Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation Author(s): John S.

Dryzek and Christian List Reviewed work(s): Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 1-28 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092266 . Accessed: 28/03/2012 12:58
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DOI: 10.1017/S000712340300001 Printed in the United Kingdom

Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy:A Reconciliation
JOHN S. DRYZEK AND CHRISTIAN LIST*
The two most influential traditions contemporary of social choice theoryand aboutdemocracy, theorizing deliberative are the in to democracy generally thought be at loggerheads, thatone demonstrates impossibility, or of collectiveoutcomessoughtby the other.We arguethatthe two instability meaninglessness the rational traditions be reconciled.Afterexpounding centralArrowand Gibbard-Satterthwaite can the impossibility decision democratic the whichmeaningful under results,we reassesstheirimplications, identifying conditions is We that and can theseconditions, hencethatsocialchoicetheory making possible. argue deliberation promote musthavea deliberative decisionmaking impossible, rather democracy is that but suggestsnotthatdemocratic aspect.

I. TWO TRADITIONS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

In the past decade the theory of democracy has been dominated by two very different approaches. Within democratic theory as conventionally defined the strongest current is now deliberative.1 For deliberative democrats, the essence of democratic legitimacy is the capacity of those affected by a collective decision to deliberate in the production of that decision. Deliberation involves discussion in which individuals are amenable to scrutinizing and changing their preferences in the light of persuasion (but not manipulation, deception or coercion) from other participants. Claims for and against courses of action must be justified to others in terms they can accept. Jiirgen Habermas and John Rawls, respectively the most influential continental and Anglo-American political philosophers of the late twentieth century, have both identified themselves as deliberative democrats.2Deliberative democrats are uniformly optimistic that deliberation yields rational collective outcomes.
respectively. Previous versions of this article were presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium

* ResearchSchool of Social Sciences, AustralianNational University;and Nuffield College, Oxford,

for Political Researchin Mannheim,1999, and at the AnnualMeeting of the AmericanPolitical Science did Association,Washington, D.C., 2000. The authors muchof the initialworkwhile Dryzekwas a visitorat NuffieldCollegein 1998,andDryzekthanks Collegeforits hospitality. helpfulcomments, thank Keith we For the Dowding,JamesFishkin,NatalieGold,RobertGoodin,lain McLean,GerryMackie,DavidMiller,ClausOffe, Anne Sliwka,the Editorand the anonymous reviewersof this article.
1 See, among many others, James Bohman and William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on

Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); JoshuaCohen, 'Deliberationand Democratic Legitimacy',in Alan HamlinandPhilipPettit,eds, TheGoodPolity:Normative Analysisof the State(Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34; John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy andBeyond: Liberals,

in Critics,Contestations (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2000); Jon Elster,'Introduction', Jon Elster,ed., Deliberative (New York:Cambridge Press,1998),pp. 1-18; JamesFishkin,Democracy Democracy University and Deliberation(New Haven,Conn.:Yale UniversityPress, 1991); Amy Gutmann Dennis Thompson, and Mass.:Harvard Democracyand Disagreement (Cambridge, UniversityPress, 1996).
2

Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy

Mass.:MITPress,1996);JohnRawls,'TheIdeaof PublicReasonRevisited',University Chicago of (Cambridge, Law Review,94 (1997), 765-807, pp. 771-2.

3 Arrow proved the non-existence of any aggregation mechanism satisfying a set of seemingly innocuous conditions. 157-72. then. 1982). THE SOCIAL-CHOICE-THEORETIC CHALLENGE Before we explicate some of the impossibility results at the centre of the social-choice-theoretic critique of democracy (11. instability and arbitrariness. The structure of this article follows the results of social choice theory. our arguments consist of a logical component. not deliberation over their content.grievous foundational flaws . more systematic testing is beyond our scope here. The normative component defends the claim that the constraints required for bringing about condition x are inherent in or consistent with core elements of deliberative democracy. The logical component takes an 'if-then' form: If condition x obtains. While we provide empirical illustrations. we briefly sketch what we take to be the essence of social choice theory (11. Roemer.2 DRYZEK AND LIST The main competing tradition is social choice theory. for it is these that both pose the challenges to democracy and pinpoint the locations at which deliberative responses must be sought. thus providing a crucial service to deliberative democracy. Riker's radicalization of the social-choice-theoretic critique created a chasm between the two traditions that might seem impossible to bridge.54-67.in democratic thought and practice'.2) and describe how they are usually invoked (n. social choice theory has exposed 'flaws . II. 170. 1963 [1951]). 40 . whose proponents generally deduce far less optimistic results. Social Choice and Individual Values. As Hardin puts it. some even arguing the opposite. Liberalism Against Populism (San Franscisco: W. 5 RussellHardin. To social choice theorists.6 We argue that the two traditions can in fact be reconciled. rather the 3Kenneth Arrow. 6 But see David Miller.JeanHampton JohnE. it has been argued that such aggregation is bedevilled by impossibility. Special Issue of Political Studies. Disentangling Social Choice Theoryfrom Rational Choice Theory Social choice theory is a mathematical theory of group decision making. Freeman. by the logic of social choice theory. pp. who argued that any notion of a popular will independent of the mechanism used to aggregate preferences was untenable.1. Though social choice practitioners may be unaware of it. finally.3). 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice'. DavidCopp. 1993). interests or preferences across individuals.4 Given that there is no good reason to choose any particular mechanism over any other. we argue that their theory points to the functions deliberation can perform in making collective decisions both tractable and meaningful. The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. in and eds. H. and democracy is emptied of meaning. (1991). Riker.1). seeks to render plausible the empirical hypothesis that deliberation facilitates the emergence of condition x. This critique of democracy was radicalized by William Riker. the democratic problem involves aggregation of views. supposedly democratic collective choices are arbitrary. Its concern is not so much the empirical question of how groups actually do make decisions. meaningful collective decisions are possible. The empirical-hypothetical component. 2nd edn (New York: Wiley. 'PublicChoiceversusDemocracy'. II. Methodologically. a normative component and an empirical-hypothetical component. 4 William H. at p. From the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow onwards.

}. x is at least as good as y'. For instance. i's interests as assessed by some external evaluation standard. labelled 1. Such rational-choice-theoretic premises may or may not turnout to be empirically adequate. . Hence Riker's argument that there is no popular will independent of a particular aggregation mechanism is not in itself a decisive challenge to democracy: without normative input in the form of a favoured set of conditions. xRiy will be interpreted as 'from individual i's perspective. distinct from.. N.Abbreviated. y and z. i.8 We consider a set of individuals (for example. and could. labelled x. an n-tuple {Rii. i. n }. ]is 1 and IXs o10 is assumedto be reflexive... Ri. and three alternatives. Ourpoint is simply that social choice theory and rational choice theory should not be conflated. committee members). But the purely logical side of social choice theory will not favour one such set of conditions over another. The normative aspect is the specification of minimal conditions an acceptable aggregation mechanism must satisfy. .connectedand transitive. alternatively. One of the roles of deliberation is to seek agreement on such a set of conditions. Social choice theory is. then. an empirical account of individual behaviour may (implicitly) affect the normative choice of minimal conditions on aggregation. As a further abbreviation. labelled X = {x. interests or preferences of individuals into group decisions. we may require that aggregation mechanisms minimize people's incentives to manipulate information (an example of such a condition is strategy-proofness as discussed below). 2. with the following preferences: individual 1: x > y > z individual 2: y > z > x individual 3: z > x > y Then there are majorities of two out of three individuals for x > y. 9 > u > 2. Arrow's theorem generalizes Condorcet's insight. over the alternatives in X. for y > z and for z > x. z.7 there is no reason why the purely logical and normative analysis of aggregation mechanisms should presuppose any specific behavioural assumption. we recall Condorcet's paradox of cyclical majority preferences. The resulting majority preference ordering is cyclical: x > y > z > x. 2 and 3. Social Choice and Individual Values. human beings tend to distort information when expedient.9 To each individual. y. While social choice theorists often model individuals as self-interested utility maximizers.g. 11. election candidates).Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem To introduce Arrow's theorem. we write xPiy if xRiy and not yRix. . Nonetheless. Liberalism Against Populism. 7 For example. voters. aggregate information about the views.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 3 normative and logical questions of how they should. there corresponds a personal preference ordering. decision makers. labelled N= { 1. This formalism allows different interpretations: Ri could represent individual i's explicitly expressed views or judgements or. policy options.2..10A profile ofpersonal preference orderings is an assignment of one such ordering to each individual. if. Riker. Suppose there are three individuals. and not committed to the premises of. Ri . The logical aspect is the identification of the class of logically possible aggregation mechanisms satisfying a given set of conditions. 8 Arrow. rational choice theory. empirically. and a set of alternatives (e. it is impossible to design a social choice mechanism.e.

relaxation of the requirement that social orderings be transitive does not solve the problem. For each profile of personal preference orderings. for all i in N. Weak Pareto Principle (P).12 By Arrow's theorem. transitive. We write xPy if xRy and not yRx. (P). xPiy implies xPy. Let R = F({Rii e N). SWFis oligarchicif thereexists a subsetM of N suchthat(i) xPy if. Arrow's theorem abstracts from pairwise majority voting. by not be transitive. Arrow's conditions are as follows. Now pairwise majority voting is the function F mapping each {Ri}ieeN to the corresponding Condorcet ordering R. (I) and (D). whilethe generate lattergeneratesingle winningalternatives. The weaker requirement of quasi-transitivity may still give rise to a so-called oligarchy. xPiy. manipulability by changes of the set of options X (the 'agenda') (if (I) is violated).connectedand.unless statedotherwise. Any democratic decision mechanism thus exhibits at least one of the following flaws: a failure to generate a determinate social ordering for certain profiles of personal preference orderings (if (U) is violated). or dictatorship (if (D) is violated)." xRy will be interpreted as 'from the perspective of the group N. Moreover.pp. Non-Dictatorship (D). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of personal preference orderings. define a social choice function (SCF) to be an aggregation function F whose input is a profile of personal preference orderings and whose output is a single winning alternative in X. xPiy. xPiy. see AmartyaSen.'3 To state the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.4 DRYZEK AND LIST A social welfare function (SWF) is an aggregation function F whose input is a profile of personal preference orderings and whose output is a social ordering R over the alternatives in X.1970). the Condorcet ordering is the social ordering defined as follows: xRy if and only if the number of individuals with the preference xRiy is at least as great as the number of individuals with the preference yRix. 76-7.Social . satisfying certain minimal conditions that generates transitive social preference orderings. If. for all {R})iEN in the domain of F and all x and y in X. N. 13 Quasi-transitivitytherequirement thestrong is that P whileR itselfneed ordering induced R be transitive. then xPy. A Condorcet winner is defined to be a top-ranked alternative in a Choiceand Individual Values. x is at least as good as y'. any SWF F will of logical necessity violate at least one of (U). (P). 11R is also assumedto be reflexive. (P) (ii) xRyif. for some i in M. F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an i in N such that.For a proof. Pairwise majority voting is an example of a SWF.and A social orderings whichsatisfies(U). The position of x relative to y in the social ordering R depends exclusively on the position of x relative to y in each of the personal preference orderings in {Ri)i. There exists no SWF F (generating transitive social orderings) which satisfies (U). F. inefficiency by sometimes ranking Pareto-suboptimal alternatives above Pareto-optimal ones (if (P) is violated). forall i in M.Any SWF generating quasi-transitive and (I) is oligarchic. Theorem 1. What Condorcet's paradox shows is that pairwise majority voting may fail to generate transitive social orderings. CollectiveChoice and Social Welfare(San Francisco: Holden-Day. 14 Thusthe difference betweenSWFsandSCFsis simplythatthe former socialorderings. Universal Domain (U).14Pairwise majority voting also provides an example of a SCF. 12 Arrow. showing that there exists no other SWF. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I). (I) and (D).

