JAPAN CP – MASON FILE

Japan Cp
INDEX
1NC shell

2-4

Solvency – General

5-11

Humanitarian Solvency

12

AT: No solvency – no mil aid

13

Iraq Solvency

14

AT: Checkbook Diplomacy

15

AT: Security Council

16-18

AT: Article 9

19-22

US not suited

23

Japanese wants Leadership

24-26

Inc Leadership

27-28

Japan is a leader

19-31

Net Benefit – Security

32-33

AT: Perm

34 -35

Cp Inc soft power

36

Article 9

37-30

No Solvency

41-43

No Solvency – no flexibility

44

Perm

45-48

Checkbook diplomacy

49

AFF

1

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp – Shell 1/3
Text: The Government of Japan, including relevant agencies, should establish a foreign policy
substantially increasing its support of United Nations peacekeeping operations by [insert the
Affirmative mandates]. Funding and enforcement are guaranteed.
Observation 1 – competition
A. Net Benefit – The counterplan does not link to Japan DA or a trade-off DA (such as AIDs
trade-off)
Observations 2 – Solvency
1. Japan has been successful in peacekeeping missions, but also has increased the quality of the
missions
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan – 2000 (“UN Peacekeeping Operations”)
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html
To date, Japan has also made contributions in kind. For example, Japan provided refugee relief
materials such as tents and blankets to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) working for Kosovar refugees and East Timorese displaced persons in 1999. In the
same year, Japan also provided the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with
radios for public information purposes in support of the direct ballot in August 1999.In addition
to these field activities, Japan takes an active part in discussions in the United Nations to improve
the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Japan, for example, has been serving as vice-chair
for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the principal UN forum undertaking a
comprehensive review of the questions related to peacekeeping operations. With regard to the
issue of the safety of peacekeepers, Japan strongly maintained that necessary measures should be
taken for significant improvement, and Japan's initiative resulted in the adoption in 1994 of the
"Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel," which Japan was the second to
ratify. Japan has been actively urging other countries which have not yet done so to become a
party to the convention. Japan will continue to cooperate with UN peacekeeping activities not
only by participating in actual operations but also by actively engaging in discussions for further
improvement of these operations

2

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp – Shell 2/3
2. Japan is capable of a greater role with PKOs for several reasons
Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh
“Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast
Asia pg 82)
Permanent UN Security Council Seat and Peacekeeping Operations Japan has stepped up efforts
in its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat.58 The Japanese
Government believes that it is both ready and has the capacity to assume greater global
responsibilities through the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. To the Japanese,
the bid is justified on several grounds. First, Tokyo is the second-largest financial contributor to
the regular UN budget and to the UNPKO budget.59 Japan provides approximately 20.6 per cent
of the UN budget, second only to the United States, exceeding the combined contributions of four
permanent members of the UNSC (excluding the United States).60 Secondly, the bid is supported
by Japan's increased participation in UNPKO, following the enactment of the International Peace
Cooperation Law in 1992.61 The key development was Tokyo's deployment of 1,800 troops to
Cambodia as part of an UN-sponsored peacekeeping force in 1992.62 Following that experience,
Japan conducted successful peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in Mozambique in
1993, Zaire in 1994, and the Golan Heights in 1996.63 More recently, the Diet passed a revision
to the peacekeeping co-operation law, which would allow peacekeeping forces to engage in such
activities as monitoring compliance with ceasefire agreements and disposing of surrendered
weapons. The amendment also relaxes restrictions on the use of weapons by SDF personnel to
virtually protect troops of other countries in the event of an attack.64 Thirdly, Japan's bid for a
permanent UNSC seat is also supported by its strong support in promoting international
disarmament and non-proliferation while firmly keeping to its three non-nuclear principles of not
possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into its
territory.65

3

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp – Shell 3/3
3. The overburdened United States PKOs want the Japan to take a greater role in peacekeeping
operations
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
107).
On the human resource side of the ledger, during the debate in the aftermath of the deaths of
Nakata and Takata, William Perry, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, spoke in Tokyo on the need
for Japan to exercise leadership in global issues and that the Cambodian operation was a useful
step in the right direction. The desire on the part of the US to see Japan playing an active role at
times led to exasperation at the soul-searching and debate within Japan. The Yomiuri Shinbun
reported one US State Department source as stating that it hoped that Japan would take a greater
burden for US troops stationed within Japan, and in the field of PKOs would make more of a
human contribution, even to peace enforcement operations, as the majority of US citizens were
believed to have no objection to the despatch of Japanese troops abroad (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 May
1993). According to a Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll of April 1993 support for Japan’s
participation in PKOs among the Western nations reached a mean of 70 per cent (with France at
73 per cent, the US at 71 per cent, the UK at 69 per cent and Germany at 68 per cent—a higher
proportion than in Japan itself, polled at 59 per cent support). This showed a steady increase from
a poll conducted in 1992 before the UNTAC operation that estimated support among the West as
being 66 per cent in the US and 54 per cent in Japan (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 April 1993).

4

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Japan Cp
General Solvency 1/7
Japan is the leader of Asia, who can successfully lead peacekeeping missions.
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
3).
In the case of justifying the study of Japan, most scholars are quick to cite the rapid development
and economic growth of Japan since the Second World War. However, this task has been
undertaken ad nauseum in the literature pertaining to Japan—outlining Japan’s remarkable levels
of gross national product (GNP), status as the largest creditor nation and so on—and need not be
repeated here. This is very much an upshot of the shock the West received with Japan’s
development into an economic superpower from the 1960s and the vast amounts of wealth that
accumulated thereafter in Tokyo during the bubble period of the 1980s. As Williams has stated,
‘in a way true of no Asian nation since the vigorous prime of the Ottoman Empire, Japan looms
large today in the practical affairs and speculative cares of the contemporary Westerner’
(Williams 1996: xii–xiii). However, despite this attention, the Japanese experience of
government, security and foreign policy has singularly failed to enter into the West’s
consciousness and it is not so widely expounded why Japan matters. After having justified the
reasons for concentrating on PKOs in the post-Cold War period, it is now necessary to shed light
on the salience of Japan’s experience, both generally in the field of security and foreign policy,
and specifically in the sub-field of peacekeeping.
Japan will provide a new perspective on peacekeeping different from the West
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
4).
There is an obvious gap in the literature addressing and evaluating sufficiently the contribution
Japan can make to PKOs as a nation having renounced its right to belligerency, in addition to the
influence the UN and the practice of peacekeeping can exert in the promotion of Japan’s role in
international society. As will be demonstrated throughout this book, the Japanese experience of
security in terms of its Peace Constitution and the respect accorded to both societal and
international organizations, especially the UN, provides us with new ways in which to think about
attitudes towards, and the influence of, peacekeeping, as well as the way we think about foreign
policy-making and the role of state and non-state actors in this process. It will become apparent in
the following chapters that state and non-state actors within and outside of Japan have sought to
limit Japan’s peacekeeping role with reference to traditionally anti-militarist ideals and values,
whereas the UN has played a crucial role in justifying the Japanese government’s evolving
peacekeeping role, and ultimately its incremental, military role. Thus, by studying the debates in
Japan surrounding peacekeeping, this book will shed light on Western ways of thinking about
international relations and unearth new centers of power, in line with the contention that ‘one
should study Japan to understand the totality of human experience.

5

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp
Solvency 2/7
Japan reorganized its government to increase its role in the world, including a successful
operation in Cambodia.
Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh
“Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast
Asia pg 82)
Following the Gulf War, the security dimension in Japanese foreign policy gained prominence. In
response to the emergence of new external threats, Japan adjusted its security policy to allow for
greater participation in the international security environment. It did so in particular ways. First,
in 1992, Tokyo enacted the International Peace Co-operation Law, which allowed Japan to play a
more active security role through greater participation in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations (UNPKO). The passing of this Law led to the successful deployment of 1,800
Japanese troops to Cambodia as part of a UNsponsored peacekeeping force in 1992.5 Secondly,
Tokyo reformulated the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) in 1995 - the first time
since 1976. That reformulation emphasized Japan taking a greater role in UNPKOs, and the SelfDefence Force (SDF) addressing lowintensity threats such as terrorism.6 Thirdly, in 1996, the
Japanese Government agreed to enter into talks with the United States to revitalize the U.S.-Japan
alliance to make it more relevant to the postCold War environment. In the new U.S.-Japan Joint
Security Declaration, both countries outlined an agenda for a greater role for Japan in expanded
defence co-operation, including defence planning, research and development, missile defence,
and diplomacy towards China.7

