BEFORE THE HONOURABLE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY THE ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN AT ISLAMABAD.

In reference constitution petition number 77-85 & 89 of2011

WRITTEN STATEMENT/AFFADAVIT OF MR. HUSAIN HAOOANI (RESPONDENT) TO BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE

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Written Witness Statement by Husain Haggani before the Honourable Commission set up by the Supreme Court

1. I reiterate that I had no role in creating, drafting and/or delivering the memorandum to Chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, which was first reported in The Financial Times, London dated October 10,2011 in an article titled 'Time to Take on Pakistan's Jihadist Spies' written by Mr. Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen. There has been no ambiguity in my consistent stance in this respect.

2. I have waited until now to submit a detailed statement before the Commission to ensure that the purported evidence supporting Mr. Ijaz's claim is first on the record before I respond to it.

3.

Lt. General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, then head of Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI), had said in his affidavit before the Supreme Court of Pakistan that in his meeting with Mr. Ijaz on October 22,2011 he had seen "enough corroborative material" to prove Mr. Ijaz's version of events ..

4. In the meeting at the PM House on November 22,2011 attended by the President, the Prime Minister, Chief of Army Staff and DG lSI where my offer to resign as ambassador to the United States was accepted I was not shown any evidence against me. In fact, my participation in that meeting lasted no more than a few (5 to 10) minutes.

5. A campaign was orchestrated in the media, labeling me as having engaged in treasonous conduct, to the extent that the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan cited national security concerns and media reports as well as the affidavits of General Pasha and COAS General Kayani in its judgement which, inter alia, barred me from travelling abroad.

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6. Under such circumstances, I was legitimately concerned that evidence against me might have been cooked up by Mr. Ijaz and others who were supporting his version of events to discredit me and the elected civilian government that appointed me ambassador to the United States. I was advised by counsel that it would be prudent to see the purported evidence before responding to it.

7. Now that Mr. Ijaz has recorded his statement and presented his purported evidence I am in a position to go beyond stating that I had no role in the conceiving, drafting or delivering of the memorandum in question and address the specific claims made by Mr. Ijaz and the purported evidence he has offered.

8. As ambassador I always had full access within the US government to communicate any messages on behalf of our government as instructed and did not need an intermediary of controversial credentials. Mr. Ijaz has himself acknowledged during cross-examination by the honourable commission that "Mr. Haqqani has very good contacts in Washington DC and in the American establishment."

Response to Mr. Mansoor Ijaz's claims and assertions 9. Mr. Ijaz is wrong in claiming that he met President Asif Zardari on May 5, 2009 during the President's official working visit to Washington for 45 minutes to an hour and that I arranged such a meeting. I submit the official program of the President's visit maintained by the Embassy of Pakistan as Annexure A, which shows no such meeting scheduled. All scheduled and substantive meetings of a visiting head of state or government are duly reflected in his/her program. Occasionally, PakistaniAmericans show up at hotels where the dignitaries are staying and are allowed to shake hands or take a picture with the President or Prime Minister and I do not recall if Mr. Ijaz was among those during that particular visit. 10. Mr. Ijaz has made the preposterous suggestion that as a private US citizen working alone he had access to transcripts of exchanges between US military helicopters and Pakistani Air Traffic Control or to records of conversations between senior Pakistani officials on May 2, 2011. It may be noted that after initially referring to these dubious documents, he backtracked and acknowledged that he could not vouch for their authenticity. As I recollect, Mr. Ijaz never spoke to me or conveyed to me by any other means the subject matter of these dubious transcripts at any time.

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11. Mr. Ijaz has admitted during cross-examination that he does not have any email, BBM or text message from me that requests, directs or authorizes him to convey any message on my behalf to anyone in the US government or to specifically convey the points contained in the memo he eventually sent to General James Jones for onward transmission to Admiral Michael Mullen.

12. In many instances, Mr. Ijaz's claims rest on emails sent out by him such as the one about meeting President Zardari or BBM or text messages sent out by him. Many individuals, especially members of the Pakistani diaspora, seeking attention of officials send communications not relevant to official functions and it was my practice as ambassador to ignore such messages when they were received. Occasionally I sent a courteous response so as to not appear aloof from American citizens of Pakistani origin. 13. Mr. Ijaz's entire claim in relation to the contents of the memo emanating from me rests on telephone conversations with us between May 9 and 12, 2011. I do recall these phone conversations because of their significance in the context of my damage control efforts in the aftermath of the May 2, 2011 Abbottabad raid. But I categorically state that I neither needed to send the message claimed by Mr. Ijaz nor did I discuss it with him. 14. I have submitted to the Commission my complete itemized telephone bills for the period as well as preceding and subsequent months. It should be noted that most telephone calls were initiated by Mr. Ijaz and calls from me to him were very brief, reflecting courtesy rather than substance. 15. Furthermore, the proportion of time spent communicating with Mr. Ijaz represents a miniscule portion of the overall communications undertaken by me -including telephone calls, text messages and data -during the period. 16. I engaged in good faith with Mr. Ijaz as part of my outreach to several people who were commenting in the US media on the US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. It is apparent to me that around May 9-12, Mr. Ijaz created a trail of text and blackberry messenger exchanges that he could line up alongside contemporaneous telephone calls to falsely and maliciously implicate me in his own scheme and specifically to create evidence that I was involved in a memo that he drafted and gave to General James Jones for onward transmission to Admiral Mullen.

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17. Mr. Ijaz has made a false and unsubstantiated allegation in suggesting that I was "trying to subjugate the army and lSI." I have always fully supported the armed forces of Pakistan in fulfillment of their duties in accordance with Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan. As a US citizen who has repeatedly demonstrated his ignorance about the history, constitution and politics of Pakistan during the course of these proceedings, it is clear to me that he has no independent means of substantiating his false assertion.
18. If the Commission so directs, I will produce in a sealed envelope letters from commanders of Pakistan's armed services commending me for my efforts as ambassador in securing various weapons systems from the United States and facilitating US Pakistan military to military relations in other respects between 2008 and 2011. At no stage in the period of my service as ambassador did anyone in the Pakistan army at any level convey to me any reservations on the army's part about my professional conduct. 19. Mr. Ijaz has also leveled false and unsubstantiated allegation about my "working with the US intelligence officials" to help "orchestrate an entire movement to allow CIA, NSA and defense personnel to be present in Pakistan to protect American interests." Mr. Ijaz has no means of knowing anything in this respect and is simply rehashing propaganda from the internet and a section of the Pakistani media. His motives in doing so as a US citizen who repeatedly proclaims his loyalty to the United States is, at best, suspect. 20. Mr. Ijaz fabricated the claim that my "actions led to a conflict between General Shuja Pasha and Mr. Leon Panetta, the then CIA Director, over the question of the permissible number of American officials in Pakistan" and that it was as a result of "the American presence in Pakistan the American government was able to gather information about the location ofOsama bin Laden, the No 1 enemy of the USA." Mr. Ijaz has no way of knowing independently what transpired between General Pasha and CIA Director Panetta. His motives in making this allegation are again suspect. 21. I am required by the Official Secrets Act to not publicly reveal the information I may have about the Intelligence to Intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. I can, however, say that as ambassador I facilitated this relationship in Pakistan's interest and as directed by the Pakistan government and never acted outside official channels. I maintained, and transmitted through the foreign office, proceedings of all my meetings with US officials in the form of secret Cypher telegrams, which are all part of the official record. 22. I was targeted by elements within the media and politics of Pakistan that oppose close relations with the United States. At no stage did any institution of state convey their reservation or criticism of my conduct as ambassador acting in accordance with overall instructions from the Foreign Office. ~~ OF~;'
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The Nature and Frequency of My Contacts With Mr. Ijaz

23. Mr. Mansoor Ijaz is known to me. But I do not know him well. He has himself acknowledged before the Commission that our families have never met each other. I only recall a handful of in-person meetings with him, possibly 3 or 4 including in social settings and even his own claim of 12 meetings in ten years do not attest to a close acquaintance, let alone friendship. Mr. Ijaz has himself acknowledged that outside of our coming face to face during the Commission's hearing from London recently, our last in-person encounter was in 2009. 24. During the last ten years I have served as a Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Director for the Center for International Relations and Associate Professor at Boston University and as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. I have used office computers in all three positions, as well as different laptops to exchange thousands of emails with hundreds of people. I do not have a record of each and every email sent or received by me. 25. Mr. Ijaz was one of these hundreds of people with whom there may have been occasional exchanges of email. I do not recall each email but even if Mr. Ijaz's claim of exchanging a total of 85 emails over 10 years is accepted, it hardly affirms the close and trusting relationship he claims as the basis for his role in drafting and delivering the memo allegedly on my behalf. The disputed record of emails submitted by Mr. Ijaz before the honourable Commission testifies to the superficial and sporadic nature of our contact. 26. After Mr. Ijaz presented what he said were copies of emails exchanged between us over the years, I made an effort through my counsel in the United States to see if these could be tracked on their server. The letter from Boston University stating their policies about retention of emails on server is attached as Annexure B. It states that emails are not retained on the server beyond 14 days. I am, therefore, unable to say anything about emails Mr. Ijaz claims he sent me on my email address haqqani@bu.edu as I can't recall having read such emails. 27. My interaction with Mr. Ijaz since 2003 has mainly been in the context of his appearances on US TV or his articles in US publications on Pakistan. In 2009, along with former US National Security Adviser General Brent Scowcroft, I attended a charity dinner hosted by a charity organization for Afghan children run by Mr. Ijaz as a featured speaker. I may add that as ambassador I was invited to several such events and accepted invitations to such events whenever possible as a way of reaching out to wider audiences in the United States. 28. Contrary to Mr. Ijaz's claim, we never published any article jointly nor were we ever on a television show together. In the aftermath of9/11, Mr. Ijaz was a FoxNews contributor, which meant he was bound by contract to appear only on

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FoxNews channel. I seldom appeared on FoxNews in that period and, therefore, his claim that whenever he could not appear in a particular TV show he recommended me for it is false. 29. Mr. Ijaz is also making a false claim when he says that over the last ten years my views coincided with his. I have been actively associated with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) since 1993. Mr. Ijaz, on the other hand, was critical ofShaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto even after her tragic assassination by terrorists. In his article titled 'The Benazir Bhutto I knew' published in The Christian Science Monitor on December 28, 2007, Mr. Ijaz spoke of the Shaheed leader as "an imperious, venal, and corrupt politician," which is diametrically opposed to the views expressed by me in various articles published over the last 19 years. Mr. Ijaz's said article is attached as Annexure C. 30. Over the last decade, I have identified most prominently with the observance of Pakistan's constitution and for civil, democratic rule by elected politicians under the constitution. Mr. Ijaz, on the other hand, has advocated various alternatives for Pakistan, including hybrid government by military officers and technocrats. 31. In an article titled 'Stepping Down' published in National Review Online on September 8, 2007, Mr. Ijaz advised General Pervez Musharrafto appoint General Ehsanul Haq, former DG lSI with whom he claims to have acquaintance, as Chief of Army Staff and set up a caretaker government headed by former army chief and ambassador to the US, General Jehangir Karamat. This article, attached as Annexure D, reflects Mr. Ijaz's penchant for engineering Pakistan's future just like his memo of May 2011

Reason for not being able to produce Blackberry handsets or recalling every BBM chat or text message 32. I first acquired a Blackberry handset on my phone number beginning with 617 in 2007, well before I became ambassador. Since then I have changed my handset on that number 7 or 8 times. I acquired a Blackberry handset on my phone number beginning with 202 in late 2008 or early 2009. I have changed the handset on that number 4 Or 5 times. I attach as Annexure E an article by Roger Entner, Analyst and Founder of Recon Analytics that shows how different individuals in various countries have a different handset replacement cycle. 33. These changes of handsets were usually to upgrade models or because of other reasons. I recall having to change one handset because it was damaged by water during rain. It is my understanding that it is common for mobile phone users to change their handsets and I am no exception. Mr. Ijaz has admitted changing in July 2011 the handset that he used in May. It is nc y normal practice or that of most

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people to keep their discarded handsets. A handset no longer in use is usually put away, given away or thrown away. 34. When I travelled to Pakistan on November 18,2011, I had no reason to carry my discarded handsets with me and only after the matter reached the SC and the honourable Commission asked for their production did I ask for the ones in use in May 2011 to be located. Unlike Mr. Ijaz, who has attempted to prove his false and malicious allegations by citing his handsets as evidence, I have never had to produce old and discarded handsets to prove myself. I do not, as a practice, retain old and discarded telephone handsets and would be surprised to find that too many people do. It is, therefore, patently false to suggest that my change of handsets or inability to produce old and discarded handsets had anything to do with the matter that is being probed by the honourable Commission. 35. Mr. Ijaz has himself acknowledged before the Commission that the PIN number ofa Blackberry handset cannot be traced or identified except from the handset. 36. As Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, I maintained telephone, text and BBM contacts with a large number of people including members of Congress, media personalities, officials and former officials in both Pakistan and the United States, family members, friends and former students. This included several individuals who were critical of Pakistan and Pakistani policies. Mr. Ijaz was one such individual, peripheral in importance and significance to me. 37. The sheer volume of my electronic correspondence made it impossible for me to recall every message. Indeed, I did not have time to respond to everyone. It was my practice to delete text and BBM messages frequently and I never maintained backup files or records of chat or messenger conversations. 38. I have denied the transcripts and screen shots presented by Mr. Ijaz on grounds that I do not recall these. It is, however, pertinent to point out that there are roughly three trails ofBBM exchanges produced by Mr. Ijaz. Each set is connected to his television appearances or newspaper articles. The first is from May 9-12,2011 after his interviews on Fox News and 630 WMAL radio and his articles in Financial Times and on the Washington Post blog relating to the Abbottabad raid; the second is an alleged exchange from June after the publication of his article in The Daily Beast about the murder of journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad; and the third after his October 10 article in the Financial Times.

The Nature of my May 9-12 Communications with Mr.ljaz

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40. As President Obama announced on the night of the raid, the US government gave no prior information to any individual, department or agency in the government of Pakistan about its plan or operation. Our government was taken completely by surprise both by Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad and the US operation to get him. Nor did I have any advance information about the raid. 41. I boarded a British Airways flight for London and Dubai on my way to Pakistan on the night of May 1,2011 Washington time. My E-ticket receipt showing my bookings is attached as Annexure F. My boarding passes from Washington to London and London to Dubai are attached as Annexure F-l. Upon arrival at London's Heathrow airport I learnt of the American covert operation, cancelled my onward flight to Dubai and turned around on the first available flight to return to Washington DC. Annexure F-l. reflects this changed flight and includes the new boarding pass from London to Washington. 42. In between the flights, I received an email copy of the foreign office statement at Annexure G which said, inter alia, "Osama bin Ladin's death illustrates the resolve of the international community including Pakistan to fight and eliminate terrorism. It constitutes a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world." It also said, "Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism. It is Pakistan's stated policy that it will not allow its soil to be used in terrorist attacks against any country. Pakistan's political leadership, parliament, state institutions and the whole nation are fully united in their resolve to eliminate terrorism." 43. I was instructed to assure upon my return the US government, Congress and the media that Pakistan's government, armed forces or intelligence services were not to blame for allowing Osama bin Laden's presence in the country. Although US President Obama had called our President to acknowledge Pakistan's overall counter-terrorism cooperation, the Pakistani and international debate on the matter was already moving in opposite directions by the time I landed back in Washington DC around 5 PM Washington time on May 2, 2011 44. Elements in Pakistani media had started raising questions about Osama bin Laden's death and whether the US operation was covertly supported by the Pakistani government. The violation of Pakistani sovereignty in conducting the raid was the primary concern of most Pakistanis. The International community, on the other hand, was focused on asking how and why Osama bin Laden, a man declared to be a terrorist by name through a United Nations resolution, was able to live in Pakistan. 45. Western media quoted Pakistani officials alternately sharing credit for the overall anti-terrorist effort that resulted in Osama bin Laden's death and expressing concern about the US operation. An article from the dian titled 'Osama bin Laden is dead; Obama announces' is placed at eflecting that divergence.
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46. White House counter-terrorism Chief John Brennan had publicly asked the question, "A number of people have questions about whether or not there was some type of support (for bin Laden) that was provided by the Pakistan government." This set the stage for a confrontational phase in US-Pakistan relations. Reuters news story containing Mr. Brennan's quote is at Annexure J. 47. Immediately upon arrival in Washington, I went from the airport straight to the CNN studios and gave a comprehensive interview in the show Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. I tried to strike a balance between Pakistani concerns about the violation of our sovereignty and international suspicions over why and how Osama bin Laden had been found in Pakistan. As directed from Islamabad, I also assured the American public that a full and proper inquiry would be undertaken in Pakistan on the matter. The transcript of this interview is attached as Annexure K to show that I defended the government, armed forces and intelligence services of Pakistan contrary to the false assertions of Mr. Ijaz. 48. The decision to establish a Commission to inquire into the May 2, 2011 Abbottabad raid was made through a resolution by the joint sitting of parliament on May 14, 2011. This contradicts Mr. Ijaz's claim that the inquiry was the result of his memo, which included the suggestion for a full investigation into Osama bin Laden's presence in Pakistan. 49. Over the next few days, I faithfully and diligently carried out my instructions. In addition to many meetings with US officials and members of Congress, I robustly engaged the US media to defend Pakistan's position and to protest suggestions that Pakistan was somehow complicit or responsible in bin Laden's stay in Pakistan. As a result of my hectic efforts I collapsed in a CNN studio on May 5, 2011 and was taken to the George Washington University Hospital. Letter from the hospital confirming this episode is attached as Annexure L. 50. Cypher telegrams comprising records of meetings with US officials as well as reports on my engagements with the media were duly sent to the Foreign Office in Islamabad. Among the officials I met during this period, in person, was Admiral Michael Mullen who gave no indication of receiving any memorandum from Mr. Ijaz. None of the US officials I met expressed any concern about an impending coup nor was the likelihood of the same brought up by anyone else in Washington. 51. Apart from interviews and on-the-record briefings of media, I also reached out to those who were being critical of Pakistan, our armed forces and the lSI to attempt to modify their stance and to explain Pakistan's position to them. Mr. Mansoor Ijaz was one of these intransigent and harsh critics that I reached out to. 52. "Inan article in Financial Times on May 3, 2011 Mr. Ijaz had accused Pakistan of being Osama bin Laden's babysitter. This article has already be .' d by Mr. Ijaz in front of this honourable Commission.
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53. Also on May 3, Mr. Ijaz appeared on Fox News TV and claimed "military types" were involved in building the compound in Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was located. He also called President Zardari "a naive buffoon" and "someone who doesn't have any control over any single lever of government." 54. Mr. Ijaz's proposed policy for the US expressed in this Fox News interview was similar to what he subsequently proposed in the unsigned memo he sent through General Jones to Admiral Mullen. He said, " ... from now on, if we get actionable intelligence we just go in there. Sovereignty or no sovereignty, I don't think that America can ever again look at Pakistan just as a nation. We have to look at it as a place where they are allowing the breeding of these terrorists that want to come and destroy us and we have got to stop this." The CD and transcript of this interview has already been presented to the Commission and admitted by Mr. Ijaz. 55. On May 5, 2011, Mr. Ijaz gave a detailed interview on the 'Morning Majority' show on 630 WMAL radio station. In this interview, he said, "I think no American listening to this radio program or any where else in America today should believe for one second a word out of the Pakistani civilian side of the government or the military side that they did not know that bin Laden was there. They absolutely knew that he was there." 56. In this interview Mr. Ijaz provided no evidence to substantiate his claims. He expressed agreement with the theory of the show's host that someone in the Pakistani military -possibly Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani according to him -may also have known about the US operation to get bin Laden and facilitated the penetration of US stealth helicopters deep inside Pakistani territory. That interview has also been admitted by Mr. Ijaz in cross-examination and its transcript entered into the record. 57. On May 6, 2011, Mr. Mansoor Ijaz published another article on the Washington Post blog title, 'After Osama bin Laden, Pakistan's narrow window for redemption.' In this article he argued for redesigning US-Pakistan relations along lines very similar to the ones that can be identified in the disputed memo, making it clear that this was his agenda. The article is attached as Annexure M-l. 58. In that article Mr. Ijaz wrote, "For much of its life as a country, Pakistan has been ruled either directly or indirectly by the military. The Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) has grown to act like a state within the state, operating with absolute power and impunity-often arrogantly and shamelessly in its own interests-the country and its civilian population be damned. Yet the same firewalls, now exposed, that were erected by the army and lSI to shroud in secrecy their activities to harbor Osama bin Laden, and to make their civilian leaders appear hapless and cartoonishly stupid on the world stage, contain important silver linings in them. Taken advantage of properly by U.S. policymakers, exposed treachery could usher in a new era of transparency in Pakistan's internal affairs-much as the Watergate scandal did in