A. . (1973). Rn ). If such a situation can occur. 6 (1989). '7 Prasanta Pattanaik. . GlennW. If i submits a false preference ordering R (where RX' Ri). Rn }) andy = F( {R1. However. all { eNin thedomain F andallx in therange F. of See computational powerto recognize possibilities manipulation. any SCF will violate at least one of (U). simply a we define dictatorship follows: is than 15 To restate (D) of if dictatorial there existsani inN suchthat.17 A SCF violating (S) can then create perverse incentives in the form of a prisoner's dilemma. 16 A.'VotingGamesandComputational Complexity' of Moore of School Business. the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is concerned with SCFs in general. the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem clearly poses a significant challenge to democracy. for a theoretical and and result.. In Section 11i. 1978). everyone would be better off submitting true preferences. strategic manipulability (if (S) is violated). . 187-217. 2001)foran (Economics Working Paper B-01--01. insensitivity to individuals' views. Now pairwise majority voting is the function F mapping each {Ri}i E N to a corresponding Condorcet winner. where y' = F( {R. (R). There does not exist a profile {Ri}i.Social Choiceand Welfare. In addition to (U) and (D). In analogy to Arrow's theorem. J. Gibbard.'5 two minimal conditions are imposed on a SCF F: X. 10 (1975). A. (D) and (S). interests or preferences (if (R) is violated).. . J.... (D) and (S). University South result. of for Riii where y = F({ Ri)i c N). Suppose F is manipulable by individual i at {Ri )i N. abstracting from pairwise majority voting. R. The range of F contains at least three distinct alternatives in F is manipulable by individual i at the profile {Ri}i N if the following condition holds: Strategic Incentives (SI). is normatively attractive. Carolina. 'TheComputational an Difficultyof Manipulating Election'. Given any SCF F. If the incentives for individual i and coalition M are as shown in Table 1. 'Manipulability for Theorems Voting and and Existence Correspondence Satterthwaite. and the (unique) Nash equilibrium is the bottom right-hand box of the payoff matrix. ToveyandM. 227-41. There exists no SCF F which satisfies (U).16 By the Gibbard-Satterthwaitetheorem. empirical . 'Strategy-Proofness Arrow'sConditions: Procedures Social WelfareFunctions'. Ri. The problem of strategic manipulation becomes even more intractable if we allow the possibility of counterthreats of the form 'if you submit false preferences. individuals act on the incentives for manipulation provided by situations of type (SI). then the dominant strategy for everyone is to submit false preferences. we challenge the plausibility of this empirical assumption in a deliberative setting. As indicated in Section Ii. dictatorship (if (D) is violated). Trick.Econometrica.2. . Harrison Tanga McDaniel..18 F as condition for SCFs(rather SWFs). Theorem 2. namely condition (S). ... The Range-Constraint (R).1. 587-601. then so will I/we'.formally y'Piy. at least one of the following flaws thus seems inevitable: a failure to generate a determinate winning alternative for certain profiles of personal preference orderings (if (U) is violated).Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 5 Condorcet ordering. . then a condition that rules out the occurrence of such situations. Bartholdi. aboutthe true preferences others. then F selects an alternative y' that is strictly better from the perspective of i's true preference ordering than the alternativey that would be selected by F if i submitted the true preference ordering Ri. M. yRix.the individuals of may have insufficient 18 Even underfull information C. N at which F is manipulable by some i in N. Strategy-Proofness (S). (S) is a (normative) condition whose appeal is closely linked with an empirical assumption. If. and Journal of Economic Theory. Strategy and Group Choice (Amsterdam: North-Holland.. 41 of VotingSchemes: General A Result'. and suppose a coalition M of other individuals states a counterthreat against i's manipulation to submit false preferences themselves. empirically. (R).

pp. deliberation might even exacerbate 19 20 Jon Elster. Two Ways to Deploy Impossibility Arguments In the sporadic encounters between deliberative democracy and social choice theory. 112. 'The Possibilityof RationalOutcomesfrom DemocraticDiscourseand Procedures'.'The Marketand the Forum'. but requires further elaboration. But these are exactly the conditions of structurelessness conducive to impossibility.3. Miller's argument points in the right direction. p. instability and strategic manipulability in collective choice.eds. the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems have been deployed to support diametrically opposed positions. 103-32. because deliberative democrats prescribe a procedure as open as possible in allowing different viewpoints and as free as possible from constraints imposed by rules and inequalities.in Jon Elsterand AanundHylland.21 a structure condition to be discussed below. 58 (1996). Miller argues that deliberation produces preference profiles that satisfy singlepeakedness. thus proving the necessity for deliberation across those holding initially different preferences. so even after discussioninduced preference changes aggregation of conflicting preferences may be necessary. at p. followers of Riker have argued that Arrow problems devastate deliberation. it does not show why deliberation avoids the same problems.20 However. Below we will address his hypothesis that deliberation induces single-peakedness in greater detail. 734-52.19 But this invocation merely asserts deliberation's superiority through reference to the problems of aggregation. 'Deliberative and Democracy Social Choice'. Elster holds that under deliberation 'there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism. 244. and we will argue that disaggregation helps only under specific conditions. Journal of Politics. He further suggests that if the basic cause of cycling is the combination of several normative dimensions into a single vote or choice. .6 DRYZEK AND LIST TABLE 1 A Prisoner's Dilemma of Manipulability Coalition M Submit 'true' preferences Submit 'false' preferences Worst outcome for i Best outcome for M 2ndworst outcome for i 2nd worst outcome for M Individual i Submit 'true' preferences Submit 'false' preferences 2ndbest outcome for M 2"dbest outcome for i Best outcome for i Worst outcome for M in. 22 David van Mill. citing Arrow. that 'it is doubtful that private desires or even aspirations can be well-aggregated through the process of majority rule'. Cass Sunstein. Sunstein argues. 1986). From the direction of social choice theory. Foundations Social of ChoiceTheory(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences'. then aggregate these choices into a coherent collective choice. Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press. From the direction of deliberative democracy. then deliberation can unpack the various dimensions. 1993). 21 Miller. it is surely overly optimistic to expect that rational discussion will always produce unanimity. Deliberators can search for acceptable choices on each dimension.22 Regarding the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

In some of our arguments. The normative component of our arguments defends the use of these constraints as consistent with. arguing that openness and freedom of communication within the forum will 'unsettle. the recognition that the requisite constraints could be consistently implemented in the institutions of a deliberative democracy does most of the work . and such procedures can. and deliberation can supply such information. For effective manipulation requires information about others' preferences. any extant shared understanding of political conflict'. Knight and Johnson recognize that 'the standard claim that deliberation aims at preference transformation appears . respectively. there exist social choice procedures satisfying all the others. we would solve the impossibility problems seemingly at the expense of. If we relax (I) or (S). If any one of these conditions is relaxed. We explained above that our arguments consist of a logical 'if-then' component. 277-96. deliberation. 22 Legitimacy'. the prescriptions of deliberative democrats are likely only to make collective choice more intractable. and p.along the lines of Miller's hypothesis . 23 Jack Knight and James Johnson. majority rule need not generate cyclical social orderings'. particularly those in Sections 1I1. In Section 111. if not altogether subvert. 282-3. . we argue that there are 'structuration' processes endogenous to deliberation that can speak to the problems highlighted by social choice theory.23But Knight and Johnson are less optimistic than Miller on whether such agreement can be achieved in practice. or even inherent in.2 mII. III.consistent with all of Arrow's conditions. which require further empirical corroboration. But first we introduce some conceptual tools to classify aggregation problems and those aspects of deliberation that can be brought to bear. a normative component and an empirical-hypothetical component. in principle.5 discuss an escape-route from Arrow's theorem that is .3. homogeneous preferences. The problem. 24 KnightandJohnson.5. is that all these conditions are so basic that weakening even one would yield undesirable consequences..4 and 11i. The aim of deliberation must then be to impose certain constraints on democratic decision processes required for satisfying the antecedents of these 'if-then' results. However.24 Against this interpretationof the conditions of deliberation as lack of structure. particularly those in Sections I1i. depend more crucially on empirical hypotheses..that 'if voters can agree about the dimension over which they disagree .2and III. The 'if-then' component is given by social-choice-theoretic possibility results. possible agenda manipulation or possible submission of false that to preferences.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 7 strategic behaviour.'Aggregation Deliberation'.at first sight surprisingly . be employed in democratic decision making. A DELIBERATIVE RESPONSE Each condition of Arrow's theorem and of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem points towards a potential escape-route from the impossibility problems. where agreement about the dimension of disagreement is interpretedas single-peakedness.' And they point out .whether they will be implemented is of course a different matter..4 a relaxation of each of (S).. Other arguments. In short. for example. we argue in Sections 111. at pp. either too strong or beside the point. according to social-choice-theoretic critics. we (U) and (I) is an option in a deliberative setting. 289. It is too strong if it requires convergent. (1994). 'Aggregation and Deliberation: the Possibility of Democratic On Political Theory.

