RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
The Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies The Cummings Center Series RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century Editor: Gabriel Gorodetsky
THE CUMMINGS CENTER FOR RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
The Cummings Center is Tel Aviv University’s main framework for research, study, documentation and publication relating to the history and current affairs of Russia, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe. The Center is committed to pursuing projects which make use of fresh archival sources and to promoting a dialogue with Russian academic circles through joint research, seminars and publications. THE CUMMINGS CENTER SERIES The titles published in this series are the product of original research by the Center’s faculty, research staff and associated fellows. The Cummings Center Series also serves as a forum for publishing declassified Russian archival material of interest to scholars in the fields of history and political science. EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Gabriel Gorodetsky EDITORIAL BOARD Michael Confino Igal Halfin Shimon Naveh Yaacov Ro’i Nurit Schleifman MANAGING EDITOR Deena Leventer
.RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
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John Löwenhardt and Stephen White Russia’s Place in European Defence Alyson J.Contents
List of Abbreviations Introduction Gabriel Gorodetsky
Part I: A Great Power in Transition Faces Globalization 1. 2. Radical or Revolutionary? Alex Pravda 2 11
5.Bailes Russian Strategic Uncertainty in an Era of US Tactical Intrusiveness Alvin Z. The New Russia and the New World Order L.
Part II: Russia’s Road into Europe 6. Russia and the Dual Expansion of Europe Margot Light.Rubinstein 56 70 81
.Klepatskii The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin Bobo Lo The Transformation of Russia’s Military Doctrine in the Aftermath of Kosovo and Chechnya Alexei Arbatov After the Empire: Russia’s Emerging International Identity Dmitri Trenin Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September.N.K.
Part IV: The Southern Tier and the Middle East 11.Baev Northern Europe: A New Web of Relations Ingmar Oldberg 92
10. Opportunities and Challenges for Russia in the —Baltic Region Pavel K. 12.
Part V: Rethinking the Far East 15. Russia between Europe and Asia: Some Aspects of Russia’s Asian Policy Mikhail G.Neil MacFarlane The Security Dimension of Russia’s Policy in South Central Asia Lena Jonson The Role of Islam in Russia’s Relations with Central Asia Yaacov Ro’i Russia in the Middle East: The Yeltsin Era and Beyond Oded Eran 117 124
Part III: A Northern Passage 9. Russian Policy in the CIS under Putin S.
.Nosov Putin’s Foreign Policy: Transforming ‘the East’ Richard Sakwa Notes on Contributors Index 163
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan. Ukraine. Moldova Committee of State Security Congress of Russian Communities North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization
. Ukraine. Uzbekistan. Moldova Georgia.List of Abbreviations
ABM APEC ASEAN BEAC BMD CBSS CESDP CFE CFSP CIS CMEA (COMECON) CPRF CPSU EAPC EMU EU FIS FSB FSU GNP GUAM GUUAM KGB KRO NACC NATO
anti-ballistic missile Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of South East Asian Nations Barents Euro-Arctic Council ballistic missile defence Council of Baltic Sea States Common European Security and Defence Policy Conventional Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Communist Party of the Russian Federation Communist Party of the Soviet Union Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council European Monetary Union European Union Foreign Intelligence Service Federal Security Service former Soviet Union gross national product Georgia.
NMD OPEC ORT OSCE PCA PfP R&D RRF SEV START TACIS TMD UN WEAG WEU WMD WTO
National Missile Defence Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries state Russian television station Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Partnership for Peace research and development Rapid Reaction Force Council of Economic Assistance Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty Technical Assistance to the CIS Theater Missile Defence United Nations Western European Armaments Group West European Union weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization
which enable the reader to extrapolate lessons applicable from one arena to the other. where contradictory forces such as globalization. From the geopolitical point of view. The analysis in this volume of the Japanese. the conclusion that Russia lacks the means of maintaining great-power status is highly premature. north-west
. exposed during the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent arduous transition from communism. imposed by the exigencies of a diffuse New World Order. The vast and varied cultural and physical spaces which constitute Russia’s spheres of interest dictate that different frames of mind be applied in devising a policy. Scepticism about Russia’s capabilities emanated from inherent systemic failings. Russia still covers vast spaces bearing directly on Europe.000 nuclear warheads and maintains probably the largest arsenals of chemical and biological weapons in the world. Little has been done in that direction. the Near East and the Far East. as attention is usually drawn to a conflict region when it is already in the eye of the storm. This collection of essays attempts to track the mechanism of Russian foreign policy in the transition period. Finally. the country is blessed with tremendous human talent and virtually unparalleled natural resources. Such a study unveils modes of behaviour and fixed patterns in the conduct of foreign policy. even in its reduced state. it is no secret that Russia stockpiles over 20. This process is impeded by constraints. The spatial aspect is a striking element in the conduct of Russian foreign policy and warrants a comparative study. regionalism and US unilateralism seem to reign. Yet. through a comparative study of continuity and change in the policies executed by Russia in diverse conflictridden regions. The prevalent tendency prior to 11 September 2001 had been to dismiss Russia as a Third World nation and to write it off as a major player on the international scene. Hence. The forging of Russian foreign policy reflects the search for identity and an attempt to reconcile traditional national interests with the newly emerging social and political entity. Paying heed to Russia’s own perception of its international status is therefore as vital as exploring its immediate capabilities.Introduction
The challenge facing Russia in establishing its new identity bears directly on its foreign policy.
strongly suggest the perseverance of power politics dictated by an age-old legacy of Russian national interests. The intriguing issues addressed by the present volume question the extent to which the new Russian entity is prepared willingly to abandon its historical irredentist ambitions. to forge new alliances. The process of redefining and reestablishing Russia’s statehood mitigates first and foremost the regulation of relations with the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. often at variance with those of the USA. They seek to establish the extent to which Russian foreign policy has undergone a genuine metamorphosis. Middle Eastern and central Asian examples is therefore vital for a better understanding of the multidimensional features of Russian foreign policy. or in the Black Sea region. Russia’s immediate spheres of influence (now termed ‘the near abroad’) have always been the focal point of its national interests. They emphasize how vital it is for Russia to prevent ethnic. Russia may well be tempted. In both cases. all leading academics or prominent practitioners. conduct a comparative study of Russia’s relations with the West and the East in an attempt to establish whether the traces of the Cold War are fading from Russian military and political thinking. is well coordinated. The emerging consensus is that the legacy of the past—be it ‘Imperial’ or ‘Communist’—weighs heavily on the execution of contemporary Russian foreign policy. Most contributors to the present volume share the assumption that. and condone the gradual Western encroachment into the region? The various contributors illustrate how domestic and international issues intertwine in relations with the CIS. even after 11 September. This legacy pertains both to the Russian perception of its own position in world affairs and to the way the rest of the world views Russia. Russian foreign policy. The cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy remains the relations with its former adversary. Confronting the unchallenged pivotal global power of the USA. though those relations may well be reflected in Moscow’s attitude towards third parties. despite the semblance of chaos and sporadic whims. economic and social unrest in this area from spilling over into the mainland. mostly in the Eurasian subcontinent. The Balkans and the Caucasus are indeed the arenas where Russia has already chosen to flex its muscles.INTRODUCTION xi
European. to counterbalance the Atlantic alliance in an attempt to restore its status as a major power. What are the chances for the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) to turn into an effective strategic alignment? Will Russia forsake vital economic and strategic interests (mostly oil). relations continue to be coloured by lingering preconceived ideas. The authors of the chapters. The book further attempts to detect those forces and values which have been filling the vacuum. covering a vast geographical entity. Its policies in Iraq and Iran. Various chapters in the book lay bare the same tendency by
. in the Caucasus. the USA.
Various Russian initiatives during the war—especially the dispatch of the Black Sea fleet to the Adriatic Sea and stealing a march on NATO through a bold dash of Soviet special forces to the airport of Kosovo’s capital. the aim of which is to reinstate the indivisible Russian Federation. and they bear directly on the conduct of foreign policy. further accentuated by the intricate fabric of a markedly multi-ethnic society. to the events in Kosovo earlier that year. for instance. It highlights the continued significance attached by Moscow to traditional interests. resolute and independent policy. The legitimization for the war is typically presented within the historical context of Russian national interests. which has a low and uneven population density. fixed and unyielding. Grave from Moscow’s standpoint was the realization that the war might set a dangerous precedent in international affairs. The universally declining power of the nation-state and the increasingly defused open borders. The second war in Chechnya in 1999 is linked by Arbatov. At the same time it also validates the limits of Russia’s capability for executing a more dynamic. The historical legacy denotes a dynamic reciprocal dialogue between the power of the state and the territory. hardly seem to touch Russia. The war was a painful awakening for the Kremlin. The apparent contradictions in the execution of Russian foreign policy and the tension entailed relate to its spatial vastness: the need to control this enormous space. coupled with the restoration of enduring national interests and great-power status. The remaining illusions about a benign New World Order dissipated. Various moments during the war were dangerously reminiscent of the Cold War. Yeltsin even accused the West of wishing to turn Yugoslavia into a ‘protectorate’. Prishcina—
.xii RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
focusing on Russia’s stratagem in the rarely discussed spheres of northern Europe and the Far East. The reintroduction of imperial as well as Soviet symbols and language. lies at the heart of the war in Chechnya. where Russia still enjoys its postwar status as a major power. Russia’s spatial immensity. If there is any persistent characteristic in Russian foreign policy it seems to be historical consciousness. are further complicated by the boundless extent of its peripheries. The recourse to symbols of statehood. That war is seen in Moscow as an expression of hidden Western agendas rather than a fulfilment of a sublime universal mission. are all part and parcel of the attempt to refurbish a national identity. marking the so-called age of globalization. Thus the legacy of the past is anchored in fixed geopolitical conditions. and particularly the predominance of the concept of spheres of influence. Those conditions. The war in Kosovo best illustrates both the aspirations and the constraints of Russian foreign policy. continue to determine the principles governing Russian foreign policy. for instance. These are solidly rooted in geopolitical and geocultural premises. which would permit US intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states while bypassing the United Nations.
the natural resources of the southern tier of central Asia and the Caucasus are extremely attractive to the Russians. such as refugees. argues that security considerations predominate in the Russian approach.INTRODUCTION xiii
were ecstatically welcomed in Moscow. Trenin and liberals akin to his thinking in Moscow are haunted by the legend of the phoenix rising from the ashes. perceive itself to be the heir to a great power. It goes without saying that. a security-oriented leader. terrorism and the possible impact of local trends. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the neighbouring countries are far too weak to handle those issues on their own. Although they would wish to see Moscow’s foreign policy ambitions scaled down.
. MacFarlane. Russia therefore has important security concerns at stake in neighbouring states. Thus. Another case in point is the Nordic—Baltic region discussed by Baev and Oldberg. and does not conform to the spirit of ‘globalization’. There were also open expressions of satisfaction at the controversy which the bombing campaign had aroused in Europe. Bobo Lo. Seen through Russian rather than Western eyes. that fluidity of policy in the absence of a long-term strategic view causes experts to attribute significance to events which might have only passing import. the southern countries serve as a buffer zone with respect to Islamic radicalism. but which conform to preconceived notions of Russian foreign policy. unequivocally recognizes ‘the primacy of political-military over economic priorities’. Although the term derzhavnost’—an aspiration for a strong state and great-power status—is neither fashionable nor ‘politically correct’. communications/information. the Moscow elite does. He warns. which might destabilize particular regions of Russia. however. however. The most promising prospects in the Nordic—Baltic area appear to be in the economic. such as Islamic revival. But these two scholars suggest that Putin emerges as a hardliner. on the economic level. social/ecological spheres and other non-state-levels of interaction—often described as the ‘soft security’ field—reflecting the spirit of globalization. He points out that the strategic environment surrounding the Russian Federation is widely perceived to be hostile and potentially threatening. they witness their leaders championing an anti-universalistic agenda. the romantic liberal vision of foreign policy. MacFarlane defines these as ‘spillover’ of local conflicts. with clear preferences for various ‘instruments of power’ ranging from the secret services to nuclear submarines. for the most part. while the western ones act as an obstacle to Europe’s extension of NATO. waves of immigration. a keen observer in Moscow of Russian foreign policy in the making. subjugating Russian interests for the sake of a moral global scheme —the ‘great experience’ of Gorbachev—is seen as a reckless one. notably in the Caspian Basin.
the Russians have been shying away from the bipolar confrontation while advocating multipolarity—as clearly emerges from Klepatskii’s chapter.xiv RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
The Russian damage control policy. Multipolarity envisages an international system which is essentially not antagonistic and is dominated by a limited number of poles. dictated by American hegemonic power and the geopolitical assets lost at the end of the Cold War. In the interim period of coping with the tremendous task of restoring the nation-state. The paradox of the state striving ceaselessly to regain and retain great-power status while resting on fragile foundations and seeking to accommodate ‘Western values’ remains unresolved. the notion that high politics and military security have been replaced by the benign lower politics of wealth and welfare is seriously challenged. Seen from the Russian vantage point. Faced by the chronic dilemma of whether to toss away the legacies of the past and move forward towards a somewhat utopian ‘brave new world’. particularly in the wake of 11 September. The systemic in-built tension between the vision and the legacy. Even that is not a rigid principle but rather a pragmatic reactive procedure. Indeed. mirrors the uncertainty related to the process of forging a Russian national identity. Multipolarity further appeals to the Russians because it allows them to avoid a Eurasian solution or the centuries’ old debate on Russia’s position between East and
. priority is assigned to cooperation with the hegemonic power. the near abroad and Russia. without any one pole possessing absolute power. with its pressing constraints but also vast potential rewards. brief. Many of the writers here point out the fallacies of Western policies. which not only fail to address Russian sensitivities but also perpetuate enduring preconceived ideas and prevent the Cold War from being brought to a genuine end. The fanciful. innovative attempt to obliterate the Soviet legacy has slipped into a far more modest ambition of reconciling with the burden of the past. drive her closer to Europe. when advantageous circumstances arise. the geopolitical view of politics. such as 11 September. Asymmetry is bound to be accentuated as a source of conflict which could spill over into the heart of Europe. Consequently. This dilemma explains perhaps what Alex Pravda rightly detects as the absence of a long-term strategy in Putin’s foreign policy. seems to prevail. Europe is in no way the haven sought by the Russians. The stark contrasts between neighbouring states and accession states are likely to increase as the transformation and integration process into Western organizations accelerates. Most analysts in the present volume concur that the evolution of Russian foreign policy has been proceeding from idealistically unqualified Westernism to realistic pragmatic nationalism. between persisting geopolitical and geo-cultural features and changing universal values. Their exclusion from key institutions on the continent only brings out the geocultural differences between Europe. this is perfectly understandable.
verbally at least. The proper mechanism for the inclusion of Russia within the workings of NATO must therefore be found. The process of forging a new Russian national identity is a sine qua non for a definition of Russia’s role in the New World Order. Seen from the Kremlin.INTRODUCTION xv
West. globalization is an extraterritorial factor which transcends the state and may indeed be at times conducive to economic growth and an instrument of democratization. The great challenge for Moscow is therefore to resolve the intrinsic tension between Russia’s continued search for a dominant position in world affairs and a recognition of the power of globalization—which seems to eat away at state sovereignty—in the economic sphere. nor is European security feasible without the USA’. and even transforms their contents. which is anyway regarded as a euphemism for unilateralism. they are determined to prevent it from eliminating or replacing national interests. President Bush’s acceptance of Russia as a full ally into the unipolar structure after 11 September 2001 is perhaps the outcome of the paradigm outlined by Margot Light et al. it almost vanished from the lexicon of the Kremlin. What seems to be more durable is the pursuit of national interests in the traditional sense while. though. Multipolarity. While open to the economic benefits which globalization might entail. The public is living in a bleak present: split over the interpretation of past aspirations as well as over a definition of future expectations. The obvious change in policy. is a response to the popular notion that some sort of stability and conformity is
. and a guise for the reinstatement of the old order based on spheres of influence and balance-of-power politics. is far from being a sacred principle. One solution which seems to emerge. since Putin’s assumption of power. The war against terror indeed created favourable conditions which allow the Russian to seek the construction of such regional blocs according to their own vision. reaching an accommodation with globalization. What remains to be seen in the long run is to what extent either the ideas of multipolarity or the full incorporation of Russia in the unilateral system will be genuinely and fully absorbed in Moscow and to what extent Putin’s acquiescence is no more than tactical. at least for the intermediate period. is an attempt to function within the framework of globalization while solidifying relations on an inter-regional basis. which inflame a vociferous debate and elude consensus. In fact. But their fear is that globalization is often manipulated by the USA in order to further American national interests and mobilize international support for that purpose. Paradoxically. the process of nation building is aggravated by the newly achieved liberties in Russia. according to which ‘there can be no European security without Russia. particularly in the economic and financial spheres. after 11 September.. however. The Russians fully recognize the fact that globalization exerts influence on national interests. when prospects of acting on a par with the Americans seemed viable.
however. The policy pursued of late by the IMF. the Chancellor. would cause it to reconcile with the unipolar New World Order. it often denotes successful implementation of a free-market economy. It has hardly escaped Moscow’s attention. the newly formed oil giants Lukoil and Yuksi (which exceed some of the USA’s larger petroleum corporations in reserves). the end of the Cold War. Financial and economic aid is therefore geared towards imposing on Russia ‘Western’ ideas and bolstering social reconstruction which would continue to render it less imperialist. Nation building in Russia is thus affected by external and domestic factors. Lukoil. Samuel R. reflects a lack
. Germany and. Some writers argue that the economic factors inspire Russian foreign policy. the major creditor of Russia.xvi RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
necessary for the population to rally behind a national leadership. Gerhard Schroeder’s new Germany. early in 1999. Even the proponents of cooperation with Russia. and the subsequent slow and painful execution of economic reforms instilled a belief that Russia had been stripped of its potential role as a major power in international politics for the coming decades. During his first visit to Moscow. by Japan. conditioned any future assistance on the progress made in the process of democratization. less militarized and less threatening to its neighbours and the world. help it to come to terms with its bankrupt position on the international arena.Berger and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Michel Camdessus. When ‘democratization’ is applied to Russia. of course. the dismembering of the Soviet empire. But the oligarchy itself is constrained in pursuing its economic agenda by what is conceived to be Russia’s national interests. of dangling a financial carrot in front of the Russians in anticipation of political dividends. and that only then will the world be able to relate to Russia again as a major power. is indeed very transparent. seems to be confined to a small ‘oligarchy’ running the major privatized companies such as Gazprom. It is rightly interpreted as a desire to exercise effective supervision over Russia’s nuclear arsenal and to ensure that communism is not restored. In the West. characterizing the evolution of the democratization process. Menatep and Oneximbank. and Moscow-based banks such as SBS-Agro. Such an approach. increasingly finds itself the arbitrator of European affairs. ‘Business’ has surely become a catchword in the execution of Russian foreign policy. The ‘bait’ affects directly only the tip of the iceberg. MOST. Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. extremely vigorously. the so-called oligarchy. a recurrent theme of the present volume. In other words. assumed that outfitting Russia with the mantle of a ‘civic society’. like his American colleagues. for instance. that the aid is not simple charity. has been a major factor in Russia’s accommodating policy towards Iraq. through the introduction of market economy. such as Professor Sacks. This controversy is the keystone. One of the erring tendencies has been the assumption that the chaos.
And yet. The collapse of the Soviet Union was by no means. as Nosov reveals. Public opinion. the East can be constructed on the basis of a rational consensus. reflecting a deeprooted philosophy? Or is it a convenient pragmatist standpoint? Sakwa proposes that the East should not be defined within the context of the traditional schism between the Slavophiles and the Westerners. The majority of representatives in the Duma. almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The deliberate colonization actually
. the nationalist mood seems to have been inflamed by the emergence of the so-called New World Order. Sakwa suggests that the terms ‘East’ and ‘West’ may be somewhat anachronistic. as Nosov points out. Japanese industrialization and market economy is identified as the epithet of Western economic progress. and the withdrawal from the Baltic and the Black Sea littoral were envisaged. His retrospective rationale is laden with idealistic and moralist notions. more specifically by US incursion into regions which Russia regards as its own backyard. The virtual abandoning of the highly strategic hold over the Baltic littoral created a real conundrum. Rather than hanging on to the ideological tenets of the nineteenth-century debate. any attempt to divert Russia to the East immediately sounds an alarm in Moscow. Throughout Stalin’s reign the Soviet Union secured the integration of the region into the Union through a massive influx of Russian citizens. African and east European emigrations and cultural influences. follows a similar pattern. as becomes clear from this volume. must increasingly contend with a blend of Asian. dismantling of the empire created vast anomalies. antiuniversalism and multilateralism. its trade with Asian countries. not to mention the secession of the southern republics. It is indeed most doubtful whether. is less than 10 per cent of its overall turnover. as Gorbachev would like us to assume today. aimed at replacing the clearly obsolete ideology while discarding the enduring and sound traditional premises of ‘national interests’. Does the East—West division and the introduction of the term Eurasia connote a messianic role for Russia.INTRODUCTION xvii
of purpose. the unification of Germany. On the other hand. and in many ways irresponsible. an orderly and inevitable affair. Even from the economic point of view. The hasty. In fact. As the West seems to be dominated by the USA or Europe. Russia predominantly continues to seek association with the West. Turning to the East. while Russia’s share of Asian trade does not exceed 1 per cent. as the Kosovo war and the second war in Chechnya demonstrate. are increasingly supporting nationalist agendas. Rather paradoxically. within the framework of Perestroika. The centuries’ old fear of isolation continues to haunt the mind of the rulers in the Kremlin. with almost the sole exception of Yavlinsky’s liberals. European countries. the East offers Russia more possibilities of maintaining its status as a major power.
the USA. The Kremlin for its part would need to decide whether to resort to force and bellicose alliances or to achieve its aims through diplomatic and economic means. At times it may be a reaction to the extension of NATO. further rekindled that suspicion. Their foreign policy may appear chaotic and senseless at times if examined in isolation. Russia’s attitude to the Baltic region. overlooking the ponderous weight of the past. in the international arena. The success of such a policy depends to a large extent on the will and ability of the USA to recognize and accommodate Russia’s long-term interests. Japan and China. the extension of NATO and the failure to activate the NATO—Russia Council preoccupies
. The legacy of the past is never too far from the surface. will be decided by domestic and foreign policy factors: at home by the nature of the political and economic reconstruction to emerge out of the transition period. through the ability to redefine its relations with the ‘near abroad’. Signs of that were clearly discerned in various European capitals during the war in Kosovo. And yet. either in the Middle East. The off-handed fashion in which the Americans have imposed their new global dominance will surely produce a backlash in the long run. accentuated by political instability at home. A quick glimpse at both Western and Russian newspapers will show that mutual suspicion lingers. and the ease with which it could be recruited to sustain a nationalist line. Ukraine. based essentially on its geopolitical disposition. Black Sea and the Balkans. formed by the Pacific Ocean. could be calamitous. attention is therefore drawn in the book to the modus operandi which it chooses to employ. the inclusion of Poland and Czechoslovakia in NATO generated much resentment in Moscow. on the other hand. Europe. will remain the ‘litmus test’ for the course negotiated by Russian foreign policy. Likewise. but the Russian encroachment into these regions often diverges from the main axis of Russian-American relations. the establishment of functioning constitutional balances. regarded as a flagrant challenge to Russia’s security assets. hopefully by peaceful means based on mutual trust. The methods the Russians use to regain their status in the vital geographical triangle. on the one hand. It hardly comes as a surprise to find that the Russians perceive the US bombing of Iraq as a violation of the agreement of the antiballistic missile defence treaty signed by Moscow and Washington in 1972. the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. On top of querying the objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. with similar percentages in Estonia.xviii RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
reduced Latvia’s indigenous population to 52 per cent by 1991. the southern tier or the Far East. The war in Kosovo. the political regroupings. is by relating them to Russia’s broader view of international affairs. Indeed. Russia’s successful return to great-power status will be determined by the pace and effectiveness of economic reforms. and the ability to cope with regional conflicts (mostly in the Caucasus). The key for understanding Russia’s aims. and to the Kurile Islands in Far East.
will emerge as a US-dominated contrivance or. At an early stage. A no less significant arena. The American resort to ad hoc alliances. from the Russian point of view. Since then. often on Russia’s borders. NATO’s expansion to the East is perceived as a blatant American attempt to divide Europe by lowering a new ‘iron curtain’. the Russians hastened to conclude an extensive economic agreement with Iraq. But even in that case it remains to be seen whether NATO. using NATO as its main policing force. is an overwhelming Russian interest. as the recent events in
. is Iran. Light et al. But threats on other borders may well promote similar reactions. As Trenin correctly points out. Russia has been a champion of attempts to pass a resolution in the Security Council which would lead to lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq. NATO is considered to be an instrument of US foreign policy. is indeed debatable. as the author suggests. regardless of the nature of the regime there.INTRODUCTION xix
Russian policy makers and is constantly in the headlines. currently undergoing a metamorphosis. Even politicians like Yavlinsky were quick to spring to the defence of the government’s decision to use an iron fist in dealing with the uprisings in Dagestan. even if it places them on a collision course with the Americans. there is a prevalent tendency in Russia to contrast ‘the good West of Europe/EU’ with the ‘bad West of America/NATO’. Whether this is an indication of the priorities set now on economics. during the Gulf War in winter 1991. The marriage of convenience celebrated by the Americans and the Russians once the war against terror was launched could hardly blur this antagonism. Russian politicians never tire of justifying their efforts to forge special relations with Iran. The need to pacify Russia’s southern tier and prevent any turmoil from spilling over into the southern republics. as a secondary force in a more traditional coalition structure. agree that the extension clearly marks the creation of a divide. and one of the chief means by which the USA intends to achieve unipolarity. Rubinstein argues unequivocally that the extension of NATO is not only disastrous for the conciliation of Russia in the future but actually is a detriment to the USA’s own interests. while Bush was in the midst of contemplating a second campaign against Iraq and seeking international support within the scope of the war against terrorism. heavily populated by Muslims. or whether political and security considerations remain predominant. The impotence of NATO in the recent war against terrorism in Afghanistan seems to encourage the Russians. Likewise it is vital for them. In summer 2002. Eran underscores the continuity in Russian Middle Eastern politics which is manifested in an increasing involvement with its southern ‘near abroad’ and the southern tier of Turkey and Iran rather than the Israeli— Palestinian conflict. was perceived in Moscow as proof that ‘the world was descending into dictatorship and arbitrary rule’. as the Russians hope. Russia assumed the role of a mediator (alas unsuccessfully).
its presence is likely to persevere. It has deprived Western politicians and historians alike from recognizing the unmistakable continuity characterizing Russia’s policies. similar effort has also been directed to the construction of nuclear power stations and joint projects executed through Gazprom and local companies. Similarly ambitious is the construction of pipelines transporting oil from Turkmenistan through Iranian territory. in a permanent state of turmoil and on the verge of bankruptcy succeeds. just outside the realm of more vital Near Eastern interests. though not on a comparable scale. have been developed with Iraq and Syria. The end of the Cold War—a war which in retrospect seems to have been merely a passing episode in twentieth-century history—has proved the relativism of ideology and demonstrates the need to come to terms with history. Russia. shortly after Evgenii Primakov’s appointment as Foreign Minister in 1995. Russia has been investing massively in Iran. 2003
. Amicable relations with Iran are not only vital for economic and domestic reasons but are motivated by considerations of a traditional balance of power. as long as Russia feels that the new global order is dictated in an arbitrary fashion by the USA. Paradoxically. applied to conflicts concerning overlapping interests or regional ethnic issues and manipulated through the instruments of balanceof-power politics. therefore. not only in the transfer of ballistic missile technology (which has introduced a sour note into their relations with Israel). The Middle East and the Israeli-Arab conflict lie. nonetheless. did not mark a regression but rather stability and the re-emergence of geopolitics and nationalism as the compass of Russian foreign policy. seem to remain the modus operandi for the execution of Russian foreign policy. which vanished almost overnight. in punching its weight in the international arena. many of Russia’s future energy resources are tied to the Near East and the Caucasus. The return of Russia to the Middle East. Nonetheless.xx RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Chechnya and Dagestan have proven. Gabriel Gorodetsky Tel Aviv. Moreover. Other economic projects. to contain fundamentalist Iranian influence on the southern CIS through conciliation. The participants in the conflict served for decades as pawns in a Cold War ‘battlefield’. The traditional Russian practice of dressing intrinsic national interests in an ideological cloak has contributed much to diffusing the rational and fixed elements in Soviet and Russian foreign policy. Notions of space and geopolitics. aimed at developing the natural gas region near Isfahan. Some sort of alignment with Iran is also sought in an effort to check the growing Turkish influence in that region. encroaching on Russian interests.
Part I: A Great Power in Transition Faces Globalization
and yet others. and so forth. and the nature of the New World Order remains an open question. been adopted as the official doctrine of Russian foreign policy. As soon as
. but at that time the entire diversity of world development was reduced to the formula of ‘class’ relations between the two military-political blocs and their leaders. practical conclusions were never drawn. Russian policy envisages a multipolar path for the evolution of international relations. It should be noted that Russian political scientists do not share a uniform view of multipolarity. These divergent opinions and assessments can be explained mostly by the fact that the problems of the evolution of international relations since the end of the Cold War have been insufficiently studied.KLEPATSKII
In the aftermath of the Cold War the structure of international relations is in a state of transformation. that it corresponds to the realities of world development even less than the idea of US leadership. it also existed during the period of bipolarity. By and large the matter comes down to disagreements over Russia’s foreign policy orientation: some propose a tilt towards the West. The international community can and must determine the path it intends to take.N. In fact. Although the idea of ‘polycentrism in international policy’ was expressed as early as 1993. that it does not provide a complete picture of the contemporary world. But. that it establishes false guidelines. This idea is reflected in a range of documents. Meanwhile.1 The New Russia and the New World Order
L. on the whole. a multipolar world system is already a reality. analysis of the various points of view on this topic shows that the opponents of multipolarity are unable to raise serious objections to a multipolar world system. The principle of multipolarity has. in the foreign policy doctrine developed under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. others towards Asia. One can only hope that its choice will correspond to the changes taking place in international relations. such as the new version of the National Security Doctrine (approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 10 January 2000). towards the USA. consequently. Arguments can be heard that multipolarity is not only incorrect but even harmful to Russia’s national interests. This particular orientation took shape gradually.
which gradually ripened even at the height of the Cold War but which became clearly manifested only after its end. the vulnerability of countries to external factors in their quest to ensure stable and progressive development is becoming ever more apparent. There seem to exist other players in world affairs besides the state. which is changing the economic. as never before. On the one hand. first and foremost. of which Russia is one. social. Contemporary international relations in the epoch of globalization could develop along a variety of potential paths. as is their influence on events on the regional level and beyond. Multipolarity can therefore be seen not just as another ideological scheme but also as an objective condition of international relations. On the other hand. it takes into account. It should be noted that the collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations and the concurrent process of globalization has created a qualitatively new situation in international relations and generated numerous problems that require either new analysis or modification of previous interpretations. The number of regional organizations of various types is growing. Thirdly. It is no longer possible to realize national interests within the framework of one bloc alone. cultural and informational environment of human life. Therefore there
. it leads to increasing interdependency among countries with regard to practically all aspects of their national interests.THE NEW RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3
bipolarity vanished from the stage of world politics. the role of national interests acquired a remarkable new significance. Their very existence serves to democratize international life. Many states belonging to structures whose existence had been dictated by the logic of confrontation between the two blocs found themselves in an awkward position. Multipolarity is created. which is linked more with civilizational than with ‘polar’ traits. Non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations are playing an increasingly prominent role. In particular. a major challenge to nation-states. This is also true of the possible configurations of multipolarity. Therefore. the question of the subjects of international relations requires a new analysis. One determining factor is globalization. Secondly. Therefore. it opens up prospects for democratization and the humanization of international relations. The shadows of the past gradually disappeared leading to an erosion of the former single-bloc orientation. de facto. This is especially true for large states. multipolarity not only ‘continues’ history but also responds to globalization and its consequences for international relations. both the established centres of gravity and influence that have formed in international relations and the newly emerging ‘poles’ at the regional and sub-regional levels. military and political factors rather than by global cultural diversity. multipolarity represents an entirely realistic perspective for the further evolution of the contemporary world. the state of the international arena has become. Fourthly. by economic.
processes. Previous limitations on choice are disappearing and there is an increasing diversification of political and economic ties. At the present time. when the USA is characterized as the sole superpower in the world. but nonetheless independent. This will represent the consolidated interests and functions of the member states of the EU. Globalization exerts an influence on national interests. It would be a serious mistake to ignore the autonomy of these two processes. One of the positive consequences of globalization is the growing range of possibilities that states have for pursuing their national interests as members of the world community. when speaking of multipolarity. Therefore. Each has its own roots and its own internal driving forces of development. on the assumption that the latter is the totally dominant trend. which has set itself the goal of forming a fully fledged political entity and pole of international relations with a single currency and economic. This is apparent even among members of military-political alliances. The most advanced is the framework of the European Union (EU). its share of gross world production is just over 20 per cent. for all its significance. The emerging multipolarity provides broad opportunities for national-political autonomy beyond the determining force of economic factors. At the root of international relations lie the national interests of states.4 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
is a need for non-traditional approaches to the formation of political doctrines for a modern world system that address the conditions of the twenty-first century. foreign and military policy. but rather seeks their compatibility and consolidation in pursuit of security and stability. it should be remembered that states have new possibilities for realizing their national interests. since there are attempts to dissolve international relations in the wake of globalization. with varying degrees of maturity. particularly in the economic and financial spheres. it should be borne in mind that globalization can also lead to the manipulation and distortion of the transformation that is taking place in the world community. transforms their content. we should bear in mind that globalization and the further evolution of international relations are mutually intertwined. Hence. it should not be forgotten that. Their existence and interaction provide the basis for economic multipolarity in international relations. And yet. It is precisely these poles that occupy the leading position in the world economy today. The process of globalization is developing unevenly. It does not eliminate the disparity between national interests. To a
. but in no way eliminates or replaces them. Moreover. and this is most apparent in the formation of integrated economic ‘poles’ characterized by a fairly high level of density of economic connections and complex interdependency. several dozen integrated economic coalitions exist. This remark is necessary.
not all existing economic groups can become world-class poles. China and ASEAN (Asssociation of South East Asian Nations) amounts to more than 20 per cent. The tendency towards integration on the regional and sub-regional levels is a general feature of the development of international relations. Their integrative and defensive functions should be examined when considering the further evolution of contemporary international relations. as evidenced by the collaboration now gaining momentum between the EU and Latin American integrated groups. mechanisms have not yet emerged for the management of these processes. Asia-Pacific and Latin America. The advantages of globalization are realized precisely on the level of regions and integrated unions. I would like to emphasize above all the regional scale of multipolarity. Let us look into the economic sphere of international relations which has changed fundamentally since the 1970s. between the regional organizations of Europe and Asia. without any one pole possessing absolute power. Inter-regional ties can also be viewed in relation to the establishment of methods to regulate globalization processes. as demonstrated by the scale of the recent Asian economic crisis which dealt such a painful blow to Russia’s weak market economy. it is compounded by the development of connections on the inter-coalition and inter-regional levels. while the share of Japan. the integration of state economies makes it possible to mitigate the negative aspects of globalization. by 2015. but their significance on the regional and sub-regional levels cannot be ignored. On a global level. since it is on this level that opportunities appear to create cooperative mechanisms for managing these processes and reducing the costs of globalization for nation-states. it is easier to implement management strategies successfully on the level of integrated unions than on either the national or the global level. World economic expansion will gradually take shape as a result of the interaction among integrated unions. Multipolarity in contemporary international relations means today a limited number of poles. In summing up this brief analysis of these phenomena. Prognoses suggest that. we are witnesses to a unique historical experiment—the birth in Europe of something like a new species of cooperative superpower. Today in the economic sphere. Such integration qualitatively changes the structure and orientation of international collaboration. integrated unions fulfil a clearly defensive function. It is clear that economic integration demands increasingly intensive coordination between the actions of states in the political sphere as well. Of course. At the same time. the USA and the EU account for approximately 21 per cent each of gross world production.THE NEW RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 5
certain extent. Moreover. the integrated alliances that form its framework and their growing influence on the behaviour of states. particularly since the 1970s. the share of both the USA and the
. Consequently. In other words.
multipolarity is incompatible with hegemony in international relations. which cannot but reflect multipolarity. Naturally. But this is a country with enormous. 42 per cent of its natural gas and 43 per cent of its coal. Japan and China. undermining the strategic position of the USA and narrowing the dollar’s ‘living space’. only a multipolar world system in all its diversity can provide a genuine framework for ensuring the balance of interests among the participants in global processes. monetary unipolarity is being eroded. Russia falls between the tenth and twentieth place among the most developed nations.6 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
EU will have diminished relatively. Specifically.5 per cent of gross world production. As we see. the country’s intellectual property is assessed at US$400 billion and it has significant potential in the area of high technology. It is
. which is a separate topic). the EU’s determination to establish its autonomous military potential is clearly aimed at overcoming just this situation. Russia and a number of Latin American countries possess sufficient resources to ensure their own development (putting aside. possessing 15–20 per cent of the world’s estimated oil reserves. which has resulted in the establishment of an Asian monetary fund. potential. The main point is not the number of poles but the very nature of international relations. which is already a salient tendency. Of course. multipolarity in international relations does not mean the quest for some kind of ideal recipe or panacea for all the abundant threats and misfortunes afflicting the human race. for now. Until recently. In terms of its GNP. there are other states apart from the USA that can be counted as relatively independent ‘poles’. In this arena. At the same time. However. the introduction by the EU of a single currency has removed this asymmetry. India. the world monetary system has been tied to the American currency—more than half of world trading accounts are settled in dollars. This is precisely what was demonstrated by the initiative of the finance ministers of the ASEAN countries. at their meeting in Chiang Mai (Thailand). though as yet unrealized. States such as China. To economic can be added monetary multipolarity. the Republic of Korea. However. The consolidation of Asian countries in the financial sphere could have farreaching consequences for the American dollar. while the share of China and Japan will increase along with that of the entire Asian group. an assessment of the quality of this development. The EU has also announced its intention to ‘catch up’ with the USA in the sphere of high technology. whose share will amount to practically one-quarter of the gross world product. even in this sphere of international financial and economic relations. which has placed the USA in a significantly advantageous position. Russia is an insignificant force with slightly over 1. Nonetheless. but even they do not shun various forms of integration with other states. The USA has unequivocal hegemony in the military sphere and in the field of high technology.
political and economic inclinations. Asiatic counties? Previously. it proceeded from the assumption that the democratization of international relations should be an inextricable element of peace in the coming century. A country’s role cannot be reduced solely to economic factors. enjoy a certain advantage in this respect since they have turned out to be. but only on condition that democratic states apply to international affairs the values that prevail in their own domestic affairs. maintaining the role of the United Nations in supporting peace and security. In this sense. will undoubtedly have a beneficial influence on international relations. the establishment of a civil society. Indeed. and strengthening strategic stability. They are not part of the well-known political. Malaysia and other growing economies also the West or do they remain nonetheless Eastern. Russia. Therefore. The affirmation and observation of democratic norms and principles in internal state policy.THE NEW RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 7
increasingly evident that the urge of a single state or group of countries to dominate global politics and economics contradicts the fundamental principles of contemporary international relations. as it were. The interweaving of traditional concepts into an analysis
. ones that correspond to the country’s national interests and to all aspects of its security. India. when the Russian delegation proposed to the countries of the G8 its doctrine for peace in the twenty-first century. economic and regional military and political structures and have preserved freedom of manoeuvre in their choice of foreign. which in the 1990s has been in a state of political instability and economic crisis. A theoretical analysis of multipolarity in international relations is significant in and of itself. Russia. The use of military force and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states can hardly be included among these democratic values. and perhaps the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Russia was supported in these aims by an overwhelming majority of members of the international community. Are Japan. the existing global political poles are engaged in fierce competition for the foreign policy orientation of Russia. but now globalization is erasing the traditional boundaries between the two. strays. multipolarity is the obvious alternative in so far as it is based on consideration of the national interests and sovereignty of states. It has taken a stand as a firm advocate of preserving the principles of contemporary international law. has somehow managed not to dissipate its weight in foreign policy. the geographical indicator dominated in determining whether a given country was East or West. We may recall the quite eloquent recognition by US President Bill Clinton of India as the ‘world’s largest democracy’. In the context of globalization the concept of the ‘West’ should be examined more closely. but it also has practical value: it should enable the Russian government to determine the most appropriate parameters and guidelines for its foreign policy.
It should be kept in mind that in the context of multipolarity and the transitional state of international affairs. Russia’s negative reaction to a number of US actions in the area of strategic stability—the use of military force to resolve international conflicts. is nonetheless inadequate to deal with contemporary threats. Russia’s choice of a multipolar world system absolves it from the need for confrontation in a union with someone against someone else. not to mention any number of other ‘antis’. For Russia’s national interests and security.8 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
of contemporary trends reflects the transitional state of international relations. because of their geographical proximity and the intensity of the integrative processes taking place among them. at least in the next 15 to 20 years. This is especially important as Russia is a country much in demand. a country that each of the poles wants to have on its own side. to which can be added the massive and multifaceted complex of military issues. with the weight shifting towards the latter half of the equation. The Russian conception of multipolarity is sometimes described as antiAmericanism. but it would be just as logical to speak of the antiAmericanism of the EU. Russia cannot permit itself a one-sided orientation towards only one pole. Naturally. To choose the West or the East. the optimal choice is balanced openness which allows freedom for manoeuvre in foreign policy. whose management depends on supporting and strengthening strategic stability. The same is applicable to collaboration with the USA. ignoring the UN Charter along with the norms and principles of international law—is shared by other countries. Europe or Asia. Russia’s national interests are best served by willingness to collaborate with all powers regardless of the continent on which they may be located. is a false dilemma. Russia can concentrate its efforts on resolving its domestic problems. however. priority should be given to those powers that are located in the European or Asian spheres and also to the USA—with regard to the first two. In the context of globalization and a multipolar world. Since such a necessity does not seem likely. But to ‘merge’ with a broadly conceived West guarantees absolutely nothing—there are enough faceless states there even without Russia. and foreign policy should provide the optimal conditions for this. relations are shaped by a combination of balance of power and balance of interests. It is obvious that a confrontational posture does not correspond in any way to Russia’s national interests and security. The experience of Russo-American relations over the 1990s indicates that there is a wide variety of platforms for collaboration. while still significant. which have a direct influence on the degree of Russia’s integration into the world economy. The element of force. For example. which considers itself a pole. in the framework of transatlantic relations two poles have taken shape: the
. Kosovo is an example of this.
In the 1990s.THE NEW RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 9
USA and the EU. First. Collaboration with Asian countries and their regional organizations should be more intensive than at present. the world community. Multipolarity is the salient democratic alternative in the development of contemporary international relations. albeit not at the top rank. Russia can raise its standing as one of the world powers. This experience cannot be ignored—its historical consequences are well known. For all its shortcomings and all the doubts about its effectiveness. has worked out a whole compendium of principles and norms of international law to regulate relations among states and their behaviour in world affairs. when the USSR supplied fuel and raw materials at lower than world prices and received. In many respects there is no alternative to the UN as a mechanism for managing the system of international relations today and in the long term. 35–40 per cent of Russia’s foreign trade is already with the EU. economic and technical leadership of the industrially developed countries. industrial products of mediocre or even poor technical quality. This does not mean keeping an equal distance or equal proximity. the figure rises to over 50 per cent. A different path might be the expansionist model of globalization. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). the Russian side lost the opportunity to become the ‘locomotive’ of economic integration. This does not mean that the volume of foreign trade with the EU should be reduced. there has existed for half a century an organization that is the bearer and embodiment of these principles: the United Nations (UN). at inflated prices. Paradoxically. It means precisely a balance. This is certainly possible. Hence there is a need for civilized rules of the game and behaviour in international affairs. the striving for hegemony in world politics and economics on the part of a single country or group of countries can only provoke resistance—open or concealed—on the part of other centres of influence. In practice. As one Russian political scientist has noted. during its many years of evolution. has enormous potential to become a centre of gravity. it remains unique. by broadening collaboration with the former Soviet republics. relations which naturally have a preferential character. It would be rash to opt for only one of the two. relations with them should be balanced. Secondly. which can be defined as a Eurasian formation. This does not mean playing down relations with the EU and other European states. Russia has repeated the model of collaboration with the former Soviet republics that was characteristic of the former Council of Economic Assistance (SEV). in return. it has already become that. but only for the purpose of its own disintegration. Currently. and if the east European countries are included.
. However. at the root of which is the acceptance of the political. The imbalance that has developed can be corrected through more intensive cultivation of trade and economic relations with Asian countries.
it is the multipolarity of international relations that can best serve its national interests and promote its international security. And for the new Russia and its Eurasian position. as well as a number of sub-regional organizations both in the north and in the south of the continent. cooperation between the UN and these regional organizations is becoming ever more necessary in order to coordinate resistance to threats in the field of security and to establish joint rules of conduct. There are equivalent organizations in Africa and Latin America.10 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Regional organizations play an ever greater role in the development of collaboration among states within their regions. In the conditions of globalization.
. In Europe there is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this way it will be possible to create a political superstructure of multipolarity in international relations. In Asia the potential of ASEAN and its regional security forum (ARF) is growing. It is precisely multipolarity in its various dimensions that presents a real platform for ensuring the balance of interests among the participants in global processes.
India and Iran). It seeks to examine the extent to which Moscow’s approach to international relations differs from that under Yeltsin. the new President faced multiple challenges: reestablishing Russia as a more or less credible international actor. if any. bind Russian foreign policy in the post-Yeltsin era? It must be acknowledged at the outset that the task of answering these questions is hardly straightforward. In these unpromising circumstances. Putin’s years in office have been marked mostly by
. plus ça change. Putin has yet to commit himself to a particular external philosophy or world view. Kosovo—and a severe deterioration in relations with the USA and major west European powers in the latter years of the Yeltsin administration had generated an atmosphere marked by acute pessimism and a maximum of resentment towards the West. plus c’est la même chose (the more things change. hold true? What themes and concepts. and placing Moscow’s relations with the West on a more constructive footing while ensuring that Russia retained its trumps elsewhere (developing ties with China. The first is the paradox that Putin’s activism— reflected in numerous high-level two-way visits—confuses rather than clarifies the direction in which Russian foreign policy is heading. several very high-profile setbacks—NATO enlargement. the more they stay the same). An anarchic institutional climate. with the express purpose of keeping open as many options as possible. In particular. Can one speak about a distinct Putin style. or does the old French adage. Iraq. and his comprehensively global approach has been designed. This chapter seeks to take preliminary stock of Putin’s conduct of Russian foreign policy. Russian foreign policy was in a state of rout. restoring confidence in government decision making.2 The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING When Vladimir Putin moved into the White House in January 2000. two critical problems of analysis come to mind. it seems. adopting more effective positions in defence of various national interests. Therefore.
geographical and institutional context on both the presentation and substance of policy. Given these circumstances.1 Although the Soviet demise brought with it greater transparency in some areas of political activity. In the post-Soviet era. it is especially important to focus on practical policy outcomes. Eurasianism and ‘strategic partnership’. The necessity of standing above the fray. In such a fluid policymaking environment. quite another for such rhetoric to translate into substance. while the relationship with the USA continues to reflect traditional preoccupations such as ‘strategic stability’ and closer consultation in international conflict resolution.2 more ‘Eastern’
.12 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
familiarization and image projection. Thus. of seeing each visit. ranging from more Eurocentric. it is vital to adopt long-range views and to recognize the influence of political. By their very nature. with correspondingly opaque decision-making processes. FOUR DIMENSIONS OF SECURITIZATION Unlike Yeltsin’s reign. Consequently. relations with China and India have been dominated by themes of multipolarity. Not only is this frequently contradictory. in which he has specifically tailored messages to different audiences and purposes. but it also reflects a long tradition of official myth-making— what might be called the Potemkinization of foreign policy—dating back to the time of Catherine the Great. therefore. foreign policy has remained an elite preserve. Putin’s approach to international affairs has been ascribed various traits. they remain by far the most reliable guide to administration thinking. policy documents such as the Foreign Policy and National Security Concepts have been important less as a meaningful guide to action or as a conceptual framework than as an indicator of political fashion and a mechanism designed to reconcile—at least in public—sharp contradictions among competing sectoral interests. communiqué or policy development as indicative of a larger shift in foreign policy when it often simply reflects the concerns of the moment. in the former Soviet Union. of seeing beyond the detail. one needs to beware of interpreting declared policy as necessarily reflecting actual intentions and commitments. the vehemence of official utterances and a surface ‘activism’ have frequently acted in the past as surrogates for genuine action. It is one thing for the government to describe a particular issue as a top priority. a more activist Russian approach has derived impetus from the heightened profile of international terrorism and Islamic ‘extremism’. such documents have been intended to present a picture of harmony and strategic vision. In examining Putin’s foreign policy. is all the more critical given the second of our two problems: the unreliability of much of the so-called ‘evidence’. While not foolproof. indeed. there is a danger in over-interpreting signals. in meetings with European leaders the emphasis has been on participation in pan-European processes.
Putin’s first year has been distinguished by the interplay between securitization on the one hand and what might be called the ‘economization’ of Russia’s external relations on the other. although it borrows elements from other attempts at conceptualization.7 In support of this thesis. more globalist and less Westerncentric). In the same way that we might speak of the ‘militarization’ of a particular society. or the ‘civilianizing’ of the military. The primacy of security priorities and concepts One of the more specious arguments. It implies. as well as the President’s numerous references to the critical importance of such goals.8 while the Foreign Policy Concept considers a ‘fundamental task’ of foreign policy to be the ‘creation of favourable external conditions for the progressive
. key constructs of geopolitics—zero-sum.5 more ‘economic’.e. securitization is not a discrete phenomenon. there are radical differences in their presentation—differences which. Secondly. balance of power. Although security conceptions are changing slowly. Although these tendencies might appear mutually contradictory. On the contrary. with an emphasis on one assuming a minimization of the other. particularly in the West. at times. spheres of influence—have retained their relevance in the calculus of the Putin administration. Notwithstanding talk about the latter’s increasing importance.3 more confrontational. is that Putin has redirected Russia’s focus away from traditional geopolitical emphasis towards a more economically driven set of priorities.THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 13
(i. The contention in this chapter is somewhat different. the primacy of political—military over economic priorities.4 more focused on internal priorities. Thus. the National Security Concept lists the ‘condition of the national economy’ first among ‘threats to the national security of the Russian Federation’. It argues that the most significant strategic feature of Russian foreign policy since Putin’s coming to power has been its ‘securitization’. Thirdly. securitization is an ongoing process. old-style or ‘hard’ security interests remain at the top of Moscow’s external agenda. some observers point to the prominence of economic objectives in major policy statements such as that of the National Security Concept and Foreign Policy Concept of 2000. securitization is as much a matter of personalities and process as it is of substance. first and most obviously. so it is appropriate to understand ‘securitization’ in Putin’s Russia as reflecting the greatly increased role and influence of the security apparatus in foreign policy—both at the individual level and institutionally. divorced from other trends in Russian foreign policy. It is not just about reworking themes and priorities from the Soviet and Yeltsin eras. Moreover. promoting instead a more holistic approach to international relations that is at once cooperative and competitive. have had important policy implications.6 and so forth. Fourthly. in many cases the effect has been just the opposite.
and (2) American plans to develop a strategic missile defence system and the implications for strategic stability.14 Whatever we might think about the merits of these responses. if brutal approach towards Chechnya.10 On the face of it.11 It is also worth remembering that the 1997 version of the National Security Concept focused almost exclusively on domestic socio-economic challenges to Russian security12— an emphasis directly at odds with the Yeltsin administration’s ongoing obsession with geopolitical themes such as NATO enlargement. then these two issue-areas have ranked consistently above all others in Moscow’s horizon. Suffice it to recall Moscow’s approach towards CIS-related issues during the 1990s. contrary to the case under Yeltsin. domestic and international. the Putin administration has been active in supplementing rhetoric with concrete policy action: a vigorous. relations with China. then. Where. Iraq. The dominating issues have not been Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. Paris Club debt. What matters are the hard realities. to highlight the truism that saying and doing are often two entirely different things.13 Furthermore. CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) ‘modernization’. development of Caspian energy resources. and its relationship with questions of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.14 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
development of Russia’. the pervasive influence of official mythmaking demands that a sceptical attitude be adopted towards policy statements of broad intent. and wider international profile. when an ambitious agenda was largely nullified by passivity of action. as suggested earlier. ‘securitized’. Although these matters are assuming greater importance. since Putin took office. their policy prominence cannot be compared to that of the two flagship issues of the Putin administration: (1) terrorism. they highlight at least an
. has Moscow concentrated the bulk of its attention and resources? The answer is security in the hard sense of the term—to such an extent that one can speak of Russian foreign policy becoming more rather than less. gas exports to western and central Europe or involvement in a new ‘Silk Road’ stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic. If one conceives of policy significance as the totality of high-level government interest. We cannot assume. Russian foreign policy seems indeed to be undergoing a process of ‘economization’. and so on. coordinated. and the so-called European Missile Defence Initiative to counter American moves to dismantle the 1972 ABM treaty.9 Putin’s speech to the Federal Assembly on 3 April 2001 clearly gave more prominence to Russia’s integration into the global economy than to the CIS integration and relations with NATO. that Putin’s foreign policy agenda is more ‘economic’ merely on the basis of official say-so. then. domestic political resonance. First. And yet the situation remains unclear. One can hardly overlook the fact that it took three years for the 1994 Russia—EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to enter into force—this despite ties with the EU being consistently described as strategic.
Here. For only
. the long-term prize is loosening the transatlantic security consensus. indeed. is to assist devolutionary tendencies in Western security. not his protestations that Moscow does not view the former Soviet republics as a ‘sphere of influence’. There may be fewer references these days to concepts. but also in an underlying security-based philosophy. France. As with the CIS qua ‘sphere of influence’. it is Putin’s activist approach which is most pertinent. For example. and the tactics used to prosecute them on the other. treating the latter as a de facto sphere of influence. While he is interested in expanding economic ties with western Europe. Germany. much of the motivation in Putin’s courting of western European countries such as the UK.16 In an important sense. Putin has adopted a less declamatory approach. The Russian President can have few expectations of early success in such an endeavour. Italy and others is motivated principally by geopolitical concerns. popular under Yeltsin. positive-sum view of the world. it is especially important to distinguish between strategic purposes on the one hand.THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 15
enhanced commitment to the task as well as the enduring primacy of security interests more generally. balance of power and spheres of influence. but appreciation of this reality does not negate an underlying premise that is firmly grounded in zero-sum and balance-of-power ideas. but it would be mistaken to conclude from this that Moscow is moving towards a more benign. the Putin administration prefers not to adopt the lexicon of geopolitics and. the objective is not a stronger Europe per se. and many in the Russian political class. what we are witnessing is a kind of reverse Potemkinization: whereas the Yeltsin administration was apt to describe the former Soviet Union as Russia’s major foreign policy priority while in practice assigning it second-class status. in the case of the CIS. The methods are less crude than in the past. For Putin.17 Implicit in this thinking is the zero-sum assumption that an increased role for Russia in Europe is predicated on a corresponding dilution of American preeminence within the same. but one which is able to dilute or counterbalance perceived unilateral tendencies in Washington’s decision making. But much of the purpose behind the European Missile Defence initiative. and Moscow’s encouragement of developments such as the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). such as the ‘global multipolar order’15 as well as a less overt emphasis on notions of zero-sum. but the strategic objective remains the same. particularly after the chastening experience of NATO solidarity during the Kosovo crisis. Similarly. this primacy finds expression not only in individual policy positions. but one which in reality is far more serious about exercising Russian influence in the periphery. one driven principally by economic considerations. denies any agenda to undermine Western solidarity. Moreover.
