Abstract People often have a tendency to acquire and retain false beliefs, despite available evidence to the contrary

, especially when the belief concerns some positive description of the self. Such tendency has been termed self-deception. According to Robert Trivers, selfdeception evolved in order for people to better deceive others, because when people believe the lie themselves, they are less likely to be caught lying to others. An oft-cited example of self-deception is people’s tendency to judge an attractively enhanced version of their photograph to be their actual image. The present study replicated such result but failed to find evidence to support the idea that enhancement in self-recognition is synonymous with self-deception. The idea that self-deception might have adaptive value was also not supported.

“The power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them...To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just as long as it is needed, to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the reality which one denies - all this is indispensably necessary.” George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four

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Introduction Self-deception is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Traditionally, scholars in psychology and philosophy have thought of self-deception as analogical to deception of others (DeWeese-Boyd, 2012). Hence, deception occurs when agent A convinces agent B of some proposition p, while simultaneously believing its negation, ~p. Self-deception, on the other hand, is when A and B are in fact the same agent (Haight, 1980). As such, selfdeception is virtually equivalent to what Orwell had famously called “doublethink”. However, modelling self-deception after interpersonal deception results in at least two major problems. First, it gives rise to two “paradoxes” or puzzles of self-deception. The static puzzle concerns the alleged impossibility of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind. The dynamic puzzle concerns the impossibility of intentionally deceiving oneself – how does the self-deceiver knowingly acquire the false belief ~p, if she was aware of its falsehood the whole time? (Mele, 2001). Second, it renders any empirical study of self-deception very difficult, as it is almost impossible to verify whether the individual in question is truly self-deceived, i.e. holding two contradictory beliefs at the same time. That said, there have been two studies to date, which claimed to demonstrate existence of self-deception using the dual-belief framework. The first study by Gur & Sackeim (1979) used the fact that people do not like the sound of their own voice. They asked their subjects to listen to a tape recording of different voices and report whenever they think they can hear their own voice. The subjects’ galvanic skin response was also measured. It was shown that while the subjects sometimes failed to report hearing their own voice, the skin always got it right. In another elegant experiment, Quattrone & Tversky (1984) demonstrated that people shift their tolerance to pain in order

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to suit a favourable interpretation of such tolerance. The subjects were first asked to submerge their forearms in cold water until they could not bear it anymore. Subsequently, they were told that either increased or decreased tolerance to pain was indicative of “a healthy heart”. Most subjects denied consciously trying to adjust their tolerance, even though the results showed a clear shift in the desirable direction. While both aforementioned experiments demonstrate a discrepancy between the subjects’ overt behaviour and their awareness of such behaviour, it does not follow that they held two contradictory beliefs simultaneously. Even if we accept the notion that one of the beliefs could be stored in the unconscious, while the other was acted on consciously (Gur & Sackeim, 1979) neither of the studies offers direct evidence that this is indeed happening. Therefore many scholars have more recently preferred a version of what I call a motivational account of self-deception (Mele, 1997; Mele, 2001; Trivers, 2000; Van Leeuwen, 2007). On this reading, a number of varying definitions have been put forward such as “active misrepresentation of reality to the conscious mind” (R Trivers, 2000) or “treatment of relevant data in a motivationally biased way” (Mele, 1997). While, the nuances of various definitions of self-deception are outwith the scope of this article, I wish to emphasise their common underlying assumption that a sufficient condition for selfdeception is favouring one kind of information (usually the favourable one) over another, in accordance with ones’ goals and motivations. Another longstanding tradition in psychology, which dates back to Freud is to study self-deception in intrapersonal terms. On such reading, self-deception is an expression of “ego defence” (Freud, 1946) or a form “psychological immune system” attuned to protecting one’s mental wellbeing (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). However, according to Robert Trivers (1976/2006; Trivers, 1985; Hippel & Trivers, 2011) an intrapersonal account of self-deception is incomplete and we should turn to studying 3

