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        Adapt  or  Perish:   The  Governance  of  Climate  Change  in  Africa           Triggers  of  Institutional  Adaptation  to  Meet  the  New  Challenge  of   Rising  Hydro-­Meteorological  Disasters  in  Africa,  1995-­2010         Comparative  Insights  from  Mozambique,  Uganda  and  Senegal    
 
              Arame  TALL   PhD  Candidate   African  Studies   Johns  Hopkins  University     School  of  Advanced  International  Studies    April  2012      

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS      
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
PREFACE  

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  INTRODUCTION     PART  I:  BACKGROUND   CHAPTER  2:  TRIGGERS  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGE   CHAPTER  3:  WHY  CLIMATE  CHANGE  REQUIRES  NEW  OR  ADAPTED  INSTITUTIONS?     PART  II:  METHODS   CHAPTER  4:  METHODS     PART  III:  RESULTS   CHAPTER  5:  CROSS-­COUNTRY  CLASSIFICATION  RESULTS   CHAPTER  6:  SENEGAL   CHAPTER  7:  UGANDA   CHAPTER  8:  MOZAMBIQUE     PART  IV:  DISCUSSION   31   33   59   104   105   133   134   144   200   254   312   7  

CHAPTER  9:  CROSS-­COUNTRY  ANALYSIS   313   CHAPTER  10:  CONCLUSION,  TOWARDS  A  THEORY  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  ADAPTATION  TO  MEET   THE  NEW  CHALLENGE  OF  CLIMATE  CHANGE   331       BIBLIOGRAPHY     347  

       
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AKNOWLEDGEMENTS     This  thesis  was  a  long  odyssey.  It  would  have  never  come  to  completion  without  the   support  and  constant  encouragement  of  the  following  individuals  and  institutions.     I  stand  before  them  in  deep  gratitude.      Mame  Boury  and  Mamadou  Tall,  without  whom  I  would  have  never  come  this  far;    I   am   grateful   to   the   assistance   of   Ms.   Anita   Twesigomwe   in   the   search,   compilation   and   archiving   of   the   newspaper   clips   that   underpinned   my   events   analysis  for  Uganda.    I   am   thankful   for   the   assistance   of   Lucia   Jorge   in   the   search,   compilation   and   archiving   of   the   newspaper   clips   that   underpinned   my   events   analysis   for   Mozambique.    In  Senegal,  archivist  Sammy  Laris  was  of  invaluable  support  to  unearth,  compile   and   catalogue   newspaper   clips   on   government   responses   to   climate-­‐related   disasters  between  1995-­‐2010.    I   am   indebted   to   Filipe   Lucio   of   the   World   Meteorological   Organization   for   his   insightful  comments  on  the  Mozambique  chapter,  and  to  Alessandra  Giannini  of   Columbia  University  for  her  time  reading  through  the  Climate  Change  chapter.    UNDP-­‐GEF   and   UNDP   Mozambique   country   Program   on   Climate   Change   Adaptation  supported  and  funded  my  fieldwork  in  Mozambique  from  March-­‐May   2011,  as  part  of  the  project  document  development  for  the  Mozambique  Coastal   Adaptation  project.      The  SAIS  PhD  Committee  provided  the  bursary  that  enabled  research  in  Senegal   and   Uganda.   I   am   indebted   to   the   Senegalese   Red   Cross   National   Society   for   providing   the   logistical   support   and   manpower   that   greatly   facilitated   the   Climate  VCAs  in  Senegal.    Last  but  not  least,  I  am  thankful  to  all  of  my  PhD  committee  members,  who  have   taken  the  time  to  read  and  comment  on  the  various  versions  of  this  manuscript;  I   thank  them  for  their  time  and  intellectual  generosity.   •   3  

 

PREFACE       On   August   28   2011,   following   two   days   of   heavy   uninterrupted   rainfall,   sudden   landslides   on   the   slopes   of   Mount   Elgon   in   center-­‐east   Uganda   buried   twenty-­‐six   people   alive   at   once   in   the   district   of   Bulambuli.   Ten   more   lives   were   claimed   in   the   landslides  of  the  days  after.  These  followed  the  national  landslides  of  just  the  year   prior,   which   killed   over   three   hundred   people,   in   a   country   that   had   only   seldom   known  landslides  in  the  past.     In  Mozambique,  Indian  Ocean  cyclones  and  tidal  incursions,  increasingly  frequent  in   recent   years,   have   displaced   entire   coastal   communities   along   Mozambique’s   two   thousand  five  hundred  (2,500)  kilometer-­‐long  oceanic  interface,  forcing  them  inland   and   depriving   them   of   a   much-­‐needed   livelihood,   which   the   ocean   had   provided   them  with  hitherto,  compelling  them  to  adapt  to  a  new  life  as  agriculturalists.     West   of   the   continent,   in   Senegal,   a   formerly   drought-­‐ridden   country   of   the   Sahel   until   the   end   1980s,   flooding   has   been   progressively   claiming   more   lives   since   the   mid-­‐1990s,  creating  damage  only  faintly  estimated  by  official  reports.       All   across   Africa,   climate-­‐related   disasters—hereafter   referred   to   as   Hydro-­‐ Meteorological  Disasters  (HMDs)  –have  been  on  the  rise  since  the  1990s;  and  their   impacts  have  begun  to  wreck  havoc  in  communities  at  the  frontlines  in  Africa’s  rural   areas  and  urban  centers  alike1.     Many   attribute   this   increase   in   the   frequency   and   magnitude   of   climate-­‐related   disasters   in   part   to   global   anthropogenic   Climate   Change2,   and   contend   that   with   more  climate  changes  to  come  –a  result  of  the  inertia  in  the  climate  system  (mostly                                                                                                                  

1  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  Human  Development  Report  2007/2008,  Fighting  climate  

change:  Human  solidarity  in  a  divided  world  (New  York:  McMillan,  2007),  75-­‐88.  
2  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC),  “Climate  Change  2007:  Impacts,  Adaptation  and  

Vulnerability”,  Contribution  of  Working  Group  II  to  the  Fourth  Assessment  Report  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel   on  Climate  Change,  ed.  M.L.  Parry  et  al.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2007).  

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resident  in  the  oceans),  which  will  continue  to  react  for  many  more  years  to  current-­‐ day   atmospheric   carbon   stocks   we   are   already   committed   to–   more   HMDs   are   expected  to  occur,  with  sizeable  impacts  over  Africa3.     In   the   continent   least   prepared   to   address   the   impacts   of   climate-­‐related   changes,   these   new   threats   are   a   major   source   of   concern.   How   are   African   countries   governing   the   new   challenge   of   a   fast   changing   climate?   Which   institutions   and   policy   frameworks   have   countries   endogenously   devised   to   confront   rising   HMDs?   How  have  relationships  within  society,  between  governed  and  governors  in  Africa,   changed   or   been   reshaped   as   a   result?     How   are   they   likely   to   change   in   response   to   continued  climate  fluctuations?  Fundamentally,  what  makes  African  countries  take   Climate  Change  seriously,  and  place  the  issue  high  on  the  political  agenda?     The   present   dissertation   seeks   to   answer   this   last   essential   question.   We   already   know  a  lot  on  what  needs  to  be  done  and  have  plentiful  advice  readily  available  for   governments   regarding   the   design   of   institutions   effective   for   Climate   Change   Adaptation   (CCA)   and   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   (DRR),   including   establishing   early   warning   systems,   embedding   institutions   mandated   to   tackle   climate   risks   under   powerful  ministries  and  so  forth  (see  World  Resources  Report  2010-­‐11)4.  However   the   other   side   of   the   causality   arrow-­‐   what   MAKES   governments   adopt   these   effective  institutions,  uptake  all  of  this  advice  and  engage  in  institutional  change  to   better  address  and  deliver  on  the  new  demand  for  effective  CCA-­‐DRR  policies  –that   is   where   a   critical   gap   in   understanding   lies,   one   which   this   dissertation   seeks   to   address.     As   the   issue   of   Climate   Change   moves   to   the   fore   of   national,   African   and   international   agendas,   a   framework   is   urgently   needed   to   understand   the   complex                                                                                                                  
3  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC),  Managing  the  Risks  of  Extreme  Events  and  Disasters  to  

Advance  Climate  Change  adaptation  (SREX),  Special  Report  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  ed.   Field  et  al.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2012),  8-­‐9.   4  World  Resources  Institute  (WRI)  in  collaboration  with  United  Nations  Development  Programme,  United   Nations  Environment  Programme,  and  World  Bank.  World  Resources  2010–2011:  Decision  Making  in  a  Changing   Climate—Adaptation  Challenges  and  Choices,  ed.  P.  S.  Angell  et  al.  (Washington,  DC:  WRI,  2011),  70-­‐79.  

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interactions   between   climate   and   societies   in   Africa,   and   attempt   to   predict   how   precisely   African   societies,   livelihoods   and   governance   structures   will   respond   to   increasing  climate  variability.       To  answer  this  question,  we  focused  on  rising  HMDs  as  a  proxy  for  Climate  Change   impacts  in  Africa,  and  investigated  national  governments’  policy  responses  to  HMDs   during  the  period  1995-­‐2010,  when  HMD  frequency  began  to  increase  over  Africa.   In   each   of   the   country   cases   where   we   conducted   research,   Mozambique,   Uganda   and   Senegal,   we   then   asked:   what   prompted   governments   to   adopt   the   policy   and   institutional   frameworks   that   they   did   to   address   rising   climate   risks?   Positing   disaster   management   as   a   public   good,   we   analyze   why   some   countries   across   the   continent   have   provided   the   public   good   of   disaster   prevention,   towards   the   fulfillment   of   their   constitutional   mandate   of   protecting   citizens   against   all   crises,   including  climate  ones;  whereas  others  have  not.     What  this  dissertation  unravels  is  that  in  many  instances,  institutional  adaptation  to   meet  the  new  challenge  of  Climate  Change  is  an  issue  eminently  path-­‐dependent.  In   the   countries   of   Africa   where   high-­‐frequency   HMDs   in   recent   years   have   wrecked   havoc  (accidents  of  history),  therein  governments  have  had  no  choice  but  to  address   the   issue.   When   the   imperative   of   adaptation   met   convinced   leaders   and   trusting   donors   willing   to   support   the   country’s   newfound   desire   for   effective   national   policies,  plans  and  management  of  climate  risks,  therein  the  governance  of  Climate   Change   was   improved.   Thus   the   desire   for   change   has   to   come   from   within,   stemming  from  a  strong  national  demand  for  improved  CCA-­‐DRR,  which  in  turn  led   to  the  development  of  endogenous  institutions  to  seriously  confront  rising  climate   risks  and  manage  new  climate  opportunities.    Under  these  circumstances,  effective   CCA-­‐DRR  institutions  have  obtained.       Understanding   these   political   underpinnings   of   policy   and   institutional   change   is   an   important   pre-­‐requisite   for   all   the   activists   and   programs   promoting   Climate   •   6  

Change   adaptation   on   the   continent,   and   expecting   governments   to   uptake   these   programs.     Climate  Change  is  one  of  the  defining  issues  of  our  time.  In  the  words  of  the  UNDP,   no  issue  merits  more  urgent  attention–  or  more  immediate  action5.  This  is  so  even   more   for   developing   regions   such   as   Africa,   projected   to   bear   the   brunt   of   its   impacts   in   the   21st   century.   A   framework   is   urgently   needed   to   understand   how   Climate   Change   will   impact   the   human,   socio-­‐economic   and   political   systems   of   developing   regions,   as   well   as   incentive   structures   within   them   for   institutional   change.  This  dissertation  contributes  an  important  stone  to  that  edifice.                                                                                                                                                                          
5  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007/2008,  1  

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Chapter  1:  INTRODUCTION      
“When   the   cyclones   come,   all   my   cassava   harvest   is   destroyed.   I   can’t   go   fishing   because   the  cyclone  comes  from  the  sea.  I  rebuild  the  roof  of  my  house  with  coconut  tree  leaves,  but   if   the   cyclone   persists   for   days,   the   roof   flies   off   again   and   rains   flood   into   my   house.   What   am  I  to  do  against  all  these  calamities?  I  would  like  to  open  a  small  shop  selling  pastries  in   front   of   my   house,   to   have   the   means   to   buy   a   zinc   roof   to   put   over   the   heads   of   my   family,   but  means  to  start  up  are  limited.  God,  please  help  us.”     -­  Cyclone  afflicted  resident  of  Macuacuane  Village,  Pebane,  central  Mozambique  

         

1.1 Problem  Statement   1.1.1 Climate  Change  &  Rising  Disasters  in  Africa  

Climate   Change   will   very   likely   lead   to   an   increase   in   the   frequency   of   heavy   rainfall   events   worldwide6,   with   medium   confidence   that   anthropogenic,   or   man-­‐made,   influences   have   contributed   to   the   intensification   of   extreme   precipitation   on   the   global  scale7.  We  also  now  know  with  quasi-­‐certainty  that  Climate  Change  will  bring   over   most   land   areas   a   warming   of   extreme   daily   minimum   and   maximum   temperatures   on   the   global   scale8,   with   warmer   and   fewer   cold   days/nights,   and   warmer  and  more  frequent  hot  days/nights.  Warm  spells  and  heat  waves  will  very   likely  be  more  frequent  as  well,  with  impacts  on  all  sectors  of  human  activity,  from   agriculture  to  water  resources,  human  health,  industry  and  tourism9.  More  intense   tropical  cyclones  are  also  likely10.  Finally,  it  is  likely  that  currently  observed  extreme   coastal  high  water  and  rise  in  mean  sea  level  are  a  result  of  anthropogenic  Climate   Change,  and  will  continue  to  rise  as  Climate  Change  ensues.     Climate  Change  impacts  related  to  changes  in  patterns  of  extreme  events,  based  on   projections   to   the   mid-­‐   to   late   21st   century,   not   withstanding   any   changes   or   new                                                                                                                  
6  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  8-­‐12   7  IPCC,  SREX,  13   8  Ibidem   9  Ibidem   10  Ibidem  

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developments   in   adaptive   capacity,   are   hence   significant   and   non   negligible11.     Though  the  attribution  of  single  extreme  events  to  anthropogenic  climate  change  – versus  natural  climate  variability–  is  challenging,  it  can  be  affirmed  that  a  changing   climate   leads   to   changes   in   the   frequency,   intensity,   spatial   extent,   duration,   and   timing   of   extreme   weather   and   climate   events,   and   can   result   in   unprecedented   extreme  weather  and  climate  events12. Thus   with   Climate   Change,   a   new   era   of   more   erratic   fluctuations   in   weather   and   climate   patterns   is   to   be   expected,   including   on   the   continent   of   Africa,   where   impacts   of   such   likely   changes   in   climate   and   weather   are   most   feared,   due   to   the   continent’s   limited   means   to   withstand   them,   as   well   as   the   high   dependence   of   a   large  majority  of  its  population  on  natural  climate  factors  –  temperature  and  rainfall   chiefly–  for  livelihood  and  development.       Indeed,  in  Africa  impacts  of  a  changing  climate  on  local  communities  dependent  on   climate  for  their  livelihoods  and  sustenance  are  large  sources  of  concern.  An  average   57%  of  Africa’s  active  population  is  employed  in  a  rain-­‐fed  agricultural  sector  that  is   highly  sensitive  to  rainfall  and  temperature  fluctuations.  Only  6.8%  of  arable  land  in   Africa   is   irrigated13.   Furthermore,   increasing   population   densities   in   ill-­‐planned   settlements   at   the   peripheries   of   Africa’s   urban   centers,   in   Dakar,   Accra,   Lagos,   Nairobi  and  Johannesburg,  are  directly  exposed  to  the  vagaries  of  changing  rainfall   patterns14.   When   climate-­‐related   hazards   strike   in   Africa,   they   generate   human   development  setbacks  that  have  monumental  social  ramifications15.  They  jeopardize   progress  towards  achievement  of  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  and  generally   force   poor   households   to   forfeit   meager   assets   in   the   process   of   coping   with   climate                                                                                                                  
12  IPCC,  SREX,  11   13  Food  and  Agricultural  Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  FAO  Statistical  Yearbook  2009,  (Rome:  FAO,  2009),  

11  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  17-­‐18  

accessed  April  04,  2012.  http://www.fao.org/economic/the-­‐statistics-­‐division-­‐ess/publications-­‐ studies/statistical-­‐yearbook/fao-­‐statistical-­‐yearbook-­‐2009/en/   14  Pelling,  Mark  and  Ben  Wisner:  Disaster  Risk  Reduction:  cases  from  Urban  Africa.  London:  Earthscan,  2009   15  Tall,  Arame,  “Climate  forecasting  to  serve  communities  in  West  Africa”,  Procedia  Environmental  Sciences  1   (2010):  421-­‐431,  accessed  online  December  1,  2011.  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/18780296  

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related   disasters16.   This   has   prompted   UNDP   to   declare   that   Climate   Change   is   hampering   efforts   to   deliver   the   MDG   promise17.   The   projection   that,   with   Climate   Change,  Africa  will  be  faced  with  more  frequent  extreme  weather  and  climate  events   is  a  worrisome  prospect.       In  light  of  all  of  these  reasons,  Africa  has  been  identified  by  the  Inter-­‐governmental   Panel   on   Climate   Change   as   the   second   region   most   vulnerable   to   Climate   Change   impacts   in   the   world,   immediately   after   the   Arctic   polar   zone,   and   before   small   island   nation   states   and   Asian/African   mega-­‐deltas;   “Africa,   because   of   the   continent’s  low  adaptive  capacity  and  projected  climate  change  impacts”18.     More   frequent   climate   and   weather   extremes   are   not   just   a   future   scenario   in   Africa   however-­‐   many   African   countries   have   already   begun   facing   them   in   recent   years.   Over  the  decade  of  the  1990s  alone,  Africa  as  a  whole  has  experienced  a  surge  in  the   number  of  heavy  rainfall  events  and  floods  hitting  the  continent19.  This  constitutes  a   sharp   contrast   with   the   prolonged   droughts   of   the   1970s-­‐80s,   leading   many   scientists  to  observe  that  a  ‘greening’  is  occurring  in  areas  such  as  the  Sahel,  which   suffered  from  severe  droughts  for  two  decades  and  now  enjoys  plentiful  rainfall  on   average.   This   return   of   the   rains   has   been   far   from   a   being   a   welcome   godsend   however.   When   the   rains   returned,   they   came   back   with   full   force,   carting   along   a   plethora   of   flash   floods,   water-­‐borne   epidemics   and   dry   spells   scattered   between   the  bouts  of  plentiful  but  ill-­‐distributed  rainfall.       Recent   empirical   evidence   emanating   from   across   Africa   confirms   this   assertion:   between  2007-­‐2009,  disaster  interventions  across  Africa  have  increased  by  a  factor                                                                                                                  
16  As  noted  by  Emmanuel  Skoufias,  “poor  households  are  typically  less  equipped  to  deal  with  shocks  […]  In  the  

absence  of  an  effective  public  safety  net  system  [as  is  the  case  throughout  most  of  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa],  poorer   households  may  use  coping  strategies  that  ultimately  prevent  them  from  ever  escaping  from  poverty  […]”  for   example,  selling  their  productive  assets,  such  as  draft  animals,  or  taking  their  children  out  of  school.  World  Bank,   World  Development  Report  2003:  Sustainable  Development  in  a  Dynamic  World  (Washington  D.C.:  Oxford   University  Press,  2003),  1088   17  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08,  28   18  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  13   19  International  Federation  of  the  Red  Cross/Red  Crescent  Societies  (IFRC),  World  Disasters  Report  2009:  Focus   on  Early  Warning,  Early  Action  (Geneva:  IFRC,  2009),  172  

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of  820.  In  2007  alone,  the  continent  experienced  close  to  30%  of  the  world’s  hydro-­‐ meteorological   disasters   –the   majority   of   which   were   flood   and   flash   flood   disasters—,   causing   about   2   million   victims   in   East   and   Central   Africa   during   the   January   floods,   and   more   than   2.6   million   victims   between   West   and   East   Africa   during   the   July-­‐August   floods.   In   2007,   floods   in   Sudan,   where   damages   were   thoroughly  documented,  caused  more  than  US$  300  million  in  damages,  whereas  in   Madagascar   cyclone   Indhala   caused   over   $240   million   worth   of   destruction21.   In   2008,  floods  destroyed  homes,  infrastructure  and  crops,  killing  over  300  people  in   West   Africa22.   Droughts,   floods,   pest   infestations,   rising   sea   levels,   storms   and   cyclones   are   increasingly   reducing   opportunity   and   wrecking   havoc   in   communities   all  across  the  continent23.       Whether   a   partial   manifestation   of   anthropogenic   Climate   Change   as   suggested   by   a   growing   number   of   climate   scientists24,   or   a   consequence   of   higher   localized   human   vulnerability  caused  by  higher  exposure  (for  instance  increasing  human  densities  in   low   elevation   coastal   zones   in   Africa;   see   McGranahan   et   al.)25,   weaker   safety   nets   and  social  protection26  and  declining  agrarian  fortunes27,  or  yet  the  mere  spurious   outcome   of   better   disaster   reporting   on   the   part   of   African   countries;   an   upward   trend  in  climate-­‐related  disasters  is  noticeable  across  the  continent,  as  evidenced  by   the   significant   rise   in   the   number   of   reported   climate-­‐related   disasters   since   the   mid-­‐1990s  (see  fig.  1.1).  