America. It could transform the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship from one of begrudging mistrust in the mutual need of each other into one of an openly architectured security relationship that reduces, perhaps one day even eliminates, the myriad threats emerging from Pakistani soil." 59. Mr. Ijaz went on to say, "Pakistan is the global epicenter of radical Islamist ideology, its extremist practices and the terrorists it breeds. Since the country's founding in 1947, Pakistan's spy services have used extremists as a foreign-policy sledgehammer to level the playing field for the army's sub-standard performance on the battlefield." 60. The text of Mr. Ijaz's article in Financial Times of May 3, 2011 is attached as Annexure M-2. The transcript of Mr. Ijaz's interview with Fox News on May 3, 2011 is attached as Annexure M-3, Mr. Ijaz's interview on the 'Morning Majority' show on 630 WMAL radio on May 5, 2011 is attached as Annexure M-4. No Threat of Coup 61. Contrary to Mr. Ijaz's claims there was no threat of a military coup in Pakistan immediately after May 2,2011. No one among Pakistan's civilian leaders that I was in touch with expressed such concern nor did I have any reason to fear the Pakistani military acting against the constitution. I gave dozens of interviews during the period, met many journalists, officials and Congressmen and even after the controversy generated by Mr. Ijaz no one has come forward to suggest that I expressed concern about the possibility of a military coup at the time or that such a coup was likely. 62. Seeing the screen shots and transcripts of BBM messages submitted by Mr. Ijaz, which I do not specifically recall, I must note that the only person conveying rumours or reports about an impending coup appears to have been Mr. Ijaz. I paid no attention to his messages in this regard and did not even remember them until the current controversy. 63. The real impact of the May 2,2011 US raid in Abbottabad was on US-Pakistan relations and my focus at the time was on trying to save the relationship from further deterioration. I effectively defended Pakistan's armed forces and Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) in the United States, considering it my national duty at the time to defend all national institutions. Protecting the morale of our soldiers was important, given that they were in the front lines of the battle against terrorism, which I wholeheartedly support. Civil-military relations were not an immediate priority even though I have been an outspoken advocate of reform in that sphere since 1993.

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64. I place an article titled 'Ambassador fends off doubts about Pakistan's role' by Farah Stockman from the Boston Globe of May 8, 2011 as Annexure N. The article detailed my efforts in defending Pakistan and its institutions of state and spoke of the personal threats I received from Americans as a result. It said, inter alia, "Threatening phone calls that have been pouring into the Pakistani Embassy in Washington are not what concerns Husain Haqqani most since a US raid killed Osama bin Laden in the heart of his nation. Haqqani, a Boston University professor who took leave to serve as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, must field pointed calls from sources that hold sway over his country's crucial alliance with the United States: Pentagon officials and members of Congress." 65. That article further said, "Some seek an explanation for why Pakistan's powerful military and intelligence service could not find the terrorist mastermind all these years; others wonder whether Pakistani elements had been secretly protecting him. Some have called for a halt to the billions in US aid that Pakistan receives ... Haqqani, who has tried for months to halt deteriorating relations between the two countries, now faces perhaps the greatest challenge of his career: convincing Americans that Pakistan is not to blame for harboring bin Laden. And he has to do so without concrete facts because much of the truth lies buried in the murky world of spies. 'He has got an impossible job," said Owen Sirrs, a former analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency who is writing a book about the lSI, Pakistan's intelligence agency ... He finds himself sticking up for Pakistan's security forces in interviews with American media. To deflect blame, he has pointed out embarrassing US intelligence mistakes ... He frequently notes that Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies have lost more officers in the war against militants than any other country - and arrested more suspected terrorists than any country - but that Americans continue to push for more ... Haqqani's remarks have been carefully worded explanations of Pakistan's perspective, even anti-American sentiments that he does not personally agree with."

The events of May 9-10, 2011 66. On May 9, I arrived in London for a two-day visit that had been arranged in advance by Mr. Tobias Ellwood MP, then Parliamentary Secretary for Defence in the British government. Mr. Ellwood had been working on proposals for reconciliation in Afghanistan, a subject of great concern to our government. I chose not to cancel or postpone the visit in wake of the May 2 Osama bin Laden raid partly to seek an understanding of the British position after that defining event. Britain and the United States maintain very close ties and in matters such as Afghanistan, their position was more accommodative of some Pakistani concerns than that of the United States. Programme of that visit is attached as Annexure P.

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67. I spoke to Mr. Ijaz over the phone after arriving in London on May 9 as part of my official instructions to address those attacking Pakistan in the media. The only phone number I had for Mr. Ijaz was a UK mobile number, thus I believed he was often in the UK. All I wanted to do was to speak to him and seek a toning down of his criticism and attacks on Pakistan in the aftermath of the bin Laden raid. I hoped to try and reason with Mr. Ijaz and attempt to get him to tone down or "tweak" his message and find some middle ground following his allegations about official Pakistani involvement in protecting Osama bin Laden for which I believed he had no evidence. 68. A discussion about changing or toning down media criticism was not a topic that required a face to face meeting. Had I wanted Mr. Ijaz to undertake a serious assignment on my behalf, such as the drafting and delivering of the disputed memo as he has alleged, I would have required an in-person meeting. Indeed, one would expect, Mr. Ijaz would have demanded a face-to-face meeting before accepting such an important task. 69. I do not recall the exact duration of the first phone call but I remember that Mr. Ijaz, and not I, spoke for most of the time given his propensity for verbosity. There was no discussion about Mr. Ijaz sending a message or memo of any sort to US officials on my behalf or on behalf of anyone in the Pakistan government. 70. Contrary to Mr. Ijaz's assertion, there were no codes or coded language in any of our exchanges. In any case it is imprudent to suggest that I should have been concerned about the Pakistani lSI being able to listen-in into telephone conversations conducted on British and US mobile telephones. 71. I never exchanged any emails with Mr. Ijaz on the subject of the message or memo and Mr. Ijaz has not produced any email in this respect from my side. I did not receive the emails Mr. Ijaz claims to have sent me. There was no significant interaction with Mr. Ijaz after May 2011 that I recall until October. 72. It is a false assertion on part of Mr. Ijaz that I discussed with him my stepping down from my position as ambassador and sought his support to further my ambitions. Once again, there is no one else in the United States or in Pakistan who has come forward to say that I had a similar discussion or conversation with them. 73. It is a reflection of Mr. Ijaz's ignorance of Pakistan's politics and constitution and a reflection of his delusional tendencies that he even suggests I would want to or could become President of Pakistan with US, support. Moreover, having claimed before this honourable Commission that I had great influence in Washington and with the American establishment it is strange that he should claim I asked for the backing of an individual who told this Commission that he operates alone for my future career move.

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74. I interacted again with Mr. Ijaz after he wrote an article in the Financial Times on October 10,2011 titled, 'Time to Take on Pakistan's Jihadist Spies' though I do not recall the exact duration of phone calls or wording of messages exchanged. It is in this article that he first mentioned the memo and linked it to a 'Senior diplomat' from Pakistan. 75. After reading the article, I called to ask him who the senior diplomat might be, knowing fully well that it was not me. Mr. Ijaz told me on the phone that he knew several senior Pakistani diplomats, including retired ones. I expressed concerns to Mr. Ijaz about how his claim might create domestic political issues in Pakistan. Any interaction I had with him after October 10 related to dealing with the political impact of his claims and not because I had any reason to feel personally threatened by his claim. 76. I made inquiries about the existence of the memo from Pakistani and US officials and was told that no one in the government of Pakistan had sent such a memo while no one in the White House or the State department knew anything about receiving it. Other false statements made by Mr. Ijaz show that he has no credibility 77. Mr. Ijaz has been embroiled in other controversies similar to this one and has a long record of exaggerating or falsifying claims that make him appear to be a high-level behind-the-scenes political operator or intelligence actor. At Annexure Q-l is an article by former White House adviser David Frum published on CNN.Com on December 5, 2011. Mr. Frum describes Mr. Ijaz as a "reckless fantasist motivated by childish vanity." 78. At Annexure Q-2 is an article by David Ignatius in the Washington Post wherein Mr. Ijaz is described as a "quixotic accuser" who "seems like a character in a fanciful spy novel of his own design." 79. At Annexure Q-3 is an article titled "What is Behind the Furor in Pakistan" by CNN National Security Analyst Peter Bergen published on November 24, 2011 that lists Mr. Ijaz's false and inaccurate claims in the past. At Annexure Q-4 is a report from the US organization 'Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting' (FAIR) published in July/August 2004, page 4-5 of which are solely about Mr. Mansoor Ijaz and his tendency of "ignoring evidence while citing only shadowy, unnamed sources." 80. In a December 3,2011 article written by Mr. Ijaz and published on the Daily Beast website, Mr. Ijaz accused me and President Zardari of having prior knowledge of US plans for the May 2, 2011 raid in Abbottabad. Mr. Ijaz has never provided any evidence that would support this untrue and preposterous allegation. Even the dubious transcript he presented to this Commission on the subject had no reference tome.

14

81. On December 5, 2011, after the article was published, White House Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden confirmed that "[t]here is no truth to the reports that Ambassador Haqqani ... had advance knowledge of the May 2 Abbottabad operation." This statement has been echoed by current US Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter. My attorneys in the United States, Mr. Steven Barentzen and Kenly Webster have been in touch with lawyers for The Daily Beast to seek a retraction. Mr. Ijaz's article from The Daily Beast dated December 5, 2011 is appended as Annexure R. 82. In his May 10,2011 cover e-mail to General Jones, included in his affidavit to the Supreme court of Pakistan at page 71, in which Mr. Ijaz provides General Jones the memo, he also claimed to be "working with Sen. Tom Daschle as well as Sec of the Navy Ray Mabus to deliver the document at an in-person meeting in Washington." But he has since admitted this allegation also is untrue. In an article entitled "Karamat, Durrani Helped Prepare Memo: Ijaz," published January 14,2012 in the Nation, (Annexure S) Mr. Ijaz admitted that Dasch1e and Mabus "were never involved directly in this. I never had any direct contact with Daschle or Mabus." Conclusion 83. There is no human witness to support Mr. Mansoor Ijaz's claim that he drafted and delivered the disputed memo to General Jones for onward transmission to Admiral Mullen under my instructions because Mr. Ijaz's assertions are false. I gave no such instructions and Mr. Ijaz, a peripheral acquaintance, has failed to establish why he felt compelled to carry out my purported instructions. 84. The communications log provided by Mr. Ijaz shows more activity by Mr. Ijaz, which raises the question why he was more eager to draft and convey the disputed memo if the idea originated from me. Mr. Ijaz's account of his telephone conversations with me is false. He has admitted that there is no email, BBM or text message from me that explicitly confirms his claim that I asked him to convey a message to Admiral Mullen. He has simply woven a story by lining up various alleged communications. 85. Apart from the claims of Mr. Mansoor Ijaz, there is no evidence of my role, or that of any other Pakistani official or citizen in the authorizing, authoring or delivering the disputed memo. It is a tragedy that the Pakistani nation had to endure so much suspicion, suspense and anguish on account of Mr. Ijaz's claims. I have personally suffered a great deal because of the willingness of some to believe Mr. Ijaz's wellwoven story without prior investigation into his background and his claims.
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PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM

Monday, 4 May 2009 1840 hrs Arrival at lAD Washington DC by British Airways flight BA-265 Stay at Willard Intercontinental 1401 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20004 Tel: 202-628-9100 Quiet dinner Tuesday, 5 May 2009 1030-1130 hrs Meeting with House International Committee Venue: Capitol Hill 1215-1245 hrs Interview for Wolf Blitzer 'Situation CNN Venue: Willard Intercontinental Quiet lunch 1400-1430 hrs Call by Mr. Robert Zoelick, President World Bank Venue: Willard Intercontinental 1500-1600 hrs Media engagement Venue: Willard Intercontinental Room'

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1500-1600 hrs Bilateral meeting with President Karzai Venue: Willard Intercontinental 1800-2000 hrs Address to the community over dinner Venue: Marriot Wardman 2660 Woodley Road, NW Washington, DC 20008 Tel: 202-328-2000 2130 hrs 2230 hrs Departure for New York Arrival New York III East 48th Street, New York NY 10017-1261 Tel: 212-755-5900

Saturday, 8.to Monday 11 May, 2009
Private

Sunday, 10 May
1500-1700 hrs President's meeting with Pakistani prodemocracy activists Venue: Hotel Barclay Intercontinental Tuesday, 12 May 2230 hrs Departure New York for London by British Airways Flight BA-182

14

Boston University

Office of the General Counsel

125 Bay State Road Boston. Massachusetts T 617-353-2326 02215 F 617-353-5529

Erfka Oeetter, Deputy Genefal Counsel egeetter@bu.edu

January 25, 2012

Steven K. Barentzen, Esq. The Law Office of Steven Barentzen 1575 Eye Street, NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20005 Re: Husain Haqqani Dear Mr. Barentzen: I am writing in response to yourletter of January 23, 2012, in which you requested information concerning Boston University's e-mail retention policies for the e-mail account held by Associate Professor of International Relations, Husain Haqqani. I have consulted with Mr. Quinn R. Shamblin, Executive Director of Information Security at-Boston University. Mr. Shamblin has, informed methat Mr. Haqqani's e-mail account is hosted on a system that is configured with the following _backupand retention policies: • A backup of the inbox is taken every night and the backups are retained for 14 days. The backup process is' a snapshot of whatever was.present. in the e-mail box at the-time. It is not-a.journalingsystem thatretainsa copy-of every message that flows through the system. On this e-mail system-it is possible· for a user to create folders to organize and store messages. A snapshot of these folders is also taken .each night, but only the most recent version-of each folder is·retained, and:the University does not keep historical versions of'the folder,

I hope that this provides ,YQU with the information you were seeking. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely;

Erika Geetter Deputy General Counsel

ANNfixvR€

"C I,

The Benazir Bhutto I knew
Her death need not be the beginning of Pakistan's end. By Mansoor Ijaz J December 28. 2007

Benazir Bhutto was a beautiful and idealistic woman when she came to Pakistan's rescue in 1988. Growing up as the scion of one of its most powerful pOlitical families imposed enormous responsibilities on her and created perhaps unrealistic expectations

of what she could deliver to save her chaotic country from disintegration. Her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, reportedly encouraged her as an up-and-coming politician to study the lives of history's great women leaders, from Joan of Arc to Indira Ghandi, so she could prepare to lead Pakistan. During her two terms in office as prime minister, Ms. Bhutto earned a reputation among many as an imperious, venal, and corrupt politician, bringing Pakistan to the brink of financial ruin on more than one occasion. Her assassination now brings this teeming, nuclear-armed nation to the brink of complete state failure, with inevitable accusations intelligence and security services - charged with

that President Pervez Musharrafs

protecting her welfare as she campaigned for a third stint as prime minister - were somehow complicit in her death. Civil war, or worse, an Islamist army coup in the ensuing political chaos that may engulf Pakistan in the coming days and weeks before the elections scheduled for Jan. 8, 2008, are now the two most likely scenarios if Mr. Musharraf does not re-impose martial law. I knew Benazir well. I am often blamed by her supporters for having helped bring her government down in 1996 by exposing her hypocrisy and corruption in two Wall Street Journal Op-Ed pieces. We remained in touch over the years after she went into exile, even developing a begrudging respect for each other over time. She struck me as a terribly conflicted person who deep in her heart wanted to save Pakistan from its evils, but was unable to put her personal lifestyle choices aside in doing so. But I firmly believe that she loved Pakistan, and for all her faults, had returned there this time to turn a new page in its troubled political history. We should remember her for her courage to stand up in the face of incalculable odds to bring some semblance of sanity to the disaster that Pakistan has become. Musharraf, with whom she tried futilely over the past three months to cobble together a power-sharing arrangement, must immediately call for an independent international led by a blue ribbon panel of FBI and MIS offlcials,

investigation into her assassmation,

that determines the extent - or lack - of complicity from Pakistan's police and intelligence services in her death. This is the most critical decision he can make as a gesture of national reconciliation with bereaved Pakistan Peoples Party workers to avoid the appearance. of conflict to his ongoing service as president, and to prevent Pakistan's descent into civil war or an internally led Isla mist army coup. Her death will not have been in vain if Musharraf galvanizes the forces of democracy that bubble just under the surface of Pakistan's political fabric to have a truly transparent election of all of Pakistan's political leaders. In order to level the playing field, the Election Commission should delay the election until early February so each party can have time to regroup. The Pakistan People's Party should select a new candidate to contest the elections they have a good candidate in human rights activist and lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan - and get

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3/8/2012

him on the campaign trail as soon as the mouming period for Benazir is over. The Election Commission should allow Nawaz Sharif, as bad a choice for Pakistan as he would be. to contest the election so the grass roots of democratic activism in this nation of 165 million people can take hold once again. Rebuilding political institutions was one of Benazir's key platforms as a candidate. The country should honor her death by making that happen. Benazir Bhutto was a brave woman. She was the face of modernity that Pakistan needed to salvage its descent into a sea of Islamist darkness. She should be remembered as a guardian of Pakistan's identity as a modern Islamic nation. Her death need not be the beginning of Pakistan's end . • Mansoor Ijaz, a New York financier of Pakistani ancestry. jOintly authored a cease-fire plan between Muslim militants and Indian security forces in Kashmir in 2000 and met with Benazir Bhutto on more than a dozen occasions in Islamabad. Dubai, and London since 1994.

