A Mathematical Analysis of the Decisions Made in Taking a Date to Prom

Cary Lee D-000351-180 22 January 2007 Mathematics Word Count: 1936

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Abstract
The following paper considers this question: How can game theory be used to model the decisions made in taking a date to prom? The paper examines three problems, decisions commonly made by high school students on prom night. The problems include buying corsages and boutonnieres, paying for dinner, and deciding whether or not to dance. The problems are modeled by games using game theory which are solved to find their Nash equilibria. Each game considers the payoffs for the decisions made by two theoretical partners at the dance: a boy, and a girl, . The essay discusses the process by which these payoff matrices are assigned and the importance of consideration when assigning these payoff matrices. When the problems are solved, the significance of these solutions is discussed. Each problem utilizes a different aspect of game theory. The first considers a 2x2 game, the second a 3x3 game, and the third a 2x2 game with iterations. The conclusion discusses the relevance and limitations of the Nash equilibria found in the essay.

Lee 2 D-000351-180 Table of Contents Abstract1 Introduction to Game Theory...3 Problem 1 Buying Boutonnieres and Corsages.4 Problem 2 Paying for Dinner.6 Problem 3 Dancing8 Conclusion...10 Works Cited.12

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Introduction
Game theory is the mathematics of games. These games, or competitive situations, can be solved and used to model real-life situations A game must have a few basic factors (Duffy 1): Two or more players Strategy is required in some way One or more possible outcomes Outcome must be dependant on strategies used in game play

A game in standard form lists the payoffs for possible outcomes in a payoff matrix. The first opponents strategies are listed on the left side of the matrix and the second along the top. When the payoffs are listed, the first opponents payoff and the seconds is separated by a comma. For example:

A1

A2

B1 Bs payoff, As payoff Bs payoff, As payoff B2 Bs payoff, As payoff Bs payoff, As payoff Every game has Nash equilibria as proven by John Nash. There are two types of Nash equilibria: Pure Strategy equilibria: When a player chooses a strategy consistently with a probability of one. Mixed Strategy equilibria: When players use a selection of strategies with a set probability distribution. Most games have pure strategy equilibria, but some, like rock-paper-scissors, do not. These use mixed strategies instead. The Nash equilibrium of a game is the outcome where one player cannot improve his or her payoff by changing his or her strategy. This essay provides an example of an application of game theory. The games are used to model real-life situations and include a variety of types of games.

Lee 4 D-000351-180 The set of problems considered here mathematically relate to a question annually attempted by high school upperclassmen without math: how to have a good time with a date at prom. The problems consider three prom-related situations in chronological order: 1. Buying boutonnieres and corsages 2. Paying for dinner 3. Deciding whether or not to dance Each problem is modeled by a game which is solved to find the optimal strategy for each player a boy, , and a girl, . These problems all are part of the research question: How can game theory be used to model the decisions made in taking a date to prom?

Problem 1
The next problem in consideration is the common dilemma of purchasing flowers for the dance without prior communication. considers buying a corsage and considers buying a boutonniere, but neither has thought of deliberating with the other before it is too late and each must decide separately. What should they do? The expense is the only factor in consideration, then the payoffs in this game are simple to define. Giving a corsage or boutonniere means a monetary loss equal to the value of the flowers while receiving one means a monetary gain equal to the cost. This is shown in the normal form game below.

b c 0 (cost of corsage cost of boutonniere), (cost of boutonniere cost of corsage) cost of boutonniere, -(cost of boutonniere)

0 - (cost of corsage), cost of corsage 0

Lee 5 D-000351-180 To simplify the matrix, let the cost of the corsage = x and the cost of the boutonniere = y. This yields the simpler normal form game:

c (x y), (y x) x, x 0 y, y 0, 0

To solve for the Nash Equilibrium, I plugged in values for x and y. To do this, I assumed both and shopped on the online florist http://www.miamionlineflowers.com/ and chose the least expensive flowers. So x = 14.99 and y = 9.99. This yields the following normal form game:

b c 5, 5

0 14.99, 14.99 0, 0

0 9.99, 9.99

As 9.99 > 5 and 0 > -14.99, 0 dominates c, so c can be eliminated. Similarly, as 14.99 > 5 and 0 > 9.99, 0 dominates b so b can also be eliminated. Thus the Nash equilibrium for this game is 0, 0, meaning that neither nor should buy the other flowers.

