CHAPTER THREE: Use of Force in Fighting Piracy in the East Coast of Africa This chapter will discuss the

use of force in fighting Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. Generally the chapter will endeavour to critically examine the counter-piracy efforts, especially the use of military intervention mechanisms. The aim is to assess the efficiency and success of counter-piracy efforts in the East African coast.

Background The East African Coast, which includes the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, has seen the largest share of global piracy attacks in recent years and the problem seems to be growing. In 2009, more than half the global piracy attacks were ascribed to Somali pirates with the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reporting the most significant escalation. In May 2009, IMB report indicated that pirate activity off the coast of Somalia jumped from a total of 111 incidents, including 42 hijackings during the twelve months of 2008, to 114 incidents with 29 hijackings during the first four months of 2009.1 Other areas of piracy risk include the Gulf of Guinea, the Malacca Straits and off Nigeria.

The recent wave of piracy began with seizures of vessels off the Somali coasts in 2002 and since then the pirates have been emboldened, targeting larger vessels including tankers on the high seas.2 Until recently, piracy was a phenomenon in decline, but attacks peaked at roughly 350 to 450 reported attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and then dropped by almost half in 2005.

“Pirate attacks off Somalia already surpass 2008 figures.” International Chamber of Commerce; Commercial Crime Services, (2009)., Accessed 7 February 2011.

Deccan Chronicle, ‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York, Friday, January 14, 2011 (, Accessed on 7 February 2011.


feeding local wars. acquisitive crime. 2. has been relatively less violent with captors seeking only ransom and sparing the crew. The rescue operation triggered retaliatory use of violence by pirates as was the case when Somalia pirates attacked another US flagged ship MV Liberty Sun. which is transnational because a ship is considered the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag she flies. seizing massive oil tankers. Armed with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.S rescue operation of MV Maersk Alabama.3 2 . the patrol navies as well as the pirates themselves. where the vessel and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid. Roger. piracy figures again sky-rocketed due. the first is robbery or hijacking. in 2008-2009. Maritime piracy is an organized operation because hijacking and ultimate commandeering a ship at sea without being detected requires considerable planning and some specialized expertise.p. The East African situation is unique in that almost all of the piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. For instance on April 2011. However. cargo vessels and luxury boats. where the motive of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its cargo. three pirates were killed by snipers in the U. as maritime trade is threatened and ransom payments to Somali pirates have risen to the millions of dollars. almost entirely.3 Piracy is once again on the forefront of the international community’s attention.This reduction was attributed to effective and coordinated international action against the pirates. but of late it is progressively getting violent on either side. Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper No. Niger Delta and East Asia. Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade. a US flagged ship. The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of offences. and the second is kidnapping. 2008. pirates in rickety skiffs have often carried out brazen hijackings. and a pirate leader was later quoted saying that 3 See Middleton. East African coast piracy. compared to other areas like the Caribbean. to the dramatic increase of such activities off the Coast of Somalia. Maritime piracy is a rather violent.

this is not the first time military intervention has been used to fight piracy. British Admirals and Chinese Pirates. between 1861 and 1869. and Austria-Hungary. but had sent a team with special equipment to destroy any ship flying the US flag in retaliation for the killing of their friends. 1832–1869. Rhode Island Newport Paper Thirty-five. each of which dealt in some measure with the problem of Chinese pirates. and David Rosenberg (eds).’ April 14. 1869. Italy. 2009 Fox. the 1866 decree. Newport. China engaged in signing bilateral treaties with foreign nations to control piracy. 6 Bruce A. amended in 1867 and re-stated in 1868. Denmark. the Netherlands.they were not after the ransom. 1864. Spain. Meanwhile. 1863. ‘Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter. 1863. meant that vessels caught assisting pirates could be impounded and that piracy losses were spread to the other “members of the same shipping division in proportion to the degree of their responsibility.145– 82. and it proved an extremely effective deterrent. Belgium. which began in 1869. Westport. Prussia. 1973.”5 This mutual responsibility system exerted real social pressure within China to halt piracy.4 This trend has subsequently necessitated the use of force to counter piracy. pp. 1866. 1865. 1861. Conn. By exposing merchants who bought pirate spoils.:Hyperion. Elleman. was the greatest blow ever struck at piracy as it brought within legal restriction the haunts and stores of the robbers and the native dealers in marine supplies.6 4 Agence France Presse (AFP). the registration of Chinese ships. Piracy and Maritime Crime Historical and Modern Case Studies. China negotiated agreements with six other Western nations. January 2010 5 3 . Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Grace. However. Historically on its own initiative. Andrew Forbes.