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ANNF-xuItE
NATIONALREVIEW ONLINE www.nationalreview.com PRINT

"1>"

Stepping Down
By Mansoor Ijaz
September 8,2007 12:00 A.M.

T

win terrorist attacks earlier this week in Rawalpindi and Islamabad underscored

the troubles confronting Gen. Pervez Musharraf as he struggles to stabilize Pakistan and hang on to whatever is left of his power there. He faces unprecedented challenges to his rule from two former prime ministers, and is attempting to co-opt one while keep the other out of power. He has picked unnecessary fights with the judiciary and is now facing the wrath of a chief justice whose power he can no longer undermine. . He tries to cut deals with Islamists when others won't talk to him. When they do, he gets into even deeper trouble with his western allies. Ever the tactician and rarely the strategist, Musharraf's end game this time seems to have no good outcome for the people of Pakistan. The state, it seems, is inching closer to failure on his watch. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, now of the ritzy Belgravia neighborhood in London, is set to return to Pakistan on Monday after a Supreme Court ruling allowed him to come home from exile. He is hardly fit to lead Pakistan he has support neither in Washington nor within the Pakistani army. Muslim states, most importantly Saudi Arabia, have dubbed him an unwelcome visitor for abrogating agreements to stay out of Pakistani politics until 2010. The on-again, off-again power-sharing romance with Benazir Bhutto seems off again institutions which now

would only bring back venal, corrupt governance to civil

hardly a fix for anything. A return to a politics of greed and power is

no solution to what ails this nuclear-armed state; it would serve no end but the selfperpetuation of Pakistani robber-barons.

http://www.nationalreview.comlblogs/printl222068

312112012

A national unity government is needed, and its leaders need to be independently minded and well-respected men and women who are prepared to serve Pakistan in the same way Muhammad Ali Jinnah, its founder, did. If the general, who so desperately seeks to cobble together patchwork solutions for hanging onto power, legitimately believes he should be president, he should appoint a caretaker administration and step down as both army chief and president. He should run for office like all other candidates on the merits of whatever record he has compiled while in office. Musharraf' s first act should be to appoint Gen. Ehsan ul Haq as the new army chief for a fixed one-year term before he retires officially on October 7. Gen. Haq, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior most active military officer in the army, distancing others in seniority by nearly a decade. He is a moderate who believes in making peace with India over disputed Kashmir and has much firsthand experience with the outside world on matters of counterterrorism and security. He is a apolitical military officer who would firmly march the army back into the barracks and out of civilian affairs. As former director of both military intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, his working knowledge of how these organizations can rebuild Pakistani security, rather than harming it with ill-advised adventures (such as backing Taliban forces in Afghanistan), would be a welcome change in Pakistani foreign policy and security strategy. The general's second act should be to appoint a caretaker government before his term ends on November 15, one that has leading members of each of the main political factions so groundwork can be prepared for free and fair elections by June 2008. He should then resign the presidency and become a candidate, and he should not block any other politician or Islamist from becoming a candidate either. He should run on his record and let others run on theirs, and then trust the .. . ~~~~ c h· orce th at IS m th e best i est mterests 0 fth err country. ~~ • . people to make a
~-1

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The caretaker government should be headed by Jehangir Karamat, former army chief and ex-ambassador to the United States, who has a reputation and knack for telling his bosses where to get off when they are wrong. Karamat would fuse together the support of Pakistan's only two functional institutions the judiciary and the army and would carry the support of important ally countries, including the United

States. Most important, he is genuinely committed to improving the lot of Pakistanis on the street. He has their trust, and he can rebuild confidence in civil institutions. He could be joined on the roster by the current prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, to maintain continuity and stability of the financial markets and economy (GDP has grown at a 7-percent annual rate and national debt has been cut from 100 percent to 60 percent ofGDP during Mr Aziz's tenure). So to should senior advisers of Ms. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party join; Aitzaz Ashan would be an ideal candidate, being a close adviser and confidante of Ms. Bhutto, and having fought for and won the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikar Chaudhry late last month. The ruling faction of Mr. Sharifs Pakistan Muslim League could offer former foreign and finance minister Sartaj Aziz and former Musharraf ally Chaudhary Shujaat Hussein. Mukhtar Mai, the woman who became a national hero by standing up to her rapists and tormentors and whom Mr. Musharrafvilified for embodying all that was wrong with Pakistan could become the representative of the disaffected and poor to

ensure their voices were brought to bear on the country's future. Pakistan's political institutions are decimated by years of neglect and army rule. They are not yet ready for a prime time appearance that would be required by a BhuttoMusharrafpower-sharing arrangement, or by the reemergence ofNawaz Sharif.
0

These leaders have tried, and failed, to govern the country. They seek power its

sake, and voters are only important to them on Election Day. The day after, the '

Pakistanis that he has their best interests in mind. Perhaps he does, and if so, then he

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should selflessly execute a game plan that could make him the odds-on favorite to recapture his leadership position, but this time with the real support of Pakistanis, not via a manufactured and artificial government that has no credibility to lead Pakistan's industrious people away from the brink of failure. - Mansoor Ijaz, a New York jinancier of Pakistani ancestry, jointly authored a ceasejire plan between Muslim militants and Indian security forces in Kashmir in 2000. He is an NRO contributor.
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INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS: THE HANDSET REPLACEMENT CYCLE
By Roger Entner, Analyst and Founder, Recon Ana/ytics The United States still suffers from a wireless inferiority complex. Seemingly every other country is better. In fact, the further away the country the better it seems. Is this inferiority complex based on facts? Or are American wireless consumers victims of a complex delusion? This is the first in a series of reports from Recon Analytics in conjunction with Mobile Future that will examine, compare and contrast the performance of 14 countries: Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The countries were selected to provide a good comparison in terms of geographic and economic diversity as well as the different stages of wireless development, in terms of wireless penetration and wireless data usage. Mobile device sales figures are among the most obscure and difficult to obtain statistics around the wireless world. Recon Analytics has worked with handset manufacturers to ascertain the number of devices sold in each country. We use these figures to then calculate the handset replacement cycle (Le., how often a consumer replaces their device). Mobile handsets are becoming more capable every year, while price points for these devices have held steady. Shorter handset replacement cycles translate into newer, more technically advanced devices in the hands of consumers and business users. The more technically advanced the device, the more likely a consumer or business user is to take advantage of advanced wireless services and mobile applications. This is a critical prerequisite for innovation that every country needs to succeed and prosper the 21 SI century. The innovation in mobile devices and its associated services has been impressive and unprecedented. New smartphones in conjunction with high-speed wireless data networks have truly put the power of the Internet in the palm of people's hands. The things people do and the utility and satisfaction they receive were inconceivable only five years ago. Access to private and business email anywhere, anytime is no longer viewed as a miracle. Watching the same on-demand television programs that consumers have at home is now taken for granted. And on the spot, real-time information about business processes has transformed into a necessity rather than the mere academic vision statement and wishful thinking it once was. Through this explosion in capabilities, these new devices engage owners much more than any device they might have had in the past. Unsurprisingly, every survey confirms that consumers with a new, more powerful device have higher satisfaction scores than consumers with older, less capable devices .

"

"

International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle

I 23 June

2011

Page 2 of 8

Table 1 Handset Replacement Cycle in Months 2007 2008 2009 2010 Prepaid Subscriber Income in PPP$

Source: Recan Analytics, 2011, IMF 2010

The data set in Table 1 shows that the United States has consistently had the shortest handset replacement cycle, while India and Brazil have the longest. In 2010, Americans replaced their mobile device after one year and nine months, whereas Indians replaced their device after seven years and nine months and Brazilians after six years and eight months. The considerably slower pace of technological change in the most vibrant technology sector is truly amazing. Many countries in Europe, which American folklore considers leaders in wireless, are actually laggards. Average Germans and Italians keep their devices in excess of four years, more than twice as long as Americans. This proves conclusively that Americans use the newest handsets in the world. As we all know, new affordable handsets are a key decision factor for consumer when chosing their mobile carrier. Hence the level of handset subsidization is an indicator of how competitive a market is. In no other country are consumers upgrading faster than in the U.S., so no one else has comparable access to the latest handsets, technology and services than the American consumer. The rapid handset replacement cycle has put new smartphones in more people's hands faster than anywhere else in the world. As a direct result the mobile applications market is sky rocketing. Apple's App Store alone had 1 billion application downloads within nine months of its launch and hit the 10 billion download mark in just two and a half years from more than 350,000 applications.

/I/RECON / v ANALYTICS

International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle 123 June 2011

Page 3 of 8

There are a number of other points the table underscores.
The replacement cycle for the United States has edged up slightly since 2007. But, in comparison to Japan, which is often pointed to as an advanced wireless country, Americans upgrade far faster. In 2007, Japanese consumers replaced their handsets after slightly more than two and a half years, compared to the U.S. figure of 18 months. As noted, the U.S. figure has edged up, but the Japanese figure has nearly doubled to just under four years in 2010. A slow handset replacement cycle means that consumers and business cannot take advantage of new technologies as rapidly and adoption of those new technologies is correspondingly slow. This hinders new innovation and slows down the virtuous cycle in which the adoption of new technology creates new services, enhances efficiency and builds new revenue streams that help the overall economy of the country and its inhabitants. Even Finland, which is thought of as a wireless technology vanguard, has seen its handset replacement figures skyrocket from an already-sluggish 41.8 months in 2007 to 74.5 months. There's a good chance a consumer will replace their car faster than that. What are the factors that get people to replace their handsets faster or slower? Let's look at some of the factors that could playa role. • Percentage of prepaid subscribers: At first glance there seems to be a connection between the handset
2007 2008 19.6 2009 21.1 2010 4.5 74.5 46.3 21.7 -United

Handset Replacement

Cyle

2007 to 2010
States -Finland -Japan

replacement cycle and the percentage of prepaid subscribers in a country. Many countries that have a slow handset replacement cycle have a high percentage of prepaid customers. Could it be that just being on prepaid means that you keep your handset longer? However, as a notable exception, it is obviously not stopping the people in the United Kingdom from changing their handsets almost as quickly as the people in the United States, even though they are more than twice as likely to be on prepaid plans. • Per capita income at purchase power parity: Another factor could be simply how affluent the people are in a country undisturbed by exchange rates. The logic is that the more people earn the quicker people will replace their handset. The data in Table 1 generally agrees with that premise, but again there are important exceptions. Israelis, Italians, and Koreans earn almost the same, but the handset replacement cycle in Israel is 76.5 months, in Italy 51.9 months and in Korea 26.9 months. Although they have the same income level, Israelis keep their phone three times as long as Koreans, and Italians twice as long as Koreans. Is it because of prepaid subscriber levels? The data doesn't support that because Israel has 53% prepaid subscribers and Italy has 87% prepaid subscribers, while Korea has none. • level of handset subsidization: One common practice, especially among operators that provide their

services via contract, is to subsidize the device in exchange for the commitment of the customer to stay a certain period with the operator. Similar to higher income, more affordable devices allow customers to purchase a device sooner rather than later. Instead of focusing on the absolute handset price, the handset subsidy is a better metric to consider because handset price overemphasizes low cost handsets regard

~~
/ v ANALYTICS
///RECON

International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle I 23 June 2011

Page 4 of 8

capabilities, whereas handset subsidy focuses on the shift in the value perception of the consumer. It is one thing to have a higher income and it's another to be tempted by a low price. Because data is sparse when it comes to average handset prices and even more so for how much an operator paid for a handset, we have to find a suitable proxy, ideally in the most vibrant part of the market - smart phones.

Fortunately, the Apple iPhone 4G with 16MB is such a proxy. Apple sold 18.65 million iPhones in Q1 2011 and achieved revenues of $12.3 billion from it, which results in an ASP of $660. The iPhone 4'5 ASP is higher than that of the iPhone 3GS, but the volumes for the iPhone 4 are vastly greater than for the iPhone 3GS. So for the sake of simplicity and conservativeness, let's make them even.

Table 2 Handset Subsidization:

The iPhone 4G Case Study

Income in

2010 Handset Replacement

Note: The iPhone is not offered in India and Israel and is only offered through an is only offered with 3 year contracts.

/ v ANALYTICS

/1/RECON

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..

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International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle 123 June 2011

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One of the most interesting observations in the table above is that in the lowest income countries - Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa - the iPhone is sold at a profit. The iPhone in these countries is even more of a status symbol than it is in the United States and is simply unaffordable for the average consumer in that country. Therefore, the operators in these countries are following the rational path of charging for the iPhone as a luxury item to a largely price-insensitive clientele. This means that the market for the iPhone is vastly different compared to the other countries where it is a mass consumer item and does not make them suitable for our exercise. Another interesting note is that Canada is the only country in the world that has three-year contracts for the purchase of a new device for the lowest price. For most devices the price difference between a 3 year contract and a 2 year contract is more than $300, sometimes even $400, whereas the difference between a 2 year, 1 year or no contract is only an additional $30 per step. This provides Canadians with a significant incentive to commit to 3 year contracts. Nevertheless, Canadians replace their devices every 2 % to 2 % years. If a customer would like to upgrade their phone before the contract expired, they have to pay an additional Canadian-$20 per month until the original committed period expires to upgrade to the new device. Even with this additional cost, the average Canadian upgrades 6 to 9 months early. Even with the unique 3 year contracts, Canadians have the fourth shortest handset replacement cycle in the world. Clearly the contract length is not having a major impact compared to many other countries that have a longer handset replacement cycle (but shorter contract duration) than Canada.

What is really going on?
Regression Analysis: When several factors, such as prepaid subscriber percentage, income, and handset subsidization, affect a variable such as the handset replacement cycle, regression analysis can determine the impact of the different factors. More detailed analysis further revealed that, not surprisingly, handset subsidization was the dominant factor, far ahead of how people paid and their income levels.

We first look at how well the formula explains the empirical data: An r2 of 0.64 indicates that the formula used has good explanatory value, but not perfect. Let's look at it by the various components.

/ v ANALYTICS

A/RECON

International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle

I 23 June

2011

Page 6 of 8

by 1.1 months. The impact of income is modest, which is clear in a comparison between United States and Italy. The income differential between the two countries is roughly $18,000, which affects the handset replacement cycle by two months when the overall difference in the handset replacement cycle is about 30 months. Again, the direction is surprising, but the magnitude of the impact is small. A good example to illustrate the lack of impact that income has is a comparison of Finland, France, and the United Kingdom. The average income in all three countries is almost identical: Finland with $34,585, France with $34,077 and the United Kingdom with $34,920. At the same time, the handset replacement cycle is remarkably different. As mentioned before, in Finland the handset replacement cycle is 74.6 months, while in France the average consumer replaces his or her handset every 30.8 months. In the United Kingdom, the average consumer changes their handset every 22.8 months, which is almost as quickly as consumers in the United States. The same income yet significantly different handset replacement times supports the findings of the analysis that income is a negligible factor in how quickly the handset gets replaced.
Finland

Example: Finland, France, and the United Kingdom

france
• Handset Replacement

United Klnadom
Cycle

• Pl'P Income

The next variable is the percentage of postpaid subscribers. For every 10% of postpaid subscribers the handset replacement cycle goes down by 0.3 months. While the direction is somewhat surprising, the relatively small magnitude of the increase is a lot more important. It shows that the handset replacement cycle is relatively unaffected by the way people pay their bills in a given country. The maximum difference in handset replacement cycle between a country with 100% prepaid and a country with 100% postpaid is about three and a half months compared to a baseline of 74.,9 months or almost seven years. The most interesting examples of a significant direct connection between the significance of prepaid and the handset replacement cycle are Germany, Japan, and Italy. The handset replacement cycle in all three countries is almost the same (between 45.7 and 51.1 months), whereas the percentage of customers using prepaid could not be more diverse: Japan is almost exclusively postpaid with only 1% of customers using prepaid; in Italy 87% of customers are on prepaid plans; in Germany the two payment options are almost equal, with 55% of customers choosing prepaid plans. The average income in all three countries is also close ranging from $29,392 in Italy versus $33,805 in Japan and $36,303 in Germany. The final factor is the handset subsidy provided by the operator. For every $100 handset subsidy, the handset replacement cycle shortens by roughly 8.6 months. By directly lowering the price of the handset through a subsidy, the
90 70 50 30 10 -10

Example: Germany, Italy, and Japan

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International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle

I 23 June

2011

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handset replacement cycle is most dramatically impacted. The price/value perception of the consumer is altered and the new device becomes even more attractive through its affordability. The general trend is clear, as shown. through the comparison of the United States and France, a greater handset subsidy generally leads to a faster replacement cycle. Nevertheless, the comparison of the United States and Germany shows that the relationship is far from perfect. While in both countries the devices are subsidized by about the same amount, the handset replacement cycle in the United States is far shorter. As we indicated at the beginning, an

Example: France, Germany, and the United States
$500 $400

,.z of 0.64 is a

good fit, but not a perfect fit. There are other contributing factors which we will examine as this series continues. One of the contributing factors could be the lower cost of of wireless telecommunications and the higher consumer surplus that Americans are enjoying.

$300
$200

$100

so
France • Subsidy Germany • Handset Replacement Cycle United Statll$

Conclusion and additional thoughts
Based on the data and analysis outlined in the report, it is conclusive that over the last four years, handset subsidization is the dominant factor influencing the handset replacement cycle. The percentage of subscribers on postpaid and prepaid plans, as well as the relative income level in the countries, had a negligible impact on the handset replacement cycle. There is considerable empirical evidence to support the analysis. When the original iPhone was released, it was priced at $499 to consumers. Sticker shock ensued and sales were relatively modest-falling short of some overly exuberant forecasts. The iPhone became a mass market phenomenon when AT&T and Apple reworked their arrangement and AT & T increased its handset subsidy from the typical $150 to $200 level to the previously unprecedented $450, which allowed the handset price for consumers to come down to a more palatable $199. Another example is the situation in Finland, which for a long period of time outlawed handset subsidies. Since it lifted the ban it has only modestly adopted handset subsidization, and has one of the longest handset replacement cycles in the world-about six years.