however. finally.27However. or (d) in a group discussion? There are now four sub-categories of JD: JD-nv. seems unrealistic: it represents the limiting case in which a decision is made on the basis of views and judgements expressed in group communication. revise and express their views and judgements in a reasoned discussion leading to an appropriate (consensus) decision. A Simple Taxonomy of Decision Processes in a Deliberative Democracy We use two (purely formal) criteria for the classification of aggregation problems that fit our description of social choice theory:25 What is the input of the aggregation? (J) Views or judgements of individuals. Category JD-dd represents the pure deliberative case. Category JD-nd. In reality. Category JD-nv represents the (rare) limiting case of pure aggregative decision making. or (W) A welfare judgement.Democracyand Deliberation. in which people frame. by an index of a person's socio-economic welfare). Perhaps group discussion in what Gambetta calls a 'Claro!' culture could take this form. It is helpful to subdivide the category JD further by the following criteria: (iii) Prior to the actual decision. or (I) Interests or the welfare of individuals. or (d) deliberation? (iv) When the decision is finally taken. where highly opinionated agents are unwilling as a matter of 'discursive machismo' to subject their ideas to deliberative scrutiny. JD-nd. 19-43. (i) Of the four possible combinations of these criteria. and finally they express their views again in the same questionnaires. but they need not banish voting-based processes. Deliberative democrats consider processes of type JD-dd more desirable than processes of type JD-nv. criteria (iii) and (iv) admit a continuum of possibilities between n and d and between v and d. Fishkin's deliberative opinion polls can be interpreted as a version of JD-dv.1. 26 Fishkin. in 27 Diego Gambetta. this outcome would 25 Amartya Sen.'"Claro!": Essayon DiscursiveMachismo'. 1995). Unlike purely aggregative democrats. then they deliberate. JD and ID are most relevant to the theory of democracy. with no discussion. Elster. Deliberative Democracy. are the individuals' views and judgements expressed (v) by (anonymous) voting..ed. . as assessed by some external standard(for example. chap 8. 1982). (ii) What is the output of the aggregation? (D) A decision. as explicitly expressed by them (for example. JD-dv. they do not treat views and preferences as exogenously given.:Yale UniversityPress.26 Participants first express their views by filling out confidential questionnaires. Category JD-dv may seem desirable if the number of decision makers is large or if individual decision makers are to be protected against social coercion.8 DRYZEK AND LIST III. by voting).James Fishkin. An pp. respectively. in which no discussion is involved in the formation of people's views and judgements. Choice. The Voice of the People: Public Opinionand Democracy(New Haven. Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Conn. are the individuals' views and judgements subjected to (n) no deliberation. and JD-dd.

first. in the knowledge that these preferences have to be justified to others. then a relaxation of condition (S) becomes an option: the existence of profiles which . judgements and social dispositions? Deliberation has informational (inf).2 . according to which the non-existence of SCFs satisfying (S) (together with (U). to the challenge of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. On the basis of such a standard. argumentative (arg).Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 9 be contingent on substantial immediate agreement among the agents on what is obviously right ('Claro!' is a conversational putdown that translates as 'Obvious!'). Relaxing Strategy-Proofness In this section we propose the empirical hypothesis that Hypothesis 1. reflective (ref) and social (soc) aspects. or values and ends.2 concerning specific outcomes. confirm or refute the internal consistency of such arguments. information or perspectives. enabling each person to recognize their interrelation with a social group. (arg) draw people's attention to new arguments about the interdependence of issues. Deliberative democrats highlight JD-dv and JD-dd . (R) and (D)) and generating determinate winning alternatives.we discuss such decision problems in Sections to in. and clarify whether controversies are about facts. We suggest that each of these aspects plays a role in facilitating the solution of social-choice-theoretic problems.2. but also on second-order decisions concerning institutional arrangements. be Noris it ourclaim inducing that individuals submit preferences outtheoccurrence profiles to true rules of which . i. (R) and (D)) implies the inherent vulnerability of democracy to strategic manipulation. And. to the attempt to dismiss talk as inconsequential or even directly counterproductive in collective decision making and. Group deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views truthfully. new information or new perspectives on a given issue.in the formal sense of the definition of manipulability in Section 1i. if we relax condition (S). for instance concerning taxation or welfare provision. secondly. Deliberation could reach agreement on the choice of some interpersonally significant standardfor assessing people's interests or welfare (such as Rawlsian primary goods). The hypothesis responds. It can (inf) confront people with new facts. the relevant decision and distribution problems can be interpreted as type ID Section Ini. How may deliberation affect people's preferences.5discusses such decision problems. as well as corroborate or falsify previously believed facts. If the hypothesis is correct. if they have a disposition to be truthful.provide an incentive to submit false preferences poses no problem if individuals do not act on that incentive. views. Yet deliberation can focus not only on first-order decisions ni.4. then there are aggregation mechanisms satisfying other reasonable conditions (such as (U). make explicit previously hidden premises and assumptions. (ref) induce people to reflect on their preferences.e. methods and means.28 28 Our claim thissection notthat in is deliberation individuals agree what leads to on choices should made. 111. (soc) create a situation of social interaction where people talk and listen to each other.

. From a rational-choice standpoint. 'Strategic Modelsof Talk'. Rather.'All Men Are Liars:Is Deliberation Meaningless?' Elster. there may be risks and penalties attached to informational deception and false disclosure of preferences. thatthiswill makea relaxation to can of that become availableundera relaxation of condition(S) more acceptable. and hence an individual may no longer be better off if they reveal false preferences. We have noted in Section II.David 'Strategic Political Science Review.124-52.Indeed. where truthfulness corresponds to co-operation and submission of false preferences corresponds to defection. 'Information Transmission in Debate'. pp. 34 International of Models Talkin Political Decision-Making'. property (SI) would hold into ones in which property (SI) no longer holds. The Evolution of Cooperation (New York:Basic Books.31 The incentives for truthfulness created by recurrent interaction parallel the incentives for co-operation in repeated (as opposed to one-shot) prisoner's dilemmas. Effect 2: Inducing in individuals a greater co-operative disposition. American Journal of Political Science. of preferences. 32 Robert Axelrod. We argue that deliberation can have (at least) one of two effects: Effect 1: Explicitly changing the incentives.2 that. there are penalties for being exposed as a liar. In a deliberative setting. then there are no incentives for truthfulness. However. to manipulate and to reveal. Any SCF satisfying (U). introducing multiple speakers helps to create incentives for truthfulness by enabling (F'note continued) our leadto cycles underpairwisemajority may voting. Austen-Smith.30 Listeners are aware of the possibility of deception. i. 31 Gerry in Mackie. and hence that they will no longer act on the incentives provided by (SI). 1984).10 DRYZEK AND LIST To defend the plausibility of the proposed hypothesis.e. that they will submit true preferences. p. decisions about whether or not to submit true preferences may have a structure similar to a (one-shot) prisoner's dilemma. Examplesare the Bordacount(to be discussedbelow) or single transferable 29 David Austen-Smith. and so calculate whether or not to believe speakers. We now address the two effects in greater detail. let us briefly recall what the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies. Deliberative Democracy. Let us first consider Effect 1. 'potentially influential only insofar as it alters individuals' beliefs about how actions map onto consequences'. . when property (SI) holds. 16 (1992). (R) and (D) will violate (S). without deliberation. If there are no punishments for being exposed as a liar. 57. Austen-Smith analyses talk in strategic terms: it can convey information. (1990). 30 Austen-Smith. and true claimis onlythatdeliberation induceindividuals submit preferences. Austen-Smith stresses the informational (inf) aspect of deliberation and how agents will calculate what information to believe. which are prior and exogenous to the decision process.97-122.29 Information conveyed in talk is selective and possibly false. nobody will believe you the next time. Deliberation may increase the likelihood that individuals will co-operate. and hence there will exist situations with property (SI): An individual is better off from the perspective of their true preferences if they revealfalse preferences than if they reveal their true preferences. i.e.32 But even in one-shot interactions a deliberative setting may create incentives for truthfulness. Thus deliberation may transform situations in which.ed. but never change preferences. 45-58. if interaction is recurrent.truepreferences still leadto suchcycles. mechanisms The aggregation condition will be different they (S) cycling-free): will be thekinds voting(andin particular frompairwisemajority for of mechanisms areoftencriticized thegrounds theyprovideincentives strategic that on that misrepresentation vote (STV). untruthfulness may be costly. First.

'Behavior. the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects actually constrain the individuals' opportunities for manipulation. Assemblies are only completely partisanin political systems on the verge of disintegration. vande Kragt. 100 (1990). at least by members of one's own side. Suppose i's true preference ordering is xPiyPiz. The best case that i can make for revealing the preference ordering xPizPiy late in the day is that he/she has been persuaded of this ordering by the preceding deliberation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.otherwise there would be no reason for i to act strategically against y here. 54 (1988). i perceives that x has a better chance of beating z than beating y. the more confident any one individual becomes during this discussion that others will co-operate. 34 Jane J. Now. Even when experimental conditions are modified to ensure that the discussion is on topics irrelevant to the choice between co-operation and defection. There is a risk that the others will not believe that i is sincere. Communications. the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation means that i must justify this false ordering. 35 R. because the payoff structure of the choice situation is unchanged by discussion: indeed. Orbell. thus ruling out explicit promise-making. John M.'All Men Are Liars'. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 616-27. outweighing any incentives to truthfulness.AlphonseJ. Dawes. J. In short. van de KragtandRobynM.34 In our discussion of Effect 2. in Mansbridge's classification. But Effect 1 holds to the degree the setting has any deliberative aspects at all .33 Secondly. A robust empirical finding in experiments on one-shot prisoner's dilemmas is that a period of discussion within the group prior to each individual choice between co-operation and defection increases the proportion of co-operative choice. Yet such a lie is risky. while 'hanging back' to disclose his/her own preferences selectively and possibly deceptively. Shaklee. Consider. but empirical evidence suggests that social norms and/or psychological dispositions in favour of keeping promises are more powerful. a truly canny actor i intent on taking advantage of the deliberative revelation of preferences by others. beyond the informational (inf) aspect of deliberation. After listening to others reveal their preferences. 'Explaining in Discussion-Induced Cooperation Social Dilemmas'. 36 JohnM. Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books. and Assumptions About OtherPeoples' Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation'. Proposed explanations range from an 33 Mackie. We argue that deliberation's social (soc) aspect may promote the individuals' co-operative disposition.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 11 corroboration of information.36 Rational choice theory would predict that in one-shot interactions such promises will be broken. . RobynM. which in turn is necessary to make any effective deliberative interventions.35This result falsifies the rational-choice prediction that individuals should still defect. so i then pretends to have an ordering xPizPiy. the more that person should calculate that the payoff from defection will increase.'TheLimitsof Multilateral Promising'. 35 (1977). DawesandAlphonse C. not z . McTavish and H. Orbell.prevaricatorsrisk destruction of their stock of credibility. it might be argued that in partisan settings (such as a legislature) skilful prevarication may actually be admired. because the content of deliberation has actually advanced the standing of y. C. How do we explain discussion-induced co-operation? Discussion provides participants with opportunities for multilateral promise-making about the choices they will make. 1980). for instance. Mansbridge. However. Thus Effect 1 works in 'adversary' and 'unitary' democracies alike. 811-19. Ethics. Dawes. discussion still increases the proportion of co-operators. 1-11. J. we will now address a different mechanism that may induce truthfulness in one-shot interactions. the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation constrains strategic and deceptive disclosure of preferences.

