Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n

South Africa and Namibia
A book of data based on material
prepared by the Anti-Apartheid Movement

The Unesco Press

Paris 1974

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa South Africa and Namibia

Published by the Unesco Press, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris Printed by ImprimeriesRCunies, Lausanne

ISBN 92-3-101 199-5
French edition: 92-3-201 199-9 0 Unesco 1974 Printed in Sivif:erland

Cover photograph: Almasy


S o m e clutes i the history ojSouth Afiica und Namihici, 9 n

P r I South Africa at
1. The historical hcickgroiind to upartheid,15 SouthAfrica,18 ; The GreatTrek. 1 ; Diamondsand gold,21 ; Rhodes: 8

Boer-British i a r ,24:African organization,27 rvly

2 Development of the economy,33 . Geographyand climate,33;South African grossdomestic product,35; Industrialization, Trade, 1 37; 4

4 3. Apartheid in operation,4 The l g l z d framework,45; South Africa becomes a republic, 48; eaie Apartheid and t e economy,48; Education, 62; The pass laws, 67; h ‘Homelands’, Africans i urban a e s 75;Security,78 69; n ra. 4. From oppositiori to resistance,85 Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign,88;The Congress of t e People,90; h The ‘treasont i l ,92:Sharpeville.92;Opposition goes underground,94; ra’ Rivonia. 95;The Case of t e Twenty-two, Port Elizabeth strike,98; h 98; T i l of t e ‘Pretoriasix’, 98;Student p o e t 99;New s r k wave. 102; ra h rts. tie Black Consciousness.102


0 5. The outside world,1 4 The United Nations,104;Africa, 105;S r t g c considerations,108;Bans taei and boycotts.1 1 1
6. Win suclz men revolt, I21 le Nelson Mandela,121;Abram Fischer,122;Albert Luthuli,123

Part II Namibia

1. Background, 127
2. The economy, 128 Minerals, 128; Farming, 129; Fishing, 129; Tourism, 129; Wages, 129; Welfare, 130
3. Education,131

4. History andpeopfes,133
5. The South African takeover,137

6. Namibia and the United Nations,140

7. Apartheid and the ‘homefunds’, 142
8. Resistance.146
Appendix Further reading, 153


Most people are aware of apartheid from what they read in newspapers or see on television. Thousands are passionately concerned by the suffering it causes, but literally millions are suffering directly under an inhuman and degrading system which deprives them of even the most elementary of human rights. Horrified beyond measure by what had happened during the Second World War, the community of nations adopted the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights in 1948.For a majority of the inhabitants of southern Africa, this might as wl never have happened: for them. the Declaration has remained a dead el

This book is based on material prepared by the Anti-Apartheid Movement for a teaching k t on southern Africa. A section on Rhodesia, which formed i part of this material, wl be published separately. The views expressed in this il book do not necessarily reflect those of the Secretariat. As the United Nations Specialized Agency for education, science and culture,Unesco hopes that this book wl interest teachers in particular and that il it wl assist them in making a new generation more conscious than their elders il of the intolerable injustices w still tolerate-and more effectively determined e to eliminate them.

S o m e dates in the history of South Africa and Namibia

South Africa

700 onwards Movement of Bantu peoples into southern Africa. 1652 F r t Dutch settlement a; the Cape under Jan van Riebeeck. is 1779 F r t Kaffir war: first major confrontation between settlers and is 806 809 818 823 83 4 836 860 867 868 884-85 885 886 899-1902 902 904 906 907-13 910 912 93 1 919 920
Bantu. Cape Colony becomes British. Proclamation restricts movement by Coloureds. Beginning of career of Shaka the Zulu. Moshoeshoe becomes king of the Sotho. Abolition of slavery i Cape Colony. n Great Trek begins. Frt indentured labour arrives in Natal from India to work on the is sugar crops. Diamonds found at Kimberley. Lesotho becomes a British Protectorate (as Basutoland). Treaty of Berlin. Botswana (Bechuanaland) becomes a British Protectorate. Gold found at Witwatersrand. Anglo-Boerwar. Death of Rhodes. Chinese labourers imported for gold mines. Zulu poll-tax rising. Indian pass laws in Transvaal. Gandhi organizes civil disobedience campaign among Indian community. Independence for Union of South Africa, within the British Empire. African National Congress founded. Native Land Tenure Act. African National Congress pass burning campaign in Rand. Industrial and Commercial Union formed in Cape Town. African miners in Rand.


926 936

946 948 950

1952 1953 1955 1955-56 I955 1956 1957 1958 1959
16 90

16 91

1962 1963

16 96

1967 1969-71 16 99 1971

Masters and Servants Amendment Act removes African right t o strike. Representation ofNatives A t createsNative Representative Counc c l and M.P.s i representativeof natives. Strike i Rand by 60,000African miners-broken by armed police. n General election victory for Nationalists. Police shoot a protesting crowd i Witzieshoek Reserve; sixteen t n Africans killed. May Day: work stoppage;skirmishes with police lead to eighteen deaths. 26 June: National Day of Protest and Mourning. Defiance campaign. Boycott ofschoolsi response t introduction of ‘Bantueducation’. n o Fifty-eightthousand familiesremoved from Sophiatown. African women protest against extension of pass laws to women. Evaton bus boycott against fare increases l s s over s x months. at i 26 June:Congress of the People adopts Freedom Charter. One hundred and f f y s x arrests : Treason Trial accuses African it-i National Congress. 26 June:one-daystay-at-home. for a basic wage of one pound Call a day.Alexandria bus boycott l s s four months. at One-daynational strike. Police baton-charge2,000women i Cat0 Manor. Boycott starting n with Rembrandt tobacco and certain products leads t c l for an o al internationalboycott of South Africa. 21 March: Sharpeville. State of emergency. Sweeping arrests. 28 March: massive strike i protest. April: African National n Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress declared ‘unlawfulorganizations’.Pondoland revolt; thirty-ninedead. March: Mandela elected leader of new National Action Council. 2 March : three-day stay-at-homereceives huge support despite 9 armed intimidation by Government which leads t Mandela calling o if off on second day. June: African leaders discuss tactics for change t violent resistance. o August: Mandela captured and imprisoned for five years. Trial il ’ speech:‘Iwl still be moved... . 1 1 July :many leadersofunderground resistancemovement arrested a Rivonia. Hundreds of documents seized. Eight defendants, t including Mandela, on t i l for their lives, spark off international ra protest.Sentenced t lf imprisonment. o ie n oiia ras May :Abram Fischer,outstanding defence counseli p l t c l t i l , Afrikaner and communist,sentenced t life imprisonment. o Guerilla incursionsinto Wankie Valley (Rhodesia)mark launching of guerrilla struggle by ZAPU-ANC military alliance. f Case o the Twenty-two. April :Durban dockworkers strike. March : Port Elizabeth bus boycott ; eleven people shot when police fire on crowd. May: freedom fighter jailed; James April sentenced t f f e n years under Terrorism Act. o ite


1970 onwards 1972-73

Leaflet bombs distribute African National Congress material to rush-hourcrowds i many centres. n Many strikes,particularly i Durban area.Emergence of the Black n Consciousness movement.Increased student activity.

1484 1792 1820-30s 1850 1862-70 1868 1876 1878 1883 1884-85

1889 1890 1892 1894 1896 1897 1903-07 1904 1908
11 94

1915 1916 1917 11 99 12 91 1922 1923 I925

Diego Cao, Portuguese explorer,visits coast and captures some inhabitants. Europeans from Cape Province visit Dumara iron and copper mines. Ovambos mine copper a Tsumeb. t Hottentots and Afrikaner familiesmove north from Cape Province. Jonker Afrikander (Nama leader)defeats Hereros. Nama-Hererowars. British Commissioner sent from Cape Town. Boers trek t north-eastof territory. o Britain annexes Walvis Bay. Luderitz Bay ‘bought’ a German merchant.Annexed by Germany by i 1884. n Berlin Conference recognizes German sphere of interest. Maharero, Herero chief, forces Germans to withdraw from h s i capital. Frt German troops arrive. is Germany annexes territory. German troops massacre Namas. Another defeat of the Namas ; Herero rebellion crushed. Nama rebellion crushed. Disease destroys 95 per cent of Hereros’cattle. Namas and Hereros revolt again.More than 70 per cent of Hereros and 60per cent of Namas k l e or die of starvation. ild Ovambosdefeat Portuguese expeditiona Naulila,killing 305 troops. t Discovery of diamonds leads t mineral rush and growth of o settlement. Frt World War. Ovambos under King Mandume force German is expedition t withdraw. o South Africa invades,defeats Germans. Portuguese attack Mandume. South Africa attacks Mandume, k l s him i battle. il n League ofNations mandate of South West Africa granted to South Africa. South Africa appoints a Consultative Council. .r South Africa establishes ‘reserves’ and starts to distribute land t .’ o settlers. Namas and Bondelswarts bombed by South African A r i Force for refusing t pay dog tax. o Rehebothers compelled t accept change of status for their o community. Legislative council established-with all-whiteelectorate.


1932 1945 1946 1950 1959 1960 1966 1968 1970 1971 1971-72 1972

South African A r Force and armoured unit destroy village of i O v a m b o chief Ipumbu. South Africa asks United Nations to be allowed to annex Namibia. United Nations refuses. South Africa refuses to place territory under Trusteeship Council. International Court of Justice unanimous decision that mandate i s s i l in existence (contrary to South Africa’s claims that it ceased tl with the League of Nations). Protest against ‘removals’n Windhoek :twelve killed,fifty wounded i when police open fire. African countries seek ‘contentiousjudgement’from International Court, requiring South Africa to carry out the mandate-and thus end apartheid. Court decides that it cannot make a ruling. 26 August: SWAPO launches armed struggle. General Assembly terminates mandate. Thirty-eight SWAPO members, including Ja Toivo put on trial i n Pretoria on terrorism charges ; twenty-one sentenced to l f imprisie onment on Robben Island. Chief Hosea Kutako dies, aged 103. International Court declares South Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal. Massive strike by Namibian contract workers brings economy to a halt. State of emergency declared in Ovamboland. M a n y deaths in disturbances. Secretary-General seeks discussions on Namibia with South African Government. Namibian rejection of any idea of ‘independence’ under South African rule.

Part I

South Africa


The historical background to apartheid

Southern Africa is made up of a number of groups of people. Some, as far as w know. w r always inhabiting the area, other groups moved i a different e ee n t periods and under differing circumstances. It is not an area where groups have ever lived an entirely self-contained existence. As i the rest of Africa, groups s l t into other groupings, were n pi absorbed into larger groups,intermarried and established trading relationships. Within the area groups of differing technological levels, of different linguistic o and physical characteristics coexisted. This is important t state since the archaeological truth runs counter to the propaganda of the South African Government and also to much popular belief. The main-but not the only-groups inhabiting the area during the first century A.D.w r the San and the Khoi. They w r later joined by groups who ee ee had been moving southwards.These groups intermarried.absorbed or integrated with sections of the San and the Khoi. Some groups of San continued to coexist with the new groups particularly along the east coast.W e know little of i ie the history of the southern t p of the continent except that by the t m the Europeans came they found the San and the Khoi there. The black people living i eastern and central South Africa---at beginn the ning of the Christian era i Europe-spoke Bantu languages. From as early n 00 e as A.D. 1 0 w can distinguish two major, but related. linguistic groups-the Nguni and the Sotho. Iron,copper and gold were mined and worked. Socioee t political structures w r complex and a times powerful kingships emerged and fell, as for instance those of the Luba and the Mutapa. Major settlements and iy trading centres existed,such as the still unexplored c t of Zimbabwe. A n impressive society which flourished from the eleventh to the fifteenth century was that ofthe Shona.Shona influence spread widely across the central parts of northern South Africa under the leadership of Mutota (c. 1420-50)and Matope (c. 1450-80)each of whom carried the title of Mwana Mutapa. This period saw the arrival of the first Europeans,the Portuguese.Around 1500they made contact on the western coast with the powerful Kongo kingdom. Portuguese trading and influence gradually increased and,i 1665,the Kongo n were conquered.The Portuguese then looked south to the neighbouring kingdom

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


of Mbundu whose king was known as the ngola (hence Angola) and t i i turn hs n was conquered and colonized i 1683. Until the nineteenth century, however, n Portuguese rule was confined t the coast and its immediate hinterland.The ino terior was merely a source of slaves for the colony i Brazil;hundreds of thoun sands of Africans were exported. In the east (Mozambique)the Portugueseencountered Arab traderswho had been s t l d on the Indian Ocean seaboard for generations. The Portuguese atete tempted to penetrate the interior i search of gold and slaves.They soon came n into contact with the Shona empire of Mwana Mutapa, and i 1629 a succession n dispute enabled the Portugueset i s a l their own candidate as ruler,giving alleo ntl giance to the King of Portugal.As i Angola,Portuguese rule hardly extended n beyond the coast,though there w r various attempts t either subdue or convert ee o the inhabitants-mostly i vain. n o t The Dutch were the next t arrive,settling a the Cape in 1652 on behalf of the Dutch East India Company under the command of Jan van Riebeeck. The company intended the settlementsimply as a staging post for India-boundships, but van Riebeeck needed cattle to supply the ships with meat, and t i brought hs the Dutch into inevitableconflict with the San and with the Khoi,who possessed large herds of c t l and who resisted Dutch intrusion i their lands. ate n Within a f w years,the problem of land,which was t bedevil relations bee o tween white and black for many generations,had plainly intruded on the scene.1 In van Riebeeck’sown words: The reasons advanced by them f r making war upon us ls year, a i i g out of t e o at rsn h complaintst a our people l v n a a distance and without our knowledge had done them ht iig t much i j r and a s perhaps s o e and eaten up some of t e r sheep and calves,e c ,i nuy lo tln hi t. n which t e eis a s sometruth,and which it is v r d f i u t t keep t e common people from hr lo e y ifcl o h doing,when alittle outofsight; o t a they think they had causef r revengeand e p c a l , s ht o seily they said,upon people who had come t take and t occupy t e land which had been t e r o o h hi own i al ages,turning with the plough and c l i a i g permanently t e r b s land and n l utvtn hi e t keepingthem off t e ground upon which they had been accustomed t depasture t e r cath o hi tles, so t a they must consequently now seek t e r subsistence by depasturing t e land of ht hi h otherpeople,from which nothing could a i ebut disputeswith t e rneighbours;i s s i gso rs hi nitn strenuouslyupon t e point of restoringt them t e rown land, h t we were a length comh o hi ta t p l e t s y they had e t r l f r e t d t a right,through t e war which they had waged eld o a niey ofie h t h againstus,and t a we were not i c i e t r s o e it, a it now had become t e property of ht nlnd o etr s h the Company by t e sword and t e lawsoft e war. h h h

ee Khoi resistance was quelled and many w r enslaved.The offspring of marriages ee n and liaisons between the Dutch and the Khoi w r either absorbed i what was to become the Afrikaner community, or w r with the descendants of slaves ee n from the East Indies, to form the bulk of the 2 million Coloureds i South Africa today. Many Khoi also died from new diseases or founded new communities. The San,too, found their way of lf drastically threatened by the Dutch. ie Thousands were simply k l e by the Dutch, but children were often taken ild as slaves and l t r intermarried with the Coloured servant community. Others ae fled into the northern deserts.
1. cf. A.J.W l s Introduction to the History of Central Africa, p. 45,1913. il,

South Africa


The settler communityincreased i size over the years and more immigrants, n including some French Huguenots, came from Europe. The desire for more land increased and some moved north from the Cape. The first party of Dutch,l d by Jan Coetzee,crossed the Orange River i 1760. There they came e n into contact with the Xhosa people who had been settled between the Limpopo and Orange rivers for several hundreds of years. In 1779 what is known as the first Kaffir war broke out;it ended i defeat for n the Xhosa,and the River Fish became the boundary of the new Boer territory. Xhosa resistance,however,continued over succeeding decades. In 1806 the British took over administration a the Cape.The Boers,dislikt ing both o f c a interference and anti-slavery pressures, trekked off again away fiil from the Cape and, i the nineteenth century, across the Drakensberg, the n Orange River and the Vaal. In order to hold the whole Cape Colony,Britain i m ported 5,000new emigrants-the ‘1820settlers’. This Boer movement followed closely upon the migrations of some southern Bantu-speakinggroups and the consolidation of many diverse groups into the Zulu kingdom.This happened under Shaka who is considered a hero by many Africans on the one hand and a despot by the encroaching Europeans on the other.With trading routes disrupted by European settlement,with the emergence of a new powerful African kingdom some groups including the Ndebele and the Ngoni moved northwards again. The Sotho inhabited the tableland between the Drakensberg and the Kalahari.The consolidationof the Zulu kingdom and the trend towards establishing more centralized kingdoms created among the Sotho a new leader, Moshesh, who established himself i 1823 i a fortress of Thaba Bosiu (‘the mountain n n e that grows t l e by night’).H entered a diplomatic relationship with the Zulu. alr After the death of Shaka i 1828 Moshesh began t see that the greatest threat n o t his independencecame,not from the Zulu kingdom,but from the Europeans, o particularly the Boers,groups ofwhom were beginning to move into the Caledon valley. By 1835 the British had reached the Orange River and Moshesh realized he l i kl o would have to use al h s diplomatic s i l t prevent his territory being taken by either or both ofthese groups.The next thirty years were a d f i u t t m for him; i f c l ie he feared the Boers’avowed expansionism but did not entirely trust the British either. Finally,war broke out between Moshesh and the Orange Free State i n 1853;some Sotho territory was annexed by the Boers i 1866 and t o years later n w Moshesh’s kingdom became a British protectorate (Basutoland, now Lesotho). Moshesh died i 1870;he had been a courageous and capable leader. had unified n h s nation and created the central authority of the king over semi-indepeni dent chiefs.These chiefsparticipated i al important decisions,the laws promuln l gated by the tribe being collective rather than autocratically imposed. North ofthe Limpopo,the Ndebele settled i the area adjacent to the territon r of the Shona-areas t be called Matabeleland and Mashoualand by the first y o British settlers and which today make up Rhodesia.In Mozambique the main tribes were al Nguni i origin (Ovambo,Nama, ec) In Namibia the different l n t.. African groups w r a first protected against invaders by the arid Namib desert ee t on the coast,by the Kunene (Muene) and Orange rivers and by the Kalahari desert t the east,until their land too was threatened,first by the British a the o t

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Cape,and then by the Germans,who proceeded t acquire it by purchase as wl o el as by force.The expropriation of African land was completed by the South African Government after 1920.

South Africa
When the British f n l y took over Cape Colony i 1806,many of the Dutch setial n tlers resented t i imposition of alien rule,the enforced usage ofEnglish as the ofhs f c a language,and the British attitude to Africans and Coloureds.They were iil horrified,for example,when the British i 1812 set up the ‘BlackCircuit’court n which dealt with complaints by servants and slaves against their white masters. The f n l blow came i 1834,when slaves i southern Africa,as i the rest of the ia n n n British Empire,were set free.Slavery was a fundamental part of the Dutch settler society and t i law seemed t be an attempt t undermine the life they had built hs o o o for themselves.It was part of their tradition,however,t make journeys or treks n i search of new land,and t i is what they did i 1837.This is known as the n hs Great Trek.

The Great Trek
About 4,000Boers, accompanied by about the same number of ‘servants’, entered Natal through the Drakensberg Mountains.Some others went north,but a t t i stage the greatest part of the Voortrekkers went into Natal. They found, hs however,when they reached there that they w r faced with opposition from a ee Zulu nation that had been reorganized into a powerful force by their leader, Shaka,but were a t i t m ruled by Dingaan.Several confrontations took place t h s ie and several new Voortrekker settlements were destroyed ; the most important battle took place a Ncome R v r (Blood River) on 1 December 1838,when the t ie 6 Voortrekker army,l d by Andries Pretorius,was able t defeat the Zulu army. e o This Boer victory had a disastrous effect on Zulu morale and some groups withdrew their allegiance from Dingaan.Later he was killed i battle and Pretorius n was able t appoint a new Zulu king,Mpande,who agreed t be a vassal of the o o Natal Republic. For the t m being,the Voortrekkers seemed t be f i l secure i Natal and ie o ary n they drew up a constitution,placing the sovereignty of their new republic i an n elected assembly oftwenty-fourwhite men,known as the Volksraad (parliament). They were determined that t i should remain a republic i the Voortrekker s i i hs n prt t o and so the blacks had no political rights a all;there was never t be any question of equality.White Uitlanders (foreigners) who came into the republic w r not ee allowed t become citizens or own land until they had ( ) lived i the republic for o a n a year,and (b) produced a c r i i a e of good conduct signed by three citizens. etfct Their security was to be short-lived, however,for soon Zulu refugees began t return t their old homelands and,increasingly,to outnumber the Boers.Some o o could be absorbed into the labour force,but the numbers might become a threat t the new republic.Accordingly,the Volksraad decided t move the Africans o o out of Natal into the area south of the River Mtamunna. This decision affected the British,a Cape Colony,since these surplus Afrit

Cape T o w n : the industrial city.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


cans might become a threat t their boundaries. In Britain itself the Aborigine o Protection Society protested about the Boers’treatment of the Africans. As a result,i 1842,the governor of Cape Colony decided, first, to occupy Portal n Natal and later,t annex the whole of Natal i s l .The following year the Volkso tef raad of Natal accepted British colonization of their republic and most of the Voortrekkers lf the colony on the second stage of the Great Trek. et Natal, therefore,developed a quite different character from what were t o become the other provinces of South Africa. The departing Boers were replaced n by large numbers of British settlers,who i 1860 brought the first indentured Indian labourers t work for them, the Africans proving unresponsive t the o o demands of permanent employment.1 It is thus that today most of the South n African Indian population either lives i or originatesfrom Natal. New developments took place i the colonists’policy towards the Africans n i Natal.Under the supervision of Theophilus Shepstone several areas or ‘locan tions’ were set aside for Africans i Natal and al Africans were encouraged t n l o move into them.This can be seen as a forerunner of the present South African policy of requiring people of different races t live i different areas. Shepstone o n also made use of the traditional chiefs and headmen,making them responsible for law and order and on occasion creating new chieftainships. The Voortrekkers moved northwards where several groups of their compat i t had previously settled,across the Orange River.This,however,was a much ros disputed area during the 1840s.The Ndebele people were forced further north across the Limpopo by the Boers,but the Sotho and the two groups of Griqua (Coloured Khoi) had claims i the area. British missionaries had become n involved i Griqua a f i s and tried t persuade the British Government t give n far o o n i protection t them.Eventually,i 1848,the new governor i the Cape,S r Harry o n Smith,annexed the whole area between the Orange and the Vaal,despite the opposition of most of the whites there,and called it the Orange River Sovereignty. ee o e The British w r able t defeat a Boer force l d by Pretorius but they were unable t defeat the Sotho under Moshoeshoe. Eventually to Smith’s dismay,the Lono don government decided, for financial reasons, to disannex the Orange River Sovereignty.This was done a the Bloemfontein Convention i 1854 and secured t n ie the independence of the Orange Free State for the t m being. Meanwhile the Boers were creating a new colony of small republics i the n t Transvaal.A n agreement was made between them and the British i 1852,a the n Sand River Convention,which established the Voortrekkers’right to African territory.A clause i the agreement stated : n
It is agreed that no objection shall be made by any British authority against the emigrant
Boers purchasing their supplies of ammunition in any of the British colonies and possessions of South Africa, it being mutually understood that a l trade in ammunition with the native l tribes is prohibited both by the British Government and the emigrant farmers on both sides of the Vaal River.
1. However, it should be noted here that t i was the argument both of the B i i h s t l r hs rts etes i South Africa and the plantation-ownersi the Caribbean. In the l t e case the Caribbean n n atr o argument is that the issue was not that Africans were unresponsive t work, but that planters w r unresponsive t wage demands and preferred unfree labour.This may well have been the case ee o i South Africa as well. n

South Africa


So the Voortrekkers could buy guns and the Africans could not.This enabled the Boers t create their independentstates,although it was still not easy to defeat o people such as the Pedi and the Venda. And for many years Moshesh profited from inter-Boerdissension until, i 1868, Moshoeshoe's kingdom became the n B i i h protectorate ofBasutoland (now Lesotho) to prevent it being taken by the rts Boers,who eight years e r i r had agreed on a constitution for their new Transale vaal Republic. Racial inequality was an a t c e of faith i t i constitution,and ril n hs the Transvaal was their promised land.

Diamonds and gold
Boer independence,however.was short-lived, the discovery of gold and diafor monds within their boundaries during the next few years brought them once again into the sphere of British influence--first economic, then political. The Boers,mainly farmers.were less interested i t i mineral potential than the B i n hs rt ish. The factor which made the situation i South Africa quite different from n that i any other colonies i Africa was the industrialization which followed the n n discovery of gold and diamonds.New immigrantspoured into South Africa from e Europe t make their fortunes.A f w became millionaires but most became o members of the powerful new white labour force.These discoveries occurred a a t t m when the Europeans had l i claims to great parts of the land i southern ie ad n Africa and,consequently.many Africans were landless and i search of employn ment. Many features of South African life today. such as passes and job reservation,originated i t i period of upheaval. n hs Diamonds were found i the Orange and Vaal rivers i Griqualand i n n n 1867-68.The land was a that t m under the control of the Orange Free State, t ie but Britain was able t re-possessit i 1871.Europeans,Coloureds and Africans o n poured into the area,the Africans generally becoming labourers and the Europeans prospectors or 'diggers'.By 1872,El .5million worth ofdiamonds had been found:labourers' average weekly wages were 7s.6d.plus rations worth 6s.6d. The Diamond Diggers' Protection Society claimed t be worried about diao mond thefts by Africans and competition from African and Coloured diggers. They therefore t i d t have legislation introduced which would make it imposre o sible for a 'native'to be granted a licence to dig or to hold claims or diamonds. The British high commissioner of Griqualand West would not accept such overt racism i the law but the proclamation he did eventually make placed similar resn trictions on 'servants',who were usually African or Coloured. 'Servants' were also required to have a labour contractand to produce a certificate of its registration on demand. After 1875,when the price ofdiamonds fell,many small men were forced out ofbusiness.Mergers took place and the diamond business began t be increasingo l run by large companies.Ultimately,one big corporation,D e Beers Consolidaty ed Mine, was formed of al the companies. This reorganization l d t many l e o changes that affected the way i which the workers worked and lived. Comn ie t pounds for the African workers were set up for the first t m a Kimberley where they were required t spend the whole of their contract period. They lived i o n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


cabins,twenty t a room,i an area surrounded by a high fence.They were never o n allowed out of the compound,except when they went into the mines, and could only buy food a the company’s stores i the compound.A the end of every t n t ee o ti working day Africans w r required t s r p naked and undergo a search for stolen gems.When attempts were made t search white workers i a similar way i o n n 1883 and 1884,strikesand r o s followed and,eventually,the employersagreed t it o hold only surprise searches. The white miners were quick t form themselves into a powerful.group t o o protect their own interests,both from the mineowners and from the Africans whose cheaper,unorganized labour they saw as a threat.Thus by 1 0 white min90 ers were earning E1 2s. 6d.per shift,compared t the non-whiteminer’s 3s. 5d. o per day. Some years after the discovery of diamonds a Kimberley, another great t mineral discovery was made-this t m of gold a Witwatersrand i the Transvaal ie t n i 1884.As a Kimberley,many prospectors came.The ordinary fortune-hunter, n t J. however,had little chance of success since such people as C. Rhodes and Barney Barnato,who had become millionaires a Kimberley,invested some of their t fortunes a Witwatersrand and very soon their companies were controlling the t gold industry as they controlled the diamond industry. Gold output increased rapidly and by 1898,3.8million ounces of gold,worth E16.5 million, was being produced i a year. To safeguard their interests, the n mineownershad i 1889 organized themselves into a Chamber of Mines.Most of n these men w r of British origin,and since they were making their fortunes i a ee n Boer republic,there was considerable resentment against them among the local people. The Volksraad charged high taxes of these Uitlanders but gave them no p l t c l rights. oiia The Chamber of Mines also m t with opposition from its white employees e who,i 1892,formed the Witwatersrand Mine Employees and Mechanics Union. n They w r concerned with the usual grievances about working conditions,hours ee and wages and also with the chamber’s attempt t bring i cheap labour.The o n union’sfirst secretary took the v e that ‘ fany wages had t be reduced,let the iw i o wages of black labour be cut down’.The white workers found an a l i the ly n Volksraad which was also concerned about the chamber’s attempts t bring i o n cheap non-whitelabour.The inequality of white and non-whitewas written into their constitution,and so when they came to pass labour legislation they had no hesitation i meeting the trade unions’demands that,on the grounds of safety, n jobs such as preparing charges or loading d i l holes should not be given to nonrl whites. o The great boom i gold resulted i the rise of Johannesburg t become one n n of the major centres of the Western world, and i the creation of great personal n fortunes. Ltl benefit, however, accrued t the African workers. The comite o pounds and pass system of Kimberley was introduced i the Rand and,between n o 1895 and 1897,the average earnings of the African worker fell from E3 3s. 6d.t ee aiiis t E2 8s.7d.There w r no medical f c l t e a the mines.By 1902-03,the death rate was sixty-nineper thousand;among groups of men from tropical regions it ranged from 118 to 1 4 per thousand.It was 1 0 before a hospital was opened. 6 96 It became difficult to recruit men locally for the mines. Some Sotho chiefs said : ‘ W edo not like our men to go to Johannesburg because they go there to die.’The

Cape Town :African location

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa

2 4

mineowners therefore had t seek labour from farther away. They attempted t o o bring i Chinese labourbut t i was opposed by the white trade unions,and they n hs then made an agreement with Mozambique t supply conscripts. The need for o labour also l d the British administration to impose a hut tax on Africans,forcing e thousands of them on to the labour market i order to obtain the cash. n n Thus there were four main groups involved i the exploitation of mineral resources i South Africa whose relationshipslargely determined the future histon r of the territory. y F r t there were the employers-mostly of British origin-many of whom is, e made vast fortunes i a f w years. They were and have remained interested n always i finding new supplies of cheap labour,from whatever source. n Secondly,there was the white labour force.Many had been lured from Europe by the rumours of gold and diamonds.Trade union activity a home made t them consciousof the need for organization,but they did not include black workers whom they regarded as competitors whose cheaper labour would force down wages. Thirdly, there were the Afrikaners (Boers) who w r primarily farmers. ee Gold brought great wealth t their state,which they intended t keep i their own o o n hands.They were determined that contemporary social and economic upheavals would not result i bringing blacks any nearer equality with whites. n Finally there were the Africans, forbidden by law or implication from dign ging their own claims,paid considerably less than whites, housed i prison-type conditions,deprived of much of their freedom,lacking trade unions t represent o them and t state their grievances,and generally held i subjection by their new o n masters. This is the background to the present-dayconditions.

Rhodes: Boer-British rivalry
British expansionism,the doing of individuals rather than of governments,was a crucial feature of the l t nineteenth century. Although anxious t prevent the ae o Boer republics from having access to the sea (hence the annexation of Natal) the London government was lukewarm towards taking responsibility for much more territory (hence the disannexation of the Orange Free S a e . In 1872, tt) however,Cape Colony was granted ‘responsibleself-government’ which its asn sembly had been requesting since its inception i 1854,and the British colonists’ ambition was allowed free rein.The 1871 annexation of Griqualand was followed i 1877 by the annexation of the Transvaal,made possible by the Boers’failure t n o defeat the combined African forcesof the Pedi and the Zulu.But the British w r ee unwise enough t take on the Zulus also,and w r heavily defeated by them (uno ee der Dingaan’s successor Ceterayo) i 1879, before f n l y subduing them s x n ial i months later. The Boers began to agitate for a return t independence i 1880. Under o n Kruger’s leadership they rebelled against the British, and the first Anglo-Boer n t il war broke out.It lasted ten weeks and ended i the Boer victory a Majuba Hl. Although Britain retained nominal sovereignty,the Transvaal became formally independent once more a the Pretoria Convention the following year. t

South Africa


This briefly halted the colonial expansion,but the discovery of gold revived

British interesti the Transvaal.The leadingfigure was Cecil Rhodes,whose earn liest wl, il made before he had accumulated his wealth,envisaged ‘theextension of British rule throughout the world’,including the whole of Africa and the ‘ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire’.Hs diamond monopoly included a provision for colonization north of i the Limpopo. n Following the German annexation of Namibia i 1884,Rhodes persuaded the British governor to take over Bechuanaland (now Botswana) as a protectorate t prevent possible German encroachment.O n the Rand,Rhodes took longer o n n to become as interested i the possibility of gold as he was i diamonds,because l i he believed that the real E Dorado lay north.Hs company (Consolidated Goldf e d ) contained the same provision for northward colonialism as D e Beers. In ils 1888 he established his British South Africa (BSA) Company, with explicit designs on Matabeleland and Mashonaland ; two years later,he became prime minister of the Cape. These events l d to growing conflicts i the Transvaal,mainly between Boer e n farmers and British miners,and exacerbated the antagonisms between rural and urban interests.The Boers t i d t discourage the outsiders--or Uitlandersre o from settling by imposing very high taxes and refusing the franchise. The Uitlanders then set up an organization called the Transvaal National Union and o o n appealed f r help t the British administration i Cape Colony. Although the British Government was unwilling t t y annexation again, o r n Rhodes was sympathetic to the Uitlanders.By establishing itself i Rhodesia,the BSA Company had become a powerful political force on the Transvaal’snorthern border. and trouble was fomented by its representative i Rhodesia. Starr n o n Jameson, who helped t smuggle arms i to the Uitlanders. The Transvaal Government took steps to strenghten its position. It had talks with the Government of the Orange Free State about the possibility of a federation. Freight rates on the railway between Johannesburg and the border with Cape Colony w r trebled so that the Uitlanders who exported gold w r now faced ee ee with an additional financialburden. The situation seemed to be deteriorating.But although Rhodes and Jameson w r anxious t annex the whole republic,the Uitlanders,much as they hated ee o Boer restrictionson their operation,did not view a British takeover with much enthusiasm. Jameson was eager t organize an uprising and he wanted one t take place o o before the end of 1895 despite misgivings on the part of the Uitlanders that it might be premature.However,he overrode objections and decided to make a raid into the Transvaal on 29 December 1895,which was supposed to coincidewith an uprising by the Uitlanders i Transvaal. n The rising failed t materialize, however,and Jameson and his men were, o f i l ignominiously. captured by the Boers. Rhodes was seen to be involved i ary n the raid and was obliged to resign from his positions as prime minister and direct r of the BSA Company. The British colonial secretary,Joseph Chamberlain, o had unofficiallyknown about the raid and was lucky t avoid being implicated i o n it himself.At that t m , i e however,Britain was committed t a war i Sudan and o n was not prepared to become involved i a war i southern Africa. Relations ben n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


tween the Boers and the British w r nevertheless a such a low ebb that it was ee t ie clearly only a matter of t m before open conflict broke out. Shortly after the Jameson raid,the Ndebele and Shona rose against BSA Company rule and w r subdued with much force and brutality.The main reason ee why Rhodes’star was not completely eclipsed by these two events lay i h s pact n i with Chamberlain and Alfred Milner. In 1897 Milner was appointed British high commissioner i Cape Colony n and Rhodes re-emergedfrom h s political disgrace t lead the Progressive Party. i o Both were totally committed to the idea of extending British rule and were eager for a decisive end t the question of the Transvaal,then without doubt the wealo t i s area i southern Africa. The situation polarized.Inside the Transvaal,the het n leading English newspaper was suppressed,and Paul Kruger was re-elected as president on a programme diametrically opposed t the aims of Cecil Rhodes. o The Boers saw Rhodes as the personification of everything that threatened the way of life that they had fought for hundreds of years to preserve (Kruger called him ‘thecurse of Africa’) and they were not prepared to allow him or any other mining intereststo deprive them of their freedom.Negotiations nevertheless took place a Bloemfontein between Milner and the Transvaal Government over the t British Uitlander’srights,and Kruger made some concessions.But when the B i rt i h Government refused t withdraw its nominal sovereignty,he responded by s o withdrawing the same concessions. The breakdown of the Bloemfontein Conference provided a situation i n which ‘intervention’ a confrontation with Kruger’s republic would be accepor table to the British public. 89 l In September 1 9 Britain broke off negotiations with the Transvaal. Al male citizensi the Transvaal over the age of 13 w r enlisted.Troops w r mobin ee ee lized,too,i the Orange Free State since,although they had not been involved i n n e t i dispute,British troops were concentrated on their border. For a f w weeks hs there was stalemate,but on 11 October war f n l y broke out and the following ial day the Boers attacked Mafeking,Kimberley and Ladysmith. The British sent thousands of troops t South Africa and,after about a year, o most of the towns were i British hands. The Boers,however,withdrew t the n o countryside and guerrilla tactics. The Uitlanders,on whose behalf Chamberlain was stirring up public feeling i Britain,were not enthusiasticabout the war.They were much too busy making n money out of the Rand and cared little for British supremacy. Far from helping them, the war caused a serious economic depression. Nor did British business require that the Union Jack fy over Pretoria;the c t of London was perfectly l iy happy to invest vast sums of money i South Africa regardless of whether Kruger n accepted or rejected British overlordship.The Rand paid handsome dividends, which was al that mattered.Al i a l the war served only to exacerbate Anglol l n l, Boer dissension and,more strongly,to embitter the Boer community for generations t come. o rt The war dragged on for two years.To isolate the Boer commandos,the B i ish rounded up their women and children and placed them i camps.E.A. n Walker,i his c a s c History o South A r c (p.498) states that 200,000women and n lsi f fia n children died i these camps.Although the war was won by Britain i 1902 there n was little sense of triumph.The two Boer republics,Orange F e State and Transre