16 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
in this way can Moscow maximize its opportunities for substantive engagement and influence in continental affairs. The changing face of securitization Ultimately, then, the most important difference in the approach of the Yeltsin and Putin administrations lies in modalities rather than concepts. Particularly after Kosovo, Moscow understands that more subtle methods are required to advance long-standing security objectives. Most notably, there has been a sea-change in the way it responds to actions it considers damaging to Russian interests. Whereas the Kremlin was once apt to express outrage and wounded pride or threaten unspecified ‘countermeasures’, Putin rarely wastes his breath or his time on the unrealizable. It is significant, for example, that he has largely eschewed the rhetoric of multipolarity while taking far more active steps towards a more globalist foreign policy. At the same time, his practical style is reflected in a general absence of ‘paper’ agreements or compromising entanglements. In contrast to his predecessor’s penchant for idle promises and ‘bold initiatives’, Putin has offered up the very image of level-headed reasonableness, committing to little, but leaving open as many options as possible. This pragmatic yet geopolitically driven approach to international affairs is especially well illustrated by the Kremlin’s management of relations with European institutions like the OSCE, NATO and EU. On the one hand, Putin has moved away from the idea of the OSCE as Europe’s umbrella security organization to which all other groupings are subordinate. There has been no formal rejection of this article of faith so popular during the Yeltsin period, but in practice the OSCE has been relegated to the margins of security thinking. It is seen as unwieldy and cumbersome, intrusive (notably vis-à-vis Chechnya), and incapable of serving as an effective instrument for promoting Russian strategic goals—a view confirmed by Moscow’s belief that no useful purpose would be served by an OSCE summit in 2001.18 Conversely, under Putin, Russia has in some measure resumed ties with NATO after the hiatus following the alliance’s intervention over Kosovo. It was his invitation to Lord Robertson in March 2000—when still only Acting President—that provided the initial impetus for moves in this direction. It has been followed since by a stream of reciprocal high-level visits and even some concrete, if minor, achievements such as the opening of a NATO information office in Moscow. Putin understands that the alliance is by far the dominant security reality in Europe, and that Russia has no choice but to adapt accordingly. Continuing Russian objections to alliance enlargement and policies, however, make it clear that Putin does not see NATO in benevolent positive-sum terms, whose widening activities serve only to promote
THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 17
stability and security in Europe.19 The alliance may be an inescapable fact, and one without alternatives, but that does not oblige Russia to ‘learn to love’ it. So while it cooperates with Brussels, the extent of this engagement is limited and calibrated; there is no meeting of minds in the broader sense, but case-by-case cooperation in specific areas like joint peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. Significantly, Moscow continues to view NATO ‘expansion’ as a greater threat than EU enlargement, even though it is the latter that poses potentially far more of a threat to Russian interests, particularly in relation to Kaliningrad. Consistent with this mindset, the Putin administration has tended in the case of the EU to focus on security developments—the CFSP, West European Union (WEU), RRF—rather more than trends in economic and social integration.20 Although there is increased awareness of the implications for Russia of, say, the Schengen visa regime, such relatively mundane issues are not likely in the foreseeable future to displace more emblematic subjects like NATO enlargement. In short, the securitization of Russian foreign policy under Putin is at once flexible and pragmatic in presentation and unreconstructed in its fundamentals. Putin understands the importance of accommodation and deal making, but he proceeds from an intellectual and philosophical base that is firmly grounded in geopolitical assumptions. He may not yet be in a position to follow through on the second part of Theodore Roosevelt’s maxim to ‘speak softly, and carry a big stick’, but this remains the eventual ambition. His is not a classical realist, confrontational view of the world, since he accepts interdependency and globalization as part of today’s realities. Nevertheless, his view is informed as much by notions of competition as by cooperation, a consideration that naturally predisposes him towards the familiar—that is, geopolitical and traditional security trumps—rather than towards more liberal, modern, yet alien interpretations of security that assign prime importance to democratization, an open market economy and a civil society. Notwithstanding his claim that Russia is ‘a part of western European culture’,21 the key consideration for Putin is that it should be a ‘great power’ in the global as well as regional sense. Securitization and economization under Putin One of the curiosities of Putin’s foreign policy is that the continuing primacy of geopolitical and security priorities has been matched by an increased emphasis on economic interests. Even if we take a properly sceptical view of official statements, there is no doubt that the new administration has adopted a more energetic approach towards both macroeconomic reform in Russia and economic ties with the outside world. Important changes in tax laws and practice have been introduced; national budgets are acquiring credibility; the foreign investment environment, although hardly felicitous, is better than at any time in nearly
18 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
a century; Moscow is assiduous in chasing down debts from the former Soviet republics; and its approach to Caspian Sea development issues is more focused, united and determined than ever before. The existence of these parallel tendencies—the geopolitical and the economic—might seem to signal certain ‘normalization’ in Russian foreign policy. Instead of propounding its inherent ‘right’ to be treated as a great power,22 Russia is slowly evolving into a ‘normal’, postimperial nationstate, with a balanced slate of external priorities covering the full gamut of national interests. The irony is that this parallelism has actually intensified the securitization of Russian foreign policy. Rather than speaking about a process of ‘economization’, it is more appropriate instead to talk about the ‘geopoliticization’ or ‘securitization’ of economic priorities. Two aspects of this paradoxical state of affairs stand out: (1) the nexus between a strong economy and an assertive foreign policy; and (2) the role of economic factors in power projection. In the first case, Putin, like many members of the governing elite, is conscious of the crippling effect that the post-Soviet economic crisis had on Russian foreign policy and military capabilities. Not only have other countries paid diminishing heed to Moscow’s interests and sensitivities, but the government itself has only occasionally felt able to allocate the resources necessary to sustain an assertive line in, say, the former Soviet Union. It is therefore not a choice between either following a more economically oriented foreign policy or maintaining a geopolitical approach to the world, but of doing both. The great lesson of the Cold War (and after) is that the more prosperous a country’s economy, the greater its international clout in all, not just economic, spheres. Where Putin differs from the West is that he sees a strong economy not only as an intrinsic good—improving the welfare of the people, etc.—but also in instrumental terms, as the springboard from which to restore Russia’s international fortunes. He does not want Russia to become a ‘normal’ nation-state if this would limit its status to being that of a major regional power at best. The objective, albeit one he realizes cannot be achieved for many years, is Russia’s return to something like its former global eminence, without, of course, the tensions and conflicts of the Cold War. More tangibly, the pursuit of external economic priorities is about power projection. At the crudest level, a capacity to exert economic pressure on others is seen as a prerequisite for ensuring that they follow policies acceptable to Russia. Thus, an activist approach to Caspian Sea energy development pays off in a more solid strategic presence in central Asia and the Caucasus; a tougher line on gas payment arrears translates into a more pliable Ukraine, less disposed and/or able to engage with the West; while Georgia’s dependence on Russian energy requires that it pay particular attention to Moscow’s security interests across the whole Caucasus region. Under Yeltsin, Russia had the option of exploiting the
THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 19
linkages between economic interests and power projection, but did not do so to anything like the extent possible. By contrast, the Putin administration has shed these inhibitions to follow a much harder line in the CIS, using economical rationalist methods to achieve geopolitical and security goals.23 The result, in keeping with the overall style of the President himself, has been a far more ‘securitized’ approach in practice. Even in a more overtly cooperative context, economic complementarities have contributed to a renewed assertiveness and capacity to project influence. Arms sales to China and India, in the 1990s essentially a means of earning export income and sustaining the Russian military-industrial complex, are now a practical expression of multipolarity, giving substance to the ‘strategic partnerships’ with these countries. Nuclear cooperation with Iran is not only financially lucrative, but underlines Moscow’s role in the Near East and reminds the West that Russia remains an important player in key aspects of global security, in particular, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the particular case of western Europe, the region’s reliance on Russian gas exports24 constitutes as compelling a reason as any for continuing engagement with Moscow on a range of matters extending far beyond the purely economic. Again, these linkages were present in some form or other during the Yeltsin years, but they were rarely exploited to the degree that is evident today. At a time when Russian military capacity (conventional and nuclear) remains feeble, economic instruments have become by far the most effective means of pursuing long-standing geostrategic interests. The securitization of foreign policy management If many of the underlying geopolitical assumptions of the Kremlin have proved remarkably resilient, then the institutional context of foreign policy making has, on the other hand, undergone significant transformation. Changes in administrative practice have become a critical component in the ongoing securitization of foreign policy, affecting matters of substance as well as ‘style’. At the most literal level, the involvement of the security apparatus in policy formulation and implementation has increased significantly. Although its role was by no means negligible under Yeltsin— after all, Primakov headed the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) before he became Foreign Minister—it was difficult to discern a distinct security and intelligence influence as such. It was more the case that the so-called power (silovye) institutions—the Federal Security Service (FSB), FIS, Interior Ministry, Ministry of Defence—sometimes constituted a strong (but by no means always united) constituency for conservative nationalism, one that heightened the profile of security issues and, more generally, served to check the liberalization (or ‘normalization’) of Russian foreign policy. Under Putin, the security apparatus has emerged from its previous near-
no one is in any doubt about the pre-eminence of the President in Russian political life. Although the policy implications arising from this more ordered institutional context remain to be played out.g. and in May 2001 former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was appointed Ambassador to Kiev—a pivotal position in Russia—Ukraine relations. notably the CIS (e. for example. But the difference now is that Putin’s more understated approach to power and the institutional stability it has encouraged has generated a far more centralized. Although he has surrounded himself with trusted faces from his past. The new President has been careful to balance new appointments with the retention of many familiar figures from the Yeltsin era. coordinated and disciplined approach to foreign policy management. If nothing else. Although the full policy implications of this securitization of the institutional environment have yet to emerge. Thus. Igor Ivanov remains as Foreign Minister. the management of Russia’s external relations may be said to have become securitized in the sense of absorbing the kind of implicit discipline commonly associated with the security agencies whence Putin came.
. in its management of the external aspects of the Chechen conflict. their introduction in government has been achieved smoothly. it is indubitable that the increased weight of the security apparatus relative to the other ‘power’ ministries was one of the principal outcomes of Putin’s rise to power. the Russia—Belarus Union). it means that security priorities will remain at the top of Moscow’s agenda for some time to come while ensuring that a relatively pragmatic outlook continues to prevail in the Kremlin.20 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
anonymity in policy making to assume a much more public profile. More generally. This is evident. unlike in the 1990s when policy in many areas. In place of the earlier Byzantine factionalism and sectionalization. while talk of a new consensus in foreign policy is still premature—particularly given the contradictions within its external agenda—Russia these days presents a broadly consistent face to its various audiences. where the Kremlin has maintained a resolutely unapologetic stance. one can already identify a greater degree of self-confidence and predictability in Moscow’s behaviour towards other countries. backed up by action on the ground. Putin’s substantial popular mandate and his more even personality compared with Yeltsin have been conducive to greater bureaucratic certainty than at any time since the Soviet collapse. Igor Sergeev survived more than a year with the defence portfolio (before being moved to an honoured position as the President’s adviser on strategic stability). in the face of sustained Western criticism. As under Yeltsin. Not only is a former head of the FSB now President of Russia. but his closest confidant and former KGB/FSB colleague Sergei Ivanov is the nearest the country has to a vice-president. While personalities and not institutions remain the key to decision making.25 This literal securitization of the institutional context has had a crucial impact on foreign policy conduct.
including a determination to invest real content into declared objectives. wherever they live. there is the matter of American indifference towards Russia. Moscow finds in western European capitals a more receptive audience to many of its security concerns.28 Then there are the obvious implications of geographic proximity: a whole raft of issues—security. In today’s much calmer operating environment. it represents potentially fertile soil for the evolution of closer ties between Russia and western Europe. The fact that the latter had slipped well down the list of
.26 There is much to be said for this theory. or enlisting European support for Russian positions on international issues such as strategic missile defence. in many cases. there are also objective factors advocating a more Europeanized approach towards foreign policy. His working background—senior KGB officer in former East Germany. Putin exercises greater control over policy presentation and content. this has resulted in a much greater degree of professionalism and confidence in foreign policy management. economic. More than one-third of Russia’s trade is with the EU. RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN THE ERA OF SECURITIZATION One of the more fashionable claims since Putin’s advent to power has been the notion that Russian foreign policy has become more ‘European’ in contrast to the Atlanticist bias of the Yeltsin administration. political. For one thing. a share that some analysts expect to rise to around 60 per cent after the next wave of the Union’s enlargement.29 And although this relative goodwill or sympathy is often not readily convertible into hard political capital. In addition to issues of personal preference.27 It is also relevant that he has invested considerable time and effort in substantiating this claim. highlighting the importance of closer economic relations with the EU and its member states. that Russians are Europeans. Such formative experiences have clearly contributed to the conviction. joint solutions are required. Putin is Eurocentric by experience and conviction. ecological—where Russia and Europe face common problems and where. expressed in his book Ot pervogo litsa. at once avoiding damaging turnarounds and leaving himself plenty of room for manoeuvre. With the policy swings of his predecessor consigned to the past.THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 21
fluctuated wildly according to whichever sectional interest was in the ascendancy at the Kremlin court. such as strategic stability. than in Washington. Relatedly. Europe’s rise and Russia’s decline have resulted in a rough equivalence in geostrategic terms. and later Deputy Mayor of St Petersburg with responsibility for the city’s relations with the outside world—meant that such foreign policy expertise he acquired prior to becoming President was largely in relation to Europe. Finally. whether by visiting the major western European capitals.
the pivotal role of Europe. and so forth. including the idea of the USA as Russia’s primary point of strategic reference. while there are some signs of an increased willingness to enter into such activities as a ‘normal’ player. Although Russian foreign policy subscribes to notions of multipolarity. The first is the continuing geopolitical strain in the worldview of much of the political class. but he understands also that Russia. in time.32 This is why it is likely. whether in strategic disarmament. Irrespective of how much it might resent American ‘hegemonism’ and ‘diktat’. However.31 The second major constraint is that.30 There is still a deeprooted reluctance to accept a diminished. with others on issues such as peacekeeping and reconstruction in the Balkans. western Europe will follow Washington’s lead—even those countries such as France and Germany which have often criticized American policies. regional role for Russia as just another important European power. and so on. the promotion of a stable European security space. economic globalization. While many concede intellectually that Russia needs to become more ‘European’. when it comes down to the difficult decisions. And yet there are compelling reasons to suggest that this may prove elusive. the globalist vision. Putin may ‘feel’ European. In short. developing multifaceted economic relations. even while it works hard to improve the modalities of an eventual deal. remains consuming. even China. For the administration to move away from this mindset requires that it absorb more ‘European’ or positivesum views of continental security in which Russia joins. continuation of a
. cannot help but be primarily influenced by Washington’s actions. to agree to an accommodation over American missile defence plans and the strategic disarmament agenda. the Europeanization of Russian foreign policy will depend less on Moscow’s inclinations than on the actions and policies of others—the USA. inclination and logic would seem to dictate a more Eurocentric outlook. it will continue to assume that. it knows it must deal with Washington on the issues that really matter. western Europe. as a mere equal. economic. like everyone else. these are more often than not counterbalanced by what Vladimir Baranovsky has called a ‘not-like-the-others’ mentality. notwithstanding the impressive performance of the major western European powers in recent years.22 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Washington’s priorities prior to 11 September 2001 has reinforced the case for a geographic reorientation of Moscow’s foreign policy. technological and cultural dominance is for many Russians the all-encompassing reality of today’s world. primacy of the UN. Thirdly. This trend has been reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001. in practice Putin pursues a cold-blooded pragmatism. their instincts remain moulded by the calculus of international power politics—and this presupposes a fundamentally Americacentric approach. or elsewhere. For example. American strategic. In the European context. combating international terrorism and transnational crime.
with western Europe relegated to the largely auxiliary role of helping to soften Washington’s positions. the product of a particular concatenation of circumstances. following the stagnation of the later Yeltsin years. and facilitate the process of Europeanization in its external outlook. the very securitization of Russian foreign policy under Putin could turn out to be the single greatest barrier to a proper rapprochement.33 while European attitudes towards Russia continue to be highly ambivalent. the extent to which Russian foreign policy can become ‘Europeanized’ and Russia a part of Europe. then. But the widening gulf in political and civil values between Russia and western Europe—highlighted especially in differences over Moscow’s conduct of the Chechen war— could become serious. In this context. the major continental powers are disposed to a qualitative improvement in relations with Moscow. On the other hand. one should note recent signs of a more activist approach to foreign policy on the part of the Bush administration. So it is an open question whether the current Eurocentric approach of the Putin administration signifies a strategic shift towards a more ‘normal’ foreign policy. leaving Russia with little alternative but to focus on relations with western Europe. or whether it is just a passing phase. For the time being. individual human rights—it is unlikely that Russia will be accepted as a fully fledged member of a wider European community of nations.34 Here. instrumental and morally arid approach to external relations. In this event. the USA would return as the prime focus of Moscow’s attention. While Moscow continues to adopt a narrowly pragmatic. an assertive attitude by Washington in areas such as strategic missile defence. NATO enlargement and international conflict resolution would feed deep-rooted preconceptions and prejudices—just as it did during the first wave of alliance enlargement and at the time of the Kosovo crisis. the extended election hiatus.THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 23
disengaged approach by the USA in international affairs would provide a breathing space for the longer-term development of Russia’s ties with western Europe. We have already had a taste of this when a period of transition in American politics—the ‘dead’ months of Clinton’s second term.
. and the settling-in period of the new Republican administration—coincided with a noticeable reduction in Washington’s international commitments. transparent political processes. comes down to a strategic choice between two diametrically opposed tendencies: a securitization characterized principally by a repackaging of essentially old ideas and concepts. one based on exploiting the sometimes fortuitous confluence of security and economic interests rather than on shared values—a commitment to media freedoms and diversity. In the end. and a normalization that changes the paradigm and moves decisively beyond the parameters of current Russian foreign policy thinking.
2001. 9. p. ‘Kontseptsiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. 50. was in the habit of putting up facades of prosperous villages (complete with freshly dressed peasants) along the Empress’s carriage route in order to hide from her the reality of extreme rural degradation and poverty. 6. 31. the term pokazukha (fake show) has come to signify government attempts. including Duma deputies and staffers. This view. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 8. 10. p. p. p. Prince Potemkin. Putin began his address with the assertion that Russia ‘has always felt itself to be a Eurasian country. Since that time. See also Margaretha Mommsen. 3. officials. no. 4. p. 23–30 October. p. 16–17. 7 June 2001. 4 April 2001. the Potemkin village syndrome’. pp. pp. ‘Vneshnyaya politika Moskvy v poiskakh suti’. no.’ going on to describe it as the ‘distinctive integrating centre linking Asia. former Ambassador to the USA. Moskovskie novosti. Vladimir Putin: ‘Ne budet ni revolyutsii. 8 January 2000. ‘Sfinks v Kremle’. 121–2. 11. Anatolii Adamishin. was also strongly implicit in such headlines as ‘Vladimir Putin. 2000. ni kontrrevolyutsii’. favoured by some Western correspondents in Moscow. 1. The survey focused on the views of 210 members of the Russian foreign policy establishment. an elite survey completed in April 2001 by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Questions and the Moscow office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. in “‘Kazhetsya za god osobykh oshibok vo vneshnei politike my ne nadelali”’. 5. academics and think-tankers. no. 11. Nezavisimaya gazeta. no. At the Brunei APEC summit in November 2000. 11 July 2000. 7.
. especially during the Soviet period. Rossiiskaya gazeta. 13. 4. 1. pp. 28 December 2000. 14 November 2000. ‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. address to the Federal Assembly. 45). p. Nezavisimaya gazeta.24 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
1. See ‘Vneshnepoliticheskii kurs stal bolee sootvetstvovat…’. p. 6. One of Catherine the Great’s particular favourites. In the foreign policy context. 3–4. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. was the first to highlight the Russian ‘passion for mere show. specifically the contrast between initial triumphalism and subsequent disappointments in mediating between Saddam Hussein and the Western powers—‘Bengalskii ogon v araviiskikh peskahk’. Nezavisimaya gazeta. round-table discussion in Nezavisimaya gazeta. p. 2. See also ‘Vneshnepoliticheskii kurs stal bolee sootvetstvovat natsionalnym interesam strany’. Internationale Politik. See Viktor Kremenyuk. see ‘Rossiya: novye vostochnye perspektivy’. See comments by former Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He was referring to Moscow’s approach towards Iraq. members of the Federation Council. 1. 5. 11. Russia’s Post-ColdWarrior’ (The Economist. See Strategic Survey: 2000/2001 (Institute of International Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press). to promote the fiction of wealth and happiness where little of either existed. 14–20 January 2000. Europe and America’. Vladimir Lukin.
p. Vladimir Putin: Ot pervogo litsa (Moscow. 17. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 51. there was no mention of the OSCE in Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly a few days later. 15. 13. vol. I was fortunate enough to receive a copy of the 1997 Concept of National Security. 20. p. Significantly. 6 (in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. for example. 2000). in Tatyana Parkhalina (ed.). as typified by his claim that Russia’s participation in the post-Kosovo settlement at the 1999 Cologne G8 Summit had ‘reaffirmed its status as an equal political partner. Putin. ‘Rossiya i Evropa na rubezhe stoletii’. Putin tacitly acknowledged these problems by calling for a major improvement in the quality and effectiveness of Russia—EU cooperation. 12.g. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. technical cooperation and technology sharing. with one notable difference—the absence of any preamble about alleged American/Western attempts to impose unipolarity and diktat. p. 14. 16. 3). Izvestiya. 2001. In an address to the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on 26 January 2001. 11 March 1994. Evropeiskii soyuz na rubezhe vekov (Moscow. no. see also his 2001 comments to the Federal Assembly. 2. ‘Ne budet ni revolyutsii…’p. Putin gave primary emphasis to these priorities in his address to the MFA collegium. even so-called liberals such as former Foreign Minister Kozyrev claimed that Russia was ‘doomed’ to remain a great power (‘Rossiya i SShA: Partnerstvo ne prezhdevremenno. This point has been made by Russian commentators. See Putin’s comments reported by Arkady Dubnov in Vremya MN.
. See. a zapazdyvaet’. While short on detail. in ‘Stroitelstvo vtoroi opory Evropeiskogo soyuza: Ispolzovanie novykh tekhnologii’. 2000. p. Notwithstanding Yeltsin’s immodest (and false) reference to ‘my concept of a multipolar world’ in his Midnight Diaries (London. Although no less an authority than Alexei Arbatov has criticized the proposals as impractical (at a round-table discussion at the Moscow Carnegie Centre on 2 April 2001). 22. no. 16 December 1999. it was former Foreign Minister Primakov who assiduously promoted ideas of multipolarity and the development of a ‘diversified’ and ‘multi-vectored’ Russian foreign policy. no. 26. 6. 16). p. p. 21. p. However. p. 51–2. See ‘O zadachakh Rossiiskoi diplomatii’. without whom it is unthinkable to resolve world conflicts and decide important issues…’ (Midnight Diaries. 6. 31 March 2001. ‘O zadachakh…’. the Russian proposals for cooperation in ‘non-strategic’ missile defence envisaged joint threat assessments. p. p. 1. Yeltsin was especially fixated on this idea. 19. As an Australian diplomat in Moscow. 1999. 156. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 4. 346). Igor Ivanov. In most respects it was very similar to the 2000 version. Dmitrii Danilov. Russia’s ‘right’ to great power status was a constant refrain throughout the 1990s. 4. 163). p. 2000). pp. see ‘O zadachakh…’. e. ‘Moskva protiv provedeniya sammita OBSE v etom godu’. 18.THE SECURITIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 25
11. 2. they at least represented an advance on the policy paralysis of Yeltsin’s last year. 2001. also. 50.
. 122). no. 24. See Marina Volkova. should also be the one to introduce liberalizing reforms into the Soviet economy in the early 1980s. pp. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 29. 451.’ characterized principally by reduced Russian subsidies to those countries: ‘Ukraina i Belorussiya v Rossiiskoi vneshnei politike 90-kh godov’ (theses of a roundtable presentation at the Moscow Carnegie Center on 2 April 2001). According to him.. 76. 31. International Affairs. Even vocal critics of Kozyrevian Atlanticism. 42). The fragility of Eurocentrism in foreign policy thinking was amply illustrated by the disproportionate Russian media reaction to the fact and outcomes of the Putin-Bush summit at Brdo in Slovenia—see. ‘Energeticheskii krizis sblizil Moskvu s Evrosoyuzom’. 3. 30. Putin stated that CIS integration was not ‘an aim in itself but must bring concrete rather than rhetorical benefits to Russia and its citizens see ‘O zadachakh…’. 31 October 2000. p. 2000. In the specific context of relations with Ukraine and Belarus. no. has been far from unqualified in its support. 28. Berlin and Rome have exhibited a consistently lukewarm attitude towards the American proposals. In his MFA address in January 2001. 2000). 34. 33. Paris. 3. 156. p. Washington’s closest ally. 1. 5. 23 June 2001. 26. Putin. 116. p. p. 25. 10. 7. the KGB—in particular its external departments—was considered by many observers to be more informed and therefore more pragmatic about the extent of the Soviet system’s weaknesses. for example. Strategic Survey: 2000/2001. Compared with other power institutions. Although European attitudes on this question are not uniform. It perhaps explains why former Communist Party General Secretary Yurii Andropov. p. Even London. 11. pp. a ‘decisive’ rapprochement with Europe is contingent first on the development of ‘stable and solid’ relations with the United States: see ‘Rossiya v novom miroporyadke…’. p. 40–1. p. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 2.26 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
23. See Strategic Survey: 2000/2001. have warned against ‘excessive’ expectations regarding the Europeanization of Russian foreign policy. See figures in Tamozhennaya statistika vneshnei torgovlya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow. comments by Vyacheslav Nikonov. in Trud. such as Pushkov. One radical expression of this argument is Alexei Pushkov’s view that Russia cannot be politically integrated anywhere. Arkadii Moshes has described the new rationalist phase under Putin as a’moderate-pragmatic period. it also cannot allow itself the luxury of becoming a ‘classical regional power’ like Germany or Japan (ibid. p. Consistent with this logic. 122. 27. See also ‘Vneshnepoliticheskii kurs stal bolee sootvetstvovat…’. vol. 32. an illiberal figure principally associated with the brutal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and later persecution of Soviet dissidents during the Brezhnev era. Vladimir Baranovsky. 2000. p. ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?’. p. Ot pervogo litsa. let alone in the West: ‘Rossiya v novom miroporyadke: ryadom s zapadom ili sama po sebe?’. p. The Institute of International Strategic Studies puts the EU’s share of Russian foreign trade even higher at over 40 per cent (Strategic Survey: 2000/2001. 39.
partnership between Russia and NATO.1 The document was officially approved by President Putin shortly after his inauguration in May 2000. Many European states had experienced similar regimes at various periods of their history. South Korea and Taiwan for instance). militarized powers owing to the dialectics of external confrontation and internal oppression. joint peacekeeping operations.
. the system survived in Russia until the mid-1980s when it underwent a drastic transformation. with farreaching and controversial consequences for Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. defence doctrine and military policy. When it came to strategic issues. The new official concept was adopted by the National Security Council in January 2000 and the new Military Doctrine a month later. but this model came to be mostly associated with ‘Asian’ development (which is scarcely justified when considering India. The US-led NATO military action against the sovereign state of Yugoslavia severely undermined the post-Cold-War framework of security. Russia has never existed between Europe and Asia. It was against this background that the 1999 war in the Balkans triggered a major revision of the Russian National Security Concept. For various complex historical reasons. empty slogans and ceremonious US and European summits could hardly conceal the profound deterioration of relations between Russia and the West throughout the second half of the 1990s. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union evolved as authoritarian.3 The Transformation of Russia’s Military Doctrine in the Aftermath of Kosovo and Chechnya
Strictly speaking. Asia and Africa. even geographically. strict compliance with the UN Charter. Japan. which allegedly was to be based on an enhanced role for the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It has always been an east European nation which from the sixteenth century acquired huge territories in northern Asia—at about the same time as the west European empires were gaining their vast colonies in South and North America. international law and agreements between Russia and the West (foremost the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997). and comprehensive arms control and disarmament measures.
This implied the selfproclaimed right to act independently. Its new strategic concept. from the Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. President Yeltsin elaborated these principal doctrinal points openly for the first time when appointing the new Minister of Defence. with their predominant portion (up to 70 per cent) allocated to the maintenance of the armed forces. the new NATO strategy now allowed for military action of an offensive nature and beyond the territories of NATO member states. Notwithstanding the alterations introduced into the Military Doctrine. and possibly to have much higher status and power than. which demonstrated more then ever before the West’s arrogance in its power and intention to overlook Russian interests whenever they diverged from its own. Transcaucasus and central Asia. NATO’s military action against Yugoslavia in March 1999 marked a watershed in Russian assessment of military requirements and defence priorities. to a certain extent. which.28 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
NEW LOOK AT DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS Russian military requirements continue to be a subject of domestic debate. This Military Doctrine postulated two main tasks of defence policy: preservation of nuclear deterrence and anticipating and preparing for local conflicts (including peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations). This was perceived as a slap in the face for Russia. despite the increasing tension with NATO over its enlargement programme. the western military districts of Russia (Moscow. NATO’s offensive against Yugoslavia appeared to be a clear demonstration of a genuine transformation of that alliance. Leningrad and Ural-Volga) were largely considered rear areas. engagement in local conflicts or peacekeeping operations mainly in the north Caucasus military district. the UN and OSCE. they were to provide supply and training infrastructure for the forces assigned missions in the south and south-east where Russia had security commitments. it is derived. with greatly reduced numbers (altogether by 30 per cent). in May 1997. The defence budgets of 1997–99 were structured accordingly. which was regarded as desirable but not necessary for the initiation of military action by NATO. It was a particularly painful humiliation for Moscow. 1833). since President Yeltsin had committed himself personally many times to preventing such action and had guaranteed Yugoslavia’s security. claimed a much greater mission in the post-Cold-War world: to be on at least an equal footing with. could occur in several places simultaneously. Thus. approved by the Security Council on 2 November 1993 and legalized by Yeltsin in an official decree (No. Igor Sergeev. without UN or OSCE authorization. The new versions of the Russian
. while the bulk of R&D and procurement appropriations went to the modernization of strategic forces. adopted at the April 1999 summit. it was assumed. Moreover.
which will acquire nuclear strategic and tactical superiority over Russia by 2010 because of the shortage of funding for maintenance and modernization suffered by the Russian nuclear forces. Hence. is an even greater emphasis on robust nuclear deterrence. which is already taking shape. but also large-scale conventional attacks of the type manifested in the Balkans. as well as in response to a large-scale conventional aggression in critical situations for Russia and its allies’. in addition to involvement in local conflicts in the south and in the east. the most probable response.4 Accordingly. in 1999 a new law ‘On Financing the Defence Contract for Strategic Nuclear Forces’. The new Military Doctrine indeed reserved for Russia ‘the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons against Russia and its allies. air force and naval assets. THE NEW PRIORITIES IN DEFENCE POLICY The principal point of the new National Security Concept (compared with its 1997 version) was the supposition that the military threats to Russia were growing and that the main dangers emanated from the West: ‘Elevated to the level of strategic doctrine the shift of NATO to the practice of using force outside its area of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction threatens to destabilize the entire strategic situation in the world. Moscow’s reaction to the Balkan war. therefore. THE NEW WAR IN CHECHNYA Another crucial provision of the new National Security Concept and Military Doctrine.3 The Russian military reform became subject to serious reassessment. Nonetheless. Nonetheless. which is clearly spelled out. relying on enhanced strategic and tactical nuclear forces and their C3I systems. was adopted by the Duma and approved by the President. This explains the new emphasis on the buildup and modernization of Russia’s conventional air defence. some Russian critics claim that the threat of nuclear first use would not be a credible deterrent against NATO. is the possibility of
. It was realized that conventional forces might once again be oriented to hightechnology warfare against NATO in the west.’2 An obvious way to respond to this threat was to enhance Russian nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear.TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE 29
National Security Concept and Military Doctrine clearly reflected. This law envisioned stable long-term funding for strategic forces R&D and procurement at a level of about 40 per cent of the investment portion of the defence budget. the development and deployment of sophisticated capabilities analogous to NATO’s massive precision-guided conventional air and naval potential will clearly be beyond Russia’s financial capacity for a long time.
it is important to forestall the danger of escalating US-Russian and Russian-Western confrontation. The war in Yugoslavia greatly affected the Russian leadership and public opinion. Other steps should be a tacit understanding on no further NATO expansion over the next several years. on robust conventional defence against the NATO threat. and its effects on relations between Russia and the West. armed revolts. as well as on the regular employment of armed forces to deal with domestic conflicts. with all the political dangers and devastating implications of such actions. It certainly does not cater for a lengthy. Hence. one of the crucial dilemmas of Russian domestic and military policy is whether the domestic employment of armed forces is to be legalized (through amendments to the law ‘On the State of Emergency’). However. or whether Russia should risk losing control over armed secessionist movements. violent civil. large-scale military campaign deploying aircraft.
.30 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
employing armed forces in domestic conflicts. were closely related to the events in Kosovo earlier in the year. Their emphasis on nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as principal pillars of Russian security. it should be pointed out that this law implies specific operations against specific cases of terrorism which are well defined. The Chechen campaign was officially justified on the basis of the law ‘On the Fight against Terrorism’. gradually expanding the zone of cooperation and providing it with solid public support. and that negotiations are of dubious value used merely as a cover for military action. The main lessons drawn from it were that the end justifies the means. leading to huge losses among federal troops and still greater ones among the local population. the devastation of whole cities and villages. on a pragmatic basis and without excessive expectations. It should be recognized that Russia’s war in Chechnya. armour and artillery. Despite the circumstantial coincidence of interests between Russia and the West since 11 September 2001. all reflect Moscow’s great security concerns and have huge economic. initiated in the autumn of 1999. Reviving the NATO-Russian Partnership for Peace would be encouraged by a thorough reorganization of the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and other conflict-ridden regions and a revision of the START-III/ABM package agreements. The dubious justification and weak legal foundation of this war is one of the serious reasons for the strong condemnation of this action by the West. foreign and domestic political implications. The security cooperation must be patiently and consistently rebuilt step by step. The growing rift between Russia and the West is reflected in the new official documents on the highest level: the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine. which formally sanctions the use of armed forces for such purposes. ethnic and religious conflicts. with which internal troops and police are unable to deal effectively. that crisis is best resolved by force if applied decisively and massively.
p. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. ‘Strategicheskaia kontseptsiia NATO’. Krasnaia zvezda. pp. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. no. 17. Sergei Sokut. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. 30 April–6 May 1999. ibid. 9 October 1999. no. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie.. 16. ‘Prioretnyi gosinteres Rossii’.TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE 31
. 1–6. 1. ‘Voennaia doktrina’. 2. 1. no. pp. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti’. 14–20 January 2000. 3–4. 7–13 May 1999. 4. 3.
then. I call this tale a phoenix legend. The crisis was so severe. there is no longer a fundamental value gap between Russia and
. raised an army. that when that superpower collapsed under its own weight a little more than a decade ago. the internal divisions so deep and the foreigners so rapacious that the great country almost ceased to exist. too. It. chased out the invaders and finally brought their house in order. something that in the past was either natural or could be effectively imposed. we will be back. Yet. defeated the oppressors and shook off their yoke. it is very misleading when it comes to analysing the present and forecasting the future. there can be no isolation or semi-isolation of Russia from the international environment. passing from imperial breakup to imperial restoration. but it lost its unity and was overrun by nomads who kept it captive for a quarter of a millennium.e. i. Miraculously but predictably. And some foreigners feared. lines of communication.4 After the Empire: Russia’s Emerging International Identity
There is an old story told in Russia and believed elsewhere. and the world has entered Russia: neither can be undone. and again broke up amid the flames of a civil war and external military intervention. the country grew even bigger and more powerful. interfaces. It is certainly very attractive. the country expanded in all directions to become the biggest and one of the most powerful empires on earth. It does offer a crude interpretation of the past. it later stumbled into a severe domestic crisis. For the following three centuries. however. The reason for this is the discontinuities in Russia’s structure and behaviour that militate against the repetition of the familiar cycle. Once free again. Russia will always be the same. It is hardly surprising. Borders as barriers are being replaced by borders as frontiers. its people organized themselves. it was rescued again. fell victim to internal divisions that its rulers were unable to manage. lasting three decades and leading to a turmoil which in its turn invited its neighbours to invade and occupy it. Moreover. However. many Russians said. restored to its former splendour and glory. Russia has entered the world. it rose to a position and standing it had never enjoyed before—that of one of only two poles in the international system. Still. Likewise. Slowly. First. Once upon a time there was a vast country. its people gathered their strength.
or even ‘doomed’ to be a great power. a major international pole of attraction. It was Primakov again who early on stressed CIS integration as a way of restoring Moscow’s influence in the former USSR. Concentration of all national resources in one pair of hands is highly unlikely. The West. when they must act. giving way to pressure from the rimland. Evgenii Primakov. who tirelessly promoted the idea of multipolarity. and of Moscow’s international diplomatic and military weight (in spring 1999. Russia is more than ever before dependent on the outside world for domestic development. Thirdly. Russia’s gross domestic product (about 1. the international system is clearly emphasizing geo-economics over traditional geopolitics. its federal budget is between US$20 and US$25 billion. China. The result is a peculiar schizophrenia. in August 1998). but had to concede that. the long-term geopolitical trends have reversed themselves.
. Russia as a monolith is over. In a spectacular gesture of protest over the NATO air attack against Yugoslavia. Fifthly. they usually respect the current realities. but rather to try to persuade the International Monetary Fund to allocate funds to Russia. and so on. the phoenix legend still holds a promise to them. Authoritarian rule. sectorial and regional levels. even if imposed.5 per cent of the world’s total) is less than 5 per cent of the USA’s. financial and psychological) to attempt even a modest project aimed at imperial restoration. had not been flying to the USA to discuss conflict settlement in the Balkans. The Russian armed forces are still vast. had to manage the consequences of Russia’s double devaluation. Secondly. In other words.RUSSIA’S EMERGING INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY 33
much of the rest of the world. numbering over 1 million people. That these points are valid and can be proven by the empirical experience does not yet guarantee their acceptance by the majority of the Russian elites and the public. in terms of the required finances. making its repayment an extremely heavy burden. However. Yet. Many leaders and ordinary citizens who espoused traditional geopolitical thinking once they abandoned MarxistLeninist dogma clearly believe that Russia is destined. first of the ruble (coupled with de facto sovereign default. He. Fourthly. Primakov turned his plane back over the Atlantic. however. economically. now or in the foreseeable future Russia will lack resources (material. will have to take into account the many existing interests at national. Japan and the Islamic world have all been on the rise. The country is still not a democracy. Both the Third Rome and the Third International are relics of the past. and the sovereign debt stands at US$158 billion. politically and spiritually. but it is genuinely pluralistic. but they have to survive on a budget of a mere US$4 billion. not pointers to the future. over Kosovo). technology and investment. The Russia—dominated Eurasian heartland has shrunk.
Beijing and New Delhi. His message was both trivial and out of place. as a result of Russia’s continued economic and social decline. The distance separating it not
. The various conceptual documents approved by Putin even before he formally took office as President in May 2000 are a good illustration of the Russian identity crisis. Typically. including for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Politically. and a few weeks before his own resignation. externalizing the nation’s frustrations and casting Russia into the role of a rogue state. The recurrent theme of the Russian foreign and security policy debate is the absence of allies and the confusion about the adversaries. only to hear that there was no interest among the other would-be partners in forming a common front. placing many neighbouring states on the verge of a precipice. In practice. the decline will place Russia in the category of a failed state. or the country will disintegrate. the EU/Europe offers the only credible option. simply ignoring the largely overlapping membership of the two organizations. he saw a loose Western-oriented coalition of GUUAM (Georgia. top Russian officials in the spring of 1999 branded the NATO countries as aggressors while at the same time reaching out to the EU members as partners in conflict management. Economically. Either a new brutally nationalistic regime will emerge. In civilizational terms. but increasingly has to take account of the real and likely contingencies along Russia’s southern periphery. creating a gigantic vortex in the middle of Eurasia. President Yeltsin thundered from Beijing about Russia’s nuclear might. and attempt to fit Russia in. who had to tone down Yeltsin’s bombast. former Soviet republics were moving ever further apart. both politically and economically.34 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
in reality. for the foreseeable future. Instead of integrating other lands and nations into an ever greater Russia. Azerbaijan and Moldova) becoming more consolidated. The National Security Concept has inherited both the unipolarity/multipolarity dichotomy and the notion of the primacy of internal security threats. By the end of his brief tenure as Prime Minister. Russia gravitates towards western Europe. Uzbekistan. Beyond a certain line. Russia—inthe-EU is either a fantasy or a nightmare. Ukraine. The Military Doctrine continues to see the Western alliance as the principal potential adversary. Two exits are possible from that low point. integrated Europe is the most powerful constellation of countries on Russia’s periphery. In theory. The opposite scenario is integration. Primakov also dropped the hint of a ‘Eurasian triangle’ linking Moscow. A year later. this scenario calls on the Russians to make a conscious choice in favour of one of the principal poles of attraction. much less one to be led by Russia. Russia is closest to its western neighbours. What are the available options for exiting from the crisis and adopting a clearer view of the outside world and Russia’s place in it? One is marginalization. and it created a mild embarrassment.
from this point of view. Russia needs to fulfil a formidable domestic agenda. Even before this becomes possible. but its aspirants in central and eastern Europe. Russia’s elites will have to recognize that unless they display responsibility and lead the reform process. A policy of self-concentration is not one of self-isolation. ‘Joining Europe’. Russia’s structural problem is that it has become too small to stand separately but continues to be too big and too difficult to be absorbed by international. there is a need to practise self-concentration. in order to integrate with them on more favourable terms. with all its potentially dangerous overtones. Russian diplomacy’s main mission will be to create the best external conditions for domestic transformation. Russian elites remain greedy and short-sighted. foreign policy is a resource. cannot be done without international cooperation and some form of foreign aid. institutions. Those who care about the country’s status in the world agree that a strong Russia is the one with a sound economic foundation. Russia’s principal business is Russia itself. healthier social relations and practising a genuine form of democracy and federalism. Russia will not be able to develop its economy without massive foreign investment and a flow of advanced technology and know-how. and not a drain on resources. Thus. Russia will need to agree with its foreign creditors about the debt issue. In any event. For them. Rather than see itself as fundamentally different from the rest of the world. According to this approach. civil servants and other highly trained professionals. such a policy will seek to find ways to make Russia compatible with the more advanced parts of the world. Now and for the foreseeable future. the eastern expansion of the EU can eventually draw a dividing line between Russia and the rest of Europe. How probable is each of the three outcomes? A decade after the end of communism and the collapse of the empire. i. and not in some intricate negotiations with or in Brussels. not only will the country go under but chaos and confusion will probably set in. before it can seriously contemplate integration. Unlike NATO’s enlargement. possession. leaving only a handful of key interests that can be protected or promoted.RUSSIA’S EMERGING INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY 35
only from long-standing members of the Union. One major prerequisite for Russian growth and integration. is above all a domestic project.e. and their very existence. endangering the elites’ position. is growing. whose success or failure will be decided in the classrooms around Russia. in the broadest sense of the word. marginalization. Western. Russia’s international identity will be informed by the emerging national identity. This. which can substantially advance or retard the economic recovery. is still a serious threat. personal interests dominate and
. is endowing the country with thousands of modern managers. Moscow’s foreign policy ambitions need to be scaled down even more. too.
pushing Russia further towards the periphery of international economics and politics. Indeed. Moscow will attempt a nuclear build-up. The demonstration effect upon Russia of its former satellites (Poland. Under these conditions. it will not resemble the old phoenix. the odds against drafting and implementing this policy are enormous. It allows the rulers to buy time until the population is ready to embrace a positive national goal. and Russia on the other is likely to grow wider. is not a realistic option over the medium term. A return to isolation and confrontation. It appeals to the pragmatists and does not provoke the ideologues. when and if it finally rises from the ashes. However. a showdown will be difficult to avoid.36 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
common good is non-existent. It will be a very different bird. arms control can become severely crippled. In the worst scenario. A ‘Russian miracle’ is definitely not in the offing. which cannot be ruled out in the medium term. on the one hand. some of which are considered below. on the other hand. this will be echoed by Russian xenophobes and isolationists. History is not bunk. The public is disappointed. Should the USA choose to neglect Russia’s opposition to the National Missile Defence plans. Hungary) and provinces (the Baltics) making swift economic progress will not be entirely lost on the Russian publics.
. can be facilitated by a number of international attitudes and developments. disillusioned and disoriented. If anything. Russia’s chances of making an economic turnaround are minimal. the gap between the advanced countries in Europe and Asia. especially Ukraine and the Caspian region. and fail to reach an acceptable compromise with Moscow over the issue. Should ‘temptation of containment’ of Russia or even the ‘Russia fatigue’ prevail over the effort of engagement. It would avoid unnecessary conflicts with more powerful states. Humiliation suffered by Russia in the world arena in the 1990s provides a breeding ground for revisionism. they would support the traditional Russian remedy of authoritarianism to bring the house in order. a product of domestic development. Russia will never be able to become a Sweden or a Poland. Integration. Self-concentration is not only the rational. nationalism and chauvinism. the main purpose of the integrationist project is to serve as both an anchor and a beacon. and the domestic reform agenda can be twisted or scuttled altogether. but also the optimal choice. The probability of this option will be enhanced if external processes reach their peak against the background of yet another severe economic crisis in Russia itself. Other developments that can push Russia back to the Soviet-style pattern of behaviour include NATO’s invitation to the Baltic States to join the alliance. and demonstration of US/NATO involvement in the newly independent states. However.
Putin was seen to have resolved the ambiguities of the Yeltsin era. Lilia Shevtsova. how great a departure did Russian foreign policy following 11 September actually represent? Is there a complete break. especially when they are on the scale of 11 September. One may discount some of this instant assessment as part of the political hyperbole that usually accompanies dramatic international events.1 President George W. Let us be clear: viewing the reaction to 11 September as a radical rather than revolutionary turn in Putin’s foreign policy is not to deny its importance as a shift of strategic significance. a paradigm leap in Russian foreign policy. Western politicians were quick to greet active Russian support for the war against terrorism as marking the real end of the Cold War. It simply avoids falling into the trap of
. More telling for our purposes is the fact that serious analysts of Russia interpreted Putin’s moves as a revolutionary departure in Russia’s foreign policy. and as having made Russia a strategic ally and an integral part of the civilized world. In siding rapidly and actively with the West after 11 September. Bush echoed Blair in praising Putin as a true friend and an enlightened leader with an internationalist vision strong enough to overcome the doubts of many in Moscow and to ally with the USA against the terrorist threat. First. One of the most respected observers of the Russian political scene. described the steps taken by Putin as a revolutionary and fundamental break.2 This chapter raises three sets of questions about Putin’s post-September policies and advances three general arguments. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly enthusiastic in welcoming Moscow’s ready cooperation as drawing the decisive line under all remnants of hostility between Russia and the West and ushering in the post-Cold-War era.5 Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?
Politicians and analysts hailed President Putin’s international moves following 11 September 2001 as a remarkable departure in Russia’s foreign policy. between Putin’s moves before and after September? I argue that post-September steps reflect a remarkable radicalization of features discernible in Putin’s earlier policies. a caesura.
Closely related is a second set of questions about the factors shaping the moves after 11 September. Putin continues to think in ‘great power’ terms. very crudely. Those more liberal-minded members of Moscow’s policy class who acknowledge the decisive importance of economic factors in international affairs. That in turn hinges on how far Washington meets the expectations of reciprocity which underpinned Moscow’s policy of active cooperation after 11 September. proceeding from concerns with material capabilities and relative state advantage. precisely in order to be able to play its inherent great power role. Putin can best be understood as a pragmatic modern realist who thinks in power categories and sees the world as intensely competitive. That is not the main problem. At the same time. How stable and robust are the policies that flowed from this response? This forms the core of the third and last set of questions the chapter addresses. Putin’s commitment depends not so much on the amount of elite grumbling as on how he personally assesses the balance of costs and benefits. How close such cooperation. based on institutional cooperation which increases absolute gains. insist that Russia will long be a power of the second rank. The Kremlin can withstand such criticism as long as the President himself remains committed to the post-September line. Does post-September policy reflect thinking that is sufficiently innovative to warrant talking about revolutionary policy and paradigm leap? More precisely. the prominence of economic factors does not mean Russia must reconcile itself to modest international status. Moscow has to use all available resources to become more economically competitive. For Putin. As the chapter concludes. A lack of American reciprocity is likely to encourage Russia to cooperate more closely with Europe. it is not simply a matter of Russia competing effectively on world markets. what kind of foreign policy thinking should we associate with Putin? Let us distinguish. In order to become an integral part of that community. between. Russia needs to become a ‘competition state’. whether with Brussels or Washington or both. on the one hand. hence his rapid response to 11 September. taking full advantage of all opportunities.38 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
exaggerating pendulum swings in Russian policy and misinterpreting the shift as a complete departure from previous approaches and practices.
. Many have asked how long Putin can pursue active cooperation in the face of widespread criticism within the elite. As far as Russia’s place in the world is concerned. especially the military. a realist perspective. and that requires the kind of pluralist democracy that scarcely fits in with Putin’s domestic political agenda. becomes in the longer term depends on fundamental issues of compatibility between Russia and the leading states of the international community. and on the other a liberal perspective. Putin realizes that a weak international economic hand means that Moscow has to play an especially skilful game.
to help constrain the world hegemon. Putin responded in a more sober but more consistent manner than Yeltsin. trying out a range of diplomatic initiatives to strengthen Russia’s credentials as a cooperative player to be reckoned with on the world stage. which remained a bone of contention through the summer of 2001. They are too easily seen as a revolutionary break with Russian foreign policy in the later Yeltsin period and even in the pre-September months of Putin’s presidency. For much of the first 18 months of his presidency Putin seemed to be feeling his way. These new presidential links did not seem to narrow differences on issues such as the ABM treaty. Putin continued to use both vocabularies though he soon ceased highlighting multipolarity. But the relative success of his contacts with Bush encouraged Putin to use the personal approach in the aftermath of 11 September. The Russian President was the first foreign leader to call the White House after the attacks. Under Yeltsin. and through the months that followed Putin continued to place a heavy emphasis on direct contact with Bush. The language was often tough. official speeches and documents pronounced on the need for Russia to help reinforce a multipolar world. At issue is the question of how much of a break September actually marks and in what areas its distinctiveness lies. He
. On coming to office. particularly on security issues. It was perhaps in part because of his personal investment in the relationship that Putin took pains to avoid slipping into the traditional Russian vocabulary of complaint and indignation at every unfavourable turn in events. whether over NATO expansion or military action in the Balkans. on what Gorbachev used to call ‘the human factor’ in international relations. the Russian President tried to establish a climate of personal trust and seemed partly successful in doing so. in Ljubljana and Genoa. There is no doubt that the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington triggered cooperation from Moscow that was far more active and willingly given than any political and security help over the previous decade. but more straightforward than that of the later 1990s. At his meetings with Bush. There was much indignation about ‘unipolar’ tendencies. the excessive power of the USA in all areas. The break is more evident in the way in which Moscow conducted policy towards the West rather than in the thrust of substantive action on contentious issues. the voice of Russian foreign policy mixed pledges of friendship with increasingly loud tones of protest. Sitting uneasily alongside commitments to cooperation there was a rhetoric of irritated assertiveness and appealing to others.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 39
WHAT KIND OF A BREAK IN POLICY? The bold and dramatic manner in which Putin extended support to Bush and the American war on terrorism has tended to colour assessment of the policies followed by Moscow in the wake of 11 September. Where Western leaders showed readiness for closer relations. such as China. and especially in the later 1990s.
On closer inspection.40 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
played down what many in Moscow regarded as highly objectionable developments. When we move from presentation and rhetoric to substantive action. Putin seemed to be trying to carve out a more consistent line which would marry the benefits of cooperation with the dignity of great power status. Moscow under Yeltsin was more collaborative in action than words. Through the most acrimonious exchanges of the later 1990s. While Putin had little choice about expressing general sympathy. There were no efforts to use the situation to coordinate critical
. The events of 11 September seemed to offer him the opportunity of cooperating with the USA on a basis of partnership. the Kremlin held fast to its established line of cooperation with the West. not least. Even the last-minute ‘dash’ to take Pristina airport was in essence a symbolic move to try to stake out a claim to territory in a peacekeeping operation which involved cooperation with Western forces. Russian assertiveness under Yeltsin had a selflimiting quality. Let us review briefly the extent and depth of Moscow’s supportive moves. as Moscow had done on previous occasions. the differences between pre. and asked that they not be overdramatized. Active cooperation after September was less extensive and more contingent than the accompanying declarations of solidarity and alliance might lead one to believe. The high tensions which surrounded Kosovo in 1999 did not prevent Russia from eventually collaborating with the Western powers in order to avoid political isolation. In the realm of style and presentation. then. The contrast between Russian policy before and after September is less marked than it might first appear. Moscow eventually accepted its inevitability and negotiated a new relationship with the organization in the shape of the 1997 Founding Act. We have already noted the rapid and unqualified nature of the Kremlin’s declaration of political solidarity with the USA and the West in the war against terrorism. he could have qualified his support for American military interventionist action.3 In former Yugoslavia as elsewhere. largely because Moscow understood that open conflict might jeopardize political inclusion and. Criticism of NATO action in Bosnia continued alongside political cooperation within the Contact Group. Many of the moves associated with what may be called a policy of dignified cooperation were dictated by the extraordinary and rapid changes in the international environment. While continuing to fulminate against the idea of NATO expansion.September are considerable. For the first 18 months.4 Putin was sensitive to the flaws of self-limiting assertiveness which brought Russia neither the international reputation she sought as an aspiring great power nor the full fruits of partnership with the advanced industrial states her economy needed.and post. the flow of economic support. such as news in early 2002 of increased US military presence in central Asia and the Caucasus. the gap is smaller if still significant.
there were reports that between 1.8 Cooperation on the Afghan campaign encouraged the development of closer general contacts between intelligence services.000 Russian technicians. to the need for reciprocity suggest that Moscow saw the Americans as reluctant to match Russian intelligence provision.9 Contributing such resources to the anti-Taliban campaign did not necessarily always serve the common cause. References by Sergei Ivanov. as defined by Washington. he expressed none of the concerns about proportionate reaction shared by some participants and backed a full military campaign against global terrorism.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 41
stances with China and Third World states. or more accurately the North. the Minister of Defence.6 The events of 11 September created ideal conditions for just such a common front. So there is an important continuity of purpose at play here. Russian solidarity with America on this issue reflected a radicalization of Putin’s established position on combating terrorism. What was striking about Russian collaboration was the extent of operational support involved.000 and 2. All told. pilots and military advisers were helping the Northern Alliance in their operations. Moscow had repeatedly called for cooperation and a common international front against terrorism and depicted Russia as the natural ally of the West. The Russians reportedly encouraged their Afghan allies to move fast to take Kabul and themselves
. This operated effectively and Moscow reportedly provided more valuable information than any NATO ally. From the outset. he had identified terrorism as the main threat to the security of Russia and had blamed militant Islamic networks for destabilizing the north Caucasus as well as central Asia.7 This operational help ranged from intelligence collaboration to aid in accessing military facilities in the region. While Moscow strenuously denied having any servicemen in Afghanistan. with cooperation admirably serving established Russian security interests. the Alliance benefited from an estimated US$30–45 million worth of military aid.5 Such solidarity was confirmed in a joint Russian-US statement on countering terrorism. Putin broke new ground in the range and depth of help he provided for the US campaign against the Taliban. February 2002 saw the first visit to Washington by a head of Russian military intelligence. against terrorist threats from the South. Significant operational support for the campaign against the Taliban also came in the shape of Russian aid to the Northern Alliance on which Washington had to rely for ground forces. The sharing of intelligence with the USA was managed through a coordinating group. Moscow used its long-standing military and political links with the Northern Alliance to further its own agenda. New in its degree and forcefulness. On the contrary. at the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Shanghai summit in mid-October.
In the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. they seemed to make less difference to Putin’s view of NATO expansion into the Baltic States. If the decisions to respond positively to Washington’s requests for help were taken in Bishkek and Tashkent. This certainly represented a break with policy under Yeltsin. Under Putin. Rather. it is to suggest that even before September his stance on these issues highlighted a greater capacity for pragmatic flexibility. the Russian President conceded that the Baltic States had the right to join NATO if they so wished. This is not to claim that Putin clearly signalled his later tolerance of US presence in central Asia. the Russian role was more one of acquiescence to these states cooperating with the Americans. statements about NATO reach became less categorical.12 Russian readiness to accept a US military presence in central Asia reflected a more flexible stance on the broader issue of NATO influence within the CIS. both Putin and Ivanov were cautious about the involvement of any CIS states in military action against Afghanistan. with his record of independence within the CIS.10 The mixed quality of Russian help also extends to the contribution that Moscow made to clearing the way for American use of military facilities in central Asia. Moscow made available its air base near Dushanbe for retaliatory strikes against the Taliban and must have played a decisive part in persuading the Tajik government to overcome its initial reluctance to host US forces. the only central Asian state which can be described as a de facto Russian protectorate.42 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
acted quickly to establish a substantial diplomatic presence in the capital and promote a purely Northern Alliance provisional government. Active help was most clearly evident in the case of Tajikistan. Russian support in central Asia came in two forms: active help and facilitating acquiescence. like any others. During his visit to the USA in November 2001. The week before the terrorist attacks Putin had stated that Moscow recognized the right of the Baltic States. Yet such resigned tolerance was not a product of the 11 September. a benevolent or at least neutral attitude on Moscow’s part eased the way. Such acquiescence played a facilitation role. to seek NATO membership even if he added that there was no objective reason for their wish to do so. Moscow talked about the unacceptability of NATO expanding beyond a kind of Red Line around the borders of the CIS. Through the later 1990s. Initially.13 Nor was the line on NATO in general radically
. might have continued to hesitate to accept the attractive American deals on offer to Uzbekistan without knowing that Moscow could live with the outcome. Even Karimov.11 The 24 September presidential speech on active cooperation marked a turning point and was followed by far more helpful statements on specific facilities to be made available in the states bordering Afghanistan. While the events of 11 September brought about a step-change in Russian tolerance of US military presence in central Asia.
16 For Putin. Under the ‘passive’ heading comes what might be called reasoned acquiescence—Putin’s readiness to accept powerful adverse developments. the new quality of active cooperation with the USA still calls for explanation. foreign policy. and this came through strongly after September. since the attacks had revealed the inadequacy of NATO as a security provider. to the neoliberalism of the Gorbachev era and the first year or so of the Yeltsin period? I would contend that we do not. as politics and public service in general. The Yeltsin years—and indeed the Gorbachev era—could be seen as graphically demonstrating the pitfalls of a foreign policy led by emotion and ideological vision. a presidential reversion. is too serious a matter to be dealt with in an emotional and ideological manner. He even added that 11 September showed the urgent need for such an evolution. These policy shifts were essentially decisions not to protest or try to move against
. perhaps. Putin took a pragmatic and calculating approach to the conduct of foreign policy.15 Putin deliberately fostered the image of a cool. Putin held out the prospect of Moscow reconsidering opposition to NATO enlargement if it moved from a military alliance to become a political organization—a common refrain of Russian policy. controlled decision maker. Both were visible to some extent before September and brought out more sharply by the sudden change in the international environment. Pragmatism and predictability were the features given pride of place in official statements. but these did not amount to a paradigm shift. Among the President’s qualities. On his visit to Brussels in early October. one that has struck observers forcefully was described by the editor of the Wall Street Journal as ‘enormous earnestness’. It is within this framework that one should view the tolerance the Kremlin showed towards US military presence in central Asia and the prospect of NATO expansion into the Baltic States. Interpreting post-September Russian foreign policy in terms of pragmatic responses flowing from modern realist predispositions and priorities takes us a long way. From the beginning of his presidency.14 PRAGMATISM OR PARADIGM LEAP? Even if there is less of a break between Russian policy before and after 11 September than might first appear. The experience of September and managing its policy aftermath undoubtedly catalysed some changes in the weighting of priorities. The lessons of these decades surely reinforced Putin’s temperamental predisposition to take a dispassionate and pragmatic approach. To make sense of post-September policies. One can see two types of pragmatic behaviour at work in Putin’s responses: passive and active.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 43
altered by September. do we need to identify a shift in policy paradigm. It calls for a businesslike managerial approach focusing on effectiveness and the efficient use of resources.