then.See by FedericoVarese and Meir Yaish. 24 (1995). as noted above. European Journal of Social Psychology. particularly its social aspect (soc)? A decision-theoretic explanation of how co-operation can be triggered even in one-shot interactions suggests a mechanism that may work in both laboratories and the real world.Games Economic and 'Whois this "We"? Levelsof CollectiveIdentity Self Representation'. 'the decision-maker's conception of the acts.Relaxing Universal Domain The threat Arrow's problem poses to democratic decision making depends on the level of diversity across different individuals' preferences. some evidence in support of Hypothesis 1: we may expect deliberative talk to be truthful rather than manipulative.Science. J. Dilemma Game'. and that this effect can still occur in adversarial settings. Framing DecisionsandthePsychology Choice'.12 DRYZEK AND LIST evolutionary-psychological or social trust mechanism. Gardner. aggregation is easy. . while unanimity is a sufficient condition for avoiding Arrow's problem. 76 (1998)." Varying an agent's frame can lead to major preference changes. 202-25. but also on a decision-frame.afterbeing personally addressed Jews andaskedfor help. 307-34. 12 (2000). 11i.3. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 93-7. up to complete reversal. then this would open up an escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. of Rationality and Society. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. most peoplehelped. 1-45. 'The Importance Being Asked: The Rescue of Jews in Nazi Europe'. outcomes. 'The Cunning of Trust'.41 The co-operative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an 'I'-frame of self-interest. provided only that they have some deliberative component. may 39 AmosTversky DanielKahnemann. behaviour beeffective inhigh-stakes in Varese even of In of situations. 19(1997).'The and Variable Frame of An and Behavior. if Hypothesis 1 is correct. it is overly optimistic to expect deliberation to produce unanimity. a study therescue Jews NaziEurope.Gaeth. 83-93. However." People express less selfregarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts.43We hypothesize that deliberation can have a similar effect of making a 'we'-frame of collective interest focal. or a 'we'-frame of collective interest.' of Economicsand Statistics. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.38 Is evidence from stylized dilemma games relevant to the real world of deliberation. and of of 'The 211 (1981). Schneider G. BrewerandW. People's preferences are not description invariant: an agent's preferences depend not only on a decontextualized payoff matrix. it is not a necessary one. 'us' and 'our' have been shown to induce use of the 'we'-frame. 4 (1974). 40 41 of Framing Effects'. preference structuration. 149-88. In (rare) cases of unanimity. and contingencies associated with a particular choice'. Bacharach. 43 M. by which exposing one's vulnerability to others makes it less likely that they will exploit that vulnerability. mechanism thereis someevidenceto suggestthata trust co-operative inducing andYaish showedthat. 71 (1996). 38 Philip Pettit. 453-8. But. Theory FocalPoints: Experimental Study'. There is.Eiser K-K.1997). And we have argued that. S. Levin.MichaelBacharach MicheleBernasconi. exemplified 37 It mightbe objected worksonly in situations thatthe trustmechanism in identified laboratory experiments wherethestakesarelow.Universityof Oxford. Frames NotCreated and of in 'The of on Effect Situational Bhavnani. Meaning theBehavior Subjects thePrisoner's 42 Michael "We" Institute of A Frame Equilibria: Variable Theory Cooperation' (Working paper.37to the idea that people are trust-responsive because there is a positive payoff in being seen by others as co-operative and trustworthy. Moreover. and A and 'All Are Analysis Equal: Typology Critical I. B.42 Experimental conditions as undemanding as asking subjects to edit a text by circling all occurrences of 'we'.

if (2(x) < 2(y) < 2(z)) or (?(z) < 2(y) < Q(x)). 45 basic significance the result. specifically pairwise majority voting. (I) and (D). 1. may 'On Rationale'. Single-peakedness.45there exists a Condorcet winner for each profile contained in Ds.TheTheory Committees. .47 of DecisionMaking'. Sen. Theory Committees Elections of Cambridge 46 Black. A 'left'-'right' ordering with this property will be called a dimension. z.SocialChoiceandIndividual of . There exists a bijection 02:X { 1. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th x z v y w personalpreferenceorderings Fig. If the number of individuals n is odd.'A Possibility Black. Black. k } such that. A profile {R}i N of personal preference orderings is single-peaked if there exists a single ordering of all alternatives from 'left'-most to 'right'-most such that each individual has a most preferredposition on that 'left'-'right' ordering with decreasing preference for alternatives as they get increasingly distant from the most preferred position. w). w which are single-peaked with respect to the same dimension Q2 (ordering the alternatives from 'left' to 'right' in the order x.Liberalism of AgainstPopulism. (1948). University Econometrica. y. . there exist SWFs on the domain Ds satisfying (P). y.C. then xRiy implies xPiz.see Riker. z. We will discuss the implications of this observation for deliberative democracy. z and every individual i. labelled 02. (Cambridge: Theorem Majority on 34 Press.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 13 by Black's condition of single-peakedness. v. y. Sen.section5. If the number of individuals n is odd. Decisions'. Single-peaked Let Ds denote the set of all profiles of personal preference orderings satisfying single-peakedness..n is even. for every triple -of alternatives x. the Duncan The and Black.44 is already a sufficient condition. 56 44 DuncanBlack. Arrow. 1958). Amartya 'APossibility 491-9.46 Theorem 4. 47 Theorem'.there be (harmless) which notundermine is if the do ties.'Onthe Rationale'. Figure 1 gives an example of two preference orderings over the alternatives x. Thisrequirementa technicality. Theorem 3..Journalof Political Economy. v. 2.(1966). 'On the Rationale Group 23-34. Values.

. a meta-level. 4 and 5 still hold if Ds is replaced by Dv. 525-31).A profileof personal even whenthe preference orderings may formallysatisfysingle-peakedness individuals notsemantically But do the in conceptualize alternatives termsof thesamecommonissue-dimension.A profile (Ri). But it is also possible for two or more individuals to disagree on how to rank alternatives. Enterprises'. it is not necessary. in arguments PoliticalScience American with Unidimensionality'.1965)). thereexist w E {x. 72-9.If {R.Economic 52 Christian The List. the conditions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) are likely to exist if only 75 per cent or even fewer of the individuals have personal preference orderings that are structured by the same dimension.53 48 Ri is strict if x 0 y impliesthatnot bothxRiyandyRcx.the perfect case being unanimity. Decision-Making Partial 5~' Richard Niemi. (D).63 (1969).and of value-restricted foreverytripleof distinctalternatives y. 'Two Conceptsof Agreement'. Agreement at a meta-level may imply single-peakedness. Such agreement is called agreement at a meta-level. depending on the total number of individuals. there exist SCFs on the domain Ds satisfying (R). then the profile of preferences orderings across these individuals satisfies single-peakedness. 'Majority of Simulation a SmallVoting Review. 488-97.49 The possibility results of Theorems 3. transitive social orderings satisfying the conditions of Arrow's theorem (and by easy implication. GoodSociety.52Two or more individuals agree at a substantive level to the extent that their preferences are the same . Ward. 49 Thisresult implied theSatterthwaite fromtheauthors a is theorem. 'A Possibility University conditions.'Majority (see Voting and Alternative Md:JohnsHopkins in (Baltimore.we shall here consideronly single-peakedness. x. If the number of individuals n is odd. Campbell.section5. z (in cases of indifference. y.E of personalpreference is individuals odd. y. If different individuals agree on a common dimension along which each individual's preferences are systematically aligned in the requisite way.Liberalism AgainstPopulism. 32 Formsof Public (1964).is logicallyless demanding beingonly a formalstructure 53 Single-peakedness. G. thenthe Condorcet R ordering is stricttoo.we will use the terms 'dimension'(in the formalsense) and 'issue-dimension' the (in semanticsense) interchangeably wheneverthereis no dangerof confusion. . bearingin mind that the present could easily be restated termsof the less demanding conditionof value-restriction. (D) and (S) (where Ds contains all profiles of strict orderings in Ds). z} andr E (1. see also G. Inada. Margolis.14 DRYZEK AND LIST Theorem 5.See Sen. the number concerned if. while full single-peakedness is sufficient for the existence of SWFs satisfying (P). alternative have morethanone rankr).80 (1970). (S).ed. at thanagreement condition. 3 } suchthatno concerned ranksw as his or herr-thpreference individual an can amongx. Profiles with sufficiently large single-peaked subprofiles can be included in the domain as well. 11 (2002). z.For simplicity. Econometrica. System'. and yet to agree on a common dimension in terms of which the alternatives are to be conceptualized. if Theorem'. ThePublic Economy UrbanCommunities of betweenthese of for Theorem' a discussion the logicalrelations Press. iEN is a profileof strictorderings. proofcanbe obtained by correspondence on request.50 Further. 'A Possibility are not all tied in this individual'spreference is orderings N ordering. 97-104.48 specifically pairwise majority voting.51 Single-peakedness can be related to a distinction between two different concepts of agreement: agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level.'Computer Journal. Otherstructure separability into two groups (see K. 'A Note on the Simple Majority Decision Rule'. see Riker. we will assumethatagreement a meta-level one of themostplausible common'causes'of single-peakedand at is ness. (I). TullockandC.An individual concerned over a tripleof alternatives these alternatives is 50 Sen.C. (D) and of SCFs satisfying (R). and latin-square-lessness B. where Dv is the set of all profiles of personal preference orderings satisfying the more general (and less demanding) structure condition of value-restriction. 2. For this reason. Niemi has shown that. D. Ds is a propersubsetof and resultsaresingle-cavedness conditions are sufficient avoidingthe impossibility that for Dv. J.