                                                                                                               
20  IFRC,  World  Disasters  Report  2009,  172   21  The  Center  for  Research  on  the  Epidemiology  of  Disasters  (CRED),  Annual  Disaster  Statistical  Review,  The  

numbers  and  trends  2007  (Brussels:  CRED,  2008)  
22  Braman,  L.,  Early  Warning,  Early  Action,  an  Evaluation,  Report  to  the  IFRC/Red  Cross  Red  Crescent  Climate  

Centre  (2009),  Accessed  April  4,  2012   http://www.climatecentre.org/downloads/File/ewea_an_evaluation_of_ifrc_west_and_central_africa.pdf   23  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08,  73   24  See  IPCC,  SREX;  and  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  13   25  McGranahan,  G.,  D.  Balk  and  B.  Anderson,  “The  rising  tide:  assessing  the  risks  of  climate  change  and  human   settlements  in  low  elevation  coastal  zones”,  Environ  Urban  19  (2007):  17–37   26  Ellis,  Frank,  Stephen  Devereux  and  Philip  White,  Social  Protection  in  Africa,  Northampton:  Edward  Elgar   Publishing,  2009   27  Bryceson,  D.  F.,  “The  Scramble  in  Africa:  Reorienting  Rural  Livelihoods”,  World  Development  (2002):  725–739    

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Fig.  1.1:  Number  of  climate-­related  disasters  reported  in  Africa  since  the  20th  century:  A  sharp  increase   from  the  mid-­1990s  (based  on  EM-­DAT  data;  source:  author).  Note:  Are  classified  as  climate-­related   disasters:  floods,  pest  infestations,  droughts  and  storms/cyclones.28    

 

  These   Hydro-­‐Meteorological   Disasters—hereafter   referred   to   as   HMDs—are   the   principal  object  of  this  dissertation.       Using   rising   HMDs   as   a   proxy   for   projected   CC   impacts   in   Africa,   we   ask:   how   are   African   countries   currently   addressing   the   challenge   of   a   changing   climate?   Which   governments   are   doing   what   in   the   face   of   rising   HMDs,   and   what   policies   and   institutional   frameworks   have   they   endogenously   devised   to   address   the   new   challenge?  Which  factors  have  prompted  them  to  adopt  the  policies  that  they  did?  In   instances   where   policy   change   has   occurred,   what   has   triggered   it?   In   general,   what   factors   prompt   a   country   to   become   a   climate   disaster   averter,   versus   a   disaster   responder  or  a  firefighter?                                                                                                                  
Vulnerability.                                          Hazard  *  Vulnerability      
28  We  follow  here  the  definition  of  a  Disaster  as  the  conjugation  of  a  naturally  driven  Hazard  and  human-­‐induced  

                                                                                           DISASTER=                                                                                                            Capacity   The  character  and  severity  of  impacts  from  climate  extremes  depend  not  only  on  the  extremes  themselves  but   also  on  exposure  and  vulnerability.  Exposure  and  vulnerability  are  key  determinants  of  disaster  risk  and  of   impacts  when  risk  is  realized    (IPCC,  SREX,  2012).  A  disaster  can  thus  be  conceived  of  as  a  serious  disruption  of   the  functioning  of  a  community  or  a  society  causing  widespread  human,  material,  economic  or  environmental   losses,  which  exceed  the  ability  of  the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. It results from the combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2009)

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We   circumscribe   our   analysis   to   HMDs   that   have   occurred   between   1995   and   2010,   period  when  HMDs  have  begun  to  rise  in  Africa  (see  fig.  1.1)  and  over  which  more   reliable  data  is  available.  We  analyze  what  African  countries  have  done  hitherto  to   address   these   disasters,   as   a   means   to   understand   their   response   patterns   and   surmise  how  they  may  continue  to  manage  HMDs  into  the  future  and  rise  up  to  the   new  challenge  of  Climate  Change,  as  impacts  become  more  pronounced  over  the  21st   century.       Against   the   context   of   changing   climate   risks   and   rising   extreme   weather   events,   projected   to   only   keep   rising   in   the   21st   century,   understanding   the   policies   in   place   to   address   impacts   of   currently   occurring   HMDs   in   Africa   is   a   pressing   issue,   important   to   appraise   national   responses   to   the   impacts   these   disasters   are   already   exerting   on   local   livelihoods,   societies   and   political   systems,   and   to   attempt   to   predict  outcomes  if  climate  disasters  continue  to  rise.     On   the   ground,   across   Africa,   communities   and   countries   have   already   begun   to   contend   with   climate   changes   we   are   committed   to,   while   bracing   for   those   yet   to   come.  Therein  lies  the  relevance  of  studying  how  one  of  the  world’s  most  vulnerable   regions  to  climate  change  and  variability  is  already  impacted  and  will  continue  to  be   impacted  by  global  Climate  Change,  and  what  endogenous  institutional  solutions  are   being   attempted   to   thwart   its   most   immediate   and   damaging   impacts   on   vulnerable   communities.         1.1.2. CC   Governance:   Climate   Shock   Management   &   Constitutional   Design     Despite   the   magnitude   of   the   Climate   Change   challenge,   and   its   implications   for   human   development   in   Africa,   it   is   unfortunate   to   note   that   scholarly   work   on   national  climate  change  adaptation  policies  has  been  severely  wanting.  Not  enough   political  scientists  have  addressed  the  issue  of  Climate  Change  adaptation,  which  has   been   by   and   large   left   to   climate   scientists,   geographers   and   physical   science   • 13    

researchers;  whereas  if  the  latter’s  prediction  of  steadily  increasing  climate  extreme   events  turns  to  be  accurate,  we  may  be  witnessing  over  the  next  few  decades  some   of  the  largest  reversals  in  human  development  ever  witnessed29.       This   is   even  more   surprising   in   light   of   the   findings   of   the   World   Bank’s   global   track   study,  which  concludes  that  by  2020,  the  annual  costs  of  adaptation  for  developing   countries   will   range   from   $75   billion   to   $100   billion/year.   Of   this   amount,   the   average  annual  costs  for  Africa  would  approximate  $18  billion/year30.     Just   as   when   the   Human   Immuno-­‐Deficiency   Virus   (HIV)   threat   emerged   on   the   continental  scene  in  the  decade  of  the  1990s,  the  21st  century  is  witness  to  the  new   Climate  Change  threat,  and  we  do  not  know  what  to  make  of  its  projected  impacts   and   opportunities,   nor   how   to   analyze   and   forecast   its   consequences   on   already   fragile  African  political  and  social  systems.  A  framework  is  thus  urgently  needed  to   understand  the  impacts  of  Climate  Change  on  Africa’s  vulnerable  communities  and   countries,  and  devise  preventive  policy  solutions  realistic  in  the  context  of  existing   governance  structures.     In   this   thesis,   we   bring   Climate   Change   back   into   the   realm   of   policy   scrutiny.   We   delve   into   the   systemic   factors   that   spur   governments   to   take   Climate   Change   seriously,   and   confront   it   effectively   to   climate   proof   their   development   gains   and   engage   on   a   track   of   climate-­‐compatible   development.   Our   approach   to   test   our   framework  is  to  look  into  how  already  occurring  climate  changes  impacting  African   countries   are   currently   managed,   as   a   way   of   understanding   patterns   of   response,   and  predicting  how  they  will  likely  impact  and  be  managed  into  the  future.  Looking   into  the  past  to  predict  how  the  future  will  likely  unfold.    

                                                                                                               
2010),  19-­‐25.  

29  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007/08,  1.   30  World  Bank,  Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Synthesis  Report  (Washington  DC:  The  World  Bank,  

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We  focus  on  one  manifestation  of  Climate  Change  to  do  this:  climate-­‐related  extreme   events;   and   hone   in   specifically   on   how   countries   at   risk   are   currently   addressing   these,   as   a   means   of   inferring   how   they   will   respond   to   future   climate   hazards,   assuming   a   perfect   line   of   continuity   in   the   disaster   management   (DM)   policies   in   place.   In   the   cases   where   the   perfect   line   of   continuity   is   broken,   we   look   into   the   systemic  reasons  that  led  to  a  change  in  DM  policy,  in  order  to  derive  insights  into   what   factors   prompt   governments   to   adopt   better   policies   to   improve   their   management  of  climate  shocks.     Two   strategic   reasons   prompt   us   to   focus   on   the   governance   of   climate-­‐related   hazards  as  a  proxy  to  analyze  the  governance  of  Climate  Change  in  Africa:   1) A   confident   projection   for   Africa   that   future   Climate   Change   will   be   an   exacerbation   of   current   climate   variability.   As   such,   gaining   a   better   understanding   of   how   governments   currently   respond   when   climate   and   weather   fluctuations   occur   (i.e:   climate-­‐related   hazards)   allows   us   an   introspection   into   how   governments   will   most   likely   respond   to   future   hazards  –again  assuming  a  line  of  continuity  in  governance  of  these  climate   risks.   2) A   reasoned   possibility   that   Climate   Change   will   lead   to   an   increase   in   the   frequency   of   extreme   weather   events.   There   remains   a   lot   of   uncertainty   regarding   whether   climate-­‐related   threats   will   increase   with   CC;   current   scientific   evidence   suggests   this   (IPCC   2007).   The   death   toll   and   social,   economic   and   psychological   damages   generated   by   climate-­‐related   or   hydro-­‐ meteorological   disasters   at   their   current   frequency   levels   are   enough   however  to  put  their  governance  of  as  a  serious  object  of  study,  even  if  future   scientific   breakthroughs   do   not   demonstrate/project   an   increase   in   their   frequency.    

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What   we   already   know   is   that   “Africa   is   characterized   by   institutional   and   legal   frameworks   that   are,   in   some   cases,   insufficient   to   deal   with   environmental   degradation  and  disaster  risks”  (see  Sokona  and  Denton,  2001;  Beg  et  al.,  2001)31.       What  we  have  yet  to  find  however  is  how  much  degradation  and  risks  will  countries   in   Africa   absorb   before   they   engage   in   meaningful   institutional   reform?   What   are   the  general  triggers  of  such  institutional  reforms?     A  fundamental  related  question  of  interest  is  what  can  be  done  to  curtail  the  impacts   of   CC   on   African   countries,   by   these   countries   themselves,   and   ensure   effective   governance   of   Climate   Change   risks   and   opportunities,   in   order   to   thwart   their   negative  impacts  on  the  development  endeavor.  A  preliminary  answer  seems  to  be:   build   resilience   to   current   climate-­‐related   disasters,   since   they   will   likely   only   go   crescendo   with   CC32.   As   we   will   find   soon,   our   preliminary   findings   however   indicate  that  only  a  very  small  minority  of  Africa’s  fifty-­‐countries  is  doing  so.     Most   importantly   however,   we   are   interested   in   knowing   why   countries   in   Africa   adopt  the  climate  disaster  risk  management  policies  that  they  do.  What  prompts  or   deters  states  from  adopting  socially  beneficial  climate  disaster  risk  reduction  (CCA-­‐ DRR)   policies?   Which   factors   determine   African   governments’   response   to   Climate   Change?   Is   it   limited   knowledge   or   technical   expertise   on   national   vulnerability   to   climate   risks?   No   additional   financial   resources   to   tackle   climate   risks   and   opportunities?  Or  simply  no  political  buy-­‐in  to  govern  climate  change  and  avoid  its   detrimental  consequences?  We  get  to  these  reasons  and  detail  them  in  our  country   findings  chapters.                                                                                                                    
31  In  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  453-­‐4.  

32

 United  Nations  International  Strategy  for  Disaster  Reduction  (UNISDR),  Hyogo  Framework  for  Action  2005-­

2015:  Building  the  resilience  of  nations  and  communities  to  disasters  (Geneva:  United  Nations,  2007).  Accessed   March  29,  2011.  http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf  

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1.2. Research  Question  and  Hypotheses     1.2.1. Research  Questions     My  dissertation  aims  to  answer  the  fundamental  question:       How   are   countries   in   Africa   governing   rising   Hydro-­Meteorological   Disasters   (proxy   for   Climate   Change),   and   what   factors   determine   African   governments’   response  to  climate  shocks?         The   goal   of   the   present   research   is   to   test   whether   X   (hypothesized   Independent   Variables)   causes   Y   (adoption   of   socially   beneficial   institutions   to   meet   the   new   challenge   of   CC).   Is   GDP/capita,   disaster   frequency   or   an   accident   of   history   (hypothesized   Independent   Variables)   the   main   driver   of   the   observed   differences   in  climate  risk  management  institutional  frameworks  across  Africa,  or  do  alternative   hypotheses   hold   more   explanatory   power?   What   makes   African   countries   take   Climate  Change  and  its  associated  risks  seriously,  and  place  it  high  on  the  political   agenda?     Extensive  literature  exists  on  what  needs  to  be  done,  with  widespread  policy  advice,   guiding   interested   governments   in   the   adequate   design   of   institutions   effective   for   Climate   Change   Adaptation   (CCA)   and   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   (DRR),   including   establishing   early   warning   systems,   embedding   institutions   mandated   to   tackle   climate  risks  under  powerful  ministries  and  so  forth  (see  World  Resources  Report   2010-­‐11)33.   However   we   have   yet   to   understand   what   MAKES   governments   adopt   these   effective   institutions,   uptake   all   of   this   advice   and   engage   in   institutional   change  to  better  deliver  on  the  new  demand  for  effective  CCA-­‐DRR.                                                                                                                      
33  World  Resources  Institute  (WRI)  in  collaboration  with  United  Nations  Development  Programme,  United  

Nations  Environment  Programme,  and  World  Bank.  World  Resources  2010–2011:  Decision  Making  in  a  Changing   Climate—Adaptation  Challenges  and  Choices,  ed.  P.  S.  Angell  et  al.  (Washington,  DC:  WRI,  2011),  70-­‐79.  

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Our  general  question  has  two  sub-­‐components:       1) How  do  countries  in  Africa  confront  rising  HMDs?        What   policies   have   African   governments   experimented   with   to   confront   rising   climate-­‐related  disasters  between  1995-­‐2010?      What   is   the   current   institutional   architecture   in   place   to   govern   climate-­‐related   disasters  at  national-­‐level?  Where  is  climate  finance  coming  from  and  flowing  to?     2) What   factors   prompt   governments   in   Africa   to   effectively   govern   climate-­ related  risks?      What  factors  prompt/deter  a  State  from  adopting  socially  beneficial  institutions   to   address   the   new   demand   for   climate   change   adaptation   –   disaster   risk   reduction  (CCA-­‐DRR)?      What   incentives   make   countries   adopt   policies   that   prevent   HMD   impacts   and   climate   disaster-­‐proof   development   gains?   What   are   enabling   and   limiting   conditions?    Under   which   institutional,   political   and   socio-­‐economic   circumstances   does   a   country  adopt  CCA-­‐DRR  measures?    What  have  been  the  pathways  for  pressure/change?      More   generally,   what   makes   governments   adopt   socially   beneficial   policies   and   institutions?  What  are  obstacles  to  achieving  socially  beneficial  institutions  in  the   context  of  Africa’s  governance?     These  two  subsets  serve  as  the  research  questions  I  will  be  specifically  investigating.             •   18  

1.2.2. Hypotheses    
  RQ1: Which   policy   responses   have   African   countries   provided   to   govern     rising  HMDs  in  1995-­2010?    

     H1.1  :  Most  African  countries  satisfy  with  ex-­post  response  when  they  are  hit   by   HMDs,   because   they   do   not   have   or   apply   pre-­defined   procedures   for   disaster  management.    
 

 H1.2:     Current   national   climate   adaptation/disaster   management   policies   are  not  aligned  with  priority  local  adaptation  needs  on  the  ground,  because   a   disconnect   exists   between   national   policy-­making   on   CCA   and   local   realities.  
 
         

RQ2: What  factors  prompt  States  to  establish  institutions  for  effective  

CCA-­DRR?  

What   incentives   prompt   States   to   adopt   the   policies   and   institutional   frameworks   that   they   do   in   response   to   rising   climate-­‐related   risks?   Here,   we   probe   the   incentives   and   pressure   channels   for   effective   CCA-­‐DRR   in   the   context   of   Africa’s   governance.   An   incentives   analysis   will   enable   such   a   probing,   with   a   deep   look   into   the  incentives  systems  that  modulate  the  reality  of  African  governance  of  CC.       Our  working  hypotheses  are  as  follows.      H2.1:   Climate-­related   disasters   reshape   political   relationships   at   the   sub-­ national-­level,   because   they   create   new   channels   of   pressure   from   the   base   that  make  the  government  pay  attention  to  the  needs  of  local  citizens.     19  

•  

 H2.2:   Severe   past   disaster(s)   prompt(s)   governments   to   engage   in   ex-­ante   preparedness   for   HMDs,   since   wherever   there   have   been   multiple   severe   disasters,   national   leaders   have   reformed   national   climate-­disaster   management  policies/institutional  frameworks.      H2.3:   Donor   pressure   drives   policy   change   in   national   climate   disaster   management,  through  increased  funding  earmarked  for  CCA-­DRR.  
 

 H2.4:   Government   capacity   matters,   because   poor   countries   are   not   able   to   carry  out  ex-­ante  disaster  preparation.  
  This  last  hypothesis  runs  as  follows:  State  capacity  (fiscal)  determines  the  type  of  disaster   management  policy  in  place  in  the  country.  Wealthier,  more  capacitated  countries  engage  in   ex-­ante   disaster   preparation   and   generate   better   disaster   outcomes,   whereas   poorer,   weaker  countries  only  respond  to  disasters  and  manage  disasters  poorly.     H2.4-­a:   Government   Capacity   is   positively   related   with   Disaster   management   policy   (yes,  capacity  does  matter)     H2.4-­b:  Capacity  does  not  matter  as  much  as  Institutions  do  (strength  of  relationship   between   Institutions   and   Disaster   Policy   more   significant   than   strength   of   relationship  between  Capacity  and  Disaster  Policy).  

  The   present   thesis   is   dedicated   to   responding   to   these   specific   research   questions   and  testing  the  above-­‐outlined  hypotheses.     Figure  1.2  summarizes  our  main  hypotheses.  

•  

20  

• Cyclone   • Flood   • Drought   • Storm   • Landslide  

Competing   Independent   Variables  (cause):   Dependent  Variable   (effect):  
• HMD  frequency/ magnitude   • Donor  pressure  for   improved  CCA-­‐DRR   • Climate  Finance:  Aid   earmarked  for  CCA-­‐DRR   • State  capacity:  GDP/ capita     • Dedicated  leadership   • Key  political  bastion  at   risk   • Extensive  Media  coverage   of  disaster  impacts     • Institutional  change  in  the   management  of  climate   risks:    adoption  of  socially   benevicial  institutions  to   address  the  new  challenge   of  CCA-­‐DRR  

Climate  Hazard  Hits  

 
Figure  1.2:  Hypothesized  Independent  Variables,  and  pathway  of  cause  and  effect.    

1.3. Methods     In   order   to   test   our   hypotheses,   we   focus   on   one   analyzable   sub-­‐set   of   projected   Climate   Change   impacts   for   Africa:   risks   of   extreme   weather   events,   which   if   un-­‐ buffered,   translate   into   large-­‐scale   disasters.   Our   hypothesis-­‐testing   is   rooted   in   empirical   evidence   emerging   from   across   Africa,   with   cases   from   Senegal,   Uganda   and   Mozambique,   where   we   analyze   the   performance   of   current   governance   schemes   at   the   national,   sub-­‐national   and   local   levels   to   manage   climate   risks   and   address   the   adaptation   needs   of   communities   at   the   frontlines   of   Climate   Change   impacts,  as  a  proxy  for  assessing  how  well  these  systems  will  manage  exacerbated   climate  risks  in  the  future,  assuming  perfect  policy  continuity.      

•  

21  

We   circumscribe   our   analysis   to   the   period   beginning   in   1995,   when   a   consistent   rise   in   HMDs   began   to   be   observed   in   Africa   (see   fig.   1.1),   up   until   2010,   when   enough  reliable  data  is  available  in  each  country.       A   three-­‐phase   research   and   analysis   plan   enabled   us   to   answer   our   research   question:   phase   1   of   this   research   is   dedicated   to   identifying   policies   in   place   to   confront  HMDs  across  Africa,  while  phase  2  zooms  in  at  community-­‐level  to  assess   the   adequacy   of   national   policies   to   address   local   adaption   needs,   and   phase   3   delves  into  an  incentives  analysis  of  why  a  given  policy  in  each  country  came  to  be.       We   used   a   mixed   design   (of   both   quantitative   and   qualitative   methods),   involving   two   units   of   analysis:   the   household   and   the   nation-­‐state.   We   avoided   the   ecological   fallacy   by   drawing   conclusions   in   each   of   the   parts   of   our   analysis   that   only   apply   to   the  units  of  analysis  under  consideration  in  that  part.  For  instance,  the  goal  of  phase   1  is  to  identify  the  various  policies  in  place  across  Africa  to  address  climate-­‐related   disasters;   the   conclusion   from   that   first   part   were   then   used   to   select   cases   illustrating  each  type  of  policy.  The  goal  of  this  endeavor  differs  from  that  of  phase   2’s,   which   seeks   to   assess   which   of   the   policies   categorized   in   phase   1   is   most   aligned   with   local   communities’   adaptation   needs,   zooming   in   on   households   within   communities   that   were   severely   hit   by   disasters   (hence   the   change   in   units   of   analysis).   The   insights   reached   in   this   section   were   only   applied   to   the   communities   under   consideration.   Finally,   we   returned   to   the   nation-­‐state   in   our   final   analysis   phase   to   identify   what   factors   in   the   context   of   Africa’s   governance   reality   could   incentivize  governments  across  Africa  to  adopt  the  latter  policy.  The  different  goals   of  each  research  phase  justify  the  different  units  of  analysis.     1.3.1. A  note  on  Sampling      Selection  of  country  case  studies:       Country   cases   have   been   selected   based   on   a   continent-­‐wide   classification   of   the   different  climate-­‐related  disaster  management  policies  in  place  at  the  national-­‐level.   • 22    

For   the   purposes   of   this   research,   we   have   hypothesized   three   distinct   climate   disaster  management  policy  types  across  Africa:   1) The   Policy   of   ex-­post   response   to   disasters   (the   “Firefighters”):   countries   choosing   not   to,   or   unable,   to   address   disasters   until   they   occur.   Countries   in   this  category  solely  respond  to  disasters  after  they  have  occurred,  mobilizing   any   personnel   available   and   sending   them   to   disaster   sites.   For   this   reason   we  label  them:  the  Firefighters.  Official  emergency  response  in  the  countries   of  this  category  is  characterized  by  amateurism  and  improvisation,  and  there   are  no  pre-­‐established  well-­‐rehearsed  procedures  to  follow.     2) The   Policy   of   ex-­ante   preparedness   for   disasters   (the   “Prepared   Firefighters”):  Countries  in  this  category  have  experienced  a  paradigm  shift   in  their  strategy  to  address  disasters  and  have  transitioned  from  responding   to   disasters   only   after   they   occur,   to   preparing   for   them   before   they   occur   (ex-­‐ante  preparation)  so  as  to  ensure  more  efficiency  and  swiftness  in  relief   operations.     3) The   Policy   of   pro-­‐active   disaster   prevention   allying   ex-­ante   preparedness   for   disasters   AND   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   (the   Disaster   Preventers):   Finally   countries  in  the  third  category  have  shifted  the  focus  away  from  the  disaster   events   towards   the   prevention   of   disasters.   They   focus   on   pre-­empting   disasters   by   reducing   disaster   risk/vulnerability   so   that   hazards   may   not   turn   into   disasters,   using   weather   forecasts,   early   warning   systems,   risk/vulnerability   mapping,   and   other   related   tools   for   climate   risk   management.       We   delve   in-­‐depth   in   the   methods   and   results   our   cross-­‐continental   classification   of   African  countries  by  climate  disaster  management  type  in  chapters  4  and  5.     Following   our   classification   of   all   of   Africa’s   fifty-­‐three   countries,   we   selected   a   country  case  study  from  each  policy  type  and  use  that  country  to  make  inferences   for  the  entire  policy  group.  This  approach  is  inherently  prescriptive:  we  am  trying  to   arrive   at   a   policy   that   can   be   recommended   to   African   governments,   and   others   • 23    

across  the  developing  world  scrambling  to  find  strategies  to  address  the  challenge   of   climate   adaptation,   with   an   extensive   explanation   of   the   particular   circumstances   under  which  the  latter  policy  generally  arises  and  is  implemented  in  a  country.       As   one   may   notice,   we   worry   about   case   selection.   Our   preliminary   cross-­‐ continental   classification   of   countries   by   climate-­‐disaster   management   policy   type   in  Africa  serves  as  an  attempt  to  use  objective  criterions  to  select  the  cases  studies   we  consider  in  this  research.  As  cautioned  by  Adam  Przeworski  in  his  contribution   to  the  Symposium  on  the  Role  of  Theory  in  Comparative  Politics34:    
  “We  are  often  told  to  find  cases  that  are  as  similar  as  possible,  in  as  many  aspects  as  possible,  and  then   find   a   crucial   difference   that   can   explain   what   one   wants   to   explain.   In   so   doing   however,   we   rig   our   research   to   reach   the   results   we   want   to   reach.   There   is   a   need   to   worry   about   selection,   and   try   our   ultimate  best  to  eliminate  selection  bias  when  selecting  cases  and  making  inferences  in  a  world  that  is   often  not  exogenous  [...]  Is  the  mechanism  by  which  our  observations  are  produced  independent  of  what   we   are   trying   to   explain   or   not?   Unless   we   pass   that   test,   we   will   be   making   biased   inferences.   Our   outcomes  will  be  due  to  selection,  not  “treatment”.  Use  objective  case  selection  criterions”.  