self-deception in interpersonal terms. His original hypothesis is that self-deception might have evolved as a means of deceiving others more efficiently. Put simply - if you were to tell a lie, it would be more convincing if you believed in it yourself. The rationale behind such explanation is threefold: First, people give away a number of cues associated with lying and deception such as overall nervousness, increased vocal pitch (DePaulo et al., 2003), pausing or simplified sentence structure (Vrij et al., 2006). However, when engaging in self-deception, the individuals believe the falsehood themselves and would not give off such cues (Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Second, upon discovering deception, attribution of deceitful intent is essential in determining who to seek retribution from (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Self-deceived individuals are by definition not aware of their intention to deceive, thus are less likely to be punished if the deception is exposed. Third, in addition to Trivers’ arguments, I believe there might be at least one more reason for why self-deception evolved for interpersonal purposes. Being unaware of one’s own deception might serve as a “buffer” which protects from retribution. Challenging a deceiver might be costly if he is deeply self-deceived and the potential challenger might be aware of this cost and even withdraw from seeking retribution in order to avoid hearing the oft used accusation: “Are you calling me a liar…!?” Self-deception manifests itself in a number of ways. People think that they are better than average and possess more positive than negative traits (Alicke, 1985); they claim responsibility for their own group success but attribute failure to external, temporary or specific causes (Mezulis et al., 2004); a vast majority of drivers think they are better than the average driver (Svenson, 1981); and as many as 94% of college professors claim they are better than the average teacher at their own institution (Cross, 1977). These are just some examples of what Taylor and Brown (1988) termed “positive illusions” – unrealistically high or positive beliefs about oneself. This paper focuses on a particular

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example of such a positive illusion – people’s tendency to think they are more attractive than they really are (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008). In their study Epley & Whitchurch photographed faces of 23 participants and subsequently morphed them with a very attractive face (AF) and a very unattractive face (UF) to produce 10 composite images ranging from 50% AF to 50% UF in 10% increments. Next, the subjects in the study were invited back to the lab and presented with 11 randomly ordered pictures (the 10 composites and the actual photograph) and asked to identify which one was their actual image. Subsequently, they were shown each picture in isolation (in random order) and asked to estimate (from 0% to 100%) the likelihood that it is their actual image. The results showed that people, on average, identified the face that was about 10% AF as their own (in 3 separate experiments) and tended to claim that the attractive faces are more likely to be their own. The participants also completed a Rosneberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and a test of implicit self-esteem using name letter effect (Nuttin, 1985). The methods used by Epley & Whitchurch in their study, although adequate, could still be improved at least two ways. First, the participant’s photograph was used in all three experiments described in their paper, instead of its mirror image, which is obviously more familiar to the subjects (Mita, Dermer, & Knight, 1977). Second, the method used to create both more and less attractive faces was somewhat arbitrary. The AF that they used was a composite of several photographs obtained from a third-party website which resulted in a highly average facial image. While average faces are universally held to be very attractive, other qualities such as symmetry, youthfulness, sexual dimorphism or pleasant expression are also important (Rhodes, 2006). Conversely, the UF was a picture of a sex-matched patient with craniofacial syndrome. Although their images are certainly unattractive there was no objective criterion, which their unattractiveness was judged against. Consequently, the facial images of the subjects did not differ from the UF in a systematic fashion and it is

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possible that UF were objectively more different from the subject’s own face than the unattractive morphs. Therefore, the first aim of the current study is to refine the work of Epley & Whitchurch by replicating parts of their study using improved materials and methods. Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) claim that the effects demonstrated in Epley & Whitchurch’s study (as well other cognitive biases and “positive illusions” mentioned before) are an example of self-deception. However, according to the “distinctist” account, bias requires a one-level mental representation, whereas self-deception requires a twolevel representation, since the self is both the deceived and the deceiver (Pinker, 2011), hence, self-deception and bias (or “positive illusions”) should be considered separate. Regardless of which account is correct however, this debate is outwith the scope of the current paper, as its subject matter is phenomenological (or merely semantic) rather than empirical. The aim of the present study is to investigate the relationship between inflated views of one’s attractiveness, as studied by Epley & Whitchurch and self-deception. In classic psychological literature on self-deception, the concept of self deception was originally used to explain biased responding to psychometric questionnaires (Sackheim & Gur, 1979; Paulhus, 1984). This tendency to give exaggerated or overly positive self-reports was termed Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) and synonymous with self-deception. To control for SDR in psychometric assessment a number of self-deception questionnaires have been devised. Arguably, the most popular one is Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) also known as Paulhus Deception Scale, currently in 7th version (Paulhus, 1998). The BIDR consists of two sub-scales: Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) and Impression Management (IM). The two subscales were developed in order to differentiate between the more public tendency to enhance one’s self-image (IM) and more 6