This approach emerged much earlier than September. The general thrust and dynamism of post-September cooperation makes sense if we also see it in terms of an active pragmatism. Soon after becoming president. Plagued by its own self-limiting assertiveness and others’ overwhelming resources. action on the ground and actual impact on developments. to put forward a package designed to prevent the development of a North Korean ballistic missile programme. The American need to destroy the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network in central Asia brought about a highly favourable shift in what might be called the overall terms of trade in Russia’s relations with the USA. in the early 2001 discussions on Russia’s debt. At the July 2000 G8 summit he capitalized on a high-profile visit to Pyonyang. associated with the early Bush administration. made en route to the meeting. It was this kind of pragmatic reasoning that induced Putin well before September. At best. the opportunistic and flexible use of Russia’s foreign policy resources to maximize international returns.44 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
developments over which Moscow had little leverage. particularly. to come down on the side of those in the Russian economic establishment who rejected suggestions of non-payment and argued for observing the internationally recognized rules of the game. Moscow’s campaigns had exposed the disparity between rhetoric. Russian resources and cooperation became more valuable to the USA than at any time since the end of the Soviet Union. their adroit presentation at the summit helped to establish Putin’s reputation among his G8 colleagues as an effective leader with whom they could do business. In response to the subsequent cooling of relations with Washington.17 Building such a reputation involved avoiding dramatic. Putin made active use of opportunities to capitalise on Moscow’s links with Soviet-era allies to try to boost Russia’s standing as a cooperative member of the international community. policy stance. Even though the proposals ultimately failed to yield any real progress. of its military and security assets in the region. Here Putin seems to have drawn lessons from the ineffectiveness of past Russian campaigns of noisy protest against NATO enlargement and Western military action in the Balkans. Putin seized the opportunity
. Putin tried to use links with Europe and differences over the ABM treaty to bring the attention of the USA to the need to take Russia more seriously as a partner. Washington’s urgent operational needs suddenly raised the value of Moscow’s diplomatic support and. The damaging consequences for Russia’s credibility were especially clear to a leader like Putin who placed so much emphasis on the importance of Russia’s image in the world as a serious international actor. the expenditure of very considerable resources would have yielded meagre returns. The events of 11 September created a remarkable opportunity to make use of Russia’s resources to raise the country’s international standing. half-hearted gestures to obstruct developments driven by forces largely beyond Russian control.
Putin might reasonably have thought that support for Washington in its hour of need would ease the negotiation of a compromise solution to the vexed question of missile defence and the ABM treaty.18 Joining the US campaign certainly posed some potential risks of attracting retaliation. In any case. Putin was particularly vehement in denouncing the opposition in Chechnya as bandits and had long regarded the reimposition of control over this troublesome republic as his ‘historical mission’. The last two sets of expected dividends from cooperation lay beyond this arc and involved global issues. in general and al-Qaeda in particular. Beyond such potential general advantages. On the political and security fronts. By making al-Qaeda the most important single international threat for Washington. close. The first was Chechnya. the events of 11 September in themselves inclined the Americans to take a far more sympathetic view of long-standing Russian complaints about Islamic terrorism. more widely. It could produce more international sympathy with the methods used by Russia against the Chechen opposition or at least stem the criticism levelled at Moscow. Long before September.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 45
to take advantage of the inflated value of his resources to improve Russia’s standing with the USA and. His strength of feeling on the subject made it likely Putin would see any war against terrorism as a common cause. In summer 2000 there was even talk of bombing Taliban targets. Here was an unprecedented chance to put on the international scales security assets which might help make up in overall standing for Russia’s chronic lack of economic power. cooperation with the USA could help strengthen Moscow’s hand against any attempts by al-Qaeda and the Taliban in retaliation against US attacks to cause trouble in the north Caucasus. but this was ultimately considered too risky. A similar hope figured in the second area where Moscow looked for dividends: ex-Soviet central Asia. in disrupting Chechnya. rather than standing to one side. Further. September also held out the prospect of active cooperation bringing gains for Moscow in four specific areas. could enable Moscow to punch above its economic and technological weight on the world stage. yet Putin could have no confidence that this would be avoided by staying on the sidelines. to strengthen its position in what in Soviet times had been termed the international correlation of forces. The central Asian states had inadequate forces to withstand serious counterattacks and the Russian troops in the region were overstretched. Cooperating actively in such a war had a double attraction. and even allied. which had long troubled
. relations with the USA would enhance security in Russia’s southern arc of instability. Moscow had identified the Taliban as the main threat to stability in the region and as a source of inspiration and material support for the fundamentalist Islamic movements that were causing growing problems for the governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Taking advantage of 11 September by cooperating with the USA.
forms part of the second. this perspective sees cooperation with states and international organizations yielding benefits to all. For Putin. He is traditionally realist in seeing security as essential to the vigour of the Russian state and central to the Kremlin’s domestic and international priorities. One approach is to attempt to locate Putin in terms of two perspectives which have influenced Russian foreign policy thinking. Most commonly found among the advocates of pluralist political democracy and market reform. Putin take a more modern realist view. Putin’s professional experience helps account for his views on security issues. this view highlights the prime importance of economic performance in international affairs. this perspective is associated with the idea of Russia as a great power which deserves to play a prominent role in world affairs. it is the quality of resources that matters. power and prestige in a highly competitive world.46 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
relations with the USA and was the main focus of tensions in 2001. Russian cooperation in central Asia could also bring American reciprocity in the economic field. proceeding from a notion of national interest based on material capability and on achieving influence. The best way for foreign policy to help the country advance along this path is to cooperate and integrate with the leading developed states and international organizations. in varying degree at different stages over the decade. liberal. Development of an efficient market economy is seen as the only path to prosperity and security at home and influence abroad. and especially within the security establishment. perspective. Interpreting active cooperation after 11 September in terms of pragmatic calculation takes us quite a long way towards understanding the decisions made in the Kremlin. Where security resources are concerned. since they tend to produce absolute gains rather than the relative ones inherent in the competitive world that remains central to the realist perspective. In its strongest version. Widespread within the Moscow policy class. cooperation and integration are safe as well as necessary. A more modest role for Russia. The first is essentially realist. In the liberal view. Putin may be best described as a sophisticated modern realist. and this applies not just to ‘hard’ military capabilities but to also ‘soft’ security
. He seems critical of traditional military concerns with quantitative issues in the nuclear or conventional field. He appreciates the economic as well as security components of state power. He understands that Russia has to cooperate with the Western-dominated international system in order to make any headway in what remains a world of competitive states. as a power of the second rank. Moscow harboured hopes of US help in rescheduling her large international debt and in advancing towards membership of the World Trade Organization. But any attempt to gain a deeper appreciation of these decisions must look at the ideas and values that shaped the priorities and defined the weightings of the various elements in Putin’s cost/benefit reckoning.
For Putin. and in June 2002 underlined the need for ‘total immersion’ in the world economy. Russia must safeguard its national interests. Putin takes important elements from the liberal perspective.24 Within the political class. cultural and spiritual resources. as do all other states. But in cooperating. critical comment ranged from
. but he factors them into a modern realist framework and a grander vision of Russia’s international role. the way ahead for Russia still lies through cooperative relations with the most powerful states and membership in the key organisations. Putin believes in close involvement. In other words. His central project is to build a strong modern state capable of delivering order and plenty at home and the capacity to compete effectively within the international system. Awareness of the need to catch up with the developed West lies behind his insistence on rapid growth. Russia is inherently a great power. In Putin’s perspective. Russia can at best become a more prosperous and more influential power of the second rank.19 On this and related issues. In spring 2002. he urged the government to be far more ambitious in its growth targets. he retains a realist view of the international environment. He shares their conviction that the best way forward for Russia is through adjustment to and adoption of international market capitalist standards. For liberals.22 On the other hand. as bringing about national revival and ensuring that Russia achieves the international position it deserves by right. HOW ROBUST IS POST-SEPTEMBER COOPERATION? The policy of active cooperation appears fragile on two main fronts: domestic criticism and inadequate Western reciprocity.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 47
areas. The key to both lies in a vigorous and advanced economy. Putin is keenly aware of the enormous distance the Russian economy has to travel before being capable of meeting these domestic and international objectives. On the one hand. Russia. Many commentators have pointed to the wide gap Putin’s responses to 11 September opened up between the Kremlin and large segments of the policy elites in Moscow.20 Putin sees his mission in somewhat de Gaullist terms. This sophisticated understanding of security needs reinforces an emphasis on economic development that also stems from Putin’s state-building agenda.21 Economic dynamism through integration is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for achieving this position. Putin identifies with the most radical of the liberal economists. cooperation and integration must be practical strategies to maximize influence and standing. by virtue of its history and its scientific.23 In this competitive climate. had to be strong and competitive as she would have to ‘fight’ for its ‘place in the sun’. he told the Federal Assembly in April 2002.
Widespread executive dissatisfaction with the policy was perhaps intensified by irritation at being excluded from what was a narrowly presidential decision-making process. The usually cautious Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. and especially from the foreign policy and military establishments. In private discussions with Putin soon after the attacks on the USA. Sergei Ivanov.28 Privately. This could expose Russia to retaliation and bring little in compensating rewards from Washington. After initial sympathy with the victims of terrorism.48 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
the predictable communist charges of national betrayal to more mainstream doubts about the dangers of siding overmuch with the USA. the overwhelming majority of party leaders expressed scepticism about giving the Americans full support. And even those had little or no real impact on policy.29 More open criticism came from the military elite. Speculative reports about who might have influenced
. without voicing open criticism. translate into any appreciable decline in general support for Putin’s foreign policy or in his impressive personal ratings. large sections of the public expressed doubts about the extent of Russian support being given as well as about the USA as a partner. many Russian diplomats considered Putin’s moves unwise and would have preferred a policy of ‘positive neutrality’. Under Putin’s presidency. in turn himself attracting scathing comment from Kremlin associates. in consultation with a few close advisers. There was apparently no meeting of the Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the September attacks. however. the most extreme objections were voiced by retired communist and nationalist-minded officers. Predictably.27 The strongest scepticism about Putin’s cooperative stance came neither from the public nor from politicians but from the executive. to some extent on behalf of larger numbers of their serving colleagues. the Duma has become a largely tame legislature unlikely to present the Kremlin with serious problems in pursuing its line of cooperation. This is especially the case as Putin’s popular standing remains high. in the immediate wake of the terrorist attacks seemed to rule out the American use of military facilities in central Asia.31 While this was the first of several indications of the Defence Minister’s more cautious attitude to cooperation with the USA. The months following September saw none of the kinds of Duma protest which used to surface regularly in the earlier Yeltsin years in connection with pro-Western moves. expressed Moscow’s position in a discernibly less enthusiastic fashion.26 Such scepticism did not.25 Such high levels of private dissent were not reflected in any organized and effective political protest. Minister of Defence and formerly secretary of the Security Council. The key decisions seem to have been taken by Putin. it may have reflected a lack of policy certainty and coordination in the early days after 11 September.30 Far more serious for Putin was the apparent difficulty of overcoming doubts among leading military and security officials supposedly close to the Kremlin.
to manage critical pressures from the policy elites. In an important sense. As a specialist in security matters. Washington failed to respond in kind to the active support extended by Moscow. shared by most on the Western side.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 49
Putin singled out civilians such as Sergei Prikhodko. Little thinking seems to have been given to longer-term implications or to alternative moves in case developments failed to follow the course initially assumed. he had no apparent difficulty in translating his decision into policy and no serious problem in asserting his authority to silence public questioning of the consequences of his pro-US line. Sergei Yastrzhembskii and Mikhail Margelov. Moscow might be able even to exercise some constraint over Washington.33 The decision to provide military support does not appear to have formed part of an elaborated strategy. and most of all from his own doubts about the evolving balance of costs and benefits associated with the policy.32 It is difficult to believe that Putin would not also have consulted his security chiefs and former St Petersburg security colleagues now in the presidential administration. It was also reasonable to hope that Moscow’s close links with the Northern Alliance would give it considerable say in shaping the succession to the Taliban. as a highly popular and vigorous president.34 In any case. such as a major economic crisis. This was the case with misgivings surrounding US bases in central Asia and the Caucasus. Unless something untoward happens. Bush conceded only the trappings of a new ‘strategic relationship’. the greatest vulnerability of the policy lies in its inherent shortcomings as a strategy. The working assumptions through September were that the Americanled campaign would be long and hard-fought. Putin would feel confident about taking personal decisions in this area. In the event. such reasonable assumptions proved to be wrong and the USA achieved its immediate objectives more quickly and easily than most had anticipated. The kind of pressure likely to weaken active cooperation is far more likely to come from within Putin’s close circle. By being an indispensable partner. This was a perfectly reasonable scenario. Putin hoped his generous response would bring the fruits of partnership if not alliance. concerns about US withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the spread of US military presence to Georgia. Putin made a choice of strategic significance but did not develop a strategy to match. In any case. Neither the presidential get-together at the Crawford ranch in November 2001 nor the Moscow summit of May 2002
. although the actual decision to provide the range of support announced on 24 September may well have been made by the President himself. Following the events of 11 September. the duration and difficulty of the conflict would prolong and deepen Washington’s indebtedness to Moscow and so increase the dividends of the active cooperation line. This was perhaps one of the costs of the narrowly presidential decision-making process. it is well within Putin’s capacity.
While shrugging off the demise of the ABM. Nor was Moscow reassured by statements from Washington that the USA did not plan to establish permanent bases in the region but would make use of them for however long proved necessary. as Defence
. Similar American obstinacy appeared in the negotiations on nuclear arms cuts.39 It was left to Sergei Ivanov. the Americans refused to change their plans so that the arms reduction treaty signed at the Moscow summit in May 2002 had little substantial importance. Moscow still interpreted the return of criticism of sensitive domestic affairs as violating the spirit of post-September partnership. the substantive military issues mattered less than the political signals that these American moves conveyed. Moscow had long regarded the 1972 treaty as a symbol of stability in strategic relations. They scarcely reciprocated the kind of partnership attitudes Moscow had tried to exhibit in September. Putin had to assure critics that the deployment in Georgia was neither a shock nor a tragedy. but he could not have been very happy about the way in which the move had been made. For Putin. the Russian President must have been disappointed by Bush’s stubbornness.700–2.36 Further concern about American intentions was aroused by the way in which the US military appeared to be settling in for a long stay in central Asia. particularly since Bush had begun his drive for the National Missile Defence (NMD) system.200 over a ten-year period. across a range of issues. Criticism of Russian conduct in Chechnya soon resurfaced and was accompanied by adverse comment about the growing pressures on the mass media. There was apparently no consultation with Moscow before Bush’s denunciation of the ‘axis of evil’ in February 2002 which Putin tried to play down as an emotional speech made for domestic purposes. It simply gave Moscow a week’s notice of the US decision to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty. The subsequent announcement of plans to store a large proportion of the old warheads in case of future need aroused critical comment from Moscow. Nor did such attitudes stand out in American handling of the difficult questions of Russia’s relations with Iran and Iraq. The defiant manner in which the President claimed success for his policy perhaps indicated his own growing concern about its effectiveness. Despite continued Russian concerns. Putin had repeatedly expressed willingness to amend the treaty in a way sufficiently permissive to allow development of the NMD.38 More damaging to Putin’s hopes for partnership behaviour from the USA was the cavalier manner in which Washington proceeded on strategic nuclear issues. Washington agreed to reduce warheads to a level of 1.37 Sensitivity about the creeping extension of American influence into the Caucasus was heightened by the sudden appearance of US military advisers in the Pankisi Gorge in March 2002.50 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
saw major steps forward in the relationship. Even though Washington avoided taking any firm stand on either issue.35 From Putin’s standpoint. were hardly encouraging. American moves in these months.
especially from the Defence Department. diluted its content and reinforced Russian doubts about its value. The economic balance sheet is central to the continued viability of the postSeptember line. the new Council of 20. Up to summer 2002. also went some way to meeting the Kremlin’s expectation of greater inclusion in the key international clubs. with decisionmaking rights on selected issues. Full admission to the G8. Moscow’s adverse reaction to US military action against Baghdad still seems likely to be moderate. fulfil its pledge to recognize Russia as a market economy and showed other signs of helping to support Moscow’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). On this and other issues. to reiterate that Moscow would not support US military action against Iraq. The military reacted to the scheme with predictable scepticism43 and even Putin felt the need to underscore Moscow’s determination to have its voice heard and its interests taken into account. if only symbolically. by the long afterlife of the Jackson-Vanik Agreement. Putin stood firm on Russian involvement in building Iranian nuclear power reactors. Throughout the months following the ‘axis of evil’ speech. As of mid-2002. Moscow found many west European governments more amenable than the USA.40 National economic interests also figured prominently in Moscow’s stance on its relations with Iran. seemed to give Moscow relatively little new of substance.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 51
Minister. particularly if the Kremlin receives assurances that any new Iraqi regime would safeguard Russian economic interests. In order to avoid a situation which would place Moscow’s relations with Washington under great strain. the picture here was mixed. From Moscow’s standpoint. Russia continued to promote a political solution to the problem within a UN framework.44 Moscow expected some real progress towards transforming NATO from a defensive alliance into a political organization dealing with security throughout Greater Europe. Objections to the scheme in Washington. One important litmus test of the willingness to include Russia continued to be Western attitudes to Moscow’s relations with NATO. The proposal put forward by Prime Minister Tony Blair in November 2001 to create a new Russia—North Atlantic Council was clearly an effort to make a newly cooperative Kremlin feel appreciated. Should political methods fail. however.41 What emerges clearly from the case of both Iraq and Iran is Putin’s determination to safeguard Russian strategic economic interests. Washington did.42 Apart from being more inclusive in presentational terms. announced at its June 2002 gathering. He countered continuing American objections by accusing Washington of double standards and pointing to US involvement in nuclear plant construction in North Korea. trade relations with the USA remained burdened. There are good economic and political reasons for the president to focus on
. it looked likely that the disappointing dividends yielded by active cooperation with the US might incline Putin increasingly to turn his attention to Europe.
in M. 6 October 2001. 6121. The elaborate framework of processes is too wide and insufficiently focused. and the political public. security and general political issues. the EU and the major European states offer a potential counterweight to American dominance in NATO and also some possible influence over Washington. 4.
. ‘Putin’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges’ given at the Carnegie Endowment. In security terms. reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List (hereafter JRL). 57–83. that Europe and the EU represent the most benign face of the West.Aron. ‘The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Post-communist Russia: Its Domestic Context’. March 2002. ‘“Walking the Tightrope”: The Kosovo Conflict and Russia’.Lynch. remained unresolved in mid-2002. no. yet Putin adhered to entrenched positions and even criticized Brussels for trying to impose unacceptable solutions. 1999. L.45 Putin seems also to have some personal inclination to see Russia as inherently oriented towards Europe.46 The disagreements over visa regimes in Kaliningrad flag a fundamental problem that Russia is likely to encounter in its efforts to promote integration with the West in general and with Europe in particular. 8. integrated and competitive member of the international community. no. Trud.). The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York. 1998). D. 3. Putin’s notion of a managed democracy does not fit well with the liberal requirements for the ‘competition state’. European Security. Russia’s contacts with Europe have long been beset by the slow. Even if Russia makes good progress on economic. 4. And there is a widespread feeling within the policy class. Mandelbaum (ed. p. See the transcript of her talk. The EU was helpful in advancing Moscow’s case for joining the World Trade Organization.47 Success on the domestic side of his project of building a strong modern state could make it more difficult for Putin to achieve his ambition to see Russia become a powerful. 32. The EU has long been Russia’s most important trading partner and the source of half of total inward investment. bureaucratic nature of the way the EU manages external relationships. just beating the USA in recognizing Russia as a market economy. more accessible and potentially most profitable for a Russia seeking to modernize and integrate. where progress would help build wider confidence. 2. vol. it might come up against a normative barrier. One might have expected the Kremlin to display particular flexibility on the visa issue in order to improve Russia’s standing with the EU. pp. NOTES
1. Questions such as access to Kaliningrad.52 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Europe to further his agenda of making Russia a more integral and more competitive and weighty member of the international community. Even so.
also see the Foreign Policy Concept. 11. 3. 17. Newsline. SWB. 16–22 October 2001. 6072. 16. V. 27. one of the most astute analysts of Russian foreign and security policy. 29. Putin. 19. 21. SWB no. no. SWB in JRL. 9 April 2002. translated in the JRL. 4 October 2001. translated in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (hereafter CDPSP). For a review of the situation. 4 October 2001. 7. P.Fedorov. 13. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 32. 19 April 2002. For his reported admiration of de Gaulle. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 30. 9 June 2000. Izvestiya. p. MID website. 1. 3889. 28 September 2001. 18 September 2001. 2002. Putin. A. no.PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 53
5. 11. According to Yavlinsky. 6032. 31.Akerman. no. see Wall Street Journal editor’s comments in JRL. no. no. 3. Survival. 54. Rossiiskaya gazeta. no. 18. Moskovkskie novosti. no. 54. Putin. 26. 20 November 2001. 6072. vol.Kulagin. 8 July 2000. 43. 23. 28. translated in CDPSP. 9. ‘Sovetniki tainye I deistvitelnye’. ‘Putin’s Gamble’. no.ru. 25. JRL. 16. 33. See the assessment of Dmitri Trenin.Felgengauer. translated in CDPSP.Antonenko. translated in JRL. 24. speech on 31 January 2002 at the Carnegie Endowment. 6322. 3888. 12 February. 15 September 2001. Izvestiya. 3 September 2001. 53. 15. vol. 2000/2002. Kommersant.Fedorov. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB). Brifing Moskovskogo Tsentra Karnegi. no. in Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL). vol.Korotchenko. 50.ei.Golts and D. ‘Osennii marafon Vladimira Putina: k rozhdeniyu rossiiskoi vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii’. 6061. Izvestiya. 11 July 2000. G. 3890. 10 July 2000. 6. no. ORT. no. no. 9 January 2002. O. 9 October 2001. 20. For estimates of financial benefits. 10 November 2001.Pavlovsky’s sniping at Ivanov. Russian television 8 July 2000. no. 3864. Review of International Affairs. see Kommersant. 16–22 October 2001. Nezavisimaya gazeta.Pinsker. vol. 3889. Moskovkskie Novosti. Rossiiskaya gazeta. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 10. 14 May 2002. 13. ‘September 11: Implications for Russia’s Central Asian Policy and Strategic Realignment’. 13 May 2002. SWB. Itar-Tass. For instance. see Y. pp. 3888. SWB. 10 July 2000. no. 15 January 2002. vol. Yezhedelny Zhurnal. Putin in Helsinki. 6072. Y. 22. 4. For Putin’s 24 September speech. in JRL. reported by Reuters.
. see E. See interview in JRL. no. 8.ru. B/5–12. 25 September 2001. 39. only 2 of the 21 present agreed with the President’s line. 5 March 2002. Foreign Policy Concept. Sovetskaya Rossiya. I. see Moskovsky Komsomolets. 1. on www. no. 14. 5423. smi. no. November 2001. Rossiiskaya gazeta. IT. Sovetskaya Rossiya. 27 March 2002. 12. vol. 24 June. 9–10. no. no.
Trud. 3. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 6025. for Kvashnin’s derogatory comments. London: Centre for European Reform. Korotchenko. 36.Gowan. no. 29 May 2002. Los Angeles Times. 15 January 2002 as reported by Reuters. 6351. Putin. 11 February 2002. prognozy. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Evropeiskaya Bezopasnost: sobitiya. For analysis of the ‘competition state’. 6 March 2002. NATO I evropeiskaya bezopasnost’. JRL. JRL. pp. Moscow Times. 2000. no. 45. see P. 32. 43. 6072. Institut nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam. ‘Integratsiya s ogoborkami? Rossiya.Cerny. 11 July 2002. 28 February 2002. Nezavisimaya gazeta.54 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
34. 2 March 2002. S. vol. V. 29 May 2002. See the incisive analysis by Bobo Lo.Nikonov. 39. Assistant Secretary of State E.G. 1997. tsentr izucheniyu problem evropeiskoi bezopasnosti. Newsline. RFE/RL. no. see I. ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization’. and V. 40. no. 21 January 2002. as cited in S. 2002. Kommersant Daily. How Can the EU Help Russia.Charap. 2.
44. 35. 41.Baranovsky. RFE/RL. Putin interview in the Wall Street Journal. 251–74.Frolov.Jones as reported by Agence France-Presse. see D. 47. RFE/RL. Newsline.
V. 37. 12 February 2002.
46. 11 July 2002. Newsline. For excellent studies on Russia’s relations with the EU. Russia’s Attitudes towards the EU: Political Aspects.Karaganov.
. 23 May 2002. 42. JRL. otsenki. 22 May 2002. no. 38. Reuters.
Part II: Russia’s Road into Europe
3 It does not object to EU enlargement. Being outside affects the way people perceive themselves and their environment. the European Council. Poland and Slovenia. A month later. recommended that the European Commission should begin negotiations for membership of the EU with the governments of Cyprus. and no matter how many ‘partnership’ agreements they offer to non-members. The perception of exclusion. the Czech Republic. has important consequences for the domestic and foreign policies of outsider states. Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks. Those countries that are neither EU ‘accession’ states (the shorthand term used to refer to the six states in the process of negotiating membership) nor ‘pre-ins’ (as Slovakia. invitations were issued to the governments of the Czech Republic. It also affects their relationships with both insiders and fellow outsiders. it is inevitable that admitting some countries to full membership of the two organizations and excluding others will produce ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. by definition. Romania. A process began of separating Europe into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. For no matter how frequently NATO and EU officials say that they do not intend to redivide Europe. Latvia. Russia is the most important example of an excluded state. the Russian government does not seek EU or NATO membership. JOHN LÖWENHARDT AND STEPHEN WHITE
INTRODUCTION In June 1997. meeting in Amsterdam. Estonia. outsiders. Bulgaria and Malta were categorized in October 1999 when the European Commission proposed opening negotiations for their accession)2 are. Exclusion from the expanding NATO alliance influences outsiders’ security perceptions and the way they view their role in Europe. Hungary. therefore.6 Russia and the Dual Expansion of Europe1
MARGOT LIGHT. It is vehemently
. Lithuania. if only because of its size and strategic significance. at a NATO summit in Madrid. and does not mind if some of the Soviet successor states join the EU. Notwithstanding then Acting President Vladimir Putin’s widely quoted throw-away remark to David Frost on 5 March 2000 that he could see no reason why Russia should not join NATO in due course.
4 Russia was a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) from March 1992. When NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in 1994. the first common strategy adopted by the European Council in June 1999 was the Common Strategy on Russia. making great efforts to ensure that it was adopted before the formal accession of new members. They cannot disguise the fact that a wider Europe is being created from which Russia is excluded. And when NATO heads of state and government decided to enlarge NATO. they also began to negotiate a separate charter with Russia. for example. and it opposes any further extension of membership. Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed by the Secretary-General of NATO and heads of state and government of NATO and the Russian President in Paris.5 These attempts by the EU and NATO to allay Russian anxiety have not prevented many Russians from feeling isolated and marginalized as enlargement gets under way.
. on two focus groups conducted in September 1999. particularly if former Soviet states are permitted to join. Russia signed a PfP Framework Document on 22 June 1994. When the treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. It protested very strongly against the first round of expansion. On 27 May 1997. The Russian government responded later that year with its own medium-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–2010). The EU Treaty of Amsterdam (adopted in June 1997) introduced a new policy instrument: common strategies to be implemented in fields where EU member states share important interests. and it became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which succeeded it in 1997. This chapter examines the effects of exclusion on Russian perceptions of Europe. It is based on the published views of the foreign policy community. and on the results of our first nationwide survey commissioned in January 2000. however.6 All the evidence indicates that Russians are deeply affected by exclusion from European expansion. NATO expansion affects Russia’s relationship both with NATO itself and with those Soviet successor states that wish to join NATO or which appear to prefer better relations with it than with Russia and the CIS.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 57
opposed to NATO expansion. The EU concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia in June 1994. but that they are more worried about NATO expansion than about the enlargement of the EU. but its ratification was delayed because of the first war in Chechnya and it only came into force on 1 December 1997. on interviews conducted in Moscow in September and in Kazan’ in December 1999. The EU and NATO have attempted to allay the anxiety of the Russian government about the enlargement of the organizations. the Founding Act on Mutual Relations.
in March/April 1997. 62 per cent thought that expansion of the Alliance would harm Russia. even if they had different reasons for objecting. thus encouraging Western politicians to take further advantage of Russia. specific path of development. while pragmatic nationalists were hesitant. But the ground for future disagreement was laid when it became clear that whereas President Yeltsin interpreted the Act to
. On the subject of NATO expansion. President Yeltsin also consistently made it clear that he disapproved of NATO expansion. on the other hand. Moreover.9 Whatever his private views.10 The NATO-Russia Founding Act was intended to reassure Russia that cooperation between Russia and the Alliance would continue even if enlargement proceeded. used every available public opportunity to express Russia’s opposition whenever the possibility of NATO enlargement was mooted.8 RUSSIA AND NATO Liberal Westernizers dominated Russian foreign policy immediately after the disintegration of the USSR. the most prominent liberal Westernizer and Russia’s first Foreign Minister. Fundamentalist nationalists. When Russia’s membership of the Partnership for Peace was debated. it was the issue of NATO expansion. like Russian officials and politicians of all persuasions. of the 22 per cent of respondents who were reasonably well informed about NATO. the Russian public believed that NATO expansion would harm Russia: in an October 1996 poll. interests. not Russian.7 In general. believe that Russia can forge its own. One businessman we interviewed. maintained that Andrei Kozyrev. Another of our interviewees accused Kozyrev of having made ‘unforgivable mistakes’ as Foreign Minister. there are few genuine liberal Westernizers left and none of them remain in policy-making positions. They see the West as hostile and are nostalgic for the Soviet (or even the Russian imperial) past. Kozyrev. above all. They tend to believe that a market economy has to be adapted to specific Russian conditions. Both pragmatic and fundamentalist nationalists blamed them for making too many concessions to the West. Pragmatic nationalists also endorse democracy and want good relations with the West. however. liberal Westernizers favoured signing up. had defended Western. liberal Westernizers favour a Western type of democratic market society for Russia and want good relations with Western countries. and fundamentalist nationalists were unambiguously opposed. ‘pragmatic nationalists’ and ‘fundamentalist nationalists’ in Russia. After a faux pas in Warsaw when he told President Walesa that Russia did not mind if Poland joined NATO. for example.58 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
While there are distinctions between the foreign policy views of liberal Westernizers’. 32 per cent thought that expansion would be bad for Russia. they were united. that undermined their influence. but they put Russian national interests first.
in Russian eyes. while many people in the West seemed to think that by signing the Act. Russian analysts. for example. At the beginning of 1999. another argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was simply a testing ground for further attacks that NATO intended to undertake. on the other hand.13 Kosovo was the final straw. an interviewee expressed the view that ‘the US now openly says it wants to rule the world’. as President Clinton expressed it. Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO in March 1999. it looked briefly as if Russians had accepted the inevitable. and it undermined more moderate views. for example. that Russia would have ‘a voice in but not a veto over NATO’s business’. although the new Foreign Policy Concept adopted in June 2000 reiterated that ‘Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO’. To Russians this seemed to forebode that NATO was intent on denying Russia a voice on important European security issues.11 Moreover. During interviews with the foreign policy elite in September. its new strategic doctrine implied that it might. considered expansion a ‘strategic error’. ceased to be a defence alliance. the Russian government had signalled its tacit acceptance of NATO expansion. disapproved of NATO expansion. in future. followed by the adoption of a new strategic concept at the 50th anniversary NATO summit in Washington and the announcement that the door to NATO membership remains open. Public criticism of expansion did not abate. In Kazan’. but they understood that Russia could not prevent it from occurring. he believed that the USA was using NATO as an instrument to reach that goal. which had nothing to do with
. Pragmatic nationalists pointed out that Kosovo had persuaded the army and the general public that NATO’s new strategy represented a direct threat to Russia. The attack on Serbia confirmed the prejudices of those who held fundamentalist nationalist views. Angry protests about NATO’s action were still being voiced in December 1999. In separate interviews in Moscow and Ekaterinburg in December.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 59
mean that NATO would have to consult Russia in the Permanent Joint Council.12 The formal accession of Poland. and argued that the new strategic doctrine undermined Russian security. claimed that the attack on Serbia revealed NATO in its true colours. Moreover. our interlocutors across the political spectrum condemned the air strikes against Serbia. this did not at all correspond to the Russian interpretation. NATO leaders insisted. intervene in the conflicts on the periphery of Russia. caused further consternation. NATO had. The public response to expansion was extremely negative (66 per cent in a July 1999 poll believed that it represented a direct threat to Russia). NATO’s use of military force was not discussed by the UN Security Council and nor did NATO consult the Russian government in the Russia—NATO Joint Council. One fundamentalist nationalist in Moscow.
Again. even among the elite. 60 per cent of those polled thought that Russia should increase its spending on defence—but they were responding as much to the war in Chechnya (which they strongly supported—71 per cent supported the campaign entirely or in part. however. realism prevailed. suggesting variously that military spending would rise. but there is nowhere from which to take the money for military spending. the ‘nuclear factor’ would be ‘reconsidered’. NATO is ‘being used by the US to weaken western Europe’.
. and 35 per cent did not know. They also revealed that NATO and the USA were widely seen as synonymous. When it came to how Russia should respond to NATO expansion. and ‘in essence. at first. As Dmitri Trenin points out. far less blame for the attack on Serbia was attached to European NATO members than to the USA. Russians are deeply concerned that NATO might expand further. there would be a new arms race. EU enlargement seemed. Nevertheless. but there are no measures they could take. but even after NATO had expanded and the EU could no longer be seen as an alternative. however.60 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
foreign policy. Curiously.14 Focus group discussions confirmed that Kosovo had made a deep and negative impression on people at all levels of society. 37 per cent of respondents thought that Baltic membership of NATO would present a threat (a large threat or some threat) to Russia. and only 24 per cent thought an attack likely. a large majority (75 per cent) thought it unlikely that Russia would be attacked in the next five years. this concern is prevalent at all levels of society. They may say that military spending will rise. the EU was subservient to NATO and the Americans’ in the Kosovo conflict. and new allies would be found. For the most part. while only 17 per cent saw it as no threat. extension of EU membership to former socialist states was still regarded favourably. but I can’t see what they can do. said a history lecturer in Kazan’. particularly to include the Baltic states or Ukraine. They have illusions. to be perceived as an acceptable alternative to NATO expansion. interviewees understood that economic weakness limited Russia’s ability to respond.’ RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Russian views about the EU are generally positive and they contrast strongly with the widespread criticism levelled at NATO. In our January 2000 survey. while 9 per cent opposed it) as to the expansion of NATO. fundamentalist nationalists and a few pragmatic nationalists predicted a strong Russian response. Among the foreign policy elite. interlocutors invariably criticized NATO policy in the Balkans. Oddly. One academic of liberal Westernizer persuasion summed it up as follows: ‘Russia’s political leaders will have to take measures. however. their rhetoric is strong.
and they believed that fulfilling EU demands and conditions would benefit the Russian economy. however. seem to lack even name recognition of the EU. people who identify with pragmatic nationalist views are better acquainted with the organization than fundamentalist nationalists. as long as the EU does not attempt to ‘force Russia into a corner’. compared with the attention given to Russia’s turbulent domestic affairs. On the other hand. warning of a possible return to a divided Europe. Other interviewees were rather more wary. however. and European integration has no relevance to people’s daily lives. Very few were clear. Lack of knowledge about the EU among the general public may be understandable. ‘exclude it‘or ‘turn it into a pariah’. nearly 48 per cent of respondents thought that Russia would benefit if it joined the EU. 69 per cent responded either that they did not know anything about the EU’s actions and aims or that they did not know what they thought of them. One of the few who understood the problem was a leading member of the Tatarstan parliament who feared that Russia might become isolated very
. not the dramatic stuff of news headlines. although given the amount of EU assistance which Russia receives. Some thought that enlargement would serve to draw Russia closer to the EU. Thus. the EU gets little media coverage. consequently. the European Commission might be disconcerted to discover how little awareness there is of what the EU does for Russia. very few people in Russia are informed about the EU. about the potential hazards of an expanding market which excludes Russia. EU enlargement had the support of the general director of a successful factory that manufactures medical instruments who had adopted EU quality standards and hoped to export even more goods. while 40 per cent thought it would make no difference.16 This explains why public awareness is low.17 Sixty-nine per cent of respondents in our survey at the end of January 2000 did not know where the headquarters of the EU are located (answering either ‘don’t know’ or naming the wrong city). given their professional positions. Among those who know something about the organization. even if the Baltic countries join. On the whole.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 61
there is a tendency in Russia ‘to contrast “the good West of Europe/EU” with the “bad West of America/NATO”’. one of whom told us that ‘if a European Union is formed. after all. then Russia must be part of it’. Only 20 per cent assessed the actions and aims of the EU as very or fairly positive and. International issues in general have a low profile in the media. although only 11 per cent assessed them as very or fairly negative. ought to be better informed. European publics themselves are poorly informed about it. there is no apprehension about its enlargement. Relations with the EU are primarily economic and technical. only 12 per cent thought that it would not benefit. why some members of the Russian foreign policy community who. and there is no reason why publics in non-member states should be any better informed. It is less comprehensible.15 On the other hand.
since it would enable the government to re-establish the kind of protectionist policies that would revive Russia’s real economy. Although one journalist suggested to us that EU barriers would benefit Russia. particularly. the pre-ins will also sign up. reflects these concerns.62 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
quickly.20 Even when asked directly in September about what the implications would be for Russia. and draws particular attention to Kaliningrad’s problems. Section 5 refers to the ‘ambivalent impact’ of enlargement on Russian interests and sets as a priority the task of ‘achieving the best advantages’ and ‘preventing. At the same time. Russia’s dependence on the EU. officials in the relevant ministries who deal with EU expansion are well aware that EU enlargement may have negative economic consequences for Russia. As the accession countries and the pre-ins gradually reorientate their trade towards the EU. eliminating or setting off possible adverse consequences’ of enlargement.’ Of course. No alarm was
. the issue that causes most concern is movement across borders. The anti-dumping measures regularly initiated against Russian exports on the grounds that Russia is a statetrading country (although Russia’s PCA refers to it as an economy in transition) have long been a source of friction. It calls for consultations to secure Russia’s interests as the acquis is adopted in the CEE countries. will grow. Russian citizens will require visas to travel. this was not a view shared by these officials. which will in due course become a Russian enclave within the EU. it is not only the accession countries that will introduce stricter visa regimes. Moreover. This is a particularly acute problem for Kaliningrad. They know that problems will arise as the accession countries adopt the EU’s acquis communautaire. it will become more difficult for Russia to export to Poland and the Czech Republic. For Russia this will mean a loss of several billions of dollars per year. Of all the potential negative consequences of EU enlargement.18 Russia’s Medium-term Strategy (2000–2010) which was presented to the European Council in October 1999.19 Russian government officials are only now beginning to realize how complex the task is of negotiating and consulting with both the EU and the accession states and. the foreign policy elite revealed little awareness of the EU’s intention to develop a military capacity. There is growing concern among officials and the business community that when the central and east European countries join the Schengen agreement. which currently receives 40 per cent of Russia’s exports and provides 38 per cent of its imports. because of the high EU standard in these countries. Under pressure from the EU. He thought that ‘after EU enlargement in the next five years. their trade relations with Russia will be adversely affected. of ensuring that there is sufficient coordination across relevant ministries. At first the decision taken at the Cologne European Council to expand the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) made little impression in Russia.
while military security was dealt with in other departments. the EU’s planned military capacity acquired the name of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). which would diminish NATO’s importance in Europe. at the same time. it can use to drive a wedge between the European members of NATO and the USA. In other words. In December 1999. the National Security Blueprint. In fact. that Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were in danger of reverting to the kind of zero-sum thinking that was characteristic of the Soviet Union. In particular. This system will not isolate the USA and NATO. The authors of Russia’s Medium-term Strategy were clearly well informed on the subject. Neither does Russia’s new Military Doctrine which was adopted in April 2000. but in September 1999 they seemed preoccupied by the consequences of exclusion for Russia’s economic security. and relatively unconcerned about more traditional forms of security.21 In other words. The preamble to the Strategy maintains that a ‘strategic partnership’ between Russia and the EU can achieve a pan-European system of collective security based on ‘equality without dividing lines’. in section 1.
. The Medium-term Strategy also calls. It does not mention the EU at all. they were deceiving themselves in thinking that the Western system was a kind of balance in which ‘increasing the “European”’ weight would automatically weaken the American side of the balance’. But the people in defence-related fields whom we interviewed also knew very little about EU intentions with regard to security and defence. includes an extensive list of ‘fundamental threats [to Russian security] in the international sphere’. for practical cooperation with the West European Union (WEU) in the area of security ‘which could counterbalance…the NATO-ism in Europe’. and they took a positive view of the prospect of the CFSP’s acquiring a defence aspect. particularly in relation to the EU. however. which was drafted and discussed in 1999 and adopted in January 2000.22 Russia’s Medium-term Strategy indicates a tendency among officials to believe that the CESDP will provide a means by which Russia can cooperate with the EU in security matters and which. at the Helsinki European Council. It was still not perceived in Russia as representing a threat.2. Foreign Ministry officials directly concerned with relations with the EU were better informed. however. a military aspect to the CFSP was perceived to offer an alternative European security structure.5.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 63
expressed. they may have been unaware of the EU’s plans because their business was the economy. Of course. but nor will it permit them to dominate the continent. On the contrary. this may simply reflect the problem of compartmentalization which is characteristic of most bureaucracies but which afflicts Russia particularly severely. and there was effectively no communication between departments. More sophisticated Russian analysts pointed out.
On the contrary. It was highly unlikely that the person who had designed and implemented NATO expansion would take responsibility for an EU policy that was directed towards diminishing or undermining NATO’s influence in Europe. and the lengthy negotiations on which the accession countries were engaged. as one of Russia’s main external threats.23 The appointment of the former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy supported this warning. that the objective of the Union is to develop the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.25 The CESDP gives the EU many of the attributes of a military alliance and. he insisted. not an alternative. for example. Solana also argued. insisted —calling himself both a committed European and a committed Atlanticist— that the EU was seeking to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. ‘the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security’. Moreover. he added. European leaders have made clear.64 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
increasing the European weight was possible only because it would not undermine the transatlantic link. ‘as a former Secretary-General’ of NATO.24 Once it became clear that the CESDP was intended to supplement NATO. They may also have been taken by surprise at the rapidity with which developments in the security field advanced. Other analysts argue that the
. In any case. At the time of writing. but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged’. CESDP as an addition. and even more difficult to implement. some Russian analysts still believe that the CESDP offers a means by which Russia can continue cooperating with the West despite the tension between it and NATO. that the CESDP would not replace the Alliance. it may be perceived as detrimental to Russia’s military security when it includes new EU members such as Estonia. Moreover. EU officials emphasized that the CESDP was intended as an addition. Their own experience within the CIS suggested that agreements and treaties were difficult to make in multilateral bodies. the long delay between signature and ratification of the Russia—EU PCA. Russian policy makers became less sure about the advantages of the EU’s developing a military potential. to NATO. it might require a reassessment of their previous positive response to EU membership for former Soviet states. EU High Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten. The Military Doctrine lists. Moreover. not an alternative. ‘an effective CFSP will be to the advantage of NATO…[but] NATO will remain the foundation for the collective defence of its members’. to NATO seemed to signal the possibility of even further isolation for Russia. may have led them to believe that progress on CESDP would be slow and difficult. The Foreign Policy Concept published in June 2000 states enigmatically that ‘the EU’s emerging military-political dimension should become an object of particular attention’. seen as an augmentation of NATO.
one reason why EU officials. to the unipolar world which they believe that the USA now wishes to construct and dominate. The expansion of the Alliance enhanced the perception. Again. it was not only the Soviet Union that used this tactic in the past. however. and to oppose its strengthening as one influential centre in a multipolar world’ as one of the main threats to Russian security. one more acceptable to Russia. Unipolarity has acquired such significance as the symbol of a world from which Russia’s voice is excluded that the new Military Doctrine defines ‘attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving international security problems. and the attack on Serbia confirmed it. at first. the Military Doctrine indicates how seriously these events affected Russian perceptions. the rational response is to try to divide it.28 The CESDP seemed. The latter argue that Russia’s first priority ought to be re-engaging with NATO. In other words. the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)’ and ‘the use of coercive military actions as a means of ‘humanitarian intervention’ without the sanction of the UN Security Council’. They interpret it as a return to the Soviet past.27 NATO is perceived as an instrument of US foreign policy. when faced by a perceived hostile and superior force. particularly Chris Patten and Javier Solana. When it became apparent that CESDP is intended to complement NATO.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 65
Russia—EU security dialogue cannot act as a substitute for the Russia— NATO relationship. Western analysts and policy makers sometimes react as if Russia’s hopes to use CESDP as a wedge were unnatural rather than simply unwelcome. which became a possibility after the Cold War and which Russia supports. The first two factors listed as destabilizing Russia’s military-political environment are ‘attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily. and one of the chief means by which the US intends to achieve unipolarity. Russia responded less positively to it. for only when it has re-engaged will it be able to establish a constructive relationship with the CESDP.26 CONCLUSION Russian policy makers frequently contrast the multipolar international system. In fact. Moreover. Paradoxically. found it necessary to insist that CESDP would enhance and not undermine NATO was the fact that Russia saw it as a wedge which might be used to divide the European members of NATO from the USA.
. or at least a sign of the potential danger that Russia might represent to European security. to offer an alternative security system for Europe. it would be unnatural if Russian policy makers did not try to divide what they perceive as a dangerous opposition.
and the more attractive it is to Russia—and vice versa. is to alleviate the perception of hostility that makes it a rational response.30 Treating Russia as an equal need not imply giving it a veto over Alliance policy.
. President Putin and his government also have a responsibility to foster cooperation. The way to prevent it. those made by people such as Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov. but it clearly requires doing more to ensure that Russia’s voice is heard within NATO than members have been prepared to do up to now. but fears that the USA might revert to a policy of isolationism and withdraw from NATO and Europe—the only way out of the general dilemma is to ensure that the relationship between NATO and Russia improves. They need. the USA and the Russian Federation have diametrically opposite reactions to the CESDP. While the USA likes the fact that the CESDP might make Europe shoulder a fairer share of the Western defence burden. it should put more effort into improving the relationship between NATO and Russia. but also directed towards the USA. is that wedge-driving is a rational response to a perceived hostile alliance. the idea that it could undermine NATO’s predominant role in European security is far from welcome. therefore. They might also recall the insights of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘new political thinking’. at least. in particular. President Putin has declared that there is nothing to prevent cooperation between Russia and NATO ‘if [Russia] is treated as an equal partner’. in relation to the effect Soviet rhetoric had on producing the ‘enemy images’ that underpinned the Cold War. The EU’s assurances that the CESDP will complement NATO exacerbate Russia’s perception of exclusion from an enlarging hostile alliance rather than alleviate it. The more the CESDP seems an alternative to NATO. EU assurances that the CESDP will complement NATO are not only intended to deter Russia from attempting to divide European NATO members from the USA. It should also ensure that the determination expressed in section 3 of the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia. But both sides have to cooperate if the NATO-Russian relationship is to improve.31 Applying the precepts of Soviet ‘new political thinking’ to some of the more hard-line public statements about international relations (for example. the less welcome it is to the USA. to ‘develop cooperation with Russia in the new European Security Architecture’. to make a greater effort to understand the nature of the dilemma and the role they play in producing it. In other words. however. if the EU wishes to prevent wedge-driving on the part of Russia.29 is translated into policy.66 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
It was used just as frequently by the West in its relationship with the Soviet bloc. In fact. The important point. Since Europe itself is ambivalent—it wants to pull its international weight by having an effective CFSP. One way in which it might do this is to use its good offices to reactivate the Russia—NATO Joint Council.
159. 13 October 1999. Putin maintained that Russia would not want to be a member of NATO in its present form. In conversation with three Russian journalists. Available at www. 2000). see the Finnish Presidency. This chapter is based on research conducted by Stephen White and John Löwenhardt in Russia in September (Moscow).RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 67
head of the International Relations Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence)32 might improve the opportunities for cooperation. For Russia’s Medium-term Strategy.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/intro/ index. all three sets of policy makers must concentrate on improving the cooperation between NATO and Russia. NATO On-line Library. 4 June 1999. For Russia’s PCA agreement.int/docu/handbook/1998/ v070. senior officials in key ministries. There can be no European security without Russia.nato.htm (accessed 29 April 2000). 3. p.asp (accessed 29 April 2000). The EU’s Common Strategy on Russia is published in OJ L 15. A ‘differentiated’ approach will be taken towards the pre-ins. therefore. account of each candidate’s progress towards meeting the criteria for membership. on the other hand. of mixed gender. 1998 edition.fi/frame.htm (accessed 29 April 2000). age and education. membership would be worth discussing. 4. in other words. nor is European security feasible without the USA. which will take programme. Ukraine. www. The participants of the focus groups. 6. senior party officials. However. See Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession. We interviewed foreign policy elites. NATO and Russian policy makers. The text of the Founding Act can be found at NATO Handbook. and December (Kazan’) 1999. if NATO were transformed into a primarily political organization. Ot pervogo litsa: Rasgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow. at www. An earlier version of parts of this chapter appeared as Policy Paper 02/00 in the Policy Papers series of that 2. 28 November 1997. were ordinary people.presidency. see Official Journal of the European Communities (hereafter OJ) L 327. 5.finland. Moldova and the New Europe’ (Project Grant L213252007). prominent businessmen. The research project. Belarus. NOTES
1. members of the Duma and Federal Council foreign policy committees.eu. entitled The Outsiders: Russia.europa. EU. is part of the Economic and Social Science Research Council ‘One Europe or Several?’ programme. IP/99/751. And since the US security role in Europe is enacted via NATO. ‘Unofficial Translation by the Russian MFA of the “Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000– 2010)” Presented by the Russian Side at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki on 22 October 1999’ (hereafter ‘Medium-term Strategy’). The full project will examine the effect of exclusion on
. all have similar responsibilities with regard to cooperation.
Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. For the liberal westernizer arguments about PfP. Moscow School of Political Studies. These interviews were part of a project conducted by the European Institute for the Media that monitored the media coverage of the Russian parliamentary elections. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers. p. President Yeltsin’s remarks are quoted in Krasnaia zvezda. See also Alexander Sergounin. 20.gov. Russia was the largest NIS recipient. February 2000. Alex Pravda.68 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
7. Aleksei Pushkov’s interview with Vladimir Lukin in Moskovskie novosti.int/usa/president/s9705l4c. The project was funded by the European Commission through the Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford. 1999). 16. ‘Russia—EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps’. ZEI Discussion Paper C 26.
14. Russkii put’.Ivanov and B. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’. Belarus and Moldova as well as on Russia.Konovalov and S. no. ‘Posledstviia rasshireniia NATO’. no. 1999.
. President Clinton’s Rose Garden speech appears in NATO.Oznobishchev in Segodnya. 11–12. 1997. Washington. in Russia on Russia. M-87-97.
8. 1997. no. 1997. We are grateful to David Gowan for drawing our attention to this paper. Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration. 6. pp. 26 March 1994. 1999). 28 May 1997. coming tenth of the eleven candidates. Boris Kazantsev. Opinion Analysis. Dmitri Trenin. DC. P. Igor Leshoukov. receiving 16. the EU was the largest donor to the newly independent states (NIS). for example. data will be obtained from nationwide opinion surveys and 16 focus groups (including four among military personnel). Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat. President Clinton Hails NATO-Russia Agreement. in Aleksei Podberezkin. see the article by A. The US Mission. 16. p.
Ukraine. ‘K kakim beregam plyvet Evropa’. 4.13 per cent of the vote. Office of Research and Media Reaction. 5–15. 11. since there are overlaps between them and some individuals change their views over time. nos. Apart from approximately 140 elite interviews in the four countries. 10. See also I.html (accessed 23 August 2000). gives the pragmatic nationalist doubts. They are used for convenience and are not intended as strict categories.4 per cent of Official Development Assistance and 43.nato.
10. 1994. Centre for European Integration Studies. Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’. Roy Allison and Margot Light.
9. 23–25 April 1999 (Brussels. at www. These terms are used in Neil Malcolm. A detailed blueprint of fundamentalist nationalist views is offered. 1996) to categorize views about Russian foreign policy. Podberezkin was a candidate in the March 2000 presidential elections. ‘Rossiia-NATO: chto dal’she’.
15. he gained 0.Maksimychev.
17. no. 52. pp. Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’. 1998. M-12-97 and 27 May 1997. htm (accessed 1 November 1999). The new strategic concept and the Membership Action Plan are published in The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington. 24 January 1997.ru/main/ministry/ispvlast47.4 per cent of Technical Assistance. 29–36. Bonn. Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms. From 1990 to 1995. Available at www. USIA. 4th edn (Moscow.
OJ L 15. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. 3–9 December 1999. pp. Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’.int/comm/dg1a/tacis/country_closeup/russia/ cc_russ_indic. Bulletin EU. no. 27.ft. 37–44. Dmitrii Danilov. and see ‘Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council’. See ‘Medium-term Strategy’. See.
See European Commission. 31.
19. no. p. Total TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS) funding to Russia in 1991–1996 was Ecu 927.globalarchive. 24. The indicative budget allocation for TACIS assistance to Russia for 1996–1999 was Ecu 0. ‘Medium-term Strategy’. Reported by BBC Monitoring International Reports from Interfax news agency. at www. no. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers. 1987. no. pp. ‘Potentsial’nyi soiuznik Moskvy’. 2000. no. V. Danish Institute of International Affairs. pp. speech/99/174 to the WEU Council of Ministers Luxembourg. 23 November 1999. The Foreign Policy Concept’. 159. 22. 11 February 2000. 2. ‘Novye strany na poroge Evropeiskogo soiuza’. ‘Doverie i vyzhivanie chelovechestva’. We are extremely grateful to David Gowan for sharing both his sources on. 22 April 2000.Petrovskii. 3. Will the EU use Northern Dimension to Solve Its Kaliningrad Dilemma?. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 691–704. 11. Russian perceptions of an expanded CFSP with us. 21.RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE 69
18. 24 June 1999.com/search-components/index. On the EU’s Kaliningrad dilemma. 15. and his understanding of. Javier Solana.europa.
.Fairlie.Ganzha.89 million. pp. In a speech to the Duma on 24 April 2000. 26.
23. and Trenin. ‘TACIS Country Close-up: Russia’. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. See European Commission.int/comm/dg1a/nis/intro/index. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii.eu. ‘Russian-EU Partnership’.Pozdniakov and S. 12/1999. 20. 30. V. Ibid. Ot pervogo litsa.eu. 29. 28. 15 August 1988.
25.jsp (accessed 30 April 2000). see Lyndelle D. 21.6 billion. for the second. See Danilov. and Shevardnadze’s speech at a conference of diplomats in Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative’. Chris Patten.htm (accessed 30 April 2000). ‘EU cooperation with the New Independent States and Mongolia’. Colonel-General Ivashov accused the USA of being behind the war in Chechnya and manoeuvring to thwart Russian military operations in Chechnya. 47. 1999. at www. Copenhagen. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti’. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. 1999.europa.htm (accessed 30 April 2000).
32. at www. ‘Potentsial’nyi soiuznik Moskvy’. for example. 27–46. for the first views. no. 15– 26. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. The Rt Hon.
as I would prefer to imagine. whether it should be pursued inside or outside NATO. from 1991 to 2001. But there is one thing I can claim which is unusual if not unique: namely that I have worked in a western integrated institution. For 50 years it has remained an area of confusion and frustration because the Europeans themselves could not agree on what the concept really meant.BAILES1
The subject of this analysis may seem rather specialized. especially as I am not in any sense a Russia expert. might also help to illuminate them from a new perspective. ideally. which Europeans should be allowed to take part in it. My personal qualifications for addressing these issues are slight.7 Russia’s Place in European Defence
ALYSON J. Should we conclude that the relative weakness of WEU as an organization.K. plans and capabilities for Europeanled crisis management missions (‘non-Article V cases’ in NATO language) where there is no immediate clash of competence either with NATO’s collective defence work or with the EU’s political and economic responsibilities. is there something about the concept of European defence. has simply left nothing to argue with Russia about? Or. but I will try to develop it in a way which leads back to some of the larger issues of Russian security in Europe and which. which has never experienced the slightest problem with Russia.2 The only frustrations in Russia—WEU relations have arisen when one or both sides were not able to exploit the positive potential of the relationship as fully as they might have hoped. For ten years. And this despite the fact that WEU’s activity has been focused on the linkage between two fields. notably the fact that it has never carried out any significant military operations. taking a greater step forward than at any time since 1945. West European Union (WEU). It
. and so on. that opens the way for a more positive Russian response and a more mutually profitable solution? It would be important to know the right answer because European defence is about to become big business. or vice versa. defence and European integration. WEU tried in its modest way to overcome. the actual combining of the notions of defence and of European identity. or at least reduce these contradictions. It has concentrated on preparing structures. which have both in themselves been the source of frequent contradictions in relations between Russia and the West.