6

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp
Solvency 3/7
Japan realizes that it needs to be involved in the worldwide effort in peacekeeping
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
147).
Thus, he began to advocate participation in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) effort in Somalia
and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. Kakizawa stressed, unlike Mitsuzuka, not the need to
demonstrate what Japan can and cannot do but rather:
help dispel the suspicion at home that the passage of the PKO Bill last year was engineered in a
hasty, politically-motivated move to send SDF personnel abroad with only Cambodia in mind.
The truth is that the International Peace Co-operation Law is an instrument of co-operation for
UN peacekeeping operations everywhere in the world and not one of serving Japan’s interests in
our part of the world alone.
(The Japan Times, 16 February 1993)
The position of the new coalition government of Hosokawa was highly supportive of a more
active role in PKOs with Hata Tsutomu, as Foreign Minister, stressing the effort that Japan must
produce in order to realize peace in international society, ‘we must be determined to sweat and do
our utmost to bring about a peaceful world’ (The Japan Times, 11 August 1993). When
considered alongside Hosokawa’s speech to the General Assembly (mentioned earlier), which
quoted the famed Japanese inter-war internationalist Niitobe Inazō, this demonstrates the
administration’s commitment to international society and its standards of behaviour (The Japan
Times, 29 September 1993). Furthermore (as mentioned in Chapter 5), the Hosokawa government
sanctioned for the first time in two decades the advisory report The Modality of the Security and
Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. This report stressed a new
direction for Japan’s foreign and security policy:
Japan wants to participate in PKOs, and is accepted worldwide
Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999
(Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the
1990s” CNAPS Working Paper)
Amid these trends, the Japanese commitment to an expanded diplomatic role is irreversible.
Proactive engagement through peace making efforts and peace keeping operations are widely
supported by the Japanese public in general terms and well understood by the international
community as a whole. Nationalistic sentiment prevailing among Japanese will prove to be a
temporary phenomenon as was the case in the early 1990s. A series of economic stimulus
packages together with structural reforms of the banking system are expected to bear fruit in the
not-so-distant future. Those elements will all positively promote proactive diplomacy

7

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Japan cp
Solvency 4/7
Japan’s past successes make it the perfect candidate to lead further peacekeeping operations
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan – 2000 (“UN Peacekeeping Operations”)
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html
Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, has been strenuously working for
the maintenance of peace and security. Accordingly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations
is today placed as one of Japan's important areas of cooperation for international peace and
security. Japan's first substantial participation in a UN peacekeeping operation was in 1989, when
27 electoral observers were dispatched to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) in Namibia. Then in 1992, the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law
enabled Japan to send not only its civilian personnel but also its Self-Defense Forces personnel to
UN peacekeeping operations. Based on that law, Japan participated in peacekeeping operations in
Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor, and since 1996 has been
dispatching a Self-Defense Forces contingent to the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF), which is deployed on the Golan Heights. Japan's Self-Defense Forces personnel
were also sent to assist Rwandan refugees and East Timorese displaced persons as part of
international humanitarian relief operations. Japan also cooperated in international election
monitoring activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were conducted by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 and 2000.
Iraq shows the greater involvement of Japan in Peacekeeping operations
Economist – 2004 (May 6th “Not so nice”
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2656985)
Unsurprisingly, the other area in which Japan finishes last is security. It does, after all, have a
pacifist constitution. Yet Japan's Self Defence Forces began participating in peacekeeping
missions, such as to Cambodia and East Timor, in the 1990s. The index recognizes that such
missions tend to help the poor, but makes the assumption that only those approved by the United
Nations or other international bodies are helpful. All of Japan's peacekeeping missions have been
UN-approved; but since it has contributed few troops relative to its size and military budget, they
do not count for much in the index. Japan's decision to send non-combat forces to Iraq earlier this
year, after a UN appeal for general assistance, may lift it up the security rankings next time. Many
Japanese pacifists regard the deployment as an unholy departure from Japan's traditional way of
dealing with the world. Yet on at least one measure, sending soldiers to Iraq was one of the few
gestures their country has made which could be seen as comparatively generous.

8

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Solvency 5/7

Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000
(Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
Because Japan needs a more visible role that would work towards the creation of global peace
and stability and would result in an honorable place for Japan in the international community, it
should concentrate its resources and efforts in peacekeeping. The blue helmets/berets have
become one of the most recognizable symbols of the United Nations, and have accorded to many
of the wearers, respect and a good reputation.22 In conjunction with the constraints upon Japanese
participation in such operations, niche diplomacy would advocate the concentration of resources
in a specific area of peacekeeping, namely a supplemental role. By "supplemental" it is meant
those tasks that require the personnel to be in the area of conflict and under the command of the
UN, hence acting as members of the blue helmets. However, a supplemental role does not
necessarily mean on the front lines where there is a higher risk of having to resort to force. Such
tasks include, for example, election monitoring, acting as civilian police units, infrastructure
construction (both for the communities and the UN personnel), transporting goods and personnel
and providing medical relief. Such roles are allowable under the International Peace Cooperation
Law but more importantly, are agreeable to the Japanese public. In 1995, the Japanese Prime
Minister’s office conducted an opinion poll on diplomacy that found that seventy percent of
citizens supported peacekeeping.23 Given that Japan is a newcomer to this field and lacks the
historical tradition of peacekeeping that Canada has, such a support level is respectable.

9

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Japan Cp
Solvency 6/7
Japan has been successful in peacekeeping operations in various countries
Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004
(Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q
35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid
%3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e
The world will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals without Japan's technological
prowess and its focus on “human security”. Just ask the people of the dozens of African countries
what a difference Japan has made in promoting health, education and environmental protection
there. We need Japan to remain involved in the Organization's political, peacekeeping and
human rights work. Just ask the people of Tajikistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique and
Rwanda, for example, how much they appreciate your efforts to help them emerge from conflict
and re-build stable, functioning states. And consider how much Japan has done for Afghanistan –
organizing a successful pledging conference two years ago here in Tokyo, and I was privileged to
attend that conference, and continuing to play a leading role in the country's reconstruction.
Since 1992 Japan has been involved in many different peacekeeping operations
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
Japan has supported a variety of international efforts under the auspices of the UN since 1992.
This support has included Japanese assistance in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador,
and the Golan Heights. The range of functional support has varied in size and complexity. The
focus in Angola, Mozambique, and El Salvador was on monitoring elections. Japanese support in
1992-93 to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia included monitoring the cease-fire and
storage of collected weapons, advising and training police, construction of roads and bridges,
logistical support, and election monitoring. Japanese support to Cambodia involved civilians,
members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and civilian police, which amounted to a total
participation of approximately 1,330 personnel. In another example of Japanese involvement with
United Nations overseas operations, Japan has deployed personnel to the Golan Heights in
support of the UN Disengagement Observer Force since February 1996. Approximately 50 SelfDefense Force personnel are engaged there in transportation and storage of supplies, road repair,
and maintenance of heavy equipment. Personnel are also involved in planning, coordination, and
liaison.[24]

10

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Japan Cp
Solvency 7/7
Japan has already made valuable contributions to peace in various parts of the world
Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public
Policy Studies – 1997
(James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.)
Within these constraints, Japan has done much. Your country is second only to the U.S. in
financial contributions to UN peacekeeping, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars each
year. Japan has also actively participated in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations in
Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and currently in the Golan Heights. The tragic
death of the Japanese police officer in Cambodia highlighted the risk that peacekeepers take, but
it is important to remember that his sacrifice contributed to the safety and stability of an entire
nation long traumatized by war. Around the world, men and women from many UN member
states have also made the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of humanity's shared responsibilities.
Japan has made very valuable contributions to international peace. The issue is not whether Japan
is doing enough, but can it do more?

11

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Japan Cp
Humanitarian solvency 1/1
Japan has participated in humanitarian peacekeeping operations in Rwanda
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
Humanitarian and disaster relief operations are an area of potential bilateral cooperation which
could render significant benefits in the future. The International Relief Cooperation Assignments
for Rwandan Refugees represents a missed opportunity for bilateral US-Japan cooperation of this
type. Japan responded to a request by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees by sending a
Self-Defense Force contingent to Goma, Zaire, from September to December 1994. The
contingent was 423 members strong, and supported UN efforts through medical assistance to
refugees, water purification, logistical support, liaison, and coordination.[26] Complications arose
in attempts to coordinate US airlift to support the Japanese deployment. Ultimately, Japan turned
to a contractual arrangement with Russia to support its airlift requirements to Goma. That Japan
would have to secure its airlift from a country other than the United States, which routinely stages
cargo aircraft from bases in Japan, is very odd. This peculiarity is compounded by the fact that
the United States had been involved in supporting operations in Zaire since 1991. From
September to October 1991 the United States staged Operation Quick Lift, which provided airlift
to transport French and Belgian troops and equipment in support of noncombatant evacuation
operations in Zaire. Additionally, the United States engaged in Operation Support Hope in July
1994, providing humanitarian relief and support operations for Rwandan refugees. The ease with
which the United States was able to support NATO allies with air-lift reflects the efficacy of
NATO's acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA). Conversely, the Rwandan relief
operation helped underscore the absence of such an agreement between the United States and
Japan, and its potential value in facilitating efficient responses to requirements of this nature.[27]

12

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Japan Cp
AT: No Solvency – no military aid 1/1
Japan can provide all type of aid; just not military aid
Japan Economic Insitute Report – 1999 (Barbara Wanner. “SECURITY CHALLENGES
HIGHLIGHT COALITION POLICY DISCORD”
http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9946w4.html)
Mr. Obuchi's offer no doubt disappointed Mr. Annan, especially in view of Japan’s participation
in the operationally similar 1992-93 U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia but also because of
its continued detailing of SDF members to the U.N.'s presence in the Golan Heights. The sevenyear-old peacekeeping support law — a response to the international criticism directed at Tokyo
for its perceived too-little-too-late support for the multinational forces fighting in the 1990-91
Persian Gulf War — does indeed authorize SDF participation in UNTAET-type missions, if only
in logistical, medical or humanitarian support capacities.