South Africa


vaal,came under British r l but it was quite clear that any attempt t subjugate ue o the Boers was out of the question.And within eight years the Union of South ee Africa came into being and Boers for the most part w r once again ruling what they saw as their own country.Several of the new leaders,including Botha and Smuts,had fought i the war as generals against the British. n

African organization
In view ofthe influence l t nineteenth century events on the subsequent histoof a e r ofSouth Africa,it may be recalled that there was an almost completedisregard y during the Anglo-Boerconflictsof the interestsor rights of the African majority. Rhodes died i 1902,but the BSA Company went on to colonize Rhodesia and n o n n impose conditions similar t those imposed i South Africa and consolidated i subsequent decades. White parliamentary politics centred largely on country of origin and on two main parties--most Afrikaners supporting the Nationalist Party,English-speakers and industrial employers (led, however, by Afrikaners) supporting the Unionist Party.Both parties were opposed t racial equality,although i Cape o n Province non-whiteshad access to the franchise-a legacy of British imperial humanitarianism. The Labour Party was also committed to white privilege as regards skilled employment,and fought hard against black encroachment on jobs. Parties with no racial barriers were formed from t m t tm but had virtui e o ie a l no chance of electoral success.In the Cape General Election of 1904,for exly ample,the Political Labour League fought on the basis ofequal rights for al civil lized men. Al the candidates. however, were white, had little experience or l money,and their campaign totally failed.The Communist Party of South Africa made attempts to educate and politicize the black population and, eventually, their 1928-29 conferenceadopted the idea of a black republic with citizenship f r o a l But they had no mass support and no hope of electoral success. l. In fact,although the Anglo-Boerwar l f deep scars,both white groups colet laborated t strengthen their control over the rest of the population. In 1910 o South Africa acquired dominion status and complete freedom from British governmentalinterference. Black groups began gradually to organize i the c t e as the tribal groups n iis were progressively tamed and restricted to particular areas.They w r al f i l e e l ary conservativea first, and attempted to work within the existing system. t One of the f r t African leaders was John Tengo Jabavu.A n election was is held i the Cape,where educated Africans then had the vote,and he organized n African voters i support of the liberal candidate (who won the seat). H e was n then given some money t start the first independent African newspaper Znzvo o Zubniitsiintlzi(African Opinion), which made him influential.In 1887, when Africans i the eastern Cape were being disfranchised, he sent a petition t Queen n o Victoria-to no avail.Hs political position can be gauged from an editorial i i n e o which he said: ' W e not only preach loyalty, but w preach subordination t superiors.' was In 1902 the African Political Organization (APO) founded.One of its leaders was Abdul Abdurahman, a Coloured doctor.Although open to a l races l

P r E i a e h the w i e wealth. ot lzbt: ht

South Africa


it remained predominantly Coloured.It,too,t i d to work within the system and re urged people t apply for electoral registration.Abdurahman went,unsuccessfulo ly,t London t protest against the colour bar i the South African parliament. o o n The APO tried to mobilize Coloureds i passive resistancecampaigns and politin cal strikesbut f i e t get support,perhaps because many Coloureds aspired t a ald o o role i the European community. n In 1912 the inaugural conference of the African National Congress (ANC) brought together the various native congresses i the provinces. It, too,for long n remained conservative.Its meeting was attended by chiefs, the then traditional leaders,and intellectuals.The Reverend J.L.Dube was appointed president.The congress gradually developed a political consciousness among Africans, and when,i 1926,prime minister Hertzog introduced a Bl t eject Africans from n il o the white p l t c l system,it was congress which voiced African opposition.Opoiia position,however,f i e t prevent the white parliament from passing t i and ald o hs other measures which severely limited African social,political and legal rights. Land appropriation by whites had first roused African opposition.Land had c 9 been formally divided under the Native Land A t of 1 13 (shortlyafter the Union became independent of British control). In 1936,i the Native Trust and Land n Act,the whites gave themselves 86 per cent and the Africans 1 per cent of the 4 t t l land.Then,as now.whites w r a small minority of the population.The U oa ee r ban Areas A t of 1923,consolidated i 1945,restricted Africans’ right of movec n ment. Indians w r prohibited from moving out of the province i which they ee n were born under the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913. In 1 4 the ANC drew up a Charter of Rights,based on the Atlantic Charter 93 drafted by Churchill and Roosevelt. In addition t what was being done by political organizations largely domio nated by intellectuals,African workers attempted industrial action. In the absence of trade unions it was d f i u t t organize strikes. ifcl o However, i 1918,white e e t i a mechanics i the Rand struck and sucn lcrcl n ceeded i having their wages increased t the equivalent,i real terms, ofpre-war n o n rates.Their success encouraged African sanitary service attendants t strike for o o it wage increases of 8d.t Is. a day. The ffy men who came out on strike were arrested and charged,and over two-thirds were convicted.When other attendants w r ordered t do the work of the men imprisoned a further 152 came out on ee o strike.In turn,they were sentenced to two months hard labour for breach ofconih tract and threatened w t work without pay,armed guards and flogging. The contrast between the treatment of these black strikers and the w i e ht mechanics who had also been on strike was very marked. The ANC launched a campaign t release the prisoners.This developed into a popular demand for a o general strike on 1 July, despite ANC lack of approval for this action. A this point the South African Industrial Federation (the w i e trade union t ht o movement) decided t create a defence force t protect white women and chilo dren i the event of a general strike.The government,however. had decided t n o and released the imprisoned strikers.The general strike avoid a confrontation, was called off.None the less, on 1 July, 15,000miners refused t work, and the o ee n o o o police w r called i t forcethem t work.The police then decided t prosecute eight men whom they held responsible for the strikes. Three were Europeans, leaders of the International Socialist League, and five were Africans, three of

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


them leaders of the IndustrialWorkers’Union ofAfrica.This was the first time i n the history of South Africa that Europeans and Africans w r prosecuted togethee er for p l t c l activities.The prosecution case collapsed when it emerged that oiia much of its evidence was perjured. Industrial action continued. In 1920, white miners won an increase of 8s. a day through s r k action. African miners decided t follow s i and tie o ut ask for increases ranging from 5s. t 1 s a day and also for the opportunity t o 0. o hf do more responsible work. The owners offered an increase of 3d. a s i t but said that the removal ofthe colour bar was impractical.This was rejected by the East Rand miners. Their continuing strike encouraged others, and soon over 70,000 men w r out.The strike was wl organized,withpickets,and non-violent. ee el The government again called i the troops who, forcing the men back t work, n o killed a l a t eleven of them.The strike gained none of its immediate objectives t es but, as the president of the Chamber of Mines realized, it was the first major ‘nativestrike’. The African workers had become aware of the necessity for organization. One of the most powerful unions, the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union, was formed i 1919 with Clement Kadalie as its secretary.In 1928,five n unions came together t form the South African Federation of Non-European o Trade Unions and, among other things, they demanded equal pay for equal work.In the following year another five unionsjoined the federation.By 1945 the 1 federation represented 1 9 unions and 158,000workers. The African Mine Workers’ Union (AMWU),f i i t d t the federation, aflae o organized one of the most important strikes i South African history.The Lansn downe Commission of 1942 had recommended cost-of-living increases but the government refused t grant these t miners.After the war ended,the AMWU o o tried to negotiate an increase i the daily rate from 2s.3d. t 10s. but t i was n o hs refused by the Chamber of Mines. In the elections of May 1938, the United Party-identified with Englishspeaking interests-won 11 1 out of 150 white seats. The nationalists increased their total by seven t twenty-seven. o They had fought the election on two issues : restricting the vote which Coloureds still had i the Cape,but not i the rest of n n South Africa,and an unequivocal declaration on the question of South African sovereignty vis-a-vis United Kingdom. the Just before the Second World War, the Nationalist Party (n opposition) i questioned the use ofpublic fundson ‘native’ education and the influx ofAfricans o t the towns. They favoured the increased taxation of Africans t meet African o needs,less public spending on Africans,and regulations which would make it ea-sier t find Africans for farm labour ; they argued that the Unionist Party’s a t o ti tude t Africans and Coloureds would operate t the detriment of poor whites. o o e e pis There w r s l t within the Unionist Party.Some members had liberal views but the more conservativemembers w r i favour of transferringAfrican educaee n tion from theprovinces t the centralgovernment’sDepartmentof Native Affairs. o This v e was eventually endorsed by the Nationalist Party and implemented by iw them after their victory i 1948. n The smaller opposition groups had particular interests.The small Dominion Party was primarily concerned with strengthening the position of the Union of South Africa within the British Empire-in contrast t the Afrikaners and a o

South Africa


growing number of English-speakingwhites who wanted a separate South Africa. The Labour Party policy was social security and increased wages for the white population--coupled with complete separation of blacks from whites, socially, economically and territorially, although with such financial assistance t o blacks as might be required. Africans were not directly represented i parliament ; instead,three Euron peans represented 'native'interests.These could obviously be overruled a any t t m i an assembly of 153 and,i any case,formed part of the system of governie n n ment. They did protest against the already discernable policy of making the Native Affairs Department entirely dependent on African taxes,and with a growing control over African education,social services and development.But the only alternative that they had t voting with the Unionist Party was to vote with the o opposition. Dominion Party policy could be regarded as a variation of Unionist Party policy and was i any case completely overshadowed by the upsurge of nationaln im that followed the Second World War. As far as the Labour Party was s o concerned. the Nationalist Party now seemed t the white working class the best defender of what they regarded as their interests. South Africa was divided on the issue of entering the Second World War. n German settlers i South West Africa,and Germany itself, seemed sympathetic towards Afrikaner nationalism,and Nazi doctrines heavily influenced Afrikaner thought. The quasi-fascist'grey s i t ' were mostly Afrikaners,so were most hrs members of the Ossewa-Branduag(Oxwagon Sentinels). Members included the present Prime Minister Vorster and the present Minister of Finance.Diederich. Vorster himself was interned during the war. Pro-Nazisympathies thus l d many influential nationalists to favour neue trality.It was an emotional issue which further consolidated Afrikaner nationalism:combined with the scale of urban development during the war,and various political issues which the war forced to the surface.it was to have a lasting impact on South Africa. For the war did not expand African participation i political lf but did the n ie opposite.War emergency regulationspassed i 1943 made al strikes by al A r n l l fi cans i ai circumstances i l g l These regulationsw r continued each year after nl lea. ee the war ended, and then formally codified by the nationalist government after their success i 1948. n Controls on Africans coming t work i urban areas provided the precedent o n for the subsequent pass laws. By the end of the war, Africans w r demanding greater participation ee through an extension of the system of voting,they were demanding an end t the o pass system and the recognition of their trade unions for bargaining purposes. Their demands w r minimal but they were enough t pose to the white elecee o torate the question as t where South Africa went after the war. The unionist o reply was equivocal.They had no intention of extending the vote to Africans or of meeting the demands of African labour.The position was further influenced by the tension which grew up between the Native Representative Council and the government. Hofmeyr had suggested communal electoral roles but with each black group representingitself i parliament rather than through white represenn tatives,but t i proposal which attempted to bridge the growing gap between hs

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Africans and some white liberals on the one hand and the bulk of the white electorate on the other,could not be supported by Africans and liberals on the one hand as making communal representation permanent nor by the white electorate on the other as being too liberal. Smuts (who was then prime minister) agreed that social change must comebut i the future,and he argued that whatever the advances,social discrimination n must continue.This s t s i d neither liberal nor conservative. The Nationalist aife Party,however,had a clear answer.It was ‘separatedevelopment’ apartheid. : O n 12 April 1946,50,000 African miners (one-sixthof the work force) came out on strike.Armed police w r sent i and seven miners were k l e or injured. ee n ild n Four thousand Africans marched t Johannesburg from West Springs Mine i o rils support of the strike. The press frightened white readers with a t c e on the dangers of such demonstrations.The government’sNative Representative Council, which was supposed t keep the government informed on African opinion, o o o was refused permission t go t the Rand t observe the strike.The handling of o the strike proved the f n l straw for the council,which held only one further meetia ing and suspended itself, unable t operate i the face of intensifying racial diso n crimination. Coloured and Indian tobacco workers who came out i sympathy with the n miners w r baton-chargedby the police. The repression of the striking miners ee 7 continued.Their leaderswere arrested,and the strike ended on 1 April 1946,five days after it began.The AMWU leaders w r tried. Some w r given short senee ee tences and others acquitted. The strike had not succeeded i its aims,but it did demonstrate the increasn ing militancy of African workers against their conditions.The attempt t c l a o al general strike i sympathy with the miners also failed,but the fact that the atn tempt had been made a al showed how non-whiteworkers w r realizing the imtl ee portance of organization and collective action. A few years earlier,young members of the African National Congress (including Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela) had set up an African Youth League. o n They were no longer prepared t accept a subordinate,if improved,position i the existing system and advocated non-co-operationi order t bring about the n o very different kind of society they wished t see i South Africa. o n The South African Indians,i 1945,removed some of their more conservan tive leaderswho had been prepared t accept voluntary segregation,and appointo ed younger men such as Dadoo and Naicker,who planned t organize the Indian o community t resist the government. In 1947 Dadoo and Naicker together with o D Xuma,ANC president a the t m , r t i e made a joint declaration of unity. It soon became apparent,however,that more than unity and determination was needed when the Nationalist Party won the elections i 1948 and formed a government. n


M beya


V I Cabrai o



.ee Tt






Southern Africa.

Movements of peoples.



Supposed stages in the spread of Bantu-speaking peoples.


=m m aa m



The Great Trek.



.. . .......... .........


2,200-2,600 1,800-2,200 ...



Southern Africa: rainfall.






..:. .:. ..* .::: MACCHIA ..:: ::.


Southern Africa: vegetation. SU 6-DESERT Q AND DESERTSTEPPE
e *


Southern Africa : minerals.


Land allocation in South Africa : Bantustans.



Development of the economy

South Africa’s climate,mineral wealth and other natural resources have enabled it t become the most prosperous and heavily industrialized country i Africa. o n

Geography and climate
In an area of 432,379square miles live 21.3 million South Africans (15 million Africans,3.8 million whites,2 million Coloureds and a half million Asians). The climate is mostly subtropical, conditionsrange from the lush Medibut terranean-typesouthern Cape and east t the arid deserts of the northern Cape. o o Rainfall decreasesprogressively from east t west,with the seaward slopes of the Cape Mountains and the Drakensberg (whichform the border between Lesotho and South Africa, and extend north-eastthrough Natal) receiving upwards of 60inches per annum;virtually al the western half of the country receives under l 1 inches.Rain f l smainly i summer (November-April), although the southern 0 al n coast has more evenly distributed rainfall and the Cape Town region has its highest levels i winter. Most of the country is high plateau,behind the coastal n ranges which form a virtually continuous escarpment between 5 0 0 and ,0 1 1,000 high.Thisescarpment forms a watershed from which the Orange Rivfeet et t e system flows w s to the Atlantic a Alexander Bay.There are four provinces. r

Largest and most sparsely populated of the four,the Cape has a climate which ranges from subtropicaland Mediterranean around the coast to hot and dry i n the interior,merging into the Kalahari desert i the north-west.The Cape occun pies almost 60per cent ofthe total area but contributes only about 30 per cent of the net industrialoutput.One of its main drawbacks i the long distance between s the Cape coast and the major developed areas of the Transvaal and Natal.Nevertheless,it containsthree ofthe four major ports (PortElizabeth and East London n et, al i the east and Cape Town itselfi the w s ) and the major road and r i systems n show a distinctnorth-east-south-westbias.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area contains the motor industry which grew out of imported component assembly and includes Ford and General Motors. The western Cape around Cape Town is industrialized and is also the main centre s of f u t farming for export.The province’s main farm product is wool which i ri also the republic’smost important agricultural export. The northern Cape depends largely on mining and exploration,although the extension of irrigation through the Orange River project should increase the amount of farming land. Mining still centres on Kimberley (where the first diamond discoveries i South Africa were made). The north-westCape has vast den posits of copper,manganese,silver,iron,asbestos,limestone, salt,gypsum and ee tungsten i commercially exploitable quantities. Copper and zinc deposits w r n valued i 1973 as worth a l a t 1 0 0million Rands. The western coast is only n t es , 0 beginning t be developed. o Early i 1973 it was announced that the big iron ore deposits a Sishen are t n t o be more intensively exploited.A freight-onlyr i link is t be built t the w s al o o et coast harbour of Saldanha Bay,which wl be greatly enlarged,because most of il the Sishen ore wl be mined f r export. il o t The South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR)is aiming a ‘aniniil export target of 15 million tons of iron ore annually by the early 1980s’. ta There has been a growing uncertainty,however,about the potential market. The Japanese Government was uneasy about the prospects of Japanese firms investing i South Africa. The iron ore project, one of the most important industrial n ventures,may have overestimated ISCORs sales possibilities.There are,however, other potential customers, and France, Portugal, Spain and Italy have been mentioned.

The Orange River forms the boundary between the Cape and the Orange Free State.The economic mix is again mining and farming.The north of the province lies a the south-westernend of the Rand-Reefmining area which contains the t basic mineral wealth so far exploited.The main towns are Bloemfontein ( a i a ) cptl, Welkom,Kroonstad and Ficksburg.Most of the Orange Free State,which is the with only a small area on the border of Lesooriginal Afrikaner state,is ‘white’, tho ‘reserved’ an African ‘homeland’, it has the highest proportion of for but African population except Natal.There are practically no Asians or Coloureds.

This is the most populous (6.2million) and industrialized province of the four.In addition t the administrative capital (Pretoria), it contains the commercial and o industrial capital ofJohannesburg (population 1 4 . million i 1968,the largest c t n iy n on the African continent). Over half of South African industry is concentrated i 0 the southern Transvaal(the s r p running the 1 0miles or so from north of Pretoti r a to Vereeniging,on the Orange Free State border). A large area of the northern i Transvaal has been designated as a ‘homeland’(see map showing Bantustans).

South Africa


Al the major Transvaal cities developed rapidly, encouraged by preferential l
e o freight rates t and from the Rand;and the need for mine labour l d t conceno trations of Africans i s t l i e areas around these cities. n aelt The establishment of the Bantustans was, o f c a l a least,t lead t a defiily t o o centralizationofindustry.In 1970the prime minister’s economic adviser,D Pe r it Riekert,explained that the ‘ultimatetarget’ of the decentralization programme was t s e the flow of Africans from the ‘homelands’ o the cities;and 24 per o tm t cent ofindustrial investmentwould have t be channelled to the border areas and o ‘homelands’ compared with 10 per cent i 1968). Even t i is probably opti(as n hs mistic: as D Riekert said:‘As ahead as one can see the bulk of new factories, r far as wl as extensions t existing ones,wl continue t be built i the metropolitan el o il o n areas.’ Despite its industrial strength and continuing growth,however, the Rand economy is based on gold mining, which needs migrant labour,a great deal of which comes from outside South Africa itself. By the 1970s gold production was ee beginning t decline,and other minerals such as platinum w r assuming greater o importance.The Transvaal contains South Africa’s major known and worked reserves of gold,iron ore,copper,nickel,manganese and platinum.

Natal is sometimes known as the ‘English’ province because of its original colonization.It has proportionately more Africans than either the Orange Free State n o or the Cape:i the 1960 census a ratio of nine t one (cf.the national average of about four t one). It is one of the ‘traditional’ o areas of African settlement and as a result figures largely i the ‘homeland’ n policy; by f r the greatest part of the a land area has been designated as either ‘homeland’ ’border area’.As a result, or c the restrictive provisions of the Physical Planning A t (which largely decides where Africans may live) has weighed less heavily on the province than on,for example,Transvaal or the Orange Free State. Industrial growth i Natal was and still largely is centred on the capital, n Durban,the major port of eastern South Africa;but it has also spread along the coast and along the railway towards the centre of the Rand. A major port for n t exporting coal and a petro-chemicalworks were begun i the early 1970s a Richards Bay. The consequence of the designation of s many ‘border’ o areas i Natal was n commented on by the Financial M i : ul
Now we have the irony of the ‘English’province qualifying en bloc for government concessionsand incentives;tax concessions;relatively high depreciation allowances;moving cost subsidies:lower minimum wages than i non-borderareas;interest-freeloans;railway n rebates.

South African gross domestic product
In 1 6 the gross domestic product was provisionally estimated a R. 99 t 10,542 million,made up as shown i Table 1. n South Africa is coming t resemble the advanced Western economies,and t o o 90 experience similar problems.Rapid growth i the 1 6 s was followed by serious n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


inflation (running a 1 per cent i 1972-73) and balance of payments problems. t 0 n Mining, although still the basis of prosperity,is declining, and manufacturing overtook mining during the l s decade. at However,the vast majority of the population is still employed i farming. n Roughly 9 , 0 whites and 1.5 million blacks are employed i the white, 000 n commercial farming areas. Output has increased by an annual average of 4 per cent and has more than kept pace with population growth since the Second World War,s that South Africa is self-supportingi foodstuffsexcept for items o n l k tea, coffee, cocoa and rice. Almost half the agricultural production is ie processed by secondary industrieswhich,i 1972,employed some 2 per cent of n 1 al industrial workers. l
TABLE South African gross domestic product 1.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1,005 Mining 1,231 Manufacturing 2,390 Wholesale and retail trade 1,509 Finance 1,093

9.5 11.7 22.7 14.3

Transport Construction Services Government Others (non-profitand domestic service)


470 482 961

9.4 4.4
4.6 9.1





Farming i the Cape and Natal was mentioned above, but there is a vast n differencebetween white-ownedcommercial farming and the subsistence farming of the African reserves. In South Africa as a whole the main cash crops are maize, sugar, groundnuts, tobacco, citrus and deciduous fruits. Livestock are probably of greater importance than crops. It is estimated that,using present methods,only 15 per cent ofthe land is suitable for arable farming (which depends largely on r i f l ) anal, although irrigation schemes and, i particular, the various branches of the n ie Orange R v r Project,may considerably extend the productive area. Traditional Afrikaner agriculture took the form of extensive, but rather inefficient,sheep and c t l ranching;wool and f u t production are major industries. ate ri The areasdesignated as 'Bantu homelands'occupy some 5 , 0 square mls 800 ie (some 13.5per cent of the total land a e ) ra. African wages paid by white farmers are the lowest i the country,and farm n servants are the most impoverished and exploited of al workers. The average l income of a white farmer is R.6,000 year; farm labourers,i cash and kind, a n .4-9. average R 1 4 1 2 Further details were provided by the International Defence and Aid Fund, London,i 1973 : n
There are more than one million black farm labourers. They are not protected by any ordinary labour legislation : It is illegal for them to strike, or even t break their contract of service. o They have no holiday rights, no pensions, no paid leave, no sick leave, no union to protect them.

South Africa


Disobediencecan be punished by their employer,the farmer.And often is: the lash and the boot maintain a reign of terror on many farms. In such a legal and political climate,it is not surprising that the farms are a closed sector of the country,where reportersare unwelcome,information scanty.But some details do emerge from the feudal realities: In Naboomspruit, Transvaal, it was discovered that some labourers were paid R.4-8 a month,plus a sack of maize;they worked 12-hourshifts. seven days a week,and could take tm offonly i they found a replacement. ie f In the northern Orange Free State,it was reported i 1971 that labourerswere getting R.3 a n month,plus three paraffin tins of maize: and they lived i rusted iron shelters. n In February 1956,two Cape farmers were found guilty of beating a labourer t death with a o sjambok.They received short sentences and a smallfine-one ofmany examplesof lf on the ie farms. And,as recently as May 1971, Hartebeesfontein farmerwas found guilty of having put a a castration ring ( o rams)round the testicles of a 14-year-old fr African shepherd.

Farming receives privileged treatmentAasy t understand because of the o predominance of farmers i the Nationalist Party. Farmers receive direct aid n million a year,but contribute only R.35million i taxation. n totallingsome R.300 There is a government agricultural adviser t every seven farmers,but efficiency o has not improved dramatically, and s i erosion i particular is a serious ol n problem i dry areas. n

Industrializationrepresentsan effort t achieve self-sufficiency n industry as well o i as i food production and so reduce reliance on the outside world. Angola i a n s nearby potential source of o l one major natural resource which South Africa i, lacks. The projected industrial development has been largely successful. The Economist (29June 1 6 )suggeststhe following reasons: 98
The determination and drive of white South Africans i business and finance: an n entrepreneur's paradise. 2 2. The high rate of savings ( 0per cent of total wealth) which can be used for investment. This i possible because less then one-fifthof the population (i.e.the whites) receives s over two-thirdsof the total income,and white taxation is relatively low. 3. The abundant supply of cheap,under-utilizedlabour maintained by apartheid. 4. The natural supply of uranium,asbestos. copper,manganese,iron and other minerals (sofar the off-shoresearch for ol has been unsuccessful). i 5. Cheap power from coal kept cheap by low wages. Extra hydroelectric power can be made available both inside the republic and outside (e.g.Cabora Bassa i Mozambique). n


Metal and engineering are by far the most important industries.Steel produced by the State-ownedISCOR (Iron and Steel Corporationj is among the cheapest i the world because of local raw materials and low wages. n


South Africa. Ownership of foreign investment 1 9 6 4 and 1969 (estimated)

Sterling area

Dollar area International organizations
rniintriee _.. .._I


. e h ; : Western Europe




Sterling area
wrier counrries

Western Europe

Foreign ownership

country, 1960

South Africa: economic chart.

Direction o South African trade f

A. Federal Republic o Germany (5.8%) f B. Belgium (4.1%) C. Italy (3.9%) D. France (3.9%) E. Other Europe (8.3%) F Africa (15.2%) . G. Oceania (0.1%) H. Adjustments (4.3%) I. South America (0.5%) J. Other North America (2.8%) K United States o America (7.3%) . f L. Other Asia (4.5%) M. Japan (12.9%) N. United Kingdom (26.4%) f A. Federal Republic o Germany (14.7%) B. France (3.6%) C. Italy (3.4%) D. Switzerland (2.2%) E Netherlands (2.2%) . F. Other Europe (5.8%) G. United States of America (16.6%) H. Other North America (1.5%) I. Oceania (2.7%) J. Adjustments (0.7%) K South America (1.0%) . L. Africa (5.4%) M. Other Asia (9.8%) N. Japan (9.5%) 0. United Kingdom (20.9%)

South Africa. Balance of trade and gold production, 1959-72

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Value of exports 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n



The enormousmotor industry began with vehicle assembly.It hopes t produce a o car 66 per cent South African made by 1976,i e t be producing,by then,such .. o basic componentsasengine blocks and body shells;it had achieved a 50 per cent 99 local content by 1 6 .The motor industry is located mainly at Cape Town and Port Elizabeth,and the designation of many of is centres as ‘borderareas’has t resulted i tax concessions and lower minimum wage rates. However, the n industry is handicapped by is small market (see below). t

The chemical industry started with the making of explosives for use i the mines. n This developed into what was probably the world’s largest privately owned explosives factory until it was recently taken over by the government. In recent years the most important branch has been the nationalized SASOL plant i t n n o producing ol from coal a Sasolburg,i the Orange Free State,i an attempt t compensatefor the lack of ol i South Africa. The unit production cost i very i n s high,but the plant also produces a wide range ofoil-basedchemicals and plastics.

The mining of gold and diamonds has f r the past seventy years been the o mainstay of the economy. Gold mining was adversely affected when the world price of gold was fixed a $35 per ounce i 1934, but nowadays the price is t n continually r s n - n July 1973 for example, as against the o f c a price of iigi fiil $42.22, free rates fluctuated between $70 and $120.The higher prices were the expected t lead t the early opening ofnew mines.The South African Chamber o o ofMines estimated i 1 6 that gold production would f l o f between 1 7 and n 97 al f 91 1996, when the economically usable reserves would be exhausted. Production i n n South Africa decreased by almost 7 per cent i 1972,although profits increased by 58 per cent and dividendsby 24 per cent. N e w equipment i being designed, f r example an explosive rock cutter s o ii s which would lmt the effects ofgeological faulting.It i hoped that an improved il o t recoveryprocesswl allow more gold t be recovered a negligibly increased cost. The high price fetched by gold also gave a new lease of lf t older mines, ie o whose lower grade ores became economic. The production of other minerals has been increasing i importance. n Platinum,for instance, received a great boost i the early 1970s when antin o ntl pollution legislation i the United States required motor manufacturers t i s a l n exhaust converters containing platinum-based metals i new cars. General n Motors signed a ten-yearagreement t buy platinum from South Africa. Other o n manufacturers no doubt followed.Uranium is available i large enough quantit e for the State t go ahead with an extremely costly uranium-enrichmentplant, is o which would produce for export and enable South Africa t contemplate nuclear o industries.

South Africa


TABLE Value of mineral exports (in million Rands) 2.
1971 1972 1971 1972

Copper Asbestos Manganese Vanadium

34.8 30.9 16.9 15 10.5

Iron ore

82 86 28.6 21.4 20 11.7

Chrome 12.1 Coal 9.9 Antimony 14.7 Fluorspar 4.6 Miscellaneous (includinguranium and platinum) 144

1. 05 8.4 6.0 3.8

Mining is the industry which employs the largest proportion of black workers and pays the highest differential between skilled white and unskilled black wages. In mining,building,and railways white trade unions have always been most insistent on apartheid i the shape of job reservation ( t l a t i n a es n p i c p e . Mining needs thousands of migrant workers,many of whom come rnil) from outside South Africa. This migration i often cited as evidence that South s s African conditionsare i some way better than i the countriesoutside. It i true n n r n that wages i the mines attract those living a subsistence level o below i n t neighbouring countries,but migration is not entirely spontaneous.It owes much t the recruiting activities of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association,and o t government encouragement i these countries. Throughout this century, o n mineowners i the Rand have had a special agreement with the Portuguese n authoritiesfor the supply ofup t 1 0 0 0 o 0 , 0 Mozambican workers a s much per t o o o man. Conditions f r migrant labourerscontinue t be appalling.
TABLE Foreign Africans working i South Africa in 1972 3. n
Country of origin
Numher 111 South Africa
Country of origin

Rhodesia Swaziland Zambia

Numher 111 South Africa
~ _ _ _ _

Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique

154 3 1,960 13 1,749 131,291 121,708

Other parts of Africa

6,200 10,108 638 7,340

South Africa exports approximately one-quarterof is output, and imports a t quarter o its consumer goods; its dependence on trade becomes even clearer f when the structure ofexports and imports i examined. s South Africa is perhaps best known as an exporter of minerals,especially o gold,and food,especially fruit.Fruit exports t Western European markets are helped by the fact that when it is winter i Europe it is summer i South Africa. n n 99 o exports Gold,however,has been declining.In the eleven years from 1 5 t 1969,

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


rose from R.870 million t R.1,500million, while gold exports rose only from o R.500million t R.850 million. o By 1969,total exports (including gold) accounted for only 21 per cent of the gross domestic product (cf. 25 per cent i 1961). n Gold has,however,been of v t l importance t the economy i two ways. It ia o n provides a reservewhich can i the l s resort be sold t obtain foreign currency; n at o and it is also a physical export. Until the sharp rise i the free market price of n gold i the early 1970s, the surplus created by gold exports had been f l i g n aln steadily throughout the 1960s.The demand shows no signs of slackening,and il at gold wl no doubt remain a substantialasset as long as stocks l s . However,dependence on gold is fl t be economically unhealthy-hence et o the drive t industrialize. o During the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa’s rapid industrialization was based on ‘importsubstitution’,. .locally producing much of its consumer goods ie and semi-processedmaterials which had hitherto been imported,e.g.domestic durables,textiles,motor vehicles, components,spare parts. As i many other n countries,the attempt has not been entirely successful.However,it has definitely changed the import emphasis from consumer goods and processed raw materials t capital goods and unprocessed raw materials.Machinery and equipment now o account for some 44 per cent of total imports. Although the l t s available aet figures(1966)are long out ofdate,the trend is unmistakable:total imports of raw materials rose from 10.7per cent i 1961 t over 13 per cent i 1966. n o n While South Africa is a major producer of some raw materials (mainly minerals) it urgently needs t import others. A considerable percentage of the o exports consist of gold,diamonds and copper,items for which the home market is limited.Moreover,the home market is small for certain types of manufactured il goods.The industry t produce these wl necessarily be on too small a scale to o compete i low-costmarkets elsewhere. Paradoxically enough,while low wages n keep down the costs of manufacture,they a the same tm prevent the developt ie ment of a home market among the majority black population t whom those o o ul n wages are paid,and so constitute an obstacle t f l economic expansion i South Africa. New trade outlets are constantly being sought. Japan is a big potential lsiid customer-so much so that visiting Japanese businessmen are c a s f e as al ‘honorarywhites’lest they be rudely treated and sales deals fl through. Britain is still South Africa’s largest single trading partner,taking 26.8 per cent of her exports i 1971 and supplying 23.2 per cent of her imports,but both n et. have been declining (correspondingfigures for 1961 :32.9 and 29.2per c n ) However, trade figures do not include return on investments. ‘When assessing Britain’s exports to South Africa’,commented the Financial Times (15 December 1972), ‘it must be remembered that a large slice of South African o manufacturing industry is British-ownedor controlled... it is probably true t ot n n say that what is l s i exports is picked up either i directly remitted profits of British subsidiariesor is reflected i the retained profits of those companies.’ n Trade with other countriesis growing.By 1970 Japan,the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were South Africa’s second,third and fourth best trading partners respectively. Major increases came i the 1960s. In only n three years, 1966 t 1968,exports t Japan rose from R.83 million t R.204 m l o o o i-

South Africa


lion :with three products, iron ore,manganese and maize, predominant,while o between 1964 and 1968 exports t the Federal Republic of Germany almost doubled,and imports from it increased by over 5 per cent. 0 The decline i the share of South Africa’s trade with Britain reflects two n things:the United Kingdom’sown falling share of world trade as a whole,and the change of direction from the Commonwealth towards the European Common Market (EEC). decline would probably have been still faster but for the The Commonwealth preference enjoyed i the British market despite South Africa’s n expulsion from the Commonwealth i 1961. n South Africa feared British accession t the Common Market because of the o loss of Commonwealth preferences i the British market, and because some n products (notably apples) would be subject t quotas under the EEC common o i n agricultural policy. (Indeed,i 1973 South African apples were h t i this way, n although the effects were somewhat mitigated by the failure of the Argentine crop.) o South Africa has been trying t negotiate special agreements with the EEC, particularly i regard t f u t and wines. Frequent visits were made t London n o ri o o and Brussels.But no special accommodation was extended t South Africa apart from what general policy changes extended t al ‘thirdcountries’(Fimmciul ol Mail ( 4September 1973)). South Africa’sagricultural trade with the EEC,therefore, 1 depended on ‘compensation’ negotiations through GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The major l s is agricultural,for although fresh Cape f u t sells wl i the os ri el n EEC countries,tinned f u t and wine do not. ri The importance oftrade t South Africa has l d the United Nations t adopt o e o resolutions t boycott al such trade (see below). o l


Apartheid in operation


When the Nationalist Party came t power i 1948, post-war nationalism was o n n preparing the way for independence i most African countries.These currents naturally influenced Africans i South Africa.The groundwork for apartheid had n been prepared by a long period of settlement by Europeans which the war years had consolidated,although they also helped t c l the whole system i question. o al n Nationalist Party policy,based on apartheid and the continuation of white domination,appealed t some i e l s s who could not stomach African equality o dait but hoped for a way out of the impasse that would allow both separation and equality. The party promised the rural white population that more attention would be paid t the problems of agriculture; t the poor whites i towns it o o n promised further restrictions on black competition; and t al Afrikaners,urban o l and rural alike,it promised the end of British supremacy. Apartheid is an Afrikans word meaning separateness.The government has recently shown a preference for the term ‘separatedevelopment’. The apartheid policy involved the following : 1. The consolidation and extension of legislation governing the separation of blacks,whites and Coloureds. o 2. Bringing indirect rule via the chiefs and traditional special structures up t date i such a way as to inhibit the rise of an African nationalism. n 3. Emphasis on Afrikaner economic and social control. 4. Racial separation through the medium of separate social institutions (language,culture,education) controlled directly by the government or through the selective use of State finance. The aims of apartheid were : 1. To ensure the continuation of white supremacy,while a the same tm t ie controlling the pace and direction of African nationalism. 2. T o guarantee the expansion and competitiveness of South African business (Afrikaner i particular) by means of a lowly paid,docile and highly mobile n reserve of African workers. In 1948,the following main groups existed: Africans. The pool of cheap labour on which the economy is built. Mainlyalthough not completely-unskilled or semi-skilled,working i the mines n

South Africa


and i industries i the main towns.A few had succeeded i entering law, n n n ,liberalstudies,and journalism.In the rural areas,employed on white farms or living i ‘reserves’. n CoZoureds. Mainly semi-skilled or foremen,junior manager jobs i industry, n particularly i the Cape area.Some sil work i agriculture,but most have n tl n shifted t better paid urban jobs. o Asians. Mainly descendants of the indentured Indian labour recruited for the sugar plantations. Some free immigrants (mainly Moslem) had become traders and shopkeepers.Some Chinese and Malayans also. Ajrikciners. Many Afrikaners were still farmers,but many had become urbanized. Urbanization generally had been speeded up by the world economic depression i the 1930s. Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans n each controlled a sector of the economy. English-speaking South Africans. A broad term used t distinguish Afrikaner o groups from other whites who had British descent or connexions.They were mostly urbanized, usually more wealthy than the Afrikaners, and professional or managerial by occupation. Separated from the Afrikaners by history,area of settlement,language,religion and tradition. The victory of the Nationalist Party i 1948 was i part the victory of the n n Afrikaner nationalism which had been nurtured i two hundred years of fighting n against Africans f r the controlofthe land:against the British (marked especially o o by the Anglo-Boerwar); against the humiliationsoffeelingthemselvest be poor whites i a rapidly industrializingeconomy. n

The legalized framework
The first step was t institutionalizeclear-cutracial differentiation.The Prohibi-’ o tion of Mixed Marriages Act (1949)and the Immorality Act (1950)outlawed ’ marriage and sexual intercourse between whites and blacks. The Population Registration Act (1950)divided the population into racial categories and,as of l 6 o August 1966,it became compulsory for al citizens over the age of 1 years t possess identity cards and t produce these a the request of an authorized o t person. Race is one of the entries on the identity card. The Group Areas Act stipulated that each racial group must l v i specifically demarcated areas. ie n The Bantu Education Act (1953,amended i 1054, 1956, 1959 and 1961i n applied apartheid t African education. Separate education was stipulated for o o n Indiansi the Indians’Education Act (1965).and f r Coloureds i the Coloured n Peoples’ Education Act (1963).Under the terms of these Acts, education for whites, Coloureds,Asians and Africans is separately administered,separately financed and followsdiffering curricula. Laws were introduced t control the movement of African workers. Even o before 1948,the Nationalist Party and some of the Unionist Party were worried o n n about the influx ofAfricans t the towns.Africansworking i urban areas lived i designated townships outside the actual towns, and even then were subject t o specifiedconditions.The Bantu Urban Areas Act (1945) amended i 1964.In was n 1953 Africans were required t carry special identity documents and reference o books (usually known as passes) on them a al times (Bantu Abolition of Passes t l and Co-ordinationof DocumentsAct (1953)).

