrendered in response to a radio appeal transmitted by PWB over international distress-signal frequency, British Admiral Cunningham said: “Tell General McClure they’ve accomplished in one day with propaganda what I've been trying to do for three years with the Navy.



Responsibilities between OWI and OSS were but vaguely defined, and disputes within and among CIAA, OWI, and OSS became disruptive. At this early stage of the war, few officials knew what their organizations should be doing, but many knew

what other organizations should be prevented from doing. Donovan’s ambitious plans for OSS were fought doggedly by Sherwood and Davis. The squabbling led to presidential Executive Order 9312 of 9 March 1943, which, in attempting to clarify the responsibilities of OWI and OSS, gave white propaganda (white propaganda is issued from an acknowledged source. This type of propaganda is associated with overt psychological operations) to OWI but left black propaganda’s (black propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. This type of propaganda is associated with covert psychological operations) status unclear. As the war progressed, OSS became the de facto owner of black propaganda and OWI of white, and this arrangement was formalized by an agreement between Donovan and Davis in June 1944. Early in the war, the U.S. had little expertise in subversive warfare. Donovan borrowed heavily from the British for experience in black propaganda; the British, after going through their own period of high-level resistance to unconventional methods of warfare, had borrowed from the Germans. By mid-1943, OSS command (under the director and assistant director) consisted of two principal deputy directors: the Deputy Director of Intelligence, who controlled such branches as Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counter-Espionage (X-2), and the Deputy Director of Psychological Warfare Operations (later Deputy Director of Operations), controlling branches such as Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups (OG), Maritime Units (MU), and Morale Operations (MO). MO was the source of black printed propaganda. In summer of 1943, OSS theatre officers were appointed for each of the major military theatres in which OSS was operating: ETO (European Theatre of Operations), METO (Middle Eastern), NATO (North African), and FETO (Far Eastern). NATO was later renamed MEDTO (Mediterranean Theatre of Operations), which through its MO branch was responsible for much of the black propaganda emitted by the OSS. In addition to serving in the chain of command to OSS headquarters in Washington, the theatre officers were the liaisons between OSS and the military theatre commanders, who had approval authority over all OSS and OWI projects in their theatres. The theatre officers served through December 1944, when another OSS reorganization eliminated this structure.

SHAEF Insignia OSS established many missions overseas during the course of the war. The MO units themselves are described later. The OSS had an important headquarters in London, with Donovan arranging its first beginnings in August 1941. OSS London reached its final form in 1943 and early 1944; the MO unit in London was established in May 1943, where, operating under direct allied military control, it produced subversive propaganda for the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). In neutral Switzerland, OSS maintained a headquarters in Bern beginning in May 1942, using the diplomatic cover provided by the OWI. There, the OSS (headed by Allen Dulles, who arrived in November 1942 and operated as code number 110, with cover name "Mr. Burns") and the OWI (under Gerald Mayer, whose code number was 678) cooperated extensively on production of propaganda, and official correspondence on this subject seems to make little distinction between the offices. The Bern OSS unit operated from Herrengasse 23. The OSS established five sub-units in Switzerland: in Geneva, Zurich, Lugano, Ascona, and Basel. OSS operations were conducted with great caution to avoid exposure and arrest by the rigorously neutral Swiss. The contributions of OSS Switzerland were deemed highly effective. In neutral Sweden, the OSS established a small base of three men in Stockholm in 1942; by late 1944 it had grown to 35 members. A small two-man MO unit arrived in Stockholm in April 1944. In the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, OSS-MEDTO was originally (in 1943) designated the 2677th Headquarters Company (Provisional) G-3. To increase its autonomy, in May 1944 the unit was designated a regiment, officially the 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional). The regiment was activated in July 1944 with headquarters near Caserta, Italy, when North African Theatre of Operations military headquarters (NATOUSA) moved from Algiers to Caserta. The regimental commander was Colonel Edward Glavin, a Strategic Services Officer of MEDTO. Most of the black propaganda produced by the OSS originated with MO Rome, which was organized in mid-1944.

One of the original personnel. under OSS leadership. and by March was ready for action.. despite continual interference from OWI and the military. This reinforced the natural secrecy and turf protection always present in intelligence and PSYOP work. and Brindisi. Patrick Dolan. Howard Baldwin (active in late 1944). stickers. OSS Morale Operations (MO) The Morale Operations Branch of the OSS was created in early January 1943. Caserta. unlike Donovan (code 109). Handel und Wandel. Stockholm. Naples. and LTC Herbert S. The MO Unit in Switzerland . had more autonomy. Algiers. Casey was named Chief of Secret Intelligence. and Whitney Shepardson (Chief of Secret Intelligence in Washington. LTJG William Casey. letters. after the dissolution of OSS). code 154). Casey operated without a code number. As CSI-ETO. Nachrichten für Die Truppe. Little (chief on 30 November 1945. and led to considerable local independence of action of the field units. Gerald Meyer (head of OWI in Switzerland. MO-Rome produced significant philatelic black propaganda. and postcards. MO-Bern forged German postage stamps.000 pamphlets. The various field MO units did not work together on a regular basis. producing subversive propaganda for PWD/SHAEF and assisting the British in the production of the highly successful grey (propaganda that does not specifically identify any source) Nachrichten für Die Truppe (Message for the troops) newspaper. USN. MO-Rome maintained contact with MOBern in the European Theatre of Operations. Bari. and on occasion shared ideas and materials. nor did they have close tactical connections with higher authority in Washington or London. The London MO unit (cover name MOTTA) was under direct military control. ETO.psychological means operating or purporting to operate within the enemy or occupied territories. posters. Its primary function was to attack "the morale and the political unity of the enemy through. Using OWI equipment. Mann (replaced Oechsner in May 1944). MO-MEDTO began with a 3-man mission to Algiers in March 1943. 20 April 1945 Throughout most of the period of our main interest – 1944 and 1945 – MO and other branches of the OSS reported through their OSS theatre officers. leaflets. (Trade and Change) a weekly business and financial publication aimed at German industrialists. By 1945. Morton Bodfish. MO-ETO maintained missions in Paris.The OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945. Other MO units. In 1944. and in the Italian towns of Rome." Chiefs of MO include Frederick Oechsner (began in early 1943). The MO Unit in Stockholm A two-man MO mission (code name Sioux) arrived in Stockholm in March 1944. Dulles (code 110). the unit produced some 250. Charles Healy. Roller (chief in February 1945). quickly undertook production of the Harvard Project newsletter. COL Kenneth D. Siena. Bern. MO-MEDTO maintained bases in Cairo. code number 678). (The names are not necessarily all in order of service). and London. and would serve in the 1980s as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.. LTC J.

Warner. and production methods. Cornflakes. MO-MEDTO is often referred to as MO Rome. Schuhl oversaw a prolific print shop in Geneva shared by the OSS and OWI. later promoted to major after COL Glavin (commander of OSS-MEDTO) personally interceded in Dewart’s behalf with General Donovan)." (presumably Gerry Mayer) states that Schuhl’s phone number was 2. and other forms of printed propaganda. which developed the propaganda ideas. Under this group were the operation and implementation planners who created such operations as Sauerkraut. located at Via Baccina 45 in Rome. The papers of Allen Dulles shows that during the war Schuhl was considered for a U. Warner’s title was MO Chief. but it was a political impossibility to give a formal award to a foreign civilian doing "black" propaganda. texts.M.000 forged German Hitler head stamps from MO Rome to assist in a proposed project to insert propaganda letters into Germany from Switzerland. The MO Units in Italy – MO Rome Morale Operations Rome Printing Press Much of the OSS printed propaganda was produced by the Morale Operations unit in Rome during the period mid-1944 to mid-1945.The Chief of MO Switzerland and its principal forger was Raymond Arthur Schuhl. postage stamps. a French propagandist who had served in the 6th Section of the 2nd Bureau (the Deuxieme Bureau – military intelligence) of the French Secret Service until the fall of France. A letter to Dulles from "G. Morale Operations (MO-MEDTO) bore the designation "2677th Headquarters Detachment OSS (Provisional)".) MO Rome was headed by Eugene P. military decoration for his outstanding work. Stabilimento Aristide Staderini. formerly of the Associated Press. Other clues suggest that MO Switzerland was producing forged German postage stamps in the early fall of 1944 (prior to the end of October). and Pig Iron. since the Pantone color code for the ink used in the forgery of the 6 pfennig Hitler head stamp was 2677. Schuhl’s group produced millions of white and black pamphlets. including distribution of the propaganda documents. Within the 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional). Schuhl received 10. His executive officer was Captain William T. (The "2677" was the subject of an inside joke at MO Rome. MO Rome’s activities centered on the editorial and planning group. MO Rome used an existing Italian printing house.S. with headquarters in Rome on Viale Regina Margherita. . a civilian. where many of the leaflets.74 at the Hotel Regina in Geneva. an individual would be a participant in all three areas. posters. and forged postage stamps were printed. helpers and field operatives carried out the activities. Around Christmas 1944. Dewart Jr. (scion of the New York Sun publishing family. Assisting Clemente with the printing were SGT Alfio D’Urso and civilian Helmuth Gruchol. and postwar public relations director of TWA. Schuhl relocated to Switzerland and operated for the OSS under the cover name Robert Salembier (code name "Mutt").M.61. This would suggest that MO Rome originated the forgery of the German stamps. who later became a close associate of Senator Joe McCarthy. leaflets. This shop was run by CPL Egidio Clemente. cards. Finally. In many instances.

and 12-pfennig German Hitler Head postage stamps for use in sending propaganda through the German Reichspost. MO Rome produced an extensive series of "black" propaganda postcards. begun 1 July 1944). and envelopes. by late 1944 efforts to distribute anti-German propaganda inside Germany had met with only limited success. codename Eddie Zinder. assisted Italian Partisans in the production and distribution of their underground newspaper. stickers. newspapers. MSG Richard Lee. then a LTJG. . however. and use of friendly German prisoners of war (Operation Sauerkraut. mailings by allied agents within the Third Reich. A related effort. who after the war became a noted travel author. and hopes were tied to Operation Cornflakes. La Riscossa Italiana. Writers Jan Liebig (alias Jan Libich) and H. (In official reports. spoke fluent German and participated in the interrogation of prisoners in Operation Sauerkraut. Clemente’s print shop was forging 6. hand delivery by the German underground. described below. F. who frequently operated near the location of across-the-line infiltration. The propaganda was distributed by a variety of means including airdrops. Woman’s Army Corps CPL Barbara Suzka Lauwers. CPT Temple Fielding. leaflets. names were often disguised with aliases. we include the real names where known. a writer. in this discussion. often in huge quantities. Forgeries such as postal cancels and German military documents were done by a civilian.) Famed New Yorker cartoonist Saul Steinberg. did much of the propaganda artwork. "Pitz" Broch de Rotherman (alias Hermann de Rothermann) planned and directed the Cornflakes and Pig Iron operations. Before the end of October 1944.Das Neue Deutschland MO Rome produced forged postage stamps. subsequently with the New York Daily News. Neither Lee nor Fielding could speak or write German. was in the planning group. However. Operation Sheet Iron. An early venture by MO Rome into the field of leaflet airdrops (Operation Pig Iron) included dropping more than 10 million miniature copies of the black propaganda newspaper Das Neue Deutschland (The New Germany). postcards. provided valuable support.