private tendency for ego defense (SDE) (Paulhus, 1984). There is an ongoing controversy about the meaning and validity of the constructs underlying these two factors. Among known effects, SDE (but not IM) has been linked to self-perception of mental health (Paulhus & Reid, 1991) as well as inflated self-ratings relative to ratings by fellow group members (Paulhus, 1998). Literature linking SDR to other positive illusions, however, is limited. It has been previously shown that high self-deception subjects exhibit more illusion of control, belief they are safe drivers and proneness to love (Paulhus & Reid, 1991) as well as higher intrinsic religiosity (Leak & Fish, 1989) but no research has looked at unrealistically positive evaluations of one’s own attractiveness with connection to self-deception. Since BIDR measures a general trait-like tendency to give positive self-evaluations (Paulhus, 2002) it can be used in conjunction with the face recognition task used by Epley & Whitchurch to test whether enhancement in self-recognition is part of the trait-like tendency to self-deceive. Since, Epley & Whitchurch found a relationship between enhancement in own-face recognition and implicit measures of self-esteem but not explicit measures of self-esteem, it is important to note that BIDR is a semi-implicit measure, because the scores from BIDR are not taken at face value (Paulhus, 2002). Therefore, the second aim of the study is to investigate whether the self-enhancing effect demonstrated by Epley & Whitchurch constitutes self-deception. Finally, the third aim of the current study is to test the idea that self-deception evolved in order to better deceive others by applying it to the domain of sexual attraction. As von Hippel & Trivers put it themselves: “To test these possibilities, one could assess whether the presence of attractive women causes men to show greater self-enhancement in their information-processing biases” (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011, p.14). Thus, the argument is as follows - if men want to convince women of their attractiveness, they should believe in 7

their attractiveness themselves. To my best knowledge, the argument for adaptiveness of self-deception has never been thoroughly tested and this study would be one of the first to explore this theory. That said, a number of recent literature hints that self-deception might have adaptive value. First, a number of recent articles using agent-based and gametheoretic models have shown that self-enhancing perceptions of oneself can evolve and be beneficial to agents. Specifically, overconfidence in conflict is one such trait, which is suspected to confer adaptive benefits as long as the benefits of victory are sufficiently large relative to costs of competing (Johnson, Weidmann, & Cederman, 2011; Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Three hypotheses in the current study are as follows: 1. People will show enhancement in the recognition of their own facial image. 2. Enhancement in face recognition should correlate with measures of self-deception. 3. In the presence of an attractive female confederate the male participants will be more prone to self-enhance on the face recognition task, but not score higher on measures of self-deception than in the presence of a male equivalent.

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Methods Design The subjects in the study were randomly split into two groups - half of them completed the experiment in the presence of an attractive female confederate. The experimental task consisted of the face recognition task and BIDR questionnaire.

Participants The subjects were 26 male Caucasian students of Glasgow University who selfidentified as heterosexual. They volunteered to complete the experiment for either a financial reward or course credits. The mean age of participants was 19.6 years. All participants were clean-shaven on the day of the experiment.

Materials All participants first had a photograph taken using a digital camera. The pictures of their faces were morphed in software based on Matlab and subsequently presented to them on the computer screen. Next, the subjects completed a 40-item Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (6th edition) (Paulhus, 1991). The 7th edition is commercial-only and only the previous edition is freely available for research purposes. The two subscales (SDE & IM) typically exhibit some inter-correlation (Paulhus, 2002) hence were collapsed into one measure of self-deception.