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Labour rights w r curtailed. Strikes by Africans are i l g l as also are ee lea c 15). racially mixed trade unions (Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) A t (93) I African unions are not illegal but have no formal status and may not participate !i collective bargaining. White unions, on the other hand, are registered and n ’ officially recognized as workers’ representatives i labour law (Industrial n c 15). Conciliation A t ( 9 6 ) Outside the ‘reserves’Africans are limited by custom, and sometimes by law,t the lower grades of employment.Under the Industrial\ o ConciliationAct (1956) as amended i 1959,the government may reserve certain n types ofjobs t persons of a ‘specified’ o race.Outside the ‘homelands’ Africans are by custom almost universally excluded from exercising administrative authority over whites. Q Al non-whitep l t c l rights (such as they were) w r systematically eroded. l oiia ee The limited franchise promised t Indians was abolished. In 1956 Coloured o voters i the Cape were removed from the common r l and permitted instead to n ol elect four whites t represent them i parliament.In 1968 t i representation was o n hs c 16). l abolished (Separate Representation of Voters A t (98) In 1970 al political and social rights outside the ‘homelands’were abolished (Bantu Homelands Citizenship A t (90) c 17). This completed the process of removing non-white representation from parliament. Coloured interests are served by the Coloured Peoples’Representative Council,and Indian interests by the National Indian Council (both established i 1 6 ) both are purely advisory. n 94; oiia Since 1968, under the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, p l t c l barties have been forbidden t have members belonging t more than one race. o o As non-whiteshave no direct representation i parliament,non-white political n activity has largely been confined to extra-parliamentary groups (which i other n countrieswould probably be legitimatepolitical p r i s . To r s r c the a t v t e ate) etit ciiis ,of al such groups,the government has introduced several blanket laws covering l ri actions and publications which promote any form of industrial,political,social ’or economic change and threaten public safety and order. Any person or organization can be banned a the discretion ofthe State president.A n individual t ‘ban’ prohibits the person concerned from the company of more than one other person and from al political activity;it may include house arrest and daily visits l t the local police station.( f Suppression of Communism Act (1950), Unlawful o C. 16) c 16). OrganizationsAct ( 9 0 ,General Law Amendment A t (93) Other ‘security’ measures are discussed below. During the 1950s a series of laws introduced ‘petty apartheid’ racial jegregation i public places,i.e. i al buses,trains,taxis,parks,zoos,museums, n n l $alleries, cinemas, theatres, public lavatories, beaches, sports grounds, cafks, restaurants and so on (Separate Amenities Acts (1953) and ( 9 0 ; Motor 16) c c 15). Transportation Amendment A t (1955); State-aided Institutions A t (97) /Segregation is also applied t hospitals, where black and white are treated o separately by staff of their own racial group, and sport,where mixed teams, !mixed competitions and mixed spectators are al forbidden. Factories have t l o provide separate entrances, clocking-in devices, pay offices, first-aid rooms, crockery and cutlery, washrooms, lavatories, changing-rooms,rest-rooms, 1 dining-roomsand work-rooms(Factories and Machinery A t (90) c 16).
l l

Child in Johannesburg slums.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


South Africa becomes a republic

Q South Africa became a republic on 31 M a y 1961. It lf the British Commonet
wealth but remained i the sterling area.The o f c a languages are English and n fiil Afrikaans. O f white South Africans 37.3 per cent are registered as Englishspeaking. The population (1970 census) by racial group i as follows: Africans, s 15,057,952; whites,3,751,328; Coloureds,2,018,453; Asians,620,436. In the 1970 parliamentary elections the Nationalist Party won 1 17 seats,the United Party 47 and the Progressive Party 1. The vote percentages were: Nationalist Party,54.43; United Party,37.23 ; ProgressiveParty,3.43;Hesligite National Party,3.56. The head of the republic i the State president who i empowered t dissolve s s o the Senate and the House of Assembly, t confer honours,t appoint ministers o o o o and deputy ministers,t appoint the times for sessionsofparliament,t prorogue parliament,and t declare war and make peace. Tenure i seven years from the o s date of taking the Oath ofOffice. The Executive Council i composed of a maximum of eighteen ministers s appointed by the president. Parliament,the legislative power, consists of the president, the House of Assembly and the Senate. The Senate has fifty-fourmembers of whom ten are nominated by the president.It is mainly a reviewing body. The House ofAssembly has 160 members,directly elected,and s x members i elected for South West Africa under the terms of the 1949 South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act. Qualifications for the parliamentary vote are: ( ) registration as a voter; a i (b) residence for five years in the republic; () South African citizenship; c i (d) 18 years of age minimum;() white.There is no representation of non-whites e i parliament. n There are fourprovincialcouncils:Cape,Transvaal,Natal and Orange Free State.The members are elected and the voting qualifications are the same as for parliamentary elections. The legislative assemblies of the African ‘homelands’,and the Coloured RepresentativeCouncil,are discussed later.The minimum age for exercising the limited right t vote ofnon-whitesi 21. o s


Apartheid and the economy
During the 1960s the rate ofSouth African economicgrowth was 6 7 per centper annum. This rate has since declined.Prices are rising,and inflation is serious. South Africa faces d f i u t economic problems, some of which derive from ifcl apartheid;job reservation,for example. In order t protect white workers from economic competition,Africans are o often specificallydenied by law from f l i g various skilled jobs. From the point iln o ofview ofthe economy this limits their productivity t a much lower level than need be.

, f


South Africa


It also reduces the number of Africans permitted to take any kind of industrial job a a l thus very often creating a t f c a manpower shortages. t l, riiil Despite white immigration from other countries,which provides 30,000 workers a year,there are not enough skilled operatives for the expanding requirementsof industry. This may lead t a head-on collision between the drive for greater o prosperity and apartheid ideology.In fact,clashes have already occurred. In the early 1970s,the labour shortage became s acute that many firms took o t employing Africans i higher positions than they were legally entitled to,and o n the demand that job reservation be l f e t a higher level was heard throughout itd o industry.The government was adamant,and was supported i t i by the white n hs unions;but there were also indications that job reservation would be relaxedwithout abandoning the colour bar principle. Many jobs previously done by pi n skilled white workers were done by Africans for lower wages,or were s l t up i order t avoid the job reservation laws. There have also been demands from o employers for improved education and training f c l t e for Africans. aiiis Job reservation,involving shortages of skilled workers,makes industry less efficient,while low wages inhibit the growth of a potentially enormous black consumer market-and the growth of industry t supply it. o o kls Hence the South African dilemma: t raise the level of African s i l , productivity and earnings and create a relatively prosperous proletariat would undermine the whole basis of apartheid;yet if it does not, the whole economy may stagnate. c o The Group Areas A t and the internal migratory labour it is intended t produce constitute another instrument of apartheid which affects the economy. So as t regulate the supply and cost of labour required by the white community o without endangering its dominance and exclusiveness,other races are restricted from settling i areas designated as white. n The social effects of t i are twofold. hs F r t i al but a f w exceptional cases, Africans are restricted to black is, n l e townships on the outskirtsof the large towns, e.g.Soweto,with a population of 500,000 on the outskirts of Johannesburg. Secondly, most people i these n townships are temporary residents, entitled t live there only as long as they have o work; otherwise they must return t the ‘homelands’. o They are not allowed t o bring their wives or families t the townships.In 1968, 1,664,000 o single migratory n ht o Africans were living under these restrictions i w i e areas. According t apartheid ideology,a black man is allowed into a white area only for the purpose of providing low-paidlabour. The nationalist government has vigorously pursued t i policy; D Verhs r woerd stated i 1955: n
The migratory system has been i force f r generations.Everyone knows that as far as mine n o labour is concerned,it is the best and probably the only practicable,workable system.M y contention is that the strengthening of the system and the expansion of the system t other o spheres of labour would be i the interest of the Bantu. n

According t the nationalist policy of separate development, there wl be no o il more large African townships on the edges of white towns when the African

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


peoples live i their own ‘homelands’. n Their economy is t be separate from the o economy of the white areas,but they would still supply labour for white frs i im n r hs n adjacent areas. D Verwoerd explained t i policy i the House of Assembly (June 1 5 ) 99:
White South Africa wl have two industrial iegs.the one being the white industry deep i the il n white interiorand the second the industries owned by white people and employing the Bantu labour coming from the Bantu areas because those industries are i the border areas of the n Bantustans.The majority of the workers can be absorbed there i the service of the white n people.

In principle,the government wl help t place the Bantustans on a fr economic il o im and industrial foundation i the following ways : loans for African-managed n industriesi African areas and the training of Africans for management ; grants n aiiis t improve s i conditions i the reserves; medical and educational f c l t e , o ol n housing loans,the building of roads and other such f c l t e ;the encouragement aiiis of new industries t go t the border areas surrounding the Bantustans by o o restricting further employment of Africans i white areas. n A certain amount of industry was to be decentralized,i.e.moved to ‘border areas’adjoining the Bantustans.Africans would then work i the white sector of n the economy,l v i black areas and be a long distance away from white towns. ie n Redirected industry would benefit,with wages even lower i border areas than i n n towns,and labour even more easy t direct and control. o There is no evidence that this policy is working. A few craft centres have been set up i the ‘homelands’, white industry has shown no desire t move n and o into border areas despite incentives,for simple economic reasons-the lack of communicationsand the reluctance of white managerial staff to take jobs i the n middle of nowhere.The analysis made by T e Economist (supplement on South h Africa,June 1968)explains the dilemma :
Because the Bantu have lagged so far behind white South Africans i economic development, n these homelands are very stagnant and depressed areas i the middle of a very rich one. The n natural pattern is therefore for the young men i the poor and stagnant area to go and find n well-paid jobs i the rich and growing labour-hungryones. By al means, mitigate t i i n l hs f possible by usual ‘depressedarea policies’: which i this case should mean giving special n treatment and investment incentives for white capital to go into the Bantustans (though probably on a leasehold system for the land,and subject to some special system of company registration and company law and company taxation i these Bantustans); plus an n agricultural policy which should be designed t get away from traditional, small-scale o subsistence farming and t bring into being a modern, larger-scale,cash-crop,Bantu o professional farmer class. Unfortunately, however, the dream of the l t South African P i e Minister, ae rm D Venvoerd,was that the Bantu i their homelands should relapse into being the nice,tame, r n contented peasants of his mythology. Hs agricultural policy was, therefore, that the i homelands should base themselves on precisely the traditional subsistence farming which has kept them poor (although with some experts i avoidanceof s i erosion helping them); and n ol his industrial policy was that while ‘exploiters’capital should be forbidden, but that a government-sponsored Bantu Investment Corporation should shuffle out money t help o establish some small selected semi-ruralcrafts.

South Africa


The r s l shave,ofcourse, eut been ludicrous.I t e r r l areas oft e Transkeit e e a e n h ua h hr r no young men t be seen,because they are away working i white South Africa. Bantu o n women roam around f t h n water and looking f r wood, rather than c l i a i g many ecig o utvtn crops.I t e first sx years of t e development of t e Bantustans,even although t e Bantu n h i h h h DevelopmentCorporationhas spent R. 1 m l i n (&6,420,000),fiil f g r s suggest t a 1 ilo ofca i u e ht only 945 new i d s r a jobs have been created i t e homelandsfor Africans. nutil n h [Onwhite border i d s r e ]The p l c is succeeding i c r a n v r exceptionalcases, nutis oiy n eti ey mainly i areas where t e tribal homelandsconcerned are not really normalt i a homelands n h rbl a all. For example there is an area c l e Rosslyn 12 mls north of t e centre of Pretoria, t ald ie h which is nominally on t e border of one of t e e h s o i a black patches on t e map.It is h hs itrcl h entirely convenientf rnew factories t be set up there,near t markets,f e , o o o u l good transport fclte.government, aiiis urban f e h pots f rwhite managerial staff.When I was i Johannesls o n burg somevery top v s t n B i i h businessmen indeed were announcing t a t e might be iiig r t s ht hy about t set up factories i Rosslyn:‘1 am told t a t e e wl be no government r s r c i n o n h t h r il etitos on employing African labour there.’

Despitethe evident lack of success,the nationalistgovernment i not deterred. In s June 1971,it produced a White Paper entitled Report b?, the Iriter~le~)arfnieiit(il Coriiriiittee o~i Drc.eritrcrli_Litioliqf’Iridiistrirs.popularly known as the Rickert the Committee Report.The aim i t maintain economic growth under apartheid.It s o was recommended that white-labour-intensive policies should be encouraged i n metropolitan areas. black-labour-intensive policies i ‘decentralized’ n areas,i or n near the Bantustans. A white t African labour ratio was t be determined o o o et o (Colouredand Indianemployers were t be lf outJ,and t be used as one ofthe Fdctorsi deciding the location of industries. n The government gives incentives t encourage border industries,including o loans,and income tax rebates, wage concessions,and road transport exemptions. It has discontinued the concessions given t firms moving into Rosslyn and o Hammarsdale (see extract from The Ecomniixt above). and i attempting t s o concentrate attention on ‘homelands’n the remoter areas. There wl be no job i il reservation,or industrial council wage agreements, and separate wage rates n il differing from those i white areas wl be established. Protests have already been made about textile wages i border areas as n compared with rates i white areas i the Transvaal,and about wages paid and n n profits made i the garment industry i border areas. n n The Bantustans have not acquired any semblance of independent selfgovernment,and any (partly elected) black governments have s r c l limited tity powers. The business world dislikesthe border industry policy,partly f r the reasons o already mentioned, partly because the ‘Bantu education’ policy cannot be expected t qualify Africans for the greater range of jobs which decentralization o might introduce into the Bantustans and border areas. ‘A large rubber company, for instance,‘ wrote the Fiiicnzciul T m s ie (32June 19701, ‘requiresworkers wt a least Standard Six education f r is ih t o t machines.But when it investigated it found none i the border area of is choice. n t M Siegfried Kuschke. chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation, r has time and again pleaded for better education f c l t e and more trade schools aiiis i the border areas.’ n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


‘TheBantustan policy’,the same a t c e concludes,‘cannotcontinue much ril longer without. .. clearly emerging as a fantasy or a fraud.’

Unions cannot be mixed (apart from the f w that w r mixed prior t the e ee o legislation introduced i the 1950s), and Africans may not form o f c a or n fiil ‘registered’ unions. Official unions may organize, negotiate and, under certain conditions,strike,and are regulated by the Industrial Conciliation A t The term c. ‘employee’ used i t i act specificallyexcludes Africans,who have no right to as n hs organize,represent or negotiate,and are expressly forbidden t strike,on pain of o a E550 fine,or up t three years’imprisonment.Severer sanctions can be applied o t trade union activity,e.g.picketing,under the Sabotage and Terrorism Acts. o Under the IndustrialConciliation Act,Indians and Coloureds are recognized as employees and can thus form registered unions.However,where they form joint unions with whites, the whites must be i control of the union,unless there is n express governmentpermission t the contrary. o African unions are not i l g l but Africans involved i industrial organizalea, n tion find themselves on the wrong side of the police.They can be told t stop their o a t v t e or r s being ‘endorsedout’of the area and so lose their jobs. ciiis ik The Africans’lack of labour rights has worked almost entirely t their white o employers’ interests, but the strike wave that swept through Natal i 1973 n indicated that t i policy,too,has its limitations.The prohibition of strikes did hs not prevent them taking place, and once the workers w r out it was almost ee impossible for management to negotiate terms, or arrange an orderly return to work,because no machinery for t i purpose was available. hs

The government encourages South African ownership of industrial capital t o counteract the domination of industry by foreign capital. n ee o In May 1973 it decreed that further share issues i banks w r t be made only t South African residentsuntil the foreign-heldpercentage was reduced to o ten. A recommendation by the Franzen Commission i 1971 had already n recommended that foreign banks reduce their holdings t 5 per cent ‘over a o 0 reasonable period’. Until recently, the English-speaking white community dominated the managerial and industrial sectors;the Afrikaans-speaking white community were engaged mainly i agriculture.This has now changed to some extent. While much n capital is still controlled by English-speaking whites, Afrikaners are actively involved i pushing forward industrial development. They are now found a n t every level of management,and Afrikaner investment is spreading right through the economy, from banking to mining and tertiary industry. They have been assisted by governmental policy i regard t investment and the control of n o foreign capital. The government is becoming more and more involved i investment, n especially i the public sector, and uses investment as a means of promoting n policy i regard to,for example,the location of industry.The decentralizationof n

Public library in Durban.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


television assembling,for example,is i l n with the border industry policy.The n ie government has invested some R.460million i the Sishen-Saldanhaproject, n R.700million i the Richards Bay petro-chemical plant, R.1,300 million i n n ISCOR (apart from the Saldanha scheme), R.1,850million i ESCOM.It plans n t invest R.550 million i a uranium enrichment plant. The State armament o n n industry (ARMSCOR)has large holdings i strategically important industries (explosivesand electronic equipment) and owns the Atlas Aircraft Corporation. The State virtually owns television ( n which it invested R.lOO million) and the i railways.Government control extends t the marketing of agriculturalproducts o through export boards, and government subsidies finance certain sectors or communities.O gross domestic fixed investment (R.4,112million) i 1972,the f n public sector for the first tm accounted for more than half.The 1973 estimate of ie public sector investment of R.2,500million represented an increase of R.440 million over 1972. Taking advantage of export subsidies on shipping and wool, and import restrictions designed to encourage ‘import substitution’, private investment has also been growing. The private sector has become increasingly c i i a of the rtcl extension of the public sector,of certain import restrictions,and of the effects of some government policies which a f c the efficiency of certain sectors of the fet economy. Under apartheid,wage levels,jobs,land and housing are al instruments i l n the effort t ensure that capital ownership remains firmly i white hands. Black o n investmentdepends upon the government-controlledBantu Investment Corporation (BIC), which makes loans t Africans wishing to invest i the ‘homelands’. o n It would seem from the 1969-70figures that the loans were made mainly t smallo scale trade and service industries:R.5,940,152 loaned to 959 Africans (cf. R.700 million t the Richards Bay plant alone). Capital investment was accordingly o extremely small. The importance of foreign investment i building up the South African n industrial structure-investment banking, insurance, mining, manufacturingcan hardly be overestimated.Since the great mining boom of the nineteenth century, foreign ownership has been common. In the earlier colonial period, British capital was more important than any other,but as the economy developed and industry grew, other Western countries increased their stake. The sterling area is still responsible for around 60 per cent of South Africa’s total foreign aln 6 n 92 l a i i i s although its share has f l e (from 6 per cent i 1 6 to 61.6per cent iblte, i 1 6 ) In 1970,sterling investment totalled &1,728million (58 per cent of total n 99. 90, investment). During the 1 6 s West European investment has increased more rapidly than that of any other area, accounting for over 24 per cent of total foreign l a i i i s i 1970 (15 per cent i 1963). Dollar investment i 1 7 iblte n n n 90 represented 15 per cent of total investment. In the post-warperiod, foreign capital flowed regularly into South Africa 16) until 1957,thenfell off. In the years following the Sharpeville massacre ( 9 0 and the resultant p l t c l and economic uncertainty,invested money moved out oiia the of South Africa on a substantialscale.In 1961, government introduced strong exchange control measures t lmt t i outflow;resident and non-residentfirms o ii h s were prohibited from exporting capital,and these measures were, by and large, successf 1. u

South Africa


But,since 1 6 , 9 4 capital from abroad has once again moved into South Africa on an increasingscale,for three main reasons:( ) the general trend of investment a towards advanced rather than developing countries;(b) rapid economic growth i South Africa up t 1969;(c) the instability of European and American monies n o (asthe world’smajor gold-producing country South Africa tends t attract funds o when other countries have currency problems). In the five years 1965-69, there was a total net inflow of E650 million (E260 million i 1968;i 1970 the figure n n increased again t E328 million). o The particularly high inflow i 1968 was probably due t the devaluation of n o sterling,and t the establishment of the two-tier system of gold pricing, which o caused an immediate boom both i Johannesburg stock exchange prices and i n n the free market price of gold. However,t i extremely rapid inflow was not an hs ee o unmixed blessing for the South African economy, and steps w r taken t n ae 9 0 . discourage it i the l t 1 6 s Nevertheless,a staggering R.501 million (E291.67 million) of foreign capital moving into the republic i 1970 mopped up only part n of the massive balance of payments d f c t eii. Direct private investment by foreign holding companies i their South n African subsidiariesis the most important element i the investment inflow.The n main inducement is the exceptionally high rate of profit.Between 1965 and 1968 the average return on British investments was 12 per cent-higher than that from any other country except Malaysia. This private direct investmentis made up of three main elements:(a) shareholdings (equities and preferences); (b) long- and short-term loans; ( ) unc distributed profits ploughed back into the South African subsidiary. Such undistributed profits are probably growing i importance, as South n African subsidiariesgain more autonomy from the parent company (which they n are almost bound t do as they develop). For example,of a R.428million rise i o n total foreign investment i 1969,R.205 million was i ‘the foreign share of n accumulated reserves of foreign-controlledSouth African enterprises’.Although it i e y iblte direct figures are not available, is l k l that the proportion of foreign l a i i i s accounted for by retained profits grew during the 1960s,if only because of the exchange control restrictions then i force. n It is an open question whether such a rapid growth of the ‘retainedprofits’ element i foreign l a i i i s leads i practice t greater autonomy for the South n iblte n o African subsidiaries of the British, American, Japanese and European frs im involved.Probably,as the scale of a business grows,any one large part of it may become more independenti its day-to-dayoperations,but t i is not necessarily n hs

Foreign banks have helped by underwriting South African loans,particularl loans for government projects. y Foreign insurance also invested heavily i government and local authority n stocks. And foreign technical help has greatly assisted i building up South n African industry. South Africans know that foreign capital is sometimes vulnerable t pressure o or direct intervention by governments t prevent investment i South Africa, o n generally whole or i particular industries there. It is d f i u t t estimate the n ifcl o extent or effectiveness of such pressure. The results seem to be marginal. n However,the role played by foreign investment i building up the nationalists’

In the slums of Johannesburg.

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n


power t impose apartheid has inspired use of sanctions as a political weapon o against it. Tables4and 5 i l s r t the pattern of wages i South Africa.Certain points lutae n o may be noted :the importance of African labour t the South African economy, the low and discriminatory pattern of African wages, the cluster of African labour i mining (593,086), n construction (276,000),the r t i trade (1 1 , 0 ) and eal 210, the particularly low African representation i finance. n

TBLE4. Average wages a the end of 1973 ( n Rands)l t i
Africans Coloureds Asians Whites

Clothing Textiles Food Tobacco Wood and cork Furniture Paper and products Printing Leather and products Chemicals and products Rubber products Non-metallicmineral products Basic metal Machinery Metal products Electrical machinery Transport equipment Electricity Gold mines (cash wage only) Coal mines (cash wage only) Construction Banks Building societies Insurance companies Wholesale Retail Motor Licensed accommodation (hotels,e c ) t. Central government (excluding 'homeland' governments) Provincial administration Local authorities Railways,harbours,airways
Relations. 1974.

69 5 4 65 86 54 75 89 98 67 74 83 63 73 80 75 85 86 8 0 2 1 2 1 7 1 88 76 9 0 63 52 63 38

80 90 82 79 82 134 113 142 92 14 1 126 111 145 124 137 122 133 105 108 58 138 16 0 117 124 95 77 98 6 1 163 75 107 72

78 103 120


122 142 142 156 107 11 5 127 148 157 180 111 125 153

102 97 14 9 142 165 227 132 10 4 137 88
232 122 88 55

378 41 0 355 359 329 373 408 356 346 44 0 361 390 396 397 405 367 380 415 36 9 421 408 314 302 340 335 179 298 193 336 320 331 320

5 9 4 6
54 54

I. A Survey of R u m Relurions in South Africu 1973. p. 2268 and p. 234. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race

South Africa


TBLE 5. Average weekly wages of Africans i 'decentralized areas', i e 'border industries' n ..
Rands Rands

Bis rt Berlin Kimberley Ladysmith Newcastle Phalaborwa Butterworth Umtata

9 10 8-9 8 9 8 7 7

Pietersburg Potietersrus Rustenburg Richards Bay King Williams Town Babelegi Isitheke

6 6.5 8
9 8

7 7

Wage rates differ between al the racial groups, the greatest gap being l between Africans and whites. The difference is greatest i gold and coal mining (even after counting n rations and accommodations, which are not included i the present f g r s . n iue) Apart from mining the differenceis remarkable i 'decentralized'areas (cf. n the stated government policy of encouraging industry i 'border' or 'decentran lized' areas as part of its apartheid policy). This point is discussed i some detail n later. During the scandal which broke out i 1973 regarding wages paid by foreign n frs operating i South Africa,much was said about the Poverty Datum Line im n (PDL).This is generally understood to include only the minimum necessary to maintain physical lf (mainly food,clothing,rent,transport,l g t , and not such ie ih) items as education, which are included i another criterion-the Minimum n Effective Level (MEL)--considered t be the l n above which, and only above o ie which,a family can be sustained. Either l n is difficult t calculate because of the growing cost of living.This ie o has h t most consumer products, but food and housing have been rising faster i e s el than other items. and particularly affect the l a t wl off. The followingis quoted from a Roneoed documentprepared by the Universit ofCape Town entitled 'An Updated Memorandum presenting Information on y Black Wages and Poverty i the Cape Town Area'. n
In real terms the Poverty Datum Line i hardly a human standard of living.It has been said s t be more remarkable for what it excludes than what it includes.No allowance is made for o long-termneeds as wl as many important short-termones.To mention only some items,it el excludes: 1. Furniture and other hire purchase items. 2. Household goods such as crockery,linen,pots and pans. 3. Chemist's and dentist's bills and transport costs t health clinics. o 4. Stationery,reading matter and postage costs. 5. Sweets,tobacco,liquor and entertainment. 6. Communication expenses (telephone). 7. Savings and insurance. 8. Money sent t dependent relatives ( major reason for seeking work i the first p a e . o a n lc) The above represent items without which it is difficult t subsist.Moreover,i a population o n group that suffers from the debilitating effects of disease,the minimum budget for health is too low.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa




m >

South Africa


TABLEComposition of the labour force 7 .
Africans Coloureds Asians Whites

Al mines l
Clothing Textiles Motor industry Food Tobacco Beverages Footwear W o o d and cork Paper and products Furniture Printing Leather and products Rubber products Chemicals and products Basic metal Metal products Machinery Electrical machinery Transport equipment Electricity Construction Banks Building societies Insurance companies Wholesale Retail Motor Licensed accommodation Public authorities (excluding ‘homelands’) Police : Officers Warrant officers Chief sergeants Sergeants Constables Others

593,086 35,500 64,100 67.263 88,900 1,900 13,800 5,500 46,500 15,800 19,600 8,500 180 ,0 14.200 38.400 48,200 95,400 33,100 20,300 38,000 17,500 276,800 5,780 1,718 4,179 82,300 112,110 51,700 32,300 110,594 1 0

7,914 57,700 16,000 1 . 11 50 19,200 1,200 6,100 12,100 6,500 5,100 9,200 8.000 4,200 2,200 5,800 160 .0 1100 ,0 400 ,0 9,400 14,900 600 47,500 1,794 314 3.318 20,400 32,800 10,600 6,600 35,068 7

730 23,800 5,600 4,096 8,800

400 16,000 1,300 3,700 2.000 1,900 600 700 2,100 600 4,900 500 1,300 150 .0

5,700 635 16 5 734 10,100 16,900 3,100 500 .0 8,387 3

83,699 10,100 8,200 47,674 20,200 1.100 5,300 2,300 6,400 7.500 6,300 17,700 700 5,800 21,700 32,000 35,300 27,400 17,000 26.000 10,200 58,900 46,531 9.122 25,669 77.100 125,100 44.300 9.300 102,881 1,901 2,106


1 8 2.028 7,427 316 18,843

6 250 103 .5 32 1,375

3 18 4 549 9 728

5,000 7.427 2,409 18,843

Soirrcc. A Surrey of RUC<, Reluliorr, in South Atrrco 1973. Johannesburg. South African Institute of Race Relations, 1974

The PDL and the MEL are s i h l lower i rural areas. The PDL has been lgty n calculated a R.60-96 and the MEL a R.75-140 for an average household of t t five persons.It is obvious from the table of average wages a the end of 1973 (see t Table 4) that many African,and some Coloured and Asian heads of families are being paid less than the PDL and certainly less than the MEL.Hence there is not only wage discrimination,but some of the wages paid are less than the minimum needed t sustain life. o Table 6 shows minimum PDL monthly expenditure.

acism and apartheid in southern Africa


The principles which govern the education policy of the nationalist government were l i down by D Verwoerd (former prime minister) i parliament i 1953: ad r n n


Native education should be controlled i such a way that it should be i accord with the n n policy of the State.... If the Native i South Africa today.. . is being taught to expect that n he wl live h s adult life under a policy of equal rights,he is making a big mistake.... il i


In June 1954 he said :
Our school s s e must not mislead the Bantu by showing him the green pastures of ytm European society i which he is not allowed to graze. n

Until 1953 African schools w r of four types:private schools run by religious ee communities; subsidized mission schools founded by church organizations, subsidized by the State and teaching a syllabus prescribed by the Provincial Education Department; government schools; and community or t i a schools rbl maintained by African communities themselves. The Bantu Education A t of 1953 was designed to:(a) simplify the adminisc trative control over African schools;(b) bring the control of African education into l n with the policy from Africans adopted by the Ministry of Bantu Affairs; ie (c) provide the type of education which the ministry had decided was best suited t Africans as unskilled labour for white areas, and limited i access t more o n o s i l d occupationsoutside their ‘homeland’; make Africans finance their own kle (d) education. African education has been under the control of the Bantu Affairs Department since 1955 and is o f c a l referred t as ‘Bantu education’.Although fiily o partial control of education has been transferred t Bantustan ‘governments’ o the ministry retains the key divisions,e.g.approval of budgets,control of examinations and, t some extent, curricula.African education i white areas and i o n n reserveswhere a ‘government’ not yet been established remains totally under has the ministry’scontrol. It is doubtful therefore whether administrative control is now any less complicated than before,but it is certainly true that the South African Government can use its control of the finances and its control of the examination system t influence African education both i the ‘homelands’ o n and i white areas. In n August 1972,the Bantu Education Journal indicated that there w r 5,093schools ee n i white areas or reserves without Bantustan governments,and 5,855schools i n the ‘homelands’. The ‘homeland’ governments have questioned certain aspects of the Bantu Education Act.The Transkeian government has taken over control of community schools, altered the syllabus and reintroduced English or Afrikaans as a medium of instruction rather than those formerly imposed by the government. The K w a Zulu government introduced its own Education A t which imposed c, English i preference t Zulu as the main medium of teaching i the higher n o n classes. African education is paid for by African taxation,by funds derived from n bazaars,concerts and so on (particularly i the Bantu community schools), by

Gold mining i Doomfontein. n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


‘voluntarycontributions’ by parents, and by school fees. The South African Government makes an annual grant which fluctuates but averages about E8.5 million ( n a total budget of about E20 million). i Recent South African Government expenditure per pupil per year was as follows: African (1971-72), R.25.31;Coloured ( 9 2 , R.94.41; 17) Indian ( 9 2 , 17) R.124.40; white ( 9 1 7 ) R.461. 17-2, In addition t fees and book charges,African heads of familiespay a levy of o 2 cents a month i urban areas towards the cost of building primary and lower 0 n secondary schools.The building of new high schools is discouraged and ‘excess’ n pupils are expected t board a schools i the ‘homelands’.Fees i the ‘homeo t n lands’range from R.64to R.70for school and hostel.Most parents cannot afford this, and,i any case, the shortage of hostels lmt the numbers that can be n iis admitted. School attendance is compulsory for whites, compulsory for Coloureds i n some areas,and optional for Africans. School places and buildings for Africans are inadequate throughout the country,because the money is not provided t o r build o extend. Drop-outs are common, because of the general poverty of African homes, the shortage of teachers, the distance from schools, and the inefficiency of double sessions.African secondary-schoolstudents,unlike their white counterparts, have to pay for their education and for textbooks and stationery.The effect of t i can be judged by a glance a the wages paid t hs t o different racial groups. In 1972 the average cost of the books needed i primary schools was R.9per n annum, i secondary schools R.37 per annum.1 Some ‘homeland’authorities n include a small grant for textbooks i their annual budgets,but t i is never even n hs nearly adequate. Voluntary appeals or teaching efforts by newspapers, businessmen, or studentorganizationshave only served to underline the enormity of the problem. Voluntary funds are no substitute for stable o f c a financing and the general fiil poverty of Africans exclude any possibility of financing i t i way a system of n hs compulsory education. The pupil-teacherratio is roughly 60:1 i schools for Africans and 20: i n 1 n schools for whites. Many African schools are forced t operate a double-shift o system and most of their teachers are underqualified. Government statements suggested that the Department of Bantu Education might provide some textbooks i 1 7 . n 94 In 1965, the minister provided the following information i parliament n about the qualifications of teachers i African schools under his department: n 1.39 per cent had a degree, 2.35 per cent had a diploma from the department, 31.45 per cent had a higher primary teacher’s certificate,45.47 per cent had a lower primary teacher’s certificate,0 2 per cent had technical qualifications, .1 19.13 per cent had lesser qualifications. By 1970 the relative percentages had hardly altered. r The government attitude to African teachers’salaries was stated by D Verwoerd i 1954:‘Thesalarieswhich European teachers enjoy are i no way a fit or n n permissible criterion for the salaries of Bantu teachers.’
1. Cape Times, September 1972. 29

South Africa


The highest salary for an African teacher is lower than the lowest grade for a white teacher w t the same qualifications. Coloured teachers get 72 per cent of ih w i e teacher’salaries and African teachers 52 per cent-about half. ht Under these conditions the education of Africans is far inferior t that of o whites.African parents are very anxious for their children t attend school,but o there are never enough places,and pupils are forced t drop out as they get older o o o because the fees increaseand they have t work t supplement the family income. Seventy per cent of Africans get no farther than the first f w school grades, e and 95 per cent do not finish primary school. The proportions going on to secondary school and higher education are consequently infinitesimal.
TABLE African school enrolment 1 7 and 1972 (excluding technical and trade schools 8 . 91
and teacher training)
1971 1972
Percentage (1972)

Secondary Form V Form IV Form 111 Form I1 Form I Primary

4,065 7,833 29,800 42,509 53,605 148,374 160,3 6 1 205.114 282,942 342,636 451,684 511.224 676,317

4,814 9,909 32,074 47,256 63,733 161,472 176,109 222,913 301,232 359,339 475,848 536,818 687,990

0.16 0.32 10 .4 15 .4 2.07 5.24 5.72 7.24 9.78 11.67 15.45 17.43 22.34

Standard 6 Standard 5 Standard 4
Higher primary Standard 3 Standard 2

Lower primary Standard 1 Sub-standardA Sub-standard€3

In other words 66.89per cent of African pupils are attending lower primary and 94.87 cent are a primary school.U p t and including Standard 6,instruction per t o is i the mother tongue i al African schools except those i the Transkei and i n n l n n Zululand.Pupils accordingly learn less English and Afrikaans, the two o f c a fiil ifcly n languages; have great d f i u t i studying subjectslike mathematics,which have hardly been translated into the vernacular;and are confined exclusively t the o only textbooks available-those provided by the Bantu Affairs Department.In the Transkei,mother-tongue instruction has been dropped as from Standard 3; al schools teach i English from that level. l n Recent South African Government statements would seem t provide for o teaching i English or Afrikaans i the ‘higherclasses’-a reversal of the former n n position i mother-tongueinstruction. n According t the South African s a i t c l yearbook,a white child is more o ttsia

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


than 1 0times more l k l to pass matriculation than an African child.Neverthe0 iey less,night schools for working Africans which were once run by volunteers i the n Cape Peninsula and i the Rand have been declared i l g l n lea. Since 1972,however,adult literacy schemes have been started by various firms and organizations for, i a technological society,i l t r t s cannot keep n lieae ie proper work records or tm sheet+to quote just one example. rs The Ministry of Education,A t and Science deals only with the education c hs of white children. The National Education Policy A t (1967) requires t i minister t ensure that education shall have: ( ) ‘aChristian character’and (b) ‘a o a broad national character’. During the parliamentary debate on the b l ,the minister said : il M y interpretationof t e ‘Christian h character ofeducation’is t a education s a l b i d on ht hl ul t e b s s oft e t a i i n lWestern cultureand v e oflife which recogniset e v l d t oft e h ai h rdtoa iw h aiiy h B b i a principles, ilcl normsand values.By ‘national’ is understood t a education s a lb i d it ht hl ul on t e i e l of t e national development of al c t z n i South Africa,so t a our own h da h l iies n ht i e t t and way oflife s a l be preserved,and i order t a t e South African nation may dniy hl n ht h constantly appreciateits t s a p r ofWestern c v l s t o . ak s at iiiain Figures for 1971 indicated that there were 863 African students a the three t African universities (University of the North a Turfloop, Fort Hare and t Zululand); and 1,707Indian students a the University of Durban-Westville. t The number of white students was 56,982.