Secondly. but to place it in the correct perspective. and the EU’s Defence Ministers have agreed on a process for stimulating each other to make better military contributions so that in a couple of years’ time the EU should be able to put 60. the European forces to be used will not take the form of a standing army but will be put together to meet the specific needs of each operation.4 At the time of writing. new EU committees created for this purpose have already been meeting for five weeks on a trial basis within the so-called second pillar.RUSSIA’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 71
has also tried to bring in the very widest range of interested countries so that no one has to feel excluded: thus WEU regularly works with a group of 28 west and central European democracies and has special relationships not just with Russia but also with Ukraine. so-called traditional peacekeeping and pre-emptive deployments. the spectrum of tasks that the EU may wish to carry out is the same that WEU has focused on since 1992 (the so-called Petersberg tasks). Canada. Malta. ranging from evacuation of European citizens in danger through many kinds of humanitarian operations. These are quite diverse. by acquiring everything it needs in order to carry out crisis management operations directly under its own command. even up to the possibility of ‘peace making’ where the task is suitable for European forces and the
.3 But despite this good political and conceptual approach. WEU has not been allowed to lead any military operations. there are several respects in which the new EU initiative has a rather wide-ranging and even open-ended character. for the first time in its history. Cyprus. it is worth underlining some important limitations. because of a longer-term evolution that has now reached critical mass. this is not going to be an area for fully standardized or juridically binding cooperation since every member of the EU will have a free choice whether to give military forces or not for any particular operation. and the overall lack of success in getting Europeans to modernize their military capacities was exposed all too painfully in Kosovo in 1998 to 2000. the 15 countries of the EU decided in 1999 on a bold institutional change. they are only going to work together for non-Article V tasks in the service of the wider international community. and so the Union is not going to turn into anything like an alliance.6 This is remarkable progress by the normal standards of the EU. First. the members of the EU are not all going to exchange defence guarantees. for this same reason and also because of the unpredictability of crisis management tasks. Israel and six other non-EU Mediterranean states. Thirdly. The EU itself is going to become a defence organization.000 well-trained and harmonized Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) on the ground in as little as eight weeks. First. On the other hand. perhaps. drawing on existing national and multinational formations which already wear a number of other ‘hats’. As a short-term reaction to the Kosovo crisis but also.5 the first elements of an EU Military Staff have arrived in Brussels.
Thirdly. resulting in the publication of a detailed study on Russia—WEU relations. economic and financial player.8 At the same time. as follows.10 Practical cooperation is closely geared to the possibility of WEU operations being carried out with Russia’s support and/or participation. political. The six nations who are in NATO but not the EU and the others who are applying to join both organizations will be offered the chance to help in three different ways: in the EU’s general preparations and planning for military tasks. in its new defence work. including regular sessions with the ambassadors who head the Russian Mission in Brussels.72 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
necessary legal base available. border controllers. Consequently. saying only that it will act in response to ‘international crises’ and in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. and in the assembling of the rapid reaction capabilities needed to meet the EU Headline Goal. aid workers or medical specialists for a part or even the whole of a specific European-led operation. The WEU’s Institute of Security Studies has also carried out major projects with the help of Russian experts. but all the other Europeans who have been part of the WEU family. (1) What will be Russia’s direct and practical involvement in the EU’s new defence activities? (2) What effects of importance for Russia could this EU initiative have on the present-day landscape of European and transatlantic security? (3) What longer-term perspectives could this open up for the linkage between the European integration process and Russia’s own destiny? RUSSIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE EU’S NEW DEFENCE ACTIVITIES Russia’s relationship with WEU in recent years has had a double focus: policy dialogue and practical cooperation. The former has involved highlevel visits by Russian officials and debates with the 28 nations of the WEU Council. in the execution of individual missions where they may be able to contribute forces.11 Russian
. It has included the supply of Russian imagery to the WEU Satellite Centre. in any given crisis prevention or crisis management situation the EU is almost certain to be involved also as a diplomatic.9 What does all this mean for Russia? In what follows I will try to tackle this question from three different perspectives moving from the narrowest to the broadest and from the short to the longer term. not its master. it can directly harmonize its military action with these others and make sure the military element is always the servant of a broader European policy.7 The EU has not so far made clear whether it intends to put any geographical limit to the possible scope of such missions. the EU has already made clear that it intends to find ways of involving not just its own 15 members. the EU will have a much wider choice than NATO of instruments for intervention inasmuch as it could use paramilitary or nonmilitary elements like police. Secondly.
It is hard. coordination of policies on the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and its activities.13 If Russia wishes to maintain the equivalent types of dialogue and contact with the EU after the Union takes over WEU’s crisis management responsibilities. Russia has also made known its interest in dialogue with WEU’s sister organization WEAG (Western European Armaments Group). it would not be correct to see this as an anti-NATO initiative or something that implies a two-way split within the Atlantic community. It is logical to suppose that the same will be true when the EU starts carrying out such operations directly. the door on the European side would seem to be already open. I can perhaps best try to illuminate the issues involved by mentioning two interpretations which I think would not be correct. which addresses the issues of European armaments policy. namely to define first its internal decision-making structures and only then to define the precise modalities of cooperation for strategic dialogue partners such as Russia. there is ground for confidence but perhaps a little need for patience on this front.15 The EU will probably prefer to take things in a logical sequence.RUSSIA’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 73
observation of a number of WEU crisis management exercises including the one held jointly with NATO in February 2000. to imagine any problems arising in this specific shortterm context. So. but did not exclude that the need for treaty amendment and/or complications of a purely practical nature might delay certain aspects of the transfer. and here it would be premature to give a clear and simple answer. but specifically states that the EU will consider inviting Russia to take part when it carries out a crisis-management operation using WEU as its agent. and that the EU will then be just as interested as WEU has been in exploring the various practical modes of Russian support.14 The detailed chapter of the Strategy on this subject mentions not only the possibility of dialogue. It should merely be noted that the exact timing of the handover is not yet certain: the EU expected to be politically ready to carry out the main part of the transition at the end of 2000.12 and negotiations for a WEU—Russia framework agreement on the provision of long-haul airlift. First. assuming of course that Russia is content to accept the EU as the inheritor of WEU for this purpose. arms control and disarmament. then.
. to sum up. The EU adopted in June 1999 a Common Strategy on Russia which included as one of its highest aims the joint effort for European stability and for global and European security. EFFECT OF THE EU DEFENCE INITIATIVE ON RUSSIA My second question was about the impact of the European defence initiative on the larger security environment. and joint policy initiatives for conflict prevention.
has used a graphic image by saying that he is quite capable of ‘riding two horses at once’.17 The Europeans will not thank anyone who tries to destroy their balancing act by shooting one of the two horses beneath them. mutual reinforcement and complementarity with NATO since it specifies that the EU will lead operations only where NATO as an institution is not involved. not just for carrying tough military operations of this kind but also to provide a guaranteed framework for US—European consultation and a barrier to any nationalistic tendencies among themselves. which do not have to be in conflict with Atlantic interests but may objectively differ from them. the EU would have the possibility. rather than allowing European nations to divert their efforts towards a conflicting or less demanding set of military requirements. On the other hand. After all.74 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Although some Americans have expressed such fears. of asking NATO to lend such assets for use under European command and EU political control in a specific operation.
. for example in the degree of priority and concern that the Europeans attach to certain risks. when trying to explain the contradictions inherent in his job during the new age of USA-Europe relations. It will reflect a distinct set of European interests. being also the EU’s High Representative for its new-style security and defence policy. The Europeans know very well that they still need NATO. WEU’s SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana has steadily told them that they are mistaken and he is well placed to know the truth. It is still based on the idea of ‘dual use’ of European command structures and other valuable military assets developed within NATO. More generally. NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson. It will be a different type of defence player with a quite different set of strengths. It will be important for any country that wants to associate itself with the EU initiative to accept these political realities and to avoid any approach that creates unnecessary EU-NATO friction. the EU took its key decisions in June 1999 in the middle of the Kosovo crisis where NATO was taking the lead and was receiving loyal support in doing so from both allied and non-allied Europeans. in other words. or in the precise type of military contribution that the Europeans’ culture.16 And even in the field of improving defence capabilities the EU’s leaders have made clear that they want to achieve improvements that will enhance NATO’s strength as well. history and experience make it possible for them to offer. So the EU’s new initiative is in many ways remarkably ‘NATO-friendly’. it is quite clear that the EU does not intend to be either a subordinate to NATO or a kind of inferior copy of the Alliance. the EU’s approach is based on the idea of partnership. just as WEU has had up to now. including the possibility mentioned above of putting together integrated packages of military and non-military actions.
But even if there is not to be a militarization of EU policy. In south-eastern Europe.’18 And as a final remark. but it is hard to see any real foundation for them. not clones. in accord with the principles of the UN Charter. a greater awareness by the EU of the security consequences of its actions and a greater readiness to combine and adjust its various policy instruments for overarching security goals. peace and order in different ways. better able to promote its specific interests both at the European and (when necessary) the world level. this experience may also make it easier for ‘mutually reinforcing’ relationships to emerge between NATO and other strategic partners and institutions. to ensure that the Union can take full responsibility for its expanded territory as EU enlargement goes forward. and as many Europeans have been happy to quote: ‘We’—that is the USA and Europe—‘are cousins. the less reason those nations will have to misunderstand the nature of such operations or to fear that European strength could be used in improper ways. however. or that it could start to present some kind of strategic challenge or competition to its neighbours. He sees this greater European strength as helping. the EU’s
. As former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said.RUSSIA’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 75
In broader terms. the more successful the EU can be in building a framework for its neighbours and partners to participate directly in EU-led actions. In these respects the EU initiative seems to fit well with the idea of a more multipolar world order in which groups of democratic states can legitimately play different roles and can serve the common cause of prosperity. Of course. it is legitimate to hope that the new defence competence will lead to a certain ‘securitization’ of EU thinking: that is. among other things. as Solana has often stressed. It would be the first to suffer from any destabilization in the larger Europe and it has gone to some trouble to reassure its neighbours that its defence powers will only be used as a last resort. if NATO can learn to live with the EU and respect it as an independent partner. because it will be better equipped to deal with all the crises and other possible dangers—apart from an old-style military attack—which might threaten that territory from outside. acquiring defence competence will make the EU a more credible and capable global actor. Such concerns might be felt on the southern as well as the eastern borders of the EU. be to push this analysis too far and to conclude that the EU will now become militarized. if EU enlargement is to be carried out with proper regard for everyone’s interests and with a positive net effect on stability. In particular. The second incorrect interpretation would. it will be important for the EU to understand the possible security implications and prepare constructive solutions for them. The EU is in essence a peaceful organism which tries to build prosperity and democracy through a process of interdependent cooperation with partners both close to its borders and further away.
and if we added to this Russia’s trade with Turkey and the central European countries who hope soon to join the EU.76 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Stability and Growth Pact initiative adopted at Amsterdam in June 1997 has shown some welcome signs of this security-conscious thinking. In the Nordic—Baltic region. As a general proposition I would suggest that the EU needs to give much more concrete support to regional networks which soften the future and present dividing line of the EU frontier. many parts of Russia’s western territory are already quite involved in and influenced by patterns of regional trade and cooperation. (If combined with the EU entry of central and east European countries. Charles Grant. First. the EU has already acknowledged that the expansion of its borders must take place in a way that respects the integrity of Russian territory and which. has recently suggested that the terms of this economic relationship could be modelled on those of the present European Environment Agency agreement with Norway and Iceland. as a way of ‘help[ing] Russia to assert its European identity’. the Barents region and Baltic Sea frameworks and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. notably the market that would be offered by the huge Russian population and the prospect of being able to share in developing Russia’s great natural resources. the proportion would rise to nearly one-half. and that a security-based approach should lead it to give even greater attention to those networks that involve Russia—the Northern Dimension. what prospects is the EU already offering to Russia and how does Russia feel about taking them up? The EU’s Strategy document mentioned above talks not just about strategic partnership but also about the ‘integration of Russia into a wider area of cooperation in Europe’. which link them intimately with present or future members of the EU. such as joint infrastructure developments.19 EFFECT OF THE EU DEFENCE INITIATIVE ON Russia—EU RELATIONSHIP The final question I raised is about how the longer-term Russia—EU relationship could be affected by bringing European defence into the equation. brings new advantages rather than new problems for Kaliningrad. specifically. It mentions the idea of a future free trade area between the EU and Russia—and an influential British academic. This means looking ahead into such an uncertain future that its implications can only be tackled by exploring another set of questions. it would also have the effect of giving Russia full and equal access again to their
.20 In fact. which implies a very close degree of integration indeed.21 Besides. So the idea of a larger Russia—EU trade community is not without a certain material foundation and some aspects of it might seem rather attractive for the EU as well. about one-third of Russia’s external trade is already done with EU countries.
and is it ready to contemplate the great changes in the balance of its own culture and identity which the incorporation of Russia—and a genuine adaptation to Russia’s needs and interests—would bring?
. and since the European power structure is more balanced and fluid with obvious areas of strength on both the Russian and the EU sides. Applying EU norms across the whole of Russian territory. There is a big difference in economic and social conditions between Russia and western/central Europe. these EU common values and the common standards that they imply are not just a matter of theory but can lead to political reactions which. let alone the free movement of persons and capital.RUSSIA’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 77
markets. when we look at it in the cold light of today’s realities the achievement of this dream seems much more difficult and perhaps even doubtful. to any outside observer. about whether Russia really understands and accepts what it means to be part of an integration process in the European sense. would risk severe destabilization on both sides. in a way that has not been possible since the end of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. and the early imposition of free trade. However—and this is a point on which the British are well qualified to speak—living in the EU style brings changes and demands sacrifices which are very hard to imagine when looking at it from the outside. and is Russia willing to pay the price that it will demand? Indeed. There is a further question that needs to be asked. and even if it does not involve formal guarantees it does bring a strong obligation of solidarity towards other EU members in trouble. would look very like interference by some EU members in other members’ internal affairs. In the security field it puts constraints on the kinds of action that can be considered in defence of national interests. is the EU willing to ‘get into bed’ with Russia in the same spirit. It involves very specific and wide-ranging transfers of sovereignty—a sovereignty that in Russia’s case appears to have great political and psychological value and presumably would not be easy to surrender even in part. both internally and externally.22 Is life in such a promiscuous community really how Russia sees its future. and a wish to take part fully and equally in the development of the rules of a free international community. would be a frightening task. As Austria has discovered recently.) However. since the USA will not be involved. It is true that Russian attitudes to the West include a strong element of wanting to ‘belong’. It means exposing one’s national identity to a very intimate mixing process with a wide range of other European societies and cultures and with quite unpredictable results. such as competition policy and social and environmental standards. It could also be argued that the EU offers a much better setting for Russia to try to fulfil this goal than NATO does. even in the fields directly related to trade.
on the use and transport of Eurasian oil and gas resources consistent with a future Russia—EU economic partnership and. and towards the Asian and Pacific regions as a whole? Could any deeper involvement of Russia in the European integration process bring lessons and possible new solutions for the organization of multinational security structures involving Russia in these other geographical regions? And if not. specifically. Afghanistan. France. Italy.
. 3. Greece. Iceland. Are current Western policies. is a European defence organization with ten full member states: Belgium. Poland. with EU members’ own reliance on Russian gas and oil? Should European policy in this respect reflect different interests from those of the USA? 2. complementary or parallel security interests towards such neighbours as Iran. 2. Hungary.78 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
In case these questions are not difficult enough. what would be the role of Russia’s CIS neighbours? Might the EU and Russia together be able to find the formula for voluntary. Turkey). more specifically related to security. Spain and the UK. Western European Union. as Ukraine has done already? 3. mutually profitable and durable cooperation with all these states which neither the EU nor Russia could perhaps find today on its own? What would Russia’s attitude be if these neighbours also want to establish cooperative links with the EU’s new defence identity. I will end this analysis with four others. including EU policies. Luxembourg. In addition to its full members. Do the EU and Russia have conflicting. five observers (Austria. export control and nonproliferation. and looking further ahead into the possible new dynamics of EU-Russia relations: 1. Norway. originating from the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and modified Brussels Treaty of 1954. Will the EU’s new defence responsibilities in crisis management gradually lead the Union to adopt more distinctive and stronger positions on issues of arms control. and if so. Netherlands. In the vision of an EU-Russia free trade area or of an even more fully integrated partnership. Germany. The statements in this chapter are made in a purely personal capacity. Portugal. India and China. how difficult would it be for Russia to exist with a strengthened security community on its western border while having to play by a different and more old-fashioned set of rules towards the east and south? NOTES
1. the WEU offers wide-ranging involvement in its policy-making work and activities to associate members (Czech Republic. are these positions likely to strengthen or to complicate the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia? 4.
were formally launched at the Pörtschach European Council meeting at the end of 1998. Principles and structural arrangements for the new policy were worked out in stages and published notably in the conclusions of the European Councils at Cologne (3–4 June 1999) and Helsinki (10–11 December 1999). where each EU nation declared its national contribution to this pool of politically deployable troops. which are not applying for EU membership but are members of NATO.
. The conclusions of the Feira European Council on 19–20 June 2000 set out modalities for consultation with. plus Cyprus and Malta. Finland. in the same fashion as the military goals mentioned above. Ireland. The overall framework will cover all central and east European states recognized as applicants to the EU. Poland. Romania.
9. Hungary. and plus Norway and Iceland. The EU’s global target for a military intervention capability was defined at the Helsinki European Council under the name of a Headline Goal. Within the framework.
5. involving policy-making work within the ‘second pillar’ of the Union (in conjunction with the the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the identification/enhancement of both military and paramilitary intervention capabilities. Latvia. The range of non-Article V ‘Petersberg tasks’ was defined in the WEU’s Ministerial Declaration issued at Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992. Norway. Consultations in these various formats were launched on an experimental basis. in Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. took place in November 2000 (under the French EU presidency).
8. The Helsinki European Council decided to launch work in 2000 on identifying the range of non-military (notably police) capabilities that might be required for Petersberg-type missions under EU command. on full activation of the CESDP machinery at the end of 2000. The EU’s efforts to develop a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).RUSSIA’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 79
4. Estonia. using the provisional EU organs established in May 2000. A Capabilities Commitment Conference. The aim is to set a Headline Goal for such forces and identify national contributions. the six European non-EU Allies (Czech Republic. as an indication of the range of European operations for which it might wish to take political responsibility. Sweden) and seven associate partners (Bulgaria.
7. in the weeks immediately following the Feira meeting. Lithuania. The EU incorporated the same wording. Iceland. Slovakia. notably concerning the right to join in EU operations which make use of NATO assets and capabilities. Slovenia). agreed upon on 17 June 1997 and signed on 2 October 1997. the key deliberative bodies below Council of Ministers level would be a new Political and Security Committee manned by ambassadors of the 16 member states permanently located in Brussels and a European Military Committee meeting occasionally at Chiefs of Defence Staff level but normally manned by senior military representatives. The Helsinki European Council decided that. a total of 15 interested non-EU states in connection with the EU CESDP. Turkey) will have somewhat more frequent consultations and some additional rights. Interim versions of these two bodies began meeting on a trial basis in Brussels from early May 2000. and practical contributions by.
Turkey). NATO-WEU joint crisis management exercise CMX/CRISEX.int/ institute 11.useu. Norway. Helios) and from others (Russia. established in 1993 to promote European armaments collaboration. 12. 20. Chaillot Paper No. India. is linked with WEU but has a different membership structure and procedures (WEU’s ten full members plus Denmark.80 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
10. is a subordinate organ of WEU devoted to the analysis of space-based imagery. which it can obtain both from satellites owned by WEU countries (e. 4 June 1999. Ibid. made final provision for the close-down of WEU’s former crisis management work (leaving WEU with only its residual Article V competence). Observer status for the exercise was granted to Russia. 22. Ukraine among others).g. The reference is to the political sanctions applied by other EU members against Austria in spring 2000 following the formation of an Austrian government coalition including Jörg Haider’s neo-fascist party. 15. From OECD trade statistics 1997. The European Council held at Nice in December 2000 confirmed the EU’s assumption of its new defence responsibilities.weu. Formula used in the Helsinki European Council statement.
. 17–23 February 2000. WEU Institute Paris. ‘How to Help Russia’. Available at www. 13. 21. 16. April 1998. 18. Dmitri Danilov and Stephan de Spiegeleire. 31. ‘From Decoupling to Recoupling: A New Security Relationship between Russia and Western Europe’. NATO’s and WEU’s Mediterranean dialogue partners and certain other Partnership for Peace nations. Charles Grant. Centre for European Reform (CER) Bulletin. The WEU Satellite Centre. February–March 2000. 17. and in the process clarified such matters as any requirement for EU treaty amendment. 14. Ukraine. 10 March 2000.be/issues/ useu0310. The Western European Armaments Group. Speech by Secretary Albright at the opening of the US Mission to the EU’s new Chancery building. Quoted by Lord Robertson at several press conferences in early 2000.html 19. sited at Torrejon in Spain. Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. adopted at the Cologne European Council. Available at www.
if the USA had continued to operate within a status quo NATO. with an attendant desire to downgrade foreign policy. geostrategically. Still. and given the capacity of domestically driven foreign policy moves to compound mistakes into follies. The mistake has already been made—as an assessment of the worsening strategic relationship between the USA and Russia will demonstrate. a dramatically different geostrategic environment was ushered in—or so it seemed at the time. and again in the post-1945 period. as some have argued. the Soviet Union had ‘lost’ the Cold War. Once the Cold War ended in December 1991. Instead. this was the start of an era of assorted transitions in Europe. but it was certainly at the heart of US policy in the Second World War. the international environment in many ways resembled that of the 1920s. the USA’s national interest in Europe is basically the same today as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century: to ensure that no single power dominates the European continent. None of the major powers was faced by a serious military threat or by a polarizing ideological or military adversary. it could have decisively shaped both Europe’s security architecture and its political attitudes.RUBINSTEIN
From a geostrategic perspective. strategy and the US national interest are continually under review. little to do with a coherent US strategy for Europe and Eurasia. In fact. As in the 1920s. the USA could dominate the slowly emerging acentric international system and influence its evolution much more effectively than it had been able to. it could have promoted security. The USA had ‘won’ the Cold War or. there are grounds for deep concern over
. reform and cooperation for all the nation-states of Europe. east Asia and the Middle East in the wake of collapsed empires. as well as throughout the era of bipolarity and rivalry between the USA and Soviet Union. while the major powers preferred to look inwards to domestic challenges. In the early 1990s. This may not have been a crucial determinant of US involvement in the First World War. Washington opted for the expansion of NATO. The important outcome was that. and little to do with advancing global security and interests. The determining arguments for NATO enlargement had little or nothing to do with the US national interest.8 Russian Strategic Uncertainty in an Era of US Tactical Intrusiveness
as so often in the course of these rapidly moving events. The expansion of NATO to the east changed the calculus of power and the network of inter-relationships. a second wave that might include the Baltic States. As they defined Europe. the USA. Slovenia and Romania. Slovakia. was not an impossible dream. Washington—troubled. hesitant.’1 Nothing better exemplifies Washington’s post-Cold War mishandling of its relationship with Russia than NATO enlargement. The admission of Poland. conditions in Europe (including Eurasia) were conducive to a security and peace that had at its centre a USA that could provide guarantees to all countries on the continent: not only was there a functional hegemon. George Kennan’s prescient words. NATO enlargement has quite possibly destroyed the best chance the international system had for a protracted period of peace and security cooperation. but these are mutually reinforcing phenomena only in a condition of essential equilibrium. not in conditions of change. In 1992. by ramming NATO enlargement through in haste. the vision of a ‘common European home’. to which the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev had aspired. And there is little doubt that anti-Russian sentiment—undisguised or implicit—did permeate the American Senate’s hearings on NATO enlargement held in October and November 1997. NATO enlargement has upset this short-lived equilibrium among the interdependent countries on the continent. to the detriment of US strategic interests. written of a different era. Fear of Russia served as a surrogate for a convincing strategic rationale—which was never offered or effectively explained. First. the Czech Republic and Hungary enhanced their security. The USA purports to seek security and stability. which did not covet any country’s territory. among others.82 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
the possibility of further expansion—that is. reluctantly. NATO enlargement has repolarized the European security environment. the non-NATO countries (small as well as large. and ill-informed—had spoken. but no country had any prospect of challenging or supplanting the US position and role of manager. NATO’s enlargement was perceived by Russia to be anti-Russian in character and aim. Moreover. Russia was beyond the pale. into the past. but not the security (or stability) of all European states. weak as well as strong. arbiter and benign superpower. The second consequence of NATO enlargement is the growing estrangement of Russia from the USA (somewhat modified by the events of
. and vulnerable as well as secure) had a rare chance to look inwards to develop viable institutions and promote democratization and development: indeed. All advocates of enlargement made it very clear that excluding Russia from membership was essential and inevitable for the indefinite future. nonetheless resonate for our situation: ‘Once again. the USA lost the opportunity to fashion an acceptable Pax Americana-type domination over the entire European continent.
which has three facets: the vulnerability of its borders to unwanted migrations from eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. indefinitely.2 But was it strategically in the US national interest? The USA wants strong allies—but not too strong. Another likely consequence of NATO enlargement will be to diminish the relative importance of France and the UK in the alliance. Territorially shorn of a forward position in the heart of Europe. military and cultural aspirations. to rekindle adversarial and competitive relationships between Germany and France and between Germany and Russia and. A bit of anxiety is not necessarily bad. lest this result in an independent policy line not in the US interest. and involving considerably more resources than would have been necessary in the absence of enlargement. It has reopened a psychological and political divide. The Soviet Union’s implosion at the end of December 1991 pushed the frontiers of Russia in Europe back to where they had been in the early seventeenth century.RUSSIAN STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 83
11 September 2001). Enlargement answered Germany’s complex Eastern Problem. and their aim was Russia’s acceptance in the common European home. NATO enlargement unwisely altered the calculus of Germany’s position in an evolving Europe. and the sense that Germany should not again be squeezed between two adversarial blocs but should take ‘its natural geographic place. complicate the possibility of a prolonged period of peace in Europe. in the process. Indeed. the psychological feeling that Germans have of continuing ‘to live at a frontline’. NATO enlargement squelched all of these Russian diplomatic. The rhetoric of partnership spouted periodically at summit meetings is just that: Moscow does not believe it. political. Already the most powerful country in western Europe and the EU’s dominant member. Central and eastern Europe will be more firmly under Germany’s economic and political influence than they already are. the most pro-Western ruler Russia had ever known. NATO enlargement is likely. (If the USA still views Castro’s Cuba as an enemy. within a decade or two Germany should regain the position of economic and industrial power that it had on the eve of the First and Second World Wars. the opposition in Poland and the Czech Republic fears that by joining the EU the way would be open for Germans to buy up former German lands. Russia became a militarily diminished power. which is a prime US objective and which may require a greater US commitment. in time. for
. not at an artificial borderline of European subregions’. in 1992. which is in the center of Europe. the ‘Westernizers’ in the Russian elite—and the reformers—held sway. in part. Bitter French criticisms of US hegemony are. Nonetheless. veiled hints of French displeasure with Germany’s increasing tilt towards the USA. NATO enlargement has had chilling effects on Russian-American relations. what must Moscow think of the USA?) Thirdly. under Boris Yeltsin. By ending Germany’s position as a border state and placing it once again at the centre of Europe.
it can spur cooperation and accommodation. Starting in late 1996. Moreover.4 The conviction that the USA and Germany were conniving to acquire unchallenged supremacy over the world was shared by both communists and non-communist nationalists. The distinguished historian of German history and politics Fritz Stern.’5 START II may eventually be ratified by the Duma.3 Fourthly. exacerbating and complicating all of this. he noted. but the character and degree of cooperation originally envisaged and needed to ensure full and expeditious compliance is a new uncertainty. I think. NATO enlargement has already adversely affected progress in arms control negotiations. comprehensive and constructive military relationship with Russia is a primary US security interest. While not believing that history must repeat itself. and. there is a ‘new vocabulary of interests. the vulnerability to theft and tampering of nuclear stockpiles. For him. The problems are many: less reliable command and control systems. Germany’s uneasiness over its eastern border reinforced its deference as a NATO ally and its need for a continuing prominent American presence. Russia remains a nuclear superpower. agree that a close. Russia’s nuclear condition is more worrisome now than it was during the Cold War. Empathetic and astute observers of German policy and cultural angst worry that nationalism rather than Europeanism are beginning to surface in Germany’s approach to the countries of central and western Europe. and influence’. Notwithstanding straitened circumstances and a diminished conventional weapons capability. great European power. From Washington’s perspective. when visiting Germany in early 2000. Only the USA is equipped to deal effectively with Russia on a range of critical nuclear and nuclear-related issues. which stemmed from the Duma’s anger at NATO’s expansion in the east. awaiting
. START III is problematical. whose expansion was widely compared to Nazi Germany’s Drang nach Osten. Russian publications revealed a bitter hostility to NATO. Aleksei Arbatov criticized the USA for treating Russia as a defeated power.84 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
nations as for individuals. Most analysts would. they foresee inevitable tensions which will require Germany to act with exceptional self-restraint. the growing danger of nuclear accidents and pollution in a deteriorating social and security environment in Russia. NATO was the cause of what had gone awry in Russian-American relations: ‘NATO’s expansion to the east [was] undoubtedly a turning point in relations between Russia and the West in the post-Cold-War period. the sale of nuclear technologies to such countries as China. all signed arms control treaties are on the block. Where once the talk had only been of Europe and détente. with the communist press caricaturing NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana’s ‘assurance in the form of a smiling boa constrictor’. today. also spoke of a need for German restraint. is the stasis in START II negotiations. Iran and India.
resource-poor. that the ‘gains decisively outweigh the burdens’. Nor is the security of any other NATO country significantly enhanced by the three new members. dependent.Ikle’. As Michael Mandelbaum and others have argued. is borne out. Washington would be diverted from pressing ahead with Russia on much higherpriority nuclear issues. whose defence only adds unnecessarily to every NATO country’s burden. The nuclear issues that require Russian action are so important. as in other areas and on other issues. NATO seems bent not on downsizing military establishments and building on the existing series of arms limitation agreements. Fifthly. he not only expressed his concern that NATO enlargement would complicate further efforts to proceed with nuclear downsizing. ‘in the event of need to repulse armed aggression. In its present geographical and military position.6 Fred C. geographically vulnerable new members. know-how or capability offered by the countries of central and eastern Europe.’7 In the field of arms control. As a result of NATO’s Kosovo war. in managing NATO enlargement. but it enables Washington to sidestep the issue of the next tranche. if President Clinton’s statement that ‘NATO first [new] members should not be its last’. that we must focus on them all our leverage and influence with Moscow. the Russian military has emphatically committed to a first use’ doctrine of nuclear response. In testimony before the House Committee on National Security on 17 July 1997. at a time when Europe is at peace and secure. so overarching.RUSSIAN STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 85
Washington’s decision on ballistic missile defence (BMD). none of whom is in immediate or remotely foreseeable danger of attack by any power. has proved to be right. Against this background. Yet. He noted: There is only so much time in high level meetings to cover multiple agendas. there is even more trouble ahead.8 More disturbing. all the “carrots and sticks” that we can command for this continuing negotiation with the Russian authorities. Undersecretary of Defence for Policy in the Reagan administration and a highly respected strategic thinker. NATO enlargement has been justified on grounds that it will strengthen the alliance. no alliance has strengthened itself by embracing weak. but on upsetting the unparalleled strategic stability that it has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. The Charter involves no binding commitments on the USA. Acting President Vladimir Putin formally issued the national security blueprint (kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti) of the Russian Federation in January 2000. even while
. the USA does not need the territory. Russian suspicion was further heightened in January 1998. historically. if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective’. but he stressed his fear that. when the US-Baltic Charter was signed in Washington. The essential concern is not what Russia will do but rather what it will not do. the USA should avoid the triumphant notion that there is nothing Russia can do to prevent NATO’s further expansion.
but in China. In the past. as illustrated by its lack of consultation on the timetable for NATO enlargement. intelligence and combat support. At first. Bosnia precipitated acrimony and bitterness within NATO. In 1956 there was the Suez crisis. and assured these countries that the USA would support them to become secure. and rejection of the view of a majority of NATO’s leaders at Madrid in July 1997 in favour of membership for Slovenia and Romania (as well as for Poland. the ArabIsraeli conflict. stable. that is. in the mid-1960s and again in 1974 there were Turkish-Greek tensions over Cyprus. In trying to alleviate the disappointment of the Baltic States. feeling confident in their ability to manage the situation. That mood was aggravated. With their sense of ineptness came a growing resentment at Washington’s equivocation. prosperous democracies integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures. in regions lying beyond NATO’s mandate. the Czech Republic and Hungary).10
. the west Europeans. even though there is no strategic case. Sixthly. in the late 1970s and 1980s. the west Europeans’ tilt towards Arab positions on peacemaking and towards the Palestinians. the surprise announcement by Secretary of Defense William Cohen that American troops would be withdrawn from Bosnia by 30 June 1998 (an announcement subsequently retracted). When Yugoslavia imploded in 1991–92. in the late 1960s and 1970s. However. sought to develop a common approach.9 Reading public statements and speeches of what US officials asseverate to Russian audiences on NATO’s benign purposes is to wander into the world of Orwellian doublespeak and obscurantism. divergent national interests and ambitions around NATO’s vast southern flank have caused serious intra-Alliance tensions. India and other countries as well. especially in Paris. the US may be opening the way for a new administration to push enlargement in response to domestic electoral considerations. in April 1986 the refusal of France and Spain to grant US bombers based in Britain over-flight privileges to attack targets in Libya in reprisal for Qaddafi’s terrorist action against American servicemen in Berlin. lax commercial and political relations with Libya and an accommodating approach to Iran. by Washington’s often high-handed behaviour.86 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
reaffirming its pledge to keep NATO’s door open. unfortunately for strategic stability. the coincidence of NATO enlargement and NATO’s projection of military power in out-of-area matters. they soon realized their military limitations and dependence on the USA for logistical. has sounded alarm bells not just in Russia. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott defined the fate of the Baltic States as ‘a litmus test for the fate of the entire continent’. During a three-day visit to Estonia in late January 2000.
Compared with Bosnia. in order to obtain the diplomatic legitimacy to accompany its triumph on the battlefield. President Clinton reported to the nation that ‘the Serb army and police are withdrawing from Kosovo. Clinton unleashed NATO’s air power (mostly US planes). far exceeding initial US administration estimates.000 NATO troops bogged down in an occupation without an exit strategy.’11 Critics remain unconvinced. China and the UN. Kosovo has spawned even more doleful strategic consequences for the US policy of pushing NATO into assuming out-ofarea roles for which the Alliance was never intended. US planes mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Instead. meanwhile. On 7 May 1999. after Serbia refused to accept a NATO demand for NATO-led supervision of the Serbian province of Kosovo in order to protect the Albanians living there. Carl von Clausewitz warned of the need always to take account of the unpredictable that occurs in ‘the fog of war’ and to remember that war can never be separated from political intercourse.RUSSIAN STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 87
The high expectations for the US-cobbled Dayton Accords of December 1995 have steadily dropped. an aggravation of US—Russian relations. The main point to be emphasized here is that NATO’s overwhelming use of power against a small country lying outside NATO’s sphere has had adverse repercussions for US relations with Russia. which demonstrated just how far he had departed from his early commitment to multilateralism and constructive engagement. They continue to believe that the war was avoidable. democratic Bosnia is realizable: a ‘politically correct’ policy for Bosnia seems beyond even the American capability of demonstrating its capacity for social engineering. as the UN did in June. (2) that a willingness to accept Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo at Rambouillet in March 1999. We have achieved a victory for a safer world. the costs continue to rise. the Serbs resisted stubbornly. as it was eventually required to do in June. The full force of NATO’s military power was directed against Serbia on 24 March 1999. They contend (1) that the USA could have fashioned a political settlement by working through the UN Security Council in March. expecting an early capitulation.
. The consequences of NATO’s pummelling of Serbia and occupation of Kosovo are 40. and failure to bring the matter first to the UN Security Council. alltoo-free recourse to military means to get its way. might have led Serbian President Milosevic to grant the Albanians official autonomy. costs for reconstruction and development that are not forthcoming from western Europe or the USA. for our democratic values and for a stronger America. multi-religious. and (3) that Clinton’s recourse to NATO and a unilateralist policy was reinforced by his belief in the US role as ‘the indispensable nation’. On 10 June 1999. and American troops in Bosnia have no exit strategy—and there are pathetically few signs that the objective of the recreation of a multi-ethnic. evoking sharp criticisms from Beijing of USA’s hegemonic ambitions.
88 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Russia’s position that it is more justified in its application of disproportionate force against the rebels in Chechnya than NATO was in attacking Serbia; western Europe’s uneasiness over its dependence on the USA; and a new arms race as other powers seek to enhance their military capability to offset the technological and logistical prowess displayed by the USA in Kosovo. In retrospect, the strategic consequences for the US— Russian relationship seem likely to intensify their re-emerging adversarial relationship. Seventhly, inevitably, NATO enlargement and NATO’s savage destruction of Serbia’s civilian infrastructure (which, it must be noted, went far beyond the destruction wreaked on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq over the past decade) have served to focus the Russian military’s attention on security issues in ways that do not augur well for irenic cooperation in building cooperative security in Europe. In the post-Yeltsin era, any Russian leader is likely to proceed on the assumption that the USA is the prime adversary of and threat to Russian interests; and he may be expected to engage in skilful manoeuvering and adept use of a variety of often contradictory tactics to safeguard and advance Russian foreign policy interests. Eighthly, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities in Transcaucasia and central Asia heighten Russia’s sense of beleaguerment. An adjunct of NATO enlargement, PfP’s intrusiveness is interwoven with the competition for control of oil and natural-gas pipelines and reserves in the region, with the result that there seems to be emerging a new ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia, involving Russia, the USA, Iran and Turkey. NATO’s intrusiveness is easily catalogued: in September 1997, for example, US-led military exercises were held with Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Uzbek forces; in October 1997, the then US ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, visited Azerbaijan and Georgia for discussions on PfP programmes and NATO-sponsored activities to be held on the territory of these two nations; and in October 1998 the then Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, spoke in Tbilisi of NATO’s interest in making the region’s security environment congenial for investment and development and described the region as part of EuroAtlantic security space.12 For his part, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, who, has been courting NATO in order to offset Russian pressures for military bases, speaks openly of his intention to apply for NATO admission at the earliest opportunity.13 And in late December 1999, after a visit to NATO headquarters, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister announced his country’s interest in applying for membership; in the meantime, Azerbaijan’s parliament has approved a status of forces agreement with NATO, and Azerbaijan dispatched its first peacekeeping contingent (a platoon) to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo. Is this all symbolism? Too much can perhaps be made of these various activities. But Russian military planners see them through a prism of suspicion as
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 89
attempts by NATO to build outposts of influence all along Russia’s vulnerable southern periphery. To the extent that Moscow views NATO’s activism in the region as a quest for strategic advantage, and not just for strategic denial, its hostility and worst-case interpretations must be expected. Finally, how an enlarged NATO is to handle Russia is still an open question. In his speech at West Point on 31 May 1997, President Clinton insisted that NATO enlargement would strengthen the Alliance; that it would ‘provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy, and prosperity can flourish’; that NATO would encourage prospective members to resolve their differences peacefully; and that NATO enlargement together with PfP would erase ‘the artificial line in Europe that Stalin drew and bring Europe together in security, not keep it apart in insecurity’.14 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is an uncertain factor in the future of the overall US—Russian relationship. For the moment, however, at least in the realm of foreign policy, it is clear that he is a nationalist, a statist and a pragmatist. Eager to improve relations with the EU, and especially with Germany, his policy towards Yugoslavia has been geared towards Europe rather than the USA. For example, Putin was quick to embrace the electoral defeat of Slobodan Milosevic; to send the Russian Foreign Minister to urge Milosevic to accept the verdict of the Serbian people and not resist the turnover of administrations; and to recognize the new government of Vojislav Kostunica. In the uncertain Balkan politicaldiplomatic arena, Putin will try to exploit west European uneasiness over the US approach to such issues as National Missile Defence, the ABM treaty and further expansion of NATO in order to pursue Russia’s objectives on the continent. NOTES
1. George F.Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, NJ, 1956), p. 517. 2. Reinhardt Rummel, The German Debate on International Security Institutions’, in Marco Carnovale (ed.), European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War (New York, 1995), p. 187. 3. Roger Cohen, ‘A Peacemaker for the Germans’, New York Times, 8 January 2000, p. B9. 4. J.L.Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? (Lanham, MD, 2000), p. 64. 5. Ibid., p. 95. 6. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 1, 14–20 January 2000. 7. Statement by the Honorable Fred C.Ikle’ before the Committee on National Security, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 17 July 1997.
90 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
8. Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996), passim. 9. As quoted in Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, vol. 6, no. 21, 31 January 2000, p. 3. 10. For example, see R.W.Apple, Jr, ‘Clinton on His Foreign Policy: A Rosetinted World’, New York Times, 18 December 1997, p. A12. 11. ‘Clinton’s Remarks on Balkan War’, New York Times, 11 June 1999. 12. See ‘The South Caucasus: Solana in Tbilisi’, Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 4, no. 180, 1 October 1998, p. 3. 13. ‘Shevardnadze Winds Up Landmark Visit to the US’, Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, vol. 3, no. 142, 22 July 1997, p. 4; see also ‘Georgia Knock-KnockKnocking at NATO’s Door’, ibid., vol. 6, no. 5, 7 January 2000. 14. See www.pub.whitehouse.gov
Part III: A Northern Passage
Sustained reductions of armed forces in the area. Even without artificial urgency and deliberate prioritization. one issue that has the potential for escalating into a major political crisis and blocking cooperation in many fields is the next round of NATO enlargement. The new Russian leadership shows interest in exploring the emerging opportunities for expanded cooperation in the area. and some of them even have the potential of acquiring truly catastrophic proportions. and particularly the massive cuts in Russian defence structures. The dilemma of East-West appears irrelevant for Russia’s prospects in this direction. Hard choices with high-risk factors were awaiting decisions from President Vladimir Putin in almost every political direction except one. The potential for violent conflicts in this area is by far the lowest around Russia’s borders. the soul-searching Eurasian ideas do not seem to make much sense here. while the brewing internal crisis in Belarus has little impact on the BalticNordic neighbourhood. But in fact the scale of hidden security challenges in this region is no smaller than in the Caucasus. while offering some attractive cooperative options. Russia appeared to waver at various crossroads in its internal transformation and external orientation. In the Nordic—Baltic area Russia is most firmly anchored to the emerging new European security order through well-developed institutional frameworks.BAEV
INTRODUCTION During the transition of power from its first president to his hand-picked successor. recurrent tensions in its relations with the three Baltic States have reliable channels for resolution. have in essence led to the demilitarization of the regional security agenda. The vast north-western area looked remarkably uncomplicated and problem-free. However. Russia’s north-west has traditionally been its ‘window to Europe’ and it now offers a natural interface with welldeveloped cross-border links. Russian regional leaders also recognize their European interests.9 Opportunities and Challenges for Russia in the Nordic—Baltic Region
PAVEL K. this issue looms in the background of many
named the Northern Dimension. with the gubernatorial elections not far off) which were liable to bring about a massive redistribution of power. personified as the ‘Putin factor’. they required hard and sustained work—and promised results only in the medium term. While promising new opportunities had started to emerge there. focusing particularly on the new cooperative agenda with the EU. overcoming the numerous controversies in its relations with the three Baltic states. had been planning an initiative that would channel the Union’s activities towards the Baltic States and north-western Russia.5 The Russian leadership. was announced by
. which led to. Two unfortunate results of this hidden and postponed crisis are the poor military-to-military contacts and the hugely inadequate attention paid in the West to the increasing problems of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal in the Far North. and was much aggravated by. in 1997 and early 1998 it appeared possible that Russia would be able to achieve a breakthrough towards a deep engagement with qualitatively stronger links to northern Europe. cultural and political ties. Priorities of the Russian leadership. It starts by examining the various institutional frameworks in the area. generally lost interest in the Nordic—Baltic area.OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 93
international initiatives and poisons the political atmosphere. unlike in some other European sub-regions. it presents the extraordinary risks related to Russia’s poor maintenance of its nuclear structures in the region. This massive and sudden crisis showed very clearly the limited effectiveness of the available institutional structures for dealing with Russian-scale disasters and their meagre potential for further development both in the economic area (since Russian markets contracted so greatly) and in the political sphere (since Russian politics became introverted).3 Since these institutions have provided for the sustained development of economic. Finland. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND THE NEW COOPERATIVE AGENDA The Nordic—Baltic area is unique in its wealth of various institutional frameworks which. the August 1998 financial crash.4 That opportunity was missed in essence owing to the poor state of the Russian economy. Lastly. faced with impending double elections (parliamentary and presidential.1 The aim of this chapter is to examine the unique combination of opportunities and risks for Russia and its Western partners in the Nordic— Baltic area. both launched at the beginning of the 1990s. since joining the EU in 1995. are evaluated.2 Russia is an active member of the Baltic Sea Cooperation Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Initiative. actually work and perform useful functions. It then looks into the potential crisis that a new wave of NATO enlargement could cause. The initiative.
At the December 1999 EU summit in Helsinki. Karelia has developed useful skills in exploiting Finnish interest in launching joint projects. Many EU-supported cross-border projects have been launched involving Russian participants mostly on regional and local levels. the Chechen issue very clearly hijacked the agenda and devalued the offer. for productive cross-border contacts. without provoking any ‘unhealthy’ nationalistic movements on either side of the border. booming drug trafficking and an AIDS epidemic).7 Significantly. which will continue to require priority in political attention and resource distribution. first of all at the expense of Russia. but appeared slow and inattentive. while sinking into the mire of urban decay and social fragmentation (much aggravated by pervasive crime. the EU-centred cooperative agenda in the Nordic— Baltic region could be significantly reduced and narrowed down. and for external aid focused on the most urgent societal problems. which was supposed to make a big engagement offer to Russia. for most EU
. Kaliningrad.94 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Prime Minister Lipponen in September 1997 in order to prepare the ground for launching it as a major EU programme during the Finnish presidency in the second half of 1999. Russian economic relations with the three Baltic states had shown stability and growth throughout the 1990s.9 The region that has best been able to use these new opportunities during the past few years has been the Novgorod oblast. where reform-oriented leadership has succeeded in creating an investor-friendly climate. scientific and cultural potential.11 At the same time. Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts. Nevertheless. That issue effected a whole range of cooperative projects involving Russia.6 Russia was presented with ample opportunities to participate in designing and focusing specific projects within this framework.10 St Petersburg. despite occasional political rows and scandals (such as with Latvia in spring 1998). which had a very promising start in the early 1990s with the Barents Initiative. we can take it for granted that north-western Russia has the best opportunities for direct foreign investment (and not just ‘adventure capital’ flocking to Moscow). is consistently seeking international aid to struggle with its ills and hoping to find new prospects by opening up towards its Baltic neighbours. Another issue that objectively limits the scale of the whole Northern Dimension in the EU’s activities is Kosovo. with its huge industrial. resources and dynamism than all the other institutional frameworks combined. Promising as it is.8 Without going into too much detail on economic interactions (addressed in Chapter 10 by Ingmar Oldberg). have found themselves on the far fringe of the Northern Dimension and are struggling to attract more attention. by the end of the 1990s the increased activity of the EU in the Nordic—Baltic region had made it the major actor there with much more influence. aspires to become a natural capital of the Europeanized north-western Russia as well as one of the focal points of the Northern Dimension.
but the character of post-Kosovo contacts between the Russian military and NATO could be perhaps described as controlled hostility.16 While Russia did play a constructive role in finding a political way out of that war (some would say saving NATO from a suicidal failure) and has duly participated in KFOR (the NATO Kosovo Force).OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 95
members the need to stabilize the Balkans is more serious than the need to engage north-western Russia. and the Russian regions might find themselves neglected and pushed out of the most dynamic frameworks. these structures of cooperation failed to produce a common understanding over the escalating crisis in Kosovo and then all but collapsed when NATO resorted to a massive use of air power against Yugoslavia. which corresponds to the détente
.15 Indeed.18 Certainly. and neither side perceived the Permanent Joint Council as a body capable of developing a mature partnership on a new level. but the most significant threat is seen in the fact that the entry of three former Warsaw Pact states into the Atlantic Alliance inevitably opens the prospect of its further expansion to include the three former Soviet Baltic republics. now see no need to produce a list of reasons or any elaborate argument. For Moscow. WHO NEEDS ANOTHER NATO ENLARGEMENT CRISIS? In the emotional. who were so sophisticated in the first round of the NATO debates.14 The resolution of the crisis in NATO-Russia relations in May 1997 through the Founding Act (a pompous but not legally binding document) was not satisfactory.12 That may result in a shift in focus of the Northern Dimension towards helping the Baltic states to prepare to join the EU. the issue of the ‘Atlanticization’ of the three Baltic states was never far from the surface. these documents should not be interpreted as guidelines.13 For the solid majority of the Russian political elite this prospect is simply unacceptable. disruptive and essentially counterproductive debates between NATO and Russia on the prospects of enlargement in 1993–97. a possibility that first emerged as a ‘clear and present danger’ against the background of the Kosovo war. The key national security documents approved in early 2000 clearly imply the possibility of a military confrontation with the Alliance (without directly defining it as the enemy. Hungary’s or the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO is of little geopolitical importance. as the drafts did).17 The normalization of relations with NATO initiated by Putin even before he was elected president does not amount to overcoming the rift and restarting the partnership. perhaps towards 2010. Poland certainly has more direct impact. mainstream commentators and media pundits. the Kosovo crisis made a huge difference in NATO-Russian relations and will continue to generate mistrust and a sense of threat for years to come.
As far as the Baltic ‘theatre’ is concerned.20 This concentration of attention and resources on the southern flank objectively works against enlarging NATO in the Baltic area (Slovenia has become the most useful candidate). In the USA. which on the Russian side is irreversible. Russia. relies on Republican experts who argue for consolidating rather than expanding the Alliance and limiting US security commitments. who is generally less interested in European affairs. the drive for expanding the Alliance further is all but non-existent.19 Fresh efforts undertaken by the UK. Vilnius (most active in the Atlantic networks).21 Another party that might be interested in a new NATO enlargement crisis is. short-lived) on the political level. In this situation. which more or less unilaterally determined the dynamics and the scale of the first wave of enlargement. that at the beginning of his presidency. President George W. but the reality of a fundamental conflict is essentially taken for granted by the majority of the Russian political elite. This might generate a need for a new cause for political mobilization (particularly as public support for the Chechen war declines). including Kaliningrad.Bush. Putin has demonstrated a clear intention of avoiding such
. the perceptions might be different and more varied. and the concerns about isolating and alienating Russia are widespread. and cooperation with Russia is an important element of both. The remarkable internal cohesion achieved around Vladimir Putin’s rise to power may prove to be short-lived as he starts to implement policies challenging the interests of ‘oligarchs’ and regional leaders.96 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
(quite possibly. paradoxical as it may seem. Hungary and the Czech Republic. NATO has to give top priority to sustaining its operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. On the NATO side. They may become particularly interested in speeding up their ‘Atlanticization’ if the EU enlargement proves to be a slow-moving process with their possible accession dates beyond 2010. the problem is that the 1990s saw a massive demilitarization. France and Germany to create an independent European military capability for dealing with local conflicts are also focused on the Balkans. and a new confrontation with NATO could be useful in this respect. could initiate this process by advancing ‘moral responsibility’ arguments and trying to make Germany the champion of their cause. Although none of the major Euro-Atlantic players is interested in a new phase of NATO enlargement in the Baltic direction. Riga and Tallinn would hardly find the Baltic Charter sufficiently reassuring and would most likely instrumentalize the ‘Russian threat’ (by playing up the Chechen war) in order to attract more attention in NATO headquarters. following the example of Poland. it still might happen. leaving Moscow with many strategic weaknesses and vulnerabilities. however. The three Baltic states. Arms control is again (very much like in the Brezhnev era) being instrumentalized for reducing the risk of a major confrontation. It should be noted.
Indeed. Besides. implicitly complicates Russia’s European positions. He has shown skill in strategic horse-trading with the USA but until 11 September could not find many assets for bargaining in the Nordic—Baltic region. perhaps not a showcase of European civilization but still certainly a part of Mitteleuropa. his understanding of ‘big politics’ was probably closer to hard bargaining on the top level than to partnership based on personal understanding and trust.OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 97
confrontation. Therefore. which is widely perceived in the West (including Poland and the Baltic States) as an authoritarian and inherently unstable outcast. A MAN FROM ST PETERSBURG Several features of Putin’s personal style of leadership and his initial political agenda have direct relevance for Russia’s short-term prospects in the Nordic—Baltic area. loyalty and relative incorruptibility. While even the most general contours of his economic policies have so far remained unclear. Putin is essentially a man from St Petersburg. it is obvious that Vladimir Putin. who might be inclined to give relations with north-western Europe more of his personal attention. First of all. failing to recognize the new supranational quality achieved in the course of European integration and finding it difficult to relate to the EU as the major player in the area. nor does he cherish any of the vague Eurasian ideas that Evgenii Primakov held so dear. it comes as no surprise to find a ‘natural’ European orientation in the new Russian leader. on inter-state relations. he is a product of the KGB bureaucracy with all its advantages of professionalism. The hidden problem here is that the liberal market-oriented prescriptions do not sit well with Putin’s
. by extension. the determination to cut down on external borrowing and the intention to change the investment climate from a ‘criminal and risky’ into a ‘friendly and safe’ one have been declared unequivocally. One message that Putin has been trying to get across in his initial European forays is an invitation to invest. and disadvantages such as lack of flexibility and imagination. he was only too glad to seize on the opportunities provided by 11 September 2001 both to deflect the criticism of Russia’s war in Chechnya and even more to reconcile the relations with the USA and NATO. in essence.22 This argument should not be interpreted as an attempt to portray Putin as a Europeanist or a westernizer because. He is very much focused on the role of the state and. At first it seemed that he was less interested in befriending European leaders than Yeltsin was. very much unlike previous Russian and Soviet leaders. each new step in advancing the political and military union with Belarus. does not have strong personal connections to and feelings for the Russian deep periphery (glubinka). his formative experience was acquired in East Germany. which is the most Europe-oriented urban centre in Russia.
the ongoing reductions in Russia’s strategic arsenal do not reduce nuclear risks and may even aggravate them as retired submarines are left to rust with their reactors unprotected and as nuclear warheads are disabled without proper treatment of radioactive materials.24 There is. social/ecological and other non-state-level interactions (often described as the ‘soft security’ field). which has reached the level on which armed confrontation is practically impossible. which allowed cooperation to make an unimpeded start but left the nuclear problem unattended. runs against Putin’s political master plan. The military dimension was deliberately left out of the Barents Initiative. However. International attempts to assess the scale of this nuclear disaster revealed such a horrific picture that the Russian authorities.26 In fact. for instance. in Kaliningrad. with strong preferences for all sorts of ‘power instruments’. communications/information. the new Russian president welcomes every opportunity to raise St Petersburg’s European profile (despite personal tensions with Governor Vladimir Iakovlev) and praises the achievements of Novgorod’s reform-oriented Governor Mikhail Prusak. opted for suppressing the activities of environmentalists.23 President Yeltsin’s confidencebuilding initiatives presented in Stockholm in December 1997 and the resolution of the CFE ‘flank issue’ at the December 1999 Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have essentially covered a high-profile arms control agenda.27
. one crucial exception to this picture of disarmament: the massive concentration of nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula. however. while Putin is very much a ‘hard security’ man. His obsession with central control precludes establishment of any ‘free economic zones’ (on the Chinese model). being unable to reduce the risks.25 Military-to-military contacts in the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme have been on a very limited scale and could not make much impact either on the force readiness or on the mindsets of officers. And that brings us to the most serious security risks in the region. Defying Moscow’s gravitational pull.98 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
vision of a strong state modelled on such a vertically integrated structure as the KGB. built into the EU’s Northern Dimension programme. the emphasis on intra-regional and cross-border cooperation. ‘THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE’ UP NORTH One fundamental achievement of the 1990s in the Nordic—Baltic region was demilitarization. from secret services to nuclear submarines. Russia in the midterm perspective could not rebuild a military potential sufficient even for occupying the three Baltic states. the contradiction is that the most promising prospects in the Nordic—Baltic area are in the economic. Generally.
1906 and 1921). Russia’s strengthened political reliance on the nuclear status does not translate into a noticeable flow of funds to the naval strategic systems. which were all old and due to be scrapped. particularly since the Russian nuclear forces have no funds to modernize the old launch-upon-warning system (now partly blind and deaf due to poor radar coverage and the decline of the satellite fleet) with its many technically outdated control mechanisms. or even catastrophic ones when nuclear assets are involved. This depressing atmosphere in the combat units increases the probability of nuclear-related accidents. which could lead to their aggravation. besides the ‘heroic’ pages on the role of the Baltic Fleet in the revolutions of 1917. President Putin might have a personal interest in building up a ‘proud’ Russian navy (as reflected in his Navy Day speech in July 2000 and several statements after the Kursk disaster). as quite possibly was the case with the Kursk. is in principle the most vulnerable element of the armed forces. which were particularly badly maintained. undermanned and chronically depressed fleet. and under-resourcing significantly increases the risks of technological accidents which (as the Kursk tragedy has reminded us) could easily acquire disastrous proportions. Most of the nuclear weapons and reactors belong to the Northern Fleet. Pamyat’ Azova in 1906). with its sophisticated weapon systems. which throughout the 1990s was seriously underfinanced and was unable to provide proper maintenance.
.32 Remarkably. it may be worth while to recall the history of mutinies in the Russian navy in the early twentieth century.OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 99
One aspect of the nuclear problem in the Kola Peninsula is technical and financial. Examples of inadequate reaction in tense situations and irrational behaviour in the barracks are plentiful and the statistics of suicides are more than just worrisome. and in naval bases (Sveaborg in 1906 and Kronshtadt in 1905. Moscow requires only a few strategic submarines in order to be able to perform.31 Low morale and poor training of crews also increase the probability of violations of safety regulations and mistakes in handling minor technical accidents.28 The navy. Underfinancing and the cumulative lack of skilled personnel and shortage of drafted sailors (while the army annually receives with the draft only onehalf the number of recruits they need. This history includes mutinies on battleships (Potemkin and Ochakov.29 and the navy is inevitably suffering from further deprioritization. both in 1905.30 but his promises to give more attention to naval problems and allocate more funds to their solution would most probably amount only to polishing the decks of several flagships and would have no impact on the increasing probability of technological catastrophes. the navy receives even less) are eroding discipline and morale in the navy. in all these cases it was bad food. Given this picture of a rusting. The second Chechen war is consuming a very large portion of the armed forces’ depleted resources. Another aspect of the nuclear problem is related to the human factor.
narrowing Russia’s ‘window to Europe’ to a mere peep-hole.