In the summer of 1944. SGT Arthur Hammond. Reddick. the chief printer. William Reddick later was transferred to the OSS London Cover and Documentation Office. MD. CPL Clemente. T/5 Larry Bruzzese. 1998. Bari is on Italy’s Adriatic (eastern) coast. behind the Headquarters building at 72 Grosvenor Street. known from a unit commendation from General Donovan dated 3 November 1944.2LT Robert Allen. saved instances of much of the MO Rome propaganda in several scrapbooks. and this notion was adopted and refined in 1945 in MO Rome’s Operation Cornflakes. He told me that he had established a forgery plant in Washington D. Official documents indicate that Washington sent at least 50. His job was to establish a print shop in London to produce forged documents. collected two specimen copies of all printed MO Rome propaganda. McIntosh. and was in charge of an operation that forged large quantities of Japanese occupation banknotes. It appears that OSS Washington was very involved with counterfeiting the currency of enemy nations during WWII. 1LT Jack Daniels of Company B in Bari was liaison with MO Rome and operations officer at MO Bari. current president of the Anna Kuliscioff Foundation in Milan. 1LT Arthur Mathieu. At least four of Allen’s scrapbooks survived the war. (Some of these names may be aliases. about 250 miles southeast of Rome.C. who arrived in Rome on 3 August 1944 with Broch de Rotherman. in order to provide documentation for congressional leaders who would determine support for MO activities. The OSS Combat Propaganda Companies . each different but containing overlapping selections of materials. That summer. Fistere was probably succeeded as chief by Capt. Temple Fielding. MO in Washington: Little is known of MO propaganda and forgery activities that originated in Washington. Fistere had experimented with air-dropping Hungarian mailbags filled with propaganda leaflets. SSG Walter Weisbecker. According to Sisterhood of Spies . We also know that LTC Carl F. John Fistere. and who was initially assigned as an assistant in production and in charge of shipping.the Women of the OSS. Other personnel of the 2677th MO Rome. SGT Laird Ogle.C. Elizabeth P. Italy. 2LT Marcel Robich was an "assistant" (probably second in command) at MO Bari when Daniels was chief. In the 1960s he donated one set to Guilio Polotti. Naval Institute Press. SGT Marcel Robich. Eifler requested OSS Washington to develop and produce counterfeits of the Japanese invasion money (JIM) for Malaya. Annapolis. have provided invaluable firm evidence of the products produced by OSS Rome. and civilians Roland Dulin and William Laas. These scrapbooks.) The MO Units in Italy – MO Bari OSS Agent in the Rome Printing Plant inspects propaganda material MO Bari frequently participated in the distribution of black propaganda designed and produced by MO Rome.000 ten dollar banknotes to anti-Japanese guerillas in Malaya. the chief of MO Bari was Mr. were 1LT Jack Daniels (later associated with the Cornflakes Operation). by March 1945 he was chief of MO Bari. I did interview an OSS forger several years ago by the name of W.

inspire and guide friendly inhabitants of occupied territory in their cooperation with our objectives and forces." The same might be done with pictures of horribly mutilated soldiers who have been removed from the front and sent home. OWI refused to cooperate with JPWC. distrust of his motives for combat. This stipulation was strictly observed thereafter. Donovan to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 3 February 1943. "Why?. They may also be entitled as follows. preferably in the order suggested below). The Navy Department had the most consistent interest in the subject. b." "The New Order. and during the war the Navy established the Special Warfare Branch (OP-16W) within its Office of Naval Intelligence. Fear.S. Each picture might be entitled as follows. "He escaped death. Military Organization of PSYOP – Government Level For the most part. These units represent partial activation of the Combat Propaganda Companies. which. deceive and otherwise hamper the tactical activity of enemy troops opposite our lines. The War Department engaged in only inconsistent and tepid support of PSYOP. the companies will be transferred to the Theater of Operations Commander and will therefore operate under his command. the U." "His children will miss him. and led to closer interactions . war weariness. (Though each of these aims may be pursued separately. a Special Studies Group (SSG) was formed to coordinate activities with COI and CIAA. a military Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) was formed on 18 March 1942." "An Iron Cross and a wooden crutch. Upon completion of training. in part to coordinate activities of other U. and execution of the military program of psychological warfare. Before World War II. SAMPLE CAMPAIGN THAT MAY BE USED BY A COMBAT PROPAGANDA COMPANY Devices designed to undermine an enemy's will to resist by developing in him feelings of fear. far more effective results may be achieved by saturating the enemy with the greatest amount of material possible. to the Office of Strategic Services has been accomplished. The Theater Commander may obtain from the Office of Strategic Services and special psychological warfare studies or data desired by him. and willingness to surrender." and a picture of a blinded soldier entitled. No further central military control of PSYOP was attempted during the war. Break the will to win or resist of the enemy inhabitants of enemy territory. development. a transfer of certain combat propaganda units. will be available to Task Force Commanders as fully mobile combat units to: a. government organizations.S. Through his liaison officer. After OWI was formed in mid-1942. each showing the horrible fashion in which their soldiers met death. formerly a part of the Military Intelligence Service. coordination. "He never saw the fatherland again. dated 23 December 1942 under which this office is charged with the planning. Inform. c. when completely activated and trained. Some of the pertinent portions of the memorandum are: In accordance with the Directive of the Joint United States Chief of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services. assure.S. However.How did the OSS produce "black" propaganda in the field? Much of the story is told in a declassified "secret" memorandum From Director William J. thereafter JPWC became swamped with dealing with OSS administrative problems." U." and "More than he bargained for. What kind of PSYOP did these combat propaganda teams produce? One example is given in a 1943 secret OSS document. Executive Order 9312 of 9 March 1943 provided that all PSYOP projects were subject to the approval of the appropriate military theatre commanders. military was not enthusiastic about PSYOP. and by the end of 1942 JPWC was disbanded. A continual series of pictures should be dropped over enemy lines. futility of further struggle. One batch of pictures a day should be dropped on them. Following a proposal by SSG. Demoralize.

occupation units that worked in newly captured territory. OWI and OSS. Colonel Charles B. Eisenhower established the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of the Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ) as a joint U. and the British and American Army and Navy intelligence services.between the military and the two civilian organizations. This set a precedent for other Allied joint ventures.S. at the time one of the few military leaders sympathetic to psychological warfare. Eisenhower Beginning in October 1942. and British operation in the North African theatre. On the other hand. General Eisenhower and Brigadier General McClure . PWB coordination of propaganda was extended to the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy and other actions in the Mediterranean theatre. as the joint North African Operation Torch was about to begin. with little exchange of information or personnel across major military commands. Hazeltine organized PWB in three sections: combat propaganda units attached to front-line forces. PSYOP activities became balkanized. Allied Military PSYOP in the European Theatre General Dwight D. became concerned with the problems of coordinating the activities of the U. Following the North African operation.S. and base units that coordinated propaganda efforts of the Allied Forces Headquarters with those of London and Washington. the British Political Warfare Executive and Ministry of Information. General Dwight Eisenhower.

and staffed mainly by OWI personnel. The official PWD/SHAEF history. Control of the information services in occupied Germany. the first was handled by a subsidiary organization known as the AIS (Allied Information Services). says in part: PWD/SHAEF was nominally charged with two main functions in addition to psychological warfare against the enemy. The PWD/SHAEF history continues: To fulfil the need for consolidation operations among friendly populations. designated the 6805th AIS Group Headquarters (Provisional). Elsewhere. and in this study the productions of these two PSYOP organizations are shown under the United States. In northwestern Europe. together with certain personnel designated as Advance PWD/SHAEF and the personnel of the first field consolidation team. and. at the beginning. PWD had an important role in the production and dissemination of white propaganda in the northwestern European theatre until the end of the war. was established. later USIS (United States Information service). PWB continued its operations under a less complex structure. established in 1943 by Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in London during the preparations for the cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe in June 1944. . PWB was a model for the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD or PWD/SHAEF). 2. AIS was made up of a Group Headquarters. David Lerner says about the AIS in Sykewar: Actually. landed on the Normandy beaches 5 July 1944 and reached Cherbourg the following day. McClure. Both PWB and PWD reported to American generals. a subsidiary of PWD. called Allied Information Services. Consolidation propaganda in liberated friendly countries. three field teams each with a commanding officer. 1.PWD-Allied Information Service (AIS) Commander LTC Lance Lazonby (seated) with his staff. The elimination of the phrase Psychological Warfare from the title was done simply because it did not appear to be diplomatic to speak in terms of "waging psychological warfare" against our friends. The head of PWD/SHAEF was Brigadier General Robert A. PWD incorporated the activities of PWB (with PWB units attached to each of the armies). AIS Group Headquarters.

