You are on page 1of 91

GDI 2004

1

Scholars

1NC Shell

European Union Counterplan

Observation 1: Text- The European Union will <do plan>

Observation 2: Competition- The CP Competes via the net benefits of politics, EU credibility, and better solvency.

Observation 3: Solvency

The EU is a uniquely better actor than the US in that it understands the more basic requirements of peacekeeping

Schake, 2002 (Kori, senior research professor at the National Defense University, “Post-9/11 U.S. Perceptions on ESDP,” http://csis.org/europe/priv/esdp.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) When gauged against the lack of any tangible progress during the three years since NATO’s 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 areas for European improvement, the U.S. reluctance to use European militaries appears understandable. However crucial they may be, such capabilities have been lacking on the European side for the better part of the last 50 years. Moreover, even as DCI remains a necessary objective, it is not sufficient for addressing the growing strategy gap. (Making capabilities the key issue at NATO’s Prague summit next November, as some have suggested, would also not solve the lingering transatlantic tensions in the strategic and military areas.) A Europe that tends to think about war in terms of its implications for the ensuing peace will not only continue to dwarf a rising U.S. military colossus but will also insist on thinking differently about the world at large. To some extent, the U.S. fascination with technology tends to ignore some larger strategic questions. “Fighting and winning the nation’s war” is certainly a very compelling motto, but absent serious thinking about how to fight and win the peace, the U.S. approach to addressing the security threats of the future remains incomplete. A comprehensive strategy cannot exclude, for example, ways of addressing low-intensity conflicts—that is, precisely what ESDP is best equipped to confront. Dismissing more traditional civilian assets in favor of overwhelming military capabilities risks encouraging a truncated strategy that does not effectively tackle the numerous security challenges of our era.

GDI 2004

2

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Independent EU action is critical because if they work in conjunction with the US the EU risks their credibility, which is key to the peace process.

LaFranchi 2004 (Howard, Staff Writer for the CSM, Christian Science Monitor April

26 th 2004, lexis)

The immediate result is a blow to Mideast reforms, both because would-be promoters from outside are discredited, and because internal reforms, increasingly associated with the West, are suspect.

Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of

Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace, having so

"

Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace,
Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace,
Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace,

fully identified with the Sharon position," says Edward Walker, a former State Department official

and now president of the Middle East Institute. "Countries in the region will be hard-pressed to cooperate with the administration on questions like reform, Iraq, and even terrorism as their populations react to their perception of this one-sided US position." At the same time, pro-

modernization Arabs are telling American contacts that

domestic reform efforts are being hurt by an

association with pressures from the US for change. Recent events have also cooled European

 

enthusiasm for working with the US on Mideast reform - just as the US is acknowledging it needs

 

more partners in Iraq and in the broader region. Even Bush's stalwart ally, British Prime Minister

 

Tony Blair, has expressed frustration at the US drawing closer to Israel, while Europeans worry that

the poor US image in the region could tarnish the work the EU has done in encouraging

Arab

reforms. "The Europeans will have greater difficulty working with the Americans as they did before,

when they all wanted the Americans in the driver's seat because that was the way progress in the

 

region

 

has been made," says the European official in Washington. "

The problem is they [the

 

Americans] just drove off in a certain direction, and we were not cautious enough."

 

Peace process breakdown causes war

Jerome Slater, professor of political science at SUNY at Buffalo.Tikkun Mareh 1, 1999

There has been a

kind of

conspiracy of silence over the potential consequences of a breakdown of

 

the peace process, perhaps because in the worst case they are nothing short of apocalyptic. But

 

the

risks are real. Israel has hundreds of nuclear weapons

, Syria has nerve gas mounted on ballistic

 

missiles aimed at Israeli cities, and it is only a matter of time before other Arab states or - far worse - fanatical terrorist groups obtain weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or

biological.

clear intention to continue to dominate the West Bank and deny the Palestinians true national citizenship and sovereignty lead to a resumption of sustained terrorism, this time with the tacit acquiescence or open support of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and with the general support of the Palestinian population. Israel reacts with economic and military retaliation that creates widespread desperation among the Palestinians, and this results in the eclipse of Arafat by Hamas

and other Palestinian extremists

bombs. Israel responds with unprecedented repression,

bombs. Israel responds with unprecedented repression, Here is the nightmare scenario: The intransigence of the

Here is the nightmare scenario: The intransigence of the Netanyahu government and its

The intransigence of the Netanyahu government and its . The intifada resumes, this time not with

. The intifada resumes, this time not with stones but with guns and

and the cycle of communal violence and

counterviolence continues to escalate

until Israel decides to reoccupy the West Bank and perhaps

Gaza in order to crush the Palestinian movement - maybe even expelling large numbers of

Palestinians into neighboring Arab states.

An inflamed Arab world greatly increases its support of

 

the new intifada or, worse, moderate governments that try to stand clear are overthrown and

 

replaced by extremists

in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In these circumstances,

even if a general

 

war in

 

the Middle East

could somehow be averted, there is likely to be escalating international terrorism

 

against Israel and its supporters - sooner or later including nuclear or other forms of mass terrorism.

GDI 2004

3

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

1NC Shell without Peace Process

Why on earth you wouldn’t want the peace process advantage, I don’t know

Observation 1: Text- The European Union will <do plan>

Observation 2: Competition- The CP Competes via the net benefits of politics, and better solvency.

Observation 3: Solvency

The EU is a uniquely better actor than the US in that it understands the more basic requirements of peacekeeping

Schake, 2002 (Kori, senior research professor at the National Defense University, “Post-9/11 U.S. Perceptions on ESDP,” http://csis.org/europe/priv/esdp.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) When gauged against the lack of any tangible progress during the three years since NATO’s 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 areas for European improvement, the U.S. reluctance to use European militaries appears understandable. However crucial they may be, such capabilities have been lacking on the European side for the better part of the last 50 years. Moreover, even as DCI remains a necessary objective, it is not sufficient for addressing the growing strategy gap. (Making capabilities the key issue at NATO’s Prague summit next November, as some have suggested, would also not solve the lingering transatlantic tensions in the strategic and military areas.) A Europe that tends to think about war in terms of its implications for the ensuing peace will not only continue to dwarf a rising U.S. military colossus but will also insist on thinking differently about the world at large. To some extent, the U.S. fascination with technology tends to ignore some larger strategic questions. “Fighting and winning the nation’s war” is certainly a very compelling motto, but absent serious thinking about how to fight and win the peace, the U.S. approach to addressing the security threats of the future remains incomplete. A comprehensive strategy cannot exclude, for example, ways of addressing low-intensity conflicts—that is, precisely what ESDP is best equipped to confront. Dismissing more traditional civilian assets in favor of overwhelming military capabilities risks encouraging a truncated strategy that does not effectively tackle the numerous security challenges of our era.

GDI 2004

4

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Independent EU action is critical to ensure solvency LaFranchi 2004 (Howard, Staff Writer for the CSM, Christian Science Monitor April

26 th 2004, lexis)

The immediate result is a blow to Mideast reforms, both because would-be promoters from outside are discredited, and because internal reforms, increasingly associated with the West, are suspect. "Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace, having so fully identified with the Sharon position," says Edward Walker, a former State Department official and now president of the Middle East Institute. "Countries in the region will be hard-pressed to cooperate with the administration on questions like reform, Iraq, and even terrorism as their populations react to their perception of this one-sided US position." At the same time, pro-

modernization Arabs are telling American contacts that

domestic reform efforts are being hurt by an

association with pressures from the US for change. Recent events have also cooled European

 

enthusiasm for working with the US on Mideast reform - just as the US is acknowledging it needs

 

more partners in Iraq and in the broader region.

Even Bush's stalwart ally, British Prime Minister

 

Tony Blair, has expressed frustration at the US drawing closer to Israel, while

Europeans worry that

the poor US image in the region could tarnish the work the EU has done in encouraging

Arab

reforms. "The Europeans will have greater difficulty working with the Americans as they did before,

when they all wanted the Americans in the driver's seat because that was the way progress in the

 
 

region has been made," says the European official in Washington. "The problem is they [the

 

Americans] just drove off in a certain direction, and we were not cautious enough."

GDI 2004

5

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

GDI 2004

6

Scholars

2NC Overview

European Union Counterplan

The counterplan solves 100% of the case and more- the Lafranchi 2004 evidence from the 1NC indicates the EU has unique credibility to deal with peacekeeping because they are perceieved as a neutral party. The US doesn’t have the soft power to establish lasting peace because

A. They are seen as only preserving their own strategic interests and, thus,

not the parties involved- the War on Iraq is a perfect example

and

B. The US has historically always taken sides in disputes which ultimately further exacerbates conflict in the future- for example, US unwavering support of Israel has destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of Arab nations

C. <insert specific solvency>

Next, only EU independent action can solve- as indicated by the LaFranci evidence. The US and the EU acting together will tarnish the reputation of EU efforts in the region, destroying hopes of credible peacekeeping. This turns case and any permutation because the opportunity cost of US action in the region would be the preclusion of credible EU peacekeeping- destroying the chances for long term peace.

And, the impact is to the internal net benefit is nuclear war- a tarnished EU reputation would destroy their efforts to bolster the Arab-Israeli peace process. This would create instability throughout the Middle East, ensuring an Arab attack on Israel- the Slater ’99 evidence indicates that if war would break out the world would witness an apocalyptic nuclear war.

GDI 2004

7

Scholars

***Solvency

European Union Counterplan

GDI 2004

8

Scholars

EU Solves Sudan

European Union Counterplan

The EU is ready and willing to start Peacekeeping in Sudan, and it is Key to the EU’s security force legitimacy

Financial Times, April 12 2004 (EU-led Forces 'Could Intervene' in Sudan Conflict, Judy Dempsey;

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0412eu.htm)

The European Union's top military official says EU-led

The European Union's top military official says EU-led forces could intervene in Sudan, where more

than 670,000 people have fled the western region of Dafur following weeks of killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. Although the Sudanese government and two rebel groups from western

Dafur are negotiating a ceasefire, Kofi

Annan, United Nations secretary-general, has said the

 

The surprise comments

by Gustav Hägglund, who ends his three-year stint as the first chairman of

international community "must be prepared to take swift action, which may include military action."

the EU's military committee this month,

defence capabilities.

coincide with fresh efforts by Brussels to strengthen its

In an interview with the Financial Times, General Hägglund said the possibility

of the EU sending a force to Sudan had been raised by Louise Fréchette, the United Nations deputy secretary-general. "Sudan is on the list of the UN [for some form of peacekeeping mission]," Gen Hägglund added. The 65-year-old Finnish general was appointed Europe's top military chief three years ago, when the EU had a fledgling military staff, no idea which military missions it would undertake and persistent ambiguities between Britain and France over the future role of European

defence.

   

Since then, the EU has taken over a small Nato-led mission in Macedonia, quickly

 

deployed a 1,500-strong military force to Bunia,

Democratic Republic of Congo, last summer

 

EU's first military mission outside Europe. "

There is no reason why the EU could not go to, for

instance, Sudan. I see it to be very possible. It would be mandated by the UN. It is part of the

 
and
and

will take over this year from Nato the large mission in Bosnia. The Congo mission last year was the

battlegroup concept," said Gen Hägglund. Britain and France are spearheading ambitious defence

plans for the EU through their "battlegroups".

The idea is that the EU should be able to deploy

 

within days up to 1,500 highly trained troops, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping to combat

missions operating under a UN mandate.

Gen Hägglund said

the battlegroups could allow the EU

 

"to take on more and be able to sustain itself". The authors, who have met with key players in

 

Sudan's peace process, including government officials and rebels, say deployment of an international quick response and peacekeeping force under authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter — which mandates intervention only in the event of a threat to peace that includes massive loss of life — is a crucial element to avoid a reversion to war. Stephen Morrison, director of CSIS's Africa Program, said the most worrying threats to security in post-conflict Sudan are transfer of power, militia groups not included in a power-sharing government, unstable hotspots around the country and spillovers of rebel groups from other countries. He added that a quick reaction force would include air support that could get around the country rapidly to any pockets of conflict. The report suggests a force of about 600 soldiers. On Sunday, however, Sudanese State Foreign Minister Najeeb al-Khair Abdel Wahab rejected the idea of international peacekeepers, telling Agence France-Presse, "The government prefers that the responsibility for keeping the peace shall be confined to the Sudanese." Last month, Abdel Wahab said, "We consider peacekeeping as mainly a Sudanese responsibility while the role of the international community, including the European Union, will be backing up the Sudanese capability in keeping peace."

GDI 2004

9

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Can Solve The Conflict in the Darfur Region

European Commission , EC04-143EN, 10/6/2004, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3566

Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid Poul Nielson said: “Resolving conflicts in Africa and bringing peace to the continent will first of all require effective and responsible leadership by the Africans. The African Union has shown just that in its response to the Darfur

crisis.

This is greatly encouraging and raises prospects not only of a lasting end to the conflict in

 

Darfur but for peace across the African continent. I also take great satisfaction in the swiftness[1]

 

with

which the EU has dealt with the African Union request. The Peace Facility is a new instrument

that could become an important tool in the construction of the new peace and security agenda in

 

Africa.