. the Russian leadership is certainly paying insufficient attention to the challenges presented by deteriorating infrastructure and rusting military hardware and remains reluctant to develop international cooperation aimed at reducing the nuclear risks. But what makes the risks of naval mutinies so much more dangerous today is the fact that nuclear facilities and weapons would inevitably become involved. but the present situation in the Russian navy is coming alarmingly close to the explosive days of 1905 and 1906.100 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
poor conditions and officers’ attempts to enforce discipline rather than any revolutionary propaganda that were the main driving force behind the violent uprisings. Such planning could benefit from the history of the British operation in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk in 1918–19. The fallout from the second Chechen war continues to reduce the scale and dynamism of many cooperative projects. President Putin does not seem particularly keen to grasp the opportunities. At the same time. NATO has to give serious consideration to scenarios where a limited military intervention might become necessary in order to secure certain nuclear assets.33 on the other hand. which involve mostly regional and local interactions supported and coordinated by the EU.34 CONCLUSIONS The north-western direction where Russia has an interface with the Nordic —Baltic region presents a unique combination of opportunities and challenges. It is in the north-west that Russia has its greatest opportunities to confirm and reinforce its European identity. One important factor that is lacking is a humiliating naval defeat such as that suffered in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05. Taking into consideration the obvious lack of combat-capable and sufficiently reliable Russian units in the Leningrad military district and the very difficult access to many naval facilities from the land. The military authorities faced serious difficulties in suppressing those uprisings owing to widespread sympathy for the rebels among the rank and file as well as among the civilian population onshore. Reflections on this history do not necessarily lead to predictions of mutinies in Gremikha or Gadzhievo. but it also remains perfectly capable of cutting itself off and continuing to slide down in what looks like a spiral of self-destruction. which would guarantee a resonance far greater than that of Potemkin. the marines of the Northern Fleet have been involved in some of the bloodiest combat operations of the Chechen wars.
‘Republic of Karelia: A Double Asymmetry or North-Eastern Dimensionalism’. paper presented at the 5th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). 6. p. which dumps about 1 million cubic metres of untreated sewage into the Gulf of Finland. Report for the Northern Dimension Programme (Helsinki. 5 November 1997. 1998).spb. Report G78. 17.). Report of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. in 1999 over 750. 1994).) Subregional Cooperation in and around the CIS Space (New York. 2000. 10. 28 October 1997.). International Herald Tribune. 13. The Barents Region Revisited. November 1997. pp. March 1998. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers. 3. Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region (London. The Foreign Relations of Russia’s Western Regions’. Several research projects in Moscow at that time explored the opportunities in this direction.ru). 4. See the St Petersburg Committee of External Relations website (www. Overcoming Unfriendly Stability: Russian—Latvian Relations at the End of the 1990s. I had an opportunity to participate in the inaugural conference The Northern Dimension of the CFSP’.kvs. 7. See Oleg Reut. See Geir Flikke (ed. 9. 1999). Report of the Carnegie Moscow Center. See Dmitri Trenin. 1999. Arkady Moshes.). contains several chapters focused on related problems. Conflict Studies Research Centre. a number almost equal to the size of the entire population of that republic. Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe (London. 13–15 April 2000. The EU’s Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad. Lyndelle Fairlie. The Heart of Plague’. ‘Kaliningrad: Problems and Perspectives’. Chapters by Pertti Joenniemi and Carl-Einar Stalvant in Andrew Cottey (ed. New York. provide a good overview. 5. no. 7–8 November 1997. The World Today. 8. On the beginning of the Barents cooperation. 2. The Kursk tragedy in August 2000 drew much international attention to the prolonged decay of the Northern Fleet and to the risks generated by the neglect of this process. in Pertti Joenniemi (ed. Sandhurst. See Jakob Hedenskog. This institute produced a useful series of papers and monographs in 1998 and 1999. Nezavisimaia gazeta. See Michael Specter. 78–9. See Ingmar Oldberg. see Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (eds).000 people crossed the Russian-Finnish border at the 17 border points in Karelia. 1999). For instance. organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (UPI) in Helsinki.
. The Baltic Chance. Rossiia i Pribaltika.OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 101
1. The Barents Region (London. Conference Proceedings (Oslo. 1999). An example of external aid is Finland’s investment in the modernization of St Petersburg’s sewage system. in the same series by the EastWest Institute. Another example is international assistance in the struggle against the AIDS epidemic in Kaliningrad. I have argued about the chances for a breakthrough in ‘Bear hug for the Baltic’. 2000). Renata Dwan (ed.
20. The presentation of Vladimir Baranovskii at the conference The New World Order: Russian between East and West’. ‘Russia’s Northwestern Strategic Direction’. Rossiia. in A. See RFE/RL Newsline. 15. 18. NATO i novaia arkhitektura bezopasnosti v Evrope (Nizhnyi Novgorod. no. no. 9–12.A. pp. held in Brussels on 29–30 March 2000.). NATO Transformed (Washington. pp. See Peter van Ham.S. Johnson’s Russia List. Survival. pp. particularly pp. ‘Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship’. 23. Jane’s Intelligence Review. 16. no. 1. I have argued this in ‘Boris Woos the Baltics. The NATO-Russia Founding Act: Trojan Horse or Milestone of Reconciliation?’. See A. 1.4 billion. see ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. The new Military Doctrine was approved by a presidential decree on 21 April 2000. and its draft was approved by the Security Council on 5 October 1999. Between Autonomy and Central Government: St Petersburg and Its Relations to the Federal Powers. 4.Makarychev (ed. The National Security Concept was approved by a presidential decree on 10 January 2000. 19. 28 April– 11 May 2000. FOA Report (Stockholm. Report of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council. A more recent example is Rossiia i Pribaltika II. 138–9 and 164–6. 13. Only the Quick Start Package was evaluated.. Survival. 1998). no. offered to the Russians. 145–64. 3 May 2000. might indeed bring to an end the thorny debate over NATO’s extension and with it a final conclusion of the Cold War. 22. See Roland Dannreuther. Kosovo: International Aspects of the Crisis (Moscow. but Are the Russians for Real?’. 1997. June 2000. 2000. 1998). 215–28. which ‘by implication will be an attack on NATO’. was convincing in this respect. 17. A good example is the strong statement about the possibility of a Russian military attack against the Baltic States. See Dmitri Trenin and Ekaterina Stepanova (eds). DC. 21. For an acute analysis see Karl-Heinz Kemp. see Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick. I have speculated on Putin’s political style in ‘Putin’s Honeymoon Coming to the End’. 1999. though still as secondary citizens in the wake of 11 September 2001. For a solid analysis see Jacob W. ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States’. see ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. 315–34. July–August 1999. by Latvian President Vike-Freiberga on 30 April 2000. 15. pp. Security Dialogue. 12. ‘Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russia Relations’.102 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
11. 121–42. 14–20 January 2000. 3–5 April 2000. Winter 1999/2000. March 1998. See the interview with Bodo Hombach in European Security: OSCE Review. 52–65. 14. 4114. For an earlier analysis. Summer 1996. 24. See Jakob Hedenskog. One has to see whether the new partnership in NATO. Military Review.Sergunin. Kipp. 1999). pp. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. See David Yost. 17 February 2000. Tel Aviv University. pp. Aussenpolitik. 1999). at 2. ibid. ‘Russian Debates on NATO Enlargement’. A good estimate of the scale of the resources necessary for implementing the Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe has emerged from the Regional Funding Conference.
27. Aleksandr Nikitin was arrested by the FSB (Federal Security Service) on espionage charges soon after the release of this report and acquitted by Russia’s Supreme Court only in April 2000. 187–200. CT. The Barents Region (London. International Herald Tribune. ‘Costs of the Chechen War’. Igor Kudrik and Aleksandr Nikitin for a project conducted by the Bellona Foundation. 28 August 2000. 22 August 2000. While the efficient help from Norway and the UK in the Kursk rescue operation could help to reduce prejudices against NATO. 14–19. 1988). PONARS Memo no. 1996). See Mikhail Hodarenok. The Kursk disaster was in fact directly compared to the catastrophic defeat of the Russian navy at Tsushima in 1905. See Aleksandr Gol’ts. The Barents Region as a European Security-building Concept’. On that topic. Nezavisimaia gazeta. see Deborah Y. 33. The report The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination (1996). 32. A reliable English-language source is Evan Mawdsley. pp.’ Itogi. ‘Humiliation in Russia: A Force for Renewal or Collapse?’. arrested by the FSB in October 1999. See Benjamin D. remains the most informative source on this problem. 1978). no. The Security of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal: The Human Factor’. 31. ‘Samaia strashnaia katastrofa Otechestvennogo Flota’. Adam Ulam’s Russia’s Failed Revolutions (New York. prepared by Tomas Nielsen. 1994). See Ingmar Oldberg (ed. Jane’s Intelligence Review. The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet (London. 28. 28 August 2000. pp.Rhodes. 35. The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia. 26.OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORDIC—BALTIC REGION 103
25. See William Pfaff.). 92. January 2000. see Mark Galeotti. ‘Kuda zh nam plyt’.
. 29.Ball. 34. 1918–1919 (Westport. See Anders Kjølberg. 30. October 1999. Harvard University. Conference Proceedings (Stockholm. One new target for accusations of nuclear-related espionage is Igor Sutiagin. the fact of close monitoring by British and American submarines of the Northern Fleet exercises reflects Cold War stereotypes. 1981) remains the standard reference. The Russian Navy Facing the 21st Century. in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (eds). a researcher from ISKAN (USA and Canada Institute). For a competent estimate.
as it were. and these states turned westwards instead.10 Northern Europe: A New Web of Relations1
Historically. This chapter examines briefly whether Russia’s relations with the countries of this region are developing towards conflict or cooperation. which became observers in the Nordic Council. When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991. Following Swedish reports throughout the 1980s about submarine incursions. but there was also much trade and friendly exchange. As will be seen. All these countries except Iceland are also situated on the Baltic Sea. the region was enlarged by the three Baltic states of Estonia. the strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula grew as a result of the START agreements with the USA concerning the reduction of land-based nuclear forces. it was in the north that Russia and (western) Europe met most directly. These states together form the Nordic Council. MILITARY-STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND NATO ENLARGEMENT It can be claimed that the military-strategic importance of the Baltic Sea region to Russia increased as Russia lost its positions in central Europe. Compared with other regions. which placed the blame on Russia. The strongest Russian fleet with most nuclear submarines and other strategic assets were based in the Kola region and it became vital to secure these for deterrence. and the NATO states Norway.2 This was also the case after the Second World War. Many wars were fought there and competition over the command of the Baltic Sea was fierce. Poland and Ukraine around 1990. Latvia and Lithuania.4 Despite or because of these strategic interests. these priorities are closely interrelated. The West crept closer. political and economic priorities as they have evolved in the 1990s. Northern Europe traditionally includes the five Nordic states: non-allied Finland and Sweden. the Soviet Union considered this a relatively quiet one.3 This task is approached by analysing the Russian military-strategic. Moreover. Denmark and Iceland. Russia agreed to a joint investigation and
. Russia in the early 1990s gave priority to détente and disarmament in the Nordic region.
in 1991.5 When. Russia applied all kinds of pressure on the Baltic states—from military threats to economic sanctions (see below)—but this served only to reinforce the Baltic states in their resolve to join NATO. if Lithuania were to follow Poland into NATO. As alternative solutions. The possibility of NATO bases in the Baltics. The neutrality policies of Sweden and Finland were praised and held up as models for the Baltic states. which met opposition in northern Europe. The north-western flank of Russia was officially declared to be the most secure.7 To this end. Thus Yeltsin used his first official visit to Sweden in 1997 to launch the idea of the 40 per cent troop reduction. When NATO decided to enlarge and the Baltic states applied to join. In 1997. Russia agreed instead to sign a cooperation agreement without security commitments. It further proposed a regional zone of stability and confidence. these Russian steps towards retreat and conciliation were accompanied by more assertive ones. and this was accomplished in 1998.6 It should be noted. was dusted off. Furthermore.8 A prominent Russian ex-diplomat thought that such a system could be based on Gotland or the Åland Islands. Kaliningrad would be surrounded by NATO states.9 These ideas were actively propagated by Russian officials in the Nordic states. President Yeltsin announced a unilateral initiative to reduce troops in north-west Russia by 40 per cent. a process that was completed (with minor exceptions) in August 1994. these alternative proposals were rebuffed not only by the Baltic States but by the Nordic states as well: a response that the
. however. Russia started to participate in NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea together with the Baltic and Nordic states.NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 105
could relish later reports to the effect that many incidents could have been either mistaken or caused by NATO. from where Russia had recently withdrawn. or even double guarantees together with NATO. now stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Russia was willing to accept the Baltic states’ joining the EU instead of NATO. hindering this development became the most important Russian objective in this region.10 In the face of the growing NATO presence Russia was little concerned with Swedish and Finnish military aid to the Baltic States. Moreover. which would include the Baltic states. and the old Soviet idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Russia recognized the Baltic states and gradually pulled out its troops.11 However. Finland abrogated the friendship and mutual assistance treaty of 1948 with the Soviet Union. that this Russian disarmament was carried out not only for friendship’s sake but also for financial reasons and that some forces were more needed in the south for the Chechen war. Sweden and Finland. Russia offered unilateral security guarantees and several confidence-building measures to the Baltic states. Another idea was a joint air surveillance system for all Baltic littoral states. and the exchange of military visits with the Nordic states was intensified. was seen as a major threat to the Russian heartland.
which probably makes enlargement in the quiet Baltic region less urgent. Thus. Russia perceives new threats.106 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
disappointed Russians attributed to NATO pressure. which is seen as being directed against Russia in the context of US plans to build an anti-ballistic missile defence system in violation of the 1972 treaty. Russia appreciated the restrictions they had imposed on NATO bases and exercises during the Cold War. whereas Russia adopted the opposite position.14 Concerning the NATO members Norway and Denmark.15 Norway was reprimanded for permitting NATO exercises with NATO units further north than before. the worst irritant is the construction of a large space radar station at Vardö. giving priority to territorial integrity over human rights. Russia also criticized signs that Sweden and Finland were diverging from their policy of neutrality. for example when right-wing political parties and individuals advocated NATO membership. even if the security situation in the north remains stable compared with other regions. Russia was also concerned about the demilitarized status of Spitzbergen and engaged in spying activities in Norway. which now could be used as a model for Poland. Russia was displeased by Finland’s purchase from the USA of 64 F-18s for its air force in the mid-1990s. there were no territorial claims from Norway. NATO’s enlargement and new missions as well as Russia’s war in Chechnya have clearly impaired its relations with its Nordic neighbours. but the question of the delimitation of the economic zone in the Barents Sea and around Spitzbergen remained
. POLITICAL INTERESTS Russia’s interest in military security on its north-western flank was closely linked to its political interests and ambitions. First was the need to gain recognition for its borders in the region.17 NATO’s Kosovo operation and Russia’s second war in Chechnya in 1999 separated the Nordic and Baltic states from Russia even more. The good news for Russia in the current situation is that NATO is preoccupied in the unruly Balkans.16 Currently.12 Sweden was repeatedly accused of spying on Russia. These states supported NATO’s military efforts to stop Serb repression and condemned the Russian methods of suppressing the Chechen separatists. But Denmark was upbraided for supporting Baltic membership in NATO and participating in the new NATO staff headquarters at the German-Polish border town of Szczecin. As before.13 Russia was gratified by Swedish willingness to have a bilateral naval exercise with Russia in 2000. especially with regard to the Baltic States. 60 kilometres from the Russian border. The good news for the Baltic states is that Russia is bogged down in the Caucasus. allegedly even acting on NATO’s orders. but was disappointed when it was postponed owing to the Chechen war.
human rights were being violated.19 More problems arose with the new Baltic states. Specifically. which was a primary objective for Russia. and it was ratified by the Lithuanian parliament in 1999. With regard to Lithuania.18 Nor did Finland present official claims to territory that it had lost during the Second World War.21 It was pointed out that hundreds of thousands of persons (290. a border treaty was signed with Russia. but duly appreciated the official Finnish view—so much so that a former diplomat suggested that Russia could lease Pechenga on the Arctic Sea to Finland. Estonia and Latvia did at first lay claims to Russian regions as they based their legitimacy on continuity with the states that had existed between the world wars and rejected Stalin’s occupation and border changes during the Second World War. the resolution of ethnic disputes was also a condition for NATO membership. Russia started to refuse to sign the border treaties as a means of keeping the states out of NATO. since they deterred Estonia and Latvia from liberalizing their citizenship and language laws and drew
. Moreover. the campaign against Latvia since 1999 could serve as a riposte to Western objections over Russian violations of human rights in Chechnya. 650. refusal to sign border agreements. and that the Russian language was being suppressed. even though there were small groups in Finland who raised this issue. Russia employed a wide variety of methods to support its compatriots in Estonia and Latvia: military threats. Concern for human rights in Estonia and Latvia was popular among Russian nationalists who dominated the Duma until late 1999. especially in Estonia and Latvia. and so forth. economic reprisals. which Stalin had transferred to Soviet Lithuania in 1945. Russia paid much attention to these voices. some nationalists there indeed wanted to incorporate Kaliningrad. especially when the Soviet Union disintegrated. In negotiations with Russia about border treaties.20 Another political goal for Russia was to support the Russian-speaking minorities in the new Baltic states.000 in Estonia. Instead.000 in Latvia in 1999) had not received citizenship and were therefore deprived of political and economic rights. but all consecutive governments renounced such claims against Russia. which would not admit states with unresolved border questions. Russian nationalists made claims to the Klaipeda region. some Russian officials realized that these methods were counterproductive. partly in order to keep Lithuania out of NATO and partly as a means of gaining freer transit to Kaliningrad. and it served to exert political pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments. according to the Russians.NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 107
disputed and unresolved despite improved relations. and the Duma (at least the one elected until 2000) refused to ratify the border treaty. Instead. However. But around 1996 they gave up these demands because they received no support in the West and their primary goal was to join NATO and the EU. In 1997. where.
thereby promoting Russia’s well-being and internal stability. Visa procedures were simplified and border crossings were opened with both the Nordic and Baltic neighbours. The five Nordic states. while Russia. on the other. the EU and not least the Nordic states to put pressure on the Baltics. including the Nordic states. The Nordic states have helped these Russians and promoted their integration more than Russia has.24 In sum. Political contacts improved on all levels. Thus Russia has also used the indirect method of making appeals to the UN. were seen as instrumental in this regard. Western and Nordic concern has probably been more instrumental in promoting liberalization of the Baltic laws than Russian pressure. In 1993. Russia and Lithuania agreed on visa-free travel for Kaliningraders and Lithuanians. wavering between pressure and great-power politics. Russian political ambitions in the Baltic—Nordic area have been rather ambiguous. Russian (and Baltic) towns developed relations with twins in the Nordic states. mainly with respect to the small Baltic nations. President Yeltsin for example paid official visits to Sweden and Norway. on the one hand. and the desire to be integrated and efforts to foster stability.23 A third Russian objective since 1991 has been to gain recognition as a democratic state and to participate in the integration processes in Europe. even though they had supported the Baltic states’ fight for independence. a fact that informed Russians are willing to admit. which lacks the financial resources either to take in the Baltic Russians or to support them in their states. especially Europe. which could pay world market prices for Russian products and sell high technology to Russia. and the royal families of these states made trips to Russia. in fact wants them to stay and be integrated there. Foreign trade was liberalized and most of it gradually shifted from CIS states towards western Europe. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. which had conducted a rather cautious and friendly policy towards the Soviet Union.108 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
criticism against Russia in the West. Russia co-founded the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) with its Nordic neighbours in order to encourage cross-border cooperation between the regions in the Far North.22 The Baltic Russians patently prefer to remain in their homes rather than to move to Russia. and the number of official visits multiplied. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE EU CONTEXT Russia’s transition from a militarized state to a market economy with a growing emphasis on economic development boosted its interest in trade with the West. as well as the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) including the three Baltic states. This is why the Council of Baltic Sea States has a special mandate for minority questions. Russia thus signed its own partnership agreement with the EU and did not oppose Sweden’s and
a major goal of which was to develop ties with Russia and to support the development of its democracy and market economy. which other states in the region could join later. less than Swedish trade with. According to the Russian researcher Alexander Sergounin.28 Russia also developed strong common interests with the non-EU member Norway (and OPEC. the volume of trade seldom reached the levels of Soviet times and was relatively small for the Nordic States. The Swedish government did not exclude the possibility of a Swedish-Russian free-trade zone. especially of manufactured goods. As for Finland. on Moscow. Leningrad and Kaliningrad have become more dependent on their western neighbours than. Norway and Sweden have proved willing to provide environmental aid and investments in north-western Russia. President Yeltsin suggested building a gas pipeline to Sweden and called for investment in Russia. which are vital for the Russian state budget balance—in opposition to other states led by the USA. Russia also had high expectations of Sweden’s presidency of the EU in 2001.30 Nonetheless. which want to lower the prices. the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) on maintaining high oil and gas prices. Russian exports to Sweden grew. This initiative received support from the EU and other European institutions and—concerning nuclear disarmament—the USA. Sweden was the sixth largest investor in Russia.26 When visiting Stockholm in 1997. the Russian oblasts of Murmansk. and the Russian share even in Finnish foreign trade was only about 6. for example. Thus it is naive to believe that Sweden. Russian trade made up less than 1 per cent of Swedish foreign trade. Norwegian and Icelandic trade with Russia was even less. Russia’s main trading partner in northern Europe. since they are directly affected by industrial pollution and risks of accidents in active or decommissioned nuclear submarines and surface ships in the Arctic Sea as well as in nuclear reactors on the Kola Peninsula and near St Petersburg. as did Swedish exports to Russia. ahead of. Danish. trade exchange in 1997 returned to the levels of the late 1980s after the intervening decline. Finland. Russian timber exports increased considerably. for example.
.29 The Russian Arctic fishing fleet also made profits from landing catches in Norway and Iceland. when Finland promoted the Northern Dimension programme. for example.NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 109
Finland’s joining the Union in 1995. France and Japan.25 In particular.5 per cent. Poland. and 40 per cent of Russian road transports went through Finland.27 The opening of an IKEA furniture store in Moscow earlier this year was given wide publicity. Karelia. A government newspaper thus asserted that Sweden’s membership in the EU had several caveats which enabled it to conduct an independent economic policy and to withstand anti-Russian sanctions. According to this paper. for example. It also argued that Sweden had problems in selling its products in the eurozone since it was not an EMU (European Monetary Union) member. Russia appreciated the Finnish EU chairmanship in the second half of 1999.
Thus. Russia has little money to spend on the environment. Russia’s relations with the EU and the Nordic states are burdened by many problems on both sides. With regard to fishing. Furthermore. restrictive and ever-changing legislation. and imposed EU environmental rules on Russian road freight. The industries processing these raw materials were left almost empty-handed and paid much less in taxes to the state. railways. while Western experts disliked the blackmail that Russia could go on polluting until it received aid. there were disputes with Norway and Iceland not only over economic zones but also over quotas and the size of net meshes. Western investment in Russia was hampered by Russia’s bad infrastructure. Consequently.31 Norway tended to follow OPEC in raising oil exports to curb prices. Besides. in December 1999. Nevertheless. Both states are bound to fall into line with the EU Schengen agreement on imposing stricter external border controls. Moreover. and promised more state control in the economy and federal control over the regions. on which Russia became so dependent. since 1999. which Russia has reciprocated. Russian economic interests there were naturally quite different. and nuclear waste disposal will probably never become commercial. at least from the August 1998 crisis. who had provided Norwegian environmentalists with information about the Northern Fleet. Russians officials could complain that most of the money is spent on expensive Western (Nordic) consultants. its contradictory. pipelines and ports. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin increased timber export tariffs threefold. environmental projects pay off only after a long time.110 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
would risk its position in the EU because of dependence on Russian trade. Turning now to the three small Baltic states. Indeed. political instability and recurrent economic crises. corruption and crime. Thus Finland has restricted visa exemptions for short-term Russian tourists. fish and timber. and the election of Putin as president may bring more stability and predictability. The ruble crash in August 1998 was a heavy blow to the banking system and led to a sharp reduction in Russian imports.33 Russian military interests also entail reluctance to grant access and provide data to Westerners. This may actually bring more Nordic (Western) trade and investments to Russia.34 Another problem was that Russian exports were dominated by raw materials—in the above cases. industrial production and trade with the West have recovered. Russia is painfully aware of the problems of remaining outside the expanding European market. even if other partners are still preferred. The Latvian port of Ventspils thus at times handled 20–30 per
. which led to protests in Karelia.32 Concerning environmental aid. which is not seen as the most urgent problem. Thanks to their roads. One symptom of this was the repeated espionage trials against the ex-naval officer Vladimir Nikitin. these states were particularly important for the transit of the growing Russian exports to the West.
Russia was also interested in maintaining its economic positions in the Baltic states. often resorted to politically motivated economic sanctions against them. Kaliningrad was compensated by being declared a special economic zone in 1996 with free import and export with its neighbours. with Sweden and Finland taking over the role of first partners. was that they undermined the principle of free trade and hurt Russian private companies and their Baltic Russian partners. which spelled crisis when the August 1998 ruble crash occurred. Russia has begun to point out problems and demand consultations. often in cooperation with local Russians. Finally. has so far not been granted mostfavoured-nation status and pays double customs dues. and its big business made investments in the rapidly developing Baltic market economies. Russian economic pressure also reinforced the desire of the Baltic countries to reorient their trade towards the West (to which in any case they wanted to belong). The problem with such sanctions.NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 111
cent of Russia’s total oil exports. The problem was that Kaliningrad became heavily dependent on imports of foodstuffs.36 In order to escape ‘exorbitant’ Baltic transit fees. partly because Russian business could thereby gain greater access to the EU market. it will be harder for Russia to apply economic pressure on them without antagonizing other Union members. and the West was forthcoming. And if the Baltic countries become members. as the Baltic membership negotiations are advancing.35 However. instead most of their trade was directed towards Germany and western EU states. Estonia. which is the fastest developing of these states. preferring a strong statement of protest instead. Estonian trade with Russia decreased from above 90 per cent of the total in 1991 to below 20 per cent in 1993. In Latvia and Lithuania. partly for military and political reasons. Russia was concerned about the Kaliningrad exclave and its transit across Lithuania. Customs and transport costs made goods from Russia proper about 50 per cent more expensive in that region. Russia. though the newly elected Duma in 2000 rejected this policy. Furthermore. particularly in the energy and raw material sectors. Russia has further decided to build new ports in the Gulf of Finland for oil. as noted above. gas and metal exports. Owing mainly to its citizenship policy. Russia has accepted EU membership for the Baltic states as an alternative to NATO membership. however. The construction of new ports both costs a lot of scarce investment money and takes a long time. But lately. imports from Russia accounted for only 10 and 20 per cent respectively in 1999 (data based on nine months). especially from Lithuania and Poland.37 As mentioned above. convinced of the Baltic states’ dependence on it. Russian criticism of Baltic border claims and ethnic discrimination also serves to complicate the states’ EU accession. The Duma decided to impose sanctions on Latvia on account of its discrimination against the Russians. Amazing results were achieved. since the zone was used as a loophole
however. This was duly noted in Russia. yet not qualifying for NATO
. even if the costs of the visas were later reduced after Russian protests.38 Lithuania. political and economic respects.39 The EU is engaged in technical assistance projects in the region. Russia’s relations with the Nordic states. which had formerly been fairly stable and quiet. In January 1998.112 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
for imports from the West to the rest of Russia. specifically the enforcement of the Schengen rules on stricter external border controls. authoritarianism and state control. However. The latter was especially the case with regard to the small Baltic states which had so recently been part of the Soviet Union. and new promising projects emerged. Russia still viewed the Baltic countries as belonging to its sphere of influence. Russia’s foreign policy in this direction (and others) was also dictated by its domestic scene and the priorities of the main actors on it. and Russian policy towards them was considered a litmus test of whether Russia was heading for cooperation. and will try to help Kaliningrad obtain special favours from the EU. the Baltic states’ efforts to join the West in the form of NATO and the EU were seen as legitimate and welcome. In the Nordic states. This problem is aggravated by the EU enlargement process. and Kaliningrad’s governor Leonid Gorbenko wanted to protect local producers. both because of their location. were thus strongly affected by developments in the Baltic states and the Nordic attitude to them. the customs freedom was undermined by quotas. Poland reintroduced visas for Kaliningrad so as to prepare for EU membership. its attitude to the EU and its eastern enlargement was positive. Russia’s interest in economic relations with northern Europe became more pronounced than before. CONCLUSIONS As the Baltic states became integrated with the Nordic states in the 1990s. outside the CIS. which resulted in price hikes. and Sweden vowed to address the problem when it took over the EU presidency.40 Thus. However. which. but it has declared that it will not impose restrictions before then. which tends to increase the isolation of the Kaliningrad exclave. as Poland did. close to the West and the Russian heartland. Russia’s relations with them were increasingly influenced by wider concerns. on which Kaliningrad is most dependent. interpreted this promise as a sign that Sweden is against isolating Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia. this interest was still crippled by systemic problems in Russia and military and political considerations. and because of their recent past as Soviet republics. will certainly also adapt to the Schengen rules when it becomes an EU member. while at the same time drawing closer to Europe in military. The Baltic states played an inordinate role for their size. democracy and market orientation or confrontation.
‘No Love Is Lost—Russia’s Relations with the Baltic States’. Baltic Security: Looking Towards the 21st Century (Riga. Russia and the United States in Northern European Security (Helsinki and Bonn. SU/3088 E/1. 20 April 2000. 2. For a similar approach. 2000). Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford. 28 November 1997. The joint investigation could not agree which country was behind the incursions. even if the latter received added weight. 6. The Baltic Sea Dimension in the Relations between Russia and Europe (Stockholm. 7. in Gunnar Artéus and Atis Lejins (eds). 34ff. p. In the 1990s. 8. 1997). Carnegie Moscow Center. in Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham (eds).L. Trenin. 16ff. 202 ff. 15 March 2000. ‘Novyi etap otnoshenii Moskvy i Khel’sinki’. A government paper recently claimed (erroneously) that Sweden is
. See Ingmar Oldberg. 3. pp. a decision that took effect in March 1999. 152 ff.NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 113
membership. in EU and Russia: The Northern Dimension. 1999). Iurii Deriabin. 1998). 1– 2 October 1999. DC. NOTES
1. pp. Russia Faces NATO Expansion (Oxford. 325ff. NATO decided to admit Poland in July 1997. Petr Cherniakov. 29. Petr Cherniakov. Dmitri Trenin. BBC Monitoring Service. The finalization of this chapter has profited from a research grant at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Washington. in April 2000. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 3. pp. FOA R 99– 01055–180–SE. ‘Security Cooperation in North-eastern Europe’. ‘Security Cooperation in North-eastern Europe: A Russian Perspective’. 4. Russia and Europe.). ‘In Search of a New Strategy in the Baltic/ Nordic Area’. ‘Russia and its Western Neighbours in the Context of NATO Enlargement’. pp.). 10. Summary of World Broadcasts: Former Soviet Union (hereafter SWB). in Ingmar Oldberg (ed.). in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed. 9. pp. ‘Shvedy gonialis’ ne za temi podlodkami’. ‘Mery doveriia na Severe Evropy’. 16ff. pp. p. Arkady Moshes. 5. see Lena Jonson. 1999).Black. Russia continued to show a penchant for exerting pressure wherever it perceived signs of weakness and for making links between military and political issues —policies that were rather counterproductive and detrimental to Russia’s own best interests in the region. J. ‘Russian Policy in Northern Europe’. 2000). Nezavisimaia gazeta. in Baranovsky (ed. Ingmar Oldberg. See also Alexander A. Russian military and political interests prevailed over economic concerns. Conference Proceedings. It remains to be seen whether President Putin will rely more on his past as a security agent or on his economic experience from St Petersburg when it comes to developing the future policy towards the Nordic/Baltic area. At a Loss: Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s (Stockholm. Sergounin.
114 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
24. 25. 26. 27.
permanently neutral and opposes NATO eastern enlargement: Aleksei Chichkin, ‘Shvedskii biznes “v politiku” ne igraet’, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 15 April 2000. Pik Paip and Viktor Sokolov, ‘Pribalty otkazali Rossii’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 November 1997. Jan-Anders Ekström, ‘Jeltsin Avvisar Finländskt Medlemskap’, Svenska Dagbladet, 17 March 1997; Cherniakov, ‘Novyi etap otnoshenii Moskvy i Khel’sinki’. Sergei Gorlenko, ‘Chto ishchut shvedy v Iantarnom Kraiu?, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 March 2000. Vladimir Ermolin, ‘Odinochnoe plavanie Baltflota’, Izvestya, 5 April 2000. As a kind of compensation, Sweden invited the Russian navy to a ceremony over a Soviet submarine which had sunk in Swedish waters during the war, and Russia gratefully accepted (Itar-Tass, 22 May 2000). Marat Zubko, ‘Datsko-norvezhskaia model’ dlia novykh chlenov NATO?’ Izvestya, 27 February 1997; ‘Rossiia-Daniia’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 2, 1999, p. 35. ‘Rossiia-Norvegiia’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 4, 1999, p. 34; Centre for Russian Studies Database, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, www.nupi.no/cgiwin/Russland, ‘Norway Fears Russia, Sweden Does Not’, 12 July 1995, ‘Norway Expels Russian Diplomats’, 12 March 1998. Anatolii Diakov and Teodor Postol, ‘Protivoraketnyi front na Severe Norvegii’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 7, 25 February–2 March 2000; Moscow Times, 20 March 2000. Andrei Farutin, ‘Chto nam delat’ so Shpitsbergenom?’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 November 1998. Vladimir Fedorov, ‘Karel’skii sindrom’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 30 May 1996; Cherniakov, ‘Novyi etap otnoshenii Moskvy i Khel’sinki’; Sergounin, ‘In Search of a New Strategy in the Baltic/Nordic Area’, pp. 343ff. Oldberg, ‘Russia and its Western Neighbours in the Context of NATO Enlargement’, pp. 38, 41ff. Since the Nordic states have no Russian minorities, the Russian press has instead accused Norway of oppressing its Saami population. Petr Cherniakov, ‘Oslo ugnetaet Saamov’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 March 2000. For a Swedish reaction, see Elisabeth Crona, ‘Lindh kritiserar Ryssland’, Dagens Nyheter, 18 May 2000. Oldberg, ‘No Love Is Lost’, 158 ff; Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike, ‘Rossiia i Pribaltika-II’, Nezavisimaia gazeta—Stsenarii, no. 9, 13 October 1999; Dmitri Trenin, Baltic Chance (Moscow, 1997). Moshes, The Baltic Sea Dimension in the Relations between Russia and Europe, pp. 11ff. Ibid., p. 6; Stefan Lundberg, ‘Ryssar får Finland att Blomma’, Dagens Nyheter, 9 June 1998. Cherniakov, ‘Novyi etap otnoshenii Moskvy i Khel’sinki’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 April 2000. Aleksei Baliev, ‘Briussel’ Stokgol’mu ne ukaz’, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1 April 2000; Chichkin, ‘Shvedskii biznes ‘v politiku’ ne igraet’, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 15 April 2000.
NORTHERN EUROPE: A NEW WEB OF RELATIONS 115
28. Elena Vansovich and Evgenii Leonov, ‘Otsel’ grozit’ my budem shvedu’, Kommersant, 17 March 2000. 29. Petr Cherniakov, ‘Norvegiia posleduet resheniiu OPEC’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 March 2000; I.I.Rodionov and S.Z.Zhiznin, “‘Gazovye’ prioritety rossiiskoi diplomatii’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 2, 2000, p. 63. 30. Alexander Sergounin, The Process of Regionalization and the Future of the Russian Federation, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper, no. 9, pp. 9, 15 ff. See also www.bellona.no and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Barents Region Cooperation and Visions for the Future (Odin: Utenriksdepartementet, UD) at www.odin.dep.no/ud/publ/1999/barents (accessed 11 November 1999). 31. Farutin, ‘Chto nam delat’ so Shpitsbergenom?’ 32. Cherniakov, ‘Norvegiia posleduet resheniiu OPEC’. 33. For analyses of these problems, see Geir Flikke (ed.), The Barents Region Revisited (Oslo, 1999); see also special issue of Nordisk Östforum (Oslo), no. 1, 2000. For one example, see Centre for Russian Studies Database Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, ‘Primakov meets with his Finnish counterpart’, 21 February 1999 (www.Nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/ krono.exe/3968). 34. For several articles, see Bellona Foundation, Russia, at www.bellona.no/e/ russia (accessed 8 September 1999); and Steven Sawhill, ‘Cleaning Up the Arctic’s Cold War Legacy: Nuclear Waste and Arctic Military Environment Cooperation’, Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Studies, no. 1, 2000. 35. Moshes, The Baltic Sea Dimension in the Relations between Russia and Europe, p. 9ff; Oldberg, ‘No Love Is Lost’, pp. 166ff. 36. BBC Monitoring Service, SWB, SU/3808 B/8, 6 April 2000. 37. Oldberg, ‘No Love Is Lost’, pp. 168ff; Michael Wyzan, The Baltic States: Still Recovering from the Russian Crisis (Stockholm, 1999), p. 11. 38. Ingmar Oldberg, The Kaliningrad Region—a Troublesome Exclave’, in Daniel R. Kempton and Terry D.Clark (eds), Unity or Separation, CenterPeriphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union (New York, 2000), p. 65; V.G.Pozdorovkin and Iu.S. Arutiumov, ‘Kaliningradskii faktor v sotrudnichestve Rossii so stranami Baltiiskogo regiona’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 1, 2000, pp. 67ff. 39. Vytautas Usackas, ‘Linking Russia with New Europe’, Washington Times, 12 January 2000; Home page of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania’s Cooperation with Russia’s Kaliningrad Region, Political Dept and Information and Press Dept of MFA, 1999, at www.urm.lt/political/ kaling.htm (accessed: 26 November 1999). 40. Lyndelle D.Fairlie, ‘Will the EU Use the Northern Dimension to Solve the Kaliningrad Dilemma?’, in T.Forsberg and Karoliina Honkanen (eds), Northern Dimensions (Helsinki, 2000), pp. 85ff; Chichkin, ‘Shvedskii biznes “v politiku” ne igraet’.
Part IV: The Southern Tier and the Middle East
11 Russian Policy in the CIS under Putin
INTRODUCTION There has been much speculation about the directions in which Russian foreign policy veers under Vladimir Putin. When elected as President, an International Herald Tribune headline suggested: ‘Putin is another riddle wrapped in a mystery in an enigma.’ An earlier headline read: ‘Putin has big lead, but few know where he is going.’ A reported exchange with a reporter prior to the presidential election is symptomatic. When asked whether he was going to change after the election, he responded, ‘I am not going to tell you that.’1 Leadership, however, is not the only important determinant of state behaviour. The latter depends as much on the conditions faced by policy makers—and notably such factors as the distribution of power, state capacity and identity—as it does on the personalities and dispositions of the policy makers themselves. In this short chapter, although not dismissing the important role of personality (or, for that matter domestic politics) in foreign policy, I examine the context in which the Russian leader makes policy, and the constraints which that context places upon his policy choices, with specific reference to the southern tier of the CIS.2 The first section looks at the meaning and types of hegemony as a regional structure of power in international relations as one possible approach to explaining and predicting Russian policy in the region and identifies a number of hypotheses that may be useful in explaining Russian strategy in the Federation’s immediate region. The second section discusses the sources of Russian engagement in the non-Russian former Soviet republics, focusing on the Caucasus and central Asia and applies the framework of analysis to the case of Russia in what used to be called ‘the near abroad’. Before beginning, it is important to state two assumptions that underlie the analysis. First, the analysis assumes that Russia will survive and maintain its territorial integrity. The second, and perhaps more
ideational and normative. Here the suggestion is that the general environment in which a state finds itself is likely to affect its policy choices substantially. It can be loose. On this basis. and Russia in the CIS) suggests considerable variation within the general category. For example. Although this is a highly contentious question. for that matter. economic welfare) for its weaker neighbours. In the first place. However. the USA in the Americas. his proposal to create seven new super-regions in Russia and to reform the upper house of the Russian parliament to remove regional governors and thereby deprive them of their immunity from prosecution. The principal instruments may be economic or military.g. preliminary indications (and not least the approval of the relevant legislation by the lower house) are that Putin will prevail. the means that hegemonic states employ to secure control vary.118 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
controversial. a quick historical and comparative analysis of cases of regional preponderance (e. the degree of control sought by the powerful over the weaker varies. or. One set of hypotheses is external to the state in question. India in south Asia. South Africa in southern Africa.3 As for the second. if the larger environment in which a regionally dominant state exists is perceived to be threatening. for example. weaker states. This is in turn related to a second point: the degree to which the dominant state relies on cooperation and consent as opposed to coercion and imposition varies historically and regionally. This is related to the extent to which the preponderant state is able to generate public goods (stability. cooperative and non-militarized and the other coercive. there is already clear indication of a degree of economic recovery. Stronger states seek to secure influence over. Preponderant states in a region generally seek to exercise a degree of control over the lesser states around them. this may intensify its perceived need for control over its immediate
. The extreme variant here is empire. assumption is that Russia will undergo a degree of state consolidation and economic recovery under President Putin. if not control of. associated not least with rising oil revenue. having to rely on self-help for security. HEGEMONY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY The basic proposition in realist international relations theory is that. There are several possible ways to explain this variation. militarized. The President’s intentions with regard to the reassertion of a greater degree of central control over the regions are clear in. Thirdly. intensive and intrusive. one can identify a range of possible patterns of behaviour between two extremes: one consent based. as with US influence over Canada and western Europe. states use their power in order to control areas of potential threat and to expand access to the sources of power. or tight as in the control exercised by the USSR over eastern Europe during the Cold War.
in contrast. The example of US interventions in Panama in 1989 and in Haiti in 1994 are cases in point. as was. Where such options exist and are credible. Where such options are not available. several issues arise. Does the state in question have a messianic self-understanding? How deep and valued is the state’s (and culture’s) military tradition? To what extent is ‘greatness’ a characteristic value of the political culture? How introverted or extroverted is the state’s political history and culture? Do political actors and the constituencies they represent believe that they have special rights and responsibilities in their neighbourhood (e. then the dominant state’s strategy is likely to be more benign. A third consideration here is that the behaviour of a dominant state within its own region is likely to depend strongly on its capacity to define and to marshal the resources to implement it. At the level of the state. If. smuggling and other criminal activity) affecting the hegemon. A second external variable that may be useful in explaining the behaviour of regionally dominant powers is the capacity of neighbouring states to manage their own affairs in such a way as to prevent or to minimize negative spillovers (e. the strategic environment of the hegemon is more permissive. arguably. and where the effects on the dominant power are damaging. The capacity of a hegemon to dominate its region is also affected by the existence of balancing options for weaker states in the region. the Indian intervention in the civil war in then East Pakistan in 1971–72. Most notably. incoherent and
. Where a weaker state is incapable of managing such issues itself. some scholars have argued that states undergoing processes of democratization may. be more war prone than either democratic or non-democratic states. the Monroe Doctrine)? To what extent is the cohesion of political society threatened by internal ethnic or national differences? What are the relative weights of conflictual versus cooperative understandings of international relations in the cognitive frameworks of political elites? The answers to these questions may strongly inform the responses of hegemonic states to the challenges they face in their region.g. Weak. in contrast.4 Although this may hold for consolidated democracies.RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CIS UNDER PUTIN 119
surroundings. for both institutional and normative reasons. this means of protection is ineffective. political instability. the weaker parties can resist the preponderant state’s effort to control the space in question through informal or formal alliance relationships with third parties.5 A second-unit-level consideration related to the first is that of identity.g. this invites intervention. military conflict. Elites threatened by the widening of popular participation in politics may employ nationalist mobilizational and legitimizing strategies that involve the evocation of external enemies. it has been suggested that democratic states are less likely to go to war than are nondemocratic ones.
and the possibility that trends in central Asia may destabilize particular regions of Russia (e.g. This effect is arguably at work in the evolving Russian-Belarussian military relationship. The extent to which this is becoming a more significant preoccupation of Russian policy makers is evident in. with their associated border control and air defence infrastructure. NATO enlargement may favour a Russian policy of regional consolidation in the western CIS. Moreover. one of the early leitmotivs of Putin’s policy in the region is a renewed effort at security cooperation in central Asia and focusing on countering terrorism and criminality. The immediate region also exercises an attractive force on Russian policy as a source of potential profit. This concerns the presence and the development of natural resources. Russia has important security concerns at stake in neighbouring states. Russia seeks to share in and influence the development process in such a way as to profit from it and to limit the extent to which decisions about such issues as pipeline infrastructure enhance the independence of the smaller Caspian Basin states. The effective borders of the Russian Federation remain to an important degree the outer borders of the USSR. they display little capacity to prevent negative spillovers. terrorism.g. These include the spillover of conflict (e. the CIS states serve as a buffer for the Russian Federation with regard to NATO enlargement.120 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
underfunded state structures and divided polities in a dominant state impede efforts to implement a regional agenda effectively and encourage other states in the region to explore extra-regional balancing options. broader migration associated with the economic collapse of Caucasian and central Asian states. the
. notably in the Caspian Basin.6 Russia’s neighbours are weak states. In a more prosaic sense. and focusing on systemic factors. the strategic environment surrounding the Russian Federation framework is widely perceived to be hostile and potentially threatening. Not surprisingly in this context. The same effect may result from the apparent trend within the EU to give that organization a meaningful security and defence identity and policy. it bears mention that the borders between Russia and its fellow CIS members are largely undefended. refugees from Georgia in North Ossetia and Krasnodar). Russia’s neighbours to the south serve as buffers with respect to Islamic radicalism. RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CIS Where does Russia fit in this analytical framework and what does this imply about Russian policy in the CIS region? First. They tend towards instability and have considerable difficulty controlling their own territory. for example. One set of concerns arises from the negative externalities of regional instability. the impact of the Islamic revival in central Asia on the Muslim populations of the Volga Basin). These induce Russian engagement in the affairs of its neighbours.
The conflictual and competitive perception of the international system and belief in the hostility of the West predominate in traditional and current cognitive frameworks of many Russian policy makers. but also to a deeper strain of mission in Russian nationalist thought and the place of ‘Eurasia’ in this thinking. in other words.RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CIS UNDER PUTIN 121
spoiler role that Putin is playing with regard to the proposed transcaspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. although the arrival of Putin may delay or reverse this trend. The dynamic predicted in the literature on the subject appeared to have been operating in President Putin’s selling of the Chechen war and may also have some bearing on the development of a forward security policy in central Asia and the southern Caucasus. it bears stressing that Russia remains lacking in state capacity to implement a hegemonic policy in the CIS. There are few serious external challengers to Russia’s efforts to dominate the region. If we now turn to the unit level of analysis.8 Some have suggested that this may be changing as a result of the growing interest of the West in Caspian Basin energy reserves. There is little if any evidence that NATO would seriously contemplate enlargement to or basing options in the Caucasus and central Asia. An assertive and coercive strategy in the region is also favoured by the identity considerations mentioned above. This is related not only to a lingering post-Soviet nostalgia. There is a clear tendency—inherited from the Yeltsin era—to claim special rights and responsibilities in the region. Russia is usually considered to be engaged in a political transition to democracy. The ‘Great Game’. Both in Russia and elsewhere in the region. the strains that democratization places on the political system favour an assertive foreign policy in the region. balancing options for the smaller states of the CIS are limited. Russia’s political heritage is one of force rather than persuasion.9 In summary. Consequently. There is an apparently strong aspiration within elements of the foreign policy and political elites to restore Russian power and to ensure its recognition both regionally and globally. coercion rather than consent. the possibility of an active NATO role in the Caucasus and central Asia has been discussed. Russia faces strong negative and positive impulses from its surrounding environment that favour a forward regional policy.7 Russian assertion in the region is facilitated by an important permissive condition. is not so great.10 On the other hand. The western states have never attempted to interfere seriously with Russian military policy in the region. and deal first of all with the character of the political system. The capacity of the
. If the hypothesis that democratizing states are more prone to war is correct. One of the more consistent aspects of Russian foreign policy since 1992 has been the insistence that the Russian Federation enjoys a droit de regard in what is perceived to be Russia’s ‘backyard’. The policies of potential regional competitors such as Iran or Turkey display considerable caution in the effort to expand their influence in the region.
societal and cultural aspects just discussed. intensive and intrusive end of the spectrum of preponderance. Given the capacity problem. see the collection of articles gathered in Michael Brown et al. consent-based and mutually beneficial form of regional preponderance in the CIS. ‘international terrorism’ and conflict in the vicinity of the borders of the Russian Federation as threats to
. Russia’s capacity to rely on economic relations as a source of power and influence has diminished considerably as the Russian economy itself has declined and as Russia’s ties with the other CIS states have weakened. The various bureaucracies involved in the design and implementation of foreign policy in the CIS have had difficulty in coordinating their actions and in controlling the activities of groups within them. These limitations. I am treating the CIS primarily as a geographical space. 5. however. 29 and 23 March 2000. 2. See J. For a comprehensive treatment of this proposition. NOTES
1. given the region’s unresolved conflicts and substantial remaining conflict potential as well as the worsening economic conditions of much of the population and the stagnation of political and economic transition. 4. this may create the basis for a more public goods-oriented. militarized. the analysis indicates that the Russian Federation will remain substantially engaged in a quest for influence in the CIS region.. 1997). Given the systemic. if Russia does restore a more effective state apparatus while escaping an authoritarian solution. proved to be less of a constraint under Putin. 9 June 2000.122 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
state to extract revenue in order to finance a more ambitious foreign policy has shrunk considerably and the balance of power between the centre and the regions has shifted to the detriment of the authorities in charge of foreign policy. as reported in Reuters.Snyder and Barnett R. The Russian military is tied down in Chechnya and has suffered greatly over the past decade of halting reform and fiscal stringency. Conflict and State-Building (London 1998). rather than as an institution. Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge. SUMMARY On balance. is likely to be persisting regional disorder.Rubin. and if the economy recovers. economic. The result. state. the Director of the Moscow Carnegie Center. 3. See. for example. Post-Soviet Political Order. the comments of Alain Rousso. 6. the effort might be expected to be ineffective in attaining Russian objectives. For a discussion of ‘uncontrolled’ migration. On the other hand. the engagement is likely to tend towards the more intrusive. MA. International Herald Tribune.
President Putin reactivated Russian pipeline diplomacy in the region in May 2000. See also the most recent version of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 28 April–11 May 2000. no. Indeed. 10. see ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsiia’. 58. 14–20 January 2000. no. Winter 1999/2000. 15.
. 10 June 2000). see S.Neil MacFarlane.
9. The (not so) Great Game’. not least the 1994 acceptance by the UN Security Council of Resolution 937 that authorized the CIS peacekeeping force in Georgia. no. 10. Post-Soviet Affairs. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie.
8. vol. no. 1. reversing previous Russian uncooperativeness on Turkmen gas exports and agreeing to increase Russian purchases of Turkmen gas by 10 billion cubic metres every year until total purchases reached 50–60 billion cubic metres (Reuters.RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CIS UNDER PUTIN 123
Russia’s security. ‘Russian Conceptions of Europe’. July–September 1994. Anatol Lieven. there were repeated instances of Western expression of support for Russian efforts to maintain stability in the area. For a more extensive discussion. Nezavismoe voennoe obozrenie. 3. National Interest.
SHIFTS IN RUSSIAN POLICY After Vladimir Putin became Prime Minister in August 1999. Together they constitute a nest of instability and a severe challenge to regional security. brought the struggle against international terrorism and religious extremism to the agenda of the Russian leadership. anti-terrorism seemed to be the issue around which the central Asian leaders could rally. The August 1999 attacks by Islamic terrorists in southern Kyrgyzstan contributed to make the anti-terrorist struggle a central factor in Russian policy towards the central Asian states and provided the Russian government with a platform for proposing closer military and security cooperation with these countries. Uzbek President Islam Karimov responded positively to the Russian government’s proposals. and the triangle of Uzbekistan. As Russia was searching for a policy to counter its waning influence in central Asia. and (2) to identify dilemmas for Russian policy in the region and discuss whether these dilemmas may lead to further revisions in Russian policy. The analysis concentrates on Russian policy with regard to Uzbekistan. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Russian policy observably shifted to a stronger emphasis on relations with central Asia in general and certain central Asian states in particular.12 The Security Dimension of Russia’s Policy in South Central Asia
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to identify main elements of Russian policy with regard to south central Asia in order to find the determining factors behind the policy shift during Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. This new focus can be regarded a radical shift by comparison both with Moscow’s initial lack of interest in central Asian affairs (except for Tajikistan) immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union and with the ambivalent Russian interest during the following years.
.1 The events in Dagestan in August 1999 when Chechen rebels invaded Dagestani territory and the Russian military campaign against Chechnya that followed. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan became key states for Russia’s policy in the region.
Putin mentioned three levels of ‘integration’ between Russia and CIS countries. with the aim of reducing dependence on Russia and developing relations with other states. as a ‘turn for the better’ but described Russian-Uzbek relations as a’strategic partnership’. He placed relations with Belarus on the first level. and a series of bilateral agreements on security and military-technical cooperation were signed. relations with the countries of the CIS Customs Union. and demonstrated continued Russian support for its ally. and is therefore of great interest for Russia. on the second level. Discussions with Turkmenistan initiated in autumn 1999 resulted in an agreement on renewal of Turkmen gas exports to Russia and indicated a willingness to allow the transit of larger quantities of Turkmen gas in the future. Uzbekistan is the potential regional power in central Asia. Azerbaijan and Moldova). which besides Russia and Belarus includes Kazakhstan. However.2 The visit to Uzbekistan which followed in December was no less important. and Russia’s relations with Uzbekistan on the third. However. Putin not only described the bilateral treaty on military and military-technical cooperation of 11–12 December 1999.3 With regard to the latter. He even suggested that the bilateral agreement ‘in its scope and in terms of integration processes…is more significant than the Collective Security Treaty’ of CIS states of 1992. Putin’s address to Russia’s Federation Council on 22 December 1999 signalled this new emphasis on policy towards central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular. and kept cooperation with the CIS and Russia to a minimum. it was the issue of international terrorism and extremism that produced the shift in Russian policy. with the largest population and the strongest army. The Russian government also became more active with regard to issues connected with the energy export from central Asia. His first foreign trip as Prime Minister was to Tajikistan. from which Uzbekistan withdrew in April 1999.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 125
The new importance given to central Asian affairs was reflected in visits and in statements by Prime Minister Putin during the autumn of 1999. That the Russian government ranked relations with Uzbekistan so high could be regarded as sensational.
. Uzbekistan. The weighty Russian delegation included the Defence Minister. just before the Tajik presidential election. Uzbekistan left the Collective Security Treaty and joined the GUUAM (consisting of Georgia. Ukraine. from the mid-1990s it developed an independent foreign policy. In April 1999. The discussions reflected Russian efforts to counter plans to build a transcaspian pipeline for the export of Turkmen gas to Turkey. It actively participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and developed its contacts with the USA. and also the Minister for CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Affairs and the director of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. in November 1999. Igor Sergeev.
but the peace process that followed remains fragile. ‘We are convinced that Russia’s help and presence in the region will allow us to repel the rampant expansion of extremism and terrorism’. said Putin after talks with Uzbekistan’s President Karimov. including weaponry. is completely dependent on Russian military. when a peace agreement was signed. ‘We are ready by joint efforts to put a barrier to the spread of terrorism and extremism’. training military personnel. reaffirmed that these troops ensured the forward defence of Russia itself. economic and material support.5 Sergeev. The Russian government responded to the Kyrgyz request with military-technical assistance.6 As Russia had no soldiers or aircraft in the conflict territory in Kyrgyzstan.126 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Putin’s concern for Tajikistan was expected since the country is not only Russia’s closest ally in the region but also the weakest state as a result of its five-year-long civil war. Russia has regarded stabilizing Tajikistan and guarding its border with war-ridden Afghanistan as being in its national security interest. and the joint struggle against international terrorism. the Kyrgyz government pleaded for Russian and CIS assistance. Uzbek soldiers and aircraft played the critical role in defeating the Islamists.7 The agreement envisaged cooperation between the two countries’ defence ministries and armed forces on questions of strengthening military security. when inspecting the Russian border troops stationed along the Tajik-Afghan border in November 1999. Russia’s assistance included generals and officers in the conflict zone of the Osh region. The civil war ended in June 1997. The December 1999 Russian-Uzbek agreement referred directly to the common struggle against this new threat. analysing the situation.4 A NEW PUSH FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATION? After Uzbek Islamists advanced into the Batken district in Kyrgyzstan on 22 August 1999 and took hostages in an effort to force their way from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan through Kyrgyz territory. Russia delivered attack helicopters to Uzbekistan which were used in fighting the extremists.8
. ammunition and other military supplies. made it clear that ‘the question of sending Russian ground units to the theatre of combat operations is not being discussed’. said Karimov. President Imomali Rahmonov. who has been in power since late 1992 and was re-elected in 1999. Defence Minister Sergeev declared that the central Asian states themselves had to play the leading role in eliminating the terrorist groups. developing and producing military equipment and armaments. working out proposals and participating in planning. A wave of Russian activity was initiated with the purpose not only of responding to the new threat but also of finding a new basis for future security and military cooperation. Putin. however.
The anti-terrorist emphasis also added new
.11 The Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Kyrgyzstan. infringing the constitutions of the countries concerned and constituting ‘a significant threat to the national security of our countries’. terrorism and organized crime.10 At a meeting of the interior ministers of the CIS countries. Tajikistan. Uzbekistan.17 Visits of high-ranking Russian military officials became more frequent after the events in Kyrgyzstan.9 At the CIS summit on 25 January 2000 it was decided to work out an interstate programme of joint measures to combat extremism. and. in early April. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan agreed to create such a centre. Troops from all member states of the CIS Collective Security Treaty plus Uzbekistan participated for the first time in combat training.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 127
At an emergency session of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers in Moscow on 15 September 1999 (Russia.15 Not only the armed forces but other security ministries—security services. which aimed at preventing probable military incursion by Afghan extremists into countries of central Asia.12 Russia thus suggested coordinated efforts to meet a terrorist threat. The scenario envisaged a resolution by CIS heads of states as the legal basis’ for a collective decision by defence ministers to launch a joint military operation.13 Operational military cooperation intensified between Russia and the three central Asian members of the Collective Security Treaty plus Uzbekistan. etc. but the central Asian states remained reluctant to commit themselves to the creation of permanent structures under Russian leadership. frontier troops.14 This exercise was followed up in early April 2000 by a larger exercise. The mission of the operation outlined was similar to the events in Kyrgyzstan in August. Russia suggested the creation of an anti-terrorist centre. A joint command-and-staff exercise. CIS Southern Shield 2000.16 Russian Defence Minister Sergeev described the scenario for the exercise as a situation in which religious nationalist extremism had resulted in attempts to declare territories independent. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. asked CIS member states to adopt national legislation that would authorize Russian special units to operate on the countries’ territories. Russia. to operate on the basis of the special units of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Kazakhstan. Putin announced the establishment of an anti-criminal coalition in order to handle extremists ‘everywhere from the Caucasus to the Pamir’. interior troops. they did not agree to the establishment of ‘joint rapid-deployment anti-terrorist forces’ under the Collective Security Treaty as Russian official representatives had suggested in November 1999. Sergei Ivanov. CIS Southern Shield 99. in March 2000. Kyrgyzstan. and was summed up as liquidation of bandit-terrorist gangs penetrating from nearby states into Kyrgyzstan’s Osh Region and Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Region or forming in those territories’. Consequently. was conducted in late October and early November with troops from Russia. Armenia and Belarus).—participated.