The dramatic successes of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in 1941 and early 1942 led to the controversial Allied Operation Torch – the invasion of North Africa – in November 1942. Rommel reported to the senior German commander in the Mediterranean. there had been no significant U. With the outbreak of war. This British success led Hitler in early 1941 to send to North Africa an expeditionary force under General (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel. who would serve with distinction in Italy. The "rule of threes" expresses a tendency to have three units within its parent unit. etc. who in turn was replaced in August 1942 by General Sir Harold R. Middle East. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. typically there are three Corps in an Army. Platoon. Alexander. Division. Two types will be delivered in the first years of production: 1. Leaflet G21 I added British leaflet G21 to this article because we are talking about war in the desert and the Afrika Corps.L. and Squad. Battalion. To command the British 8th Army in North Africa. This allows two units to be on the line.G. Limousine 2. and Luftwaffe commander in the Mediterranean. Cabriolet/Limousine . The Germans used their “people’s car” as a form of internal PSYOP to convince the people that things were getting better and even the young and the working class could afford a car under Nazi rule. Regiment/Brigade. Army unit structure: The hierarchy is Army. Until that time. who quickly resurrected British fortunes by routing Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika (which included the Afrika Corps) first at Alam Halfa in August and then at El Alamein in October. Corps. a small force of the British 8th Army found itself opposed in Cyrenaica by the Italian 10th Army. three Divisions in a Corps.(Note on U. which the British quickly routed.) Allied Military Operations in the Mediterranean – North Africa and Italy Military units in North Africa. with one unit in reserve. South. Churchill appointed General Bernard Montgomery. Commander-in-Chief.S. The original pamphlet describing the car said in part: Each German Folk-companion has the opportunity to obtain a KdF car. Company.S. The leaflet shows an interesting use of both internal and external PSYOP. For instance. by General Sir Claude Auchinleck. forces in the North African theatre. The British military had undergone several changes in command: In 1941 General Sir Archibald Wavell was replaced as Commander-in-Chief.

“After Stalingrad and Tunis?” Operation Torch. the U. which was already on the scene.” Once the saver has accepted the savings card.” Below the photograph of Hitler and the miniature model of the car is a second photograph showing two dead German soldiers contorted in the North African desert heat with the military version of the automobile.S. beginning 9 September. Jr.the slogan meaning strength (or power) through joy. the cars were never delivered and I assume the collected monies all went to the German war effort. Clark attacked the western shore at Salerno (Operation Avalanche). which began 8 November 1942. The leaflet title is. The text is “Hitler sees the model. and the British 1st Army. were forced to surrender North Africa in mid-May 1943. British leaflet G21 was dropped from 20 April 1943 to 5 May 1943. The text is. Anderson. he is obliged to purchase RM 5 in saving stamps each week… German KdF car savings stamps The RM 5 was deducted from the paycheck of the German worker who signed up to receive what would eventually become the “People's Car” (Volkswagen). In an attempt to break the stalemate and outflank Kesselring’s troops. the invasion of Anzio. the forces were comprised of a Western Task Force (U. 7th Army under General Patton. The German forces. General Kenneth N. so perhaps the Arabs got to them before the British.S. an Eastern Task Force (U. Ferdinand Porsche was commissioned to design a car for the Nazi Kraft Durch Freude organization . on 22 January 1944 the Allies launched Operation Shingle.” The text mentions German military disasters in the Soviet Union and North Africa. and ends. A photograph at the top of the leaflet depicts Hitler being shown a model of the KdF car that was to be eventually owned by every German. General George S. The occupation of Sicily was completed in September 1943. that same month Hitler created the 5th Panzerarmee in Tunisia under General Jürgen von Arnim to augment Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika.S.. The British looked at the KdF campaign and saw an opportunity to attack the German Government. 5th Army under Lt. German defenses were under the command of Field Marshal Kesselring. In reaction to this assault.” The back of the leaflet is all text and entitled “Hitler Strategy. together with remains of the Italian 1st Army. but it wasn't until after the Second World War that it became available to civilians as the Volkswagen. The purchase request for the KdF car has to be made through the offices of the National Socialist Fellowship “Strength through Joy. Berlin 1938. who commanded the 15th Army Group. under the command of Major General Lloyd R.S. General Mark W.) that included the U. They seem to have been stripped of their uniforms. Patton. Alexander was placed in charge of the newly created 18th Army Group. This group consisted of the British 8th Army under General Montgomery and the U. was the first combined Allied military operation of the war.S. The result was deadlock on two fronts. Military units in Italy. thwarted by Kesselring’s skillful defense. a Center Task Force (U. commanded by Lt. “I allowed for each possibility ahead of time. Torch was under the command of General Dwight David Eisenhower. at Cassino and Anzio. and British) led by Major General Charles Ryder. The Cabriolet/Limousine costs an additional RM 60 because it is more expensive to produce. In February 1943. Fredendall (and later under Patton). The stalemate dragged on with heavy losses . The Allies occupied southern Italy during late 1943. “Strength through Joy!” Directly beneath the title is a Hitler quote from 30 January 1941. but.Cost for the Limousine is RM 990.” (Note) The KdF-Wagen was produced in military versions such as the Type 82 and amphibious Type 166. “The finished vehicle in Africa 1943. II Corps. Of course. In addition to the British 8th Army under Montgomery. which incorporated the British 1st and 8th Armies and the U.S.) under Lt. The invasion of mainland Italy commenced on 3 September 1943. II Corps in Tunisia. with the British 8th Army under Montgomery attacking at the toe of Italy and on the Adriatic (eastern) shore.S. For Operation Husky – the invasion of Sicily in June 1943 – overall ground command went to General Alexander. the Allied advance bogged down in the winter of 1943-1944 at Cassino on the Gustav Line in south-central Italy.

and was influential in establishing the propaganda warfare school at Fort Bragg. Klaus Mann. "Modern war has become a struggle for men's minds as well as their bodies. . He was able to merge members of the OWI." For some of its work. and related duties.S. 1990. In January 2001 the Army formally recognized McClure's contributions as the father of Army special warfare by naming the US Army Special Operations Command headquarters building in his honor at Fort Bragg. The Free French in North Africa also made use of SIPA’s press.G. it appears to have been a local printing job shop that published newspapers.S. He was military attaché to the London embassy during 1941-1942. the Allies stalled at the Gothic Line in late August and the Winter Line for the long winter of 1944-1945. with Kesselring fighting an effective delaying action throughout the remainder of 1944 and into 1945.S. Rome was captured on 4 June 1944. the Allies used the SIPA press in Algiers.S. By the end of the war. the U. Allied Military PSYOP Activities in North Africa Prior to the joint Allied Operation Torch in November 1942. OSS. Volume 13. AFHQ for a few months. 5th Army to participate in Operation Anvil (renamed Dragoon). signal. converged on Rome. He was to serve as chief of military propaganda for more than a decade. By the end of the North African campaign the section grew to over 1500 personnel. and confusing. General McClure's organization was made up of over 2300 personnel. In 1944 he was named Director of PWD with the responsibility of coordinating all PSYOP in the ETO. called him the "Forgotten Father of U. leaflets. Fighting continued until the end of the war on 2 May 1945. there is little doubt that the bulk of Allied military printed propaganda for Italy originated with the Americans.on both sides into the spring of 1944. In this capacity he planned and commanded INC. two days before the invasion of Normandy. MAAG. following a breakout from Anzio. Following the capture of Rome. 5th Army in Italy produced numerous white propaganda newspapers and leaflets. missing. A few leaflets in Arabic are known from this period. and it is often difficult or impossible to determine the origin of the leaflets. propaganda. He had no special training in PSYOP and yet was able to successfully teach himself to become an expert in the field. In Italy. advances by the Allies continued at a crawl. Paddock Jr. Brigadier General Robert A. These activities were based in Cairo. The PWB operated out of Algiers under the command of Brigadier General Robert A McClure. Some leaflets produced in Algiers were dropped in southern France and Northern Italy. 1990. Army Special Warfare" in an article in Perspectives. Number 3. 1953-1956) is an interesting individual. control of propaganda was assigned to the newly created Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ). However. censorship. until in May the Allies broke through the Gustav Line and. Auckland. After the war he was quoted. North Carolina in 1952. The best compilation of these leaflets is R. In October 1942. Alfred H. Code designations for white leaflets for this theatre are. McClure (later promoted to Major General while assigned as Chief. the British PWE and MOI into a smooth-running and efficient machine. Although the meaning of SIPA is not known. an attack on southern France in mid-August 1944 to divert German forces from the Normandy front. Iran. probably designed leaflets for both Armies. Leaflets in Arabic and leaflets in French were airdropped for civilians in North Africa. German-language leaflets and bilingual German/Italian leaflets were airdropped on Axis troops. The propaganda output was almost exclusively white. the Journal of the Psychological Operations Association. NC. The 5th Army also assisted the British 8th Army in leaflet production. with the approach of Operation Torch. PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No. Allied Military PSYOP Activities in Italy From 1943 to 1945. Egypt. as is not surprising in wartime. 5th Army. He was accustomed to working with British military and civilian groups. Catalogue of Allied Leaflets Dropped in North Africa to German and Italian Troops and Civilians. Eisenhower then selected him to head up the Information and Censorship Section (INC) in AFHQ. Leaflets in German and in both German and Italian are known. 17. largely inconsistent. The numbering and labeling systems used in this theatre are confusing. with the U. Allied leaflets in Italian were airdropped on Italian troops in Tripolitania and Tunisia. with responsibility for radio. British and American efforts were hindered by the withdrawal of substantial portions of the British 8th Army and the U. following which he became chief of intelligence. 1940-1943. British units produced a small amount of white printed propaganda aimed at Italian and German troops and indigenous Arab civilians in North Africa. Some 30 leaflets in Italian are known to have been directed to Italian troops in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (both now in Libya). repetitive.

