Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence Author(s): Markus M. L.

Crepaz and Arend Lijphart Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 281-288 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194089 . Accessed: 13/01/2011 18:35
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01 0. Their first criticism deals with the way we measured corporatism.19 0. Both concepts should be analysed independently.42 GOVTAX REFEREND UNICAMER 0.00 0.Notes and Comments TABLE 4 281 Regression of the Nine Characteristics Corporatism on Consensus Democracy* Beta - plus Variablet MINWIN ELECDIS CABDUR ISSUEDIM NPARTIES T 5. Hence.68 0. San Diego.41 . If compared to other factors.64).85 0. Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory.25 Sig.71 4. this Journal.20 0. they do not have the same meaning and can be distinguished empirically in relation to the features of liberal democratic decision making.17 CORPORAL CONFLEX 0.0.22 0.23 6. the relative weight of corporatism is so small that it does not fit in the model. We have demonstrated that both concepts are strongly intertwined with the type and the organization of the political system and also strongly related to the complexion of government and parliament. The University of Georgia.34 0.T 0. in order to assess the extent to which each does indeed influence democratic decision making.13 0. The University of California.03 1. L.00 0. Secondly.27 0. Concepts and Evidence MARKUS M.06 0. They reject our 'composite' approach on the basis that different experts have different conceptual understandings of corporatism.07 .29 t See Table 3 for explanationof abbreviations.38 1.00 0. corporatism explains a negligible part in the variance of the features of consensus democracy as defined by Lijphart.52 0. preceding pages) of our attempt to link corporatism and consensus democracy falls essentially into three parts.86 0. CREPAZ AND AREND LIJPHART* Hans Keman's and Paul Pennings's critique ('Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?'. . it is unwarranted to add up these various scores. they argue.08 2.02 0. respectively.0. Department of Political Science.61 5. Although the concepts are apparently similar.00 0. = 0.24 0.72 0. they claim that our central relationship between consensus * Department of Political Science. consensus democracies plus the composite scale of corporatism we can determine the relative weight of corporatism in explaining the variance of consociationalism (Table 4). together with other political variables.99 0. Although the bi-variate relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism is ratherstrong (r.01 (Constant) * Adjusted R2 = 0.

ed. 3 For example. 1991). In our original article. organization. ON MEASURING CORPORATISM. Goldthrope. 235-46. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press. L. 'Reflections oni Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going'. pp. defines corporatist concertation as having two essential features: first.4 Based on 1 Phillippe C. Manheim and Richard C. in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Phillippe C. In creating a broadly based measure of corporatism. driven by two outlying cases: Italy and Austria. Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca. corporatism should not be integrated into the concept of consensus democracy. We did not want to rely on one individual measure because that would have invited the criticism that we chose a particularmeasure simply because it best fitted our argument. We are well aware that our various experts operationalized corporatism differently based on different features of corporatism. Crepaz. we explicitly mentioned Schmitter's distinction between the institutional aspects of corporatism such as hierarchical structures. The important concept of validity is defined in the social sciences as 'the extent to which our measures correspond to the concepts they are intended to reflect'.2While this is a useful distinction. 'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks'. which Keman and Pennings add as a third conceptually distinct class of corporatism. They point to the difference between the institutional aspect of corporatism within the strategic actors. etc. Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science (New York: Longman. Schmitter. and because this would have made our results dependent on that individual's concept of corporatism. Since the level of measurement encompassed nominal. 62. Rich. 2 Arend Lijphart and Markus M. and the concertation aspect of corporatism between the strategic actors .since the various experts offering scores on corporatism had different meanings of that elusive concept in mind. the difference between 'concertation' and 'social partnership'. they add a third aspect: social partnership. in addition. they claim that corporatism and consensus democracy are two different phenomena. Schmitter. Peter Katzenstein's (Small Staitesin World Markets. we wanted to produce a measure that was as impartial as possible. Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making (London: Sage. 1985).3 We believe that the 'social partnership'and 'concertation' aspects are very closely related. labour and capital. and that therefore. centralization. it integrates differing conceptions of group interest with vaguely held notions of the public interest'. these organizations manage their conflicts and co-ordinate their action with that of government expressly in regard to the systemic (gesamtwirtschaftliche) requirements of the national economy'. and second. 21 (1991). p. 1982). To this distinction. (vertical corporatism). 32) definition of 'social partnership' seems to be closely related to Lehmbruch's notion of concertation: 'This ideology [social partnership]mitigates class conflict between business and unions. Gerhard Lehmbruch. 4 Jarol B. 1984). p. Thirdly. British Journal of Political Science.282 Notes and Comments democracy and corporatism is a function of our particular measure of corporatism and. NY: Comell University Press. 'it involves not just a single organized interest with privileged access to government but rathera plurality of organizations usually representing antagonistic interests. 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages'. We shall address these three main criticisms in the order described. in John H.. 62. 'EXPERT' JUDGEMENTS AND VALIDITY Keman's and Pennings's first criticism is that producing a composite measure of corporatism is unwarranted.a distinction which Schmitter referred to as 'corporatism 1' and 'corporatism 2' . eds. . ordinal and interval data. and 'concertation' which refers to the relationship among the strategic actors (horizontal corporatism). is less convincing. standardization was a suitable statistical procedure to create a composite score. 60-80 at p.