there are other non-coercive ways in which deliberation can narrow the domain of actually occurring preference profiles. The profile of personal preference orderings {Ri}i Nafter a period of group deliberation will satisfy (or approximate) single-peakedness.Discursive Democracy. this itself might induce single-peakedness. dimension. the term 'generalizable Political Studies. someone may have good reasons for having preferences with more than one peak on the identified dimension. which in turn are more persuasive than those couched in terms of the interests of specific individuals. Deliberation may rule out arguments that cannot withstand deliberative scrutiny. preferring massive military action to withdrawal to limited action. the subsection after that addresses the possibility that identifying multiple relevant issue-dimensions and determining people's separate dimension-specific preference orderings may generate intra-dimensional single-peakedness. 835-49. or meaningful votingproduces approval is The as approval votingeachinvidualcastsa vote for all optionsregarded acceptable. . the RobertE.846-7. this ordering is single-peaked. Unless deliberation can produce agreement on one dimension as exclusively relevant. M be the largest } subset ofNsuch that the subprofile {Ri)i Msatisfiessingle-peakedness. the third subsection discusses empirical evidence. Goodin. for participation in deliberation has to bring to mind the interests of these others. an appeal to rationality alone cannot induce single-peakedness.55 It might be argued that rationality requires one determinate dimension on which preferences are single-peaked. but still reasonably explicable. winningalternative that votes (StevenJ. pp.If it is acceptable restrict to preferences by theArrowandGibbard-Satterthwaite expression individual social choices. and provide a partial solution to Arrow's problem. However. 54-5.'Approval of Voting'. pp.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 15 In the next subsection we discuss mechanisms whereby deliberation might induce greater (unidimensional) single-peakedness. and to their society. 'Enfranchising Earth. Arguments couched in such terms are more persuasive than those couched in terms of the interests of some subgroup. Dryzek. Fishburn. However. Consider a preference ordering in the United States concerning the Vietnam War. If the relevant dimension is extent of military action. via agreement at a meta-level.57One kind of generalizable 54 We shouldnote an alternative some of the problems to posed way of usingdomainrestriction circumvent of results. with a value close to 0 representing low level of single-peakedness a value of 1 representing single-peakedness. Then define the index of single-peakedness The to be the size of M dividedby the size of N . Bramsand PeterC. 72 (1978).56Preference orderings denying the personal integrity and political equality of other actual or potential deliberators are not easily sustained.Under to binarychoicesbetweenapproval disapproval. Allowing that issue-complexity or normative disagreement may often rule out agreement on a common dimension.formallyIMI/IN1. 831-47). Deliberative theorists often stress the invocation of interests 'generalizable' to deliberators. this individual's preferences may be single-peaked along a different. the ordering violates single-peakedness.54 One-dimensional preference structuration. But if the relevant dimension is expected net gain of military action. Let the 55 Thefollowingsimpleindexcanbe usedforquantifying level of single-peakedness.index will takevaluesin the intervalfrom full and a 0 to 1.and Its Alternatives'. whose identification enables a group to criticize as irrational personal preference orderings which have more than one peak on that dimension. Because the present escape-route from Arrow's problem rests on empirical hypotheses. receivingthe greatestnumber approval American Political Science Review. In this subsection we discuss: Hypothesis 2. As most individuals would eschew appearing irrational. 44 (1996). 56 57 interest'comes fromHabermas.

5). y = subsidies for family farms only. political and 'If.e.16 DRYZEK AND LIST interest is the economist's idea of a public good.59 A sceptic might counter that invocations of generalizable interests are just rationalizations for self-interest. z = no subsidies. of the political is outcome guaranteed.. argues that for unidimensional issues 'multipeaked .'6 Yet rationalization can still shift debate to a single publicly-sustainable issue-dimension. on the most preferred position on that dimension). A more sanguine view of motivation would see individuals truly adopt positions they can sustain publicly.for each tripleof alternatives. y and z. Motivating Political Morality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 60 Riker.61 Perhaps becoming civilized in Elster's terms involves 'finding one's peak' on the publicly identified issue-dimension. by reason discussion. So Riker castigates. p. 'an assertion of the general virtue of rurallife on the family farm [that]justifies farm subsidies.' dimension evidenced single-peakedness). Another kind is access to the basic needs of life (food. then (a high level of) single-peakedness is a likely consequence. then there is a cycle across x. p. 62 Robert E. Assuming material self-interest. p. mightbe sufficiently unlikelyso thatcycling wouldnot be preferences view voters havea common of civiceducation. not medium. Supposing (for the moment) this generalizable interest is associated with a single dimension (such as ecological sustainability). Imagine three policy alternatives: x = subsidies for all farms.Public Choice II (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. if. But is an appeal to a generalizable interest sufficient to induce (a greater level of) single-peakedness? We suggest that. not at a substantive level (i. But if deliberation induces a need for rationalization along Riker's lines. for family farmers yPixPiz.62Even if individuals privately cling to their 58 Dennis Mueller. argues: all value-restriction only that. 1989). and for taxpayers zPiyPix. socialization. Rationality may finally lead individuals to have single-peaked preferences on the shared dimension. 205. 61 Elster. If none of the three groups controls a majority but each pair of them does. Elster speaks of the 'civilizing force of hypocrisy' accompanying deliberation. 128. This mechanism requires only agreement at a meta-level (i. (i) a particulargeneralizable interest becomes focal and (ii) this generalizable interest can be associated with a single dimension. individuals requires 59 Even less demandingly.. chap 7. deliberation-induced rationalization may narrow the domain of preference profiles. . education etc. shelter. a transitive then (as by much a problem. which options least or most degrade an ecosystem). agribusiness's preference ordering cannot be sustained. Liberalism Against Populism. which can only be supplied jointly and indivisibly to all individuals. 12. such as ecological integrity. debate. on a shared dimension). then the informational (inf) and argumentative (arg) aspects of deliberation may resolve factual disagreements on how alternatives are aligned on that dimension (for example.58 The mechanism can be described as follows.p. the preference ordering for agribusiness is xPizPiy (z is preferred to y because subsidies for family farms only would hurt the competitive position of agribusiness). 67. a deliberator might question with regard to this dimension why subsidies should also go to large agribusinesses. Goodin.Liberalism by AgainstPopulism. through deliberation.e.' of This is acknowledged rationalchoice theorists:Riker. for example. In short.or not worst. and the cycle is broken. see Section Hi. formalizable in Sen's notion of functionings or in Rawls's notion of primary goods (on such 'divisible' kinds of generalizable interest.'Introduction'. The reflective (ref) and social (soc) aspects of deliberation may lead people to re-frame a given decision problem in terms of a generalizable interest.). On farm subsidies. is agreethatone of the threealternatives not best. 1992).

89-90. Fearon. but compromise was now preferred to desecration.65 But even in JD-dv situations with secret voting.2). for JD-dv situations. this Earth First!er eventually co-wrote (along with a cattle rancher) most of the Guidelines for Range Management produced by the Council. His background. 'Toward a Theory of Discursive Environmental Policy Making: The Case of Public Range doctoraldissertation.yet still vote based on different private preference orderings.'Unveilingthe Vote'. as we see in the subsection following the next. 64 Michael Welsh.'Deliberation Discussion'. 44-68.64 No doubt preservation remained his first choice. Thus this individual found his peak . for individuals might still disagree about what is in the public interest.and lost his pique. 63 JamesD. on the grounds that once it loses its pristine character. or whether (say) ecological integrity or economic growth should receive priority when these public interests clash. BritishJournalof Political Science. The present arguments are applicable ifdeliberation leads to the identification of a single shared dimension. at p.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 17 original preference orderings.even in its above stated one-dimensional form.individuals who engage in such perceived deception are penalized in deliberation. As Brennan and Pettit point out. Deliberative as Democracy.63 To illustrate.66 Even a deliberation-induced focus on 'generalizable interests' does not necessarily solve the problem.2000). but rather the antecedent condition: as Mueller holds. it is implausible that individuals would vote one way while simultaneously talking another way.in Elster. What is implausible is the assumption that the issue space is one dimensional'. Rational choice theorists might agree that the demanding part of our argument is not the claim that a focus on a single dimension would induce single-peakedness. pp. single-peakedness does not seem to be that strong an assumption. 65 GeoffreyBrennan andPhilipPettit.2.ed.Public ChoiceII. Management' (unpublished Universityof Oregon. consider the preference ordering of an individual selected as one of the mandated environmental representatives on the Resource Advisory Council for Eastern Washington set up by the Federal Bureau of Land Management under the Rangeland Reform of 1995. wilderness might as well be trashed to drive home the point. 54. the social aspect (soc) of deliberation may induce a co-operative disposition towards expressing publicly oriented rather than self-regarding preferences (see Section As 111. However. If so. However. A sceptic could allow that. as we argued in Section III. 66 Mueller.. individuals might indeed be constrained in their public expression of preference orderings . Issue complexity may rule this out. our proposed mechanisms would ultimately provide no solution to Arrow's problem via single-peakedness. a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for this objection is that voting be secret. '[g]iven that we have a single-dimensional issue. empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 1 . this claim is supported by empirical evidence from Fishkin's deliberative polls. . Participating in this deliberative forum. When voting is public. 'unveiling the vote' induces individuals to vote in a 'discursively defensible manner'. 20 (1990). 311-33. was in the radical environmental group EarthFirst!. pp. proposals are likely to be crafted only in response to publicly sustainable orderings. we shall note in the subsection following the next. whose slogan is 'No compromise in defense of Mother Earth!' The EarthFirst! preference ordering violates single-peakedness with respect to the dimension 'extent of wilderness preservation': members prefer wilderness preservation to desecration to compromise development. and arrestrecord.

she might say that she prefers zero to blanket to selective tariffs because a selective tariff will cause inequity across industrial sectors..R or..67 (iii) For each dimension j. Rik> of dimension-specific preferences. Thus if a profile of personal preference orderings {R)i e-N violates single-peakedness. a third preference for a selective tariff. .particularly we introduce manyissue-dimensions as thereareindividuals in N. . {Rik i N. the reason might be that preferences are determined by more than one dimension. dimension-specific as if practically situation any mightseem to fit this category. This leads us to propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3 (i) Group deliberation leads to the identification of those issue-dimensions that are considered relevant to a given decision problem. deliberation.is satisfied.2.. Thus she reveals two dimensions: open/closed trade and equity/inequity . Secondly.. Other members might then rank their preferences on both these dimensions. and (b) a specification of the relative importance individual i attaches to each of the k dimensions (the disaggregation condition). Logically.with a greater importance placed on the former . One person claims a first preference for free trade. in deliberation one must give reasons for preferences or appeal to generalizable interests.18 DRYZEK AND LIST Multidimensional preference structuration. Upon questioning. if deliberation can disaggregate a profile {RiIi.on both of which her preference ordering has only one peak. for each dimension j. Rnj}. and hence there is less potential for the type of disagreement leading to violations of single-peakedness in each dimension-specific profile. . .. .less demandingly. or created through.. partial 0i: thus on { 1. 2 . k} (where{ 1. k} --. ie each such dimension-specific profile is more likely to be single-peaked than the original profile. 2 .. 2. k} is the set of issue-dimensions). will use theterm reducible non-single-peakedness only if anadditional we to are semanticconditionis met:the identified issue-dimensions required have some publiclysharedmeaning. {Rij)i = Rlij. For each individual i in N. imagine a committee having difficulties deciding what level of tariffs to impose on imports. a second preference for a blanket tariff. As we argued in the previous subsection. The mechanisms identified in the previous subsection are thus likely to be effective for each dimension-specific profile. each focusing only on a single issue-dimension.namely the focus on a single dimension .. However. then single-peakedness is not a demanding requirement. . allowingthe expression ordering Oi 67 of incommensurabilities. the corresponding dimension-specific profile of personal preference orderings across individuals. (ii) Ri2... the ordering Riirepresents individual i's preferences with respect to dimension j. if preferences focus on a single dimension.. To illustrate. specification this couldbe a weighting function {1. {RiR2 N.. These dimensions may be uncovered by.. . where. after a period R2j N• of group deliberation will satisfy (or approximate) single-peakedness (the intradimensional single-peakedness condition).. profiles accordance conditions (ii) and(iii).. because their antecedent condition .68 Why is the hypothesis plausible? First.. into k separate uN profiles {Ril }i N. producing a single-peaked profile on each dimension (assuming a Formally. represented by the numerals 1.. i's preferences can be represented by (a) a vector < Ril. empirically... k (the identification of dimensions condition). and this itself is conducive to the identification of relevant issue-dimensions. .. Disagreements about issue-priorities are by definition 'factored out' in each dimension-specific profile. 68 into We use the term reducible non-single-peakedness if a non-single-peaked profilecan be disaggregated with a set of single-peaked in (i). it is hard to distinguish between these two possibilities.