 

Member States have today shown that they are willing to allow this new instrument to play

just that role and

that the EU will be a credible partner in the African Unions aspiration’s

 

to assume

the necessary leadership of this peace and security agenda.” The EU will provide 12 million in

 
 

support of the African Union observer mission to Darfur for a period of 12 months. The observer

mission will comprise up to 120 observers and a possible protection force of 270 military personnel. The observers will support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed by the parties to the Darfur conflict in Addis Ababa on 28 May 2004. In particular the Mission is expected to: (i) ensure that the rules and provisions of the ceasefire are implemented; (ii) define routes for the movement of forces to reduce the risks of incidents; (iii) assess requirements for de-mining operations; and (iv) receive, verify and judge complaints related to possible violations of the ceasefire. The observer mission is currently being deployed in Sudan. A successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement is a precondition if vital humanitarian aid is to reach the millions of Sudanese that have been affected by the conflict.

Empirically, the EU can solve crisis in the Darfur region

Washington Times, June 10 th 2004 (http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040610-020334- 3820r.htm, EU gives $14.5 mln for Sudan peacekeeping)

Brussels, DC, Jun. 10 (UPI) --

The European Union said Thursday it will provide $14.5 million (12

 

million euros) to support peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan. The money will be

used by the

Africa Union

to monitor the implementation of the recent cease-fire agreement in Darfur over a 12-

 

month period.

An observer mission of 120 members

 

and a protection force of 270 military personnel

is expected. "Resolving conflicts in Africa and bringing peace to the continent will first of

is expected. "Resolving conflicts in Africa and bringing peace to the continent will first of all

 

require effective and responsible leadership by the Africans

member States (of the EU) have

 

today shown that they are willing to allow this new instrument to play just that role and that the EU

will be a credible partner in the African Unions aspiration's to assume the necessary leadership of

 
 

this peace and security agenda," said Poul Nielson, EU commissioner for development and

 

humanitarian aid.

GDI 2004

10

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The crisis in Sudan is a logical Stepping Stone for EU peacekeeping Forces

EU Observer, 2004 (http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=13&aid=15112 13.04.2004 By Andrew Beatty, EU could lead Sudan peacekeeping force, says top military official)

A

peacekeeping mission to Sudan could be on the cards, according to the outgoing chairman of the

 

EU's military committee

Gustav Hägglund. In an interview with the Financial Times, Mr Hägglund,

who is completing his three-year stint as the EU's top military chief, said that

he sees an EU

 

peacekeeping role in Sudan as "very possible". His comments raise the prospect of the European

 

Union undertaking its second peacekeeping mission outside Europe, and second on the African

 

continent. Last year a French-led EU force intervened in the north-eastern Congolese town of Bunia

to

quell an upsurge in violence.

Although limited in scope,

most see the intervention as a success

   

giving the EU the confidence and credibility to proceed.

Half a century of war EU and UN

 

diplomats have been considering the possibility of a similar military intervention in Sudan for some

time.

The UN and the international community are keen to stop the ‘war within the war’, which is

 

currently taking place in the western Sudanese region of Dafur.

GDI 2004

11

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU is ready and willing to start Peacekeeping in Sudan, and it is Key to the EU’s security force legitimacy

Financial Times, April 12 2004 (EU-led Forces 'Could Intervene' in Sudan Conflict, Judy Dempsey;

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0412eu.htm)

The European Union's top military official says EU-led

The European Union's top military official says EU-led forces could intervene in Sudan, where more

than 670,000 people have fled the western region of Dafur following weeks of killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. Although the Sudanese government and two rebel groups from western

Dafur are negotiating a ceasefire, Kofi

Annan, United Nations secretary-general, has said the

 

The surprise comments

by Gustav Hägglund, who ends his three-year stint as the first chairman of

international community "must be prepared to take swift action, which may include military action."

the EU's military committee this month,

defence capabilities.

coincide with fresh efforts by Brussels to strengthen its

In an interview with the Financial Times, General Hägglund said the possibility

of the EU sending a force to Sudan had been raised by Louise Fréchette, the United Nations deputy secretary-general. "Sudan is on the list of the UN [for some form of peacekeeping mission]," Gen Hägglund added. The 65-year-old Finnish general was appointed Europe's top military chief three years ago, when the EU had a fledgling military staff, no idea which military missions it would undertake and persistent ambiguities between Britain and France over the future role of European

defence.

   

Since then, the EU has taken over a small Nato-led mission in Macedonia, quickly

 

deployed a 1,500-strong military force to Bunia,

Democratic Republic of Congo, last summer

 

EU's first military mission outside Europe. "

There is no reason why the EU could not go to, for

instance, Sudan. I see it to be very possible. It would be mandated by the UN. It is part of the

 
and
and

will take over this year from Nato the large mission in Bosnia. The Congo mission last year was the

battlegroup concept," said Gen Hägglund. Britain and France are spearheading ambitious defence

plans for the EU through their "battlegroups".

The idea is that the EU should be able to deploy

 

within days up to 1,500 highly trained troops, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping to combat

missions operating under a UN mandate.

Gen Hägglund said

the battlegroups could allow the EU

 

"to take on more and be able to sustain itself". The authors, who have met with key players in

 

Sudan's peace process, including government officials and rebels, say deployment of an international quick response and peacekeeping force under authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter — which mandates intervention only in the event of a threat to peace that includes massive loss of life — is a crucial element to avoid a reversion to war. Stephen Morrison, director of CSIS's Africa Program, said the most worrying threats to security in post-conflict Sudan are transfer of power, militia groups not included in a power-sharing government, unstable hotspots around the country and spillovers of rebel groups from other countries. He added that a quick reaction force would include air support that could get around the country rapidly to any pockets of conflict. The report suggests a force of about 600 soldiers. On Sunday, however, Sudanese State Foreign Minister Najeeb al-Khair Abdel Wahab rejected the idea of international peacekeepers, telling Agence France-Presse, "The government prefers that the responsibility for keeping the peace shall be confined to the Sudanese." Last month, Abdel Wahab said, "We consider peacekeeping as mainly a Sudanese responsibility while the role of the international community, including the European Union, will be backing up the Sudanese capability in keeping peace."

GDI 2004

12

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Ivory Coast

.

EU Has resources to solve the Ivory Coast

European Commission, EC04-143EN, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3310, 19/3/2004

The European Commission has adopted a second emergency rehabilitation programme providing a

further 25 million to consolidate the current peace process in Ivory Coast.

The objective of this, the

second emergency package,

is to support the reunification of the country by restoring effective civil

administration across the territory, improving civilians’ security, and boosting the provision of

 

social services including health and education.

Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian

Aid Poul Nielson said: “I recently met with Prime Minister Diarra in Brussels. I was then encouraged by the news of the considerable progress that has been achieved in the Ivorian peace

process and encouraged Prime Minister Diarra to persevere and pursue the process.

With this

 

decision we are clearly demonstrating our intentions to fully support the Ivorians in their efforts to

promote reconciliation and create the basis for a renewed peaceful development of the

 
 

country.”Following the attempted coup of 19 September 2002, the Ivory Coast was thrown into a

major crisis which lasted for more than a year. The crisis caused an effective partition of the country in two zones (North and South). The resulting economic, social and political consequences were without precedent in the country’s history, with an estimated 3,000 deaths and over 900,000 people fleeing the combat zones. As a result, the level of people living in poverty has now reached 43 % and life expectancy has fallen dramatically from 55 years at the end of the 1980s to approximately 45 years today.

The EU is capable of peacekeeping in he Ivory Coast while the US has done nothing Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22 Feb 2004, Côte d'Ivoire: Disarmament to start

on 8 March - Prime Minister

http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/4ed2f4ba6ca3eb4b85256e430069c902?OpenDocument

 

The United States, which pays for 27 percent of the cost of all UN peacekeeping forces,

had been

the only permanent member of the Security Council to oppose the sending of blue helmets to Cote

d'Ivoire.

 

Annan has recommended that 1,400 West African peacekeeping troops already stationed in

Cote d'Ivoire should be incorporated into the UN force, but diplomats do not expect additional

troops to arrive until April, with full deployment unlikely until June.

The French government has

 

said that a 4,000-strong French peacekeeping force which has born the brunt of peacekeeping duties

in Cote d'Ivoire over the past year and a half,

would remain in the country, independent of UN

 

control, to provide a rapid reaction force that could act in support of the blue helmets if necessary.

The DDR programme, which was originally due to have started in August last year, has been

 

modelled on plans drawn up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and will be

implemented with financial support from

the World Bank and

European Union

 

GDI 2004

13

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU has an integral stake in the future of Cote d’Ivoire, and is able mediate and enforce Peacekeeping there

Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.© United Nations 2004 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html, from the first Report of the Secretary- General on Côte d'Ivoire, S/2003/374)

The peace Agreement provided for the establishment of a committee to follow up on the

implementation of the Agreement (the Follow-Up Committee).

The Committee

will be based in

Abidjan. It

is composed of representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS,

 
 

European Commission, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the Bretton Woods

 
 

institutions, the Group of Eight countries, the European Union, a military representative of the

 

troop-contributing countries and France. A meeting of the heads of State of concerned African

the
the

countries and France, which was held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, endorsed the Linas- Marcoussis Agreement. During that meeting, President Gbagbo, in consultation with other Ivorian parties, appointed the former Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, to head the new government of

national reconciliation.

In addition, during consultations conducted on the sidelines of the meeting,

an understanding was reached on an arrangement for the distribution of cabinet posts among the

 

Ivorian parties, under which the key portfolios of defence and the interior were allocated to the rebel

movements.

Both the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the conclusions adopted by the heads of

 

State in Paris on 26 January 2003 (S/2003/99, annex II) envisaged a United Nations role in the implementation of the Agreement, including participating in and chairing the Follow-Up

Committee. The Agreement stipulated that

would seek assistance from

ECOWAS,

the new Ivorian government of national reconciliation France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the

the new Ivorian government of national reconciliation

the new Ivorian government of national reconciliation France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the reform
France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the reform
France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the reform

France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the reform

and restructuring of the defence and security forces; international development partners are requested to cooperate with the new government in putting in place a programme for the reintegration of all armed elements. In their communiqué, the heads of State proposed the strengthening of the presence of the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and human rights, as well as the deployment of civilian and military observers, who would help to supervise the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis

Agreement.

They also expressed the wish that the Security Council would endorse the peacekeeping

 

operation launched by ECOWAS and France, and authorize that operation to take the necessary

 

measures to ensure the freedom of movement and security of its personnel, and to guarantee the

protection of civilians facing the imminent threat of violence.

 

GDI 2004

14

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Liberia

The EU is the largest Donor to Liberia, and is invaluable to their peace process European Commission of Development 21 January, 2004 Liberia Country Overview

http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=lr&lng=en&status=new

The European Union is the largest international aid donor in Liberia.

The European Commission

appointed a Permanent Advisor for Liberia in December 1998, which meant the formal re-opening of the Commission office in Monrovia. This is the only diplomatic representation of the European Union in the country. Political situation Liberia is severely affected by the protracted internal conflict that erupted in the late eighties. Charles Taylor came to power by force in 1990 and was elected President in 1997. Rebel groups have been fighting to overthrow Taylor between 1990 and 1997 and again from 1999. Respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights has been minimal on all sides. There have been reports of resources plundering (diamonds, timber), endemic

corruption and ethnic problems

. Following the rebels’ advance in 2003 and under pressure from the

international community the Government of Liberia agreed to come to the negotiation table. Peace

 

talks held under the auspices of ECOWAS and financed by the European Union have been under

 

way since 4 June 2003.

In the framework of these peace talks a cease-fire agreement was signed

between the belligerent parties on 17 June 2003.

Mandated by UN Security Council

n° 1497 of 1

August 2003,

ECOWAS started with the deployment of a peacekeeping force on 4 August to help

enforce the cease-fire.

 

Under pressure from the international community and in accordance with the

agreements reached in Accra, Charles Taylor stepped down as President and handed over power to

Vice-President Moses Blah on 11 August.

The peace talks are still ongoing in order to draw up a

comprehensive peace agreement that should include the creation of a transitional government.

 

The European Union has Just as much at stake in Liberia as the US

China Daily July 9, 2004 UN meeting seeks $488 million to rebuild Liberia,

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/06/content_303919.htm

Andrew Natsios, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, said Liberia's years of turmoil had killed as many as 250,000 people, most of them civilians, but had touched all its 3 million people "in profound ways." "More than 1.3 million are displaced or refugees. Abductions, tortures, rape and other human rights atrocities have taken place on a massive scale," he said. An estimated one in 10 children may have been recruited by militias as fighters and a similar percentage "has been traumatized by seeing their families and friends murdered or raped," Natsios

said.

Washington has already earmarked $200 million in new money for Liberia, and the European

 

Union and its 15 member-nations are expected to nearly match that figure, U.N. officials said.

One

major challenge on the agenda is how to rehabilitate the thousands of armed youth without education

or jobs who roam the countryside and neighboring nations, raping and looting.