Found at http://www. China. 491.. the coastlines alone of the greater Horn of Africa and Yemen totals 5. p. the resolution provided for the deployment of naval forces and the investigation. trial and punishment as part of repression efforts “unprecedented in scope and authority for the international community to counter a threat in the maritime domain. Use of Military Force against East African Piracy A diverse and growing number of nations are now are now involved in joint efforts.” Press Release. in the region in question. Hence three large coalitions of naval forces conduct counter-piracy patrols in the vast area. The East African coast is very expansive. 4. the EU’s NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atlanta).html. For example. (2009) “Combined Maritime Forces Works with International Navies to Counter Piracy. 4 . and Commander. No. NATO has established the NATO Shipping Centre to act as an information clearing house for news and information concerning pirates and best practices for merchants. by monitoring and tracking their progress throughout their respective areas and coordinating military responses when necessary.7On a similar note. Naval Forces 7 Schaeffer N. Vol.510 miles. Spain.. Combined Maritime Forces of NATO (Operation Ocean Shield). This has necessitated the need for a multinational force to be deployed in a joint effort to fight piracy. Strategic Analysis. Germany. only Yemen and Kenya have at least rudimentary maritime patrol capabilities. July. France. And warships from the navies of the United States. and others now participate as Combined Maritime Forces in patrols to disrupt and intercept pirates. Accessed on 7 February 2011. 8 Brian W. authorizing states to take actions aimed at combating Somali based pirates.cusnc. Turkey.”8 The International Maritime Organization has established the a global network of Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centers to enhance the protection of merchant US 5th Fleet. to reduce East African piracy. Worse still. “Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean”. 2009. mainly military.International Intervention. the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1851 in December 2008.

DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528. fixed wing aircraft. 2010:pp. prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be 9 Robert I.9 In August 2008. Task Force 151 is responsible for the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin and is the primary counter-piracy operation of the allied effort. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa. more secure transit zone for merchant vessels. 2009. representing the first naval operation under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). the European Union launched EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA. the Dutch-led task force CTF 150 and partner forces agreed to the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to serve as a dedicated. January 26. Task Force 151 ranges beyond the Gulf of Aden and well into the Indian Ocean in response to increased piratical attacks more than 1.” Washington. World Peace Foundation. helicopters. dedicated manner. and naval vessels to these three task forces and to the NATO and EU efforts in 2009 and early 2010. serving as Commander Maritime Force for Combined Task Forces (CTF) 151. Whereas Task Force 150 has responsibility for sea-borne counter-terrorism efforts in the Red Sea. Since it has extensive geographical authority. Lauren.11 In support of Operation ATALANTA. et al. p. Forty-five nations contributed service men and women.U. including the use of force. and the Gulf of Oman. to deter. operates in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf from a base in Abu Dhabi. Central Command in Bahrain. p. The MSPA has been credited in part with lowering the success rate of Somalia pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone. Rotberg. the international community did not respond to the threat of piracy in the waters off of Somalia in a coordinated.000 miles east of Somalia. Task Force 152.16 11 Ibid. the Gulf of Aden. Policy Brief #11.3 5 . ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’. EU NAVFOR deployed up to twelve ships through December 2010 to: “Employ the necessary measures. drones.10 Until 2008.1-11:3 10 Ploch.S. whose mission is the interdiction of terrorists and related materials. In December 2008.

‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’. delivered 269 pirates for prosecution under prevailing legal interpretations to Kenya and other jurisdictions (of whom 46 were jailed). In 2009. and killed 11 pirates. the responses to piracy off the Horn of Africa include multinational naval patrols and the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden. defend against and disrupt pirate activities’ as they transit the region. the forces participating in Operation Allied Protector will ‘deter. the option of escorted (accessed 20 November 2009). and numerous ladders. The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor protected by warships. the combined maritime operations of NATO and allied forces disrupted 411 pirate operations of the 706 encountered. NATO launched its second anti-piracy mission. January 26. 2010: pp1-11:2 6 .” Washington. Policy Brief #11. though not well coordinated. GPS receivers.12 In addition to the United States and European Union. and other assorted equipment. Also 12 EU NAVFOR. Operation Allied Protector.14 Generally. The combined operations also destroyed 42 pirate vessels. World Peace Foundation. mobile phones. 13 Ploch. confiscated 14 boats. nearly fifty rocketpropelled grenade launchers.committed in the areas where they are present”. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.13 These combined. hundreds of small arms. et al. p. http://www. Mission Statement. Rotberg. According to NATO. in March 2009. grappling hooks. 2009. has improved arrangements for surveillance and information sharing among participating navies. naval patrols in the East African waters is credited for the relative reduction in the number of vessel capture.eunavfor. “European union naval operation against piracy”. which is being carried out by Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528. Lauren.17 14 Robert I.

‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York. Rothwell.16 It has been observed that despite all these measures. and to a large extent in the Indian Ocean off the Kenyan and Somali Accessed on 7 Feb 2011.hiiraan. Accessed on 7 Feb 2011.rieas.18 This indicates that the naval operations have several 15 IMO.aspx).org) 7 . the challenge is that still. during 2008.15 Limitations to Use of Force However. 17 Liam Bellamy.17 To illustrate this. 129. with only two dozen patrol ships on station. Friday. principally in the Gulf of Aden.imo. director of the London foreign-policy think tank Chatham House research project is quoted by press to have said that though piracy costs were increasing What is clear is that the current defences used by merchant shipping are not effective enough.crimesofwar. 2011 (http://www. January 14.and air-based surveillance efforts. Accessed 7 Feb 2011. February 24th 2009 (www. “Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia”.asp?topic_id=1178. 16 Deccan Chronicle. a gradual upsurge in pirate attacks occurred off the east African coast. Maritime Piracy and International Law. Anna Bowden. at www. 18 Donald R. No. what was more concerning is that all counter-piracy efforts are simply treating the symptoms and almost nothing is being done to treat the root cause. ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper. More than 60 ships were seized by pirates off the Somali and these attacks have continued into 2009. The number of vessels captured increased month on month throughout 2008. all manner of small ship or casual dhow can and do evade land-based and now sea. March 2009 (http://www. Crimes of War Project’s website.series of IMO meetings with littoral states have promoted cooperation and developed a Code of Conduct among the countries covering matters such as the prosecution of offences. attacks in the waters off the East African coast especially the Horn of Africa continue.

Cheaper and less well-armed coast guard vessels and aircraft would be quite sufficient for the task. however. many merchant ships fail to take all appropriate precautions against attack. Then there are naval escorts with their associated weapons and aircraft. are in many ways too much resource for anti-piracy operations. Audit Report no. the seas off the coast of Eastern Africa represent an attractive environment for pirates. p. who as a group. By their very nature. Sea piracy: some inconvenient truths. The United States has deployed surveillance drones to the Seychelles. there are the pirates themselves. Australian National Audit Office. Coastwatch: Australian Customs Service. Then there are limitations imposed by the environment and by the nature of international law. but these do not provide a visible deterrent to pirates. 2000. constantly adapt and react. 2010 8 . An even cheaper option would be to use civilian aircraft under charter perhaps to the United Nations. there are the individual merchant ships. Canberra. Disarmament Forum. but there are insufficient military patrol aircraft. Maritime Security. an assessment by this study reveals a number of different angles or levels from which the counter-piracy measures can be looked at. there are still slow and vulnerable vessels sailing in the area independently of the escorted convoys.19 Finally. is the lack of resources in terms of the number of ships and surveillance aircraft covering the piracy-prone waters. 66. with their sophisticated military equipment.limitations. First.20 In a nutshell. However. The most serious limitation. Finally. 38. 20 See Sam Bateman. for example. Comprehensive air surveillance is a basic requirement. Most warships have restrictive rules of engagement and they lack the national legal authority to arrest pirates and bring them to trial. 19 The Auditor-General. modern warships and military aircraft.

