Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections

Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez' quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him (as previously mentioned). Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985). Issue: W/N Rodriguez can be classified as a “fugitive from justice”? Held: No. The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice", the determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice": . . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Facility at the Subic. par. 1985. 4 since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts. Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. is challenged in this original petition. who claim to be taxpayers. And obviously. . of the Constitution.The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. Art. (d). Art. Facilities in the Philippines.. maintain that the proviso in par. there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition. which provides that "[t]he President shall . 13." 3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least. par. • Flores vs. IX-B. which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure. a charge has already been filed. employees of the U.A. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). 5 and. appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992. first par. of the Omnibus Election Code. as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez." under which respondent Mayor Richard J. . and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U. at the time of flight. 7. (d) of Sec. . as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995. 16. (c) Sec. VII. (g). Zambales. (b) Sec. Drilon Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition.S. 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25. 4 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12. Petitioners. and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint". or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.S. 261. . 7227. by almost five (5) months. of R. of the Constitution.

Juico. is INVALID. so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. WHEREFORE. par. . 83896. Sec.A. . of R. of R.Issue: Whether the proviso in Sec. 7227. 6 ". He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts. 13. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. 7227. . 7 of Art. . as Secretary of Agrarian Reform.A. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City. respondent Richard J. Inc. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. . Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. Sec. Provided. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Gordon. like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. 8 But. the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act. G. which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency . (d)." It is argued that Sec. 13. (d). The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person. hence NULL and VOID. . No. the proviso in par. for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. of R. including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. which states: ". consequently. No.R. however. Hence. Philip Ella C. 13. v. however. par. That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act. agency or instrumentality thereof. and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines.R.A. should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. the contention is fallacious. G. 83815. attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility. Executive Secretary. . Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position." violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts? Held: In full. a public officer or employee. . . (d)." is declared unconstitutional. 7227 which states. "Provided. the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.

on 02 December 1993. Lim . U. Hence. denied a reconsideration of the resolution. a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate. State of California. that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. however. a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District. herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee.S. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. • Drilon vs. when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law. not being a trier of facts. albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations). The Court believes and thus holds. is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.• Marquez vs.A. Unfortunately. this petition. Forthwith.40 of the LGC? Held: The Court certainly agrees. for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. it is claimed. to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. The Court itself. In its 02 February 1993 resolution. Commission on Elections Facts: Bienvenido Marquez. Issue: W/N Eduardo Rodriguez is consider a fugitive from justice as contemplated in Sec. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. County of Los Angeles. private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not. in fact. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest. petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. The COMELEC En Banc.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. a violation not only of Article X. specifically Section 4 thereof. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and. Issue: W/N the act of the Secretary of Justice is valid? Held: Yes. Supervision does not cover such authority. and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments." His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code. nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. he may. he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance. If they are not followed. and the policy of local autonomy in general. on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer. if warranted. to annul them. the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and. If the rules are not observed.Facts: The Secretary of Justice (Drilon) had. but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. in his view. that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. As we see it. to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. 7794. it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. This was. but he himself does not lay down such rules. order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. that is. More importantly. null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. in his discretion. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment." while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. he may order the . What he found only was that it was illegal. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed. declared Ordinance No. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision. Judge Rodolfo C. inferentially. the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law. otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila.

5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. of Art X of the Constitution? Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 29. Pimentel. • League of Cities vs. and no more nor less than this. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Following the advice of Sen. as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel. Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. 9009 (RA 9009). 29. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10.4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Article X of the Constitution. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain. Article X of the Constitution. .13 Issue: W/N Cityhood Laws violate Section 10. except that of Naga. which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. individual cityhood bills. and are thus unconstitutional. On 22 December 2006.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. During the 12th Congress. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007. Comelec Facts: During the 11th Congress.3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009. and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. In the opinion of the Court. However. through their respective sponsors. 16 municipalities filed.work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. Secretary Drilon did precisely this.

Second. 1998 elections. Fifth. Sixth. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. • Mercado vs. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s . the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. plain and unambiguous. Seventh. the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. However. applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective. as amended by RA 9009. In his answer. needing no resort to any statutory construction. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen. Manzano FACTS: Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11. even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code. CA) on Sept. Fourth. including the Cityhood Laws. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. not a retroactive application.First. Third. the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6. because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. for converting a municipality into a city are clear. He was born in the United States (San Francisco. 14.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may. as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states. this petition for certiorari. such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: 1. 2. Under Philippine law. dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position. 40). without . Hence. it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such. The former arises when. this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship. Such a person. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport. Moreover. IV) of our Constitution. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country. he no longer had US citizenship. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. Under the Local Government Code (sec. which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. 3. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli. unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual Allegiance To begin with. as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. For instance. the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority. ISSUES: Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen? Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office? HELD: Dual Citizenship vs. In its resolution.

but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. whether by birth or naturalization. By Electing Philippine Citizenship. While dual citizenship is involuntary. by some positive act. • PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP: The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. when . private respondent has. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines. private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. loyalty to two or more states. therefore. who must. upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. on the other hand. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States. they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes. It may be that. our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post. To recapitulate. be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. be also a citizen of another state. by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen.performing any act. such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. That is of no moment.” Consequently. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country By electing Philippine citizenship. it would suffice if. On the other hand. Unlike those with dual allegiance. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. Dual allegiance. Nevertheless. shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws. LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship” The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance. dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. for candidates with dual citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. in electing Philippine citizenship. and taken part in past elections in this country. received his education. we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that. Should he betray that trust. Defensor-Santiago. he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship . In Yu v. practiced his profession as an artist. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who. after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen. there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. renounces his foreign nationality.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful

Master Your Semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master Your Semester with a Special Offer from Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.