TABLE University enrolment,June 1973 9.
Number of students University White Coloured Asian African Total

Cape Town Durban-Westville Fort Hare1 Natal Orange Free S a e tt Port Elizabeth Potchefstroom Pretoria Rand Afrikaans Rhodes Stellenbosch South Africa North Western Cape Witwatersrand Zululand

8,057 6,829 5,841 1,735 5,891 13,752 1,897 2,163 8,845 25,388 9,803 90,201


16 1

5 1,053 244



104 ,1 160 ,0


1,937 385

3,765 1,274
2 6 979

8,562 2,192 1,053 7,507 5,841 1,735 5,892 13,752 1,897 2,203 8,845 32,104 1,274

2 1 3,105





1. Attendance decreased very considerably during the year, due to disturbances amongst the students. Source: Surrev of Race Reloirons in South Africo 1973 Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations, 1974

South Africa


I figures for the University of South Africa, which runs correspondence f courses only, are omitted, the number of full-time students was as follows: Whites, 64,813 at ten universities;Coloured,2,091 at four universities; Asian, 3,080a f v universities;African, 3,583 a eight universities (two of which have t ie t only one African student). The Extension of University Education Act (1959) provided for the establishment of university colleges for African, Coloured and Indian students,and five have since been established.Each is run by a white council.with a non-white council serving i an advisory capacity,and white staffi each outnumber black, n n particularly a senior levels. t Black students are not usually permitted to attend the other universities, wt the followingexceptions: ih 1. The Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand are allowed to admit black students who have obtained government permission. They are segregated socially,but integrated academically. n 91 2. The University of Natal had 550 black students i 1 7 who were housed and taught i a separate section of the university. n 3. Rhodes University has thirty-oneChinese students.

The pass laws
Identity cards are obligatory for al races i South Africa.In the case of Africans, l n the identity card (with photograph and l s i g race,sex, identity number. address, itn ps', age,marital status,etc.) is pasted into a book (the 'reference book' or ' a s ) which also contains ethnic group or tribe,employer's name and address,length of employmentand tax receipts.Every month,an African's employer has to sign the reference book and insert the date when employment is terminated.In the case of African women,the book contains the name,address and referencebook number of her husband,parent or guardian.When the books are issued,fingerprints are recorded for a central bureau. The identity card of other races must be produced within seven days of demand,but i the case of Africans,the holder must always carry h s pass book. n i If he cannot produce it immediately on demand,he may be arrested on the spot. 6 Every African man or woman over the age of 1 must carry a pass. Offences under the pass laws account for over 700,000prosecutions every year,and many more summary arrests.The daily t l of those picked up for pass ol hs law questioning is nearly 2,000and there is evidence that the police use t i method to harass innocent citizens.In 1972, centres' w r empowered to deal 'aid ee with minor offencesrather than taking al casesto the Bantu court.The court can l send pass offenders whom it considers ' d e or ' nuisance' t a work colony or il' a o youth camp. The pass laws enable government o f c a s to regulate the flow of Africans fiil into 'white'areas.A n African needs a permit from the labour bureau to remain i n an urban area for more than seventy-twohours, unless: (a) he was born there, and has worked there continuously;or (b) he has worked continuously for one employer for not less than ten years; or (c) he has worked for more than one employer for a total offifteen years.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Other regulations provide for the expulsion from the urban areas of any Africans surplus t labour requirements.Africans can thus be ‘endorsedout’ or o evicted from urban areas when their presence is not considered desirable.In the l s year for which government figures were kept of the numbers endorsed out at (1965) the Minister ofBantu Administration stated that 86,186Africans had been evicted t i way. hs Many of the people endorsed out are placed i transit camps i the ‘homen n lands’,and the threat of being endorsed out is sometimes made by the police t o those who complain of ill-treatmentor,for example,those who help to organize African unions. The pass laws have seriously affected family l f . ie In 1971,the Anglican Bishop of Zululand, the Right Reverend Alpheys Hamilton Zulu,was arrested a 5 a.m.a a conference centre i the Transvaal t t n where he was attending a seminar.H was held a the police station for five hours e t before being charged with faling t produce a reference book. H was offered, o e and refused,the opportunity t pay a R.5 admission-of-guiltfine.The charge o o was l t r withdrawn. Of h s arrest,Bishop Zulu said it was ‘agreat experience t ae i sufferfor what the police regard as a pass,when senior men i government assure n us that passes for the black man have been abolished and al they need to have is a l reference book’. In the early weeks of 1972 several hundred cases were heard by the Bantu n court i Port Elizabeth.Sentenceswere usually R.15 (or thirty days i prison) for n being i the area without a permit,and R.5 (or ten days) for f i i g to produce a n aln o o al referencebook on demand.Many Africanscannot afford the finesand s go t j i . The following are some examples of the working of the pass laws, here quoted from the South African press.
Monica Malatlhoe of Soweto passed her matric i 1 7 and applied to a number of hospitals n 90 for a vacancy as a trainee nurse.She was accepted by three training hospitals,but she cannot obtain a reference book i Johannesburg, although she was born and brought up there. n Bantu Affairs Department is reluctantto issue reference books i Johannesburgbecause they n confer a right to remain there.Johannesburg Star ( 9May 1971). 2

M s Duncan of the Black Sash reported complaints from a large number of African servants. r Their employers had threatened t destroy their pass books or to f l i y information i they o asf f didn’tobey their every command.Johannesburg Star (3 July 1970.)
Gilbert Gamede,32, of Soweto,was assaulted and robbed by a group of men. Among the possessionswhich they took was his reference book.H was so worried about the loss of the e book that he hanged himself the following day. Rand Daily Mail (6 October 1970.)

S.M., 22,was born i Alexandra and lived there with his parents until the family was aged n moved to Diekloofi 1962.In 1965 he applied for a reference book. H e was asked where his n father was born,and he correctly replied ‘Rustenburg’. e was endorsed out to Rustenburg H where he had been only twice i h s lfn i ien both occasions he was arrested and taken there under escort.H knows nobody there, and so has walked home on both occasions. H is e e lawfully entitled to live i Alexandra, but is unable to prove his continual residence there. n The authoritieswl not accept an affidavit from his mother. South African Press Reports. il
M Harlen Meini (59) is a crippled African factory worker who has lived legally i the town r n
of Wellington,i the Western Cape for the past 1 years. n 8

South Africa


Hs wife, Lena,was born in the Eastern Cape town of Dordrecht and stayed there, with i Harlen’s family until 1958. She then went to join her husband, but the authorities, over the ih next 12 years, refused her permission to stay w t him, and she was several times fined and sent back to Dordrecht. Eventually, it was found that she had no legal right to be i n Dordrecht either. Accompanied by her three daughters, she l f for Illingi resettlement et r township i the Eastern Cape. M Meini and their son are remaining in Wellington in order n to keep their jobs. Cape Times (November 1970.)

‘Separation’ includes the designation by tribal group of areas within an African urban area,and the Department of Bantu Administration and Developmenthas requested municipalities t provide tribally demarcated housing areas for A r o fi cans. Daveytown Benoni, for example, has designated areas for ( ) Venda; a (b) Shengaan and Tonga, () Xhosa, Swazi,Zulu and Ndebele; (d) northern c e and western Sotho of the Transvaal;and ( ) southern Sotho.This arrangement helps t reinforce the idea of ‘homeland’citizenship and reverse the former o trend towards forgetting tribal t e i a growing sense of African nationalism. is n

Separate development is primarily based on land ; the long conflict between Africans and whites was settled wt the military defeat of the Africans.Henceih forth land would be unilaterally allocated by a white government representing white interests. The Botha-Smuts governmenthad l i the foundationsof segregation i the ad n Native Land Act of 1913, which restricted the Africans’ right t own land o although without specifying where the restrictions would apply. Africans were not permitted to acquire land or any interest i land outside the scheduled n ‘Nativeareas’except with the consent of the governor-general. additional land to Africans The Native Trust and Land Act (1936)‘released’ and set up a South African Trust which could acquire land i ‘Africanareas’. n Apartheid was built on t i unequal division ofland :86.3per cent t remain hs o il under the permanent control ofwhites,and 13.7per cent which wl eventually be passed over to Africans.Blacks are treated as if they w r foreigners. ‘Passports’ ee il il f ih which wl eventually replace passes wl be necessary i they w s to move even ii, between different tribal areas. Cvl political and social rights must await the t m when the ‘black’ ie areas i which blacks are t be entitled t self-ruleeventualn o o l become ‘independent’ y states within a white-dominatedSouth Africa. These areas are the ‘Bantu homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’(see map), and roughly correspond t what used to be called the ‘reserves’. o The term ‘Bantu o homeland’is designed t support the myth that whites moved into empty South Africa,and that the present boundaries between black and white are the result, not of white conquest,but of pre-colonialblack settlement. The Bantustans are based on tribal origin-one for the Zulus,two for the Xhosas,one for the Tswanas,and so on.A present,as the map shows,the areas t are not geographically consolidated but consist of smaller and larger patches of land scattered over a wide area.Consolidation programmes are progressing,but to a limited degree,and the t r s ‘Bantustan’ ‘homeland’, em or which suggest large, single territories,are misleading.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The Bantustans, when f n l y consolidated,are t cover about 58,000square ial o mls (some 13.5per cent of the total land a e ) The governmentclaims that t i ie ra. hs allocation is just, as only a relatively small part of South Africa is naturally n cultivable;hence a nominal 13 per cent is really much more and,being partly i high rainfall areas,potentially of high f r i i y etlt. However, heavy rainfall can be as great a problem as drought. In the Transkei,although the average rainfall is over 30 inches,it is unreliable,with frequentdrought and occasional torrential rains which increase erosion.Much of Tswana,the l a t populated Bantustan, is arid. There are virtually no ports, es industriesor exploitable minerals i any of the Bantustans. n Opponents of apartheid point out that,even i racial division were desirable f i South Africa,the division has been decided and made wholly unilaterally by n whites.

TABLE ‘Homelands’:area and distribution of land 10.
‘Homeland’ Blocks of land Total area Hectares Square miles

Transkei Ciskei K w a Zulu Lebows (northern Sotho) Venda Cazankulu (formerly Machangane) Bophutha Tswana Basotho Q w a g w a Swazi

2 19 29 3 3 4 19


3,672,2 12 918,547 3,144,421 2,214,086 604,355 667,292 3,754,018 45,742 211.807 15,232,480

14,178 3,547 12,141 8,549 ‘2,333 2,576 14,494 177 818 58,s13

Source: A Surve.v of Race Relarions 1972,p. 168,Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations. 1973.

Land continues t be added t the ‘homelands’ o o under the government policy of consolidation,or as compensation for the removal of Africans from ‘black spots’, under allocationsmade i 1936 which are only now being implemented. or n The areas involved are small,but even so,transfer is complicated by the problem ofbuying out white farmers already s t l d on t i land.Government spokesmen ete hs state continually that only land promised t Africans i 1936 wl be ceded. o n il Africans move not only between black and white areas but between ‘homelands’. Bantu Laws Amendment A t No.7 (1973) enacted measures for the partial c consolidation of the ‘homelands’;by a resolution passed by both houses of parliament any area could be added t the present ‘released areas’as an area i o n which Africans might buy land.The total,however,could not exceed 6,209,857 hectares.An amendment of the Bantu Administration A t of 1927 provided that, c

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n


if deemed to be i the public interest,the minister could,without prior notice to n any persons concerned order any tribe,portion thereof or individual African t o move from one place t another within the republic.The 1973 A t reinforces the o c powers of removal:its main purpose seems t be t authorize the removal of the o o largenumbers ofTswana,Pedi,Ndebele and Xhosa people who a present live i t n Bantustans not assigned t their group or i areas bordering other Bantustans. o n

TABLE Population density in ‘homelands’(1971) 11.
Density o population f per square mile
Defaclo De jure



Density o population f per square mile
Defacto De jure

Transkei Ciskei K w a Zulu Lebows (northern Sotho) Venda

122 148 173 127 113

212 261 332 236 153

Gazankulu (formerly Machangane) Bophutha Tswana Basotho Q w a g w a Swazi

61 136 144


1,085 562

To be consistent,great numbers ofwhites would have to be shifted to permit consolidation-including those involved i mining corporations, plantations, n industries,harbours.The government has conceded that complete consolidation is impossible, and that the ‘homelands’wl consist of scattered areas. For il n o example,even if ownership of the land i question passes t the Bantustan,the ownership of the mineral resources i a mining concession wl not. It is d f i u t n il ifcl could mean i these conditions.Even communication n t see what ‘independence’ o between different parts of the same ‘homeland’ would depend on the goodwill of the white South African Government. These problems (consolidation, ‘white patches’, black removals, influx ee control, retention of effective power by the government) w r discussed by a meeting of ‘homeland’leaders, i 1973, which also considered the growing n significance of the liberation movements,the dissatisfaction of African workers, and disquiet among the white population. The best-knownBantustan,the Transkei,containing 2 million Xhosa, was allowed a limited form of self-government, with a legislativeassembly,under the Transkei Constitution A t of 1963.The A t was t ‘conferself-governmenton c c o the Bantu resident i or deriving from the Transkei’ and applies not only t n o Xhosa-speaking people living i the Transkei, but t ‘every Xhosa-speaking n o Bantu person i the Republic’,i.e. a Xhosa-speaking person who was born and n has lived continuously i Johannesburg,for example,is regarded as a Transkeian n citizen by law. The legislative assembly has 1 9 members, 64 of whom are chiefs,holding 0 o f c automatically.The appointment of the chiefs is subject t the approval of fie o the South African Government,which can also dismiss any chief after he has

South Africa


been appointed. This power has been used i the past to remove troublesome n opponents of apartheid, the most famous case being that of ex-ChiefAlbert Luthuli,i Natal. n o The assembly’s powers of legislation are limited t the following: direct taxation of Transkei citizens,public works and irrigation,municipal authorities, Bantu education,lower courts,Transkeian civil service,agriculture, sections of the police force (as the South African Minister of Justice sees fit). Matters pertaining t defence, internal security and foreign affairs are o reserved t the South African parliament.Whites resident i the Transkei remain o n citizens of South Africa, and the Transkeian Government has no power over them. In addition,the South African parliament can a any tm overrule any law t ie passed by the Transkeian assembly. The chief minister of the Transkei is Chief Kaizer Matanzima,leader of the Transkei National Independence Party. In April 1970,he demanded that the South Africans hand over t the Transkei certain areas a present under white o t occupation. This was coupled with a demand that al portfolios other than l defence should be handed over to h s government,and that white c v l servants i ii should be phased out more rapidly.A spokesman for the South African Government was reported i the D i y Telegraph (15 April 1971) as saying: ‘Such n al remarks by the Chief Minister are typical of statements meant for internal consumption.’It is certainly true that Matanzima has made similarly militant demands for land on a regular basis over a period of some years,and persistent refusalsby the South African Government t grant them have not resulted i any o n diminution of his enthusiasm for apartheid. The Transkei has i many respects been the ‘model’ Bantustan developn for ment. It was cited by South Africa before the InternationalCourt of Justice as evidence of what the continuance of the mandate for South West Africa (Namibia) would mean,and Orambo chiefs were brought to see and admire. The Transkei. however,has been i a state of emergency (declared by the n South African Government) since 1960,and nearly 1,000Africans have been detained without t i l under Proclamation400. Johannesburg Sundaj. Times ra The stated (1 March 1 7 ) that malnutrition had increased by 600 per cent over the 90 previous three years, and that every f f h Transkeian had tuberculosis; the it government had bought two hotels for Africans for &82,000,and both w r ee empty,presumably because no Africans could afford to stay i them. n it was estimated that, properly farmed, the Transkei area could produce 50 million bags of maize a year.In fact,only 1.25million bags were produced i n 1970,insufficient even for local needs,and over twice as much again had to be imported. The largest of the projected Bantustans is Zulustan,or K w a Zulu,i Natal, n which could potentially support 3.5 million Zulus. Unlike the reasonably consolidated Transkei, it consists of 188 separate areas amounting t o 12,000square m l s About half the Zulus i South Africa are i the o f c a l ie. n n fiily n designated area,while the remainder live i the white areas. in June 1972,the Vorster government announced plans to consolidate the separate pieces of Zululand into ‘manageable’and ‘economically-viable’ units. The result would be a Zulustan s l t into f v pieces, each isolated from the pi ie

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


others. Except for a tiny s r p of shore south of the new white harbour a ti t Richards Bay K w a Zulu wl have no access t the sea between the white c t of il o iy 0 n a Durban and Sardenha Bay,2 0 miles away i its f r northern corner.The Zulus are also excluded from the coastal area between Sardenha and the Mozambique border,which is a game park. s The chief executive of the K w a Zulu Territorial Authority i Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who has campaigned for a f i e share of South Africa’stotal assets for arr K w a Zulu and who has become a leading spokesman for a federation of black States.This idea has been widely canvassed by Bantustan spokesmen.Some white groups have supported it i the South African press-also some members of the n United Party,although their idea would not seem t be quite the same as Chief o Buthelezi’s. The idea of a South African federation is not new. It reappears over the years,and has even been supported by some members of the Nationalist Party. One version is a federation including Lesotho and Botswana (now independent States) and Namibia.Some believe that t i would amount t legitimizing South hs o African economic dominance of the area, and would leave the problem of the imbalance ofland division intact.It has the attraction for some Bantustan leaders that it might provide a solution for the present fragmentation of African areas. Moreover, although Bantustan leaders are appointed by the South African Government,they cannot ignore the African desire for unity,the black nationalim that started i the 1970s,and the general unrest which erupted i strikes. s n n The liberation movements oppose the Bantustan scheme,since they regard South Africa as a single entity. However, some of their members see i the n reactions of ‘homeland’ leaders t the ideal of African unity a resurgence of o African nationalism despite the lmt imposed on it by the present political iis raiis elte. The South African economy depends on black labour.The Bantustan system was never intended t remove African labour from white-owned industry. It o rather reinforces the continuanceof native reserves. As the African population is confined t a subsistence economy, inadequate for its support,its able-bodied o men have t come t ‘white’ o o areas for jobs and enter a cash economy. Industrialization i South Africa as elsewhere forces people t leave the n o countryside for the towns.This has affected both whites and blacks.A n increasing number of Africans have l s their rural ties. The Bantustan policy attempts ot to s e the movement of Africans out of the ‘homelands’without however tm compromising the supply of cheap African labour needed to maintain economic development. The policy is contested by some supporters of an ideal apartheid who consider t i compromise with economic forces immoral.It is also contested by hs manufacturers hampered by the multiplicity of regulations governing African labour,and the restriction of a potentially important African consumer market. Poverty is growing i Bantustan areas as the already overcrowded land is n made to support more and more people. The government reply t t i is induso hs t i l decentralization or ‘borderindustries’.But t i has failed t provide more ra hs o than a handful of jobs,and unemployment is becoming a serious problem. The ‘development’aspect of separate development-whatever the encouragement given by the South African Government-has largely failed.

South Africa


The Bantustan policy raises the issue of Africans living i urban areas and n the various ‘separatedevelopment’schemes for resettlement and removal. The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development said i a general n circular i 1967: n It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident i the n European areas of the Republic,for as long as they offer their labour. As soon as they
become,for one reason or other.no longer fit f r work or superfluous i the labour market. o n they are expected to return t their country of origin or the territory of their national unit o where they fit i ethnically i they were not borii and bred i the homeland... . It must be n f n stressed here that no stoneis t be lf unturned to achieve the settlement i the homelands of o et n non-productiveBantu a present residing i the European areas. t n

The Minister of Baitu Administration and Development,C.M.Botha,made a further statement i 1969:1 n
The policy ofthe Nationalist Party is based on the very obvious truth.. . that the whites and Bantu i South Africa differ from one another so radically that they are separate nations and n there i absolutely no possibility ofconsideringany process oftheir becoming equal,and thus s no opportunities for t i should be created... . hs For the whites and for each Bantu nation separate development is the course. Bantu persons can be present i the white areas solely for their labour --not a ‘stake’ a ‘share’ n for or i the Parliament, for anything else... . Bantu individualscan be present i the white area n or n solely for their labour and i addition.. . not so that they can compete on an equal basis with n the whites. o on a basis which entails potential equality, so that when they attain that r equality. they can integrate with the whites into one entity. That is the basis and for that reason we must now state for the umpteenth t m i t i House that the basis on which w ie n h s e organize our labour policy for the Bantu and allow the Bantu into our white areas is not a basis for economic integration.. . There is a wall,a roof. and one cannot get past that.W e . state t i openly,and cannot,nor dare not, conceal it. Nor do w wish t conceal it. The hs e o Bantu cannot strive towards the top on an equal footing w t the whites i our politics, social ih n matters. labour.economy and education i white South Africa.This is our territory.and here n there are only limited opportunities of that nature for them. In their homelands there are measureless and limitless opportunities for them, and there you. M Speaker, and I. as r whites,are i our turn restricted.That i the morality of our policy. n s

Africans in urban areas
African residence i urban areas is regulated by the Bantu Abolition of Passes n and Co-ordinationof Documents A t (1952) and its Amendment No. 76 (1963), c and the Bantu Laws Amendment A t (1964)and its Amendment No.7 (1973). c Africans may remain i urban areas only under very strict regulation, and n even then they may not remain i white residential areas after curfew. n According t the 1964A t Africans may be ‘endorsedout’of urban districts o c (a)if the minister has decided that the number of Africans i the area concerned n exceeds its reasonable labour requirements; (b) if the African concerned comes o from an area from which the minister has decided no more labour is t be recruited i the white area concerned;(c) i the African is deemed to be ‘idle’or n f o n ‘undesirable’; ifit is deemed not t be i the interests either of the employer or (d) the employed,or i the public interest,that the contract of service shall continue. n
1. Hts yf’dssetnbli~ orr Debates (Hmsard). 3 February 1969.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Wives and other dependents ofAfricans working i the white areas and who n had not resided i the area continuously previously require permission t visit n o husbands or fathers if t i visit would be longer than seventy-two hours. hs Employers are allowed t house ‘key’ o African workers and their wives together, but children must remain i the ‘homelands’.Domestic servants are t be n o recruited on a single basis, and both employer and employee must sign a il document agreeing that the service contract wl be terminated if children or dependants are introduced into the area. Unauthorized whites may not visit an African area without permission. The Natives (UrbanAreas) A t No.25 of 1945 as amended provides that al Africans c l i an urban area, unless exempted,shall live i a location,African village or n n hostel. The 1963 Amendment expands this, making any unemployed African n n l a l t be required t live i a location-and not necessarily i the urban area ibe o o concerned,or t take up residence i a reserve(‘homeland’) there is no place for o n if him within the location. African residence i urban areas, therefore, is doubly restricted ( ) as t n a o permission t reside a al and (b) as t where they may reside. o t l o a l ‘Resettlement’for Africans i urban areas involves:( ) the clearance of al n the smallerAfrican residentialareas,or ‘blackspots’from within the white areas; ( ) the reduction of the numbers of Africans living i ‘white’ b n urban areas. In 1969 the government claimed that there were nearly 4 million ‘superf u u ’Africans left i the urban areas.Speaking i parliament i March 1973, los n n n the Minister of Bantu Administrationgave the number ofAfricans removed from white areas as follows: April 1968 t March 1969, 62,459;April 1969 t o o o o March 1970, 66,683; April 1970 t March 1971, 57,957; April 1971 t March 1972,45,397; total of 232,496. a In 1972 there w r over seventy ‘resettlement’ ee camps and villages. They are sealed off from unauthorized entry and facts about them are hard to obtain. However,some have received publicity, and the names of many of the ‘resettlement’ camps-Limehill, Stinkwater, Dimbaza, Schmidt’s Drift, Weenen, Kuruman,Marsgat-became symbols of apartheid throughout the world, as the story of the movement of whole populationsbegan t be told.One priest,Father o Cosmas Desmond,who published an account of a journey of inquiry into such camps throughout the country,was banned and placed under twenty-four-hour house arrest t prevent him from further activity. o The rations provided a Dimbaza for indigent African women are inadet quate both i quantity and quality according t nutrition experts (Rand D i y n o al Mai/, March 1973). The monthly ration consists of: maize meal, 20 lbs; 20 mealies,8 lbs;beans,5 lbs;margarine, 1 lb;skim milk,2 lbs;salt, Yz lb. The diet,weak i calcium and vitamins, leads t deficiency diseases such as n o scurvy,anaemia and pellagra. Visitors t the camps reported that water was scarce and polluted,that there o had been deaths from gastro-enteritis(particularly among children), and that a t Limehill there had been an outbreak of typhoid.Lavatory and washing f c l t e aiiis w r poor.Limehill and Dimbazaare far from any work areas and,with the men ee away looking for work,‘resettlement’ t be done by the womenfolk.Employhas o ment was scarce,and with the shortage of water even subsistence farming was dfiut ifcl.

South Africa


The Bantu Affairs Administration A t No. 45 (1 9 1 completed the c 7) separation of African from other urban areas. A Bantu Affairs Administration Area could be declared i any area outside the ‘homelands’. n Boundaries could be changed by the Minister of Bantu Administration.The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards would administer the Bantu Affairs Administration Area. The minister ‘makes the appointments to these boards, decides the number of members and the duration of appointment,and may remove any member deemed guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty. A board resembles a local authority except that (a) members arc not elected but appointed so that the board lacks the relative independence of a local o authority,and (b) the board is empowered t acquire,develop or dispose of land for African occupation and is responsible for the allocation of labour (hence, certain of its members t be appointed have a specialized knowledge of the o African labour required for agriculture,commerce or industry). To the end of 1973,twenty-two boards had been appointed, i the Cape, n Natal,East Rand,West Rand (including Johannesburg), Transvaal and the Free State. One consequential effect was that Johannesburg City Council was no longer allowed t subsidize certain expenditure on Africans. since the boards are o required t be ‘self-supporting’. o Administrationis furthercomplicatedby the existence ofBantu councils.The o n major problem is jurisdiction.According t the government,Africans i urban areas legally belong t their respective ‘homelands’.e it is obvious that a l a t o Yt t es o some ofthem are there t stay,and that there must be some sort of local government i the area.Apartheid,with its centralized control of non-whitecommunin ties, cuts across the strong provincial tradition of white South Africa. The t government has attempted t curtail t i by setting up the boards, while a the o hs same t m allowing the councils t deal with the relatively unimportant sections ie o of local affairs.The councils may or may not be f l y elected,and are allowed t ul o have limited funds.The boards have jurisdiction over both urban and rural areas, the councils arc confined t urban areas.Boards also group together many local o authorities. In spite of controls,i s i e of removals,Africans remain i white areas n pt n where they are needed t work, and continue to increase:i 1936 a total of o n i i n 1,245,682;n 1946,1,856,029;n 1951,2,328,534;n 1960,3,192,130;i 1970, i 4,989,371( h s figure may include ‘dormitory’ ti towns i ‘homelands’ n servicing industry i white areas). n From 1936 t 1960 the percentage of the population urbanized rose from 68 o o t 80 among whites and from 18 t 29 among Africans. By 1970 approximately o 6.9million Africans (46 per cent) were living i the ‘homelands’, million (53.5 n 8 per cent)i white areas. n

The Group Areas A t (1950) provided that each racial group should live i c n 6) specifically demarcated areas. Proclamation 255 (1 9 0 excluded blacks from ‘ h t cinemas, wie ’ places ofrefreshment, seated accommodationor clubs.Proclama-

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


tion R.26 (1965)specified ‘anyplace of entertainment’.Amendment No. 56 of 1965 placed African areas under the control the the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, the Minister of Community Development being responsible for al other areas. l Amendment No. 83 (1972) of the Group Areas Amendment A t (1950) c extended urban administrativeseparationto Coloured and Indian areas,under the control ofministers of Coloured a f i s and of Indian affairs who are responsible far for establishing local government bodies i their respective areas. Coloureds i n n the Cape Province l s their municipal vote i the formerly common voters list. ot n Coloured and Indian group areas i towns are governed by ( ) consultative n a committees,nominated by the administrator of the province or (b) management or local a f i s committees (made up of both nominated and elected members). far There are two f l y elected Indian town boards,but elsewhere boards are partly ul nominated.

In February 1971,the Minister of Community Development notified that the o n following numbers of families were disqualified t remain i areas where they c ti lived under the terms ofthe Group Areas A t ( h s does not include Africans who are disqualified under other legislation): Coloured families, 70,889; Indian, 38,180;white, 1,578;Chinese,933;a total of 111,580families.The numbers of c n familiesresettled since the original A t passed i 1950 are as follows:Coloured, 37,606;Indian,24,388;white, 1,246;Chinese, 64-a total of 63,314 families. During the year 1972 alone 4,097 Coloured families,1,400 Indian families, 80 white familiesand 3 Chinese w r moved. ee Those ‘resettled’are faced with acute housing problems. Removals also affect employment,shopkeepers for example,having their livelihood completely disrupted. Each designation of an urban group area intensifies the already serious housing problem ; Coloureds,for example,are mainly squatters i certain urban n areas.

The nationalist government has introduced an ever-growingnumber of laws it claims t be necessary t preserve security.Many of these replace the rule of law o o by ministerial decree. They have increased the severity of penal measures, sentencing and the treatment ofsuspectsand prisoners by police and prison s a f tf. The primary purpose of the first of these A t ,the Suppression of Commucs c o nism A t (1950),was t give the government various administrative powers for banning organizations and people.The Minister of Justice simply decides that a person or an organization is communist,and bans. The Communist Party,the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Defence and Aid Fund (whose purpose was to supply l g l ea

South Africa


advice for prisoners and help maintain their dependants) are among those banned o under the Act.Once an organization is banned,it becomes an offence t further is aims,and prison sentencesof three years are common f r this offence. t o A person banned under the Act is usually: (a) restricted t a particular o magisterial district;(b)forced t reportt the police a fixed times;() prohibited o o t c from attending a gathering with a common purpose,whether political, educational,or social. o Banned persons have been convicted f r such offences as playing bridge, chaperoning a daughter a a New Year’s Eve party,s t i g i a kitchen while a t itn n party proceeded i the living room,attending a barbecue with two friends. n N o one may quote or publish anything which a banned person has ever said or written. Banning orders are usually imposed for a period off v years. ie The number banned a any given date averages 200;frequently bans are ret imposed when they expire,or people are served with s r c banning orders on tit their release from j i and so effectively prevented from returning to normal life. al Whites who have been banned include Father Cosmas Desmond,who wrote i The Disccirded People about conditions i the ‘resettlement’areas; the ban n n prevents the book from being quoted anywhere i South Africa. However,most n of those under banning orders are Africans. House arrest is frequently added.In 1 7 a number ofex-politicalprisoners i the eastern Cape w r not allowed back 91 n ee t their former homes i Port Elizabeth,but forced t l v i ‘resettlement’ o n o ie n areas. As wl as being used to shut people up after they have served prison el sentences,banning orders are also used t anticipate future actions that may o embarrass the government. There is no right of appeal against bans, and the minister is not obliged to give reasons. People can thus be punished a wl t il without having committed any offence. The GeneralLaws Amendment (Sabotage) ( Act 1962) l i down a minimum ad of f v years and a maximum of death for sabotage. ie The definition of sabotage is extremely wide;a person is deemed guilty of sabotage i ,i contravention of any f n law, he enters or is upon land or building.The onus is then on him t prove o o himself innocent of any intent t commit sabotage,i.e. to prove that he is innocent. The Sabotage Act incorporated the principle of indefinite imprisonment without t i l into South African law. Section 17 empowered any senior police ra officer to arrest without warrant any person suspected of having information about offences of a political nature; and t detain him for interrogation i o n solitary confinement for periods of up to ninety days.The courts interpreted this as meaning that the police could hold prisoners for successive periods of ninety days ad i l r i u . r~itm Altogether over 1 0 0 , 0 people were detained under the ninety-daylaw before it was suspended i 1965. n T e I SO-day law was introduced under the Criminal Procedure (Amendh ment) Act (1965): the attorney-general,acting on the advice of the police, can order the detention i solitary confinement of persons who, i his opinion,were n n likely t give material evidence i certain kinds of t i l . especially those of a o n ras political character.During the first three years the law was i operation (1965n 6 ) 388 people w r detained (statementsby the Minister of Justice). 7, ee

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The most commonly used instrumentfor indefinite detention now appears to be the Terrorism A t (1967). This empowers a senior police officer t order the c o indefinitedetention i solitary confinement of any person suspected ofhaving any n information about terrorism.Neither lawyers nor next-of-kinneed be informed about any person s detained ; accordingly,no reliable figures of numbers of such o detainees are available. The A t is used both to detain suspects without t i l for long periods and t c ra o Joseph convict them for ‘terrorist’ offences.A typical case is that of 68-year-old Tshukudu Maleka,who was charged i 1972 with having been connected with n members of the African Peoples Democratic Union of South Africa (who w r ee also tried, separately, and convicted, of offences under the Terrorism A t . c) Maleka was originally detained on 1 February 1970 and kept i custody for 1 0 9 n 1 days before being released;he was re-arrestedon 7 May 1 7 and detained for 91 e l ad forty-onedays before being charged.H was acquitted of al charges l i against ie n al him,by which t m he had been i j i for a total of 440days. Terrorism is defined under the A t so as t include any act calculated t c o o o embarrass the administration.The onus is shifted to the accused t prove his innocencei certain important respects.As with the Sabotage A t the minimum n c, c sentence is five years and the maximum is death. The Terrorism A t was made retroactivet 1962, o thus providing the death penalty for offences which w r not ee ie capital offences a the t m when they were committed. t Because no names of those detained on suspicion are given,it is impossible t t l what proportion of those arrested are eventually convicted. O n o el 1 January 1972 a total of 463 persons were serving sentences under the four main 2: security laws (see Table 1)
TABLE Persons serving sentences 12.
Africans Asians Coloureds Whites

Sabotage Act Suppression of Communism Act Unlawful Organization Act Terrorism Act


248 23 109 50 430

13 1

9 1


1 0


5 4

1 4

Source: House o Assembly Debates. (HansardJ, f Cape Town,South African House of Assembly


The average daily prison population i recent years was as follows: 73,030i n n 196fX7;80,534i 1967-68; 88,079i 196849;90,555 i 1969-70,and 91,108 n n n in 1970-71. The l s figure is made up of71,190 at Africans,16,238Coloureds,3,217whites and 463 Asians. In 1972 M Justice Hiemstra pointed out that the prison r population had increased by 76 per cent over the past ten years, whereas the

South Africa


general increase i population is 24 per cent. Many prisoners are short-term, n mainly for offences under the pass laws and non-paymentof fines. Both prisoners and warders are segregated.Different diets are provided,for example whites get more meat than Africans. Conditions of work, recreation, study,privacy and rest are much better for white than for black prisoners. (maximum security), Political prisoners are automatically c a s f e ‘D’ lsiid irrespectiveofprevious history or character,and have fewer privileges than most o ordinary criminals.Remission of sentence of up t one-thirdcan be earned for good behaviour but t i does not apply t p l t c l prisoners. hs o oiia

Detainees are held a the absolute discretion of the security police. They are t allowed no visits, letters,or access t the outside world. The 180-day detainees o must be visited by a magistrate once a week; Terrorism A t detainees once a c rtczd fortnight ‘ifcircumstancespermit’.The visiting magistrates have been c i i i e as ‘unobservant’n the South African House of Assembly. i Allegations of torture are commonplace. These allegations-made by persons accused and by witnesses-are detailed and consistent, and describe treatment ranging from electric shock torture t the driving of nails through the o penis.The allegations are denied by the security police,who publicly claim that they treat detainees w l , e l even becoming very friendly with them.