 

GDI 2004

15

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Burundi

The EU is capable and willing to assist In Burundi peacekeeping

Statement to the Security Council of the United Nations by Ms Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union. Progress report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the Security Council mission to Central Africa (New York) February 17, 2004:

mission to Central Africa (New York) February 17, 2004: The European Union is greatly encouraged by

The European Union is greatly encouraged by recent progress in Burundi. Since we last had the

opportunity in this chamber to discuss the state of the peace process there, a significant milestone has passed with the convening of talks between President Domitien Ndayizeye and a delegation

from the National Liberation Forces, the FNL.

The European Union is pleased that these talks took

place in a constructive and cordial atmosphere. We also welcome the parties’ recognition of the

 

need to end violence in Burundi and their willingness to continue the dialogue.

The European Union

hopes the proposed follow-up meeting between President Ndayizeye and the FNL takes place at the earliest opportunity. The EU calls for the cessation of all hostilities in Burundi, and for the

conclusion of an agreement for the inclusion of the FNL in Burundian state institutions.

The

 

European Union remains willing to assist the parties in their quest for a peaceful solution and we

reconfirm our readiness to support Burundi in its reconstruction efforts, which remain severely

 

hampered by the ongoing violence in the absence of an all-inclusive peace agreement. Mr.

   

President,The European Union is committed to working closely with our African partners to strengthen African capacities in the area of conflict resolution and peace-keeping. In this regard the EU commends the African Union in its establishing the African Mission in Burundi, AMIB—the

first force of its kind in the history of the AU.

The European Union fully supports this initiative and

is contributing 25 million to AMIB. In addition, a number of the EU’s member states have also

 

made significant national contributions both in advance of and in response to the Secretary-

 
 

General’s recent appeal for support. Notwithstanding the success and importance of AMIB, the

 

European Union believes, as stated last November in this chamber, that the option of a UN operation in Burundi authorised by this Council will have to be considered in due course. In this regard, the EU welcomes the Secretary General’s sending of an assessment mission to Burundi later this month and we look forward to its reporting in due course.

The EU is one of the Key backing members for Burundi Peacekeeping

European Commission, EC03-310EN http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3068 December 4,

2003

The European Commission today welcomed approval by EU Member states of a 25 million grant

 

from the European Development Fund

to support current peacekeeping operations in Burundi

under

the authority of the African Union (AU).

The objective of the support is: (i) to offer urgent

 

assistance to the implementation of a fragile peace process that has recently shown signs of positive

development; and (ii) to promote a return to stability and national reconciliation to the benefit of the

 

Burundian people, who have suffered tremendously from 10 years of civil war. Poul Nielson,

 

Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid, said: “I see the instrumental role of leaders from South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique in brokering peace in Burundi as a confirmation of the determination with which African leaders are currently addressing conflict

resolution on their continent.

I believe that it is our firm obligation to lend our full support to these

efforts. While the Burundian peace process remains fragile, it is offering encouragement on the

 

prospects of a final peace settlement in Burundi. Not only to the benefit of the Burundian people but

as an important contribution to the stabilisation of the Great Lakes region that has suffered tremendously from decades of war and conflict.”

GDI 2004

16

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU is responsible for all status quo operations, meaning it is the logical actor for the plan

Human Rights Watch Transition in Burundi: Time to Deliver April 30, 2003

http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/burundi/burundi043003-bck.htm

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and regional leaders preside over a number of diplomatic initiatives to end the war, but the actual work of peace-keeping is to be handled by a mission of the African Union, a first for the newly-constituted organization (formerly the Organization of African Unity). Forty-three observers attached to the mission have arrived from Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Gabon and Togo and are deployed in several towns, although they are not

traveling to combat zones for security reasons.

in Bujumbura on April 27

soldiers that will include soldiers from Mozambique and Ethiopia.

More than one hundred South African troops arrived

of three thousand and five hundred

The mandate of the force is only

, part of a larger peacekeeping force

to monitor the cease-fire,

leaving it unlikely that its soldiers will even endeavor to protect civilians.

The
The

As yet, the force has no unit specially tasked with monitoring the human rights situation.

European Union recently pledged 1.23 million euros ($1,100,000) and Belgium promised another

 

million euros ($900,000)

 

to pay for the African mission. The United States will provide some

equipment and training.

The amounts pledged until now are far short of what will be needed to

 

deploy a force throughout Burundi. Quick to join in diplomacy to help end the war in Burundi,

international donors now need to provide the funds needed to help implement the accords on the

ground.

 

GDI 2004

17

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Ethiopia/Eritrea

The EU has negotiated between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the past successfully

Emira Woods, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) FPIF Commentary from Foreign Policy In Focus Eritrea/Ethiopia War Looms as Washington Watches January 21, 2004

http://www.grassrootsonline.org/gol_0204_eritrea.html

On December 12, 2000 , Eritrea and

Ethiopia signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Algiers

,

assisted by mediators from the

U.S. , the

European Union, and the Organization of African Unity.

 

Under its terms, a 25-kilometer-wide

Temporary Security Zone was established within Eritrea to be

 

patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces,

while an international Boundary Commission, whose

 

members were approved in advance by both sides, delimited the contested border. The UN force has been there ever since. The Boundary Commission issued its findings in April 2002, giving a little to each side but confirming that Badme was in Eritrea . Both parties initially accepted the outcome, though Ethiopia voiced objections over Badme, which had become the symbolic rationale for the war itself. As a result of this and other reasons (de-mining delays, among them), the actual demarcation never took place.

Because of the EU’s financial Contributions, it is in a unique place to negotiate between Ethiopia and Eritria

Africa News January 19, 2004 Monday Copyright 2004 AllAfrica, Inc. PanAfrica; Seek Peace And Prosperity - German Chancellor Schroeder Lexis search: Ethiopia w/40 EU w/40 peacekeeping

The EU has pledged -225 million

(about US $275)

to help peace initiatives on the continent, and

 

Germany has backed peacekeeping-training centres in Africa.

 

Earlier, Schroeder had praised

 

Ethiopia for its support in the fight against global terrorism and welcomed the country's contribution

 

towards resolving regional conflicts, noting in this context that Ethiopian peacekeepers had been

 

deployed in strife-ridden Liberia and in Burundi, currently emerging from a decade of civil war. During a private meeting, he and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi discussed the stalled three-year-old

peace process between Ethiopia and neighbouring Eritrea

. Fears have been growing that without a

 

breakthrough, tensions between the two countries could once again flare up into hostilities. Ethiopia

and Eritrea fought a bloody two-year border war that ended in a peace deal in December 2000.

 

Under the agreement an independent boundary commission was set up to resolve their border dispute and defuse the tensions between them. But Ethiopia is contesting elements of the commission's ruling, one of which placed Badme, the town where the war first flared up, in Eritrea, and another that Ethiopia hand over parts of Irob. Ethiopia says the ruling could serve to ignite renewed conflict, and has called for a "broad-based dialogue" with Eritrea, which, for its part, has rejected such talks until the physical demarcation of the border begins.

GDI 2004

18

Scholars

EU Solves Congo

European Union Counterplan

The EU has done Peacekeeping in the Congo with great success

Tom Kabs September 2003 http://iss.krakow.pl/Thomas%20Kabs.doc, EUROPEAN UNION’s “ CONGO” –MISSION, Lieutenant Colonel NATO School.

Of course

 

EU’s Congo mission was a small one, a timely limited one; but no doubt about that – it

 

was

 

a successful one. Solana said, that

the

French-led

force had

“….

given a positive boost to the

peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo….”.

 

European Union’s very first autonomous

military mission, the very first military mission without any NATO support was a political sign. I

 

think we have to see this mission as a far bigger test of European Union’s effort to develop a

 

military wing independent of NATO, but not in competition to NATO. Therefore it was the right

   

decision from several EU NATO countries to run this mission alone without NATO (US) influence and to remove “Berlin Plus” rules, which would allow special NATO countries certain control over

any EU-led peacekeeping in return for NATO planning and assets.

Anyway European Union is

 

becoming more and more active, showing more and more confidence to extend its peacekeeping

responsibilities. As you all know EU is sill running its peacekeeping mission in the Former

 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but using NATO capabilities, and is increasing its engagement in

the Balkans ( at the moment 80 % of the 25.000 NATO led forces in the Kosovo and of the 12.000

 

troops in Bosnia where the EU set up a civilian/policing mission last January).

Sooner or later

 

European Union may have another operations on its agenda, may be in Moldova (Trans Dnestr conflict) may be somewhere else.

The EU has done a significant amount of work in the DRC

Statement to the Security Council of the United Nations by Ms Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union. Progress report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the Security Council mission to Central Africa (New York) February 17, 2004:

In the DRC, the European Union is encouraged by the significant improvements achieved. These

include, inter alia, the improved security situation; the signs of national reunification, such as

 

increased transport links and improving commerce; the better relations between the DRC and its

neighbours; and the progress in Security Sector Reform.

The EU commends the Transitional

Government in its implementation of the Sun City and Pretoria agreements. Difficult decisions have been taken and the commitment of the parties is encouraging. Nevertheless, the situation remains fragile and the European Union urges President Kabila and his Government to continue their work and put in place the legislative framework and establish the national institutions required for the holding of free and transparent elections at all levels, the formation of restructured and integrated military and police forces, and for the implementation of a national DDR programme. Mr. President,

The European Union is committed to underpinning peace, security and democracy in the DRC.

 

Operation Artemis and the Union’s support for the Integrated Police Unit are clear demonstrations

of that commitment. The EU stands ready to support concrete initiatives for the rebuilding of a

 

stable Congolese State able to guarantee the safety of the Congolese people, national reconciliation

and stability in the region.

In this regard, the European Union commends the Secretary-General for

his initiative in calling last week a high-level meeting to consider a strategy for the international community’s support of the Security Sector Reform effort.

GDI 2004

19

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU has experience in the Congo, and troops on the ground

CNN June 4, 2003, EU backs force for Congo,

http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/04/congo.eu/

BRUSSELS, Belgium --

The European Union has agreed to send a 1,400-strong French-led

 

peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo in what will be the body's first military

operation in Africa.

The decision was made by EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels Wednesday,

and is expected to be formally ratified Thursday.

a cease-fire deal in the Bunia region in the northeast of the country, which has seen hundreds of

civilians killed in ethnic fighting during the past month.

Council's sanctioning of the French-led operation last Friday, but it does not have NATO logistical

The force, to be dubbed Artemis, hopes to secure

The decision follows the U.N. Security

support.

The joint operation is only the second the EU has embarked on. The first involved about

400 troops being sent to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia last March.

The EU plans to

establish a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force to handle future trouble spots.

Wednesday's decision

resolved thorny issues such as financing. France is to contribute 700 troops with the others possibly coming from Britain, Belgium, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland. Non-EU countries such as

South Africa, Brazil, Canada and Ethiopia could also take part, European diplomats said.

will hold a conference Tuesday in Paris for countries wanting to contribute troops.

likely to act as a "bridging force" between the departure of the 750 U.N. Uruguay soldiers and the

France

The troops are

arrival of the U.N. Bangladesh mission.

Diplomats said the

EU force would be well armed, backed

by mechanized units and would operate under robust rules of engagement to allow it to defend itself

and civilians. Its main tasks will be to secure Bunia and its airport and protect aid agencies and tens

of thousands of refugees around the city.

 

GDI 2004

20

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU is very effective in the Congo

United Nations 2004 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q10.htm, FAQ; How is the UN cooperating with other peace and security organizations?)

More recently, other peacekeeping partners have stepped in to assist UN peacekeeping at critical

 

moments to bridge gaps in deployment and strength and to further develop rapid response

 
 

capabilities. In July 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Operation Artemis,

a French-led

European Union force, stabilized the situation in Bunia, Ituri province, where civilians were being

 

targeted by warring factions. Authorized by the Security Council for 90 days, the force stanched the

violence, got weapons off the streets and saved thousands of civilians. It also prepared the way for

 

the Ituri Brigade, deployed by MONUC, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, before the

 

EU force withdrew. In October 2003, in Liberia and more recently in Côte d’Ivoire,ECOWAS

 

forces paved the way for the deployment of United Nations troops. In addition, regional brigades are being formed in Africa as part of the African Standby Force—an initiative of the African Union welcomed and supported by the United Nations.

Artemis proves that the EU is capable of peacekeeping around the globe and in the Congo

Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress

Additionally, from June to September 2003,

the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400

in the Congo that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers. The Congo mission was

 

requested by the United Nations and headed by France in a “lead nation” capacity. This mission

came as a surprise to many EU observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was

 

geographically farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was

 
 

conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The Congo operation was planned by French military

planners in national headquarters. Some NATO and U.S. officials were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether it wished to undertake the Congo operation. EU officials did consult with NATO about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its permission given that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets.34

GDI 2004

21

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Sierra Leone

The EU has the primary lead in the Sierra Leone, and is running and efficient cost effective operation

JOHNNIE CARSON PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Testimony to congress, JUNE 11, 1998

While ECOWAS has the leading diplomatic role

 

in Sierra Leone, the region cannot establish peace alone. The international community must be

prepared to help.

In this regard, the United Kingdom has offered to take the primary lead in

 

generating additional donor support, especially among European Union and Commonwealth

 

countries. A major issue is providing additional support for ECOMOG. ECOMOG has

and ECOMOG is the peacekeeping/security force

approximately 10,000 troops in Sierra Leone. It estimates another 6-8,000 peacekeepers are needed to have sufficient strength and territorial coverage to provide security and implement disarmament. At the May ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff meeting in Accra, several ECOWAS member-states pledged additional troops, conditioned on receiving donor support to deploy and sustain these

contingents.