Therefore, Finns have some of the oldest devices in their hands and seem poised to miss out on the mobile Internet revolution. Another myth can be laid to rest is that early termination fees are a barrier to consumers getting new handsets faster. For both the United States and Canada, where two-year and three-year contracts are the rule, consumers chose to upgrade their phones on average three months before the end of the contract. Contracts including handset subsidies and early termination fees that are used to protect the operator's investment are accelerating the handset replacement cycle rather than inhibiting it. Americans are benefitting greatly from handset subsidies that allow them to have newer, more powerful devices than MLatoOwe are observing right

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/1/RECON
ANAL YTICS

International Comparisons: The Handset Replacement Cycle

I 23 June

2011

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now with the smartphone revolution, the countries that make the most advanced technology quickly available to businesses and consumers will reap significant benefits from it. Not only do the devices become more powerful, but the software on the devices are innovating in a six to twelve months cycle compared to desktop operating system innovation cycles of several years. Entire new business sectors are created, such as mobile application development, which help existing companies reap the economic benefits of enhanced productivity. In addition, consumers are enjoying entire new ways of communication and doing some of their daily activities in unprecedented ways. What has the rapid handset cycle brought us? Only four years ago, flip phones were the pinnacle of consumer trends. These devices had one inch screens, the size of a postage stamp, that had barely enough room to display the phone number and processing capabilities that were barely beyond that of a pocket calculator. When sending or receiving a text message with 140 characters, the user had to scroll down the screen twice. Data speeds were slow to the point where a tiny mobile website took half a minute to load. It would have been inconceivable for consumers to watch videos on four inch screens whose resolution is on par with that of a high-definition TV set. Social networking, something that today's wireless users take for granted, has been made possible through these new devices. Cameras and video capabilities that rival that of stand-alone devices have become the standard and people today are taking more pictures and videos than ever before in history. Low cost, high quality, and part of what people carry with them all the time. Due to the rapid handset replacement cycle, more than 37% of Americans own smartphones today. With smartphones, the power and capabilities of the Internet that only a few years ago were limited to a computer in the home or at work are now in the palm of your hand virtually anywhere you go. Ten years ago, the things we take for granted now were the very things we saw in a science fiction series - now we live with them every day.

Addendum
Handset replacement cycle: The handset replacement cycle describes the length of time in months that a device

owner keeps his handset before purchasing a new one. It is calculated by first subtracting the number of new subscribers from the subscribers at the end of a year to get the number of long-term device owners. Then we subtract from the total number of device sales the number of net subscriber additions to determine the replacement device sales. Then the number of long-term device owners is divided by the number of replacement device sales and multiplied by 12. This results in the handset replacement cycle in months. «subscribers - net subscriber additions) I (device sales - net subscriber additions» * 12 in months Purchase power parity: The exchange rate at which the domestic purchasing power of both currency is equivalent. ASP: Average Selling Price, the amount that the wireless operator pays for the device to the device manufacturer.

= handset replacement cycle

A/RECON / v ANAL YTICS

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P.R.No.150/2011 Date: 02/05/2011 Office of the Spokesperson Press Release Death of Osama bin Ladin In an intelligence driven operation, Osama Bin Ladin was killed in the surroundings of Abbotabad in the early hours of this morning. This operation was conducted by the US forces in accordance with declared US policy that Osama bin Ladin will be eliminated in a direct action by the US forces, wherever found in the world. Earlier today, President Obama telephoned President Zardari on the successful US operation which resulted in killing of Osama bin Ladin. Osama bin Ladin's death illustrates the resolve of the international community including Pakistan to fight and eliminate terrorism. It constitutes a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world. Al-Qaeda had declared war on Pakistan. Scores of Al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist attacks resulted in deaths of thousands of innocent Pakistani men, women and children. Almost, 30,000 Pakistani civilians lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. More than 5,000 Pakistani security and armed forces officials have been martyred in Pakistan's campaign against Al-Qaeda, other terrorist organizations and affiliates. Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism. It is Pakistan's stated policy that it will not allow its soil to be used in terrorist attacks against any country. Pakistan's political leadership, parliament, state institutions and the whole nation are fully united in their resolve to eliminate terrorism. Islamabad 2 May 2011

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Printers

Osama bin Laden is dead, Obama announces
Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind al-Qaida, is dead, President Obama announces from the White House
Declan Walsh in Islamabad, Richard Adams in Washington
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 1May 2011 23.00 EDT and Ewen MaeAsklll in Washington

A!a=I......u.r
Article history

Osarna bin Laden has been killed by US operatives Images

in Pakistan, President Obama announced.

Photograph:

AFP /Getty

Osama bin Laden. the criminal mastermind sought-after operation,

behind al-Oaida and the world's most
2001, has been killed by a US

terrorist since the attacks of 11 September President Barack Obama has announced.

In an address to the nation, President Obama said Bin Laden was killed in a "targeted operation"

in Abbottabad, a highland town north of Islamabad, last night.
lead last August, and culminated in an "After a firefight they killed bin involving a "small team of Americans".

The operation started with an intelligence operation Laden."

None of the Americans was killed. Pakistani co-operation said.

"helped to lead us to him" he

Osama's body is in possession of the US, according to the first reports from the US television networks.

As the news spread, crowds gathered outside the gates of the White House in
Washington DC, singing the national anthem and cheering.

President Obama made the highly unusual Sunday night live statement to announce the news at around 11.30pm eastern time. Bin Laden's capture comes eight years to the day that President George Bush declared "mission accomplished" in Iraq. As president, Bush declared he wanted bin Laden "dead

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama/print

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J

or alive" - but it is now the unlikely figure of Barack Obama who has been able to announce the final triumph as US commander-in-chief. This is a turning point in the global "war on terrorism" that has been waged since and the news will reverberate around the world. boost for US foreign policy, the key aim of which of al-Qaida, and coincidentally

®
9/n -

The news comes as an unparalleled

since 2001 has been the disarming and dismemberment probably ensures the re-election of Obama in 2012.

As a candidate during the 2008 election campaign, Obama repeatedly vowed: "We will kill Osama bin Laden." And so it has proved. The Obama statement congressional was scheduled originally for 10.30pm, but the need to inform US

leaders caused the delay.

In the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, one western diplomat described the news as a "game changer" - not just for al-Qaida, but also for US foreign policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, a region embroiled in turmoil and violence since 2001. "I'm overjoyed," said the diplomat. "But what this exactly means is really not clear." Some analysts fear bin Laden's death could spark a precipitous US withdrawal from the

region, with the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan still unresolved. It will likely also reconfigure relations with Pakistan, where the CIA is engaged in a controversial assassination campaign against senior al-Qaida figures using Predator and Reaper drones. "He's dead," said an official with Pakistan's details other than to say that it Inter-Services Intelligence, declining to give

was "highly

sensitive intelligence operation".

The official said he was "not at liberty" to give further details on the killing, including on reports that Pakistani intelligence was involved in the operation. information later this morning," he said. "We11 release more

Abbottabad is about two hours' drive north of Islamabad, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It is not part of the tribal belt, where the CIA drone strike campaign has been concentrated, but is home to the Pakistan military's main training institution, the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul. The fact that bin Laden was killed outside the tribal belt in Pakistan will raise questions about how the six-foot four-inch fugitive, one of the most famous faces in the world, managed to escape justice for so long. Pakistan's intelligence services have largely co-operated Pakistan's cities such as the architect of with the US in capturing al-

Qaida fugitives - some of the most notorious figures seized since 2001 were caught in

9/n,

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad

In recent months US military and intelligence officials have publicly complained that the lSI has been assisting the Haqqani network, an al-Qaida-Iinked that straddles the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. militant network

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or Its afIiIiated companies. All rights reserved.

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Fears of Qaeda vengeance after U.S. kills Osama
Mon, May 2 2011 By Mark Hosenball and Kamran Haider WASHINGTON/ABBOTTABAD, Pakistan (Reuters) - World leaders warned of revenge attacks after Osama bin Laden was killed in a U.S. assault in Pakistan on Monday that brought to a dramatic end the long manhunt for the al Qaeda leader who had become the most powerful symbol of Islamist militancy. President Barack Obama declared the world was a safer and "better place" with bin Laden dead. But the euphoria that drew flag-waving crowds to "Ground Zero" of the September 11, 2001, attack in New York was tempered by calls for vigilance against retaliation by his followers. The revelation that bin Laden had been holed up in a compound near Islamabad threatened to exacerbate U.S. tensions with nuclear -armed Pakistan, which had not been told of the raid in advance. The White House acknowledged there was good reason for U.S. lawmakers, already doubtful of Pakistan's cooperation against al Qaeda, to demand to know whether bin Laden had been "hiding in plain sight" and to raise questions about continued U.S. aid to Islamabad. Bin Laden was given a sea burial after Muslim funeral rites on a U.S. aircraft carrier. His shrouded body was placed in a weighted bag and eased into north Arabian Sea. The death of bin Laden, who achieved near-mythic status for his ability to elude capture for more than a decade, closes a bitter chapter in the global fight against al Qaeda, but it does not eliminate the threat of further strikes. Under bin Laden's leadership, London. al Qaeda militants struck targets from Indonesia to the European capitals of Madrid and

But it was the September 11, 2001, attacks, in which al Qaeda militants used hijacked planes to strike at economic and military symbols of American might and killed nearly 3,000 people, that helped bin Laden achieve global infamy. Those attacks spawned two wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, inflicted damage on U.S. ties with the Muslim world that have yet to be repaired, and redefined security for air travelers. "Even as we mark this milestone, we should not forget that the battle to stop al Qaeda and its syndicate of terror will not end with the death of bin Laden," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said just hours after bin Laden was killed. NIGHT RAID NEAR ISLAMABAD A small U.S. strike team, dropped by helicopter to bin Laden's hideout near the Pakistani capital Islamabad under the cover of night, shot dead the al Qaeda leader with a bullet to the head. One of bin Laden's wives was thought to have been used to shield him at first, White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan told reporters. She was killed, along with one of bin Laden's sons, in the 40-minutes of fighting. Television pictures from inside the house showed bloodstains smeared across a floor next to a large bed. Obama and his staff followed the raid minute by minute via live video feed in the White House situation room, and ~r::,<iOF there was relief when the commandos, including members of the Navy's elite Seals unit, stormed the compound ~ "We got him," the president said, according to Brennan, after the mission was accomplished. "Yesterday is a defining moment in the war against al Qaeda, the war on terrorism, by decapitating snake known as al Qaeda," Brennan said. Mindful of possible suspicion in the Muslim world, a U.S. official said DNA testing showed a "virtua"y match with the al Qaeda leader. ;, the head of ~ ... 100 percent ~~". ~~ "

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While some intelligence officials said there was no indication Pakistani authorities knew bin Laden was sheltering 35 miles north of Islamabad, U.S. lawmakers insisted Pakistan give an explanation. Reflecting a lack of trust between the two countries, Washington did not tell Pakistan about the raid in advance. "A number of people have questions about whether or not there was some type of support (for bin Laden) that was provided by the Pakistani government," Brennan said. "People are raising these questions, and now we're going to have to deal with them." Obama, whose popularity has suffered from continuing U.S. economic woes, will likely see a short-term bounce in his approval ratings. At the same time, he is likely to face mounting pressure from Americans to speed up the planned withdrawal this July of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. However, bin Laden's death is unlikely to have any impact on the nearly decade-long forces are facing record violence by a resurgent Taliban. war in Afghanistan, where U.S.

Many analysts see bin Laden's death as largely symbolic since he was no longer believed to have been issuing operational orders to the many autonomous al Qaeda affiliates. "There are a lot of al Qaeda look-alike celis," said Steve Clemons, a Middle East analyst at the New America Foundation. "Bin Laden was an animating force but there are other ways these groups get oxygen and can remain a threat." Financial markets were more optimistic. The dollar and stocks rose, while oil and gold fell, on the view bin Laden's death reduced global security risks. BURIED AT SEA, WARNINGS OF REVENGE Analysts warned that objections from some Muslim clerics to the sea burial could stoke anti-American sentiment. The clerics questioned whether the United States followed proper Islamic tradition, saying Muslims should not be buried at sea unless they died during a voyage. The United States issued security warnings to Americans worldwide. CIA Director Leon Panetta said al Qaeda would "almost certainly" try to avenge bin Laden's death. France's President Nicolas Sarkozy hailed the killing as a coup in the fight against terrorism, but he, too, warned it did not spell al Qaeda's demise. British Prime Minister David Cameron said the West should be "particularly vigilant." Vows to avenge bin Laden's death appeared quickly in Islamist militant forums, a key means by which al Qaeda leaders have passed on information. "God's revenge on you, you Roman dog, God's revenge on you crusaders," one forum member wrote. A U.S. national security official said there was no fresh intelligence interests since bin laden's death. suggesting new plots against U.S. or other Western

It was the biggest national security victory for the president since he took office in early 2009 and will make it difficult for Republicans to portray Democrats as weak on security as he seeks re-election in 2012. In Saudi Arabia, bin Laden's native land, there was a mood of disbelief and sorrow among many. The Palestinian Islamist group Hamas mourned bin Laden as an "Arab holy warrior." But many in the Arab world felt his death was long overdue. For many Arabs, inspired by the popular upheavals in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere over the past few months, the news of bin Laden's death had less significance than it once might have. (Additional reporting by Phil Stewart, Jeff Mason, Patricia Zengerle, Arshad Mohammed, Alister Bull, Missy Ryan, Mark Hosenball, Richard Cowan, Andrew Quinn, Tabassum Zakaria, Joanne Allen and David Morgan in Washington and Chris Allbritton in Islamabad; Writing by Ross Colvin and Matt Spetalnick; editing by Jackie Frank)

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CNNSituation Room with Wolf Blitzer May 2,2011 http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ll0S/02/sitroom.02.html (COMMERCIAL BREAK) BLITZER:Some more now on the breaking news, the death of Osama bin Laden, killed by U.S.forces in a raid on a mansion just a few dozen miles north of the Pakistani capital. It's raising lots of questions about the terror leader's presence in Pakistan, what officials there knew. Let's talk about it with Husain Haqqani, he's the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Mr. Ambassador, thanks for coming in. John Brennan, the president's counter terrorism advisor, says it's inconceivable that bin Laden didn't have some sort of support system in Pakistan. What happened? HUSAINHAQQANI,PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR THE UNITEDSTATES:Obviously, bin Laden did have a support TO system. The issue is was that support system within the government and the state of Pakistan or within the society of Pakistan. We all know that there are people in Pakistan who share the same belief system as bin Laden and other extremists. People like myself have been fighting them. Benazir Bhutto was a victim to them. So that is a fact, that there are people who probably protected him. We will do a full inquiry into finding out why our intelligence services were not able to track him earlier. BLITZER:This compound was a huge compound, bigger than all the other houses in the area, with a big wall around it. Didn't anyone from the lSI, the Pakistani intelligence service, or the military, the police go in there and see what was going on? HAQQANI: olf, you can't do that in Pakistan, where there are many houses which W are larger than others and unless and until you have due cause. The reason you can't enter them, if there had been intelligence, that would have happened. If you remember, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was found in a similar house in the city of Rawalpindi a few years ago, and the Pakistani government was responsible for arresting him at that time. What I find incredulous is the notion that somehow, just because there is a p support network in Pakistan, the state, the government and the military of should be blamed. BLITZER:Because we have high respect for the military, the intelligence service. You can disagree with them, but they're very good. Listen to this interview I did on April

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12, 2010, about a year ago or so, with your prime minister, Prime Minister Gillani. Here's some excerpts. (BEGINVIDEOCLIP) BLITZER:Are you any closer right now, do you believe, to finding, to capturing or killing Osama bin Laden or his No.2, Ayman al-Zawahiri? PRIMEMINISTERYOUSAFRAZAGILLANI,PAKISTAN: n fact, Osama bin Laden is I not in Pakistan. BLITZER:How do you know for sure he's not in Pakistan? GILLANI:Because our military actions are very successful, and we have a very successful operation in Malakar (ph) and Swat and now in South Waziristan and elsewhere. If there would have been any chance, he would have been arrested or maybe even don't know whether he's alive or not. (END VIDEOCLIP) BLITZER:It sounds to me like Prime Minister Gillani was in total denial of what was going on. HAQQANI:Look, we have to as a nation in Pakistan re-evaluate our view of this whole problem. After 911, there were people in Pakistan who said we shouldn't side with the United States because the United States is about to crumble like the Soviet Union did and we should actually support the Taliban. You remember that. That changed. Pakistan has to come to terms with the fact and we will. BLITZER:But Mr. Ambassador, he was within a two-hours drive of Islamabad.

BLITZER:Let me ask ... HAQQANI: nd any question about intelligence failures will definitely be addre A by us jointly. As I said only two or three days ago in your program, we are allies .• "_"".Lh.. want ... BLITZER:Why didn't the U.S.trust Pakistan to share anything about this operation until all those U.S.troops were out of your air space? HAQQANI:Because the United States didn't share information on this operation with the Australians, with the British, with the Canadians. It did not because ...

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BLITZER:He was in Pakistan, not in Australia or Britain. HAQQANI:But my point is that the United States made a critical decision. President Obama decided that the success of the operation was far more important than the niceties. And that said -- that said ... BLITZER:But even when those helicopters were flying back to Afghanistan or to the Indian -- they still didn't tell you until you were -- they were completely out of your air space. HAQQANI:Pakistan and the United States have a lot of things to work out as we move forward, but move forward we will. Pakistan has no interest, the people of Pakistan have no interest in protecting our keeping terrorists on our soil. We need to build our nation. Half our children don't go to school. Two-thirds of our people live below the poverty line. Those are the issues we want to address. BLITZER:Bottom line, you're happy bin Laden is dead? HAQQANI: ou bet. I have -- I have wanted bin Laden not to be on the scene for a Y long time. The terrorists have brought Islam a bad name. They have brought Pakistan a bad name. They have brought all our neighboring countries a bad name, and we want to defeat them as much as you and any American. BLITZER:Mr. Ambassador, thanks for coming in. We'll continue this conversation .