By the end of 1966,o f c a figuresgave the numbers of prisoners convicted under fiil the main security laws as r s n t a peak of 1,825.By the end of 1967,after the iig o o i o i n o passing ofthe Terrorism Act,this was down t 1,335;n 1968 t 1,019; 1970 t 809;i 1972 to 464. n Prisoners are held i three main prisons : Robben Island (black men), Pretoria n Local ( h t men) and Barberton (black women). There are no longer any white wie women i prison.Namibian prisoners are also held on Robben Island.Political n prisoners are treated l k common law prisoners,but with certain additions (see ie below). The 1959 Prisons Act,prohibiting the publication of f l e information as concerning prisons or prisoners,had the effect of a ban on the publication of any informationwhatsoever.The governmenthas refused t hold any public inquiries o into prison conditions. In 1965 the Raid D i v Mail published a series of interviews with Harold al Strachan,a released p l t c l prisoner.Strachan told a story of sadistic warders, oiia filth,obscenity and brutality, African prisoners ‘herded l k animals’,of govie ernment by caprice and the flouting of regulations by prison authorities.The State subsequently l i charges against Strachan, the journalists and the ad newspaper,but the disclosures had,i the words of a recently released political n prisoner,‘brokenopen the whole system’.Several improvements i the physical n conditionsof the prisoners (notonly politicals)followed.Outside concern led,for instance,t the building of a new section i Pretoria for white politicals, with o n better living quarters and a workshop.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


In 1969,the Minister of Prisons said no workshop would be established on o Robben Island :black prisoners could continue t break rocks and collect sand and seaweed. In 1973,black politicals presented a petition t the Commanding Officer of o Robben Island. Complaints included : harassment and assaults by certain warders ; denial of library, recreational and study f c l t e ; insufficient and aiiis unpalatable food ; dangerously casual and unhygienic medical attention; prisoners given contradictory instructions,governed by caprice,not informed of t es their rights. A l a t one of the prisoners connected with the petition was punished and given s x months’ solitary confinement. M Justice Diemont i r declared i Cape Town that the punishment was i l g l and he ordered that n lea, prisoners be given copies of the Prison Regulations on request,but he also ruled that access to library and recreation facilides,and permission to pursue courses of study,were not rights but privileges granted a the discretion of the prison t authorities.


Barberton Prison was largely ignored i the publicity that brought about some n reforms for the men.It is a harsh punitive prison i a very hot part of the country. n The longest available walk is the ten yards to the matron’s office.There are no recreational f c l t e whatever and the women are not even allowed to look out aiiis of their cell windows.Their work consists of washing and cleaning.



Officials deny that there are ‘politicalprisoners’i South Africa and say that no n prisoners are discriminated against.But the treatment of the political prisoners clearly differs from that of common law prisoners i a number of important n aspects,as follows: 1. No remission,amnesty or parole.This means,for example,that a man with a l f sentence faces the prospect of never leaving prison. ie 2. No news,radio or newspapers,by order of the security police. Additional tensionsare created by thecensorshipofoflettersand the monitoring ofvisits. 3. No remuneration for work. o 4. The grading of prisoners,and privileges,into categoriesA t D is used as a weapon against politicals, who invariably begin i Grade D and find n e e ntal ‘promotion’ and d f i u t (Grade D prisoners w r i i i l y allowed one slow ifcl. half-hour visit and one 500-word letter every s x months. They are now i etr allowed a letter a month. Category A prisoners are allowed three l t e s and two half-hourvisits a month.) 5. The arbitrary withdrawal of other privileges, such as library and study f c l t e , is used t ensure ‘good behaviour’ and as a means of exerting aiiis o psychological pressure. 6. Regulations for politicals are ultra-strict.

South Africa



Sincedetention without t i l was first introduced i 1963, fewer than nineteen ra n no detaineesare known to have lost their l v s while i the hands of interrogators.It ie n has been o f c a l admitted that twenty-two persons have died i detention, fiily n causes being given as ‘suicide’(eleven), ‘natural causes’ ( h e ) ‘thrombosis’ tre, (one), ‘broncho-pneumonia followingminor head injury’(one), ‘slippedon soap’ (one), ‘accidentalf l down stairs’(one),‘unknown’ al (one).In addition t these, o forty persons,excluding those detained the Minister ofJusticestated that i 1972, n n under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act,had died while i detention. The following are four cases of detainees who died while under interrogation. Suiiman Salojee died after falling seven floors from the security police headquarters i Johannesburg on 9 September 1964, two months after h s n i detention. A security policeman, who refused to answer some of the defence questions,denied that Salojee had been assaulted. The magistrate found that Salojee died ofmultiple injuriesafter a f l during interrogation.He could not say al whether Salojee committed suicide or was trying t escape but said there was o nothing i the evidence to suggest assault or other irregularities. n James Lenkoe,aged 35,a Lesotho railway worker,was found hanging by a b l from the window of h s prison c l on 1 March 1969,five days after he had et i el 0 n i been detained.Traces ofcopper were found i a wound on h s toe.Four pathologists,one of them from the United States,said that the wound could have been caused by an e e t i burn. Security police witnesses denied that detainees were lcrc given electric shock treatment. The coroner found that the apparent cause of o death was suicide by hanging,that no one was t blame, and that the allegation that electric shock treatment contributed t h s death was not proved. o i Imam Abdullah Haron,a prominent Moslem leader and newspaper editor i n Cape Town,died i custody on 27 September 1969 after four months i detenn n at tion.Security police evidence was that the Imam slipped and fell down the l s f w steps of a flight of s a r after interrogation on 1 September.H did not e tis 9 e appear to have been hurt,they said. and they denied any knowledge of assaults on him. But according t the post-mortem report, he had twenty-six separate o bruises on h s body,a blood swelling on h s back and a fractured rib.A patholoi i g s who made the report a the inquest said some of the bruises were older than it t others,and could not al have been caused by the f l .The magistrate found that l al the Imam died as a result of i i u i s partly caused by an accidental f l down a ijre al f i h of steps.He could not say how the other injuries were caused. lgt Ahmed Timol was detained under the indefinite detention clause of the Terrorism A t on 22 October 1971.O n 27 October,while undergoing interrogac tion a security police headquarters i Johannesburg, he plunged to h s death t n i from the tenth floor. The police claimed that he had committed suicide by jumping out of the window,and that the police sergeant who saw him jump could not prevent him because there was a chair i h s way. n i According t medical evidence, Timol received injuries four to s x days o i before h s death.These consisted ofcircular bruises on the upper arms.The State i pathologist conceded that these w r ‘possibly the result of numerous blows’. ee Counsel for the dead man’sfamily suggested that the injurieswere consistent with

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


a man’s being kicked while lying on the floor, having put up h s arms for i protection. The pathologist agreed that t i could have been the case,‘butI do hs not say it did happen’.Counsel pointed out that other injuries,even serious ones, nlce would not show if they were i f i t d just before death. Timol’s mother gave evidence (unchallenged by the police) that her son was unhurt when he was first detained. N o police evidence was called that the injuries referred t were o sustained before arrest,for example i a fight.The magistrate returned a verdict n of suicide.


From opposition to resistance

African p l t c l activity dates from the l t e part of the nineteenth century. It oiia atr was centred mainly i Cape Colony where the disabilities of Africans were not n o too great and they could hope eventually t get the vote,even t a limited extent. o The first African p l t c l organization, Lubumba Yama Afrika, believed oiia that African unity offered the only hope of countering the continuing neglect of African interests by al white parties. l In 1884 John Tengo Jabavu, wt white financial support, started hnvo ih Zabantsztndu (African Opinion). In 1887 he organized opposition t the Paro liamentary Voters Registration B l ,which denied t i a Africans the vote by its il rbl definition of the franchise.In 1889 Jabavu and others combated proposals t o extend pass regulations. In 1894 h s newspaper opposed the Glen Grey A t i c (which foreshadowed later South African ‘separate’ egislation). Most of the new l n o Christian-educatedAfrican elite involved i these protests were wholly loyal t the Crown,and believed i the gradual evolution of a multiracial South African n State. Some Ethiopian sects,though not ostensibly political,were of some political importance.These were exclusively black Christian sects, heavily influenced by the Methodist Episcopalians i the United States.Unlike Jabavu and his friends, n ee the Ethiopians w r sceptical about white help and argued that Africans could progress only if they worked through exclusively African organizations and resolutely refused white civilization. These two trends4o-operation with sympatheticwhites or total rejection of white assistance--constantlyrecur i the history of South African resistance and n can to-existi the same organization. n Black South Africans were,of course,aware of black movements elsewhere; those studying i the United States,for example,were much impressed by Booker n T.Washington and W.E.B. u Bois. Black South African protest was heavily D influenced by post-warevents i the rest ofAfrica.They had protested against the n invasion ofEthiopia by Italian troops;they immediately saw what fascism had i n common w t settler rule i South Africa;they w r profoundly affected by the ih n ee implications of the Declaration of Human Rights;and they influenced and were influenced by the demands for freedom and independence elsewhere on the

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


continent.But the 1948 election victory of the Nationalist Party was the white response t the intensified demand of al Africans for f l political participation. o l ul Prior t 1948,African protest had achieved little. Africans i the Transkei o n had objected t the terms of the original Union.Africans and Coloureds went t o o c London t plead for the removal of the colour bar i the South Africa A t which o n followed the Boer war and was to establish the Union. They w r ignored;the ee c n British parliament proceeded with the A t i spite of African protests. Protests were made against the terms of the Native Affairs Bl (1920) and the Native il c n atr o Lands A t (1913)(with petitions i the l t e case to King George V,and t the parliament and people of Great Britain). A curiousdocument,Native L f i South Africa, by Solomont Plaatje (1916) ien stated :
In every crisis of the past four years... the native leaders have taken upon themselves the thankless and expensive task of restraining the natives from resorting t violence o

which would seem t indicate that the leadersi question w r ‘moderates’. o n ee ee o Protests w r not restricted t South Africa. The South African Native n National Congress petitioned King George V i 1928 on the subject of the German colonies.They asked that the territoriesi Africa n
should not be disposed of or their future destiny determined without the wishes of the inhabitantsbeing known.. . That both German South West and German South East Africa . should never be handed t the Union Government of South Africa unless its system of rule o be radically altered s as to dispel colour prejudice. o

They suggested that control should pass t the United States. o Opposition t apartheid was also influenced by happenings elsewhereo Mahatma Gandhi’stheoriesofnon-violence, example,influenced the African for National Congress for a long t m , the United Nations lent weight t appeals i e and o t the internationalcommunity. o A t r its election.victoryi 1948,the Nationalist Party began to implement fe n apartheid through parliament. Disturbances became more widespread as the Africans saw new laws being enacted against them.In the Witzieshoek Reserve, near Basutoland (now Botswana) land hunger and c t l laws had been the basis ate for unrest since 1947.When the police intervened during the investigations of a commission of inquiry i November 1950, shots w r f r d a a crowd of n e e ie t 600Africans,and sixteen were k l e and forty wounded. ild Within the African National Congress (ANC)the Youth League was ie demanding more action ; it felt that the t m for resolutions, conferences and t 99 delegations was over.A the 1 4 conference the new executive was charged with the vigorous execution of the Youth League’s programme of action,involving a total boycott of elections and ‘strikes, disobedience,non-co-operation’. civil Protest first centred around the introduction of the Suppression of Commuc, al nism A t with a c l from ANC,Indian and trade union leaders for a one-day stoppaget coincide with the internationalcelebration of May Day 1950.Despite o a government ban on demonstrations and meetings, and the presence of 2,000police i the Johannesburg area,more than half the African workers stayed n a home,and many people attended meetings.The police broke up al gatherings. t l

s 2


.. i

Segregation in South Africa

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


In the various skirmishes,eighteen people were killed and thirty (including three ee children) w r injured. Common sorrow brought the African and Indian congresses more closely together,and a co-ordinationcommittee formed on 1 June called for a national 4 day ofprotest and mourning on Monday,2 June 1950.Thousands ofAfricans i 6 n Johannesburg stopped work, and the Indians closed their shops. In Port Elizabeth al cargo work was halted, businesses, shops, hotels, restaurants, l garages and even hospitals were closed.Ever since,26 June has been commemorated,i South Africa and internationally, South Africa Freedom Day. n as

Defiance of Unjust L a w s Campaign
O n 21 January 1952the African National Congress sent a letter t D Malan,the o r prime minister,demanding the repeal of the main repressive legislation.I l s e t itd the following: the Pass Laws, Group Areas Act, Suppression of Communism Act, Separate Representation of Voters Act, Bantu Authorities Act, Stock f Limitation Regulations.The letter announced that i these lawswere not repealed by 2 February 1952,a mass protest would be held on 6 April 1952-van R e 9 ibeeck Day (celebrating the 300th anniversary of white ruletand country-wide passive resistance. O n 6 April a vast crowd i Johannesburg heard Moroka,ANC president, n and Dadoo of the Indian National Congress, c l for 1 , 0 volunteers. ‘The al 000 demonstration remained peaceful throughout. Over the next f w weeks Nelson Mandela was appointed volunteer-in-chief. e The volunteers were carefully chosen, accepting the following formula: ‘ W e solemnly pledge that w shall exert al our moral,physical and financial effort t e l o obtain our objective-the freedom of the oppressed people of South Africa.’ They w r to offer themselves for arrest, refuse b i and opt t serve prison ee al o sentences. O n 26 June 1952 a group of Africans walked through the ‘EuropeansOnly’ entrance t the railway station i New Brighton township. They w r arrested o n ee and given j i sentences of f f e n t thirty days. The Defiance of Unjust Laws al ite o Campaign had begun. In the Transvaal,Nana Sita and a group of forty-two Africans and ten n Indianswalked on to a location without permits.A n ANC meeting i Johannesburg dispersed a 11 p.m. t without the ‘special’ permits authorizing Africans t be o ie 0 i the town a that t m ;1 6 arrests were made. n t c Leaders recently’banned under the Suppression of Communism A t nevertheless continued t speak a meetings. Moses Kotane was given a fouro t month j i sentence i July 1952,Njongwe, Matji and Mrs Matomela and other al n hs leadersi the eastern Cape,i September 1952,were sentenced under t i same n n A t to nine months’ hard labour,sentence suspended for three years. Moroka, c Sisulu,Mandela, Dadoo,the Cachalias,Marks and Bopape and several others w r accused of breaking their bans under the Act.For the preliminary hearing ee the court was crowded with people singing the songs which had become popular during the defiance campaign.The case was adjourned,and the news spurred hundreds more t defy. o

South Africa


During July,August and September 1952,the numbers arrested or jailed w r respectively 1,500,, 0 and 2,358.ANC membership increased as people ee 200 from al over South Africa joined the defiance campaign. l It was apparently believed that violence could stop the campaign from growing. In New Brighton on 18 October 1952 two Africans alleged t have o t stolen a pot of paint were shot a by the police. After twenty-one shots, the enraged crowd attacked the police station.Seven Africans and four whites were killed,and twenty-sevenpeople were injured.A one-daystrike called by the local ANC branch was 50 per cent observed,and thousands of African workers were dismissed by the railway authorities and the municipality. Two weeks later,a banned prayer meeting i East London was charged by n i it t the police who shot and wounded severalpeople.O n 8 November 1952, n r o s a ee Kimberley,fourteen Africans were shot dead and thirty-fivew r wounded. N o government inquiries were held into any of these events,or into a similar r o i it n the Rand. o al n In October,2,254volunteers went t j i ,and i December the first group of whites, l d by Patrick Duncan on crutches,walked into Germinston’s African e township.There were thirty-eightarrests.Lilian Ngoyi of the ANC Women’s League went into the European section of the post office i Johannesburg and n sent a telegram of protest to the Minister of Justice. New laws enacted by the government made it i l g l to defy a law as part of a lea campaign against the law,and imposed penalties of up t E300 or three years, o imprisonment with ten lashes. A the beginning of December 1952,280 more went t jail. Moroka and t o ra Sisulu,Mandela and others stood t i l and called no defence witnesses. Justice o Rumpff, i giving sentences of nine months’ hard labour, suspended f r two n years,on al twenty men,said the charge had ‘nothingt do with communism as l o it is commonly known’,and ‘1 accept the evidence that you have consistently advised your followersto follow a peaceful course of action and t avoid violence o i any shape or form.. .’. The governmentcontinued its bans :fifty-twoleaders of n the campaign were banned ; Mandela was confined to Johannesburg and Bopape to Brakpan. Despite the arrests,bans,imprisonmentsand shootings,resistance continued to grow and as apartheid policies were introduced i al aspects of l f ,protests n l ie ee people had gone to j i ,but al and campaignsw r constantly mounted.Over 8,500 confidence and self-respecti the Indian and African communities had risen n enormously. Huge numbers had become involved,and ANC leadership spearheaded the movement. Some white sympathizershad also become involved and a the end of 1952 a t t a conference called by Oliver Tambo for the ANC and Yusuf Cachalia for the Indian Congress,the Liberal Party and the white Congress of Democrats were formed.The African Peoples Organization,largely supported by Coloureds,reformed i s l as the South African Coloured People’sCongress. tef In February 1955 there were protests against removals i Sophiatown.The n Bantu Education Act of 1953led t a schoolstrike,parents keeping their children o a home i protest.In October 1955 women began a protest against the pass laws t n which continued for some years and was extended t protest against police raids o on housing i the townships and forced,unpaid labour i rural areas. n n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The Congress of the People As wl as campaigns on specific issues,a general call for action was made i the el n
mid-1950st al opposed t the policies and practices of apartheid. o l o Speaking t a r l y i the Cape early i 1953, Professor Z. Matthews o al n n K. suggested that a ‘nationalconvention representing al the people of t i country, l hs irrespective of race or colour’should be called,‘todraw up a freedom charter for the democratic South Africa ofthe future’. This idea was adopted by the ANC i n December 1953,and a Congress of the People was called for 25-26 June 1955. In alliance with the Indian Congress,the (white) Congress of Democrats,the Coloured People’sCongress and the multiracial Congress ofTrade Unions,ANC issued invitations t various parties and organizations (including the United o Party,and the English-speakingopposition i parliament whose general policy n was i favour of apartheid). n Circulars were sent out months beforehand t cities, villages, kraals and o locations throughout the country.They asked : ‘Ifyou could make the laws.. . what would you do? H o w would you set about making South Africa a happy n place for al the people who live i it?’ l On 25 June 1955, on a small patch of land i Kliptown, a village near n Johannesburg,some 3,000delegates assembled for the Congress of the People; 2,000Africans plus 200 t 3 0 each of Indians,Coloureds and whites. Banners o 0 ieie, carried slogans:‘FreedomIn Our L f t m ’‘LongLive The Struggle’.Watched by the SpecialBranch,the congress listened as the Freedom Charter drawn up by the National Action Council was read i English,Sesotho and Xhosa.The crowd n approved each section with a loud ‘Afrika!Mayibuye!’ Messages came from countries al over the world,and from the leaders of the congress alliance,nearly l al of whom were absent because of banning orders. l The Charter was adopted :
W the People of South Africa declare for our country and the world to know: that South e
Africa belongs to a l w h o live i it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim l n il l authority unless it is based on the wl of a l the People.

It demanded :
The People shall govern.

Al national groups shall have equal rights. l
The People shall share in the country’s wealth. The land shall be shared among those who work it. A l shall be equal before the law. l Al shall enjoy equal human rights. l There shall be work and security. The doors of learning and culture shall be opened. There shall be houses, security and comfort. There shall be peace and friendship.

O n the Sunday afternoon 2 June 1955 armed police marched in,took the names 6 and addresses of al the delegates,and removed al papers and documents. l l The following September, a co-ordinated raid was made a dawn on t 4 0 homes throughout the country :again papers and documents were removed. 0

Coloured carnival i Cape Town. n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


And a sunrise on 5 December 1956, 156 arrests were made. The arrests included t the leaders of the movement,and many of its main supporters,black and white, African, Indian and Coloured. They were accused of being members of a conspiracy to overthrow the South African State by violence.Ironically enough, the leaders could speak t each other i jail;outside they could not because of o n banning orders.

The ‘treason trial’
The preparatory examinations before the ‘treason t i l ,as it became known, ra’ lasted nearly a year. O n the first day, 19 December 1956,crowds gathered from 5 a.m.,and the vans bringing the prisoners were driven through the singing crowds. O n the second day the crowd was even bigger. From inside the court shots were heard : the police had baton-charged the throng, and twenty-two people were taken t hospital. o The case was centred on ANC policy between 1952 and 1956.The Freedom Charter was the key document produced by the prosecution;others w r seized ee during the Congress of the People,and i some thousand police raids meanwhile. n The defence objected t the idea that the charter was treasonable,and declared o ee ra that it was not 156 individuals who w r on t i l ‘but the ideas that they and thousands of others i our land have openly espoused and expressed’.The chief n prosecution witness,said by the police t be a lawyer,was shown to have no legal o qualifications,and to have served four prison sentences for forgery and fraud. By the t m the main t i l opened i Johannesburg on 1 1 August 1958,the ie ra n charges had been withdrawn against Luthuli, Tambo and fifty-nine others; ninety-onepeople went to t i l on the main charge of high treason with alternara tive charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. . The t i l dragged on until 29 March 1961. Charges against sixty-oneof the ra defendants were quashed i April 1959.The remaining thirty were finally found n not guilty and told :‘Youmay go’--overfour years after they had been arrested. Meanwhile,the struggle against apartheid continued.In mid-1957, from the D l Hall, Johannesburg,where the t i l was proceeding,Luthuli called for a rl i ra stay-at-home 26 June,as a protest against apartheid,and i support of the c l on n al for a pound a day basic wage being demanded by ANC and the Congress of Trade Unions.Token demonstrationstook place al over South Africa. Support l for the strike was particularly strong i the Port Elizabeth area,and i the Rand n n there was an 80 per cent response. In Alexandria township a new rise i fares n i e people walked to and from work for four caused a bus boycott for the third t m ; months before a successful conclusion was reached.


South Africa



O n 2 March 1960, news agencies told the world of the massacre a Sharpe1 the t ville. Some 5 0 0 1 , 0 people had assembled a the police station i the ,0-000 t n African township of Sharpeville. Some were there t protest against the pass o laws,others were expecting an announcementt be made a the police station.A o t t first there w r only twelve policemen a the station,s x w i e and s x black. But ee t i ht i as the morning wore on, 3 0 armed and uniformed men arrived,together with 0 five Saracen armoured cars.Lieutenant-ColonelPienaar ordered h s men t f l i o al i and then t ‘loadf v rounds’.H e denied that any further order was given,but n o ie as Bishop Ambrose Reeves wrote i h s paper for the United Nations Unit on n i Apartheid :
Whatever doubts there may be ofthe sequence ofevents i those fatefulminutes,there can be n no argument over the devastating consequences of the action of the poke ... sixty-nine people were killed. including eight women and ten children,and that of the 180 people who were wounded thirty-onewere women and nineteen were children.According t the evidence o of medical practitioners it is clear that the police continued firing after the people began t o flee,for while thirty shots had entered the wounded or killed from the front oftheir bodies no less than 155 bullets had entered the bodies ofthe injured and killed from their backs.A l this l happened i forty seconds.during which time 705 rounds were f r d from revolvers and Sten n ie guns.

The incidentprovoked furthermass protests.A Evaton a crowd of 20,000people t was dispersed when Sabre jets and Harvard planes dived low over them,and i n 000 Langa,a crowd of 1 , 0 were given a three-minutewarning by a police officer. Few heard before sixty police baton-charged the crowd, w r stoned i return, ee n n ee and the order t fire resulted i the death of two Africans; forty-nine w r o injured. day The dead were given vast funerals,and a stay-at-home of mourning called by Chief Luthuli was observed throughout the country. But soon the frustrationbroke through again with rioting i Johannesburg and i Worcester i n n n the Cape.In Cape Town,the entire population of the African townships went on strike for a period of almost three weeks. O n 3 March a state of emergency was 0 ee declared,and thousands of people w r put under detention.Some 2,000leaders ee o more were ofthe congress movement w r detained for up t five months;20,000 arrested under another section of the Emergency Regulations, and thousands were sent t prison or work camps after secret t i l . o ras Over the previous years resistance had been hardening.The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) been formed i March 1959 as a break-awayfrom the ANC, had n and had elected Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, lecturer i Z l studies a the n uu t University of the Witwatersrand, as president. H e expressed the PAC aim as government ‘ofthe African,by the African, for the African’ for everyone who o o owed his only loyalty t Africa and was ‘preparedt accept the democratic rule of an African majority,being regarded as an African’.In a subsequent interview (Contact,3 May 1959) Sobukwe said : 0

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


W e have admitted that there are Europeans w h o are intellectual converts to the African’s cause, but because they benefit materially from the present set-up,they cannot completely identify themselves with that cause.

Indian leadership was drawn from the merchant class,he said,and ‘taintedwith the v e of national arrogance and cultural supremacy’.H wanted ‘Indians’to iw e reject this opportunist leadership and produce their own. A its annual conferencei December 1959 the ANC decided for a massive t n day ofaction against the pass laws on 31 March 1960.Sobukwe,on behalf of the PAC,announced a campaign for the abolition of the pass laws, to begin on 2 March. Sobukwe urged people t leave passes a home and surrender 1 o t e hs o themselves to the nearest police station.H stated that t i was the first step t the achievement of independence by 1963. H invited the ANC t co-operate. e o The ANC, whose plans for an anti-passday of action ten days l t r w r already ae ee o far advanced,replied that they were not prepared t support ‘sensationalactions that might not succeed’.

Opposition goes underground
Governmental action following the Sharpeville shootings forced the opposition movements t re-thinktheir tactics. o O n 8 April 1960,ANC and PAC w r declared ‘unlawfulorganizations’. ee c Under the Suppression ofCommunism A t the penalty for furthering the aims of an unlawful organization was imprisonment for up t ten years. O n 25 August o the Rand Daily M i declared that the ANC and PAC leadership had ‘withered al away’. However, on 31 August, the people detained under the Emergency Regulations after Sharpeville were released, and within two weeks an ANC caretaker committee had formed cells to continue their work underground.Only ten days l t r UHURU slogans (the freedom slogan of East Africa) were daubed ae throughout the country and l a l t attacking the pass laws were distributed. efes o al o The l s legal act of the ANC had been t c l for a national convention t at lay the foundationsof a new Union of South Africa. The c l was renewed by al Mandela when he addressed the ‘ l i Africa’ Conference i Pietermaritzburg A ln n i March 1 6 . n 91 The c l was taken up by a multiracial group representing liberal,religious al and academic opinion. The government replied by mobilizing police, army, commandos and citizen forces and Saracen armoured cars.White people were sworn i to be specialconstables,gun shops sold out t whites,and thousands of n o Africans were arrested.But Mandela had gone underground and eluded capture. H continued to work,organizing,touring,calling for the convention.H wrote e e r o t prime minister D Verwoerd, and t D e Villiers Graaff, the leader of the o United Party.There w r no replies.O n 1 May 1 6 al gatherings were banned ee 9 91 l until 2 June,and on the eve of29 May strikerswere warned that they would lose 6 their jobs and be ‘endorsedout’,and that police would move into the townships and force residents t work. A night helicopters fe low over the townships, o t lw flashing searchlights on the houses. Yt on Monday 29 May 1961 hundreds of thousands of Africans responded e t the c l oftheir leaders.The Indian and Coloured communities stayed a home o al t

South Africa


as w l .In Port Elizabeth the strike was 75 per cent complete. Many schools el struck.But the naked display of strength by the government was too much, and on the second day,Mandela called the strike off. Ifpeaceful demonstrationswere t be m t with such crushing strength it was o e f t l t use peaceful methods any more-this was the end of non-violence.In uie o o June 1961 a number of African leaderscame together with whites and Indians t decide what form of counter-violenceshould be used; they wanted t sabotage o e selected installations but not harm people. Umkonto w Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) thus came into existence. O n Djigaans Day (16December 1961) ten explosions took place a electrical t installations and municipal o f c s i Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg.Posters fie n distributed by Umkonto w Sizwe declared : e
This is a new independentbody formed by Africans.It includesi its ranks South Africans of n al races.. .. Umkonto w Sizwe wl carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by l e il new methods which are necessary t complement the actions of the established national o liberation organizations.

Mandela secretly left the country t attend the Pan-AfricanFreedom Movement o Conference i Addis Ababa i 1962, and t visit African heads of State. In n n o August 1962 Mandela was captured and imprisoned for five years for inciting o t n leal. people t stay a home i May 1961 and for leaving the country i l g l y In a speech from the dock a h s t i l which restated h s belief i the struggle t i ra, i n of h s people and the necessity for armed struggle,Mandela concluded : ‘When i il o my sentence has been completed,I wl still be moved by my conscience t resist race discrimination.’ Many people were forced into exile,but the underground continued.

O n 1 1 July 1963 a Special Branch task force surrounded Lilliesleaf Farm-a house i extensive grounds i the outlying Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia. A n n detainee had broken during police interrogation and described the hideout that was being used by Walter Sisulu and others i the political underground. A t r n fe months of searching the police had their coup.Walter Sisulu,Govan Mbeki and others (some i disguise) w r arrested and 250 documents were seized,includn ee ing many relating t the manufacture of explosives and a draft memorandum o called ‘OperationMayibuye’. A month later,on 12 August 1963,four of the men arrested escaped from ht, prison.Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, both w i e escaped from South no Africa.The other two,Mosie Moolla and Abdullah Jassat,slipped quietly i t Botswana and went on t Dar es Salaam some t m later. o ie Mandela was brought from Robben Island t stand t i l with the remaining o ra eight,after they had been held for eighty-eightdays i solitary confinement while n the State prepared its case. The i i i l indictment,alleging 222 acts of sabotage by Umkonto we Sizwe, nta was quashed a the request of the defence-led by Abram Fischer,Q.C. f n l t The i a

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


indictment alleged that the accused had recruited men for training with the object of causing a violent revolution,and had committed 154 acts of sabotage. o International interest was aroused because the Rivonia Trial (as it came t be called) revealed for the first tm the extent and importance of the change ie from non-violentresistance. Mandela’s address t the court from the dock made a historic impact i o n South Africa and abroad.H traced the history of the ANC up to its ultimate e decision t turn t violence only after ‘long and anxious assessment’ of the o o political situation.By June 1961, said:‘Itcould not be denied that our policy he e to achieve a non-racial State by non-violencehad achieved nothing....’ H agreed that he had helped t form Umkonto w Sizwe,and quoted its manifesto : o e
The t m comes i the l f of any nation when there remain only two choices-submit or ie n ie fight.That t m has come to South Africa. ie

Umkonto w Sizwe had adopted the use of sabotage i order to avoid loss of life e n and had explained t i i its manifesto : hs n
W e of Umkonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and c v l clash.W e hope,even a this l t hour,that.our first actions wl awaken everyone to the ii t ae il realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy i leading.W e hope that s w wl bring the government and is supporters to their senses before it is too late,so that e il t both the governmentand its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of c v l war. ii

With a reference to the very real fear that he and the other accused might be sentenced t death,Mandela concluded h s speech with a fresh declaration of the o i confidence i his b l e s : n eif
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society i which al persons l v together i n l ie n harmony and with equal opportunities.It i an ideal which I hope to l v for and to achieve. s ie But i needs be,it i an ideal for which I a m prepared to die. f s

A t r hearing the speeches and explanations of the accused the judge gave his fe
l verdict. The crime of which he found al but one guilty was, he said,essentially high treason,but he would not impose the death sentence.Six Africans,one white man and one Indian were sentenced t life imprisonment. o The prisoners started their sentenceethe non-whites on Robben Island. As Category D prisoners they w r allowed only one letter and one half-hourvisit ee every sx months and, on the grossly inadequate food, would have to do hard i labour. As soon as the verdict was announced another spate of explosions damaged post offices and pylons, and an attack was made on the walls of Johannesburg jail-sabotage, relaxed during the period of the t i l was t ra, o continue. O n 1 August 1967, 0 R. Tambo, deputy president of ANC and 9 . J. R. D. Chikerema, vice-president of the Zimbawe African People’s Union (ZAPU)announced a military alliance between the two organizations. The fighting of which they spoke heralded the new armed phase of the struggle for which the ANC had been preparing since 1960.Resistance had not been crushed.

Xhosa school i the Transkei n

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The Case of the Twenty-two
From May 1 6 t December 1970, marathon case involved twenty-twopeople 99 o a accused of offences under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism A t cs and others arrested with them,held and interrogated by the security police. This is sometimes called ‘TheCase of the Twenty-two’. Among those arrested was ie ee Winnie Mandela,wf ofNelson Mandela.Three detaineesw r released,nineteen acquitted. But acquittal is not necessarily .the end i South Africa. Winnie n Mandela,for example,was subsequently kept under house arrest.