13

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Japan Cp
Iraq Solvency 1/1
Japan is perfect country to help to rebuild Iraq because they have sent in peacekeeping operations
Gozaimashita - Secretary-General of Japan - 2004
(Arigato. The Secretary-General's Address to the Japanese Parliament
www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=789 - 26k)
In short, there will be formidable challenges ahead – but they will not be insurmountable if Iraq is
supported by a united international community. Japan is among those countries that have taken
the lead in embracing this challenge. You have responded to the appeals of the UN Security
Council, and shown commendable solidarity with Iraq's plight. You are a member of the “friends
of Iraq” grouping that I have just established in New York. You have pledged to contribute
generously to reconstruction. And after a difficult debate, you have dispatched the Self-Defence
Forces to Samawah to help with reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.

14

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Japan Cp
AT: Checkbook diplomacy 1/1
The Gulf War showed the Japanese that they needed to be involved in directly with PKO instead
of financially to stay a world power
Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996
(Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of
Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf)
The emphasis on financial support in Japan's international contributions continued until the Gulf
War, when its reluctance to undertake military support operations to assist the multinational
forces10 became a contentious issue in the bilateral relationship with the United States, which put
considerable pressure on Japan for engagement beyond mere financial contributions. The lesson
learned from the war [Gulf War] was that Japan risked exclusion from the league of 'big players'
in world affairs by continuing to substitute international financial contributions for more direct
forms of contribution to international security, including human or physical contributions. The
Japanese government scrambled to pass legislation establishing a U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps
to provide logistic back-up for the multinational forces in the Gulf, only to be defeated by
concerted political opposition in the Diet. After the hostilities had ended, it did, however, manage
to construct a firm legal and political foundation for the dispatch of Japanese minesweepers to the
Persian Gulf.11 This was the first time that SDF activity was described as a contribution to the
international community and specifically a contribution in terms of personnel or human
resources. According to the
Japanese defense white paper, "ensuring safe ship traffic in that sea area at the earliest date
possible was called upon by international society. Therefore, the dispatch of the minesweepers
was of significance as a measure to contribute to the international community in terms of
personnel for peace and humanity".12 Along with Japan's subsequent participation in
peacekeeping support functions launched with the passage of the 1992 Law, it represented an
important qualitative shift away from so-called 'chequebook diplomacy'.

15

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Japan Cp
AT: Security Council 1/3
There is not linkage between the Japanese emphasis on PKOs and their bid for a Security Council
seat
Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996
(Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of
Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf)
The Foreign Ministry denies any explicit linkage between peacekeeping and permanent seat
issues partly out of fear that such a connection might be counterproductive in the domestic
political environment. It continues to base the Japanese claim primarily on financial grounds,23
although the relationship between peacekeeping and a permanent seat is clearly evident in the
Foreign Ministry's eagerness for Japan to sustain the momentum in peacekeeping sufficiently to
maintain Japan's international credibility and to deflect international criticism that it is failing to
do its part. The Peace Cooperation Headquarters in the Prime Minister's Office (which is staffed
mainly by seconded Foreign Ministry officials) is always on the lookout for new missions and
recently canvassed Macedonia which was earlier rejected as too dangerous. Earlier, the Ministry
downplayed the risks of sending peacekeepers to Cambodia24 which later rebounded when a
Japanese civilian election monitor and a policeman were killed; it hastily drafted the original
peacekeeping law which failed to fly in the Diet in part because it was so poorly conceived; and it
was very eager to send peacekeepers to Zaire to aid the Rwandan refugees in spite of strong
reservations from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the SDF because of the potential dangers
involved. Given the Foreign Ministry's more adventurous stance on engagement options, there
has been some disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the JDA/SDF side in decision
making about where and when to dispatch Japanese peacekeepers. The SDF supports the
peacekeeping enterprise in principle as a means of bolstering its position both domestically and
internationally and it is also willing to assume a proper role in the international community, but it
is concerned that it may be ill prepared for certain missions in terms of practical matters such as
training, equipment and interoperability issues.25 Furthermore its personnel have to wear the
physical risks.

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Japan Cp
AT: security council 2/3
Japan’s increased interest in PKOs comes from a need to be more international not from a desire
for a security council seat
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
149).
El Salvador became the third recipient of Japanese peacekeepers in March 1994 with fifteen
Japanese personnel despatched to observe the presidential election scheduled for March of that
year. At the same time, another UN internationalist norm entrepreneur, Owada Hisashi, was
appointed as Japanese Ambassador to the UN was widely regarded as an attempt to secure a
permanent seat on the UNSC—an accurate appraisal considering MOFA appoints its own
officials; however, not a move to be confused with Japan’s participation in PKOs which is
characterised more as an attempt to live up to a norm of international society. This undertaking of
international responsibility was also evident in Japan’s active role in drafting and becoming a
party to the Convention of the Safety of the UN and Associated Personnel in June 1995, as well
as contributing US$500,000 to a project aimed at improving the protection of UN volunteers—a
direct consequence of the lessons from the UNTAC operation. Moreover, in April 1997 Owada
elaborated a plan to the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the strengthening of the UN’s
peacekeeping activities stressing co-operation with regional organisations, provision of
humanitarian assistance and preventative diplomacy (MOFA 1997b). At the Special Committee
on Peacekeeping Operations on 11 April 1997, Japan’s Ambassador to the UN, Owada Hisashi,
stressed the importance of the changes in peacekeeping and the role Japan could play in new,
multidimensional peacekeeping:

17

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Japan Cp
AT: security council 3/3
No actions is merely altruistic there is always a hidden motive, but Japan should participate more
actively in peacekeeping operations.
Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000
(Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
But the Japanese government has met with formidable obstacles in defining what its role should
be. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been interpreted by some within the government
and among the public, to prohibit the overseas dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) in any capacity, thereby negating any military role that Japan could play in UN
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).8 Although the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law
defined the conditions under which the SDF may participate in PKOs – a cease-fire must be in
place; the host territories/parties to the dispute must agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping
force and must agree to Japanese participation in that force; the force must maintain impartiality;
Japan reserves the right to withdraw from the mission if these conditions cease to exist; weapons
may be used only as a last resort or in cases of self-defense9 – there is still considerable debate in
defining Japan's contribution. Many scholars advocate that Japan continue to be the financial
contributor while others argue for it to assist in the development of peacekeeping policy. If
Japan's desire to partake in peacekeeping operations was based purely on altruistic reasons, such
roles would be appropriate. However, given that few countries partake in such operations
completely free from self-interest, both middle power and niche diplomacy theories would
advocate a different role for Japan. Taking into consideration Japan's middle power role, its
national interest and its commitment to peace, as well as its military strengths and financial
situation, niche diplomacy would suggest that Japan physically participate in peacekeeping
operations through a supplemental role. This essay will therefore focus on why Japan should play
this role and will conclude with some policy implications for Japan and the international
community.

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Japan Cp
AT: Article 9 1/4
Article 9 will not prevent the Japanese from solving the problem because PKOs are not allowed
to fight
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
43).
Fourth, the non-use of force has been generally recognized as a characteristic of PKOs (Liu
1992). It has been said that when the first peacekeeping troops were dispatched to the Palestine in
1948 they carried revolvers, but no ammunition. Provisions for the non-use of force (except for
self-defense) are usually contained within the rules of engagement drafted for each operation.
Traditionally, only light weapons have been carried because peacekeepers are sanctioned to use
force only in self-defense. This goes hand in hand with peacekeeping being regarded as a
confidence-building measure and taking a non-threatening stance. Fifth, the military and political
neutrality of the UN between belligerents is a necessary condition. PKOs do not target an enemy,
which may be the case in a collective security action. Ideally, there are no judgements made by
peacekeeping troops as to who is guilty or not and independence between the policies of each
belligerent must be retained (Kōzai 1995:27). With all this in mind, Goulding (1993) tentatively
defines UN peacekeeping as:
Article 9 is flexible, the government has been able to interrupt it the way that they was necessary
to respond to challenges
Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996
(Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of
Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf)
It has been customary for defense policy changes to occur by a process of 'revision by
interpretation'. The wording of the constitution remains unaltered, but the interpretation of
Article 9 is changed to permit the desired activity of the SDF. Such developments include
peacekeeping itself, defense of the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles which was Japan's first
step into strategic defense in depth,50 and the acquisition of military equipment that enables
Japan to project a greater degree of force. Revision by interpretation may occur again in order to
accommodate the encroachment of the SDF into the realms of either collective security or
collective self-defense. Although in the last resort, interpreting the Japanese constitution is a legal
matter (the Supreme Court is entrusted with its interpretation on a legal challenge)51 in terms of
practical reality, constitutional interpretation is a political matter. The Constitution
means whatever the Japanese government of the day says it does, with the major constraint being
the perceptions of political and bureaucratic elites of the outer limits of public tolerance.

