INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION
Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Republic of the Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa South Sudan Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

INTRODUCTION COLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE European colonization by WWI .

single or multi-party *** OTHER Military junta. power may be limited by constitution REPUBLICS Varies in levels of authoritarianism. parliamentary democracy TRANSITIONAL Result of civil wars among rebel groups . constitutional democracy.INTRODUCTION FORMS OF GOVERNMENT MONARCHIES Hereditary king or queen acts as head of state.

copper. manganese. bauxite. diamonds • Africa's external debt now stands at $255 billion . chrome. antimoney. platinum. iron ore.INTRODUCTION ECONOMY •Natural resources: the region is a major exporter to the world of gold. vanadium. coltan. uranium.

Scarce foreign currency was used for military hardware . civil conflict. •Militarization: Hundreds of thousands of Africans have died at the hands of state-supported military units. .INTRODUCTION HUMANITARIAN ISSUES •A majority of Sub-Saharan Africa still lack basic civil liberties and human rights.money that could have been used for development or humanitarian aid. epidemics and economic decline threaten nearly 60 million of the region's 550 million people. exrteme poverty. •Humanitarian crisis as a combination of drought.

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS [CONCEPT] STATE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS .

distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding the other organizations’ activities.POLITICAL DYNAMICS STATE: An organization within the society where it coexists and interacts with other formal and informal organizations from families to economic enterprises of religious organizations. It is however. [BRATTON] .

POLITICAL DYNAMICS .

POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE AFRICAN STATE ► Partial autonomy alongside partial interpenetration (forrest) =========================================== ► national leaders and administrators remain closely linked to societal actors and groups. African leaders are unable to convince the majority of their populace that the state's central purpose is to act in the interests of its citizenry. . to some extent beholden to their interests and often bearing the brunt of their dissatisfactions =========================================== ► not able to consolidate the political penetration of local level institutions → remain independent of higher level authorities =========================================== ► ↓ LEGITIMATING IDEOLOGY .

COOKIE CUTTER Financial Sector . ===================================  LIBERALIZED.POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & THE ECONOMY  Link between African bureaucracy and economy (Goldsmith) ===========================================  Legitimacy down because of poor economic performance undermining popular support and reducing further already fragile capacity of state to perform (Bratton) ===========================================  Subject to pressures for financial sector reform from global markets and international financial institutions.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & INSTITUTIONS  the state's rules and procedures of law are distinguished by a claim to universality ===========================================  REGULATION → establishing state autonomy. of which the state is only one. ======================================= ==========================================  state-society relations are really an encounter between a structural arrangement of rule-bearing institutions. . takes shape in any policies that are designed to displace the rules and practices of alternative institutions.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Conditionality: debts from world institutions ======================================= ========================================== .

POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & BUREAUCRACY  Link between African bureaucracy and economy (Goldsmith)  Bureaucracy not over-expanded but underperforms (Goldsmith) ======================================= ==========================================  Legitimacy down because of poor economic performance undermining popular support and reducing further already fragile capacity of state to perform (Bratton) .

ethnic political disputes ========================================== =======================================  state-society relations are really an encounter between a structural arrangement of rule-bearing Institutions.Clan. of which the state is only one . citizens don’t recognize or are skeptical that the government will work towards the populace’ interest  Ethno-regional opposition | Inter.POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & CIVIL SOCIETY  Lack of sovereignty.

Bantu: own ontological history.POLITICAL DYNAMICS THE STATE & CULTURE  Tension/conflict between retaining culture vs modernity i.e. own “civilization” [evolution of human personality ======================================= ========================================== THE STATE & COLONIZATION  Tension/conflict between retaining culture vs modernity  Question of the political efficacy of totalitarianism vs democratization  African state as weak in respect to conventional measures of institutional capacity .

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questions the legitimacy of the state and its institutionalism ================================= • ‘Rationalizing’ the NON-WEST .FRAMEWORKS POST COLONIALISM • Deconstruction.

FRAMEWORKS POST COLONIALISM External Fusion | Internal Fission ============================================ Bhaba’s HYBRIDIZATION THEORY .

FRAMEWORKS NEO-STATISM • STATE as most eligible institution of power interacting with other institutions BUT ============================================ ============== TRADITIONAL • Rational actor NEO • Natural protector .

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and military and police organizations that holds centralized political power in a given territorial domain [FORREST] .MODELS STATE . officials. political institutions.constellation of leaders. administrative agencies.

behavioral. . and decision-making autonomy from social and economic forces in society.MODELS : States in postcolonial Africa have moved to consolidate their power through the establishment of bureaucratic.

leaders and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces National leaders and administrators remain closely linked to societal actors and groups.MODELS : STATE HARDNESS THEORY OF ‘WEAK STATES’ [FORREST] 1 STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY state institutions. thereby counteracting states moves towards autonomy .

the centralized politico-administrative system .MODELS: THEORY OF ‘WEAK STATES’ [FORREST] 2 POLITICAL PENETRATION OF SOCIETY national leaders and governmental institutions secure clear cut hegemony over intermediary and ground level political actors and social units National leaders are not able to thoroughly consolidate the political penetration of local level political and social institutions so that these structures remain mostly independent of higher level authorities rather than becoming effectively integrated into formal.

official control over rural trade. which presents an especially problematic challenge to states economic growth in these predominantly agrarian and non-industrialized nations .MODELS: THEORY OF ‘WEAK STATES’ [FORREST] 3 EXTRACTION OF RESOURCES FROM THE MOST PRODUCTIVE ECONOMIC SECTORS: peasant agriculture Severe limitations in appropriating peasant resources and in establishing regularized.

MODELS: THEORY OF ‘WEAK STATES’ [FORREST] 4 IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION promulgation of official doctrines to defend and justify the achievement of autonomy. penetration extraction Leaders are unable to convince the majority of their populace that the states central purpose is to act in the interests of its citizenry .

MODELS: PATRIMONIALISM/ ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM MAX WEBER • Top-down and traditional form of political dominion • Power flows directly from the leader to the bureaucracy • Strengthen bureaucracy .

” – (Williams) . the patrimonial state model needs to be refined with an analytical tool that adequately assesses the variable weight and influence of competing forms of authority.MODELS: PATRIMONIALISM/ ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM “In order to reconcile the untenable image of an autonomous state and the fragmented nature of society.

MODELS: PATRIMONIALISM/ ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM PATRIMONIALISM IS SEEN AS DETRIMENTAL TO A GOVERNMENT “getting ahead becomes a matter of connections than performance” (Goldsmith) .

capable.MODELS: WEBERIAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY [ [ An effective bureaucracy is run by efficient. and qualified personnel Achieved through competitive system of selection based on merit and qualification ] ] ============================================ .

” (Goldsmith) .” (Goldsmith) ============================================  “Countries that fail to bring their public bureaucracies closer in line with Weberian precepts are going to have a hard time meeting their populations’ economic and social needs.MODELS: WEBERIAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY  “Economic troubles in Africa are more likely related to aimless or inattentive but not necessarily enlarged bureaucracies.

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BANKING ============================================ STATE HARDNESS MODEL • Relationship between state and private sector (IV)  the entrenchment of the domestic politics of financial reform and economic progress (DV) .CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS ECONOMY .

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS INSTITUTIONS – LAND REFORM PATRIMONIAL MODEL ============================================ ============================================ • Emergence of land reform policies that acts as panaceas for revolutionizing national development (IV)  Institutions as elitist instruments (DV) .

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS BANTU PHILOSOPHY – POST COLONIALISM ============================================ STATE HARDNESS MODEL ============================================ • Relation of colonial influence towards cultural sturdiness (IV)  explosive growth of informal colonial influence through culture (DV) .

IMPLICATIONS X STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY X POLITICAL PENETRATION OF THE SOCIETY X EXTRACTION OF RESOURCES FROM THE X MOST PRODUCTIVE ECONOMIC SECTORS IDEALOGICAL LEGITIMATION WEAK STATE .

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Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in Africa Michael Bratton • Relationship of state and society in Africa: Elite politics • The state is an instrument for the accumulation of wealth and power as well as the creation of social classes • An endogenous change in civil society is at hand • Bratton emphasizes the need to reevaluate African Civil society based on its contribution to political development .

Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in Africa Michael Bratton • Nigeria: – Nigerian Bar association publicly opposed the government's use of military tribunals to prosecute corrupt civilian politicians and to ban critical organs in the press. • Senegal – Islamic brotherhoods and the regional separatists movement in the Casamance opposed the government's experiment with multiparty competition. • Zimbabwe – white and black farmers have organized to "contradict" party socialist policy preferences" and push for policies more to their own liking .

Land alienation 3. Williams • State autonomy through land reform programs • Three patterns of change 1.Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies Donald C. Concentration of land Rights 2. Elevated position of lineage authorities .

Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies Donald C.Western Uganda: connections with Bahima chiefs to acquire Mailo lands (land was nationalized in 1975) .Kenya and Cameroon: use of connections in order to obtain land clearance .Burkina Fasco: village chiefs used agrarian reform to safeguard their authority . Williams 1. Concentration of land Rights .

Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies Donald C. peasants displaced in the process: .Ivory coast.Uganda and Somalia: Land nationalization failed certificates of occupancy only given to those who could afford it. Incidence of Land Alienation . Williams 2. Nigeria and Burkina Faso: used authority to grant certificates of occupancy to elites .

Africa’s Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth Arthur A. Goldsmith

• Examines the relationship between bureaucracy and economic growth
– Size of bureaucracy – Strength of civil society

• Measured through comparison of Botswana and Mauritius with the rest of SSA

Africa’s Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth Arthur A. Goldsmith

• Significant Findings on Botswana & Mauritius
– Economic performance over the last 25 years resemble East Asian Tigers\increase in capita income (1985-95) à SSA decline – Botswana & Mauritius must have been built on a base of impartial, professional bureaucrats – Mauritius & Botswana’s bureaucracies are four times larger than other African countries (World Bank) – B&M have reputations for administrative integrity and capability à rapid economic growth

Africa’s Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth Arthur A. Goldsmith

• How do B&M avoid politicizing their bureaucracies?
– Botswana: country’s president only entitled to few senior appointments; commitment to neutrality; recruitment open to all; promotion meritiocratic; employees have right to appeal personnel decisions – Mauritius: heavy emphasis on achievement as means for climbing up ranks; strong public service commission to insulate bureaucracy from inappropriate political meddling – Unlike Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia: civil service became an instrument of political power patrimonialism (getting ahead is a matter of connections than performance) – Botswana and Mauritius are confident in their civil service (541)

The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa
Joshua B. Forrest

• Despite a sustained and vigorous drive to achieve state hardness, the political and economic strength of society has to a large extent impeded state rulers from carrying out their goals • It is essential for states to achieve at least a degree of autonomy from society in order to secure their power and exercise their hegemony

organizational and personal interests . Forrest • EMPIRICAL STUDIES: PARTIAL AUTONOMY FROM SOCIETY VS. PARTIAL INTERPENETRATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY – African rulers and officials seek to augment state hardness – Removing themselves form societal influences – Attempt to act in their own political.The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa Joshua B.

The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa Joshua B. Forrest • Zaire – Attempt to allow the political elite to more completely dominate the now restricted political arena – “The Zairian administration thereby carved out a zone of ‘invulnerability’ vis-à-vis society” – The state constitutes “a partially autonomous center” with an ability to “distance itself from domestic and international class an and ethnic interests” giving public officials “room to overpower or ignore some of the less pressing interest demands and to expand their administrative functions and powers” .

district. state bureaucracy forced to take greater account of peasant interests – Peasant leaders were able to utilize informal links with national officials to win a reversal of the governments initial decision to empower planting restrictions and trade control on coffee crop . and local organizations – Ultimately. members of parliament. Forrest • Kenya – patron-client relationships formed in early independence period linked rural groups and individuals to the state through informal ties – Cabinet members. middle level bureaucrats became integrated into a hierarchy of patron client ties with regional.The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa Joshua B.

Forrest • National leaders are not able to thoroughly consolidate the political penetration of local level political and social institutions so that these structures remain mostly independent of higher level authorities rather than becoming effectively integrated into formal. village. local level sociopolitical units and to ensure that these groupings function according to official rules and within a centrally .The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa Joshua B. religious. the centralized politico-administrative system • Most contemporary African states have been largely unable to overcome the resilience of deeply entrenched traditional. and other non-formal sector. ethnic.

• Important part is discussion of the West’s mission to civilize the Bantu .Bantu Philosophy Placide Tempels • Bantu Philosophy explores the ideologies of the Bantu civilization – the nature of beings. forces and true wisdom • Bantu philosophy is seen to be primitive based on the Western standard of the civilized.

Bantu Philosophy Placide Tempels • Correct attitude in respect of “non-civilized” people – What is the true primitive man? • The mission to civilize did not begin with a “tabula rasa” – We are not starting from scratch .

before all else. to be steeped in the enthusiasm of one's faith to the extent of being ready to make sacrifices for it and to suffer for it?” (75) . lead to the end of a civilization unless human personality steps in – “Does not civilization consist. in ability to entertain an intelligent view of the world and of life. to have convictions in regard to man's ends.Bantu Philosophy Placide Tempels • Civilization is a progress in human personality – Industrialization has neglected man and may in the long run.

their vital force.” (77) .Bantu Philosophy Placide Tempels • What point of view should the colonizer adapt in face of Bantu Philosophy? – “We must get to know how to present them as ways of increasing and strengthening their being. and not as means of annihilating the mind of the Bantu.

Elevated position of lineage authorities . Williams 3.Cameroon and Kenya: land seekers must seek the help of their kin and lineage elders .Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies Donald C.Uganda: impossible to obtain occupancy rights without seeking the help of kin .

.what they know of government is from scratch. Postcolonial African regimes have not invented .On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • Commandement: the specific imaginary of state sovereignty • Factors on activity of governing 1. Dealing with human behavior and how it is regulated in a state framework 2.

spread. Authority’s maintenance. Founding Violence: colonizer as the sole power over laws 2. Weakness of and inflation of "Notion of right“ 2. establishes cultural imaginary that state shared with society . and permanence: role in everyday life.On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • Two main features of state sovereignty in a colony 1. Colonial Sovereignty rests on 3 kinds of violence 1. Legitimization: converts founding violence into an “authorizing authority” 3.

Eliminated all distinction between ends and means 2.On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • Its distinctive feature was to act as both authority and morality 1. It introduced infinite permutations between what was just and what unjust • The distinctive feature of colonial sovereignty: unpredictability – Unconditionality and impunity as principle of power in the colony .

On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • Two Traditions (image of the colonized as an animal) – Hegelian Tradition • the native subjected to power and to the colonial state could in no way be another “myself.” – Bergosnian tradition • one can sympathize with the animal/colonized but be affectionate toward the master in return. object of experimentation .

On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • COMMANDMENT AS MODE OF EXERCISING POWER: 1. REGIME OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 3. CIRCULARITY . LACK OF RULING BETWEEN RULING AND CIVILIZING 4. Régime d’Exception 2.

On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe 1.e. levy taxes 2. exempted from license/customs. collect rents. landlords raising troops. Regime of privileges and immunities companies. right to trade . being vehicles of colonization were given power to raise taxes. Régime d’Exception principle which departed from common/ single law political elite have more power i.

On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe 3. power reduced to right to demand. proceed by orders and demands COMMANDMENT – ACCOUTREMENT AND ATTITUDE. force ban accomplishments not directed to a public 4.patronage and old hierarchies. Circulatory - . Lack of ruling between ruling and civilizing colonial arbitrariness. political and social ethical increases in supply need justified use of natives in modes of production imaginary of the state as an organizer of state happiness estatisation of colony . privatization of public prerogatives & socialization of arbitrariness FIRST AND FOREMOST HAVE COMMAND ON NATIVE – compelled to carry out obligations.

Zimbabwe – “most stable” and most “prosperous countries . Côte d’Ivoire.On the Postcolony Achille Mbembe • Nigeria • Exploitation of oil and minerals • Cameroon. Kenya. Gabon.

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What solutions can be suggested towards reconciling the tensions between post colonial ethnic boundaries and the current state formation of sub Saharan Africa? .THEORETICAL GAPS PROBLEM OF THE SUB SAHARAN AFRICAN ‘WEAK STATE’ – One cause of weakness of the state is rooted in colonially drawn boundaries cutting across ethnic groups.

and particularly political development? (Bratton) . A reconceptualization of state-society relations is necessary to keep pace with a changing reality. to discern avenues that might lead out of the current economic crisis. and to appraise the prospects for democracy in Africa. weaknesses. (Bratton) What are the conditions which facilitate associational life in Sub Saharan Africa and the strengths.THEORETICAL GAPS PROBLEM OF RISING TENSIONS BET. and potentialities of civic organizations in promoting economic. social. STATISM & PLURALISM.

THEORETICAL GAPS In order to reconcile the untenable image of an autonomous state and the fragmented nature of society. the patrimonial state model needs to be refined with an analytical tool that adequately assesses the variable weight and influence of competing forms of authority (Williams) How can we resolve the incongruities between the rule of the patrimonial state in Sub Saharan Africa and the formal state apparatus? Williams .

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social classes are most likely to have constructed an economic base independent of the state and a set of shared interests that are best defended by autonomous political action . 427 .Beyond the state (Bratton) pg.HYPOTHESIS: Associational life is likely to be most developed in economies that have undergone the greatest degree of indigenous capitalist industrialization. In these situations.

•Banking systems are more clearly dominated by private capital and embedded in more competitive. diverse. •These countries are characterized by low levels of financial development. and market-oriented financial systems. State. •Statist banking system: banking is highly concentrated and government controlled. including and in general have less diversified and developed economies than many other sub-Saharan African countries. capital and the politics of banking reform (Boone) .SOUTH AFRICA CONGO •Deepest penetration of capitalist production and exchange relations and the highest rates of domestic capital accumulation outside of the state.

trade unionists. democratic accountability. It represented a multiclass alliance of workers. lawyers. the UDF was a loose national federation of membership groups built on principles of mass participation. poor peasants. •Organizationally. and journalists.SOUTH AFRICA •United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa Called into being new forms of organizing popular groups in all spheres of life of the society •Over six hundred affiliate organizations and two million adherents. traders. with a known leadership drawn from among the clergy. and ideological pluralism. Civil society and associational life (Bratton) pg. 419 LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AUTONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY? . students. rich peasants. and professionals.

• Greatest number of intermediate activist organizations in Africa today can be observed in urban South Africa • One would also therefore expect the expansion of civil society to be led by. and to accrue to the advantage of. social classes well positioned to exploit economic opportunities in a capitalist economy .

Potential comparison between South Africa (developed economy) and Congo (under developed economy) and the strength of their civil society .

. practically feasible.RECOMMENDATIONS [POTENTIAL COMPARISONS/CONCLUSIONS] COMPARISON WITH POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY IN LATIN AMERICA. they confront the issue of if and how states can recognize both individual and communal rights in an ideologically meaningful. demands. DEVELOP A BUREAUCRATIC FORM. WHERE GROUPS WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY GAINED GREATER OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTRACT A FOLLOWING. AND FORMULATE POLICY ALTERNATIVES DUE TO STATE REFORMS IN THE 80S INDIGENOUS POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY Contesting Citizenship in Latin America Deborah J. Yashar •As policymakers face the challenge of responding to indigenous organizations in civil society and their demands. • Political liberalization in the 1980s provided greater space for the public articulation of ethnic identities. and conflicts. and enduring way • The conditions under which indigenous movements have emerged in Latin America are primarily a response to the twin emergence of incomplete political liberalization and state economic reforms.

and enduring way • The conditions under which indigenous movements have emerged in Latin America are primarily a response to the twin emergence of incomplete political liberalization and state economic reforms. demands. they confront the issue of if and how states can recognize both individual and communal rights in an ideologically meaningful.RECOMMENDATIONS • As policymakers face the challenge of responding to indigenous organizations in civil society and their demands. • Political liberalization in the 1980s provided greater space for the public articulation of ethnic identities. . practically feasible. and conflicts.

land reforms. increased local autonomy—as peasants often increased their economic independence from landlords and carved out local spaces for traditional authority structures and customary law. and the establishment/protection of property rights somewhat unwittingly. although not uniformly. . PROMISES OF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADERS IN LATIN AMERICA Greater state penetration.RECOMMENDATIONS the provision of social and economic policies targeting peasants as a corporate sector institutionalizing corporate forms of state representation that appeared to offer access to the state.

RECOMMENDATIONS COMPARING STATE BUILDING AND SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY IN LATIN AMERICA WITH CURRENT TRENDS IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA… How can this comparison contribute to scholarly literature on civil society and its active participation and integration into the sub Saharan African state? What comparisons can be made between the degree and effects of political liberalization in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa? How does this comparison work towards bridging the gap between the wants and needs of various ethnic identities and the demands of the state in Sub Saharan Africa? .

RECOMMENDATIONS COMPARING STATE BUILDING AND SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY IN LATIN AMERICA WITH CURRENT TRENDS IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA… Can this be used as a model for the strengthening of associations in civil society? How can we compare the process of state building and its relation to social movements in Latin America with Sub Saharan Africa? .

============================================ THE DIFFICULTY TO CONFORM WITH WESTERN STANDARDS MAY SUGGEST THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR INDIGENOUS STRUCTURES OF ORGANIZATION TO BE CONSTRUCTED. .CONCLUSION STATES IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA ARE WEAK WITH RESPECT TO THE FACT THAT IT IS UNABLE TO PENETRATE THROUGH SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCE MATERIAL WELFARE.

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