” Washington.The Gulf of Aden represents a vital conduit through which vast quantities of finished goods. pirate attacks continue.(2008).S. has deterred some attacks. pirates increase their range via the use of larger more sea worthy mother-ships from which smaller raiding boats are launched.S. Similarly. the area is simply too vast to prevent all incidents. For example.htm.”23 Comparison of Case Studies on the Efficiency on the Use of Force 21 “FACTBOX-Somali pirates risk choking key world trade route. Accessed 7 Feb 2011. Lauren. 2009. as merchant ships move further out to 4% of the world’s daily oil production passes through the area as does 18% of the US and Europe’s combined yearly oil imports. was approximately 300 nautical miles away. natural resources. the U. governments around the world are contributing to attempts to secure it. Seaborne counter-piracy efforts are mired by the very size of the ocean and pirate tactics that adjust for defensive 23 “Piracy ‘cannot be solved at sea. Yet despite the fact that naval vessels from a host of countries now patrol some two million square miles of the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. conducted by more than fifteen nations. the new commander of the European Union’s anti-piracy operations.’” BBC (2009). 22 Ploch. the U. Bainbridge was only able to arrive on the scene of an aborted 14 April 2009 attack on the MV Liberty Sun a reported 6 hours after the attack ended. When the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked on April 8.alertnet. For example. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.S.21 Given this area’s importance to the global economy. told the BBC in June 2009 “Illegal activity off the coast of Somalia is not necessarily something which will get solved at sea. Bainbridge. et al. and military supplies transit. the closest naval vessel.” Reuters. The solution lies ashore. DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report Accessed 7 Feb 2011. 9 . http://www.stm. p. Found at http://news.22 As Rear Admiral Peter Hudson. Most defense analysts acknowledge that while the unprecedented level of naval patrols in the area.

Singapore. 10 .. maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca Strait.A comparison of strategies of anti-piracy measures in the East African coast and those of the relatively successful Malacca Strait show similarity in concept on use of force. and a better use of technology aimed at the detaining pirates at source rather than in the high seas. coordinating initiatives with other concerned littoral states and international organizations needs to be emphasized as much as possible. 2006. In whatever capacity initiatives to support or promote anti-piracy and related terrorism measures. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. some states in the East African coastal region have weak internal structures aggravating piracy and lawlessness. (eds). The similarity is that both are involved increasing the amount of maritime patrol and enforcement. in the Strait of Malacca the affected littoral states are also able to exert control over the landward side of the littorals. pp. Further. This may be primarily due to the fact that East African coastal states are logistically and financially challenged with maritime enforcement only affecting the seaward side of the littoral. but a difference in tactics. The East African counter-piracy efforts apparently need local multilateral cooperation. and Thailand. In spite of the efforts of the international community the number of pirate attacks in East Africa has increased. whereas those of the Malacca Strait have tremendously reduced.24 Any landward efforts in Somalia for instance have provided no significant result. An example of local multilateral cooperation is the “Eye in the Sky” initiative inaugurated in 2005 among Malaysia. The difference is that in the Malacca Strait the patrols were performed by the three littoral states concerned and in the East African region the patrols have been performed by a coalition of warships from the international community. In short the counter-piracy policy for the Malacca Strait is stronger enforcement. The idea ostensibly 24 Ong-Webb and Graham G. On the other hand. Pasir Panjang. Piracy. 29-30. Indonesia. has more regional cooperation.