Egidio Clemente. 3rd Army.S. Devers. 1943-1945. "GN". Adriafront / Wochenblatt für deutsche Truppen. McClure. "C/GN/". 1991.In Italy. The 6th AG comprised the French 1st Army. The 5th Army probably also produced various series of leaflets coded "AU/" (for Austria). commanded by General George Patton. The 21st AG comprised the Canadian 1st Army. At the Army level. At the Army Group level. "G. Simpson. commanded by U. commanded by General D. commanded British Field Marshal Bernard F.S. Powell 21st AG: Brigadier Neville. the U. commanded by General Miles Dempsey. Under Eisenhower. Allied Military PSYOP on the European Western Front Northwestern European theatre: military organization of SHAEF. Luftpost / Ausgabe Süd. 1944-1945.A. Compilations of Allied leaflets for Italy are found in Hans Düsel. Officers in charge of PWD activities in the Army Groups and the Armies were: 6th AG: James Clark 12th AG: Colonel Clifford R. including Frontpost / Wochenblatt für deutsche Soldaten. Catalogue Listings of U. the 5th Army produced several long-running series of leaflet newspapers. and "NN" ("Neueste Nachrichten"). Military PSYOP Structure Under PWD/SHAEF Brigadier General Robert A. "GIG/".S. General Omar Bradley. Frontpost Ausgabe Süd / Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Soldaten. Frontpost / Ausgabe der Adriafront. and the U. Istituto Storico Della Resistenza in Provincia di Novarr "P. Psychological Warfare Branches (PWB’s) were formed within the General Staff section G2 (Intelligence) of each Army. and the U. 1995. Nominally. the 12th AG. "Gn/". 19. Fornara". 5th Army produced the "G-" and "GL-" series of leaflets. The 21st British Army Group produced approximately 81 different leaflets coded AgG. and Hans Dusel. Catalogue of Allied Aerial Leaflets for German and Austrian Troops in Mediterranean Countries and Islands. commanded by General William H. the U. describes the Allied black propaganda produced by his old unit. 1 and ran through No. and the British 2nd Army. 9th Army. Montgomery. Fifth Army’s main Frontpost series began 4 November 1943 with Issue No. and the 21st AG. in a chapter entitled "Moral Operations" (pages 150-164). PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No.". G. and numerous other one-shot leaflets either uncoded or with codes not belonging to a series. then CPT Albert H. General Jacob L. 126 (20 April 1945). 1st Army: LTC Sheperd Stone. "GS". 1st Army.S. SHAEF was organized in three Army Groups (AG’s): the 6th AG. commanded by General Alexander Patch. 1994.S. "Luftpost" and "Frontpost" Newspapers Disseminated by Air to German Troops and Civilians in Europe and to German Troops in Italy. PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No. Salvatori." . "GT/". Nachrichten aus der Heimat / Frontpost Beilage. "GC/".S. Frontpost Ausgabe Süd / Wochenausgabe. 7th Army. The First Army produced approximately 63 different combat team leaflets coded "CT. McClure The Chief of PWD/SHAEF was Brigadier General Robert A. "LN" ("Letzte Nachrichten").S. 21. commanded by General Courtney Hodges." through "G. the chief printer at MO Rome.S. commanded by General Lasse de Tassigny. "GTC/".Z. gives an extensive discussion of the propaganda to and from Italy. an AG’s PWD officer reported through the AG’s P & PW officer. U. then CPT Jacob Tenenbaum. "G/" (for the Balkans). From late 1943 until the German surrender. The 12th AG comprised the U. PWD was combined with Public Relations to form a special Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P & PW) section. and Luftpost und Soldaten-Nachrichten / Ausgabe Süd. The Italian-language book Propaganda Politica e Mezzi di Comunicazione di Massa: Tra Fascismo e Democrazia. Crerar.S. commanded by U.

Approximately 10% was done by the Royal Air Force. Frontpost (Front Postal Service) was a weekly semi-tactical newspaper produced by the Twelfth Army group for dissemination by fighter-bomber and medium bomber. . The 7th Army produced tactical leaflets coded with the numeral seven. American troops are approaching your city. in terms of continuing day-by-day tasks and in day-by-day production of materials. We have no data on the number of leaflets prepared in this "7" series.S.S. and production section to serve PID and OWI. and leaflets operations as such came to an end. In regard to dissemination and special operations the final report says: Through the agency of the Special leaflet squadron.000. Army team under field conditions. then Hans Wallenberg. U. The 9th U. printing. There were a number of special PSYOP operations performed by the PWD. An example is "7 A-D 8. Mr.S. Operation Aspidistra: Propaganda radio on German frequencies giving false orders and news reports to cause chaos among the people and government. The 3rd U.S. at first of two. Largest.U. Mayor. and approximately 5% by artillery. The Psychological Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force – An Account of its operations in the Western European Campaign 1944 – 1945 explains some of the inner workings of PWD/SHAEF. 9th Army: MAJ Edward Caskey.S. Army produced approximately 40 different CPH leaflets. The first step toward PWD coordination in the British and American leaflet efforts was the establishment of a joint layout..S. 3rd Army: LTC Louis Huot. that is." and goes on to explain that there is no need to fear because American troops will not attack civilians. Operation Clarion: The use of propaganda along with raids on the German transportation system to frighten repair workers and demoralize civilian and military personnel." which has a propaganda text that starts. U. In regard to the use of leaflets it says: The largest single operation of PWD/SHAEF against the enemy was in the field of leaflets.000 leaflets were distributed over the Continent by aircraft based in the United Kingdom during the leaflet operation in the European Theater. approximately 80% of all leaflets disseminated in the areas of the AngloAmerican armies were by the 8th Air Force. By May of 1945 when Germany surrendered. which was dropped continuously on or behind the German Western front from 25 April 1944 until the German capitulation. PWD also published three newspapers on a regular basis: Nachrichten für die Truppe (Messages for the Troops) was a daily leaflet newspaper.997. "To the Mayor. A total of approximately 5. Operation Nest Egg: The use of psychological warfare to cause the German garrisons on the British Channel Islands to surrender. Frontbrief (Front Letter) was a weekly newspaper published by the Seventh U. Army produced approximately 56 different Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) leaflets. Operation Braddock II: The airdropping of small incendiaries to be used for sabotage by foreign workers in Germany. Some of the more notable were: Operation Huguenot: An attempt to convince the German High Command that Luftwaffe pilots were deserting to the Allies with their aircraft.. 7th Army: CPT Roos. the Anglo-American leaflet operation was utilizing exclusively more than 80% of the total offset printing capacity of the United Kingdom. then CPT Peter Hart. Operation Capricorn: A mixture of black radio and white propaganda leaflets stating the Germany had already lost the war and was fighting on needlessly. and then four sides. approximately 5% by the fighter-bombers of the Tactical Air Force.

” Colonel Robert L. the leaflet asked. Coded GE233. 1315 enemy aircraft were destroyed in battle. This was in conjunction with Operation POINTBLANK. Mardenburg. The problem was to destroy sufficient German aircraft in the months prior to OVERLORD to assure Allied supremacy of the air over the beachhead. After initiation of the campaign. The theme of this campaign was “Where is the Luftwaffe?” The subtlety with which it was done made it a classic. The caption is: Focke-Wolf plants. At the same time the Luftwaffe began to abandon its conservative tactics. East Prussia The text follows: In the course of a week (20 to 28 February) the following plants were destroyed or damaged: Aircraft works Regensburg-Prüfening (Messerschmidt fighter bombers). You know best what this defeat means to you. Obertraubling Messerschmidt aircraft works. Wo bleibt die Luftwaffe? (Where is the Air Force?). The soldier is still fighting courageously and with exemplary endurance. This figure represented 25 percent of the German first-line fighters. Frankfurt. Gotha Robert Bosch AG Stuttgart-Feuerbach (spark plugs). The front shows a group of infantry troops at the front and the text: Where is the Air Force? Even the best infantry fights in vain without air superiority. Positions. which at the same time adopted new tactics to provide maximum protection against fighters. March-April 1971: In Europe…a psychological warfare campaign enabled air power to achieve an objective that for a while appeared unattainable.Another interesting Allied PSYOP campaign asked “Where is the Luftwaffe. Aircraft works Regensburg. Leaflet GE-233 The leaflet shown above was produced by the American 5th Army for German troops in the Balkans during 1943-1944.” Air University Review. Bogged down at all front lines. United ball bearing works Bad Cannstadt Naxos Union. Daimler-Benz works. The back depicts a photograph of a bombed aircraft factory. Gleason discusses this operation in “Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses. Focke-Wolf plant. In May alone. reinforcements and transport are smashed by enemy aircraft. the German Air Force is insufficient everywhere because production of aircraft goes down while that of the enemy is constantly increasing. the number of fighter intercepts rose from 1800 in March to 2500 in April to 3200 in May. As experienced soldiers of the front you know what the lack of air cover means: Every advance is impossible. Berlin- . It was obvious that the German Air Force was closely husbanding its fighter resources in the spring of 1944…The psychological warfare people from the Office of War Information were called upon to assist in initiating a campaign to force the Luftwaffe into launching more intensive attacks so that their aircraft could be destroyed by the Allied bomber formations. Untertürkheim (air engines and weapons). But – a judgment has already been rendered for the air force. an operation intended to neutralize the combat potential of the Luftwaffe.

and there is no way to evaluate the number of leaflets with the specific results." .I. Leipsic-Mockau (Me 109). Berlin-Lichtenberg (air devices). Henschel aircraft works AG Berlin-Johannisthal Klettner Ltd. It tells the German people that the Americans have entered the war in strength and reminds them that it was the Germans who declared war on the United States. USG 8 USG 8 is an example of the full-color American strategic propaganda leaflets produced for dissemination over Germany. Authors Kenneth W. "This leaflet was dropped by an American bomber.Treptow. 1977 depicts all of the American USG leaflets (approximately 53) and all of the XG leaflets (approximately 26) for the years 1943-1944. Siemens machine-building works. Klaus Kirchner. Yarnold and Jean Marie Dady attempted to evaluate the leaflets dropped by aircraft in northwest Europe from 1944 . Flugblätter aus den USA 1943-1944. It was dropped in late 1943 and depicts an American B-17 with bomb-bay doors open. General transport facilities Ltd.A." The text on the back is. Verlag D+C. The text on the front is. "Now the American Flying Fortresses are in action. We should note that not everyone was so enamored with the leaflet operations.1945 compared with other propaganda media.. 1941.G." Around the four sides of the back of the leaflet is the message. Since this is clearly impossible. The Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University published a 1950 booklet entitled The Value of Propaganda Leaflets Disseminated by Aircraft. Brunswick (Me 110 components). the authors state: The techniques used did not demonstrate that airdropped leaflets had any positive value. Lepsic-Mockau (production of Ju 88). Berlin-Johannisthal M. "Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States December 11. Berlin-Johannishof (production and repair works). Erlangen. Junkers aircraft engine works Leipsic-Mockau Erla machines Ltd. Focke-Wolf aircraft construction Ltd.