Russia has followed the development of Islam closely. RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS What Putin was now referring to as ‘international terrorism’ had previously been called ‘religious extremism’ by the Russian government. in September 1993. Russia had entered a political coalition with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with the purpose of preventing ‘the spread of aggressive fundamentalism and extremism in the region’. Both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan agreed to take a more active role in ‘anti-aircraft defence initiatives’ and Kyrgyzstan joined the joint combat anti-aircraft defence duty of CIS member states. The document identified as a central task of the Russian military to actively assist in localizing ‘the source of tension and stopping hostilities as early as possible’. Armenia and Tajikistan).20 The main factors that explain the latest shift in Russian policy towards central Asia are concerns about: (1) the security situation. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Belarus. and the threat of Islamic extremism was mentioned indirectly in the draft Russian Military Doctrine of May 1992.’18 Statements by individual Russian official representatives reflected that a more activist and militant approach was gaining support within the Russian leadership.128 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
impetus to general military cooperation. When. Russia and three
. Kyrgyzstan. (2) the strategic situation. the Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Ivanov did not rule out ‘pre-emptive strikes’ against terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Although Uzbekistan had not joined the CIS multilateral agreement on air defence. The agreement addressed what has come to be perceived by the Russian and central Asian governments as a main threat to central Asian security—that of Islamic extremism. In May 1998. The Russian paper Vedomosti commented: ‘It seems that Russia is ready to take revenge in central Asia for what it loses in the Caucasus.21 It referred to local conflicts as a major threat to Russian security— especially those fanned by ‘an aggressive nationalism or religious intolerance’.19 At the Summit of Secretaries of the Security Councils of the members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (Russia. Thus Russia seemed to be successful in revitalizing military security cooperation with central Asian states. The following sections look more closely at each of these. and (3) local dynamics. Defence Minister Sergeev declared in April 2000 that Russia had to increase its presence in central Asia since events in the Caucasus and central Asia bore witness to the fact that religious and nationalist terrorism posed a major threat to the treaty’s member states. Kazakhstan. it participated in a major air defence exercise held in April 2000 based on the scenario of an aircraft hijacking.
The coalition was not a strong enough reason to keep Uzbekistan in the Collective Security Treaty after it expired in April 1999. The 1994 report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and its then director Evgenii Primakov. He was also in charge of the 1996 turn of Russian policy in Tajikistan. By January 2000. thereby posing a security threat to Russia and the other CIS states. they are therefore open to illegal trespassing. which resulted in the signing of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties in June 1997. Primakov. Russian border troops had been withdrawn from
. It was the offensive by Islamic extremists in Kyrgyzstan in August 1999 that provided Russia with a strong argument with which to persuade Uzbekistan of the benefits of cooperating with Russia.24 In July 1999.22 Radical Islam had been a limited phenomenon in central Asia but spread during the 1990s as part of the general process of Islamization in these societies. the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Islam became politicized and was exploited by the political leadership as well as by the opposition in central Asian states. who had spelled out the Islamic threat in the 1994 report. the threat of Islam was referred to as ‘external aggression’. The Russian presence at the outer central Asian borders was radically reduced during the late 1990s. during the Tajik civil war. where radical Islam had a stronghold in the densely populated Ferghana Valley. Nevertheless. and not even the terrorist bombs against government buildings in Tashkent in February 1999 made Uzbekistan more willing to stay. was more explicit in describing the threat posed by Islamic extremism. in 1996 introduced the distinction between fundamentalism and extremism in government statements.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 129
central Asian states decided on the deployment of a CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan. A fear of Islamic extremism spreading from Tajikistan to the rest of central Asia had been reflected in Russian support of the Tajik government against its adversary. The borders between the central Asian states are not yet functioning as state borders and there is no proper border control. however. The elusiveness of the borders is a serious problem to the states of the region.25 No practical measures of cooperation followed. terrorists.23 This was especially evident in Uzbekistan. criminal border infiltrators and drug and arms traffickers’. The report mentioned as one possible scenario for the future development of the CIS that the position of ‘Islamic extremists in CIS states with a Muslim population’ was expected to become stronger. which included a clause on military assistance. The May 1998 coalition to prevent ‘aggressive fundamentalism and aggression’ was followed in October 1998 by a declaration on mutual assistance in the event of aggression. further documents on cooperation were signed calling for regular trilateral contacts to counter ‘aggressive religious and other extremists.
the numbers were reduced between 1997 and 1999 from 16.27 New prospects for the exploitation of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea raised the interest and stakes of external powers. among others. however. Russian border guards remain only in Tajikistan. President Yeltsin. seeking assistance and investors from the West and the USA.000. During the first half of the 1990s. Russian troops were withdrawn from all states except Tajikistan. The 1994 report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service had warned that the West in general and the USA in particular were hindering Russian efforts to integrate the CIS and to restore its former ‘great power’ position. Iran and Turkey being especially mentioned among the latter. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.000 to 11. After 1995.
. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan remained members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. needed the assistance of Russia. the EU and the USA. It cooperated with Russia to bring Rahmonov to power in Tajikistan in 1992. Uzbekistan did not extend its membership in the Collective Security Treaty. Trade increased between central Asian states and China. Uzbekistan distanced itself more and more from Russia. however. Turkmenistan adopted an independent course. It never joined the Collective Security Treaty. In his 1996 address to the parliament on national security. Iran. at the time the report was published it did not fully reflect government policy. avoided signing multilateral CIS military agreements and reduced its bilateral military cooperation with Russia. declared a policy of neutrality and had its status as a neutral state recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1995. However. Turkey.28 The report also gave a good deal of attention to what its authors considered to be involvement in central Asia by Western and Muslim states. The Russian retreat opened the way for investors from other countries. when describing the changing strategic scene on CIS territory.130 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan and replaced by national border guard services of the countries concerned.26 RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC CONCERNS A process of strategic reconfiguration in central Asia was stepped up during the second half of the 1990s when Russian economic and military withdrawal intensified. Prospects and plans for the construction of oil and gas pipelines circumventing Russian territory threatened Russia’s future role and influence in the region. As has been mentioned. Russia’s role and influence were reduced and the states of the region had started to reorient their foreign policy away from Russia. Uzbekistan seemed to be developing into a close military ally of Russia. At the end of 1999. in April 1999. however. of the central Asian states only Tajikistan. and ceased to participate in multilateral CIS structures on both military and economic issues.
Pakistan. All the states of the region. central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region’. Russian and central Asian leaders diverged drastically in their understanding of security and the developments in the region.29 The draft of Yeltsin’s address. Iran or China offered instead a guarantee of independence
. Turkey. the Caucasus.32 Thus. To central Asian leaders. From the Russian perspective. greater involvement on the part of the USA. Special attention was given to the increasing engagement by the West (mainly the USA and NATO) in the Caucasus and central Asia. Russia’s national interests in the international arena were said to be threatened by ‘attempts of other states’ to prevent it from asserting its national interests ‘in Europe. The draft warned that in a worst-case scenario a new buffer zone could be created to the south-east on former Soviet territory by states unfriendly to Russia. The new keywords of ‘multipolarity’ and ‘unipolarity’ provided these documents with a conceptual basis for criticism of US policy and for the creation of tactical alliances with states in order to counter the USA and the West. During the following years Russia watched with concern how central Asian states discussed with Western partners plans and projects for the construction of oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea region along routes that would avoid Russian territory. Joint military manoeuvres of the central Asian peacekeeping battalion were carried out within the framework of the PfP involving NATO soldiers in exercises on central Asian territory. Iran.31 Vladimir Putin participated in the finalizing of these documents from April 1999 when he became a secretary of the Russian National Security Council. the USA and NATO were mentioned as the main external actors.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 131
called ‘actions by states and their alliances…to undermine Russia’s relations with former Soviet republics’ a threat to Russia’s national security. The draft was also more specific with regard to developments in the Caucasus and central Asia.30 The central Asian states were described as being incapable of following an independent policy and therefore of increasingly being targets for foreign influence. which was prepared by his security adviser Iurii Baturin and published separately. The new Russian Military Doctrine of April 2000 and the new National Security Concept of February 2000 reflected the Russian reaction to the changing strategic scene. joined the NATO PfP programme in 1994 and demonstrated their interest in further developing such cooperation. except Tajikistan. more explicitly pointed to a general trend of disintegration on former Soviet territory and of Russia’s loss of influence. Saudi Arabia. the Middle East. the engagement of external powers constituted an external threat to Russian as well as to central Asian national and strategic interests. Turkey. The documents demonstrated Russian concern with an ongoing strategic reconfiguration taking place on former Soviet territory and in the world. Security and military issues also became a topic for cooperation between central Asian states and Western states.
As long as Uzbekistan remained an ally of Russia. There is a risk that conflicts will spread across the state borders of central Asian states.33 With large Uzbek diasporas in neighbouring countries Uzbekistan influences the domestic life of these states. A large Uzbek diaspora can also be found in border areas of Kyrgyzstan (16 per cent). it threatened to shift the balance in the region. The April 1999 NATO Strategic Concept providing for out-of-area operations and the bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in spring 1999 left Russia extremely frustrated. This culminated in autumn 1999 in the West’s criticism of Russia’s military offensive against Chechnya. and foreign investors were welcome. which constitutes 24 per cent of the total population. constitute an additional source of conflict. Growing tensions within Uzbek society between the regime and its critics.132 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
and a promise of future economic development. With an ethnically complex population. first and foremost radical Islamists. Until 1999. central Asian leaders (except the Tajik President) did not respond with enthusiasm to Russian proposals for military cooperation. The Uzbek population of Tajikistan. lives mainly in the north and along the border with Uzbekistan. Fear of Islamist extremists led the Uzbek authorities to intervene in the neighbouring countries in spring and summer 1999. add a source of tension to an area with a large potential for conflict. When Uzbekistan became more independent from Russia. Russia reacted strongly to NATO’s 1994 decision to enlarge the alliance. and Russia tried to restrain Uzbek influence. Events outside central Asia made Russia more concerned by the processes in the Caucasus and central Asia.34 The severe social and economic situation of these countries and widespread corruption there create conditions in which social discontent and political speculation with regard to national. and again when the enlargement took place in 1999. regional differences. CONCERNS WITH UZBEKISTAN AND LOCAL DYNAMICS Uzbekistan’s role in the local dynamics of the area adds to Russian concerns. Uzbek security services
. Russia accepted Uzbek involvement in neighbouring countries. Turkmenistan (9 per cent) and Kazakhstan (2 per cent) and in the north of Afghanistan. Threats were perceived by central Asian leaders as emanating mainly from within society—from economic underdevelopment—and Russia had little to offer in this regard. particularly of Tajiks and Uzbeks. regional or religious affiliation flourish. Large diasporas. there is a breeding ground for conflicts and extremism. harsh socioeconomic conditions and an ongoing Islamic revival. Uzbekistan also constitutes a challenge to Russia as it has a potential to become a regional power.
First. On the one hand Russia has tried to counter Uzbek influence in the neighbouring countries. but also bombed villages on the Tajik side of the border. The defeat of the Uzbek Islamists’ incursion into Kyrgyzstan under Juma Namangani in late October 1999 was used in the Russian media to illustrate Russia’s capacity to provide military security assistance in the
. Uzbekistan closed the Tajik-Uzbek border and the authorities referred to reports of a Tajik connection in the bombings. thereby creating several dilemmas. (At the CIS summit of January 2000 this issue was indeed transferred to the Ministries of Defence. with permission from the Kyrgyz authorities. The struggle against religious extremism and international terrorism offered a common denominator. there is the dilemma created by Russia’s emphasis on the struggle against ‘international terrorism’ as a main theme for developing security cooperation with the states of the region.35 After the 1999 bombings in Tashkent.37 Uzbekistan’s President Karimov criticized the Kyrgyz authorities for not demonstrating greater urgency and ‘resolution’ in resisting the militants. The new situation may therefore pave the way for a more drastic policy revision in the future. This shift is apparently an effort to counter the trend of Russia’s decreasing influence in the region as well as a response to new security challenges.38 The events in Kyrgyzstan created tension in relations between the central Asian states. however. seem instead to increase the ambiguities and contradictions in Russian policy.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 133
were ordered onto the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to pursue ethnic Uzbek Wahhabites there. The Uzbek intervention in Kyrgyzstan in autumn 1999 to fight terrorism once more demonstrated the potential and determination of Uzbekistan to become the dominant power in the region. Uzbekistan took an active role in fighting the terrorists.36 During the events in the Batken district in southern Kyrgyzstan in August 1999. DILEMMAS FOR RUSSIA’S SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA POLICY Russian policy towards south central Asia as it is taking shape under Putin demonstrates a shift of emphasis. it is not certain that it is capable of living up to its commitments. which led to protests from the Tajik government. The internal problems of Uzbekistan thus constitute a factor of instability for its neighbours. On the other hand. Uzbek aircraft bombed the area. Russia has tried to find a common ground for cooperation with Uzbekistan. The Russian approach to Uzbekistan has been ambivalent.) While Russia makes commitments to provide assistance in this kind of situation. The label of ‘international terrorism’ indicates a very narrow aspect of a much wider problem and gives too strong an emphasis to the military means to respond to the challenge. The effects of this policy.
In this way he indicated that Russia is not prepared to take on the burden and the responsibility as it once did in Tajikistan in the early 1990s. A second dilemma is created by Russia’s emphasis on ‘strategic partnership’ with Uzbekistan: Russia can hardly expect a longlasting alliance with the country. and will probably have to remain there for a long time. Russian military forces and border troops have already been withdrawn from Uzbekistan. The question remains. Repression may prepare the conditions for a complicated and turbulent transfer of power after Karimov. There are several reasons for this. the first being that Uzbekistan is an authoritarian regime which does not allow political opposition. The restraint on future Russian military assistance was reflected in the statement by Russian Defence Minister Sergeev in September 1999 that the central Asian states had to cooperate in order to solve the crisis in Kyrgyzstan mainly by themselves. even if the visit by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to central Asia in April 2000 indicated a greater engagement in this kind of issue. Russia therefore offered only military-technical assistance and equipment but no troops. Russia would be neither willing nor able to send troops. NATO and international organizations were described as incapable of providing any assistance in this kind of situation. This is probably correct. The USA. however.134 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
event of a crisis in central Asia. There could be negative consequences if Russia were to become too involved with this repressive regime. whether Russia itself would be capable of assisting if a serious conflict erupted in the region. Russian elite troops are concentrated in the northern Caucasus in order to secure control over Chechen territory. Russia therefore seems to be able to provide assistance only in minor crises in some low-intensity conflicts in the region. As has been pointed out by some Russian commentators. It seems evident that if a serious crisis developed in central Asia. The second reason is the possible backlash from Russia’s own large Muslim populations if Russia
. they cannot be sent to central Asia. During the crisis in Kyrgyzstan. For Russia it may be politically dangerous to rely on Uzbekistan and to be involved with Uzbekistan on such issues as ‘religious extremism’ and ‘international terrorism’. Uzbekistan’s cooperation with Russia is tactical and Uzbekistan is hardly interested in revising its foreign policy or in damaging its relations with the West. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan and somewhat reduced in Tajikistan. President Karimov has initiated an offensive against his domestic opposition and has labelled more or less all the Uzbek opposition ‘extremists’. Russia would not be prepared to engage in a central Asian ‘Chechnya scenario’. Repression and severe socioeconomic conditions in Uzbekistan are fertile ground for the flourishing of Islamist groups. Several Russian commentators fear that fighting will start again.
If Russian policy prioritizes Uzbekistan it will be more difficult for Russia to restrain Uzbek influence in Tajikistan. Most Russian politicians and commentators believe that a continued Russian military presence in Tajikistan is necessary. A long-term troop reduction and reorganization of the remaining troops have already started with regard to the Russian border troops. The fourth dilemma stems from the problem of maintaining stability in Tajikistan. He declared that Uzbekistan was ‘quite within its rights’ to conduct an operation against terrorists in Tajikistan. It was all brought there through the territory of Kyrgyzstan’. Kyrgyz President Akaev and the Kyrgyz government tried to play down the Islamic threat. Neighbouring Tajikistan is utterly vulnerable to Uzbek involvement and influence and has accused Uzbekistan of supporting anti-government forces in Tajikistan. Russian press reports have warned that a ‘Dagestani scenario’ may follow on the events in the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan in the sense that Uzbek forces would march into Tajikistan to destroy bases and camps assisted by artillery and air raids. Dushanbe and Bishkek. Reactions during the war in Chechnya have already indicated such a reaction.40 During spring and summer 1999. A close partnership between Russia and Uzbekistan may therefore weaken the constraints on Uzbek power and influence and trigger a development in the region and a reaction from Uzbekistan’s neighbours. Akaev commented in summer 1999 on Uzbek behaviour more or less to the effect that a small country could not do much when a larger neighbour behaved as the Uzbek security service did in Kyrgyzstan.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 135
becomes too involved in fighting radical Islam. Still there are arguments and proponents in favour of reducing that presence. which may turn out to be detrimental to Russian influence in the region. In order to prepare for withdrawals of Russian troops. when the Uzbek secret service were pursuing Islamists on Kyrgyz territory. The incursion by Islamic extremists into Kyrgyzstan seriously aggravated relations between Tashkent.39 Karimov severely criticized the Kyrgyz authorities for passivity and lack of capacity to handle the situation during the crisis. Andizhan and Namangan.41 His words reflected concern with the Uzbek involvement. ‘Hence all these criminal raids and the tons of explosives we discovered in the cities of Kokand. Russia has built up and trained the Tajik national army and contributed to the creation of a national border troop service. The third dilemma concerns the regional consequences if Russia supports Uzbekistan and is therefore bound to accept Uzbek involvement in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries. This may be the most important factor that produces negative consequences for Russia’s position in the region. It is therefore a tricky balancing act for Russia to support Uzbekistan in a partnership relationship and at the same time counter Uzbekistan’s growing influence. he said. He believed the terrorists had crossed the Kyrgyz border not in August 1999 but two years earlier. Russian border troops have
. which is crucial to regional security.
The ranks of the Russian 201st Division have been filled by Tajik nationals.42 A completely opposite policy recommends diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government and the restoration of diplomatic relations. and a future Tajik government may not favour a Russian military presence in the country. for which a strong presence is necessary. In the long run. an approach that has been suggested by some Russian analysts. Since 1998. Since 1998 the Taliban have tried to take control of the northern provinces of Kunduz and Takhar and thereby cut the supply channels of military and other assistance to the Northern Alliance. but for the moment this is far from being realized. and the ethnic Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum. If Russia instead chooses to continue its support for the Northern Alliance.
. the situation in Tajikistan will remain unstable.44 The Russian government excludes diplomatic recognition. Since the Tajik government is not yet capable of controlling Tajik territory. In an effort to secure a Russian military presence in the future. The fifth dilemma stems from the threat of Taliban forces advancing into northern Afghanistan and the border of the central Asian states. Trade is developing between the two countries and there are plans for Turkmenistan to provide the Afghan border regions with electricity. national Tajik forces may be capable of taking over border defence and national security. which is led by the ethnic Tajik Ahmad Shah Masud. In this way the Russian government is able to secure control of Tajikistan and its border with Afghanistan. the country remains a black hole in the sense that it offers transit routes for drug trafficking. In contrast to Russia and other central Asian states. Turkmenistan already has consular relations with the Taliban regime. On the other hand. arms smuggling and all manner of illegal trespassing. If Russia reduces its presence. The antiTaliban Northern Alliance. it needs the support of Uzbekistan. They managed to oust Dostum and press Masud up to the border of Tajikistan. an agreement has been signed for reorganizing the 201st Division into a military base with a smaller number of soldiers for a duration of 25 years. This would make it possible to come to agreement with the Taliban government on common problems. and is supported by Russia. the Tajik ethnic component in the officer staff has also increased. As long as war in Afghanistan continues.136 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
also transferred tasks along a limited part of the Tajik-Afghan border to Tajik national border troops. One alternative would be to increase support by Russia and the central Asian states for the Northern Alliance in its struggle against the Taliban. has been pushed back by the Taliban and now controls the territory close to the border to Tajikistan. Uzbekistan may fill the vacuum. This has prompted different suggestions in the Russian debate as to how the Russian government might best respond to the situation.43 Turkmenistan already follows the latter recommendation. a military presence may not be economically defensible in the long run.
DC. Central Asia is a region with a great potential for conflict. Against the background of the great potential for conflict in central Asia. so far mainly of a non-military character. As this chapter has pointed out. ‘Russia and Central Asia’. NOTES
1. the overall Russian resource base will hardly be sufficient for a competitive situation. in Lena Jonson and Roy Allison (eds). has resulted in several policy dilemmas. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan or it has to initiate a policy in favour of close cooperation with both international organizations and external powers in the region in a joint effort to respond to security challenges. Russia has come to a crossroads in its policy towards central Asia. The complex situation in south central Asia and the potential for violent conflict in the area together with the ambiguities and contradictions in present Russian policy may pave the way for a revision of Russian policy in the future. Russia and Central Asia: A New Web of Relations (London. No single external power can take on the task and the burden of acting as a security guarantor. as reflected in Russian government policy under Vladimir Putin. International cooperation may be the only option if conflicts are to be prevented. and one which will prove to be the most realistic response not only to the security challenges of the region but also to the challenge of Russia’s own national security.
. giving priority to Uzbekistan in Russian policy may have negative consequences for regional dynamics. Russia has to give priority either to its concern with the intensified strategic competition with other external powers engaging in the region or to its concern with the security of the region. Either Russia has to engage more actively in providing military security guarantees and assistance in situations of domestic crisis in Tajikistan. Lena Jonson. Ultimately the cooperative option for Russian policy may therefore be the best option. Lena Jonson. There has been growing interest among central Asian states as well as external powers in creating and participating in security arrangements. or for providing military assistance if a serious violent conflict erupts. Russia’s present policy in the region is both ambiguous and contradictory and may be counterproductive in the sense that it helps to speed up the weakening of Russia’s position and influence. 1998). 2001).SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 137
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE The new emphasis on strategic concerns regarding developments in south central Asia. Central Asian Security Dynamics: The New International Context (Washington. Its new focus on the struggle against ‘international terrorism’ and ‘religious extremism’ may create illusions both in Russia and in south central Asia that these kinds of problem can be solved by military means and force.
17. p. Troops from five states participated. vol. no. about 20 battle helicopters and about 30 fighter aircraft. Russian TV. Jane’s Defence Weekly. Armenia. Monitor. 13. Nezavisimaia gazeta. no. On 1 April the combat stage proper started on the Tigrovaia Balka test area in Tajikistan and near the town of Termez in Uzbekistan. 2 September 1999. Nezavisimaia gazeta. Vladimir Georgiev. 15. 3. 6. 10 April 2000. Over 50 planes took off in Belarus. Itar-Tass news agency. 3. ‘Vizit rossiiskogo premera v Tadzhikistan’. Jamestown Foundation. 22 December 1999.138 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
2. 9.000 servicemen. in BBC Monitoring Service. Kazakhstan. 3. Segodnya. 7. Segodnya. 15 September 1999. ‘Uzbek Servicemen Armed with Russian Weapons to Conduct Operations in Kyrgyzstan’. 6 April 2000/ Reuters. 6. (In the 1999 exercise. 5. On 5 April. 1. 6. 4/Reuters. Moscow. Uzbek ground detachments and aviation were to be deployed near Termez and interact with the main anti-terrorist headquarters located in Dushanbe. p. an armed incursion from Afghanistan was to be suppressed by anti-terrorist military detachments of treaty countries and Uzbekistan. with the exception of the Tajik unit. Monitor. vol. 6 January 2000. 26 January 2000. 5.
. According to the plan for the exercises. 6 April 2000/Reuters. Izvestya. p. 12. vol. ‘Rossiia ne toropitsia otkryvat’ “novyi front”’. which marched across the territory of Uzbekistan. Ostankino Radio Mayak. Vedomosti. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 11 December 1999. 8. 26 January 2000/BBC Monitoring Service. p. 4. 4. Kyrgyzstan. Inside Central Asia. 15–21 November 1999.000 servicemen took part in the exercises. the CIS antiaircraft defence system held unprecedented headquarters command training exercises. 4 April 2000. 16. International Reports. 17 November 1999. Kommersant Daily. Moscow. 4. 11 December 1999. 4 April 2000/Reuters. there was no combat firing and troops exercised mainly on the territories of their own states. Leonid Panin. Ibid. a few missile systems.) Both Armenia and Belarus participated in April 2000. 10. 5 April 2000. 18. Nadezhda Alekseeva. Uzbekistan and Ukraine. including 13. Monitor. Jamestown Foundation. and BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 5. ‘Voiska treniruiutsia’. Yuri Stepanov and Igor Shestakov. About 20. in Russian. 13 March 2000. Kommersant Daily. It was the first time that cooperation between the operating control of the anti-aircraft defence systems of these countries had been practised in a situation requiring the application of national strength and resources to detain hijacked planes. Itar-Tass in Jamestown Foundation. ‘Rol’ Rossii v uregulirovanii konfliktov usilivaetsia’. 22 September 1999. 14. including tanks. Iurii Golotiuk. no. 1126 GMT. 40 armoured personnel carriers. 5 November 1999. 4 April 2000. no. no. 7 April 2000. 7 April 2000. 11. Leonid Ivashov (Main Directorate for International Cooperation of the Defence Ministry). 301. p. 51. 206.
1998). Proekt’. 33. Similar problems along the Uzbek-Kazakh border led the authorities of a border region of Kazakhstan. ‘Russia and Central Asia’. no. ‘Mezhdu otvergnutym proshlym i tumannym budushchim’. BBC Monitoring Service. 25. ‘Islam and Politics in Central Asian States’. no. 22 September 1994.
. 2 (May 1996). pp. to request that a military unit be deployed there. Patrolling functions along parts of the Tajik-Afghan border were transferred in 1999 to the Tajik national border guard service. The concept was drafted by Iurii Baturin. the Makhtaral’skii region. Lena Jonson. 23. 15. 1/Former Soviet Union 15 Nations: Policy and Security (Moscow). see Jonson. DC. ibid. 32. Tajik and Afghan factors.000 Tajik refugees in Kyrgyzstan. 3 April 2000. Interfax. 27. ‘Russia is Joining the Union of the Three’. 7. July 1999. Note from Anara Tabyshalieva. 1999. Major-General Aleksandr Markin. pp. For an analysis of Russia and Central Asian security dynamics of the Uzbek. 28 April–11 May 2000. p. 1501–17. Europe-Asia Studies. no. no. 17 April 1999. Iurii Golotiuk. 19–25 July 1999. 14 June 1996. Conference Papers 24. 1997. 11 April 2000/Reuters. 284. 41. p. ‘O natsional’noi bezopasnosti: Poslanie Prezidenta RF Federal’nomu Sobraniiu’. 7. 21. 9 October 1999. 8. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. October 1998. Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia. no. 20. Central Asia Turns South? Trade Relations in Transition (London. 11 April 2000. no. 7. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Sodruzhestvo NG.. 1999). Central Asia. p. Krasnaia zvezda. Inside Central Asia. 14–20 January 2000. Izvestya. Aleksei Malashenko. 49. 24. The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy (London. The Official Russian Concept of Contemporary Central Asian Islam: The Security Dimension’. Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen. Igor Rotar. final version published in Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. Tabyshalieva mentions the figure of 45. IPR Strategic Business Information Database. 22 July 1999/BBC Monitoring Service. 13 October 1998. vol. 34. ‘SNG: Khronika Sobytii iyun’-iyul’ 1999’. no. July 1999. 1 and 5. Sodruzhestvo NG. NG-Stsenarii. adviser to Yeltsin. Richard Pomfret. 1999). and ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. ‘Rossiia i SNG: Nuzhdaetsia li v korrektirovke pozitsiia zapada?’. According to their commander. The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley (Washington. 3 April 2000/Reuters. 31. 28. ‘Moskva obrela novogo soiuznika’. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 2. 22. See also Vladimir Georgiev. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 29. 1. p. 26. 35. 30. ‘Politika natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (1996–2000)’. Nezavisimaia gazeta.SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA 139
19. Rossiiskaia gazeta. in Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov (eds).
This was suggested by Colonel Valerii Popov. 5. no. Ibid. p.’ However. ‘Neprostoe sosedstvo’. Former Soviet Union 15 Nations: Policy and Security. 39. As these analysts point out. 301. p. p. 15–21 November 1999. 27 September–3 October 1999. See also Mikhail Pereplesnin. Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. when the Taliban government recognized the independence of Chechnya. ‘Russia Names its Principal Ally in Central Asia’. Former Soviet Union 15 Nations: Policy and Security. Gafarli Mekhman. Igor Rotar.
. p.140 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
36. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 37. 23 October 1999. Inside Central Asia. 11–17 February 2000. no. 5. 18 February 2000. ‘Taliby pytaiutsia poluchit’ priznanie mira’. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 294. Nezavisimaia gazeta.’ BBC Monitoring Service. Kyrgyz National Security Minister Tashtemir Aitbaev responded that Kyrgyzstan had taken ‘very correct steps’. See Vladimir Mukhin. Inside Central Asia. 85. ‘Narkobiznes i islamskii ekstremizm’. the central Asian leaders had started to discuss the possibility of recognizing the Taliban government. BBC Monitoring Service. 2 July 1999. Uzbek President Karimov said: ‘These things are happening because of the weak policy carried out by the Kyrgyz government. 3. the question of recognition was considered but left for discussions by Russia and the five central Asian countries. 5. See articles by Aleksandr Umnov in Nezavisimaia gazeta already in 1998. 18–23. ‘Taliby pytaiutsia poluchit’ priznanie mira’. Gulfira Gayeva and Yuri Chubchenko. 42. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. pp. 44. 43. diplomatic relations with Kabul would have prevented situations like the one which arose in January 2000. Pereplesnin. August 1998. 41. as late as February 2000. ‘We did not let them drag us into a long drawn-out war. Kommersant Daily. ‘Extension of the Zone of Taliban’s Influence May Significantly Infringe upon Russia’s Interests in Central Asia’. p. 40. no. February 1999. In 1998. This kind of humane attitude towards terrorists will lead to this kind of incident. 2. p. 6. 38. Valerii Popov. On the eve of the summit of the Central Asian Economic Union in August 1998. chief of the operational department of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan. ‘Ukhodit’ iz Tadzhikistana nel’zia’. 26 February 1999.
might be expected to rally Russian public opinion behind government policy and to win support for that policy in the USA and western Europe to boot. primarily the Volga Tatars. It is not clear to what extent Russia’s new rulers—or their Soviet predecessors—really believed that Islam’s politicization might jeopardize the country’s stability. as the newly independent successor states of the former USSR have been dubbed. Certainly. there was the strife between Ossets and Ingush. Muslims expressed their disgruntlement
. so too in Tatarstan the eponymous population sought to restrict the confessional activity of the Russians. There was a clear relevance for domestic policy as well. who comprised the second largest ethnic group after the Russians. The link between the enhanced national awareness of the Soviet Union’s numerous nationalities in the last decade or so of its existence and their traditional ‘national’ religions was likely to be a factor conducive to inter-ethnic tension within the Federation after independence. and. To some observers it appeared rather that the theoretical possibility of such a threat was elaborated in order to provide a pretext for repression of what Moscow termed Islamic extremism or fundamentalism. Similarly. which. if cleverly played. This perception persisted into the Gorbachev period of glasnost’ and perestroika. indeed. religion seemed to have a role in some of the inter-ethnic conflicts which broke out in Russia in the 1990s: apart from the obvious case of Chechnya. there were manifest instances of strain between Russians and Tatars which sometimes centred on their religious differences. the Russian Federation having a considerable Muslim population of its own. The issues at stake were not solely those of foreign policy—relations with the ‘near abroad’. and with the Muslim world outside and the West. Moreover. from time to time in certain ‘Russian’ regions.13 The Role of Islam in Russia’s Relations with Central Asia1
Islam came to be perceived as a threat to the stability of the Soviet state following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978–79 and the formation of an active Islamic opposition to the Marxist regime in Afghanistan in the same period. into the post-Soviet era of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. but also the Bashkirs and the various north Caucasian ethnicities. it was a card. As in some of the north Caucasian republics. In fact.
‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was one of the major components of Russia’s rapprochement with Karimov’s Uzbekistan and Imomali Rahmonov’s Tajikistan. it was likely that statements by Russian politicians and military leaders about Russia’s struggle with Islamic fundamentalism’ in Tajikistan would encourage inter-faith and inter-ethnic antagonisms in Russia.4 Undoubtedly. four out of five of whom were former republican Communist Party first secretaries. on the one hand. They interpreted this direct involvement as a reaction to the participation of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan in the coalition government. particularly in the northern Caucasus. Moreover. particularly in the sphere of education. In this context they insisted that no
. joined up with hardliners in their Islamophobia.3 The leaders of the newly independent states of central Asia. as one of Christianization. Throughout 1992. commentators saw in this the raison d’être of Russia’s considerable military involvement in Tajikistan’s civil war even prior to Rahmonov’s becoming President. Trends that surfaced and developed there would almost certainly have an effect on Russia’s Muslims. Some people in Moscow seemed to think that the sovereignty of the former union republics. and Islamic official organizations and institutions. Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. who were reformers within Russia.5 Indeed. Karimov sought to distinguish between the increasingly manifest and ubiquitous practice of Islam. which he isolated and delegitimized. on the other. members of the Yeltsin administration. could and should be subordinated to Russia’s alleged security interests. but also in the near abroad. at certain stages it appeared as if the common interest of the governments of Russia and of central Asia in suppressing. assimilated the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) leadership’s understanding of the Islamic threat. or preventing the rise of.2 In this context it was inevitable that Russia would show an interest in developments within Islam not only inside its own borders. have. especially the Muslim ones. This meant first and foremost central Asia. In this way. which ruled that country from May to November 1992. The president of the most populous of these states. has made Islam synonymous with turbulence and opposition: all believers who come together in any form of Islamic association not under the direct control of his government have been branded opponents of the regime.6 Be this as it may. for their part. Karimov kept up a ‘relentless barrage of propaganda’ concerning the threat to all of central Asia and Russia from a chain reaction sparked by Tajikistan’s Islamists. And Moscow heard similar stories from Tajikistan’s own hardliners. where about two-thirds of the Muslims of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) resided.142 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
at the insufficient attention paid by officialdom to their religious needs and looked upon government policy.
11) It was thus entirely logical that Russia maintained an armed presence in Tajikistan during and after the civil war.ROLE OF ISLAM IN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 143
foreign. neither rhyme nor reason for Russia to be drawn into the West’s hostile relationship with the Muslim world. as well as Azerbaijan. indeed indicating that Russia would ‘provide the “front line” of defence’ against Islamic fundamentalism. had gone on record in expressing their concern over the Islamic threat. which was historically combined with anxiety at a possible Islamic threat and a belief in the feasibility of cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and traditional Islam.10 (A somewhat different assessment of the Russian internal debate points out that the Islamic factor has been most vigorously exploited both by Russian or Slavic-Orthodox nationalists and by the proWestern Atlanticists. in essence. they feared the total alienation of the Muslim areas of the CIS. the sole guarantor of the Rahmonov regime. in their view. Andrei Kozyrev. moreover. i. secular and modernist views of Islam as a geo-cultural threat. They opted rather for friendly relations with the countries of the Middle East. favoured by Yeltsin. Yeltsin’s first Foreign Minister. sought to demonstrate that Russia would be instrumental in bringing the central Asian states closer to the West. It therefore meant allocating to Russia ‘an activist role in the Islamic containment’. where Russia became.8 There was. with serious potential for political challenge to Russia’s interests’. interference in Tajikistan’s affairs would be tolerated.7 According to one scholar. rejected the idea of opposition and hostility towards the Islamic world. Afghan.9 Against these ‘neo-Eurasians’ were the ‘Euro-Atlantists’. and had no desire for an alliance with Washington in a struggle against Islam. the considerable disagreement in Moscow itself over the direction that Russia’s role in the Tajik civil war should take. who took ‘a much more ideological and cultural view of the Islamic factor. On the one hand were the conservative centrists—Foreign Ministry officials and some leaders of the Communist Party. It also enhanced Moscow’s ability to justify and obtain support from the West for ‘an ever-expanding political-military intervention in Tajikistan’. was a necessary projection of conflicting opinions among the Russian political elite on the issue of Russia’s relations with central Asia and the Caucasus and its position regarding ‘the Islamic threat’. To achieve this they were. Moreover. interested in employing the good services of the central Asian states. especially Iran and Turkey. These forces consisted of border guards—comprising a small central Asian contingent from other regional
. They were the heirs of the Russian imperial and Soviet view of central Asia as a legitimate sphere of influence. since all of them. drew ‘heavily from the predominantly Western. This view. notably Kazakhstan.e. advocating a significantly more thorough and sustained containment policy’. the traditional southern flank. Iranian or Pakistani.
15 In addition to its strictly security implications. By autumn 1993 there were 15. which in many ways provided the apologia for its great power status.000. and this number grew by the middle of the decade to 20. on Islam. among others. For the newly independent states of central Asia. the issue under review— the role of Islam in Russia’s relations with the near abroad—has an important emotional aspect. as it were. Islam is an integral part of the national heritage and culture. of an Islamic fundamentalist drive northward. finally reaching Russia itself. although both continued to see in a politicized Islam a threat to their internal stability and to exploit this real or imaginary danger to justify anti-democratic procedures in their respective territories. Islam represents.12 Among the explanations that Moscow gave for its participation in the ongoing fighting in Tajikistan were the alleged participation of Afghans and Tajiks in attacks on Russian troops and. first into Tajikistan. KGB and police personnel from both states remained in the country to help the new government crush all opposition. often based on unsubstantiated or falsified information. deployed in Tajikistan since the Soviet period. (The other main source of concern has been drug trafficking. Russian and Uzbekistani troops helped the hardliners in their final drive on Dushanbe in late 1992.000 Russian troops in Tajikistan. the vestiges of the traditional antagonism between East and West. legitimizing Russia’s historical role as the defender of Christendom and Western civilization against the primitive and sinister aggressiveness of its Asiatic neighbours. above all. then into other Central Asian states’.144 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
states of the CIS—and the Russian army’s 201st Motorized Rifle Division.14 While Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan is extraneous to the theme of our discussion. Russia’s strategic interest in combating Islamic fundamentalism. it is clear that Moscow’s genuine or apparent apprehensions regarding the instability that might easily spill over from that country into neighbouring CIS states have focused. and military.) In the second half of the 1990s.16 Since even autocratic regimes have to beware of totally antagonizing their populations.13 In the words of one Western analyst. they have found
. They therefore differentiate between ‘moderate’ or establishment Islam and attempts at Islamic organization or consolidation beyond the orbit of government control. Uzbekistan’s special relationship with Moscow seemed to weaken. For Russia. despite their official secularism. Karimov’s Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century devotes an entire chapter to ‘great power chauvinism’. The painful associations of [the war in] Afghanistan for many Russians and other citizens of the former Soviet Union’ enabled ‘the combination of the civil war in Tajikistan and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan’ to stimulate ‘repeated alarms. however. in which the author’s main concern is the persistence of Russian imperialism. in contrast.
Moscow. Uzbekistan pulled out of the CIS collective security pact and joined GUAM.) Indeed. which. Ukraine. for its part. as well as Kazakhstan. but President Sapurmurad Niyazov has persistently distanced himself from the regional politics of both Russia and his central Asian neighbours. he claimed.) Tajikistan’s two central Asian neighbours Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.ROLE OF ISLAM IN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 145
themselves walking a rather difficult tightrope and giving considerable publicity to the dangers that Islamic ‘extremism’ poses to social and political stability inside their countries. Despite Karimov’s reservations regarding Russia’s great power chauvinism. The nightmare scenario from Moscow’s point of view would be a link between Islamic forces in central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. was said to be stationed in Kulob in Tajikistan. Already concerned by the constant hazards of the north Caucasian situation. He also told Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that Russia and Uzbekistan faced a common enemy in Wahhabism. one of the leaders of the anti-Taliban coalition. either of which could turn into an anti-Russian jihad. The perils inherent in the region as a result of a possible spillover of the protracted Afghan civil war made them all. Azerbaijan and
. Tashkent and Dushanbe concluded a triple alliance in May 1998 to coordinate efforts in the struggle against extremist tendencies in Islam. The dilemma of the central Asian states emanates from their lack of an effective security apparatus capable of meeting any serious domestic opposition let alone a significant external menace. (Part of the air force of Ahmad Shah Masud. is interested in constraining and localizing conflict to the distant periphery of the CIS and keeping it as far away as possible from its own borders. manifestly dependent on Russia’s goodwill and even concrete military assistance. the association of Georgia. Many observers perceived the civil war in Tajikistan and the continued instability there after the war’s termination in 1996 as a projection of developments in Afghanistan. the Russian Federation certainly does not desire further Islamic influence in the south-east. bringing Karimov’s reservations regarding Russian great power chauvinism to their logical conclusion. (Turkmenistan also has a common border with Afghanistan. however.19 In August 1999.18 or between Islamic forces in Afghanistan and in central Asia.17 Russia. The situation became more complex as of 1998. The Uzbek President said specifically that ‘the threat…coming to us from the south’ was aimed at both Uzbekistan and Russia. provided the ideological underpinning of nationalists in the northern Caucasus and of the opposition in Tajikistan. have all proclaimed their support for decisive action to preserve that country’s territorial integrity. and the family of President Birhanuddin Rabbani to have evacuated to Dushanbe. and particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. the threat of a spillover highlighted the sharing by the regional states and Russia of a common cause of concern.
20 After being elected President in March 2000. in the very same month. Putin continued in the same vein. they now chose to launch
. the fighting began in the mountainous region of Surkhandarya in southern Uzbekistan and soon spread into neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeev thereupon visited Tashkent. where he stated that Russia would send weapons. taking on the form of a regional crisis.146 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Moldova that was designed to constrain Russian imperialism. China. Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev even favoured a pre-emptive strike. Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan. the international terrorist Osama bin Laden and Juma Namangani. to Kyrgyzstan to resolve the crisis. They decided to consolidate ‘military ties for joint strikes against nationalist separatism and religious extremism. In January 2000.21 Karimov’s doubts evidently emanated from fears that Uzbekistan would be the direct victim of the Taliban’s countermeasures to Russian aggression. they did not rule out the bombing of that country in retaliation of an Islamic military offensive. Russia began establishing an air defence network in central Asia to duplicate Western uses of air power for punitive measures in Afghanistan in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999. though not troops. This time. In May. In mid-April the police and security chiefs of the Shanghai Five— Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov asserted that ‘acts of terror and other actions which could damage the interests of Russia and its partners in central Asia are being prepared on the territory of Afghanistan’. At the same time a Kremlin spokesman highlighted an agreement allegedly reached between representatives of the Taliban and of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. internationalist terrorism and the protection of regional security and stability’. and by December 1999 Russia. Indeed. members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan moved into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan from the Karategin Valley in eastern Tajikistan.22 In summer 2000. Yet. relations between Russia and Uzbekistan seemed to have improved. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were actively backing the anti-Taliban alliance in Afghanistan in a bid to keep the radical Sunni militia away from their borders. the IMU struck again. While Karimov and Nazarbaev expressed reservations concerning a Russian pre-emptive strike against Afghanistan as suggested by Moscow. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—agreed that the Taliban constituted a meaningful threat to regional stability. head of the outlawed IMU. Karimov and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev reportedly proposed a programme for fighting terrorism and religious extremism across the CIS.23 The IMU deployed different tactics from those of the previous year: rather than mounting a major offensive. ammunition and other equipment. inducing Kyrgyzstan to approach Moscow for further security cooperation. following Putin’s appointment as Prime Minister. the last three countries together with Kyrgyzstan took part in a meeting with Putin in which they emphasized that their primary concern was combating terrorists and extremists.
Karimov’s theory of Uzbekistan as a wall preventing the spillover of radical Islam into Russia was intended to encourage Russian and Western aid. and on 20 August the leaders of these three states met with Kazakh President Nazarbaev and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov. a list of demands to the Uzbek government. the imposition of Shari’a law and the sanctioning of Muslim dress. Karimov. this contention was designed to justify Russia’s role in solving the crisis. but as soon as speculation started about Afghanistan being the target of the upcoming American attack. in both Russian and Western eyes. as the last barricade preventing militant Islam from marching westwards.ROLE OF ISLAM IN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 147
small-scale incursions and to attack villages and military posts over a larger area. Following 11 September 2001.’25 Putin. the US government embarked on an operation to ‘uproot’ international terrorism. On the same day the Uzbek. and to some extent also Akaev. the Russian government began stating reservations concerning American military involvement in central Asia. I see no reason whatsoever. Karimov also insinuated that a direct link existed between Caucasian Islamic radicals and the IMU. On 14 September 2001. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov pointed out that ‘central Asia is within the zone of competence of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. All five parties pledged the commitment of their governments to take decisive measures to crush ‘terrorist action’.24 The Russians claimed that the insurgents were being successful owing to the poor coordination of the military efforts of Uzbekistan. and that its aim was to destabilize central Asia and increase drug trafficking from Afghanistan. It in no way indicated that he ceased fearing a scenario in which Russia would use the Islamic factor as a pretext to regain a tight grip on central Asian and Uzbek politics. the reopening of all mosques shut down by the Uzbek government. The secretary of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council claimed that the IMU was backed by international terrorist organizations. members of the CIS. even hypothetical. dreading the possibility of the Americans gaining influence in a historically Russian-dominated zone. sought to internationalize the crisis in order to establish themselves. Initially. the IMU announced. the Russian administration expressed its support for the USA and offered to cooperate in the task of combating terror. Russia quickly became involved. Kyrgyz and Tajik governments formed a joint headquarters in the Leninabad/Sugd region of Tajikistan to coordinate their response to the new offensive. for any suppositions about conducting NATO operations from territories of central Asian countries. for his part. including the release of all IMU members imprisoned in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. including Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. dispatched Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo to discuss with the central
. Presumably. On 14 August 2000.
31 It provided a common language for Russia.30 In conclusion. Whether we accept or reject the rhetoric that has accompanied the recurrent joining of forces between the governments of Russia and central Asia in order to counter the ‘threat of Islamic extremism’. Putin declared that Moscow would send weapons to opposition forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and would open its airspace to humanitarian flights by the USled anti-terrorist coalition. the Russians appreciated that they had to loosen their grip on central Asia so as not to be alienated from the international anti-terror campaign. as it
.148 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Asian leaders the issue of granting Washington bases. for a continued Russian presence in central Asia. On 19 September. Karimov’s and Akaev’s pleas to the West for aid in their ‘war on terror’ were now answered with American aid. Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov realized that in order to achieve these objectives. Moscow’s main goal was to depict the Chechen as part of an international terrorist conspiracy. it behoved them to mitigate their approach on the issue of American military deployment in central Asia. stated on 15 October 2001 that Washington did not intend reducing Russian influence in central Asia through its military operations against Afghanistan. US National Security Adviser. As the dust began to settle.26 The Russians also tried to coordinate the global war on terror through the UN and thus deprive NATO of its leading role in the campaign. the American-led campaign against the Taliban regime created new political opportunities. Islam has been an important component in Russia’s relations with the new central Asian states. then.27 On 24 September. the Russian administration began to search for ways to use the new international situation to its advantage. overflight rights and intelligence sharing.28 Although Condoleeza Rice. and hinted that Moscow would not object to the USA using air bases in central Asia. if not a reason. To quote one scholar: ‘the use of labels like “fundamentalist” and “Wahhabi” and playing on unpleasant memories of the war in Afghanistan are a significant factor in encouraging uncritical alarmism about the purported Muslim menace’ and goad Russia into playing a more confrontational role not only in the northern Caucasus but also in central Asia. For the central Asian leaders. Ivanov said that every member country of the CIS had the right to decide for itself whether to allow other countries or alliances to make use of military bases on its territory. In addition to being conducive to the letting up of pressure regarding their abuses of human rights. there is no way of denying that Islam played a central role in creating a pretext.29 The possibility of a military alliance with the Americans would also provide an alternative for the central Asian governments who had been strongly dependent on the Russo-Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the Shanghai Five changed its name when Uzbekistan joined the pact in June 2001).
p. 1997). in Sovremennyi islam: kul’tura i politika (Moscow. 1995). all consider their stability to be endangered by developments in Afghanistan. 2. Mohiaddin Mesbahi. New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge. particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. ‘Tajikistan: Reform. Atkin.
. 9. NOTES
1. vol. 1997). 261. Also Lena Jonson. pp. p. p. as they seek to consolidate themselves and adopt the form of government they consider most viable politically. 2000. and Civil War’. Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century (Richmond. ‘Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence’. 2. no. 190. Mohiaddin Mesbahi. in Michael Bourdeaux (ed. no. 8. V. 8.V. In summer 2002 the question is whether and how Russia will recover its leadership role if and when the US lets up its newly won position in central Asia. 12. 2. 147. pp. Politics and Bogeyman in Tajikistan’. Central Asian Survey. 6. 1. 262–3. 11. vol. politics and bogeyman’. 22–6. ‘Islam as Faith. Irina Zviagelskaia. For details of Russia’s involvement in Tajikistan. ‘Islam as faith. Muriel Atkin. New States. 2. 10–12. ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus’. The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (London.ROLE OF ISLAM IN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 149
forged its policy towards the near abroad. ‘Rossiia i Islam’. p. New States. 16. 7. 10. 3. And until September 2001 only Russia seemed likely. 1997). Central Asia and the Caucasus. to be able to save them from any such menace. for its part. The central Asian states. 156. 124. and Islam Karimov. no. p. Tsentral’naia Aziia. 1994). and the local.). pp.. in Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras (eds). see Muriel Atkin. vol. in Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras (eds). p. Iran and the International Politics of the “Islamic Factor”’. p. Iran and the International Politics of the “Islamic Factor”’. Gregory Gleason. where the Islamic threat’ is deemed most real. 1998. in their view. The party’s participation in government was the outcome of the compromise reached between President Rahmon Nabiev—another former republican first secretary (1982–85)—and the opposition in spring 1992.Naumkin. and The Rhetoric of Islamophobia’. 613. The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia (London. 87. New Politics: Building the PostSoviet Nations (Cambridge. 157. Moscow. 590. This chapter relates only to Russia’s relations with the new states of former Soviet central Asia. Reaction. Central Asian Survey. 1993. ‘Tajikistan. Ibid. p. pp. ‘Politika Rossii v Tsentral’noi Azii na primere Tadzhikistana’. 5. 1997. 146–7. Mesbahi. no. was only too keen to encourage and build up this image. p. 1995). central Asian regimes. 4. ‘Tajikistan. Surrey.
Resolution and Change (Chevy Chase. ‘ZThe Rhetoric of Islamophobia’. ‘The Rhetoric of Islamophobia’. 25. 24. p. Radio Free Europe (hereafter RFE). 127. p. RFE/RL Weekday Magazine. Ro’i. Newsline. 2001) p.150 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
12. esp. 27. Turkistan Newsletter. 8. 15. Atkin. According to Russian sources. 34–9. 30. see above. MD. See RFE/RL. Vladimir Socor. pp. 11. 29. ‘Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: in Search of a Strategy’. ‘Is Putin Picking a Fight with Afghanistan?’. Atkin. Viacheslav Nikonov. 79–80. Uzbekistan on the Threshold. 1995). Steve LeVine and Owen Matthews. In the early 1990s. ‘Politika Rossii v Tsentral’noi Azii’. were among the proponents of this position. later became ‘rebel’ field commanders. 17 September. 129. 193. 125. Western news agencies reported that Putin placed a telephone call to President Bush on 12 September 2002 offering him assistance in the fight against terror and instructed his staff to assist the Americans. 4. p. 22 June 2000. Politics and Bogeyman’. Theodore Karasik. 1 and 3 September and 10 December 1999 and 26 January 2000. as quoted in Turkistan Newsletter. 28 September 2001. the Russian security services claimed to have information proving that one of the terrorists involved in the 11 September bombings in the USA had participated in the Chechen war. 2001. 21 September. Newsline. 24 September 2001. Ibid. 14. Islam in the CIS.
. For Karimov’s position. Wahhabism is an epithet widely used in Moscow and elsewhere to depict Islamic extremism. They also contended that Chechen militants were linked to Arab finance and had ties to bin Laden. 23. See Sodruzhestvo NG. The accuracy of the term is irrelevant to our study. The agreement followed a declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization several months before that called for the establishment of an anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek to host a joint Sino-Russian military force. 22. no. such as Salman Raduev. Kyrgyzstan’s agreed to grant the USA access to an airbase near Bishkek in order to assist anti-terrorist operations. 6. in Roald Z. vol. 1997. Central Asia: Conflict. was to receive US$160 million in 2002. 2001. 20. p. 31 January 2002. Atkin. 57. Uzbekistan. 17. 20 September. 31 August. Tsentral’naia Aziia. See also RFE/RL. 4. 2. no. for example. Kadir Alimov. p. 13. Wall Street Journal Europe. 2001. no. 28. 5 June 2000. 7. See RFE/Radio Liberty (hereafter RL). Two veterans of the Afghan war. Yaacov Ro’i. 263. pp. Newsline. an increase of US$100 million from previous years. 19. 1998. 18. ch. RFE/RL Weekday Magazine. 13 September. 21. The establishment of the US base in Bishkek. 127. Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Aleksandr Lebed’. 16. some of whom. vol. vol.Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower (eds). 78. 2001. Islam in the CIS: A Threat to Stability? (London. Newsweek. pp. Karimov. hundreds of young Chechens and Dagestanis were said to have studied in underground medreses in the town of Namangan in the Ferghana Valley. ‘Russian Threat to Strike Afghanistan Tests Central Asian Partners’. ‘Islam as Faith. 26.
27 February 2002. The Rhetoric of Islamophobia’. 31. p. biweekly briefing. Atkin. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.
. 132.ROLE OF ISLAM IN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 151
along with other US military cooperation agreements with central Asian states. blocks the establishment of a Sino-Russian condominium in central Asia.
The other one has to do with ethnogeography: post-Soviet Russia shifted much of its attention and inputs from the Arab-Israeli zone and refocused them on two countries that had not been Soviet allies during the years of Soviet-American confrontation: Turkey and Iran. for his part. adding that ‘economic diplomacy is coming to the fore in our foreign policy’ and that Russia should enter the world market where it can be most competitive: the armaments market. To be precise. The Soviet’s leap-frogging over them into the Arab world.14 Russia in the Middle East: The Yeltsin Era and Beyond1
In his address to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 12 May 1998. resulted not only from the rising opportunities within the Arab nationalist regimes but also from the uninviting political circumstances in these two nations.2 While this statement is quite revealing as to the Russian conduct towards the Middle East (and for that matter other regions of the world) in the last decade of the century. in the last 20 years of its existence. while the revolutionary regime that followed him showed. The task of Russian foreign policy. Prioritizing economic imperatives over strategic goals is just one of two notable reversals of the Soviet Cold War perspective regarding that area. it is certainly not the whole story. had been a strategic ally of the USA. was to remedy this disproportion. said Yeltsin. at times. before he was overthrown by the Islamic revolution. maybe for the first time during the Cold War. that breaking with Washington did not mean an automatic affinity with Moscow. had concentrated their political. while the Soviet Union had been working hard—and with some degree of success—to improve its relationship with Ankara and Teheran. ‘a military might placed on a not very solid economic foundation’. as of the mid-1950s. Turkey has been a constant member of NATO and a founding member of the regional anti-Soviet military alliance. The Shah of Iran. the tsarist empire. military pressures on these two states. as well as the pre-Second-WorldWar Soviet Union.
. Historically speaking. viewing them as the gatekeepers to the area. One might argue that there is nothing new in Russia’s perception of Turkey and Iran as the two most essential countries in the region. President Boris Yeltsin argued that Russia had inherited from the Soviet Union a ‘unidimensional power’ namely. diplomatic and.
MIG-29 combat airplanes and T-72C tanks. Russia is willing now to go ahead with a lucrative deal.5 What is less clear is the nature and volume of Russian involvement in the lucrative Iranian military. allowing the Iranians to assemble. has provided Russia with hundreds of millions of dollars of loans in order to boost Turkish exports. all along. To begin with. and probably for individual Russians. primarily textile products.4 Likewise. In November 2000. This pattern vanished together with the Cold War. Post-Soviet Russia values these newly found regional acquaintances for reasons of economics and politics. Reportedly. and the Russian civilian nuclear industry has already completed the construction of an US$800 million nuclear reactor in Busher and signed agreements for three more. In 1997. Iran is reportedly working hard on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. for its part. Turkey and Iran have re-emerged as the centre of Russian regional attention. capable of servicing their commercial debts. although not necessarily for the old historical motives. risking US sanctions. US and Israeli sources claim that there is a constant flow of technology and technological know-how from the Russian military industrial complex and scientific establishment to the Iranian military projects. Russia informed the US government that it had decided to withdraw from a secret understanding. and the opportunities that it offers seem irresistible to Russian economic planners. The Russian military industry has in recent years supplied to Iran four Kilo-type submarines. Ankara. Turkey and Iran are its largest and most lucrative trading partners in the area. to Russia. between Vice-President Al Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to stop conventional arms sales to Iran (implementation of existing contracts was excluded). Russia continues to covet the Iranian conventional arms market.3 Turkey has also become the first member of NATO to purchase some Russian military hardware.RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 153
the strategic relationship with the Arab client states nonetheless remained. for US$4 billion. under licence. named Blue Stream. Furthermore. projects. the focal point of Soviet conduct in the region. A 750-mile pipeline. not to mention granting Russia convenient lines of credit. from 1995. nuclear and ballistic missile. the volume of Russian-Turkish trade reached US $10 billion. In 1998. which could significantly shorten the time that Iran would need to acquire weapon-usable fissile material. not to
. is being laid on the Black Sea bed (construction started in February 2000) Blue Stream will link the southern Russian town of Izobil’noe to Ankara and increase the sale of Russian natural gas from 7 billion cubic metres a year to 30 billion by 2010. In the reality of a cashstarved Russian economy and the imperative to keep industries—the defence industries included—going. Moscow and Ankara signed a US$20 billion agreement to supply Russian natural gas to Turkey. this must be an overwhelming consideration. the Iranian economy has become a fountainhead of hard currency for Russia.