Thus Keman's and Pennings's claim that our index is 'meaningless in terms of validity' is simply incorrect. Lehmbruch seems to agree with this assessment when he. they claim that our '(lump sum) measure [of corporatism] is among those that correlates strongest with [our] own index of consensus democracy'. p. Germany. In fact. p.7 which is not included in our composite measure correlates very strongly with our measure (r = 0. it does not matter much whether the scores of the individual expert judgements sometimes measure 'institutionalization' and sometimes measure 'concertation'. x Frederic Pryor. even Keman's own corporatism score. have to be present in order successfully to intermediate between the major functional groups in industrial societies. 'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks'. within institutions and between actors. If this is the case. states that. 239. Canada. 10 Gerhard Lehmbruch. Lijphart and Crepaz. precisely because we were aware that various experts attributeddifferent features to the concept of corporatism. 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict'.8 More importantly. This should permit a ranking of countries for the purpose of concur with Lehmbruch's statement. 12 (1988).Notes and Comments 283 this definition we measured exactly what we wanted to measure. Belgium. both elements. our aim was to create an overall average of the experts' combined wisdom. 5. notwithstanding differences among those experts with respect to the conceptual meaning of corporatism. Ireland. 9 Lijphart and Crepaz.870). CONNECTING CORPORATISM WITH CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY The second criticism from Keman and Pennings deals with the empirical relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy and consists of two parts: first. Thus. 6 . In fact. correlates even more strongly with our scores (r= 0. We say as much in our original article. United States.5 If the countries in our Table 1 are ordered from most to least corporatist the following order emerges: Austria.' concept We of corporatism. Norway. United Kingdom. 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy'. 326. both elements of corporatism. Sweden. they should be integrated into a pluridimensional crossnational comparison and for the investigation of empirical regularities. p. l Keman and Pennings. p. Frederic Pryor's measure of corporatism. Italy. Denmark.963). 61 (emphasis added). since these different developments [of corporatism] are interrelated. Switzerland. which was to provide an overall average score of corporatism based on the combined wisdom of different experts on that subject. Netherlands. i. 'Corporatism as an Economic System: A Review Essay'. obtained by personal communication in 1994. a strong institutional structure (capacity to co-operate) organizing the interests within strategic actors is a prerequisite. 317-44. for corporatism to be successful the willingness of the functional bodies to co-operate is equally crucial. p. 'I have earlier (1982) argued that. also not included in our composite measure. 7 Latest scores used by Hans Keman. after describing various distinct forms of corporatism such as sectoral corporatism and tripartism." Implicit in this criticism is the claim that the association between consensus democracy and corporatism is driven Keman and Pennings. Australia. In order for concertation between strategic actors to be successful. Journal of Comparative Economics. 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict'. p. 235-6. New Zealand. institutional capacity and willingness. 274. Finland. Japan. France.9 Moreover. can be observed simultaneously in practice. 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy'.e.6 This is very much in accordance with the conventional wisdom on the relative strength of corporatism in various countries.