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Procedure First, the participants arrived at the lab and had their faces photographed. Once they all had their photographs taken, the photographs were pooled together and the most representative image was selected for each participant (forward facing, focused and evenly lit). The image of each participant was subsequently separated into the texture and shape components. To create the shape component, each image was manually annotated using 41 landmark points corresponding to the overall shape of the face as well as outlines of other salient features: eyes, mouth and nose. By treating the landmark points as interconnected vertices, a mesh was created, which was the shape component of the facial image. The texture component was created by warping the pixel-by-pixel representation of the images onto the common reference shape. The pictures were also mirrored, because the mirror images of photographs are known to be significantly more familiar to participants than their true images (Mita et al., 1977). Next, after a period of about 2 to 3 weeks each of participants was invited back to the lab to complete the second part of the experiment. Depending on the condition, they were greeted by the male experimenter (whom they have met while taking the photograph) or the female confederate, whom they have not met before. In both conditions, the experimenter/confederate were present in the room for the duration of the experiment. The subjects were seated in front of the computer screen and asked to rate the facial photographs of all other participants in the study on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “very unattractive” to “very attractive”. Using the ratings from each subject, the participants’ actual images were morphed to create both more and less attractive versions. The face was divided into principal components according to the mesh crated by the connecting the landmark points. Linear regression of the face shape and texture against the ratings of each face made by the

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participant were performed. The regression coefficients for each principal component (the texture) and each vortex (the shape) were used to calculate the attractiveness dimension for each participant (Vetter & Troje, 1997). Both the shape and texture components for each participants’ own face were morphed in the direction of faces that they rated higher to create more attractive morphs and in the opposite direction to create less attractive morphs. On each trial the subject was presented with a lineup of 7 images containing the actual photograph, the 3 attractive morphs and the 3 unattractive morphs in random order. The morphs varied randomly in the amount of deviation from the actual image on each trial. The participants completed 50 of such trials, in which they were asked to choose the facial image that they thought was their actual image. Subsequently, the participants completed a pen-and-paper version of BIDR questionnaire and were debriefed with respect to the objectives of the study.

Results 1. Face recognition task As predicted, the participants tended to choose the attractive morphs more often the unattractive ones. The one-sample t-test shows that the difference was highly significant [t(25) = 5.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.02] with a mean of 0.24 and 95% CI of (0.15, 0.34). The histogram of mean morph level selected by all participants is presented in Figure 1. The mean morph level selected was above zero for all but 4 participants.

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2. Correlation with BIDR The scores from face recognition task were correlated with scores from the BIDR questionnaire. However, since the SDE and IM factors of the BIDR showed no significant correlation, they were analysed separately. All of the correlations with the face recognition task were highly non-significant – the table of results is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Relationships between SDE, IM, BIDR and face recognition task.
SDE Face recognition task SDE
Values in cells correspond to: Pearson’s correlation coefficients p-values

IM -0.15 0.46 0.02 0.93

BIDR -0.16 0.43

r = -0.08 p = 0.69

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3. Confederate vs. no confederate The group who completed the experiment in the presence of a female confederate showed no improvement in the face recognition task, SDE or IM over the group who completed the experiment in the presence of the male experimenter. The results of oneway MANOVA show that there was no significant between-group difference [F(3,22) = 0.20, p = 0.90] Since the difference between groups was not significant, no follow-up comparisons were conducted.

Discussion Hypothesis 1. The results of the face recognition task showed that the participants tended to select the more attractive faces as their own significantly more often than the unattractive ones. These results gives further support to the notion that people enhance while assessing their own attractiveness. Moreover, it shows that such enhancement can be implicit and automatic in nature and thus distinct from explicit measures of “positive illusions” (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1994). This finding also extends previous research, which used face morphing techniques to assess peoples’ self-image. In a similar study, Verosky & Todorov (2010) morphed their participant’s faces with either more or less trustworthy facial images generated by the computer. They found that the participants perceived the more trustworthy morphs as more similar to the self across all levels of morphing. Therefore, the current study adds to this literature. However, puzzlingly, such results are also partly at odds with literature on