P r Elizabeth strike ot
In March 1971 a meeting of thousands of Coloureds i Port Elizabeth protested n a threatened fare increases ofup t 30 cents on the buses which carried them the t o six mls t and from work. There also w r other grievances about housing ie o ee shortages and conditions,and wage levels. Police opened fire on the crowd and shot eleven people.One of the injured was a pregnant woman, shot through the stomach. The people of Port Elizabeth boycotted the buses, walking to and from work every day for three months i response t the fare increases. n o

Trial of the ‘Pretoria six’
In Pretoria Supreme Court on 20 June 1973 four South Africans and two white foreigners were sentenced t a total of seventy-seven years’ imprisonment for o 4, offences under the Terrorism Act. Theophilus Cholo (aged 2) Gardner Kitchener Sejaka ( 0 , Justus Mpanza (34) and Petrus Aaron Mtembu (37) were 3) each sentenced t f f e n years’ imprisonment;Alexandre Moumbaris ( 4 , a o ite 3) naturalized Australian,t twelve years;and Sean Hosey ( 3 , an Irish citizen,t o 2) o five years. The indictment contained a total ofnineteen charges,i each of which one or n more of the accused were named. A l except Hosey, were alleged t have l, o conspired with one another,with the ANC and with twenty-nineother named people t instigate violent revolution i South Africa.They were alleged t have o n o secretly agreed t bring arms,ammunition and explosives into South Africa and o t train people i South Africa i ‘warfareand subversion’. o n n In count two Theophilus Cholo, Justus Mpanza, Petrus Mtembu and o n Gardner Sejaka were alleged t have had military and political training i African countries and i the Soviet Union between 1962 and June 1972. n In countsthree t sx Alexandre Moumbaris was alleged t have harboured, o i o concealed or helped terrorists, or alternatively t have taken part i t r o i t o n errs a t v t e . H was said t have assisted people t enter South Africa from ciiis e o o Swaziland and Botswana i June and July 1972. n Moumbaris was accused on five further counts,including having pamphlets published by the ANC distributed i Durban,on 26-27June 1968,and reconn noitring the Transkei t find places suitable for seaborne landings. o ee o Cholo,Mpanza,Mtembu and Sejaka w r alleged t have boarded a motor yacht,Avventura, with arms, ammunition and explosives i Somalia with intent n

South Africa


t land secretly on the Transkei coast (the yacht had developed engine trouble o and did not complete the journey); to have secretly entered South Africa from Swaziland and to have brought into South Africa false reference books and materials for establishing secret communications. Gardner Sejaka was also accused of having explained to people i the n Transkei how to make incendiary bombs i August 1972. n Sean Hosey was accused of having had ANC pamphlets distributed i Cape n Town i August 1971 and of trying to give Justus Mpanza and Petrus Mtembu n n f l e reference books,tax receipts and R.540i cash. as Theophilus Cholo, Justus Mpanza, Petrus Mtembu and Gardner Sejaka were found guilty on al counts on which they were charged. Moumbaris was l found guilty on nine counts,but acquitted on the grounds of a technicality on count one,and Sean Hosey was found guilty of possessing forged passes but acquitted on the charge of distributing ANC pamphlets. Fifty-threeState witnesses were called during the ninety-eight-dayt i l the ra, longest since the Rivonia t i l i 1963.The s x accused al gave evidence i their ra n i l n own defence.Only one other defence witness was called. Several of the accused made allegations of torture. Theophilus Cholo said that he had been struck repeatedly by security police and this assault had caused him to have weakened sight. painful ears and a blocked nose for three months. Security police had stepped on his feet,crushing the nails of both big toes. o Counsel for Alexandre Moumbaris said that he had attempted t commit suicide as a result of the way i which he had been treated. Counsel for Sean n Hosey said that he had been questioned almost continuously for seventy-two hours and was kicked,given a drugged cigar and threatened with a gun. Leaving the court after the passing of sentence,the four Africans accused gave clenched fist salutes t a crowded public gallery. o

Student protest
Student opposition to apartheid inside South Africa flared up i the summer of n 1972.Students a the African Turfloop University made a bonfire of diaries t which had been returned t them by the university authorities after they had o removed the policy manifesto of the all-black South African Student Organization (SASO) and a SASO-inspired declaration of students’ rights, which the diaries had originally contained. They demanded that the white rector of the university resign. A the graduation ceremony soon after, a student leader, t Ramobithi Tiro,was expelled after a speech he made on receiving his certificate. Hs speech, which the rector described as ‘disgraceful’contained the i following passages:
Our parents have been locked outside,but white people who cannot even cheer us have the front seats.M y dear people,shall w ever get a f i deal i this land,the land of our fathers? e ar n The system i failing.W e Black graduates are being called upon t greater responsibilis o ties i the liberation of our people.O f what use wl be our education if w cannot help our n il e people i their hour of need? n There is one thing the Minister cannot do;he cannot ban ideas from men’sminds.The day shall come when al shall be free t breathe the a r of freedom. l o i

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa



O n receiving the news that one of their leaders had been expelled, the entire body of students staged a sit-ina their college. The police moved i and the t n 1 1 6students who participated i the sit-inwere expelled. ,4 n wf. Reaction t t i was sit The Western Cape Coloured students came out o hs on strike i sympathy with the Turfloop students.The Durban Westville Indian n o University students’council resigned because they were refused the right t join SASO,and also took action t support the students a Turfloop.The Fort Hare o t African students’ union called a general strike of al black students i South l n Africa. The support from Coloured students was reported by the Johannesburg Star (13 May 1 7 ) 92:
A mass student boycott of lectures at the University of the Western Cape t protest against o
the expulsion of al students a the University of the North (Turfloop) brought campus l t activity a the Coloured University t almost a standstill. t o The move was a result of a decision taken at a mass meeting of the students where a motion calling for a boycott of lectures was unanimously adopted. More than two-thirdsof the students stayed away from lectures.

And the Rand Daily Mail ( 6 May 1972)reported 1


More than t o thousand Soweto residents yesterday called for an unconditional reinstatew ment of al 1,146 l expelled University of the North students. They also demanded that M Abraham Tiro, a student who was expelled from the r university after an attack on Bantu education,be reinstated with the rest of the students.. . . There were sharp attacks by students and parents on al aspects of Black university l administration and apartheid.


Durban. While Security Branch detectives listened a the windows of the Vedic Hall i t n Durban yesterday,more than 1.000Indian students from the University of Durban-Westville voted t stay away from al lectures from today until the demands of Black students o l throughout South Africa were met. Amid wild cheers speakers a the meeting lashed out against the authoritarian Black t education system. ‘ W e are not voting as Indians, but as Blacks. W e need solidarity t eradicate the o repugnant system that is oppressing us,’ said one student, summing up the mood of the 1 other speakers. 0 Yesterday’smeeting was the latestmove i the escalating Black student unrest since the n recent expulsion of the entire studentbody from the University of the North,Turfloop. Fort Hare students have already been on strike for a week. The Springfield Teachers Training College i Durban goes on total strike on June 1. n African students a the University of Zululand wl meet on Wednesday t consider the t il o issue.

South Africa



By Thursday most of South Africa’s 10,000Black university and college students could be joined in a nationwide strike against university conditions.

The following week,white students demonstrated their support, and the police response h t the world headlines (The Times,London,3 June 1 7 ) i 92:

Johannesburg. Police wielding rubber batons attacked about 100 white students demonstrating peaceably against apartheid on the steps of St George’s Cathedral in Cape T o w n today. Students w h o attempted to take refuge inside the cathedral were dragged out-some by their hair.

Students a the University of the Western Cape ( Coloured university) were t a ee angered i October 1972 when regulations governing the students there w r n declared law by the Minister of Coloured Affairs,thus giving the force of law to internal disciplinary rules. There are seventy-threeregulations i a l including the following: n l, Any person applying for admission as a student shall submit together with his application,testimonials ofgood conduct acceptableto the advisory council. Students shall be neatly and suitably dressed when attending classes, when visiting the administration buildings and the library and when participating n i sport or appearing i public. n A student shall refrain from any conduct which is aimed a harming instruction t and discipline i the various departments,lectures,classes and examinations n of the university and discipline i general. n Only student organizations approved by the council may be established a the t university. Approved student organizationsmay conduct meetings of registered students i n accordance with the constitution of the organizations concerned.No other meetings shall be held on the campus without the permission of the rector. Student periodicals,student publications or any pamphlets shall be distributed only with the permission of the rector, and notices or placards may be displayed with the permission of the rector. Press statements or press interviews which involve the bodies and persons i n controlof the university,or which may harm the good name of the university,shall not be issued or granted by a student or a student organization. Students protested a the beginning ofJune 1973 by a demonstrationcalling upon t the rector to resign, and by occupying lecture rooms.The rector, C.H.Kriel, immediately closed the university for a month and announced that students wishing to return would be obliged to complete a re-admissionform which would ih l itd include a promise to comply w t al university regulations.The students l s e eight complaints, demanding less oppressive rules and regulations, better treatment by staff,and an explanation of the expulsion of four studentsearlier i n the academic year. They demanded unconditional re-admission,and many pledged not t sign or return the re-admissionforms. o The Black Staff Association supported the students’stand on the grounds that the university. intended exclusively for Coloureds,was still controlled by 106 whites thirteen years after it had opened.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The students returned t the university on 25 July 1972, pending the o establishmentofan inquiry,but unrest erupted once again the next day when the suspension of thirteen leaders resulted i another mass walk-out. n

N e w strike wave
During the l s months of 1972 and the first f w of 1973,South Africa witnessed a at e 000 massive strike wave by African workers which,with 3 , 0 workers a day out on strike i mid-February, the largest,most militant and most dramatic mass n was action since the May 1961 stay-at-home. Press reports (often very scanty) indicated that between 200,000 and 250,000 workers were involved i strikes between October 1972 and April 1973. n In the three months January-March 1973, press reports detail no f w r than ee 159 strikes and stoppages,lasting between ten minutes and seven days. Many of the strikes achieved instant wage increases;i others the strikers n w r discharged,since such action is i l g l i South Africa. Durban and the ee lea n adjacent industrial areas contained about half of the strikes,but al the main l industrial centres w r hit-Johannesburg and the R e , Cape Town, East ee ef i txie London,Port Elizabeth and Pretoria.Nearly al sectors were h t ( e t l s with l twenty strikes, iron, steel and engineering with twenty-two being the most affected); municipalities,transport,construction and the distributive trades also suffered,for example 16,000black municipal workers striking against Durban Corporation. ey Only mining and agriculture escaped-for f i l obvious reasons:both r l ary heavily on unskilled,non-SouthAfrican and migrant labour.Industrial organization is d f i u t because workers are housed i prison-like compounds, and i ifcl n n farming the labourers are dispersed over large areas. lea The fact that it is i l g l for Africans to strike,and that they have no effective union organization made the strikes particularly significant. There w r no ee negotiating procedures through which t arrange a return t work, and the o o strikersrefused t elect representatives-who would inevitably be intimidated,or o imprisoned as organizers or 'agitators'.Mass political action of this nature,with no o f c a or formal organization, reflects not only the extent of African fiil grievances i South Africa, but also the extent t which underlying p l t c l n o oiia awareness remains a real force for change.

Black Consciousness
In 1970 African students s l t off from the National Union of South African pi Students (NUSAS) t form the all-black South African Student Organization o (SASO) which argued that blacks should build up their own position independently of whites,and make and formulate their own demands. In practice co-operation with N U S A S continued, but SASO expressly rejected 'white liberals' and,.whileaccepting loyalty t Western traditions,felt o that African values should also be explored and expressed.

South Africa


Black theology made its appearance i 1971.It was described by one black n theologian as a theology of disinheritance and liberation seen from the perspect v of those who were oppressed because of their colour. ie Throughout1972 and 1973 the Black Consciousness movement grew.It was made up ofvarious strands,the constant factor being the emphasisplaced on selfhelp and on a redefinition of the South African situation.At first the government saw t i as a victory for apartheid. But as the movement became increasingly hs militant and c i i a of the structure of South African society (includingi some rtcl n cases i t i the Bantustan leaders), the government moved. In 1973 most of the n hs leaders of the movement. including the SAS0 leadership. were banned or restricted ; i fact the young black leadership that had sprung up i the seventies n n o n was put out of operation or forced t flee and take refuge i neighbouring

In 1973-74 there had thus been fourmain categoriesof protest:(a)the urban working class protest against low wages and poor working conditions;(b) the Black Consciousness movement,increasingly drawing into its orbit Indians and Coloureds;(c) white protest, mainly centred around the white student movements: (d)the liberation movements,now mostly underground.


The outside

The United Nations
The United Nations,of which South Africa was a founder member, helped t o focus internationalattention on apartheid.India drew attention t the treatment o of South Africa’s Indian population, and condemned the rtgime for its racial policies i general.A a succession of colonial countries achieved independence, n s the demand for action against apartheid increased. Discussions i the United n Nations became a constant sourceofirritationto the SouthAfrican Government. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo i 1 6 which is still i force. n 94 n However,certain countrieshave argued that the embargo does not affect the sale of weapons which are not intended for use for internalrepression.The l t e atr term is open t various interpretations,and there is no indication that the o embargo has been effective. South Africa seems t have little d f i u t i o ifcly n n purchasing any arms it wants, and is i any case nearing the point where, with the technical help of certain technologically advanced countries,it can produce most of the armaments it needs. Despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice i June n lea, 1971 that South Africa’scontinued rule i Namibia is i l g l the United Nations n has not succeeded i ending its control of the territory (See Part I1 of t i book). n hs South Africa’s racial policies have been under discussion a the United t Nations since the first session of the General Assembly i 1946.A t r vain n fe attempts t reach a negotiated solution,the General Assembly adopted resoluo 71XI) o tion 1 6 ( V I on 6 N o v e m b e u 6 2 requesting Member States t impose diplomatic sanctions against South Africa :it asked them
to take the following measures ... to bring about the abandonment of the policies of apartheid : (a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations. (b) Closing their ports to al vessels flying the South African flag. l (c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports. (d) Boycotting a l South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including a l l l arms and ammunition, to South Africa.

South Africa


o l o h () Refusing landing and passage facilities t al aircraft belonging t t e Government of e South Africa,and al companiesr g s e e under t e laws of SouthAfrica. l eitrd h

O n 2 December 1968 the General Assembly requested al States ‘todiscourage l lw o the f o of immigrants,particularly skilled and technical personnel, t South Africa . . .’ and requested ‘ l States and organizations t suspend cultural, al o ih ih educational, sporting and other exchanges w t the racist regime and w t organizationsor institutionsi South Africa which practise apartheid’. n

The Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU), founded i 1963,adopted a compren hensive set of resolutions concerning South Africa, including recommendations t that its members should deny South African Airways landing rights a their airports and transit rights across their territory ; and that African States should stop exporting to the republic and importing from it. It set up a Liberation o n Committee t finance and support liberation movements i guerrilla warfare against al white minority regimes i the continent.Most of the Member States l n agreed to implement these resolutions. South Africa has s far been able t withstand world criticism and,more t o o o the point. t thwart specificinternational actions,such as those mentioned above. o j Neither economic sanctionsnor the armsembargo, nor as yet,guerrillaincursions 4 have made a great deal of difference.Indeed,the economy continues to flourish, although not without attendant problems,and South Africa’s greatest expenditure on armaments has taken place since the arms embargo was imposed. The government nevertheless began.during the l t 1960s.to adopt a more outwardae going policy towards the rest of Africa, and attempted t promote formal and o informal international exchanges on the grounds that, despite differences of opinion,dialogue was possible. Thereare t omain reasonsfor this change,one political,the other economic. w Politically,South Africa would have much to gain if African States w r ee friendlier.This could signal the start ofa wider acceptance throughout the world. The apartheid State would become legitimized; for if black governmentsestablish ties there would be little reason for European and American countries,theniselves remote from the continent,t continue t oppose apartheid. The way o o would be opened f r a change of relations with the rest of the world. o South Africa would take care to ensure that the African countries remained o ‘friendly’-possibly with dire consequences f r any guerrillas who might have sought sanctuary i them.White supremacy,insouthern Africa would be further n entrenched. The economic reasons are even more potent.South Africa has failed t find o adequate trade outlets i Europe and North America, hampered as it is by n i distance, higher unit costs and adverse technological factors. In the first s x months of 1969, only 4 per cent of its exports t the United Kingdom were o manufactures-as compared with 87.5per cent of its exports t Zambia i 1967. o n Africa provides a natural market for such goods.

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n


Increased trade with black African Statesis only a first objective.Ultimately, a huge free trade area and customs union i central and east Africa would n provide an enormous market for South African goods,and offer a solution for balance of payments d f i u t e . ifclis Some African States responded t the South African invitation but soon o found that the two conceptions of ‘dialogue’were very different. Some of the leading African spokesmen for ‘dialogue’ were careful to explain that this was a l s attempt t t y t persuade South Africa t change its internal policies, and at o r o o that the idea had been only reluctantly accepted because sanctions had failed. South African insistence that ‘dialogue’ precluded any discussion of the principle of apartheid, the determined opposition of the liberation movements, and the r a fear that African unity might be threatened,put an end t the discussions.A el o large number of African States were i any case opposed from the outset to any n wt ‘dialogue’ i h South Africa. In June 1971,African States issued the following declaration a the OAU t meeting i Addis Ababa : n

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. meeting i its Seventeenth n Ordinary Session i Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 t 1 June 1971,discussed i an n o 9 n atmosphere ofutmost cordiality and franknessthe question ofa proposal for a dialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa. The discussions afforded al Members ofthe Council an opportunity t f l y express the l o ul views of their respective Governments on this important question. The Council reaffirmed : 1. Theirtotalcommitmentt the principles and purposescontained i Articles I1 and 111 of o n the Charter ofthe Organization ofAfrican Unity. especially i regard to the eradication n of al forms of colonialism from Africa, and the absolute dedication t the total l o emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent. 2. Thatthe Manifesto on southernAfrica (LusakaManifesto) unanimously adopted by the Organization ofAfrican Unity and endorsed by the United Nations and the Conference ofNon-AlignedStates,but rejected by the racist regimesof southern Africa,is the only objective basis for any meaningful solution to the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism i Africa. n o 3. The legitimacy of the struggle being waged by the peoples of Africa t obtain their legitimate rights t independence,freedom,human dignity and equality,and that al o l Member States of the Organization of African Unity remain totally and unconditionall committed t their struggle. y o Moreover,it was agreed that no Member State of the Organization of African Unity would initiate or engage i any type of action that would undermine or abrogate the solemn n obligations and undertakings t the commitments contained i the Charter. o n I was also agreed that any action t be taken by Member States i regard t the t o n o solution of the problems of colonialism,racial discrimination and apartheid i Africa,must n be undertaken within the framework of the Organization of African Unity and i f l n ul consultations with the liberation movements of the territories concerned. The Council rejected the idea of any dialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa which is not designed solely t obtain for the enslaved people of South Africa their o legitimate and inherent rights and the elimination of apartheid i accordance with the n Lusaka Manifesto.

An African girl in the Transkei.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The Council of Ministers also considered and agreed that i any case any form of n dialogue should appropriately be commenced only between the minority racist regime of South Africa and the people they are oppressing,exploiting and suppressing. The Council of Ministers also agreed that the proposal for a dialogue between the independentAfrican States and the racist minority regime of South Africa i a manceuvre by s that regimeand its a l e t divide African States,confuse world public opinion,relieve South lis o Africa from internationalostracismand isolation and obtain an acceptance ofthe status quo i southern Africa. n In view ofthe aboveconsiderations the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity emphatically declares that there exists no basis for a meaningfuldialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa. Under these circumstances,the Council reaffirmsits determination t continue t render and increase its o o assistance t the liberation movements until victory i achieved. o s

Strategic considerations
South African policy makers have always had a grandiose conception of their strategic and political importance.The country is a ‘bastionof the free world’, and a ‘protectorof Western civilization’i Africa against the threat of commun nism (as defined by South Africa). Anti-communismwas and remains central t government policy,serving t o o justify demands for more sophisticated armaments from the West, and as a pretext for suppressing opposition a home.It found expression i a contribution t n to the Berlin a r i t i 1948,and the dispatch of a fighter squadron to Korea i ilf n n 1950 i answer t the United Nations c l for military assistance. Internal n o al legislation included the Suppression of Communism Act,which also dates from 1950.This was also the s a t of a programme t expand and modernize the armed tr o forces which was accelerated during the s x i s Diplomatic links with the Soviet ite. Union were severed i the early 1950s,and the Soviet representativewas asked t n o leave. South Africa’s leaders increasingly saw its security as dependent on the West. As early as 1951,an African defence f c l t e conference i Nairobi was aiiis n attended by representativesfrom Britain, South Africa, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal,Ethiopia,Southern Rhodesia and the United States ( n an observer i capacity). Very little came of this, mainly because of South Africa’s absolute refusal t countenance the idea of Africans bearing arms. Nor did anything of o substance emerge from another round of talks on Pan-African strategy for the West, held i Dakar i 1954. n n The new direction taken by British colonial policy i Africa and Asia i the n n middle fifties was a new source of alarm. Independence i the Gold Coast n (Ghana), M a u M a u activity i Kenya,the withdrawal of British forces from the n Suez Canal area,togetherwith British inconsistenciesover the High Commission territories(Bechuanaland,Swaziland and Basutoland), were al seen as contributl ing t the spread of communism i Africa. o n As a result,the then Minister of Defence,F.C. Erasmus,proposed that the naval base a Simonstown i the Cape Peninsula be subjected t five-power t n o control i order t discourage Soviet and Indian ambitions i Africa. He also n o n

South Africa


called for the creation of a Western Indian Ocean Treaty..Although these suggestions were not taken up, there was an exchange of letters, i July 1955, n between the British and South African governments on the future of Simonstown. South Africa agreed t expand its naval forcesby purchasing from British o shipyardss x anti-submarine i frigates,ten coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats.Britain agreed to hand over control of the base by 31 March 1957, and South Africa agreed to expand the f c l t e of the base. Britain was to have aiiis use of Simonstown i both peace and war, whether or not South Africa was n involved as a co-belligerent. Provision was made f r the exchange of officers and o aiiis ratingsbetween the two navies,and British training f c l t e were made available to the South African navy. These agreements make no mention of any guarantees. They are solely concerned with naval co-operationand the use of Simonstown by Britain i times n ofpeace or war,and bind neither party t come to the a d of the other i the event o i n of hostilities. This point is worth mentioning since there seems t be some o confusion about the respective responsibilitiesof the two parties. In the view of the South African Government,Simonstown ‘protected’ the Indian Ocean from Soviet incursions and guaranteed t the ‘West’the use of the o Cape route,particularly when the Suez Canal was closed. This point has been repeatedly made by South African statesmen. D Vorster,celebrating twenty-fiveyears of Nationalist Party rule,insisted r n that it was i the interest of the Western world that South Africa should remain o strong,since the Cape route was the ‘lifelinet Europe’ (SouthAfricm Digest, 13 July 1973). The Defence Minister, P.W.Botha, stated that South Africa maintained ‘cordialmilitary relations with a least twenty countries i the free t n world’(South Afiicun Digest,13 July 1 7 ) The names of these countries were 93. not disclosed. The South African assumption regarding its key position i ‘defendingthe n free world’ is not universally shared. Racial policies make it vulnerable as a potential military ally,and the importance of its strategic position alters with changesthat are constantly occurring i international relations.trade routes and n defence strategies.Even the Simonstown agreement,as we have seen. is pretty limited. A this point,South Africa’s defence strategy and spending can be considt ered. Defence expenditure is escalating. Sharpeville ( 1960) had widespread political repercussions-almost unanimous world condemnation,and economic sanctions against the regime. Internally it l d to the declaration of a state of e emergency,the banning of the African liberationmovements.There was a radical reappraisal of the defence position. As the nature of the weapons purchased shows,South Africa now began to think seriously about military attacks from other countries. It is difficultto see from where attacks might come.None of the independent neighbouring countrieshas anything like the military strength needed to mount a conventional attack.There are as yet no signs that any other country or group of countries intends to declare war. Nevertheless this fear appears t permeate o t ie l military thinking i South Africa. It is clear,a the same t m ,that nearly al n armaments available can be used i dealing with internal unrest. They would n appear t serve three main purposes: o

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Their sophistication and modernity would f c l t t South Africa's inclusion aiiae i a Western alliance; that,if it could be achieved,would imply a general n acceptance of apartheid by the new a l e . lis l 2. Nearly al the weapons available can also be used for internal security purposes (even the submarines can be used t track the movements of o guerrillas along the c a t . os) sit 3. Military resources and manpower can be effectively used to a s s colonial governments i fighting black resistance, and maintaining a buffer zone n between South Africa and the north. South African forces help i patrolling n the Rhodesia-Zambiaborder,and protecting the Cabora Bassa dam.
480 460 440 420 400 380 360 340 320 300 280


+ 220


200 180

0 - 160 7


140 120 100 80 60 40 20
1960 1 6 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 91 91 9 2 9 3 9 4



. 5



fi m





South Africa : budget estimates for defence 1'960-74

South Africa


The military situation became increasingly worrying i 1973,with FRELIMO n (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) successes i Mozambique and n increasing resistance i Rhodesia.White manpower,already limited,was further n strained by an increase i the defence forces to 110,000. first serious steps n The were taken to recruit Africans into the South African army,and to increase the number of Africans available for policing African areas. South Africa now produces al its own small arms and aims a self-sufficienl t cy i military aircraft production. Planes assembled a the Atlas factory (Finann t cial M i , April 1973) include Mirage F. fighter planes (South Africcui Digest, u l 27 1 28 September 1973). South Africa manufactures the Impala fighter and the o Impala reconnaissance aircraft.Some 200 new aircraft were t be supplied to the a r force i 1974. i n In The Military Ba1anc.t. 1972-73 the Institute of Strategic Studies (London) gives a breakdown for the South African armed forces. their equipment, and suppliers.The army.navy and a r force are al partly equipped from abroad. i l

Bans and boycotts
During the late 1950s boycotts were used many times by the Africans, Indians and Coloureds i campaigns against the injustices of apartheid. A potato n boycott,calling attention t the conditions of farm labourers,and the blacking of o al goods produced by the Rembrandt tobacco company (Carreras-Rothmans) l were highly successful examples. In 1959 people and nations throughout the world w r asked to use the same t c i to bring about the complete isolation of ee atc South Africa, not only boycotting goods but evading al contacts with the l apartheid State. The international response l d t the banning of South African imports i e o n some countriesand the formation ofanti-apartheidmovements i many.This has n affected South African exports (notably ‘Outspan’ ‘Cape’f u t , sport and and ri) cultural.academic and professional relations.Attempts to end contacts continue, for example the 1971-72 campaign to get the Royal Institute of British Architects t end its links with its South African counterpart, and constant battles to o exclude South Africa from international football,tennis and sport associations.

The United Nations Unit on Apartheid explained the case for an economic boycott as follows. The South African economy is an integral part of the world economy.It has important markets i Europe, North America and Asia. It buys large and n c i i a l important quantities of manufactured goods abroad.Most of its major rtcly trading partners allow South Africa to accumulate the debts which its trade d f c t sometimes entails.South Africa would seem, therefore,to be particularly eii vulnerable to economic pressure from other countries. However,a trade boycott has never been implemented by the partners on whom South African trade depends.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Many countries continue t trade openly with South Africa. In these o countries,however,certain consumer boycotts have some success,and are often supported by local councils,trade unions and student and other organizations. The South African economy is highly dependent on imports of ol and capital i equipment-in the case of ol almost completely so.A ban on gold purchases i from South Africa would also be extremely damaging to its economy. In April 1964an internationalconference on economic sanctions against South Africa i n London was attended by representatives of over forty nations, including governmental delegations from thirty countries. The conference considered papers from experts on the economic,racial,political,legal and strategic aspects of sanctions,and on t i evidence hs
considered it had established the necessity, the legality and the practicability of internationally organised economic sanctions against South Africa, whose racial policies were seen to have become a direct threat to peace and security in Africa and the world.1

When Arab countries were threatening t diminish ol supplies t the West i o i o n 1973, they threatened a total ban i the case of South Africa, Rhodesia and n Portugal. Foreign investment plays a v t l part i South African industry and as such ia n has become a prime target for anti-apartheid campaigners;amongst the other things,they have called on investors t boycott South African companies and o foreign companies with interests there, and made protests a company annual t i general meetings. Churches, trade unions, student unions, universities and ’numerous organizations have been called upon to disinvest. In February 1973 the United Kingdom Anti-Apartheid Movement l s e some successes,including itd the following sales of shares:the Church of England Commissioners,&I .5 million n im i RTZ shares; the World Council of Churches,21.25million i frswith South n African interests;the Trade Union Congress of shares i frs with interests i n im n South Africa and i the Trade Union Unit Trust because of their investment i n n itd these firms. It also l s e four trade unions which had withdrawn investments, a number of universities, a local constituency labour party, the withdrawal of investmentsworth &150,000i f r swith South African interests,and the closure n im of an account with Barclays Bank by the London Borough of Camden. Similar action has been taken i the United States by some Churches, and n protests have been made a annual general meetings of companies. t Protests from its 1,000black workers resulted i the American Polaroid n o n A Corporation suspending sales of its products t South Africa i October 1970. committee of two white and two black employees v s t d South Africa.As a result iie n 91 of its report,the company announced i January 1 7 that it felt it should remain i South Africa and encourage change by improving educational and n employment opportunities for blacks. It offered a programme of reforms including : improved salaries and benefits for black employees of its South African distributors;the training of blacks for importantjobs;the allocation of a proportion of company profits from South Africa to black education schemes. Wages were increased,R.35,000 vested i a trust for African education was n and, after a year’s t i l Polaroid announced i December 1971 that the ra, n programme would continue.
1. See Alfred Maizels, Sanctions Against South Africa. London, 1964

South Africa


A massive campaign was launched i America against the use of a Polaroid n process t produce the ‘passes’ o which are a basic feature of the apartheid system. al With the support of leaders of the South African liberation movement, a c l was made for the complete withdrawal of Polaroid from South Africa and a boycott of Polaroid products.The boycott had a considerable impact on sales i n America. In the Netherlands a campaign against coffee imports from Angola led t a o temporary suspensionof t i trade i 1972.A boycott of ‘Outspan’ hs n oranges and a campaign against Philips for allegedly using cheap black labour i its subsidn i r e was organized i 1973. During a solidarity week i May 1973, ais n n 500,000 publications carrying information about South Africa were distributed. The World Council of Churches published a booklet l s i g foreign f r s itn im with investments i South Africa, and called on a f l a e Churches and n fiitd individual Christians t withdraw their investmentsfrom South Africa. o o In 1973 the Guardian newspaper published data on wages paid t African employees of British companies i South Africa which raised a scandal. A n parliamentary committee was asked t investigate.Its report,published i March o n 1974,did not deal w t the c l from the liberation movements for a complete ih al im withdrawal of investment,but recommended a code of practice for British frs operating i South Africa, i v e of the detailed evidence provided of n n iw exploitation of cheap labour.

The campaign for a cultural boycott was introduced i response to a c l from n al South Africans trying t end apartheid i culture and entertainment. It was o n centred largely on the question of segregated audiences, but of course also involved the wider issues of apartheid generally. Almost al theatres and concert halls are reserved for whites only.There are l some segregated cinemas for Coloureds and Indians. Blacks have virtually no access a a l and anything that is allowed is s r c l censored. t l, tity In 1 6 a professor of law estimated that there w r 13,000 banned 99 ee publications. Banned authors include James Baldwin, Bertholt Brecht, Jules Feiffer,Aldous Huxley,Norman Mailer,Henry Miller, Alan Sillitoe.Al books l by liberation leaders are banned. The Publications and Entertainments A t c prohibits the publication or manufacture of ‘undesirable’material i South n c Africa, and the Customs and Excise A t prohibits the import of ‘objectional’ goods. The interpretation of these A t lies with the government’sPublications cs Control Board.Not al banned books are banned because they oppose apartheid, l but the list includes many that could not have been banned for any other reason. Al fls are also seen by the board. The 1963 Publications and l im Entertainments A t e t t e it to, c nils
... approve a certain cinematographic fl subject to a condition that such a film shall be im allowed only to a particular race or class. ...

Thus, certain fls are shown only t whites, certain fls only t whites, im o im o Coloureds and Indians, and some t whites, Coloureds, Indians and children o

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


under 12.Al scenes showing any form of social relationship between black and l white, other than situations where black characters play a subservient role, are automatically cut. Despite the extent of the board's powers government spokesmen have advocated their further extension. Protests against the censorship on publications have been made by opponents of apartheid and by those who fear the effect that the threat of banning has on al South African literature. l Al performing artists w r invited to refuse to go to South Africa under l ee im o o apartheid conditions,playwrights and fl directorsnot t allow their work t be presented or screened i segregated theatres or cinemas,fl actors not t allow n im o flsi which they appear t be screened i segregated cinemas. im n o n In 1957,the British Musicians Union totally banned al appearances by its l members i South Africa.The London Symphony Orchestra,the Beatles,and the n Rolling Stones are among the many who have turned down requests t tour o South Africa. Also i 1957,the British Actors Equity Council instructed its members t n o ee work i South Africa only if a stated proportion of the performances w r open n t non-whites. o A similar ban by the British F l and Television Technicians Union im n hindered South African plans t s a t television services i 1975. o tr In 1963 and again i 1967, leading playwrights i the United Kingdom n n issued public declarations of their opposition t apartheid, and instructed their o agents t insert a clause i their contracts forbidding the performance of their o n plays before segregated audiences. It is difficult t see how creativity can be fostered i literature,music,dance, o n theatre and fl i South Africa today, with its repressive apparatus and an im n o o f c a culture whose only function is t rationalize a separation based not on fiil rational experience,but on chauvinistic myths and symbols.The questioning of society and ofits structuresis not only discouraged,but wl more l k l than not il iey be considered treasonous. A t f c a barriers between people inhibit any riiil understanding of the South African experience and its transformation into literature and art. Most important South African writers are either i exile or banned. n o Journalism is practically barred t them because of restrictions on material and publication. Even the relatively privileged Afrikaner writer, protected by .subo rt, o sidies and by a traditional status,is free only t w i e not t question.



South Africa is very sensitive to anything which affects sport,which is akin t a o national religion i the country.With increasing political and cultural isolation, n other internationallinks assume an added importance.It i very important for s ils n whites t see their teams accepted on the sports f e d of the world where, i o addition,victory can seem a kind of vindication of the system under which they live. M Braun,South African representativea the 1967 International Olympic r t Committee said :

South Africa


Expulsion from t e Olympic Games has deprived us of t e very reason f r our existence. h h o Despair,frustration and disillusionment have been deeply felt a al levels of sport i South t l n Africa and among al sections of t e population. The stigma o being looked upon as an l h f outcast has not been an easy cross t bear. o

Sport can only a t f c a l be considered i isolation from other human activities. riiily n n Even i whites and non-whitescould legally play together,or even watch sports i f unsegregated accommodation,bad nutrition and poor health place the nonwhite,and especially the African, at a disadvantage.The average white has far more leisure for sport,and money for equipment and so on. Facilities for nonwhites are poor or non-existent.Whites have swimming pools, private sports clubs and public f c l t e ,the African often has a bare patch of earth. Limited aiiis finances and the travel permit system severely r s r c competition between nonetit whites.In other words the racial inequality o f c a l institutionalized applies t fiily o sport as much as t any other aspect of l f . o ie Hence, international sports boycott campaigns are concerned with more than simply getting the government t accept the principle of having multiracial o teams.For example,it would have made little practical difference to the nono white South African sportsman i D’Oliveira (see below) had been allowed t f tour South Africa i 1969: t home,nothing would have changed.Would it really n a e o n matter if South Africa sent a f w non-whitest compete i the Olympics? The experience of the l s decade suggests that,while apartheid lasts,there can never at be equality of sporting opportunity. The MCC (Marylebone Cricket Club) tour t South Africa was cancelled i o n September 1968 when the South African Government refused to accept Basil D’Oliveira, ‘non-white’, a member ofthe team.A South African cricket team a as was due to tour Britain i 1970.By that t m an international campaign t isolate n ie o South Africa i sport already existed,and rugby and cricket,the two major sports n i South Africa,were to become the focus of the campaign i Britain. n n In the summer of 1969,a tour by South African cricketers was arranged by W f Isaacs, a wealthy Johannesburg businessman. A month previously, i l organizationslike the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the South African Non-racial Olympic Committee and the Young Liberals had announced their intention of opposing the 1970 tour,and they saw the W f lsaacs tour as an opportunity to i l demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions.At nearly every match there were protests;many matches w r disrupted,and play was held up as demonstrators ee sat on the pitch. These relatively small demonstrations (the largest was only 0 about 1 0 strong) were bitterly resented by white South Africans. A t r the Isaacs tour, a demonstration took place at the Davis Cup lawn fe tennis match a Bristol between England and South Africa. which was partially t disrupted. The demonstrations received wide publicity and gave the anti-apartheid supporterssome idea ofthe supportthey would get f r their campaign t stop the o o 1970 cricket tour. In September 1969 a number of organizations formed the Stop the Seventy omte but o Tour C m i t e (STST).Its purpose was not to organize demonstrations, t get the tour called off,by non-violentdirect action. Meanwhile,a rugby tour by the South Africans,due t start i November o n 1969, became a target for a campaign which developed into more than just a t i l ra

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


run for the cricket tour.It became a massive campaign i its own right against the n system which sent all-whitesports teams t represent a country with an 80 per o cent non-whitepopulation. The first match,due t be played a Oxford,was called off by the Oxford o t University Rugby Club after massive protests and threats of direct action. The match was rearranged a the l s minute for Twickenham,the headquartersof the t at Rugby Union,but i spite of the short notice (less than twenty-fourhours) over n 100 , 0 demonstrators turned up. These demonstrations continued at every match. A the tour progressed,the emphasis switched from stopping the rugby tour s back to giving the cricket authorities a clear indication of things to come. Just before the end of the rugby tour, the MCC committee decided unanimously that the cricket tour should go ahead. But the South African Cricket Association had just turned down an offer of a tour by the International Cavaliers Club on the grounds that the team would be multiracial,and about the i same t m , i e the South African Government refused to allow the black American tennis star, Arthur Ashe, t enter South Africa to play i an international o n i tournament. Internationalpressure was brought to bear on Britain t have the tour called o o f Thirteen African countriesthreatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games, f. due t be held i July a Edinburgh. Forthcoming cricket tours by India and o n t n Pakistan were also threatened.Pakistani cricketers i England announced that they would refuse to play against the South Africans. Many organizations i Britain were coming out publicly against the tour. n They included the Community Relations Committee,the Labour, Liberal and Communist Parties, the National Union of Students, the British Council of Churches and over twenty trade unions, representing millions of members. The Fair Cricket Campaign was launched by the Bishop of Woolwich as chairman and Conservativeand Labour M.P.s vice-chairmen. as O n 1 May 1 7 ,the Cricket Council announced that the tour,due t s a t 9 90 o tr on 6June,would take place as planned.It had already been cut from twenty-four matches t twelve. However,it was stated that o
no further tours between South Africa and this country wl take place until South African il cricket is played and teams selected on a multiracial basis in South Africa.