19

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Japan Cp
AT: Article 9 2/4
There are many roles that the SDF can participate in that do not violate article 9
Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004
(Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q
35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid
%3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e
Of course, the obligation of the Self-Defense Forces not to engage in offensive combat operations
remains unchanged. With its expanded roles, however, the Self-Defense Forces are well prepared
to engage in other military operations, such as shadowing and chasing spy ships, anti-terror
activities, and missions to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles. Japan's warships can help with sanctions monitoring and minesweeping. Its ships and
aircraft can rescue stranded nationals. But these incremental changes in Japan's military capacity
and policies, though necessary and effective, can be sustained only with a clear national
consensus on the country's defense interests. The international community's demand that Japan
participate directly in resolving global tensions has helped, by changing the terms of domestic
debate. The old deadlock on security issues is relaxing, and the Japanese public, recognizing the
changed international environment, mostly embraces the Self-Defense Forces' deployment in
pursuit of international and regional responsibilities.
Relaxations to Article are coming, already peacekeeper are allowed to defend themselves
Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm)
The revision of the peacekeeping cooperation law last year enabled SDF members to use arms to
defend PKO personnel from belligerents in other countries that are "under the protection of
Japanese peacekeepers." However, they may only defend individuals--they may not defend troops
in an organized, tactical sense. The use of arms is limited to self-defense, and SDF members are
not allowed to use arms for the fulfillment of their duties--a practice authorized by the United
Nations. The is because the government is unable to extricate itself from the Cabinet Legislation
Bureau's interpretation that use of arms by SDF members might develop into the exercise of
military force, which is prohibited under the Constitution.

20

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Japan Cp
AT: Article 9 3/4
The Defense Guidelines show the effort of Japan to increase their security
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
The revised Defense Guidelines reflect proactive Japanese efforts to meet the responsibilities of
being a world power. They enhance regional stability by adding flexibility to the partnership's
ability to respond to regional crises. In today's complex threat environment, that flexibility is a
vital weapon in the security planner's arsenal. The catastrophic potential of high-tech threats from
a multiplicity of sources also lends urgency to the concept of "preventive defense." Japan's higher
profile on the international security stage, as exemplified by its participation in international
peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, is a manifestation of preventive defense.
Since Japan started peacekeeping operations in 1992 many bills have been passed increasing the
flexibility of the operations
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
In 1992, the SDF began to take part in U.N. peacekeeping operations in various parts of the
world. Since then, it has been subject to increasing public scrutiny on how it fulfills its duties.
Three contingency bills passed in June 2003 improve the legal framework for the SDF to carry
out necessary activities in times of civil and military emergencies, but the SDF is still limited in
its ability to deploy an effective missile defense system

21

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Japan Cp
AT: Article 9 4/4
Article 9 has already been weaken with growing worldwide threats
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
Perhaps most important, Japan's security environment has become more unpredictable and
unstable because of North Korea's increased belligerence, including its 1998 test launch of a longrange ballistic missile over Japan and its current nuclear programs. While Japan remains
primarily a status quo power, other countries in the region are not. For example, China has
territorial disputes with its neighbors and great power ambitions, while North Korea remains
dedicated to revisionist goals. At the same time, Japan's growing economic interaction with China
raises troubling strategic issues for the future as China's economy continues to grow while
Chinese security objectives in the region are uncertain. In addition, new non-state threats,
including global terrorism, have come to the force. As a result, the Japanese government has
taken unprecedented steps in its foreign policy in recent months. In addition to deploying SDF
troops to Iraq and three destroyers to the Indian Ocean, the Japanese Diet in May 2003 passed
three wartime preparedness bills that specify the government's ability to mobilize military forces
and adopt other emergency measures

22

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Japan Cp
US not suited 1/1
The United States is not fond of peacekeeping operations that they consider messy and detract
from other military missions
Giarra – former Defense Department Official – 1999
(Paul. “Peacekeeping: As Good For The Alliance As It Is For Japan?” February 9
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0699.html)
But beyond that, the U.S. military loathes peacekeeping operations. They are open-ended, messy
and lack clear objectives. They wear out troops and equipment, and detract from traditional
warfighting budgets, training, experience, and martial valor. The U.S. military has avoided them
wherever possible. So even when the JSDF had been disposed to cooperate in the past, it didn't
happen.

23

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp
Want ldp 1/3
Both the United States and Japan realize that Japan needs to redefine its role in the world,
including being involved in more peacekeeping operations
Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000
(Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
Japan also hopes to use middle power diplomacy to augment its international reputation and
prestige. After Japan surrendered to the allies and forever renounced war as a means of dispute
settlement (Article 9 of its Constitution), it engaged on a pacifist course, playing no active role in
the maintenance or promotion of international peace and security. Such a stance was agreeable to
the United States during the Cold War, but in the wake of the collapsed bipolar system, Japan's
pacifist approach to the collective security arrangement is no longer acceptable. Indeed, during
the Gulf War Japan's lack of participation in peacekeeping came under intense criticism from the
United States which felt that Japan’s financial contribution (approximately thirteen billion
dollars) was too little too late.5 As Alex Morrison observes, "there is developing a consensus that
those states with resources and an interest in resolving conflict have an obligation to do so. This
obligation overrides notions of well-defined neutrality, consent or altruism."6 Even within Japan
there developed the desire to redefine its role in the international community. As a draft report
prepared by the Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community states:
The recent war in the Persian Gulf has made it clear that appeals for peace are not enough, that
peace in some cases cannot be realized without united action by the international community. The
Japanese are coming to agree that maintaining peace requires efforts including the participation of
personnel.7
Japan’s goals in the coming era include a greater international role, which peacekeeping
operations will help to achieve the goal
Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000
(Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
As previously stated, niche diplomacy advocates that the pursuit of national interest, and
participate in the international system, be based on comparative advantage. It is therefore
necessary to examine Japan's foreign policy goals with regards to the United Nations. According
to publications from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are two basic and interrelated
goals that Japan seeks to attain: assuming a more responsible or honourable international role and
creating a global framework based on cooperation, peace and security.10

24

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Japan Cp
Want leadership 2/3
Japan wants a greater leadership role, but first the country must be given the responsibility
Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004
(Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q
35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid
%3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e
Every Japanese citizen may have his or her own opinion, but a clear majority appear to agree that
Japan must become a prominent nation in promoting international and regional security, as well
as economic growth. To achieve these ends, Japan must be endowed with responsibilities
equivalent to the country's national power, while securing the safety, comfort, and prosperity of
Japan and preserving the people's identity as Japanese with pride and honor
East Timor shows the government’s willingness to participate in further operations
Downer – Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs – 2001
(Alexander. “Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Force in East Timor Welcome”
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/fa166_01.html)
I welcome this week’s announcement of Japan’s significant contribution to the United Nations
peacekeeping operation in East Timor. I understand Japan will contribute a self-defense force
engineering unit. The international community has done a remarkable job in East Timor, but
more remains to be done. Japan’s announcement underlines its commitment to staying the course
in East Timor. It adds to Japan’s already significant contribution to building a stable and
democratic future for the people of East Timor. Japan’s announcement also demonstrates the
Koizumi Government’s preparedness to make a more active contribution to regional security,
including through peacekeeping activities. Australia strongly welcomes this and looks forward to
working with Japan, East Timor and other partners in ensuring the continued smooth operation of
the UN peacekeeping presence in East Timor.