 

The   independent   mechanism   that   we   devised   to   generate   our   country   cases   is   encapsulated  in  the  first  part  of  our  research:  an  identification  of  all  the  policies  in   place   across   Africa   to   address   mounting   hydro-­‐meteorological   disasters.   The   typology  of  policies  we  defined  guided  our  country  case  selection  process,  and  one   country  was  selected  to  illustrate  each  policy  type.  Once  selected,  we  delved  into  our   country  cases  and  used  them  as  case  studies.  The  only  biases  that  were  introduced   when   selecting   between   different   country   options   within   the   same   policy   group   were   personal   preferences   on   ability   to   conduct   research   in   certain   countries   relative  to  others  (more  in  Methods  chapter);  as  well  as  a  concern  to  keep  selected   countries   as   comparable   as   possible   (similar   on   at   least   n   variables)   across   policy   types   to   rule   out   a   number   of   competing   independent   variables   that   could   explain   differing  institutional  outcomes.                                                                                                                   •  

34  Kohli,  Atul,  Peter  Evans,  Peter  J.  Katzenstein,  Adam  Przeworski,  Susanne  HoeberRudolph,  James  C.  Scott  and  

Theda  Skocpol,  “The  Role  of  Theory  in  Comparative  Politics:  A  Symposium”,  World  Politics  48-­‐1  (1995),  1-­‐49,  17.    

24  

Thus   I   got   to   my   three   principal   country   cases:   Senegal   (representing   the   climate   disaster   responders   policy   group),   Uganda   (to   infer   for   the   Disaster   Prepared   Firefighters’   group)   and   Mozambique   (representing   the   effective   climate   disaster   averters).  On  this  basis,  we  conducted  our  cross-­‐country  comparison  of  triggers  of   institutional  adaptation  to  meet  the  challenge  of  rising  climate-­‐related  disasters.     Then,  in  each  country  we  asked:  how  were  climate  related  shocks  governed  in  1995-­‐ 2010?   Which   national   policy   was   in   place,   what   was   the   institutional/governance   landscape:   how   was   management   of   climate-­‐related   hazards   organized?   How   well   did   the   national   policy   in   place   address   local   adaptation   needs?   What   are   constraints/enabling   conditions   prompted   the   government   to   implement   the   climate  disaster  management  policy  solution  that  it  did?      Selection  of  community  case  studies:       In   order   to   fully   understand   the   impacts   of   disasters   on   communities,   we   also   carried  out  extended  fieldwork  in  the  most  severely  impacted  communities  within   my  principal  country  cases.  Random  selection  was  used  to  select  amongst  different   climate   disaster   hotspots   –communities   most   severely   impacted   by   HMDs   in   each   country   case.   Within   the   selected   communities,   a   significant   sample   of   the   population   was   surveyed   (an   average   of   30%   of   all   households   in   each   target   community),   following   a   community-­‐based   Vulnerability   and   Capacity   Assessment   (VCA)  methodology  toolbox  that  uses  both  a  standard  questionnaire  gathering  data   about   my   key   variables   under   study,   as   well   as   extended   focus   group   interviews   with  male  and  female  members  of  the  community.  Again  households  were  selected   using  random  sampling  (every  6th  household  on  our  way,  walking).       We   get   more   in   depth   into   the   VCA   methodology   and   results   of   these   community-­‐ level  data  mining  in  the  Methods  chapter  as  well  as  in  country  chapters.     Then   in   each   community   we   asked:   what   are   local   needs   for   adaptation   to   rising   HMDs,   in   excess   of   local   capacity   to   cope   with   their   impacts?   How   relevant   and   • 25    

adequate   are   local   and   national   plans/policies   in   place   to   meet   these   local   needs   for   adaptation?   Based   on   answers   to   these   questions,   we   reach   a   final   assessment   of   adequacy  of  current  governance  schemes  to  manage  climate  related  risks,  one  that   is  both  quantitative  and  qualitative.     1.4. Preliminary  Findings     What  we  have  found  is  that  communities  at  the  frontline  across  Africa  are  already   bearing  the  burden  of  coping  with  increased  climate-­‐related  shocks,  such  as  floods,   drought   and   cyclones,   which   currently   exert   a   heavy   economic   and   human   toll   on   already   marginalized   communities.   Extreme-­‐weather   events,   fruit   of   both   intrinsic   and   anthropogenic   disruptions   in   the   continent’s   highly   variable   climates,   are   an   immediate  threat  to  development  in  these  communities  and  countries,  and  are  likely   to  become  so  for  many  others  as  climate  variability  increases  and  unpreparedness,   as  well  as  dependence  on  climate  factors,  persists.     What   this   dissertation   reveals   is   that   institutional   adaptation   to   meet   the   new   challenge   of   Climate   Change   in   Africa   is   often   an   issue   eminently   path-­‐dependent.   Only  when  accidents  of  history  occured  –  in  this  case,  high-­‐impact  HMDs  that  have   hit   countries   of   Africa   with   increasing   frequency   in   recent   years,   wrecking   havoc   and   leaving   governments   with   no   choice   but   to   adapt   or   perish–   has   institutional   change   ensued   to   deliver   more   effective   governance   of   the   Climate   Change   challenge,  setting  the  country  on  a  new  track  and  institutional  pathway.       More  generally,  this  thesis  offers  us  a  theory  for  why  governments  adopt  societally   beneficial   policies   and   establish   coherent   institutional   frameworks.   The   path   forward  for  effective  mangement  of  climate  risks  is  political  incentives  that  ensure   that  DRR-­‐CCA  is  placed  high  on  the  national  agenda,  and  institutionalized  within  a   coherent  national  framework  for  Climate  Change  adaptation  in  order  to  give  a  real   chance  for  Climate  Change  risks  to  be  effectly  governed  in  Africa.  These  incentives   have   to   come   from   within,   however,   stemming   from   a   strong   national   demand   for   • 26    

improved   CCA-­‐DRR,   which   in   turn   leads   to   the   development   of   endogenous   institutions   to   seriously   confront   rising   climate   risks   and   manage   new   climate   opportunities.  As  our  country  cases  will  evidence,  the  national  demand  for  effective   national  institutions  to  confront  the  CC  challenge  can  only  be  country-­‐driven.  Once   this   national   desire   is   formed,   donor   support   in   the   development   of   coherent   national   policies   and   institutional   mechanisms   are   needed.   However,   national   driving  of  this  process  is  an  essential  needed  pre-­‐requisite.     Understanding   these   political   underpinnings   of   policy   and   institutional   change   is   an   important   pre-­‐requisite   for   all   the   activists   and   programs   promoting   Climate   Change   adaptation   on   the   continent,   and   expecting   governments   to   uptake   these   programs.       1.5. Plan     The   present   thesis   is   organized   in   four   parts.   Part   1   introduces   the   conceptual   foundations   of   this   research,   part   II   details   our   methodology   and   experimental   design,   part   III   exposes   results   and   country   findings   and   the   final   part   brings   together   comparative   insights   and   conclusions   emanating   from   cross-­‐country   analysis.     In  part  I,  we  introduce  concepts,  and  attempt  to  build  a  common  understanding  of   the   implications   of   Climate   Change   for   Africa,   and   why   it   is   an   urgent   problem,   increasingly  gaining  prominence  on  national  agendas  across  the  continent.       We   first   conduct   in   chapter   2   a   literature   review   of   the   hypotheses   that   explain   institutional   change   in   general,   and   institutional   change   in   response   to   climate   shocks   in   particular,   and   strongly   pin   our   research   against   the   extensive   theory   of   institutional  change  in  Africa;  before  then  going  in-­‐depth  into  the  scientific  basis  of   Climate   Change   (its   causes,   key   concepts,   consequences,   projected   impacts   over   Africa  and  uncertainties)  in  chapter  3.     •   27  

Part   II   offers   a   detailed   exposition   of   the   experimental   design   and   methods   we   have   used   to   conduct   our   comparative   analysis   of   climate-­‐related   disaster   management   policies   across   Africa.   Chapter   4   thus   exposes   in   detail   our   research   design   and   methodology.  In  this  part,  we  delve  into  the  methods  utilized  to  conduct  our  cross-­‐ country   comparison   of   climate-­‐related   disaster   policies   across   Africa,   and   present   the   results   of   this   classification,   basis   of   my   country   case   selection.   We   will   see   a   map  of  Africa  shaded  in  three  different  colors:  red  for  the  large  majority  of  countries   that  are  solely  disaster  responders;  yellow  for  the  handful  of  countries  that  are  on   the   track   of   disaster   preparedness   for   effective   response   to   HMDs   when   these   occur   (the  “Prepared  Firefighters”);  and  finally,  green  for  the  six  countries  that  qualify  as   effective   disaster   preventers   and   have   shifted   focus   away   from   disaster   events   to   combating  the  underlying  factors  of  disaster  risk  and  vulnerability.     Part   III,   the   crux   of   this   research,   presents   our   results   and   encapsulates   country   chapters.  Chapter  5  displays  the  results  from  our  Africa-­‐wide  country  classification   by   disaster   management   policy.   Chapter   6   presents   the   findings   from   the   “RED”   policy   group-­‐   Senegal   serving   as   the   principal   case   study   to   illustrate   this   policy   type.  Chapter  7  is  dedicated  to  the  “YELLOW”  policy  group,  principally  centered  on   findings   from   Uganda,   whereas   chapter   8   presents   the   findings   from   the   “GREEN”   policy   group,   represented   by   Mozambique.   These   country   chapters   summarize   the   insights   and   findings   emanating   from   each   country   case,   with   inferences   made   for   the   entire   policy   group   regarding   the   incentives   that   generated   the   specific   policy   type  in  place.     Finally,   part   IV,   the   closing   section   of   this   research,   draws   the   conclusions   emanating   from   our   cross-­‐country   comparison   of   disaster   management   policies   to   address   rising   HMDs   in   Africa.     Chapter   9   comparatively   presents   the   insights   coming   from   our   country   cases,   and   outlines   what   the   most   optimal   policy   to   address   rising   HMDs   in   Africa   appears   to   be.   We   end   with   a   closing   chapter   that   draws   the   conclusions   and   perspectives   that   our   comparative   research   offers   for   •   28  

better  governance  of  Climate  Change  risks  and  opportunities  on  the  continent,  and   for  the  curtailing  of  its  socio-­‐economic  impacts.     All  in  all,  our  dissertation  will  have  generated:   1) A   continental   assessment   of   what   Climate   Change   brings   and   implicates   for   African  policy-­‐makers  and  ordinary  citizens;   2) An  innovative  methodology  to  assess  local  communities’  adaptation  needs,  in   excess   of   their   local   capacities   to   cope   –the   climate   adapted   version   of   the   Red  Cross  Vulnerability  and  Capacity  Assessments  (VCAs);   3) A  cross-­‐continental   picture   of   the   different   policies   in   place   to   address   rising   climate  related  risks,  as  well  as  an  assessment  of  these  policies  based  on  their   ability  to  respond  to  community  adaptation  needs;   4) Policy  solution(s)  for  African  countries  to  address  the  risks  and  opportunities   created  by  Climate  Change,  as  well  as  recommendations  on  where  to  invest   the   new   influx   of   climate   finance   and   optimal   institutional   arrangements   to   put  in  place  in  order  to  effectively  govern  climate  risks.  These  solutions  are   rooted   in   the   successful   experiences   of   other   African   countries   and   in   the   reality  of  Africa’s  governance  incentives;     5) A   deeper,   more-­‐contextualized   understanding   of   how   the   projected   socio-­‐ economic,   political   and   cultural   impacts   of   Climate   Change   will   concretely   play   out   in   African   countries,   through   which   pathways   of   cause   and   effect,   and   with   what   implications   for   development   prospects   on   the   continent   of   Africa.     A  final  note  on  conceptual  definitions:  All  throughout  this  thesis,  we  will  define  and   redefine.  This  is  an  attempt  to  build  common  ground  and  understanding,  in  order  to   bridge   two   very   different   epistemic   communities   that   each   have   their   own   research   agendas,   approaches   and   conceptual   frameworks   as   well   as   research   customs,   yet   which   my   topic   brings   together:   the   classic   development/social   science   (political   science,   anthropology   and   economics)   community   and   the   global   climate/environmental   change   natural   scientists.   These   two   research   communities   • 29    

seldom   work   jointly.   Despite   intensifying   efforts   to   bridge   them,   they   remain   two   separate   communities   of   practice.   Thus,   we   will   be   painstakingly   throughout   this   thesis  attempt  to  clarify  each  concept  we  use,  as  a  way  forward  to  build  a  common   understanding  of  the  topic  of  climate  change  national  institutions  and  institutional   adaptation.  

   

•  

30  

  PART  I:  

 

   
Theories  of  Institutional  Change:  New  Institutionalism  Revisited       Towards  a  Theory  of  Institutional  Adaptation  to  Meet  the  New   Challenge  of  Climate  Change  Governance  in  Africa    
                                          •   31  

In   this   first   part,   we   conduct   a   literature   review   of   the   hypotheses   that   explain   institutional  change   in   general,   and   institutional   change   or   adaptation   for   effective   Climate  Change  governance  in  particular,  and  strongly  pin  our  research  against  the   theory  of  institutional  change  in  Africa.       We   then   go   in-­‐depth   into   the   conceptual   linkages   between   Climate   Change   Adaptation  (identifying  and  preparing  for  likely  future  changes  in  climate/weather   patterns),   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   (concerned   with   managing   the   root   causes   of   disasters),   the   Development   endeavor   in   Africa   (dedicated   to   poverty   alleviation   and  building  community  resilience)  –what  we  coin  as  the  Triple  bottom  line  of  CCA-­‐ DRR-­‐Development  –  and  Governance  (sets  of  actors/networks,  rule  making  systems   and   formal   and   informal   rules   that   steer   societies   towards   collective   goals).   Here,   we  attempt  to  understand  why  the  challenge  of  Climate  Change  Adaptation  requires   new  or  adapted  institutions  to  meet  the  triple  bottom  line  of  DRR-­‐CCA-­‐Development   in  Africa.       This   thesis   addresses   the   fundamental   question   of   how   policies/institutions   get   changed.  Much  literature  exists  on  institutional  change,  notably  with  multiple  case   studies   over   Africa.   In   our   thesis,   we   test   institutional   change   theory   on   the   new   quandary  of  institutional  adaptation  to  meet  the  climate  change  challenge,  in  all  of   the   case   countries   where   we   conducted   research.   What   brought   about   change   in   institutions  in  place  to  address  the  new  issue  of  Climate  Change  in  these  countries?   Does   this   process   of   institutional   change   confirm   existing   theory   on   sources   of   institutional  change?  Do  the  theoretical  hypotheses  hold?     Firstly,   we   review   the   literature   on   institutional   change   however   and   its   founding   precepts,  before  we  move  on  to  apply  institutional  change  theory  to  our  analysis  of   Climate  Change  institutions  in  Africa.         •   32  

CHAPTER  2:       THEORIES  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGE:  INSTITUTIONALISM  REVISITED       2.1 Institutionalism  vs.  New  Historical  Institutionalism     A   focus   on   institutions   as   explanatory   variables   for   societal   outcomes   is   not   new.   Indeed,   the   study   of   institutions   or   Institutionalism   dates   back   to   the   early   20th   century  after  World  War  I,  when  American  political  scientists  began  systematically   studying   European   political   systems,   comparing   concepts   such   as:   presidential   vs.   parliamentarian   systems,   federal   vs.   unitary,   the   structure   of   political   parties,   the   origins,  nature  and  impact  of  democratic,  socialist  and  fascist  regimes35.  The  focus  of   that  body  of  literature  however  was  formal  legalistic,  and  did  not  factor  in  informal   and  dynamic  variables  as:  interest  groups,  public  opinion,  political  parties,  process   variables,  input  functions,  decision-­‐making  and  the  processes  of  change  (see  Wiarda   in   Rustow   and   Erickson)36.     When   the   world   changed   again   after   WWII,   and   the   newly  independent  nations  of  Africa  and  Asia  emerged  onto  the  world  scene,   a  new   framework   was   needed   to   account   for   processes   of   political   change   in   the   new   nations   of   the   third-­‐world,   as   compared   to   the   development   process.   The   field   of   political  development  was  born  as  a  response  to  this  need.     For   many   decades   after   that,   as   deep-­‐seated   ideological   battles   raged   between   Modernization   theorists   (see   Almond   and   Verba37,   Lipset38   and   Rostow39)   and   Dependencia   neo-­‐marxists   (see   Samir   Amin40,   as   well   as   Huntington’s   1968   critique                                                                                                                  
35  Rustow,  Dankwart  A.,  and  Kenneth  P.  Erickson  (eds.),  Comparative  Political  Dynamics  (New  York:  Harper  

Collins,  1991)  
36  Ibidem   37  Almond,  Gabriel  A.,  and  Sydney  Verba,  The  Civic  Culture:  Political  Attitudes  and  Democracy  in  Five  Nations  

(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1963)  
38  Lipset,  Seymour  M.,  "Some  Social  Requisites  of  Democracy",  American  Political  Science  Review  53  no.  1  (1959):  

69-­‐105  

39   Rustow,   Dankwart   A.,   “Transitions   to   Democracy:   Toward   a   Dynamic   Model”,   Comparative   Politics   2-­‐3   (1970):  

337-­‐363  
40  Amin,  Samir,  Imperialism  and  Unequal  Development  (New  York:  Monthly  Review,  1977)  

•  

33  

of   developmentalism41,   Gunder   Frank42   and   Cardoso43),   the   focus   on   institutions   was  lost.  However,  institutions  were  again  brought  back  onto  the  table  in  the  decade   of  the  1980s,  as  a  response  to  neo-­‐classical  economic  theory,  which  was  perceived   as   a-­‐historical.   This   literature   that   reenacted   institutionalism   was   coined   the   ‘New   Institutionalism’,   and   came   to   the   fore   in   the   late   1980s   with   dynamic   proponents   such   as   Douglas   North   and   Mancur   Olson.   The   new   school   of   thought   placed   very   strong   focus   on   historical   processes   as   explanations   for   institutional   outcomes,   which  have  bought  the  body  of  literature  its  name  of  Historical  Institutionalism.     New   historical   institutionalism   is   concerned   with   explaining   through   case   studies   and   process   tracing   why   a   particular   historical   outcome   occurs,   then   generalizing   from  it.  North44  and  Olson45  highlight  the  importance  of  institutions,  among  others.   The   work   of   Engerman   and   Sokoloff46   emphasizes   the   historical   roots   of   institutional  differences  (often  tracing  it  back  to  colonization).       Two   competing   explanations   however   need   to   be   distinguished   within   Historical   Institutionalism:   structural   explanations   of   institutional   change,   and   agent-­‐based   explanations  of  institutional  change.  Both  approaches  explain  through  case  studies   and  process  tracing  why  a  particular  historical  outcome  (social  or  political)  ensues.   Fundamental   epistemological   differences   exist   however   in   the   assumptions   and   methods   of   these   two   approaches.   Table   2.1   summarizes   the   differences   between   the  two  different  explanations  of  sources  of  institutional  change.    
  Table  2.1:  Agent-­based  vs.  Structuralist  Institutional  Change  Theories  under  Historical   Institutionalism  

 

 

                                                                                                               
41  Huntington,  Samuel  P.,  Political  Order  in  Changing  Societies  (New  Haven  :  Yale  University  Press,  1968)   42  G.  Frank,  Andre,  Latin  America:  Underdevelopment  and  Revolution  (New  York:  Monthly  Review  Press,  1970)   43  Cardoso,  Fernando  H.,  and  Faletto  Enzo,  Dependency  and  Development  in  Latin  America,  trans.  by  Marjory  M.  

Urguidi  (Berkeley  :  University  of  California  Press,  1979)  
44  North,  Douglass,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance  (Cambridge:  Cambridge   45  Olson,  Mancur,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development”,  American  Political  Science  Review  87  (1993):  

University  Press,  1990)  

46

567-­‐76   Stanley  L.  Engerman,  and  Kenneth  L.  Sokoloff,  "Factor  Endowments,  Inequality,  and  Paths  of  Development     among  New  World  Economies,"  Economia  3  1  (2002):  41-­‐101  

•  

34  

 

Explanation   of   institutional   change    

AGENT-­BASED  Institutional  Change   Theory   (Quantitative  equilibria  for  mutual   profit-­‐maximizing  among  rational   players  explain  institutional  outcomes)    Institutional  outcome  is  most   often  the  result  of  rational  purposeful   behavior  by  players      History  as  the  outcome  of   rational  and  purposeful  behavior  based   on  the  idea  of  equilibrium,  not  a  result   of  historically  pre-­‐determined   outcomes      Institutional  change  ensues   from:   -­‐  Agents’  desire  for  improved  societal   performance  (or  campaigning  on  this   platform),  aligns  private  interests  with   public  ones,  leading  to  socially  efficient   outcomes   -­‐  Local  demands  that  determine  new   political  opportunities/constraints  at   the  local  level  forcing  national  leaders  to   put  local  demands  on  the  national   agenda  

STRUCTURAL  Institutional  Change  Theory                        (Path  dependence,  and  accidents  /randomness                  explain  institutional  outcomes)  

Main   theorists  

Arguments  

 

 

 Most  often  systemic,  structural  and   accidental  factors  determine  institutional   outcomes    Accidents  of  history  and  randomness   (conjunctures),  as  well  as  path  dependence,  lead   to  particular  institutional  configurations    Examples  of  conjunctures  (accidents  of   history)  are:   Exogenous  conjunctures:   -­‐  Economic  crises     -­‐  Agendas  of  international  funding  agencies   promoting  democracy   -­‐  Colonial  domination/arrival   -­‐  War  /  revolution   -­‐  Natural  disaster  (North)     Endogenous  conjunctures:   -­‐  Weak  military  capacity  of  a  regime  (Theda   Skocpol)   -­‐  Existence  of  a  well-­‐capacitated  government  body   to  manage  issue   -­‐  Factor  endowments  /  country’s  geography   (Engerman/Sokoloff)  or  being  an  area  of  low   population  density  (Herbst)  or  low  mortality   (Acemoglu  et  al.)       -­‐  Informal  behavior  (e.g.:  gossip  in  Scott’s  Weapons   of  the  Weak)      Catherine  Boone    Barrington   Moore,   Theda   Skocpol,   Sam    Grindle   Huntington:  the  precursors    To  a  certain  extent  Acemoglu  &    North,   Geddes,   Herbst,   Englebert,   Mancur   Jonson  also     Olson:  the  main  advocates     NB:   Different   from   the   old   formal   legalistic   Institutionalism,   focused   on   the   comparative   analysis  of  legal  systems  and  structures    Institutional  invention  is    Institutions  (rules  of  the  game)  constrain  the   possible,  and  has  been  enacted   behavior  of  organizations  (players  in  the   in  countries  of  Latin  America.   game),  both  politically  and  economically.    In   Individual  agency  matters   turn,  institutions  are  humanly  devised.  This   (mostly  when  politicians  have   apparent  tension  between  agency  and   campaigned  on  a  platform  of   determinism  is  resolved  with  the  theory  of   societal  performance   path  dependence.   improvement)  and  it  needs  to    If  the  institutional  setting  and  the  state  are   be  understood  within  the  prism   bad  for  the  economy  and  for  societal   of  behavioral  science,  and  not   performance  at  large,  why  don't  the   rational  choice  alone  (Merilee   individuals  in  society  just  change  the   Grindle)   institutions  for  the  better?  The answer to this problem from North is that institutional change  In  Africa,  local  level   is path dependent.  Path  dependence  is  based   configurations  of  power  and   on  the  idea  that  it  is  problematic  and   interest  matter  and  determine   "costly"  to  change  paths.  Path  dependence   institutional  outcomes  (Boone)   explains  why  economies  get  stuck  in  an    Regimes  “choose”  the   institutional  framework  that  is  not  efficient   institutional-­‐building  strategies   or  does  not  induce  growth  and  at  large   that  maximize  their  advantage   improved  societal  performance.   in  particular  (local)  political   • 35    Institutional  Change  is  overwhelmingly   contexts.  The  result  is  differing   incremental  and  Slow,  as  institutional   institutional  strategies  of  rural   outcomes  are  in  large  part  historically   incorporation,  or  neglect,   determined  (path  dependence).   within  even  a  same  country.    Within  institutional  framework,   “State  building  strategies  differ  

Arguments  

Institutional  invention  is   possible,  and  has  been  enacted   in  countries  of  Latin  America.   Individual  agency  matters   (mostly  when  politicians  have   campaigned  on  a  platform  of   societal  performance   improvement)  and  it  needs  to   be  understood  within  the  prism   of  behavioral  science,  and  not   rational  choice  alone  (Merilee   Grindle)   In  Africa,  local  level   configurations  of  power  and   interest  matter  and  determine   institutional  outcomes  (Boone)   Regimes  “choose”  the   institutional-­‐building  strategies   that  maximize  their  advantage   in  particular  (local)  political   contexts.  The  result  is  differing   institutional  strategies  of  rural   incorporation,  or  neglect,   within  even  a  same  country.   “State  building  strategies  differ   because  rulers  face  different   challenges  and  opportunities”   (Boone,  2003).     Thus,  one  of  the  critical  ways  to   guarantee  socially  efficient   institutional  outcomes  is   through  adequate  political   institutions  which  link  the  City   to  the  countryside.  As  she   contends,  “one  of  Africa’s  top   development  priorities  is  to   reform  and  strengthen  the   political  institutions  that  link   city  and  countryside.”   Local  demands  and  political   configurations  will  have  to  play   a  significant  role  in  determining   institutional  change,   substantive  democracy  in   Africa  will  have  to  be  bottom   driven”  (Ake).  