Iran tested the Shehab-3 medium-range missile. Thus far. Syria and
. the volume of trade and cash flow do not tell the whole story. though the potential of the Israeli economy continues to attract attention in Russia. no serious conflict has developed between Russia and these two nations related to that geographic web. nevertheless. as its economy is bigger than the economies of Egypt. On the other hand. top providers of sophisticated weapon technology and material to Iran.9 As a veteran Russian expert on the Middle East said recently: ‘We want commercial relations with Israel. Russian defence industries have been shopping for markets in the Gulf States. it has ranged between US$300 and US $700 million annually. however. Also. no major political drive into these lands was evident on the part of Ankara. particularly in the case of Tajikistan. if not collaboration. though for diversified reasons. only with limited success. but unlike in the case of Turkey and Iran. With the exception of some limited Turkish political involvement in Azerbaijan and intrinsic sensitivity towards the Chechen crises. which allegedly is unauthorized and peddled by private and individual interests. It should be borne in mind that Russia has strongly pursued its claim to include these former Soviet territories in the realm of its security and political interests. some degree of Iranian acquiescence. Thus far. its effectiveness remains doubtful as we are dealing with an extremely profitable business. The volume of trade between the two countries has never reached the levels of that with Turkey or Iran. where it managed to conclude a US$3 billion deal. Russia’s only real achievement is with the United Arab Emirates. they do not seem to have been effective. these two Muslim neighbours are potentially contenders as well as possible collaborators with Russia in the competition for influence in the ethnic/religious mix of central Asia and the Caucasus.8 Israel is another case in point. offer Russia lucrative trade opportunities. allowed the administration to impose sanctions on ten Russian firms and their scientists who are. allegedly. The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. with Russian interests was manifest. Russia regards Turkey and Iran as priority countries not the least because their interests and its own are intertwined in an area and issues that extend beyond the scope of this chapter: the politics and oil economics of central Asia and the Caucasus.6 Nonetheless.154 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
mention that twice. The Russian government claims that it has done its best to curb that flow. Jordan. The economic perceptions and considerations of these two nations regarding that regional context are often not agreeable to Moscow. If measures were indeed taken. As Kuwait cannot be regarded as a novice to Russian armaments. signed by US President Bill Clinton on 15 March. in 2000. Of course.7 The conspicuous shift in Russian priorities towards Turkey and Iran is concomitant with overtures towards other countries of the region which have no recent record of any significant relationship with the Soviet Union but may.
has been epitomized by fairly unsuccessful attempts to rebuild its leverage on regional politics. the first one had appeared in the last years of the Soviet Union and lasted for about two years after the implosion. It was embodied by open. The contraction of Moscow’s empire. This vibrant and still growing community is actively contributing to thriving and multifaceted relations between Russia and Israel. The volume of diverse Soviet activities and military presence is almost all gone.13 Notwithstanding. since 1992 we have seen two versions of Russian behaviour in that zone of the Middle East. particularly towards the Arab and Arab-Israeli zone of the Middle East. certainly dwarfed in comparison with the pre-1992 levels. for American regional policies. with the concomitant shrinkage of the Russian power projection and political influence capabilities. reinforcing Russia’s claim to be a legitimate party to the peace process.RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 155
Lebanon put together. by discarding regional confrontation with the USA. the Kildin. in a sense. This line was initiated by the team of President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and culminated with the Russian vote in the UN Security Council to authorize the military measures against Iraq. since 1992. if somewhat reluctant support.’10 More essential to the relationship between Moscow and Jerusalem are the 1 million former Soviet citizens who have emigrated to Israel in the past 30 years. from its Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol. While the demise of the Soviet Union led the new Russia to reprioritize its bilateral relations with the countries of the region. What Russia actually lost is the political and military leverage previously enjoyed by the Soviet Union in that part of the Middle East. it would be wrong to argue that Moscow lost its interest either in the Arab world in general or in the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular. Having experienced the role of Israel. has created a vacuum. a power broker in Israeli electoral politics. leaning primarily towards Turkey and Iran. Nonetheless. Furthermore. This mass of Russian-speaking emigrants has become the largest ex-Soviet diaspora in the world. Russian leaders appear to perceive Israel as capable of influencing the US government and Congress. as well as by exercises in redefining the legitimacy of its claim. on the issue of freedom of emigration for Soviet Jewry during the Cold War. The team of
. Russia’s conduct. Russia has not given up its long-harboured claim to the status of a Middle Eastern power. the other goes beyond that and is more elusive.12 In February 2000. they have become. To be precise. with the mission of monitoring the situation in the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Generally speaking.11 Russia attains two main political benefits from the newly discovered acquaintance with Israel: one is regional. and of the American-Jewish community. Russia sent another signal of interest by dispatching an intelligence ship. The Russian navy has kept its access contract to the port facilities of Tartus in Syria (the only other ‘foreign base’ that it still contracts is in the Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam).
which was obvious in a spectrum far broader than the Middle East. who had no intention of reversing the reform line as demanded by the communists. Nevertheless. was of little political help to Yeltsin as the December 1995 elections resulted in a communist-dominated Duma. Almost simultaneously it called for the termination of the sanctions against Libya. Russian participation in the signing ceremonies of the Oslo Accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993. giving its blessing to the US-sponsored efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and terminate the formal state of war between Israel and Jordan. For the first time. In addition to its inherent disdain towards American muscle-flexing in the Gulf. its ceremonial participation in the peace process was acceptable to all the pertinent partners: the US government. A more regional perspective may have been to get Russia to subscribe to political arrangements that it might otherwise challenge in the unforeseeable future. Furthermore. Actually. Jordan and the Palestinians. Washington probably had in mind encouraging the Yeltsin regime to continue along the path of economic reforms and strengthening him against his—and Kozyrev’s—domestic critics. In view of the growing criticism to the effect that a submissive Russia was trying to please the USA. the latter was already perceived by the opposition as the epitome of humility before the West. These domestic pressures started to show in Yeltsin’s policies on a variety of subjects.14 (The sanctions against Libya were indeed cancelled in 1999. enabling them to resume arms purchases from Moscow. dictated the need for more vigorous international behaviour. not to mention service their debts from the Soviet period. was somewhat pathetic. and later in the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in Aqaba in October 1994. it was becoming harder and harder to cling to the ‘pro-American’ line. Israel. which did not go unnoticed at home. By bringing Russia in. made one significant concession to the ‘red brown’ majority in the Duma:
.156 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev continued along the same path. By then. popular resentment against the liberal economic reforms. estimated at US$7 billion in the case of Iraq and US$3 billion in the case of Libya. In the Middle East the change became evident in 1994. At that time the nationalist and communist opponents of the President were vexing Kozyrev on a whole range of foreign policy issues. Yeltsin. combined with the prospect of the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995.) The new look of Russian foreign policy. the story of Russian foreign conduct since then cannot be conveyed without appreciating the interaction between internal political constraints and external needs. Russia has an obvious economic interest in abolishing the UN sanctions against these two countries. Russia called for the lifting of the international sanctions against Baghdad and denounced the American bombing of Iraq that year. Despite the weakening of Russia’s regional muscles.
16 In November of that year. as soon as it became clear to the Syrians that Russia was no longer prepared to provide the generous credit for the Syrian purchase that had been customary during the Soviet
. the Palestinian Authority and the neighbouring countries. matching the American emissary Dennis Ross. Primakov organized 1997 as a year of pilgrimage by senior Middle Eastern dignitaries to Moscow: Chairman Yasser Arafat. which did not pay off as well: it was the pretence that Russia was still a superpower with good leverage on regional politics. Primakov arrived in the area twice. Primakov appointed the late Viktor Posuvaliuk as special envoy to the Middle East. trying to persuade Syria and Iran to terminate their support for the Hizballah. as if statements of intention. which enabled him. in early 1998 and again in 1999. to claim the credit for playing a pivotal role in delaying a military showdown with Iraq. in November 1996 and October 1997. which had first emerged in 1994. and at first it seemed as if the old friendship between Moscow and Damascus had been fully restored. This was the first visit of the Syrian President to the Russian capital since the collapse of the Soviet Union. the Lebanese Premier. displaying his ability to provide good services on the basis of real or imaginary Russian leverage over Syria. a kind of mediator status. This stance gave Russia. However.15 On a different occasion. in May 1997. and Primakov personally. Russia’s strong and explicit opposition to unilateral American military measures against Iraq. manifesting itself in October 1997. Nonetheless. a show of activity and much diplomatic motion would suffice to bring business back to usual. The two years following his appointment as Foreign Minister witnessed an increased volume of Russian diplomatic activity in this zone. impressing upon observers that Moscow could still pull some strings. the compensation for not withdrawing from the path of reforms was found in a more independent-minded foreign policy which catered to nationalist sentiments. Primakov lost no time in projecting the image of renewed Russian activism in the Arab-Israeli space. A US$2 billion arms deal was discussed between the sides. at least in 1998. became constant. he was reported to have intervened in the Lebanese crisis. Reportedly. in the latter visit. there was another dimension to his conduct towards the area.RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 157
he replaced Kozyrev with Evgenii Primakov as Russia’s Foreign Minister. In a way. visiting Israel. the Syrian Foreign Minister. Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak all arrived in the Russian capital. which took place after Primakov’s brief term as Prime Minister (from September 1998 to his dismissal by Yeltsin on 12 May 1999). The limits to this ‘photo-op’ policy were particularly evident in the case of President Assad’s visit to Moscow in July 1999. Primakov’s ascendancy was felt immediately across the board. Prime Minister Netanyahu. In the Middle East. he transmitted messages between Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad.
Lebanon.20 Russia remains consistent in pursuing its historical claim while acknowledging that its leverage in the area is greatly reduced.19 It goes without saying that Yeltsin’s resignation from the presidency in December 1999 hardly changed this pattern. Primakov’s fanfare style has gone. During the violent events that took place between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in October and November 2000. Primakov’s dismissal as Prime Minister had no effect on Russia’s interest in the Arab world in general or in the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular.17 Furthermore. indeed. if a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement is concluded in the foreseeable future. an element of innovation is apparent as well. Ivanov twice arrived in the region. Egypt and Syria to discuss with them the troubled peace process. Naturally. Tsarist Russia claimed strategic and religious concerns. the euphoria dissipated. As Syrian debt to Russia is estimated at US$10–13 billion. visiting Syria.18 it does not seem that the Russian economy will receive significant cash injections from trading with Syria. later that month. Israel and the Palestinian areas. it can no longer argue in the name of anti-imperialism. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov telephoned the Foreign Ministers of Israel. President Yeltsin indicated to him that Russia was interested in a central role in the peace process. did not enhance Moscow’s regional stature. Adapting an Arab proverb: Primakov’s tongue was by far longer than his hands. To be sure.158 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
period. since postcommunist Russia has discarded its global confrontation with the West. during the visit to Moscow of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak shortly after his election. Syria will probably be inclined to switch alliances and turn to the USA for arming its military forces. Those who seek some sense of mission. Neither intense diplomatic activity nor even Primakov’s personal skills at statesmanship could have transformed Russia’s current predicament. but Russia’s basic claim to be involved in regional politics remains. which had been so evident in Tsarist and Soviet foreign policies. offering again his good services in promoting the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. disregarding the fact that Russian ability to influence political developments in the area had sunk to its lowest ebb since the mid-1950s. might perceive Yeltsin’s visit to Jerusalem to celebrate the
. the long and almost uninterrupted sequence of Russian interest in the Middle East since the nineteenth century is obvious. looking for some role for Russia in the diplomatic efforts to reinstate the peace process. The concept of historical claim suggests continuity. Primakov’s predilection for trumpeting an imminent Russian comeback to the Middle East and his fondness for making hollow statements. To cite just one example. Although similarities to the past can be discerned in the way that the new Russia is making its case for the Middle East. while the Soviet Union emphasized strategic and ideological considerations. In February 2000. and. Moscow co-hosted the multilateral Middle East talks and.
The focus is no longer on the nature of the polity in a specific country but on purely commercial considerations. In all likelihood Russia will continue to conduct itself according to its distinct interests. in our times. while being reminiscent of nineteenth-century Russian claims. as well as the volatile religious/ ethnic web inside Russia and within its defence perimeter in central Asia
. what emerges from the text of the Concept. this is a glaring departure from the solidarity with the Arab ‘revolutionary’ regimes. interested in curing its ailing economy and worried about external instability. This document became available just a few days after President Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly in Moscow. Although there had always been some economic angle to Soviet courting of the Arab nations. the daunting economic crisis facing Russia.RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 159
Orthodox Christmas. Perhaps the best way to understand current Russian conceptions on a variety of international issues is to consult the official materials. conflicting occasionally with the interests of other Western nations (such as competition for the area’s arms markets) and manifesting its disdain towards any show of force on the part of the USA. is that. Putin makes it clear that the Concept ‘stipulates the supremacy of internal objectives over external ones…[and] that this policy is based on pragmatism. presumably. either in this area or anywhere else in the world. Having said that. several days after his resignation from the presidency. He singles out ‘international terrorism and the direct attempt to move this threat inside the country’ as a major challenge to Russia’s ‘state sovereignty. what transpires is that Russia’s top objective in that geographical space is political stabilization for the purpose of forestalling the spillover of political and military crises endemic to the region into the volatile areas of central Asia and the Caucasus. Relating specifically to the Middle East. in its richer countries. Adding to that goal Russian economic interest in the richness of that area. economic efficiency and priority of national objectives’. How would this perspective affect the future conduct of Russia in the Arab Middle East? There is no reason to believe that Russia will revert to the tamed policies of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze or the Yeltsin-Kozyrev teams. Consequently. as signalling a renewed religious attachment and interest of Russia in the Holy Land. outlining Russian objectives in the international arena in general and in the Middle East in particular. in general terms. Nevertheless. Vladimir Putin’s government published its newly approved Foreign Policy Concept. the Concept presents a regional approach profoundly different from the past Soviet perspective. inside Russia and out. first and foremost.21 Both texts are quite instructive of the new perspective guiding current Russian thinking on the outside world. in its ‘near abroad’. Russia is an inwardly looking country. the argument of religious affinity cannot be as effective a policy tool at the beginning of the twenty-first century. territorial integrity’. In July 2000.
Turkey. Reuters. pp. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL). the new Russia is more likely to seek an alliance with the existing order. no. 3. Afghanistan is not just a bitter memory of the Soviet defeat. as well as maintaining its influence in the newly independent southern republics. portends strong antipathy towards Muslim extremism. Moscow. 3. the new leadership of Russia will continue to take an active interest in the Middle East but is not likely soon to regain the leverage on regional politics enjoyed by the Soviet Union. when any revolutionary wind was perceived as a threat to its autocratic regime. which made its inroads into the Arab world by challenging the existing Western-oriented political order and supporting the revolutionary trend. then.160 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
and the Caucasus. shying away from extremism. from fundamental extremists. not to mention Chechnya. and to its ability to project influence into the southern ‘near abroad’. 25 August 1998. 5. Moscow. Unlike its predecessor the Soviet Union. Reuters. Turkey. 1–6. International Affairs. Samuel Huntington projected a more conflictual relationship between the (Russian-led) Orthodox and the Muslim civilizations in the twenty-first century.Nogee. 25 November 1998 and 2 February 1999. Enduring Patterns (New York. economic ailments and intermittent threats to the territorial integrity of the motherland. A very real threat to the stability in central Asia. Washington. 28 November 2000. AFP.
. Moscow. (Russia’s interest in stability in the core of the Muslim world may be analogous to tsarist interest in maintaining the conservative order in Europe throughout the nineteenth century. NOTES
1. is still emanating from this country. 1998. Agence France-Press (hereafter AFP).) In sum. Robert H. augur strong Russian interest in a politically stable Middle East. AFP.Donaldson and Joseph L. portend the supremacy of the domestic perspective in Russian decision making towards the Middle East in the foreseeable future. 23 October 2000.22 Soviet and Russian experiences with assertive Islamic orientations have been rather traumatic. 18 August 1999. Furthermore. pp. 28 November 2000. 27 August 1998. Reuters. which is likely to remain a ‘bleeding wound’ for a long time to come. ‘President Yeltsin’s address to Russian diplomats’. Istanbul. 44. 2. 1998). vol. While the imperatives of the Russian economy dictate prioritizing relations with the oil-wealthy Arab countries. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems. See also Shai Feldman. the agenda of preserving its integrity as one nation-state. 254–6. The preparation of this article was made possible by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. 4.
no. Russian Ambassador to Israel. 13. Ha’aretz. 29 January and 17 July 1999. Donaldson and Nogee. Analysis of Current Events. 22 March 1998.
19. Moscow. 15 November 2000. 12–16. Washington. Ma’ariv. Washington. 8 July 1999. Ha’aretz.Freedman. pp. Johnson’s Russia List. Kiev. April 1998. 5 February 1999. 14. ‘Brown Bag’ lunch presentation. 17. 13 September 1999. vol. 11 June 1998. Teheran.
The Return of the Russian Bear’. Spring 1998. pp. 1. 3 August 1999. 20. Washington. 10 August 1999. Ha’aretz. pp. Samuel P. ‘Russia and Israel under Yeltsin’. 3 August 1999. Reuters. Alexei Vasilev. Moscow. 261. 1. The discussion is based on the following documents: ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’. Analysis of Current Events. and the Elections in Israel’. Reuters. Reuters. 15 November 2000. Tel Aviv University. 16. AFP. 1999. 12–16. 20 July 1999. 23 July 1999.
22.RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 161
6. Ha’aretz. New York Times. Ha’aretz.
8. ‘Russia and the States of the Middle East/Political Economic Relations’ (in Hebrew). 17 December 1998.
15. 7 and 10 July 1999. 10 October 2000. Research Department. Feldman. Reuters. 3 August 1999. Najam Abbas. Reuters. 13–15. ‘Russian President’s Address to Federal Assembly’. vol. 8 February. The Return of the Russian Bear’. ‘A Marriage of Convenience: The Emerging Tactical Alliance Between Iran and Russia’. 1999. Israel Studies. 11. Damascus. 9 July 2000. Reuters. 140–69. 9. Russian ambassador to Israel. Russian Ambassador to Israel. Oded Eran. Moscow. BBC Monitoring Service. 5/6. 10 Decmber 1998. Robert O.
7.Huntington. Moscow. reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List. Ha’aretz. Ha’aretz. 6 October 2000 (including a statement by American Secretary for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn). 2. 2. 5/6. ‘Russian Immigrants. p. Reuters. ‘Russia and the States of the Middle East’. Moscow. The Foreign Policy of Russia. Moscow. 3 August 1999. Reuters. AFP. Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies. Ha’aretz. no. Russia. no. 10–12. Ibid. 21. 12. 5 February 2000. 3. 16 February 2000. Columbia University.
. pp. The Middle Eastern Institute. 15 November 2000. vol. 10 July 2000. Itar-Tass. Strategic Assessment. AFP. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York. 1997). 23 February 2000. New York Times. 1. Reuters. 15 November 2000. Interview with Vice-Admiral Victor Patrushev. Russian ambassador to Israel.
10. (unpublished ms) Israeli Foreign Ministry. 29 January. April 1999. pp. and Moscow. 14 July 2000.
18. translation from IRA Novosti.
Part V: Rethinking the Far East
the second largest nationality in Russia. Japanese management would be considered Europeanization regardless of Japan’s geographical location.15 Russia between Europe and Asia: Some Aspects of Russia’s Asian Policy
MIKHAIL G. Russia in that sense is making attempts to correlate its state structure in accordance with universal ethics and principles. In the Asian part of Russia. Historically. African and Latin American cultures. which itself is contending with a blend of Asian. Many consider Russia to be a European country. for Russia. but rather follows the Japanese definition of internationalization. while others think it is a part of Asia.
. Russia passed through a long period of evolution from a system of state and economic management that was purely of Asian origin towards the basic principles of European state structure. ‘when Peter the Great opened a window on Europe he attached European hands to Russia’s Asian body’. At the same time. the European part of Russia is also inhabited by Tatars. the majority are Slavs. or considers itself as belonging. culture and mentality belong to Europe. As the father of Russian Marxism Georgii Plekhanov said in 1889. or. Bashkirs and many other nationalities which by their origin. At present the concept of Europeanization no longer carries the connotation of detachment from Asian traditions. to the Slavs. how that identity is perceived by the outside world. where only about 21 per cent of the Russian population live. In September 1999. However. as well as by Chyvashes. Thus. More than a century later the process of Russia’s ‘Europeanization’ is still under way. although the percentage of Asians is higher there than in the European part of the country. In Russia the prevalence of European culture is intimately connected with the obvious domination of Orthodox Slavic culture which leans strongly towards Europe. It is quite obvious that Russia will pursue its orientation towards European culture. while 21 per cent identify themselves with Asia. a poll conducted by Moscow radio revealed that 79 per cent of Russians consider Russia to be a European country. culture and religion are Asian. This reflects the situation in which the majority of the population belongs.NOSOV
One of Russia’s problems is that of identity. who by language. to be more precise.
Despite some successes in its relations with China and Japan. has a real chance to become the spiritual and economic bridge connecting Europe and Asia. by virtue of its unique geographical position and ethnic peculiarities. it means enhancing relations with the USA and Europe as well as opposing NATO’s enlargement accordingly. Unfortunately. In fact there are no Asian countries on the list of its principal creditors. Europe and Asia have been trying for a long time to institutionalize a process of cultural and economic interaction. by virtue of its geographical and ethnic characteristics. The threat posed by NATO’s extension in the West is far more acute. Russia lacks the will to legitimize its position. but mainly because of Russia’s participation in the integration processes taking place on both continents and the creation of the preconditions for their broad interaction. This is not only because Russia can promote a greater understanding of Asia in Europe and Europe in Asia. market. It is vital to create conditions in which not only Russia will be interested in expanding its interaction with the external world. Russian policy has been oriented towards the West. which is devoted to enhancing the dialogue between the two continents. Russia’s diplomatic efforts were mainly aimed at Europe and America. These efforts are taking place through the channels of bilateral ties and by the means of a new organization ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). Russia’s prime goal is an unceasing attempt to bring the USA and European countries to take the interests of Russia into consideration. while Russia’s share of Asian trade does not exceed 1 per cent. the Russian government has little concern for the problems of regional security. but the world too will seek partnership with Russia. In many respects this lack of involvement is the result of the persistent Eurocentric orientation of Russian policy. In view of its strong defence posture on the Far East. although. it could play an important role in it. In a situation in which the economic factor can adversely affect the level of relations between countries. specifically European. What is the driving force behind Russia’s Eurocentrism? Obviously Asia is still far from becoming a high priority issue in Russian foreign policy. This process runs against a background of Russia’s gradual loss of its economic and political leverage. In economic terms it is associated with Russia’s efforts to seek integration into the global.
. All these circumstances combine to downgrade the Asian element of Russian foreign policy. Russia does not participate in the activity of ASEM. Since 1992. This development is first and foremost important for Russia itself. Russia’s trade with Asian countries is less than 10 per cent of its turnover. Those objectives barely touch on Russia’s economic relations with Asia.164 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Russia. In political and military terms. Having acquired formal membership in regional organizations. The dualism of Russia’s Eurasian stance strongly influences its foreign policy.
Source: Calculated on the basis of B.
Table 15. 10. Unfortunately. Therefore. advanced means of space communication and a vast territory. Such a bridge evidently requires a firm economic basis. An upswing in trade would further Russia’s political and cultural ties with both Europe and Asia. no. contributing to the deterioration of the situation in the Russian Far East.RUSSIA BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA 165
However. it is obvious that a stable balance between the ‘European’ and ‘Asian’ policies should be achieved. pp. It might help the Russian economy. 122–3. 118–19. to recuperate. and the Asia-Pacific region. especially the Russian Far East. this would facilitate a balance of political priorities. conveyance by the Trans-Siberian Railway has dropped more than sevenfold compared with 1991. The shortest route from Europe to Asia lies through Russia. Russia’s collaboration on the Eurasian bridge project would galvanize the economy of the regions housing the transport arteries and increase trade between Russia. which could control the conveyance of goods all the way from producers to recipients. Russia’s assets include a developed transportation network. 126–7. now at a low ebb following a lengthy period of poorly planned reforms which have particularly affected the Russian Far East. Transportation and communication could become key elements of such a policy. The benefit of a transport bridge is beyond doubt: transit deliveries account for more than 40 per cent of the total amount of service export in the Netherlands. or Tokyo and Berlin—diplomatic initiatives should be promoted in both directions. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. Bolotin ‘International Comparison: 1990–1997’.1 Changes in economic indicators of four Pacific countries. 1998. This does not mean having to choose between London and Beijing. The shortest route between the two continents—the Great Northern Route—may thus be an important element of a Eurasian bridge.
. if Russia were to become a bridge connecting Europe and Asia.
The identity and perception of the East was no less multilayered. the economic success of the ‘Asian tigers’ stood in stark contrast to Russia’s continued struggle to come to terms with modernity and modernization. it was Russia itself that sought to become emblematic of this tendency. however. Although India would play a role in such a version of the East. in the East.16 Putin’s Foreign Policy: Transforming ‘the East’
INTRODUCTION The debate over Russian foreign policy in the 1990s tended to focus on a single stark polarity: Atlanticism versus Eurasianism. as would the effective exploitation of the energy reserves on Sakhalin.1 The third East is a geo-ideological one in which the East represents not only a spiritual alternative to Western materialism but a broader alternative to the West in general. The West was susceptible to a number of geographical and ideological interpretations: geographically. While the West may have been dominated by America. At least three Easts can be identified. with recognition that the Pacific Rim had overtaken the Atlantic basin as the centre of global economic activity and increasing prosperity. This in turn was a debate over the attitude towards and meaning of ‘West’ and ‘East’. With the accession of Vladimir Putin to the acting presidency in December 1999. and the rhetoric of a Sino-Russian ‘strategic partnership’ was an attempt to establish a counter-balance to an increasingly fraught relationship with the West. there was a tension between the American and the European versions. The main actor here was China. the conceptualization of both East and West
. The chronic under-development of the Russian Far East would require investment from Asian countries. Russia could reaffirm itself as a great power. Despite the economic crisis in the region in the late 1990s. above all Japan. The first saw the East as a zone of geopolitical contestation and affirmation. A second interpretation of the East focused more on geo-economics. while the ideological ambiguity of the West was reflected above all in the tension between perceptions of the West as a military (primarily NATO) identity or as a zone of capitalist prosperity.
in particular under Kozyrev. both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister. A blueprint for the new ‘third wayism’ was offered by Sergei Karaganov’s Council for Foreign and Defence Policy in a document. the fruit of 14 months of discussion between numerous working groups encompassing some 100 individuals. At its base was an attempt to negotiate a new path between Gorbachev’s and Kozyrev’s perceived uncritical Westernism. but it did mean the pursuit of a far more conscious attempt to match ambitions to resources. The first Russia is the liberal one. confrontation with the West and autarchic economic policies. This did not mean giving up aspirations to global influence. under Putin a’new realism’ emerged. in April
. A third way in foreign policy began to emerge. repeatedly stressed his non-partisan approach to issues. those elements that were distinctively Primakovian harked back to an earlier Soviet era. A pragmatic strategy in economics assumes an active role for the state.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 167
began to be rethought. grounded above all in economic weakness. The slogan of the Primakov government.3 The second Russia is one where geopolitical considerations rule supreme and trample the development of civil society. while many of the elements of Putin’s new realism were already in motion under Primakov and even earlier. with Putin’s accession to the leadership there was a much sharper recognition of the limits of Russian power. While suggesting a nonideological approach. like his period in office as Foreign Minister. Equally. inalienably part of Europe. it is one based on the striving to achieve the restoration of territories like the Crimea and Sevastopol.2 what Alexander Yanov has called Decembrist Russia. It will be recalled that Primakov. while in foreign policy it suggested that the aims were clear and only the means were to be regulated by the much-vaunted pragmatism. While Russian foreign policy under the stewardship of Evgenii Primakov (Foreign Minister between January 1996 and September 1998. was pragmatism. THE NEW REALISM: A THIRD WAY BEYOND EAST AND WEST? It is conventional to talk of a battle between two Russias. and the sullen rejectionism offered by the communist opposition and its rather more urbane but equally ineffective ‘pragmatic’ variant offered by Primakov. This is the Russia that Yanov dubs Slavophile. Although Primakov’s pragmatism in practice was relatively flexible and continued many features of the allegedly super-liberal era of Russian foreign policy management under Andrei Kozyrev (1990–96). pragmatism is itself deeply embedded in an ideologized practice. and then Prime Minister from September 1998 to May 1999) can be characterized by the notion of pragmatism.
but the federal response endangered the tenuous and hardfought liberties of Russian citizens. Viacheslav Trubnikov. today. From this perspective. Endless Russian and Chinese talk about the need to restore a multipolar world reflected concern about the unbalanced world system that had emerged as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. while we had become accustomed in the past to talk in terms of the East-West conflict. However. The tension between universalism and particularism has been apparent throughout Russia’s often disastrous engagement with modernity and modernization. Associated with this approach is Russia’s implicit adoption of the ‘Asian values’ agenda. the evidence is mixed. beginning in September 1999. as with so many developments under Putin. emerges as a distinctive value system that does not necessarily undermine the universal principles of human rights and democracy but provides a way to make the universal agenda a genuinely universal project. between tradition and modernity. Russia. The end of the Cold War was followed by the unalloyed supremacy. the appointment of Sergei Lebedev in May 2000 to
. The document talked in terms of a more focused foreign policy and ‘selective engagement’. the new self-conceptualization of ‘the East’ that is emerging brings together a number of themes that are not necessarily in conflict with the West. not least in the Caucasus itself. of ‘the West’. did face a grave threat from the Chechen insurgency. in so far as we can conceptualize Putin’s nascent foreign policy. where democracy and human rights are subordinated to developmental tasks and where priority is granted to order and discipline rather than to individual liberty. It should be noted that ‘multipolarism’ reflects an ‘orientalist’ strain in Russian foreign policy. The concept of ‘the East’ encompasses both the actual East. The second Chechen war. Russia’s messianism took the form of the espousal of communism as an alternative route to modernity. Instead. In the past. For example. However.4 At the base of Russian foreign policy already under Yeltsin but far more pronounced under Putin there lay a specific attempt to reforge ‘the East’. indeed. the ‘orientalist’ Primakov and then by another orientalist. one strand of Russian foreign policy casts the country as a victim of globalization. but perhaps more importantly tries to theorize the idea of an East that was not West but at the same time that was not opposed to the West. allowed the rhetoric about the ‘terrorist’ threat to overshadow and even to threaten democratic consolidation. promoted in particular by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). headed between 1991 and 1996 by the specialist on the Middle East. indeed triumphalism. a Third-Worldist perspective espousing multipolarity and resistance to American dominance.168 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
2000. the East. however defined. and the post-communist experience was only the latest stage in this ambivalent relationship between Russia and the West. Russia appears to have achieved a transition from the Second to the Third World.
Some talked in terms of engaged isolationism. Any number of factors could derail Russia’s attempts to forge a new relationship with its Western and Eastern neighbours while at the same time rethinking the priorities of its own national identity. Lebedev had become known to Putin while working in Germany. At the base of the geo-ideological conception of Putinism is an attempt to re-create something larger than Russia alone. of course. The new conception of the East as the site of complex interactions in which Russia should be involved takes many forms and involves many aspects. and thus a distinctive third way would open up between. the traditional Cold War confrontation between East and West and. THE NEW REALISM AND THE THREE EASTS Each of the three Easts identified above—geopolitical. It was in this context that various terms were employed to describe the multifaceted reality that was Putin’s early foreign policy. geo-economic and geo-ideological—in turn sustains Russia’s own developing understanding of itself as the exemplar and representative of an Eastern pole. This is the potential of the ‘new realism’. as stressed above.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 169
head the SVR put an end to the rule of the orientalists. whose role in foreign policy formation had by 1998 probably exceeded that of the Foreign Ministry itself. I argue that some notion of a new Easternism perhaps captures the reality more effectively. could be modified. It was likely that the SVR.
. Iraq and Serbia. it may. the unabashed reduction of modernization to Westernization. with the West. For example. not be fulfilled. in contrast (although. Let us take a look at the three identified above. While East-West relations as a distinctive subject may have gone.S. not necessarily in conflict).Panarin examined recent Russian history in the framework of the main trends of world development. while allowing Russia autonomy to develop as a state and economy. on the other. a new Eastern pole in a multipolar world. on the one hand. Geo-ideology There is no shortage of Russian thinkers who have tried to set Russia up as the representative of an Eastern world. would now diminish. The new East in this understanding is complementary and not in conflict with the West. and his experience was of the West alone. Panarin argued that world history had swung from a Western phase of development to an Eastern one. Iran. the philosopher A. representing a shift from an emphasis on technological change towards spiritual revival. ‘the West’ remains a relatively coherent subject of international politics while ‘the East’ has fragmented. and thus that some of Russia’s aggressive posturing on NATO enlargement.
Echoes of this parallelism resound in the concept of the new Easternism. The fact that Putin’s first foreign visit was to London suggested that if there were to be a strategic partnership with anyone.170 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
towards a post-economic and post-material period. It also represented a move beyond the ‘bridge’ metaphor of Russia linking East and West to an affirmation that Russia was a destination in itself. With the exhaustion of socialism and liberalism the West has no new idea to offer the world. Gorbachev had repeatedly argued that the capitalist and socialist worlds could transcend their rivalry yet remain distinct and continue to develop in parallel. As Andrei Zagorskii had noted several years earlier.5 This was no longer an Easternism that was provoked by the failure to become Western. the symbolism of his journey to London via Minsk and returning via Kiev was lost on no one. In its search for a new way. multilateralism. it would be with Britain. on the other hand. The contrast with Gorbachev’s continued idealism is striking. The difference between Gorbachev and Putin was that the latter well understood the national subject with which he was concerned: Russia. was redefining its values and its response to the Western challenge. whose code words are multipolarity.7 Amid much speculation that Putin’s first visit abroad following his inauguration on 7 May 2000 would be to an Asian country. Gorbachev. After all. and the like. it was the geo-ideological aspect of the East that became more prominent. had lost all sense of the USSR as a subject of history with any real national interests of its own. is right-wing economics and left-wing politics: economic liberalism accompanied by statist great power politics. was swiftly deemphasized (see below). Russia.8 The basic policy orientation of this quasicentre. This suggested not only a continuation of privatization and other economic reforms. he argued. with a defined (although evolving) set of national interests. Towards a Russian third way and the transformation of the East Viktor Sheinis argued that victory in the December 1999 Duma elections went to the ‘quasi-centre’. but an attempt to forge an alternative to Western modernity in its entirety. yet Putin did not allow the conceptualization to get in the way of pragmatic deal making. the Eurasianist notion of Russia between East and West was a bridge leading nowhere. the elections revealed ‘the minimal movement towards a self-sustaining civil society’ and ‘the separation of the
. and hence became increasingly reactive and concessionary in foreign policy. in so far as it has one. According to Sheinis. but also the continued iron grip of the bureaucracy over the ‘market’. by about 1989. a bridge is designed to be trampled on. During perestroika. The geopolitical element. and in particular the idea of a strategic partnership with China.6 Under Putin.
This is the basis of the new Easternism. although much of the writing and commentary about the subject is indeed trite. Putin’s policies were characterized by contradictory formulations. As for politics. It does not come from a historical convergence on the centre ground of policy. Writers like Peter Struve and Semen Frank are drawn on to sustain the emerging consensus over a Russian third way based on support for the reconstitution of state authority while continuing market reforms and international economic integration. but from attempts to create a genuinely radical politics of the centre. but the need for a new industrial policy to develop key branches of the economy and to stamp out corruption was stressed. with the document first appearing on the internet. While the third way in the West is an attempt to come to terms with the apparent exhaustion of traditional social democracy and represents an attempt to renew it. or genuine politics of the centre. He stressed that an enormous effort would have to be undertaken to put Russia back in the front rank of developed powers. Russia’s third way. the manifesto emphasized the traditional role of the state in Russian life but insisted that this was complementary to the development of democracy and human rights. His policies focused on an unstable mix of statist market-oriented moderate centrism combining a commitment to democracy with the appeal to strong leadership while
. is drawn from an older tradition: liberal conservatism. The argument here can be reduced to the following. In his manifesto and in later speeches Putin was evidently trying to move beyond traditional amorphous definitions of centrism towards a more radical future-oriented model. promising to maintain Russia’s system of power and property while radically renovating the state system and giving political and legal reform a great boost within the framework of the existing constitutional settlement. This is why Sheinis’ notion of a quasi-centre is so suggestive. The manifesto presented by Vladimir Putin in the last days of 1999 reflected the old theme of liberal conservatism but in a dramatically modern idiom—both in form and content.9 is derived not simply from the repudiation of idealized notions of left and right. This gulf between the power system and society was something noted by many other commentators. The nature of the increased role of the state in the economy remained unspecified.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 171
political class from the deep layers of society’. in the manner of Giddens. but from the opportunistic cooptation of politics to ensure regime survival. This is not a trivial political project. A genuine third way. reflected in traditional class politics.10 Putin talked frankly about Russia’s comparative economic backwardness and condemned not only the faults of the Soviet system but challenged its very status as a modernizing regime. but insisted that Russia would have to do this in its own way. How different this was from Primakov’s centrism is a matter of dispute. Putin in the Duma elections sought to present himself as a symbol of confidence and stability.
Although Ludwig von Mises always argued that there was no third way or third system between the Soviet and the American forms of social organization. a post-Washington consensus had emerged. In that sense. but it also had the potential to transcend traditional divisions and to lead the country on to a balanced developmental path conforming to native traditions while encouraging integration into the international community. currency convertibility. the possibility of testing out a variety of paths is more relevant than ever. However. since there is no reason (as Lord Dahrendorf has stressed) not to think in terms of a fourth. today. with the end of the Cold War and the ideological confrontation between East and West. focused on fiscal and monetary discipline. between Slavophilism and Westernism. for the first time in a decade.172 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
drawing on both Slavophile and Westernizing ideas. between market and non-market. The extremes of left and right were rejected but the actual content of Russia’s third way remained vague. such a programme was in danger of becoming amorphous to the point of meaninglessness.11 These policies were then adopted to varying degrees by India and other countries that had pursued socialist-inclined developmental strategies. Economies were opened up to international influences and domestic monopolies broken up and privatized. fifth and ever more ways. This was already apparent in the December 1999 parliamentary elections. The Washington consensus. By definition. a third way represents not an abstraction but a specific response to Russia’s self-identity and problems of development today. In the post-communist countries this was accompanied by great falls in economic activity. with Russian GNP halving by 1995 and then hovering between recession and growth until plunged into renewed crisis in August 1998 and then recovering on the back of a fourfold ruble
. what we may call a Moscow consensus. and above all between Atlanticism and Eurasianism. The election marked a turning point in Russian politics in that. there appeared to be a near universal consensus (as reflected in the various manifestos and programmes) in support of a distinctively Russian path of development. between individualistic and collectivist approaches to social development. We do not need to think in terms of only a third way. The essence of Putinism as a political programme was the attempt to construct a dynamic and future-oriented politics of the centre. Good relations with the West were to be based on genuine partnership rather than Russian kowtowing to Washington. the term coined by John Williamson to describe the neoliberal policies adopted by a number of Latin American states in the mid-1980s. In economics. price and trade liberalization and the privatization of state enterprises. in my conception the notion of a third way is specific to the attempt to overcome the traditionally polarized nature of Russian politics between socialism and capitalism.
like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). and in general a retreat from threats of renationalization. the Moscow consensus modifies the Washington consensus but means continued engagement with the international economic system and financial organizations. The National Security Concept of December 1997 had insisted that the greatest threats to Russia’s security came not from the international system but from various internal threats. Rogozin went on to head the Third Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee and adopted a robustly patriotic approach to international affairs. Sergei Glaz’ev. The radical rejectionists of market-oriented reform had been marginalized. attempts to service the debt and reach a negotiated way of dealing with it. a stronger state role in establishing a more friendly investment climate to achieve the recapitalization of the economy. The Moscow consensus now stretched from the liberals through to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). in which Russia remained central as the only truly Eurasian power. In economic terms. unilateral actions and virulent protectionism. headed by Dmitrii Rogozin) and the radical left. This is a measure of the degree to which the 1990s had been a harsh learning experience for many of the Russian political elite.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 173
depreciation that made imports expensive hence encouraging import substitution. was tempered by the continuing insistence that Russia was not a subordinate member of the international community but a major player without whose active participation no political. and the main issues in the centre of policy debate had become questions of tactics and not of strategy. The main modifications of the Washington consensus focus on a more active social policy. Geopolitics In foreign policy the traditional centre of the Russian national security debate in the 1990s had been occupied by the ‘statist’ views reflected in the concept of Eurasianism. and less tolerance of official corruption. economic or security problem could be resolved.12
. whose economic programme for the parliamentary elections was framed by the well-known critic of Yeltsinite economic policies. the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO]. however. the majority understood that any attempt to achieve quick fixes outside the constraints of the emerging consensus would have unpredictable and probably dire consequences. This liberalism. The only serious organizations stepping beyond the bounds of this consensus were the nationalists (for example. the attempt to maintain macroeconomic stability by harsh fiscal measures. The document acknowledged the threat posed by NATO enlargement but insisted that effective multilateral means for cooperation remained.
It noted the ‘attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanisms for ensuring international security (above all the UNO and OSCE)’. Russia continues to play an important role in world affairs. and the attempt by the USA and its allies to carve out a unipolar world outside of international law. all conspired to a rethinking of the international environment. in March 2000.13 The use of NATO with an unclear UN mandate to enforce attempts to stop Serbia’s violation of Kosovan human and political rights.17 It should be noted that. the UN and the CIS. noting in particular the weakening of the OSCE.15 The new Military Doctrine (replacing the 1993 version) that was approved by presidential decree on 21 April 2000 represented years of interdepartmental wrangling. the aftershock of the August 1998 economic crash that revealed Russia’s vulnerability to speculative international financial markets. the search for international recognition of Russia’s rightful place in the world was a dominant theme: Russia is perceived to be one of the largest countries in the world with a long history and a rich cultural tradition. and ‘the use of coercive military actions as means of “humanitarian intervention” without the sanction of the UN Security Council. The new document expanded the list of external threats to Russia’s security. however. was stressed. scientific-technological and military potential. Objectively. As in many official documents of the Putin era. and to oppose its strengthening as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world’. together with NATO enlargement. in which relations are based on international law and an acceptance of a significant role for Russia.14 The main problem in Russia’s relations with NATO. was less sanguine about the external environment. was that ‘we do not feel ourselves to be full-blooded participants in the process’.16 Russia’s search for recognition was reflected in the comment that one of the main external threats was ‘the attempt to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in the resolution of problems of international security. it is asserted. as Putin noted. regardless of generally accepted principles and norms of international law’. but it also revealed many of Russia’s underlying concerns. The tension between the emergence of a multipolar world. As a result of its significant economic.174 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
The new National Security Concept signed into law by Putin’s decree of 10 January 2000. In the words of Foreign
. the Security Council adopted a draft version of a new Foreign Policy Doctrine. Russia continues to hold a unique strategic position on the Eurasian continent irrespective of the complex international situation and difficulties of an internal character. There was no longer talk of partnership with the West but instead an emphasis on more limited ‘cooperation’. strategic arms control tensions and renewed war in Chechnya.
TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 175
Minister Igor Ivanov, it was ‘significantly broader, more realistic and closer to the needs of the country’ than the previous version.18 At the same meeting of the Security Council on 24 March, Putin had once again stressed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to be the main coordinator of foreign policy; and he then went on to give the Security Council, headed by Putin’s long-time colleague Sergei Ivanov, a far higher profile. The new Doctrine, however, for long remained unpublished. It appeared to have stressed the need for Russia to win new markets in ‘third countries’ (i.e. not Western), and reflected the significant input of Russia’s multitudinous security agencies. The East as a counterhegemonic formation Speaking at a conference on the Middle East in Moscow on 1 February 2000, Putin argued that ‘it is unacceptable to cancel such basic principles of international law as national sovereignty and territorial integrity under the slogan of so-called humanitarian intervention’.19 Russia appeared now to stand as the champion of an anti-universalistic agenda. Opposition to the idea that the international community had a right to intervene when governments were guilty of abusing their own population entailed a repudiation of much of the drift in international politics since the Second World War. On this and other occasions, Putin insisted that the principles of territorial integrity and national sovereignty should take priority over humanitarian intervention. The complement to Russia’s anti-universalism was its espousal of what it sought to portray as a rational consensus based on international law and multilateral institutions, above all the UN. The concept of a multipolar world as espoused by Russia had a somewhat confrontational edge. While Russia’s earlier attempts to use the CIS as the basis for a counterEuropean project had met with ignominious failure, anti-humanitarianism appeared a more viable basis on which to try to build a counterhegemonic bloc. While the former focused on opposition to NATO enlargement, and thus was a largely negative phenomenon, anti-humanitarianism could be seen to be a more generalized defence of the rights of states. Under these circumstances Russia was in danger of being perceived as the friend of ‘pariah states’, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic. The Western response to the visit of the indicted war criminal, the Yugoslav Defence Minister Dragoljub Ojdanic, to Moscow in late May 2000 obviously took Russia by surprise, and the visit was later explained, unconvincingly, as the result of a mix up.20 The fact that Russia found it necessary to distance itself from the visit suggested a responsiveness to the concerns of the West and a realistic appreciation of the political costs Russia would incur if it stepped too far out of line with the US-dominated ‘hegemonic consensus’. More broadly, Russia’s long-held commitment to
176 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
multilateral institutions like the OSCE became rather less apparent after the Istanbul summit of that body in November 1999. Russia was severely castigated for the behaviour of federal forces in Chechnya. Consequently, Russia’s earlier advocacy of the creation of a European Security Council was shelved. It must once again be stressed that the attempt to create ‘the East’ as the core of this counterhegemony based on a rational consensus, antiuniversalism and multilateralism does not necessarily have to take an antiWestern form. Putin repeatedly emphasized his aspirations for good relations with the West. The East was conceptualized as an alternative but complementary modernity. This was the way that Gorbachev had conceived of his renewed socialism, and it remains to be seen whether this new variant on the old theme of the third way will be any more successful. Representations of the East meet the real East Russia repeatedly stated the view that its presence in Asia was a ‘factor for regional stability’. For most of the late 1990s, Russian diplomacy sought to forge an Indian-Chinese-Russian triangle as a counterbalance to the US and NATO.21 The Indian link in this chain was always the weakest, but even the Chinese one was beset with contradictions. While I shall emphasize here the geopolitical element, it should be noted that the success of China’s ‘four modernizations’, launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, especially in contrast with Russia’s travails in the 1990s, meant that the Chinese path of modernization in which the Communist Party acted as the instrument of capitalist restoration, appeared attractive to many in Russia.22 However, the exaggerated shift towards close relations with China, something encouraged by Primakov, was largely a reaction to NATO enlargement and a way of ‘cocking a snook’ at the West. As Jonathan Steele pointed out, ‘Russia needs good relations with its largest Asian neighbour, but to make them a lever for solving problems in other regions is dangerous.’23 Meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, in Moscow on 1 March 2000, Putin declared that relations between Moscow and Beijing ‘resolve the problem of stability in the world on a global scale as much as they do in bilateral relations’.24 At that time there was much speculation over whether Putin would make his first official visit to China, Japan or India, and the fact that these three eastern countries were at the top of a very long list was significant. At the very time that Putin was meeting in Moscow with the Chinese Foreign Minister, a high-powered Russian delegation was in China headed by Deputy Prime Minister Il’ia Klebanov, responsible for Russia’s defence industrial complex, and including the Minister of Atomic Energy Evgenii Adamov, the Minister of Trade Mikhail Fradkov, the Minister of Fuel and Energy Viktor Kaliuzhnyi, as well as the head of the Russian space agency Iurii Koptev. These five vividly reflected
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the main spheres of Russia’s civilian economic relations with China. Klebanov actively discussed the issue of arms sales with top Chinese officials. There were even suggestions that military-technical cooperation had deepened significantly following the war in Kosovo, with up to 2,000 Russian specialists working in Chinese laboratories on advanced weapons projects.25 With both Russia and China emphasizing the need for a multipolar world and a mutual commitment to the territorial integrity of states (that is, Chinese support for Russia’s war in Chechnya and Russia’s support for the ‘one-China’ policy that claims Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan), there were plenty of points in common in the Russian and Chinese view of the world. The Russo-Chinese link was built on a number of shared concerns: the struggle against unipolar hegemonism; against humanitarian interventionism (the principle of non-interference in internal affairs);26 Islamic secessionism (Chechnya, Kosova, Xinxiang); arms sales; opposition to NATO enlargement; basic economic links; some mutual acceptance of Russia’s hegemony as a guarantor of order in Eurasia. However, Primakovian talk of a strategic alliance with China reflected a basic lack of understanding of the way that China conducts its foreign policy; its refusal to enter into multilateral alliances. In addition, despite a long shared border, trade between Russia and China remains low, totalling only US$6 billion in 1999 and putting Russia in ninth place as a trading partner, far below the US$66 billion between China and Japan and the US$62 billion between China and the USA. In a broader context, Russian GNP represented only 1.4 per cent of the world total, and without Western support it was unlikely to improve significantly. The concept of a strategic partnership suggests mutual unconditional support, something that neither China nor Russia was ready to commit to.27 Moreover, there were many points of tension in the relationship. The territorial issue concerning three islands on the Rivers Argun’ and Khabarovska had not yet been resolved. There were rumours that Putin had signed a secret decree suspending the transfer of sensitive military technology and know-how to China. Moscow was concerned that China was buying Russian military technology and know-how while avoiding the purchase of large ready-made stocks of military hardware.28 Already, one of the world’s most advanced fighter planes, the SU-27, was being assembled in China. In other words, the perception in Moscow was that China sought to achieve technology transfer to develop its own defence production capabilities while lessening its dependence on Moscow. It was clear that sections of the Russian military and political elite harboured concern over a potential military threat from China. Putin’s attempts to mend relations with NATO was obviously not greeted with enthusiasm in Beijing and could provoke a downswing in Sino-Russian relations. While China had earlier enthusiastically joined with Russia in condemning NATO,
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there was no immediate cause for the Chinese to be alarmed by Russia’s engagement with NATO, although Russia’s membership in that body, as suggested by Putin in his interview with David Frost (albeit ‘as equals’),29 would be another question. It would also make NATO another type of organization, one that had become more of a political and less of a military organization, and there was no evidence that the existing members wished to see such a transformation in NATO’s role. Already during the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister mentioned above, there had been a noticeable shift in the rhetoric away from overblown Primakovian talk of a strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing towards a more modest and far more realistic emphasis on technical and economic ties between the two countries.30 The shift in rhetoric marked a change in Russia’s foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis China. American plans for a National Missile Defence (NMD) scheme to protect the USA from missile attacks together with plans for the deployment of a theatre missile defence (TMD) system in the western Pacific provoked China into adopting a US$10 billion package for strengthening its nuclear capabilities. Moscow had long supported China’s opposition to the proposed US-Japanese TMD system in Asia, while Beijing supported Moscow’s opposition to any weakening of the ABM treaty. At present, China has only some two dozen strategic missiles capable of hitting the North American mainland, making them vulnerable to even a limited NMD system. The Chinese build-up affected not only the USA but also Russia. China’s predominance in conventional weaponry is offset by Russia’s nuclear strength, but this could be eroded. Fears about the vulnerability of Russia’s vast but underpopulated Russian Far East neighbouring China’s land-hungry population endowed the psychological climate with anxiety. Russia’s membership of G8, moreover, and China’s continued exclusion could not but add a hint of bitterness to the relationship. It should be noted that China has signed 17 international conventions and protocols on human rights, and thus any attempt to use China as a battering ram against the emerging universalist consensus on the value of a human rights regime is at the very least ambivalent. It was not the principles of universalism, as such, that China criticized, but their selective and instrumental application by the world’s hegemonic powers. Above all, the whole notion of a multipolar world, according to Karaganov, head of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, suited Chinese rather than Russian interests since it drew Russia into the stand-off between China and the USA. He urged Russia to give up the superpower-style politics that led Russia into confrontation with the rest of the world and to recognize that in promoting multipolarism Russia ‘was only an instrument wielded by China’.31
as evidenced by the apparent reversal of Japan’s earlier condemnation of Russian actions in Chechnya during the visit of Ivanov to Tokyo in February 2000. the latter sought Moscow’s help in normalizing relations with Pyongyang. Moscow. however. the first had been by Andrei Kozyrev in 1995. Putin: ‘I’ve been practising judo for the last 20 years and I can’t help but love Japan. As so often in Russia’s attempts to enter new markets.32 This was only the second time a Russian Foreign Minister had visited Vietnam since the fall of communism in 1991. The relationship between Japan and me. There was also the personal factor. I can’t help but love Japanese culture and philosophy. The fundamental obstacle to the improvement of bilateral ties remained: the status of the Kurile Islands. Primakov’s successor as Foreign Minister. if I may describe it in a Russian way. the US sought to protect its own markets by a mix of economic and diplomatic coercion. The resolution of the
.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 179
Traditional ties between Moscow and Hanoi were renewed as part of the modification of Russia’s alleged earlier obsession with Atlantic relations. allow it to play a greater mediating role in the affairs of the peninsula. A telephone conversation of early March 2000 reported by the Japanese media between the then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. It was clear that Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi was anxious to improve relations with Russia. in part to offset Russia’s US$1. Japan had invested considerable efforts in building up a constructive relationship with Yeltsin. a more reliable interlocutor with a stronger domestic base. talked about the need for the two countries once again to raise their relations to the level of a strategic partnership. On his visit to Hanoi in February 2000 Igor Ivanov. and Russia was concerned to maintain a presence there. However.’34 Whether Russia and Japan would be able to sign the much-awaited bilateral treaty by the end of 2000. in St Petersburg on 29 April 2000. primarily saw South Korea as a potentially lucrative arms market. The real test for Putin’s relations in Asia would be his ability to normalize relations with Japan. is not something that was established in a minute. remained very much in doubt. As for South Korea. helped lay the foundations for further discussions towards the conclusion of a formal peace treaty ending the Second World War. The 25-year lease on the former US base at Cam Ranh Bay was due to end in 2004.33 Russia’s attempts to restore its international influence under Putin could. however. although perhaps on a lower level. The Vietnamese debt to Russia of some US$17 billion was the subject of some anxiety on both sides. and now it was faced with the challenge of starting anew with Putin.35 The meeting between Putin and the new Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. as promised by Yeltsin and the then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997. there were advantages that had not been available earlier—above all. and Putin ran as follows: Obuchi: ‘Please wear your judo black belt when you come to Japan’.8 billion Gorbachev-era debt.
was an implicitly anti-Russian alliance. The CIS as an institution.180 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
territorial issue. wanting Russian assistance in its struggle against ‘Islamic extremism’. It was unable to sustain a coherent foreign policy. atrophied. Azerbaijan and Ukraine) would probably provoke more problems than it would be able to resolve. While Russia had become a partisan of geopolitical pluralism. showed how central Moscow was to the region. both intellectually and geopolitically. suffering from multiple vulnerabilities. in response to the enlargement of the latter. could only be achieved by concessions on both sides. Azerbaijan and Moldova (Uzbekistan joined in April 1999). with almost no achievements to its credit other than resisting Moscow’s attempts to revise the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The great strategic problem facing Russia was the challenge of foreign policy diversification by its former brother Soviet states. This was the great failure of the post-Cold War world.38 A rump GAU (Georgia. Uzbekistan by early 2000 had clearly cooled towards the body. the USA appeared resolutely to advance it. above all forging ever closer links with Belarus. At one time it looked as if. the USA was perceived by many to have developed ever more layers to its hegemonic ambitions. It should be noted that the USA had strongly supported the GUUAM initiative as part of its two-prong strategy of supporting Moscow verbally
.37 On Russia’s southern flank the emergence of the GUUAM organization in 1998. GUUAM would be able to push back Russian influence in the region. however. but the vociferous opposition of most other CIS states meant that the CIS could not become the kernel of a new Eastern project. just at the time that Russia began to reject the logic of geopolitics. Moscow had tried to transform the CIS into a security body to rival NATO. In September 1995. it was clear that the CIS had failed to become the great counter-European institution that some in Moscow had hoped it would. small countries do matter. despite periodic attempts to revive it. Of course. with American support. However. The revenge of geopolitics It was clear that Eurasianism had died. Instead. Uzbekistan. The institutional marginalization of the OSCE in the post-Cold War era reflected a larger failure to sustain the politics of Helsinki. depending on the circumstances. while Moldova feared antagonizing Russia.36 It appeared that the postCold War world had been unable to sustain the Helsinki approach to international order and instead there appeared to be a trend towards a return to the politics of Yalta: small countries appeared not to matter. bringing together Georgia. for instance. Russia concentrated on bilateral relations with former Soviet states. Ukraine. As noted. However. the relative failure of GUUAM.