25

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Japan Cp
Want ldp 3/3

Iraq shows how Japan is seeking a more proactive role in the world
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
Koizumi's firm stance on pursuing a more proactive foreign policy indicates Japan's desire to
become a more equal partner of the United States. While some may criticize Japan's contribution
to Iraq as stemming from obedience to U.S. demands, it should instead be seen as an important
act of foreign policy independence. Moreover, Japan's active involvement in Iraq lays the
groundwork for future contributions to international security not just in the region, but also
beyond. The U.S.-Japan alliance has proven the test of time, but both partners must make the
effort to ensure that it will remain relevant and productive in the future.
A strong and credible foreign policy by Japan is necessary to maintain global order
Kuriyma – advisor to the Japanese minister of foreign affairs and a visting professor at Waseda
University – 2000 (Takakazu, Japan Review of International Affairs, “Challenges for Japan’s
foreign policy future, p 215-6)
In the twenty-first century Japan will have to further extract itself from its passive approach to
foreign policy; it cannot allow itself to be satisfied with its efforts made to date. While keeping its
foreign policy strategy centered on the two sets of coordinates described above, the nation must
adopt a more proactive stance, participating actively in the work of building a new international
order. In short, Japan must carry out a foreign policy in keeping with its responsibilities as a
major power. To the ears of the Japanese born since the end of World War II, the term major
power may ring an unpleasant, discordant bell, bringing to mind the militaristic policies of prewar
and wartime Japan. As I use the term, however, it simply describes a country with the capacity to
exercise substantial influence on international political and economic relations, and it has no
direct connection to the way in which that influence is wielded. Within a country the formation
and maintenance of order is the duty of the national government. But in the international
community, where there is no suprantnational authority, these tasks fall to the major powers. If
such a power were to refuse to take on those tasks, this would represent a threat to the global
order.

26

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Japan Cp
Inc ldp 1/2
Peacekeeping operations will increase the leadership of Japan but only if they take an active role
instead of sitting on the side lines
Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000
(Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
Many scholars offer advice on how Japan should get involved. After acknowledging that Japan
has the "will, the need and the capacity to assume more global responsibilities," Alan James
considers the various roles that Japan could play with regards to UN peacekeeping.16 One
possible role is policy input to international peacekeeping, since its International Peace
Cooperation Law puts Japan in a better position vis-à-vis the great powers to determine the
appropriateness of traditional peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement actions in a given
situation. Alternatively, Japan could continue its financial contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping
assessments (Japan, at just over 15%, is second to the US in terms of assessed contributions). In
applying niche diplomacy to these roles, however, it is clear that concentrating its resources here
would not necessarily gain for Japan increased international recognition since such recognition
will only come through more high profile activities. In an age of media revolution in which the
picture is mightier at swaying public opinion than is the pen, the pursuit of Japan’s foreign policy
goals requires that it wear blue (i.e., partake in PKOs).17

27

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Japan Cp
Inc ldp 2/2
Participating in PK operations will show the world that Japan is ready to take on their global
obligations
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
The revised Guidelines symbolize Japan's progress toward the goal of contributing to
international security in ways commensurate with its economic might. The past asymmetric
relationship between Japan's economic prowess and its military posture was brought home during
the Persian Gulf War, during which Japan contributed significant financial sums ($13 billion) to
the coalition campaign but was criticized nevertheless for its use of "checkbook diplomacy." The
result was a growing perception outside Japan and even within Japan itself that Japan's role must
reflect the human risks that world powers assume in fulfilling their global obligations. The desire
to make Japan a meaningful player in the international security arena is reflected in the writing of
Ichiro Ozawa, an influential Japanese political leader who led a political coalition to bring down
the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan for most of the last 50 years. Ozawa's bestselling book Nihon kaizo keikaku (Plan to Reform Japan) puts forth the idea that Japan must
become a "normal country." Proponents of this view believe "normalization" may be achieved by
participating in collective defense, undertaking international efforts to support United Nations
peacekeeping operations, and enhancing the US-Japan bilateral partnership to allow greater
flexibility to deal with security requirements.[19]

28

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp
Japan is a leader 1/3
Japan has a duty to promote the Asian community, peacekeeping operations such as East Timor
provide an excellent opportunity
Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm)
For its part, Japan, as a member of the Asian community, has a duty to do all it can to help the
country develop. The pillar of Japan's contributions to the country is the participation of the SelfDefense Forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations in East Timor. About 680 SDF personnel, the
largest contingent to date, recently were dispatched to the country. The SDF members, who will
engage in logistic activities, such as the repair of roads and bridges, over the next two years,
already have embarked on some activities.
Peacekeeping operations will help Japan become a normal country
Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm)
PKOs are international joint activities conducted under the United Nations for the purpose of
maintaining peace in the international community. In this respect, they bear no relation to the use
of military force as the exercise of the state's right. As far as arms use in PKO activities is
concerned, the government should set rules of engagement that would enable SDF officers to
carry out the same activities as troops from other countries. So that Japan's contributions to the
international community are recognized, we believe it is the duty of the Japanese government to
position the PKO mission as one of the SDFs' main duties, on a par with its defensive role in the
event of armed attack on this country.
Japan should try harder to become a "normal country."

29

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Japan cp
Japan is a leader 2/3
Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999
(Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the
1990s” CNAPS Working Paper)
The passage of time and the beginning of new era are not the only explanations for the emergence
of a more proactive Japanese foreign policy. In fact, the Japanese public simultaneously
developed an awareness that Japan should play a more active role in international affairs over a
long period of time. Thus, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War merely happened to
coincide with a time of heightened awareness among the Japanese people about foreign affairs.
Since foreign countries began to recognize Japan as an "economic superpower" in the 1970s,
Japan has been called upon to play an increasingly active role in the international community.
These heightened demands gradually began to sink in with the Japanese.
Japan has jumped out of shell recently trading with other countries, thus security is more
important than ever, especially peacekeeping operations
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
A confluence of recent developments, however, has led Japan to become more proactive in its
foreign policies. Economically, Japanese interests have shifted from Southeast Asia toward
Northeast Asia, particularly China. In 2003, Japan's trade with China exceeded $132.4 billion,
setting a record high for the fifth consecutive year. Japanese exports to China surged 43.6 percent
to $57.2 billion, while imports from China rose 21.9 percent to $75.2 billion. In contrast, JapanU.S. trade has been declining, with exports falling 2.6 percent and imports increasing by only 1.7
percent in 2003. Since 2002, Japanese imports from China have exceeded imports from the
United States.4 South Korea remains an important economic partner. Thus, Japan's interests in
promoting and maintaining stable and secure relations in Northeast Asia have never been more
important. Politically, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been instrumental in promoting a
more proactive foreign policy. Since assuming leadership in April 2001, Koizumi has overseen an
increasing centralization of policy decision-making amidst the decreasing popular prestige of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the institutions and
bureaucracies that have traditionally controlled foreign policy decision-making.

30

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Japan Cp
Leader is a leader 3/3
Japan should promote more peacekeeping operations as a leader and a promoter of these missions
since the creation of the UN
Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public
Policy Studies – 1997
(James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.)
Japan is an integral part of the world community and truly a world power -- perhaps more so than
even many of its own citizens realize. Japan's prominent international trade creates a very
tangible link to events almost anywhere. Around the world, Japan matters, and not simply
because its economy is the second largest in the world. Politically, Japan has a distinguished
record as an active promoter of peace ever since becoming a member of the United Nations. Its
contributions have earned deep gratitude in many corners of the globe. And yet, despite the
praiseworthy role Japan has played in helping to resolve crisis after crisis, there remain many here
and abroad who believe that Japan could do more to contribute to international peace and
security.

Participating in PK operations will allow the
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
The revised Guidelines symbolize Japan's progress toward the goal of contributing to
international security in ways commensurate with its economic might. The past asymmetric
relationship between Japan's economic prowess and its military posture was brought home during
the Persian Gulf War, during which Japan contributed significant financial sums ($13 billion) to
the coalition campaign but was criticized nevertheless for its use of "checkbook diplomacy." The
result was a growing perception outside Japan and even within Japan itself that Japan's role must
reflect the human risks that world powers assume in fulfilling their global obligations. The desire
to make Japan a meaningful player in the international security arena is reflected in the writing of
Ichiro Ozawa, an influential Japanese political leader who led a political coalition to bring down
the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan for most of the last 50 years. Ozawa's bestselling book Nihon kaizo keikaku (Plan to Reform Japan) puts forth the idea that Japan must
become a "normal country." Proponents of this view believe "normalization" may be achieved by
participating in collective defense, undertaking international efforts to support United Nations
peacekeeping operations, and enhancing the US-Japan bilateral partnership to allow greater
flexibility to deal with security requirements.[19]

31

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE
Japan Cp
Net Benefit – Security 1/2
Japan needs to participate in PK operation for security
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
47).
Examining the motives for this increased participation in peacekeeping, altruism can be pointed
to in two ways. First, the humanitarian desire exists, as it always has done, to assist a fellow
member of the international system, demonstrated in the operations in Somalia. Second,
participation in peacekeeping has been regarded by a number of traditional and reliable
peacekeepers, such as Canada and Finland, as a norm for responsible members of international
society that can enhance a state’s reputation and standing. Realist motivations can also be pointed
to. Contributing to peacekeeping can also be inspired by a desire to enhance security. As a means
for achieving security in Asia, the ASEAN states championed the UNTAC operation in
Cambodia. The issue of security can also be seen in the contributions of smaller states hoping to
enhance their reputation in case they need to receive peacekeeping assistance in the future. This is
what Findlay has called ‘a down payment on future assistance’ (Findlay 1996:8).
Japan’s security depends on its ability to be involved outside of Asia
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
147).
Kakizawa Kōji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Miyazawa cabinet,
summed up the expanded sense of commitment by stressing that ‘our place in the world today has
evolved to a point where this country can no longer afford to remain preoccupied only with the
affairs of Asia but must raise its sights beyond it’ (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993).