"One leader – one Reich. the CT series were disseminated by artillery.CT-36 (Leaflet courtesy of Rod Oakland) Tactical leaflet CT-36 depicts a cartoon of Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler with one hand covering a portrait of Adolf Hitler." Like the CPH leaflets. 23. Himmler's foot smashes a relief map of Germany. not Hitler but Himmler delivered the "celebration speech". implying that Himmler is stealing power in the Third Reich from their beloved Fuhrer. Text on the front is "Three Fuhrers…" and "…No Reich. They were produced and distributed by the United States First Army in Western Europe from D-Day+6 to the end of the war. 1996. PsyWar Society Blatter No.Three Fuhrers…No Reich . We only know that not Hitler but Himmler issued the proclamation for the formation of the "People's Army. It is obviously meant to cause division within the German people. We only know only that on 9 November. hundreds of your comrades and numerous German officers. The German-language text on the back is over a large question mark." Perhaps that your officers can answer the question whether you are still bound by your oath of allegiance to Hitler in spite of the fact that nobody answers your question: Where is Hitler? . The text is: The large question mark. In the last weeks. who found safety and protection in our prisoner-ofwar have camps asked us: "Where is Hitler?" It does not interest us where Hitler is." This is a parody of the German slogan. A complete list of the CT series is illustrated by Rod Oakland in Leaflets Disseminated by Artillery Shell. and the other hand pressing on the head of Reichsmarschall Air Marshall Hermann Goering." We only know only that not Hitler but Himmler has taken the oath of allegiance of the "People's Army.

Here in the collection (P. we knew that an attack was imminent. They seem to have been first printed about October 1944. The whole bridgehead obviously made no sense anymore.W." The alleged sender is the "3rd company of the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment in an American collective camp. The Americans came across every night and captured a few of us.Florian Geyer (Front) We mentioned the CPH leaflets above. For three days we had nothing to eat at Hasenfeld. They were used in limited local operations against the Wehrmacht for a specific operation or campaign." The text is: Dear Comrades! When the Americans threw up a smoke screen. CPH-16 . But at least we made a virtue of necessity. We are allowed to write four letters and four cards home each month. the leaflets were printed in a shop in the Dutch town of Maastricht. this leaflet was prepared for use against a specific German division.) camp we eat three meals a day. The CPH leaflets were tactical leaflets.(Back) . They were disseminated by artillery or grenade. Our relatives will be very happy to see us again after the war. On December 8.CPH-16 . Because of that idiotic bridgehead the whole company was sacrificed. CPH-16 is in the form of a German field postcard addressed "To the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment of the 363rd People's Grenadier Division near Broich at the Rur. they took the whole company. Later. the CPH leaflets were produced by mobile printing presses in the field. The Americans immediately treated our casualties.Florian Geyer Card . As you can see from the address below.O. Initially.

In Leaflets from the U. The accused colonel of the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment was apparently named Florian Freiherr von Gall (Freiherr = baron).S. In Geschichte der 363 Infanterie Division." The message is: Why did we have to push our bicycles on the march from Ede to Titz? Why were the officers allowed to ride their bicycles while you sat in your automobile? Why could we not hold on to the Hasenfeld farm? Because you had taken no precautions if it had been necessary to blow up the Rur bridge. since the 8th SS Cavalry Division was called "Florian Geyer.S. It was during this time that the CPH leaflet was prepared.S. The lines "Florian Geyer" and "just seems to be dead!" are above and below the knight. He stated that he had seen the leaflet and was amused by it. the undated CPH-16 postcard was produced one or two days after the defeat. (History of the 363rd Infantry Division. 1944. the Division was unable to hold the lines and lost the last bridgehead of this front sector on 8 December 1944 to the American troops. The flag is inscribed "Colonel baron Florian von Gall. He was sure that his men considered the American propaganda text foolish. Flugblätter aus den England aus USA 1944-1945. author Klaus Kirchner adds that Colonel von Gall was captured by U." The 363rd People's Grenadier Division faced the American 9th Army at the banks of the river in November 1944. He felt that no German soldier would expect his commanding officer to walk on foot with the infantry rather than ride in an automobile. 1977). The motto “Florian Geyer only seems to be dead” was designed to raise the morale of his men who were trapped in the Falaise Gap. As told in the text on the card. later. Florian Geyer (1490-1525) was a Franconian knight. Kirchner mentions that 50 artillery rounds loaded with CPH16 were forwarded to the front on 17 December 1944. "The men of the 3/957 People's Grenadier Regiment accuse you. says that the Florian Geyer leaflet was shelled to the German troops on December 10. . Colonel. But we saved ourselves. His fight for a better Reich was used as propaganda by the Nazis. author Helmut Gohlke illustrated CPH16 and stated that it was fired by artillery on and around the night of 10 December 1944. In addition. Selbstverlag: Lubeck. It lost the last bridgehead of this front on December 8. You wanted to sacrifice us pointlessly to save the bridgehead. Klaus Kirchner. The 363rd Volks Grenadier Division was reorganized on 17 September 1944 from the 566th People's Grenadier Division and the survivors of the 363rd Infantry Division that escaped the defeat in the "Kessel von Falaise" in France. troops and interviewed on 7 March 1945. Do you seriously think that a foolish motto like 'Florian Geyer only seems to be dead' can replace shot-up pneumatic boats? You. 1944. are guilty of the fact that the last German bridgehead between Linnich and Jülich west of the Rur near the Hasenfeld farm was taken by the Americans. Being a tactical leaflet. Mr. Colonel.S." Near the picture is a typed text headline. Verlag D+C. the WG (workers) leaflets (approximately 56) and all of the VG SHAEF Newspaper leaflets (approximately 27) for the years 1944-1945. He thought that the leaflet text was a joke. It fought the U. Armies for German Soldiers in Western Europe 1944-1945. the British in the Arnhem area of Holland. Erlangen. 9th Army in the Rur River area from November of 1944. 1977 depicts all of the American/British ZG leaflets to the German Wehrmacht (approximately 139). 101st Airborne Division near Nijmegen and. It opposed the U. German author Helmut Gohlke who published the story of the 363rd Infantry Division in 1977.The back of the card depicts a knight in medieval clothes holding a banner.

in order to prevent the invasion of Germany in the East and West.000 copies of Leaflet ZG 79K were dropped in November and December 1944. even the utmost bravery and willingness to sacrifice can only have one result: your own death. It is up to you to give a sign.160. You may be able to save yourself. Examine carefully therefore what it has to say.Some Samples of ZG Leaflets ZG 79K 2. If there had been anything which might have staved off defeat. it would have been committed now. . You do this by raising your arms and waiving something white. 2. The enemy is able to break down all resistance ruthlessly. 1. that you do not wish to commit suicide. Why does the enemy send you leaflets instead of bombs? Does he perhaps have to economize with bombs? NO: This leaflet has a message for YOU. Sometimes in attacks or counterattacks there is an opportunity to stay behind and let oneself be captured. It is supposed to save YOUR life. when in a hopeless situation. Germany has lost the war. And since no wonders occur in the machine age. The leaflet poses this question and explanation to the enemy: Enemy Propaganda? BOMBS could have fallen from the plane that dropped this leaflet.

000 copies of this leaflet were dropped during November 1944.and to try it from Nimes to Poix along the Rhone and the Saone. the successor of the captured Colonel Krug).but the unequal fight has so far cost no less than 11. the former Division Commanding General of the 716th Infantry Division is well. Thousands upon thousands of other soldiers of the division have been buried in the soil of Normandy. and is safe and sound in allied captivity. which meanwhile has been broken in the North. . up to the farefield of the West Wall. But that was not enough! The survivors together with a few thousand newcomers." 240. In the first onslaught of the invasion in the West. but bigger.that time has now arrived for all.000 casualties in one division and what for? That is the question which the survivors of the twice desolated regiments are asking.000 Casualties in one Division. Again thousands of casualties (and among them Colonel Hafner. were sent from one catastrophe into the other. After hard fighting and bitter disappointments the last soldier of the 716th Infantry Division must realize today: They comes a time when the sacrifice of human lives simply no longer benefits one's country and that time which had been reached before by thousands of comrades who have been taken prisoner . FLASH: Major General Richter. First the 716th Infantry Division was simply crushed by the overpowering material superiority of the Allies. More than 2. The 718th Infantry Division has fought well . 1944. And the enemy's superiority as meanwhile not become smaller. The text of the leaflet reads: That is the history of the 710th Infantry Division since June 6. They are to try the impossible also against the enemy who landed in overwhelming force in Southern France . the Commanding Officer of the 736th Infantry Regiment).ZG 80 K Leaflet ZG 80 K reports "11.000 were captured in the course of the unequal battle (among them Colonel King.