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body image. Both males and females of almost all ages show dissatisfaction with their own body in terms of both weight and size, more so among women (Feingold & Mazzella, 1998), individuals with eating disorders (Skrzypek, Wehmeier, & Remschmidt, 2001) and especially during adolescence (McCabe & Ricciardelli, 2004; Powell, Matacin, & Stuart, 2001). However, it must be noted that body image dissatisfaction is not the same as enhancement in the perception of one’s body. In addition, subjective measures, which use body size or weight, are particularly ill-suited to test body perception in men. The reason is that the ideal male body is highly muscular, but low in body fat and the two measures are confounded - weight and size correlates positively with muscle mass but negatively with low body fat. Nevertheless, some recent studies have assessed the perception of own body using the method called somatoform matrix, which considers body fat and body muscle as separate factors. The method could be considered a whole-body analogue of the task conducted in the present paper (Cafri & Thompson, 2004). The somatoform matrix is a bidimensional measure, which consists of a computerised library of images varying in both muscle mass and body fat in uniform increments. In one study performed in three separate countries (the US, France and Austria) men were asked to select a computer generated image that would most closely resemble their actual body and the results showed that in all countries men tended to pick a slightly more muscular model (Pope et al., 2000). Such results are consistent with the findings of the current study as well as Epley and Whitchurch (2008). In a study of enhancement in self-perception cultural factors are important to consider. A number of studies in the recent decades uncovered a multitude of cultural differences ranging from social cognition through economic decision making to visual perception (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). For example, Westerners have been shown to score much higher on measures of explicit self-esteem than non-Westerners. However,

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levels of implicit self-esteem have been shown to be comparable in both cultures (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Since, the scores on face recognition task have correlated positively with implicit but not explicit self-esteem in Epley & Whitchurch’s 2008 study, it can be concluded that inclusion of Caucasian participants only was justified. As second shortcoming of the current study was the necessary exclusion of female participants, in order to test Hypothesis 3. However, no sex difference is expected on the face recognition task as both males and females are presumed to enhance their perceptions equally. In fact, any potential difference between the sexes should, in principle, be an even bigger enhancement in females than males. As research in evolutionary psychology has shown, females more often than males put emphasis on their appearance and are aware of the fact that males seek attractiveness in a potential partner (Buss, 1989). Nevertheless, no such sex difference was reported by Epley & Whitchurch, hence it is concluded that the lack of female participants was not a significant limitation of the present study. Many participants in the study reported dissatisfaction with the attractiveness of their actual photograph, after completing the study. They have also reported giving very low ratings to most images of other participants with the majority of faces receiving a rating of 1, 2 or 3 on a scale between 1 and 7. Such reports indicate that the combination of unnaturally high luminance, en face orientation and cropping might have resulted in an image that was of inherently lower attractiveness than the participants’ actual, objective attractiveness level. If that had been the case the enhancement in self-recognition could have been driven by the fact that the actual photographs underestimate the subjects’ true attractiveness. To remedy such possible effect, the task could first be performed by a stranger in the presence of the actual participant. The stranger would be asked to select an image that she thinks belongs to the actual participant. Subsequently, the mean morph 15

level selected by her would be used as the true, actual image during the task involving the participant. Since, as Epley & Whitchurch (2008) have shown, there is enhancement in the recognition of a friend’s image, comparable to own-image recognition, using a friend of the participant could have potentially biased the procedure.

Hypothesis 2. Contrary to predictions, no correlation was found between the measures of trait selfdeception and the face recognition task. The result can be interpreted, as showing that enhancement in own-face perception is distinct from trait-like general tendency for selfdeception. The result shows that the phenomenon measured by the face recognition task is domain specific and cannot be subsumed under the more domain-general construct of self-deception. The result is somewhat surprising, as both SDE and IM have been shown to correlate with various measures of “positive illusions” such as unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority (Hoorens, 1995) as well as more importantly to both implicit and explicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Since implicit self-esteem has been shown to correlate with the face recognition task and BIDR is also a semi-implicit measure it is surprising that the correlations did not even approach significance.