identification of the dimensions of these subdecisions and subsequent dimension-specific aggregation might be sufficient. for all individuals i and all dimensions j.e. it has long been observed in negotiations that an issue can be made more tractable by the introduction of multiple dimensions. While people may agree on how alternatives are aligned on the dimensions of (a) ecological sustainability. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I). There are at least four ways in which dimension-specific aggregation can help solve a collective decision problem. Theorem 6. cross-border bodies. Given the intradimensional single-peakedness condition of Hypothesis 3. (D) or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite conditions (R). (2) Lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions. for all inputs in the domain of F and all x and y in X. (D) and (S).. They still face the problem of aggregation across these two dimensions. In the most general case. In such cases. mere unpacking of dimensions does not solve the problem of what overall decision to take. . Theory List. (P). Often decisions come in 'packages' and cannot easily be subdivided into separate dimension-specific subdecisions such as one on amnesty. {Ri2 ie N. the problem of aggregating k dimension-specific profiles into a single social ordering.. But once dimensions are introduced . and whose output is a social ordering R over the alternatives in X.e. electoral systems or guaranteed representation for particular groups . 70Conditions and canberestated themultidimensional Weak Pareto as for frameworkfollows: Principle (P) (I) (P). the domain that would result from Hypothesis 3). provided that the relevance of each of these dimensions is publicly accepted and that deliberation can induce sufficient single-peakedness in each dimension-specific preference profile. one on electoral systems. 2002. with effective majorities of key actors against every conceivable alternative. they may still disagree on the relative importance of each dimension. To illustrate. 69 Christian and Arrow and Problem'.. one on civil rights. etc.i. The R positionof x relativeto y in the social ordering dependsexclusivelyon the positionof x relativeto y in each 1 { of the dimension-specific personal preference orderings in < { i Ri (iE 2 N. {Rik}i EN >. and suppose F satisfies (P) and (I)..such as amnesty for politically motivated crimes.then xPy. rather than into k dimension-specific orderings. even if each dimension-specific profile satisfies single-peakedness. (b) employment and (c) economic growth. then xPy. raises problems similar to Arrow's problem.. The peace process in Northern Ireland follows such a course. civil rights. If confined to the single dimension of sovereignty..an effective super-majority for a settlement could be constituted. forthcoming. Theorems 4 and 5 imply that separate dimension-specific aggregation can yield a social ordering or a socially most preferred alternative (particularly.69 Let F be an aggregation function whose input is a vector of k dimension-specific profiles of personal preference orderings < {Rili =N. If. . the issue is intractable. .Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 19 no complications from these other preference orderings). but we turn to this issue below. xPi1y for all i . (1) Subdividing the decision. 'Intradimensional Single-Peakedness theMultidimensional Decision. Suppose F {Rik}i E N> is defined for all vectors of dimension-specific profiles where each dimension-specific profile satisfies single-peakedness (i. xPiy. a Condorcet winner) for each dimension in accordance with Arrow's conditions (I). .70 Then F will make one dimension dominant: there exists a fixed dimension j such that. For decision problems which can be subdivided into several independent dimension-specific subdecisions. if all individuals rank x above y in dimension j .

the weights the individuals attach to each issue-dimension could be aggregated into such an overall lexicographic ordering. Anderson. as offered by social-choice-theoretic analysis.see Section III. 73 Sen.2lying about one's own preferences is potentially costly in deliberation. 90 (1990).Alternatively. one could imagine debate on the relative weights of the dimensions of (say) ecology. In practice. While this individual might still misrepresent this intensity. across of fora related on can discussion howanassignment weights solveproblems aggregation of multiple dimensions. as potential coalition partnersin a majority coalition. Collective Choice and Social Welfare.7. can get their way on particulardimensions by threateningto block overall agreement. Still. the dimension-specific profile corresponding to the second-highest-ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker. Columbia Law Review. Because people's views on such weights are as changeable by deliberation as their preferences on alternatives. (3) Logrolling.1997). deliberation might produce agreement on a lexicographic hierarchy. the dimension-specific profile corresponding to the third-highest ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker.A. One such way of justifying preference intensity is for an individual to indicate what he/she would be prepared to accept on other dimensions in return for getting his/her way on the dimension he/she cares about most. and democracies may feel apprehensive about solving cross-dimensional aggregation problems involving difficult mattersof issue-priority by a mechanical decision procedure.only if there are still ties.3. is much more desirable than mere recognition of inconsistency as a result of a lack of structure in individual preferences. employment and business.71 But this aggregation problem is not immune to the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite problems either.20 DRYZEK AND LIST The only aggregation functions satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6 are (possibly lexicographic) hierarchies of dimensions. . 72 Richard PildesandElizabeth Social ChoiceTheory. at least two different conclusions can be drawn. especially given (arg) and (ref). enlarged edition(Oxford: Oxford University Press. From a rational-choice perspective.'SlingingArrowsat Democracy: and Pluralism. problems of cross-dimensional aggregation are often solved by logrolling rather than by explicit assignment of weights to dimensions. the 71 See Amartya OnEconomic Sen. at p. and so on. If at this juncture a seeming impasse is reached. The overall social ordering is determined.Value H.5. first. exclusively on the basis of the dimension-specific profile {Ri} i N corresponding to the highest-ranked dimension. Democratic Politics'. the identification of the precise nature of the problem at issue. 2120-214. Inequality. intense minorities. A lexicographic hierarchy of dimensions might solve collective decision problems when deliberation can generate agreement on a lexicographic order of importance of different issue-dimensions. it is excoriated for enabling coalitions of special interests to prevail over general interests. One is that the information contained in the available profile(s) of personal preference orderings (even after unpacking issue-dimensions) is insufficient for reaching a decision in accordance with Arrow's conditions73. In deliberation. In particular. individuals have to justify their preferences in terms acceptable to others. But logrolling also provides information about preference intensity72and thus about what weights agents attach to different issue-dimensions. as we saw in Section IIn. (4) Demonstrating the nature of the problem or crafting new alternatives. only if there are ties. Even if there is no straightforward solution to the cross-dimensional aggregation problem. logrolling provides opportunities for misrepresentation of preference intensity. 2191. Under logrolling. From a manipulability perspective.

(ii) a specialization-ofarrangement committee labour arrangementorjurisdictional system. the committee might.p.76Although this study does not measure single-peakedness as such. On the hypothesis that deliberation can increase endorsement of 'generalizable interests'.Vivica Kraak. In our tariff example.andtheremaynotexist anoption inX whichis thedimension-by-dimension and median.alternative(or position. or contemplate ways a non-discriminatory restricted tariff could be designed.in a multidimensional this issue-by-issue median position (like all positions in the issue-space) is not in general stable in cross-dimensional coalition formation. The Environmental Promise of Democratic Deliberation (Madison: University of WisconsinPress. . perceivedspatial positionof alternatives. unlike the spatial voting framework.75 On the hypothesis that deliberation induces greater single-peakedness. 45 (1976). framework does not identify our individuals policyalternatives positionsin a (multidimensional) or our with distinguishes issue-space.In our framework.Christine McCallum.74 Empirical Evidence. Social Choice andDemocracy of the for (Berlin:Springer. 'Institutional and in Journalof PoliticalScience. 76 David Pelletier. think about compensatory taxes and subsidies that would restore equity across industrial sectors should a selective tariff be adopted. Although the empirical evidence on how deliberation affects preference structurationis limited. These constraints whose restrict on can outcome beproduced. well as the positions.and thushave to deliberate the relativeweight on. 77 Pelletieret al.Individual deliberation.Shepsleis also criticized assuming dimensional separability individuals'preferences.see RichardMcKelvey.even if individuals'preferencesare single-peakedin each separate dimension(this follows from spatialvoting theory. (1979).and (iii) the role of multidimensional (as unpacking by sometimessimplyto analysethe precisenatureof the impasse. such as the it median. to that However. formalism betweenpolicy alternatives theirperceivedissue-spatial and as preferences.23 Arrangements Equilibrium Multidimensional VotingModels'.Ulla Uustalo and RobertRich. Norman Schofield. is not in generalthe case thatall dimension-by-dimension can positionsin a multidimensional issue-space be filledwithpotential options.we do not in generalsingle out one specific. parallels The between Shepsle'sproposal oursareprobably closest in the case of subdividing decision. NormanSchofield.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 21 information from unpacking dimensions could be used to craft new alternatives. 75 Adolf Gundersen. in Shepsle's terms). changeduring may Secondly. to assign to differentdimensions.However. 117.so as to reachagreement a lexicographic on hierarchyof dimensionsor on is cross-dimensional trade-offs exemplified logrolling).. 'The Shapingof CollectiveValues Through Deliberative An Democracy: Empirical Studyfrom New York's NorthCountry'. 575-94.Econometrica. interviewed participantsbefore and after a deliberative 'search conference' on food supply policy in upstate New York. such as (i) a division-of-labour or installingconstraints system. Shepsle'scriticsarguethat. Policy Sciences. finds that in every case deliberation promoted commitment to the generalizable interest of ecological integrity.as the ideal outcome. 27-60).77 This might suggest that deliberation leads individuals to identify more closely with their 74 Our discussionof multidimensional unpackingmay seem similarto the dimensionalmedian solution associated with Shepsle's concept of 'structure-induced equilibrium'(KennethA. one result is that individuals who subscribed to two distinct positions before deliberation tended to subscribe to one or other of them (but not both) after deliberation. Shepsle. Shepsleobservesthatlegislatures complexissues into multipledimensions. 'GeneralConditionsfor Global Intransitivities FormalVotingModels'. strategizing thefloorof thehousesuchthata stablewinning issue-space.and (iii) a monitoring arrangementor amendmentcontrol rule. some recent findings corroborate our hypotheses in the previous two subsections.American oftendisaggregate (1979). reporting a series of 'deliberative interviews' on environmental issues. 'Shapingof CollectiveValues'. which allows combiningthe winning outcomesin different the dimensions forman overallpolicypackage. Gundersen. 32 (1999). not yet contained in X. Review of Economic Studies.'Instability in 47 of Simple Dynamic Games'. Pelletier et al. 1995). spatialpositionis the medianon eachdimension. 103-31. for instance.we acknowledge often(i) therequisite separability or divisibilitymay not be given. 1986)). 1085-111. mechanicallycomputable. (ii) peoplemightdisagree.

2000). (P) and (D).de Borda. the Australian results remain encouraging because in a situation where substantial preference shifts occurred. deliberation substantially increased the level of single-peakedness.James Fishkinand RobertLuskin. and the logical possibility of agenda manipulation (implied by violations of (I)) no longer poses a problem. The hypothesis responds to the challenge that the non-existence of SWFs satisfying (I) (together with (U).81 78 ChristianList.Theory and Decision. Robertson and Hearl. Finally. 'An Axiomatization Borda'sRule'. and where a cycle over three options was a live possibility (the third option being the status quo). the claim that unpacking multiple relevant issue-dimensions facilitates intra-dimensional preference structuration is compatible with a study by Budge. more what issue-dimensions are relevant. DC. Although the effect of deliberation on the indices of single-peakedness was less marked than in the Texas polls. Fishkin's deliberative polls provide data for testing the hypothesis that preferences after deliberation exhibit a greater level of single-peakedness than preferences before deliberation.'M6moire les l61ections scrutin'.4.79 1II. For several deliberative polls on Texas energy policy. Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives We now suggest: Hypothesis 4. then there is little scope for an agenda-setter strategically to introduce or delete alternatives from X so as to affect the relative chances of other alternatives in X. Positional rules. then there exist SWFs generating transitive social orderings and satisfying (U). are well-known such SWFs. Fishkin and Luskin. which are sensitive to the position of an alternative in each individual's ranking Ri. Group deliberation can lead individuals to reach agreement on the content of the set X of relevant alternatives. (P).22 DRYZEK AND LIST 'peak'. The significance of these shifts for single-peakedness in the unidimensional sense is investigated by List. (Cambridge: Cambridge VotingFunctions'. If the hypothesis is correct.H. 1987). 9 (1974). 79 Ian Budge. though the Condorcet winner changed from a republic with a directly elected president to a republic with an appointed president. deliberation appears to have protected against a loss of structure. if we relax condition (I). Histoire de I'Acadimie in au sur 81 J-C. eds. showing that the main point of disagreement and competition in politics is less what the best policy option within a specific issue-dimension is. 'Positional 80 P. Washington. For a deliberative poll on the 1999 proposal in Australia to replace the monarchy with a republic. 'Can Deliberation Induce Political of at Greater Preference Structuration?' Meeting theAmerican presented theAnnual (paper Science Association.78 Two indices of single-peakedness are applied to individual preference data collected before and after deliberation. 4 (1973).80 The Borda rule is the most famous example. 43-52. Ideology. (D)) implies the inherent vulnerability of democracy to manipulability by changes of the agenda X. Strategy and Party Change UniversityPress. Young. And. Fishkin's own research indicated that deliberation induces substantial preference shifts. . of Royal des Sciences(Paris:1781). Giirdenfors. McLean. thus providing empirical support for Hypothesis 2 above. P. J-C. then a relaxation of condition (I) becomes an option. David Robertson and Derek Hearl. lain Mclean. 1-24. If the individuals agree on what the set of relevant alternatives X is. Journal of Economic Theory.de Borda. the level of single-peakedness was high both before and after deliberation.

and its winner goes to the next step. 79. though only to the extent individuals behave according to rational-choice precepts. + B. Why is Hypothesis 4 plausible? The composition of the set of alternatives can itself be subjected to deliberation (or possibly to a decision by consensus or approval voting). with sixty-five deliberators preferring x to y to z. each subset is then voted on. x. positional rules such as the Borda rule may be attractive aggregation mechanisms (and so perhaps legislatures should adopt this solution). Arguing strategically for an alternative that the individual does not truly support carries two risks. but that introducing alternative w. xRy if and only if Bi(x) + B2(X) + .potentially incurring punishment as discussed in Section III. Discussion about what alternatives are relevant seems inherent in decision processes of types JD-dd and JD-dv. assume the Borda rule is being used and there are three alternatives. he/she must justify that preference in terms others can accept.. + Bn(Y). 135 for y and 35 for z. The first is that the argument may persuade others. relating to the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects. The fact that deliberators could decide to restrict the set of relevant alternatives does not mean that they will do so. Individual i may be prepared to lie here. which involve subjects with induced preferences that they are told to keep secret from the others. inducing the group to choose that alternative. Liberalism Against Populism. let Bi(x) be the number of alternatives y in X such that xPiy. and thirty-five deliberators preferring z. and so led to dropping that alternative from the set of relevant alternatives. 146-60.American . there was one exception: when the chair of one group allowed a straw vote at the outset.83 However. but if the lie fails to convince others then i will suffer the penalties we mentioned in Section III. an individual cannot simply introduce or support an alternative. Consider some experiments designed by Plott and Levine to demonstrate agenda manipulation. The second is that the individual may be exposed as a liar (either in argument or by subsequent voting behaviour) . failing to choose the Condorcet winner and revealing ubiquitous agenda manipulation. could change the situation.Other deliberators may well ask i why he chose to introduce Economic Review. showing how such demarcation can limit the scope for agenda manipulation. 83 Riker. 68 (1978). y. a canny individual i sees that his favoured alternative x will be beaten by y. 82 CharlesPlott and Michael Levine.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 23 Given {Ri}i eN. In deliberation. 'A Model of AgendaInfluenceon CommitteeDecisions'.2.2. the Borda rule determines a social ordering R as follows: for each alternative x in X and each individual i in N. This straw vote revealed that one of the five alternatives was least preferred by everyone. If they do not. But there is a mechanism intrinsic to deliberation that promotes this likelihood. eventually producing an overall winner. But now i must justify his (false) preference for w over x.(x) ? Bi(y) + B2(y) + .. which the sixty-four other proponents of x are likely to prefer to y. To illustrate. for every x and y in X. which is why Riker says they 'impress me deeply'.conceivably by approval voting or by consensus. Once the group has decided which alternatives are relevant. The experiments generally went as expected.. With Borda scores of 130 for x. p. This process may itself seem vulnerable to strategic manipulation.. y to z to x.82The subjects take a series of votes on how a set of five alternatives is to be partitioned. the group then converged on the Condorcet winner. This straw vote was functionally equivalent to the use of deliberation for demarcating the set of relevant alternatives. then deliberation can be used to decide on a procedure for distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant alternatives .

Christian anEscape-Route fromArrow'sTheorem'. where Wi(x) is interpreted as a measure of the welfare of individual i under alternative x. too. W. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. The smaller this class of transformations. preference of Amartya Sen). condition substitute W(. F(({WiN)= F({W*i}e N) if.. Two such assumptions are ordinal measurability with interpersonal comparability of welfare levels (OLC) and cardinal measurability with interpersonal comparability of welfare units (CUC). F({ Wi}i N) = F({ a. and positional rules may become attractive SWFs. + domainof F. J.Mass. a2. A social welfare functional (SWFL as distinct from a SWF) is a function F whose input is a profile of personal welfare functions {Wi}i N and whose output is a social ordering R. Bossert and andJ.1996). b arerealnumbers .Sen. '(Ri)i. in S.86This class is also interpreted as the class of transformations up to which a profile of personal welfare functions is taken to be unique.24 DRYZEK AND LIST w so late in the day. (U).P. 223-38 (specialsectionin honour { Wi}ie N' 86 in for 'ontheposition x relative y in eachof thepersonal to of orderings {Rii E N'. 6 (2001). In conclusion. However. if i has to argue against x to justify w. W*i= ai-. 'Utilityin Social Choice'. Welfare and Measurement. even strengthening. 87 OLC: For any {Wi)iEN and {W*i. Vol.5. for each i. chap 11. Hammond C.87 Informally. Moreover. further.:Kluwer. This may seem paradoxical. we now discuss a solution compatible with preserving. Sen. W*i}i . .84 If we allow interpersonal comparisons of preference intensity or of a suitable individual welfare measure. for Arrow shows that these conditions are mutually inconsistent. all the conditions.forsome For R monotonic transformation R. where al. Handbook of of a List. andb > 0. if deliberation can demarcate the set of relevant alternatives in a publicy acceptable way. the more information is contained in a profile.Introducing More Information While the responses discussed so far involve relaxation of one of Arrow's conditions. the ratio of individual i's welfare gain (or loss) to individual j's welfare gain (or loss) equals a' are meaningful. Other informational assumptions have been discussed. 'I Wi)}i N' for 'personal preference in functions welfare in in and 'on (I). eds.(I)and simply conditions berestated SWFLs follows: can for as (D). he risks convincing others that x (his true preference) is indeed undesirable. N'. Seidel. 'Introducing "Zero-Line" Welfareas Utility Theory.W(x)> Wi(y)' 'xPiy'. for each i. throughout ' for welfarefunction'for 'personal substitute ordering'.b*Wi. Choice. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. this. Pacific Economic Review. We now assign to each individual i a personal welfare function Wi:X --+R. Welfareand Measurement. and CUC is the assumption that comparisons of the form 'if we switch from alternative x to y. = 4(Wi). A.88 84 Sen. a violation of condition (I) may become defensible. OLC is the assumption that comparisons of the form 'individual i under alternative x is at least as well off as individual j under alternative y' are meaningful. Barberi. Choice. Weymark. and again there are penalties for lying. Collective Choice and Social Welfare.}eN in the domain of F.CUC: any{Wi}iNandI{W*i)i N inthe 0: W*i positive } N) if. 2 (Boston. 88 For example. Sen argued that Arrow's impossibility result is driven by the informational limitations of Arrow's ordinalist framework. III. needs to be justified by i. then there exist aggregation mechanisms satisfying all of Arrow's conditions.85 Assumptions on measurability and interpersonal comparability of welfare are formalized by specifying the class of transformations with respect to which a SWFL is required to be invariant. 85 Arrow's conditions (P).x) Wi(y) eachof thepersonal Sen. Sen.