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Japan Cp
Net Benefit – Security 2/2
Japan should participate in PKOs to ensure security in the whole Asian region
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
145).
Japan’s motives for contributing to operations in East Timor also demonstrates its rising profile in
East Asia and desire to construct a stable security regime in the region. In explaining the dispatch
of SDF engineering units to East Timor in March and April 2002, MOFA cited the fact that ‘as
East Timor faces many challenges, Japan as an Asian nation will continue to actively support East
Timor’ (MOFA 2002a). This represents a considerable shift from a policy of having previously
supported Jakarta economically (JEI Report, 18 June 1993). In a speech given in Singapore
during a tour of ASEAN countries on 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi cited the specific
cases of conflict prevention in the region such as Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor and claimed
that ‘in co-operation with the countries of ASEAN, we intend to make an even more active
contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia’ (MOFA 2002b). This
demonstrates how the once constraining norm of anti-militarism in its East Asian variant, based
upon fear of a resurgent Japanese militarism and perceived by the Japanese government, has been
transformed over the decade since the UNTAC mission into a constitutive, encouraging East
Asians norm. Participation in PKOs is facilitated by the goal of ensuring regional stability
through co-operation and encouraged by the attitudinal shift among Japan’s East Asian neighbors,
prompting Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul, the Thai commander of UNTAET, to state, ‘I
expect much from the SDF. I think they are highly capable’ (Daily Yomiuri, 8 April 2002).

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Japan Cp
AT: Perm 1/2
AT: Perm – Japan needs to be separate from the United States pg 143
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
143).
This enthusiasm was accompanied by Koizumi referring to Bush as akin to Gary Cooper in the
Hollywood western, High Noon (Asahi Shinbun, 28 September 2001). As Okamoto has written,
the US–Japan relationship remains ‘the essential alliance’ (Okamoto 2002:59) and because ‘[f]or
Japan, the United States is the country’s only ally, Japan concentrates all its attention on
smoothing its relations with the United States’ (Okamoto 2002:63). This was evident in the overreaction the Japanese government to the events of 11 September 2001 in offering and providing
more than the US was actually requesting of Japan, such as the dispatch of state-of-the-art Aegis
destroyers. However, the flip-side to the strengthening of the norm of bilateralism is that the
Japanese government does not want to be seen as blindly following the US and to this end has
requested considerable prior warning if the ‘war on terrorism’ is to be expanded to other nations
within Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ (Daily Yomiuri, 12
Japan must articulate its own independent foreign policy to escape foreign pressure from
the U.S. and preserve the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Funabashi – Washing Beureu chief of Asashi Shimbun – 1994
(Yoichi, Japan’s International Agenda, “Introduction: Japan’s International Agenda for the
1990s” pg 7)
First, the use of foreign pressure does not help generate healthy policy debates or create a good
milieu in which to promote Japan’s own initiative. It shifts debate away from the issue of what
Japan should do in its own interest and toward what other countries want Japan to do. For this
very reason, it often arouses nationalist feeling’s and emotionalizes the issue. Second, it provides
a “cover” for those who actually pursue their own wealth. Second, it provides a “cover” for those
who actually pursue their own agenda (e.g., sending Self-Defense Forces aborad) under the guise
of policy coordination with others, particularly with the United States. Abused gaiatsu politics
undermines the U.S.-Japanese relationship because it tends to pertuteute the patron-protégé
relationship and love-hate emotions between the two countries.

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Japan Cp
AT: Perm 2/2
Japan must take strong policy without the US to be a leader in Southeast Asia
South China Morning Post – 2003 (Brad Glassman, staff writher, ‘Why Weak friends make
poor allies” pg 13)
It is equally important that Japan shelf its passivity, both in relation with the US and when
implementing foreign policy. There are times when it has to be able to say no to the US with
confidence and with good reason, and also provide a credible, alternative policy. Japan has
accumulated significant goodwill in Asia, but it is all for nothing to draw upon it. The most
important thing if for Japan to get its economy back in shape so it can be a strong and reliable
partner. Yet even the most optimistic forecasts put recovery a decade away. A failure to act will
make irreverence look good in comparison.

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Japan Cp
Cp inc Japan’s soft power 1/1
The Cp enhances Japan’s soft power leadership – allowing it to influence the direction of the
world community and make it conductive to its values
Funabashi – The Washington Bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun – 1994
(Yoichi, Japan’s International Agenda, “Introduction: Japan’s International Agenda for the
1990s” pg 11)
Japan must establish its self-image in the world. It must express its cherished values and selfenlightened interests. Yet a new self-image projection should not be radical; rather, a conscious
effort should be make to develop it incrementally. Japan’s unorthodox power portfolio
(“economic giant and military dwarf”) should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional
phenomenon. On the contrary, the portfolio’s very nature gives Japan a golden opportunity to
define its power and role in radically changing world of the 1990s. The changing nature of power
in the increasingly interdependent world will upgrade economic and technological capacity,
educational quality, and the developmental model effect in which Japan excels. The widespread
perception that the Gulf War, after all, underscores the supremacy of military power as the
ultimate power element should not alter Japan’s new strategy of being a global civilian power.
Japan should search for various avenues of enhancing political power based on economic
strength, not on military might, in order to stimulate a new perception of a new perception of the
changing nature of power in the world, community and the recognition that Japan should be
accepted as a prototype of the global civilian power. It can said that “global civilian power” is a
concept of power that fits well with Japan’s long-term national interests. IF Japan’s adoption of
this concept is internationally accepted and if Japan thus can contribute to the “civilization “ of
the international community, it could in turn contribute to the creation Japan’s economic interests
are global, and they require Japan’s global commitment. Thus, Japan’s power must be global in
dimension.

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Japan Cp - Aff
Article 9 1/4
Article 9 prevents the Japanese from being able to fully participate in PKOs
Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003
(Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg
49).
Debates within the Diet thereafter centered around the question of whether Japan would be forced
under UN membership to dispatch Japanese troops abroad on missions like that in Korea, or if
Japan could fulfill the criteria for membership if it were not to dispatch troops on peacekeeping
operations. In June 1954 the House of Councilors eventually silenced debate on the issue and
approved a resolution preventing the dispatch overseas of the SDF (Ogata 1995:252). All these
debates attest to the emergence and existence of (and tensions between) the norms of antimilitarism and UN internationalism. Throughout these debates, the government continually
stressed Japan’s right to individual self-defense but not collective self-defense. Thus, the SDF
Law, enacted in 1954, contained articles prohibiting the dispatch of SDF troops abroad mainly in
consideration of what Japan might be obliged to do under the terms of the treaty with the US,
although with obvious implications for participation in PKOs. During this period Article 9 was
the oft-quoted restricting frame of the anti-militarist norm. For example, upon being questioned
by LDP politician Namagi Yoshio, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo acknowledged the argument
for sending troops abroad but insisted that in the case of Japan, due to Article 9 and its denial of
the right of belligerence, it would be improper for Japan to contribute and overstep the bounds of
the Constitution (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, no. 16, 13 March 1954:10–13). This opinion was reiterated by Shimoda Takezō, Chief of
the Treaties Division, stressing the dispatch of Japanese troops within the limits imposed by the
Constitution as being ‘impossible’ (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, no. 27, 27 March 1954:9–10).

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Japan Cp - Aff
Article 9 2/4
Article 9 will not allow full participation in PK operations: Japan is not the best actor to
implement the plan
Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh
“Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast
Asia pg 82)
Japan's behavior in the security sphere is not considered normal, as it does not fulfill the two
features highlighted above. First, despite being a member of the United Nations, Japan had given
up its right to the use of force. It has a Constitution that renounces war as an instrument of
national security policy. The core of this distinctive aspect of its Constitution is Article 9, which
imposes restrictions on the conduct of Japan's security policy. In it, Japan renounces war as a
sovereign right of the nation; repudiates the use of force as a means for settling international
disputes; and does not recognize the state's right to belligerency. 15 Renouncing the right to
belligerency engendered a "pacifist" sentiment among the Japanese people. Both the Peace
Constitution and the emergent pacifist sentiment facilitated the task of economic reconstruction,
but imposed limitations on Japan's participation in regional security affairs.
The Japanese have different rules from other countries; making cooperation impossible
Timeasia. Com – 2001 (Matt Rees. Japan's peacekeepers in Israel are well-trained,
disciplined and prepared to deliver the goods April 30
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/japan_view/military.html)
Such influence isn't readily apparent on the Golan. For the men on the ground who make up
Japan's only overseas military operation, the curbs on their duties are surreal, a day-to-day life
ripped out of the pages of Catch-22. Soldiers aren't allowed even to shovel snow from the street
with troops from other countries because that would be an exercise of collective security. If the
stable situation in their section of the Golan were to deteriorate into conflict, Furusho's men are
allowed to shoot to kill only in self-defense. The Canadians have orders to use lethal force to
protect themselves, U.N. civilian employees and the Japanese. That's one reason why the guard at
Camp Zirouani's gate is always Canadian. "Japanese troops can't work together with other
troops," says Gen Nakatani, who was in the army for four years and, as a member of parliament,
has visited the Golan contingent. "They're there with other teams but have to operate within
Japan's own rules and regulations."