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CNNSituation Room with Wolf Blitzer July 11, 2011 BLITZER:And joining us now Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani. Mr. Ambassador, welcome back to THE SITUATIONROOM. HUSAINHAQQANI, AKISTANIAMBASSADOR U.S.:Thank you for inviting me. P TO BLITZER:This crisiS, and I think it's fair to say there's a crisis in U.S.-Pakistani relations. The United States withholding $800 million in promised military aid to Pakistan because the U.S.is not happy with what you're doing, what do you do about it? HAQQANI:First of all, I don't think that's a correct characterization. The $800 million includes $300 million in reimbursements that have just been slowed down. We haven't received a reimbursement since December 2010. So basically, it's just something that's already slow, having been slowed down more. The fact is that-BLITZER:Are you saying this is not a big deal? The $800 million of aids has been suspended. HAQQANI:Both sides are working together on a number of things and Pakistan is not happy with the pace of delivery of assistance. Americans are not happy with the pace of delivery of certain deliverables from Pakistan. It happens sometimes. Right now because Pakistan is a fledgling democracy and everything that happens there hits the media and similarly, of course, there's an American domestic political context in which everything becomes an issue because of the way people react to your administration. This has become -BLITZER:The reaction in Pakistan to the U.S.decision to suspend at least for now $800 million in promised aid, a spokesman for the Pakistani military saying in the past, we have not been dependent -- we have not been dependent on any external support for these operations and they will continue. Basically suggesting, you know what, keep money, we don't need it. HAQQANI: ell, I think what needs to be understood is that Pakistan and the United W States have a relationship that goes beyond aid from 1990 to 1999. There was no aid relationship. You remember the Presler (ph) amendment and so even though the U.S.and Pakistan continued to work together albeit in a limited manner. I think the Americans also need to understand that vanishing aid as weapon of influence all the time is not a good idea. It insults the people of Pakistan. ~~ Of' ~~.
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BLITZER:So you know $800 million is a lot of money that can be used to build schools here in the United States. HAQQANI:First of all, the format of this discussion doesn't allow me to give you a breakdown of that $800 million, how they come up with that figure. So all I'm saying is we cannot have a conversation and a dialogue that's just aid centered. Secondly, the United States needs Pakistan for a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan needs the United States to beat terrorism, which we consider to be a menace for our own people. So we need to work together and both sides are working together. The only problem is whenever there's a disagreement or the pace of things, it always becomes a much bigger story. My understanding is that the United States government is continuing with all civilian assistance to Pakistan. BLITZER:But military is a different matter. HAQQANI: hich as you know is more than $1 billion in promises. W BLITZER:Let's talk about what's deeply irritated U.S.officials. I know this because they've told me this, that on a couple of occasions at least they gave intelligence information top your government about terrorists building bombs, secret locations. Within a few days, when your troops went there to do something about it, all the folks were gone. All the bad guys -- somebody tipped off the bad guys about the information. HAQQANI: he important thing is that the troops went there to take action. T BLITZER:But it was too late. HAQQANI:Previously, we always heard Pakistan is not taking action. Here's the problem. When Pakistan takes action -BLITZER:But they take action after somebody tipped off the bad guys. HAQQANI: here is no evidence that anybody tipped anybody off. What we need to T do -- and that's how governments function. They need to talk to each other and we are talking to each other at every level. We have an understanding that we will solve these problems together.

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HAQQANI: olf, my point is that you can -- U.S.officials can say anything behind my W back. BLITZER:They can say it publicly, basically. HAQQANI: o one has said it officially and no one has said it to us, that you N deliberately tipped them off. They just said they're concerned this happened and there's a way to resolve issues. And that's a way we're all working on. What has happened to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in my opinion is that everybody's got an opinion on it. And when everybody has an opinion, there are television talk shows in Pakistan. There are about 30 channels. There are your evening shows every time, everybody talks about it. In private, the U.S.officials and Pakistani officials are working things out. In public, everything that is negative gets amplified. BLITZER:Here's something that's very negative and caused a huge uproar in Pakistan and you do have a robust journalistic community in Pakistan. There's a journalist who is named Shahzad. You're familiar with this journalist. HAQQANI: e was a personal friend of mine. H BLTIZER:All right, so he was brutally tortured and killed. And Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly had accused elements of the Pakistani government of being involved in the killing of this courageous journalist in Pakistan. HAQQANI:Please read the transcript of what he said. He said, I have read, I have heard. He never said -BLITZER:He says he had reason to believe. HAQQANI: e has reason to believe based on what he has heard and-H BLITZER:That's a pretty strong statement from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. HAQQANI: nd the government of Pakistan has appointed a Supreme Court judge no A less to head the Commission of Inquiry. You cannot put a nationor its government or its state machinery on trial through newspaper articles. If there is going to be -BLITZER:Who do you suspect killed this young journalist?

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HAQQANI:I am not going to suspect somebody on television. I'm only going to say that once there is a commission of inquiry, if the U.S.side has any intelligence on the matter, they need to provide it to that commission of inquiry, if there is intelligence. BLITZER:Here was the chain of the events. This is a journalist who was writing critical articles of the lSI, your intelligence service. And then, all of a sudden, two days after a major article appears, he disappears and his body is later found tortured. HAQQANI: olf, if something like that happened in another country and there W wasn't a kind of political environment about that country that exists right now here, somebody would have said, in that manner and getting whatever number you're getting, is a conspiracy theory. Let us let the commission of inquiry inquire into the matter. Look, Pakistan has a history. I'm familiar with that history as much as you are. BLITZER:You're much more familiar with it than I am. HAQQANI: here are issues that need to be resolved, but they will be resolved over T time. Holding a gun to our heads, saying that this is going to be about breaking off ties or cutting off of aid, et cetera, is not conducive. And senior American officials understand that. The U.S.State Department has said today that we are working towards a cooperative relationship. My only request is that the American media also needs to understand that diplomacy takes its course, and there's a time for diplomacy and a manner of diplomacy. Screaming and shouting and raising voices, and putting a nation in the dark, is not the way forward. (ENDVIDEOTAPE) BLITZER:Husain Haqqani, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States.

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GEORGE WASHINGTONUNIVERSITY
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After Osama bin Laden, Pakistan's narrow window for redemption
By Mansoor Ijaz
.. For much of its life as a country, Pakistan has been ruled either directly or indirectly by the military. The Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) has grown to act like a state within the state, operating with absotote power and impunity-often arrogantly and shamelessly in its own interests-the country and its civilian population be damned. Yet the same firewa"s, now exposed, that were erected by the army and lSI to shroud in secrecy their activities to harbor Osama bin Laden, and to make their civilian leaders appear hapless and cartoonishly stupid on the world stage, contain important silver linings in them. Taken advantage of properly by U.S. poucvmakers, exposed treachery could usher in a new era of transparency in Pakistan's internal affairs-much as the Watergate scandal did in America. It could transform the U.S.Pakistan bilateral relationship from one of begrudging mistrust in the mutual need of each other into one of an openly architectured security relationship that reduces, perhaps one day even eliminates, the myriad threats emerging from Pakistani soil. Pakistan is the global epicenter of radical Islamist ideology, its extremist practices and the terrorists it breeds. Since the country's founding in 1947, Pakistan's spy services have used extremists as a foreign-policy sledgehammer to level the playing field for the army's substandard performance on the battlefield. For nearly three decades before 9-11, the lSI's undeclared official support for jihadists in Kashmir brought Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war thrice with India. And for the past decade since 9-11, bin Laden's al Oaeda legions (ensconced in Pakistan's urban centers), Sirajuddin Haqqani's terrorist network (interspersed along the Afghan-Pakistan border in Waziristan) and Mu"ah Omar's caliphate (reorganizing the second coming of Talibanism from Pakistani soil) have a" served the lSI's foreign-policy interests to reassert its control over Afghanistan-control that was lost to NATO, to a rising India and to America's armed forces in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks. In the days since bin Laden's death, Pakistan's response has demonstrated its guilt and complicity. Yet this need not be the case. Bluster, arrogance and dissimulation-a" very high on the list of character traits in Pakistani leadership-need to be replaced with equal measures of humility, candor and calibrated actions that remedy the lies. President Asif Ali Zardari, a shrewd politician even if always self-interested, has a narrow window in which he can potentially end the army's rogue operations and get control over his spies. He should instruct Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and lSI Director-General Shuja Pasha that in order to compensate for Pakistan's complicity in sheltering bin Laden, they are to locate Mu"ah Omar, Ayman AI-Zawahiri, Sirajuddin Haqqar» and other high-value targets and hand them over to U.S. Special Forces in five days. If they do not, he should tell them he will permit any U.S. military operation on Pakistani soil or in its airspace that rids Pakistan of the terror masters, and then fire both generals.

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textural engagement not from the Oval Office or on the stump in anytown America, but from Pakistani soil so he can help rebuild confidence in its people that America is not a fair weather friend. In this darkest hour of Pakistan's humiliation, an American president coming face-to-face with the very people who burn him -in effigy could have a dramatic turnaround effect in rehabilitating the psychology of a nation whose own leaders are as incompetent to rule as they are venal and corrupt. .. Obama should meet Pakistan'S people as widely and as often as he can while there. But he should meet the army and intelligence chiefs privately-so as to not humiliate them further in public-and lay down-the law about granting further American taxpayer support to Pakistan. He should tell them if they want more money to sustain counterterrorism operations, they need to give hlm a plan that, for example, transforms radicalized madrassahs into schools of higher learning that are open to both girls and boys within three years (in time for the next elections), and then he should tell them he will not allow that they accept Saudi patronage of madrassahs any longer. The money required to purchase one F-16 funds an entire province's education budget for six months. He should then ask the army to prepare a plan that puts al Qaeda sympathizers to work buil~ing roads, bridges, hospitals and'irrigation systems that raise up farmlands-in short, anything that is gainful employment-and put American money to work behind that armybacked revitalization plan. People with jobs don't have time to throw stones or build bodysuit bombs. After nearly $20 billion in aid over the past 10 years, and with $3 billion more slated to come in this year, America needs to force Pakistan to disburse U.S. money down to the right layers of civil society. Pakistanis don't hate Americans, they hate the American government for letting all that money go into the wrong places and never doing anything about it. They see us as a moral nation that allows immoral acts in Pakistan's backyard to be done with money that we claimed was destined to help them. In essence, they see us as hypocrites. They are right. We need to fix our own messy aid-giving paradigms. Obama should then tell the military and intelligence chiefs that the- U.S. will have no choice but to violate Pakistan's sovereignty at every future opportunity it gets until Pakistan is ready to come clean on its malfeasance and stop using terrorists as a key instrument of its failing foreign policy. America can never again be held hostage to the lies and deceit of Pakistan's military men, whose agendas are nefarious and whose vision of the world is limited to brin~manship in their own backyard. Obama might end the meeting by reminding the generals that he knows precisely why his stealth helicopters really bothered them, whether they knew the U.S. airships were coming or not. They demonstrated critical weaknesses in Pakistan's air defense and rapid response systems that, with glee, the Indians were paying great attention to. He might then drop a hint that he could either quietly lay an arm on the Indians to keep away, or stand aside and let them have at the Pakistanis.

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Pakistan is an important country and a critical ally. In everything it does, it behaves badly and then rattles its nuclear saber or terrorist-hunter credentials to bail itself out. This time, the magnitude of humiliation it has suffered after being caught red-handed may just be enough medicine to change its behavior as a nation. But American engagement in the right ways is crucial to achieving a good result. The other option-:-a failed terrorist state with nuclear ..weapons - is not an option unless ·Washington is planning an array of special operations to destroy everything in that country. Mansoor ljaz, an American of Pakistani ancestry, is chairman of Zurich-based Aquarius Global Partners, a venture investment firm. Previously, as a private citizen, Ijaz negotiated Sudan's offer of counterterrorism assistance on Osama bin Laden and other radical groups to the Clinton administration, FBI and CIA in 1997 and was theJoint author of the blueprint for a ceasefire of hostilities in Kashmir between Indian security forces and Kashmiri militants in the summer of 2000.

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Security chiefs must end Pakistan's duplicity
ByMansoorg&% Plblished: May 3 2011 14:22 Ilast updated: May 3 201114:22

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In the early hours of Monday morning at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Navy Seals swept in and killed Osama bin Laden. along with the al-Qaeda leader's 24-year old son, the two men who were his trusted oouriers and an unidentified woman. But as Pakistan now awakens to a post-bin Laden era, the nuclear-armed nation seems unable to respond truthfully or credibly to the duplicity of its policies, or the oomplicity of its spy agency in harbouring a mass murderer. The oompound's location near an elite Pakistani military academy and among the homes of high-ranking Pakistani military retirees raises hard questions about Pakistan's role in harbouring the al-Qaeda leader in plain sight while its intelligence services and military chiefs nursed on the American taxpayer's wallet. It is unclear who built the compound, or owned the land, or even who brought groceries and supplies - and whether any of this was known to Pakistan's spy services. EDITOR'S CHOICE
Opinion: Rogue army runs a shattered Pakistan - May-05 Editorial Comment: Pakistan's lethal dalliance - May-04

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Analysis: Caught off-guard In
Pakistan - May-03 . DavId PROng: Chasing Afghan shadowS - May-04 John Gapper: Half-baked from Abbottabad - May-04 Opinion:
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Intelligence, the premier Pakistani spy agency, knew nothing about where bin Laden was. Indeed, it seems much more likely that elements within the agency knew exactly where he was, and kept bin Laden within that oompOiJnd on just the terms it wanted. In all of this, Pakistan has almost certainly acted as a knowing babysitter, watching over the terror master so he would do no further harm - as long as the babysitting fees were suffICient and recurring. Washington, in its infinite naiveties, simply did not know who exactly was being babysat. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil; it was the perfect arrangement between a Pollyannish parent and its seditious babysitter.

----------,,It seems implausible that Inter-Services

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now beoome clear. In recent years it has been ent(lngled in a web of lies and deceit that even it oould not untangle as the final chapter of bin Laden's life unfolded. One theory would suggest that with drone attacks along the Wazlristan border areas complicating Pakistan's internal politics, bin Laden was moved to an urban area, thereby reducing the need for larger numbers of attacks that encroached on Pakistani sovereignty. Keeping the rising agitation factor on its streets under oontrol was a key Pakistani objective. The lSI's watchful eye on bin Laden also would have had the advantage of creating_plausible deniabftity with both the military and civilian wings of government, as we are now seeing.
The resutt of Islamabad's nefarious brinkmanship will only
This is not to implicate Pakistan's cMlian leaders directly. They only get to know what the 151 wants them to know. It has been that way since the country was founded. The decade-long rule of General Pervez Musharraf, who doubled as army chief and president, ushered in the era of "blind eye~ fir-ewalls to lSI activities that again gave a head of state in an army uniform "plausible deniability.

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~ffer the September 11 attacks. So what to do with such a tangled mess? Bin Laden's death presents a rare opportunity in Pakistan's rife as a nation, and indeed in the bilateral relationship with America that has soured after a string of recent setbacks, to fIX a lot that is wrong. But to do so requires a decisive break. Pakistan must realise it needs to end its duplicitous policies of dealing with the menace of Taliban mercenaries and al-Oaeda terrorists, before the US withdraws its support. This means its mirltary leaders must bolster ties in Afghanistan, where they seek strategiC depth to offset (unreaRstic) perceptions of an Indian threat, utiliSing America's influence in Kabul rather than pushing a policy that promotes the Taliban. Pakistan's military leaders should also bolster its weak civilian government by encouraging better use of American aid, reduced as it soon may become, for rebuilding civil society schools, hospitals, clinics, nutrition and food production facilities - so ordinary citizens can see some tangible results of American largesse, and share some spoils from bin Laden's demise. Siphoning most of that aid into the orifices of Pakistan's military-industrial complex, where it just disappears, needs to stop. Put most bluntly, Pakistan's intelligence service chiefs should once and for all wake up to the reality that every time they try to con the world into thinking they are a blllCh of good guys protecting their country, they just get caught with their pants down - each time eroding further the nation's credibility. . America, for its part, should now dramatically reduce the visibility of its footprint in the region at least for a while - so that confidences can be rebuilt. Avenging the loss of those who died in the ashes of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon bears a special moral responsibility. While we rightfully rejoice that terrorism's evil genius is gone, our behaviour as a nation will determine much about how the Islamic world's non-lunatic fringe is able to respond and gain the upper hand in its local environs. The best antidote for radicalism's scourge is not more special forces operations directed by an American president - it is getting Islam's rational and sane '... voices to rise up and beat back the march of their own radical elements.
The writer, chairman of Aquarius Global Partners, is an American of Pakistani ancestry. In negotiated Sudan's offer of counter-terrorism assistance to the Clinton administration . . He was also involved in the negotiation of the ceasefire in Kashmir in August 2000

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Anchorperson/Host: Pakistan president today taking '2n the US press today on this , whole issue dismissing suggestions that Pakistan is indeed protecting terrorists, claiming to be pursuing them but how could Pakistan not have known about OBL? His hideout about just 38 miles from the capital. It would be like a fortified compound down the road from the White House from Baltimore, also about 38 miles to the capital. Counter Terrorism analyst Mansur Ijaz says officials in Pakistan absolutely did not know something, but we might be looking at the wrong officials. Mansur joins us on the phone. Explain buddy. MI: The point that I made today in my op-ed piece today was that for the better part of

the life of this nation, Pakistan has been ruled by military men. And when military men enter the political ground what they do is that they try to create a wall of plausible deniability so that the civilian side of the government can say legitimately to the outside world that wants it to be democratic and so forth, we don't know what's going on or we didn't have any knowledge of this and this is exactly what Zardari is doing and everything that he's saying and talking about it in both written as well as his addresses on television ..
AnchorpersonlHost:

But that's even scarier right?

MI: Yeah it is. This is contrived and that's what is so dangerous about this and that is the part that Ithink the American people have a right to get to the bottom of that how can it be that in this modem age with amount of money we put into that country, the civilian

side of the government is not allowed to know certain things or it doesn't want to know, turns a blind eye, and still those things go on and they can legitimately say we didn't know anything about this. This is a conflict internally in that government that we have to get to the bottom of and that's the focus we ought to have in our congressional investigations and our legislative paradigms to find out why the military chiefs and intelligence chiefs know one set of data and the civilian side of the government that we have to interface with because we're a democracy and want to deal with a democracy on the other side, there's a bunch .... Yeah, you know there's a' lot of stuff that doesn't, just doesn't add up. This compound itself. I mean if you're a military person, you're curious, by nature, about anything that is unusual around you. Let's talk. about this compound in question. The trash burning on the inside, in other words, to me I mean, you're not putting your garbage out every Monday, you're burning it inside. Certainly that would catch the attention of trash company they would think, jeez, every time I pass these guys there is no trash. '
AnchorpersonIHost:

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Who was responsible for constructing the house? How did that house come into being? What were the construction plans? Were there for example secret chambers under the house? Were there exit strategies for them to be able to get out in cave like structures under the ground?