aims at providing limited airborne surveillance over the Malacca Straits and builds off the earlier Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MASLINDO) accord. and commit to flying two sorties a week over the Straits. The jurisdiction of a State over acts of piracy is based upon nationality or territoriality. considerable legal challenges remain. Under the initiative. or between the State and the waters on which the offences take place. The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism. Piracy.. and Challenges for the United States (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation.. for every seven days there will be at least 16 hours of continual coverage over the waterway. and the Challenge to International Law. Therefore. 50:3 11 . Virginia’ Journal of International Law. Vol. That is. each participating country will make two planes available. ‘Somalia: State Failure. the responsibility for enforcement will predominantly fall upon those members of the international community whose ships are currently patrolling off the coast of Somalia. 2008). The ability of a State with a ship in Somali waters to apply and enforce its own laws with respect to piracy and sea robbery will depend on whether the pirate ship or the pirates have the nationality of that State.26 25 Chalk P. It will also depend on the extent to which the national law of the enforcing state makes piracy a universal crime which can be subject to arrest and prosecution anywhere throughout the world. 26 Mario S. unprecedented moves by the international community to address the growing threat posed by maritime piracy. Piracy.25 Legal Considerations Despite significant. Thus unless Somali courts are willing and able to conduct prosecutions. It is clear that the current legal regime is not comprehensive with respect to the enforcement of either international law or domestic criminal law against those responsible for pirate attacks. there must be a genuine link between the State and the ship.

the Seychelles and other prospective countries that have facilitated the handing over of captured pirates for prosecution.3 Ibid Ibid 29 30 12 .28 Other countries like Portugal. the question of whether this is ultimately a police mission.3 28 Ib Id. June 2009. while UK and U. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). due to domestic legal constraints.Although there is sufficient legal scope for robust anti-piracy measures. ‘Making Waves: Piracy Floods the Horn of Africa’. ETH Zurich No. p.30 Nevertheless. but can only hold pirates until a judicial authority can formally arrest them. entered an agreement with Kenya. but then merely returned pirates to home shores rather than sealing prosecutions. 55. 27 Hulbert M.29 France and Netherlands have by-passed Kenya’s Mombasa piracy court by trying pirates directly. Counter-balanced against this however is that while states may be prepared to offer their military support to ensure the safety and security of shipping lanes. but also the prosecution of hijackers. Canada and many others have boarded vessels with ample evidence of piratical attacks. The EU has however. For instance French commandoes have used force to free hostages.. some states will be reluctant to seek to prosecute the offenders either because their legal regimes are inadequate or for political considerations. except within the internal waters of other States.27 This indecision is not only hampering deterrence. as has occurred in Somalia. or a more tangible Chapter VII mandate of UN continues to vex political leaders. all States need to have the capacity under international law to prosecute persons who perpetrate acts of violence against foreign ships in all settings. Centre for Security Studies (CSS)..S prefer to work through the Kenyan courts. p. the reality is that.

These arrangements are designed to facilitate prompt detention and transfer of suspected pirates to the Kenyan criminal justice system. or prosecute pirates operating within its jurisdiction.31 Conclusion In conclusion. There are significant obstacles to using international law to address the problem of Somali piracy. despite the large international response in the fight against maritime piracy in the East African coast. On January 16 the United States and United Kingdom signed agreements with Kenya allowing for the transfer of suspected pirates to Kenya for trial. detain. Although UN maritime law makes piracy on the high seas illegal throughout the world.Some new initiatives are being explored to address these issues. Through this arrangement. most nations have been reluctant to take pirates into custody for prosecution in their own domestic courts. The Somali government lacks any means to investigate. and the Challenge to International Law. There are also proposals to consider the creation of a specialist international criminal tribunal to deal with pirates. ‘Somalia: State Failure. “It seems involvement in piracy is 31 Mario S. Furthermore. Vol. the US naval forces in the Gulf of Aden have on different occasions detained more than a dozen suspected pirates who have subsequently been arraigned in Kenyan courts for trial. 50:3 13 . Piracy. although the Security Council resolutions authorize the pursuit of pirates into Somali waters. this law has proven to be ineffective. As Ross et al says. Virginia’ Journal of International Law. piracy attacks have still continued to plague the East African waters with the Horn of Africa being the epicenter.. as evidenced by the dramatic recent increase in piracy in the Horn of Africa.