Designed as a move to appease public opinion,t i only succeeded i rousing it hs n still further against the tour. If they were not going to play against a racially selected team i the future,why play against t i one? Against a background of n hs tremendous pressure from al sorts of organizations and people,the government l was forced t intervene,and the Cricket Council called off the tour on 22 May. o The main aim of the anti-tourcampaign had been achieved. Another campaign took place over South Africa’s participation i the n Olympic Games. Article 1 of the Olympic Code states:
No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation.

A t r imprisonment fe

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


This would seem t exclude South Africa automatically from membership. o Indeed,from 1946 onwards,organizationsof black South African sportsmen had protested t the International Olympic Committee ( O ) o I C about the membership of the all-whiteSouth African Olympic Committee.The IOC did nothing, and h s ie the matter was apparently not even discussed u t l 1959.By t i t m sportsmen ni from newly independent African States were becoming prominent,and were less and less willing t take part i Olympic comprtitions with South Africa. o n In 1963 the IOC adopted the following resolution:
The National Olympic Committee of South Africa must declare formally that it understands and submits t the spirit of the Olympic Charter and particularly Articles 1 and 24.It must o also obtain from its government,before December 31, 1963,modification of its policy of racial discrimination i sport and competitions i its territory, failing which the South n n African NOC wl be forced to withdraw from the Olympic Games. il

These declarations and assurances were not given, and South Africa did not n e compete i the 1964 Olympic Games i Tokyo.In the next f w years South Africa n t i d t get the resolution rescinded.In 1967 it presented a list of ‘concessions’o re o t the IOC as follows:
Whereas participation i the Olympic Games previously were t have been on the basis n o of non-whitesand whites representing whites,blacks and whites wl i future form il n one team t represent South Africa. o o 2. Whereas white and non-whiteparticipants,previously,were t have travelled separately t the Olympic Games, they wl, n future,travel together. o il i participantspreviously had t be dressed differently,had o 3. Whereas white and non-white t be accommodated separately and could not march under the same flag in opening o ceremonies,they wl now wear the same uniform, stay together and march as an il integrated team under the South African flag. 4 Whereas,previously, South African whites and non-whitescould not compete against . one another a the Olympic Games or other international meetings, this wl now be t il standard practice. n 5. Whereas i previous Olympic Games white officials only were responsible for the selection of participants, an equal number of white and non-white officials under the chairmanship of the president of the South African National Olympic Committee wl il now be responsible for the selection ofparticipants i al those Olympic Sports in which nl different population or racial groups take part.

These ‘concessions’e e accepted by the IOC, wr although they did not comply with the 1963 resolution stipulation of a ‘modification of its policy of racial discrimination i sport and competitions i its territory’. They show how n n desperate South Africa was t compete i the Olympics,short however of doing o n what was demanded,namely,conforming t the Olympic Code. o The black South Africans’ v e of the ‘concessions’ was given by iw I.S. Cassoojee,vice-presidentof the Border Soccer Union,and council member of the non-racialSouth African Lawn Tennis Union : As a true South African who believes that only merit counts i sport, irrespective of race. n colour and creed,I see nothing to be elated about i the new move. Due t the white South n o African policy of apartheid i sport,the country has found i s l almost totally ostracised n tef

South Africa


from the international scene.To save itself from being kicked out completely it had hit upon this gag.. .. W h e n I, a South African of copper colour, can participate with white South il Africans in local,provincial and national championshipsat h o m e without stigma,I wl have something to be happy about.

The views of other black Africans were equally clear when the IOC decided t o admit South Africa t the Mexico Games i 1968: the whole of Africa, o n represented by the Supreme Council for Sport i Africa, decided t withdraw n o from the Games.The Soviet Union,France and Italy called for a special meeting t reconsider the matter. and the Mexican organizing committee refused t send o o the invitation. As a result of this international pressure,the IOC withdrew the invitation t o South Africa. In 1970 the IOC decided (by thirty-fivevotes to twenty-eightwith three o abstentions) t expel South Africa altogether from the Olympic movement.

P R O P O S E D R U G B Y T O U R OF N E W Z , E A L A N D

A New Zealand tour by a racially selected,all-whiteSouth African rugby team
o n planned f r June 1973 was called off by the New Zealand Governmenti April. Early i January, the prime minister of New Zealand, Norman Kirk, n o from inviting the promised t dissuade the New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) South African team.Hs opposition t the tour was supported by the following: i o The Federation of Labour, which threatened t withdraw its members from o transport,hotel and delivery services to the tourists. Gough Whitlam,Australian prime minister, who said transit through Australia would be refused t the South African team. o strike against The New Zealand Seamen’sUnion,which held a twenty-four-hour apartheid. The Catholic National Association of Priests. The Presbyterian Church of New Zealand. The Christchurch Commonwealth Games C m i t e which feared a boycott of omte, the games should the tour go ahead. The National Union of South African Students,who called on the New Zealand Government and people t stop the tour. o T w o anti-tourorganizationsi New Zealand (theCitizens Association for Racial n Equality (CARE), Halt Al Racist Tours (HART))who promised to and l disrupt the matches i they took place. f In February 1973,i spite of warnings by Norman Kirk,the NZRU stated that n the tour would go ahead.Parliament debated the issue i March. Norman Kirk n failed to persuade the NZRU to withdraw the invitation. The South African o Rugby Board (SARB)would not decline the invitation t save their hosts’ embarrassment.O n 10 April 1973,Norman Kirk accordingly issued a directive t o the NZRU indicating that the invitation must be deferred. This was accepted under protest. The prime minister gave four reasonsforcancelling the tour:( ) the strainsit a would place on New Zealand society by exacerbating differences of attitude on

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


racial matters;(b) the disorder and violence to which it would give rise;() the c effect on New Zealand’sinternationalrelations;( ) the virtual certainty that the d 1974 Commonwealth Games t be held i New Zealand would be a failure,or o n have t be cancelled. o The cancellation was greeted with relief by al parties,including NZRU and l n SARB. It was generally regarded as a victory for anti-apartheid moderates i New Zealand who,i a rugby-lovingcountry,had persuaded the government and n the public t put principles before pleasure. Following the cancellation,S A R B o announced that ‘mixed t i l ’ would be held, for touring rugby teams only, t ras o select Springbok teams as from 1974. There have been some modifications of apartheid sports policy i response n t internationalopposition.In 1973,for the first t m , black (American) boxer o ie a fought a white (South African) boxer. Sport i South Africa has been declared n ‘multinational’, teams from each racial group may now compete against each i.e. other i international events.The South African Games were staged in 1973 on n t i basis, and those overseas competitors who accepted the all-expenses-paid hs invitation were l d t believe that they were ‘multiracial’ e o games because al races l ras took part. However, there were no mixed t i l ,no mixed teams and no mixed spectators.A club and provincial level,sport remains rigidly segregated. t

South Africans passionately want t be accepted as belonging t a European o o tradition. English-speaking whites look t London, Afrikaners t Paris and o o Amsterdam. They want contacts with Europe i order to break the geographical n s n and moral isolation of white South Africa. This i understandable i human terms, and necessary t the ideology of apartheid itself; its claims t be the o o outpost of Europe i Africa needs t be j s i i d by European recognition of its n o utfe place i the mainstream of European culture. n


W h e n such men revolt

Nelson Mandela
Nelson Mandela was born near Umtata i the Transkei i 1918. the eldest son of n n e a Tembu chief.H was reared by the paramount chief when his father died and Mandela was 12,but he ran away t Johannesburg soon after to avoid a tribal o 6 t marriage.At 1 he began studying a Fort Hare University College for an arts degree by correspondence from Witwatersrand University,befriended by Walter Sisulu,who urged him t study law.H was articled t a fr of white attorneys o e o im i Johannesburg and qualified as an attorney-at-law.entering practice with n Oliver Tambo,who later became acting president-generalof the ANC. Mandela helped to found the AN< Youth League and pressed for more e n militant policies from 1949 onwards.H played an important part i the defiance campaign i 1952 and was one of the defendants i the ‘treasont i l . n n ra’ Mandela’s role, always working amongst his people, organizing ANC volunteers on a street basis,became especially important when ANC was banned i 1960 and had to go underground. Mandela left his home, office, wife and n children, to live as a political outlaw, and become known as the ‘Black al Pimpernel’.In 1961 the c l for a strike to protest against the declaration of the republic was issued i the name of Nelson Mandela,who also became secretary n of the new National Action Council. In 1 6 Mandela went t the Addis Ababa conference of the Pan-African 91 o Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. H was received by prominent e African leaders,and visited military training camps i Algeria and elsewhere. n From its inception i 1961,Mandela was appointed commander-in-chief n of e Umkonto w Sizwe,the military wing of the ANC. Seventeen months after he had gone underground,Mandela was betrayed by an informer and sentenced to five years’imprisonment for h s leadership of the i 1 6 strike and for leaving the country illegally.In October 1963 he was taken 91 from his c l to the dock i the Rivonia t i l on further charges of sabotage and el n ra i conspiracy to overthrow the government by force.Hs powerful statement from the dock opened the defence on that occasion and serves as a remarkable testament of the African cause.Six of the nine accused,including Mandela,were sentenced t lf imprisonment. o ie

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Abram Fischer
In May 1966 Abram Fischer was sentenced to lf imprisonment on a charge of ie e n o sabotage. A f w white people had been outspoken i their opposition t apartheid, and Fischer was t epitomize their dilemma and t rock the o o s n i i i i s of the Afrikaner nation t whom he had turned ‘traitor’. esblte o Born of a family which had been i South Africa since the eighteenth century,h s forebears n i had fought i the Boer Wars of Independence i 1881 and 1899-1901. Son of a n n re judge president and grandson of a former prime minister of the Orange F e State,Rhodes scholar, Oxford graduate and eminent Queen’s Counsel, Fischer had seen the evolutions of laws i South Africa from the Prohibition of Mixed n Marriages A t a the beginning of nationalist rule, t the Sabotage A t i the c t o c n s x i s Fischer was one of the defence counsel i the ‘treasont i l ,and l d the ite. n ra’ e defence team during the Rivonia t i l These w r only two of many similar ra. ee cases;shortly before his arrest Fischer became the longest-servingmember of the Johannesburg Bar Council. Throughouth s career Fischer had belonged to the Communist Party,which i he had rejoined when it was banned i 1950, seeing it as the only party n consistently opposed to white rule.In September 1964 he was arrested and,with twelve other white men and women, charged with belonging to the i l g l lea Communist Party.The others received sentences of between one and five years. Fischer was granted b i t appear as counsel i a long-standingcase i Southern al o n n Rhodesia when it was taken t the Privy Council.In h s application to the court o i for b i he said : al
I a an Afrikaner. M y home is South Africa. I wl not leave m y country because m y m il ih political beliefs conflict w t those of the Government.

H won his case, and returned to South Africa. A f w months later, on e e 25 January 1965,he disappeared from h s home and explained,through a letter i
read t the court by h s counsel,that he was going underground to continue h s o i i work against apartheid :
If in m y fight I can encourage even some people to understand and to abandon policies they n o w so blindly follow, I shall not regret any punishment I may incur. Unless this whole intolerable system is changed radically and rapidly, disaster must follow and appalling bloodshed and civil war become inevitable.As there is oppression of the il majority such oppression wl be fought with increasing hatred. I can no longer serve justice in the way I have attempted to do during the past 30 years-I can do it only in the way I have n o w chosen.

H eluded the police for ten months,with a price of &3,000on his head,working e ie n alone,disguised,separated from h s children (his wf had been killed i a car i crash soon after the Rivonia t i l i 1964), before being captured on the night of ra n 1 1 November 1965. Fischer said little i the way oflegal defencea h s t i l Addressing the court n t i ra. from the dock, he explained why he had taken the course he did. H e devoted much of h s speech t an eloquent indictment of apartheid,and a defence of the i o conduct of the national liberation movement.

South Africa


Albert Luthuli
Chief Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli-teacher, chief and leader of the South n African people-was born i 1898 near Bulawayo i Rhodesia where his father n had gone,as evangelist. an After completing the higher teacher’s training course, he taught at the Training College for Teachers at Adams College from 1921 t 1935.During t i o hs period,he became secretary of the Natal African Teachers’Association and the non-racialSouth African Football Association,and founded the Zulu Language and Cultural Society. In 1935 he accepted the chieftainship of the Umvoti Mission Reserve i n Groutville,following repeated appeals by the elders of the tribe. Soon he was elected chairman ofthe Natal and Zululand Association and the Mission Reserve Association.H e became a member of the Durban Joint Council of Europeans and Africans and the Instituteof Race Relations.H was elected t the executive e o of the South African Christian Council and, i 1938, he attended the n International Missionary Conference i Madras. n Hs initiation into politics may be traced t 1945 when he joined the Natal i o ANC.Elected t the Native RepresentativeCouncil i 1946,he joined the other o n n African members i moving the indefinite adjournment of the council i protest n against discriminatorylaws. H was drawn into active participation i the struggle against apartheid i e n n 1951 when he was elected president of the Natal ANC.When he l d Natal i the e n Campaign of Defianceagainst Unjust Laws i 1952,the government gave him an n o e ultimatum:t resign either from the ANC or from the chieftainship.H refused to resign from either and the government deposed h m i November 1962.Next i n month,he was elected president-general the ANC,a position he held until his of 1 tragic death on 2 July 1967. During his f f e n years as president-general,Chief Luthuli led many ite 1 peaceful and non-violentcampaigns.He endeavoured to unite a 1 opponents of apartheid---Africans, Indians,Coloureds and EuropeansAn a common struggle for a non-racialdemocratic society. The government,however, subjected him to constant bans and arrests.In 1963,when he undertook a tour of the country as the new president-general, he was banned for a year from al largec t e and from attending gatherings.In midl iis 1954when he went to Johannesburg to lead a protest against the forcible removal of75,000Africans from Sophiatown and other African townships,he was served with more severe orders,confining h m t the Groutville area f r t o years.O n i o o w 5 December 1956,he was arrested with over 150 other opponents of apartheid on the charge of high treason.Acquitted by the court,he undertook a tour of South Africa,speaking to many white audiences to promote a peaceful solution.The government again served banning orders i 1959,confining him to Groutvillefor n f v years.Detained during the state of emergency i 1960 for f v months,he ie n ie returned to confinement i Groutville.In 1964,the government served more n stringentbanning orders for a furtherfive years.Under these banning orders,no writings or statements of Chief Luthuli could be published i South Africa. n The government,however,could neither undermine the influence of Chief Luthuli i South Africa nor silence him.Moreover,his appeals to the world were n

m and apartheid in southern Africa


instrumental i promoting the movement for the boycott of South African goods, n and for South Africa’se i from the Commonwealth. xt H was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1960 and chosen in 1964 for the e award of the Society for the Family of M a n i New York.H was elected rector n e of the University of Glasgow. In h s statement on being deposed from the chieftainship,he recalled that i ‘thirtyyears of m y lf have been spent knocking i vain, patiently, moderately ie n and modestly a a closed and barred door’.H decided t remain i the struggle t e o n ‘forextending democratic rights and responsibilities to al sections of the South l African community’. A t r the Sharpeville massacre of 1960,and the banning of ANC and PAC, fe resistance was obliged t go underground and it gave up its strict adherence t o o non-violentmeans.In h s l s public statement,on the conclusion of the Rivonia i at t i l Chief Luthuli said : ra,
The African National Congress never abandoned its method of a militant, non-violent struggle,and of creating i the process a spirit of militancy i the people. However, i the n n n face of the uncompromising white refusal to abandon a policy which denies the African and other oppressed South Africans their rightful heritage-freedom-no one can blame brave just men for seekingjustice by the use of violent methods;nor could they be blamed i they f tried to create an organized force i order t ultimately establish peace and racial harmony. n o

H appealed to the world to take decisiveaction to help end the hateful system of e apartheid. Chief Luthuli died i a train crash i South Africa i 1967. n n n In an ‘Appealsent to the people of the United Kingdom’in May 1963,Chief Luthuli welcomed the recent United Nations resolution and went on :
I would ask you to unite i demanding that your governments should honour the resolutions n taken a the United Nations.I would urge that you and your government be not deterred t
from any action by the excuse often advanced by our oppressors-that boycotts and sanctions wl bring to us blacks more suffering than to the whites.W e have been victims of il suffering long before our boycott and sanctions c l to the nations of the world. W e are al committed to suffering that wl lead us to freedom-as it has been the lot of al oppressed il l people before us from t m immemorial.What w are determined not to do,cost what it may, ie e i to acquiesce i a status quo that makes us semi-slavesi our country. s n n . ..the t m must surely come when South Africa must emerge from the dark night of ie racial fanaticism to take its place among the free nations of the world. You all--people and governments-can,to your honour,hasten this day. .. .To the nations and governments of the world. .. I say: Cast aside your hypocrisy and deceit.. . D o not think we wl be deceived by your pious protestations as long as you . il are prepared to condone,assist and actively support the tyranny i our land.... The test i n s action-action against oppression.

In h s autobiography L t M y People Go,Luthuli said : i e
The indignation oPother countries can have a practical bearing on the course of events [to] follow i South Africa....W e are not anti-South African. W e are anti-white-supremacist. n W e do not enter into dark conspiracies with foreign powers. But we are acutely aware that the disapproval and ostracism of other countries wl have the effect,i properly directed,of il f shortening the days of bloodshed and bondage.

Part II


Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n



Reho lh


Land allocation i Namibia. n




Namibia is the name given t the former territory of South West Africa by the o General Assembly when the United Nations terminated the South African mandate for it i 1966. n The population of Namibia is 610,000 (South African estimate;Namibians claim that t i has been estimated far too low to reduce the apparent importance hs of the territory). The area is 318,261 square miles, including Walvis Bay (434 square miles) which is part of South Africa but is administered as part of Namibia. It is divided into three distinct physical regions: (a) central plateau (over 50 per cent of the land area;annual rainfall under 2 inches); (b) Namib (desert central belt, 4 8 miles wide; annual rainfall under 2 inches); (c) Kalahari &0 (eastern strip,no surface water). T w o political divisions have been made: (a) the ‘policezone’ (European settler area,with small,scattered African reserves:comprises two-thirds of the land area, and contains the main towns, industries and mining areas); (b) northern area (reserves containing more than 50 per cent of the African population ; three areas recently designated as ‘self-governing homelands’). Namibia suffers from low rainfall:the Kunene,Okavango and Orange are the only perennial rivers. Inland rivers run only intermittently,after heavy rain. There are two harbours, Walvis Bay and Luderitz (which is relatively shallow). The major towns are Windhoek (administrative centre, population 47,000),Luderitz,Walvis Bay (population 16,500)and Tsumeb, Orangemund, n l Keetmanshoop, Okahandja,Otjiwarongo ( l under 10,000i population). Al al these towns are i the police zone and contain the bulk of the settler population n (stated to total 9 , 0 ) 600. The Africans l v i segregated ‘locations’ compounds which must be at ie n or l a t 5 0 yards away from w i e towns.The Caprivi Strip (see map) is a corridor es 0 ht linking Namibia to where the Zambezi River provides a common frontier between Botswana,Zambia and Rhodesia.It is arid and only 20 miles wide for i most of its length.Its populated eastern sector contains the major a r and military base a Katime Mulilo,which is part of South Africa’snorthern defences,and the t target of numerous guerrilla attacks.


The economy

The gross domestic product i about E145 million but the national income is only s about E25 million. The discrepancy is explained by the amount of wealth siphoned off by South African and other foreign companies. Over 30 per cent of the foreign trade derives from the mining sector and Namibia i the world’s second largest producer of diamonds (South Africa s is) being the frt.

D e Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa Limited,which has a concession i n the coastal region 60 miles wide and 220 miles long,makes a net profit o about f E25 million a year and controls 90 per cent of diamond production.Diamonds account for over half the value of al minerals mined,and bring the government l about E15 million i taxes and duties (more than t i e what it spends on al n wc l services for Africans, including education). It has been estimated that the t diamond reserves may be exhausted by 1980 a the present rate of mining. Some 80per cent ofal the copper,lead,zinc,cadmium,silver,tin,vanadium,beryllium l and lithium mined are produced by the Tsumeb Corporation,i which foreign n companies are important shareholders. From 1947 to 1966 the gross value of metals mined by Tsumeb was nearly E250 million. Prospecting continues a an unprecedented rate. By 1969, the eighty-five t ie concessions granted covered 4 million hectares and included the entire 800 ml coastline. Uranium mining a Rossing near Walvis Bay represents a major t il development. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority wl take E45 million worth i the 1970s. n Almost al mineral development lies outside the black ‘reserves’.Even the l wl iron ore i the Kaokoveld ‘homeland’il be exploited by white authorities,with n black Namibians doing the unskilled work a low rates of pay. t



Namibia produces nearly halfthe world's supply of Karakul ('Persian lamb' used o i luxury fur coats) and exports over E12 million worth annually t the Federal n Republic ofGermany,Italy,France,the United States and the Nordic countries. The pelts are marketed mainly through auctions i London. The dry conditions n suit the Karakul sheep, which are farmed on white-owned farms south of Windhoek (the Namibians rarely taking a more lucrative r l than that of oe shepherds or farm labourers). o el Frozen and tinned beef and mutton are sold t South Africa, as wl as cattle,hides and wool. Livestock sales i the 'reserves' where stock disease is n prevalent,make up less than 1 per cent of the total.

About E25 million worth off s products-tinned f s .f s meal and fish o l a e ih i h ih i-r exported annually from Walvis Bay and Liideritz.Over a million tons of f s are ih caught every year (mainlysardines,crayfish,snoek and cod). Many nations f s ih outside the t e v - i e w l e m l territoriallmt Only about 3 0 0 ii. , 0 people are employed i n fishing,and the bulk of the profit flows out of the territory.

So many white South Africans visit Namibia's many scenic attractions.from the Fish River canyon i the south to the Etosha Pan game reserve i the north,that n n tourism may overtake fishing as a revenue earner for the South African Government.Black Namibian participation consists of menial labour.

In 1967 the South African Institute of Race Relations found a 'large gap' between white and black wages,and stated that the majority of Africans must find it extremely difficult,i not impossible,to buy an adequate diet. For example, f African contract miners get 9p to 20p a day, plus food and accommodation. Farm contract workers, rightly classified by fitness and length of service, get R.6t R.8.50per month plus rations.Statutory minimum wages for recruited o ~ o n building workers are 7 % t 9p a day. though i practice they receive a slightl higher weekly wage,without food and accommodation.Workers are expected y to save and send money home on these wages. A 1971 press report states that 'contract workers employed i and around Windhoek [earn] roughly E5 per n month', plus accommodation, food and clothing. Permanent residents (the minority), 'normally earn about E25 per month'. Even these figures,however, should not be taken a their face value,i view of the evidence of carefully falsit n f e pay sheets being prepared a the Ruakana Falls dam construction site,for id t the United Nations inquiry team (see Georg von Konrat, Piissport t Truth, o 1972).

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Pensions are as in South Africa, where African old-age pensioners receive

75p per month. There are no welfare services outside the white areas. The
Odendaal Commission recommended that aged Africans and other welfare cases should be returned to the ‘homeland’whenever possible.



The education of Africans i Namibia is governed by the Bantu Education Act. n W e have already seen i Part I how this works inside South Africa. n iue) e In Namibia (1972 f g r s , f w schools are controlled by 'homeland' authorities(only 7 out of 423 as against 1 i 1 i South Africa). For farm schools n 0n (established by white farmers for their employees) the figure is less (4out of 473 as against 1 i 4 i South Africa). n n Most schools are community schools. The following (1973) figures are taken from the Biii Educrrtion Journal of March 1974. published by the citi Republic of South Africa: Tiyw of' school: lower primary,243 ; higher primary, 30: primary. 207; secondary, 8; technical, 0: teacher training. 6 ; trade training, 4; special schools,1 ; continuation classes,0. Control;government or territorial,12: community,443: farm,4;mine, 0;faCtory,0;Roman Catholic,0:other church and private. 32. Only one-thirdof the amount spent on w i e pupils is spent on African pupils ht (who are seven times more numerous). This follows the South African pattern.
Table 1. Enrolment figures




Seco?lcinrJ~ scllools

Priinary schools

Form V Form IV Form 111 Form IT Form I

51 110 378 575 805

0.05 0.10 0.36 0.55 0.76

Standard 6 Standard 5 Standard 4 Standard 3 Standard 2 Standard 1 Sub-standardB Sub-standardA

3,722 4,472 6,536 9,005 12.020 15.925 19,513 32.300

3.53 4.24 6.20 8.53 11.40 15.10 18.50 30.68

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n


The I972 enrolment figures (excluding technical and trade schools and teacher training) are shown i Table 1. n Thus 98.18 per cent of al African pupils w r i primary schools, with l ee n 75.68 per cent i the first four years. n African students i grades Sub-standardA t grade 2 represented 75.68per n o cent (as against 66.89i South Africa); 22.5 per cent i grades 3 t 5 (against n n o 27.98 per cent); 1.67per cent i secondary grades 1-111 (against 4.65 per cent); n et. and 0.15per cent i secondary grades IV and V (against0.48per c n ) n As regards teacher training,the enrolment was: lower primary teachers' course,88.54per cent i Namibia (against83.06per cent i South Africa); prin n mary teachers' course, 1 . 6 per cent i Namibia (against 16.94 per cent i 14 n n South Africa). The same pattern applies t the trade schools ( l situated i the 'homeo al n l n s ) Namibia does not have even the limited access t continuation classes ad'. o and night schools available for Africans i some urban areas of the republic. n


History and peoples

Natural frontiersmark off Namibia as a distinct region of southern Africa. The Kunene R v r which forms part of its northern frontier with Angola ie ee divided peoples who nevertheless w r culturally very similar. The Portuguese held the harbours and main trade centres of Angola since the fifteenth century, but there was little white penetration into Namibia. The Orange R v r forms the southern border.It flows through a b l of dry ie et land which helped to cut Namibia off from southern influences.After the river was recognized as a frontier i the eighteenth century. African refugees and n migrants. displaced by the Dutch settlers a the Cape. continued to move up t into Namibia. The three straight lines forming the eastern border (along the 20 E.m r ei dian or east of it) run through dry Namaqualand,the Kalahari desert and w s et of the Okawango swamps,which again formed natural frontiers. West is the Atlantic.This did not protect Angola from Portuguese landings and slavers.But the Namibian coastline is reinforced along most of its length 0 ie and to a width i places of 1 0 mls by the Namib desert which4ontaining n only dry sand i mountainous dunes, with almost no rainfall and negligible n plant and animal life4iscouraged early explorers. Ltl was known i Europe about Namibia until wl into the nineteenth ite n el n century,when traders and hunters told of its varied landscape i the interior, and its widely settled communities.When American independenceobliged B i rt ain to find other places t which convicts could be transported, South West o Africa was first thought ideal for convicts--as w l as for ‘loyalAmericans’ and el other settlers. A naval sloop was sent out and reported that the entire coast, from 15 to 33 S.was barren and sandy-this was,of course,the Namib desert. The scheme collapsed,and Botany Bay was chosen instead. In fact,Namibia, originally the home of the San people (‘bushmen’), had for centuries been receiving Bantu-speakingpeoples from central and east Africa (from perhaps the fifteenth century or earlier) and Khoi-Khoi from the south. The communities who migrated (along a route somewhat similar to that taken by the guerrillasfighting white South Africans today) found tolerably well-

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


watered savannah and woodland south of the Kunene River and w s i the et n drier Kaokoveld. Most stayed here, while more venturesome groups moved south i search of new grazing for their vast and treasured herds. n Those who s t l d remained peacefully i the central areas of Namibia until ete n groups moving north from Dutch Cape Colony rule began t compete for paso ture lands and water supplies.A long series of skirmishes i the 1830s (mainly n between Bantu-speaking Hereros from the north and (Khoi-Khoi)Nama and mixed groups from the south) gave early European writers entering Africa from Walvis Bay the impression of internecinenative conflicts. In fact, the various communities i Namibia had enjoyed centuries of n peace,and developed a culture and way of life that suited their varied environments. Because of wl animals, and very uncertain rainfall, their settlements id w r impermanent but were handsomely l i out.The stronger groups (Ordonee ad ga, Ukwanyama, Ovatjimba, Herero, Nama) developed distinctive clothing. Their religious and social systems w r incomprehensible t the adventurers ee o from Europe who first came among them,and were usually misunderstood and disliked by Christian missionaries who wanted t convert them t their own o o alien religion and social customs. Namibia thus consisted of coherent communities of grazers who also grew crops,and (especially i the north) were smiths and traders,their chiefs usually n recognizing a suzerain,who might himself have treaties with leaders of groups who spoke a different language,or w r of different ethnic origins,for example ee the Ovambos ( n the north) and the ‘red nation’( n the central area). Desert on i i three sides,and irregular rainfall elsewhere,formed a hardy mobile people, but also delayed the advent of modern ideas and education. S t against the centuries that preceded it, the thirty years of German colone ization seem short indeed.The alien German culture,modern efficiency and authoritarian ideas came into conflict with the developing Namibian social order, and very nearly resulted i wiping out sections of the varied community. n When German missionaries came i the 1840s,Namibian trade was already n considerable+attle, ivory,guano (from the islands) and copper. The struggle between N a m a groups,l d by Jonker Afrikander and Hendrik e Witbooi,and the Hereros under Maharero threatened trade and encouraged the Germans t intervene.The Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which carved up A r o fi ca among the European powers,recognized the coastline from the Orange R v r ie t the Kunene River as a German interest.New colonial enthusiasm (especially o by Bismarck’s successor Chancellor von Caprivi) and missionary and trading interest l d t South West Africa becoming a German crown colony i 1890. e o n The Germans built roads,railways,towns and forts.German settlers urged Berlin t exert greater control over the Namibians,who quickly learned the bito ter cost of unwillingness t accept German ‘protection’. o German colonization was felt most heavily by the Hereros and Namas, who realized that the settlementwas t be permanent, and that their future proo mised nothing but subservience t Germans whom they judged by the actual o behaviour of the average settler rather than the protestations of missionaries and administrators. A terrible cattle disease (rinderpest) came i from South Africa and desn troyed 95 per cent of the Hereros’c t l i 1897.From then on the Hereros’sitate n



uation grew increasingly desperate; Samuel Maharero sought an alliance with his old enemy Witbooi and also with distant chiefs i Ovamboland. n For s x months the Hereros held their own,reclaimed l s territory,and ini ot duced other groups t revolt against the now intolerable occupation. By Julyo 94 August 1 0 fresh troops arrived from Germany under General Von Trotha, and the African revolt was smashed. A series of decrees dissolved tribal organizations,forbade the wearing of tribal insignia,forbade the Herero and N a m a from rearing cattle and dispossessed the rebellious tribes of their land.These punitive measures further aimed a securing an African labour force for the German settlers. Helmut Bley t reports:1
The integration of the individual members of the African tribes into the European labour market,a policy which was consciously pursued by the German authorities,was successfull carried out. Ninety per cent of al African men became the hired workers of European y l masters.By 1912 only 200 men of the Herero and N a m a tribes were without paid employment. The law of the territory differentiated a every level between native and non-native t citizens. Mixed marriages were forbidden and this provision applied t c v l and church o ii ceremonies alike. The disiritcgration of the Herero and N a m a was absolute. The social anthropologist,Wagner. has shown that,following this catastrophe. the social structure of the Herero tribe was shattered and thcir traditional customs and standards were rendered largely inoperative., . The overall picture is one of itinerant workers moving from farm t . o farm.off into the bush,t the building s t s and the mass settlements of the townships. o ie

German colonization had apparently not foreseen an African revolt against the idea of European dominance, German colonization and a subservient African labour force.But the alienation of land to German settlers automatically impoverished the Herero and Nama, who depended on cattle-grazing. Colonization and Christianity compromised native political institutionsand the basis of their ancestor worship, and social and economic discrimination added to the grievancesof colonial conquest. A t r the uprising,the military,and not the c v l authorities,were i comfe ii n mand. Von Trotha had taken part i suppressing the Boxer uprising, and n considered the war i Namibia a racial war i which the only answer war extermin n nation.Not al Germans agreed with him. The Kaiser relieved him of his coml mand i November 1905,and the German Chancellor declared that Von Tron t a s proclamations violated every principle of Christian and human conduct. h' The settlers themselves had a first sympathized with Von Trotha,but as the t war proceeded there was a growing fear that h s policy of extermination would i rd them of the basis of their own prosperity: cheap and plentiful African i labour.Al the settlers wanted was a society i which their supremacy and their l n wealth would be guaranteed.They did not want Von Trotha's 'white' State,and w r uneasy about some proposals i Germany f r a separate African Stateee n o either would have destroyed the settler-nativesocial system.They favoured a mitigation of Von Trotha's proposals on humane grounds, and the re-estabo lishmentof s t l r rule f r political reasons. ete
I. Helmut Bley.'Genesis: From Conquestt Mandate' i :Ronald Segal and Ruth F r t SULIIIIo n is, i w Afiictr: T c r . r . Trust, if r r r s ?of' . London.Andre Deutsch,1967.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


There was good reason for their fears.A majority i the German Reichstag n w r i favour of leaving the Herero their own territory,but t i proposal was ee n hs thwarted by legal objections raised by the German Colonial Office. Both the German Government and the settlers approved the decrees which guaranteed European supremacy and native dependency. With the ‘pacification’of the Herero and dwindling settler fears of another major African revolt,differences between the settlers and the Colonial Office increased. Following the destruction of African t i a society, the settlers believed that a semi-feudal system rbl should be based upon European-ownedfarms.There the Africans would be unfree labour, with little right t change employers, be fed badly s that they o o would not get too ‘high-spirited’, absolute power of punishment, including and whipping,would be i the hands of the European farmer (cf. Bley) :1 n
The subjugation of the Africans as the labouring class remained the basis of German policy i South West Africa. Its primary objective was t enable the German settlers t consolin o o date their position.This policy was determined by the agrarian structure of the colonial territory and remained unchanged even when the income from the diamond and copper industries covered the whole budget... the act of self-government,the educational policy and the land policy w r al subordinated t the primary objective of consolidating the German ee l o settlers.

With the f n l defeat of the Herero army i the Waterberg,Von Trotha had alia n e i most al the Herero i h s power, but a f w thousand escaped h s encirclement l n i and crossed the Omaheke Sandveld into Botswana (then a British protectorate). Only 20 per cent of the Hereros survived the war, and perhaps 60per cent of the Namas who rose f l y i revolt only after the Waterberg defeat.German losses ul n exceeded 2,000. Von Trotha declared his policy :

Inside German territory every Herero tribesman,armed or unarmed, with or without cattle wl be shot.No women and children wl be allowed i the territory: they wl be driven il il n il back t their people or f r d on.These are the l s words t the Herero nation from me,the o ie at o great General of the mighty German Emperor.

H stayed on as military governor for a year and,though Berlin countermanded e his orders, forced’ labour and starvation k l e thousands of the Hereros who ild had filteredback from Botswana or out of the Omaheke. Only 1,200Herero survived i Namibia and lossesthrough famine and slaughterwere heavy throughn out the country. The f n l decade of German rule is dealt with i The Natives o South West ia n f Africa and their Treatment by Germany (HMSO, 1918), which the British is n o Government compiled during the F r t World War i order t prepare its case for taking over the colony after the defeat of Germany. It alleged neglect of the social interest of the Namibians,deprivation of economic opportunities,denial of schooling, labour recruitment even among the people of Ovamboland (hithertolargely undisturbed by German colonization), and killings and hideous cruelties i f i t d on Namibian labour by the German settler farmers. Some of nlce o ra. these were brought t t i l On the defeat of Germany i 1918, her colonies were confiscated by the n other powers. It was the ultimate tragedy of the Namibians that their ‘liberation’from German rule came from a quarter from which they could expect only oppression,different i kind perhaps,but not i degree. n n
1. Bley, op. cit.


South African

The British and South African governments had long resented the German preshs ence on the Orange River.The reasons for t i were complex. Rhodes had dreamed of an Africa ruled by the English ‘race‘. Botha had planned the conquest of South West Africa some years before 1914;and Smuts referred t it as ‘partof our Afrikaner heritage’.English-speakingSouth A r o fi cans f l that the German settlers i Namibia sympathized with the Afrikaners, et n and so threatened the security of the State still recovering from the Boer war. Britain feared that Germany might disrupt the Cape route to India. O n the other hand,some liberals i England hoped that joint British-Gern man colonizationi Africa would improve the chances f r peace i Europe,and n o n eliminate the Portuguese and Belgians (tainted with the Congo massacres). Until the defeat of Germany the Herero massacres w r ignored. ee In 1915 South African troops overran Namibia,and both South Africa and Britain looked forward to the removal of the German presence after the war, and the annexation of Namibia. South Africa also looked forward to the annexation of East Africa.It was t be part of General Smuts’‘greatwhite communio t i southern Africa’.One newspaper summed up the South African position :1 y n
As i South West Africa so i East Africa,our fellow citizens of the Union of South Africa n n
wl very soon expel the German flag from the territory over which it has too long been sufil fered t fly.Wherever Germany rules there i tyranny and brutality, and no greater boon o s could be conferred upon the native races of Africa than t relieve them from the abominao tion of German misgovernment.