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AnchorpersonIHost: building it?

Well do we know that the military types were involved in even

MI: Yeah I mean in that area, almost all the land is owned by the Pakistani army. That's the bottom line (sarcastic laugh). That's where all the retired generals of Pakistan's Army live. And in very good houses I might add. I've been up there before. Anchorperson/Host: Then that raises another question. Let's take the Pakistani presidents word on that he didn't know about this stuff and he had no reason to believe anything was going on, then he's potentially a naive buffoon and the military had his number. The secret intelligence people were using him as a puppet, umm and just fooling him. MI: I would say that it's not a supposition. I would say that he is a naive buffoon. And I would say that he is someone who doesn't have any control over any single lever of govenunent in that country that has relevance other than his political party and I will also say we ought to be thinking about, from a strategic standpoint where Pakistan is concerned. So one side of the American people say lets stop the money. I don't disagree with that that. I think we ought to at least to reduce it dramatically so that they get a message. But the other side ought to be that now, from now on, if get actionable intelligence, we just go in there. Sovereignty or no sovereignty, I don't think that America can ever again look at Pakistan just as a nation. We have to look at it as place where they are allowing the breeding of these terrorists that want to come and destroy us and we have got to stop this. And I say this as a person of Pakistani origin. My father was a very important person in the nuclear program in Pakistan many many years ago, many decades ago. And this is something that is not something that is fun to be able to say but these guys harbored Bin Laden. They've got to come clean with us. They've got to be straight With us about what they did. And they can not stop us' from going after all the other bad guys that are on their soil anymore, just can not get in the. way of that.

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Mansoor Ijaz on http://www.youtube.comlwatch?v=emOQ-5dEEVw 00:33 right now we're joined by Mansur Ijaz, chairman of Aquarius global partners and .. an American of Pakistani ancestry. Counterterrorism analyst as well. Mr. Ijaz, good morning. MI: Good morning sir 00:45: You've written a piece and you're very critical of Pakistan's government and the intelligence agency when it comes to OBL hiding right underneath their noses. You thoughts on did-they know he was there and how many people do you think knew about his whereabouts? MI: we'll, I think it's important to understand the architecture of how Pakistan as a country works. The army and intelligence services are autonomous bodies that don't fall under the control of the civilian government as they for example in the United states or India or countries that have proper or structural democracies in them and because of that what happens is that because of the army, the life of Pakistan has been spent under Army rule of under the control of the army, in terms of the assets of the country, the physical assets of the country, they just don't allow the civilian leaders to know certain things, so there is no question, I think DO American listening to this radio program or any where else in America today should believe for one second a word out of the Pakistani civilian side of the government or the military side that they did not know that bin Laden was there. They absolutely knew that he was there. My guess is and I'm working on a new op-ed piece in which I'll lay out the evidence for that, that they not only knew he was there but they actually constructed the terms of the deal which he could stay and maybe that he wasn't just in one place. He was allowed to move around to 2 or 3 different places inside Pakistan so this Chinese wall that has been erected for many many years between the civilian side of the government so they could go tell the world whatever lies they wanted to with a straight face and the military side of the house which is doing whatever it wanted to, to serve its own devious interests. Basically the architecture that American people have to understand about why this happened the way it did. 02:5.0 Mansur this is Cliff May. There's a distinction between the lSI, the intelligence, the military, the civilians, is it possible that for example the intelligence services, they knew where he was but the military didn't or the civilians didn't either and they were all kept in the dark and just the lSI knew this? MI: Certainly the civilians did not know because they're not told these kinds of sensitive things. This is the way it was even back when the nuclear program was being developed and-the civilian side never knew what was going on. But when it comes to dealing with the army, I would bet that there were some people in military intelligence because they have to liaison with the lSI the very high level they probably did know but they probably did not inform Kiyani, the army chief of staff, because think of it this way, anyone "71.n..i..-.::'::"" ....

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had an interface with the outside world, whether it's the Europeans, the Chinese, the Americans, whoever it might be, those people were kept in the dark simply because they . could then say with a straight face "we did not know". But that doesn't mean that internally, because lSI is basically infested with certain radical fundamentalist elements already "andthe army has them at the lower level, they're not quite at the level where you would share this kind of information, but in the lSI all the way to the very top is infected with Islamist fundamentalists allover the place. 04:17 Do you think its possible that some of the information we're getting from these computers and these flash drives may point to those people in the lSI who were helping Bin laden or helping Al-Qaida and if you do get those names and that information then what do we do with it (laugh) MI: Yeah, so that's a very very intelligent question and I think the answer is that I can not sit here today and tell you whether we have that data or not, but I can tell you that the bulk of that date would have been about the network and the historical operations framework of what Al-Qaida has done up until now so, I think we're going to find out a lot about for example the insides of9-11 planning, the inside of V.S.S Cole attack, the attacks against the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, those kinds of things are what are most likely contained in the bulk of that hard drive dissemination. I think its unlikely, what I'd really like to know is who were the 2 telephone numbers that Bin Laden relied on calling if he had to get out of the country. That's where we find out exactly what the complicity was. I don't think this is contained in the computer drives as much as it is in just those two telephone numbers and knowing who those people were in terms of who he was going to contact to get out. That'll tell you everything you need to know. 5:34 Americans relations with Pakistan are not just diplomat to diplomat, it's also military to military and intelligence service to intelligence service. I've got to figure there is going to be a lot more suspicion and a lot of awkward moments now between our intelligence officials who are there and theirs and our military officials and Pakistani military officials. MI: Let me comment on that by saying the following: Imagine that you have stealth helicopters that can get in under the radar in Pakistan. This compound was exactly 2 minutes away from one of the most heavily armed garrisons of the Pakistani army. It is not conceivable to me that our people got in, stayed on the ground for somewhere between 25 and 30 minutes and got out whether there being any possibility of the Pakistanis responding so somebody had to know we were coming. I don't know who it was, at what level it happened but somebody had to know that we were coming. If they did not and we were able to get in like that then you have to make an assumption as a Pakistani if I was an ordinary Pakistani sitting there saying oh my God so that means that . basically the Indians can get in, somebody can attack and get our nuclear facilities, what kind of security, what are we paying for? Where does all the money go to try and survive the security and safety for this country?

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06:55 What about this theory, just as a possibility. The helicopters come in, somebody in the military, Kiyani, somebody gets a phone call from the US and in that phone call following is communicated: we are coming in, you do not want to interfere. Helicopters are not all that we have. If you interfere, the consequences will notbe pretty. Just keep your planes on the _ , ground. ' MI: Yeah, it's a good theory. I think that it would've had to happen just as they were entering Pakistani airspace for that to be the case. In this case the question is would somebody have alerted? You know my point is that then you have to go down the decision tree because there would have been enough time between time that the helicopters entered Pakistani airspace and the time they got there because that's not a 10 minute ride on the helicopter, it's a little longer than that and so there was theoretically enough time for somebody to then warn Bin Laden so the question is at what level the complicity was and for what purpose the complicity was and that's the only point I'm trying to make here that there are some inconsistencies and incongruencies in what we see as real data on the ground to able to figure out what exactly is going on here. I think that the reality is Pakistan not only knew, but they were harboring him. They were giving him direct assistance to be able to stay where he was because they had a deal with him and God knows who else and the question is whether or not we are implicated in any way shape or form in that deal. Whether we just decided this was the moment we go get him, whether there was an active process in place here to determine when the right time was to actually execute that kind of a plan. 08:39 A couple of years ago I was in Pakistan and raised the possibility that it was likely OBL was on Pakistani soil and a number of Pakistanis were insulted by me suggesting that. MI: You know I have to tell you, when I negotiated the ceasefire in Kashmir, one of their key guys that I worked with and relied on for communication with the hardest line of the militants was the fellow by the name of Khalid Khuwaja. He was killed a couple of years ago in Pakistan because of his association with people like me in the outside world and he was bin Laden's pilot during the afghan jihad years and I can tell you that it was 3-4 years ago this was still during the time when this was before the elections took place and president bush was still in power and once I asked him point blank "where is this guy" and he just smiled at me with a big grin and said he might be a lot closer than you think (laughs). Now it rings in my ears all the time for the last couple of days that he was trying to tell me that and I never imagined it will be that close. 09:54 Mansur great to have you on the program. Really appreciate your inside scoop. Look forward to reading your next column with that evidence. Sounds great. MI: Very good. Take care

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Ambassador fends off doubts about Pakistan's role
By Farah Stockman Globe Staff
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May 8, 2011 "Watch your back," one angry caller warned. "Americans won't stand for this."

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Another: "Protecting the world's most hated man will surely send you to hell, but I can help you get there quicker." But the threatening phone calls that have been pouring into the Pakistani Embassy in Washington are not what concerns Husain Haqqani most since a US raid killed Osama bin Laden in the heart of his nation. Haqqani, a Boston University professor who took leave to serve as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, must field pointed calls from sources that hold sway over his country's crucial alliance with the United States: Pentagon officials and members of Congress. Some seek an explanation for why Pakistan's powerful military and intelligence service could not find the terrorist mastermind all these years; others wonder whether Pakistani elements had been secretly protecting him. Some have called for a halt to the billions in US aid that Pakistan receives. "There are those who have called to say, 'M r. Ambassador, your government has some questions to answer,' " Haqqani said in an interview this past week. "And there are also those who call to say, 'We understand that this is complex.' " Haqqani, who has tried for months to halt deteriorating relations between the two countries, now faces perhaps the greatest challenge of his career: convincing Americans that Pakistan is not to blame for harboring bin Laden. And he has to do so without concrete facts because much of the truth lies buried in the murky world of spies. "He has got an impossible job," said Owen Sirrs, a former analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency who is writing a book about the lSI, Pakistan's intelligence agency. Haqqani has declared that Pakistan will launch an inquiry into the question of whether any government agency knew of bin Laden's whereabouts. But Pakistan's powerful military has a history of shrugging off inquiries demanded by its fledgling cMlian government. For instance, the government's attempts last year to investigate whether a Pakistani scientist who gave nuclear secrets to Iran acted alone appear to have been rebuffed. Pakistan's military has insisted that Abdul Qadeer Khan was a rogue. Few know better than Haqqani about the complex relationship that the lSI has had with militants. He wrote a book in 2005 criticizing the outsized role that security forces have played in the country and their ties to militants operating in India and Afghanistan .. Now he finds himself sticking up for Pakistan's security forces in interviews with American media. To deflect blame, he has pointed out embarrassing US intelligence mistakes. "If Whitey Bulger can live undetected by American police for so long, why can't Osama bin Laden live undetected by Pakistani authorities?" he asked the Atlantic. He frequently notes that Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies have lost more officers in the war against militants than any other country - and arrested more suspected terrorists than any country - but that Americans continue to push for more. Since bin Laden's death, various Pakistani officials have issued sometimes contradictory statements. Some have taken credit for aSSisting with the operation by providing intelligence, while others have criticized the unilateral operation, which they said took place without their knowledge.

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The raid has sparked angry questions from the Pakistani public about how foreign helicopters could enter their airspace without their knowledge and why Americans could find bin laden when the lSI could not. "They are trying to thread the needle," said Daniel Markey, a former State Department official specializing on Pakistan. "They can't come across as pro-At Qaeda, but they also don't want to sanction a US incursion on their territory. " Haqqani's remarks have been carefully worded explanations of Pakistan's perspective, sentiments that he does not personally agree with. But Haqqani is faced with the additional difficulty of having to preserve his professional even anti-American

reputation, said Markey.

There is a limit to what he can say and still look forward to a job in academia, Markey said, adding: "Any ambassador who has aspirations after their service faces this problem, because they can only go so far in defending the state line before it may jeopardize their chances of returning to nongovernment posts." Haqqani, an associate professor of international relations at BU since 2004, still has a job waiting for him, said Thomas Testa, spokesman for Boston University. But Testa also said it "could all be subject to change based on how long he decides to carry out his ambassadorship." Haqqani has a reputation as a political survivor capable of navigating difficult situations. Born in Karachi, he has been everything from a former Islamist student activist to an adviser to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to a consultant for The New York Times. Pakistani newspapers routinely criticize him for being too close to the United States; news of his dismissal has been reported numerous times since he took up his post in 2008. But he has managed to survive. In Washington, he has been called the" Energizer Bunny of ambassadors," relentlessly hounding those who he thinks have not given Pakistan a fair shake. Brian Katulis, of the Center for American Progress, recalled that Haqqani once took the time to complain to him that a Pakistani representative had not been invited to speak on a small panel the center held about problems facing the country. "The fact that he picked up the phone and spent 10 minutes, it's an example of how he has, in the last year or so, played a very assertive role," Katulis said. "They need a vocal advocate like him, at this time when more and more in Washington are questioning, "What have we gotten for all this aid" to Pakistan? When news of bin Laden's death broke, Haqqani was on a flight to london, en route to Pakistan. As soon as he landed, he jumped on another plane back to Washington. An aide met him at the clean shirt and a razor, and he rushed straight to CNN to speak with Wolf Blitzer. In between a seemingly endless round of interviews, he still found the time to send tweets. "On a hectic day still checking out twttr 4 amusement generated by ideologically motivated compatriots living in denial," he messaged on Twitter, apparently in reaction to Pakistanis who did not believe bin laden was dead. In another: "Pakistan-haters something right!" & Pakistani Jihadists & pseudo-nationalists both heaping abuse. I must be doing

Even before bin Laden's death, Haqqani had his hands full. In recent years, the United States has stepped up pressure on Pakistan to attack militants aggressively inside its borders. At the same time, outrage has grown in Pakistan over stepped-up' drone strikes that have killed more than 1,000 people, including 15 on Friday, in Pakistan's volatile tribal areas in the past two years. Also on Friday, about a thousand people took the streets in Abbottabad, shouted "Terrorist, terrorist, USA terrorist." the city where bin laden was killed, and

Haqqani has his work cut out for him as he tries to fix a broken relationship between two countries that distrust each other deeply, but need each other just as much.

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"The most important long-term concern is, 'How do Americans view Pakistanis and how do Pakistanis look at America?" Haqqani said. "That is what needs mending." Farah Stockman can be reached at fstockman@globe.com.
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Copyright 2011 Globe Newspaper Company.

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Program of Ambassador Husain Haqqani working visit to London as guest of Tobias Ellwood, MP May 9-10, 2011

Monday May 9: 1.30 PM meeting with Gerald Howarth, minister for procurement in MoD

2-3 PM meeting with Sir Peter Ricketts, national security advisor, Number 10 3-4 PM meeting with various MP's including Tobias Ellwood, Brooks Newmark and others 4:30-5:30 meeting with Mark Sidwell, UK high rep to AfPak 5:45-7:00 drinks in Parliament with MP's meeting also Lord George Robertson, former Minister of Defense and NATO Sec Gen and the Lady Pauline Neville Jones former Homeland Security advisor 7:30-11 PM dinner at Mark's with Gen Sir David Richards, CDS; Lady Dalmeny; Mark Sidwell; MG Nick Carter; The Hon Tobias Ellwood, MP; Lady Richards; LtCol Tom Tugendot,ADC Tuesday May 10 9:45-1030 meeting with FO Minister for Asia Alastair Burt, MP 1030-1130 meeting with CDS and other MoD officials 1200-1330: Lunch in the House of Commons with Brooks Newmark, Tobias Ellwood, Joe Johnson; and several others

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Was Pakistan tipped off to bin Laden raid? - CNN.com
By David Frum, CNN Contributor 2011-12-05T15:22:30Z

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Was Pakistan tipped off to bin Laden raid? A Pakistani policeman stands guard in front of Osama bin Laden's former compound in Abbottabad on May 7, 2011. Editor's note: David Frum, a CNN contributor, was a special assistant to President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2002. He is the author of six books, including "Comeback: Conservatism That Can Win Again," and is the editor of FrumForum. (CNN) -- Big events do not always have big causes. The British once went to war over an injury to a sea captain's ear. And today's Pakistan may collapse into military rule because of one man's eagerness to read his name in the newspaper and see his face on TV. The man in question is Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani-American businessman who takes a special delight in political intrigue. Ijaz represents himself as a democrat, a secularist, and a friend of the West. Whatever Ijaz's personal views, nobody has done more these past weeks to undercut Pakistani democracy and poison U.S.-Pakistan relations. This weekend, Ijaz added his most extreme provocation to date. The story is complicated, but a lot is at stake and Americans would do well to pay attention. Let's start with the known facts. In May, U.S. special forces raided Osama bin Laden's compound in the Pakistani city Abbottabad and killed the terrorist leader. U.S. officials had understood for years that the Pakistani military and intelligence services were deeply complicit in al Qaeda terrorism. Now the truth was revealed to the whole world.

http://www.cnn.coml2011/12/0S/opinionifrum-pakistan-bin-ladeniindex.htm1
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Laden's look-alike? You might have expected Pakistanis to react with embarrassment to the revelation. You'd expect wrong. Pakistani media filled with nationalist fulminations against the United States -- and with rumors of military plots against Pakistan's civilian government. Here is where Mansoor Ijaz entered the picture. Ijaz came to view in the United States in the months after 9/11, when he told an amazing story to anyone who would listen: In the mid-1990s, when Osama bin Laden still lived in Sudan, he -- Ijaz - had brokered a deal whereby the Sudanese would surrender bin Laden to the United States. The Clinton administration had perversely rejected the deal. This story would ultimately be repudiated as groundless by the 9/11 Commission, but at the time it gained a wide hearing on Fox News and right-wing talk radio. Ijaz himself got a contract as a Fox News analyst. In the 2000s, Ijaz produced a series of sensational revelations, which again and again proved untrue. (CNN's Peter Bergen has collected a useful summary ofIjaz's discredited claims and assessments. More can be read here.) In October 2011, Ijaz stepped forward with another amazing claim in an op-ed in the Financial Times. "Early on May 9, a week after US Special Forces stormed the hideout ofOsama bin Laden and killed him, a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned me with an _urgent request. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan's president, needed to communicate a message- to White House national security officials that would bypass Pakistan's military and intelligence channels. The embarrassment of bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr Zardari's weak civilian government to such an __ ----..,__ extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fi his army chiefs desk to end any misguided notions of a coup -- and fast."

