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Heidegger and Representationalism Author(s): Tom Rockmore Reviewed work(s): Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 363-374 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744713 . Accessed: 19/03/2012 11:24
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In his later turn which he equates with philosophy for thought against metaphysics. {Denken). Heidegger. his analysis ofwhat he initially describes as the problem of the meaning of being. Number Quarterly 3. in a word the repre sentation. From that perspective. Yet clearly his concern early and late with being in general. particularly in his and Time takes up a series of cognitive issues. The cally modern. and what is so represented. but is scarcely mentioned in later writings. July 1996 HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM Tom Rockmore is at least as old as Plato who thought that the of appearance Representationalism world was a copy. it is because dimension. we can say that throughout his writings Heideg ger is concerned with knowledge beyond beings. or the representational present purposes. and the theory of truth as disclosure (? 44). the phenomenon in the context of the discussion of the phenomenological method of investigation (? 7). even grievously mistaken. of reality. For Heidegger seem to be an error. as Derrida will later do. or with the being of beings. epistemological phy for his theory.History Volume of Philosophy 13. concerns a kind of knowledge. the hermeneutical circle (? 32). Yet clearly he makes is starting with his theory of truth as disclosure. any attempt to measure the episte difference between beings and being in general is captured in the ontologi cal difference that is the conceptual cornerstone of the book. we can understand approach to as asserting a cognitive relation between what is directly given knowledge1 in experience. or human being. And if phenomenology it has an epistemological useful for epistemological ends. This paper will examine Heidegger's contribution to a representational approach to knowledge. The cognitive thrust in Heidegger's theory is strong. to consider and epistemology under the same heading. It might representation. It could be further objected that Heidegger consistently stresses the of his position. To parody Plato's remark about the epikeina tes ousias {Republic 509). be it a mental image or an object. as Dasein. Being subjectivity. gives up the label of philoso claims for it. including early period. whereas epistemology is specifi pre-Socratic inspiration theory might seem to be an arbitrary mological potential ofHeidegger's conflation ofHeidegger with what he is concerned to reject. From an epistemological 363 .

Like Husserl before him. confus ing. or things in experience. preliminary account of phenomenology is rich in insights. Although the concern with being is allegedly unprecedented. although there are indications that point to the importance ofKant for an understanding of his position. however they regard themselves and are regarded by others. can never simply be assimilated to their predecessors. Yet although Heidegger's Husserl is suggestive. possibly confused. theory can be read as turning on the cognitive given which are taken as link between appearances is not usually regarded ofwhat is not itself so given. Like Kant and Plato. themain problem inHeidegger's beings. to which we can gain access through the visible. From an epistemological perspective. by Heidegger as well. more precisely with a phenome Heidegger nology of the invisible. Kant's phenomena. or being in general. He even affirms that his study was made possible relation to by Husserlian phenomenology. and original think ers.364 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY early theory is how to go from perspective. the general strategy of proceeding from neglected what is given in experience to what lies beyond it is frequent enough. he understands "phenome Method of In ? 7 of Being and Time. par ticularly in France. critique ofDescartes and his debt toHusserl are well known. Heidegger's . Descartes. Husserl's phenomenology is concerned with the phenomenology of the intuition. or entities. the theory stands or falls on its success in solving an analogue of the Kantian noumena. or at least since the early Greeks. introduces a subjective turn in which the problem of knowledge consists in understanding the conditions of a legitimate inference from the contents of the mind to the external world. complex. According to Heidegger. ontology is concerned with rendering explicit the being ofbeings through a method that cannot simply be taken over but must be grasped phenomenologically. or beings. problem concerning the relation between phenomena and in Heidegger's theory the relation between beings and being. In his theory. or reality. the epistemological problem lies in the transition from beings to being. visible as it is visible in phenomenological is concerned with the invisible. it would be a mistake to assimilate his theory to Husserl's. Heidegger as a Kantian. For Heidegger is clearly an original thinker. possibly also hastily constructed. entitled "The Phenomenological a preliminary exposition of his concep Investigation. Heidegger takes pains to record his gratitude to the latter inBeing and Time. Heidegger's His theory is often understood against the Husserlian background. who is often said to begin modern philosophy." Heidegger provides tion of phenomenology at the time he composed this book. to being. In Kant and theProblem of he draws attention to a connection between Kant's theory Metaphysics? and his own in reading the critical philosophy as ontology and in suggesting the need to carry Kant's theory beyond Kant.