 Institutions  (rules  of  the  game)  constrain  the   behavior  of  organizations  (players  in  the   game),  both  politically  and  economically.    In   turn,  institutions  are  humanly  devised.  This   apparent  tension  between  agency  and   determinism  is  resolved  with  the  theory  of   path  dependence.    If  the  institutional  setting  and  the  state  are   bad  for  the  economy  and  for  societal   performance  at  large,  why  don't  the   individuals  in  society  just  change  the   institutions  for  the  better?  The answer to this problem from North is that institutional change is path dependent.  Path  dependence  is  based   on  the  idea  that  it  is  problematic  and   "costly"  to  change  paths.  Path  dependence   explains  why  economies  get  stuck  in  an   institutional  framework  that  is  not  efficient   or  does  not  induce  growth  and  at  large   improved  societal  performance.    Institutional  Change  is  overwhelmingly   incremental  and  Slow,  as  institutional   outcomes  are  in  large  part  historically   determined  (path  dependence).    Within  institutional  framework,   organizations  are  afforded  opportunities  to   enact  incremental  changes  to  the  framework   if  they  perceive  higher  payouts  from  doing   so.  Institutions  modulate  new  opportunities   that  players  seize  to  shape  institutions  Thus,  Institutions  are  not  necessarily  or  even   usually  created  to  be  socially  efficient;  rather   they,  or  at  least  the  formal  rules,  are  created  to   serve  the  interests  of  those  with  the  bargaining   power  to  devise  new  rules.  In  a  zero-­‐ transaction-­‐cost  world,  bargaining  strength   does  not  affect  the  efficiency  of  outcomes,  but  in   a  world  of  positive  transaction  costs  it  does”   (North,  1990)    If  economies  realize  the  gains  of  trade  by   creating  relatively  efficient  institutions,  it  is   because  under  certain  circumstances  (very   rare)  the  private  objective  of  those  with  the   bargaining  strength  to  alter  institutions   produce  institutional  solutions  that  turn  out  to   be  or  evolve  into  socially  efficient  ones     Overly   historically   deterministic.   Though   North’s   theory  does  leave  agency  to  organizations,  who  can   enact   incremental   changes   within   the   institutional   framework  in  so  far  as  it  maximizes  their  payoffs,  it   is   constrained   within   larger   framework   of   path   dependence.  

  Limitations   Overly   case-­‐specific,   with   limited   external   validity:   How   replicable   are   identified   case-­‐specific   causalities   to   other  cases?    

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In  the  next  sections  we  go  in-­‐depth  into  the  theoretical  approaches  of  each  sub-­‐set   of   the   ‘New   institutionalism’   body   of   literature,   and   the   various   factors   they   hypothesize   constitute   sources   of   institutional   change,   notably   in   Africa.   We   will   then   utilize   these   hypotheses   in   our   analysis   of   sources   of   institutional   change   to   explain  institutional  adaptation  to  meet  the  new  CC  challenge  in  African  countries.     2.2 Definitions  &  relevance  of  Institutional  theory     Let   us   begin   with   a   few   definitions   however   to   clarify   our   understanding   of   the   institutional  change  literature.       Rawls   in   his   Theory   of   Justice   defines   a   political   institution   as   “a   common   understanding   about   the   rules   of   the   game   that   define   a   political   system…   acceptance  of  these  rules  entails  that  all  parties  subject  themselves  to  these  rules…   each   knows   that   the   other   knows   the   rules…   all   will   abide   by   the   rules   because   they   know  the  others  know  the  rules  and  will  make  him/her  abide  by  them  he/she  was   to   stray   away   from   them”47.   The   latter   part   of   this   definition   is   particularly   important.   Douglas   North,   key   pioneer   of   the   body   of   literature   on   institutions,   echoes   Rawls’   definition   in   many   regards,   but   taking   an   economic   property   rights   approach  to  institutions.  North  posits  that  institutions  indeed  define  the  rules  of  the   game,   both   politically   and   economically;   they   are   the   humanly   devised   constraints   that  shape  human  interaction48.  These  constraints  can  be  both  formal  (rules,  laws)   and  informal  (behavior  codes,  cultural  norms),  and  serve  to  reduce  uncertainty  and   facilitate   exchange   in   the   presence   of   transaction   costs.   Transaction   costs   are   in   North's   own   words:   "the   costs   of   defining,   protecting,   and   enforcing   property   rights"49.   These   transaction   costs   and   institutions   are   the   key   to   explaining   economic   growth   or   the   lack   thereof,   and   why   growth   has   been   so   absent,   rather   than  present,  in  the  economies  of  the  world,  argues  North.                                                                                                                   47  Rawls,  John,  Theory  of  Justice  (Cambridge:  Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  1971),  47.   48  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  3  
49  Ibidem,  28  

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Applied   to   the   issue   of   Climate   Change,   this   definition   of   institutions   makes   us   envisage   the   presence   or   absence   of   an   institutional   framework   to   address   CCA   as   an   explanation   for   societies’   effectiveness,   or   lack   thereof,   in   governing   CC   and   its   critical  impacts  on  vulnerable  segments  of  society.  This  lack  of  common  “rules  of  the   game”   to   achieve   the   common   purpose   of   addressing   CC   in   this   context   defines   societies’   ability   or   inability   to   effectively   address   the   new   risks   and   opportunities   raised  by  CC.   Finally,   North   distinguishes   "institutions",   which   are   the   rules   of   the   game,   from   "organizations",  which  are  the  actors,  or  players  in  the  game.     Hence,   according   to   North,   "it   is   the   interaction   between   institutions   and   organizations   that   shapes   the   institutional   evolution   of   an   economy"50,   and   the   achievement  of  societal  goals  at  large  one  could  add.  Institutional  change  takes  place   in   modifications   of   and   changes   in   contracting,   eventually   leading   to   new   "rules".   This   all   happens   "because   individuals   perceive   that   they   could   do   better   by   reconstructing   exchanges   (political   or   economic)".   Thus,   institutions   are   the   outcomes   of   the   actions   of   organizations   (players),   the   ones   holding   more   bargaining   power   eventually   establishing   institutions   (political   and   economic   arrangements  or  rules  of  the  game)  that  advance  the  interests  of  their  creators51.     In  this  sense,  North  asserts,  “institutions  are  not  established  to  be  socially  efficient   but  rather  to  further  the  interests  of  those  with  more  bargaining  power”52;  and  since   institutions   are   path   dependent   (once   established,   they   are   very   “costly”   to   change),   they  remain  and  perpetuate  themselves  indefinitely.  This  idea  of  path  dependence  is   critical   to   the   institutional   change   literature   focused   on   structural   determinants   of   institutional   change,   as   we   shall   see   in   the   next   section   devoted   to   the   structural   explanations  for  institutional  change.                                                                                                                    
51  Ibidem,  73-­‐82   52  Ibidem,  92-­‐106   50  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  6  

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Many   authors   have   elaborated   on   North’s   property-­‐rights,   new   institutional   economics   approach   to   grow   and   give   it   more   depth   (Mancur   Olson53,   North   and   Weingast54),   corroborated   by   country   examples   (Acemoglu   et   al.)55   and   analyzed   its   veracity   when   it   comes   to   explaining   institutional   change   (Barbara   Geddes   and   Jeffrey   Herbst   /Pierre   Englebert   vs.   Merilee   Grindle).   We   shall   turn   to   these   authors   to   gain   a   better   understanding   of   the   role   of   institutions   in   generating,   or   hindering,   societal  performance.      Why  are  institutions  important?  What  evidence  is  there  that  they  are  critical?     North  posits  that  first  and  foremost  institutions  are  important  because  they  secure   private   property   rights,   reduce   uncertainty   and   give   individuals   incentives   to   invest/produce   in   the   presence   of   transaction   costs   (costs   of   enforcing   property   rights)56.  North  in  this  sense  brings  a  needed  complement  to  neo-­‐classical  theory  by   introducing   transaction   costs;   “rare   if   not   inexistent   are   the   cases   in   which   the   conditions   necessary   for   the   invisible   hand   obtain”57.   This   is   because   transaction   costs  exist  and  property  rights  are  not  self-­‐enforcing  and  costless.     Indeed,   since   Adam   Smith,   economists   have   constructed   their   models   on   the   firm   bedrock  of  the  gains  from  trade.  Specialization  and  division  of  labor  are  the  key  to   the   wealth   of   Nations.   In   constructing   their   models,   however,   economists   have   ignored   the   costs   arising   from   such   specialization   and   division   of   labor   (i.e:   transaction   costs).   These   transaction   costs   underlie   the   institutions   determining   the   structure   of   political-­‐economic   systems.   What   the   neo-­‐classical   economic   model   assumes  is  that  perfectly  specified  and  costlessly  enforced  property  rights  will  give   incentives   for   individuals   to   capture   the   returns   to   society   of   investment   at   all   the                                                                                                                  
53

Olson,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development”,  567-­‐76  

54  North,  Douglass  C.,  and  Barry  R.  Weingast,  "Constitutions  and  Commitment:  The  Evolution  of  Institutions  

55

Governing  Public  Choice  in  Seventeenth-­‐Century  England",  Journal  of  Economic  History  49  4  (1989):  803-­‐832  

Acemoglu,  Daron,  Simon  Johnson,  and  James  Robinson,  “The  Colonial  Origins  of  Comparative  Development:   An  Empirical  Investigation”,  American  Economic  Review  91  (2001):  1369-­‐1401   56  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  6   57  Ibidem,  7  

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margins.  However,  “such  conditions  have  never  obtained  throughout  history;  many   resources   are   closer   to   common   property   than   exclusively   owned.   As   a   result   the   necessary   conditions   for   achieving   the   equi-­‐marginal   efficient   solution   have   never   existed—neither   in   the   Roman   Republic   nor   in   the   20th   century   US   or   Soviet   Union”58.   First,   growth   has   been   more   exceptional   than   stagnation   or   decline,   which   suggests  that  efficient  property  rights  are  unusual  in  history.  Secondly,  transaction   costs   do   exist;   and   a   theory   of   institutions   is   required   to   fill   the   gaps   in   the   neoclassical  economic  model.     In   this   seminal   work,   Structure   and   Change   in   Economic   History   (1981),   North   proposes:   a. A  theory  of  property  rights  that  describes  the  individual  and  group  incentives   in  the  system;   b. A  theory  of  the  state  since  it  is  the  state  that  specifies  and  enforces  property   rights;   c. A  theory  of  ideology  that  explains  how  different  perceptions  of  reality  affect   the  reaction  of  individuals  to  the  changing  of  “objective”  situations59.       The   example   of   17th   century   Britain   he   gives   in   his   1989   piece   with   Wiengast60   is   illustrative   of   North’s   theory   and   drives   home   what   he   understands   by   “property   rights  are  not  self-­‐enforcing  and  costless”.  Indeed,  in  1668  in  Great  Britain,  wealth   owners   in  Parliament,  exceedingly  losing  patience  with  the  Crown’s  encroaching  on   their   wealth   and   private   property   and   its   arbitrary   expropriation   of   their   wealth   whenever  it  needed  added  revenue  (reign  of  the  Stuarts  under  King  James  II  at  the   time),   led   a   revolution   to   change   the   power   bargain   between   Parliament   and   the                                                                                                                   58  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  8-­‐9   59  North,  Douglass  C.,  Structure  and  Change  in  Economic  History  (New  York:  Norton,  1981)   60  North  and  Weingast,  "Constitutions  and  Commitment:  The  Evolution  of  Institutions  Governing  Public  Choice   in  Seventeenth-­‐Century  England",  803-­‐832   • 40    

Crown  of  Great  Britain.  The  result  of  this  uprising,  which  came  to  be  known  as  the   Glorious   Revolution,   were   new   politico-­‐economic   arrangements   (institutions)   that   ensured  that:   1) The  Crown  could  no  longer  expropriate  wealth  from  private  citizens;   2) Whenever   it   needed   revenue   the   Crown   would   have   to   ask   permission   to   Parliament  and  obtain  clear,  transparent  and  predictable  tax  revenue;   3) Politically   independent   courts   were   established   to   uphold   the   sanctity   of   private   property   rights   and   the   rule   of   common   law.   Thus   both   Crown   and   Parliament   committed   themselves   to   set   these   institutions   in   stone,   and   never  again  change  them.     The  result  according  to  North  and  Weingast  were  phenomenal  increases  in  the  level   of  output  and  growth.  Indeed  by  restoring  confidence  in  the  ability  to  invest  without   the   risk   of   an   arbitrary   autocrat   coming   in   to   seize   one’s   produce/output,   Englishmen   had   an   incentive   to   invest   and   to   save   their   monies   without   fear   that   their   pounds   would   be   expropriated.   This   in   turn   led   to   the   emergence   of   private   debt   markets   to   collect   savings   and   redistribute   them   throughout   the   economy   as   loans,   which   led   to   money   creation   and   overall   to   thriving   of   private   markets   and   financial   flows.   The   authors   conclude   that   the   departure   in   the   historic   record   of   British   growth   levels   that   resulted   from   the   Glorious   Revolution   was   even   more   significant   than   the   growth   hikes   that   occurred   beginning   in   1750   –   implying   that   more   secure   property   rights   and   safeguards   from   arbitrary   expropriation   could   have   perhaps   given   business   owners   incentives   to   invest   in   new   technology,   and   thus  led  to  the  Industrial  Revolution.  That  is  a  theory  that  is  still  unconfirmed,  but   what  North/Wiengast’s  study  demonstrates  is  that  good  institutions  that  protect  the   private  property  of  citizens  have  the  powerful  ability  to  incentivize  investment  and   lead  to  growth.  Similarly,  applying  this  argument  to  the  Climate  Change  issue,  good   institutions  that  clarify  the  rules  of  the  game  and  roles  of  various  organizations  to   address  CCA,  and  sanctify  these  through  enforcement  by  designated  entities  –  such   as   courts   and   legally   mandated   organizations   to   take   leadership–,   potentially   have   •   41  

the   powerful   ability   to   incentivize   the   effective   management   of   CCA   and   promote   additional  investments  on  the  issue.     Mancur  Olson  in  his  1993  article  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  Development”,  and  to  a   certain  extent  in  his  early  work  on  The  Rise  and  Decline  of  Nations  further  elaborates   on  this  point,  giving  a  luminary  game-­‐theoretical  illustration  of  how  in  practice  the   protection   of   property   rights   and   clear   definition   of   rules   of   the   game   does   incentivize  production.  Olson,  one  of  the  pioneers  of  institutional  economics,  leads   us  to  ponder   upon   the   differences   in   productions   levels   in   the   presence   of   a   “roving   bandit”   (such   as   the   many   bandit   groups   that   roamed   through   ancient   China   in   search   of   wealth   to   plunder)   and   in   the   presence   of   “stationary   bandit”   (a   bandit   who  settles  down,  puts  on  a  crown,  maintains  a  monopoly  over  violence  in  his  new   domain   and   gets   revenue   by   taxing   his   citizens).   Olson   maintains   that   in   the   presence  of  a  stationary  bandit,  citizens  have  an  incentive  to  produce  because  they   know  the  bandit  will  protect  them  from  the  theft  and  violence  of  other  bandits,  and   will  only  expropriate  from  them  a  fixed  amount  of  tax  revenue.  In  turn,  in  order  to   maximize  his  tax  revenue,  the  stationary  bandit  has  an  incentive  to  invest  in  basic   public   goods   for   his   citizenry   to   ensure   that   they   produce   as   much   as   possible   so   he   can  derive  even  more  tax  revenue.  This  theory  holds,  and  explains  why  there  were   no   major   rebellions   and   so   much   production   has   occurred   under   stationary   bandits,   from  the  early  pharaohs  up  until  Louis  XIV  before  the  1789  French  Revolution61.     Olson   states   however   that   autocracy/stationary   bandits/dictatorships   are   only   second   best   options   however;   the   reason   being   that   the   autocrat   also   has   a   rival   incentive:  that  of  extracting  as  much  revenue  as  possible  in  the  short  time  period  he   is   guaranteed   to   be   in   power   (short   time   horizon).   When   the   time   horizon   of   the   autocrat   is   short,   he   will   coerce   his   citizens,   expropriating   from   them   ever-­‐ unpredictable   levels   of   tax   revenue   and   giving   them   disincentives   for   investment   and  production.  Although  the  autocrat  does  not  maximize  his  revenue  through  this                                                                                                                   61  Olson,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development”,  American  Political  Science  Review  87  (1993):  567-­‐76   •   42  

arrangement/institution,  it  satisfies  his  second  short-­‐term  rationality  and  as  a  result   growth  is  hampered.       For   this   reason   Olson   concludes   that   DEMOCRACIES   are   the   single   best   political   arrangements   because   by   ensuring   that   no   one   group   becomes   an   autocrat   (by   definition   what   a   democracy   does),   they   guarantee   less   capricious   and   agreed-­‐upon   levels   of   taxation/state   expropriation   and   provide   incentives   for   investment,   production   and   growth.   Thus   “Democracy   has   not   only   moral   appeals,   but   also   under   appreciated   economic   appeals”   concludes   Olson62.   This   functional   appeal   of   democracy   is   also   an   important   aspect   to   keep   in   mind   when   deliberating   on   the   effective  governance  of  CC.      What  particular  implication  does  this  have?     This   assertion   that   good   institutions   matter   for   growth   holds   tremendous   implications.   Though   originally   written   through   the   lens   of   economic   growth,   it   applies   to   general   questions   of   societal   performance   across   all   sectors,   and   begs   the   larger   question:   “How   then   does   institutional   change   occur   to   ensure   that   good   institutions   are   implemented   to   favor   growth   and   overall   good   societal   performance?”     Many  authors  have  addressed  this  question,  and  their  explanations,  relevant  to  our   understanding   of   the   circumstances   under   which   institutional   change   in   the   management   of   CC   obtains,   can   be   characterized   as   STRUCTURAL   approaches   to   institutional   change   and   AGENT-­‐BASED   approaches   to   institutional   change   (refer   to   table  2.1).       The   first   group   of   structural   thinkers   builds   on   North’s   idea   of   path   dependence.   They   assert   that   institutions   are   the   fruit   of   past   arrangements   (wrought   out   by                                                                                                                   62  Olson,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development”,  574-­‐5   •   43  

whomever   had   most   bargaining   power)   and   once   instated,   these   institutions   are   costly   and   difficult   to   change.   The   second   group   places   emphasis   on   agent-­‐based   processes  of  institutional  change.     2.3 Sources  of  Institutional  Change     2.3.1 The   Structural   or   Path   Dependent   Explanations   of   Institutional   Change     The  father  of  new  institutionalism,  and  its  most  prolific  advocate,  is  by  far  Douglas   North.  For  North:   “History  matters.  It  matters  not  just  because  we  can  learn  from  the  past,  but  because   the   present   and   the   future   are   connected   to   the   past   by   the   continuity   of   a   society’s   institutions.  Today’s  and  tomorrow’s  choices  are  shaped  by  the  past.  And  the  past  can   only  be  made  intelligible  as  a  story  of  institutional  evolution.”63   Through   this   phrase   that   opens   his   seminal   1990   work   Institutions,   Institutional   Change   and   Economic   Performance,   North   recognizes   the   profound   effect   previous   institutions   have   on   the   ones   of   today.   At   times   North   comes   close   to   providing   a   deterministic   account   on   human   behavior,   where   human   behavior   is   constrained   by   institutions,   yet   at   the   same   time   these   institutions   are     "humanly   devised"64.   This   apparent  tension  is  solved  within  and  leads  to  the  theory  of  path  dependence.       An  undeniable  merit  in  North's  theory  in  relation  to  neo-­‐classical  economics  is  that   he   has   come   to   point   to   the   need   for   a   theory   of   the   state   and   bargaining   power.   Indeed,   he   was   one   of   the   first   to   forcibly   point   that   economic   performance,   and   societal   performance   in   general,   depends   on   the   workings   of   the   state,   a   novel   statement   in   the   early   1990s. Through this statement, he has built into neo-classical theory the realization that bargaining power, ideology and the state are critical to                                                                                                                 63  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  vii   64  Ibidem,  viii   •  

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economic  performance,  and  to  societal  performance  more  generally.  He  argues  that:   "Institutions   are   not   necessarily   or   even   usually   created   to   be   socially   efficient;   rather  they…  are  created  to  serve  the  interests  of  those  with  the  bargaining  power   to   create   new   rules"65.   As   such,   the   absence   of   economic   growth   is   no   longer   a   mystery,   because:   "It   is   polity   that   defines   and   enforces   property   rights   and   in   consequence  it  is  not  surprising  that  efficient  markets  are  so  exceptional"66.  Those   with   political   power   might   not   choose   good   institutions   because   they   do   not   necessarily  maximize  their  revenues.   But,  if  the  institutional  setting  and  the  state  are  bad  for  the  economy,  why  don't  the   individuals   in   society   just   change   the   institutions   for   the   better?   The   answer   to   this   problem  from  North  is  that  institutional  change  is  path  dependent.     Path  dependence  is  based  on  the  idea  that  it  is  problematic  and  "costly"  to  change   paths.  This  is  what  North  has  in  mind  when  he  starts  his  institutional  treatise  with   the   credo:   "history   matters".   Therein   lies   the   crux   of   this   entire   literature   of   Institutions.   Bad   institutions   (politico-­‐economic   arrangements   in   society)   lead   to   poor  societal  performance.  But  because  they  are  so  costly  and  path-­‐dependent,  bad   institutions  survive  and  continuously  hamper  growth,  and  societal  performance.   In   North's   theoretical   framework,   path   dependence   explains   why   economies   get   stuck   in   an   institutional   framework   that   is   not   efficient   or   does   not   induce   economic   growth.   It   is   the   story   of   how   past   events   and   culture   influences   the   present.   In   North's  own  words:    
Institutions…   determine   the   opportunities   in   a   society.   Organizations   are   created   to   take   advantage   of   those   opportunities...   The   resultant   path   of   institutional   change   is   shaped   by:   (1)   the   lock-­in   that   comes   from   the   symbiotic   relationship   between   institutions   and   the   organizations   that   have   evolved   as   a   consequence   of   the   incentive   structure   provided   by   those  

                                                                                                                65  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  7   66  North,  Structure  and  Change  in  Economic  History,     •  

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institutions   and   (2)   the   feedback   process   by   which   human   beings   perceive   and   react   to   changes  in  the  opportunity  set.67  

  Thus   the   only   sources   of   institutional   change   in   North’s   theory   of   institutions   are   as   follows:       1) Organizations  (players)  seizing  opportunities  for  change  within   the  existing   historically  determined  institutional  framework  to  enact  small  changes  at  the   margins,  incrementally.       The   actors   of   this   change   are   the   organizations   (see   definition   above).   In   their   pursuit   of   wealth   and   utility   maximization,   organizations   incrementally   alter   the   institutional  structure.  “The  firm…  explores  the  most  efficient  governance  structure   and  organization  within  existing  institutional  constraints.  Such  maximizing  activity   by   the   firm   results   from   learning   by   doing   and   investing   in   the   kinds   of   skills   and   knowledge   that   will   pay   off   (within   the   existing   institutional   framework).   But   an   alternative   is   to   devote   resources   to   changing   the   institutional   constraints.   Which   direction   the   firm   or   economic   organization   takes   depends   upon   its   subjective   perception  of  the  payoffs.”68     Thus   for   North   the   interplay   between   self-­‐interested   organizations   seeking   to   maximize   the   gains   and   objectives   of   their   creators   &   institutional   constraints   (both   formal   and   informal)   that   set   boundaries   and   condition   the   actions   of   players/organizations   constitute   the   factors   that   “shape   the   potential   wealth-­‐ maximizing   opportunities   of   entrepreneurs”   and   determine   the   outcome   of   Institutional  change.69                                                                                                                     67  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  7   68  Ibidem,  140   69  Ibidem   •  

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Again,   institutional   outcomes   that   result   are   not   necessarily   efficient,   but   rather   reflect  the  interests  of  the  organizations  with  most  bargaining  power.  Institutional   change   is   the   result   of   individual   entrepreneurs   responding   to   incentives   for   self-­‐ interest  maximization,  within  the  existing  system.  This  change  though  according  to   North  remains  overwhelmingly  incremental.     Though  North’s  theory  is  cast  under  an  analysis  of  economic  performance,  it  can  be   generalized  to  explain  societal  performance,  or  the  lack  thereof,  as  a  result  of  static   inefficient  institutions  that  were  created  by  the  most  influential  of  the  day,  with  no   particular  regard  to  efficiency  and  coherence,  but  rather  on  the  basis  of  self-­‐interest.     2) North   mentions   also   the   possibility   for   institutional   change   to   occur   abruptly   as  a  result  of  accidents  of  history,  such  as  war,  revolution  or  natural  disaster:   “War,   revolution,   conquest   and   natural   disasters   are   sources   of   discontinuous  institutional  change.”70     However   these,   in   North’s   theory,   remain   marginal   cases.   Institutional   change   remains  overwhelmingly  an  incremental  and  a  continuous  process.     Finally,  North  acknowledges  that  institutional  change  is  a  complex  story  however:  in   part  due  to  the  persistence  of  informal  constraints  in  many  settings  (Africa  being  a   prime   example)   where   informal   constraints   at   sometimes   at   antipodes   of   formal   constraints.   This   renders   it   difficult   to   predict   the   constraints-­‐modulated   opportunities  organizations  will  be  seizing  and  the  outcomes  of  their  interventions.     Outside   of   North,   but   still   linked   to   the   idea   of   path   dependence,   other   sources   of   institutional   change   are   identified.   These   explanations   delve   further   into   the   historical  accidents  or  conjunctures  that  also  determine  historical  outcomes.  