And it's not like it would be so hard for the president of Pakistan to get a secret message directly to

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the president of the United States: There's a large and highly capable U.S. diplomatic mission in Islamabad. Ijaz's story was bizarre on its face. Bizarre or not, it triggered a firestorm in Pakistan. Militant nationalists accepted Ijaz's story and identified the supposed "senior Pakistani diplomat" as Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States -- a secularist and democrat who is despised by Pakistan's extremists for his modem views and outspoken style. Pakistan's radical nationalists accused Haqqani of treason. Zardari felt he had no political choice but to recall Haqqani, who is now detained in Pakistan and forbidden to leave the country. In a country where people disliked by the military or intelligence services are often assassinated, Haqqani's life cannot be considered safe. Neither can the life of his wife, Farah Ispahani, an important activist in Zardari's political party. All this for a story from a source of the very weakest credibility. Yet Ijaz was not done. This weekend, he put into circulation another set of allegations, even more provocative to Pakistani radicals than the last -- and also, on their face, even more desperately implausible. Here is Ijaz in a column in Saturday's Daily Beast: "In my opinion, with the benefit of facts that have come to my attention in the days since my FT column appeared, Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan's sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive's location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public's hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed. "If it all went wrong, the Pakistanis could unite in their hatred of America for violating their nation's sovereignty, with Zardari -leading the chorus aimed at Washington. Ifit went to plan, the longsought aim of putting civilians (i.e., Zardari & Co.) in charge of the Army would be complete. Washington would have bin Laden's scalp; Zardari would have Kayani's and Pasha's. And U.S. taxpayer-funded aid would flow unabated under the Kerry-Lugar bill in which Haqqani had pushed so hard to include civilian-supremacy language as a sine qua non. " It's incredible that the U.S. would have put the bin Laden mission at risk by sharing details with a Pakistani government they had ceased to trust -- even with such a personally respected representative of Pakistan as Haqqani. Yet on that incredible supposition, Ijaz builds a conspiracy theory highly congenial to the mo reactionary and anti-democratic elements in Pakistan -- and circulates the conspiracy the:M.dllle.w--~ time and in a way likely to have impact. What's he up to? ~

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Democratic Pakistanis of a conspiratorial mindset have suggested all kinds of sinister motivations for Ijaz's actions. Perhaps those suggestions are accurate. But it's also possible that these Pakistani democrats are drawn to conspiracy theories for the same reason that their anti-democratic opposites are drawn to conspiracy theories: because conspiracy theories bring order to a world that otherwise seems crazily, frighteningly random and irrational. After all, if the conspiracy theories about Ijaz are not correct, we are left with only two other possibilities: Either he is telling the truth -- but that possibility has to be discounted by the heavy evidence to the contrary -- or Pakistani democracy has been corroded, and the U.S. and Pakistan have been pushed toward a dangerous confrontation by a reckless fantasist motivated by childish vanity.

http://www.cnn.coml20

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Behind the 'Merrogate' affair that has errbroiled Pakistan's former ambassadQr to the United States. and the civiUan govemmant he represents, there is a quixotic accuser namad Mansoor ljaz who seems like a character in a fanciful spy novel of his own design. ljaz Is an Arrerican businessman of Pakistani descent who lives in high style on the French Riviera. He made rroney as an investor, but his fama has coma as a writer of op-ed pieces and a somatima Intermediary with Pakistani and Arrerican officials. He has aUeged that Husain Haqqani, the former ambassador, encouraged him to write a marro to Adm. Mike Mullen last May urging tighter controls on the Pakistani rrilltary. That charge has snared Haqqanl and triggered a crisis pitting Pakistan's civilian govemmant against its rrilitary. But even if ljaz's allegation is true, it's reasonable to ask: So what? Haqqani doesn't appear, even from ljats evidence, to have done anything IlIegal- or even outside his job as diplomatic representative of the govemmant. Pakistan's suprema court is scheduled to begin hearing the case on Tuesday. But before It gets too deep Into the blizzard of aUeged electronic massages between ljaz and Haqqani, the court should ask whether the fundamantals of the case make sense - and whether it will prove an embarrassmant to both the rrititary and the civman leadership. A review of the evidence suggests there may be less to the case than all the noise would suggest. That's the view of Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and an authority on the Pakistani miDtary, with which he has close contacts. "This is now a sideshow that is taking on Importance beyond the needs of the country,' Nawaz told ma Sunday. 'There is no evidence that the security of the state has been comprorrised. Husain Haqqanl has already been removed from his post. Perhaps it would be best to close this matter and rrove on to more serious things.' Let's start with the marro Itself.ljazouted the story in an Oct. 10,2011, opinion piece In the Financlaillmas In which he said that on May 9, a 'senlor Pakistani diplomar had had contacted him with an 'urgent request" that he convey a massage to MuUen urging the U.S. to back tighter controls on Pakistan's rrilitary and Inteffigence. ljaz later identified that diplomat as Haqqanl, who denies that he was the Instigator. In any event, ljaz wrote a merro making the argument -Including a statemant that a new 'national security team" In Islamabad would abolish the notorious '5' wing of Paklstanllnteffigence, which maintains Dalson with the TaUban and other Jhadlst groups. He then arranged for Jim Jones, the former national security adviser, to send the mamo to Mullen. ljaz's mamo was a stronger statement of argumants he had made publicly back in May, in the Financlaillmas and a Washington Post bIog, after the death of Osama bin Laden. 'Taken advantage of properly by U.S. poDcymakers, exposed treachery pn bin Laden's long residence in Pakistan) could usher in a new era of transparency in Pakistan's internal affairs,' he wrote in the Post item. Haqqani, as a representative of the civilian government, probably shared a sirrilar feeOng that Pakistani rriOtery and Inteffigence had been ernbarrassed by the fact that bin Laden had been Uvlng for years In Abbotabad. But he hardly needed ljaz's help In conveying his views to people Oke Mullen. He was In dally contact with top U.S. officials, trying to represent President Aslf AD Zardsri. The Pakistani rriOtery had a representative of Its own, a respected rriDtary attach6 who could speak on the generals' behalf. ljaz seems to have reOshed his role as a freelance adviser. His relationship with Jones, who passed the merro, Is a case in point: They had mat In 2008, and Jones, who was then NATO commander, had asked ljaz to join a strategic advisers group and travel with him to Afghanistan. Later, ljaz was asked to join the board of the Atlantic

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Council, where Jones is a former chairman. But his stint as a board meniler didn't last long, nor did he make major donations to the group. When a government official asked several years ago for a CIA check on Ijats background in international matters, he is said to have received an 'orange flag' - nothing that would rule out dealing with him, but a caution that he had a taste for publicity and sometimes talked rrore than he delivered. One of the intriguing aspects of Ijats role is whether, in his contacts with Mullen, he was in effect acting as a representative of Zardari. Jones said in an affidavit for the Pakistani court that Ijaz'mentioned that he has a message frorn the 'highest authOrity' in the Pakistan government.' And in his cover letter to Jones, accompanying the infarrous merro, ljaz wrote: 'This document has the support of the President of Pakistan.' (The cover note, along with all the other documentation, has been submitted to the court in Pakistan.) Which leads some critics of Ijaz to raise the question: If Ijaz was acting on Zardari's behalf (or Haqqani's, for that matter) should he have registered as an agent of a foreign government? That's just one of the wrinkles in a story so colorful and unlikely that it would have been branded unrealistic if written as fiction.

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What's behind the furor in Pakistan? - CNN.com 2011-11-24T19:25:03Z CNN.com What's behind the furor in Pakistan?

Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, resigned Tuesday. Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a director at the New America Foundation and the author of "The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda." Andrew Lebovich is a policy analyst at the New America Foundation. (CNN) -- Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz has set off a political firestorm in.Pakistan.-with,hiS-61aims-.thaHl&wa&-~okering·an' offer· from Pakistan's civilian leaders to the Pentagon to unseatthe leadership of the Pakistani military. Those accusations forced the resignation on Tuesday of Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, who Ijaz says orchestrated this proposal, which was delivered in a unsigned memo in May to Adm. Mike Mullen, then-U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that is home to a number of Taliban groups that attack U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan and also is home to what remains of al Qaeda's "core" organization. Haqqani helped smooth over many tense moments in the important U.S.-Pakistan relationsbip;-including,tlre's~iIr-·Janua.ry·oftw"<r'Pakistanis"·by CIA contractor Raymond Davis and the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in northerrrf'akistarrirr Mayr':": .,'. -_, Ijaz has said that the offer to get rid of the leadership of the Pakistani Army was sanctioned by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. The story is an explosive one in Pakistan, where relations between the civilian government and the military leadership are often tense and the United States is deeply unpopular.
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Writing in the Financial Times on October lO, Ijaz explained that, "The embarrassment " of bin Laden being-found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr. Zardari's weak civilian government to such an extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fist on his army chiefs desk to end any misguided notions of a coup-- and fast." Haqqani denies being involved in any such scheme, and Mullen says that while he did receive a memo that made this kind of offer-- delivered to him by Obama's former National Security. Adviser James L. Jones.-- he.ignored.ithecause it just didn't seem credible.

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According to Ijaz, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Pakistan's powerful military intelligence chief, recently traveled to London to meet with him, where he "forensically tested" Ijaz's evidence, which consists of Blackberry messages between Ijaz and Haqqani. While the affair has already brought down Haqqani, a longtime critic of Pakistan's military establishment and a well-known figure in diplomatic and national security circles in Washington, it could also damage the country's civilian government. Haqqani's wife, Farah Ispahani, is President Zardari's spokeswoman and a prominent member of the governing Pakistan People's Party. Who is Mansoor Ijaz, the Pakistani-American businessman at the center of this twisted tale? Born to a family of Pakistani immigrants in Tallahassee, Florida, Ijaz grew up in rural Virginia, the son of two college teachers. After getting an undergraduate degree in nuclear physics from the University of Virginia and·an·MAo,in·engineeringfrom'Massachusetts'fnstitute·'ofTechnology, in the early 1990s Ijaz founded Crescent Investment Management, a New York investment finn. Crescent was politically well-connected. Ijaz's partner in the finn was retired Air Force Lt. General James Alan Abrahamson, who played an instrumental role in President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). Another Washington heavyweight, the former CIA director R. James Woolsey, was chairman of the board of Ijaz's publicly listed company, Crescent Technology Ventures PLC, based in London.

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In the mid-'90s, Ijaz gave hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Democratic Party, and . ~witft.~he-,elintm!S"at<:fund'rai:sirrg"events::· . In 2003, journalist Richard Miniter, in a book titled "Losing Bin Laden: How Bill
Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror", relied on Ijaz as the principal source for the key part of his thesis, which concerned the five years Osama bin Laden spent in Sudan in the early and mid- 1990s. Miniter described multiple attempts Ijaz made between August 1996 and 1998 to interest the Clinton administration in improving relations with Sudan, as well as Sudanese offers to hand over intelligence on ai Qaeda . .-'-Inhis account to Miniter and in "later writings, Ijaz claimed to have helped draft a proposal for Sudan to provide intelligence on al Qaeda to the Clinton administration, and that Sudan had offered to arrest bin Laden. Clinton administration offic' als did not take . Ijaz up on any 0 so ers 0 e p ecause ey VIewed him as "a Walter Mitty living out a personal fantasy," according to Miniter. And the 9/11 Commission, which interviewed Ijaz, concluded that were was no "credible evidence" that the Sudanese had made any offer to hand over bin Laden .
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In a 2004 interview with Fox News about Iraq, Ijaz, in his then-capacity as a foreign
affairs analyst for the network, made another. sensational claim: Chemical warheads were

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being smuggled into Iraq for a potentially catastrophic attack against American troops. And to top it off, Ijaz strongly suggested that the whole plan was given the green light by hardline Iranian mullahs. The story had everything to attract attention -- Mad mullahs! WMD on the loose in Iraq! (At last!) And the threat of thousands of potential American casualties. Ijaz now concedes, "This was an erroneous report based on information I had received from a former intelligence official on the ground in Iraq. I did not second source this story." Ijaz also told CNN, "I have written over 170 op-ed columns, appeared over 200 times on television and have not once had a word of what I said retracted due to factual errors." (Ijaz has written one op-ed for CNN.com). Ijaz told Fox in 2003 that "eyewitness sources" placed Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman.al~Za.wahiri,..·inJIcm v Askea,·~ OOst·Bl'itHume-·about-the sourcing of the story, Ijaz responded .. "I can just tell you that the source is unimpeachable. It is from inside Iran. These~aI:e.·eye-witneSfraeeffilftts/'·· .. There was, of course, nothing to this story. Ijaz now says, "At the time I made it, I believed the source who had given the data to me." Described as a "U.S. nuclear proliferation and terrorism expert," Ijaz told the Gulf News newspaper in 2006 that Iran not only bad a nuclear bomb, it was seeking to "duplicate them in large numbers before revealing their existence to the world." Five years later, Iran still does not have a nuclear weapon, but Ijaz asserted to CNN, "They had in my view then, and it remains my view now, at least one nuclear weapon stored in component parts." In August 2003 Ijaz told the British newspaper The Guardian that he had learned that the Bush-admiftistrationAhad· brokerel:ht-deatwith:·Pnkisum~s· dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, not to capture or kill bin Laden so as not to cause unrest in the Muslim world. Ijaz told The Guardian "There was a judgment made that it would be more destabilizing in the longer term (ifbin Laden were captured or killed). There would still be the ability to get (bin Laden) at a later date when it was more appropriate." Ijaz provided no evidence for this claim, and the idea that the Bush administration would do a deal to let bin Laden gofree is ludicrous on its face. Ijaz told CNN "I stand by my .comments,' taken in full context, throughout that article." What is puzzling about all of this -- if the allegations are true that Ambassador Haqqani used Ijaz to propose a deal to remove Pakistan's military leaders to Mullen -- is: Why would Haqqani use Ijaz to do this? After all, Haqqani has manyformal and informal.contacts.at.the, Pentagon, and Ijaz has a history of making sometimes exaggerated or erroneous claims, and his record as an unsuccessful freelance diplomat with Sudan_in1he_.l990s is a-matter of public record.

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Finally, if Haqqani was looking for a discreet back channel to the Pentagon, Ijaz turned out not to be the ideal messenger as he was the person who outed the whole affair in the pages of the Financial Times last month.

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http://wwwfair.org

Extra! July/August

2004

Still Failing the "Fair & Balanced" Test
By Steve Rendall and Julie Hollar

Special Report leans right, white, Republican & male

FAIR's latest study of Fox's Special Report with Brit Hume finds the network's flagship news show still listing right-heavily favoring conservative and Republican guests in its one-on-one interviews. And, according to the study, Special Report rarely features women or non-white guests in these prominent newsmaker inter-view spots. In previous studies FAIR has found that looking at a show's guest list is one of the most reliable methods for gauging its perspective. In the case of Special Report , the single one-on-one interview with anchor Brit Hume is a central part of the newscast, and the anchor often uses his high-profile guests' comments as subject matter for the show's wrap-up panel discussion. If Fox is the "fair & balanced" network it claims to be, then the guest list of what Fox calls its "signature news show" ought to reflect a diverse spectrum of ideas and sources. FAIR has studied Special Report's guest list on two earlier occasions (Extra! ,7-8/01,7-8/02). FAIR's current study looked at 25 weeks of Special Report's one-on-one interview segments (6/30/03-12/19/03), finding 101 guests. FAIR classified each guest by political ideology, party affiliation (where applicable), gender and ethnicity. When FAIR first studied Special Report in 2001, the dominance of conservative guests was so overwhelming (71 percent of all guests) that we used just two ideological categories, "conservative" and "non-conservative." The latter included guests with no discernible political ideology. When FAIR's second study in 2002 found conservative guests had dropped to less than half of the total, we added a "left of center" category for comparison purposes. Though the "left of center" category was more broadly defined than the "conservative" category- since many right-of-center guests were not counted as conservatives-conservatives still outnumbered those on the left, 14 to one. For this study three ideological categories were used: conservative, centrist and progressive. Guests affiliated with openly conservative, centrist or progressive think tanks, magazines or advocacy groups, or who openly promote such views, are labeled as such. Guests who do not avow an ideology-such as military operations experts and journalists who decline to reveal their own political inclinations-were categorized as non-ideological. As with earlier FAIR studies of Special Report, Republicans were not automatically counted as conservatives and Democrats were not automatically counted as liberals. For instance, Georgia Democratic Senator Zell Miller, who champions many conservative causes and openly campaigns

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for George Bush, is classified as an ideological conservative. Likewise, Georgia Democratic congressmember Jim Marshall, who has one of the most conservative voting records of any congressional Democrat, was classified as a "centrist," as was Democrat Susan Estrich, who was a member of Republican California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's transition team and has implored Democrats to move to the center (e.g., "Let Clinton Be the Centrist Clinton," USA Today , 6/22/95). Dennis Ross, who has served under Republican and Democratic administrations and whose positions ·on the Middle East are center-right, was counted as a centrist for the purposes of this study. In the past, Special Report featured interviews with moderate Republicans such as Christopher Shays, Christine Todd Whitman and David Gergen who were counted as "non-conservatives" under the earlier classification system. Only one Republican was counted as a "centrist" in the current study period: Noah Feldman, a legal expert who worked for the Bush administration in Iraq.