Chatham House. The anti-piracy plan should addresses the economic aspect. et al. 2009. social. 34 Ploch. is quoted from his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee..chathamhouse. The improvement of security in the territorial and high seas of the coast of East Africa coast particularly Somalia is not enough. 2008 (http://www. where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming. (accessed 18 November 2009). and economic opportunity in Somalia.” Briefing paper. Lauren. stability. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa. because it seems pirates weigh the risks of engaging in piracy and benefiting from massive rewards and non-engagement in countries “where legitimate business is difficult.” Washington. a strategy that addresses the problems other than security is required: It is argued that a durable solution for ending piracy in the Horn of Africa will require improving security. We cannot guarantee safety in this vast region. Naval Forces Central Command. “Piracy in Somalia--threatening global trade.”35 The quote emphasizes the fact that the economic. DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40528. as well as solidifying political progress by forming a unity government and advancing the peace process. and political factors should be directly addressed in a strategy to combat piracy at the East African coast. org.34 Vice Admiral William Gortney. 32 Ross.S. 14 . much emphasis should be placed on the inland causes of piracy.27 35 Ibid. rule of law. and Joshua Ben-David. October.” Harvard Africa Policy Journal 5 (2008-2009): 55-70:58 33 Middleton R. on 5 March 2009: “Ultimately. p. “Somalia piracy: an escalating security dilemma. We made this clear at the offset of our efforts. and instability and violence make death a very real prospect.seemingly worth any perceived risks”32 Besides use of force. Commander. Shani. piracy is a problem that starts ashore and requires an international solution ashore. feeding local wars.”33 It is generally understood that in order to combat piracy in the East African Coast.

It is governments and IGO's that must make the final choice about the extent to which they wish to deal with piracy. these are decisions that can only be taken by governments and Inter-governmental Organizations. the long..and that in itself may not be enough to do more than contain piracy to within tolerable levels. political will. March 2009 ( Navies can only do as much as their political masters will let them . ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper. 15 .Furthermore. But what should be borne in mind. ship owners can only address the immediate problems thrown up by piracy.term ability of international intervention to eliminate these threats is less certain in the absence of committed and capable regional and local actors. the waters of West Africa and the Strait of Malacca have had the same requirements. Military intervention and foreign assistance require political consensus. Maritime security efforts in the Persian Gulf. the Caribbean.rieas. united front. Whether Special Forces will be allowed to operate openly on dry land and use 'hot pursuit' and how International Law and Rules of Engagement should be applied are more of political than military decisions. No. 36 Liam B. 129. legal provisions are another limitation to the extent to which use of force and international naval interventions can be applied. Accessed 7 February 2011. but the practice is spreading elsewhere too and hence it may as well prove to be a test case. Basically. While short term results in containing other transnational threats have proven to be achievable. is Somalia might be the worse area for piracy.36 A broad guiding principle of the Strategy for Maritime Security in the East African coast is that success in securing the maritime domain will not come from a state acting alone. local partnership and significant coordination in order to be successful. but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong. In conclusion.

Somalia is at the heart of the East African coast piracy. demonstrates that the strategy is not effective. makes the strategy of vast international flotillas at sea combating piracy not conclusive and productive.The view held is that the current strategic plan to combat piracy by use of force only is incomplete in that it does not acknowledge fully the factors contributing to piracy. in spite of significant international effort. 16 . This is why the next chapter will comprise of the case study which will be the impact of the Somalia situation on the fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. The problem of piracy in this region must be addressed both at sea and land. The fact that the total number of attacks has increased. in particular Somalia will not be easy. anarchy. conflicts and terrorism will emerge in this proceeding chapter. Central to this drawback is the Somalia country whose political fragility and extreme poverty for instance. In the Horn of Africa. Issues of failed state.

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