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Japan Cp - Aff
Article 9 3/4
Article 9 only allows the Japanese to fight in cases of self-defense – not making them the ideal
participation in further PK operations
Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996
(Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of
Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf)
The fact remains, however, that under the current interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution, Japan cannot deploy the SDF for any military purpose othern than the defense of
Japanese territory. The domestic debate is couched in terms of the contrast between the right of
individual self-defense (kobetsuteki jieiken) which is granted under the Constitution, and the right
of so-called 'collective self-defense' (shudanteki jieiken),45 which is prohibited. Although the
Japanese Constitution and Article 9 did not achieve the main goal of its American designers - that
is, mandating the permanent disarmament of Japan- it has achieved their associated objective preventing the Japanese armed forces from undertaking military action outside Japan.
Article 9 prevents collective security; therefore, Japan cannot fight unless in self-defense
Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996
(Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of
Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf)
According to the Japanese government, the current interpretation of Article 9 confines "the use of
armed strength...to the minimum level necessary"46; and because the exercise of the right of
collective self-defense exceeds the minimum limit...[it is] constitutionally not permissible."47
This interpretation also bans the overseas dispatch of the Japanese military to foreign territorial
land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force (kaigai hahei) "because such a deployment
of troops overseas generally goes beyond the minimum limit necessary for self-defense.48 The
implications of these provisions are that Japan has reached the outer limits of the current
interpretation of Article 9 with the abolition of the current freeze on Japanese involvement in
PKF – and even that is contested.49 Japan's involvement in any kind of overseas military
operation, whether in a U.N. or U.S. alliance context, therefore gives rise to serious constitutional
issues. The most obvious options are: a continuation of the status quo, a change in the official
interpretation of the constitution, or revision of the constitution itself. The last option is the least
likely because of procedural obstacles and the political impossibilities of getting the required
support either amongst Diet members or the Japanese public.

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Japan Cp - Aff
Article 9 3/4

East Timor shows the extent that Article 9 prevents solvency
Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J.
“US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm)
In the autumn of 1999 the self-imposed restrictions for Japanese participation in UN
peacekeeping operations factored into deliberations on how to support international efforts in East
Timor. Unable to directly participate in peacekeeping operations because the situation did not
meet all of the five conditions noted above, Japan donated $100 million to the United Nations
Trust Fund to facilitate participation by other countries in the multinational force. Japan
subsequently supported the UN High Commission on Refugees by sending three Japan Air SelfDefense Force C-130s and 150 personnel to conduct airlift operations ferrying food and medical
supplies between Surabaya and Kupang in West Timor. Japan's support to UN efforts in East and
West Timor serves to illustrate the dynamics of its current international security posture in terms
of its contributions and its limitations.[23]

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Japan Cp - Aff
No Solvency 1/3
Japanese are critical of being involved in PK operations that they have no say because they are
not a security council member
Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004
(Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4
Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html)
Speaking of Japan, we must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a
budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget
item. We must also point out that there is criticism within Japan for providing money to PKOs for
the benefit of those parties who may or may not be willing to settle their conflicts. This criticism
is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has
often no say in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the long term policies of
individual PKOs, despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs.
Needless to say, such criticism arises out of Japan's strong commitment to peace on the one hand,
and on the other, the frustration regarding the obligations incurred from assessed contributions for
peacekeeping budgets. It would be intolerable for the Government of Japan to be left out of
discussions especially if those discussions are held without due consideration for facing "the
moment of truth" for cases where there is a perceived lack of will to pursue peace. To avoid
misunderstanding, we wish to point out that this remark is based on the well known fact that
nation-building cannot take place in the absence of peace and security.
The Japanese do not have the monetary funds to give to the PK operations without trading off
other trade that they provide
Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004
(Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4
Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html)
In reality, the very steep increase in the peacekeeping budget will consume resources that could
have been allocated for humanitarian assistance or poverty reduction. Japan's share of the burden
is expected to reach $900 million. This would be an amount almost equal to the total Japanese
annual voluntary contributions to all the United Nations funds and programmes such as UNICEF,
and to specialized agencies such as the WHO. This being the case, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the next assessments for peacekeeping may impact Japan's support to
emergency and humanitarian assistance through international organizations in a devastating
manner. We have mentioned before that $900 million is equivalent to about one tenth of Japan's
total ODA, and is slightly more than Japan's current annual bilateral assistance to the African
countries. We beg you to think about it. With $900 million, every child in the world suffering
dehydration from diarrhea could be provided with oral rehydration salt, 50 million children could
be vaccinated against tuberculosis and measles, or 400 million children could be provided with
schooling stationery for education

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Japan Cp - Aff
No Solvency 2/3
Increased peacekeeping operations will trade off with further attempts of the Japanese to lessen
poverty worldwide
Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004
(Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4
Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html)
Despite my previous remarks, we should not spare resources for the noble cause of consolidating
peace. However, if there are cases where PKOs continue to exist because the parties concerned
profess a desire for a consolidation of peace without a real interest to pursue peace -- (and, we
confess that we do not know whether such cases exist or not since we do not participate in the
Security Council deliberations), -- then, my delegation would like to pose another question which
we think should be seriously considered by all the members here. Our [Japan’s] resources are not
unlimited. This is a reality whether we like it or not. If we [Japan] consumes those limited
resources in the name of peace, there may be little left for helping those who are in extreme
poverty and are unable to live in dignity even though they live in peace. We hope that all of you
here would give serious thought to this another unintended reality. And, we urge the Security
Council to give more serious thoughts to the exit and completion strategies of the ongoing PKOs.
So, the question is: "Is it truly the consensus of the international community that resources be
diverted from efforts to help children suffering from poverty and diseases?" My government and
the people of Japan wish to terminate the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty and to extend a
helping hand to those people courageous enough to abandon their weapons and fight poverty.
That is Japan's philosophy and its sincere wish.
Japan not only is against the participation in peacekeeping affairs but the UN peacekeeping
cooperation law puts limits on the activities allowed by the Japanese
Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping
Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm)
Such a new breed of peacekeepers should act far more effectively than conventional
peacekeepers, even as their actions should be clearly distinct from the enforcement of peace
processes. Namely, we can say that the vexed struggle to realize a fourth-generation
peacekeeping operation has just started. What troubles me at this point in the fast-changing
development of the United Nations' perspective is the attitude of the Japanese government, which
has remained averse to playing an active role in peacekeeping operations. It would be better if
Japan could at least fully participate in classical peacekeeping operations. However, under the
U.N. Peacekeeping Cooperation Law, the freeze on Japan's participation in the main PKO role-namely, peacekeeping forces--has not been lifted. Logistical support remains the only possible
peacekeeping area in which Japan can participate. The law also puts unreasonable restraints on
the use of weapons for self-defense in peacekeeping activities.

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Japan Cp - Aff
No Solvency 3/3
There are various reasons why Japan would fail if given greater peacekeeping operation
responsibilities
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
First, while popular aversion to an overtly activist role overseas has lessened in recent years, it
has not completely disappeared. These sentiments continue to block a vigorous public debate over
the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the constitution and some of its more restrictive
interpretations, despite new policies such as the deployment of SDF forces to Iraq. Second,
Japan's sluggish economy and the government's inability to institute sweeping political and
economic reforms undermine Japan's credibility, both domestically and abroad. In addition,
more than a half-century after World War II, Japan's Asian neighbors continue to harbor
resentment against Japan's perceived reluctance to own up to its wartime history, further
undermining Japanese leadership in the region. Third, ironically, Japan's close and enduring
security alliance with the United States is the greatest constraint on Japanese foreign policy
initiatives. As long as Japan relies on the U.S. security guarantee, it has little reason to initiate
more active policies.