Conservative & Republican
Fifty-seven percent of Special Report's one-on-one guests during the period studied were ideological conservatives, 12 percent were centrists and 11percent were progressives. Twenty percent of guests were non-ideological. Among ideological guests, conservatives accounted for 72 percent, while centrists made up 15 percent and progressives 14 percent. (The total exceeds 100 percent due to rounding.) Viewers were roughly five times more likely to see a conservative interviewed on Special Report than a progressive. The five-to-one conservative-to-progressive imbalance is actually a marked improvement from FAIR's 2002 study, which found that "left-of-center" guests-three percent of the total-were outnumbered 14 to one. In the 2002 study, however, conservative dominance was less marked, at 48 percent of total guests. Special Report's guestlist shows a similarly heavy slant toward Republicans. Forty-two guests were current or former Democratic or Republican officials, candidates, political appointees or advisers. Guests who had past affiliations with both Republicans and Democrats were counted as nonpartisan; for example, Dennis Ross-having served under presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton-was classified as non-partisan. Of the 42 partisan guests, 35 were Republicans and only seven were Democrats-a five-to-one imbalance. Furthermore, of the handful of Democrats that did appear, the majority were centrist or conservative, and frequently expressed views more typical of Republican guests. For example, centrist Rep. Jim Marshall (10/23/03) argued that the media weren't covering the "good news" in Iraq, while Sen. Zell Miller (11/4/03) talked about his dissatisfaction with the Democratic party and his fondness for George Bush. Thirty-four of the 35 Republicans who appeared were conservatives; only one, Noah Feldman, was classified as a centrist. The five-to-one partisan imbalance represents a greater slant than FAIR's 2002 study, which found Republicans outnumbering Democrats by three to two, though it is still better than FAIR's 2001 study, which found Special Report's guest list favoring Republicans by more ~~. t0 one (50 vs. 6). After the 2001 study, the show's anchor, Fox managing editor Brit 1J(i~f;, ~iRira New York Times (7/2/01) that, though he had yet to read the findings, "if it question, and we find that there is some imbalance, then we'll correct it." :~
~~

http://www.fair.orglindex.php?page= 1187&printer_friendly= 1

White & male
Special Report continues to overwhelmingly favor white and male guests: As in 2002, only 7 percent of guests were women, and the percentage of people of color rose only slightly, to 11 percent from 7 percent in 2001 and 2002. In 2003, only one woman of color was featured in a one-on-one interview: National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
As in past studies, those women and people of color who did appear on Special Report were

remarkably conservative. Four of the seven appearances by women were by conservative Republicans and two were by centrist Democrat Susan Estrich. No progressive women appeared in the study period. Of the seven guests of color (accounting for 11 appearances), five were conservative and only one was progressive, journalist Charles Cobb of allAfrica.com. The one person of color classified as non-ideological, Mansoor Ijaz, accounted for five appearances. Ijaz, a wealthy investment manager who has expressed support for Hillary Clinton, is also a frequent and vocal booster of neo-conservative causes and difficult to label ideologically. (See sidebar.) In our second study of Special Report (Extra! , 8/02), FAIR remarked, "While Special Report can claim to have moderated its imbalance with regard to Republican and conservative guests, the show still falls short of reflecting the diverse ideas and communities of the United States." With current findings indicating that the show has tipped back toward increased imbalance, it becomes harder to defend Special Report from charges that it chooses its guests based on political sympathies, not news judgment. Research assistance: Daniel Butterworth and Jon Whiten This study was commissioned for the film Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism by Robert Greenwald.

SIDEBAR: No Balance From "Liberal" Media
Conservatives often defend Fox's rightward slant by claiming that it simply counterbalances a predominantly left-leaning media. But previous FAIR studies have found that, across the supposedly "liberal" media, Republican sources dominate-and Fox simply skews even farther to the right. FAIR's original 2001 study of Special Report (Extra! ,7-8/01) included a comparison to CNN 's Wolf Blitzer Reports -which favored Republicans 57 to 43 percent. And a 2002 FAIR study of the three major networks' nightly news broadcasts (Extra! , 5-6/02) found an even greater imbalance than on CNN : Of partisan sources, 75 percent were Republican and only 24 percent Democrats. The differences among the networks were negligible; CBS had the most Republicans (76 percent) while ABC had the fewest (73 percent). Even NPR , characterized by conservative critics as "liberal" radio, favored Republican sources over Democrats by a ratio of more than three to two in a recent study of its main news shows (Extra! ,5-6/04). And Republican political domination doesn't explain the imbalance: In FAIR's 1993 study of NPR (Extra! ,4-5/93) , when Democrats controlled the White House and both houses of Congress, Republicans still outnumbered Democrats 57 to 42 percent. -S.R and J.H.

SIDEBAR: Special Report's Special Guest
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One of Special Report's favorite guests is Fox News analyst Mansoor Ijaz, an American investment manager of South Asian heritage. Neither a conservative nor a Republican, Ijaz plays a special role on Special Report . Leading all other guests with five appearances during the period studied-he's appeared on Fox more than 100 times on other occasions-Ijaz regularly echoes Bush White House and neo-conservative claims about global threats, ignoring evidence while citing only shadowy, unnamed sources. For instance, when anchor Brit Hume (11/10/03) asked Ijaz if there was "evidence of any consequence" linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Ijaz replied, "Absolutely." But the remainder of Ijaz's answer contained nothing even vaguely suggesting such evidence. The segment ended with Ijaz criticizing Democrats for questioning the White House's case for war.
If Ijaz's support for official policy is central to his current role on the show, it's not what first

made him a star on Special Report (and several other Fox shows). Ijaz came into heavy rotation as a Fox guest after charging in the Los Angeles Times (12/5/01) that President Bill Clinton blew a chance to capture Osama bin Laden in the 1990S. Ijaz claims to have brokered a deal in which Sudan would have produced Osama bin Laden in exchange for the lifting of sanctions on the African country-a deal Ijaz says Clinton failed to act on.
It was a questionable claim-in fact, the September 11 Commission later found no "reliable evidence" to support it (Hearing 8, 3/23/04)-and other news outlets noted that the Clinton administration flatly denied the allegations. Salon.com reported (8/16/02) that "the Clinton administration says there was no deal and that Ijaz never had a role in diplomatic discussions," and quoted Clinton's National Security Adviser Sandy Berger calling Ijaz's claims "ludicrous and irresponsible." Even Clinton critic Richard Miniter, in his book Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror, saw fit to include a Clinton official's assessment of Ijaz as "a Walter Mitty living out a personal fantasy." But when Ijaz repeated his Clinton-let-BinLaden-get-away story on Special Report (11/6/03), Hume simply ended the segment, "Got you. Mansoor Ijaz, great to have you. Thanks very much."

Rarely naming his sources or even identifying them by nationality or occupation, Ijaz insists on their reliability. When asked by Hume about the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden (11/20/03), Ijaz replied: "Well, Brit, tonight I can report from my intelligence sources, I consider unimpeachable intelligence sources, that we have eyewitness accounts that both Osama bin Laden, in a modified, disguised form, as well as Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two in AI Qaeda, are, in fact, in Iran." This is less than airtight evidence, but Hume apparently needs little convincing; that night, as on many segments featuring Ijaz, the anchor introduced him with lavish praise for his connections: "He is an American businessman by trade, but few people on Earth have better connections and sources in the Mideast than Mansoor Ijaz." While many of Ijaz's claims are so vaguely sourced as to be uncheckable, some have been questioned by other reporters. According to the New York Times (2/4/02), Ijaz once "confirmed" for Fox (2/3/02) an inaccurate report that the body of Wall Street Journ al reporter Daniel Pearl had been found. While Pearl's body wouldn't turn up for another three months, and the erroneous story was called a hoax by U.S. and Pakistani officials, Fox invited Ijaz on less than a week later (On the Record, 2/8/02) to s . about Pearl's condition and kidnappers.

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Last summer Ijaz told the British Guardian (8/23/03) that the White House had reached a secret agreement with Pakistan not to capture or kill bin Laden in late 2001, following the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Nerves were too raw right after the war, said Ijaz, and the immediate capture or death of bin Laden might inflame unrest in Pakistan and incite attacks on the West elsewhere. "There was a judgment made that it would be more destabilizing in the longer term," Ijaz told the paper. "There would still be the ability to get him at a later date when it was more appropriate." important qualifier-this story would obviously be huge news. But Ijaz did not repeat his dubious bombshell on Special Report when he next appeared on the show (9/10/03), perhaps because he knew that stories that reflect badly on the Bush White House are not received well there. -S.R. and J.H.
See FAIR's Archives for more on:
Murdoch/Fox News

If true-an

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23/0112012

An Insider,Analysis

of Pakistan's

'Memogate'

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An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate'
In an analysis of Pakistan's 'Mem.ogate,' Mansoor Ijaz, a key player in the controversy, offers his Interpretatlon of the actions of Islamabad's erstwhile ambassador in Washington-acti.ons that led to an uproar in Pakistan and the envoy's ouster,
bY_Mansoor Ijaz C/contributors/mansoor-ijaz.htmD

I December

5, 2011 12:00 AM EST

"Ibis FT op-ed of yours is a disaster," read a BlackBerry message to Ire on the night of Oct 10. The sender, Husain Haqqani (ItQPics/husain-h!lQ.qll!1i.htmJ>was stillPak§tan (/topics/pakistan.htmll 's ambassador inWasbington at the time. Earlier in the evening, , the Financial Times bad posted -my colurm-''Tirre to Take On Pakistan's Jibadirt Spies"-on its website, wileashing a political firestorm in Pakistan over my disclosure of a mermrandum Haqqani bad asked Ire to help him prepare and deliver to Adm Mike . Mullen (ltQpicslmike-mullen.htmJl , then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chie1SofStaff In the rrermmndum, Haqqani asked the admiral fur help in calIniDg Pakistan's restive Army chief as fears of an aDeged coup whipped tbrougb Islamabad in the tense days that fullowed Osama bin Laden (/tQpicslosama-bin-Iaden.html) 's death, in a Pakistani garrison town. Inretmn, be ofrered the United States nothing short of a whoJesa1e paradigm shift in Pakistani governance thai wouJd t:ransfur essential. powers from the Am:rj to civilianleaders, giving Pakistan the veneer of civilian legitirmcy that bas eluded it since partition from India. . . I have a Imtory of involveImnt in back-chancel diplomacy, particularly between the govel1Jll1eotsofPak6tan and hlW!l (/tOJ)icslindia.html) on the subject ofKasbmir and nuclear pro1ireramn, but it ti still important to .ask why, in this instance, Haqqani chose to COIm to im. Perhaps because be bad tried other interlocutors to deJiver the same Imssage and had been refused. Perhaps because the bass ofbti request-an alleged coup plot-was only a concocted threat and·J:1e needed someOne who couldn't veritY the postulation in the short time ~ required by the ambassador fur acton, What I am certain of s that Haqqani beJieved.I was the most plausibly deniable back channel be couJd use. He knew I was dSJiked by mmy in Islamabad's power circles 1Ot: my strong antiestablBlnmnt views. Haqqani a~o knew I had the connections to get the message quickly and quietly to MuDen He knew I tmintained friendships with 10rrrer CIA l/topics/centraJ.intelligence-agency.htmD director J81'reSWoolsey, furrrer U.S. national-security adviser OeD. James L. Jones, Reagan ''Star Wars" conmmder U Gen, J81'reS Abrahamson, a:M others. . Befure I had a chance-to read and reply to hs BlackBerry message, the ambassador caDed-"Is there anyone else in Isloo [slai1gtOr .oIsJarmbad] }'9uknQw who ti a 'senor Pakistani diplomat'?". he asked hurriedly. This was the phrase I'd used in the op-ed to describe -:the author of the ImIDJ to MllDen Not wanting to be "outed" as the Immo's author, Haqqani imisted that without another name-any ,naDJ>-tbat might put Paki;tan's pressbounds on another diplomat's scent, all trails emmating from the ImlDJrandwn woukl soon lead back to bim-or, worse, to bti boss, President Asif Ali Zardari The cover-up had begun. Haqqani wouJd orchestrate denials by Pakistan's Foreign Ministry and President's House in the days after the FT cohmm was publBhed. When those didn't douse the fanes, he had the gaR to warn me that he was about to orchestrate a U.S. denial as ..-"Are you sure your side won't deny?" be wrote by BlackBerry to ne at 10:38 p.rn. onNov. 1, a week before unwitting spokesmm issued a confused denial that was later retracted. At 10:39, he aD. but confirmed his colq»i;ity.o: . , it mt the nature of a private msson 1bat officials deny it?"
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An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate' - Print

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Zardari comers with fOomr ambassador

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In Islamabad, he was telling Zardari that he had it an mder control and that the merm flap wouki disappear in a few days once all the denials were in pJace. If the accep1ance of nmJtiple petitions by the Supreme Court ofPakistan on Dec. 1 is any indication of the seriousness with which Pakistan's entire governtrental inftastructure takes th5 6sue, the mermrandum E not going away anytirre soon. Certainly not until the fun truth comes out ,~ A few days before the Mullen denial
(http://thecab!e.forejgnpo!icy.comLposts/20IlIlIl161excJusiye
mullen confirms eriitence

of secret memo pakistani ambassador offers to r)

was posted on Foreign Po/icy's bJog, The Cable, Haqqani changed bs BlackBerry handset fOr the third time since May. Maybe he hoped that changing PlN s would erase 1m damning conversations from my handset UnfOrtunately fur him, they resmin preservednow in a bank vauh-in exactly their original form on my original devce as he and I exchanged them The comtant changing of handsets railed the disturbing specter that Haqqani bad persuaded 1m fiieods in the U.S. intelligence conmmity to assst him in "scrubbing" 1m BlackBerry records because my dEcJosures were not just about to Jose him 1m job, but coukt potentially uncover sensitive matters of U.S. national interest as weD. After aD, Iwas not the only entry on Haqqani's BJackBerry contact 1m. Other BlackBerry chats coukt prove highly embarrassing or prove complicity and culpability if they were made public by SupreIre Court action in Pakistan. Why the cover-up? For the record, Haqqani approached Ire on May 9; I did notapproach him. He asked roe to assirt him in delivering a rressage (initially verbal) to Mullen. He now denies t:hB. The message's content and structure were entirely conceived by him and dictated to 1m in broad funn during our initial 16-mirrute teepbone caD, with further refine~nts during the day by telephone, text, and BlackBerry. He received an initial draft of the mem>randum from rre by em that evening, ''tweaked it" (see irmge below), said he woukl can the, next lOOming. and then di:l so at exactly 9:06 :16 fur 11 minutes to confirm the final draft I bad sent him 15 minutes earlier. He then gave me the required consent to proceed. He denies these mcts, but filcts do not lie. 'The message, ultimately delivered in writing rather than verbaJly due to u.s. skepteism about the verbal utterances of'Pakistani official<;, was sent by General Jones to Admiral Mullen. Haqqani bad assured lIE that he bad 1m "boss's approval' near the end of that 9:06 a.m phone caD. I in turn assured General Jones in writing that the mermrandlmbad ~ approval of the highest pOJitical level in Pakstan, The ''boss'' was an obvilus rererence to Zardari Haqqani Yehe~ntJy denies thE. In 1m resigoamn ofter to Zardari, Haqqani said, "At no point was I asked by you or anyone in the PakEtani goYeIllIllmt to draft a melOO and at no point did I draft or deliver such a merm."

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An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate' - Print View - The Daily Beast

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, Screen shots of the author's BlackBerry. (Note: 612212011 m the date ofhs last comnnmication with Haqqani), Courtesy ofMansoor Ijaz
The investigatory conmssion ordered by Pakistan's Supreme Court will soon detennine whether Zardari was (a) the progenitor ofhs trustedprotege's elaborate scheme; (b) an after-the-fact approver; or (c) conpletelyout of the loop. My bet s that Zardari initiated :~. the plan, gave Haqqani a blanket power of attorney to handle operational details, and, when it was done, gave him a pat on the back :, ',-! when he returned to Islamabad onMay 12 with evidence of the job completed.

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Haqqani i; now trying to deflect attention, and possible culpability, away from Zardari But why would he mn on his sword fur the nan he once dubbed "Mr. 10 Percent"? In my opinion, with the benefit of facts that have come to my attention in $e days since my FT cohum appeared, Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to IaWlCha stealth msson to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakstan's sQvereignty. They IDly have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakstan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive's location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result ina naOOnblaming its armed furces and intelligence services fur culpability in harboring bin Laden fur so many years. They p~ to use the Paki;tani publi:'s lme and cry to furce the resignaOOns of Army chiefGen. Ashfuq Kayani and intelligence cbiefGen. Smga Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed. Ifit all went wrong, the Pakistani; could unite in their hatred of America fur violating their nation's sovereignty, with Zardari leading the chorus ~ at Washington. Ifit went to plan, the long-sought aim of putting ciVilians(i.e., Zardari & Co.) in charge of the Army would be conplete. Washington woukl have bin Laden's scalp; Zardari would have Kayani's and Pasha's. And U.S. taxpayer-funded . aid woukl flow tmabated under the Kerry-Lugar bill in which Haqqani had pushed so hard to include civilian-supremacy language as a sine qua non. Not a bad plan. Really, not a bad plan. Unfurtunately, plans leave fuotprints. Consider that Operaton Neptune Spear was approved by President Obarra at 8:20 am on April 29 . Aftef waiting one day fur bad weather, the operation conunenced. Ask Haqqani where he was during those mteful days prior to, and on the day of the bin Laden raid. Answer: London. CoincidentaUy, he would have left at just about the same tim: Obrum gave the green Iigbt. Why'! Whom did he meet? What did he dscuss with his Briti>h hosts? Why was he back fur another round of meetings with the same peopJe-Sir David Richards, chiefofthe Defense Staff (Admiral Mullen's Briti>hequivalent), and Tobias Eftwood, p~ntary private secretary to the defense secretary-a week later? For what were characterizOO as private wits, Haqqani's appointment agenda was pretty hefty-an agenda that only one rmn knew about befurehand: Asif Ali Zardari What private rmtter could be so irqJortant that it required Pakistan's eyes and ears in America to be away from 1m desk on .the, yery day hi; host country was about to execute one of the most daring military missions in history to kill the world's . on Paki>tani soil'? Was Haqqani in London so he could plausibly deny having any knowledge of the bin Laden rail on " occurred, haviogjust conveyed Zardari's approval fOrthe rail to the Obama national-security team? Or was he 1asJ(ed·~ Paki>tan's

1qani made just one critical mistake-seconding me into hs scheme. I di;like the brinksrmnship and heavy-handed role that' akistan's military and intelligence organizations have played throughout the nation's hstory, and have said so over and over again. Democracy cannot exst in a police state managed by a thuggish intelligence agency. But I ~like even more fuudal civiliancabals that feign love tOr democracy only to orchestrate their .. randiose scbemes on important secwity issues through abuses of power that sin1>ly g cannot be tolerated in an open society. .Pakistan is rraich stronger as a result of the dsclosures that have arisen after the memorandmn became the unintended IDCUS -of global media attention Its frenetic, even chaotic media did their jobs well Some su6ered threats. Yet Pakistani reporters toughed it out. They ...saw a smokescreen and decided to disperse it. It is this hunger fu£ transparency that the people ofPakstan will now use to choose .. leaders who se~ only the people, not themselves, Pakistan's military men may not allow civilian supremacy just yet, but a serious transition seem; to be underway to at least make civilian institutions strong enough to coexist on an even tOoting with the Anny in the intermediate term One day, those civilianin<;titutions ay m indeed be strong enough to protect Pakistan's truest national interests: not Kaslnnir, ~tan, and noclear bombs, but the availability of education, the expansion of trade ties, and the provsion of energy to a frustrated nation eager to find prosperity. Tags:
• World News. ({world.htmll

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An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate' - Print View - The Daily Beast

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• Joint ChietS. (/topics/joint-chiefs.htmD • Mike Mullen. </toj>ics/mike-mu11en.htmD • Central InteJJi&ence A&efiCY. (/tQpics/central-intelligence-ageilcy. • Hmain Ha.qgani (ftopics/husain-haqgani.htmll • Pakistan (/topics/pakistan.htmD

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