We will be teaming with the British to garner other donor support for these potential

troop contributing countries. The British have also pledged £2 million to support ECOMOG. As in

Liberia, support for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone promises to be an efficient, cost-effective

 

peacekeeping operation.

 

While the US has turned its back on Sierra Leone, while the European nations have solved

By Norman Kempster and Marjorie Miller LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2000 http://www.ihwc.spb.ru/a_013/13_us.htm “U.S. Keeps Out of Sierra Leone”

WASHINGTON -

 

The administration of U.S. President Clinton on Monday rebuffed

UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan's plea for a "rapid reaction force" from the industrialized West to rescue

 
 

beleaguered UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, although Washington pledged air transport and other

logistical support to reinforce the UN troops.

Meanwhile, in Freetown, capital of the war-torn West

African country, British paratroopers began arriving to evacuate British and European Union

 

citizens. The United States, the United Nations and international relief organizations withdrew most

employees as the situation became increasingly dangerous.

 

GDI 2004

22

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Western Sahara

The EU pressure is critical to achieve lasting peace in the western Sahara Nizkor International Human Rights Team Derechos Human Rights Serpaj Europe

04 Jan 1999 http://www.zmag.org/Bulletins/psahara.htm

We do consider,

given the continuous functioning of the different restrictive appliances, that the

guarantee for a free referendum does also imply the withdrawal of the services and bodies of the

Moroccan State responsible for serious human rights violations in Western Sahara, particularly, the

Moroccan Army, the Territory Security Directorate (D.S.T.), the Judicial Police (P.J.), the Royal Gendarmerie and the Mobile Intervention Companies (C.M.I.). These bodies would have been

responsible for more than 90% of the detentions carried out in Western Sahara. 6)

We also consider

as reprehensible the passive attitude of the international community

and especially of Spain given its

historical responsibility toward the Saharawi People; we would like to underline that the only possible way for the achivement of peace and safety in Western Sahara consists of the prompt celebration of the Referendum on self-determination. From this point of view, Spain should actively promote such celebration; even if this former colonizing country takes into account the active opposition of Morocco -until the moment neither MINURSO counts with any Spanish component nor the Spanish government has shown any resolute interest in the sending of qualified observers to the area- respecting and supporting at all times the right of the Saharawi People to free determination 7) During his last visit to the region, between November 30, 1998 and December 2, 1998, the UN Secretary-General could confirm that the Polisario clearly accepts the Peace Plan - Secretary-General report S/1998/1160 of 11Dec98- , which signifies that the only obstacle preventing the Saharawi People from fully enjoy its right to self-determination, according to International Law, comes from the Kingdom of Morocco, who persists in blocking the efforts of the

International Community to arrive to a peaceful and lasting solution.

The signing organizations call

 

upon the Internationl Community, in particular the European Union, to direct the necessary

 

pressures towards the Kingdom of Morocco in order to decisively contribute to the fulfillment of the

accords.

 

GDI 2004

23

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves the Golan Heights

EU Has experience and credibility for mediating the Israeli-Syrian Tensions

Paul Taylor , http://www.metimes.com/2K/issue2000-14/reg/eus_turn_to.htm “EU's turn to break the Mideast deadlock?” 7 APRIL 2000 INTERNATIONAL EDITION

The European Union's

(EU)

Middle East envoy appealed on April 2 for urgent international efforts

to break the deadlock in Israeli-Syrian peacemaking, saying the next month would be crucial.

 

Miguel Angel Moratinos said

the 15-nation EU was in close contact with the United States, Israel

 

and Syria to try to facilitate a resumption of talks following the failure of the summit between US

President

Bill Clinton

 

and Syrian President Hafez Al Assad in Geneva. "We believe a dialogue

between the parties must be restored within this month. We will use all our diplomatic and political weight to try to convince the parties that the only way to solve the issue is through diplomatic

negotiation," he told Reuters in an interview. "

We still consider the number one priority is to make

the Syrian-Israeli track move ahead, and all efforts have to be concentrated in this direction for a

 

comprehensive peace. The next three or four weeks will be crucial," Moratinos said.

 

EU is the perfect choice for solving the Golan heights

Christian Action for Israel http://christianactionforisrael.org/un/idf-leb.html 2000 Annan's public commitment of UN cooperation boosts Barak's efforts to garner broad international support for the withdrawal. Prior to leaving for Switzerland, Levy met on Monday with the US and French ambassadors to Israel to discuss the options of a beefed-up UNIFIL or a whole new peacekeeping force under European Union command. Currently, UNIFIL is an ineffective force of 4,500 soldiers from nine UN member states (France, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Nepal and Poland), several of which want to withdraw their participation. It has budget shortages and has been used by Hizb'Allah as a shield against Israeli retaliatory strikes. A new force could possibly be controlled by the EU, with heavy French involvement, in accord with President Jacques Chirac's recent offer to increase France's role in new security arrangements in Lebanon. ICEJ NEWS has learned that French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin opposes Chirac's proposal to send troops, which prompted Jospin to describe Hizb'Allah as "terrorists" during a recent visit to Israel. A UNIFIL officer from Ireland today estimated the force would need an additional 2,500 personnel to successfully expand its presence into the security zone.

GDI 2004

24

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU should be the major mediator in the Golan to avoid US disentanglement, and possible high costs for the US.

Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. , Time for "Constructive Disengagement" from the Middle East February 7, 2000, http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-07-00.html

The dominant U.S. role in the talks between Israel and Syria creates the mistaken impression that

 

core American interests are at stake.

 

The United States may be asked to pledge more than $50

 

billion to cover the costs of Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, including the relocation of

the some 15,000 Israelis who have settled in the area since 1967. And there are indications that a

   

peace agreement between Jerusalem and Damascus may require a U.S. military presence on the Golan, perhaps as part of an international monitoring team. Most of the debate in Washington over U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations has focused on the potential costs to American taxpayers and the risks to U.S. soldiers that could result from new financial and military commitments by the Clinton administration. It will be difficult to sell to the American people the proposal that Israel, the largest beneficiary of U.S. military and economic aid, should be further compensated for agreeing to dismantle the settlements on the Golan that U.S. administrations have described for years as "illegal." And at a time when Congress and the public seem weary of U.S. military interventions overseas, especially in the Balkans, the Clinton administration may find little support for placing U.S. troops in yet another province of the former Ottoman Empire, where ethnic and religious rivalries are bound to entangle the United States. Yet even Americans who contend that new U.S. commitments to support a peace accord would not be cost-effective rarely question the underlying assumption that the United States should continue playing a dominant role in the Middle East. That Israel and Syria have decided that it is in their national interest to settle the dispute between them should not be used as an excuse to deepen U.S. military and diplomatic

involvement in the region.

Instead, Washington now has an opportunity to reassess its entire Middle

East policy and start a process of "constructive disengagement."

 

All three major factors that have

 

drawn the United States into the region since the 1950s --

 

the superpower rivalry, Western access to

oil resources and the security of Israel -- have changed beyond recognition.

 

The Soviet Union no

 

longer exists,

and Russia plays a marginal role in the Middle East.

The collapse of the oil cartel in

 

the 1980s, the transformation in the global energy markets and the political disunity in the Arab

 

world have made the notion of the "Arab oil weapon" a distant memory.

Finally, Israel, with its

advanced economic and technological infrastructure, including a nuclear capability, is the

 

undisputed military power in the region.

Those dramatic strategic changes suggest that the Arab-

 

Israeli peace process has been "de-internationalized." The region has lost its geostrategic importance, and that provides incentives for the local players, including Syria and Israel, to end their conflict. America's national interests are affected only marginally by the status of the negotiations. In contrast to 1956, 1967 and 1973, any Israeli-Arab crisis can now be "localized." It would not lead to a superpower confrontation, ignite an oil embargo against the United States or threaten the

existence of Israel.

If crises in the region have any wider impact, they affect the nearby countries of

the European Union far more than they do the United States. If Israel and Syria insist on the

 

presence of foreign troops to monitor their agreement, the EU, which is developing its own EU Corps for peacekeeping missions, not the United States, should be ready to provide that type of

 

assistance. Hence, while

 

the United States

should be ready to play the role of honest mediator in the

talks, it

should not provide pay-offs to the two sides, in the form of either financial aid or military

 

commitments. Nor should Washington try to encourage Syria to become more "democratic" in

 

exchange for American economic or military aid.

The only "reward" Syria should expect is peace

 

with Israel and normal diplomatic and trade relationships with the United States.

GDI 2004

25

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Kosovo

The EU has experience in Kosovo

European Commission, December 15, 2003 http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3113 On 15 December 2003, the EU launches a new police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM). “

EUPOL Proxima” will succeed the EU’s “Concordia” peacekeeping

 

military mission, which expires that same day. It is the second EU police mission following the

 

“EUPM” that was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15 January 2003. “Proxima”

 

demonstrates the EU’s continued commitment to the consolidation of stability and the rule of law in

 

the Balkans, within the objectives of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp). The

 

promotion of European standards of policing in FYROM is part of the EU’s wider strategy of supporting the process of reform, including institution building, administrative and judicial reforms and fight against organised crime and corruption, all of which are essential for the development of a

stable and democratic state. The

EU, the leading donor, will spend a total of 54 million during

2000 – 2004 to support reforms in these areas.

 

“Proxima” is the third EU’s European Security and

Defence Policy operation in the Balkans and the fourth globally when including the “ARTEMIS” peacekeeping military mission successfully carried out in Bunia (Congo) over the Summer of 2003 Proxima aims to help the FYROM authorities develop their police forces to the highest European and international standards through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting the management and operations of the police. In particular, it will focus on supporting the government’s efforts to fight organised crime and to uphold the rule of law in the whole territory, with emphasis on the former crisis areas. The total costs of the mission amount to 15 million for the first year, including set-up costs of 7.3 million, all funded through the Community budget. The EU’s Member States will contribute in kind through the secondment of staff. EU police officers will wear their national police uniforms and an EU badge. They will not be armed and local police will remain responsible for executive tasks.

The EU is already focusing its efforts on the Balkans—it’s only feasible that it could control peacekeeping in the region

Keohane, 2003 (Daniel, Research Fellow for Security & Defence Policy at the Centre for European Reform, “EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?” http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.html, accessed July 8, 2004) Since the birth of the EU’s defence policy, out of Franco-British parentage at St. Malo in 1998, the general assumption amongst many – especially British and American – defence analysts has been

that NATO would have ‘the right of first refusal’ over prospective missions, leaving the EU to pick- up NATO’s leftovers. As Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, put it in 2000: “The EU only envisages applying a military response to a crisis if the NATO alliance as a whole is not engaged…But if the US does not engage…someone else may need to, and it is better for our overall security if we can do so effectively.”[1] And most observers have expected the EU to depend on NATO assets – such as the expertise of its military planners – to run its missions. For example, EU peacekeepers in Macedonia depend on NATO’s help to conduct their operation there. EU military missions in the Balkans are possible because of the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement signed at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. This long-awaited EU-NATO agreement, which came after months of political wrangling, allows the EU to use NATO resources to overcome its own capability

shortfalls.

been on the Balkan region. The Bush administration has already indicated that it would probably pull its forces out of Bosnia sometime in 2004, leaving the way open for the EU to take over that mission. If the US – for its own strategic reasons – eventually pulled out of Kosovo as well, the EU would probably have to fill that vacuum, putting it in charge of all Balkan military missions. But should the EU act beyond the Balkans?

In addition, the overwhelming geographical focus of EU military efforts thus far has

GDI 2004

26

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU peacekeeping would provide effective peacekeeping in the Balkans in addition to a foundation for stability in Europe

Bereuter and Lis 2003 (Doug and John, Chairman of Subcomittee of foreign relations, Sr. policy advisor for transatlantic relations, TWQ winter, projectMUSE) The EU would do better to focus its efforts on creating its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops with complementary air and naval assets that could be rapidly deployed and sustained for one year for crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian operations. If the RRF becomes fully operational, the EU will be the logical institution to assume peacekeeping in the Balkans from NATO, as some EU countries have proposed. An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as the EU’s work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. In that fashion, the ESDP can be an important part of a comprehensive spectrum of capabilities for crisis management in Europe. An important step toward a peaceful Europe came in June 2003 when the European Council declared that the EU is open to membership by the countries of the western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. Ultimately, the incorporation of this region into the EU will assist its people in building peaceful, prosperous lives. Already, the EU in March 2003 assumed the NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, with generally good results to date. Although that mission is small, with less than 350 troops, this is a positive indication that the ESDP can play a role in crisis management in Europe. In the future, the EU should assume the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo, but we must be careful not to risk the stability that NATO has brought to the region during the past eight years by having the EU assume these missions before it is ready to meet their challenges.

GDI 2004

27

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Afghanistan

The EU is has been responsible for many of the improvements in Afghanistan

European Commission, 30/3/2004, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=1910&lg=5, EC03-

001EN

The European Union

(EU)

   

reconstruction of Afghanistan.

 

Member States,

the EU provided over 850 million

Afghanistan
Afghanistan

has been and continues to be

one of the major donors backing the

Taking together contributions from the Community Budget and

in 2002 and 835

million in assistance to

in 2003 to help in its reconstruction efforts. At the Tokyo donors' conference in 2002, the

European Commission (EC) played a leading part in this EU performance. The Commission promised 1 billion over 5 years. In both 2002 and 2003, the actual amount committed to Afghanistan has been higher, and assistance has been delivered swiftly. At the 31 March 1 April Berlin International Conference on Afghanistan,

Europe will again be a significant participant. This reconstruction support is only part of the story.

Europe is

also playing a lead role in providing troops for the International Security Assistance Force and the

growing number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams which aim to improve the security and

 

stability for Afghanistan

. Contributions from the Community Budget have outstripped the Tokyo pledge. In

Tokyo, the Commission effectively pledged 200 million per year for Afghanistan. In 2002, the Commission delivered over 280 million (including 72 million from ECHO). In 2003, the Commission delivered over 300 million (including extra 50 million to promote security by supporting police salaries and training, and 55 million from ECHO). In 2004, the EC expects to commit around 245 million for reconstruction and

humanitarian support.

The European Commission is delivering fast. In both 2002 and 2003, over 70

 

percent of funds were actually contracted within one year. This is an impressive performance for the

EC and indeed for any agency.

Delivery is accelerating. Between July 2003 and April 2004, the EC expects

to commit a total of 337 in development assistance alone. By August 2004, the EC expects that, at least 80

percent of this will be contracted.

un.org/article.asp?id=1910&lg=5, EC03-001EN Just under 100 million is being devoted to the strengthening of the government in Kabul, through reform of the public sector, capacity building within key government institutions, and continued financial support for the government's recurrent budget. This helps the Afghan

government deliver services, which are urgently required by the population.

European Commission, 30/3/2004, http://europa-eu-

The EC is channelling

over

30/3/2004, http://europa-eu- The EC is channelling over € 100 million to rural development to underpin the

100 million to rural development to underpin the rapid growth that will provide legitimate long term

employment for rural communities. Almost three-quarters of the Afghan population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In addition, 9 million will be targeted explicitly on providing alternative livelihoods in the

Eastern region for those who might otherwise depend on illicit poppy cultivation.

The EC is supplying 65

million to help the Afghan police impose law and order, another key component in Afghanistan's

 

fight against drugs. Lastly, Afghanistan must be better able to stop smugglers on its borders if the

drugs trade is to be controlled.

To this end, the EC is financing a project to strengthen border control on the

Afghan-Iran border so the authorities are better able to interdict and stop drug smugglers. Beyond drugs and security, Afghanistan faces the challenge of preparing for elections this year, a key milestone in the Bonn Process to stabilisation and democratisation. By early 2003, the European Union has financed 30 million for

voter registration, nearly half of the original budget for this exercise. Within this, the Commission contributed

15 million.

economy by helping to repair the roads network ( 90 million), boost public health ( 25 million) and remove

mines and unexploded ordinance.

programmes are making a real difference to Afghans' lives: Emergency

In addition the EC is making an important contribution to the regeneration of the national

Examples of EC Achievements

The Commission's assistance

work on the Kabul-Jalalabad road

Health

assistance work on the Kabul-Jalalabad road Health has already cut travel times by up to half.

has already cut travel times by up to half. Work to fully reconstruct the road is now underway;

services are being delivered in six provinces, covering 20 percent of the population;

Key public sector workers

including doctors, teachers and nurses and the police are back at work;

A kick-start for the rural economy

by providing 57,000 metric tons of improved seed, vaccinating 200,000 animals and rehabilitating

 

633 irrigation structures.

This contributed to the remarkable economic take-off of the rural economy in 2003;

The creation of 1.4 million days of employment - in 2002 alone - to promote rural livelihoods;

The

 

clearance of 8 million square metres from land mines, allowing families to return to their homes to

 

restart their lives

;

The rehabilitation of the women's park in Kabul, plus hammans across many urban centres.

For the first time women can gather together in public without being accompanied by male family members

GDI 2004

28

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Cyprus

EU action is crtiical to preserving stability countries in the Mediterranean because they have inextricable economic, military and political ties

Dillery 2004 (Edward, retired foreign service officer, Mediterranean Quart. V15 n2 spring, projectMUSE) Europe and the twelve countries of the littoral are inextricably tied to each other by economic, humanitarian, and security interests. The partnership has been notable in that it includes countries that normally do not have relations with each other—for example, Israel and the Arab nations, the parties on Cyprus, and Greece and Turkey. Remarkably, it has been possible to assemble all the participants at several meetings. Economic relations are important. North Africa’s natural gas is vital to the economy of the EU, and the trade of each “party” is heavily oriented toward the other. Europe needs a stable Mediterranean in order to further this relationship, as do the countries of the littoral. Biscop points out the mechanisms the EU established to pursue the relationship, one of which is the European Security and Defense Policy, the purpose of which is to create an EU military capability.

The EU is vital to achieving peace over Cyprus

Dillery 2004 (Edward, retired foreign service officer, Mediterranean Quart. V15 n2 spring, projectMUSE)

The second recommendation is that the EU should “assume responsibility and should actively work

towards a settlement between Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities,” using as the

 

principal tool the accession process. He feels that a breakthrough might have been achieved in these

issues if the EU had been more active and sees progress here as a vital step in achieving real

 

partnership.

 

GDI 2004

29

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Kashmir

The EU is the only actor capable of resolving the Kashmir dispute- the US’s historical partiality to Pakistan destroys their ability to resolve the dispute credibly The Independent 8-12-1999

But it may yet be worth a try. In both countries nationalists are in the ascendant, and India's belligerence this week may not be unconnected with this autumn's election. Afterwards, however, Delhi might just be ready to listen to an outsider. And who might that be? Obviously not Britain, the former colonial power. Nor Russia, traditionally a friend of India. The US, historically sympathetic to Pakistan but now mending its ties with Delhi, is one candidate. But another is the European Union, an important economic partner of both countries, but one which carries little historical baggage in the subcontinent. The chances of success are slim - but, equally, there is little to lose. And if the EU is serious about raising its foreign affairs profile, the face-off between India and Pakistan is as good a place to start as any.

More EU involvement in the Kashmir dispute is key to a lasting settlement- US policies are too piecemeal to have any lasting effect International Crisis Group 2004 (June 24 th , Asia Report, online:

http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2825, accessed: 7-10-04) Everything from governance to education and healthcare needs funding and inventive policymaking. Almost all the burden of ending confli also required. Direct mediation or a major UN role have been rejected by New Delhi but the Indian government should recognise that some post-conflict assistance would be useful. The U.S. has played a key role in defusing conflicts but needs to develop a longer-term policy perspective to prevent crises from blowing up. The European Union (EU) should make South Asia a greater priority and be more willing to take an active part there by promoting economic and social integration ct in South Asia lies with the Indian and Pakistani governments but supportive, sustained and sensitive international assistance is and doing more to promote democracy in Pakistan.

The EU’s economic ties with both India and Pakistan give the EU valuable political clout for mediating disputes between the two countries International Crisis Group 2004 (June 24 th , Asia Report, online:

http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2825, accessed: 7-10-04) Both India and Pakistan are keen to improve their relations with the EU, a major trading partner and investor for both. Indian trade with the Union is as great as it is with the U.S. and is expected to grow significantly. In Pakistan, too, trade ties with and economic assistance from Europe could translate into leverage for the EU. Yet Brussels is hesitant to exercise its potential influence. The EU has traditionally been reluctant to get closely involved in the Pakistan-India conflict, which is seen as too far away, low on its list of priorities and difficult. There should be greater recognition of the real urgency and dangers of the situation. 1

GDI 2004

30

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Demining

The EU has an Active and Effective Demining program

Russell Gasser, Project Officer, Humanitarian Demining RTD Landmines in Africa issue 6, August 2002 http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.2/features/russellgasser/russellgasser.htm

Legislative policy on landmines is determined by the European Council

and European Parliament,

which have strongly supported the

Ottawa Process and

the elimination of all

AP

landmines within

ten years of ratification of the treaty; this includes the political decision to fund mine action. The EU

Research and Technological Development (RTD) for Humanitarian Demining (HD) is administered

by the European Commission (EC). In 2000,

the European Union (EU) contributed $125 million to

the fight against AP landmines through both member states’ donations and funding administered

 

through the EC

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mine/publication/index.htm).In July

 

2001,

the Council

and the European Parliament

adopted two Regulations on the Reinforcement of

the EU response against AP l

 

andmines

: the first

one covering developing countries and the second

 

one covering other countries;

the regulations lay the foundations for a European integrated and

 

focused policy. The majority of the RTD spending was delivered in support of the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme administered through the Directorate General Information Society (DG-INFSO) (http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka1/environment/projects/clustering.htm#cluster3).

Other Directorates General also played important roles in humanitarian mine action RTD, notably

Other Directorates General also played important roles in humanitarian mine action RTD, notably

the Joint Research Centre. The EU contribution to research and development (R&D), through the

mine action RTD, notably the Joint Research Centre. The EU contribution to research and development (R&D),

IST programme, is generally in the form of a maximum of 50 percent matching funds for

developing demining technologies

. The remainder of the funding comes from participating

 

industrial partners. The programme is therefore oriented towards the development of prototypes,

 

which can be turned into commercially successful outcomes so that the participating businesses can

recover their R&D costs from future sales of demining equipment, or other equipment in the case of

 

dual-use technologies.

This is a very different R&D environment from many military programmes

 

which are 100 percent funded and thus do not have the same commercial drive and commercial

 

constraints.

The EC is also seeking results in the short to mid term in order to aid compliance with

 

the goal of APL clearance by 2010. Academic partners and Support Measures aimed at providing a service to demining RTD can be funded at up to 100 percent of additional costs.

GDI 2004

31

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Middle East

EU’s aide in the Israel-Palestine disputes prove their credibility in the Middle East

Bereuter and Lis 2003 (Doug and John, Chairman of Subcomittee of foreign relations, Sr. policy advisor for transatlantic relations, TWQ winter, projectMUSE)

 

In the field of foreign policy, the EU is a participant along with the United States, the UN, and Russia in

the Quartet, working

to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is an excellent example of the EU

 

using its Common Foreign and Security Policy to play a constructiverole in resolving a conflict outside

of Europe that creates great instability in the Middle East as well as the broader Islamic world and that

 
 

threatens the security of Europe and North America. The June 2003 visit to the House by Javier Solana,

the EU high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to discuss the road map for Middle East peace was marked by a lively debate with members of Congress who questioned aspects of EU policy, including the damaging effect of the EU foreign ministers meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which undermined the authority of then-Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and the EU’s

reluctance to brand the civilian wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless,

few in

 

Congress fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of the EU’s role in the Middle East peace process.

disturbed by the EU’s extreme trade distorting policies.

 

EU mediation is critical to bolstering Israeli peace talks- the US has no credibility because of their unwavering support of Israel Jerusalem Post 7-30-1998

Fatah officials called on the Palestinian Authority yesterday to withdraw from negotiations with Israel due to a lack of progress in the talks. The talks were expected to resume again today after a day's recess. Saeb Erekat, the PA Minister of Local Authorities, said that little progress has been achieved at the talks. Marwan Barghouti, the Secretary General of Fatah in the West Bank, told The Jerusalem Post that the negotiations have reached a deadlock. He urged the PA to declare that the talks have failed because of Israeli intransigence and that there is a real crisis. "Without the feeling of a real crisis in the negotiations, the world will not move to rescue the peace process," said Barghouti. He has called on the EU and the UN to become involved in the process, saying the US "has no credibility" and is biased in favor of Israel. who's asked EU, and UN to join in the peace process efficiency.

GDI 2004

32

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Has Credible Force

The EU has taken on commitments before, and has a 60,000 strong peacekeeping force ready.

European Commission, 4/6/2003 (Ref: EC03-142EN, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2390)

The European Union approved its first peacekeeping mission outside Europe and without help from

NATO, deciding Wednesday to send troops to strife-torn Congo

in response to a U.N. plea. EU

ambassadors meeting in Brussels OK’d the deployment after clearing up logistical questions, including how it will be financed, EU diplomats said on condition of anonymity. The operation will be dubbed Artemis after the Greek goddess of hunting. EU ministers will formally ratify the

decision Thursday.

decision Thursday. The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last
The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last

The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last

decision Thursday. The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last
decision Thursday. The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last

Friday - would be only the second mission undertaken by the EU. The bloc took over peacekeeping

duties in Macedonia last March with about 400 troops, but received planning and logistical support from NATO, which includes the United States. A mission to northeast Congo, where tribal fighting over the past month has killed more than 500 people, would be a far bigger test of the EU's effort to develop a military wing independent of NATO to beef up its foreign policy ambitions. It also would involve considerably more risk than anything tried so far. "The situation is anything but safe or stable at the moment," EU spokesman Diego de Ojeda said. France, which has extensive experience intervening in African trouble spots, will supply the commander of the Congo force and about 700 troops. Britain, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland may also participate along with non-EU nations such as South Africa, Brazil, Canada and Ethiopia, European diplomats say. The vanguard of the force is expected in the city of Bunia this weekend. France will hold a conference next Tuesday in Paris for countries that want to contribute troops. The final order to deploy and an operational plan should be approved by the next day, diplomats said, adding that both were considered formalities. The force will take over from about 750 beleaguered U.N. peacekeepers from Uruguay until Sept. 1, when a

larger U.N. force led by Bangladesh is due to be in place.

The EU began four years ago to put

 

together a pool of 60,000 troops available at short notice for peacekeeping, humanitarian operations

and regional crises. Defense ministers declared the rapid-reaction force ready last month, although

   

hardware gaps remain.Diplomats

said the EU force would be well armed, backed by mechanized

 

units and would operate under robust rules of engagement to allow it to defend itself and civilians.

 

Its main tasks will be to secure Bunia and its airport and protect aid agencies and tens of thousands

 

of refugees around the city.

 

The EE has 5000 civilian police ready

Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress

At its December 1999 Helsinki summit,

the EU announced its “determination to develop an

 

autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and

 

conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” At Helsinki,

 

the EU decided

to establish an institutional decision-making framework for ESDP and a 60,000-strong rapid

 

reaction force to be fully operational by 2003.

This force would be deployable within 60 days for at

least a year and capable of undertaking the full range of “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement), but it would not be a standing “EU army.” Rather, troops and assets at appropriate readiness levels would be identified from existing national forces for use by the EU. In addition, EU leaders at Helsinki welcomed efforts to restructure European defense industries, which they viewed as key to ensuring a European

industrial and technological base strong enough to support ESDP military requirements.

The EU

 

has also sought to bolster its civilian capacities for crisis management in the context of ESDP. In

June 2000, the EU decided to establish a 5,000-strong civilian police force, and in June 2001, the

EU set targets for developing deployable teams of experts in the rule of law, civilian administration,

and civilian protection.

 

GDI 2004

33

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU has a credible 60,000-strong rapid reaction force capable of peacekeeping Financial Times 12/16/2002

EU leaders agreed three years ago to establish a 60,000-strong rapid-reaction force by mid-2003, capable of deployment within 60 days, of remaining on the ground for up to a year, and of carrying out tasks including humanitarian missions and armed peacekeeping. Diplomats said this plan, known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) gained a big political and psychological boost with weekend's accord, to be signed in Brussels today by Nato and the EU's political and security committee. "ESDP may finally have some credibility," said a senior EU diplomat. Launched in 1999 at the Helsinki summit, ESDP was set up to complement the EU's economic and political powers. It was also a response to the 1999 Kosovo war, which exposed the EU's lack of defence instruments. The military dimension of ESDP was stalled from the beginning because of Turkish and Greek haggling over the terms of Berlin Plus. The EU's first police mission will start on January 1 in Bosnia, when more than 500 officers, wearing their national uniforms but with an EU insignia, will take over the operation today led by the United Nations.

GDI 2004

34

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

The EU has already shown they have credibly hard power in East Timor, Africa and Afganistan The Economist 11/23/2002

A little modest muscle-flexing is already going on. European soldiers have increasingly been showing up in places far from home, from Africa to East Timor. In Afghanistan, despite the misgivings of certain politicians that this was a bit far "out of area", some European governments have contributed specialist forces and equipment to the overthrow of the Taliban and the hunt for al-Qaeda operatives; others have lent troops to the peacekeeping force in Kabul, and much more. In a sign of the expeditionary times, Germany has requested NATO assistance when it takes joint command, with the Netherlands, of the international security force in Kabul in February. Europeans have also taken on heavier duties in other places, both in the Balkans and, in the months after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, in defence of American airspace, to free American troops and equipment for the war on terrorism. European intelligence services and police forces have helped track down al-Qaeda cells around the globe.

GDI 2004

35

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Terrorism

Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress

Following September 11, 2001,

 

the EU struggled with whether to expand ESDP’s purview to

 

include combating external terrorist threats or other new challenges, such as countering the

 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In June 2002,

 

EU leaders agreed that the Union should

 

develop counter-terrorism force requirements, but stopped short of expanding the Petersberg tasks.

Increasingly, however, EU member states appear to recognize that ESDP must have a role in

 

addressing new challenges in order to remain relevant and to bolster the EU’s new, broader security

strategy developed by the EU’s top foreign policy official,

Javier Solana. The description of the

Petersberg tasks in the text of the draft constitutional treaty states that “all

of these tasks may

 

contribute to the fight against terrorism;” many analysts assert that once the draft treaty is finalized,

this language would effectively expand the Petersberg tasks to include combating terrorism. In the

 

wake of the March 11, 2004 terrorist bombings in Spain, EU leaders

on March 25-26, 2004

 

announced a new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism;” among other measures, it calls for “work

to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of ESDP to the fight against terrorism.”38

 

GDI 2004

36

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Peacekeeping

The US is unequipped for Peacekeeping, and thus is reliant on the EU for those tasks

Sherle R. Schwenninger, former Editor, World Policy Journal, Senior Fellowm World Policy Institute Co-director, Global Economic Policy Program at the New America Foundation, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2003, p. http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/schwenninger.html.

(DRG/E84)

But even in this case,

Europe may have more influence and leverage over the United States than has

been commonly recognized.

Even though Washington is trying

to build a flexible military structure

 

that is less dependent on its allies,

the United States still relies on European bases and infrastructure

for non-NATO missions, and it still needs

a measure of

European support and participation to gain

 

domestic support for those missions. Beyond this,

 

Washington depends upon European Union

 

members for peacekeeping and nation-building tasks, not just in the Balkans but in Afghanistan and

 

most likely soon in Iraq, and it benefits from European assistance for other U.S. security-related concerns, such as support for the Palestinian Authority. This is not to mention the importance of

 

Europe’s active cooperation in stopping international terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation.

 

EU POSSESSES MANY CAPABILITIES FOR SUPPORTING UN PKOS

Jakob Kellenberger, President International Committee of the Red Cross, Peace Support Operations:

lessons learned and future perspectives, eds. Spillmann, Bernauer & Gabriel, 2001, p. 177

(HARVUN2256)

The emerging EU military and police capabilities open many new possibilities for cooperation and

coordination with the UN on crisis management. As ESDP gradually develops, the density of EU’s

relations with the United Nations in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management will

 

grow. The EU’s current work on its emerging ESDP instruments as well as on conflict prevention is

echoed in several ways in the UN’s own debate on how to improve conflict prevention and crisis

 
 

management performance. The EU has lessons to learn from the UN’s experience, especially as the

UN itself is about to draw lessons from this experience. The UN debate and, in particular, the follow up to the Brahimi Report is, therefore, of direct relevance to EU’s future instruments.

The EU has an efficient Peacekeeping Force that has deployed in numerous theaters

Fraser Cameron is director of studies at the European Policy Centre in Brussels autumn 2003 NATO Review http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html

The Maastricht Treaty

also

The Maastricht Treaty also saw the birth of the European Union’s common foreign and

saw the birth of the European

The Maastricht Treaty also saw the birth of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy

Union’s common

foreign and security

birth of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Even though the CFSP could

policy (CFSP). Even though the CFSP could not have been launched at a worse time, with the wars

of Yugoslav dissolution exposing European weakness and divisions, gradually

the European Union

began to get its act together. It agreed the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, which covered

 

peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions.

It set up new institutions, notably the office of a

CFSP High Representative, currently Javier Solana, and a political and security committee (akin to

NATO’s North Atlantic Council) to provide direction.

Prompted by France and the United

 

Kingdom, the European Union also agreed to establish a rapid reaction force and tackle some of the

capability gaps that became apparent in the Kosovo crisis.

 

Most recently, and despite the divisions over Iraq, the European Union has started three

 

peacekeeping

missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*

 

and Congo. Others are

in the pipeline. There are thousands of European peacekeepers deployed in

the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Furthermore, the European Union has agreed policy

 

guidelines on weapons of mass destruction and proliferation and a new draft security policy doctrine

has been formulated by Solana.

 

GDI 2004

37

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU solves for Democracy/Hum Rights

The EU would provide the a foundation for human rights and democracy in addition to a neutral peacekeeping force The Guardian 11-21-2000

Long-standing plans to give the European Union a joint military capability took a big and welcome step forward in Brussels yesterday. Britain, rightly, is at the forefront of this effort. If the nations of Europe are to maximise their influence in a world they no longer control, they do better to speak with one voice. If shared European principles concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law are to be promoted, then it is logical for EU members to pool their resources in support of those objectives. If Britain, sidelined for example by the euro-zone countries, is to demonstrate that it can lead in Europe, defence is one area of enhanced cooperation where it has the potential to excel. But to work effectively, the EU's nascent common foreign and security policy needs teeth and clout. The 60,000-strong rapid reaction force, backed by significant naval and air assets, is intended to provide it. In the post-Cold War era, when military forces are becoming smaller, more professional, and ever more expensive, it makes sense to concentrate joint efforts and budgets on the new tasks of humanitarian assistance, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking. In theory, the days when France acts unilaterally (and ineffectually) in Rwanda (as in 1994), or Britain in Sierra Leone (as now), or when a pressing international crisis is largely left to others to resolve (as in East Timor last year), or when Europe intervenes late or not at all (as in Bosnia, Kurdistan, and Chechnya) may soon be passing - and not before time. In theory, if they existed now, EU battalions could form the neutral force currently proposed for the Occupied Territories.

GDI 2004

38

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

***EU Credibility

GDI 2004

39

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Peacekeeping Key EU Credibility

Soft power may not be enough to secure the EU’s prominence in world affairs—ESDP military projects can give the EU the credibility it needs

Haine, 2004 (Jean-Yves, Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, “The EU’s Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?” http://journal.georgetown.edu/Issues/ws04/hainelocked.pdf, accessed July 9, 2004)

EU’s Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?” http://journal.georgetown.edu/Issues/ws04/hainelocked.pdf, accessed July 9, 2004)

GDI 2004

40

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Peacekeeping is Key to EU security and credibility

Dan Smith, OBE, Senior Adviser, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Board Chair, Institute for War & Peace Reporting in London, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Spring 2002, p. 441. (DRG/E88)

While the United

   

States

takes a

somewhat distant

attitude about peacekeeping

the European Union cannot. There is nothing distant about peacekeeping

 
 

European

       

and peacebuilding,

for the
for the

and peacebuilding

Union: both are central components of EU security policy. Following the end of the Cold

War, two features of the new security landscape impressed themselves upon political opinion in Western Europe. The first was that the European Community had turned out to be an excellent security instrument. Along with NATO, it had succeeded in making war impossible between France and Germany, bitter foes whose three wars from 1870 to 1945 had dominated European politics.

From this it followed that enfolding Eastern Europe within the European Union was the most

as a whole;

the EU’s main means of security turned out to be the European Union itself.

 

durable means of ensuring European security. As in the case of peacebuilding, so in security policy

This insight

was given more influence in European strategic thinking by the second key feature of the new security landscape—the striking lack of an external threat. NATO’s planning had been predicated on external threat, even if the threat of an invasion by the USSR was already being downplayed in the 1970s. Strategic planning in the 1990s had to cope with the absence of any significant, direct, external threat. While it is possible that after September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorism may be given a new profile in EU governments’ security perspectives, the shift in thinking in the 1990s was

fundamental.

Instead of threats, security policy was shaped to face the problem of instability and

 

insecurity in neighboring regions. The means to deal with this were not defense and deterrence but

conflict management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

 

EU involvement in global peacekeeping establishes their credibility The Gazette March 23 rd 2003

"Every night we barricade ourselves at home. It feels worse than war." Today, her safety becomes the European Union's problem as the 15-nation bloc mounts its first military operation by taking over peacekeeping duties from NATO. Success could lend credibility to the vision of an independent European military force operating where NATO or the United States don't want to get involved. The EU eventually plans to form a 60,000- strong rapid reaction force.

The lack of a forceful political footing will devastate the EU’s role in global affairs

Richardson and Cox, 2004 (Keith and Robert, former Secretary General of the European Roundtable of Industrialists, and former Senior Advisor to the European Community’s Humanitarian Office, “Salvaging the Wreckage of Europe’s Constitution: Political Options for 2004,” http://www.friendsofeurope.org/pdfs/SalvagingtheWreckageofEuropesConstitution.pdf, accessed July 9,

2004)

What is at stake in the intergovernmental conference (IGC) is how the Institutions will work after 2009. The Nice Treaty failed to provide an adequate long-term solution for an enlarged Union to tackle new challenges effectively. Moreover, it did not simplify the way in which the EU works. The Treaty of Nice does not reinforce the Union's foreign policy. Neither does it provide adequate instruments to work better in justice and home affairs or to coordinate economic policies more effectively. The EU needs a stronger political foundation to become a forceful player in world affairs. Without such a political foundation, its economic achievements and its overall cohesion will be at risk. If the IGC manages to find an agreement in 2004 on an ambitious Constitutional treaty, the much needed innovations developed at the Convention should be introduced as foreseen, without any new delay. If no agreement can be reached, however, I see serious dangers for the efficiency of the European Union and its relevance to global developments.

GDI 2004

41

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

ESDP military policies give the EU international credibility by providing an effective supplement to economic policies

Papantoniou, 2002 (Yiannos, Minister of National Defense of the Hellenic Republic, “Southeastern Europe in the New Security Environment, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/PapantoniouLecture02.pdf, accessed July 9,

2004)

The EU view considers military means to be at the one end of the spectrum, with trade and economic sanctions on the other. This continuum also implies that sanctions should not only be seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the extreme case of using force, eventually. This reflects the limitations of the civilian-power Europe discussed in earnest back in the 80’s. Today, instead of ignoring the concept, the EU must build on it, by stressing the relationship between military capabilities and the support of democratic principles. Moreover, the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of the EU as an important 22 and influential international actor. By not having the military option, the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible. By having both options, the EU would enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre when dealing with international crises.

GDI 2004

42

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Peacekeeping is key for EU credibility

Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress

Enhancing European military capabilities has been and remains a key challenge for

the EU as it

 

seeks to forge a credible ESDP. As noted above, the 1999 NATO war

in Kosovo demonstrated

serious deficiencies in European military assets and the

widening technology gap with U.S. forces.

European shortfalls in strategic airlift,

precision-guided munitions, command and control systems,

 

intelligence, aerial

refueling, and suppression of enemy air defenses were among the most obvious.

In

setting out the parameters of the EU rapid reaction force and its capability needs, EU

leaders

 

sought to establish goals that would require members to enhance force

deployability and

 

sustainability, and to reorient and ultimately increase defense

spending to help fill equipment gaps.

 

The most ambitious members envisioned the

capability equivalent, for example,

EU’s rapid reaction force developing a combat

to NATO’s role in the Kosovo conflict.

Peacekeeping is essential for EU credibility

Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress

EU leaders view ESDP as one of the next great projects on the road to European integration, and

 

will likely seek to enhance ESDP further over the next decade. As noted above, most EU members

assert that EU efforts to boost defense capabilities should complement — not compete with — those

 

of the alliance. The UK hopes that bringing more and better military hardware to the table will give

the European allies a bigger role in alliance decision-making. Italy and Spain, among others, hope that ESDP’s military requirements will eventually provide the necessary ammunition to pry more defense funding out of reluctant legislatures and publics more concerned with social spending and

struggling economies.

Incoming EU member states from central and eastern Europe, such as Poland

and the three Baltic states, back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken NATO or the

 
 

transatlantic link. The EU’s four neutral members (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) prefer to

concentrate their efforts on ESDP’s civilian side.

GDI 2004

43

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Cares About Congo

The Congo mission is an important testing ground for the ESDP

Tom Kabs September 2003

CONGO” –MISSION, Lieutenant Colonel NATO School.

http://iss.krakow.pl/Thomas%20Kabs.doc, EUROPEAN UNION’s “

Yes, it is true, that this military mission was described as a very difficult, risky operation. But we

 

should also see ARTEMIS as the very first and welcome opportunity for the European Union to

 

demonstrate that the EU has “ …added some modest military muscles to its economic weight….”.

And please allow me to add that EU’s “ High Representative”, Mr Solana, really wanted to see if the

Europeans would be able to make the difference.

So – as for the very first time and I do not forget

 

EU’s military mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which I see from a different

perspective – Solana “ ….was taking the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the

 

ground to make Europeans stop talking about theory and capabilities instead carry out a

 

mission….”.

(Steven Everts, British political analyst)

The Congo is a testing point for the EU’s defense policies European Foreign Affairs Review December 2003 200324, vol. 8, no. 4,

pp. 493-503(11)

In parallel to all this, the EU has launched its first peacekeeping operations on the ground. Since January 2003, in fact, the EU has been engaged in three missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – performing a variety of tasks, from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management. On the whole, over 2 000 police and military personnel are involved in the operations. The military operations, in particular, are important test cases for the Union’s ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. Although limited in scope and time, the current engagements are the first hands-on manifestation of the EU’s security and defence dimension, which may lead to more ambitious interventions within and beyond its periphery.

GDI 2004

44

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Cares about East Timor

EU involvement in peacekeeping in East Timor is critical to their credibility The Irish Times 9-4-1999

Diplomats said, however, that the ban could and would be renewed after four months if the Indonesian authorities did not co-operate fully with the international community. And ministers called on Jakarta to accept the dispatch of a special human rights mission to East Timor under the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Mrs Mary Robinson, to conduct an investigation into violations with the aim of making those responsible directly accountable.The meeting heard an impassioned appeal from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Andrews, who is the EU's special representative on East Timor.

"

Time is of the essence," Mr Andrews told his colleagues of the need to deploy peacekeeping troops

as soon as possible. "The Union, if it is to maintain its credibility, must throw its full weight behind

those in the UN Security Council who are seeking to bring this about."

 

But he urged "extreme caution" in their dealings with the Indonesians.

GDI 2004

45

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Cares about Sudan

E.U. is concerned with resolving the issue of Sudan. The Humanitarian Aid Office, of the European Commission, 9-18-1998

http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/665f69e2a46f3548c1256686003877b0?OpenDocument

The EU welcomes the latest round of negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement which were held in Addis Abeba from 4 to 7 August 1998 in the framework of IGAD, and the agreement of the parties to convene a fourth round of negotiations within six months in Nairobi. The European Union nevertheless notes with regret that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement were not able at this stage to reach an agreement on major questions of contention, like the geographical definition of the area to be subject to a referendum. The European Union underlines the importance of the mechanism of shuttle diplomacy as a means of narrowing the gap between the parties on outstanding issues and recommends its continuation.

E.U. is concerned with Sudan, and encourages working with UN implementation of humanitarian needs. The Humanitarian Aid Office, of the European Commission, 9-18-1998

http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/665f69e2a46f3548c1256686003877b0?OpenDocument

The EU remains very concerned at the current humanitarian tragedy of the populations in South Sudan. In order to allow full access to those in dire need of assistance, the EU, recalling its declaration of 1 May 1998, welcomes the 3 months' cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal which has been agreed upon by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, and the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire issued by the Government of Sudan on 4 August 1998. The EU urges both parties to extend the cease-fire geographically and beyond the above-mentioned period. This should be done for humanitarian purposes and as a confidence building measure. The EU emphasises that food aid will be required for at least another year. The EU calls on all parties involved to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need, to provide, where requested, international humanitarian relief agencies with all possible assistance and to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law. The Union further calls on all parties to respect and guarantee the security of all personnel of the aid organisations and relief flights and their crews and other means of humanitarian transport and supply depots. It encourages the parties to work with the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance in this regard and calls on them to facilitate, as agreed and without further delay, the implementation of the UN humanitarian needs assessment mission in the Nuba mountain region.

GDI 2004

46

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Credibility Key To EU Cohesion

The EU’s credibility as a cohesive force in Europe is essential to the success of nations in the region

Grabbe, 2003 (Heather, research director of the Center for European Reform in London, Europe's Power of Attraction,” http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grabbe_wsj_24apr03.html, accessed July 10, 2004) Europe is full of gloom about the prospects for a common foreign and security policy, following the EU's spectacular divisions on U.S. policy over Iraq. But Europe should learn from its successes as well as its failures. Last week, the EU celebrated the success of its most effective foreign policy ever when it signed an accession treaty with 10 post-communist countries. Their membership in the European Union from May 1, 2004 is a triumph of Europe's "soft power"--the force of attraction and the ability to shape countries in the EU's own image. For over a decade, the EU has been actively involved in state-building on a huge scale in Central and Eastern Europe. The Union has influenced almost every aspect of institutional and economic reform in these countries. The United States cannot boast that any country has adopted its norms and values as assiduously as the candidate countries have taken on the EU's models. The initial "regime change" was achieved by the people of Central and Eastern Europe themselves. But after the 1989 revolutions were over and the hard work of reconstructing states and markets began, the EU provided a strong guiding hand. The EU did not just lead by example, it used its soft power instruments actively to encourage the post- communist countries to move toward westward models. The Union cannot claim all the credit for the region's progress, because most of the hard work was done by the countries themselves. But the EU was able to empower reformist politicians by approving their efforts and rewarding them with aid, trade and political ties. The Union influenced the political choices of the Central and East Europeans across a vast range of policy areas, from market regulation to the protection of minority rights. It also guided the reforms in great detail, from setting toy standards to improving air quality. Enlargement is a foreign policy that taps the EU's strengths. Trade, investment and aid were much more important in influencing the post-communist transformation than the EU's puny military capabilities. It used the power of attraction, not coercion. And the slow-moving, cumbersome nature of the EU's supranational institutions was an advantage--unusually--because it ensured the continuity of a long-term policy even as the commitment of the national governments wavered.

GDI 2004

47

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Credibility Key to peace in the Balkans

EU credibility enables peace in the Balkans

Kori Schake, senior research professor, and Jeffrey Simon, senior fellow in INSS, 2001, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Occassional_Papers/BUSH.HTML Skimping on the money and expertise needed in the Balkans not only will impede efforts to build peace in the region, it will also reduce support for future interventions. Both the United States and Europe need to redouble efforts to make the peace work in Bosnia and Kosovo. The United States spent several billion dollars and committed the Nation's premier experts to planning during military operations, but committed nowhere near that amount on assistance, training, and planning in the first year of UN operations. At issue are not only money and attention to the international institutions conducting the intervention, but also interagency coordination to produce integrated civil-military planning within the U.S. Government. Committing to the civil tasks with the same determination as the military would have facilitated Kosovar compliance, demonstrated to Serbs the benefits of behavior consistent with Western interests, and buoyed UN and EU credibility, which is important to the momentum of the operation.

GDI 2004

48

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

Balkan War Impact

A Balkan war would nuclear

Glaser '93 (Charles, International Security, Summer, p. 8-9) However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger,

 

U.S. security

has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought

many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war,

especially since

such a war could

grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat

 

that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major

 

European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict

security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war

 

that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland Thus, the

 

United States should not be unconcerned about Europe's future.

 

GDI 2004

49

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU credibility is key to peace in the Balkans

Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative and Peace Operations, United States Institute of Peace, June

25, 2003,

http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/SerwerTestimony030625.pdf

Let me turn to the transfer of leadership to the Europeans, who failed in the Balkans a decade ago but now have another opportunity. Today, Europe is better prepared. It has fielded an excellent team: in addition to Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia and Michael Steiner in Kosovo, Javier Solana, Chris Patten and Erhard Busek in Brussels. Europe has footed most of the bill for the Balkans, and provides most of the troops, now about 75%, vs. 15% for the US. European Foreign and Security Policy, while a shambles on Iraq, persists in the Balkans, as does successful European/American cooperation. The problem Europe faces is not its limited military capacity, or even its reluctance to use it. There is no Balkans military challenge today that the Europeans cannot handle. The real problem is credibility. The Europeans enjoy little respect especially among the Albanians, but also among the Serbs and Bosnians even though they pay the bills and even though the goal for all the peoples of the Balkans is integration within Europe. To make the vision of a European future more credible, the EU needs to stop treating the Balkans as a distant region to be stabilized and begin to view it as an area into which the EU will soon expand. This shift has already occurred for Romania and Bulgaria, but not for the Western Balkans, where until recently EU plans called for a steady decline in assistance through 2006, to half the level of 2000. At the Thessaloniki Summit last week the EU decided to halt this decline. But it needs to do more. It needs to increase its effort and provide the Western Balkans with structural assistance, which has accelerated economic development in other laggard areas of Europe. This would enhance EU credibility and spur the Balkans to serious reform efforts. The issue of credibility is not only one of resources and vision. Europe lacks common purpose and unity of command and control. It is easy to play the Europeans off against each other. To the extent they can agree among themselves, the positions they take are often the lowest common denominator. Rarely are they able to deploy all the levers of their considerable power to achieve a result, as Solana did perhaps unwisely when he forced Montenegro to stay in a confederation with Serbia. More often, they find it difficult to coordinate economic, political, diplomatic and military instruments so as to achieve a clearly defined objective. Seldom do they even try. The proposed European Constitution offers some prospect for change, but in the meanwhile Europe needs to focus on improving its performance under the existing legal framework. The next test for the Europeans is Macedonia, where they have taken over the military task from NATO. The prospects are reasonably good, mainly because the Macedonian and Albanian participants in the new government are fulfilling their commitment to the peace process and at the same time to fighting crime and corruption, which are the greatest threat to the country’s viability. Europe needs to focus on making its military mission in Macedonia a success. Then they can and should take over the military mission in Bosnia, assuming the war criminals are in The Hague and NATO has the vexing problem of unifying the Bosnian armed forces on its way to resolution.