in anything approaching their original form. unlike Aristotle and Hegel who take into account and build on earlier theories. Yet his apparent Husserlianism has a distinctly Husserlian nology quickly recedes in his three-fold discussion of the terms "phenomenon. here to philosophy since the early tradition philosophical Greeks. Closer to home. First. he looks to etymology to under stand these terms. is correct to suggest that we can only understand prior thought from our present perspective. he immediately takes leave of Husserl to return behind him to German idealism. As the conceptual and historical context becomes historically remote. Heidegger's depiction of phenome tone. In Heidegger's has not advanced beyond but fallen beneath its original but still valid insights that he hopes to recapture and carry forward. an etymological approach to the "authentic" insights of early Greek philosophy is fraught with difficulty." "logos. Except for its ontological emphasis. An Clearly." and their conjunction in the word "phenomenology. or things-in-them . Let us assume that at some time close to the inception of philosophy philosophers possessed ideas that for various reasons were later lost from view. Heidegger holds that the meta physical tradition must be "destroyed" in order to return to the original insights in their pristine form.HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM 365 nology" as providing a method capable of reaching the things themselves {die Sachen selbst) through so-called self-evidence.4 How can we recover such insights? Can we do so? It is implausible that some two and a half thousand years later etymological analysis of a few key terms will enable us to recover the insights of early Greek philosophy Heidegger bases his account of "phenomenon" on a prior account of the Greek etymology of the term. a phase of the discussion at a given point in time. So the Thomistic form of Christian no longer seems intuitively plausible in an ized Aristotelianism secular period. Even the urge to do so follows from a perspective based on the later discussion." initial difficulty arises from Heidegger's specific approach to the in this work. he holds that noumena can without contradic phenomena and noumena. Since he cannot rely on the philosophical tradition that has lost its conceptual way. Despite his unusual grasp of the philosophical tradition. In his distinction between selves. In introducing a version of the familiar distinction between reality and appearance. it obviously becomes increasingly difficult to under stand views that arose in that period. it is difficult now to under increasingly stand the context ofHegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit. in later writings after the self-described turning in his thought to view. Gadamer. That is plausible in the sense that insights are lodged within a context. Heidegger's most important student. since the early Greeks philosophy philosophy itself. Kant makes two points that are often conflated and that perhaps cannot be reconciled. above all to Kant.

knowledge requires the essence (Wesen) to appear. he makes a stronger. against Hegel. Heidegger or appears as distinguishes between the phenomenon and a second. they reject as well a representational approach to cognition that now reappears in Heidegger's approach to phenomena as appearances. between The former phenomena refers. Heidegger believes that a phenomenon is imme beyond itself. These to the problem of knowledge that Kant broaches in an early letter inwriting: "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call "repre sentation" (Vorstellung) to the object?"7 Roughly the same view ofKant is currently popular philosophy ena. or entities. that shows itself. "existential" claim in to a cognitive relation between phenomena and drawing attention noumena since "otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearances without anything that appears. He is saying is just what it is with nothing behind it.Putnam). who phenomenal appearance Heidegger closely Kantian distinguishes manner. the primary in which it appears in the form of a semblance. Hegel. meaning it is. as he says. and In this way he sides with Kant. on the The contrary. announces itself through appear ance. Silently following Hegel. but an appearance . phenomena are beings. phenomena appearances. Hegel improves on Kant in distinguishing between to veridical According (Erscheinung) and false (Schein) appearances. meaning. but an appearance has a referential function. In rejecting the underlying distinction between phenomena and appear ances. Husserl and. whereas Like Kant. privative insists on the distinction between reality and Like Kant. In general terms. entirely that a phenomenon is a sign that points beyond itself to self-contained.366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY tion be thought of as causes and phenomena can without contradiction be thought of as effects. which can or do show themselves. follow According toHeidegger. diately given. what appears through the phenomenon identifies is not itself a phenomenon. to the in a way in his the latter refers something is encountered within experience. and appearances words. Although reality. Ger man non neo-Kantianism. hence as leading to skepticism. as an appearance. Second. reality. latter leads emphasizes the idea of the phenome approach to a representational two very different doctrines in Kant's text lead to contrasting." we can say that German idealism tends to reject the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself as unknowable. Heidegger appearance. Sartre. who holds that reality cannot itself be given in experience. whether are reading favored in analytic At the heart of the problem iswhether there is anything beyond phenom in a word ing him. explicitly reject the Kantian conception of the noumenon. incompatible interpretations of the critical philosophy as centered on phenomena (Phenomena) or appearances (Erscheinung). in the anti-metaphysical (Rorty.

at least here. claims to develop the original Greek conception of truth as Heidegger as found. what in the Beitr?ge zur Philoso Q phie he refers to as the distinction between the first beginning and the other beginning. Heidegger now links this view of logos with a theory of truth that he develops inmore detail in ? 44 o?Being and Time. concealing and revealing." These include: (1) the announcing but not showing itself. is captured in the slogan describing being in general as present under the mode of absence. Heidegger establishes a tight link between phenomena that show themselves and appearances that point beyond themselves to reality. the initial position to the later position. Again like Kant in one of his phases. To explicate the referential function of phenomena regarded as appear ances. He elaborates it further in later writings. in Heraclitus. According to Heidegger. and (4) finally the view that what does the announcing is never manifest. (3) the showing itself or the view of phenomena that he now favors. Yet reason. whereas a false statement covers it up. Like Kant." Unlike Kant.HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM 367 seems to something else. For Heidegger." understood in an clearly on the self-show show apo phantical sense as "making manifest" or "letting something be seen as something. who is said to combine aletheia. it turns out that this view of discourse englobes both phenomena Discourse as well as appearances. He through an account of "logos" inwhich phenomena interprets "logos" "discourse. forwhom a phenomenon is just given. g. (2) that which does the announcing. or its ground. is only one form of apophantical discourse about something which further includes that which is exhibited. or letting be seen. Heidegger are in fact appearances be saying that phenomena that refer to what appears. anthropological. Beaufret) regard as marking the transition from Heidegger now brings together the results of this part of the discussion in a preliminary conception of "phenomenology" that he takes to mean . a true statement lets that lets something be seen is reason. Heidegger sees language as referring to a perceptual object that itself refers. ultimately through a possible use. per ception is pragmatic and ultimately. but perceived as they are through a further reference. Heidegger introduces a four-fold distinction between different senses of "appearance. Hence. orHusserl forwhom a phenomenon is just given in language." he turns away from the referential character of appearances as to focus more ing of phenomena themselves. which later becomes his official view. The latter. The result is to introduce a referential structure into phenomena that are not simply perceived as they are. phenomena. for instance. something be seen as something. particularly the 1930 lecture "On the Essence of Truth" that some observers (e. As the second step in clarifying "phenomenology.

who has absorbed the lesson. Heidegger is rather concerned with phenomena as appearances. His earlier descriptions of "phenomenon" as what shows itself or can be shown offer . to of analytic extensionalism. Yet Husserl is concerned with phenomena through an analysis of "consciousness. Although Marxists often claim that Marx goes beyond Hegel. then itmust be is to be adequate phenomenology the case that being shows itself through beings. Kantian contrasting perspectives on the cognitive object. ontology in the ontological question." Heidegger implicitly suggests that his view is or even that he has gone beyond Husserl to capture an insight Husserlian that escaped the latter. It is sometimes suggested. fundamental ontology has little ressemblance to Husser lian phenomenology. that claims know require direct demonstration in experience. and in his view. he now redescribes the conception of the phe nomenon in a way that links phenomenology and hermeneutics. Heidegger. in fact he changes the that Heidegger topic. In this respect. This approach relies on the role of the subject. The notion ofhiddenness implicit in the conception of truth as disclosure enables Heidegger to link his view of phenomenology to the disclosure of being. we should not overestimate the similarity In noting that what he calls letting the between Heidegger and Husserl.368 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY letting the cognitive object. Heidegger's problem is a version of the Aristotelian to ti hen einai? Yet in Kant's wake. there is the familiar idea that we can uncover its aspects. is scarcely confined to phenomena as The difference between Heidegger and Husserl is significant. Yet Heidegger appears tomisunderstand the con own theory and Husserl's that was painfully ceptual distance between his clear to the latter. His aim phenomena at all that are interesting to him only to the extent that they cast light on the question on which his theory turns: themeaning of being. goes beyond Husserl. First. Even at this early stage. claims straightforwardly that phenomenology is possible only as ontology. be seen as it shows itself. He remains Husserlian or in Husserlian similar terms to various perhaps in his desire to establish a science ofphenomena. in his language what shows itself. it is clear that if to its ontological task." a term that is never mentioned in Being and Time. is no longer possible. be seen as it shows itself is the meaning of the Husserlian object slogan "To the things themselves. for instance through scrutinizing what is present to mind. In support of this claim. From an epistemological perspective. from a science It ismore accurate as such to say that he changes the focus to phenomenology as a method of phenomena intended to cast light on being through the interpretation of beings. In that sense. philosophy forms as a rigorous science. mainly by Heideggerians. ancient Greek sense. the study ofwhat Putnam has called the furniture of the universe.

it still needs to be shown how phenomena selves or fail to be manifest. In identifying a form that is not accidental. The presence here inHeidegger's early theory of the view that the object shows itself prepares in part for the later so-called turning in his thought. there is an inhabitual idea attributed toHeraclitus which the cognitive object lets itself be seen or shows itself or. is concerned with what is to Heidegger.HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM 369 as active in the cognitive processus. buried over. disguising) as well as types of covered-up-ness reasons for it. etc. This claim raises two problems. We are entitled to ask how he knows what he claims to know? Since we never see being in general but only particular beings. although phenomena can fail to be given or to be covered-up. On the one hand. There is an obvious tension inHeidegger's view ofphenomenology at this point. or the cognitive object. for instance in Hegel's view that substance. According toHeidegger. a real human being rooted in existence. On the other. A similar doctrine is at least superficially illustrated in German idealism. According phenomenology or concealed. withholds itself. Second. The latter approach. becomes subject. for calls Dasein. which Heidegger sizes with respect to the self-showing of the being of beings. it needs to be shown how phenomena function as appearances to refer beyond themselves. He offers a partial response to the second problem in distinguishing different (unknown. general. according to Second. not to the or subject. it is difficult to understand how phenomenology could offer demonstrative precision or even see being at all. he stresses the importance of his reinterpretation of subjectivity as Dasein. Yet it is difficult to see the basis for this assertion that concerns what is not itself an appearance but which appears. Heidegger expands on his distinction between concealing and revealing in remarks on the idea of covered-up-ness now said to be the antithesis of phenomenality. above all being in mainly hidden. he again opens the way to consider the object as active in withholding itself from us. or is passive. although alleg edly but inexplicably rooted in the thing discovered. what Heidegger instance in carrying out research of a particular kind. as a result ofwhich in favor of being as his view of the subject as Dasein he abandoned self-disclosing. First. active in the interpretation of the contents of experience. In this view the subject is active and the object just is. fail to manifest them Heidegger does not explain the referential dimension of phenomena. He specifically claims that phenomenology offers "demonstrative precision" to ontology understood as concerned with the being of beings. seemingly transforms the cognitive object into a subject. he seemingly attributes the success or failure of efforts to acquire knowledge. and needs to be revealed. on the empha contrary. for phenomenology there is noth ing other than phenomena. but rather to the object that for unclarified reasons either gives .

Heidegger seems to realize this problem when. Yet this obviously leaves him with two different and clearly inconsistent views of truth that we can identify through reference to two great German idealist predecessors. and since ontology is possible only as phe nomenology. say. basic to later modern philosophy. Platonic manner. Since forHeidegger. ad hoc clearly inconsistent with . This is a further version menological of what we can call the traditional philosophical view of truth as inde pendent of time and place. that only the subject provides access to objectivity. what that. "True" would then mean. going back behind Husserl toKant. On the other. objectivistic sense through the grasp of unchanging structures that supposedly typify reality itself. is a stronger claim without invoking special. his view of pheno truth retains a transcendental claim. or truth stronger than mere inter "transcendental" problem corresponds to his prejudices or is discernable through his special capaci ties in some hierophantic. amplified through the concep tion of the hermeneutical circle he takes over from Dilthey and Hegel. Kant's transcendental approach is obviously meant to preserve a similar claim. Heidegger's is simply inconsistent with his claim of transcen appeal to hermeneutics dental truth (veritas transcendentalis). in a Platonic. or a calls the transcendent object. he is consistent in describing philosophy as universal pheno menological Heidegger an ontology. here makes an epistemological of being. Heidegger neither here nor later brings together the two facets ofhis view whose tension he attempts to resolve by later decentering the subject while continuing to focus on his only real object: being in Scrutiny of beings ismeant to lead us to being. above all with respect to knowledge. he presents his view of the hermeneutical circle leading to a hermeneutical view of truth based on the elucidation of a preliminary conception. The form of phenomenol It is primar ogy undertaken by Dasein is interpretative.370 withholds HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY itself. later in the book (? 32). his interpretative approach. through the analysis of what Heidegger general. concerned with knowing being in general ily through beings. or hermeneutical. On the one hand. since Kant. This is not even remotely comparable to the elucidation of the conditions of possibility whatsoever in a Kantian sense or phenomenological truth in a Husserlian sense. he opens himself to the charge that what he presents as the authentic meaning of being is no more than his own view of the matter. In appealing to interpretation. is routinely understood as indicating conditions of possibility. knowledge of being is the basic problem of philosophy. In the wake of the Cartesian insight. existentiality of existence. One claim we can the idea that through the phenomenological acquire authentic grasp approach concerns to beings we the meaning paraphrase as can of pretation of any kind.

the nature and limits of. all propose "thin. If by "knowledge" we understand "objective knowledge. orminimalist conversely. Yet begin ning with Husserl." analyses ofknowledge unrelated to. This view of truth is close to "pragmatic" conceptions inHegel. perhaps even Husserl. including Gadarner. if who should not be confused with the Husserlians. is here called Heidegger's "thick" conception of subjectivity func in the initial version of his phenomenological tions ambiguously ontology. Hegel simply denies that method can be isolated from content. The relation between the subject and claims forknowledge is a key aspect in any theory. is his continued reliance on the idea of transcendental truth. in fact often contradicted by. maximalist epistemogical claims that must be aban doned whenever we take the subject seriously by understanding knowledge as human knowledge. Heidegger silently rejects the modern tendency to a normative conception of knowledge rather grasp subjectivity through than conceptions of the subject that Heidegger initially refuses in his "thick" conception ofDasein. there does not seem to be a discernible method either inHeidegger or in Gadamer. real human beings. What is here called a "thin" conception of subjectivity drives a conceptual wedge between the cognitive subject and human being in order to preserve familiar. Ideas like subjectivity lead to mythological the cogito or transcendental unity of apperception One such indication. Descartes'famous ofmethod plays no discernible role in his later writings but continues to impress later thinkers. Yet. hence hermeneutical. What . we can say that Husserl. Heidegger of phenomenology relates phenomenological method to its scientific status we bracket and to its associated cognitive claim. comparable to views of the subject inHegel and Marx. Yet he appar In this view. Merleau-Ponty. both as that which uncovers being in general and that whose own being.HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM 371 principles that cannot escape the consequence that "true" refers to the view one currently happens to hold but may revise or even abandon at some future time. later phenomenology consistently echoes the Cartesian view that claims for truth depend in some crucial way on phenomenological method. of phenomena is always interpretative. Although a phenomenologist. hence incompatible with claims to tran scendental truth. Heidegger correctly invokes a "thick" view of cognitive since the only real cognitive subject is human being. Descartes. Another is the idea of phenomenological idea method modelled on the via regia of Cartesianism. as already indicated. Heidegger is correct to note that scrutiny ently fails to see that the kind of "thick" conception of subjectivity he proposes in his idea ofDasein is simply incompatible on any interpretation with epistemological maximalism." there is a special difficulty with respect to the role of subjectivity in Heidegger's theory. and Peirce. Kant.

theory as well as his own earlier anthropological The deeper problem is how phenomenological analysis ger reads ofKant's claim to elucidate objects and knowledge as a variation to justify the very idea that through a ofbeings we can know being in general.10 ofHegel's Phenomenology. who understood the distinction between consciousness where. this difficulty. Yet Heidegger. Variations of this same general problem run throughout modern philosophy refers from Descartes connects the to recent analytic latter's concern philosophy. Hegel was already familiar with both reading sometimes Heidegger and Marx. experience Ifwe overlook this difficulty. led Heidegger to an anthropological approach to Heideger's early theory. as Maim?n points out. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY must be uncovered."12 Heidegger simultaneously rejects both the Cartesian inclination. Reason. of reality beyond Hegel. particularly in ? 10 ofBeing and Time. For ifwe can never penetrate appearances to reality.14 This theory rests on an illicit extension through a causal reading of causality beyond the field of source of appearance. to recent. several generations of philosophers have incorrectly seen Heidegger as prolonging traditional In Koj?ve 's influential. Heideg the conditions of the possibility assertion on Parmenides' concerning of the identity of thought and being (to gar auto noein estin kai einai). this line of argument leads to skepticism. themain concern is never human being but being in general. but only interested in human being as as opening the way to an an approach to being. analytic who to Kant. tried to overcome it in relativizing and reality as a distinction within appearance appropriate conditions. the reflexive Cartesian move suggests. the fact remains that. brilliant but idiosyncratic French humanism.13 influential theory illustrates the difficulty of a representationalist In an important passage in the second edition of the Critique ofPure theory. when he adhered to traditional German Volks id?ologie. we cannot know. Yet Humanism forHeidegger. cannot take this route. in all its forms concerns human being as a central value. who rejects the approach to knowledge through the analysis of consciousness in itsHusserlian form. where. particularly in France. Putnam. he was never deeply interested in human being as such or even in the German Volk. In practice. Heidegger's approach presupposes an unexamined cognitive link between approach to beings and being that is a variant of the representationalist cognition.372 or nature.11 In criticizing Descartes transformation of philosophy in his lecture on "The Age of anthropological theWorld Picture. yond he famously construes phenomena that we do not as appearances and pointing cannot be themselves to noumena experience as the know. efforts to understand Kant's how language hooks onto the world. urged on by Koj?ve and later by Sartre. reality and appear under ance coincide or reality appears. . Even in his turning toNational Socialism.

onHeidegger's and unjustifiable. that Heidegger has no argument. Heidegger's phenomenological approach to being through beings finally remains prole gome nal. University Duquesne Received November 21. unjustified the inference from beings to being is. being sense the cause of beings. beings to being. There is a corollary of this point affecting the general question of ontol ogy. fromHeidegger's perspective. Since support our only access to being is through beings. noumena cannot of beings phenomenology themselves be known since they cannot be given in experience. then. It is. it appears that there cannot be one of being through given In that specific sense. that Heidegger remains thing-in-itself to designate committed to a phenomenology of presence15 but rather that he cannot justify his claim that being is present through beings. The problem is not. Kant's the representational offers a variant theory of knowledge phenomena as relies on his conception of appearances of noumena. itself through beings. After Being and Time. phenomenological scrutiny of never show us that being manifests itself in this way. and despite Heidegger's beings as phenomena. 1995 . inmuch the same way as Kant's thing-in-itself. beings will own terms. He maintains selves and that being shows itself through beings. as is often claimed. Despite his other achievements that are neither denied nor even minimized. it remains to be shown that after the critical philosophy ontology in a general sense is still possible. Heidegger does not propose a satisfactory form of the representational approach to knowledge. Heidegger sees world history as the effect of being. being is not a phenomenon.HEIDEGGER AND REPRESENTATIONALISM The 373 and Kant is useful to understand analogy between Heidegger which is to elucidate a cognitive inference from Heidegger's problem. Hence. but rather that the argument he does have is insufficient that phenomena show them to justify his cognitive claim. Yet if this is his claim. who holds is in some unexplained that the noumenon can without contradiction be considered as a cause of which the phenomenon can be considered as the effect since otherwise there would be an appearance with anything that appears. of the Kantian view in his contention that a Heidegger can lead to being. then. hence no way to justify the inference from beings to being. as Derrida objects. A science of phenom ena that requires direct exhibition and demonstration of its objects is not possible forbeing but only forbeings. there is no way that Heidegger can know this to be the case. since. The difficulty is not. approach to ontology as phenomenology. not a mere accident that. For while there can be a phenomenological ontology concerning beings as phenomena. Like Kant. even on a charitable interpretation. it becomes increasingly apparent that. despite much interesting discussion. Yet in claims that being manifests Heidegger of this claim we have only the faith of a phenomenologist. For Kant.

" "Philosophy trans. pp. 1989).374 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY NOTES 1. p. B (Paris: 93. g. Martin's. 6. settembre-dicembre 1993. pp. p. filosof?a. Concerning Technology Lovitt Hilary Kant. 27. Kant. p. 1772. 7. Press. Meaning and Mental R?duction Representation (Cambridge. 1967). 20. 1994). and with and Other Essays. Heidegger." Segni 5. MA: Press. See Tom Rockmore. "Heidegger. et la ph?nom?nologie sur Husserl. See. February trans.: (Frankfurt zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). von Klostermann. See Press. 6. with an Introduction the Crisis of Philosophy. by Quentin Phenomenology Lauer (New Antihu Uni and Row.. See "The Age of the World Picture. F." Heidegger. Jean-Luc Marion. Press. Putnam. a. 21. 1965). 1977). no. University e la storia della la prospettiva ermeneutica Rockmore. of Pure Reason. Reason. p. trans. Jean-Fran?ois Heidegger 3. vol. and French Humanism. William Harvard Reason. See Martin Kant Heidegger. 21. 27. 13. Smith (New York: St. Recherches Presses and universitaires de France) (Paris: et la ph?nom?nologie 1990). et le ph?nom?ne Presses universitaires . M. See Tom 1990). trans. (New York: Harper Renewing of Pure La and Row. (Paris: Vrin. in Immanuel (Chicago: Correspondence. See Martin Hermann and York: 9. 8. 467. See 15. voix B xxvi-xxvii. p. Arnulf Zweig Beitr?ge Vittorio Kant. W. See Kant. Indiana Taft (Bloomington/Indianapolis: 4. an trans. Critique Derrida. Philosophy (Cambridge: (Berkeley: The Question Introduction by University 105. B xxvi-xxvii. See 1759-99. et donation. Courtine. 1989). as Rigorous in Edmund Science. See MIT 2. N. 1992). Critique 1961). 115-154. 71. Kant Press. See Tom Rockmore. Harper 10. versity of California in Martin 12. Richard the Problem and of Metaphysics. Critique to Marcus of Pure Herz. Jacques 1967). 16-25. (London 11. K. Nazism and Philosophy On Heidegger's 1992). Husserl. e comprensione. See de France. University Philosophical of Chicago ed. B 566. Heidegger Robert Cummins. Philosophy: Heidegger manism and Being and New York: Routledge. 14. e. p.

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