the welfare-levels of the second worst-off.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 25 Theorem 7. like the economist' s 'revealed preferences' or 'utility'. is a first-orderdecision of type ID. The provider's allocation of medical resources is based not on the expressed judgements or preferences of patients (although patients' expressions inform medical diagnoses). 93 Sen..theleximin definesa socialordering as follows. but also more demanding conditions of anonymity. Given {Ri)i E N. Choice. (U).](x) . nor B to measure what is going on in A' s.94 But even if we concede Robbins's claim.93 How could this escape-route from Arrow's theorem apply in a deliberative democracy? Deliberation can concern not only first-orderdecisions on outcomes.90 The leximin-rule is a version of Rawls's (lexicographic) difference principle: make social choices to maximize the welfare-level of the worst-off individual. 94 Lionel Robbins. chap 11. 1932). < W[n](x). The escape-route from Arrow's theorem via introducing more information is available if the evaluation variable specified under (i) is interpersonally comparable. and (ii) a decision principle for aggregating these individual interests (as assessed by (i)) into a collective outcome. maximize. chap 11. separability and continuity.i1(x)> Wri. and W01(x) for for all j < i.92 The utilitarian rule is a version of the classical utilitarian principle: maximize the sum-total of the welfare of all individuals. xRy if andonly if Z NWi(x)L i E R NWi(y).(y) some i e N. given limited resources.Foreachalternative inX.. rather on an evaluation of different patients' needs by the (external) evaluation standard of the medical examinations of patients. The utilitarian rule satisfies not only the conditions of Theorem 7(ii). A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press. (P). (ii) There exist SWFLs satisfying CUC.. the leximin rule and the utilitarian rule. p. Robbins famously argued that '[i]ntrospection does not enable A to measure what is going on in B's mind.91 The leximin rule satisfies not only the conditions of worst-off. (U). . The health authority's decision on whatprinciple should govern such first-orderhealth care allocation problems is the corresponding second-order decision concerning institutional design. separability and minimal equity. (i) There exist SWFLs satisfying OLC. and the decision principle in (ii) by a SWFL F. in a lexicographic order of priority. Welfare and Measurement. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan. xPy -= if and only if W. A health care provider's decision on how much treatment to allocate to each patient. firstdefine a permutation i [i] of N (depending on x) such that Wl. x rule R 90 Given{Ri)i= N..89 Examples of SWFLs satisfying the conditions of parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 7 are. 92 Sen..the utilitarian rule Wjl(y) definesa social ordering as follows: for everyx andy in X. For certain types of evaluation variables. Theorem 7(i). Institutionally soluble first-order decision problems (particularly on the allocation or distribution of resources) can be interpretedas social choice problems of type ID consisting of two components: (i) an evaluation variable for assessing the interests of the individuals. third individuals. For every x and y in X. such comparisons may not be meaningful. i 91 John Rawls. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. (I) and (D). positive responsiveness. (P). The evaluation according to (i) can be formalized by a profile of personal welfare functions { Wi}i N. There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of two different people'. but also second-order decisions on the design of institutions for solving (first-order) decision problems. this entails not that the present escape-route is 89 Sen. (I) and (D). Choice.. such as the allocation of resources or distribution of benefits and burdens. 140. but also anonymity. positive responsiveness. if there are ties. 1973). Welfare and Measurement. respectively..W[2](x) < .

(2) universal applicability. Gutmann and Thompson identify reciprocity.non-mentalistic and measurable from the perspective of an external observer.97An interpersonally comparable evaluation variable . 97 Rawls. only that it is necessary to use a (normative) evaluation variable other than utility or subjective satisfaction for which interpersonal comparisons are meaningful. Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 99 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Group deliberation in second-order decisions on institutional design can lead individuals to reach agreement on (i) an evaluation variable for assessing individual interests that is interpersonally comparable. (3) publicity. for example.from the reciprocity idea. the effect of these constraints is to narrow down the range of acceptable institutional arrangements. for instance. Austin. combining life expectancy. one mechanism is that the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects of deliberation impose justification and transparencyconstraints on the outcomes of second-order decisions such as (1) formal generality. as a principle resulting from the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation. educational attainmentand income. and (ii) a decision principle for aggregating individual interests (as assessed by the chosen evaluation variable) into a collective outcome. eds. Is there any mechanism intrinsic to deliberation making it likely that suitable arguments for (i) and (ii) will be made and accepted? Rawls's original position or Habermas's ideal speech situation are hypothetical deliberation situations involving precisely such arguments. Using a Rawlsian index of primary goods as the evaluation variable and the leximin rule as the decision principle will satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7. 1982). on discretion. A Theory of Justice. in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. 'Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process' (paper presented to the Conference on Deliberating About Deliberative Democracy.98Under reciprocity. Democracy and Disagreement. (4) finality and (5) ordering. These include. several different aggregation procedures are available. 1992). Hypothesis 5. John Rawls. 'citizens as well as theorists consider whatjustice requires in the case of specific laws'. Texas).99Gutmannand Thompson argue that deliberators as well as theorists can derive substantive principles . Depending on what type of measurability and interpersonal comparability a chosen evaluation variable permits. In these hypothetical situations.like an index of primary goods or an index of functionings .including principles of distributive justice . including Rawls's index of primary goods .may seem more transparent and publicly justifiable than a publicly inscrutable (and interpersonally non-comparable) mentalistic evaluation variable. Similarly. . A Theory of Justice. a well-defined and systematic aggregation mechanism may seem more consistent with constraints (1) to (5) than a non-principled decision method based. The task of deliberation can then be summarized as follows. basic opportunities resemble Rawls's primary goods in that they are foundational to all individual life projects. 'Social Unity and Primary Goods'. In Rawls's original position. 96 Amartya Sen. 98 Gutmann and Thompson. the need for individuals to provide each other with mutually acceptable reasons for favoured decisions.again non-mentalistic and externally measurable.96and the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI). Though treated by Gutmann and Thompson as subject to deliberative revision. Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press. choosing 'basic opportunities' as an evaluation standard. 2000.95 Sen's functionings and capabilities . Several such evaluation variables have been proposed. 95 Rawls. section 23.26 DRYZEK AND LIST unavailable.

ed. eds. given democratic agreement. and 'Deliberative Democracy BeyondProcess'. with both an evaluation variable and an aggregation principle.1" The evaluation variable is therefore income measured in conventional terms. CONCLUSION We have argued that the seemingly conflicting approaches of deliberative democracy and social choice theory can be reconciled. Matti Pohjola and Bob Rowthorn.102 We do not suggest that deliberative democracy should convert all collective decision problems into type ID.narrowing the domain of actual preference profiles to a domain in which the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite problems do not apply (Hypothesis 2) . Corporatist government involves co-operation between encompassing labour and business federations. develops principles in the form of (i) and (ii) for allocating expensive health care. pp.Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy 27 Beyond these hypothetical examples. If deliberation induces preference structuration.1985). in Austria (the corporatist archetype) the Parity Commission for Wages and Prices set up in 1957 made its decisions so as to maximize growth in national income while compensating those adversely affected by the resulting structural adjustment.'Austria: The Paradigm Case of LiberalCorporatism?'.'Savingsand EconomicGrowthfrom a Nordic Perspective'.1992). 116. 178-209. pp. 89-125. in contrast. previously locked in a zero-sum distributional game. The agreements produced often constitute enduring distributive rules. only that. and a relaxation of condition (S) provides an acceptable escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. 102Gutmann Thompson. NICE uses 'basic opportunities' as an evaluation variable. argumentative. with an income-invariant distribution of equal entitlements to these goods. 101 KatriKosonen. IV. The aggregation principle is a type of utilitarian Pareto criterion: maximize average income and fully compensate losers. Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Oxford University Press. ThePolitical in Economy Corporatism of (New York:St Martin's. determining whether to provide public funds for new drugs in terms of how different funding schemes for the drug would affect basic opportunities of citizens. at p. favour an evaluation variable more akin to Rawlsian primary goods. some real-world systems of government have produced results of the form of (i) and (ii). The 'social corporatist' Nordic countries..in JukkaPekkarin. then strategic manipulation becomes less of a threat in deliberation. Wyn Grant. the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). the identified escape-routes from social-choice-theoretic impossibility problems are the following: (i) If deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views truthfully (Hypothesis 1). The arguments of the previous sections apply to the many remaining decision problems of type JD (possibly including second-order decisions on how to specify (i) and (ii)).then both cycling and strategic manipu- (ii) 100BerndMarin.'01 A recently introduced British deliberative body. compatible with all other conditions of the theorem. Deliberation facilitates pursuit of several escape-routes from the impossibility results commonly invoked by social-choice-theoretic critics of democracy. For example. this route can be taken for some allocation and distribution problems. . The shift from purely voting-based decision-making to decisionmaking based on the informational. reflective and social aspects of deliberation opens up many possibilities for meaningful collective decisions. To summarize.

then dimension-specific aggregation in accordance with all of the conditions of Arrow's theorem or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (except condition (U)) becomes possible. compatible with all other conditions of these theorems. or at least consistent with. The former is concerned with identification of the functions that deliberation ought to. compatible with all other conditions of the theorem. and indeed can. The role of deliberation is to bring about situations in which the antecedents of these 'if-then' results are satisfied. suggesting that democracy must in the end have a deliberative aspect. and relaxation of condition (I) provides an acceptable escape-route from Arrow's theorem. Whether or not deliberation will induce each of the antecedents of the 'if-then' results ultimately depends on the specifics of particular cases. and relaxation of condition (U) provides acceptable escape-routes from Arrow's theorem and from the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem. If deliberation helps uncover or create the tacit issue-dimensions that 'cause' a lack of preference structuration. and induces preference structuration in each separate dimension (Hypothesis 3). The normative component of our argument is that the constraints required for bringing about such situations are either inherent in. Thus social choice theory shows exactly what deliberation must accomplish in order to render collective decision making tractable and meaningful. logrolling or demonstrating the nature of the problem and creatively crafting new alternatives. perform in democratic decision making. and the latter is concerned with the clarification of the logical properties of available procedures for solving the aggregation aspects of democratic decision problems. core deliberative principles. While we have adduced available empirical evidence and illustrations in support of our hypotheses. more research is necessary to investigate deliberation's strength on each of the identified escape-routes from the social-choice-theoretic impossibility problems. If deliberation can produce agreement on what the set of relevant alternatives is (Hypothesis 4). If deliberation can produce agreement on an interpersonally comparable evaluation variable for assessing individual interests and a decision principle for aggregating individual interests into a collective outcome (Hypothesis 5). and one of the following solutions to the overall decision problem may become available: subdividing the decision.28 DRYZEK AND LIST (iii) (iv) (v) lation become less of a threat in deliberation. Moreover. then a solution to Arrow's problem that is consistent with all of Arrow's conditions becomes available for a range of institutionally soluble collective allocation or distribution problems. lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions. our arguments rest on empirical hypotheses about the effects of deliberation. But for the moment we conclude that deliberative democracy and social choice theory are mutually supportive. . then agenda manipulation becomes less of a threat.