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Japan Cp
No solvency – no flexibility 1/1
The Five principles of the law prevent flexibility and create more red tape that make it impossible
for Japan to be effective
Japan Economic Insitute Report – 1999 (Barbara Wanner. “SECURITY CHALLENGES
HIGHLIGHT COALITION POLICY DISCORD”
http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9946w4.html)
In the East Timor case, however, the SDF's hands are tied in large part by a clause in the
peacekeeping support law that rendered inactive a provision that permitted the military's
involvement in situations that might require the use of force. In order to get the controversial
initiative through the Diet in June 1992, the LDP was forced to agree to this freeze as part of a
deal with two opposition parties. Dovish critics had charged that allowing the SDF to perform
even unarmed duties outside Japan exceeded the limits of Tokyo's long-standing interpretation of
Article IX of the constitution, the so-called war-renouncing clause. Successive governments have
said that this clause bars the participation of the SDF in collective defense activities. Moreover,
the administration of then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu had little choice but to bow to pacifist
forces' demands for the inclusion of five principles in the law governing the deployment of the
SDF for U.N. peacekeeping missions — even in an unarmed capacity. First and foremost, a
viable ceasefire must be in effect. In addition, all warring parties must accept the U.N.
peacekeeping mission, and the U.N. must adopt a neutral stance with regard to the conflict. If any
one of these conditions is not met, the SDF must be guaranteed the right to withdraw
immediately. The fifth principle allows the military to use side arms only for self-defense.

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Japan Cp - Aff
Perm 1/4
Perm – Japan cannot work without the US – have them work together
Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh
“Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast
Asia pg 82)
Secondly, the role of Japan's military has been deliberately constrained in its growth and missions
by established social and legal norms. As the euphemism implies, the SDF is to be limited to selfdefense, and is not to take part in collective defense efforts.16 Although the SDF's role has
expanded over the years - from an organization devoted to relief and welfare to a greater role in
managing regional security, international peace-keeping, and disaster relief - it is still very
limited. The highly critical Japanese public, which is very influential in shaping the role and
responsibilities of the SDF, is not supportive of an enhanced military role for it. In the eyes of the
public, the SDF lacks a convincing political rationale and this has led to the military being
remarkably insulated from Japanese society.17 As a result, the SDF draws its greatest political
strength from outside Japan, especially through its security ties with the United States.18
Cambodia shows that Japan and the United States need to work together to be the most effective;
Japan cannot by itself be successful
Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999
(Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the
1990s” CNAPS Working Paper)
Japan-U.S. relations were stable during the Cold War period and Japan relied heavily on the
United States for its national security. The world was split into two blocs. There was little room,
and actually no need, for the Japanese to question the legitimacy of the Japan-U.S. alliance. When
the Cold War finally came to an end, the world entered into a new but uncertain era. Japan and
the United States shared the view that the potential for instability and uncertainty would persist in
the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and the United States had to redefine their cooperative
framework and reaffirm their roles under new circumstances. The United States, a champion of
peace in the post-Cold War era, had to ask friends and allies to share the burden of seeking and
maintaining this peace, as the United States faced difficulties with its domestic economy. The
United States also had to rely more on multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and
NATO, as the world faced various kinds of transnational challenges. Japan, for its part, tried to
stand ready to cooperate with the United States to solve issues of mutual concern. Policy
coordination was a must, because if issues were left unresolved, there existed the danger that the
common understanding of the other's role would be undermined. Both fully share the view that
"alliance" does not necessarily imply a monolithic union. For example, with the Cambodian
peace process, although Japan occasionally took steps that were different from the United States,
there was no doubt that both Japan and the United States shared a common goal-to restore a
durable peace in Cambodia and to build up a stable and prosperous Indochina. This mutual
exercise on the Cambodian issue reinforced that lesson. In

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Japan Cp
Perm 2/4
The Honduras disaster proves that Japan cannot operate in PK operations without the United
States
Giarra – former Defense Department Official – 1999
(Paul. “Peacekeeping: As Good For The Alliance As It Is For Japan?” February 9
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0699.html)
Instead, alliance cooperation was notable by its absence when the JSDF deployed to Honduras
after Hurricane Mitch last fall. What could have been a golden opportunity to cooperate on
problems, demonstrate solidarity, and showcase Japan's Western Hemisphere debut, wound up as
a unilateral show of the flag. The Japanese contingent operated on its own -- and went home after
just two weeks, even though hundreds of Hondurans were showing up daily.
As a matter of both principle and practice it is vital for the U.S. and Japan to get back on the same
PKO wavelength. How we work together in small but consequential ways now will set the course
for much more important missions in the future.
The cooperation between the US and Japanese will keep the alliance strong
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
Japan's decision in late 2003 to dispatch 1,000 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops to Iraq marks an
important milestone in the U.S.-Japan alliance and is one example of greater cooperation between
the two allies on a range of important security issues. Japan's response--not just its response to
regional threats such as North Korea, but also its assistance in global conflicts such as in the war
on terrorism and Iraq, as well as its cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD)--demonstrates
that this alliance is reliable in times of crisis.
Yet, if the U.S.-Japan alliance is to remain strong and endure as a true partnership in the 21st
century, the United States should not just rely on common security threats in the present to forge
cooperation in the future. To provide vision for and direction to the alliance, the Bush
Administration should:

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Japan Cp
Perm 3/4
Perm – have Japan and the United States work toghethor in peacekeeping operations working
together to solve the problems
Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public
Policy Studies – 1997
(James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.)
In a speech October 16 at Japan's National Defense Academy, Foley went on, the United States,
and others, would like to see Japan do more on the world stage. "The United States, and I believe
the world community as a whole, would welcome greater Japanese participation in peacekeeping
operations," Foley told his audience of Japanese cadets. "When Japan is ready to do so," Foley
added, "I would urge that our two countries [Japan and United Statees ], as allies, explore how we
might coordinate our training and planning to be able to serve together most effectively in
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions." The U.S. Ambassador said that while America's
bilateral alliances in the region "have proven their worth and remain essential," there is an
"increasing need for collective action to deal with problems that may threaten peace and
stability."
A close alliance between the two powers is needed now more than ever because of the increased
threats to worldwide security
Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation 2004
(Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm)
The U.S.-Japan alliance was created in the aftermath of World War II and became the anchor for
building stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The current security
environment, however, is dramatically different. Some Cold War threats such as North Korea
persist, while new threats from non-state actors, including terrorists, have emerged. Continued
close cooperation between the United States and Japan could prove critical to defeating these
threats.

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Japan Cp
Perm 4/4
Japan and the US would be able to handle more peacekeeping operations together with more
success than if they each tried separtely
Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public
Policy Studies – 1997
(James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.)
The United States, and I believe the world community as a whole, would welcome greater
Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations. When Japan is ready to do so, I would urge
that our two countries, as allies, explore how we might coordinate our training and planning to be
able to serve together most effectively in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In the years
and decades to come there are likely to arise crises in which the international community feels a
duty to intervene with humanitarian or peacekeeping assistance. The sense of duty may stem from
a moral imperative to help innocent victims or out of recognition that unchecked aggression
ultimately threatens us all. In any case, during the course of your professional careers there are
unfortunately likely to occur crises which our two countries will see a clear need to help resolve.
Let us prepare for those moments, so that when they appear suddenly we are ready to come to the
defense of the principles in the United Nations charter that we have promised to uphold. I have
every confidence that Americans and Japanese working together can achieve more than we would
separately. And in the process we may be able to develop more creative approaches to our future
challenges. Any mutual efforts in peacekeeping must begin with the recognition that we share a
common interest in peace and stability. There is no higher calling for us, as individuals or as
nations, than the promotion of peace. In closing, I return to the question I posed at the outset:
How can Japan best contribute to international peace and security? I encourage each Japanese
cadet present today to ask yourself, not only what are you going to do for Japan in the years
ahead, but what is Japan going to do for the world? As I have tried to elaborate in my remarks
today, I believe that a tighter U.S.-Japan security partnership and fuller Japanese participation in
peacekeeping efforts offer the best avenues for answering that large question.

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Japan cp
Checkbook diplomacy 1/1
Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999
(Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the
1990s” CNAPS Working Paper)
This was one of the important lessons Japan learned in the post-Cold War period, especially with
regard to the Gulf War. Although Japan had made a major financial contribution-nearly thirteen
billion dollars-its voice was not heard in decision-making circles. To the contrary, Japan's
contribution was criticized as being "too little, too late," and belittled as "checkbook diplomacy."
Japan was not well informed of the discussions taking place in decision-making circles, namely,
the U.N. Security Council. The Cambodian peace process also posed a big question for Japan. As
mentioned above, just when Japan began to have both the will and capability to make a
meaningful contribution to the Cambodian peace process, the P-5 closed the door of opportunity
in their face. It was a painful lesson learned by Japanese diplomats who worked on the
Cambodian issue either in the United Nations or in Tokyo. Recently, Japan has become more and
more outspoken on the issue of U.N. reform, particularly on Security Council reform, which has
been an outstanding issue for some decades. Cambodia and the Gulf War made no little impact on
the Japanese view of U.N. reform. Japan's annual contributions to the United Nations will surpass
20% of the total U.N. budget by the year 2000. One positive aspect is that Japan's eligibility to
become a permanent member of the Security Council has increased since its conventional foreign
policy has improved and it is backed by its economic power and its record of playing a political
role in Cambodia and other issues. But the situation represents another case of "taxation without
representation," which needs to be resolved.

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