b c 5, 5

0 14.99, 14.99 0, 0

0 9.99, 9.99

Lee 6 D-000351-180 This is not, however, the only way to look at this situation. It should also be considered with an entirely different payoff matrix, one that includes emotional effects instead of monetary effects. This version of the game assumes that both giving and receiving flowers are desirable and giving is more desirable than receiving. With this assumption in consideration, I assigned giving flowers 2 points and receiving flowers 1 point. This yields the following payoff matrix: b 0

c 3, 3 2, 1 0 1, 2 0, 0

For this game, both strategies 0 and 0 are strictly dominated leaving the Nash equilibrium at c, b. b 0

c 3, 3 2, 1 0 1, 2 0, 0

Therefore by defining the payoff matrix by emotional effect instead of response results the opposite optimal strategy each should buy the other flowers. This shows setting payoff matrices is a vital part of solving a game. Both of these games are valid one must consider his or her personality to choose which game best fits his or her decision.

Problem 2
and go out to dinner. Who should pay?

Lee 7 D-000351-180 Each person has three options: suggest to pay for dinner, suggest to split the cost of dinner, or do nothing. In occasions where their suggestions conflict, the males decision takes precedence in accordance with general societal rules of paying for dinner on a date. Here is an explanation of those special occasions: Whenever suggest paying, he pays in full. Whenever does nothing, pays in full. If suggests to pay and suggests to split the bill, they make a compromise where pays for the meal and pays for the standard tip (15% of the total). Following the above rules and using d to represent the combined cost of the meal and the tip, here is the payoff matrix in normal form: suggest pay suggest split suggest pay suggest split not pay -1.15d, 1.15d d, -d 1.15d, -1.15d -1.15d, 1.15d 1.15d, -1.15d not pay -1.15d, 1.15d -1.15d, 1.15d

-.575d, -.575d -1.15d, 1.15d

Here is the matrix when d = $30.00: p p -34.5, 34.5 s 30, -30 0 34.5, -34.5 s -34.5, 34.5 34.5, -34.5 0 -34.5, 34.5 -34.5, 34.5

-17.25, -17.25 -34.5, 34.5

None of the strategies in this game are strictly dominated. Looking at s possible strategies, 0 is weakly dominant as (0, p) > (s, p), (0, p) > (p, p), (0, s) > (s, s), (0, s) > (p, s), and (0, 0) = (s, 0) = (p, 0). Because eliminating weakly dominated strategies risks eliminating some equilibria, the better option is to analyze this game with the cell-by-cell method.

Lee 8 D-000351-180 p p s 0 -34.5, 34.5 30, -30 34.5, -34.5 s -34.5, 34.5 -17.25, -17.25 34.5, -34.5 0 -34.5, 34.5 -34.5, 34.5 -34.5, 34.5

The arrows point to the best outcome for the player for each of the other players options. If two arrow heads are in a cell, that cell is a Nash equilibrium. Thus this game has three pure strategy equilibria: (p, 0), (s, 0), and (0, 0). This means that may choose any strategy and should not do anything when the check comes.