860 copies of this leaflet were dropped between 1-11 January 1945. . of tanks. The surprise offensive in which Himmler and Rundstedt have staked everything is collapsing.161. Still they staked everything on one last card . That they were not available. planes. They have swelled the number of comrades who were taken prisoner in the West to 850. Further thousands will still have to die . Those comrades are the ones who won. That such a flow of replacements is needed. there are now tens of thousands who await the peace as prisoners-of-war.and lost the game. Around the long neck which Rundstedt has driven into the Allied lines. Thousands upon thousands have already perished in this campaign. is a noose that is tightening.000. but now you know that everything is lost. 3.ZG 100 Leaflet ZG 100 is titled Lost! 9. was well known to Rundstedt and Himmler.but with one difference: before. 2. Again among the soldiers who were "lost". What are the consequences? 1. Neither Liege nor Verdun were attained. they also knew. The war may still be continued by the fanatics. But after the last attempt every soldier must realize (if he is a soldier and not a party politician) that the outcome can no longer be influenced by fighting. it may have had some meaning. men and artillery. In order to prevail against the Allies one needs an unlimited flow of replacements. The text of the leaflet is as follows: The last attempt to avoid defeat has failed.

the decision has been reached: Germany has lost the 3. in a fair manner. 2. But we can only spare those who do not force us by senseless resistance. in an unmistakable manner. In the battle of material. remember what you have read. 3. war. valor alone cannot offset the inferiority in tanks. but soldiers who would spare your life if possible. 1. You are not facing barbarians who delight in killing. as becomes soldiers who have fought bravely.ZG 115 Leaflet ZG 115 is titled: ONE MINUTE which may save your life. to use our weapons against them. 6.. You must decide for yourself.544 copies were dropped between 12 March and 2 April 1945. The remainder of the text on the leaflet is: Read the following six points carefully and thoroughly. 5. It is up to you to show us your intention by raising your arms. But in the event that you should find yourself in a desperate situation. 4. They may mean for you the difference between life and death. waiving a handkerchief. planes and artillery. With the smashing of the West Wall and the collapse in the East. etc. Prisoners-of-war are treated decently. .928.

980.000 copies of this leaflet were dropped between 12 February and 17 March 1945.000 of your comrades got out of the hell of the battle of material.000 copies of this leaflet were dropped between 10 March and 9 April 1945.000 of your comrades will see home again.000 of your comrades in the West alone.000 Lives. "I SURRENDER" meant that 950. 6. The leaflets points out that as of March 7. 1945. after the end of the war. Czechoslovakia. The remainder of the text is: "I SURRENDER" said 950.ZG 116 The bold red letters at the top of leaflet ZG 116 announces: Two words that saved 950. ZG 118 K Leaflet ZG 118 K lists the German prisoner of war totals as of certain dates in the West alone since the invasion. 8.500. Similar leaflets were disseminated targeting the slave labor force brought to Germany from France. into safety. For you two words show the road home TWO WORDS: "I SURRENDER". because they realized their position was hopeless. The leaflet notes at the bottom that: These soldiers are in safety. WG (workers) leaflets These WG (workers) leaflets were created to scare away the German Civil (working) population away from the war plants. the number of German prisoners had reached one million. "I SURRENDER" meant that 950. . Poland and Italy. Shown below is the front of leaflet WG48 with the English translation and the Italian version back to the leaflet. healthy and well.

Oppau. Friesenheim. Preungsheim. Seckbach. nut the German war machine. Eisenhower General. Hausen.308. 2. Oberrad. Offenbach. 3. Esheim. Act now! out of the battle areas! Out of the war! March 17th.Ludwigshafen You live in one of Germany's most important areas of war industry. Frankental. Burgel. The whole armament industry of Frankfurt and Mannheim Ludwigshafen from now on will be subjected to a merciless bombardment. Mundenheim.978 copies of leaflet WG 48 were dropped between 19 March and 24 March 1945. You are specifically advised that from now on. Kaftertal. Neckarau. Rheingonheim. Waldhof. 1945 Dwight D. no shelter or refuge within the above named districts can be considered safe. Feudenheim. 4. Oggersheim. 1.WG 48 1. The warning applies to all parts of Frankfurt and Main including the following suburbs: Niederusel. The warning applies to the town of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen including the following suburbs: Sandhofen. Your life depends upon the immediate execution of these orders. Mutterstadt. Heddernheim. Praunheim. Eschersheim. But the allies are determined to destroy not the German people. Griesheim. Wallstadt. Niederrad. Allied Expeditionary Force To the Italian Workers . Supreme Commander. Ginnheim. Fechenheim. Every inhabitant of the above name districts is hereby warned to remove himself and his family immediately to a safe place outside the battle area. Eckenheim. Seckenheim. The text of the leaflet reads: To The CIVIL POPULATION of Frankfurt on Main and Mannheim . These districts are now combat areas. Rodelheim. For this reason the Supreme Commander has issued the following warning.

"USL" (Luxembourg). "W". "Y". "V". OWI and the British PWE (Political Warfare Executive). "USN" (Norway). Versions were also prepared in French.S. apparently outside the PWD umbrella. etc. "To Major Voss / Commander / Fort Empress.PWB-33 (Back) The message on the back is: ." The envelope shows a handdrawn "stamp" and cancel with purposely illegible text except for the cancel date of 12 December 1944. "USH" (Holland).One of four backs on leaflet WG48. produced the "PWB" series of leaflets. the OWI produced the several "US" series of white leaflets destined for various countries: "USB" leaflets were for Belgium. the PWB attached to the U. The PWD in Britain produced the "T". the 12th Army Group’s Psychological Warfare Detachment (PWD 12th AG) was particularly industrious in producing (mostly) white propaganda. and "USP" (Poland). Within the 12th Army Group. "USJ" (Channel Islands). Polish. Tactical Military PSYOP on the Western Front Twelfth Army Group. "USI" (Italy). and Czechoslovakian. produced the "X" series of white leaflets. Working under PWD. and "Z" series of white leaflets. The version shown above is the Italian version. PWD’s tactical PWB attached to the U. Other "US" leaflet codes are: "USD" (Denmark). "USF" (France). In the northwestern European theatre following D-Day. 3rd Army. Open Letter . Another PWD tactical unit.PWB-33 (Front) This United States PWB propaganda leaflet is entitled "Open letter" and depicts an envelope addressed in the old so-called "Sütterlin" type that was preferred by the Nazis. Open Letter .S. "USC" leaflets were for Czechoslovakia. which employed a country code similar to the "US" series. 9th Army in the field produced the "CPH" series of leaflets. "USG" (Germany).

Part of the map is checkered and there are small bombs drawn all over Germany. and they carried their casualties to the waiting American ambulances. Text at the top and bottom of the leaflet is: . "HKL" can be translated as "Hauptkampflinie. All POWs are treated well according to the regulations of the Geneva Treaty. We agreed to the requests of the German medical orderlies. and all the other forts around Metz have fallen – except your fort. German officers disarmed their crews and led them to the waiting trucks. How long will your subordinates have to suffer? Note: Metz is a town in Northern France. You know that all the stories you are disseminating about the treatment of German prisoners-of-war are untrue. One glance at their faces convinced us that the German soldiers were glad to have escaped the war. about 40 km south of the Luxembourg border. You know that uninterrupted fire on your fort means further victims of dead and wounded men. You know that the men you send out every night to secretly cross our lines for Germany will not achieve their goal. on your fort.Major! You know that Fort Mannstein. You know that every day you hold out will cost the life of further casualties which could be saved in American hospitals. and that your leaders have already given up you and your subordinates." PWB-47 The front of leaflet PWB-47 depicts a map of Germany surrounded by the Allies. You know that your resistance in this hopeless situation will not have any influence on the end of war. You know that your fort is far away from the HKL since our troops are already fighting east of Saarlautern." the "Main Line of Resistance" or "Main Fighting Line. Colonel STOESSEL and lieutenant colonel RICHTER knew that we will treat their subordinates fairly. They will be killed or taken prisoner. Fort Kronprinz. Fort Alvensleben. You know that we will now concentrate all our artillery that was directed against these forts. There were about 22 defensive forts in the Metz area." probably similar to the United States Army acronym "FEBA" or "Forward Edge of the Battle Area.

Group asked for and sometimes produced leaflets for special occasions. 1945 Targets most frequently bombed in the last fortnight. either agree with us and conform to our orders. The Nazis have intimidated every German through the persecution of his helpless and innocent family. or you will die or go to a concentration camp.Retreat on all Fronts German-held areas on February 11. No cause predicated on these principals has ever succeeded in a world of righteous men. because. The Nazi Party dominates the German people through the rule of the gangster. "As occasion demanded. is hopelessly lost. On the request of the field commander a leaflet was written and produced by group to serve as an advance calling card for the imminent arrival of American troops. The result was inevitable. Some of the message is: To All German Soldiers! It must be evident to all German soldiers that this war.My Name is Joe Jones The 12th Army Group after-action report mentions some special leaflet operations. nor ever will… SURRENDER NOW AND LIVE Rather than die in a hopeless cause. This was printed in color (The American flag) and with the picture of a typical American combat soldier. The Nazi Party has maintained domination over the German people and the German Army through its violation of the noblest impulse of the Human heart. The back of the leaflet is all text and bear a long propaganda message. the war was based on evil and unholy precepts. It was just called. 12th Army Group Leaflet 12 AG-20 . "My Name is Joe Jones" and presented the . like the Nazi Party. That rule is. instigated by the Nazis. which is the love of a man for his family and his blood relatives. The whole German people permits itself to be dominated and ruthlessly controlled by one-quarter million SS gangsters under Nazi rule.

