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Pursuant to the provisions of this section, any grandparent of an unmarried minor child may seek and be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child which visitation rights may be independent of either parent of the child if: a. the district court deems it to be in the best interest of the child pursuant to subsection E of this section, and b. there is a showing of parental unfitness, or the grandparent has rebutted, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the fit parent is acting in the best interests of the child by showing that the child would suffer harm or potential harm without the granting of visitation rights to the grandparent of the child, and c. the intact nuclear family has been disrupted in that one or more of the following conditions has occurred: (1) an action for divorce, separate maintenance or annulment involving the grandchild's parents is pending before the court, and the grandparent had a preexisting relationship with the child that predates the filing of the action for divorce, separate maintenance or annulment, (2) the grandchild's parents are divorced, separated under a judgment of separate maintenance, or have had their marriage annulled, (3) the grandchild's parent who is a child of the grandparent is deceased, and the grandparent had a preexisting relationship with the child that predates the death of the deceased parent unless the death of the mother was due to complications related to the birth of the child, (4) except as otherwise provided in subsection C or D of this section, legal custody of the grandchild has been given to a person other than the grandchild's parent, or the grandchild does not reside in the home of a parent of the child, (5) one of the grandchild’s parents has had a felony conviction and been incarcerated in the Department of Corrections and the grandparent had a preexisting relationship
with the child that predates the incarceration, (6) grandparent had custody of the grandchild pursuant to Section 21.3 of this title, whether or not the grandparent had custody under a court order, and there exists a strong, continuous grandparental relationship between the grandparent and the child, (7) the grandchild's parent has deserted the other parent for more than one (1) year and there exists a strong, continuous grandparental relationship between the grandparent and the child, (8) except as otherwise provided in subsection D of this section, the grandchild's parents have never been married, are not residing in the same household and there exists a strong, continuous grandparental relationship between the grandparent and the child, or (9) except as otherwise provided by subsection D of this section, the parental rights of one or both parents of the child have been terminated, and the court determines that there is a strong, continuous relationship between the child and the parent of the person whose parental rights have been terminated. 2. The right of visitation to any grandparent of an unmarried minor child shall be granted only so far as that right is authorized and provided by order of the district court. B. Under no circumstances shall any judge grant the right of visitation to any grandparent if the child is a member of an intact nuclear family and both parents of the child object to the granting of visitation. C. If one natural parent is deceased and the surviving natural parent remarries, any subsequent adoption proceedings shall not terminate any preexisting court-granted grandparental rights belonging to the parents of the deceased natural parent unless the termination of visitation rights is ordered by the court having jurisdiction over the adoption after opportunity to be heard, and the court determines it to be in the best interest of the child. D. 1. If the child has been born out of wedlock and the parental rights of the father of the child have been terminated, the parents of the father of the child shall not have a right of visitation authorized by this section to the child unless:
the father of the child has been judicially determined to be the father of the child, and b. the court determines that a previous grandparental relationship existed between the grandparent and the child. 2. If the child is born out of wedlock and the parental rights of the mother of the child have been terminated, the parents of the mother of the child shall not have a right of visitation authorized by this section to the child unless the court determines that a previous grandparental relationship existed between the grandparent and the child. 3. Except as otherwise provided by this section, the district court shall not grant to any grandparent of an unmarried minor child, visitation rights to that child: a. subsequent to the final order of adoption of the child; provided however, any subsequent adoption proceedings shall not terminate any prior courtgranted grandparental visitation rights unless the termination of visitation rights is ordered by the court after opportunity to be heard and the district court determines it to be in the best interest of the child, or b. if the child had been placed for adoption prior to attaining six (6) months of age. E. 1. In determining the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider and, if requested, shall make specific findings of fact related to the following factors: a. the needs of and importance to the child for a continuing preexisting relationship with the grandparent and the age and reasonable preference of the child pursuant to Section 113 of Title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes, b. the willingness of the grandparent or grandparents to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents, c. the length, quality and intimacy of the preexisting relationship between the child and the grandparent, d. the love, affection and emotional ties existing between the parent and child, e. the motivation and efforts of the grandparent to continue the preexisting relationship with the grandchild, f. the motivation of parent or parents denying visitation, g. the mental and physical health of the grandparent or grandparents,
h. i. j. k. l. m. n. 2. For a.