238. 'Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North America'.. Kuh and Welsch have devised a systematic way of not only detecting outliers but also leverage points. A closer look at Table 1 shows that our composite measure does not correlate the strongest with consensus democracy. 'weak'. 18 (1986). The individual measures of Crouch. Four of the twelve measurements display an association stronger than 0. Belseley. Nevertheless.1 and + / . being symmetrically aligned on either side of the regression line also strengthens the statistical outcome of the correlation coefficient . 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy'. p.0.0.0. Keman's and Pennings's second point deals with the robustness of the empirical relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. 13 Gary Marks. .0. 253-78 at p. Our corporatism measure does not stand out in any way in terms of its relation to consensus democracy. Comparative Politics. p.5. 15 David A. again not part of our original composite index.9 denote 'strong' associations. For instance. the United States and Canada equally low on neocorporatist incomes policy.7 range which is widely considered to be the 'medium' range of strength of association and three individual scores are actually higher than our composite score. he ranks Switzerland. 6. Lehmbruch and Wilensky correlate more strongly than our composite measure of corporatism. between + / . Great Britain is ranked before Denmark in neocorporatist incomes policy and Ireland is ranked between these two countries.7 and + / . 274. they question the statistical robustness of the empirical model pointing out that Austria and Italy are outliers artificially enhancing the strength of the model. Edwin Kuh and Roy E.'5 12 Lijphart and Crepaz. indicates a misunderstanding of the concept of 'outliers'.12 There is general agreement among social scientists that correlation coefficients between + / . They present an influence chart relying on two black 'dots' for identification of outliers.5 (among them Keman's own measure). Secondly.4 denote 'weak' associations.'14 Their observation that two points symmetrically aligned on either side of a regression line should strengthen a relationship. Welsch. Similarly. Fortunately.4. Italy. The low correlation coefficient with the score of Marks is peculiar. The central relationship is less robust and overlapping than is claimed by Lijphart and Crepaz.0. France. Keman's own measure of corporatism. although not included in our composite measure. while the last third (four observations) show associations smaller than 0. They argue that 'the location of the outliers Austria and Italy. Eight of the twelve individual measures fall between the 0.7 denote 'medium' ones and between + / .13Marks looked mainly at neocorporatist incomes policy and created a weighted composite score according to the number of years in which countries displayed 'mixed'.4 and + / . 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict'. despite his 'unconventional' rankings which explain his relatively low correlation coefficient with consensus democracy. 'moderate' or 'strong' incomes policies.4 and 0.0.4 and 0.284 Notes and Comments by the fashion in which we measured corporatism. another four observations display an association between 0.. falls into the same 'medium' class as our own measure. 1980). 14 Keman and Pennings. Pryor's score of corporatism. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity (New York: Wiley. we decided to integrate Marks's score into our overall score. Let us first examine the strength of the relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. Belseley. shows an association of almost the same magnitude as our own index of corporatism. His rankings indeed deviate from more conventional views on the strength of corporatist arrangements in different countries.

16 degrees of freedom).120 at the 0.and the Transformationof Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The two-tailed t-value for 16 degrees of freedom is + 2. 317-44 at p. Since residuals do not follow a hypothesized direction. . Only Austria's studentized residual exceeds this critical cut-off point.328 0. Corporatism. 274) and Schmitter (Phillippe Schmitter.128 'Expert judgement' Crouch (1985) Lehmbruch (1984) Wilensky (1981) Lijphart/Crepaz (1991) Pryor (1988) Lehner(1987. Journal of Comparative Economics. 1986) Paloheimo (1984) Cameron (1984) Schmitter(1981) Marks (1986) Note: N = numberof countries for which expertjudgements were provided. In order to reduce confusion we inversed the polarity of the Marks (Gary Marks.05 level.465 0. but not the strength of the association. 294) scores to achieve consistent positive correlation coefficients.597 0. these are observations to which parameter estimates are particularly sensitive.453 0.465 0. Comparative Politics.Notes and Comments T A B LE 285 Correlation Coefficients 'r' of the Twelve Original Individual Measures of Corporatism with Consensus Democracy Compared to the Lijphart/ Crepaz (1991) Composite Measure of Corporatism and Keman 's (1994) and Pryor's (1988) Measure of Corporatism in Descending Order N 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 17 18 17 17 15 15 Pearson's r product moment coefficient 0. 1988) Czada (1983) Keman (1989) Bruno & Sachs (1985) Schott (1984) Schmidt (1982.583 0. Organizing Interests in WesternEurope: Pluralism. Contrary to the claim by Keman and Pennings. i. Outliers affect the dependent variable space and have a stronger effect on the 16 We used the conventional 0. 'InterestIntermediationand Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America' in Suzanne Berger. 'Corporatism as an Economic System: A Review Essay'.. Table 2 provides the studentized residuals (residuals divided by their estimated standard deviations). 1981).05 level. Leverage points identify outliers in the independent variable space. 12 (1988). as can be seen from Table 2.568 0. They are shown here only for comparative purposes. 18 (1986). 287-330 at p. Since the 'studentized residuals' follow a t-distribution. 'Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North America'.16 The removal of Austria from the dataset does not reduce the strength of the relationship. two-tailed test.e.05 (two-tailed t-test) as a cut-off point to determine outliers.395 0.332 0. and the 'leverage points' (the values of the diagonal 'hat'-matrix) for eighteen countries. 253-78 at p. obtained by personal communication in 1994) and Pryor's measure (Frederic Pryor. two-tailed t-tests are appropriate.492 0.490 0. in fact its omission increases the strength of the bivariate relationship. only Austria proves to be an 'outlier'.326) were not part of the twelve original scores.503 0.546 0.596 0. Table 2 indeed indicates that Austria (2. Leaving them in their original form would have changed the sign. which obviously follow a t-distribution. ed. Keman's (latest measure.564) is indeed an outlier (at the 0.