Problem 3
At prom, and are repeatedly faced with the opportunity to dance. What should they do? This payoff matrix is based on the assumption that both and enjoy dancing, at least when they dance together. dance dance and enjoy dancing together doesnt dance is somewhat embarrassed by dancing alone and avoids the fun of dancing doesnt dance is somewhat embarrassed by dancing alone and avoids the fun of dancing For the numerical payoff matrix, 1 represents the gained fun of dancing with a partner, 0 represents the neutral situation of not dancing, and -1 represents the embarrassment of dancing alone. D represents dancing and D represents not dancing. and miss the fun of dancing

Lee 9 D-000351-180 D D
D D

1, 1

-1, 0

0, -1 0, 0

Because and must choose whether or not to dance every time a song starts playing at prom, this game undergoes many (around 35) iterations. Because of the repetition, the Nash equilibrium is not necessarily the best choice for the couple. Instead of blindly following the Nash equilibrium, they should follow a strategy. For analysis of their strategy choices, it is assumed they have perfect information, meaning that they remember every all previous choices and outcomes. Because this game somewhat resembles the famous Prisoners Dilemma, strategies from that game can be borrowed for analysis of this one.

Tit-for-Tat If chose to use this strategy, he would choose to dance for the first song. For all following iterations, he would copy s choice from the preceding game. The advantages of this strategy are clear does for whatever she does for him. If and both choose to use tit-for-tat, they will always dance and receive maximum payoff, the optimal situation. However, s use of tit-for-tat could also yield chronic wallflower behavior. If frequently chooses not to dance, too will rarely choose to dance. Thus while tit-for-tat can be good, especially when followed by both partners, it can also get them stuck in a boring rut.

Randomized Tit-for-Tat This variation of tit-for-tat begins like tit-for-tat with making the risky, but most potentially beneficial choice to dance. He again repeats s preceding choice in iterations of the game, but unlike tit-for-tat, he sometimes chooses to dance despite not dancing.

Lee 10 D-000351-180 Randomized tit-for-tat has the same benefits as tit-for-tat with a solution for tit-for-tats downfall. By randomizing, the unfortunate and boring situation of repeatedly not dancing is hopefully avoided. In the Prisoners Dilemma, the problem with randomized tit-for-tat is when playing with a strictly uncooperative player, the randomized iterations risk harsh payoffs with no real benefit. In this game, however, the player risks little by randomizing.

Conclusion
According to these model games, a boy and a girl at prom should do the following: Determine whether emotion or money is more important to them and then either buy flowers or not buy flowers respectively. The girl should say nothing when the check comes at dinner. The boy can do whatever he wants, but he might as well offer to pay it because he will have to pay it anyway. Both should dance the first dance, then repeat their partners last decision. If this gets boring, one or the other should randomly decide to dance when the night is getting slow. These models appear to give proper advice for all of these situations; however, they are limited. These games are only models for the real life situations and do not take into consideration all factors in their payoff matrices or in their solutions. They provided mathematical optimal solutions for the given information, but do not properly account for the spontaneity of life. A good example of the limitations of game theory arises in the first problem. Here, two differently assigned sets of payoffs yield the opposite solution. This shows the utter importance of consideration when assigning payoffs as well as the extreme variance of the outcome by varying payoffs.

Lee 11 D-000351-180 Games are simple representations of real-life situations often social or economic. The actual situations, however, are much more complex than the games. Therefore, games and game theory are an excellent manner of representing and understanding actual situations, but their limitations should never be overlooked. Have fun at prom, and !

Lee 12 D-000351-180 Works Cited Bewersdorff, Jrg. Luck, Logic, and White Lies: The Mathematics of Games. Wellesley: A K Peters, 2005. Davis, Morton D. Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction. New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1970. Duffy, John. "Lectures." Simultaneous Move Games. 01 Dec 2003 . University of Pittsburgh. 1 Nov 2006 <http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/Lectures.htm>. Kuhn, Harold H.. Lectures on the Theory of Games. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. Ratliff, Jim. "Game Theory, September 2003." Two-Person General-Sum Games. Sep 2003. Aichi University. 1 Nov 2006 <http://www.math.ucla.edu/~tom/gamescourse.html>. Ratliff, Jim. "Jim Ratliff's Graduate-Level Course in Game Theory." Extensive-form Games. 1 Nov 2006 <http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory>.