the mental and physical health of the child, the mental and physical health of the parent or parents, whether the child is in a permanent, stable, satisfactory family unit and environment, the moral fitness of the parties, the character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the homes of the parties and such person’s interactions with the child, the quantity of visitation time requested and the potential adverse impact the visitation will have on the customary activities of the child, and if both parents are dead, the benefit in maintaining the preexisting relationship. purposes of this subsection: “harm or potential harm” means a showing that without court-ordered visitation by the grandparent, the child’s emotional, mental or physical well-being could reasonably or would be jeopardized, “intact nuclear family” means a family consisting of the married father and mother of the child, “parental unfitness” includes, but is not limited to, a showing that a parent of the child or a person residing with the parent: (1) has a chemical or alcohol dependency, for which treatment has not been sought or for which treatment has been unsuccessful, (2) has a history of violent behavior or domestic abuse, (3) has an emotional or mental illness that demonstrably impairs judgment or capacity to recognize reality or to control behavior, (4) has been shown to have failed to provide the child with proper care, guidance and support to the actual detriment of the child. The provisions of this division include, but are not limited to, parental indifference and parental influence on his or her child or lack thereof that exposes such child to unreasonable risk, or (5) demonstrates conduct or condition which renders him or her unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provides nurturing
and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional and mental health. The determination of parental unfitness pursuant to this subparagraph shall not be that which is equivalent for the termination of parental rights, and d. “preexisting relationship” means occurring or existing prior to the filing of the petition for grandparental visitation. F. 1. The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to issue orders granting grandparental visitation rights and to enforce visitation rights, upon the filing of a verified petition for visitation rights or enforcement thereof. Notice as ordered by the court shall be given to the person or parent having custody of the child. The venue of such action shall be in the court where there is an ongoing proceeding that involves the child, or if there is no ongoing proceeding, in the county of the residence of the child or parent. 2. When a grandparent of a child has been granted visitation rights pursuant to this section and those rights are unreasonably denied or otherwise unreasonably interfered with by any parent of the child, the grandparent may file with the court a motion for enforcement of visitation rights. Upon filing of the motion, the court shall set an initial hearing on the motion. At the initial hearing, the court shall direct mediation and set a hearing on the merits of the motion. 3. After completion of any mediation pursuant to paragraph 2 of this subsection, the mediator shall submit the record of mediation termination and a summary of the parties' agreement, if any, to the court. Upon receipt of the record of mediation termination, the court shall enter an order in accordance with the parties' agreement, if any. 4. Notice of a hearing pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this subsection shall be given to the parties at their last-known address or as otherwise ordered by the court, at least ten (10) days prior to the date set by the court for hearing on the motion. Provided, the court may direct a shorter notice period if the court deems such shorter notice period to be appropriate under the circumstances. 5. Appearance at any court hearing pursuant to this subsection shall be a waiver of the notice requirements prior to such hearing. 6. If the court finds that visitation rights of the grandparent have been unreasonably denied or otherwise unreasonably interfered with by the parent, the court shall enter an order providing for one or more of the following: a. a specific visitation schedule,
compensating visitation time for the visitation denied or otherwise interfered with, which time may be of the same type as the visitation denied or otherwise interfered with, including but not limited to holiday, weekday, weekend, summer, and may be at the convenience of the grandparent, c. posting of a bond, either cash or with sufficient sureties, conditioned upon compliance with the order granting visitation rights, or d. assessment of reasonable attorney fees, mediation costs, and court costs to enforce visitation rights against the parent. 7. If the court finds that the motion for enforcement of visitation rights has been unreasonably filed or pursued by the grandparent, the court may assess reasonable attorney fees, mediation costs, and court costs against the grandparent.