And third. In response. It indicated a more independent foreign policy approach. A case in point was the decision in May 2000 to relax restrictions on the export of Russian nuclear materials and technologies.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 181
at the state level while doing all in its power politically to isolate Russia and to push it out of its traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus and central Asia. First. Moscow sought ‘maximum participation in [international] security structures’ to help ensure ‘stability and predictability’ in that region. and hence had to bear some of the responsibility for the tragic outcome. which would allow Moscow to sell nuclear technologies to countries not subject to the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna.
. The EU’s TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) project was another implicitly anti-Russian scheme. it aimed to ensure the security of its borders and the implentation of long-term confidence-building measures. noting an instrumental approach to foreign relations where grandiose ambitions were subordinated to Russia’s developmental (and hard currency) needs.40 The third element was clearly crucial. Ukraine was a willing accomplice. There has been much discussion of the ‘commercialization’ of foreign policy under Putin. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigorii Karasin outlined Russia’s three strategic objectives vis-à-vis the Far East. and indeed instrument. transport and high-technology sectors. Russia in March 2000 outlined its own plans in this area. perhaps in part conditioned by America’s attempts to modify the 1972 ABM treaty to allow the development of its nuclear shield. it sought to establish political and economic relations with countries in the region that could help the development of Russia’s Far East. It is unclear whether the USA favoured the disintegration of Russia or not. The EU’s aim was to establish an East-West transport corridor that would by-pass Russia. Some went so far as to suggest that American policy had given hope to the secessionists in Chechnya.41 It appeared that the desire to exploit one of Russia’s few high-technology assets overrode Russia’s own earlier qualms (Yeltsin in 1992 had banned such sales to countries not subject to full-scale international monitoring) and international opinion. of this strategy. Japan and the Russian Far East with the Near East and the Transcaucasus through Russian territory. that would link China.39 Geo-economics On the eve of Igor Ivanov’s visit to Japan. an ambiguity that in the Byzantine politics of the Caucasus would not remain unexploited for long. provisionally named Transcam. above all dealing with the energy. Secondly. International non-proliferation efforts appeared to be crumbling in the face of Congressional intransigence (as in its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and Russian assertiveness. Putin’s decision would allow Russia to build two nuclear reactors in India.
The key point was precisely the institutionalizing of order. the future of Russia— EU relations in the light of EU enlargement to encompass former Soviet states. President of the European Commission. At the base of the European orientation of Putin’s foreign policy were the ever closer economic links between Russia and the EU. in the context of the strong ‘Leninist legacies’ in eastern Europe. Thus Gref reflected one of the characteristic features of the new conception of geo-ideological space: the
. Between radical liberalism and restorationist authoritarianism there lay a third way.42 CONCLUSION: ‘THIRDISM’ AND THE NEW EASTERNISM Jowitt has argued that. Putin provides a new approach to the problem of institutionalizing order between the old-fashioned establishment of a repressive order and the anarchization of social relations that so characterized post-communist Russia. and this was now sought by Putin. The aim was to shift from power to authority. The importance of the relationship for both sides was confirmed by the EU-Russia summit of 29 May 2000. While Solana sought to highlight the latter.43 It is precisely this tension between the authoritarian reimposition of order and democratic anarchism that Putin sought to finesse. the head of the Centre for Strategic Development whose task it was to devise a plan for Russia’s development in the early part of the millennium. Putin on several occasions stressed that Russia was a European state. Prodi’s approach. to make it something not external but vital to the operation of the system. The summit discussed the prospects for Russian economic reform. and 38 per cent of its imports came from there. Liberal authoritarianism may well be a more ‘desirable alternative’ and a ‘more practical response than the utopian wish for immediate mass democracy in Eastern Europe’. responsible for the development of the EU’s second pillar. The EU delegation was headed by Romano Prodi. argued that ‘“the West” as some sort of definition does not mean much in particular’. a common foreign and security policy in the framework of ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity). In short. German Gref.44 It was not ‘the West’ as such that would do this or the other.182 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
In a manner reminiscent of Catherine the Great’s famous edict that ‘Russia is a European country’. focused on economic and general political issues. the aim was to achieve the internalization of authority where power moved from being despotic and arbitrary to infrastructural and legitimate. Some 40 per cent of Russia’s exports went to the EU. but concrete investors. and European concerns over the conduct of the Chechen war. which continued the Blairite line of constructive engagement. traditional attempts to strike a balance between economic development and democratic participation may not be effective. and included Javier Solana.
Russian foreign policy in the late 1990s was built on fake history and mythopoeic representations of traditional alliances. However.45 Putin’s attempts to improve relations with the West and to place relations with the East on a new basis have yet to bear fruit. however. the aim was to create a second pole. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. in that city was lost on none. but he demonstrated an awareness that the legacy of Primakov’s so-called pragmatism in foreign policy had been disastrous for Russia. Putin found himself in a position remarkably reminiscent of that facing Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985: surrounded by sullen neighbours and increasingly robust foes. China and the world. alienating its friends and confirming the hostility of those traditionally suspicious of Russian intentions. and would in all likelihood be dropped if the economy improved sufficiently to bring Russia into the First World. Russia sought to be recognized as a serious actor able to resume the role of a great power and defend its national interests in the international arena. Russia has traditionally appeared to be particularly prone to pathophysic approaches (based on the science of imagining solutions). The concept of the East was an attempt to recuperate an alternative. at most. was that Putin’s elevation of St Petersburg reflected his calls for close ties with Europe. In broad political terms. What was already clear. and this he did. This new way would be based on overcoming Russia’s traditional idealized view of the world and recognizing a few hard realities: Russia’s economy could no longer maintain any aspirations to superpower status. A new ‘Third Worldism’ emerged with Russia at its head. and the symbolism of his receiving the first two foreign leaders to visit Russia following his accession to the presidency.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 183
disaggregation of the West from a monolithic unitary actor into a more dynamic conception of the West as the site of conflicts. This was clearly an opportunistic response to the failure of having made the First World. This he has done by seeking a third way between the humiliating subservience to the West that characterized Russian policy from the late 1980s and the mindless great-powerism that predominated in the late 1990s. Putin’s own roots lay in St Petersburg. NATO was here to stay and increasing numbers of Russia’s
. Neither Russia nor China recognizes itself as a lesser developed country. the city created by Peter the Great as a ‘window on the West’. some ministries and part of the legislature could move there. divergent interests and dynamism. Putin was forced to launch a charm offensive. There was even talk that the capital could move to the northern city. In a unipolar world. If nothing else. the new conceptualization of the East was not envisaged as an alternative to the West but as its complement. although it is probable that. In foreign policy it is clear that Putin devised his own policies to overcome Russia’s isolation and to establish good relations with the West.
p. 20–8. was how to define this East. 6.gov. Strategy for Russia: Agenda for President—2000 (Moscow. Harvard University. The Commonwealth of Independent States: Developments and Prospects (Moscow. 3. paper prepared for the PSA Specialist Group conference. therefore.. vol.5. including (perhaps most humiliatingly for ‘pragmatists’ of Primakov’s ilk) Ukraine. 1992). 9. p. ‘Rossiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii’. N. Nezavisimaia gazeta. ‘NATO Expansion as a Factor in Russo-Chinese Relations’. p. 3410. 5. and this he began to do. John Williamson. 15. 7. 1. Rossiia v tsiklakh mirovoi istorii (Moscow. Jamestown Foundation. 16. 2.S.184 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
neighbours wanted to join it. The view defended by Norman Davies. NOTES
1. 5 February 2000.Wallander. The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington. 8. 4. 156. Ibid.ru 11. available at http:// www. 1998). 72. 1.scrf. Anthony Giddens. 6. Monitor.
.gov. p. 29 December 1999. 1999).. paragraph I. for geo-ideological. The great challenge facing Putin has been to transform the East while remaining engaged with the West. Johnson’s Russia List. 1996).gov.3. 1994). Russia was too big and too distinct simply to become part of the West. 17. available at www. The broad outlines of the notion of two Easts was suggested by Natasha Kuhrt. 30 December 1999. The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge. Ibid. no.Gevorkiian et al. SSEES. DC. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security.ru/ Documents/Decree/2000/24–1. Davis Center for Russian Studies. 4.html 17... paragraph I. 26 July 1999. Celeste A.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/ 706–l. ‘Posle bitvy: itogi parlamentskikh vyborov i novaia Gosudarstvennaia Duma’. ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. The Third Way. 14–20 January 2000. no. Sergei Karaganov et al. University of London. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 11 April 2000. ‘Kontseptsiia national’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’.pravitelstvo. 12. 8. no. Nezavisimaia gazeta. A. 10. The main choice facing the country. 13. and the CIS could not be used as an instrument of policy but would have to be based on genuine partnerships or it would wither away. pp. geopolitical and geo-economic reasons it would always be part of the East. Europe: A History (Oxford. Policy Memo Series no. 22 April 2000. Vladimir Putin.Panarin.scrf. available at www. At the same time. Viktor Sheinis. 102. Andrei Zagorskii et al. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. ‘Open Letter to Colleagues in the West’. 2000). Alexander Yanov. Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow. 2000).html 14. Russian National Security Policy in 2000.
23. 26. 1999). 2 March 2000. 15 February 2000. 23. Segodnia. The interview reported here was with Oleg Mironov. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL).ru/02/13. 14 March 2000. 52. For a useful discussion of the issues. The great ‘theorists’ of such an approach were Zbigniew Brzezinski. Europe-Asia Studies. 3 (May 1999). 2 March 2000. 51. 34. 21. 5 April 2000.putin2000. and his The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York. no. ‘Rossiia i kitai kritikuiut gumanitarnoe vmeshatel’stvo’. Kommersant-Daily. 50. 2 June 2000.
. Jamestown Foundation. Foreign Affairs. vol. RFE/RL. See Jamestown Foundation. 3 March 2000. 1991–1998: Stagnation and Survival’. Newsline. Monitor. ‘Nado li Rossii opasat’sia Kitaia?’. 25 March 2000. vol. no. ‘Pervyi vizit Putina—v Kitai?’. in Jamestown Foundation. no.L. p. 2 February 2000. available at www. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 38. Monitor. 28. 3 (Summer 1993). Monitor. Huntington. See Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber. Il’ia Kedrov. Newsline. Fortnight in Review. Jamestown Foundation.Titarenko (ed. Guardian. Jamestown Foundation. no. 2 June 2000. My thanks to Hugo Dobson for providing me with the transcript of the conversation. vol. 31. Valeriia Sycheva. 24. Nezavisimaia gazeta. 8. vol. One of the most detailed and balanced Russian analyses was published to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China: M. Newsline. 6. See. 6. For a highly sceptical analysis see the interview with the Moscow University Sinologist. 22–49. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (Boulder. 39. no. Monitor. 6. 27. 32. Nezavisimaia gazeta. by Natal’ia Airapetova. 1999). p. Segodnia. 16 March 2000.TRANSFORMING ‘THE EAST’ 185
18. no.). p. pp. Monitor. 7 March 2000. 19. Jamestown Foundation. for example. 11. 22. Dmitrii Kosyrev. the Russian Human Rights Commissioner. 6. 40. no. 14 March 2000. vol. 1998). vol. Monitor. Segodnia. Kitai na puti modernizatsii i reform: 1949–1999 (Moscow. 379–415. 6.html 30. 8 February 2000. 6. RFE/RL. 8 March 2000. ‘V ekonomike stanet bol’she vneshnei politiki’. 72. 17 May 2000. 2 February 2000. Newsline. 25. Jamestown Foundation. Andrei Komarov. Vil’ Gel’bras. 13 March 2000. on a visit to China where he shared Russian experience. ‘Empty Encounters’. 37.). 29. 10 March 2000. Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda (Stockholm. 108. The Clash of Civilizations?’. 24. see Gennady Chufrin (ed. p. 1996). 35. Monitor. 33. vol. 6. p. pp. CO. 32. 41. RFE/RL. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in talks with NATO Foreign Ministers in Florence on 24 May 2000 reportedly apologized for Ojdanic’s visit. 4 April 2000. 6. 1. 20. vol. 26 May 2000. Jonathan Steele. no. 36. Times of India. vol. Samuel P. 15 February 2000. Nezavisimaia gazeta. no. The Commonwealth of Independent States. Jamestown Foundation. and from a peculiarly geo-cultural perspective. 2. 52. ‘Interv’iu programma ‘Zavtrak s Frostom’ (telekanal Bi-Bi-Si)’.
1992). The West. 8 February 2000. 24. Washington Post. it simply needed recognition that it was an independent actor in world politics whose views were legitimate and to be respected. the last thing Russia needed was yet more admonitions about its economy or Caucasian policy. 106. New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley. Itogi. he urged President Clinton to ‘stress—against all his inclinations—that geopolitics has not been abolished’. As far as Kissinger was concerned. vol. p. 45. ‘Clinton Must Lay the Groundwork for a New Relationship with Russia’. in his view. 15 May 2000. ‘Sostavitel’ kontrakta’. Ibid. This was something recognized by Henry Kissinger. At the same time. CA. 31 May 2000. 44. was to stop acting as if it were part of Russia’s domestic politics. no.
. Ken Jowitt. 43.. Interview with Sergei Parkhomenko.186 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Tel Aviv University. and in France in 2000) and. His most recent publications include Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (2000. He was formerly a member of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and is author of a textbook on Russian Foreign Policy in Hebrew under the title Soviet Foreign Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev (1991). Regional Security in the Wake of the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Europe and the Middle East (2002).Bailes is the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Finland and former Political Director of the Western European Union in Brussels. Foreign Affairs. Asia and the Caucasus. He has published vastly on Russian security policies. 2. 76 (1997). Marshall Center Papers. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17(1)(2001). 1(13). Tel Aviv University. Pavel Baev is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute. The Russian Armed Forces: Failed Reform Attempts and Creeping Regionalisation’.K. including: ‘Collecting Revolutions: Academic Rigour with Style’.
. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 14(1) (2002). and ‘Russia as a Security Disaster Area: Possible Conflicts and Interventions in 2015’. co-edited with W. among them ‘Europe’s Defense Challenge’. Oded Eran is an associate member of the Curiel Center for International Studies.Weidenfeld.Arbatov is Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma and Deputy Chairman of its Defence Committee. (2002). Recent publications include the edited book Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives (1997) and ‘The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya’. ‘Does History Inform Russia’s Policy in the Great Anti-Terrorist Game?’. Alyson J. No. He has published numerous articles concerning Russian security issues. also published in German in 2001. Security Dialogue 32(2)(2001). Gabriel Gorodetsky holds the Rubin Chair for Russian Studies. Ambassador Bailes has published numerous articles on European security. Oslo (PRIO).Notes on Contributors
Bobo Lo is a fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.Neil MacFarlane is Lester B. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors (2001) and is currently completing a monograph on Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Sweden). Russian Working Papers. Among his latest articles. Mikhail Nosov is First Deputy Director. Lev Klepatskii is General Consul of the Russian Federation in Munich.
. ‘A Wider Europe: The View from Minsk and Chisinau’. Centre for International Studies. with Rosemary Foot.Smith. European Foreign Affairs Review. a fellow of St Anne’s College. and Director of Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. He is editor. She is author of Russia in Central Asia: A New Web of Relations (1998) and editor. John Löwenhardt is Director of the Institute of Central and East European Studies. London. International Affairs. Has been writing on Russia and European Security. with Roy Allison. 5/4 (2000). He is author of Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia (1999) and editor. S. Margot light is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Chair of the Steering Committee. of Ethics and Foreign Policy (2001). of Central Asian Security: The New International Context (2001). and ‘Russian Perspectives on European Security’. He has published widely on Soviet and Russian policies in the Baltic area. She is author of The Soviet Theory of International Relations (1988) and co-editor. He is the former deputy director of the Foreign Policy Planning Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Among his numerous publications concerning Russia and Asia is ‘Challenges for the Future’. 77/3 (July 2001). most recently ‘Kaliningrad between Moscow and Brussels’. Ingmar Oldberg is a Senior Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. with Jan Zielonka. Oxford. Pearson Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford. China Review (February 2001). with Karen E. and a former Australian diplomat. He is the author of Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (2002) and Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (2003).188 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Lena Jonson is senior scientific employee of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm. Russian Academy of Science. Moscow. Alex Pravda is Lecturer in Russian and East European Politics at St Antony’s College. USA and Canada Institute. 2002. of US Hegemony and International Organizations (2003). University of Glasgow.
His most recent publications are After Gorbachev (1994) and Russia’s New Politics (1999).NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 189
Yaacov Ro’i is Professor of History. forthcoming) The late Alvin Rubinstein was a Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania University. and. Russia and European Security Institutions: Entering the 21st Century (2001) and The Baltic Chance: The Baltic States. Recent publications are The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union: 1917–1991 (Sources in History) (1999). Islam in the CIS: A Threat to Stability (2001) and Democracy and Pluralism in the Muslim Regions of the Former Soviet Union (2003. Tel Aviv University. Among his most recent publications are Islam and the Soviet Union (2000). University of Glasgow. Russia and the West in the Emerging Greater Europe (1997). His latest edited volume was America’s National Interests in a Post-Cold War (1994). Contemporary Europe (2000) and Postcommunism: Concepts in the Social Sciences (1999). Stephen White is Professor of International Politics.
. Dmitri Trenin is Deputy Director. Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies. co-edited with Anne Stevens. Richard Sakwa is Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations and Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent. Foreign and Security Policy Program. Carnegie Moscow Center. Recent publications include The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization (2000).
151. 147 Al-Assad. see also specific countries ballistic missiles xviii. 146. 44. 48. 155 Balkan states x. 127. 40–4. 9. 105. 140. 154. 143 ABM treaty 1972 14. 45. 146 Åland Islands 104 Albanians 86. 153 anti-Americanism 7–8 anti-humanitarianism 174–4 anti-missile defence treaty (1972) xviii anti-terrorism. 26. 159 Africa 9 aid: financial/economic xv–xvi. 153. 157–6 Arafat. see also central Asia. 133. 155. 30.Index
201st Division (Russian) 135. 85. Russian sale of: to China 176. 44. 132. see also National Missile Defence Baltic Charter 85. 135–5. and NATO expansion 83–84 ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) 5. 26–28. 156. 157 Al-Qaeda network 44–8. Aleksei 84 Arbatov. Askar 134. Eurasia. 26–30 Argun River 177 Arkhangelsk 93. 163–3. 125–8. 95 Baltic Fleet (Russian) 99
. 95 Austria 77 authority 182 Azerbaijan 87–4. 125. Madeleine 74. Alexei xi. 43. Yasser 157 Arbatov. 38. 144. 156. 87 Albright. 153. 134. in south central Asia 123–3. 177. see also military-industrial complex Armenia 126. 126. 132. 94. south central Asia. military 41 Akaev. xix. 133 Amsterdam. Evgenii 176 Adriatic Sea xii Afghan civil war 144 Afghanistan xviii. 59. 147. 177. xvii. 135–5 anti-universalism 174 Arab world 151–68. 88. Hafez 156. 95. 33. 148. 80. 77. to the Middle East 151. 143. 145– 5. 50. 14. 127 arms control. 142. 88. 181 Adamov. see also GUUAM Baghdad 50–4. specific countries Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 163 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Shanghai summit 40 Asia-Pacific region 4 Asian monetary fund 5 Atlantic Alliance x Atlanticization 94. 99
armaments. see also specific countries Arab-Israeli dispute xix. 157. 38–2. 152–2. 9 Asia 4. 21. treaty of 56 Ankara 152.
xvii. 181 Caucasus x. 107. 86. xiv. 153. 51 C3I systems 28 Camdessus. 159. 124. 180. 121. 27. 99. 117 Caspian Sea region 35. specific countries CEE countries 62 central Asia xii. 133. 23. and NATO 41–5. 20. and Islam 40. 168. 59. and NATO 35. 119. 117. ethnic disputes 106–15. 105. 173. 95 Brezhnev era 95 Britain 76. 18. 111. 87. 106. and the Middle East 153. and the Baltic states 96. 131. 98 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) 107 Barents region 75. 163 Batken region. Osama 145. Afghan campaign 41–5. 177 Belarus 92. 38–2. and the EU 94. 127. south central Asia. 75. and Russian economization of power 18. and China 176. 153. natural resources xii. 117. 97. Lithuania Barak. Fidel 82 Catherine the Great 11. and NATO 120. see also Estonia Latvia. 158. 50. 180. 39. 127. xix. 87. and Russian security interests 104– 13. 112. 180 Berger. 140–57. and Japan 179. effects of September 11 on 44–8. 130 Castro.
. 51. 98. 119. 44
Bush. ‘axis of evil’ speech 50. Michel xv Canada 70. 168. 142. Tony 36. First (1994–96) 56. and the EU 104. 111. 70 Bulgaria 56 Bush administration 23. 49. and Russian political interests 106. xvii. 175. 146 biological weapons ix bipolarity 2–3 Bishkek 41 Black Sea Economic Cooperation 75 Black Sea fleet xii Black Sea region x. 169. 120. 43. Samuel R. 159. specific countries central Europe 103 Chechen wars 14. Ehud 157 Baranovsky. 36. 130. 81. 176. Second (1999) xi. 44. 119. 100. 39. 99. 103–12 Baltic states xvii. US bases in 48. 123. 59. 158. 159. energy resources xii. 45. 95. see also United Kingdom Brussels 42. 131. 120. 85–2. 106 Bashkir people 140. 112. US bases in 48. Iurii 130 Beijing 33. 42. xv Berlin 85 bin Laden. Islamic destabilization of 40. and the Middle East 153. 182. 140. 152 Blair. Kyrgyzstan 145 Baturin. 17. 27. 126. George W. and Russian economic interests 110– 20. see also Commonwealth of Independent States. 133. xix. 104.INDEX 191
Baltic Sea Cooperation Council 92 Baltic Sea region xvii. 18. 119. 120. economic successes 36. 13. Vladimir 21 Barents Euro-Active Initiative 92. xvi. 129. 182 Blue Stream pipeline 152 Bosnia 39. 45. 93. 106. 49. 50. see also northern Caucasus. 134.
Russian integration with 33. 183. Bill 7. Collective Security Treaty 124. 144. 65 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (EU) 14–15. 153 coal 5 Cohen. and Islam 142. 147. 77. and Uzbekistan 124 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Collective Peacekeeping Force 128 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Council of Defence Ministers 126 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Customs Union 124 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Southern Shield 92 126 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Southern Shield 2000 126–6 Clinton. 154. 2. 22. Putin and 13. 105. Belgrade 86 Chyvashe people 163 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) x. 83. 130. 126. 33. 62. 18. 145. xi. and south central Asia 129. 175–7. 173. 87. 18. 171 Cologne European Council 62 Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) (EU) 62. 145. as wedge between Europe and USA 63. 168.
summit. 18. 22. 169. 163. as supplement to NATO 63–64. 58. Viktor 20. modernization of 175–5. 63–64. 87. and Russian security issues 142. 117. 20. 131 Chinese Embassy. 16. 147. William 86 Cold War x. and Islam 145. 17. and the Russian Military Doctrine 26–30. 72. 77. Southern Tier states 117–30. 152. 36. 63– 65. and the OSCE 15. Indian-Chinese-Russian triangle 175. 167. 145. see also Chechen wars chemical weapons ix Chernomyrdin. 32. xv. 86.192 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
and Russian exploitation of the Islamic factor 147. 145. 38. 175. treaty on 180 Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 107 Council of Economic Assistance (SEV) 8 Council for Foreign and Defence Policy 167
. xix. 8–9. 180. 86. 65. xiii. 152 Chiang Mai meeting 5 China xvii. and the Taliban 145. 85. 83. 133. 65 Common Strategy on Russia 1999 (EU) 56. 64. and Russian-northern European relations 104. Sino-Russian relations 10. xix. 107. and US policy 180 Chechnya: fundamentalist Iranian influence on xix. 128. 88. trade 108. January 2000 126. 167. 65. 56. 11. 127. xx. 129. 117–30. 165. and Kyrgyzstan 125. 105. NATO’s involvement in 41–5. 144. 124. 40. as economic pole 6. 14. 2. 143. 147. and the Afghan campaign 41. 143. 180. and NATO enlargement 85. call for genuine Russian partnership with 183. 125. 80. 127. Russian arms sales to (1990s) 18. 75 communism ix Communist Party (Chinese) 175 Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 172 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 141 Congress (US) 154 Contact Group 39 Conventional Forces in Europe. share of gross world production 5.
Russian debt 32. Lord 171 Damascus 157 Dayton Accords 1995 86 defence see securitization. elections (1999) 170. 18. 181–1. Putin’s angering of 37. 156. 47. 56. Russian defence budgets 27. 165. Russian weakness 17. border questions 106. 8 economization 12–13. division with the West xvi. Russia’s debtors 156. 169. 177. 171–1 Dushanbe 41. 124. security issues democratic states 118 democratization xv–xvi. 168. 182–2. 170. 83. identity 165–5. 181 Egypt 157 elites: and the economy 172. geo-economics 165. 86. 5. 95 Dagestan xviii. and NATO enlargement 58–5. 111. 182. 166. 17–18. 82. 109 derzhavnost’ xii Dostum. 92. geo-ideological 165–5. 144 East: as counterhegemonic formation 174–4. 158–8. 120. 84. 63. 183. Russian-Asian relations 163. 168. 129. see also trade economic ‘poles’ 3–4. and NATO 85. 6. 46. 157. and Islam 142. 156. 5. 169. 109. recovery 34–7. prioritization 151. 94. 85 Czech Republic: and the EU 61. geo-economic 165. Russia and the EU 61. August 1998 32. ruble crash. 168. geopolitical 165. 43. 168.
and the imposition of external ideas on Russia xv–xvi. and the EU 56. 59. 81. 47. Russian-Middle Eastern relations 152–2. 117. 96 energy resources xix. 173–3. Moscow consensus 172. Caspian Sea region xii. 3. 173. 179– 90. 6. 168. 123 Dahrendorf. 171. 164. 143. xix. 58. 87. 118. see also natural gas. Abdul Rashid 136 Duma (Russian parliament) xvi. 106. 92. 21. and Russian economic interests 110 Eurasia xvi. 32. 110. 172. 121. see also specific countries
. 167. and EU enlargement 60–7. Russian interests in northern Europe 108–20. Russian gross domestic product xx. 120 Denmark 103. 64. 47. 103. 46–47. 48–2. 126 Cuba 82 Cyprus 56. 13. 32. oil Estonia xvii. 170. 5. 130. 37. 178. 70. 105. 172. 183. 109. 17. 13. multipolarity 3–5. 183. reforging of the concept of 7. and NATO xviii.INDEX 193
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 76 criminality 119. representations of and the real 175– 8 east Asia 80 eastern Europe 117 ‘Eastern Problem’ (German) 82–9 economic issues: Asian crisis 4. 165. ethnic disputes 106–15. 157. Russian share of world trade 5. 183. Russia’s federal budget 32. 7. 28. integration 3–5. 62. 62. 172.
and Russia in the era of securitization 20–5. TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) 180 Europeanization 163–2 Far East xi. 95. 107. Russian collaboration with 8. and Russian-northern European relations 108–20. Russia’s road into 54–88. 110. western Europe European Commission 56. 163–3. accession states 56. 100. 61 European Environment Agency 75 European Missile Defence Initiative 14 European Monetary Union (EMU) 108 European Security Council 175 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 181 European Union (EU) 4. 56. 15. northern Europe. 77. and the Nordic—Baltic region 92. Russia’s turn to following September 11 51–5. Headline Goal 71. 182 Europe xiii. 88. pre-in states 56. defence issues 5. xviii. 181. 106. xvii. 56. 63. 63. Helsinki summit. 60– 64. ‘insiders-outsiders dichotomy’ 56. and Germany 82. 75–2. and US strategic interests 80. Russia—EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 13. 130. 56. 174 foreign policy establishments: and EU enlargement 60–7. and Russia’s identity crisis 33. regional organizations 9. enlargement 16. 56. 1999 94. 164. 72–75. and Russian strategic uncertainty and American tactical intrusiveness 80–88. 167. and south central Asia 129. 61. and cooperation 66. 128 Finland 93. 62. 93–2. and Russian security interests 104. 63–65. and the EU 108. and Russian trade 21. 103. 128. Russia’s place in the defence of 69– 77. 111. 74. 97. 64. and NATO enlargement 58–5. Rapid Reaction Force 14–15. 56. 62. May 2000 181–1. see also eastern Europe. 13. 112.
militarization 5. 75. 62. 81. dual expansion of and the exclusion of Russia 56–66. 161–92 Federal Assembly 13. 4. 74–1. 168 Foreign Policy Concept 2000 11. Uzbekistan 126. 58. 105 First World War 80 fishing industry 109–18 Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) 19. Russia as bridge between Asia and 163. and the Baltic states 104. 60 European Council 56. 111. 57. 70–7. Putin’s angering of 48
. 158 Federal Security Service (FSS) 19. and Kosovo 94. securitization of 75. subservience to NATO 59. anti-Americanism of 8.194 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 56 ‘Euro-Atlantists’ 142 Eurocentrism 20–5. and Russian political interests 106. and Russian economic interests 108– 17. 126 Ferghana region. 158–7. 181–1. Russian integration with 34. and the single currency 5. 16. 63. share of gross world production 5. and the former Soviet bloc countries 56. 61. summit. 61. 103. 76–3. 47. 34.
5. xix. 95. 81. 182. Charles 75 Great Northern Route 164 Greece 85 Gulf states 153–2 Gulf War xix GUUAM (Georgia. Mikhail 176 France 22. 168. 58. 95. Leonid 111 Gore. 15. EU membership 56. 173–3. Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation 1997 26. July 2000 44. see also GUUAM Germany xv. 51 Gazprom xv. Russian 121. as unilateralism xiv Gorbachev era 42. xii. Uzbekistan. 183 geo-ideology 165–5. and Russian international relations 3. 22. 86. 167. 80. xix Genoa 38 geo-economics 32. xvi–xvii. Russian collaboration with 8. 175. US xiii. David 56. 22. Ryutaro 179 Hassan. 14. 169. under Yeltsin 13. Al 152 Gotland 104 Grant. 183 geopolitical issues xiii. 86. Robert 87–4 Huntington. 179–90. Ukraine. Sergei 172 globalization xi. 125. 85. Azerbaijan and Moldova) 33. 155. 3. 166. 43. 81. 94 Fradkov. 56. 19. 39. 81. xx–52. 87–4. 38.
and Putin’s foreign policy after September 11 36–52. 181–1. 165. 183. Mikhail xii. 58. 159. xvi. Nazi 83. 175. 168. 84. patterns of 117–8. 111. 16. 88. 56. 95 Hunter. 180 Haiti 118 Hanoi 178 Hashimoto. 85. 140 Gorbachev. reversal of trends 32. 17. and Russian national interests 2. 175
. 50. NATO membership 56. 166. unification of xvii Giddens. and NATO enlargement 82–84. Anthony 170 glasnost 140 Glaz’ev. summit. devaluation 174–4 Hungary 31–8. 82. 21. Russia and the New World Order 2– 9. 48. 145. financial debt to Russia 17. US 179 Georgia 18. 108 Frank. 66. 9. and Russian Military Doctrine after Kosovo and Chechnya 26–30. 183 Gorbenko. and securitization of Russian foreign policy 10–23. under Putin 12. 179 Helsinki European Council 62 Hizballah 156 House Committee on National Security 84 humanitarian intervention. nationalism 83. 58. Semen 170 free-market economy xv. 117. 87. 178. 94. Saddam 87. Crown Prince of Jordan 157 hegemony 6. 18. 46 free-trade areas 77 Frost.INDEX 195
former Soviet bloc 117. 59 G8 countries 6. 82. Samuel 159 Hussein. 56. ‘Eastern Problem’ 82–9. 165. 169. and the East-West divide 7. see also specific countries Founding Act on Mutual Relations. 39. 177 fundamentalist nationalists 57.
130. Islamic revolution 79 140. 109. and globalization 3. 47. 178. 146. 154. 157–6 Ivanov. 163. fundamentalism xix. Russia 152 Jackson-Vanik Agreement 51 Japan xvi. 7. 134. 108. 135–5. 93. 154. 157– 6. 126. 109. 41. 34–8. 103. Russian antipathy towards 159. 104. Sergei 167. Russian-US provision after September 11 40 Interior Ministry 19 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 181 international identity 31–8 International Monetary Fund (IMF) xvi. 110
. 181. 9. Russian-CIS 33. 132. 125–8. 163–2. xix. 50–4. 181 Ivanov. 111 Kaliuzhnyi. and NATO enlargement 85. 147. hegemony in 6. 10. 70. Ken 182 Kabul 41 Kaliningrad 16. 153. 2000 153 Iran. role in Russia’s relations with central Asia 140–57. 124. 33 International Monetary Union (IMU) 145. and multipolarity 2. 145. Western qualities of 7 Indian-Chinese-Russian triangle 175 Ingush people 141 integration: economic 3–5. 157–6. 44–8. 130. 166. 111. 11. 155. 172. Arab-Israeli dispute xviii. Grigorii 181 Karelia 93. 51. xviii. 176. 87. 118. 50–4. destabilization of the Caucasus 40. 7. 133. 174 Ivashov. Islamophobia 142 Israel xix. 131 Iran Nonproliferation Act. 95. 85. 155. xviii. 147. 142. 151–64. 146 international relations: democratization 6. visa regime 52. 180. as economic pole 6. realist theory 117 investment 97 Iran x–xi. 176–90 Jerusalem 154.196 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Iakovlev. 5. 83. 163. 158 Jiaxuan. and south central Asia 129. 48. 40. xix. Russia’s attempt to forge relationship with 10. 40. see also September 9. destabilization of central Asia 119. Tang 176 Jordan 155 Jowitt. 48. 156. 181–1 intelligence. Fred C. 50. Leonid 66 Izobil’noe. xvi. 107. 135–5 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 145 Islamic Renaissance Party 141–1 Islamic terrorism: role in Russia’s relations with central Asia 145. 32. 83. 61. 13. Russian arms sales to (1990s) 18. 152. 5. 45. xvii. 131–1. 175 Isfahan xix
Islamic extremism xii. Russian-European 20–5. 142. Russian nuclear cooperation with 18. Vladimir 97 Iceland 75. 178 Karasin. Viktor 176 Karaganov. 9. 11. 8. Sergei 19. 108. 174. 125–8. 120. 127. 77. 179. in south central Asia 123–3. 109 IKEA 108 Ikle’. 133. 84 India 77. 97. 106. Shah of 151–60 Iraq x–xi. 146–6. 75. 156. in south central Asia 123–3. 155. 87. 134. Igor 19. 165. 6. 85. 151.
and Russia’s identity crisis 33 military establishment. Il’ia 176 Kola Peninsula 97–6. 14. and the Chechen crisis 20. 145. 159. fear of isolation xvi. 129. 6. response to 11 September 37. 40. new defence priorities 28–1. xviii. 32–5. 22. 70 Mandelbaum. 19. 46–47. 129. Mikhail 48 marginalization 33. 84. Ahmad Shah 135–5. Sergei 168 Leningrad 27. see also St Petersburg liberal conservatism 170 liberal Westernizers 57. Aslan 145 Masud. 125. 64. 130. 80. after Kosovo and Chechnya 26–30. 134. 141. 104. Islamist threat to 125. 158 Lebedev. 106. 143 Khabarovska river 177 Kildin (Russian intelligence ship) 154 Klaipeda region 106 Klebanov. 170 Libya 85. 134.20 Kurile Islands xvii. 166. and Russia’s admission to the G8 group 51. 144–5. and Russian security policy 123. 88. 16. 127. modus operandi xvii. Putin’s angering of 48 military-industrial complex 18. Russian Military Doctrine after 26– 30 Kosovo Force (KFOR) (NATO) 94 Kostunica. 156. 50–4. 106–15. 144. 176. 93. 99 Kuwait 154 Kyrgyzstan 41. 172 Latvia xvii. 59. 151–68. 110–19 Ljubljana 38 Lokoil xv–xvi Madrid 86 Malaysia 7 Malta 56. 145. 109 Koptev. 103. main tasks of defence policy 27. 97. 8. 127. 39. 103–12. Vojislav 88 Kozyrev. 88. see also specific countries Military Doctrine 1992 (draft) 128 Military Doctrine 2000 63. and the Kosovan situation xi. 70. xvi. 127. 57. 125–5. 43. 73. Iurii 176 Kosovo xi–xii. 126. 175 Ministry of Defence (Russian) 19 modernity 167 Moldova 180. xvii. see also armaments Milosevic. 142. 178 Kremlin 39. Uzbek population 132 Kazan 57 Kennan. 47. 126. 142. 56. 52. multipolarity xiv. new look at 27–28. 143. 146. 179 Kursk tragedy 98. Michael 85 Margelov. 131. George 81 KGB 96. 10. 155. 124. 124. 133. 173. 48. 126. 58–5. 110– 19 Lebanon 156. 144 Medium-term Strategy (2000–10) (Russian) 61–8. 9. and globalization xiv. 129. 136. Yoshiro 179. 57. 166. 86–3. 142. 147 Kazakhstan 124. 59 liberalism 37. 134. 109. 145. 156 Lithuania 56. 105. 94–3. 63 Menatep xvi Middle East xviii–xix. 45. Islam 41. 103. Uzbek population 132
Latin America 4.INDEX 197
Karimov. 174. Andrei 2. 56 Maskhadov. 132. Islamic threat to 145. 146. 144. 15. 145. 144. Slobodan 87. 133. 46. see also GUUAM monetary multipolarity 5 Mori. 182
. under Putin 15. 35.
and National Missile Defence 35. 32–5. 154. 3. 88. 144. 42. 173 National Security Concept 2000 2. 33. and NATO xviii. 177. and the ‘Eurasian triangle’ 33. 76. 51. 87–4. 104. 72. 9. calls for transformation from defensive to political alliance 51. 41–5. 175. 14.
and international relations 2. and cooperation 65–2. 158. 38. 57. and Turkey 152 Mubarak. 50. 84 National Security Concept 1997 13. 71. 174. 8. summit. 143. 65. and the CIS 180. and the Baltic states 35. 74. and Israel 154. 38. 9. 47. 27. 145 nation-building xv national identity ix. May 2002 49. and Russian national interests 2. 51. economic 3–5. 39. 178. 35. 44. 69. 29. 147. 130 national sovereignty 174 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) xii. and the Tajik civil war 142. 40. xi. 111. 51. xx. 13. 130 National Security Council (Russian) xix. 19. CESDP as supplement to 63–64. 37. 23. 99. 177. 18. and Putin 97. 2. and multipolarity 2. xvii. collaboration with the West 10. xii–xiii. and the exclusion of Russia 81–8. see also pluralism Murmansk 93. 13. 76 national interests x. 48. xviii. 43. 153. 50th anniversary summit 58. securitization 12. as official Russian policy 2. and globalization xiv. as realistic perspective 2. economization of security issues 17. and nuclear power 98. 11. 109. 143. 43. xv. 64. 88. 167. 106. 8. 105. Islamic threat to 141. regional scale 4. 112. 16. 82. 50. 30. identity of 163. scaling down of foreign policy goals 34. 145. and the Middle East 152. xiii. and Chechnya xi. 46. Juma 133. 109 Namangani. 45. 142. 126. 3. lack of consensus regarding 2–2. Husni 157 multinationals 3 multipolarity xiv. 52. response to September 11 36. and arms control 84. 174. and China 176. Putin’s support of 169 National Missile Defence (NMD) 13– 14. and the Caucasus 120. 70. 63–64. 14–15. and south central Asia 123. fear of isolation xvi. 22. and the EU 74. and the Nordic—Baltic region 95. 28. 50. and European security concerns 62. 177–7 National Security Blueprint 2000 62–9. 49. 107. and the Far East 181. 84. 165. 5.
. 16. 157. 27. 176. 3–9.198 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Moscow x. 173. 11. 3. and Swedish trade 108. 8. and Kosovo xi–xii. 6. 13. monetary 5. 41. 27. 73. 14. 20. and central Asia 120. 84. double-edged nature of Western aid xv. 18. consensus 172. and South Korea 178. 52. 156.
18. and the EU 92. 57. 144. 117. 41–6. 180. effect on arms control negotiations 83–84. xviii–xix. 158. institutional frameworks 92–2. demilitarisation 92. 56. 85–3. xvii. 30. Russia’s political interests in 106–16. 103–22. 56–6. and the Nordic—Baltic region 92. 94 NATO-Russia Joint Council xviii. 157 Netherlands. see also Republic of Korea Northern Alliance 41. 164. 98 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 56 North Korea 44. 34. 77. and northern Europe 103–13. The 164 New Delhi 33 New World Order ix. 108. 133. and Russia’s identity crisis 33. 27–29. 59. and NATO 103–13. 131. 98. effect on Germany 82–9. 92–100. and the CIS 119. 63. 97. 104–13. underdevelopment of military-tomilitary contacts 92. 16. 49. and Sino-Russian relations 176. 145. 39. 80–88. Sapurmurad 144 non-governmental organizations 3 Nordic Council 103 Nordic—Baltic region xii. 159. Putin and 15. 64. 97. 100. 58.INDEX 199
and former Soviet bloc countries 56. weakening effect on the Alliance 84– 1 NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997 26. Partnership for Peace 56. as instrument of US foreign policy xviii. new Russia and 2–9. 148. 1997 56. xvi. and Russian nuclear capability 92. 22. Nursultan 145. Madrid summit. see also specific countries
Nazarbaev. 65 NATO-Russian Partnership for Peace 30 natural gas xix. Russian disarmament in 104. 143. perceived as universal threat 85. Strategic Concept 1999 131. 163. Binyamin 156. Russia’s role in xv New York 38 Nikitin. 51. 96–5. 124. 10. 141. 94–4. 16. 131. 27–28. 87–4. Russia’s economic interests in 108– 20. Kosovo Force (KFOR) 94. security issues 92–100. ‘insiders-outsiders dichotomy’ 56–2. xi. and NATO enlargement 92. 125. 95. and US—Russian estrangement 82. Putin and 92. and Turkey 151. 100. and Yugoslavia 26. Russian acceptance of CIS influence 41–5. and the destruction of international stability 80–8. effect on Russian security interests 87. 13. and Russian nuclear capability 99. open to question 2. 33. 58. 97–7. 148 Northern Dimension programme 75. 146 Nazi Germany 83 ‘near abroad’ x. see also NATO enlargement NATO enlargement xviii. 94–4. 183. 130. Russian inclusion xiv. 135–5 northern Caucasus 140. 105. 175. 140. Islamic threat to 147. 5. 93–2. 93–2. and south central Asia 130. 38–2. Vladimir 109 Niyazov. see also specific countries Near East 18 neo-Eurasians 142 Netanyahu. 152. 173. 108 northern Europe xi. Russia’s military-strategic interests in 103–13.
26. 18 pragmatism 37. and the EU 61. 47. 126 Oslo Accord 155 Osset people 141 Pakistan 118. 96–5 Putin. 107.200 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Northern Fleet (Russian) 98. Viktor 156–5 power: and authority 182. 94. ‘first use’ doctrine 84. 37. deterrence strategies 27. Putin and 15 orientalism 167. 152. 183 pragmatic nationalists 57. human factor 98–7. 65 Pechenga 106 perestroika xvii. 125. 96. 130 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 155 Palestine/Palestinians xix. 108. Kyrgyzstan 125. 107. 96. 173. 109 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 9. Romano 181–1 Prusak. 103. Chris 63. 57. 108– 17 Novgorod oblast 93. and the CIS 117–30. 174. 77. 176. 82. 183 Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 1993 27 Prishcina xii Prodi. 167. 120. 95. 178. 18. 105. angering of the elites 37. 64. Russian sales of 18. 99. warhead reduction 50 Obuchi. and NATO xviii. Istanbul summit. 109. November 1999 175. 33. 100. contradictory policies of 171. 56. 155. 111. and NATO enlargement 58 ‘Putin factor’ 92. 167. 86. 168 Osh region. 87–4. 182 ‘Petersberg tasks’ 71 pipelines xix. 5. Istanbul summit. 169 Permanent Joint Council 58. 130 Patten. 140. 124. xix. 98. Evgenii xix. NATO’s desire for equality with/ supremacy over 28. 166. 110 Ojdanic. December 1999 97. 158 Palestinian Authority 156. Dragoljub 175 Oldberg. Russia’s maintenance failures in the Nordic—Baltic region 92. 104 pollution 109 Posuvaliuk. 103. 105. 51. following September 11 50. 181. Keizo 179 oil xix. 32–5. 19. 103– 12. see also multipolarity Poland 35–8. 166. 58. 171. 83. 85. Ingmar 93 oligarchies xv–xvi Oneximbank xvi Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 108. 179. 157–6 Panama 118 Panarin. Georgii 163 pluralism 32. 106. xv. Sergei 48 Primakov. 57. competitive nature of 16–17. 59 Prikhodko. 97–7. 156–5.S. 72. 152 Plekhanov. 81. 48–2. 94 Peter the Great 163. Mikhail 97 public arena: and EU enlargement 60. 83. 97 nuclear technology ix. Vladimir xii. 109. 42–47.
. 128. 28–1. 169
Pankisi Gorge 50 Paris Club debt 13 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 56 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 56. projection of 17. 109 Norway 75. xiv. A.
and securitization 10–23. 166. 52. 92. 92. in the Middle East 151–68. 143–4. and the timber industry 110 Pyonyang 44 Qaddafi. 47. 96. 145. 172. 57. 147. and south central Asia 123. Dmitrii 172 Romania 56. 99–8. 29. 141. 46–47. Imomali 125. Dennis 157 ruble crash. xv. as economic pole 6. 125. 95. marginalization of 33. 100. Birhanuddin 144 Rahmonov. and NATO 66. 35. 47. 35. 96–5. 73 Rogozin. 163–2. Condoleeza 147 Riga 95–4
Robertson. 111. identity ix. 117. and Islam 140–57. and Asia 163–3. 173 Rushailo. and central Asia 123–46. xiii. isolation of xvi. 180. hegemony in the CIS 121. 56. 130. foreign policy after September 11 36–52. 146. 27. 76. 21. 164. differences between declared and actual policies of 11. 163–2. globalist self-vision of 21–4. and the Military Doctrine 27. 166–91 regional organizations 3. exploitation of the Islamic factor 142–2. 16 Reagan administration 84 realism 37. 10–11. xi. 147. and Europe 20–5. 61. August 1998 32. Asian value system of 167–7. lack of distinct philosophy/ worldview xiii. 181. 13. reasoned acquiescence of 43. 56. and the CIS 33. great power status of 37. 124. 130. 88. as ‘competition state’ 38. domestic issues xvii. Military Doctrine after Kosovo and Chechnya 26–30. exclusion from the dual expansion of Europe 56–66. 32. 124. 34–8. and the Nordic—Baltic region 92. 109. 9 Republic of Korea 5. Theodore 16 Ross. 39. on Russia’s status as a great power 37. 42–47. and the Russian navy 98. Medium-term Strategy (2000–2010) 61–8. Decembrists 166. 117–30. 166–91. 142 Rambouillet 86–3 Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 14–15. 140–57. and European integration 20–5.INDEX 201
differences between declared and actual policies of 11. 81. 127. meetings with Bush 38–2. as bridge between East and West 163. 31–8. and the Middle East 158. 107. 13. Lord 16. 126. 13–14. and the Far East 165–92. 129. speeches of 13. 42–47. and European defence 69–77. 59. 94–3. on Russian EU membership 56–2. 112. and the Far East 165–92.
. and northern Europe 110. and the National Security Blueprint 84. as realist 37. 132. 63. contrast with the West xiii. Moamar al 85 Rabbani. see also North Korea Rice. 136. 56–2. 45. liberalism in 37. 46. 170. Vladimir 147 Russia ix–xx. and the threat of Islam 140. containment of 35. 169. 86 Roosevelt. and economization 17–18. 181–1.
143. Western devolutionary tendencies 14–15. 63 Russia—NATO Joint Council xviii. 46. 174. 46. and south central Asia 123–46. 148. and the CIS 119. 65. 62–65. and economization 12. changing face of 12. hard xii. National Security Concepts. 103. and the National Security Blueprint 2000 84 Russian Federation Council 124
Russian navy 98–7. 182–2. 47. Putin’s policy after September 11 36–52. and the Nordic—Baltic region 92– 100. 182. Slavophile 166. xi. mutiny 99 Russian Orthodox Church 142 Russian Security Council 126. xiii. Russia’s place in the defence of Europe 69–77. strategic uncertainty and US tactical intrusiveness 80–88. 147. four dimensions of 12–20. in the Nordic—Baltic region 92–92. 111 Schroeder. Russian defence budgets 27. Gerhard xv Second World War 80. Tsarist 158. quest for international recognition 173. 65 Russian army 143 Russian Empire 26 Russian Federation xi. self-limiting assertiveness 39. Muslim population 140. 71. superpower status 31. xvii–xviii. 46. Putin’s policy in the CIS 117–30. of Russian foreign policy 10–23. and the New World Order 2–9. spatial vastness xi. 36. 17–18. 36. primacy of security priorities and concepts 12–15 security issues 5. 144. 15–17. 100. see also United States-Russian relations ‘Russia fatigue’ 35 Russia—EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1994 13. Tsarist and Soviet legacies of x. as Russian priority xi–xii. 12. soft xii. and northern Europe 103–22. see also Military Doctrine 2000. 32. 183. 159. 154. phoenix legend 31. 97–7. 46. 97. as Third World nation ix. 13. National Security Blueprint 2000 62–9. quasi-centre 170. Islamic threat to 140. securitization 10–23. 121. 97. 70. xii. ‘third way’ of 170–81. as second-rank power 46. 32. 13. 81. European 14–15. 144. in the CIS 142. see also Leningrad Sakhalin energy reserves 165 Saudi Arabia 130 SBS-Agro xvi Schengen visa regime 16. 19–2. 179. policy for peace 6. 167–7. 16. 106 securitization. 104–13. 43. and new Easternism 168. 1997. 109. 58. 84. 73. 145. xx. political myth-making 11. 46. 64. 174 Russian-North Atlantic Council 51 Russian-Uzbek agreement 125 Russo-Japanese war 1904–05 99 St Petersburg 93. 74. 175. securitization
.202 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
modus operandi xvii. 72. and Eurocentrism 20–5. policy management 12. 13. 141– 5. 69. 96. 94–4. self-concentration 34. in south central Asia 123–46. 61. 2000.
169. 167. 133. xiii. 96–5. Poland 105 Taiwan 176 Tajik civil war 128. Javier 63. 143. 146. 156. 106 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) agreements 30. 74. 125. 147 Tallinn 95–4 Tashkent 41. 181–1 south central Asia: border transparency 129. 127. 26. see also USSR Spain 85. 135–5. 154. 144 Tajik-Afghan border 135 Tajikistan 41. 95 Solana. 141. 130. 59. 175 Sergeev. 158. 145. see also Far East. 155. 30. 84. 127. 144. 144. Viktor 170 Shevardnadze. Oct. 147 Sheinis. 146–6. 132. 174 Soviet Special Forces xii Soviet Union ix. 125. 142. 157–6 Szczecin. 81 Slovenia 56. 104. 145. 85 Taliban 40. Josef 88. 145. 159 Shevtsova. 107. 163 Slovakia 56. 83–84. Peter 170 Suez crisis 1956 85 Sunni Islam 145 Surkhandarya region. 108–17. 126. 105. 135–5. 146. 27. 73. 148. 103. 163 Tbilisi 88 Teheran 152 territorial integrity 174. 1997 hearings 81–8 September 11. 146. 86–3. Uzbek population 132 Talbott. 124. 106. 173. irresponsible nature of the collapse of xvi–xvii. 159. 2001 ix. 64. legacy 151. 41. xiii–xiv. 141–2. and the Middle East 152. 145 Tatar people 140. 131.
. 112. 108 Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–10) 56 Struve. 144. Islamic threat to 141–2. START III negotiations 84 state xi. 21. 128. 44. Strobe xv. 148. 110 Syria xix. 145 Sergounin. Eduard 88. 133. Russian security policy in 123–46. 82. Alexander 109 Shanghai Five (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 145. 65. domestic Russian 13–14. 22. 81. 106 Stability and Growth Pact initiative 1997 (EU) 75 Stalin. xiv. 143. and Putin 117–30. 86 Spitzbergen 105. 105. 141. 104. Uzbekistan 146 Sweden 103. 96. 45. 154.INDEX 203
Senate (US). in south central Asia 123–3.
START II negotiations 83. 45. Lilia 36 Silk Road 13 Slavs 163. 134–5. see also specific countries South Korea 178 Southern Tier states xviii–xix. and Russian security policy 123. Fritz 83 Stockholm 97. 134. 146. 176 terrorism 11. 148. 125–8. Jonathan 176 Stern. and economic integration 4. 80. Igor 19. 155. 133. specific countries sovereignty 76. 120–30. identity 118. and eastern Europe 117. 145. 88. 86. 103. in central Asia 119./Nov. 124. 88. Putin’s foreign policy after 36–52 Serbia 58. role in Russia 170–80 Steele. 153.
dollar 5. bombing of Iraq xviii. 77.204 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
war against xiv. share of gross world production 4. Russian-Middle Eastern 152–2. xix. unipolarity 64. 9. 26. and GUUAM 180. 58. 38. 77. 44. 120. and south central Asia 129. 178. Sino-Russian 176 Trans-Siberian Railway 164 Transcam 180 transcaspian gas pipeline 120. 36. 75–2. see also Britain United Nations Charter 8. 75. 81. 181. 84. 128. 74 United Nations General Assembly 129 United Nations Security Council 28. 87. and Kosovo 33.
decreased role in Europe 15. 87. 80. geopolitics 179. 76. 22. 85. and NATO xviii. 64. 130. and National Missile Defence 13– 14. 131 Turkmenistan 120. 163. 87. Russian-Asian 163. 133. and central Asia 148. xviii. 44–8. and the Middle East 152–1. 155–5. 83. 142. and Iran 152. and the START agreements 103. and Russian-Arab armaments sales 152–1. 124 Transcaucasus 27. 174 United States (USA) xi. 84–1. 39–3. 146–6. 124. and NATO 59. 84. 82. 61. 5. 63. 7. 5. and Uzbekistan 125. 38. Viacheslav 167 Tsarist Russia 158. xvii. see also GUUAM unipolarity 64. 103. and US tactical intrusiveness xvi. 82. 70. 26. 2. 7. 165. 35. 175. see also United States-Russian relations United States-Russian relations: as corner stone of Russian foreign policy x. 117. 86. 77. under Putin 11. Russia and the EU 21. and oil/gas prices 108. 144 Ukraine xvii. 95. and Russian collaboration 7–8. 154. 105. 84. and globalization xiv. 65. 26. 180 transportation 164 Trenin. 153. and China 176. 181. 147. 159 Turkey xviii. and European security concerns 62. and nuclear disarmament 109. 183. 132. 64. 30. 87. Dmitri 60 Trubnikov. and National Missile Defence 35. and Bosnia 86. 171. xix. hegemony xiii. 80–88
. and Islamic extremism/terrorism 140. following September 11 36–52. Russian calls for reciprocity 37–1. 87. 18. and Germany 82. 86. 167. 152. 107. 173 United Arab Emirates 154 United Kingdom 82. 71. 161. effect of Israeli-Russian relations on 154. 82. 87. 130–40. 88. 59. 173. 45. 152. and south central Asia 129. 96. 35. 174 United Nations (UN) xi–xii. 177–7. 80–8. deterioration in 10. 179. 136. 151. 84. 73. 28. 40. 173. 29. see also September 11 2001 Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 177 Third World 40 TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) 180 trade 8. 47–4. and NATO 151. 148. 64.
and ballistic missile defence 84. 45. and the Caspian Basin energy reserves 120. 82. 142. 156. 144–4. and the Middle East 151. 73 West European Union Council 72 West European Union Institute of Security Studies 72 West European Union Satellite Centre 72 western Europe: and Bosnia 86. 148 Walesa. 86. 49. deterioration in Russian relations 26. and the Far East 167. Boris xi. 179. 178 Vilnius 95–4 von Clausewitz. 180. and the Military Doctrine 27. 155. 69–6. 58. and the Nordic—Baltic region 92. and disarmament in northern Europe 104. see also western Europe West European Union (WEU) 16. and NATO 27.INDEX 205
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 128 universalism 178 Ural-Volga military district 27 US-Baltic Charter 85 USSR 8. 45. 158. 159. identity 165. 19. 145. Ludwig 171 Wahhabis 132. EU’s influence on 52. 52 Xiaoping. 57. 13. re-examination of the concept of 7. Latvia 110 Vietnam 154. Lech 57 Warsaw 57 Washington 15. 124–5. 136. 131–1. 128–8. 51. 30. division with the East xvi. 40. 155. Carl 87 von Mises. 33. 23. 146. 39. triumphalism of 167. Russian resentment towards 10. see also Soviet Union Uzbekistan 41.
. and the Islamic threat 125–5. and the CIS 130. 96. 105. and Russian security issues 123. 41. 143. 44. 147. 18. and the Islamic threat 142. 14. Russian integration into 34–8. 21. 22. and terrorism 38. and south central Asia 130–40. and the Afghan campaign 40–4. and Iran 152. and the NATO 50th-anniversary summit 58. 84. 71–8. 47. 141. 146. Russian calls for reciprocity 37. 147. 44. 128–8. 15. 148. Russia’s turn to following September 11 51–5. Sergei 48 Yeltsin administration 142 Yeltsin. Deng 175 Yanov. and NATO enlargement 80. and Russian gas exports 18. 50. US control over 117 Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) 72 Williamson. 168. 171. 127. subservience to NATO 59. 62. contrast with Putin’s leadership 10. 133–4. 12. 97. devolutionary security tendencies 14–15. 127. Alexander 166 Yastrzhembskii. see also GUUAM Vardö space radar station 105 Ventspils. 146. 157. John 172 World Trade Organization (WTO) 13. 81. Putin and 14–15. 51. 144–4. US-Baltic Charter 85 Washington Consensus 172 West 32.
and Putin 183. 45. and the Islamic threat 140. 148. 182. 20.
107. 38. 47. 142 Yeltsin era 36. 27–28. 39. 105. see also Bosnia. 121 Yugoslavia xi. 85–2. 26. 63
. 108. 42. 33. Slovenia Zagorskii. 58. 43. Serbia. 29. and the threat of Islam 140. Andrei 169 zero-sum politics 15. and nuclear technology sales 181.206 RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
and northern Europe 104. 88. 94.