265 .However.'9 However.056 Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland UnitedKingdom UnitedStates 0.736 . intercept than on the parameter estimate.Regression value( . Belseley. Belseley.220 0.059 0. its strength and significance improves) if not only Austria but also Italy are removed from the dataset.0. outliers do not exert sufficient leverage on the parameter estimates to change the coefficients as opposed to leverage points drastically.p.0.785 0. in our case is 0. Thereareno withhigh leverage.0. 7. on with and the to report effectsof Italy'somissionindividually in conjunction Austria theparameter 18 17 . observations for that observations exceed thatthreshold leveragepoints. Kuh and Welsch suggest as a critical threshold for leverage points 2p/N. It is not at all the case that Austria and Italy 'drive' the statistical relationship as they claim.087 0.05 level).whichdoes notqualifyit foranoutlier.448 1.123 Country Australia Austria Belgium Leveragepointst 0.0.Italy'sstudentized at 16 of ? 2.087 0.157 0.631 0.e.119 0.993 0.564 .616 0.05 level. inclusion of the Austrian and Italian case actually weakens.Regression Diagnostics.090 0. indicating that none of the observations have leverage enough to sufficiently disturb the parameter estimates. the relationship.110 * 'Outliers' residuals residuals Sincestudentized standard deviation. Table 3 provides further evidence that the omission of Austria does not drastically change the effect on the parameterestimates. where p stands for the number of estimated parameters (including the constant).17 However. the slope will be sensitiveto theseobservations.0.056 0. Table 2 indicates that none of the leverage points displays values larger than the critical threshold. Belseley. the0. strengthens the parameter estimates.222 indicate t Leveragepointsarethe diagonalelementsof the 'hat' matrix.0. 8 The critical threshold.p.182 0.963 0.120 (0. criticalcut-offpointis + 2.133 1. The table also shows that the central relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism holds (in fact. then. since KemanandPennings arguethatItalyis an outlier.81 1. KuhandWelsch. we decided Diagnostics. Contrary to Keman's and Pennings's claim.580 .0.064 0.079 Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan . rather than strengthens.147 0.963)does not exceedthe criticalcut-offpoint residual 19As indicated above. dividedby theirestimated are the follow a t-distribution.i. In fact.188 .615 2.057 0.12 (two-tailed.105 0. or both. KuhandWelsch.099 0.286 TABLE Notes and Comments 2 Studentized Residuals and Leverage Points for Eighteen Countries residuals Studentized 'outliers'* .185 0. removing either Austria or Italy.andsince Italyis close to the cut-offpoint. two tailed)for 16 degrees of freedom.1. Valueslargerthan0. 17.056 0. degreesof freedom.171 0.222.we decided estimates.519 0. N for the number of cases.