Hypothesis 3. Finally, contrary to predictions, the group who completed the experiment in the presence of a female confederate did not exhibit any more enhancement in selfrecognition over the group who completed the task in the presence of the male

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experimenter. In line with the predictions, however, there was no difference between the groups on measures of self-deception. Finding no effect of the presence of the female confederate on BIDR scores was of secondary importance and not particularly interesting in the light of lack of significance on the face recognition task. However, at least one conclusion can be drawn from such a result – the tendency for self-deception is a stable personality trait is not influenced by the sex of the companion. This conclusion does unfortunately lose its power, when not contrasted with enhancement on the face recognition task, which was predicted to be a more malleable measure and activated by the cue of the presence of an attractive female. The most trivial explanation of the insignificance of the results could be that the female confederate simply did not exert a predicted effect on the participants. It might be the case that the confederate was simply not attractive enough to evoke the anticipated response. Although the choice of the confederate was arbitrary and mostly dictated by practical reasons, there is no reason to doubt that the confederate was attractive enough for the task, since she did not deviate strongly from the archetype any of the universals of female beauty such as waist-to-hip ratio of around 0.7, long hair, youthfulness, clear skin, facial symmetry, averageness and sexual dimorphism (Buss, 1994; Fisher & Voracek, 2006; Rhodes, 2006). Second, it might be the case that even though the attractiveness of the confederate was not a problem, the presence of a person in the room during the experiment created some confounding effects. The self-identification on the face recognition task might have been influenced by a number of factors unrelated to the experiment such as countless differences in individual personality characteristics of the experimenter or the discrepancy between the attractiveness level of the experimenter and the participants, who are likely to

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feel more confident about their good looks in the presence of an unattractive experimenter than in the presence of an attractive one (Banaji & Prentice, 1994). Despite lack of statistical significance, the results are not worthless, but call for a revision of the experimental protocol and further inquiry. However, research that denies adaptive value of self-deception cannot be ignored, especially in the light of null results of the present study. For example, Peterson (2003) has found that self-deception predicts higher susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy in a simple card game and high self-deceivers were more prone to risk more money in the game and consequently lost more money than low-self-deceivers. A similar conviction was expressed by Johnson, Vincent, & Ross (1997) who gave their subjects negative feedback on a bogus IQ and subsequently measured their problem-solving ability. They showed that greater self-deception predicted worse post-failure problem solving and greater hostility. Finally, the only study to date which claims to have tested the theory of adaptive value of self-deception (McKay, Novello, & Taylor, in preparation) which was mentioned in McKay & Dennett (2009) has found preliminary evidence that high self-deceivers were less likely to be trusted in an anonymous cooperative exchange situation based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm.

Directions for further research possible improvements. The current study can be improved in at least 5 following ways: (1) It should be ensured that none of the participants in the study knows each other. At least two participants in the present study knew each other, as many of them were first-year psychology students. The overall impact of such familiarity on the ratings of attractiveness in the present study should be minimal, but under ideal conditions such familiarity should be controlled for; (2) The first part of the experiment, when the participants’ photographs

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are taken should be run by a different experimenter than the rest of the study in order to minimize any effect that familiarity with the experimenter might have on the face recognition task and BIDR. Ideally the during the second part of the experiment, each subject should be run by a different male or female confederate of matched attractiveness in order to minimize the impact of any personality characteristics on the task performance; (3) A third (control) condition should be added to the experiment in order to control for the effect of the mere presence of the experimenter/confederate in the room; (4) Unless suggestion #3 is fulfilled, a representative sample of potential confederates should be rated for attractiveness by a group of males in order to ensure that the most attractive confederate is chosen to take part in the study; (5) Finally, in order to make the experimental manipulation stronger, some additional measures could be employed such as priming the participants to think about sexual relationships or giving them a bogus questionnaire asking about their sex life. Additionally, a higher level of engagement between the female confederate and the participants would be desirable, for example, the aforementioned bogus questionnaire could be administered orally.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Oliver Garrod for helpful comments, advice and support in performing the experiment. I would also like to thank Daria Merkoulova for her help in conducting the experiment.

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