Beginning with issue No. Beginning with No. This newspaper. While not forsaking its propaganda goals. is delivered regularly once a week to the opposing troops in shells fired by Allied artillery. and is therefore "white". 6-14) were printed in Paris. and Germany). Although strictly an informative newspaper edited in a neutral manner. 48. the Low Countries. their successful newspaper for German troops in the Western Front (France. a miniature but complete weekly newspaper delivered to German troops in the immediate operational zone. but that Nazi criminals and those who resisted would be crushed. The printing of the first issues (Nos.thoughts of Joe Jones in the first person. Sauveur in Normandy. The PWB Team booklet states that they were packed into shells that could carry 400 copies of the newspaper. its content began to include news of interest to German civilians in addition to soldiers." Some of the Joe Jones leaflets bear no code. Joe told the Germans that Americans had not changed since occupying Germany in the last war. dated 14 August 1944. that Americans were out after a lasting peace and were smashing the German Army for that purpose. was prepared in the operations tent in a field near St. 33. Single-sheet (two-page) issues were produced thrice weekly. that Germans who behaved themselves and had clear records had nothing to fear. others are coded 12 AG-20 Frontpost. and distribution of Frontpost. 11 December 1944 We will examine 12th AG’s progress through France and Germany by following the production and distribution of Frontpost. Frontpost contained mostly straight news. The production of Frontpost and its offspring is a useful illustration of the frenzied pace of activities during the campaign in Western Europe. written in German. The first issue. Nine issues (Nos. . Frontpost continued publication through issue No. The classified confidential Psychological Warfare Branch Combat Team booklet says in the Frontpost chapter: One of the most important undertakings of the PWB Combat Team in the field is the editing. the newspaper became a four-page weekly. printing. it fulfills major propaganda aims by providing German troops with an impartial. objective presentation of world news which is not available through any German medium. 1 through 5) was done at Rennes. printing was moved to the plant of the Luxemburger Wort in the city of Luxembourg. 15 (dated 22 September 1944). With the advance through France. in Brittany. dated 13 November 1944. The first Paris-printed issue was dated 31 August 1944. dated 20 April 1945. Since Frontpost was being airdropped inside Germany. the publication site for Frontpost and tactical leaflets was moved to Paris soon after the fall of the city.

mentions the newspapers in greater detail: "Early in November it was decided that the airdrop of Frontpost did not entirely fill the demand for getting news to the German troops facing us. in early November 1944 PWD 12th AG began an abridged version of Frontpost. 18 November 1944 In order to reach areas close to the battle lines not being serviced by Allied airdrops. called Feldpost. it was decided to produce a leaflet-sized newspaper to be fired from artillery shells. ("Field Post") appeared under the date of 5 November 1944. since areas where a newspaper might be effective were sometimes not being reached by airdrop. Army Group European Theater of Operations. to be released from artillery shells fired by front-line artillery units. later twice weekly. The first issue of this leafletnewspaper. . strippeddown form. called Feldpost.Feldpost. The first issue appeared 5 November 1944. but in condensed. The book Publicity and Psychological Warfare 1943-1945 by the 12th U. Feldpost employed the same methods and had the same objectives as its bigger brother Frontpost. Feldpost was initially issued once a week. To remedy this situation.S. Many of the same features were included. in single-sheet leaflet size.

and carried the headline: 100. and that they would perform their jobs with more enthusiasm and understanding if they themselves could read the paper that they were helping to get to the enemy." The Report of Operations of the 12th Army Group says: "12th Army group began it psychological warfare operation from a cow pasture outside St.December 1944) prepared for the artillery. It was felt that these men were entitled to know what they were shooting at the enemy. to batteries of the 82nd Airborne Division. This was done for distribution among the gunners and other Army personnel involved in the distribution of the paper. run off on a mimeograph machine. Frontpost. loaded into six shells and peddled. an exact English duplicate of Feldpost was printed in English. with difficulty. From the first. The first combat loudspeaker laid down its barrage in the hedgerows approaching La Haye de Puits. PWD 12th AG began the production of a newspaper aimed at civilians in areas controlled by the Allies. The first leaflet was written on a wheelbarrow. The first issue of the 12th Army Group newspaper for German troops." Publication was suspended with the first May issue of 1945 after the official announcement of the German surrender." . Sauveur de Lendelin seven weeks after the advance elements of the Headquarters attached to First Army produced the first combat leaflets of the war. The first tactical radio program. was broadcast to the enemy in the vicinity of St. appeared under the date 14 August 1944.000 prisoners in France. loosely "Information. also in support of the 82nd Airborne Division." All subsequent issues were entitled Die Mitteilungen." As increasing territory in Western Europe fell to the Allies.Official translation of Feldpost (Issue 6 . The first issue was dated 27 November 1944 and was called Die Neue Zeitung ("The New News") with the headline "Strassburg has been liberated. Lo. from an SCR 399.

Hoffmann and Campe. then describe the weight of artillery and . They knew the psychology and the language of the German military and people.for the Frontpost . The movie is based on the book Die Ritchie Boys . The Frontpost. “The Ritchie boys at Château de Colombières in June 1944.” The New York Times. Pennsylvania. 2005. and precisely described the situation on the front lines. Christian Bauer and Rebekka Goepfert. From the time the unit arrived in Normandy in the last week of June to the end of July. not airdropped. Hadley talks about the first use of American loudspeaker tanks in an article entitled “Firing Potent Words from a Tank. Arthur T. Hans Habe played the leading role in Colombières. Army after D-Day and interrogated German prisoners. together with maps and reports of the fates of soldiers and civilians.S. They drafted leaflets. Installing loudspeakers Before we leave the subject of the newspapers Frontpost and Feldpost we should briefly mention the “Ritchie Boys. like the leaflets. they had a mobile printing unit with them which made it possible to print the leaflets and newspapers on the spot. they were trained in PSYOP and intelligence. There was a lack of paper…When they moved westwards. He had chosen the best people from the special training course in Camp Sharpe. They advanced with the U. Die Mitteilungen was of standard newspaper size. This newspaper was later published under the name of Feldpost. This is the Ritchie boys' first French headquarters. The production of the leaflets and newspapers was difficult under war conditions. and assigned directly to theater control.000 copies of about 15 different leaflets.” In 2004 Christian Bauer directed and produced a movie entitled “Ritchie Boys” which told the story of Europeans and German nationals and Jews who fled the European Continent only to return as U. He says in part: We soon discovered that reminding Germans that they would be treated according to the Geneva Conventions was one of the most effective ways to persuade them to surrender. 25 September 2006. was first edited at Colombières Castle. In Camp Ritchie.015. which the Americans just occupied.Deutsche Emigranten beim US-Geheimdienst. where they received additional combat training. He had a staff of Ritchie boys with him.This civilian newspaper was distributed by land. and tried to persuade their German opponents to surrender.” Before we leave the subject of loudspeakers we should briefly mention their introduction on tanks. defectors and civilians.a newspaper in German which was dropped over the German lines. the printing section turned out approximately 2. The name of the exhibition is. *Intelligence personnel proceeded from Camp Ritchie to a staging area at Camp Sharpe. We would first outline the German position.* They were writing for him . Charles de Maupeou wrote to me from France in January 2007 to say that he had created a free exhibition in the castle to commemorate the time that the Second Radio Mobile Broadcasting Company was stationed there. They also went to the front lines in trucks equipped with loudspeakers. Stefan Heym came up with the idea to print the Frontpost which appeared regularly after 14 August 1944.German Emigrants in the US Secret Service). soldiers. The History of the 2nd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company details the history of the unit from Camp Ritchie to the end of the war. They edit reports and conceive leaflets.. The author says: We are at Colombières Castle. (The Ritchie Boys . a single sheet printed on both sides.. were formed into teams.S. produced radio broadcasts and helped to publish Frontpost and Feldpost.The Ritchie boys found out that the German soldiers at the front lacked important information. Maryland. The Nachrichten für die Truppe newspaper was conceived for them.

The Cologne Courier was highly successful. 12th AG began production of its first local newspaper." in William Daugherty. 1958. The Vichy radio directed towards Quebec consisted of themes such as patriotism towards France. the tank driver was forward in the driver’s compartment and the electrician who maintained the loudspeaker and electronic equipment occupied the assistant driver’s seat. Additional information is in Clayton D. 12th Army Group. Johns Hopkins Press. pages 556-562. PWC continued to improve the Canadian psychological warfare capability. even Die Mitteilungen could not serve the entire Allied-occupied area. January 1943-August 1945. this article was taken from History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare. pages 116-126. the “Voice of Canada” spoke to the world for the first time. a good deal of Canadian propaganda was also leveled at the German people. Canada entered the field of psychological warfare on 20 June 1943. In three weeks fighting beyond the Rhine in 1945. This later became the Political Warfare Committee (PWC) responsible for the oversight and general planning of psychological warfare. The broadcasters were in the turret. The Propaganda Warriors – America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany. Operation Cornflakes . Much of this was forwarded to the British and Americans. when the Political Intelligence Committee was formed. In February 1945. Psychological Warfare Casebook. including Italian. References for 12th AG activities: "News sheets as weapons of war. and beginning 2 April 1944. Laurie. Some of the ammunition racks inside the tank were removed and the amplifiers for the loudspeaker fastened to the steel insides. Although there seem to be few printed products. Kölnischer Kurier. While French and German language material was the focus of the PWC. especially in terms of French and German language material. Lawrence. The jury-rigged tank worked remarkably well.000 prisoners. as well as Canadians of various cultural backgrounds in order to address their compatriots in their own language. At the end of 1944 the equipment was procured and psychological warfare duties were then transferred from the PWC to the Wartime Information Board and eventually the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. They preferred a smaller. Starting about 31 March 1944 the PWC was able to develop a variety of linguistic capabilities. The loudspeaker itself was mounted on the forward slope of the turret and partly covered by a metal casing that resisted light machine-gun fire. Yugoslav. Clow says that the Germans had broadcast French short-wave broadcasts to French-speaking Canadians starting about 1941. then end with assurances that those troops who surrendered would be well treated under the Geneva Conventions. The PWC routinely solicited German prisoners of war. With the deeper advance of Allied forces into Germany following the crossing of the Rhine. Throughout 1944. Dutch. materials were produced in other languages. University Press of Kansas. Canadian PSYOP A Royal United Services Institute for Defense Study paper written by Oliver Ryan Clow dated April 2006 discusses Canadian psychological operations during WWII. Baltimore. people of German-occupied countries and the German military forces. the Second Armored Division credited the talking tank for the surrender of 5. No short-wave transmitter capable of reaching Europe existed in Canada until late 1944. At first the Canadian psychological warfare effort focused on countering the Vichy and German efforts. Germany would remain the focus of the PWC long after efforts in France were reduced. promoting the leadership of Marshall Petain and the common bond between Parisians and Quebecois. After the Battle of the Bulge. we mounted a loudspeaker on a light tank of the Second Armored Division.air power that was about to fall on them. Canadian psychological warfare made a valuable contribution to the overall Allied propaganda effort. Danish and Norwegian. 1996. However. and led to a chain of local newspapers as the 12th AG advanced. they made great use of radio featuring many of the German prisoners-of-war and helped both the American and the British PSYOP organizations with French and German broadcasts. more maneuverable organization. The Canadians did not want to follow the British or American models.