The Birmingham D i i Post wrote al.
. . .Anybody who has the slightest acquaintance with affairs i South Africa knows that the n late German South West Africa colony wl never be returned t its former owners. and il o that German East Africa wl also not be disposed of without some reference t the wishes il o of Union statesmen.

I. We.PteniMorning Nc11.s March 1 17). (20 9 Quoted in : Corn.Roger Louis,‘TheOrigins of the Sacred Trust’,in Segal and F r t (eds.), op.cit. is

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


There were various approaches t the colonial question after the war. Presio dent Wilson ofthe United Stateshad suggested a peace without territorial annexation. Smuts proposed that South Africa annex the colonies of the victors, including Mozambique and the Belgian Congo, t which would be added the o defeated German colony of South West Africa. British opinion was divided. ee e There w r some who agreed with South Africa’s annexation claims.Others l d and by Lloyd George agreed with the United States view :non-annexation, that ‘the desire and the wishes of the people must be the dominant factor’. The Labour Party advocated the ending of European colonialism and administration by a supra-nationalbody (presumably the League of Nations). The British Government agreed with American opinion regarding self-determination-understood as a desire t l v under British rule rather than t choose indepeno ie o ee dence. In fact, the wishes of the Namibian people w r never consulted.The British Blue Book on German atrocities was held as sufficient evidence of B i rt i h and South African good faith, of German brutality and-although this s hardly followed-of the acceptance by Namibians of South African suzerainty. Smuts had proposed a mandated territories plan. The mandate idea became an important component of the League of Nations system. A the Versailles Peace Conference i 1919 the German colonies were mant n o dated to neighbouring or t European powers under varying conditions. A class ‘C’ mandate was given t ‘ i Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the o Hs Government of the Union of South Africa’ (then still part of the British Empr) The territory was t be administered as an ‘integralportion’ of the manie. o o datory power, which pledged i s l t ‘promote t the utmost the material and tef o moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants’.The mandate syst m was described i the League of Nations Covenant (Article 22) as ‘asacred e n t u t of civilization’. rs The League repeatedly arraigned South Africa for its failure t uphold t i o hs ‘sacred trust’over the next twenty years. The old German ‘native’ laws were largely retained or expanded. Discriminatory education was retained,as was the pass system,enforced labour and the German practice of using convict labour.Africans continued t be arrested for o such crimes as insolence. White employers could arrest Africans. Some members of the Mandate Commission who had considered such practices as simply part of German misrule were shocked : they now found that Africans sil existtl ed merely t provide cheap labour for white mines or farms. o o hs o Land continued t be alienated,t i time t an influx of South African sett e s The northern peoples were kept i Ovamboland,outside what had been lr. n the ‘policezone’i German days, with no care for their social progress. The n League noted that twelve t m s as much money was spent on educating white ie children (one-tenthof the total) as on the Namibian ninetenths. In 1922 the Bondelswart people i the south were bombed by South Afrin o can military aircraft after their refusal t pay a dog tax. Defiance by the Rehoboth community three years later was more quietly handled. Bombs w r also ee dropped on the capital of the Ukwanyama Chief Ipumbu i Ovamboland,but n this received ltl publicity and was not brought t the notice of the League. ite o South African citizenship was granted t German settlers who, with the o o o newcomers from South Africa, helped t form an all-white electorate f r the



territory’slegislature.In view of German demands f r the return of their coloo nies and the growth of the Nazi movement, South Africa proposed the annexation of Namibia as a ‘ i t province’ i 1934,but this the League rejected. ffh n Nevertheless,South Africa gradually increased to grip its Namibia with a view t making incorporationinevitable. o The s i i of resistance was kept alive by one Namibian above al others: prt l the teacher and pastor Hosea Kutako,whom Maharero had nominated to lead the Herero people i his absence. Maharero’s e i e i Botswana ended only n xl n when h s dead body was carried back t Okahandja to the Herero chiefs’burial i o ground i 1923-on 26 August, the day on which the guerrilla struggle was n launched i 1966 and that is kept by Namibians as their National Day. n Kutako had fought Germans i 1904 and had been wounded. He gave the n Herero and the other groups a continuing sense of Namibian nationhood and typified the ‘no surrender’ s i i of South Africa’s unwilling and maltreated prt wards. Until his death i 1970 a the age of 103,South Africa recognized him n t e not as Herero chief but only as ‘seniorheadman’.Y t he was known throughout the territory,from the far north where he spent his boyhood, t the souo a e ly thern lands of his l t r a l Simon Witbooi,as a man entirely dedicated to the saving of h s people and their ultimate liberation. i Hosea Kutako, more than any other. prevented a final and irrevocable n South African takeover when the League of Nations,which signally failed i its peace-keeping role and i cases of aggression between Member States during n the thirties,was wound up a the end of the Second World War. t


Namibia and the United Nations

The United Nations replaced mandates by trusteeship,and set up a Trusteeship Council t guide the former mandated territories t independence. o o South Africa refused to allow Namibia t become a trustee territory,and o t i d t prepare the ground for incorporation by holding a ‘plebiscite’and re o claiming a majority for incorporation. The result was not accepted by the United Nations :Namibians had voted through their c i f - l government aphesal pointees;the question had been put i a misleading way i many cases; one obn n server even noted that the number of votes recorded was greater than the figure for total population. Kutako and other leaders sent word to the exiled Herero king i Botswana n that ‘theheritage of your father’s orphans is t be taken from them’.A young o English clergyman called Michael Scott was eventually sent t the United o Nations with a petition from the Namibians,and t i opened a new period of hs struggle which, i its first twenty-fiveyears,has seen a consolidation of South n n Africa’sde facto power i the territory and the total removal of its de jure authority t administer it. o The right of South Africa t administer Namibia has been debated a every o t session of the United Nations General Assembly since 1946, and has been the subject of no less than ten decisions by the International Court of Justice (set up by the United Nations a The Hague). t o South Africa dropped its proposal for incorporation, declined t accept trusteeship,but announced that it would ‘uphold the s i i of the mandate’. prt Successive United Nations commissions t i d t secure trusteeship.The Internare o n tional Court unanimously decided i 1950 that the mandate was still i exisn tence. In 1960, the African countries which had been members of the League sought a ‘contentiousjudgement’(i.e. one that could be enforced by the Securit Council); they asked the court t require South Africa t carry out the many o o date,end apartheid,and report t the United Nations on its administration.Six o years l t r the court reversed its own e r i r decision and said that it could not ae ale give a ruling,as the petitioners ‘had not established any right or interest i the n matter’.



The issue of apartheid had become crucial and both the Namibian leaders and the General Assembly f l bound t take action despite the court’srefusal et o to pass judgement. The General Assembly resolved i 1966 to ‘terminatethe mandate’. Subsen quent resolutions set up a council for Namibia to bring about Namibian independence,and requested the Security Council ‘totake effective measures to ensure the removal of South Africa’s presence from the territory’. In June 1971 the International Court of Justice declared the South African presence i the territory illegal, and prescribed Member State obligations n towards securing expulsion.The legal position is thus unequivocal but f w prace t c l measures have been taken t bring the r a situation into line. ia o el Following a Security Council resolution i 1972, the new Secretary-Genern e l al,Kurt Waldheim,v s t d Namibia and m t representatives of al groups.Seviie eral black political groups and also several of the Churches gave him details of oppression,and called for the creation of a ‘unitaryNamibian State’. The Secretary-Generalrecommended that a mediator be appointed t negotiate indepeno dence.Alfred Escher,a Swiss diplomat. was duly appointed,and v s t d Namiiie bia i October 1972. n Despite attempts by the South African Government t stage-manage the o v s t D Escher held seventy-fourmeetings with various groups and gained the ii. r general impression that the people wanted a united and independent Namibia. The South African prime minister refused any solution on these lines but suggested the creation of an advisory council of representatives of the various regions,this council t be under h s special responsibility.This would,i fact, o i n mean a federal approach t the ’homelands’policy i Namibia. but would not o n guarantee them any power or i any way reduce the power of the whites i minn n eral-richareas outside the Namibian ‘homelands’. ie o o The prime minister t i d for a tm t give the impression t the press that re a compromise had been reached,but t i was refuted by the Secretary-General. hs The Security Council agreed t extend the deadline for the talks to April 1973; o the Secretary-Generalwas t press the South African Government t define o o o more specifically its attitude t Namibian self-determination. The talks were finally called off by a resolution adopted on 1 1 December


Apartheid and the ‘homelands’

The old Boer dictum of ‘noequality i Church or State’became law with the n advent t power of the Afrikaner nationalist government i 1948. The aparto n heid policy, which sought to separate black and white i every sphere of l f n ie and t entrench for ever the power of white over black,duly made its way into o legislation affecting Namibia. The administration of the territory came more firmly under the South African Government,and the Ministry of Bantu Affairs brought Namibia under the centralized control exercised over Africans i the n republic. Apartheid laws were implemented despite the claim t be upholding a o United Nations mandate : ‘group areas’,Bantu education,‘influx control’,the c Suppression of Communism A t and the abrogation of the rule of law. The ‘homelands’ policy excludes Africans from wealth, prosperity or p l t c l conoiia t o i South Africa i compulsory exchange for that one-seventhof the country rl n n most devoid of wealth or resources.Namibia has its own ‘NativeNations’A t c, setting up no less than nine ‘homelands’, mostly outside the zones of good arable and grazing land. Thousands of Namibians have already l s their homes and have been ot removed t distant places. o The black people of Windhoek,for example,were robbed of their freehold rights and moved t a rigorously controlled location some miles from the city. o A protest against the move i 1959 was m t a Windhoek with police gunfire: n e t twelve killed and ffy wounded. This was a key event i the crowded years it n 1959-61 which saw the birth ofa new,militant,liberation movement, a national movement across those t i a barriers which South African policy is designed t rbl o reinforce. Apartheid has been enforced against a background of accelerated exploitation.Namibia had been a useful refuge for landless Boer farmers during the prewar depression.New civil service and railway jobs brought a further influx.This was before the authorities realized the tremendous mineral potential. Namibia today is not only considered essential for strategic reasons,but is also a-source of great wealth-all of it extracted a the expense of its native population. t Diamonds,copper,uranium,a variety of other minerals,fishing along the



850mile coastline,Karakul (‘Persian lamb’) pelts,and cattle bring great wealth t South African and foreign investor+many of the latter from Member States o o of the United Nations which are accordingly reluctant t take the steps which may be necessary t prevent South Africa from flouting the authority of the o United Nations. Under the South West Africa Affairs Act (1969)the South African Government increased its control over Namibia : justice, prisons, arms, explosives, labour,water,posts, telegraphs, telephones,radio. mining, agriculture,fishing, publications, entertainments and race relations.A n all-white legislative assembly i responsible for some aspects of the administration of justice;education, s social welfare and health services for whites; local authorities, and roads and works i white areas.Company taxes,diamond royalties and revenue from minn ing are now payable direct to the South African Government. This Act virtually incorporated Namibia into South Africa. Under the Development of Self-government for Native Nations of South West Africa Act. separate ’nations’were to be established, each with its own legislativecouncil.The first of these was Ovamboland,established i 1969. n Both Acts followed from Odendaal Commission recommendations that ‘homelands’ provided for each population group and that the South African be Government take over some of the functions of the all-whitelegislative council. The commission recommended that ten ‘homelands’ set up and given some be measure of politic21 independence.The economic structure should be maintained,however,and the South African Government should remain the final authority i al areas. Because of the number of groups which had no reserve of n l their own and the number of Herero and Nama living outside their reserves additional land should be set aside for African occupation. The commission proposed that the African ‘homelands’ should eventually occupy 39.6 per cent of the territory,while the white area should be reduced to 4 . per cent. In 1964. 41 when the commission reported, there w r 73,464 whites (to be allocated ee 4 . per c n ) and 452.540Africans (tobe allocated 39.6per cent). 41 et. The recommendationsimplied large transfers of peoples.If completely applied. 74 per cent of the Herero would have t move. 87 per cent of the Nama, o 94per cent of the Damara,and 95 per cent of the Bushmen. Table 2 gives the number of Africans by population group and the number living i the ‘homelands’ calculated by the South African Department of Stan as t s i s i May 1970. itc n
TABLE Africans by population group 2.
Yumber In ‘homelands‘
(no1 neoesarily their own)

Numher in ‘homelands‘
(not nececcnrliy

ihcir own1

Ovambo Okavango East Caprivian K a olioveider


. . .~. ... . .

342.455 292,210 49.577 47.605 25,009 14.967 6.367 6.285 7.736, 64.97j
~ ~ ~ ~~





49.203 26,460 21.909 6.757 3.719 844 14.756 -~ 3 3 746,338 420.379
. .

.. . .

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


The ‘Coloured’ communities w r t be given partly elected councils,some ee o with,and some without,a t r i o i l base.The 1 , 0 nomadic ‘bushmen’ t ertra 200 are o be concentrated a Tsumkwe,and put t work. t o In l n with the Odendaal Commission’sreport,the Development of Selfie government for Native Nations i South West Africa Amendment A t (1 973) n c ie provided that,when the t m was deemed ripe,the State President,after consultation with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and with the legislative council concerned,might declare a ‘native area’ self-governing and permit it t have its own flag and national anthem. However, ‘indepeno il native dence’wl not be complete.The legislative council of the ‘self-governing’ area wl not be permitted t deal with military organization,arms, foreign afil o fairs,internal security,the control of members of the South African police who wl remain i the ‘self-governing’ il n territories,railways,harbours,natural roads, aviation,currency,banking,customs and excise,the control of universities,and the entry of persons who are not members of the particular ‘native nation.’ ‘Self-government’ thus severely circumscribed,excluding many powers noris mally considered essential t independence. o But it is even further restricted.Any Bls which legislative councils may inil troduce t amend or repeal A t of the South African parliament which affect o cs o their peoples must first be submitted t the State President, who retains the right t refer them back t the particular council for further consideration.The o o provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa can rule on the validity of any enactment of the legislative council,and the State President il o retains h s rights i regard t the High Court.Appeals wl continue t be heard i n o by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. O n 27 April 1973, Ovambo was declared a self-governing area, with its ‘capital’t Ongwediva. a The legislativecouncil had f f y s xmembers: five designated by each of the it-i seven t i a authorities (thirty-fivenon-elected), three elected from each of the rbl seven t i a areas (twenty-oneelected). Adults over 18 years i possession of rbl n registration cards w r permitted t vote. ee o ee o l Prior t the elections which w r t select the twenty-one members, al o meetings i Ovambo (with the exception of church services, entertainments and n meetings called by o f c a s and chiefs) were prohibited unless they had prior aufiil n fi thorizationi writing from the native commissioner appointed by the South A r can Government.It was made an offence t say or t do anything l k l t uno o iey o dermine the authority of the State,o f c a s of the State,the present Ovambo fiil government,or o f c a s of that government, chiefs or headmen. It was also fiil made an offence t make an ‘intimidating’ o statement,t f i t obey a lawful oro al o der given by a chief,or t treat him without due respect. o The chiefs owe their position t the South African Government, which o relies on having a docile ‘traditional’ structure. These provisions thus made any criticism of fundamental political issues i l g l The government backed ‘Ovamlea. bo government’ by the Ovamboland Independence Party, the only party it recognized and permitted to hold meetings without prior approval. The percentage poll was 2.5 per cent:97.5per cent of the Ovambos either abstained or boycotted the elections. On 4 May 1973, Kvango became a self-governing area, with Rundu as



capital.The constitution provided that half of the legislative council would be n elected,and half nominated.Kvango is an area i which the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO)and other opposition parties are poorly represented and i which there are no political parties of any type.The poll was n 66.2 cent. per As a concession t the United Nations the South African Government has o o o promised t establish an advisory council (see above), and began t establish it i 1973.Representatives were to be nominated by the African legislative counn c l ,the Bantu authorities,and the whites and Coloureds. is As already indicated,African representation is limited on is legislative t councils and the Bantu 'authorities'are i fact controlled by government. Furn ther t ensure a subservient 'advisory council', the Herero representatives were o chosen from the politically conservativeeast.But the Namas sent no representatives,the Kaokoland did not nominate,the chief of the Mbanderos walked out, and the Coloureds withdrew their t o representatives. w



Traditional leaders l k Hosea Kutako and Samuel Witbooi carried on the interie fe is nal struggle after the Second World War. A t r the Frt World War, when the League of Nations appeared powerless t check South Africa, the t i a o rbl n structures and the Churches,especially i the Herero and Ovambo lands, had canalized resentment. New,post-colonialgovernments i Africa and Asia; a strong Afro-Asian n block a the United Nations; and a new consciousness of Africa as a coherent t entity l d t a search for new methods of political struggle i Namibia. e o n Local movements that came into being a the end of the f f i s quickly t ite linked up with national parties. The organizational groundwork was done outside Namibia by migrant workers i the Cape when security police surveillance n (especially after the Windhoek shootings i 1959) hampered local organizers, n ee exiled or gaoled on specious charges. who w r often house-arrested, Namibians who had escaped t seek education abroad joined up with polito i a fugitives and,despite political differences,combined t petition the United cl o Nations after the InternationalCourt had agreed t hear oral petitions by indio viduals. Delegations from the new parties pressed the Namibian cause a meetings t of the Organization of African Unity from its inception i 1963, and a many n t world conferences.With the failure of the International Court t make a ruling o i 1966, one of the parties, the South West African Peoples’ Organization n (SWAPO),from its headquarters i exile i Tanzania,announced that it would n n no longer await the deliberations of the world community. In August 1966 it launched a guerrilla attack i northern Namibia which has been maintained den spite early setbacks and South African counter-offensives. Herman Toivo ja Toivo,one of the founders of S W A P O , was among the thirty-eightNamibians, al S W A P O men, put on t i l i Pretoria i 1968 on l ra n n charges of terrorism.Hs f n l address t the court is a classic statement of h s i ia o i people’sclaim t self-determination: o
W are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not n o w and wl not in the future rece il
ognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us i which we have no say; to treat our n



country as if it were your property and us as i you were our masters. W e have always f regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country.

Ja Toivo confirmed h s people’sright to take up arms and said i
I know that the struggle wl be long and bitter. I also know that m y people wl wage that il il struggle,whatever the cost. Only when w e are granted our independence wl the struggle il il stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us as equals of the whites wl there be peace between us.

World pressure was brought t bear on South Africa and no death penalties o w r demanded,but twenty-oneof the men w r sent to Robben Island ‘forthe ee ee t r of their natural lives’.Ja Toivo,who had not taken part i any offensive em n action,being under house arrest i h s home during the 1 6 campaign, was n i 96 sentenced t f f e n years’hard labour. o ite Winning Namibian independence involves both military and diplomatic action-guerrilla warfare i northern Namibia. and political work from offices i n n Dar es Salaam,Lusaka,Cairo,Algiers,London,Stockholm,Helsinki and New York; contact is maintained with the growing number of students who have managed t get out of Namibia to obtain an education elsewhere. o More than 500 delegates from churches,trade unions,political parties and groups al over the world attended a Namibia International Conference conl vened by SWAPO i Brussels on 26-28 May 1972.The conference adopted an n eleven-pointprogramme which aims a the complete economic,political,diplot matic,sporting and cultural isolation of South Africa. Ltl news comes out of Namibia about SWAPO’sguerrilla activities. ite South Africa claims that they are almost non-existentyet keeps a large body of troops i the Caprivi Strip,and has several times announced casualties,somen t m s said t be from land-mineexplosions. The pro-government newspaper, ie o Die Vuderlmd,wrote,after the killing of two policemen i 1971,of the n
shocking realisation that the Republic is involved in a titanic struggle. The next few years may prove decisive for our country’s future and the survival of whites in southern Africa.

The scale of operations may not warrant such alarm.One v e is that the auiw thorities i South Africa themselves exaggerate what they c l ‘terrorism’i n al n Namibia t frighten the w i e community into cohesion and support for authoo ht ritarian measures.Physically the land does not favour guerrilla warfare,entry is extremely difficult, and the number of guerrilla fighters is small. Yet they persist, and South Africa’s failure t crush them completely after easy early victoo ries makes them a continual focus of national resistance. The South African authorities regard them as a serious threat.Large numbers of police and troops now patrol the northern sector,and guard the large military a r i l a Katima Mulilo, the administrative centre of Rundu, and the ifed t incipient hydroelectric scheme around the Ruacana Falls on the Kunene River. The northern frontier involves Portugal (through Angola), and (through the Caprivi Strip) Zambia and Botswana (independent,and sympathetic to the liberation movement but inhibited by its relationship w t South Africa). ih

Racism and apartheid i southern Africa n


It is i the eastern part of the Caprivi Strip and the Okavango portion of n Ovamboland that most of the clashes between SWAPO guerrillas and South African security forces have taken place. The guerrillas recovered from an early reverse when the SWAPO camp a Omgulumbashe was surprised and key pert sonnel k l e or captured, but a further severe blow followed i 1967 when ild n Tobias Hainyeko,the SWAPO commander,was shot dead i a gun battle on a n launch i the Zambesi.Hainyeko died covering the escape of twenty comrades n he was t lead into the Caprivi Strip. o Guerrilla clashes continued a a f i l steady level of intensity over the next t ary f w years. During the first s x months of 1973, i nine separate incidents (ine i n cluding ambushes of patrols, the capture of a South African arms depot,the use of land mines and the shooting down of a South African helicopter), sixteen South African policemen or servicemen were injured and five killed. The smaller parties i Namibia (the first two have small external missions) n include the South West African National Union (SWANU),one of whose leaders, Gerson Weii,is also imprisoned on Robben Island ; the South West African National United Front (SWANUF) the National Unity Democratic Organiza; which collaborates with the council of the Herero chiefs and suption (NUDO) ports Kutako’ssuccessor,Clemens Kapuuo,who is not recognized by the South African authorities. There are also regional groupings. The ‘Red Nation’ Name Committee i s resisting displacement due t take place i the new carve-upof Namibia. The o n Rehoboth People’sParty leads vigorous local opposition t South African cono stitutional and economic policies. There is also resistance i the churches, i n n workers’ compounds i the main mining centres and ports, and even secretly n within the existing ‘homeland legislatures’.To the regret of many Namibian leaders,there is practically no liberal or left-wingopposition among the white community;a f w may work secretly against the administration but they must e perforce work i secret. n Radical change thus seems possible only through world intervention or guerrilla action. Many,including government-paid chiefs and Bantustan councillors,believe that South Africa wl hold on and that the only solution i to come t terms il s o with South African rule and apartheid. But t i attitude t apartheid is less hs o common i Namibia than it is i South Africa. It is widely known that virtually n n every nation i the world has condemned South Africa’soccupation.Namibians n say: ‘Howcan South Africa forever prevent the whole world from giving us our country back? O n the other hand there is also scepticism because of United Nations failure to effect change. But the International Court advisory opinion i 1 7 declaring South Africa’s occupation i l g l has made a very deep imn 91 lea pression,and South Africa has been unable t suppress news of student protest o and petitions t t i a and Bantustan leaders. o rbl Towards the end of 1971 there was a widespread surge of resentment against the contract labour system,one of the fundamental features of apartheid o o n i Namibia. Any Namibian wishing t leave his ‘homeland’t work i the n o mines or i industry i white areas must first apply t the South West African n n Native Labour Association (SWANLA) which grades him according t age, o health and s on,and then allocates him to an employer. H has no choice,and o e



must sign a contractbinding h m f r a period of twelve t eighteen months. H e i i o o s not allowed t take his family w t him, and i housed i a compound during o ih s n worker would be likely t earn just over o his period of employment.A Grade ‘A’ E a month,and a miner just over E5. 4 Following the International Court decision i 1 7 resentment surfaced.A n 91 strike which seems t have begun among the Windhoek municipal workers on o o 20,000workers 13 December spread quickly t the mines.By mid-January 1972, had come out on strike,effectively bringing the economy t a standstill.Most of o the strikers were from Ovamboland but this was because most of the contract labourers are Ovambos;support also came from other parts of the country. The South African Minister of Bantu Administration attempted to get the strikers back t work by proposing discussions with the Ovamboland legislative o council on the future of the contract labour system. When this had no effect harsher methods were applied.Twelve suspected leaders w r charged with usee o n ing violence t prevent others from working.This succeeded only i making the strikers and their supporters more determined. No new recruits could be found to take over the jobs of the dismissed strikers who were transported back t their ‘homelands’, there w r widespread demonstrations and meetings o and ee i favour of the strike. n Eventually a state of emergency was declared i northern Namibia, with a n complete embargo on news. Such reports as did leak out suggested that there was a great deal of extremely b t e fighting,involving several deaths on both itr sides.Although many were forced back to work the labour situation had still not returned t ‘normal’ year later,and there continued go-slows.As a result, o a im profit margins fl drastically for the f r s involved.The authorities can claim a el technical victory but w r left i no doubt about the seething African disconee n tent. Nine opposition groups including SWAPO,the Rehoboths, and SWANU formed a national convention which held the first political r l y i Namibia’s al n history a the Katatura Compound,Windhoek,on 1 March 1973,just prior t t 8 o D Vorster’sv s t t take the chair at the first meeting of the government’s‘Adr ii o visory Council for South West Africa’.This council is actively opposed by SWAPO.In August 1973,a protest was organized i Katatura against a v s t by n ii D Vorster t attend the South West Africa Nationalist Party congress.Tanks r o sealed off the area concerned,and one protester was killed. In November 1973,a new form of repression reflected the increased level of political activity i Namibia. More than 1 0 people,after being detained by the n 0 ee n South African police,w r handed over to the tribal authorities and flogged i public.The South African Government justified this on the grounds that it was the revival of an old tribal tradition. O n 1 November 1973,three members of the SWAPO Youth League, in6 wr cluding its chairman and vice-chairman, e e found guilty of charges under the Sabotage Act and sentenced t eight years’imprisonment.In December 1973, o SWAPO held a three-dayconference i Namibia.In 1974 government reprisals n w r intensified.Those arrested included SWAPO chairman Meroro, the assisee tant secretary, acting chairman of the Youth League, and several others. As the intense political activity continues throughout Namibia, increased numbers of arrests reflect the concern of the South African authorities.

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


It must be underlined,in conclusion,that one of the main aims of the liberation movements and of most of the opposition is the independence of Namibia of as a territorial whole, and not the ‘independence’ separate native ‘nations’.

Further reading

ABRAHAMS, Tt~ll,freedom. Peter. London,Faber &Faber,1954. ADAM. Herbert. Modernizing racial discrimination: South Afiica'spolitical dynamics.Berkeley and London,University of California Press,1970. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS. Ncitiorial Congress:a short Izistorj..London, 1971. A fiicciti BALLINGER, Margaret.From union t apartheid: a trek to isolation.Cape Town and Johano nesburg.Juta,1969. BANTON, Michael. Race relations.London,Tavistock Publications.1967. BENSON, Mary. The struggle,for birthright.Harmondsworth, a Penguin Books, 1966. BRITISH COUNCILCHURCHES. OF T e,fiituref South Afkica: a stud], B i i h Christians. h o by r t s London,SCM Press,1965. BRYANT. A.T.T e Z l peoples: US they were before the white muii cutne. 2nd ed. Pieterh uu maritzburg,Shuter &Shooter,1967. BUNTING. Brian. T e rise qf' the South African Reich. Harmondsworth. Penguin Books. h 1964. CALPIN, T e South Afiican way of'I(fe:vahres and ideals of'umultiracial societv.MelG. h H. bourne,London and Toronto,William Heinemann Ltd. 1953. CARTER, Gwendolen M.(ed.). The politics of inequulitv: South Afiica since 1948.2nd ed. Thames &Hudson,1959. CARTER, Gwendolen M. al. South Africci 's Transkei: the politics qf domestic colonialism. et Northwestern University Press, 1967. CAWOOD, Lesley. The Churches cind ruce relutions i South Africa Johannesburg,South n African Institute of Race Relations,1964. COMITE ANTI-APARTHEID. histoire de l spoliation des terres et de I'exploitation du Breve a travail en Afrique du Sud.Les tenipsmodernes (Paris), no. 216,M a y 1964. DAVENPORT, The Afiikcinor Bond: the historv of' South Ajiican political party, T. H. R. a 1880-1911. London,Oxford University Press,1966. DEBROGLIO, Chris. South Africa: racisnz in sport. London, Christian Action Publications, 1970. DEKIEWIET, The imperia1,factorn South Africa: a study i politics und economics. C.W. i n London,Cass,1965. DESMOND. Cosmas.T e ciisccirciedpeople: cin account o Afkiccin resettlement in South Africa. h f Harmondsworth,Penguin Books. 1971. FIRST, One hundred and seventeen days: un account o confinementand interrogation Ruth. f
imier the South A.fi.ican ninety-day detention law. Harmondsworth,Penguin Books.


Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


FIRST, e a .T e South African connection: Western investment i South Africa. LonRuth t l h n don,Maurice Temple Smith,1972. FRIEDLANDER, ( d ) Jan Smuts remembered: a centennial tribute.London,Wingate, Zelda e . .

GALBRAITH, John. Reluctant empire: Biih policy on the South African frontier 1834-1854. rts Los Angeles,University of California Press, 1963. GORDIMER, Nadine. A guest ofhonour. London,Cape,1971. GORDON, Theodore. The growth o Boer opposition to Kruger 1890-1895. Cape Town Cecil f and London,Oxford University Press, 1971. HAIN, Don’tplav with apartheid: the background t the Stop the ‘3event.v Tour camPeter. o
paign. London,Allen &Unwin, 1971.

HOROWITZ, Thepolitical economv o South Africa. London,Weidenfeld &Nicolson, Ralph. f

HORRELL, Action, reaction and counteraction: a review o non-white opposition t Muriel. f o
apartheidpolicy.Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations,1968.
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Legislation and race relations : a summary of the main South African laws which affect race relationships.Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations, 1963. HORRELL, (compiler). The education o the coloured community i South Africa Muriel f n 1652 t 1970.Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations, 1970. o . A survey o race relations i South Africa. Published yearly. Johannesburg, South f n African Institute of Race Relations, 1963,1964and yearly t 1973. o

HUTT, W.H. economics o the colour bar: a stud-v o the economic origins and conseThe f f
quences o racial segregation i South Africa. London,AndrC Deutsch,1964. f n Implications o the activities o the mining industry and other international companies having f f investments i South West Africa. (UN.A/5840, January 1965.) n 5 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS. South Africa and the rule o law.Geneva,1 6 . f 90 INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE FUND. AND AID South Africa: arms and apartheid.London,Chris90 tian Action Publications,1 7 . . South Africa: t i lby torture-the case o the 22. London,Christian Action Publicara f

tions,1970. JABAVU, Noni. Drawn i colour: African contrasts.London,Murray, 1 6 . n 90 . Ochre people: scenesfrom South African life.London,Murray, 1956. KADALIE, Clements. M life and the ICU: the autobiography o a black trade unionist i y f n 90 South Africa. London,Cass, 1 7 . KARIS, Thomas;CARTER, Gwendolen M. From protest t challenge: a documentary history o o African politics i South A r c . 3 vols. Stanford,Calif.,Hoover Institution Press, f n fia Stanford University,1972. KUPER, An African bourgeoisie: race,class and politics i South Africa. New Haven Leo. n and London,Yale University Press,1965. . Passive resistance i South Africa. London,Cape, 1956. n LAGUMA, The stone country.Berlin,Seven Seas Publishers,1967. Alex. LEGUM, Colin.The United Nations and southern Africa. Sussex,University of Sussex,1971. LEGUM, Colin; LEGUM, Margaret. South Africa: crisis for the West. New York, Praeger,

LEWIN. Julius.Politics and law i South Africa: essays on race relations. London, Merlin n Press, 1963. LUTHULI, Albert. L t my people go: an autobiograph-v. e London,Collins, 1 6 . 92 MACCRONE, attitudes i South Africa.London,Oxford University Press,1957. I.D. Race n MACMILLAN, Miller. Bantu, Boer and Briton: the making o the South African William f nativeproblem.Oxford,Clarendon Press,1963. MANDELA. Iam prepared to die.London,Christian Action Publications,1970. Nelson.
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No easy walk t freedom. London,Heinemann. 1965. o

Further reading


MARLOWE,Cecil Rhodes: the anatomy oj'empire. John. London,Elek,1972. MARQUARD, Thepeoples andpolicies of South Africa. 2nd ed. London,Oxford UniverLeo.
s t Press, 1960. iy

MAYER, Philip. Townsmen or tribesmen: conservatism and the process of urbanization i a n
South African city.Cape Town,Oxford University Press.

MEINTJFS, GeneralLouis Botha: a biography.London,Cassell,1970. Johannes. MOLENTO, Africa and South Africa: the implications o South Africa's 'outwardRobert. f
London,Africa Bureau. 1971. looking'policy.

MORRIS, R.The ictashing of the spears: a history qf'the rise ofthe Z l nation under Donald uu
Shaka und its,full n the Z l irar of'1879. i uu London. Cape. 1966.

MPHALELE, Down Second Avenue. London,Faber &Faber,1974. Ezekiel. PATON, Hofkmjr. London,Oxford University Press,1964. Alan. PATTERSON, Colour and culture in South A-fricu. Sheila. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
. -

1953. The last trek: a stud? of the Boer people und the Ajiikaner nation. London, Routledge &Kegan Paul,1957. PIENAAR, S.; SAMPSON.Anthony. South Africa: two views of'separute dei~rlopmeiit. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. RANDALL, A taste qfpoircr. Johannesburg,SPROCAS,1973. Peter. REEVES.Ambrose. Shooting a Sharperillr: the agonj' of' South Africu. London, Gollancz, t 1960. Report of'the Commission o Enquiry into South W s Afiica Affairs,196243. (Odendaal f et Report.)Pretoria,Government of South Africa. 1964. (RP. 12/1964.) No. Report qf the natives of'South West Africa and their treatment by Germmiy. London, HMSO, 1918.(Cd.9146.) ROBERTSON, Liberalisni in South Afiica 1948-1963.Oxford,Clarendon Press. 1971. Janet. ROGERS. Barbara.South A,fiica'.s i Britain. London,Africa Bureau. 1971. stake n ROUX, Edward. Time longer than rope: a histoiy oj the black inan's struggle jbr ,firedomn i South A,frica. ed.University of Wisconsin Press,1964. 2nd SACHS.E. The anutomj'?f'upar.theid. S. London,C l e ' Ltd. 1965. olts SCOTT, Michael.Infhce offiur. Published by the author,1948. SEGAL. Ronald ; FIRST, (eds.).South West A,fiicn. Ruth London.Andri.Deutsch,1967. SIMONS, J.: SIMONS.R. Cluss and colour in South Afkicu 1850-1950. London, Penguin H. E. African Library,1969. STORKE. Olav;WIDSTRAND, The U N - O AU Confewice on Soiitheni Africa.Oslo, Carl (eds.). Y-14 April 1973.2 vols. Uppsala,Scandinavia Institute of African Studies,1973. SUNDKLER, G. B. Bantuprophets in South Aj>icn.2nd ed. London. Oxford University Press, 16. 91 THION, Le pouvoir pile ou l racisnie .siid-ufiicuin.Paris,Editions du Seuil,1969. Serge. e UNESCO. Apurtheid: its cffkcts on c~hictitioti, ,scicvice, culture tint1 itzjhiution.2nd ed. Paris, 1973. VANDENBERGHE. Pierre. South Afiica: U si i conflict.Middletown,Conn.,Wesleyan t& n University Press, 1965. VANDER HORST, The effects of industrialization on race relations i South Africa. Sheila. n In : Guy Hunter (ed.), I~i~Listririli~rition race relutions: a sjanposiimi. London. and Oxford University Press, 1965. VANDERPOLL, The Jameson ruid. Cape Town and London,Oxford University Press, Jean. 1951. VANJAARSVELD, F. The Afrikaner' interpretution qf South A, A. . Y fiican history. Cape Town. Simondium Publishers(Pty)Ltd,1964. VATCHER, William Henry. White Laager: the rise qf Afkikaner nationalism. London, Pall M l Press. 1965. al

Racism and apartheid in southern Africa


Verbatim record of the South West African cases, International Court of Justice, The Hague. In particular CR 65/73 and CR 65/71. WALSHE, The rise of African nationalism in South Africa: the African National ConPeter. gress 1912-1952. London, Hurst, 1970. WILSON, MAFEJE, Langa: a study o social groups in an African township. Monica; Archie. f Cape Town,Oxford University Press, 1963. WILSON, THOMPSON, Monica; Leonard (eds.). Oxfordhistory ofsouth Africa. 2 vols. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969. WRIGHT, Quincy. Mandates under the League of Nations.Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930.

IA.241 SHC.74/D.78/A

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