                                                                                                                70  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  103   •  

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Engerman  and  Sokoloff  first  look  at  this  idea  in  their  “Factor  Endowment,  Inequality   and  Paths  of  Growth  in  New  World  economies”  in  which  they  assert  that  institutions   result  from  the  factor  endowments/geography  of  countries.  Looking  at  New  World   economies,  they  observe  that  colonies  in  which  colonizers  brought  in  slaves  to  work   on  labor-­‐intensive  sugar  plantations  led  to  the  establishment  of  unequal  institutions   upon  independence  (Caribbean/Central  America)  whereas  in  the  colonies  of  North   America   (US,   Canada)   where   no   slaves   were   brought   in,   society   was   more   equal,   leading   to   the   widespread   establishment   of   egalitarian   institutions   that   protected   private   property   for   all   citizens.   Thus   when   industrialization   took   off   in   1750   the   latter  were  able  to  gain  from  the  opportunities  from  trade71.     On   another   continent,   Jeffrey   Herbst   confirms   these   structural   causes   for   the   difficulty   of   institutional   changes.   Looking   at   Africa,   Herbst   poses   the   following   question:   if   institutions   are   so   detrimental   for   growth,   why   do   people   simply   not   change   them?   His   response   is   that   because   of   the   particular   political   geography   of   Africa,   leaders   are   made   to   govern   an   unintegrated   peasantry   that   lives   in   the   hinterland   difficult   to   reach   because   of   the   lack   of   access   and   roads.   As   a   result   politicians   have   a   strong   incentives   to   cater   only   to   urban   interests   and   pressure,   which   in   turn   dissuades   them   from   making   any   needed   investments   in   the   agricultural   sector   of   the   hinterland   where   the   majority   of   the   population   lives72.   The   result   again   is   that   economic   growth   is   hindered.   Pierre   Englebert   further   corroborates  this  assertion  by  stating  that  because  leaders  in  Africa  are  illegitimate   (in   the   sense   that   they   do   not   derive   vertical   legitimacy   from   the   broad   pool   of   their   citizenry   to   whom   they   are   not   accountable)   they   engage   in   patterns   of   behavior   that   are   politically   rational   but   economically   irrational73.   Englebert   finds   that   in  

                                                                                                               
71  Engerman,  and  Sokoloff,  "Factor  Endowments,  Inequality,  and  Paths  of  Development  among  New  World  

Economies",  41-­‐101  

72  Herbst,  J.  I.,  States  and  power  in  Africa:  comparative  lessons  in  authority  and  control  (Princeton:  Princeton  

University  Press,  2000)  
73  Englebert,  Pierre,  State  Legitimacy  and  Development  in  Africa  (Boulder:  Lynne  Rienner  Publishers,  2000)  

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countries   where   leaders   are   found   to   be   legitimate,   economic   growth   is   higher   by   2%  than  in  their  non-­‐legitimate  counterparts74.     Acemoglu,   Robinson   and   Johnson   in   their   “Colonial   Origins   of   Contemporary   Development”   agree   with   Engerman   and   Sokoloff.   They   look   at   a   similar   source   of   institutions:   colonial   settlements   as   determined   by   white   settler   mortality.   They   conclude   that   wherever   in   their   African,   Asian   and   American   colonies   colonialists   were   able   to   settle   thanks   to   low   disease   mortality,   they   established   neo-­‐Europes   and   property   rights   institutions   that   upheld   the   sanctity   of   private   property;   whereas  where  they  could  not  settle  due  to  high  disease  mortality,  they  established   extractive  institutions  that  coerced  local  citizens  and  led  to  disincentives  for  growth   –for  example,  in  King  Leopold’s  Congo.  These  extractive  institutions  in  turn  survived   after  Independence,  leading  to  the  present  state  of  nill  growth  in  many  parts  of  the   world75.       Confirming  North’s  theory  of  path  dependence,  Acemoglu  and  Johnson  in  “Political   losers”   further   assert   that   once   institutions   in   place,   institutional   change   that   favors   technological   innovation   will   be   blocked   by   politicians   who   fear   they   may   lose   power  from  the  new  institutional  arrangements  (the  thrust  of  arguments  about  the   political   economy   of   reform   and   the   difficulty   of   insulating   economic   decision-­‐ making  from  political  pressures)76.     Barbara   Geddes,   in   her   seminal   “Politician’s   Dilemma”,   confirms   North’s   political   economy  /  rational  choice  analysis  of  institutional  change  by  positing,  in  her  study   of  Brazil,  that  politicians  have  two  clear  constituencies:    the  broad  public      their  narrow  political  base.                                                                                                                  
74  Englebert,  State  Legitimacy  and  Development  in  Africa  

75

Acemoglu,  Daron,  Simon  Johnson,  and  James  Robinson,  “The  Colonial  Origins  of  Comparative  Development:   An  Empirical  Investigation”,  American  Economic  Review  91  (2001):  1369-­‐1401   76  Acemoglu,  Daron  and  James  Robinson,  “Political  Losers  As  a  Barrier  to  Economic  Development”  AEA  Papers   and  Proceedings  90  (2000):  126-­‐130    

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Satisfying   one   comes   at   the   detriment   of   the   other.   Often   however   pressures   on   them  force  politicians  to  satisfy  their  political  base  (eg:  by  appointing  someone  not   necessarily   the   best   for   a   position),   which   hampers   economic   growth.   Thus   economic  growth  and  change  are  difficult  in  these  circumstances77.     Cases   from   across   Africa   documenting   prebendal   or   neopatrimonial   political   systems  confirm  this  situation,  whereby  leaders  are  faced  with  both  a  broad  public   and   a   narrower,   ethnical,   clan   or   otherwise-­‐based   constituency   to   which   they   are   accountable   (see   Ekeh   197578   and   Mamdani   199679).   These   unaligned   bases   of   accountability,  and  one  could  surmise  of  institutions,  have  hampered  growth  as  well   as   societal   performance   (see   Ake   1996)80.   Focusing   on   a   study   of   the   efficiency   of   markets   in   Africa,   Bates   confirms   the   dichotomy   between   State   agents’   public   interests   and   private   gains   as   the   main   driver   of   economic   stagnation   in   Africa.   A   continuation   of   colonial   state   structures   (path   dependence),   rural   development   agencies   in   much   of   sub-­‐Saharan   Africa   can   be   understood   as   institutions   of   rural   political  control  and  taxation  according  to  Bates81.     Thus   all   of   the   above   reviewed   authors   –   from   Engerman   and   Sokoloff,   to   Geddes,   Herbst,   Englebert   and   Bates)   confirm   North’   assertion   that   “History   matters…   because  the  present  and  the  future  are  linked  to  the  past  through  the  continuity  of   society’s   institutions”82.   The   main   sources   of   institutional   change   for   these   structural  authors  are  thus:    Incremental   changes,   which   are   enacted   by   self-­‐interested   rational   players   seizing   opportunities   afforded   to   them   within   the   existing   historically   determined   institutional   framework   to   increase   their   private   gains   (North   and                                                                                                                  
77  Geddes,  Barbara,  Politician's  Dilemma:  Building  State  Capacity  in  Latin  America  (Berkeley:  University  of  

California  Press,  1994)  
78  Ekeh,  P.,  “Colonialism  and  the  two  publics  in  Africa”,  Comparative  Studies  in  Society  and  History  17  (1975):  91-­‐

112  
79  Mamdani,  M.,  Citizen  and  subject:  contemporary  Africa  and  the  legacy  of  late  colonialism  (Princeton:  Princeton  

University  Press,  1996)  
80  Ake,  C.,  Democracy  and  development  in  Africa  (Washington,  D.C:  Brookings  Institute,  1996)   81  Bates,  Robert,  Markets  and  States  in  Tropical  Africa:  the  political  basis  of  agricultural  policies  (Berkeley:  

82

University  of  California  Press,  1981)  

 North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  vii   •

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Geddes);   these   incremental   changes   are   only   socially   efficient   however   in   the   rare  circumstances  that  private  gains  align  with  societal  ones;    Conjuncture   or   accidents   of   history,   whether   endogenous   –   such   as   factor   endowments   (Engerman   and   Sokoloff),  low  population  density   (Herbst),   areas   of   low   disease   mortality   (Acemoglu   et   al.)   –   or   exogenous   (colonial   institutions;   Bates  and  Geddes).     2.3.2 The  agent-­based  explanations  of  institutional  change     Another  cluster  of  institutional  theorists  purport  a  competing  theory  of  institutional   change   than   the   one   driven   by   North   and   his   cohort.   Based   principally   on   agent-­‐ based  arguments,  this  group  of  scholar  finds  that  institutional  change  is  a  result  of:    Individual   agency   and   desire   for   societal   improvement   (not   rational   choice,   behavioral  science)    Institutional   outcomes   not   the   fruit   of   historically   determined   process,   but   outcome  of  intense  bargaining  between  national  leaders  and  local  elites  (Boone)     Merilee   Grindle,   chiefly,   disagrees   with   North’s   theory   of   path   dependence.   She   agrees   fully   that   institutions   are   important   to   generate   better   economic   outcomes   however   in   her   magisterial   Audacious   Reforms:   Institutional   Reforms   and   Democracy   in   Latin   America   she   proves   that   institutional   invention   is   possible,   and   has   been   enacted   in   countries   in   Latin   America   (Venezuela   which   chartered   its   first   local/state   elections   and   allowed   individual   candidates   in   1989;   Bolivia   which   passed  in  1993  its  National  Participation  Law  decentralizing  the  political  system  in   effect   and   in   Argentina   where   under   the   leadership   of   Raul   Alfonsin   and   other   intellectuals   reforms   began   in   1994   to   give   Buenos   Aires   more   political   autonomy   and   introduce   a   balance   of   power   in   the   political   institutions).   Thus,   contradicting   directly   Geddes,   Grindle   proves   that   institutional   change   does   happen   but   to   understand   how   it   happens   one   has   to   look   beyond   the   prism   of   rational   choice   theory,   and   bring   in   other   insights   from   behavioral   science   and   sociology.   As   she   •   51  

concludes  “Agency  does  matter  and  there  is  still  space  for  agency  in  changing  one’s   institutions  and  enacting  change”83.     In   the   same   vein,   Catharine   Boone   does   away   with   historical   determinism.   In   her   seminal   Political   Topographies   of   the   African   State   in   which   she   analyzes   the   institutional   choices   adopted   by   Africa’s   newly   independent   states   to   build   their   nations,  she  concludes  that  in-­‐country  differences  in  centralization/decentralization   of  the  state  apparatus  are  not  the  product  of  exogenous  factors  –e.g.:  the  import  of   the   state   apparatus   or   external   funding   agencies’   ideas   for   what   constitutes   good   governance–,   but   rather   the   product   of   internal   variations   in   the   configuration   of   political  power  and  relationships  within  agrarian  society.  “Institutional  differences   are   determined   endogenously:   spatial   variations   in   institutional   design   and   the   extent   of   core-­‐periphery   power-­‐sharing   are   the   products   of   political   struggle   and   bargaining  that  goes  on  within  African  society  between  rulers,  their  rural  allies  and   their   provincial   rivals.   As   a   result,   institution-­‐building   strategies   aimed   at   incorporating  rural  societies  into  modern  states  have  varied  starkly  not  only  across,   but  also  within  countries  in  Africa84.     Boone   continues   on   to   condemn   the   over-­‐emphasis   on   the   predatory   State.   So   compelling  was  the  categorization  of  the  State  as  a  Leviathan,  she  writes,  that  little   room   was   left   for   accounts   describing   marketing   boards,   official   credit   agencies,   settling  schemes  and  provincial  administrations  as  politically  neutral  or  benevolent   initiatives   of   the   state   leading   to   striking   generalizations   on   the   exploitation   and   disempowerment   of   rural   society85.   In   her   account,   agrarian   society   is   not   disempowered  however,  but  the  important  scenes  for  internal  battles  among  rural   elites   who   also   sought   to   control   and   wield   power   over   the   ordinary   citizens,   whom   were  their  clients,  followers,  kinfolks  and  subjects.  New  regime  politicians  in  the  city                                                                                                                  

83  Grindle,  Merillee  S.,  Audacious  reforms:  Institutional  invention  and  Democracy  in  Latin  America  (Baltimore:  

Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  2000)  
84  Boone,  C.,  Political  Topographies  of  the  African  State:  Territorial  Authority  and  Institutional  Choice  (Cambridge:  

Cambridge  University  Press,  2003)
85  Boone,  C.,  Political  Topographies  of  the  African  State,  5-­‐6

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found   these   widely   differing   rural   politicians   in   place   who   defined   local   political   contexts,   and   designed   their   strategies   for   state-­‐building   according   to   the   possibilities  they  had  for  collaborating  with  them  or  not.     Though   Boone   shares   with   North   a   game-­‐theoretical   understanding   of   the   interactions   between   self-­‐interested   rational   organizations   within   a   given   institutional   system,   she   does   not   agree   that   institutional   outcomes   are   pre-­‐ conditioned  by  history.  Rather  she  leaves  full  agency  to  the  organizations  within  the   system,  and  based  on  her  findings  for  Africa,  she  conceives  of  institutional  change  as   being  the  equilibrium  outcome  of  fierce  political  struggles  between  different  actors   who  all  seek  to  wield  as  much  control  as  possible,  the  result  of  which  yields  a  mutual   equilibrium   in   which   all   organizations   find   an   increase   in   their   payouts.   This   equilibrium  again  here  does  not  indicate  social  efficiency,  but  rather  is  the  wealth-­‐ maximizing   optimum   of   the   various   actors   /   players   who   took   part   in   the   negotiations.     “New   politicians   in   the   city   found   themselves   locked   in   negotiations   and   confrontation   with   rural   elites   over   the   distribution   of   power,   political   prerogative   and   authority,   and   rural   wealth”   The   intensity   and   nature   of   the   rural   political   challenge   to   new   African   regimes   varied   by   region,   shaping   and   constraining   the   possibility   for   collaboration   between   regimes   and   rural   notables.   The   result   has   been   varying   institutional  strategies  for  rural  integration.”86     Boone  thus  calls  our  attention  back  to  the  importance  of  local  level  configurations  of   power  and  interest.  In  her  words,  these  local  configurations  matter,  and  need  to  be   taken   into   account   when   explaining   institutional   outcomes.   Regimes   “choose”   the   institutional-­‐building  strategies  that  maximize  their  advantage  in  particular  (local)   political   contexts.   The   result   is   differing   institutional   strategies   of   rural   incorporation,   or   neglect,   within   even   a   same   country.   “State   building   strategies                                                                                                                   86  Boone,  C.,  Political  Topographies  of  the  African  State,  35-­‐36   •   53  

differ   because   rulers   face   different   challenges   and   opportunities”87.   Thus,   one   of   the   critical   ways   to   guarantee   socially   efficient   institutional   outcomes   is   through   adequate   political   institutions   which   link   the   City   to   the   countryside.   As   she   contends,  “one  of  Africa’s  top  development  priorities  is  to  reform  and  strengthen  the   political  institutions  that  link  city  and  countryside.”88     In   reforming   and   strengthening   these   political   institutions,   local   demands   and   political   configurations   will   have   to   play   a   significant   role   in   determining   institutional   change,   and   in   all   likelihood,   demand   will   have   to   be   bottom-­‐driven,   rippling  all  the  way  up  to  the  top  of  the  State  apparatus.  This  sentiment  is  echoed  by   Claude   Ake   in   his   Feasibility   of   Democracy   in   Africa   in   which   he   states   that   “substantive  democracy  in  Africa  will  have  to  be  bottom-­‐up”89.     Yet,   it   remains   that   institutional   change   is   no   easy   task   and   it   took   a   coalition   in   most  cases  shared  from  Latin  America  and  Africa  to  enact  change.  However  given  an   increasing   consensus   on   the   importance   of   institutions   to   growth   and   societal   performance,   the   question   of   how   institutional   change   occurs   is   urgent   and   will   require   greater   inter-­‐disciplinary   work   between   political   scientists,   economists,   drawing  on  fields  as  wide  as  rational  choice  theory  but  also  behavioral  sciences  to   understand  determinants  of  institutional  change.     Overall,   from   this   group   of   agent-­‐based   explanations   for   institutional   change   emanates  that  the  main  sources  of  institutional  change  are:    An  agent’s  desire  for  improved  societal  performance  (or  campaigned  on  platform   for   this),   bringing   private   interests   in   line   with   public   ones.   As   a   result,   socially   efficient  outcome  ensues.  

                                                                                                               
87  Boone,  C.,  Political  Topographies  of  the  African  State,  35-­‐36   88  Ibidem,  5-­‐6 89  Ake,  C.    

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 Local   demands   determine   new   political   opportunities/constraints   at   the   local   level  forcing  national  leaders  to  put  local  demands  on  the  national  agenda  (Boone   and  Ake).     The   limitation   of   this   agent-­‐based   model   is   however   that   it   is   overly   case-­‐specific,   drawing   on   Latin   America   and   African   cases.   Its   external   validity   has   to   be   tested,   against   the   more   conceptually   broad   idea   of   path   dependence   as   a   determinant   of   institutional  change.     2.4  Towards  a  Theory  of  Institutional  Adaptation  to  meet  the  CC  Challenge     How  does  our  new  understanding  of  the  body  of  literature  on  Institutional  change   help   us   to   better   conceive   of   institutional   change   or   adaptation   to   meet   the   new   challenge  of  CC  in  our  case  countries  across  Africa?       First  and  foremost,  the  institutional  change  theory  above-­‐reviewed  offers  us  a  rich   theoretically-­‐grounded  set  of  potential  independent  variables  (IVs)  to  use  as  input   into   our   investigation   of   the   enabling   conditions   of   institutional   innovation   in   Africa   to   meet   the   new   challenge   of   Climate   Change.   As   such,   the   theory   can   be   easily   applied  to  our  analysis,  in  which  we  will  test  the  hypotheses  put  forth  in  the  theory   (both   agent-­‐based   and   structural   hypotheses),   on   the   new   case   of   climate   institutional  change.     Applying   institutional   change   theory   to   analysis   of   climate   change   institutions,   we   will   thus   be   asking:   how   have   countries   adapted   institutions   to   meet   the   new   challenge  of  CC?  Such  an  analysis  will  enable  us  to:   1) Gain  better  understanding  of  the  determinants  of  institutional  change  in  light   of   the   new   Climate   challenge:   what   prompts   governments   across   Africa   to   adapt  institutions  or  devise  new  ones  to  meet  the  new  CC  challenge?   2) Conduct  hypothesis  testing  of  North’s  theory  of  institutional  change  on  a  new   issue,  that  of  climate  institutional  change,  based  on  empirical  evidence  from   • 55    

across  Africa.  This  will  enable  us  to  verify  whether  it  holds  that  institutional   change   is   slow   and   incremental,   and   mainly   only   takes   hold   as   the   fruit   of   sustained  incremental  efforts  by  wealth-­‐maximizing  organizations;  or  on  the   contrary,   whether   the   agent-­‐based   explanations   of   institutional   change   are   better  fitted  to  explain  CC  institutional  adaptation.      