Liebig was placed in full charge of Operation Cornflakes in January 1945. A staff of workers prepared thousands of envelopes with proper destination and return addresses. A new printing of the OSS-forged German Hitler Head postage stamps was prepared by MO Rome in January 1945 for use in Operation Cornflakes. required large quantities of properly addressed envelopes containing propaganda. the Allies’ full-size black propaganda news sheet for Germany which purported to come from German underground sources. Letters with handwritten return addresses had been prepared in large quantities beginning in fall 1944. Authentic German cancellation devices had been obtained early in MO Rome’s operations. Weeks of search were needed to obtain post-August 1944 canceling devices. Various problems led to further delays. 15th Air Force. An envelope exists containing Das Neue Deutschland for 15 September 1944 (reference: HF files). but these were made obsolete for use in the Cornflakes mail-bag airdrops after wartime depredations caused the German Reichspost to curtail delivery of individual private letters. operating out of Foggia. Most of the envelopes were stuffed with already available propaganda such as issues of Das Neue Deutschland. overtly originating from Allied sources to represent reproduced examples of alleged German underground activity. to perform the airdrops. under the supervision of Lt. stamped with forged German postage stamps and struck with faked cancellations.S.OSS-forged German Hitler Stamps This famous project was an elaborate scheme by OSS Rome’s Morale Operations unit in late 1944 and 1945 to improve the delivery of propaganda within the Third Reich by airdropping propaganda-filled mail sacks in the vicinity of bombed railway mail cars. Cassenverein error envelope The addressed. Italy. Distribution was handled by the OSS’s Morale Operations unit in Bari. this caused another delay to Cornflakes while letters with printed (business) return addresses were hurriedly prepared in late January and early February 1945. Labels such as the "Futsches Reich" skull stamp parody of Hitler were also included. The bags were stuffed into 7-inch smoke-shell bombs and airdropped over Germany and Austria during bombing raids on mail trains in early 1945. conceived by Jan Liebig based on John Fistere’s Hungarian mail-bag scheme. Jack Daniels. but were made useless when the German Reichspost altered its style of cancellation in August 1944. Planning and production was done at MO Rome.) Some envelopes addressed to Austria contained Ten Commandments for Austrians or Austrian underground newspapers such as Der Oesterreicher. and the operation went into high gear only in January 1945. taken largely from telephone directories. in the hope that . who enlisted the 14th Fighter Group of the U. The plan. and canceled envelopes were placed in replicas of German mail bags. stamped. (Later. but some were typewritten. the return addresses were either handwritten or printed. The destination addresses were generally handwritten. reduced-size editions of Das Neue Deutschland were used as white propaganda. Twenty-one MO personnel were eventually involved in Cornflakes: 13 at Rome and 8 at Bari. These restrictions were announced in Reichspost regulations issued 29 January 1945.

Red cards were for private addressees. In 1943. Violet cards were used by the Reichspost to check the postal addresses of people living . All have a broad color frame around the margins. or detected by the Germans. Genuine "SIGN OF LIFE" Card OSS Forgery of "SIGN OF LIFE" Card Another black propaganda item prepared by the OSS-Rome was the forged "Sign of Life" cards. the German Reichspost released special postcards that allowed victims of bomb attacks to send a short message to their relatives. Poelten in Austria on 16 March 1945. Although the mail-drop scheme was somewhat successful for a time. Following an air drop on St. green cards for soldiers with field post numbers. and "Eilnachricht an" (special message to) on the the confusion following the air raid the Germans would find the "misplaced" mail bags and insert them into the regular German postal channels. the loss rate of mail bags was very high. only about half were delivered onto the targets. and some of those were surely lost. They are inscribed "Lebenszeichen von" (Sign of life from) on one side. The fake envelopes with propaganda material inside would thus be delivered by the Reichspost! About 400 pieces of mail could be put into a German mail bag. the Germans discovered the ruse upon noticing a misspelling of a company name – "Cassenverein" instead of the correct "Kassenverein" – on the printed return address of an envelope. Twenty Operation Cornflakes airdrops involving 320 mail bags of propaganda were made between 5 February and 16 April 1945. destroyed. Three versions differing in color and design were printed.

" ("For the editor"). A specification of types of forged cancels and of some printed return addresses appears in Joachim Hosang.. in a technical sense only material distributed in the twenty known Cornflakes mail-bag drops qualifies as true Cornflakes.The Illegal fighters – in all the Reich.240. George W. the British Royal Air Force dropped 2." The card is dated "19-1-45. this story is a work in progress.000." prepared in April 1945 by the Morale Operations Unit of the Rome OSS. 1. they added the text "F. The OSS forged the green version of the sign-of-life card. Covers are illustrated and discussed in Herbert Friedman’s. Perhaps we should give the final word about WWII leaflets dropped on Europe to James Erdmann. Sykewar. Gezahnte Kriegspropaganda. pages 149-152.000 leaflets on Europe. and Sheet Iron.000 and the U.151. Psychological Warfare Against Germany.R. and in Werner Bohne. Join us in the struggle! Form your own action groups!" In addition to the mail-bag scheme that was the heart of Operation Cornflakes. other airdrops of material prepared by OSS Rome were made in Austria and Germany during the early months of 1945. pages 489-496). Werner Bohne’s GPS Reference Manual of Forgeries. " ‘Cornflakes’ numbers now known. Readers with comments or additions are encouraged to write to the author at sgmbert@hotmail.C. which translates to. and the U. 1942-1945. Another excellent and more recent source is Clayton D. published by the author.11/19/03 Source: http://www. On the address side where the genuine card says "Express to" the OSS added the word "you!" At the lower left. Teil. It is likely that much of this material was inspired by or prepared in conjunction with Operation Cornflakes. 2. 1949. The Propaganda Warriors – America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany. offers additional background. pages 819-822/838. "The New so-called "Luftnotgebieten" (emergency zones). 1996." German Postal Specialist. D-Day to VE-Day. prepared by the History Project. Pig Iron. Peterson. April 1991. The forgery is inscribed in German in carefully handwritten Gothic script. in Werner Bohne.S." The American Philatelist 85. Publisher. New York. University Press of Kansas. "The United Front of all revolutionary parties fights for our liberation from the yoke of the SS and the Party. Cornflakes operations through March 1945 are described in an official report "The story of Cornflakes. Munich. As stated at the beginning of the article. Washington. page 45. 2 (February 1971). including a tabulation of cancellations and printed sender addresses. Denver Instant printing. Laurie. After D-Day." American Philatelist 98. They normally bore no cancellation. However. who wrote a doctoral thesis on U. Of the numerous reports of the Cornflakes operation. Erdmann estimated that prior to D-Day. provides information on stamps. The structure and activities of PWD/SHAEF are well recorded in Daniel Lerner." The message side bears a longer propaganda text. This form. some of the more authoritative are listed here. and published in two volumes by Walker & 1969. covers. "Poison cornflakes for breakfast. Most existing examples of so-called "Cornflakes" envelopes are probably from the ancillary airdrops. and in Herbert Friedman’s. the second volume is entitled The Overseas Targets – War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Volume 2.000 leaflets over Axis controlled Europe." short for "Fur die Redakation.000. Army Eighth Air Force dropped 500. De Falschungen der Alliierten für Deutschland. and cancellations used in the Cornflakes operation. Pennsylvania State University Press. all rights reserved . "Declassified 6/12/90. which reports investigations by Martin Roberts. The airdrops and the contents of the envelopes are discussed in " ‘Cornflakes’: Using postal forgeries to place anti-Nazi literature on German breakfast tables. Strategic Services Unit." German Postal Specialist. "Allied forgeries of the postage stamps of Nazi Germany. D. Niel H. Propaganda and Espionage Forgeries.S. "Sign of life from . provides an excellent summary (in German) of Cornflakes. most psychological operations were controlled by PWD/SHAEF. Solingen.S. These forms usually passed through the German post at no cost to the Army Air Force carried out the majority of leaflet missions and dropped a further 3. November 1995. Beneath those words are Text. although they were sometimes censored. Wolfgang Baldus. 1997. leaflet operations in the European Theater of Operations entitled Leaflet Operations in the Second World War. © Copyright. Schwarze Post. might be sent to a serviceman from Berlin or Cologne to inform him that his parents were alive and well after a severe raid. February 1973." American Philatelist. 1956.000. page 119. War Department. Action Committee. 1976. 8 (August 1984). Sources A wonderful official source of information on the OSS is Kermit Roosevelt’s War Report of the OSS. New York. who acquired an entire file of "Cornflakes" material from Robert Allen. The first volume appears as War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). May 1989 (reprinted in German Postal Specialist." Text beneath is. 1996.psywarrior. pages 130-148. sometimes called Sign of Life.html . It is usually not possible to establish that a given item was dropped in a Cornflakes raid. Vol. Stuart.D. From Hitler’s Doorstep – The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles.