GDI 2004 Scholars

1 European Union Counterplan

1NC Shell
Observation 1: Text- The European Union will <do plan> Observation 2: Competition- The CP Competes via the net benefits of politics, EU credibility, and better solvency. Observation 3: Solvency The EU is a uniquely better actor than the US in that it understands the more basic requirements of peacekeeping
Schake, 2002 (Kori, senior research professor at the National Defense University, “Post-9/11 U.S. Perceptions on ESDP,” http://csis.org/europe/priv/esdp.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) When gauged against the lack of any tangible progress during the three years since NATO’s 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 areas for European improvement, the U.S. reluctance to use European militaries appears understandable. However crucial they may be, such capabilities have been lacking on the European side for the better part of the last 50 years. Moreover, even as DCI remains a necessary objective, it is not sufficient for addressing the growing strategy gap. (Making capabilities the key issue at NATO’s Prague summit next November, as some have suggested, would also not solve the lingering transatlantic tensions in the strategic and military areas.) A Europe that tends to think about war in terms of its implications for the ensuing peace will not only continue to dwarf a rising U.S. military colossus but will also insist on thinking differently about the world at large. To some extent, the U.S. fascination with technology tends to ignore some larger strategic questions. “Fighting and winning the nation’s war” is certainly a very compelling motto, but absent serious thinking about how to fight and win the peace, the U.S. approach to addressing the security threats of the future remains incomplete. A comprehensive strategy cannot exclude, for example, ways of addressing low-intensity conflicts—that is, precisely what ESDP is best equipped to confront. Dismissing more traditional civilian assets in favor of overwhelming military capabilities risks encouraging a truncated strategy that does not effectively tackle the numerous security challenges of our era.

GDI 2004 Scholars

2 European Union Counterplan

Independent EU action is critical because if they work in conjunction with the US the EU risks their credibility, which is key to the peace process. LaFranchi 2004 (Howard, Staff Writer for the CSM, Christian Science Monitor April 26th 2004, lexis)
The immediate result is a blow to Mideast reforms, both because would-be promoters from outside are discredited, and because internal reforms, increasingly associated with the West, are suspect. "Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace, having so fully identified with the Sharon position," says Edward Walker, a former State Department official and now president of the Middle East Institute. "Countries in the region will be hard-pressed to cooperate with the administration on questions like reform, Iraq, and even terrorism as their populations react to their perception of this one-sided US position." At the same time, promodernization Arabs are telling American contacts that domestic reform efforts are being hurt by an association with pressures from the US for change. Recent events have also cooled European enthusiasm for working with the US on Mideast reform - just as the US is acknowledging it needs more partners in Iraq and in the broader region. Even Bush's stalwart ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, has expressed frustration at the US drawing closer to Israel, while Europeans worry that the poor US image in the region could tarnish the work the EU has done in encouraging Arab reforms. "The Europeans will have greater difficulty working with the Americans as they did before, when they all wanted the Americans in the driver's seat because that was the way progress in the region has been made," says the European official in Washington. "The problem is they [the Americans] just drove off in a certain direction, and we were not cautious enough."

Peace process breakdown causes war Jerome Slater, professor of political science at SUNY at Buffalo.Tikkun Mareh 1, 1999
There has been a kind of conspiracy of silence over the potential consequences of a breakdown of the peace process, perhaps because in the worst case they are nothing short of apocalyptic. But the risks are real. Israel has hundreds of nuclear weapons, Syria has nerve gas mounted on ballistic missiles aimed at Israeli cities, and it is only a matter of time before other Arab states or - far worse - fanatical terrorist groups obtain weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological. Here is the nightmare scenario: The intransigence of the Netanyahu government and its clear intention to continue to dominate the West Bank and deny the Palestinians true national citizenship and sovereignty lead to a resumption of sustained terrorism, this time with the tacit acquiescence or open support of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and with the general support of the Palestinian population. Israel reacts with economic and military retaliation that creates widespread desperation among the Palestinians, and this results in the eclipse of Arafat by Hamas and other Palestinian extremists. The intifada resumes, this time not with stones but with guns and bombs. Israel responds with unprecedented repression, and the cycle of communal violence and counterviolence continues to escalate until Israel decides to reoccupy the West Bank and perhaps Gaza in order to crush the Palestinian movement - maybe even expelling large numbers of Palestinians into neighboring Arab states. An inflamed Arab world greatly increases its support of the new intifada or, worse, moderate governments that try to stand clear are overthrown and replaced by extremists in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In these circumstances, even if a general war in the Middle East could somehow be averted, there is likely to be escalating international terrorism against Israel and its supporters - sooner or later including nuclear or other forms of mass terrorism.

GDI 2004 Scholars

3 European Union Counterplan

1NC Shell without Peace Process
Why on earth you wouldn’t want the peace process advantage, I don’t know

Observation 1: Text- The European Union will <do plan> Observation 2: Competition- The CP Competes via the net benefits of politics, and better solvency. Observation 3: Solvency The EU is a uniquely better actor than the US in that it understands the more basic requirements of peacekeeping
Schake, 2002 (Kori, senior research professor at the National Defense University, “Post-9/11 U.S. Perceptions on ESDP,” http://csis.org/europe/priv/esdp.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) When gauged against the lack of any tangible progress during the three years since NATO’s 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 areas for European improvement, the U.S. reluctance to use European militaries appears understandable. However crucial they may be, such capabilities have been lacking on the European side for the better part of the last 50 years. Moreover, even as DCI remains a necessary objective, it is not sufficient for addressing the growing strategy gap. (Making capabilities the key issue at NATO’s Prague summit next November, as some have suggested, would also not solve the lingering transatlantic tensions in the strategic and military areas.) A Europe that tends to think about war in terms of its implications for the ensuing peace will not only continue to dwarf a rising U.S. military colossus but will also insist on thinking differently about the world at large. To some extent, the U.S. fascination with technology tends to ignore some larger strategic questions. “Fighting and winning the nation’s war” is certainly a very compelling motto, but absent serious thinking about how to fight and win the peace, the U.S. approach to addressing the security threats of the future remains incomplete. A comprehensive strategy cannot exclude, for example, ways of addressing low-intensity conflicts—that is, precisely what ESDP is best equipped to confront. Dismissing more traditional civilian assets in favor of overwhelming military capabilities risks encouraging a truncated strategy that does not effectively tackle the numerous security challenges of our era.

GDI 2004 Scholars

4 European Union Counterplan

Independent EU action is critical to ensure solvency LaFranchi 2004 (Howard, Staff Writer for the CSM, Christian Science Monitor April 26th 2004, lexis)
The immediate result is a blow to Mideast reforms, both because would-be promoters from outside are discredited, and because internal reforms, increasingly associated with the West, are suspect. "Bush will probably never again be seen by the Arabs as a credible mediator of peace, having so fully identified with the Sharon position," says Edward Walker, a former State Department official and now president of the Middle East Institute. "Countries in the region will be hard-pressed to cooperate with the administration on questions like reform, Iraq, and even terrorism as their populations react to their perception of this one-sided US position." At the same time, promodernization Arabs are telling American contacts that domestic reform efforts are being hurt by an association with pressures from the US for change. Recent events have also cooled European enthusiasm for working with the US on Mideast reform - just as the US is acknowledging it needs more partners in Iraq and in the broader region. Even Bush's stalwart ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, has expressed frustration at the US drawing closer to Israel, while Europeans worry that the poor US image in the region could tarnish the work the EU has done in encouraging Arab reforms. "The Europeans will have greater difficulty working with the Americans as they did before, when they all wanted the Americans in the driver's seat because that was the way progress in the region has been made," says the European official in Washington. "The problem is they [the Americans] just drove off in a certain direction, and we were not cautious enough."

GDI 2004 Scholars

5 European Union Counterplan

GDI 2004 Scholars

6 European Union Counterplan

2NC Overview
The counterplan solves 100% of the case and more- the Lafranchi 2004 evidence from the 1NC indicates the EU has unique credibility to deal with peacekeeping because they are perceieved as a neutral party. The US doesn’t have the soft power to establish lasting peace because A. They are seen as only preserving their own strategic interests and, thus, not the parties involved- the War on Iraq is a perfect example... and B. The US has historically always taken sides in disputes which ultimately further exacerbates conflict in the future- for example, US unwavering support of Israel has destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of Arab nations C. <insert specific solvency> Next, only EU independent action can solve- as indicated by the LaFranci evidence. The US and the EU acting together will tarnish the reputation of EU efforts in the region, destroying hopes of credible peacekeeping. This turns case and any permutation because the opportunity cost of US action in the region would be the preclusion of credible EU peacekeeping- destroying the chances for long term peace.
And, the impact is to the internal net benefit is nuclear war- a tarnished EU reputation would destroy their efforts to bolster the Arab-Israeli peace process. This would create instability throughout the Middle East, ensuring an Arab attack on Israel- the Slater ’99 evidence indicates that if war would break out the world would witness an apocalyptic nuclear war.

GDI 2004 Scholars

7 European Union Counterplan

***Solvency

GDI 2004 Scholars

8 European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Sudan
The EU is ready and willing to start Peacekeeping in Sudan, and it is Key to the EU’s security force legitimacy Financial Times, April 12 2004 (EU-led Forces 'Could Intervene' in Sudan Conflict, Judy Dempsey;
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0412eu.htm) The European Union's top military official says EU-led forces could intervene in Sudan, where more than 670,000 people have fled the western region of Dafur following weeks of killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. Although the Sudanese government and two rebel groups from western Dafur are negotiating a ceasefire, Kofi Annan, United Nations secretary-general, has said the international community "must be prepared to take swift action, which may include military action." The surprise comments by Gustav Hägglund, who ends his three-year stint as the first chairman of the EU's military committee this month, coincide with fresh efforts by Brussels to strengthen its defence capabilities. In an interview with the Financial Times, General Hägglund said the possibility of the EU sending a force to Sudan had been raised by Louise Fréchette, the United Nations deputy secretary-general. "Sudan is on the list of the UN [for some form of peacekeeping mission]," Gen Hägglund added. The 65-year-old Finnish general was appointed Europe's top military chief three years ago, when the EU had a fledgling military staff, no idea which military missions it would undertake and persistent ambiguities between Britain and France over the future role of European defence. Since then, the EU has taken over a small Nato-led mission in Macedonia, quickly deployed a 1,500-strong military force to Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo, last summer and will take over this year from Nato the large mission in Bosnia. The Congo mission last year was the EU's first military mission outside Europe. "There is no reason why the EU could not go to, for instance, Sudan. I see it to be very possible. It would be mandated by the UN. It is part of the battlegroup concept," said Gen Hägglund. Britain and France are spearheading ambitious defence plans for the EU through their "battlegroups". The idea is that the EU should be able to deploy within days up to 1,500 highly trained troops, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping to combat missions operating under a UN mandate. Gen Hägglund said the battlegroups could allow the EU "to take on more and be able to sustain itself". The authors, who have met with key players in Sudan's peace process, including government officials and rebels, say deployment of an international quick response and peacekeeping force under authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter — which mandates intervention only in the event of a threat to peace that includes massive loss of life — is a crucial element to avoid a reversion to war. Stephen Morrison, director of CSIS's Africa Program, said the most worrying threats to security in post-conflict Sudan are transfer of power, militia groups not included in a power-sharing government, unstable hotspots around the country and spillovers of rebel groups from other countries. He added that a quick reaction force would include air support that could get around the country rapidly to any pockets of conflict. The report suggests a force of about 600 soldiers. On Sunday, however, Sudanese State Foreign Minister Najeeb al-Khair Abdel Wahab rejected the idea of international peacekeepers, telling Agence France-Presse, "The government prefers that the responsibility for keeping the peace shall be confined to the Sudanese." Last month, Abdel Wahab said, "We consider peacekeeping as mainly a Sudanese responsibility while the role of the international community, including the European Union, will be backing up the Sudanese capability in keeping peace."

GDI 2004 Scholars

9 European Union Counterplan

EU Can Solve The Conflict in the Darfur Region European Commission , EC04-143EN, 10/6/2004, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3566
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid Poul Nielson said: “Resolving conflicts in Africa and bringing peace to the continent will first of all require effective and responsible leadership by the Africans. The African Union has shown just that in its response to the Darfur crisis. This is greatly encouraging and raises prospects not only of a lasting end to the conflict in Darfur but for peace across the African continent. I also take great satisfaction in the swiftness[1] with which the EU has dealt with the African Union request. The Peace Facility is a new instrument that could become an important tool in the construction of the new peace and security agenda in Africa. Member States have today shown that they are willing to allow this new instrument to play just that role and that the EU will be a credible partner in the African Unions aspiration’s to assume the necessary leadership of this peace and security agenda.” The EU will provide €12 million in support of the African Union observer mission to Darfur for a period of 12 months. The observer mission will comprise up to 120 observers and a possible protection force of 270 military personnel. The observers will support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed by the parties to the Darfur conflict in Addis Ababa on 28 May 2004. In particular the Mission is expected to: (i) ensure that the rules and provisions of the ceasefire are implemented; (ii) define routes for the movement of forces to reduce the risks of incidents; (iii) assess requirements for de-mining operations; and (iv) receive, verify and judge complaints related to possible violations of the ceasefire. The observer mission is currently being deployed in Sudan. A successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement is a precondition if vital humanitarian aid is to reach the millions of Sudanese that have been affected by the conflict.

Empirically, the EU can solve crisis in the Darfur region Washington Times, June 10th 2004 (http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040610-0203343820r.htm, EU gives $14.5 mln for Sudan peacekeeping) Brussels, DC, Jun. 10 (UPI) -- The European Union said Thursday it will provide $14.5 million (12 million euros) to support peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan. The money will be used by the Africa Union to monitor the implementation of the recent cease-fire agreement in Darfur over a 12month period. An observer mission of 120 members and a protection force of 270 military personnel is expected. "Resolving conflicts in Africa and bringing peace to the continent will first of all require effective and responsible leadership by the Africans ... member States (of the EU) have today shown that they are willing to allow this new instrument to play just that role and that the EU will be a credible partner in the African Unions aspiration's to assume the necessary leadership of this peace and security agenda," said Poul Nielson, EU commissioner for development and humanitarian aid.

GDI 2004 Scholars

10 European Union Counterplan

The crisis in Sudan is a logical Stepping Stone for EU peacekeeping Forces EU Observer, 2004 (http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=13&aid=15112 13.04.2004 By Andrew Beatty,
EU could lead Sudan peacekeeping force, says top military official) A peacekeeping mission to Sudan could be on the cards, according to the outgoing chairman of the EU's military committee Gustav Hägglund. In an interview with the Financial Times, Mr Hägglund, who is completing his three-year stint as the EU's top military chief, said that he sees an EU peacekeeping role in Sudan as "very possible". His comments raise the prospect of the European Union undertaking its second peacekeeping mission outside Europe, and second on the African continent. Last year a French-led EU force intervened in the north-eastern Congolese town of Bunia to quell an upsurge in violence. Although limited in scope, most see the intervention as a success giving the EU the confidence and credibility to proceed. Half a century of war EU and UN diplomats have been considering the possibility of a similar military intervention in Sudan for some time. The UN and the international community are keen to stop the ‘war within the war’, which is currently taking place in the western Sudanese region of Dafur.

GDI 2004 Scholars

11 European Union Counterplan

The EU is ready and willing to start Peacekeeping in Sudan, and it is Key to the EU’s security force legitimacy Financial Times, April 12 2004 (EU-led Forces 'Could Intervene' in Sudan Conflict, Judy Dempsey;
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0412eu.htm) The European Union's top military official says EU-led forces could intervene in Sudan, where more than 670,000 people have fled the western region of Dafur following weeks of killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. Although the Sudanese government and two rebel groups from western Dafur are negotiating a ceasefire, Kofi Annan, United Nations secretary-general, has said the international community "must be prepared to take swift action, which may include military action." The surprise comments by Gustav Hägglund, who ends his three-year stint as the first chairman of the EU's military committee this month, coincide with fresh efforts by Brussels to strengthen its defence capabilities. In an interview with the Financial Times, General Hägglund said the possibility of the EU sending a force to Sudan had been raised by Louise Fréchette, the United Nations deputy secretary-general. "Sudan is on the list of the UN [for some form of peacekeeping mission]," Gen Hägglund added. The 65-year-old Finnish general was appointed Europe's top military chief three years ago, when the EU had a fledgling military staff, no idea which military missions it would undertake and persistent ambiguities between Britain and France over the future role of European defence. Since then, the EU has taken over a small Nato-led mission in Macedonia, quickly deployed a 1,500-strong military force to Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo, last summer and will take over this year from Nato the large mission in Bosnia. The Congo mission last year was the EU's first military mission outside Europe. "There is no reason why the EU could not go to, for instance, Sudan. I see it to be very possible. It would be mandated by the UN. It is part of the battlegroup concept," said Gen Hägglund. Britain and France are spearheading ambitious defence plans for the EU through their "battlegroups". The idea is that the EU should be able to deploy within days up to 1,500 highly trained troops, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping to combat missions operating under a UN mandate. Gen Hägglund said the battlegroups could allow the EU "to take on more and be able to sustain itself". The authors, who have met with key players in Sudan's peace process, including government officials and rebels, say deployment of an international quick response and peacekeeping force under authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter — which mandates intervention only in the event of a threat to peace that includes massive loss of life — is a crucial element to avoid a reversion to war. Stephen Morrison, director of CSIS's Africa Program, said the most worrying threats to security in post-conflict Sudan are transfer of power, militia groups not included in a power-sharing government, unstable hotspots around the country and spillovers of rebel groups from other countries. He added that a quick reaction force would include air support that could get around the country rapidly to any pockets of conflict. The report suggests a force of about 600 soldiers. On Sunday, however, Sudanese State Foreign Minister Najeeb al-Khair Abdel Wahab rejected the idea of international peacekeepers, telling Agence France-Presse, "The government prefers that the responsibility for keeping the peace shall be confined to the Sudanese." Last month, Abdel Wahab said, "We consider peacekeeping as mainly a Sudanese responsibility while the role of the international community, including the European Union, will be backing up the Sudanese capability in keeping peace."

GDI 2004 Scholars EU Solves Ivory Coast .

12 European Union Counterplan

EU Has resources to solve the Ivory Coast European Commission, EC04-143EN, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3310, 19/3/2004
The European Commission has adopted a second emergency rehabilitation programme providing a further €25 million to consolidate the current peace process in Ivory Coast. The objective of this, the second emergency package, is to support the reunification of the country by restoring effective civil administration across the territory, improving civilians’ security, and boosting the provision of social services including health and education. Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson said: “I recently met with Prime Minister Diarra in Brussels. I was then encouraged by the news of the considerable progress that has been achieved in the Ivorian peace process and encouraged Prime Minister Diarra to persevere and pursue the process. With this decision we are clearly demonstrating our intentions to fully support the Ivorians in their efforts to promote reconciliation and create the basis for a renewed peaceful development of the country.”Following the attempted coup of 19 September 2002, the Ivory Coast was thrown into a major crisis which lasted for more than a year. The crisis caused an effective partition of the country in two zones (North and South). The resulting economic, social and political consequences were without precedent in the country’s history, with an estimated 3,000 deaths and over 900,000 people fleeing the combat zones. As a result, the level of people living in poverty has now reached 43 % and life expectancy has fallen dramatically from 55 years at the end of the 1980s to approximately 45 years today.

The EU is capable of peacekeeping in he Ivory Coast while the US has done nothing Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22 Feb 2004, Côte d'Ivoire: Disarmament to start
on 8 March - Prime Minister http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/4ed2f4ba6ca3eb4b85256e430069c902?OpenDocument The United States, which pays for 27 percent of the cost of all UN peacekeeping forces, had been the only permanent member of the Security Council to oppose the sending of blue helmets to Cote d'Ivoire. Annan has recommended that 1,400 West African peacekeeping troops already stationed in Cote d'Ivoire should be incorporated into the UN force, but diplomats do not expect additional troops to arrive until April, with full deployment unlikely until June. The French government has said that a 4,000-strong French peacekeeping force which has born the brunt of peacekeeping duties in Cote d'Ivoire over the past year and a half, would remain in the country, independent of UN control, to provide a rapid reaction force that could act in support of the blue helmets if necessary. The DDR programme, which was originally due to have started in August last year, has been modelled on plans drawn up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and will be implemented with financial support from the World Bank and European Union

GDI 2004 Scholars

13 European Union Counterplan

The EU has an integral stake in the future of Cote d’Ivoire, and is able mediate and enforce Peacekeeping there Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.© United Nations 2004
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html, from the first Report of the SecretaryGeneral on Côte d'Ivoire, S/2003/374) The peace Agreement provided for the establishment of a committee to follow up on the implementation of the Agreement (the Follow-Up Committee). The Committee will be based in Abidjan. It is composed of representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Commission, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Group of Eight countries, the European Union, a military representative of the troop-contributing countries and France. A meeting of the heads of State of concerned African countries and France, which was held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, endorsed the LinasMarcoussis Agreement. During that meeting, President Gbagbo, in consultation with other Ivorian parties, appointed the former Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, to head the new government of national reconciliation. In addition, during consultations conducted on the sidelines of the meeting, an understanding was reached on an arrangement for the distribution of cabinet posts among the Ivorian parties, under which the key portfolios of defence and the interior were allocated to the rebel movements. Both the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the conclusions adopted by the heads of State in Paris on 26 January 2003 (S/2003/99, annex II) envisaged a United Nations role in the implementation of the Agreement, including participating in and chairing the Follow-Up Committee. The Agreement stipulated that the new Ivorian government of national reconciliation would seek assistance from ECOWAS, France and the United Nations in guaranteeing the reform and restructuring of the defence and security forces; international development partners are requested to cooperate with the new government in putting in place a programme for the reintegration of all armed elements. In their communiqué, the heads of State proposed the strengthening of the presence of the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and human rights, as well as the deployment of civilian and military observers, who would help to supervise the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. They also expressed the wish that the Security Council would endorse the peacekeeping operation launched by ECOWAS and France, and authorize that operation to take the necessary measures to ensure the freedom of movement and security of its personnel, and to guarantee the protection of civilians facing the imminent threat of violence.

GDI 2004 Scholars

14 European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Liberia
The EU is the largest Donor to Liberia, and is invaluable to their peace process European Commission of Development 21 January, 2004 Liberia Country Overview
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=lr&lng=en&status=new The European Union is the largest international aid donor in Liberia. The European Commission appointed a Permanent Advisor for Liberia in December 1998, which meant the formal re-opening of the Commission office in Monrovia. This is the only diplomatic representation of the European Union in the country. Political situation Liberia is severely affected by the protracted internal conflict that erupted in the late eighties. Charles Taylor came to power by force in 1990 and was elected President in 1997. Rebel groups have been fighting to overthrow Taylor between 1990 and 1997 and again from 1999. Respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights has been minimal on all sides. There have been reports of resources plundering (diamonds, timber), endemic corruption and ethnic problems. Following the rebels’ advance in 2003 and under pressure from the international community the Government of Liberia agreed to come to the negotiation table. Peace talks held under the auspices of ECOWAS and financed by the European Union have been under way since 4 June 2003. In the framework of these peace talks a cease-fire agreement was signed between the belligerent parties on 17 June 2003. Mandated by UN Security Council n° 1497 of 1 August 2003, ECOWAS started with the deployment of a peacekeeping force on 4 August to help enforce the cease-fire. Under pressure from the international community and in accordance with the agreements reached in Accra, Charles Taylor stepped down as President and handed over power to Vice-President Moses Blah on 11 August. The peace talks are still ongoing in order to draw up a comprehensive peace agreement that should include the creation of a transitional government.

The European Union has Just as much at stake in Liberia as the US China Daily July 9, 2004 UN meeting seeks $488 million to rebuild Liberia,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/06/content_303919.htm Andrew Natsios, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, said Liberia's years of turmoil had killed as many as 250,000 people, most of them civilians, but had touched all its 3 million people "in profound ways." "More than 1.3 million are displaced or refugees. Abductions, tortures, rape and other human rights atrocities have taken place on a massive scale," he said. An estimated one in 10 children may have been recruited by militias as fighters and a similar percentage "has been traumatized by seeing their families and friends murdered or raped," Natsios said. Washington has already earmarked $200 million in new money for Liberia, and the European Union and its 15 member-nations are expected to nearly match that figure, U.N. officials said. One
major challenge on the agenda is how to rehabilitate the thousands of armed youth without education or jobs who roam the countryside and neighboring nations, raping and looting.

GDI 2004 Scholars

15 European Union Counterplan

EU Solves Burundi
The EU is capable and willing to assist In Burundi peacekeeping Statement to the Security Council of the United Nations by Ms Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union. Progress report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the Security Council mission to Central Africa (New York) February 17, 2004: The European Union is greatly encouraged by recent progress in Burundi. Since we last had the opportunity in this chamber to discuss the state of the peace process there, a significant milestone has passed with the convening of talks between President Domitien Ndayizeye and a delegation from the National Liberation Forces, the FNL. The European Union is pleased that these talks took place in a constructive and cordial atmosphere. We also welcome the parties’ recognition of the need to end violence in Burundi and their willingness to continue the dialogue. The European Union hopes the proposed follow-up meeting between President Ndayizeye and the FNL takes place at the earliest opportunity. The EU calls for the cessation of all hostilities in Burundi, and for the conclusion of an agreement for the inclusion of the FNL in Burundian state institutions. The European Union remains willing to assist the parties in their quest for a peaceful solution and we reconfirm our readiness to support Burundi in its reconstruction efforts, which remain severely hampered by the ongoing violence in the absence of an all-inclusive peace agreement. Mr. President,The European Union is committed to working closely with our African partners to strengthen African capacities in the area of conflict resolution and peace-keeping. In this regard the EU commends the African Union in its establishing the African Mission in Burundi, AMIB—the first force of its kind in the history of the AU. The European Union fully supports this initiative and is contributing €25 million to AMIB. In addition, a number of the EU’s member states have also made significant national contributions both in advance of and in response to the SecretaryGeneral’s recent appeal for support. Notwithstanding the success and importance of AMIB, the European Union believes, as stated last November in this chamber, that the option of a UN operation in Burundi authorised by this Council will have to be considered in due course. In this regard, the EU welcomes the Secretary General’s sending of an assessment mission to Burundi later this month and we look forward to its reporting in due course.

The EU is one of the Key backing members for Burundi Peacekeeping European Commission, EC03-310EN http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3068 December 4, 2003
The European Commission today welcomed approval by EU Member states of a €25 million grant from the European Development Fund to support current peacekeeping operations in Burundi under the authority of the African Union (AU). The objective of the support is: (i) to offer urgent assistance to the implementation of a fragile peace process that has recently shown signs of positive development; and (ii) to promote a return to stability and national reconciliation to the benefit of the Burundian people, who have suffered tremendously from 10 years of civil war. Poul Nielson, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid, said: “I see the instrumental role of leaders from South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique in brokering peace in Burundi as a confirmation of the determination with which African leaders are currently addressing conflict resolution on their continent. I believe that it is our firm obligation to lend our full support to these efforts. While the Burundian peace process remains fragile, it is offering encouragement on the prospects of a final peace settlement in Burundi. Not only to the benefit of the Burundian people but as an important contribution to the stabilisation of the Great Lakes region that has suffered tremendously from decades of war and conflict.”

GDI 2004 Scholars

16 European Union Counterplan

The EU is responsible for all status quo operations, meaning it is the logical actor for the plan Human Rights Watch Transition in Burundi: Time to Deliver April 30, 2003
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/burundi/burundi043003-bck.htm The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and regional leaders preside over a number of diplomatic initiatives to end the war, but the actual work of peace-keeping is to be handled by a mission of the African Union, a first for the newly-constituted organization (formerly the Organization of African Unity). Forty-three observers attached to the mission have arrived from Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Gabon and Togo and are deployed in several towns, although they are not traveling to combat zones for security reasons. More than one hundred South African troops arrived in Bujumbura on April 27, part of a larger peacekeeping force of three thousand and five hundred soldiers that will include soldiers from Mozambique and Ethiopia. The mandate of the force is only to monitor the cease-fire, leaving it unlikely that its soldiers will even endeavor to protect civilians. As yet, the force has no unit specially tasked with monitoring the human rights situation. The European Union recently pledged 1.23 million euros ($1,100,000) and Belgium promised another million euros ($900,000) to pay for the African mission. The United States will provide some equipment and training. The amounts pledged until now are far short of what will be needed to deploy a force throughout Burundi. Quick to join in diplomacy to help end the war in Burundi, international donors now need to provide the funds needed to help implement the accords on the ground.

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EU Solves Ethiopia/Eritrea
The EU has negotiated between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the past successfully Emira Woods, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) FPIF Commentary from Foreign Policy In Focus Eritrea/Ethiopia War Looms as Washington Watches January 21, 2004
http://www.grassrootsonline.org/gol_0204_eritrea.html On December 12, 2000 , Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Algiers , assisted by mediators from the U.S. , the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity. Under its terms, a 25-kilometer-wide Temporary Security Zone was established within Eritrea to be patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces, while an international Boundary Commission, whose members were approved in advance by both sides, delimited the contested border. The UN force has been there ever since. The Boundary Commission issued its findings in April 2002, giving a little to each side but confirming that Badme was in Eritrea . Both parties initially accepted the outcome, though Ethiopia voiced objections over Badme, which had become the symbolic rationale for the war itself. As a result of this and other reasons (de-mining delays, among them), the actual demarcation never took place.

Because of the EU’s financial Contributions, it is in a unique place to negotiate between Ethiopia and Eritria Africa News January 19, 2004 Monday Copyright 2004 AllAfrica, Inc. PanAfrica;
Seek Peace And Prosperity - German Chancellor Schroeder Lexis search: Ethiopia w/40 EU w/40 peacekeeping The EU has pledged -225 million (about US $275) to help peace initiatives on the continent, and Germany has backed peacekeeping-training centres in Africa. Earlier, Schroeder had praised Ethiopia for its support in the fight against global terrorism and welcomed the country's contribution towards resolving regional conflicts, noting in this context that Ethiopian peacekeepers had been deployed in strife-ridden Liberia and in Burundi, currently emerging from a decade of civil war. During a private meeting, he and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi discussed the stalled three-year-old peace process between Ethiopia and neighbouring Eritrea. Fears have been growing that without a breakthrough, tensions between the two countries could once again flare up into hostilities. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody two-year border war that ended in a peace deal in December 2000. Under the agreement an independent boundary commission was set up to resolve their border dispute and defuse the tensions between them. But Ethiopia is contesting elements of the commission's ruling, one of which placed Badme, the town where the war first flared up, in Eritrea, and another that Ethiopia hand over parts of Irob. Ethiopia says the ruling could serve to ignite renewed conflict, and has called for a "broad-based dialogue" with Eritrea, which, for its part, has rejected such talks until the physical demarcation of the border begins.

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EU Solves Congo
The EU has done Peacekeeping in the Congo with great success Tom Kabs September 2003 http://iss.krakow.pl/Thomas%20Kabs.doc, EUROPEAN UNION’s “
CONGO” –MISSION, Lieutenant Colonel NATO School. Of course EU’s Congo mission was a small one, a timely limited one; but no doubt about that – it was a successful one. Solana said, that the French-led force had “…. given a positive boost to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo….”. European Union’s very first autonomous military mission, the very first military mission without any NATO support was a political sign. I think we have to see this mission as a far bigger test of European Union’s effort to develop a military wing independent of NATO, but not in competition to NATO. Therefore it was the right decision from several EU NATO countries to run this mission alone without NATO (US) influence and to remove “Berlin Plus” rules, which would allow special NATO countries certain control over any EU-led peacekeeping in return for NATO planning and assets. Anyway European Union is becoming more and more active, showing more and more confidence to extend its peacekeeping responsibilities. As you all know EU is sill running its peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but using NATO capabilities, and is increasing its engagement in the Balkans ( at the moment 80 % of the 25.000 NATO led forces in the Kosovo and of the 12.000 troops in Bosnia where the EU set up a civilian/policing mission last January). Sooner or later European Union may have another operations on its agenda, may be in Moldova (Trans Dnestr conflict) may be somewhere else.

The EU has done a significant amount of work in the DRC Statement to the Security Council of the United Nations by Ms Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union. Progress report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the Security Council mission to Central Africa (New York) February 17, 2004: In the DRC, the European Union is encouraged by the significant improvements achieved. These include, inter alia, the improved security situation; the signs of national reunification, such as increased transport links and improving commerce; the better relations between the DRC and its neighbours; and the progress in Security Sector Reform. The EU commends the Transitional Government in its implementation of the Sun City and Pretoria agreements. Difficult decisions have been taken and the commitment of the parties is encouraging. Nevertheless, the situation remains fragile and the European Union urges President Kabila and his Government to continue their work and put in place the legislative framework and establish the national institutions required for the holding of free and transparent elections at all levels, the formation of restructured and integrated military and police forces, and for the implementation of a national DDR programme. Mr. President, The European Union is committed to underpinning peace, security and democracy in the DRC. Operation Artemis and the Union’s support for the Integrated Police Unit are clear demonstrations of that commitment. The EU stands ready to support concrete initiatives for the rebuilding of a stable Congolese State able to guarantee the safety of the Congolese people, national reconciliation and stability in the region. In this regard, the European Union commends the Secretary-General for his initiative in calling last week a high-level meeting to consider a strategy for the international community’s support of the Security Sector Reform effort.

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The EU has experience in the Congo, and troops on the ground CNN June 4, 2003, EU backs force for Congo,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/04/congo.eu/ BRUSSELS, Belgium -- The European Union has agreed to send a 1,400-strong French-led peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo in what will be the body's first military operation in Africa. The decision was made by EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels Wednesday, and is expected to be formally ratified Thursday. The force, to be dubbed Artemis, hopes to secure a cease-fire deal in the Bunia region in the northeast of the country, which has seen hundreds of civilians killed in ethnic fighting during the past month. The decision follows the U.N. Security Council's sanctioning of the French-led operation last Friday, but it does not have NATO logistical support. The joint operation is only the second the EU has embarked on. The first involved about 400 troops being sent to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia last March. The EU plans to establish a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force to handle future trouble spots. Wednesday's decision resolved thorny issues such as financing. France is to contribute 700 troops with the others possibly coming from Britain, Belgium, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland. Non-EU countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Canada and Ethiopia could also take part, European diplomats said. France will hold a conference Tuesday in Paris for countries wanting to contribute troops. The troops are likely to act as a "bridging force" between the departure of the 750 U.N. Uruguay soldiers and the arrival of the U.N. Bangladesh mission. Diplomats said the EU force would be well armed, backed by mechanized units and would operate under robust rules of engagement to allow it to defend itself and civilians. Its main tasks will be to secure Bunia and its airport and protect aid agencies and tens of thousands of refugees around the city.

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The EU is very effective in the Congo United Nations 2004 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q10.htm, FAQ; How is the UN
cooperating with other peace and security organizations?) More recently, other peacekeeping partners have stepped in to assist UN peacekeeping at critical moments to bridge gaps in deployment and strength and to further develop rapid response capabilities. In July 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Operation Artemis, a French-led European Union force, stabilized the situation in Bunia, Ituri province, where civilians were being targeted by warring factions. Authorized by the Security Council for 90 days, the force stanched the violence, got weapons off the streets and saved thousands of civilians. It also prepared the way for the Ituri Brigade, deployed by MONUC, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, before the EU force withdrew. In October 2003, in Liberia and more recently in Côte d’Ivoire,ECOWAS forces paved the way for the deployment of United Nations troops. In addition, regional brigades are being formed in Africa as part of the African Standby Force—an initiative of the African Union welcomed and supported by the United Nations.

Artemis proves that the EU is capable of peacekeeping around the globe and in the Congo Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in
European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress Additionally, from June to September 2003, the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400 in the Congo that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers. The Congo mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by France in a “lead nation” capacity. This mission came as a surprise to many EU observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was geographically farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The Congo operation was planned by French military planners in national headquarters. Some NATO and U.S. officials were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether it wished to undertake the Congo operation. EU officials did consult with NATO about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its permission given that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets.34

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EU Solves Sierra Leone
The EU has the primary lead in the Sierra Leone, and is running and efficient cost effective operation JOHNNIE CARSON PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Testimony to congress, JUNE 11, 1998
While ECOWAS has the leading diplomatic role and ECOMOG is the peacekeeping/security force in Sierra Leone, the region cannot establish peace alone. The international community must be prepared to help. In this regard, the United Kingdom has offered to take the primary lead in generating additional donor support, especially among European Union and Commonwealth countries. A major issue is providing additional support for ECOMOG. ECOMOG has approximately 10,000 troops in Sierra Leone. It estimates another 6-8,000 peacekeepers are needed to have sufficient strength and territorial coverage to provide security and implement disarmament. At the May ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff meeting in Accra, several ECOWAS member-states pledged additional troops, conditioned on receiving donor support to deploy and sustain these contingents. We will be teaming with the British to garner other donor support for these potential troop contributing countries. The British have also pledged £2 million to support ECOMOG. As in Liberia, support for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone promises to be an efficient, cost-effective peacekeeping operation.

While the US has turned its back on Sierra Leone, while the European nations have solved By Norman Kempster and Marjorie Miller LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2000
http://www.ihwc.spb.ru/a_013/13_us.htm “U.S. Keeps Out of Sierra Leone” WASHINGTON - The administration of U.S. President Clinton on Monday rebuffed UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plea for a "rapid reaction force" from the industrialized West to rescue beleaguered UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, although Washington pledged air transport and other logistical support to reinforce the UN troops. Meanwhile, in Freetown, capital of the war-torn West African country, British paratroopers began arriving to evacuate British and European Union citizens. The United States, the United Nations and international relief organizations withdrew most employees as the situation became increasingly dangerous.

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EU Solves Western Sahara
The EU pressure is critical to achieve lasting peace in the western Sahara Nizkor International Human Rights Team Derechos Human Rights Serpaj Europe
04 Jan 1999 http://www.zmag.org/Bulletins/psahara.htm We do consider, given the continuous functioning of the different restrictive appliances, that the guarantee for a free referendum does also imply the withdrawal of the services and bodies of the Moroccan State responsible for serious human rights violations in Western Sahara, particularly, the Moroccan Army, the Territory Security Directorate (D.S.T.), the Judicial Police (P.J.), the Royal Gendarmerie and the Mobile Intervention Companies (C.M.I.). These bodies would have been responsible for more than 90% of the detentions carried out in Western Sahara. 6) We also consider as reprehensible the passive attitude of the international community and especially of Spain given its historical responsibility toward the Saharawi People; we would like to underline that the only possible way for the achivement of peace and safety in Western Sahara consists of the prompt celebration of the Referendum on self-determination. From this point of view, Spain should actively promote such celebration; even if this former colonizing country takes into account the active opposition of Morocco -until the moment neither MINURSO counts with any Spanish component nor the Spanish government has shown any resolute interest in the sending of qualified observers to the area- respecting and supporting at all times the right of the Saharawi People to free determination 7) During his last visit to the region, between November 30, 1998 and December 2, 1998, the UN Secretary-General could confirm that the Polisario clearly accepts the Peace Plan Secretary-General report S/1998/1160 of 11Dec98- , which signifies that the only obstacle preventing the Saharawi People from fully enjoy its right to self-determination, according to International Law, comes from the Kingdom of Morocco, who persists in blocking the efforts of the International Community to arrive to a peaceful and lasting solution. The signing organizations call upon the Internationl Community, in particular the European Union, to direct the necessary pressures towards the Kingdom of Morocco in order to decisively contribute to the fulfillment of the accords.

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23 European Union Counterplan

EU Solves the Golan Heights
EU Has experience and credibility for mediating the Israeli-Syrian Tensions Paul Taylor , http://www.metimes.com/2K/issue2000-14/reg/eus_turn_to.htm “EU's turn to break the Mideast deadlock?” 7 APRIL 2000 INTERNATIONAL EDITION
The European Union's (EU) Middle East envoy appealed on April 2 for urgent international efforts to break the deadlock in Israeli-Syrian peacemaking, saying the next month would be crucial. Miguel Angel Moratinos said the 15-nation EU was in close contact with the United States, Israel and Syria to try to facilitate a resumption of talks following the failure of the summit between US President Bill Clinton and Syrian President Hafez Al Assad in Geneva. "We believe a dialogue between the parties must be restored within this month. We will use all our diplomatic and political weight to try to convince the parties that the only way to solve the issue is through diplomatic negotiation," he told Reuters in an interview. "We still consider the number one priority is to make the Syrian-Israeli track move ahead, and all efforts have to be concentrated in this direction for a comprehensive peace. The next three or four weeks will be crucial," Moratinos said.

EU is the perfect choice for solving the Golan heights Christian Action for Israel http://christianactionforisrael.org/un/idf-leb.html 2000
Annan's public commitment of UN cooperation boosts Barak's efforts to garner broad international support for the withdrawal. Prior to leaving for Switzerland, Levy met on Monday with the US and French ambassadors to Israel to discuss the options of a beefed-up UNIFIL or a whole new peacekeeping force under European Union command. Currently, UNIFIL is an ineffective force of 4,500 soldiers from nine UN member states (France, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Nepal and Poland), several of which want to withdraw their participation. It has budget shortages and has been used by Hizb'Allah as a shield against Israeli retaliatory strikes. A new force could possibly be controlled by the EU, with heavy French involvement, in accord with President Jacques Chirac's recent offer to increase France's role in new security arrangements in Lebanon. ICEJ NEWS has learned that French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin opposes Chirac's proposal to send troops, which prompted Jospin to describe Hizb'Allah as "terrorists" during a recent visit to Israel. A UNIFIL officer from Ireland today estimated the force would need an additional 2,500 personnel to successfully expand its presence into the security zone.

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The EU should be the major mediator in the Golan to avoid US disentanglement, and possible high costs for the US. Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. , Time for "Constructive Disengagement" from the Middle East February 7, 2000, http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-07-00.html
The dominant U.S. role in the talks between Israel and Syria creates the mistaken impression that core American interests are at stake. The United States may be asked to pledge more than $50 billion to cover the costs of Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, including the relocation of the some 15,000 Israelis who have settled in the area since 1967. And there are indications that a peace agreement between Jerusalem and Damascus may require a U.S. military presence on the Golan, perhaps as part of an international monitoring team. Most of the debate in Washington over U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations has focused on the potential costs to American taxpayers and the risks to U.S. soldiers that could result from new financial and military commitments by the Clinton administration. It will be difficult to sell to the American people the proposal that Israel, the largest beneficiary of U.S. military and economic aid, should be further compensated for agreeing to dismantle the settlements on the Golan that U.S. administrations have described for years as "illegal." And at a time when Congress and the public seem weary of U.S. military interventions overseas, especially in the Balkans, the Clinton administration may find little support for placing U.S. troops in yet another province of the former Ottoman Empire, where ethnic and religious rivalries are bound to entangle the United States. Yet even Americans who contend that new U.S. commitments to support a peace accord would not be cost-effective rarely question the underlying assumption that the United States should continue playing a dominant role in the Middle East. That Israel and Syria have decided that it is in their national interest to settle the dispute between them should not be used as an excuse to deepen U.S. military and diplomatic involvement in the region. Instead, Washington now has an opportunity to reassess its entire Middle East policy and start a process of "constructive disengagement." All three major factors that have drawn the United States into the region since the 1950s -- the superpower rivalry, Western access to oil resources and the security of Israel -- have changed beyond recognition. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and Russia plays a marginal role in the Middle East. The collapse of the oil cartel in the 1980s, the transformation in the global energy markets and the political disunity in the Arab world have made the notion of the "Arab oil weapon" a distant memory. Finally, Israel, with its advanced economic and technological infrastructure, including a nuclear capability, is the undisputed military power in the region. Those dramatic strategic changes suggest that the ArabIsraeli peace process has been "de-internationalized." The region has lost its geostrategic importance, and that provides incentives for the local players, including Syria and Israel, to end their conflict. America's national interests are affected only marginally by the status of the negotiations. In contrast to 1956, 1967 and 1973, any Israeli-Arab crisis can now be "localized." It would not lead to a superpower confrontation, ignite an oil embargo against the United States or threaten the existence of Israel. If crises in the region have any wider impact, they affect the nearby countries of the European Union far more than they do the United States. If Israel and Syria insist on the presence of foreign troops to monitor their agreement, the EU, which is developing its own EU Corps for peacekeeping missions, not the United States, should be ready to provide that type of assistance. Hence, while the United States should be ready to play the role of honest mediator in the talks, it should not provide pay-offs to the two sides, in the form of either financial aid or military commitments. Nor should Washington try to encourage Syria to become more "democratic" in exchange for American economic or military aid. The only "reward" Syria should expect is peace with Israel and normal diplomatic and trade relationships with the United States.

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EU Solves Kosovo
The EU has experience in Kosovo European Commission, December 15, 2003 http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3113
On 15 December 2003, the EU launches a new police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). “EUPOL Proxima” will succeed the EU’s “Concordia” peacekeeping military mission, which expires that same day. It is the second EU police mission following the “EUPM” that was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15 January 2003. “Proxima” demonstrates the EU’s continued commitment to the consolidation of stability and the rule of law in the Balkans, within the objectives of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp). The promotion of European standards of policing in FYROM is part of the EU’s wider strategy of supporting the process of reform, including institution building, administrative and judicial reforms and fight against organised crime and corruption, all of which are essential for the development of a stable and democratic state. The EU, the leading donor, will spend a total of € 54 million during 2000 – 2004 to support reforms in these areas. “Proxima” is the third EU’s European Security and Defence Policy operation in the Balkans and the fourth globally when including the “ARTEMIS” peacekeeping military mission successfully carried out in Bunia (Congo) over the Summer of 2003 Proxima aims to help the FYROM authorities develop their police forces to the highest European and international standards through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting the management and operations of the police. In particular, it will focus on supporting the government’s efforts to fight organised crime and to uphold the rule of law in the whole territory, with emphasis on the former crisis areas. The total costs of the mission amount to €15 million for the first year, including set-up costs of €7.3 million, all funded through the Community budget. The EU’s Member States will contribute in kind through the secondment of staff. EU police officers will wear their national police uniforms and an EU badge. They will not be armed and local police will remain responsible for executive tasks.

The EU is already focusing its efforts on the Balkans—it’s only feasible that it could control peacekeeping in the region Keohane, 2003 (Daniel, Research Fellow for Security & Defence Policy at the Centre for European
Reform, “EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?” http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.html, accessed July 8, 2004) Since the birth of the EU’s defence policy, out of Franco-British parentage at St. Malo in 1998, the general assumption amongst many – especially British and American – defence analysts has been that NATO would have ‘the right of first refusal’ over prospective missions, leaving the EU to pickup NATO’s leftovers. As Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, put it in 2000: “The EU only envisages applying a military response to a crisis if the NATO alliance as a whole is not engaged…But if the US does not engage…someone else may need to, and it is better for our overall security if we can do so effectively.”[1] And most observers have expected the EU to depend on NATO assets – such as the expertise of its military planners – to run its missions. For example, EU peacekeepers in Macedonia depend on NATO’s help to conduct their operation there. EU military missions in the Balkans are possible because of the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement signed at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. This long-awaited EU-NATO agreement, which came after months of political wrangling, allows the EU to use NATO resources to overcome its own capability shortfalls. In addition, the overwhelming geographical focus of EU military efforts thus far has been on the Balkan region. The Bush administration has already indicated that it would probably pull its forces out of Bosnia sometime in 2004, leaving the way open for the EU to take over that mission. If the US – for its own strategic reasons – eventually pulled out of Kosovo as well, the EU would probably have to fill that vacuum, putting it in charge of all Balkan military missions. But should the EU act beyond the Balkans?

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EU peacekeeping would provide effective peacekeeping in the Balkans in addition to a foundation for stability in Europe Bereuter and Lis 2003 (Doug and John, Chairman of Subcomittee of foreign relations, Sr. policy
advisor for transatlantic relations, TWQ winter, projectMUSE) The EU would do better to focus its efforts on creating its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops with complementary air and naval assets that could be rapidly deployed and sustained for one year for crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian operations. If the RRF becomes fully operational, the EU will be the logical institution to assume peacekeeping in the Balkans from NATO, as some EU countries have proposed. An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as the EU’s work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. In that fashion, the ESDP can be an important part of a comprehensive spectrum of capabilities for crisis management in Europe. An important step toward a peaceful Europe came in June 2003 when the European Council declared that the EU is open to membership by the countries of the western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. Ultimately, the incorporation of this region into the EU will assist its people in building peaceful, prosperous lives. Already, the EU in March 2003 assumed the NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, with generally good results to date. Although that mission is small, with less than 350 troops, this is a positive indication that the ESDP can play a role in crisis management in Europe. In the future, the EU should assume the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo, but we must be careful not to risk the stability that NATO has brought to the region during the past eight years by having the EU assume these missions before it is ready to meet their challenges.

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EU Solves Afghanistan
The EU is has been responsible for many of the improvements in Afghanistan European Commission, 30/3/2004, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=1910&lg=5, EC03001EN The European Union (EU) has been and continues to be one of the major donors backing the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Taking together contributions from the Community Budget and Member States, the EU provided over €850 million in 2002 and €835 million in assistance to
Afghanistan in 2003 to help in its reconstruction efforts. At the Tokyo donors' conference in 2002, the European Commission (EC) played a leading part in this EU performance. The Commission promised €1 billion over 5 years. In both 2002 and 2003, the actual amount committed to Afghanistan has been higher, and assistance has been delivered swiftly. At the 31 March 1 April Berlin International Conference on Afghanistan, Europe will again be a significant participant. This reconstruction support is only part of the story. Europe is

also playing a lead role in providing troops for the International Security Assistance Force and the growing number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams which aim to improve the security and stability for Afghanistan. Contributions from the Community Budget have outstripped the Tokyo pledge. In
Tokyo, the Commission effectively pledged €200 million per year for Afghanistan. In 2002, the Commission delivered over €280 million (including €72 million from ECHO). In 2003, the Commission delivered over €300 million (including extra €50 million to promote security by supporting police salaries and training, and € 55 million from ECHO). In 2004, the EC expects to commit around €245 million for reconstruction and humanitarian support. The European Commission is delivering fast. In both 2002 and 2003, over 70

percent of funds were actually contracted within one year. This is an impressive performance for the EC and indeed for any agency. Delivery is accelerating. Between July 2003 and April 2004, the EC expects
to commit a total of €337 in development assistance alone. By August 2004, the EC expects that, at least 80 percent of this will be contracted. European Commission, 30/3/2004, http://europa-euun.org/article.asp?id=1910&lg=5, EC03-001EN Just under €100 million is being devoted to the strengthening of the government in Kabul, through reform of the public sector, capacity building within key government institutions, and continued financial support for the government's recurrent budget. This helps the Afghan government deliver services, which are urgently required by the population. The EC is channelling over €100 million to rural development to underpin the rapid growth that will provide legitimate long term employment for rural communities. Almost three-quarters of the Afghan population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In addition, €9 million will be targeted explicitly on providing alternative livelihoods in the Eastern region for those who might otherwise depend on illicit poppy cultivation. The EC is supplying €65

million to help the Afghan police impose law and order, another key component in Afghanistan's fight against drugs. Lastly, Afghanistan must be better able to stop smugglers on its borders if the drugs trade is to be controlled. To this end, the EC is financing a project to strengthen border control on the
Afghan-Iran border so the authorities are better able to interdict and stop drug smugglers. Beyond drugs and security, Afghanistan faces the challenge of preparing for elections this year, a key milestone in the Bonn Process to stabilisation and democratisation. By early 2003, the European Union has financed €30 million for voter registration, nearly half of the original budget for this exercise. Within this, the Commission contributed €15 million. In addition the EC is making an important contribution to the regeneration of the national economy by helping to repair the roads network (€90 million), boost public health (€25 million) and remove mines and unexploded ordinance. Examples of EC Achievements The Commission's assistance programmes are making a real difference to Afghans' lives: Emergency work on the Kabul-Jalalabad road has already cut travel times by up to half. Work to fully reconstruct the road is now underway; Health services are being delivered in six provinces, covering 20 percent of the population; Key public sector workers including doctors, teachers and nurses and the police are back at work; A kick-start for the rural economy

by providing 57,000 metric tons of improved seed, vaccinating 200,000 animals and rehabilitating 633 irrigation structures. This contributed to the remarkable economic take-off of the rural economy in 2003; The creation of 1.4 million days of employment - in 2002 alone - to promote rural livelihoods; The clearance of 8 million square metres from land mines, allowing families to return to their homes to restart their lives; The rehabilitation of the women's park in Kabul, plus hammans across many urban centres.
For the first time women can gather together in public without being accompanied by male family members

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EU Solves Cyprus
EU action is crtiical to preserving stability countries in the Mediterranean because they have inextricable economic, military and political ties Dillery 2004 (Edward, retired foreign service officer, Mediterranean Quart. V15 n2 spring,
projectMUSE) Europe and the twelve countries of the littoral are inextricably tied to each other by economic, humanitarian, and security interests. The partnership has been notable in that it includes countries that normally do not have relations with each other—for example, Israel and the Arab nations, the parties on Cyprus, and Greece and Turkey. Remarkably, it has been possible to assemble all the participants at several meetings. Economic relations are important. North Africa’s natural gas is vital to the economy of the EU, and the trade of each “party” is heavily oriented toward the other. Europe needs a stable Mediterranean in order to further this relationship, as do the countries of the littoral. Biscop points out the mechanisms the EU established to pursue the relationship, one of which is the European Security and Defense Policy, the purpose of which is to create an EU military capability.

The EU is vital to achieving peace over Cyprus Dillery 2004 (Edward, retired foreign service officer, Mediterranean Quart. V15 n2 spring,
projectMUSE) The second recommendation is that the EU should “assume responsibility and should actively work towards a settlement between Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities,” using as the principal tool the accession process. He feels that a breakthrough might have been achieved in these issues if the EU had been more active and sees progress here as a vital step in achieving real partnership.

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EU Solves Kashmir
The EU is the only actor capable of resolving the Kashmir dispute- the US’s historical partiality to Pakistan destroys their ability to resolve the dispute credibly The Independent 8-12-1999
But it may yet be worth a try. In both countries nationalists are in the ascendant, and India's belligerence this week may not be unconnected with this autumn's election. Afterwards, however, Delhi might just be ready to listen to an outsider. And who might that be? Obviously not Britain, the former colonial power. Nor Russia, traditionally a friend of India. The US, historically sympathetic to Pakistan but now mending its ties with Delhi, is one candidate. But another is the European Union, an important economic partner of both countries, but one which carries little historical baggage in the subcontinent. The chances of success are slim - but, equally, there is little to lose. And if the EU is serious about raising its foreign affairs profile, the face-off between India and Pakistan is as good a place to start as any.

More EU involvement in the Kashmir dispute is key to a lasting settlement- US policies are too piecemeal to have any lasting effect International Crisis Group 2004 (June 24th, Asia Report, online:
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2825, accessed: 7-10-04) Everything from governance to education and healthcare needs funding and inventive policymaking. Almost all the burden of ending confli also required. Direct mediation or a major UN role have been rejected by New Delhi but the Indian government should recognise that some post-conflict assistance would be useful. The U.S. has played a key role in defusing conflicts but needs to develop a longer-term policy perspective to prevent crises from blowing up. The European Union (EU) should make South Asia a greater priority and be more willing to take an active part there by promoting economic and social integration ct in South Asia lies with the Indian and Pakistani governments but supportive, sustained and sensitive international assistance is and doing more to promote democracy in Pakistan.

The EU’s economic ties with both India and Pakistan give the EU valuable political clout for mediating disputes between the two countries International Crisis Group 2004 (June 24th, Asia Report, online:
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2825, accessed: 7-10-04) Both India and Pakistan are keen to improve their relations with the EU, a major trading partner and investor for both. Indian trade with the Union is as great as it is with the U.S. and is expected to grow significantly. In Pakistan, too, trade ties with and economic assistance from Europe could translate into leverage for the EU. Yet Brussels is hesitant to exercise its potential influence. The EU has traditionally been reluctant to get closely involved in the Pakistan-India conflict, which is seen as too far away, low on its list of priorities and difficult. There should be greater recognition of the real urgency and dangers of the situation.1

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EU Solves Demining
The EU has an Active and Effective Demining program Russell Gasser, Project Officer, Humanitarian Demining RTD Landmines in Africa issue 6, August 2002 http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.2/features/russellgasser/russellgasser.htm
Legislative policy on landmines is determined by the European Council and European Parliament, which have strongly supported the Ottawa Process and the elimination of all AP landmines within ten years of ratification of the treaty; this includes the political decision to fund mine action. The EU Research and Technological Development (RTD) for Humanitarian Demining (HD) is administered by the European Commission (EC). In 2000, the European Union (EU) contributed $125 million to the fight against AP landmines through both member states’ donations and funding administered through the EC (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mine/publication/index.htm).In July 2001, the Council and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the Reinforcement of the EU response against AP landmines: the first one covering developing countries and the second one covering other countries; the regulations lay the foundations for a European integrated and focused policy. The majority of the RTD spending was delivered in support of the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme administered through the Directorate General Information Society (DG-INFSO) (http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka1/environment/projects/clustering.htm#cluster3). Other Directorates General also played important roles in humanitarian mine action RTD, notably the Joint Research Centre. The EU contribution to research and development (R&D), through the IST programme, is generally in the form of a maximum of 50 percent matching funds for developing demining technologies. The remainder of the funding comes from participating industrial partners. The programme is therefore oriented towards the development of prototypes, which can be turned into commercially successful outcomes so that the participating businesses can recover their R&D costs from future sales of demining equipment, or other equipment in the case of dual-use technologies. This is a very different R&D environment from many military programmes which are 100 percent funded and thus do not have the same commercial drive and commercial constraints. The EC is also seeking results in the short to mid term in order to aid compliance with the goal of APL clearance by 2010. Academic partners and Support Measures aimed at providing a service to demining RTD can be funded at up to 100 percent of additional costs.

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EU Solves Middle East
EU’s aide in the Israel-Palestine disputes prove their credibility in the Middle East Bereuter and Lis 2003 (Doug and John, Chairman of Subcomittee of foreign relations, Sr. policy
advisor for transatlantic relations, TWQ winter, projectMUSE) In the field of foreign policy, the EU is a participant along with the United States, the UN, and Russia in the Quartet, working to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is an excellent example of the EU using its Common Foreign and Security Policy to play a constructiverole in resolving a conflict outside of Europe that creates great instability in the Middle East as well as the broader Islamic world and that threatens the security of Europe and North America. The June 2003 visit to the House by Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to discuss the road map for Middle East peace was marked by a lively debate with members of Congress who questioned aspects of EU policy, including the damaging effect of the EU foreign ministers meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which undermined the authority of then-Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and the EU’s reluctance to brand the civilian wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, few in Congress fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of the EU’s role in the Middle East peace process. disturbed by the EU’s extreme trade distorting policies.

EU mediation is critical to bolstering Israeli peace talks- the US has no credibility because of their unwavering support of Israel Jerusalem Post 7-30-1998
Fatah officials called on the Palestinian Authority yesterday to withdraw from negotiations with Israel due to a lack of progress in the talks. The talks were expected to resume again today after a day's recess. Saeb Erekat, the PA Minister of Local Authorities, said that little progress has been achieved at the talks. Marwan Barghouti, the Secretary General of Fatah in the West Bank, told The Jerusalem Post that the negotiations have reached a deadlock. He urged the PA to declare that the talks have failed because of Israeli intransigence and that there is a real crisis. "Without the feeling of a real crisis in the negotiations, the world will not move to rescue the peace process," said Barghouti. He has called on the EU and the UN to become involved in the process, saying the US "has no credibility" and is biased in favor of Israel. who's asked EU, and UN to join in the peace process efficiency.

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EU Has Credible Force
The EU has taken on commitments before, and has a 60,000 strong peacekeeping force ready. European Commission, 4/6/2003 (Ref: EC03-142EN, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2390)
The European Union approved its first peacekeeping mission outside Europe and without help from NATO, deciding Wednesday to send troops to strife-torn Congo in response to a U.N. plea. EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels OK’d the deployment after clearing up logistical questions, including how it will be financed, EU diplomats said on condition of anonymity. The operation will be dubbed Artemis after the Greek goddess of hunting. EU ministers will formally ratify the decision Thursday. The French-led force of 1,400 - authorized by the U.N. Security Council last Friday - would be only the second mission undertaken by the EU. The bloc took over peacekeeping duties in Macedonia last March with about 400 troops, but received planning and logistical support from NATO, which includes the United States. A mission to northeast Congo, where tribal fighting over the past month has killed more than 500 people, would be a far bigger test of the EU's effort to develop a military wing independent of NATO to beef up its foreign policy ambitions. It also would involve considerably more risk than anything tried so far. "The situation is anything but safe or stable at the moment," EU spokesman Diego de Ojeda said. France, which has extensive experience intervening in African trouble spots, will supply the commander of the Congo force and about 700 troops. Britain, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland may also participate along with non-EU nations such as South Africa, Brazil, Canada and Ethiopia, European diplomats say. The vanguard of the force is expected in the city of Bunia this weekend. France will hold a conference next Tuesday in Paris for countries that want to contribute troops. The final order to deploy and an operational plan should be approved by the next day, diplomats said, adding that both were considered formalities. The force will take over from about 750 beleaguered U.N. peacekeepers from Uruguay until Sept. 1, when a larger U.N. force led by Bangladesh is due to be in place.The EU began four years ago to put together a pool of 60,000 troops available at short notice for peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and regional crises. Defense ministers declared the rapid-reaction force ready last month, although hardware gaps remain.Diplomats said the EU force would be well armed, backed by mechanized units and would operate under robust rules of engagement to allow it to defend itself and civilians. Its main tasks will be to secure Bunia and its airport and protect aid agencies and tens of thousands of refugees around the city.

The EE has 5000 civilian police ready Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in
European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU announced its “determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” At Helsinki, the EU decided to establish an institutional decision-making framework for ESDP and a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force to be fully operational by 2003. This force would be deployable within 60 days for at least a year and capable of undertaking the full range of “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement), but it would not be a standing “EU army.” Rather, troops and assets at appropriate readiness levels would be identified from existing national forces for use by the EU. In addition, EU leaders at Helsinki welcomed efforts to restructure European defense industries, which they viewed as key to ensuring a European industrial and technological base strong enough to support ESDP military requirements. The EU has also sought to bolster its civilian capacities for crisis management in the context of ESDP. In June 2000, the EU decided to establish a 5,000-strong civilian police force, and in June 2001, the EU set targets for developing deployable teams of experts in the rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection.

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The EU has a credible 60,000-strong rapid reaction force capable of peacekeeping Financial Times 12/16/2002
EU leaders agreed three years ago to establish a 60,000-strong rapid-reaction force by mid-2003, capable of deployment within 60 days, of remaining on the ground for up to a year, and of carrying out tasks including humanitarian missions and armed peacekeeping. Diplomats said this plan, known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) gained a big political and psychological boost with weekend's accord, to be signed in Brussels today by Nato and the EU's political and security committee. "ESDP may finally have some credibility," said a senior EU diplomat. Launched in 1999 at the Helsinki summit, ESDP was set up to complement the EU's economic and political powers. It was also a response to the 1999 Kosovo war, which exposed the EU's lack of defence instruments. The military dimension of ESDP was stalled from the beginning because of Turkish and Greek haggling over the terms of Berlin Plus. The EU's first police mission will start on January 1 in Bosnia, when more than 500 officers, wearing their national uniforms but with an EU insignia, will take over the operation today led by the United Nations.

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The EU has already shown they have credibly hard power in East Timor, Africa and Afganistan The Economist 11/23/2002
A little modest muscle-flexing is already going on. European soldiers have increasingly been showing up in places far from home, from Africa to East Timor. In Afghanistan, despite the misgivings of certain politicians that this was a bit far "out of area", some European governments have contributed specialist forces and equipment to the overthrow of the Taliban and the hunt for al-Qaeda operatives; others have lent troops to the peacekeeping force in Kabul, and much more. In a sign of the expeditionary times, Germany has requested NATO assistance when it takes joint command, with the Netherlands, of the international security force in Kabul in February. Europeans have also taken on heavier duties in other places, both in the Balkans and, in the months after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, in defence of American airspace, to free American troops and equipment for the war on terrorism. European intelligence services and police forces have helped track down al-Qaeda cells around the globe.

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EU Solves Terrorism
Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress Following September 11, 2001, the EU struggled with whether to expand ESDP’s purview to include combating external terrorist threats or other new challenges, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In June 2002, EU leaders agreed that the Union should develop counter-terrorism force requirements, but stopped short of expanding the Petersberg tasks. Increasingly, however, EU member states appear to recognize that ESDP must have a role in addressing new challenges in order to remain relevant and to bolster the EU’s new, broader security strategy developed by the EU’s top foreign policy official, Javier Solana. The description of the Petersberg tasks in the text of the draft constitutional treaty states that “all of these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism;” many analysts assert that once the draft treaty is finalized, this language would effectively expand the Petersberg tasks to include combating terrorism. In the wake of the March 11, 2004 terrorist bombings in Spain, EU leaders on March 25-26, 2004 announced a new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism;” among other measures, it calls for “work to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of ESDP to the fight against terrorism.”38

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EU Solves Peacekeeping
The US is unequipped for Peacekeeping, and thus is reliant on the EU for those tasks Sherle R. Schwenninger, former Editor, World Policy Journal, Senior Fellowm World Policy Institute
Co-director, Global Economic Policy Program at the New America Foundation, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2003, p. http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/schwenninger.html. (DRG/E84) But even in this case, Europe may have more influence and leverage over the United States than has been commonly recognized. Even though Washington is trying to build a flexible military structure that is less dependent on its allies, the United States still relies on European bases and infrastructure for non-NATO missions, and it still needs a measure of European support and participation to gain domestic support for those missions. Beyond this, Washington depends upon European Union members for peacekeeping and nation-building tasks, not just in the Balkans but in Afghanistan and most likely soon in Iraq, and it benefits from European assistance for other U.S. security-related concerns, such as support for the Palestinian Authority. This is not to mention the importance of Europe’s active cooperation in stopping international terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation.

EU POSSESSES MANY CAPABILITIES FOR SUPPORTING UN PKOS Jakob Kellenberger, President International Committee of the Red Cross, Peace Support Operations: lessons learned and future perspectives, eds. Spillmann, Bernauer & Gabriel, 2001, p. 177
(HARVUN2256) The emerging EU military and police capabilities open many new possibilities for cooperation and coordination with the UN on crisis management. As ESDP gradually develops, the density of EU’s relations with the United Nations in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management will grow. The EU’s current work on its emerging ESDP instruments as well as on conflict prevention is echoed in several ways in the UN’s own debate on how to improve conflict prevention and crisis management performance. The EU has lessons to learn from the UN’s experience, especially as the UN itself is about to draw lessons from this experience. The UN debate and, in particular, the follow up to the Brahimi Report is, therefore, of direct relevance to EU’s future instruments.

The EU has an efficient Peacekeeping Force that has deployed in numerous theaters Fraser Cameron is director of studies at the European Policy Centre in Brussels autumn 2003 NATO
Review http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html The Maastricht Treaty also saw the birth of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Even though the CFSP could not have been launched at a worse time, with the wars of Yugoslav dissolution exposing European weakness and divisions, gradually the European Union began to get its act together. It agreed the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, which covered peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. It set up new institutions, notably the office of a CFSP High Representative, currently Javier Solana, and a political and security committee (akin to NATO’s North Atlantic Council) to provide direction. Prompted by France and the United Kingdom, the European Union also agreed to establish a rapid reaction force and tackle some of the capability gaps that became apparent in the Kosovo crisis. Most recently, and despite the divisions over Iraq, the European Union has started three peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and Congo. Others are in the pipeline. There are thousands of European peacekeepers deployed in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Furthermore, the European Union has agreed policy guidelines on weapons of mass destruction and proliferation and a new draft security policy doctrine has been formulated by Solana.

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EU solves for Democracy/Hum Rights
The EU would provide the a foundation for human rights and democracy in addition to a neutral peacekeeping force The Guardian 11-21-2000
Long-standing plans to give the European Union a joint military capability took a big and welcome step forward in Brussels yesterday. Britain, rightly, is at the forefront of this effort. If the nations of Europe are to maximise their influence in a world they no longer control, they do better to speak with one voice. If shared European principles concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law are to be promoted, then it is logical for EU members to pool their resources in support of those objectives. If Britain, sidelined for example by the euro-zone countries, is to demonstrate that it can lead in Europe, defence is one area of enhanced cooperation where it has the potential to excel. But to work effectively, the EU's nascent common foreign and security policy needs teeth and clout. The 60,000-strong rapid reaction force, backed by significant naval and air assets, is intended to provide it. In the post-Cold War era, when military forces are becoming smaller, more professional, and ever more expensive, it makes sense to concentrate joint efforts and budgets on the new tasks of humanitarian assistance, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking. In theory, the days when France acts unilaterally (and ineffectually) in Rwanda (as in 1994), or Britain in Sierra Leone (as now), or when a pressing international crisis is largely left to others to resolve (as in East Timor last year), or when Europe intervenes late or not at all (as in Bosnia, Kurdistan, and Chechnya) may soon be passing - and not before time. In theory, if they existed now, EU battalions could form the neutral force currently proposed for the Occupied Territories.

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***EU Credibility

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Peacekeeping Key EU Credibility
Soft power may not be enough to secure the EU’s prominence in world affairs—ESDP military projects can give the EU the credibility it needs Haine, 2004 (Jean-Yves, Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, “The
EU’s Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?” http://journal.georgetown.edu/Issues/ws04/hainelocked.pdf, accessed July 9, 2004)

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Peacekeeping is Key to EU security and credibility Dan Smith, OBE, Senior Adviser, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Board Chair,
Institute for War & Peace Reporting in London, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Spring 2002, p. 441. (DRG/E88) While the United States takes a somewhat distant attitude about peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the European Union cannot. There is nothing distant about peacekeeping and peacebuilding for the European Union: both are central components of EU security policy. Following the end of the Cold War, two features of the new security landscape impressed themselves upon political opinion in Western Europe. The first was that the European Community had turned out to be an excellent security instrument. Along with NATO, it had succeeded in making war impossible between France and Germany, bitter foes whose three wars from 1870 to 1945 had dominated European politics. From this it followed that enfolding Eastern Europe within the European Union was the most durable means of ensuring European security. As in the case of peacebuilding, so in security policy as a whole; the EU’s main means of security turned out to be the European Union itself. This insight was given more influence in European strategic thinking by the second key feature of the new security landscape—the striking lack of an external threat. NATO’s planning had been predicated on external threat, even if the threat of an invasion by the USSR was already being downplayed in the 1970s. Strategic planning in the 1990s had to cope with the absence of any significant, direct, external threat. While it is possible that after September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorism may be given a new profile in EU governments’ security perspectives, the shift in thinking in the 1990s was fundamental. Instead of threats, security policy was shaped to face the problem of instability and insecurity in neighboring regions. The means to deal with this were not defense and deterrence but conflict management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

EU involvement in global peacekeeping establishes their credibility The Gazette March 23rd 2003
"Every night we barricade ourselves at home. It feels worse than war." Today, her safety becomes the European Union's problem as the 15-nation bloc mounts its first military operation by taking over peacekeeping duties from NATO. Success could lend credibility to the vision of an independent European military force operating where NATO or the United States don't want to get involved. The EU eventually plans to form a 60,000strong rapid reaction force.

The lack of a forceful political footing will devastate the EU’s role in global affairs Richardson and Cox, 2004 (Keith and Robert, former Secretary General of the European
Roundtable of Industrialists, and former Senior Advisor to the European Community’s Humanitarian Office, “Salvaging the Wreckage of Europe’s Constitution: Political Options for 2004,” http://www.friendsofeurope.org/pdfs/SalvagingtheWreckageofEuropesConstitution.pdf, accessed July 9, 2004) What is at stake in the intergovernmental conference (IGC) is how the Institutions will work after 2009. The Nice Treaty failed to provide an adequate long-term solution for an enlarged Union to tackle new challenges effectively. Moreover, it did not simplify the way in which the EU works. The Treaty of Nice does not reinforce the Union's foreign policy. Neither does it provide adequate instruments to work better in justice and home affairs or to coordinate economic policies more effectively. The EU needs a stronger political foundation to become a forceful player in world affairs. Without such a political foundation, its economic achievements and its overall cohesion will be at risk. If the IGC manages to find an agreement in 2004 on an ambitious Constitutional treaty, the much needed innovations developed at the Convention should be introduced as foreseen, without any new delay. If no agreement can be reached, however, I see serious dangers for the efficiency of the European Union and its relevance to global developments.

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ESDP military policies give the EU international credibility by providing an effective supplement to economic policies
Papantoniou, 2002 (Yiannos, Minister of National Defense of the Hellenic Republic, “Southeastern Europe in the New Security Environment, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/PapantoniouLecture02.pdf, accessed July 9, 2004) The EU view considers military means to be at the one end of the spectrum, with trade and economic sanctions on the other. This continuum also implies that sanctions should not only be seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the extreme case of using force, eventually. This reflects the limitations of the civilian-power Europe discussed in earnest back in the 80’s. Today, instead of ignoring the concept, the EU must build on it, by stressing the relationship between military capabilities and the support of democratic principles. Moreover, the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of the EU as an important 22 and influential international actor. By not having the military option, the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible. By having both options, the EU would enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre when dealing with international crises.

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Peacekeeping is key for EU credibility Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in
European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress Enhancing European military capabilities has been and remains a key challenge for the EU as it seeks to forge a credible ESDP. As noted above, the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo demonstrated serious deficiencies in European military assets and the widening technology gap with U.S. forces. European shortfalls in strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions, command and control systems, intelligence, aerial refueling, and suppression of enemy air defenses were among the most obvious. In setting out the parameters of the EU rapid reaction force and its capability needs, EU leaders sought to establish goals that would require members to enhance force deployability and sustainability, and to reorient and ultimately increase defense spending to help fill equipment gaps. The most ambitious members envisioned the EU’s rapid reaction force developing a combat capability equivalent, for example, to NATO’s role in the Kosovo conflict.

Peacekeeping is essential for EU credibility Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis April 6, 2004 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32342.pdf Analyst in
European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS report for congress EU leaders view ESDP as one of the next great projects on the road to European integration, and will likely seek to enhance ESDP further over the next decade. As noted above, most EU members assert that EU efforts to boost defense capabilities should complement — not compete with — those of the alliance. The UK hopes that bringing more and better military hardware to the table will give the European allies a bigger role in alliance decision-making. Italy and Spain, among others, hope that ESDP’s military requirements will eventually provide the necessary ammunition to pry more defense funding out of reluctant legislatures and publics more concerned with social spending and struggling economies. Incoming EU member states from central and eastern Europe, such as Poland and the three Baltic states, back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken NATO or the transatlantic link. The EU’s four neutral members (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) prefer to concentrate their efforts on ESDP’s civilian side.

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EU Cares About Congo
The Congo mission is an important testing ground for the ESDP Tom Kabs September 2003 http://iss.krakow.pl/Thomas%20Kabs.doc, EUROPEAN UNION’s “
CONGO” –MISSION, Lieutenant Colonel NATO School. Yes, it is true, that this military mission was described as a very difficult, risky operation. But we should also see ARTEMIS as the very first and welcome opportunity for the European Union to demonstrate that the EU has “ …added some modest military muscles to its economic weight….”. And please allow me to add that EU’s “ High Representative”, Mr Solana, really wanted to see if the Europeans would be able to make the difference. So – as for the very first time and I do not forget EU’s military mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which I see from a different perspective – Solana “ ….was taking the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the ground to make Europeans stop talking about theory and capabilities instead carry out a mission….”. (Steven Everts, British political analyst)

The Congo is a testing point for the EU’s defense policies European Foreign Affairs Review December 2003 200324, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 493-503(11)
In parallel to all this, the EU has launched its first peacekeeping operations on the ground. Since January 2003, in fact, the EU has been engaged in three missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – performing a variety of tasks, from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management. On the whole, over 2 000 police and military personnel are involved in the operations. The military operations, in particular, are important test cases for the Union’s ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. Although limited in scope and time, the current engagements are the first hands-on manifestation of the EU’s security and defence dimension, which may lead to more ambitious interventions within and beyond its periphery.

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EU Cares about East Timor
EU involvement in peacekeeping in East Timor is critical to their credibility The Irish Times 9-4-1999
Diplomats said, however, that the ban could and would be renewed after four months if the Indonesian authorities did not co-operate fully with the international community. And ministers called on Jakarta to accept the dispatch of a special human rights mission to East Timor under the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Mrs Mary Robinson, to conduct an investigation into violations with the aim of making those responsible directly accountable.The meeting heard an impassioned appeal from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Andrews, who is the EU's special representative on East Timor. "Time is of the essence," Mr Andrews told his colleagues of the need to deploy peacekeeping troops as soon as possible. "The Union, if it is to maintain its credibility, must throw its full weight behind those in the UN Security Council who are seeking to bring this about." But he urged "extreme caution" in their dealings with the Indonesians.

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EU Cares about Sudan
E.U. is concerned with resolving the issue of Sudan. The Humanitarian Aid Office, of the European Commission, 9-18-1998
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/665f69e2a46f3548c1256686003877b0?OpenDocument
The EU welcomes the latest round of negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement which were held in Addis Abeba from 4 to 7 August 1998 in the framework of IGAD, and the agreement of the parties to convene a fourth round of negotiations within six months in Nairobi. The European Union nevertheless notes with regret that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement were not able at this stage to reach an agreement on major questions of contention, like the geographical definition of the area to be subject to a referendum. The European Union underlines the importance of the mechanism of shuttle diplomacy as a means of narrowing the gap between the parties on outstanding issues and recommends its continuation.

E.U. is concerned with Sudan, and encourages working with UN implementation of humanitarian needs. The Humanitarian Aid Office, of the European Commission, 9-18-1998
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/665f69e2a46f3548c1256686003877b0?OpenDocument
The EU remains very concerned at the current humanitarian tragedy of the populations in South Sudan. In order to allow full access to those in dire need of assistance, the EU, recalling its declaration of 1 May 1998, welcomes the 3 months' cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal which has been agreed upon by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, and the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire issued by the Government of Sudan on 4 August 1998. The EU urges both parties to extend the cease-fire geographically and beyond the above-mentioned period. This should be done for humanitarian purposes and as a confidence building measure. The EU emphasises that food aid will be required for at least another year. The EU calls on all parties involved to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need, to provide, where requested, international humanitarian relief agencies with all possible assistance and to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law. The Union further calls on all parties to respect and guarantee the security of all personnel of the aid organisations and relief flights and their crews and other means of humanitarian transport and supply depots. It encourages the parties to work with the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance in this regard and calls on them to facilitate, as agreed and without further delay, the implementation of the UN humanitarian needs assessment mission in the Nuba mountain region.

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EU Credibility Key To EU Cohesion
The EU’s credibility as a cohesive force in Europe is essential to the success of nations in the region Grabbe, 2003 (Heather, research director of the Center for European Reform in London, “Europe's
Power of Attraction,” http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grabbe_wsj_24apr03.html, accessed July 10, 2004) Europe is full of gloom about the prospects for a common foreign and security policy, following the EU's spectacular divisions on U.S. policy over Iraq. But Europe should learn from its successes as well as its failures. Last week, the EU celebrated the success of its most effective foreign policy ever when it signed an accession treaty with 10 post-communist countries. Their membership in the European Union from May 1, 2004 is a triumph of Europe's "soft power"--the force of attraction and the ability to shape countries in the EU's own image. For over a decade, the EU has been actively involved in state-building on a huge scale in Central and Eastern Europe. The Union has influenced almost every aspect of institutional and economic reform in these countries. The United States cannot boast that any country has adopted its norms and values as assiduously as the candidate countries have taken on the EU's models. The initial "regime change" was achieved by the people of Central and Eastern Europe themselves. But after the 1989 revolutions were over and the hard work of reconstructing states and markets began, the EU provided a strong guiding hand. The EU did not just lead by example, it used its soft power instruments actively to encourage the postcommunist countries to move toward westward models. The Union cannot claim all the credit for the region's progress, because most of the hard work was done by the countries themselves. But the EU was able to empower reformist politicians by approving their efforts and rewarding them with aid, trade and political ties. The Union influenced the political choices of the Central and East Europeans across a vast range of policy areas, from market regulation to the protection of minority rights. It also guided the reforms in great detail, from setting toy standards to improving air quality. Enlargement is a foreign policy that taps the EU's strengths. Trade, investment and aid were much more important in influencing the post-communist transformation than the EU's puny military capabilities. It used the power of attraction, not coercion. And the slow-moving, cumbersome nature of the EU's supranational institutions was an advantage--unusually--because it ensured the continuity of a long-term policy even as the commitment of the national governments wavered.

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EU Credibility Key to peace in the Balkans
EU credibility enables peace in the Balkans Kori Schake, senior research professor, and Jeffrey Simon, senior fellow in INSS, 2001,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Occassional_Papers/BUSH.HTML Skimping on the money and expertise needed in the Balkans not only will impede efforts to build peace in the region, it will also reduce support for future interventions. Both the United States and Europe need to redouble efforts to make the peace work in Bosnia and Kosovo. The United States spent several billion dollars and committed the Nation's premier experts to planning during military operations, but committed nowhere near that amount on assistance, training, and planning in the first year of UN operations. At issue are not only money and attention to the international institutions conducting the intervention, but also interagency coordination to produce integrated civil-military planning within the U.S. Government. Committing to the civil tasks with the same determination as the military would have facilitated Kosovar compliance, demonstrated to Serbs the benefits of behavior consistent with Western interests, and buoyed UN and EU credibility, which is important to the momentum of the operation.

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Balkan War Impact A Balkan war would nuclear Glaser '93 (Charles, International Security, Summer, p. 8-9)
However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe's future.

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EU credibility is key to peace in the Balkans Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative and Peace Operations, United States Institute of Peace, June 25, 2003,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/SerwerTestimony030625.pdf Let me turn to the transfer of leadership to the Europeans, who failed in the Balkans a decade ago but now have another opportunity. Today, Europe is better prepared. It has fielded an excellent team: in addition to Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia and Michael Steiner in Kosovo, Javier Solana, Chris Patten and Erhard Busek in Brussels. Europe has footed most of the bill for the Balkans, and provides most of the troops, now about 75%, vs. 15% for the US. European Foreign and Security Policy, while a shambles on Iraq, persists in the Balkans, as does successful European/American cooperation. The problem Europe faces is not its limited military capacity, or even its reluctance to use it. There is no Balkans military challenge today that the Europeans cannot handle. The real problem is credibility. The Europeans enjoy little respect especially among the Albanians, but also among the Serbs and Bosnians even though they pay the bills and even though the goal for all the peoples of the Balkans is integration within Europe. To make the vision of a European future more credible, the EU needs to stop treating the Balkans as a distant region to be stabilized and begin to view it as an area into which the EU will soon expand. This shift has already occurred for Romania and Bulgaria, but not for the Western Balkans, where until recently EU plans called for a steady decline in assistance through 2006, to half the level of 2000. At the Thessaloniki Summit last week the EU decided to halt this decline. But it needs to do more. It needs to increase its effort and provide the Western Balkans with structural assistance, which has accelerated economic development in other laggard areas of Europe. This would enhance EU credibility and spur the Balkans to serious reform efforts. The issue of credibility is not only one of resources and vision. Europe lacks common purpose and unity of command and control. It is easy to play the Europeans off against each other. To the extent they can agree among themselves, the positions they take are often the lowest common denominator. Rarely are they able to deploy all the levers of their considerable power to achieve a result, as Solana did perhaps unwisely when he forced Montenegro to stay in a confederation with Serbia. More often, they find it difficult to coordinate economic, political, diplomatic and military instruments so as to achieve a clearly defined objective. Seldom do they even try. The proposed European Constitution offers some prospect for change, but in the meanwhile Europe needs to focus on improving its performance under the existing legal framework. The next test for the Europeans is Macedonia, where they have taken over the military task from NATO. The prospects are reasonably good, mainly because the Macedonian and Albanian participants in the new government are fulfilling their commitment to the peace process and at the same time to fighting crime and corruption, which are the greatest threat to the country’s viability. Europe needs to focus on making its military mission in Macedonia a success. Then they can and should take over the military mission in Bosnia, assuming the war criminals are in The Hague and NATO has the vexing problem of unifying the Bosnian armed forces on its way to resolution.

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EU Credibility Key to Hegemony
Restoring EU credibility is key to US leadership Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the United States, January 30, 2004, http://www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/013004.html The European Union also suffered. Europe was divided in 2003, regardless of how large a popular majority existed in Europe - "old" and "new" - against the war in Iraq. It will not be easy for the EU to regain influence and credibility as a foreign policy actor any time soon. Creating the office of a European foreign minister and vesting it with the necessary powers seems to be a necessary, albeit insufficient, step if Europe wants to be taken seriously as a political player in Washington. In what was probably one of the most negative results of 2003 in terms of the transatlantic relationship, mistrust of European intentions and of the EU as such has become rampant in Washington. European governments that opposed the Iraq war believe that, on most of the "war issues," they were right and the US was wrong--in saying, for example, that there was no imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction and that creating post-intervention stability in Iraq would be difficult and costly and would require a long-term US commitment. The fact that these Europeans were right, however, has not been of much help in restoring US trust in Europe, and in the European Union. It is to the credit of these European governments that they have generally resisted the temptation to say I-told-you-so. It is even more to their credit that they have instead begun to offer assistance in the rehabilitation of Iraq, recognizing that restoring stability and supporting modernization in the region is a key European interest in the current situation. Credibility As the EU's credibility has suffered, so has the credibility of the United States as a "benign hegemon"--and not just because weapons of mass destruction have not been found in Iraq. Polls by the highly respected Pew Research Center reveal a rather dramatic drop in US standing, and by no means in Europe alone. Can Washington be trusted? Specifically, can it be trusted to lead with reasonable regard for the interests of allies and partners? Does Washington respect its obligations under international law, or is it defining itself as above the UN Charter? The transatlantic partnership is about more than just relationships between nation-states and international organizations. It is about the very principles of the international order, and about the evolution of this order. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer asked the key question: "What kind of world order do we want?" Essentially, the centuries-old fiction of the sovereignty and equality of nations under international law is being challenged today. If international law protects the state even when that state is ruled by a barbaric dictator, then international law itself must be changed so that dictators are no longer protected; this is a popularly held view in the US and is shared by some in Europe.

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EU Credibility Stops Proliferation
A strong EU can force Iran to end proliferation
Geoffrey Kemp, National Interest, Summer, 2003 The EU can play a more assertive role, as well. Until recently, U.S.-EU approaches to Iranian policy have differed on methods, if not objectives. However, a new EU-Iranian initiative to negotiate a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has elements that should be welcomed in Washington. The EU has declared that the trade discussions with Iran are inextricably linked to progress on three non-trade items including the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The TCA negotiations, however, will be carried out by the office of the European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Chris Patten. The TCA will cover trade and human rights. Its final approval rests with the Council of the EU, with the assent of the European Parliament. In parallel, a Declaration of the Council of the EU would be issued concerning benchmarks, to which Iran must agree, on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the Arab-Israeli peace process. EU officials have assured their American counterparts that the political agenda is critical to the overall package. They argue there will be de facto, if not de jure, linkage and that they are under pressure from their own governments to make sure this is the case. They insist that one requirement within the WMD package will be that Iran ratify the additional NPT protocol. There will be European pressure groups that will strive to minimize the linkage between politics and economic transactions. This, of course, would be nothing new, as all former European efforts at "constructive engagement" have been mostly foils against which to sell things to the supposedly targeted countries. Iran obviously has every interest in de-linking the two sets of issues, and history provides them confidence they will succeed. They will focus on the economic component while hinting, not too subtly, that it is a "take it or leave it" proposition. They must not succeed. How Europe handles these negotiations will be a critical test of its seriousness on the political agenda. If the Europeans wish to be genuine allies of the United States, they must act seriously in those domains where they have the ability to do so. For its part, however, the United States must work closely with the EU to ensure that the political issues are kept on the front burner, and that the Iranians are made to understand that the linkages are real. This should not be difficult if the will is present. After all, it is in fact the EU--a vastly larger, richer and more powerful entity than Iran--that can more easily afford to walk away from the negotiations and take its trade elsewhere.

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ESDP won’t collapse NATO
The expansion of the ESDP will still leave NATO as a strategic alliance The Irish Times 9-7-2002
One might have thought that the main challenge for the member-states was to tackle unemployment, or rampant inflation caused by the euro, or fair and just integration of the applicant countries, but no. In the midst of innocuous questions like "Where can I find general information about the EU" and "where can I get information about the euro", lies this surprise. The main challenge for the EU is to develop military capabilities. And ahem, remember that stuff about Partnership for Peace having nothing to do with NATO? The next question helpfully asks: "What is the role of the (sic) NATO? Do we duplicate it? Answer: NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The development will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard to the two organisations' decision-making autonomy. EU military structures will be separable but not separate from the (sic) NATO. The aim is that there should be no unnecessary duplication." Well, God forbid that there should be any unnecessary duplication. That would be terrible. But could anyone decipher what "being separable from but not separate from the NATO" means? Could it be that we don't have to worry about membership, because members or not, we are not separate from them anyway? And don't you just love "crisis-management"? As a euphemism it is up there with "collateral damage" and "friendly fire".

The EU will still require forces from NATO, meaning that both will still exist James Apparthurai, NATO Political Affairs Division, Peace Support Operations: lessons learned and future perspectives, eds. Spillmann, Bernauer & Gabriel, 2001, p. 195 (HARVUN2259)
NATO is supporting the development of Europe’s capacities for three simple reasons. First, the EU’s desire to be more effective is sparking real improvements in capability that can only enhance NATO’s overall effectiveness. Second, if the EU is capable of acting, it means NATO will not be the only option available to the Euro-Atlantic community in times of crisis. It will not be ‘NATO or nothing’. And finally, NATO has assets that the EU will need to borrow for larger operations – assets like deployable headquarters, strategic lift and satellite intelligence. These must be available to the EU if serous European-led operations are to take place. NATO will therefore make its essential assets and capabilities available to the EU when the Alliance is not in the lead, but the EU chooses to be. NATO will also provide regular access by the EU in NATO defense planning, even in peacetime, to ensure that defense planning between the two institutions is fully coherent. This will ensure that NATO and EU forces are structured and equipped to perform NATO and EU operations, not “either or.”

AN INDEPENDENT EU WON’T THREATEN NATO CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, December 11, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E109)
NATO chief George Robertson said the alliance can accept the latest version of controversial joint EU defence plans, as diplomats confirmed they were being presented to an EU summit in Brussels. Robertson, speaking as the EU’s Italian presidency presented the proposals to EU leaders ahead of the summit Friday, indicated the new draft met NATO and U.S. concerns about the plans to set up an autonomous military planning cell.

AN INDEPENDENT EU WON’T THREATEN NATO BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, December 9, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E110)
The United States had to accept that, he said. Struck stressed that the EU did not want to compete with NATO. The Alliance continued to be the first choice in the event of emergency operations. If the Alliance should not be able to or want to provide forces, the EU would examine whether it could use NATO means and capacities. Only in cases where this was not necessary would a military staff of the EU in Brussels become active

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ESDP Helps NATO
The ESDP and NATO are inexorably linked. If one fails so will the other Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform, RUSSIA WEEKLY, August, 8, 2002, p.
http://www.cdi.org/russia/218-9.cfm. (DRG/E101) Nato needs its military organisation for three reasons. First, Nato’s skills as an experienced and proficient provider of peacekeeping are still required. The EU may soon take over the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and in the longer run in Bosnia. But the fraught situation in Kosovo requires the involvement of Nato and thus, implicitly, of the US. Second, the embryonic European security and defence policy (ESDP) will achieve very little without practical support from Nato’s military organisation. Almost any conceivable EU military mission will need to draw on Nato assets such as the expertise of its military planners. Some commentators suppose that Nato and the ESDP are in competition with each other. The truth is the contrary: they will sink or swim together. If the Europeans succeed in boosting their military capabilities, that is good for Nato and good for the ESDP. If they fail, both will suffer. Third, Nato should develop a new military role, to provide a European strike force that could fight alongside US troops in a high-intensity conflict such as that in Afghanistan. The point would be to encourage US commanders to take up European offers of assistance: they would probably be more willing to do so if such forces - including, for example, bombers and elite troops - were packaged and vetted by Nato rather than offered directly by governments. In practice, only some European countries could contribute to such a strike force, and it would not be feasible unless some defence budgets rose substantially. But if Nato could help the US not only with peacekeeping but also with fighting in distant places, American respect for Nato would grow.

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EU + NATO Key to US Hegemony
The simultaneous expansion of NATO and the EU is necessary to project US power into Europe Brzezinski, 1997 (Zbigniew, former national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, "A
Geostrategy for Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, 76:5, September/October, http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/9709brzezinski.html) In practical terms, all this will eventually require America's accommodation to a shared leadership in NATO, greater acceptance of France's concerns over a European role in Africa and the Middle East, and continued support for the European Union's eastward expansion even as the EU becomes politically and economically more assertive. A transatlantic free trade agreement, already advocated by a number of Western leaders, could mitigate the risk of a growing economic rivalry between the EU and the United States. The EU's progressive success in burying centuries-old European antagonisms would be wen worth a gradual diminution in America's role as Europe's arbitrator. Enlargement of NATO and the EU would also reinvigorate Europe's waning sense of a larger vocation while consolidating, to the benefit of both America and Europe, the democratic gains won through the successful end of the Cold War. At stake in this effort is nothing less than America's long-range relationship with Europe. A new Europe is still taking shape, and if that Europe is to remain part of the "Euro-Atlantic" space, the expansion of NATO is essential. Accordingly, NATO and EU enlargement should move forward in deliberate stages. Assuming a sustained American and Western European commitment, here is a speculative but realistic timetable for these stages: By 1999, the first three Central European members will have been admitted into NATO, although their inclusion in the EU will probably not take place before 2002 or 2003; by 2003, the EU is likely to have initiated accession talks with all three Baltic republics, and NATO will likewise have moved forward on their membership as well as that of Romania and Bulgaria, with their accession likely to be completed before 2005; between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine, provided it has made significant domestic reforms and has become identified as a Central European country, should also be ready for initial negotiations with the EU and NATO.

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NATO Collapse Good
Preservation of NATO strength will result in Russian resurgence Reiter 2001 (Dan, prof of poli sci @ Emory, Int’l Sec. Spring pg. 42)
Critics of NATO enlargement worry about its risks and costs. Their principal concern is that expansion may jeopardize relations between Russia and the West,pushing Russia away from cooperating on issues such as strategic arms control and peacekeeping in the Balkans,and perhaps turning it back toward belligerence and even ultranationalism. Critics also express concern that the anancial costs of enlargement will weaken NATO’s military power and complicate decisionmaking within the alliance.

Expansion of NATO will result in renewed Russian belligerence Reiter 2001 (Dan, prof of poli sci @ Emory, Int’l Sec. Spring pg. 42)
Second,NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of renewed Russian belligerence,rather than provide a useful insurance policy against it. Some observers have expressed concern that enlargement will jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia. George Kennan,author of the famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” essay that laid the groundwork for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War,stated it bluntly: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of the entire post–cold war era.” The historian John Lewis Gaddis was equally critical: “Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error....NATO enlargement,I believe,manages to violate every one of the strategic principles just mentioned.”24

Russian resurgence will result in global nuclear war, the end of the war on terror and the end of US oil interests in the Middle East and Central Asia Cohen 1996 (Ariel, Fellow @ Heritage, Heritage Foundation Report January 25th 1996, online: heritage.org)
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.

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US-EU Action Kills Credibility
AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN MILITARY IS IMPORTANT TO PERCEPTIONS OF ITS LEADERSHIP CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, December 12, 2003, p. online. (DRG/E105)
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said the diluted plans would now “please” Washington, whose fears of Europe’s military direction were heightened by the vocal opposition of some EU nations to the war in Iraq. “The defence accord is important. It allows Europe to wield an independent military force which will let it sit at the same table, with equal dignity” as the other great powers, the EU’s current chairman told reporters at the summit.

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US-EU action kills NATO & Credibility
US Action Along with the EU destroys NATO and EU Credibility Bruno Tertrais, Senior Fellow, Foundation of Research Strategy, THE EU’S SEARCH FOR A STRATEGIC ROLE, November 2002, p. http://sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic1/ESDP.pdf. (DRG/E103)
What is good for the EU is also good for NATO. U.S. analyst Kori Shake rightly emphasizes that the European Union would “gain America’s respect by focusing on improvements at the warfighting end of the Petersberg tasks.” And as French then-defense minister Alain Richard subtly remarked in 2001, “Our American allies must be able to decide on their participation in the management of a crisis without being constrained by European impotence to endorse alone the choice between action and abstention.” On the contrary, a division of labor where the United States does high-altitude bombing and the allies does the “clean-up” would not be the best guarantee for maintaining the cohesion of NATO.

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***Affirmative Answers

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2AC Frontline
Note: I have not taken these cards out of the file, so make sure you don’t read them twice

1. Solvency Defecit ESDP fails—it could only ensure credibility with interoperability it doesn’t have Grant, 2001 (Charles, director of the Center for European Reform, “A European view of ESDP,”
http://www.eusec.org/grant.htm, accessed July 9, 2004) For all the problems, the EU has made much progress over the past three years. Three important new institutions, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, have been established. And despite the lack of political leadership referred to, the idea that the EU should be able to manage a military operation is not opposed by any mainstream political party in the Union, bar Britain's Conservatives. Whether or not the EU chooses to declare the ESDP "operational" by the end of the year, it is already capable of carrying out small-scale Petersberg missions involving a few thousand troops. And if it was able to draw on NATO assets, it would be able to undertake more ambitious operations. Some of the longer-term challenges that lie ahead include: making sure that the EU can integrate the economic, diplomatic and military sides of its external policy. The current institutional arrangements, with responsibilities split between the Commission and the Council, Coreper and the PSC, and Patten and Solana, are sub-optimal. A potential strength of the EU, compared with other international organisations, is that it should be able to draw upon a wide range of foreign policy tools – ranging from technical assistance, to humanitarian aid, to trade sanctions, to warplanes. At the moment, the EU makes a poor job of co-ordinating these various instruments, and is weaker as a result. The EU has to find effective ways of slotting into the ESDP not only NATO members outside the EU, such as Turkey, but also countries that are in neither the EU nor NATO. Russia, for example, is interested in working with the ESDP. Given that countries such as Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to join NATO for a very long time, they could be offered a meaningful stake in the European security system through some sort of associate link with the ESDP. The EU needs to think more about developing common military capabilities, particularly at the softer end of the military spectrum. The budgetary advantages of governments collaborating on, for example, a common fleet of air transport planes, or air-tankers, or UAVs, are potentially huge: each country could save money on bases, servicing, maintenance and training. There is also money to be saved through role specialisation. Even the larger European countries cannot maintain every sort of military capability on limited budgets. For example, it would not make sense for several European air forces to separately develop the capability to destroy hostile radar systems. Moves towards role specialisation or common capabilities would, inevitably, provoke political opposition in several member-states, and not only in Britain. However, that once again illustrates the importance of political leadership: prime ministers and ministers need to sell the benefits of, and the case for, European defence. They are currently failing to do so.

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2. PERM- Have Both the US and the EU do <The plan> Independent EU action is Infeasable; The only way for a credible force is to work with the US Andrew Moravcsik is professor of government and director of the European Union Program at Harvard University's Center for European Studies. Brussels autumn 2003 NATO Review
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html European remilitarization won’t happen. Europeans, you concede, will not pay more for defence – let alone double their spending, as would be required to project power US-style (even regionally). More efficient use of current European spending can achieve only modest gains: a modest but wellequipped rapid reaction force perhaps, but not the sort of integrated force the United States deployed in Kosovo or Afghanistan, let alone Iraq. 3 The European army serves no purpose. An EU army would be an instrument in search of a mission. You say allying with the United States – the Blair tactic – cannot change US policy, so Europe needs an army. (I disagree, as you shall see.) Well, the Euro army won’t change US policy either. Would a Euro army have deterred US action in Iraq? Hardly. European “pre-preventive” intervention to forestall US action or allying with enemies of the United States are utterly unrealistic options. Perhaps the goal is simply to reduce reliance on the US security guarantee? If so, reduced dependence might indeed swing a few nervous Eastern European UN votes into the Franco-German camp, but it would also give neo-conservatives carte blanche unilaterally to redeploy US forces elsewhere. Or perhaps the proposed Euro army is intended to handle the “next Kosovo”? If so, Europeans are stuck fighting the last war. The Balkans have been pacified. The next Kosovos will be – and already are – in far-flung quagmires like Chechnya, Iran, Kashmir, Algeria and Congo. Do Europeans really believe that military involvement in such places – not as peacekeepers but in a war-fighting mode, and without US technology or backup – is a costeffective strategy?

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3. NATO Collapse Turn A. The expansion of the ESDP will reduce NATO to a relic of the past The Independent 12-6-2000
THE OUTGOING United States Defence Secretary issued a blunt warning yesterday that Nato could be reduced to "a relic of the past" if Europe's new rapid reaction force is not linked clearly to the alliance. William Cohen's outspoken comments were made during his last appearance at a Nato defence ministers' meeting. They sounded a new note of anxiety in Washington over Europe's military initiative. Mr Cohen, who welcomed the European defence plans during his Nato appearance at a meeting of defence ministers in Birmingham in October, struck a markedly different tone yesterday, taking his colleagues by surprise. His intervention is thought to reflect a growing sentiment in Washington that too much effort is being put into creating European Union military structures, with insufficient emphasis on the creation of new capabilities. "If we have a competing institution that would be inconsistent with military effectiveness, Nato could be weakened," Mr Cohen said, adding that there were simply too many questions still unanswered about the EU's plan a year after it was launched. He stressed that the European Nato countries must commit more to improving their military capabilities as agreed, and that a "co-operative, collaborative mechanism" must be established. "If there is openness, transparency and a non-competitive relationship, then the US would remain committed," Mr Cohen said. But, he added: "If, in fact, we had lip service being paid to developing the capabilities, if we had a competing institution that was established that would be inconsistent with military effectiveness, if in fact there was any element of using the (EU) force structure in a way to simply set up a competing headquarters - if all of the factors were taken into account, then Nato could become a relic." Officials believe Mr Cohen's doubts have been growing for some time and, because yesterday marked his last appearance, he decided to spell out a more robust position. The 19-nation alliance is anxious that planning and intelligence facilities should be kept under its umbrella, and Nato's secretary general, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, gave cautious support to the US criticisms. "I think Secretary Cohen was right to warn us," he said. "If we get a lot of things wrong, then Nato will be irrelevant. If we don't get the right capability for the future, then Nato will not have credibility. If we don't get the right EU-Nato linkages, then of course there will be danger for the vitality of Nato as an organisation and the security of its members."

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B. NATO breakdown causes war. John O'Sullivan, editor-at-large of National Review and founder and co-chairman of the New Atlantic Initiative, American Spectator, June, 1998
These opposing possibilities emerge in the extraordinary flux of post_Cold War politics in which NATO has lost its traditional role as the main defense against Communism. We sometimes understate the revolutionary character of that change. In theory, NATO last month could have dissolved, expanded, or embarked on some other course entirely--and there are numerous ideas for "a new role for NATO" buzzing around in alliance bonnets and (covertly) in some anti-alliance bonnets. Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would invite chaos as every irridentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability.

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EU action collapses NATO

INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY DESTROYS NATO-MULTIPLE WAYS Robert Hunter, Senior Adviser at Rand, 2002
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1463/index.html (BLUEUN0824) These are all on the positive side of the ledger. But there are also negatives for the United States to be found in the European Security and Defense Policy (and aspects of CFSP, as well). Most of these negatives are about method, however, rather than about purpose and intent. These issues will need to be resolved in order to ensure that NATO and EU/ESDP will be compatible with one another, that they will work toward the same basic objectives, and that transatlantic security and political relations will be strengthened, not weakened, by the development of ESDP. The key problems for the United States so far identified center on the following: • ESDP may stimulate some greater European defense spending, but that spending might go primarily to purchase capabilities that NATO already has in abundance; or it could be wasteful in terms of efficient use of scarce resources (e.g., the A400M large transport aircraft and even the Eurofighter); or it could stimulate (for political reasons) European efforts to close or restrict arms markets to competition from outside, including the United States. "Unnecessary duplication" is more than just a U.S. slogan; it risks becoming a serious reality. Likewise, candidates for NATO membership could be pressed to accede to ESDP requirements (including "buying European") at the expense of preparing to be effective NATO allies. • By contrast, ESDP could, in time, lead some allies to believe that they can meet the military requirements of the Headline Goal Task Force-and thus domestic political requirementswithout facing the much more onerous and expensive demands of NATO force modernization, especially the DCI, at a time of rapid U.S. modernization, thereby risking the "hollowing out" of alliance military capabilities. In other words, the "talk" of ESDP and its institutions could substitute for the "walk" of increased defense capabilities. • The elaboration of structures and processes in ESDP could, whether intended or not, cause competition with NATO's structures and processes, if only because "the beast has to be fed": structures once in being get used and, at a certain level of bureaucratic size and complexity (the EUMS is already significant in both size and competence), can compete successfully for the attention and priority required to keep NATO processes as effective as possible. Indeed, an ESDP as political and bureaucratic distraction from NATO may become the chief legitimate U.S. worry. • Also, the still not-entirely-resolved differences regarding planning (not limited to Turkey's circumstances) have special significance for NATO. First, having more than one place where operational planning takes place could potentially lead to differences in outcomes that could, at the very least, complicate any situation in which the EU, acting on the basis of ESDP, had to hand over responsibility to NATO, or where NATO had to decide what forces it could usefully transfer to an ESDP operation without prejudicing its own ability to act-a cardinal point from the June 1996 Brussels agreement. The problem would be greater if there were not total transparency in the planning processes-which in fact can only be assured if NATO's planning staff is constantly in the same room with ESDP's-e.g., a national planning staff-and if ESDP planners are at NATO.6 Among other things, any translation (escalation) of a crisis from one conducted by the European Union through ESDP to one conducted by NATO-whether non-Article 5 or Article 5could become that much more difficult and potentially dangerous

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The increased vitality of the ESDP will undermine European commitment to NATO and destroy transatlantic relations Bereuter and Lis 2003 (Doug and John, Chairman of Subcomittee of foreign relations, Sr. policy
advisor for transatlantic relations, TWQ winter, projectMUSE) Yet, the United States must view with great concern any efforts to turn ESDP into a collective defense organization that duplicates the role of NATO, a concern that is, daresay, shared by most European members of NATO. The inclusion of a “mutual defense” provision in the draft constitution for Europe is therefore disturbing. An effort to create a collective defense commitment in the EU is troubling because it would undoubtedly undermine the commitment of European nations to NATO while adding no additional military capability to Europe’s defense, which might lead some Americans to question the U.S. commitment to the alliance. Although the draft language suggests that an EU mutual defense commitment would be optional, it would permit unnecessary duplication. It also would draw resources and attention away from an ESDP that otherwise could complement NATO and contribute meaningfully to European defense. NATO remains the best guarantee of the security of its European members, and an ESDP that complements NATO will enhance transatlantic security. An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies.

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NATO Collapse Impacts
NATO is critical to the war on terror and stopping WMD proliferation Lugar 2002 (Richard, Sr. Senator from Indiana, TWQ Summer, online: www.twq.com)
To make a global CTR plan work, the United States will need the support of its allies. NATO should play the lead role in addressing the central security challenge of our time. The United States needs the Europeans—their political support; police; intelligence cooperation; economic assistance; and, not least of all, military might. Americans do not want to carry the burden of this war alone, nor should they. When the attack was on its homeland, the United States was prepared to respond immediately and do most of the work itself, but a broader campaign requires a bigger team. NATO must and will become an effective organization in the war on terrorism by addressing those countries directly involved and by isolating those who continue to proliferate WMD.

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At: NATO Russian Resurgance
1. Russia and NATO work together NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality

Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation May 28, 2002 www.nato.int
The member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security. As participants of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this goal. 2. NATO

lets Russia help in decision making BBC News Tuesday, 14 May, 2002, 19:19 GMT 20:19 UK Nato and Russia 'bury Cold War'
Nato and Russia have agreed to establish a new joint decision-making body to counter terrorism and other security threats. The proposed council, which is due to come into effect after a special Nato summit in Italy on 28 May, will allow Russia to join the alliance's decision-making process for the first time.

3. Eastern Europe is now part of NATO; checks back Russian aggression “Seven eastern Europe states join NATO” RTE News 29 March 2004
NATO has signed up seven new countries in eastern Europe in a historic expansion that extends the scope of its membership to the Russian border. The prime ministers of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia deposited instruments of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's founding Washington treaty and brought the number of members to 26. US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the move historic. President George W Bush was to meet the leaders of the new NATO members at the White House late today, along with the prime ministers of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, which also want to join. Russia again expressed disquiet over the biggest increase in NATO membership since it was founded at the height of the Cold War in 1949. Russia is particularly concerned about the inclusion of the Baltic states, all former Soviet republics which are still home to many ethnic Russians, and the possibility that NATO troops will be stationed at its border. 4. The argument is non-unique: is Russia was going to resurge, it would have done so when the former Soviet bloc countries joined NATO.

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EU Fails in the Middle East
New EU efforts in the Middle East would be counterproductive because the US is already involved in the region Dillery 2004 (Edward, retired foreign service officer, Mediterranean Quart. V15 n2 spring,
projectMUSE) Finally, Biscop would establish a permanent council for the first basket of the partnership, which would have its own secretariat and secretary-general. He suggests that it would be good to locate this entity in one of the southern countries of the EMP. One of Biscop’s main criticisms of the EU approach to Mediterranean security is that the union has spent too much effort on declarations and not enough on action to make the EMP work. His proposals for future action would require the EU to take more initiative in solving regional conflicts. To the nonexpert reader, the call for the union to play a role equal to that of the United States in the Middle East peace process appears somewhat quixotic, given the long and deep—and unsuccessful—involvement of the other players in efforts to solve the problem. The suggestion that the United States could apply more pressure to the government of Israel to be conciliatory while the EU does the same to the Palestinian Authority might well be counterproductive.

The EU destroyed their credibility in aiding the peace process because they failed to take an even-handed approach to the Middle East conflict Toronto Star April 11th 2002
European External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten apparently tried to play down the possibility of sanctions in a later statement, and the vote is not binding on EU governments -- which are divided on whether to apply them. Israel deplored the parliament resolution and said the EU's failure to take an even-handed approach to the Middle East conflict dented its credibility as a player in the peace process. "We are disappointed and deplore the resolution," Victor Harel, deputy director general in Israel's ministry of foreign affairs, told media. "This is a time for constructive proposals. We are ready for a political dialogue but Europe should take a more even-handed approach." The United States, the EU, Russia and the United Nations called on Israel after a meeting in Madrid yesterday to withdraw its forces immediately from Palestinian cities.

The lost their credibility as a neutral negotiator when Israel was found to be harboring German built submarines Jerusalem Post 7-30-1999
The Arabs are ready to match that with similar steps to reach a peace which achieves security and stability in the region, the Syrian army chief said. In a further indication of Syrian concern, the official daily Tishreen said the delivery of the first of three German-built submarines to Israel cast a shadow over the European Union's role in the Middle East peace process and greatly harmed the EU's credibility. Israel received on Tuesday the first of three $ 300- million German-made submarines capable of carrying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. "Germany's supplying Israel with three submarines that can carry nuclear warheads has cast a heavy shadow over the European role," Tishreen said. "The German nuclear submarines, which were offered at a token price to Israel, do not serve the peace process. In fact, this will encourage the Tel Aviv government to show various types of intransigence. It will also greatly harm the European role and credibility in the region."

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ESDP Cannot Solve
The EU military is technologically inferior and has no cohesive strategy Rob de Wijk, Professor of Strategic Studies & International Relations, Director, Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 2003-4, p. 197.
(DRG/E121) U.S. complaints about Europe’s armed forces are well known and, arguably, well founded. Compared with the United States, Europe lacks capabilities to project military power, and its technological base is inferior. Its forces are not interoperable with the United States, and its military doctrines are increasingly divergent, as the United States has successfully tested new concepts of warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq while Europe lacks a debate about new methods of using armed force. For cultural, political, and budgetary reasons, Europe is unlikely to close the gap within a decade or so.

Europe Doesn’t Even have a rapid Reaction Force to deploy yet, they have only talked about it Robert Wilkie, Counsel and Advisor on International Security Affairs to US Senate Republican Leader
Trent Lott, and Major Kimberly C. Field, Military Police platoon leader in Operation Desert Storm, MP company commander in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Assistant Professor of International Relations, US Military Academy, PARAMETERS, Winter 2002, p. 34. (DRG/E115) The Europeans must also close the credibility gap. The posturing of the Brussels leadership regarding the size and goals of the ESDP and its progeny, the European Rapid Reaction Force, has to be seen as more than political gamesmanship. The Europeans cannot presently meet the goals they established for themselves for mutual defense, even though they have chosen to concentrate on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that are at the lower end of the military risk continuum. Currently there is no deployable capability for the European Rapid Reaction Force.

The EU does not have the Capacity for rapid deploments Caroline Earle, Stimson Center, TAKING STOCK: EUROPE'S CAPACITY FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, March 2004 http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/EarleEuropeanCapacitiesforPeaceOperations-TakingStock.pdf (BLUEUN0818) Current European national defense budgets cannot meet the Helsinki Headline Goals. While the forces may be pledged, the EU must rely on the limited airlift/transport, intelligence and command and control provided by NATO. European forces cannot quickly reach post-conflict destinations on their own, do not have integrated intelligence systems, and are not sustainable over time. The need for modernization is real but the economic and political environment in Europe is such that defense budgets are very difficult to increase. These states are predominantly social democracies whose publics value social services and oppose shifting resources to the military. Moreover, structural factors increasingly will prevent the transfer of funds from the social to the military sphere. These factors include a growing elderly population and a declining birthrate, such that tax revenues will be generated by a steadily smaller segment of the population, unless augmented by immigration. Over time, governments will be hard-pressed even to sustain spending and avoid substantial social service cutbacks.

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ESDP fails—it could only ensure credibility with interoperability it doesn’t have Grant, 2001 (Charles, director of the Center for European Reform, “A European view of ESDP,”
http://www.eusec.org/grant.htm, accessed July 9, 2004) For all the problems, the EU has made much progress over the past three years. Three important new institutions, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, have been established. And despite the lack of political leadership referred to, the idea that the EU should be able to manage a military operation is not opposed by any mainstream political party in the Union, bar Britain's Conservatives. Whether or not the EU chooses to declare the ESDP "operational" by the end of the year, it is already capable of carrying out small-scale Petersberg missions involving a few thousand troops. And if it was able to draw on NATO assets, it would be able to undertake more ambitious operations. Some of the longer-term challenges that lie ahead include: making sure that the EU can integrate the economic, diplomatic and military sides of its external policy. The current institutional arrangements, with responsibilities split between the Commission and the Council, Coreper and the PSC, and Patten and Solana, are sub-optimal. A potential strength of the EU, compared with other international organisations, is that it should be able to draw upon a wide range of foreign policy tools – ranging from technical assistance, to humanitarian aid, to trade sanctions, to warplanes. At the moment, the EU makes a poor job of coordinating these various instruments, and is weaker as a result. The EU has to find effective ways of slotting into the ESDP not only NATO members outside the EU, such as Turkey, but also countries that are in neither the EU nor NATO. Russia, for example, is interested in working with the ESDP. Given that countries such as Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to join NATO for a very long time, they could be offered a meaningful stake in the European security system through some sort of associate link with the ESDP. The EU needs to think more about developing common military capabilities, particularly at the softer end of the military spectrum. The budgetary advantages of governments collaborating on, for example, a common fleet of air transport planes, or air-tankers, or UAVs, are potentially huge: each country could save money on bases, servicing, maintenance and training. There is also money to be saved through role specialisation. Even the larger European countries cannot maintain every sort of military capability on limited budgets. For example, it would not make sense for several European air forces to separately develop the capability to destroy hostile radar systems. Moves towards role specialisation or common capabilities would, inevitably, provoke political opposition in several member-states, and not only in Britain. However, that once again illustrates the importance of political leadership: prime ministers and ministers need to sell the benefits of, and the case for, European defence. They are currently failing to do so.

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EU peacekeeping is devoid of adequate military resources that the United States possesses Brooks and Wohlforth 2002 (Stephen and William, Asst. and Associate profs @ Dartmouth
College, Foreign Affairs J/A, lexis)

Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to the big-or-rich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive military capabilities and wield its latent collective power like a state, the EU would clearly constitute another pole. But the creation of an autonomous and unified defense and defense-industrial capacity that could compete with that of the United States would be a gargantuan task. The EU is struggling to put together a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force that is designed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management, but it still
lacks military essentials such as capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, air-defense suppression, air-to-air refueling, sea transport, medical care, and combat search and rescue -- and even when it has those capacities, perhaps by the end of this decade, it will still rely on NATO command and control and other assets. Whatever capability the EU eventually assembles, moreover, will matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a statelike decision-making body with the authority to act quickly and decisively in Europe's name. Such authority, which

does not yet exist even for international financial matters, could be purchased only at the price of a direct frontal assault on European nations' core sovereignty. And all of this would have to occur as the EU expands to add ten or more new member states, a process that will complicate further deepening. Given these obstacles, Europe is
unlikely to emerge as a dominant actor in the military realm for a very long time, if ever.

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EU Can’t Solve- No guarantee of NATO support
ESDP operations will never get off the ground—Turkey’s veto on NATO support leaves the EU without necessary backing Grant, 2001 (Charles, director of the Center for European Reform, “A European view of ESDP,”
http://www.eusec.org/grant.htm, accessed July 9, 2004) Turkey has still not accepted the accord on EU-NATO relations that every other member of NATO – including the US – approved last December. Turkey has demanded the right to be included in the ESDP's decision-making. The EU's response is that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but that because Turkey is not a member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Turkey. Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATO planning facilities at SHAPE. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contact between EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis. This is starting to hamper the EU's efforts to build up its military organisation. Last May the British, with some help from the Americans, seemed to have brokered a deal on Turkish involvement in the ESDP. Foreign minister Ismail Cem accepted a compromise at a Brussels meeting of NATO foreign ministers. But he appears to have been overruled by the Turkish general staff when he returned home. Then Greece said that it could not accept the compromise either. Indeed, some of those directly involved in trying to solve this problem complain that Greek positions – such as attempts to restrict the EU's use of NATO assets – are extremely unhelpful. It is quite possible that Turkish-EU relations will get considerably worse, before they get better. And this has little to do with the ESDP. It now seems likely that Cyprus, without the northern part, will join the EU in 2004 or 2005. This may lead Turkey to annexe the north of the island, an act which would be illegal in international law. The problem of Turkey's role in the ESDP will not be resolved unless those outside Turkey try hard to understand its position. This is rather difficult, because the Turks have – in my opinion – made very little effort to explain their views to policy-makers and opinion-formers. Their PR strategy has been little short of disastrous. Whatever the true merits of the Turkish case, they have come cross as unwilling to compromise, inflexible and unreasonable. This stance has been losing them friends in Europe.

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Net benefit non-unique Non-unique—the ESDP is already planning missions to various regions Integration Department of the EU, 2003
(http://www.europa.admin.ch/eu/info_mat/dossiers/e/sicherheit_verteidigung.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) With the ESDP, the European Union is in a position to carry out a variety of both civilian and military peace support missions: these range from humanitarian and rescue missions through peacekeeping tasks to combat operations in the framework of crisis management and the restoration of peace. The EU member states provide military resources (troops) of up to 60,000 persons that can be deployed within 60 days and sustain their mission for at least one year. For ESDP missions the EU can, if necessary, also call on NATO's personnel and logistical resources. In 2003 the EU started to put the ESDP into practice. A civilian police mission (EUPM) has been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the beginning of the year, on 1 April 2003 a military mission ("Concordia") took on peace support tasks in Macedonia and for three months during the summer of 2003 another EU military mission ("Artemis") guaranteed security and stabilisation of the humanitarian situation in the Congolese town of Bunia. Other ESDP missions are already in the pipeline: on 15 December 2003 a civilian EU police mission ("Proxima") will be launched in Macedonia, and in the medium term the possibility is also being discussed of taking over the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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US-EU Action does not Hurt Credibility
EU and America working within their respective spheres is the best way to solve and preserve EU credibility. Unilateral EU action would Ruin their credibility Andrew Moravcsik is professor of government and director of the European Union Program at Harvard University's Center for European Studies. Brussels autumn 2003 NATO Review
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html Remilitarization would run counter to deeply-held European political values. EU governments compiled a compelling case that the essentially military US policy response to terrorism in Iraq was inappropriate and short-sighted. European intellectuals penned trenchant criticisms of Robert Kagan’s anachronistically unidimensional concept of international power (i.e. military super-powers are strong Martians and all others are weak Venusians). European objections to Iraq are not just reasonable – which is why sober American conservatives like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, as well as many Democrats, share them – but they appeal to an admirable European idealism about the need for more effective use by Western governments of non-military foreign policy instruments. But now, after Washington has ignored European appeals and sent in the Marines, Europeans say: “We want an army, too.” Kagan must be pleased. He seems to have converted a continent! 5 There is a better option. Europe has more and better alternatives to the two you mention: remilitarization and submissive silence. The best of these is to invest in civilian and low-intensity power. Today, Europe is a “quiet super-power”, wielding influence over peace and war as great, perhaps greater, than that of the United States. Europe rather than the United States provides trade opportunities, foreign aid, peacekeepers, international monitoring, and multilateral legitimation. (For seemingly intractable domestic reasons, the United States has never been able to wield such instruments effectively.) Over the past decade, Europe has deployed these instruments to help democratise and pacify up to 25 countries on its Eastern periphery – a record US military power cannot match. Properly deployed, civilian and low-intensity military instruments could have a greater global impact as well. European political and fiscal capital would be much better spent on building such capabilities. Europe, the United States, the West, and the world as a whole would be better off if each side of the Atlantic did what it does best. Complementarity and comparative advantage, not conflict and competition, should be the watchwords. The Iraq war shows how vital this is. For Americans, the lesson of the past three months is that it is harder to make peace than to wage war. And in peacemaking, the United States is critically dependent on Europe for civilian and low-intensity military power. War and reconstruction tie up one third of the US military, and will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of casualties. Even so, it may fail. Europeans, ignored and humiliated in the run-up to the war, have been understandably reluctant to deploy their resources – in striking contrast to the first Gulf War and Kosovo.The result has been a policy reversal. If the United States expects help after the fact, it must engage multilateral institutions, exhaust alternatives to war, and work out postwar arrangements before intervening. Accordingly, the United States is acting with prudence in Iran and Syria. And it is seeking to bring the United Nations into the Iraq and North Korean crises. In this context, NATO is emerging as one of several promising multilateral forums in which to organise peacekeeping and to develop common principles governing future intervention. The question today is whether Europeans are willing and able to engage constructively in this process. To cut off this process of reconciliation by renouncing NATO and constructing an EU army, as you are suggesting, would be a tragic victory of symbolic politics over pragmatism.

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US-EU cooperation Key to relations
The only way to solve US-EU relations is a multilateral effort at promoting peace Morningstar, 2003 (Richard, former US ambassador to the European Union, The Boston Globe, July
31, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/morningstar_us_europe_bg_073103.htm, accessed July 8, 2004) Yet we must do better. To move forward now and in the future, the United States must recognize that although it has the power to project force unilaterally, it cannot make peace unilaterally. Afghanistan and Iraq prove that. The United States must tone down its rhetoric and treat Europe as a real partner. We must recognize that multilateralism and compromise can be in our national interest and that our rejection of international agreements is costing us prestige and possible support on other matters. We also must recognize that high-level relationships and consultations can lead to progress and can mitigate damage, as evidenced by the handling of our trade disputes. Europe also has responsibilities in moving the relationship forward. Europe cannot hope to be treated as an equal partner on issues where it does not have a common foreign policy; Iraq is an obvious case in point. Europe also must continue to develop its common security doctrine, which will allow us to reach common views on dealing with threats such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. And crucially, Europe must recognize that we do have common interests and must work with us to develop a common agenda. Promoting Europe as a counterweight to the United States or as a means to restrain US power in the world will only guarantee constant tension. The United States and Europe do not live in a vacuum. How we relate to each other has extraordinary ramifications for the rest of the world. When we work together, much is possible; when we argue, progress stalls. Iraq and Doha cannot wait. The trans-Atlantic challenge is now.

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Relations Key to Hegemony
The EU-US alliance is critical to preserving US military, economic and political interests globally Hunter 2003 (Robert E., Sr. Fellow @ RAND, TWQ Winter, projectMUSE)
The destinies of the United States and Europe are now intertwined in such critical ways as to be inseparable. Policies, programs, and practices of states on each side of the Atlantic must be measured against this reality. Some Europeans believe that Europe, Russia, and China can create a bloc to balance U.S. power, and some Americans believe the United States can divide European states from one another or simply ignore them. These attitudes and actions, however, are and will continue to be based more on fantasy than analysis or understanding. The United States in particular, with all of its power and potential, ambitions and aspirations, must grasp this notion and act according to its logic. Nothing has happened to lessen the importance of the continent of Europe as the most important landmass—economically and politically—to be kept free of a hegemonic power at odds with U.S. interests, values, and objectives (the stuff of three world wars in the twentieth century). Europe still depends on U.S. power, influence, engagement, and leadership to be fully assured of its own independence, security, long-term prosperity, and in some places even domestic tranquility. Meanwhile, the U.S. and European economies, especially those of the European Union, are now so intermingled that both sides would suffer grievous injury if either tried to lessen their level of entanglement with one another significantly. The panoply of economic interaction between the United States and the EU, including trade in goods and services, investment, cross-ownership, travel, and finance, must now be valued in the trillions of dollars, with the power to control and influence rarely having a clear locus on one side of the Atlantic or the other; certainly neither side is able to claim decisive predominance. Indeed, transatlantic economic interdependence is now so much a fact of life that the concept is no longer even questioned. At the same time, a broad array of relatively common values and institutions of incalculable worth bind the United States and Europe together, creating an interpenetration of influence unrivaled among any other set of major powers. Much of what the United States seeks to do elsewhere in the world will depend on its ability to gain the support and active engagement of European power—and European powers— politically, economically, and militarily.

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Strong EU crushes US Hegemony
EU UNITY WILL CRUSH US HEGEMONY IN MULTIPLE WAYS Gerard Baker, associate editor of the Financial Times, 9/22/03 (The Weekly Standard, p. 11)
(BLUEUN0845) All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?" This "Europe as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to turn itself into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single nation--with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check. Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa. And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could also make European awkwardness more of a constraint for America. It has long been an axiom of U.S. policy that Europe should develop military capabilities of its own--genuine ones that would enable Europe to fight hot wars in difficult places and take some of the burden off the Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a united Europe really does develop enhanced capabilities, it is inconceivable that it will not demand a bigger say in the decision-making in new international crises.

The EU is in position to effectively neutralize US hegemony—all it needs is the ability to spread its influence Oberg, 2000 (Jan, member of the Scientific Committee of International University for Peoples'
Initiatives for Peace, “The Militarisation of the European Union: A Civilisational Mistake,” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/euforce.htm, accessed July 9, 2004) So, the EU sees its chance now. It also wants to guard itself against excessive US dominance in the future. The most recent example of the rapidly widening disagreement, if not worse, between the EU and the US came with Secretary of Defence, Richard Cohen's warning to European defence ministers in Brussels on December 5 in effect saying "don't even try to compete with NATO, coordinate with it and let us -- US -- control force planning and interventions." The EU's chosen means to play a world role is economic first and from now on, military. While the former may succeed, the latter won't in the foreseeable future. If a small power wants to fight a bigger one, the first rule of thumb is: don't choose the field in which the opponent is much stronger. So, if the EU chooses to militarise itself it will remain a European sub-division of NATO. If on the contrary it does things differently, draws some other lessons from Kosovo and decides to deal with conflicts around the world in a new way, it may become much stronger and even a moral force - - and stronger than the US on most power scales. It may become a power of the future rather than a replica of its colonial past and of the present NATO. It would probably also create less suspicion among people and governments within a radius of 4000 kilometres, and beyond, who would have less reason to ask: what on earth is the EU up to for the future?

GDI 2004 Scholars

77 European Union Counterplan

A strong EU is a threat to US hegemony Eugene McCartan, Communist Party of Ireland, June 19-20, 2003, http://solidnet.org/cgibin/agent?parties/042=ireland,_communist_party_of_ireland/Irelandcp.doc We are also witnessing the attempts by the U.S to consolidate its influence in Eastern Europe in its effort to prevent an EU challenge to its world hegemony, its "Old Europe" and "New Europe" tactic. With the help of the governments of Britain, Spain, and Italy, it hopes to turn the EU into a subservient ally. It is worried that an independent Europe with its own strong currency and political and military structures would be an obstacle to its dreams of world domination. Although globalisation represents an acceleration towards monopoly and homogeneity there are contradictions in the situation such as competition between imperialisms (or styles of imperialism) e.g. US verses EU V Japan, or within the EU between Britain, France and Germany. It is clear that the United States ruling elite will not tolerate the emergence of any power, political, economic most importantly military, which challenges its global hegemony since the dismantling of the Soviet Union. As far as it is concerned, it has seen off the challenge from communism and will not allow any other movement, country, or group of countries to emerge to rival it. We are aware that within the wider labour movement of Europe (and some within our own ranks of communist parties) who believe that a strong EU is necessary as a bulwark against the United States.

A strong and united EU destroys US hegemony Gary Schneider, Vice-President for Reuters, “The New "Old" European Hegemony,” February 28, 2003, http://www.americandaily.com/item/280, accessed 8/31/03
France and Germany yearn for a single and united European Union to counterbalance, if not undermine, the U.S. role in the world. A recent poll published in Le Figaro, a French newspaper, found that over 60% of those surveyed subscribe to the notion that a U.S.- French split is good for both the global balance of power and for France’s place in the world. A link between the issue of European unification and the Iraqi crisis has therefore been widely asserted by the French and German leadership. Their global policies, to include the stance on Iraq, reflect these sentiments. The French can now exploit culturally ingrained anti-Americanism to promote unification under the false banner of peace. In essence, by opposing the United States position on Iraq, Europeans are all at once promoting European unification, refuting perceptions of American hegemony and heralding European nationalist pride. This explains why any attempted discussion on the merits of Iraqi policy are often diluted by, or otherwise inter-dispersed with, anti-American rants - because for many Europeans they are wholly integrated … for many, but not all.

Increased European power causes free riding, devastating comparative US power Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at Carnegie, Foreign Policy Magazine, Summer, 1998
Kenneth Waltz once made the seemingly obvious point that "in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it" —- a banal truism, and yet, as it happens, so untrue in this era of American hegemony. What France, Russia, and some others really seek today is not genuine multipolarity but a false multipolarity, an honorary multipolarity. They want the pretense of equal partnership in a multipolar world without the price or responsibility that equal partnership requires. They want equal say on the major decisions in global crises (as with Iraq and Kosovo) without having to possess or wield anything like equal power. They want to increase their own prestige at the expense of American power but without the strain of having to fill the gap left by a diminution of the American role. And at the same time, they want to make short-term, mostly financial, gains, by taking advantage of the continuing U.S. focus on long-term support of the international order. The problem is not merely that some of these nations are giving themselves a “free ride” on the back of American power, benefiting from the international order that American hegemony undergirds, while at the same time puncturing little holes in it for short-term advantage. The more serious danger is that this behavior will gradually, or perhaps not so gradually, erode the sum total of power that can be applied to protecting the international order altogether. The false multipolarity sought by France, Russia, and others would reduce America’s ability to defend common interests without increasing anyone else’s ability to do so.

GDI 2004 Scholars

78 European Union Counterplan

EU cohesion inhibits US hegemony - cherry-picking allies is better than relying on the whole body Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the United States, January 30, 2004, http://www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/013004.html Europeans may be disturbed by such American aspirations. However, Americans, for their part, may also be frustrated with the European Union. Some in Washington ask whether the US would not be better off with a few truly reliable European partners rather than with one EU, whose common foreign policy represents, at best, the lowest common denominator. They ask whether the need for political compromise, which Europeans view as a key element of European integration, does not in reality prevent effective joint transatlantic action. In this context the failure of the EU to ratify its draft constitution in 2003 has tended to reinforce the impression in Washington that the EU is weak, inefficient, and stuck with its cumbersome decision-making process--that it is a political actor that does not need to be taken seriously. Hasn't the European Union become a status-quo power that is more interested in risk avoidance than in bringing about change?

EU Peacekeeping Hurts US-EU Relations
EU Independent Peacekeeping Would Hurt US-EU Relations National Journal February 9, 2002, p. 1. (BLUEUN1413)
With the Europeans now leading and forming the majority of the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, and with the United States pressuring the Europeans to shoulder more of the ongoing peacekeeping duties in the Balkans, analysts are pointing to a de facto "division of labor" forming within the trans-Atlantic alliance. In this view, the United States will increasingly focus on highintensity conflict and the Europeans will handle peacekeeping and crisis-management operations, primarily through the European Union's nascent rapid reaction force. But embracing this division of labor could institutionalize a split between U.S. and European mission capabilities. Such a transAtlantic split would unfairly burden the Europeans with all the risks of putting troops on the ground and would relegate them to the military equivalent of second-class citizenship within NATO. Senior alliance officials warn that such a division of labor would eventually weaken the alliance's cohesion.

GDI 2004 Scholars

79 European Union Counterplan

ESDP OUT OF AREA COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IS KEY TO LONGTERN STRONG RELATIONS Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, International Affairs Institute-IAI, Rome, EU’S EMERGING MILITARY POLICY, November 21, 2001, p. http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/air11/air11.pdf. (DRG/E114)
In a few years (ca. 2003), the EU should have available to it a force of 50-60,000 troops readily deployable to implement the full range of the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, namely tasks connected to humanitarian and crisis management interventions, including peace enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. These forces will be on call and made answerable to the EU as well as NATO, whenever they are asked to intervene by legitimate international collective security bodies, like the UN or OSCE. They could also be made directly available to the latter. EU forces would take action either in the framework of EU-led operations, or in NATO led operations, or in EU-led operations in which NATO facilities would be made available (Combined Joint Task Forces-CJTFs). A twin organisation for civilian crisis management is being developed by the EU that should be able to take advantage of the combined resources of the members states and the European Commission. To that purpose, a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management has already been set up within the framework of the Council of Ministers. The European Commission has started developing its own crisis management units, in particular a Rapid Deployment Facility intended to provide immediate financing. An interface mechanism co-ordinates the Commission and the Council. The CESDP and the European Security and Defence Identity in NATO While CESDP’s decision-making is independent with respect to NATO decisionmaking, one must not forget that it is part and parcel of a political process whereby the U.S. and EU, in combination with the other allies, seek to establish a new, more coherent, and stronger transatlantic relationship with a view to developing crisis management so as to foster international order. The conditions under which the emergence of this European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the NATO framework is envisaged - as aptly pointed out by the US Secretary of State - are: (a) non-decoupling between the allies; (b) nonduplication of structures and means; (c) non-discrimination with respect to non-EU NATO countries and candidates countries. For these conditions to be assured, negotiations are going on between the EU, NATO, and the other countries involved, so as to come to a comprehensive and inclusive transatlantic system of consultations and decision-making. Given that this transatlantic process is supposed to be without prejudice to EU autonomy, is it likely that EU-led operations will be decided by the European Council against the wishes of the United States and the other actors involved in the game? The U.S. insisted during the Cold War that the European allies should make greater efforts in non-Art. 5 operations carried out by NATO, but to no avail. In contrast, it has been the gradual transformation of NATO into a crisis management organisation that has given way to US-EU cooperation in non-Art. 5 operations, such as in the Western Balkans. What is new about the ESDI/CESDP process is the U.S. acceptance that such allied co-operation can take place in a more articulated and flexible structure (that is not necessarily only in NATO) and even without its participation. In this perspective, the likelihood of the EU taking action alone is not only technically but also politically feasible, in the sense that the EU is not to act necessarily and exclusively as an arm of the Alliance. At the same time, I believe that the EU will never act against the Alliance or without consulting it . On the other hand, it is very likely that the ongoing process of articulation of military forces will bring about a reinforcement of the existing bodies of transatlantic and EU-US consultation and will foster new ones.