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  What  prompts  a  country  to  engage  in  institutional  change/adaptation  to  meet   the  new  CC  challenge?     I. Structural  hypotheses  of  institutional  change   a. Institutional   change   is   slow   and   incremental:   Self-­‐interested   rational   organizations   bring   about   incremental   change   in   historically-­‐ determined   institutional   framework   to   increase   their   private   gains   (North  and  Geddes);  under  rare  circumstances,  the  private  interests  of   rational  organizations  (seeking  to  maximize  their  payouts  and  further   the  objectives  of  their  creators)  align  with  socially  beneficial  goals,  in   these  rare  instances,  socially  efficient  institutions  (new  rules)  obtain     b. Conjuncture  or  accidents  of  history   i. National  Disaster,  War  or  Revolution  (North)   ii. Factor  endowments/geography  (Engerman/Sokoloff)   iii. Colonial  legacy  (Bates)   iv. Population  density  (Herbst)     II. Agent-­‐based  hypotheses  of  institutional  change:   c. An  agent’s  desire  for  improved  societal  performance  (or  campaign  on   platform  for  this)  brings  private  interests  in  line  with  public  ones  =>   socially  efficient  outcome  ensue  (Grindle)   d. New   political   opportunities/constraints   at   the   local   level   force   national  leaders  to  put  local  demands  on  the  national  agenda  (Boone)   e. Strong   endogenously-­‐developed   institutions   (coherently   integrated   with  local  institutions  and  downwardly  accountable)  
Box  2.1:  List  of  theoretical  hypotheses  to  be  tested  on  the  new  CC  case  

 

  Part  III  will  be  devoted  to  explaining  the  methods  we  utilize  to  test  the  hypotheses   of   the   institutional   change   literature   on   the   new   CC   case.   Before   we   proceed   to   explain   our   methodology   however,   it   is   important   to   revisit   the   issue   of   CC.   Why   does  the  new  CC  challenge  require  new  or  adapted  institutional  frameworks  at  the   57  

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national  and  regional  levels  to  meet  its  imperatives?  What  is  the  triple  bottom  line   of  DRR-­‐CCA-­‐Development  and  why  are  strong  institutions  so  essential  to  achieve  it?     We   end   this   part   with   a   clarification   of   the   conceptual   roots   of   Climate   Change   institutional   adaptation,   towards   a   theory   of   institutional   change   to   meet   the   new   challenge  of  CC.                                                     •   58  

CHAPTER  3:       CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK:  INSTITUTIONAL  ADAPTATION  FOR  EFFECTIVE   GOVERNANCE  OF  CCA  IN  AFRICA     Why   are   new   or   adapted   institutions   required   to   effectively   govern   the   new   challenge  of  Climate  Change  Adaptation  in  Africa?     With  Climate  Change,  unprecedented  reversals  in  human  development  are  expected   in   communities   most   dependent   on   climate-­‐sensitive   ecosystem   services   for   their   livelihoods   (UNDP   2007-­‐08).   On   the   ground,   across   Africa,   communities   and   countries  have  already  begun  to  contend  with  climate  changes  we  are  committed  to,   while   bracing   for   those   yet   to   come.   Indeed,   communities   at   the   frontlines   of   a   changing   climate’s   impacts   across   Africa   already   carry   out   spontaneous   adaptations   individually   or   collectively   without   institutional   support   or   coordination   from   national   or   local   governments   (see   Agarwal   200890;   also   UNDP   2007-­‐08   and   Benaouda  et  al.  2008  for  examples  in  Morocco91).     In   this   sense,   Climate   Change   lays   bare   the   key   governance   and   institutional   challenges   of   African   countries.   Climate   Change   adds   an   additional   stressor   to   the   multiple   ones   that   already   encroach   on   local   livelihoods   (e.g:   market   price   fluctuations,  weak  social  safety  nets,  etc.),  which  institutions,  from  local  to  national   levels,  have  to  contend  with  and  address.     Most   of   all,   faced   with   the   sheer   magnitude   of   the   challenges   likely   to   be   occasioned   by  Climate  Change,  countries  across  Africa,  and  institutions  within  them,  will  have   only   one   of   two   options:   to   Adapt   in   order   to   effectively   deliver   on   the   CCA   imperative,  or  to  Perish  –or  at  least  suffer  severe  loss.                                                                                                                    
90  Agrawal,  A.,  and  Nicolas  Perrin,  Climate  Adaptation,  Local  Institutions,  and  Rural  Livelihoods,  IFPRI  working   91  

paper  #  W08I-­‐6  (2008),  Accessed  April  04,  2012.  http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ifri/files/w08i6_agrawal_perrin.pdf     Benaouda   H.,   A.   El   Ouali   and   A.   Saloui,   Rapport   final   du   projet   CRDI/INRA  :   Mécanismes   d’adaptation   aux   changements   climatiques   des   communautés   rurales   dans   deux   écosystèmes   contrastés   en   plaine   et   montagne   du   Maroc  (Settat:  Institut  National  de  la  Recherche  Agronomique,  2008)  

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  In   order   to   understand   the   magnitude   and   cross-­‐ranging   impacts   that   Climate   Change  is  likely  to  bring  in  Africa,  and  the  imperative  of  institutional  adaptation  to   meet   these   new   challenges,   we   review   the   projected   impacts   of   Climate   Change   in   Africa.   How   is   Africa   likely   to   be   impacted   by   changing   climate?   What   does   most   current  scientific  knowledge  project?  What  are  limitations  in  our  understanding  of   how   Africa   will   be   specifically   impacted   by   long-­‐term   Climate   Change?   We   investigate  these  questions  in  the  next  sections.     3.1 Climate  Change,  The  Scientific  Basis:  Causes,  Concepts,  Implications     3.1.1 What  is  Climate  Change  (CC)?     Before   we   proceed   to   expose   the   projected   impacts   of   Climate   Change   for   Africa,   we   must  first  explain  what  is  Climate  Change-­‐  shorthanded  as  CC  from  on  onwards.   For   the   purposes   of   this   research,   we   follow   the   United   Nations   Framework   Convention   on   Climate   Change   (UNFCCC)   definition   of   Climate   Change   (CC)   as   ‘a   change   of   climate   which   is   attributed   directly   or   indirectly   to   human   activity   that   alters  the  composition  of  the  global  atmosphere  and  which  is  in  addition  to  natural   climate  variability  observed  over  comparable  time  periods’92.  This  definition  focuses   on  man-­‐made,  or  anthropogenic  interferences  with  the  climate  system,  which  may   lead  to  dangerous  disturbances  of  the  global  climate  system’s  equilibrium.     3.1.2 Change  vs.  Variability     Climate   Change   (anthropogenic)   is   different   from   (natural)   Climate   variability.   On   one   level,   the   two   concepts   can   be   differentiated   on   the   grounds   that   one   is   anthropogenic   whereas   the   other   is   naturally   driven.   On   another   level   however,   the   consequences   of   CC   and   those   of   Climate   variability   manifest   themselves   on                                                                                                                   92  United  Nations,  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  Fccc/Informal/84  Ge.05-­‐62220  (E)  
200705  (1992),  accessed  December  1,  2011.  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf  

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different   timescales.   Indeed,   Climate   Change   refers   to   the   long-­‐term   changes   in   atmospheric  conditions  that  occur  at  timescales  of  decades,  centuries  and  millennia,   whereas   climate   variability   refers   to   shorter-­‐term   fluctuations   that   occur   at   the   timescale  of  a  season,  months  or  a  few  years  (see  fig.  1).       Fluctuations   in   atmospheric   conditions   are   only   ascertained   to   be   the   result   of   Climate   Change   (CC)   when   the   latter   occur   consistently   over   long   enough   periods   of   time,  as  evidenced  by  data  demonstrating  a  statistically  significant  departure  from   the  mean  value  of  a  climate  variable  –e.g.:  a  change  in  average  rainfall  amounts  over   a  30-­‐year  period.  Only  then  can  we  speak  of  Climate  Change  or  changes  in  long-­‐term   climate   patterns   and   trends.   All   else   generally   only   represents   a   manifestation   of   climate  variability  or  natural  weather  changes.                      
Fig.  3.1:  Atmospheric  change,  a  question  of  timescales.  Source:  IRI  

  3.1.3 What  causes  Climate  Change?     Climate  Change  is  caused  by  increased  concentrations  of  Greenhouse  Gases  (GHG)  in   the  atmosphere  resulting  from  human  activities.  The  main  GHG  responsible  for  CC  is   carbon   dioxide.   Methane,   nitrous   oxide   and   sulphur   hexafluoride   are   other   significant   contributors.   Sources   of   carbon   dioxide   include   exhaust   fumes   from   industrial  production  and  car  use,  while  methane  emanates  from  cows  and  intensive   cattle   breeding,   and   nitrous   oxide   from   agricultural   land/animal   manure   •   61  

management.   Altogether   combined,   these   gases   are   responsible   for   the   GHG-­‐ induced  changes  to  our  atmosphere,  through  a  process  called  the  Greenhouse  effect.     Figure   3.2   illustrates   schematically   how   the   Greenhouse   effect   operates.   Increased   atmospheric   concentrations   of   carbon   dioxide   mainly,   as   well   as   other   GHGs,   form   a     canopy  of  GHGs  that  traps  outgoing  radiation,  and  thwarts  planet  Blue  from  emitting   thermal   infared   radiation   back   out   to   space.   Instead,   this   heat   is   deflected   back   to   Earth.   As   a   result,   the   Earth’s   energy   balance   is   set   off   equilibrium;   the   amount   of   incoming   energy   (solar   radiation)   no   longer   equates   to   the   amount   of   energy   emitted  back  out  to  the  atmosphere  (back  radiation).  This  excess  heat  is  returned  to   Earth,   making   Earth’s   global   average   temperature   rise–   a     phenomenon   better   known  as  Global  Warming.                                
    Fig.  3.2:  The  Greenhouse  Effect:  Greenhouse  Gases  trapping  outgoing  terrestrial  radiation  (red   arrow),  the  cause  of  global  Climate  Change.  Sources:  Pearson  Prentice  Hall,  2004;  IPCC,  2001.  

Between  the  decade  of  the  1870s  (corresponding  to  the  beginning  of  the  Industrial   revolution)  and  the  early  2000s  alone,  Earth’s  average  temperature  has  risen  by  0.7°   •   62  

93.   The   rise   of   Earth’s   global   average   temperature   has   multiple   consequences,   the  

most  prominent  of  which  being  the  melting  of  polar  ice  caps,  which  in  turn  cause  the   rise   in   sea   level   –a   phenomenon   better   known   as   Sea   Level   Rise,   as   the   condensed   polar  ice  sheets  sitting  on  land  thaw  to  liquid  water  and  flow  to  the  ocean,   raising   seawater  levels  worldwide.     It  is  very  unlikely  that  the  20th-­‐century  warming  can  be  explained  by  natural  causes   alone94.  Many  scientists  today  argue  that  to  maintain  life  on  Earth  as  we  know  it  and   achieve   significant   curtailing   of   global   warming,   carbon   concentrations   in   the   atmosphere   should   be   maintained   at   350   ppm,   with   a   cutback   on   current   atmospheric   CO2   concentrations   levels   that   stand   at   380   ppm   (see   Hansen   et   al.   200895;   please   note   that   IPCC   emission   reduction   targets   are   more   conservative).   However   the   point   remains   that   to   avoid   dangerous   human   interferences   with   the   climate  system’s  equilibrium,  GHG  emissions  need  to  be  curbed.      

 
Table   3.1:   Dangerous   Climate   Impacts   and   the   Kyoto   Protocol.   Note:   Sea-­level   rise   from   the   disintegration  of  the  West  Antartic  Ice  sheet  at  550ppm  (a  2°C  increase  in  global  average  temperature),   would   be   devastating   to   the   world’s   coastal   cities   and   population   centers.   The   shutdown   of   the   Gulf   Stream   circulation   and   the   loss   of   its   warming   influence   could   lead   to   a   sudden   ice   age   in   Northern   Europe.  Source:  O’Neill  and  M.  Oppenheimer,  200296.      

A   subsidiary   consequence   of   Global   Warming   not   related   to   ice   cap   melting,   is   changes  in  global  weather  patterns  and  climate  trends.  As  the  Earth  has  an  energy                                                                                                                  
94  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   95  Hansen,  J.,  et  al.,  Target  atmospheric  CO2:  Where  should  humanity  aim?  (2008)   96  O’Neill,  B.C,  and  M.  Oppenheimer,  “Dangerous  Climate  Impacts  and  the  Kyoto  Protocol”,  Science  296  (2002):  

93  IPCC,  Climate  Change  2001:  Third  Assessment  Report  

1972  

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surplus   and   strives   for   new   equilibrium   to   balance   it   energy   equation,   this   drives   changes   in   wind   patterns,   ocean-­‐land   teleconnections   and   hosts   of   other   atmospheric   changes   difficult   to   predict,   resulting   in   more   erratic   weather   and   climate  patterns.         The  projected  consequences  of  GHG-­‐induced  CC  can  thus  be  summarized  as  follows:      A  rise  in  mean  global  temperature:  Global  warming  (very  confident)   Melting  Polar  Ice  Caps  &  Sea  Level  Rise  (SLR)  (very  confident)   Shifting  global  climate/weather  patterns  as  Earth’s  climate  system  adapts  to  

energy   imbalance   and   searches   for   a   new   equilibrium   (exact   parameters   and   consequences  unknown)     3.1.4 Is  Climate  Change  New?     No,   the   Earth’s   climate   system   has   always   been   in   constant   motion.   Using   various   paleo-­‐climate   techniques   to   reconstruct   past   millennia   climate   data   (essentially   based  on  readings  of  ice  cores,  paleo-­‐fire/ocean,  lakes,  boreholes,  caves,  tree  rings,   plant   macros,   insect   pollen   and   historical   data),   scientists   were   able   to   obtain   proxy   climate   data   with   which   to   compare   more   recent   data   emanating   from   modern   measurement   instruments   (thermometers,   precipitation   gauges,   etc.).     Their   findings  revealed  that  natural  climate  changes  have  always  existed,  and  were  driven   by   phenomena   as   varied   as   changes   in   the   Earth’s   orbit,   leading   to   fluctuations   in   incoming   solar   radiation,   volcanic   eruptions   or   asteroid   impacts.   What   is   new   however  is  the  magnitude  and  rapidity  of  change  observed  in  contemporary  times.   Indeed,   current   climate   changes   dwarf   past   millennia   of   changes.   Fig.   3.3   hints   to   how   climate   changes   experienced   in   more   recent   times   on   the   geological   time   occur   at   an   order   of   magnitude   and   rate   of   change   that   is   different   from   anything   experienced  in  the  past  2.5  million  years.  

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Fig.   3.3:   Current   climate   changes   dwarf   past   millennia   of   climate   changes   (read   graph   from   right  to  left).  Source:  Pearson  Prentice  Hall,  2004.  

  The   IPCC   Fourth   Assessment   Report   further   corroborates   the   significance   of   the   observed   increase   in   rates   of   change.   “Global   atmospheric   concentrations   of   CO2,   methane   (CH4)   and   nitrous   oxide   (N2O)   have   increased   markedly   as   a   result   of   human   activities   since   1750   and   now   far   exceed   pre-­‐industrial   values   determined   from   ice   cores   spanning   many   thousands   of   years.   Atmospheric   concentrations   of   CO2  (379ppm)  and  CH4  (1774ppb)  in  2005  exceed  by  far  the  natural  range  over  the   last  650,000  years”97.  
 

3.1.5 Evidence  of  Climate  Change     Empirical  evidence  supports  the  assertion  that  increased  GHG  have  made  their  way   to  the  atmosphere,  with  detrimental  impacts  on  Earth’s  climate  system  (see  figures   3.4-­‐6).  

                                                                                                               
97  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report  

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Fig.   3.4:   The   «  Keeling   Curve  »  :   Atmospheric   CO2   measured   at   Mauna   Loa,   Hawaii   monthly   since   1960.   Source:  NOAA  Earth  System  Research  Laboratory,  January  2012  

 

Fig.  3.5:  Abnormal  increases  in  Northern  Hemisphere  surface  temperatures  since  the  mid-­1970s.     Source  :  IPCC,  2001  

 

    Fig.  3.6:  Surface  Melt  on  Greenland.   70m  thinning  of  the  Greenland  melt   area  was  observed  between  1992  and   2002  ;  the  satellite-­era  record  melt  of   2002  was  exceeded  in  2005.     Sources:  Roger  Braithwaite,  University   of  Manchester  (UK)  and  Waleed   Abdalati,  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center.    

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3.1.6 Implications  for  Africa:  Adapting  to  the  Inevitable     A   final   prominent   feature   of   the   Climate   Change   crisis   is   that   it   is   irreversible.   Indeed,  due  to  past  century  atmospheric  carbon  pile-­‐ups  we  are  already  committed   to,  further  changes  in  climate  are  unavoidable.  Nations  must  prepare  for  them.       Indeed,   the   combined   force   of   inertia   and   cumulative   outcomes   of   climate   change   are   important   features   of   the   CC   problem.   Major   parts   of   the   climate   system   display   time   lags   between   action   and   reaction,   which   makes   them   respond   slowly   to   changes  in  GHG  concentrations  in  the  atmosphere.  This  inertia  built  into  the  climate   system,   and   mainly   inherent   in   the   globe’s   oceans   –   that   have   a   long   “memory”   –   means   that   the   climate   system   will   still   continue   to   change   as   it   adapts   to   the   increased  emissions  from  past  decades.     This  means  that  even  if  all  nations  were  to  agree  to  instantly  halt  carbon  emissions   (i.e.:   perfectly   successful   MITIGATION),   we   would   still   be   experiencing   changes   in   the  climate  system  caused  by  the  carbon  emissions  deposited  into  the  atmosphere   during   the   previous   century,   to   which   we   are   already   committed   to   and   have   to   adapt,  regardless  of  what  ensues  from  climate  mitigation  international  negotiations.   Therein  lies  the  imperative  of  ADAPTATION.       Climate   Change   thus   ought   to   be   mitigated,   in   order   to   thwart   continued   carbon   emissions  from  reaching  a  tipping  point  of  catastrophic  climate  change  (the  350ppm   target)   beyond   which   the   Earth   reaches   a   disequilibrium   so   severe   the   consequences  of  which  no-­‐one  is  to  predict  –especially  if  we  were  to  get  to  the  point   where   ice   sheets   over   Antarctica   and   Greenland   give   way.   However   it   cannot   be   stalled.       As  a  consequence,  for  the  first  half  of  the  21st  century,  the  world  in  general,  and  the   world’s   poor   in   particular,   will   have   to   live   with   Climate   Change   to   which   we   are   already  committed.   •   67  

  As   eloquently   stated   by   the   UNDP   Human   Development   Report   2007/08,   “without   urgent  mitigation  action  the  world  cannot  avoid  dangerous  climate  change.  But  even   the   most   stringent   mitigation   will   be   insufficient   to   avoid   major   human   development   setbacks.   The   world   is   already   committed   to   further   warming   because   of   the   inertia   built   into   climate   systems   and   the   delay   between   mitigation   and   outcome.  For  the  first  half  of  the  21st  century,  there  is  no  alternative  to  adaptation   to  climate  change”98.     As   the   IPCC   further   confirms:   “Anthropogenic   warming   and   sea-­‐level   rise   will   continue  for  centuries  due  to  the  timescales  associated  with  climate  processes  and   feedbacks   (notably   thermal   expansion   and   response   of   ice   sheets   to   warming),   even   if   greenhouse   gas   concentrations   were   to   be   stabilized.   Thus   both   past   and   future   anthropogenic  carbon  dioxide  emissions  will  continue  to  contribute  to  warming  and   sea  level  rise  for  more  than  a  millennium99.     As   such,   there   are   double   imperatives:   one   of   Adaptation   to   the   inevitable   –   to   Climate   Change   we   are   already   committed   to   due   to   accumulated   atmospheric   carbon   concentrations—,   and   one   of   Mitigation   –   to   thwart   catastrophic   Climate   Change   by   curbing   further   carbon   buildups.   As   nicely   summarized   by   the   UNDP   special  report  on  Climate  Change,  “at  the  international  level,  doing  nothing  offers  a   guaranteed  route  to  a  further  build-­‐up  of  greenhouse  gases,  and  to  mutually  assured   destruction   of   human   development   potential”.   This   is   still   a   preventable   crisis   though,  the  world  still  has  a  few  more  years  before  we  reach  the  tipping  point.  But  if   serious  carbon  setback  efforts  are  not  engendered,  “by  the  end  of  the  21st  century,   the  specter  of  catastrophic  ecological  impacts  could  have  moved  from  the  bounds  of   the  possible  to  the  probable”100.                                                                                                                      
99
98  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08  

 IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   • 68  

100  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08  

 

At  the  national  level  as  well,  doing  nothing  will  condemn  citizens  to  a  fate  of  reduced   opportunity   and   major   human   development   setbacks;   and   scholars   will   be   writing   the   chronicle   of   a   predicted   catastrophe.   The   imperative   of   Adaptation   to   Climate   Change   is   most   immediate   for   the   world’s   poorest   regions   where   climate   fluctuations   will   have   profound   impacts   on   local   livelihoods;   some   contend   that   these  impacts  have  already  begun.       Africa,  one  of  the  most  vulnerable  continents  where  impacts  of  CC  are  feared,  is  only   left  with  two  choices:  to  Adapt  or  to  Perish  –  or  at  least  suffer  very  severe  losses.     3.2 Projected  Climate  Change  Impacts  over  Africa     Large   uncertainties   remain   regarding   the   exact   impacts   CC   will   have   on   the   continent,   in   part   due   to   the   limited   yet   growing   understanding   of   the   drivers   of   African   climate   variability.   In   even   larger   part   however,   our   understanding   of   CC   impacts  in  Africa  is  crippled  by  our  limited  knowledge  on  how  human  and  political   systems  will  react  to  future  stresses  imposed  by  a  changing  climate.     In   the   next   sections,   we   lay   out   these   uncertainties,   as   it   is   important   to   understand   them,  in  order  to  appreciate  what  we  know  and  what  still  remains  unknown  about   what  CC  will  bring  for  Africa.     3.2.1 Understanding  Africa’s  Climates     Africa’s  climates  are  both  varied  and  varying101.    Indeed,  Africa,  the  second  largest   continent,  has  a  wide  range  of  climate  regimes  ranging  from  very  humid  equatorial   regimes  giving  birth  to  the  great  equatorial  rainforests  of  the  continent,  to  the  arid   tropical  climates  of  the  African  Sahel.102                                                                                                                  
102  Nkomo  et  al,  2006   101  Hulme  M.,  R.,  Doherty,  T.  Ngara,  and  M.  New,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”,  

In  Climate  Change  and  Africa,  ed.  Pak  Sum  Low,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005  

•  

69  

  Africa’s   climates   are   also   characterized   by   high   multi-­‐decadal,   inter-­‐decadal   and   inter-­‐annual   variability,   most   notably   in   rainfall.   They   “exhibit   differing   degrees   of   temporal  variability,  particularly  with  regard  to  rainfall”103.     A   case   in   point   illustrating   African   rainfall   variability   is   the   Sahel   drought   of   the   1970s,  which  represents  a  pendulum  swing  in  the  evolution  of  this  region  of  Africa’s   climate.   The   Sahel   drought   was   a   sustained   period   of   decreasing   rainfall   from   the   1970s   to   the   1990s,   followed   by   pickup   in   rainfall   (see  figure   3.7),   which   eloquently   illustrates  the  high  variability  inherent  in  Africa’s  climate  systems.     In   West   Africa,   this   30-­‐year   decline   in   rainfall   caused   a   25-­‐35   km   southward   shift   of   the  Sahelian,  Sudanese  and  Guinean  ecological  zones  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th   century.   This   has   resulted   in   a   loss   of   forested   area   over   grassland   and   acacia,   the   loss   of   flora/fauna,   and   shifting   sand-­‐   dunes   in   the   Sahel   (see   Gonzalez   2001,   ECF   and  Potsdam  Institute  2004  in  IPCC  2007)104.    