GDI 2004

50

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Credibility Key to Hegemony

Restoring EU credibility is key to US leadership

Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the United States, January 30, 2004, http://www.germany-

info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/013004.html

The European Union also suffered. Europe was divided in 2003, regardless of how large a popular majority existed in Europe - "old" and "new" - against the war in Iraq. It will not be easy for the EU to regain influence and credibility as a foreign policy actor any time soon. Creating the office of a European foreign minister and vesting it with the necessary powers seems to be a necessary, albeit insufficient, step if Europe wants to be taken seriously as a political player in Washington. In what was probably one of the most negative results of 2003 in terms of the transatlantic relationship, mistrust of European intentions and of the EU as such has become rampant in Washington. European governments that opposed the Iraq war believe that, on most of the "war issues," they were right and the US was wrong--in saying, for example, that there was no imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction and that creating post-intervention stability in Iraq would be difficult and costly and would require a long-term US commitment. The fact that these Europeans were right, however, has not been of much help in restoring US trust in Europe, and in the European Union. It is to the credit of these European governments that they have generally resisted the temptation to say I-told-you-so. It is even more to their credit that they have instead begun to offer assistance in the rehabilitation of Iraq, recognizing that restoring stability and supporting modernization in the region is a key European interest in the current situation. Credibility As the EU's credibility has suffered, so has the credibility of the United States as a "benign hegemon"--and not just because weapons of mass destruction have not been found in Iraq. Polls by the highly respected Pew Research Center reveal a rather dramatic drop in US standing, and by no means in Europe alone. Can Washington be trusted? Specifically, can it be trusted to lead with reasonable regard for the interests of allies and partners? Does Washington respect its obligations under international law, or is it defining itself as above the UN Charter? The transatlantic partnership is about more than just relationships between nation-states and international organizations. It is about the very principles of the international order, and about the evolution of this order. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer asked the key question: "What kind of world order do we want?" Essentially, the centuries-old fiction of the sovereignty and equality of nations under international law is being challenged today. If international law protects the state even when that state is ruled by a barbaric dictator, then international law itself must be changed so that dictators are no longer protected; this is a popularly held view in the US and is shared by some in Europe.

GDI 2004

51

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU Credibility Stops Proliferation

A strong EU can force Iran to end proliferation

Geoffrey Kemp, National Interest, Summer, 2003 The EU can play a more assertive role, as well. Until recently, U.S.-EU approaches to Iranian policy have differed on methods, if not objectives. However, a new EU-Iranian initiative to negotiate a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has elements that should be welcomed in Washington. The EU has declared that the trade discussions with Iran are inextricably linked to progress on three non-trade items including the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The TCA negotiations, however, will be carried out by the office of the European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Chris Patten. The TCA will cover trade and human rights. Its final approval rests with the Council of the EU, with the assent of the European Parliament. In parallel, a Declaration of the Council of the EU would be issued concerning benchmarks, to which Iran must agree, on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the Arab-Israeli peace process. EU officials have assured their American counterparts that the political agenda is critical to the overall package. They argue there will be de facto, if not de jure, linkage and that they are under pressure from their own governments to make sure this is the case. They insist that one requirement within the WMD package will be that Iran ratify the additional NPT protocol. There will be European pressure groups that will strive to minimize the linkage between politics and economic transactions. This, of course, would be nothing new, as all former European efforts at "constructive engagement" have been mostly foils against which to sell things to the supposedly targeted countries. Iran obviously has every interest in de-linking the two sets of issues, and history provides them confidence they will succeed. They will focus on the economic component while hinting, not too subtly, that it is a "take it or leave it" proposition. They must not succeed. How Europe handles these negotiations will be a critical test of its seriousness on the political agenda. If the Europeans wish to be genuine allies of the United States, they must act seriously in those domains where they have the ability to do so. For its part, however, the United States must work closely with the EU to ensure that the political issues are kept on the front burner, and that the Iranians are made to understand that the linkages are real. This should not be difficult if the will is present. After all, it is in fact the EU--a vastly larger, richer and more powerful entity than Iran--that can more easily afford to walk away from the negotiations and take its trade elsewhere.

GDI 2004

52

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

ESDP won’t collapse NATO

The expansion of the ESDP will still leave NATO as a strategic alliance The Irish Times 9-7-2002

One might have thought that the main challenge for the member-states was to tackle unemployment, or rampant inflation caused by the euro, or fair and just integration of the applicant countries, but no. In the midst of innocuous questions like "Where can I find general information about the EU" and "where can I get information about the euro", lies this surprise. The main challenge for the EU is to develop military capabilities. And ahem, remember that stuff about Partnership for Peace having nothing to do with NATO? The next question helpfully asks: "What is the role of the (sic) NATO? Do we duplicate it? Answer: NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The development will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard to the two organisations' decision-making autonomy. EU military structures will be separable but not separate from the (sic) NATO. The aim is that there should be no unnecessary duplication." Well, God forbid that there should be any unnecessary duplication. That would be terrible. But could anyone decipher what "being separable from but not separate from the NATO" means? Could it be that we don't have to worry about membership, because members or not, we are not separate from them anyway? And don't you just love "crisis-management"? As a euphemism it is up there with "collateral damage" and "friendly fire".

The EU will still require forces from NATO, meaning that both will still exist

James Apparthurai, NATO Political Affairs Division, Peace Support Operations: lessons learned and future perspectives, eds. Spillmann, Bernauer & Gabriel, 2001, p. 195 (HARVUN2259)

NATO is supporting the development of Europe’s capacities for three simple reasons.

First, the

 

EU’s desire to be more effective is sparking real improvements in capability that can only enhance

 

NATO’s overall effectiveness. Second, if the EU is capable of acting, it means NATO will not be

 

the only option available to the Euro-Atlantic community in times of crisis. It will not be ‘NATO or

nothing’. And finally, NATO has assets that the EU will need to borrow for larger operations –

 

assets like deployable headquarters, strategic lift and satellite intelligence.

These must be available

to the EU if serous European-led operations are to take place. NATO will therefore make its essential assets and capabilities available to the EU when the Alliance is not in the lead, but the EU

 

chooses to be. NATO will also provide regular access by the EU in NATO defense planning, even

in peacetime, to ensure that defense planning between the two institutions is fully coherent. This

 

will ensure that NATO and EU forces are structured and equipped to perform NATO and EU

 

operations, not “either or.”

 

AN INDEPENDENT EU WON’T THREATEN NATO

CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, December 11, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E109)

 

NATO chief George Robertson

said the alliance can accept the latest version of controversial joint

   

EU defence plans, as diplomats confirmed they were being presented to an EU summit in Brussels.

Robertson, speaking as the EU’s Italian presidency presented the proposals to

EU leaders

ahead of

the summit Friday,

indicated the new draft met NATO and U.S. concerns about the plans to set up

an autonomous military planning cell.

 

AN INDEPENDENT EU WON’T THREATEN NATO

BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, December 9, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E110)

The United States had to accept that, he said.

Struck stressed that the EU did not want to compete

 

with NATO. The Alliance continued to be the first choice in the event of emergency operations. If

   

the Alliance should not be able to or want to provide forces, the EU would examine whether it could

use NATO means and capacities. Only in cases where this was not necessary would a military staff

 

of the EU in Brussels become active

 

GDI 2004

53

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

ESDP Helps NATO

The ESDP and NATO are inexorably linked. If one fails so will the other

Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform, RUSSIA WEEKLY, August, 8, 2002, p. http://www.cdi.org/russia/218-9.cfm. (DRG/E101) Nato needs its military organisation for three reasons. First, Nato’s skills as an experienced and proficient provider of peacekeeping are still required. The EU may soon take over the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and in the longer run in Bosnia. But the fraught situation in Kosovo requires

the involvement of Nato and thus, implicitly, of the US. Second,

the embryonic

European security

and defence policy (

ESDP) will achieve very little without practical support from Nato’s military

 

organisation. Almost any conceivable EU military mission will need to draw on Nato assets such as

the expertise of its military planners.

Some

commentators

suppose that Nato and the ESDP are in

 

competition with each other. The truth is the contrary: they will sink or swim together. If the

 

Europeans succeed in boosting their military capabilities, that is good for Nato and good for the

 
 

ESDP. If they fail, both will suffer. Third, Nato should develop a new military role, to provide a

European strike force that could fight alongside US troops in a high-intensity conflict such as that in Afghanistan. The point would be to encourage US commanders to take up European offers of assistance: they would probably be more willing to do so if such forces - including, for example, bombers and elite troops - were packaged and vetted by Nato rather than offered directly by governments. In practice, only some European countries could contribute to such a strike force, and

it would not be feasible unless some defence budgets rose substantially. But

if Nato could help the

US not only with peacekeeping but also with fighting in distant places, American respect for Nato

would grow.

 

GDI 2004

54

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

EU + NATO Key to US Hegemony

The simultaneous expansion of NATO and the EU is necessary to project US power into Europe

Brzezinski, 1997 (Zbigniew, former national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, 76:5, September/October,

http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/9709brzezinski.html)

In practical terms, all this will eventually require America's accommodation to a shared leadership in NATO, greater acceptance of France's concerns over a European role in Africa and the Middle East, and continued support for the European Union's eastward expansion even as the EU becomes politically and economically more assertive. A transatlantic free trade agreement, already advocated by a number of Western leaders, could mitigate the risk of a growing economic rivalry between the EU and the United States. The EU's progressive success in burying centuries-old European antagonisms would be wen worth a gradual diminution in America's role as Europe's arbitrator. Enlargement of NATO and the EU would also reinvigorate Europe's waning sense of a larger vocation while consolidating, to the benefit of both America and Europe, the democratic gains won through the successful end of the Cold War. At stake in this effort is nothing less than America's long-range relationship with Europe. A new Europe is still taking shape, and if that Europe is to remain part of the "Euro-Atlantic" space, the expansion of NATO is essential. Accordingly, NATO and EU enlargement should move forward in deliberate stages. Assuming a sustained American and Western European commitment, here is a speculative but realistic timetable for these stages: By 1999, the first three Central European members will have been admitted into NATO, although their inclusion in the EU will probably not take place before 2002 or 2003; by 2003, the EU is likely to have initiated accession talks with all three Baltic republics, and NATO will likewise have moved forward on their membership as well as that of Romania and Bulgaria, with their accession likely to be completed before 2005; between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine, provided it has made significant domestic reforms and has become identified as a Central European country, should also be ready for initial negotiations with the EU and NATO.

GDI 2004

55

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

NATO Collapse Good

Preservation of NATO strength will result in Russian resurgence

Reiter 2001 (Dan, prof of poli sci @ Emory, Int’l Sec. Spring pg. 42) Critics of NATO enlargement worry about its risks and costs. Their principal concern is that

expansion may jeopardize relations between Russia and the West,pushing Russia away from

 

cooperating on issues such as strategic arms control and peacekeeping in the Balkans,and perhaps

 

turning it back toward belligerence and even ultranationalism. Critics also express concern that the

 

anancial costs of enlargement will weaken NATO’s military power and complicate decisionmaking

within the alliance.

 

Expansion of NATO will result in renewed Russian belligerence

Reiter 2001 (Dan, prof of poli sci @ Emory, Int’l Sec. Spring pg. 42)

Second

,NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of renewed Russian belligerence,rather than

 

provide a useful insurance policy against it. Some observers have expressed concern that enlargement will

jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia. George Kennan,author of the famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” essay that laid the groundwork for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War,stated it bluntly:

“Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of the entire post–cold war era.” The historian John

Lewis Gaddis was equally critical: “Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to

acknowledge error

NATO

enlargement,I believe,manages to violate every one of the strategic principles

just mentioned.”24

Russian resurgence will result in global nuclear war, the end of the war on terror and the end of US oil interests in the Middle East and Central Asia Cohen 1996 (Ariel, Fellow @ Heritage, Heritage Foundation Report January 25th 1996, online: heritage.org)

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies.

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its
Attempts to restore its empire will doom

Attempts to restore its empire will doom

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its

Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone

has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995).

Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society.

The wars which would be

 

required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the

 

region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread

 

throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if

 

successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in

 

Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil

the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the

Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical

 

nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky,

have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the

 

Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine,

Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and

 

Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert

 

actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would

 

make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.

 

Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of

Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq

 

provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development

 

of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow

and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were

 

tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S.

 

should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.

GDI 2004

56

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

US-EU Action Kills Credibility

AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN MILITARY IS IMPORTANT TO PERCEPTIONS OF ITS LEADERSHIP

CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, December 12, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E105)

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said the

diluted plans would now “please” Washington,

whose fears of Europe’s military direction were heightened by the vocal opposition of some EU

nations to the war in Iraq. “The defence accord is important. It allows Europe to wield an

 

independent military force which will let it sit at the same table, with equal dignity” as the other

 

great powers, the EU’s current chairman told reporters at the summit.

GDI 2004

57

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

US-EU action kills NATO & Credibility

US Action Along with the EU destroys NATO and EU Credibility

Bruno Tertrais, Senior Fellow, Foundation of Research Strategy, THE EU’S SEARCH FOR A STRATEGIC ROLE, November 2002, p. http://sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic1/ESDP.pdf. (DRG/E103)

 

What is good for the EU is also good for NATO. U.S. analyst Kori Shake rightly emphasizes that

 

the European Union would “gain America’s respect by focusing on improvements at the war-

 
 

fighting end of the Petersberg tasks.” And as French then-defense minister Alain Richard subtly

 

remarked in 2001,

“Our American allies must be able to decide on their participation in the

 

management of a crisis without being constrained by European impotence to endorse alone the

 

choice between action and abstention.” On the contrary, a division of labor where the United States

does high-altitude bombing and the allies does the “

clean-up

” would not be the best guarantee for

 

maintaining the cohesion of NATO.

 

GDI 2004

58

Scholars

European Union Counterplan

***Affirmative Answers

GDI 2004

59

Scholars