GDI 2004 Scholars

80 European Union Counterplan

Congo Is Not Important to the EU
The EU has already ruled out Peacekeeping in the Congo, meaning there wqould be no impact on credibility PolitInfo.com Jun 8, 2004 (Brussels, http://www.politinfo.com/articles/article_2004_06_8_3216.html
No EU Peacekeepers for Congo) A European Union diplomatic source has told VOA that the 25-nation bloc is not considering sending a peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo at this time. The diplomat was reacting to a remark by Belgium's foreign minister that the European Union had agreed to send troops to Congo, and is working out the logistics. The diplomat, who is attached to the staff of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, says the Union is monitoring the situation in the eastern Congolese city of Bukavu, and is intensifying its diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the crisis there. But the diplomat, who requested anonymity, says the European Union has no intention, for the moment, to send in troops because a U.N. peacekeeping mission is deployed there. He says there is no talk in Brussels of any EU military mission at this time. Another EU official says the Union does not rule out any options, but still favors a diplomatic solution to the fighting, which has threatened the Congo's shaky peace process and reignited tension with the country's tiny neighbor, Rwanda.

GDI 2004 Scholars

81 European Union Counterplan

***Peace Process Impact Debate

GDI 2004 Scholars

82 European Union Counterplan

Peace process bad – strategic depth 1NC
*Fulfillment of the peace process ensures a Palestinian State that would be a launching ground for nuclear war
Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, March 27, 2003, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr03/beres.htm Until now, fears of a nuclear war in the Middle East have generally focussed on Iraq. Yet, when the current war against Saddam Hussein is concluded, it is highly unlikely that Iraq will be in any position to acquire nuclear weapons. A new Arab state of "Palestine," on the other hand, would have decidedly serious implications for certain regional resorts to nuclear conflict. Newly endowed with a so-called "Prime Minister," this state, although itself non-nuclear, would greatly heighten the prospect of catastrophic nuclear war in the area. If all goes well for the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush will feel compelled to reward Arab state allies and supporters with a dedicated American effort to create a Palestinian state. This state, tied closely to a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and flanking 70 percent of Israel's population, would utterly eliminate Israel's remaining strategic depth. With limited capacity to defend an already fragile land and facing a new enemy country resolutely committed to Israel's annihilation, Jerusalem would have to undertake even more stringent methods of counterterrorism and self-defense against aggression. Various new forms of preemption, known under international law as anticipatory self-defense, would be unavoidable. Significantly, a strong emphasis on preemption has now become the recognizable core of President Bush's national security policy for the United States. Several ironies must also be noted. Above all, offering Palestine as a reward for collaborative opposition to Iraq would merely exchange one terror state for another. Additionally, the nuclear risks associated with a new state of Palestine would derive not from this state directly - which would assuredly be non-nuclear - but from (1) other Arab/Islamic states (including Iran) that could exploit Israel's new strategic vulnerabilities; and/or (2) Israel's own attempts to preempt such enemy exploitations. Because the creation of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel would raise the area risk of nuclear war considerably, this very politicized measure should now be viewed with real apprehension. Indeed, its creation could even bring an Islamic "Final Solution" to the region. After all, every Arab map of the Middle East already excludes Israel. Cartographically, Israel has already been destroyed.

GDI 2004 Scholars

83 European Union Counterplan

Palestinian state bad – disclosure 1NC
A Palestinian state causes disclosure and preemption Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Dickinson Journal of International Law, Winter, 1997, p.301-2
An ironic connection exists between the so-called Middle East Peace Process n1 and the risks of regional nuclear war. Although the creation of Palestine from the Israeli lands of Judea, Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza is widely expected to reduce tensions and prevent conflict, its more likely effect will be to encourage both war and terrorism. n2 Indeed, if expanding violence were left to escalate, the creation of Palestine could even spawn the use or exchange of nuclear weapons. Why is this the case? First, it is likely that Israel, feeling more threatened by its loss of buffer territory, will feel increasingly compelled to bring its bomb out of the "basement." n3 Here, fearing that its expanded need for a credible deterrent were no longer served by the nuclear posture of "deliberate ambiguity," Israel would probably move to some form of explicit declaration of nuclear capability. Such disclosure could be full or partial and could be carried out with or without appropriate public demonstrations or tests. Whether or not such a shift from ambiguity to disclosure would actually enhance Israeli deterrence would depend upon several complex factors, including the types of weapons involved, the reciprocal calculations of Arab or Iranian leaders, n4 the effects upon rational decision-making processes by these Islamic leaders, and the effects upon both Israeli and enemy command/control/communi-cations operations. If, for example, bringing the Israeli bomb out of the basement were to result in Arab or Iranian pre-delegations of launch authority and/or new launchon-warning procedures, n5 the likelihood of unauthorized and/or accidental wars (including in the future, nuclear wars) n6 would be increased. It is also clear that merely acknowledging what one's adversaries have already believed need not necessarily enhance Israeli deterrence. Even if Israel should move from its position of ambiguity to disclosure (full or partial), enemies of the Jewish state might not realize the nuclear threat and thus commence aggression. n7 Or, perhaps even more ominously for Israel, disclosure could prod enemy leaders to preempt in the near future, a decision that would flow from their presumption that (1) war with Israel is inevitable; n8 and (2) Israel's vulnerability will only diminish. The creation of Palestine from the territories could also affect Israel's inclination to preempt. n9 One argument suggests that because of Israel's diminished size, its inclination to strike first at enemy hard targets would be especially high. n10 After all, now deprived of strategic depth, n11 it could not hold out for as long as was possible when Palestine was still the territories. In this connection, it is possible that a shift from deliberate ambiguity to disclosure after Palestine came into existence would reduce the Israeli incentive to preempt, but only if Jerusalem were made to believe that its nuclear threat, as a result of this shift, was being taken more seriously by the Arabs and/or Iran.

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84 European Union Counterplan

Peace process bad – motive 1NC
The roadmap will create a militant Palestinian state without garnering any concessions for Israel
Shawn Pine, research associate of the Freeman Center For Strategic Studies, July, 2003, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/jul03/pine1.htm Equally dangerous is the prospect that the process of the road map will supplant its tangible operative concepts and its main goal (securing a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians) for the sake of continuing the implementation of the road map process. As with the Oslo process, the bureaucratic exigency of continuing the road map will override what would become perceived as a peripheral issue (cessation of terror). This will create an environment in which the Israelis will be pressured to offer tangible concessions in return for what has historically been demonstrated to be vacuous promises. Once Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority sense that they can extract political concessions without fulfilling their obligations they will have little incentive to reign in militant Islamic Palestinian groups. This will only serve to embolden Palestinian extremists to increase and accelerate their attacks. This is nothing more than a repackaging of the Oslo Accords which resulted in the 2000 Palestinian intifada. Under this process, terms such as the need to "maintain the momentum towards peace" and "not to let terrorism win" will represent the lexicon of the road map much as it did during the Oslo process. Proponents of the process will argue that we cannot "allow terrorism to win" and that we must defeat those "opposed to peace" by accelerating the process. As the parties move deeper into the process their prestige and political credibility will become more interlocked with the process. As some point, they will be support the continuation the road map long after its chance of success will have become nullified by the reality on the ground. The net result of this process, should it reach its logical conclusion, will be the establishment of a militant Palestinian state alongside a strategically truncated Israel.

Attacks against Israel can’t be contained by the peace process – they’ll never quit
Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, August 11, 2002, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/sep02/beres.htm Today, in late summer 2002, this goal remains fixed and unchanged. Significantly, the goal remains nothing less than another Jewish genocide. Arab terrorism, as a complementary strategy of attrition, is consciously directed at the very same goal. With particular reference to the Palestinians, the Charter of Hamas - the Islamic Resistance Movement - exclaims proudly: "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad... In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad.... We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one to be dealt with on this premise.... 'I swear by that (sic.) who holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad: I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I promise to assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill.'" Arab/Islamic plans for genocidal extermination of Israel have never been kept secret, perhaps because these plans don´t really disturb the rest of the world. With rampant anti-Semitism again in fashion, especially (and ironically) in Europe, few seem to recall that, prior to 1967 - when all Arabs were already screaming for Israel´s "annihilation" and "liquidation" - there were no "Palestinian territories" under Israeli control. Exactly what was the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab world in general seeking to "liberate" between 1948 and 1967, when Gaza was held illegally by Egypt and Judea/Samaria (West Bank) by Jordan? There is no "peace process" with Arab states or authorities today, nor has there ever been such a process. The formal treaties extant between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan are little more than a temporary expedient by the Arab parties to buy time for critical rearmament and doctrinal refinement.

GDI 2004 Scholars

85 European Union Counterplan

Peace process bad – motive 1NC
The roadmap encourages Palestinian intransigence. It trades off with cultural shifts away from violence
Shawn Pine, Middle East military and strategic analyst and research associate with the Ariel Center for Policy Research, June, 2003, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/jun03/pine.htm There are signs that shifts are beginning to occur within Palestinian society that might ultimately bring about the requisite changes in Palestinian culture. The percentages of those favoring continuation of the intifada and suicide bombers were slightly lower than the percentage cited in previous polls. Moreover, the recent spontaneous protests by some 800 Palestinians against Hamas are the first notable expression that a fissure may be developing within the Palestinian society and that the Palestinians are coming to the realization that violent struggle has done little to facilitate the achievement of Palestinian national aspirations. However, although an encouraging manifestation for those seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, it has been an isolated event which indicates that the Palestinian eschewing of terrorism is in its embryonic stage. In a society in which "martyrdom" is worshipped and religious and political leaders urge its young to sacrifice themselves and to kill Jews, achieving the requisite change in Palestinian culture will be a generational process and not one that will occur over night. Until such time as a fundamental change within Palestinian society occurs any progress towards achieving a lasting peace between the two peoples will be ephemeral. Unfortunately, previous attempts to resolve the conflict, and the current situation, will ensure that the conditions under which the road map will be implemented will not be fundamentally different from those under which the Oslo process proceeded. Progress towards a real and comprehensive peace will occur only with the political isolation of Arafat and the destruction of Hamas and Islamic Jihad as effective terrorist and political forces. Only then will more pragmatic and reasonable Palestinian voices be able to speak out and compete for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people. Until such time, any attempt to reach a final settlement will not only proves fruitless, but will exacerbate the pain and suffering of both peoples. Given this reality, it is hard to fathom the motivations behind the decision to implement the road map at this time. Undoubtedly the decision by the United States to present the road map is largely part of the quid pro quo for Arab acquiescence and British support for US military operations against Iraq. The destination of the road map is the creation of a Palestinian State and a final and comprehensive settlement of the IsraelPalestinian conflict by 2005. By setting a date the US has placed Israel in an untenable position. Regardless of the lack of tangible progress that will be made in implementing the components of the road map the Quartet will seek to achieve a final settlement by the end date. This will be done only by forcing Israel to make the type of concessions that were previously offered by Ehud Barak, and rejected by Arafat, without compelling the Palestinians to fulfill any of their obligations under the road map.

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86 European Union Counterplan

Peace process good (internal impacts)
*The status quo is unsustainable. A peace deal with Palestine frees up resources and lessens the incentive for violence
Alan Dowty, Professor of Political Science at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, v3 n1, March, 1999, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria99_dowty01.html Even in the realm of security, the case for separation rather than integration looked stronger with the passage of time. While an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would pose serious strategic issues, so did continued occupation of that area. Jewish settlements did not contribute to strategic depth, but stretched the resources of the Israeli army in providing protection to scattered and isolated outposts. The army itself was diverted from its basic missions by the tasks of occupation and the increasing need to focus on control of civilians rather than training and readiness for military combat. The lack of internal cohesion within Israel was reflected in growing confusion over a security policy torn by conflicting demands and pressures. Strategists pointed out that a settlement with the Palestinians, by furthering the trend among Arab states to drop out of the conflict, would lessen the greater dangers that Israel faced. It would also strengthen Israel’s international position immeasurably, leading to final universal acceptance and legitimacy. The clear trend in Israeli opinion has been toward separation as a solution to conflict, rather than trying to integrate a large hostile population. Even the Likud was not totally assimilationist, in that its proposed program of autonomy aimed for maximum separation consistent with continued Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. The strategy of separation was also a strategy for reducing the Arab-Israeli conflict to its pre-1948 intra-Palestinian core: by allowing Palestinian Arab self-determination to be realized within Palestine, alongside Israel, the major cause and incentive for external Arab involvement would be neutralized. Israel would remain in a very strong position in dealing with a separate Palestinian entity that in itself posed no military threat (apart from the problem of terrorism, to which continued occupation was also not a solution).

The Palestinians will never back down until they get a state
Ash Pulcifer, August 01, 2002, http://www.yellowtimes.org/print.php?sid=550 But how many more suicide bombings and murdered Israeli civilians will it take for the proponents of current Israeli policy to realize that terror only fuels the flames for more terror? No matter how many assassinations, no matter how many more curfews enforced by sniper fire, no matter how many more helicopter gunship and F-16 bombings, no matter how many more tank attack and destroy missions into refugee camps: the Sharon government will not be able to stop the anger of Palestinian militants who will unleash their fury on any available Israeli target. Benedict Carey from the Los Angeles Times, in an article published on July 30, 2002, confirmed the belief that terror creates terror. In "Method without madness?" Carey studied the motives behind suicide bombers. His conclusions were that "people who have witnessed or been subjected to violence are particularly susceptible to [suicide bombing] … the families of Palestinian suicide bombers often cite motives of revenge for a father or brother killed or beaten by Israeli soldiers." According to this logic, what the Sharon government is doing is turning more Palestinian civilians into Palestinian militants as more and more Palestinians are exposed to extreme amounts of violence and hardship that come with the constant occupational and oppressive conditions they are forced to endure. The best way to alleviate these horrible conditions is for Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinian leadership. Judging by the history of independence movements, the Palestinian people will not stop their quest for self-determination until they receive it.

GDI 2004 Scholars

87 European Union Counterplan

Peace process good (internal impacts)
A Palestinian state is the only way to moderate Palestinian leaders and end violence – radical takeover is inevitable in the status quo
Khalil Shikaki, Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center, Foreign Policy Studies, Financial Times, June 24, 2002 As George W. Bush's administration ponders its next step in the Middle East—due to be outlined in a speech by Mr Bush—it should remember that a negotiated settlement is the only answer to violence and radicalism. Waiting for violence to stop before pushing the parties into serious negotiations would only reward, and thus accelerate, violence. It would also encourage both sides to adopt unilateral measures. The suicide attacks in Jerusalem last week show that Israel's April reoccupation of West Bank has done little, if anything, to reduce violence. Palestinians who continue with violence hope to force Israel into unilateral withdrawal—a "separation" on which Ariel Sharon's government has already embarked by building the new "Israel Wall" along its borders with Palestinian territories. Israelis who deny the right of the Palestinians to independence in their own state fear negotiations in just the same way. A peace strategy articulated by the US and fully supported by Europe has a much better chance of ending violence than building walls and imposing sieges. This strategy should proceed simultaneously with three processes: improving security, building peace, and creating strong and efficient Palestinian state institutions. Without it, the prospect of an end to violence is slim; and demands for Palestinian political reform are likely to be ignored. In the absence of a political process, the idea that violence pays has taken root in the consciousness of both leaders and people on both sides. The two peoples no longer define victory in terms of what benefits violence brings them, but what damage, pain and suffering they can inflict on the other side. This highly disturbing development means they are willing to sustain conflict for a long time, as long as the other side is bleeding. Even more significantly, the two sides are approaching the level of political paralysis. On the Palestinian side, a number of developments have weakened Yassir Arafat's ability to manage the crisis with Israel and have led to public questioning of the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. These developments include the emergence of a young guard that wants political reform and the end of Israeli occupation through violence; the formation of a temporary alliance between this young guard and radical Islamists; the success of the Israeli military in damaging the civil and security infrastructure of the Authority; and the inability of the already highly inefficient Authority to deliver much-needed services. This has led to a dramatic rise in the level of violence, and the granting to Islamists of a veto power in Palestinian politics—the first time this has happened since the Palestinian national movement emerged. The time could soon come when Mr Arafat and the Palestinian Authority will indeed become "irrelevant", as radical nationalist-Islamist militia control the streets of Palestinian cities.

GDI 2004 Scholars

88 European Union Counterplan

Peace process good (external impacts)
The roadmap solves the root cause of terrorism
Bhupinder Liddar, editor of Diplomat & International Canada magazine, Hill Times, August 11, 2003 The success of the roadmap will take away the raison d'etre of the Osama bin Ladens of the world for fuelling hatred against the United States and will allow Americans to enjoy living in a terror-free world. When one lives in a society as free and open as that of the United States it is difficult to counter every terrorist threat or act. Every American, Israeli, Palestinian - for that matter all of us deserve to live in a terror-free world. A major step to this end is to support the efforts of President Bush to see a successful conclusion of the journey of this roadmap with the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Canada needs to be more vocal in support of it.

Success in the roadmap increases US peace efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia
Bhupinder Liddar, editor of Diplomat & International Canada magazine, Hill Times, August 11, 2003 As leader of the sole superpower, President Bush is assuming responsibility for diffusing the simmering conflict, which could spark for a wider conflict. The protracted Israeli/Palestinian conflict also lies at the root cause for much of the resentment in the Arab/Muslim world against the United States. It is because the United States is perceived to have been playing favourite with Israel but President Bush wants to be seen adopting an even-handed approach in resolving the conflict. It will be the dawn of a new era for United States relations with the Arab/Muslim world if it can help resolve the seemingly senseless feud which sees innocent civilians killed. From Afghanistan to Pakistan to Iraq and Indonesia, the United States will be perceived in a different light if it succeeds in taking the parties to the end of the roadmap.

Success of the Afghani government sets a global model for terrorism prevention Nazif Shahrani, Professor of Anthropology Professor of Central Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University, October 14, 2001, http://www.forumoffederations.org/
The task is daunting, but the reward-liberation of the peoples of Afghanistan from the reign of terror-will be worth it. More importantly, if the United States and her international coalition partners can help Afghans set up a just governance structure with care and compassion, they will set a new precedent for combating the conditions that give rise to global terrorism.

Pakistani civil war leads to India-Pakistan nuclear war Washington Post, October 21, 2001
The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden, warned Mackubin Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a pan-Islamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ullman argued that the arrival of U.S. troops in Pakistan to fight the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan could inadvertently help bin Laden achieve his goal of sparking an anti-American revolt in the country. Andrew Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University, said it is possible "that we are sliding toward a summer-of-1914 sequence of events" -- when a cascading series of

GDI 2004 Scholars international incidents spun out of control and led to World War I.

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Peace process good (external impacts)
Indonesian fragmentation leads to massive violence and spreads throughout Southeast Asia Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst at The RAND Corporation, and Peter Chalk, Policy Analyst
working in the Project Airforce and National Security divisions of the RAND Corporation, 2001, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1344/ Indonesian disintegration would have severe humanitarian and economic consequences. First, one can assume that disintegration would be accompanied by large-scale violence in the Indonesian archipelago. There would be increased refugee flows, probably to Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. An increase in piracy and transnational crime can be expected, brought about by economic dislocation and the breakdown in law and order. There would be few, if any prospects of the return of investment capital to Indonesia, and the rest of the region—even well-ordered economies like Singapore—would suffer by association. Progress toward the development of a serious ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) would slow, as would the integration and rationalization of transport and infrastructure in the region. A deteriorating regional environment could also place at risk Philippine democracy, which steadily strengthened after the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986. Since then, there were three successive democratic presidential elections, democratic civilian control of the military was strengthened, and former military coup-makers and guerrillas alike were incorporated into the political system. Despite the impressive achievements of Filipino democracy, strong political and economic threats to stability remain. After his abortive impeachment on bribery charges, Estrada was driven from office in January 2001 by a military-backed popular uprising. The new government of President Macapagal Arroyo has to contend with significant Communist and Islamic insurgencies and the disaffection of Estrada’s supporters.4 Instability or disintegration would strengthen centrifugal forces elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The impact of the emergence of ministates in the former space of Indonesia could be especially threatening to regional states confronted by ethnic and religious divisions. As Indonesians point out, the rebellion in Aceh, although deriving from local sources, is not an isolated phenomenon. It is linked to a series of Muslim insurgencies of varying degrees of intensity, from southern Thailand to the southern Philippines.

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