TROXEL et vir. v. GRANVILLE
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
No. 99—138. Argued January 12, 2000–Decided June 5, 2000
Washington Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) permits “[a]ny person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time” and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child’s best interest. Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their deceased son’s daughters. Respondent Granville, the girls’ mother, did not oppose all visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the Troxels. The Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, and she appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels’ petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter alia, that §26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on parents’ fundamental right to rear their children. Reasoning that the Federal Constitution permits a State to interfere with this right only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child, it found that §26.10.160(3) does not require a threshold showing of harm and sweeps too broadly by permitting any person to petition at any time with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded that §26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family, violates her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters. Pp. 5—17. (a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, including parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5—8. (b) Washington’s breathtakingly broad statute effectively permits a court to disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge’s determination of the child’s best interest. A parent’s estimation of the child’s best interest is accorded no deference. The State Supreme Court had the opportunity, but declined, to give §26.10.160(3) a narrower reading. A combination of several factors compels the conclusion that §26.10.160(3), as applied here, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 304. The problem here is not that the Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests. More importantly, that court appears to have applied the opposite presumption, favoring grandparent visitation. In effect, it placed on Granville the burden of disproving that visitation would be in her daughters’ best interest and thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right. The court also gave no weight to Granville’s having assented to visitation even before the filing of the petition or subsequent court intervention. These factors, when considered with the Superior Court’s slender findings, show that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the court and Granville concerning her children’s best interests, and that the visitation order was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. 8—14. (c) Because the instant decision rests on §26.10.160(3)’s sweeping breadth and its application here, there is no need to consider the question whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation or to decide the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. There is also no reason to remand this case for further proceedings. The visitation order clearly violated the Constitution, and the parties should not be forced into additional litigation that would further burden Granville’s parental right. Pp. 14—17. Justice Souter concluded that the Washington Supreme Court’s second reason for invalidating its own state statute–that it sweeps too broadly in authorizing any person at any time to request (and a judge to award) visitation rights, subject only to the State’s particular best-interests standard–is consistent with this Court’s prior cases. This ends the case, and there is no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope of a parent’s right or its necessary protections. Pp. 1—5. Justice Thomas agreed that this Court’s recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing resolves this case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation with third parties. Pp. 1—2. O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., filed dissenting opinions.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR BRYAN COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA
IN RE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF: #Sierra Sloan , age 12, dob 1/4/2000 Hunter Sloan, age 9, dob 11/8/2002 Harley Sloan, age 9, dob 11/8/2002 Minors Case no.# Judge Admissions Statement
Comes now, Linda Grider to Admit onto Evidence as per Oklahoma Rules of Evidence, a Summary by Dr. Edward S. Stern entitled The Medea Complex: the Mother's Homicidal Wishes to her Child, as read at the Child Psychiatry Section at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Medico-psychological Association at Eastbourne. • Part I.—Original Articles
The Medea Complex: the Mother's Homicidal Wishes to her Child*
• Edward S. Stern, M.A., M.D., M.R.C.P., D.P.M., Medical Superintendent + Author Affiliations
• The Central Hospital, Hatton, near Warwick
• The situation in which the mother harbours death wishes to her offspring, usually as a revenge against the father, is described and named the Medea complex. • It is shown that there is considerable resistance against admitting these thoughts to the consciousness of the mother or any other person, but that they are of general occurrence. • The Medea complex causes many marital difficulties, e.g., dyspareunia, prevention and interruption of pregnancy, failure of breast feeding, and other disordered domestic relations.
• It explains such matters as baby farming, disposal to others, and neglect of children, unjust accusations of cruelty to children such as blood libels, and acts of covert and overt cruelty to them.
• * A Paper read at the Child Psychiatry Section at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association at Eastbourne
Comes now, Anne House to Admit onto Evidence, as per Texas Rules of Evidence one email from Merry Sloan September 11, 2006, whereby it is in evidence that Merry Sloan 1. Did not have care and custody of Hunter or Harley Sloan 2. that on this date Merry Sloan makes threats Constituting Criminal Coercion, re: a Doctor adopting Hunter and Harley. 4. Merry Sloan admits that when she went to Chris and Anne's house, it was never not clean. 5. Merry Sloan admits in this email that her intent is to have joint custody of the children, although at this time, she had not seen the children for nearly two years, of her own volition.
----- Forwarded Message ---From: Ron Sloan <email@example.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Sent: Mon, May 2, 2011 10:19:48 AM Subject: Mr. Baker I was letting you know that I have released Morrison attorney law office on the intervene of Linda Grider. I do not wish to go against her for Grandparent custody rights I am waving my parental and guardianship rights from Sierra JoAnn Sloan, Harley Rachelle Sloan, and Hunter Lee Sloan In wishing that the courts will give Linda Grider full custody of the three kids.
Ron Sloan Sales Representative Allied Stone, Inc. Office: (580) 931-3388 Cell: (580) 920-3792 Fax: (580) 931-3998 2201 W. Arkansas Durant, Ok 74701
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