 
  Fig.   3.7:   Rainfall   anomalies   in   the   African   Sahel   from   1901   to   1997.   Positive   anomalies   equate   to   above   normal   rainfall,   while   negative   values   refer   to   below   normal   rainfall,   or   periods   of   drought  (from  Nicholson  et  al.,  2000)  

                                                                                                                    103  Hulme  et  al.,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”   104  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  443-­‐44     •   70  

3.2.2 Drivers  of  African  climate  changes:  CC  vs.  Variability     The   climate   of   the   continent   is   controlled   by   complex   mechanisms105.   The   two   most   important  drivers  of  African  climate  variability  remain  nonetheless:       1) Ocean   forcing.   El   Nino   Southern   Oscillation   (ENSO)   events   in   the   eastern   Pacific   Ocean   remain   the   most   important   driver   of   inter-­‐annual   variability,   with   warm   ENSO   events   correlating   with   high   rainfall   in   equatorial   eastern   Africa   (correlation   strongest   during   the   short   rains   “September-­‐November”   rainy   season)   and   low   rainfall   in   Southern   Africa   (correlation   strongest   during   December-­‐February)   as   well   as   in   the   Sahel   (see   Giannini   et   al.   2003106;   Janicot   et   al   2001107),   all   the   way   across   to   Ethiopia   (Korecha   and   Barnston,  2007108 );     2) Land-­‐atmosphere  interactions  (land  cover  changes  and  their  feedbacks  to  the   climate  system).     3.2.2.1   Better   understanding   exists   today   of   the   complex   mechanisms   responsible   for   rainfall   variability   in   Africa.   Firstly   are   sea-­‐surface   temperature   (SST)   anomalies,   both   near   (e.g.:   SSTs   in   Gulf   of   guinea   for   Sahel)   and   far,   through   oceanic-­‐ atmospheric  bridges  and  tele-­‐connections.  For  instance,  it  is  increasingly  recognized   today  that  the  Sahel  drought  of  the  1970s  was  associated  with  the  warm  SST  trend   at  the  time.  Giannini  et  al.  confirm  this  assertion  based  on  the  observed  record  of  sea   surface   temperature   from   1930   to   2000,   they   suggest   that   variability   of   rainfall   in                                                                                                                   105  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  435   106  Giannini,  A.,  R.  Saravanan,  and  P.  Chang,  “Oceanic  Forcing  of  Sahel  Rainfall  on  Interannual  to  Interdecadal  
Time  Scales”,  Science  302  7  (2003)  
107  Janicot,  S.,  S.  Trzaska,  and  I.  Poccard,  Summer  Sahel-­‐ENSO  teleconnection  and  decadal  time  scale  SST  

Rainfall  changes  

108

variations,  Climate  Dynamics  18  3-­‐4  (2001):  303-­‐32  

 Korecha,  D.  and  A.  G.  Barnston,  Predictability  of  June-­‐September  rainfall  in  Ethiopia,  Mon.  Wea.  Rev.  135   (2007):  628-­‐650   • 71    

the   Sahel   results   from   the   response   of   the   African   summer   monsoon   to   oceanic   forcing,   amplified   by   land-­‐atmosphere   interaction.   “The   recent   drying   trend   in   the   semi-­‐arid   Sahel   is   attributed   to   warmer-­‐than-­‐average   low-­‐latitude   waters   around   Africa,   which,   by   favoring   the   establishment   of   deep   convection   over   the   ocean,   weaken   the   continental   convergence   associated   with   the   monsoon   and   engender   widespread  drought  from  Senegal  to  Ethiopia”109.     Secondly  are  ENSO  processes,  a  significant  influence  on  rainfall  variability  at  inter-­‐ annual   scales.   ENSO   has   been   associated   in   recent   years   with   severe   droughts   in   Southern  Africa  for  example.       Last  are  land  use/land  cover  changes.  Indeed,  several  studies  have  highlighted  the   importance   of   terrestrial   vegetation   cover   and   the   associated   dynamic   feedbacks   on   the  physical  climate.  A  study  by  Bounoua  et  al.  has  demonstrated  for  instance  that   an   increase   in   vegetation   density   has   been   suggested   could   result   in   a   year-­‐round   cooling  of  0.8°C  in  the  tropics,  including  tropical  areas  of  Africa  (see  Bounoua  et  al.   2000   and   Christenssen   et   al.   2007,   in   IPCC   2007)110.   Also,   complex   feedback   mechanisms   between   land   cover   changes/deforestation,   human   migration   to   the   cities   compounded   by   changes   in   atmospheric   dust   loadings   played   a   role   in   the   persistence   of   the   Sahel   drought   and   its   surroundings.   Complex   interactions   between   land   cover/land   use   changes,   human   agency   and   feedback   loops   onto   the   physical   climate   characterize   land   use   influences   on   the   climate   variability;   “the   complexity   of   these   interactions   precludes   simple   interpretations”111.   The   largest   source   of   uncertainty   in   the   planet’s   radiative   balance   remains   however   the   influence  of  aerosols,  a  case  in  point  being  Saharan  atmospheric  dust  loadings.    

                                                                                                                109  Giannini  et  al.,  “Oceanic  Forcing  of  Sahel  Rainfall  on  Interannual  to  Interdecadal  Time  Scales”   110  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  457   111  Ibidem   •   72  

Other   mechanisms   that   appear   to   influence   rainfall   variability   to   a   lesser   degree   are   the   localization   and   intensity   of   the   African   Easterly   Jet   (AEJ)   and   the   Tropical   Easterly   Jet   (TEJ)112,   and   the   warmth   of   the   Mediterranean   Sea   (giving   abundant   rainfall).  The  way  these  mechanisms  influence  regional  weather  patterns  are  being   demonstrated   through   correlations   here   and   there,   but   uncertainties   remain   large113.     The   attribution   question   remains   nonetheless.   How   much   of   these   changes   in   rainfall   are   naturally   driven,   and   how   much   can   be   attributed   to   increased   green   house  gases?  These  are  the  answers  that  climate  scientists  worldwide  are  currently   attempting  to  elicit.       Many   researchers   make   the   case   that   GHG-­‐induced   CC   is   the   culprit   for   the   many   observed  climate  changes  in  Africa  however.       The   first   change   that   this   group   of   researchers   highlights   is   the   increased   climate   variability   observed   across   the   continent   in   recent   years.   Researchers   report   on   observations   of   increased   extreme   weather   events   and   exacerbated   climate   variability.  “Increased  inter-­‐annual  variability  has,  been  observed  in  the  post-­‐1970   period,   with   higher   rainfall   anomalies   and   more   intense   and   widespread   droughts   reported   (for   examples   see   Richard   et   al.   2001;   Fauchereau   et   al.,   2003114).   In   different   parts   of   southern   Africa   (e.g.:   Angola,   Namibia,   Mozambique,   Malawi,   Zambia),   a   significant   increase   in   heavy   rainfall   events   has   also   been   observed   (Usman   and   Reason,   2004115),   including   evidence   for   changes   in   seasonality   and   weather   extremes   (Tadross   et   al.,   2005;   New   et   al.,   2006116).   During   recent   decades,                                                                                                                  
113 114
112  The  atmospheric  circulation  has  to  come  to  a  different  equilibrium,  given  the  oceanic  forcing:  it  does  so  by  

shifting  the  strength  or  location  of  these  features,  consistently  with  moisture  convergence.  

 IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  457    IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   115  Ibidem   116  Ibidem     •  

73  

eastern   Africa   has   been   experiencing   an   intensifying   dipole   rainfall   pattern   on   the   decadal  time-­‐scale,  characterized  by  increasing  rainfall  over  the  northern  sector  and   declining  amounts  over  the  southern  sector  (see  Schreck  and  Semazzi  2004  in  IPCC   2007117).  This  observation  is  consistent  with  the  recovery  of  the  rainfall  observed  in   the  Sahel  in  recent  years,  also  coined  “greening  of  the  Sahel”118.       Secondly,  on  the  climate  change  timescale,  they  point  to  the  substantial  inter-­‐annual   and   multi-­‐decadal   rainfall   variations   observed   since   the   second   half   of   the   20th   century,  a  case  in  point  being  the  near  continent-­‐wide  droughts  in  1983  and  1984,   with  dramatic  impacts  on  economies  and  environments.     Oceanic  SST-­‐driven  tele-­‐connections  are  not  enough  anymore  to  explain  changes  in   rainfall   variability.   “It   is   clear   that   the   oceans,   especially   the   Pacific   Ocean   are   important   modulators   of   both   inter-­‐annual   and   inter-­‐decadal   climate   variability   in   Africa.   But   the   oceans   alone   do   not   hold   all   the   clues...   work   examining   the   variability   of   African   climate,   mostly   rainfall,   has   to   be   set   in   the   wider   context   of   emerging  understanding  of  human  influences  on  the  larger  global  scale  climate”  (see   IPCC  2007;  also  Williams  &  Funk,  2011)119.     However,   “the   extent   to   which   these   rainfall   variations   are   related   to   anthropogenic   GHG-­‐induced   global   warming   remains   undetermined”120.   Although   many   scientists   are   beginning   to   piece   together   the   attribution   question   indirectly,   through   the   relative  influences  of  GHGs  and  sulfate  aerosols  on  the  oceans  and  patterns  of  SSTs   relevant   to   Africa   (see   Ting   et   al.   2009121;   also   Chang,   Chiang   et   al.   2011),   the  

                                                                                                                117  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report  
118   Giannini,   A.,   M.   Biasutti   and   M.   M.   Verstraete,   “A   Climate   Model-­‐Based   Review   of   Drought   In   The   Sahel:  

Desertification,  The  Re-­‐Greening  And  Climate  Change”,  Global  and  Planetary  Change  64  (2008):  119-­‐12  
119  Ting,  Mingfang,  Yochanan  Kushnir,  Richard  Seager,  And  Cuihua  Li,  “Forced  and  Internal  Twentieth-­‐Century  

SST  Trends  in  the  North  Atlantic”,  Journal  of  Climate  (2009)  1469-­‐81  
120  Hulme  et  al.,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”   121   A.   Park   Williams   &   Chris   Funk,   “A   westward   extension   of   the   warm   pool   leads   to   a   westward   extension   of   the  

Walker  circulation,  drying  eastern  Africa”,  Climate  Dynamics  (2011)  

•  

74  

attribution   question   does   not   have   an   easy   one-­‐on-­‐one   answer,   and   uncertainties   remain  large.     3.2.2.2   Attributions  for  temperature  changes  are  easier.  There  is  a  consensus  on  the  finding   that  temperatures  in  Africa  are  on  the  rise.  “The  continent  of  Africa  is  warmer  than   it  was  100  years  ago”  with  an  average  rate  of  warming  of  0.5°C/century  through  the   20th   century.   The   six   warmest   years   in   Africa   have   all   occurred   since   1987,   with   1998   being   the   warmest   year122.   These   changes   are   consistent   with   global   trends.   Africa’s   rate   of   warming   is   “not   dissimilar   to   that   experienced   worldwide   and   the   periods   of   most   rapid   warming   –the   1910s-­‐1930s   and   the   post   1970s   occur   simultaneously  in  Africa  and  the  world”123.       Model  based  predictions  of  future  GHG  induced  CC  for  the  continent  clearly  suggest   that   this   warming   will   continue,   and   in   most   scenarios,   accelerate   so   that   the   continent   on   average   could   be   between   2   and   6°   C   warmer   in   100   years   time.   While   these   predictions   of   future   warming   may   be   robust,   there   is   much   less   confidence   about   the   direction   and   even   magnitude   of   change   when   it   comes   to   rainfall   projections124.   Will   we   witness   desiccation   and   a   return   to   the   droughts   of   the   1980s,   or   should   we   expect   more   rainfall,   as   the   current   “greening”   of   the   Sahel   seems   to   suggest?   Low   confidence   in   current   climate   model   projections   precludes   any   definitive   trend   about   the   direction   or   magnitude   of   change   in   rainfall125.   Processes  such  as  ENSO,  land  cover-­‐atmosphere  interactions/changes  and  biomass   aerosols   impacts   should   first   be   accounted   for   and   included   in   GCM   predictions   before  rainfall  changes  can  be  predicted  adequately126.                                                                                                                   122  Hulme  et  al.,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”   123  Ibidem   124  Ibidem   125  IUNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   126  Hulme  et  al.,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”   •   75   Temperature  changes  

“Discernible  human  influences  extend  beyond  average  temperature  to  other  aspects   of  climate.  Human  influences  have:  very  likely  contributed  to  sea  level  rise  during  the   latter   half   of   the   20th   century,   likely   contributed   to   changes   in   wind   patterns,   affecting   extra-­‐tropical   storm   tracks   and   temperature   patterns   likely   increased   temperatures  of  extreme  hot  nights,  cold  nights  and  cold  days;  and  more  likely  than   not   increased   risk   of   heat   waves,   area   affected   by   drought   since   the   1970s   and   frequency  of  heavy  precipitation  events”127.     3.2.2.3   As   we   have   demonstrated,   distinguishing   between   the   effects   of   GHG-­‐induced   Climate   Change   and   natural   climate   variability   is   an   exercise   prone   to   multiple   uncertainties.   However,   whether   a   result   of   exogenous   anthropogenic   CC   or   naturally   driven   variability   in   the   continent’s   climate   systems,   communities   and   countries  all  across  Africa  are  already  contending  with  ongoing  climate  changes  and   their  associated  environmental,  socio-­‐economic,  cultural,  political  and  psychological   impacts.   It   is   important   to   realize   that   climate   changes   pose   a   problem   to   Africa’s   societies  whose  magnitude  they  may  not  be  well  equipped  to  face.     Social  scientists  at  the  interface  of  climate  and  societal  impacts  are  trying  to  scope   out   the   magnitude   of   the   problem   that   enhanced   greenhouse   effect   may   pose   for   African   climate   and   for   African   resource   managers128.   However   this   is   an   arduous   challenge  due  to  the  large  uncertainties  that  remain  associated  with  the  projection   of   climate   impacts   in   Africa.   Africa   is   not   aided   in   this   by   the   relative   absence   of   weather  stations  on  the  continent  (see  fig.  3.8).        Conclusion  

                                                                                                                127  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   128  Hulme  et  al.,  “Global  Warming  and  African  Climate  Change:  a  Reassessment”   • 76    

Relative  Density  of  Weather  Stations  in  Select  African  countries,  with  Africa  average.     Source:  UNPD  2007/08129  

 

  Despite  these  large  uncertainties,  climate  scientists,  working  under  the  auspices  of   the   IPCC   Fourth   Assessment   Report,   have   ventured   to   state   what   they   do   know,   based  on  their  model  projections,  and  with  which  levels  of  confidence.     Table  3.2  summarizes  the  state  of  the  knowledge  on  impacts  projected  to  hit  Africa   as  a  result  of  CC,  by  variable  of  interest  and  in  the  short-­‐,  mid  and  long-­‐terms.  

                                                                                                                129  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   •   77  

3.2.2.4
               Projection     Variable  
Temperature  

Projected  Climate  impacts  in  Africa  
Projection     Confidence  level  

Rainfall  

Sea  Level  

Extreme  events  

 Scenarios  suggest  warming  across  Africa  ranging  from  >0.2°  to   0.5°C  per  decade,  in  excess  of  natural  est.  temperature  increases    Africa  could  be  on  average  between  2°  and  6°C  warmer  in  100   years  time  (Hulme  et  al.,  2001)    Climate   Change   very   likely   to   impose   net   annual   costs,   which   will   increase  over  time  as  global  temperatures  increase.    CC  likely  to  bring  an  exacerbation  of  current  rainfall  variability    Models  however  do  not  agree  as  to  the  magnitude  and  even  direction   of  change  in  rainfall  over  the  continent  (large  uncertainties  for  Sahel)    Consequences  of  rainfall  changes  on  African  economies  highly   dependent  on  rain-­fed  agriculture  are  enormous.  Implications  for   all  sectors  of  human  activity,  notably  health  and  agriculture.      Global  expected  sea  level  rise:  88cm  by  year  2100  (worst  case   scenario)  and  a  mean  of  48cm  (IPCC,  2001),  with  large  local   differences  due  to  tides,  winds  and  atmospheric  pressure  patterns.    For  Africa,  towards  end  of  the  21st  century,  projected  sea  level  rise   will  affect  low-­lying  coastal  areas  with  large  populations.  Cost  of   adaptation  could  amount  to  at  least  5  to  10%  of  GDP,  depending  on   costs  of  coastal  protection  versus  costs  of  land-­‐use  relocation;   potential  for  movement  of  populations  and  infrastructure    Large  consequences  on  human  coastal  settlements  and   infrastructure,  notably  on  tourism  (Niang-­‐Diop  et  al.,  2005)    Possible  impacts  on  other  sectors:  changes  in  water  supply,   agricultural  productivity  loss  and  human  migration  (according  to  the   local  dynamics  of  human  demography);     -­‐ Salinization  of  irrigation,  estuaries  and  fresh-­‐water  systems     -­‐ Possible  decimation  of  mangroves,  coral  reefs  and  other  natural   buffer  ecosystems   -­‐ Increased  risk  of  deaths  and  injuries  by  drowning  in  floods    Very  likely  contribution  of  SRL  to  coastal  extreme  high  sea   level/tides,  storm  surges  (SREX,  2011)  and  tropical  cyclones    CC  will  bring  with  quasi  certainty  over  most  land  areas  warmer  and   fewer  cold  days  and  nights,  as  well  as  warmer  more  frequent  hot   days  and  nights,  with  the  following  impacts:   -­‐  Increased  yields  in  colder  environments;  decreased  yields  in  warmer   environments;  increased  insect  outbreaks   -­‐  Reduced  energy  demand  for  heating;  increased  demand  for  cooling    Hot  extremes,  warm  spells  and  heat  waves  very  likely  to  be  more   frequent,  with:  -­‐  Reduced  yields  in  warmer  regions  due  to  heat  stress   -­‐  Increased  water  demand;  water  quality  problems,  e.g.  algal  blooms   -­‐  Increased  risk  of  heat-­‐related  mortality,  especially  for  the  elderly,   chronically  sick,  very  young  and  socially  isolated   -­‐  Reduction  in  quality  of  life  for  people  in  warm  areas  without   appropriate  housing;  impacts  on  the  elderly,  very  young  and  poor    Very  likely  increase  in  the  frequency  of  heavy  rainfall  events,   notably  in  East  Africa  (SREX,  2011)  with:   -­‐  Damage  to  crops;  soil  erosion,  water-­‐logging  of  soils   -­‐  Increased  risk  of  deaths,  injuries  &  infectious  respiratory/skin  diseases   -­‐  Disruption  of  settlements,  commerce,  transport  and  societies  due  to   flooding:  pressures  on  urban  and  rural  infrastructures;  loss  of  property   -­‐  Adverse  effects  on  quality  of  surface  and  groundwater    Likely  increase  in  areas  affected  by  drought,  with:   -­‐  Land  degradation;  lower  yields/crop  damage  and  failure;  livestock   deaths;  increased  risk  of  wildfire;  more  widespread  water  stress  

Temperature   projections  for  Africa   remain  robust  

Future  changes  in   precipitation  are   much  less  confident   and  less  well  defined,   but  trend  is  towards   more  erratic  rainfall.   Accelerated  Sea   Level  Rise  is  one  of   the  most  probable   consequences  of  CC.   Sea  level  rise  under   warming  is   inevitable.     Projection   limitations  include:   weakness  in  SLR   predictions  over   Africa,  as  well  as  in   predictions  of  how   human  systems  will   react.    

There  is  now  higher   confidence  in   projected  patterns  of   warming  and  other   regional-­‐scale   features,  including   changes  in  wind   patterns,   precipitation  and   some  aspects  of   extremes.                          

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Health  

Water   availability    

Agriculture  

-­‐  Increased  risk  of  food  and  water  shortage;  increased  risk  of   malnutrition;  increased  risk  of  water-­‐  and  food-­‐  borne  diseases   -­‐  Water  shortage  for  settlements,  industry  and  societies;  reduced   hydropower  generation  potentials;  potential  for  population  migration    Likely  increase  in  the  intensity  of  tropical  cyclones,  with:   -­‐  Crop  damage;  windthrow/uprooting  of  trees;  damage  to  coral  reefs   -­‐  Power  outages  causing  disruption  of  public  water  supply   -­‐  Increased  risk  of  deaths,  injuries;  post-­‐traumatic  stress  disorders   -­‐  Disruption  by  flood  and  high  winds;  withdrawal  of  risk  coverage  in   vulnerable  areas  by  private  insurers;  potential  for  loss  of  property    Under  all  scenarios,  creation  of  new  Climate  Change  refugees   Shifting  disease  patterns  projected  for  malaria,  meningitis&cholera:    Possible  extension/contraction,  depending  on  location,  of  areas   suitable  for  malaria  by  2020,  2050  and  2080,  with  a  5-­7%  potential   increase  in  malaria  distribution  (mainly  in  the  highlands)      Consensus  among  all  scenarios  that  by  2100,  the  highlands  of   eastern  Africa  and  areas  of  southern  Africa  likely  to  become   more  suitable  for  malaria  transmission    Possible  contraction  of  the  malaria  risk  zone  by  2050  continuing  into   2080,  in  large  parts  of  Western  Sahel  and  southern  central  Africa,   likely  to  become  unsuitable  for  malaria  transmission      Possible  increases  in  floods  will  increase  the  propensity  of  water-­‐ borne  diseases  such  as  malaria  and  cholera    Migration-­‐related  health  effects  to  be  expected  with  increased  SLR    Meningitis  and  cholera  also  likely  to  change  patterns  with   exacerbated  climate  variability  and  change.    High  confidence  that  many  semi-­‐arid  areas  (e.g.  southern  Africa)  will   suffer  a  decrease  in  water  resources  due  to  climate  change    The  population  at  risk  of  increased  water  stress  in  Africa,  for  the   full  range  of  SRES  scenarios,  is  projected  to  be  75-­‐250  million  by  the   2020s  and  350-­‐600  million  people  by  the  2050s    However,  the  impact  of  CC  on  water  resources  is  not  uniform  across   the  continent.  Likely  increase  in  the  number  of  people  who  could   experience  water  stress  by  2055  in  northern  and  southern  Africa;  in   contrast,  more  people  in  east  and  west  Africa  will  be  likely  to   experience  a  reduction  rather  than  an  increase  in  water  stress.        By  2020,  yields  from  rain-­fed  agriculture  could  be  reduced  in   some  countries  by  up  to  50%,  with  decreased  crop  growth  periods      By  the  2080s,  significant  decreases  in  suitable  rain-­fed  land   extent  and  production  potential  for  cereals  are  estimated    Wheat  production  likely  to  disappear  from  Africa  by  2080s    Notable  reductions  in  maize  production  likely  in  Southern  Africa   under  possible  increased  ENSO  conditions    By  2080,  a  5  to  8%  increase  in  arid  and  semi-­arid  land  in  Africa   projected  under  a  range  of  climate  scenarios  (est.  60-­‐90  million  ha)    By  2100,  parts  of  the  Sahara  likely  to  show  agricultural  losses  of   between  2  to  7%  of  GDP.  Western  and  central  Africa  also   vulnerable,  with  impacts  ranging  from  2-­‐4%  of  GDP.    Not  all  changes  in  climate  and  climate  variability  will  be  negative    Agriculture  and  the  growing  seasons  in  certain  areas  (e.g.,  parts   of  the  Ethiopian  highlands  and  southern  Africa  such  as   Mozambique)  may  lengthen  under  climate  change  due  to  a   combination  of  increased  temperature  and  rainfall  changes    Mild  climate  scenarios  project  further  benefits  across  African   croplands  for  irrigated  and,  especially,  dryland  farms    Even  under  these  favorable  scenarios  however,  populated  regions   of  the  Mediterranean  coastline,  central  Africa,  western  and   southern  Africa  expected  to  be  adversely  affected.  

          Less  confidence   however  in  the   global  decrease  of   tropical  cyclone   numbers     Owing  to  vigorous   debates  among   climate  and  health   scientists,  robust   knowledge  on  future   behavior  and  trends   of  climate-­‐sensitive   diseases.     Socio-­‐economic   impacts  of  changing   malaria,  meningitis   epidemic  outbreak   patterns  are  difficult   to  estimate.     Robust  projections   for  impacts  on  water   availability.   But  uncertainties  for   water  access  remain   large:  Current   assessments  do  not   fully  capture  multiple   future  water  uses   and  water  stress   Assessing  future   trends  in  agricultural   production  in  Africa   remains  exceedingly   difficult.    