'Managing Political and Societal Conflict'. and two-party systems characterized by a single issue dimension. goes together with majoritarian democracy. ' After we had established an empirical link between corporatism and consensus democracy. two-tailed test. and there is no reason why the interest group system should not be linked to the political and 20 21 Keman and Pennings. the competitive. . While this may be the case. CORPORATISM AS AN ELEMENT OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY Thirdly.398 15 0.41 Austria removed 0. Tables 2 and 3 provide strong evidence for the robustness of our central relationship and invalidate Keman's and Pennings' s claim that the association between corporatism and consensus democracy is a statistical artefact. that 'corporatism and consensus democracy were in fact and in theory two sides of the same coin'. we clearly did not intend to show.542 14 Note: Consensusdemocracyis the independent is variable. 235.611** 0. 6.Notes and Comments TABLE 287 3 Change in the Parameter Estimates after Omitting Italy. the next logical step was to integrate the corporatist/pluralist system of interest representation into the cluster of consensus/majoritarian political institutions.196 3. two-tailed test. As evidence they present correlation coefficients indicating that corporatism and consensus democracy correlate distinctively with the complexion of government and parliament. the inclusive. accommodative and consensus-oriented corporatist policymaking process is conceptually related to the five more 'political' elements of consensus democracy: the sharing of executive power.206 2. p. variable.01 level.05 level.178 3. Similarly. balanced executive-legislative relations.668** 0. in the words of Keman and Pennings. Keman and Pennings argue against integrating corporatism into the concept of consensus democracy by pointing out that these are two different phenomena. 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy'.33 R2 Adjusted Degreesof freedom * 0. electoral disproportionality.403 15 0.20 Instead. strong executives. the "pluralist"interest group system. Lijphart and Crepaz. a high degree of electoral proportionality.568* 0. ** Significant at 0. We believe that the affinity between corporatism and consensus democracy.281 16 0. and with cabinet duration.705** 0. multi-party systems and multiple issue dimensions of partisan conflict. p. atomistic and exclusive pluralist policy-making style is conceptually related to political structures which encourage little sharing of executive power (minimal winning cabinets).43 ItalyandAustria removed 0. to reportthe findings with all eighteen countries and not to omit observations selectively so as to create a stronger fit artificially. we claimed that 'corporatism is the interest group system that goes together with the consensual type of democracy and its opposite. Austria and Both Full model 0.163 4.76 Statistics Coefficient Standarderror t-test Italy removed 0. corporatism the dependent Significant at 0. and between pluralism and majoritarianism is compelling. Undoubtedly.

The more corporatist a country. Effectivenumber of parties 6.288 TABLE Notes and Comments 4 Correlation Matrix of the Five Constitutional Democracy with Corporatism Elements of Consensus 1 1.435 and 0. and the medians are 0.460) indicates that corporatism can be thought of as an element of consensus democracy.305 -0.167 -0. we presented the connection between consensus democracy and corporatism in its aggregated form. it is consistent with the argument made above that corporatism can logically be integrated into the cluster of consensus democracy. YaleUniversity Press.619 . the less dominant is the executive (although the coefficient is a weak one.735 .126).661).486 . the number of issue dimensions in partisan conflict and the effective number of parties also correlate in a predictable way with corporatism.377 0.0.451 1 elementsof consensusdemocracyare based on ArendLijphart.451 and 0. .L/Cis theLijphart/Crepaz Haven.488) while also showing a higher effective number of parties (0. . Moreover. and we believe that integrating all six into a more comprehensive concept of consensus democracy leads to a richer understanding of the process by which private desires are turned into actual public policies.394 -0. the correlation coefficients between corporatism and the other five elements of consensus democracy (in the bottom row of Table 4) are about as strong as the ten correlation coefficients among these other five elements.451). associate with corporatism? Table 4 indicates that corporatism correlates with each individual element of consensus democracy in the hypothesized way. In our original article.Conn. Table 4 shows a consistent and predictable relationship of corporatism with each of the disaggregated elements of consensus democracy. The negative correlation between corporatism and the percentage in which minimal winning coalitions were in power ( .717 0.0. Electoral disproportionality of 4.e.618 -0.405 -0. Do we also find meaningful associations between corporatism and its disaggregated elements of consensus democracy? How do the five original individual elements of consensus democracy. Corporatist countries display a higher number of issue dimensions of partisan conflict (0. Overall.482 respectively. Corporatism (L/C) 2 3 4 5 6 1 0. i. the more corporatist a country. described above.: ( 1991)corporatism Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Governmentin TwentyOne Countries (New constitutional structures.0.488 1 0.661 1 0.0. Note: The five constitutional measure. The same logic applies to the other negative correlation coefficients between corporatism and executive dominance and electoral disproportionality. Given this affinity between corporatism and the five constitutive elements of consensus democracy we perceived it as logical to integrate it as an additional element of consensus democracy.447 1 0. the less disproportional is its electoral system (. the means of the absolute values are 0.0. Number issue dimensions 5.0. % minimal winningcoalitions 2. Executive dominance 3.1984).446 respectively.126 1 -0. Also.

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