Table   3.2:   State   of   Knowledge   on   Projected   CC   impacts   in   Africa.   Source:   IPCC,   2007   (unless   otherwise  noted)  

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Table  3.2  reveals  that  projected  Climate  Change  impacts  for  Africa  span  across  the   whole   continent,   with   implications   for   all   sectors   of   human   activity   (agriculture,   industry,   tourism,   water   availability   and   ecosystem   services).   Many   of   these   projections  have  already  begun  to  be  observed.       As   Table   3.2   also   highlights,   Climate   Change   will   not   bring   only   loss   and   risks   however;   it   will   also   open   new   opportunities   for   gain   in   areas   where   there   were   none   (for   instance,   new   temperate   areas   suitable   for   agriculture   and   winter   tourism)   and   reduce   risks   in   areas   where   these   were   being   suffered   (e.g.:   contraction   of   the   malaria   risk   zone   in   the   Western   Sahel,   but   expansion   into   southern   Africa   and   the   highlands   of   East   Africa;   possible   increase   in   water   stress   for  millions  in  northern  and  southern  Africa,  but  decrease  in  water  stress  for  west   and  east  Africans).  The  impacts  of  Climate  Change  will  not  be  homogeneous  across   Africa.   The   shifting   risks   and   new   opportunities   that   will   be   brought   by   Climate   Change  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.       Albeit   unevenly   distributed   across   the   continent,   within   countries   and   within   communities,   there   will   be   both   losers   and   winners   from   Climate   Change.   The   potential   for   gain   from   Climate   Change   is   there   nonetheless,   provided   households,   communities   and   countries   in   Africa   are   able   to   seize   the   new   opportunities   and   adapt  quickly  to  new  climate  equilibria.       Finally,   it   also   appears   clearly   from   table   3.2   that   the   lines   of   causality   between   changes   in   climate   variables   and   societal   impacts   are   not   linear.   Climate   variables   and  human  dimensions  interact  in  complex  ways  to  buffer  or  compound  the  impacts   of   Climate   Change   on   society,   with   multiple   lines   of   causality   and   feedback   loops   from  one  to  the  other.   Climate  Change  impacts  on  the  health  offer  a  prime  example   of   the   complexity   of   climate–human   systems   interactions.   Likely   feedback   loops   from   changing   disease   patterns   to   other   vulnerability   factors   or   “background  

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stresses”130,   for   instance   conflicts,   migrations   and   HIV/AIDS   with   which   they   will   interact,   are   likely   to   render   populations   more   susceptible   to   other   diseases   (e.g.:   cholera)   and   malnutrition.   Human   dimensions   that   mediate   CC   impacts   in   poor   settings  demonstrate  the  manifold  non-­‐linear  loops  of  interaction  between  climate   and   human   variables,   and   the   layers   of   complexity.   These   multiple   layers   of   causality  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  simple  cause  and  effect  relationship.  
 

Large   uncertainties   remain   as   to   the   outcome   of   each   climate   variable   change-­‐ human  dimension  interaction.  How  households,  communities  and  entire  nations  will   respond  to  changes  in  their  climate  variables  remains  the  single  largest  determinant   of  the  outcome  of  climate  stresses.     Indeed,  despite  multiple  educated  guesses,  knowledge  on  the  likely  socio-­‐economic   impacts  of  Climate  Change  in  Africa  is  not  robust  and  uncertainties  remain  large  on   how   societies   will   respond   to   the   impacts   of   Climate   Change.   Noteworthy   is   the   paucity  of  literature  on  how  the  projected  climate  change  impacts  projected  will  be   borne   by   poor   countries,   notably   in   the   least-­‐capacitated   area   of   the   world   to   address  them  –i.e:  Africa.     It   is   widely   recognized   though   that   Africa   is   one   of   the   regions   most   vulnerable   to   the   projected   impacts   of   CC   and   variability.   Given   the   continent’s   high   socio-­‐ economic   vulnerability   and   low   adaptive   capacity,   projected   climate   changes   have   potentially   explosive   impacts   on   Africa’s   fragile   political   and   economic   systems.   However   how   precisely   these   impacts   are   likely   to   play   out   in   African   countries   remains   a   black   box   labeled   “adaptive   capacity”   to   “multiple   stresses”.   “Africa’s   vulnerability   to   climate   change   largely   depends   on   its   current   and   future   adaptive   capacities”.   “Multiple   stresses   heighten   vulnerability   to   climate   stress   in   Africa.  

                                                                                                                130  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   •   81  

Several  of  these  stresses  are  likely  to  be  compounded  by  climate  change  and  climate   variability  in  the  future”131.     As  argued,  CC  impacts  may  further  constrain  development  and  the  attainment  of  the   MDGs  in  Africa.  Adaptive  capacity  and  adaptation  thus  emerge  as  critical  areas  for   consideration  on  the  continent132.  Which  exact  adaptive  capacity  will  be  needed  on   the   continent   to   face   what   particular   climate   impacts   are   the   crux   of   this   dissertation,   which   focuses   on   the   governance   requisites   of   effective   climate   change   adaptation.     How   are   the   already   fragile   political   and   economic   systems   of   African   countries   to   confront  the  far-­‐reaching  and  multi-­‐dimensional  projected  impacts  of  CC?       CCA   raises   key   challenges   for   the   African   State,   challenges   that   get   to   the   heart   of   age-­‐old  governance  and  institutional  questions  that  have  haunted  the  African  State   since  the  winds  of  Independence  blew  over  the  continent  in  the  1960s.     In  the  next  and  final  section  of  this  part,  we  attempt  to  make  sense  of  these  multiple   imperatives   faced   by   the   African   States   under   a   changing   climate,   to   be   delivered   as   one   under   the   Development   endeavor,   and   propose   a   conceptual   framework   bringing  together  the  manifold  concepts  involved  in  the  governance  of  CCA  in  Africa,   and  the  institutional  underpinnings  of  such  governance.        

                                                                                                                131  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   132  Ibidem   •   82  

3.3 Governing  CC  in  Africa:  Definitions  and  Conceptual  Framework     Only   in   recent   years   has   CC   started   to   be   perceived   as   a   central   development   challenge,  that  could  serve  as  a  potential  significant  limiting  factor  to  development   (see   UNDP,   2007-­‐08133   and   World   Bank   World   Development   Report,   2010134).   Today  scholars  and  practitioners  alike  are  beginning  to  appreciate  the  implications   of  the  massive  projected  impacts  of  Climate  change  (reviewed  in  the  section  above)   for  development.  Still  no  framework  exists  to  help  us  structure  our  understanding  of   CC   impacts   on   development   at   the   national   and   sub-­‐national   levels   in   Africa.     In   large   part   this   situation   is   due   to   the   still   sizeable   uncertainties   regarding   how   CC   will   exactly   manifest   itself   on   the   continent.   In   even   larger   part,   however,   this   situation   is   owed   to   our   limited   understanding   of   how   human   systems   and   societies   in   Africa   will   react   to,   anticipate,   buffer   and   adapt   to   projected   CC   impacts;   and   how   CCA,  DDR  and  governance  are  linked  as  one  under  the  Development  agenda.     Therein  lies  the  relevance  of  analyzing  how  CCA,  DRR,  and  Governance  in  Africa  are,   within   the   wider   framework   of   the   Development   endeavor.   We   develop   these   conceptual   linkages   in   the   next   sections,   beginning   with   the   concept   of   Climate   Change  Adaptation  (CCA),  and  building  on  it  one  concept  at  a  time.     3.3.1 Meeting  the  CCA  imperative:  Context  &  Challenges     3.3.1.1   Defining   what   constitutes   Adaptation   is   a   challenge.   In   human   systems,   it   is   the   process   of   adjustment   to   actual   or   expected   climate   and   its   effects,   in   order   to                                                                                                                   133  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   134  The  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  2010:  Sustainable  Development  in  a  Dynamic  World  (Washington  
D.C.:  Oxford  University  Press,  2010).  

Adaptation  vs.  Development?  

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moderate   harm   or   exploit   beneficial   opportunities135 .   The   goal   of   adaptation   is   to   build   the   capacity   of   a   country   or   society   to   adapt   to   new   climate   risks   and   equilibriums   –a   term   coined   as   adaptive   capacity.   However   “adaptive   capacity   is   intimately   connected   to   social   and   economic   development   but   is   unevenly   distributed  across  and  within  societies”136.  The  IPCC  further  notes  that:  “in  several   sectors,  climate  response  options  can  be  implemented  to  realize  synergies  and  avoid   conflicts   with   other   dimensions   of   sustainable   development.   Decisions   about   macroeconomic   and   other   non-­‐climate   policies   can   significantly   affect   emissions,   adaptive   capacity   and   vulnerability”137.   Thus   dissociating   Adaptation   from   Development,   and   preventing   negative   externalities   from   one   to   the   other,   is   a   difficult  question.  We  offer  our  conception  of  the  question  in  the  next  section,  one  of   Climate   Change   Adaptation   and   Sustainable   Development   not   as   trade   offs   but   rather  of  the  former  as  a  subset  of  the  latter.     How   to   adapt   however   is   a   difficult   tricky   question.   A   wide   array   of   adaptation   options   is   available,   but   more   extensive   adaptation   than   is   currently   occurring   is   required   to   reduce   vulnerability   to   CC.   There   are   barriers,   limits   and   costs,   which   are  not  fully  understood138.  Examples  of  planned  adaptation  are  displayed  in  Table   3.3.    
   

                                                                                                                135  IPCC,  SREX   136  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   137  Ibidem   138    Ibidem   •  

84  

 

Table  3.3:  Examples  of  planned  adaptation.  Source:  IPCC,  2007  

  3.3.1.2   For   developing   countries,   the   looming   implications   of   footing   the   adaptation   bill   are   also   cause   for   concern.   The   World   Bank’s   global   track   study   reveals   that   by   2020,   the  annual  costs  of  adaptation  for  developing  countries  will  range  from  $75  billion   to  $100  billion  per  year;  of  this  amount,  the  average  annual  costs  for  Africa  would  be   about  $18  billion  per  year139.                                                                                                                   •  
139  World  Bank,  Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Synthesis  Report  (Washington  DC:  World  Bank,  2010)  

Financing  Adaptation  in  Africa  

85  

  One  further  point  in  the  Climate  Change  debate,  subject  to  much  contention  during   the   global   negotiations   on   who   pays   for   Adaptation,   is   its   irony.   “It   is   the   poorest   who  did  not  and  still  are  not  contributing  significantly  to  greenhouse  gas  emissions   that   are   the   most   vulnerable”140.   Indeed,   Africa’s   contribution   to   global   carbon   emissions   amounts   to   a   mere   3%   of   total   global   emissions,   yet   it   is   projected   to   suffer  its  most  severe  impacts.      
Oceania  2%   Africa   3%  

CO2  emissions  by  region  
LA  1%  

Europe   16%  

North   America   27%  

Asia   50%    
(including  China,   NICs  and  India)  

 
Fig.  3.9:  The  irony  of  CC.  (adapted  from  CARMA.org  2010  data)  

  Thus,  future  generations  are  not  the  only  constituency  that  will  have  to  cope  with  a   problem   they   did   not   create.   The   world’s   poor   will   suffer   the   earliest   and   most   damaging  impacts  of  Climate  Change141.       “Responding   to   climate   change   will   require   the   integration   of   adaptation   into   all   aspects   of   policy   development   and   planning   for   poverty   reduction”   (UNDP   2007/08).   As   finally   recommended,   “success   [in   the   development   endeavor]   will   have   to   involve   a   great   deal   of   adaptation,   because   climate   change   is   still   going   to   affect  the  poorest  countries  significantly  even  if  serious  efforts  to  reduce  emissions                                                                                                                  
140  Steiner  &  Dervis  in  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   141  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08  

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start  immediately.  Countries  will  need  to  develop  their  own  adaptation  plans  but  the   international  community  will  need  to  assist  them”142.     Some  noteworthy  international  efforts  to  support  adaptation  in  Africa  have  already   taken  place.  Recognizing  the  imperative  to  adapt  to  past-­‐century  emissions  we  are   committed  to  and  the  need  to  assist  developing  countries  to  plan  for  development   with   climate   adaptation   in   mind,   the   UNFCCC   at   COP-­‐7   commended   all   party   countries  to  establish  National  Adaptation  Plans  of  Action  (NAPAs).  In  this  context,   Least   Developed   Countries   benefited   from   LDCF   funding   to   the   amount   $195,000   to   develop   their   National   Action   Plan   for   Adaptation   to   Climate   Change   (NAPAs)   documents,  identifying  each  country’s  most  urgent  and  priority  needs  for  adaptation   and  evaluating  its  vulnerability  in  the  face  of  climate  change143.     All   three   (3)   country   cases   treated   in   this   research,   Senegal,   Uganda   and   Mozambique,  received  LDCF  support,  and  developed  their  NAPAs  in  the  early  2000s.     Furthermore,   at   the   Conference   of   the   Parties   (COP15)   held   in   December   2009   in   Copenhagen  developed  countries  pledged  to  provide  new  and  additional  resources,   including  forestry  and  investments,  approaching  USD  30  billion  for  the  period  2010-­‐   2012   and   with   balanced   allocation   between   mitigation   and   adaptation.   This   collective   commitment   has   come   to   be   known   as   "Fast-­start   Finance"   (FSF).   Following  up  on  this  pledge,  the  COP  in  Cancun,  in  December  2010,  took  note  of  this   collective  commitment  by  developed  country  Parties  and  reaffirmed  that  funding  for   adaptation  will  be  prioritized  for  the  most  vulnerable  developing  countries,  such  as   the   least   developed   countries,   Small   Island   Developing   States   and   Africa.   As   such,   Africa  is  expected  to  receive  a  total  Fast-­‐start  finance  of  up  to  30billion  USD  by  2020.       What  a  review  of  the  NAPAs  reveals  however  is  that  the  endeavor  of  coping  with  the   impacts   of   climate   change   in   African   countries   stands   against   a   myriad   of   severe                                                                                                                   142  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08  
143  NAPA  Senegal,  2006  

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constraints.  Archbishop  Desmund  Tutu  of  South  Africa  gives  an  eloquent  glimpse  at   what   some   of   the   challenges   of   enabling   Adaptation   in   the   context   of   Africa’s   governance   are.   In   a   world   of   “adaptation   apartheid”   he   states,   the   adaptation   challenge   of   developing   countries   has   to   be   met   by   governments   operating   under   severe  economic,  social  and  governance  constraints144.       A  preliminary  survey  of  the  status  of  Climate  Change  Adaptation  in  African  countries   reveals  that  chief  among  the  number  of  obstacles  thwarting  its  serious  tackling  are:   lack  of  political  will  to  take  on  the  issue  of  CCA  seriously;  the  lack  of  integration  of   Climate   Change   adaptation   as   an   item   in   Poverty   Reduction   Strategic   Papers   (PRSPs);   paucity   of   reliable   information   and   knowledge   on   climate   risks   and   projected   impacts   (meteorological   information   an   imperative   for   adaptation   in   countries   where   high   dependence   on   rain-­‐fed   agriculture   is   still   a   reality,   such   as   those  in  Africa),  Uncertainties  that  remain  large  in  what  future  climate  will  resemble   (large   range   of   possibilities,   flexible   adaptation   pathways   needed),   the   difficulty   of   putting   a   price   tag   to   adaptation   (Adaptation   being   so   akin   to   Development)   and   finally  international  support  for  Adaptation,  though  this  is  slowly  changing  since  the   Copenhagen  accord  with  more  money  streaming  into  Adaptation,  notably  in  Africa.   This   is   a   non-­‐exhaustive   list,   but   it   sheds   light   on   the   constraints   to   enabling   effective  CCA  on  the  continent.     3.3.2 CCA  &  Development:  where  do  they  intersect?     A   necessary   starting   point   to   any   conceptual   understanding   of   Climate   change   linkages   with   the   development   endeavor,   we   purport,   is   a   holistic   view   onto   the   Climate   Change   challenge.   Indeed,   CC   cannot   be   analyzed   sectorally,   but   holistically,   as   a   challenge   to   overall   development   that   requires   innovations   and   adapted   solutions  mainstreamed  into  national  plans  and  across  all  levels  of  public  decision-­‐ making  (both  geographically  and  sectorally).  UNDP  proposes  further  that  the  most                                                                                                                   144  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   •   88  

optimal   pathway   to   address   the   climate   change   challenge   through   the   correct   holistic  lens  is  via  the  development  of  climate-­resilient,  low-­carbon  development   strategies,  which  address  both  the  adaptation  and  mitigation  imperatives  of  climate   change   at   the   national-­‐level,   and   exhort   countries   to   think   holistically   (see   UNDP   2011145;  also  UNFCCC  NAMAs  and  NAPs,  UNFCCC  2011)146 .     At   a   more   conceptual   level,   my   approach   is   much   akin   to   that   of   Amartya   Sen’s   discourse   on   poverty   as   deprivation,   in   which   he   depicts   poverty   (or   underdevelopment)   as   a   state   of   vulnerability   to   exogenous   shocks   (e.g.:   international   market   price   fluctuations,   disease,   inflation,   death   of   breadwinner).   Hence,  under  this  conception,  the  Development  endeavor  consists  of  building  the   resilience  of  poor  persons  and  communities  to  all  exogenous  shocks,  transforming   their   former   vulnerabilities   into   capacities,   safeguarding   their   assets,   towards   the   goal   of   enabling   people   to   exert   their   full   capacities   and   lift   themselves   out   of   poverty.   My   conception   of   Climate   Change   fits   neatly   within   this   conception   of   development  as  protection  from  exogenous  shocks.  Under  this  conception,  climatic   shocks   are   treated   as   just   one   of   many   other   exogenous   shocks   (economic,   sanitary,   political)  that  threaten  to  send  vulnerable  persons  and  communities  reeling  further   down   into   poverty.   Thus   protection   from   climate   shocks   is   a   needed   requisite   for   development,   just   as   protection   from   plummeting   cash   crop   export   prices   on   the   international   market,   skyrocketing   food   prices,   or   sudden   death   of   a   breadwinner   are  needed.     In   this   conception,   Climate   Change   Adaptation   (CCA),   or   the   process   of   safeguarding   oneself,   one’s   community   or   one’s   nation   from   the   impacts   of   exogenous   climate   shocks,   current   and   future,   is   thus   an   important   sub-­‐set   of   the   Development  endeavor.  This  conception  of  adaptation  as  a  sub-­‐set  of  development   stands   at   antipodes   with   a   number   of   mainstream   conceptions,   which   depict   CCA   as                                                                                                                  
145  UNDP,  Climate-­‐resilient  low-­‐carbon  growth  (2011)   146  UNFCCC,  NAMAs  and  NAPs  (2011)  

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an  endeavor  that  overlaps  with  development  in  many  regards,  but  still  sits  outside   of  mainstream  development,  at  the  same  level  as  Mitigation  (see  figure  3.10).      

                           
 

 

Fig.   3.10:   Where   CC   meets   Development:   Old   and   new   conceptions   of   Climate   Change   Adaptation  (left:  old  conception147;  Right:  new  proposed  and  increasingly  accepted  notion  of   CCA  as  a  subset  of  the  Development  endeavor)      

Climate   Risks:  

Increased  climate   hazards  /   Variability  

Adaptation   Activities:  

  

Climate  Risk   Management   Resilience   building   Vulnerability   reduction  

Definition:   Timescale   of  Action:  

COPING   Near-­term     (years)  

NEW  CLIMATE  EQUILIBRIUM     Inter-­decadal  Variability                                  Longer-­term  CC   and  Change      Building  codes    Process  change    Retrofitting    Paradigmatic  shifts   Example:  change  in    “Keeping   agricultural  systems  (from   development   rain-­fed  to  climate   on  track  in  the   independent)   face  of    Business  “un”usual   evolving  risks”      New  development   paradigm   CLIMATE  PROOFING   TRANSFORMATIONAL   CHANGE   Near  to  mid-­term   Mid-­  to  long  term   (years  to  decades)   (decades  to  century)  

 
  Fig.  3.11:  The  different  timescales  of  Climate  Change  Adaptation.  Source:  author.  

                                                                                                                147  Refer  to  Climate  and  Development  Network  (CDKN)  Framework,  www.cdkn.org     •   90  

3.3.3 CCA  –  Development  &  Governance     This  leads  us  to  the  issue  of  the  Governance  of  CCA.  Given  the  increase  in  climate   risks  projected  with  Climate  change,  the  State  is  called  on  even  more  insistently  to   take  responsibility  for  safeguarding  its  citizens  in  light  of  the  new  threats.       This  responsibility  is  explicit  in  most  national  constitutions  across  Africa,  where  is   explicitly   stated   that   the   Republic   shall   be   responsible   to   protect   the   physical   integrity  and  ensure  security  of  its  citizens.  The  Constitution  of  Senegal  for  instance,   in   its   Act   No.   2001-­‐03   of   22   January   2001,   part   II   on   civil   liberties   and   the   human   person,  economic  and  social  rights,  and  collective  rights,  Article  7,  states  that   “The   human   person   is   sacred.   H/she   is   inviolable.   The   State   has   the   obligation   to   respect   and   protect   him/her.   Every   individual   has   the   right   to   life,   to   liberty,   to   security  (emphasis  added  by  author),  to  free  development  of  his/her  personality,  to   physical   integrity   including   to   protection   against   all   physical   mutilation148.   That   of   Uganda  mandates  the  State  to  ensure  that  efficient  machinery  is  in  place  to  address   all  hazards  and  risks  that  may  lead  to  calamitous  disasters  for  a  community149.     An  interpretation  of  these  texts,  in  light  of  a  national  climate  shocks,  brings  to  light   the   State’s   primal   responsibility   to   ensure   security,   well-­‐being   and   integrity   of   all   of   its   citizens   in   peace   time   and   in   time   of   crisis.   Both   these   texts   make   it   a   constitutional   responsibility   of   the   State   to   provide   relief   to   victims   in   times   of   national   disasters,   or   otherwise   address   disasters,   and   posit   disaster   management   as  a  public  good  to  be  delivered  to  all  citizens,  regardless  of  their  sex,  origin  or  birth   place.   In   light   of   Climate   Change,   with   projected   impacts   high,   the   State’s   constitutional   responsibility   to   protect   and   ensure   the   security   of   its   citizens   during   times  of  climate  crisis  becomes  even  more  primordial.                                                                                                                      
148  Constitution  of  Senegal,  2001   149  In  Uganda  National  Policy  for  Preparedness  and  Management  of  Disasters,  2010  

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In  this  dissertation,  we  posit  disaster  prevention  as  a  public  good,  at  the  same  rank   as   education   or   health.   We   will   look   into   the   systemic   reasons   that   prevent   governments  from  delivering  on  this  public  good.  The  insights  we  derive  from  our   cross-­‐country   investigation   are   valuable   for   all   the   scholars   attempting   to   understand   why   CCA-­‐DRR   policies,   and   public   goods   delivery   in   general,   is   not   forthcoming  from  a  score  of  governments  in  Africa.     More   fundamentally,   Climate   Change   lays   bare   the   key   governance,   accountability   and   institutional   challenges   which   need   to   be   addressed   by   African   countries.     CC   adds   an   additional   stressor   to   the   multiple   ones   that   already   encroach   on   local   livelihoods   (e.g:   market   price   fluctuations,   weak   social   safety   nets,   etc.),   which   institutions,  linking  local  and  national  levels,  have  to  contend  with  and  address.     Ribot   confirms   this   notion   of   Adaptation   as   one   sub-­‐set   of   development   endeavor,   an   attempt   to   reduce   one   vulnerability   source   out   of   multiple   sources   of   vulnerability   communities   face:   loss   of   a   breadwinner,   market   prices,   climate   vulnerability  leading  to  a  loss  of  assets150.     Furthermore,   since   Climate   impacts   are   felt   most   acutely   at   the   local   level,   local   institutions   matter   immensely   in   supporting   communities   to   adapt.   Institutions   at   the  local  level  matter  to  define  rules  to  address  CC  impacts  and  serve  as  custodians   of   knowledge   to   address   new   risks   and   opportunities   linked   to   CC   (Denton   et   al.,   forthcoming).   Institutions   are   key   to   govern   the   issue   of   Climate   Change,   and   an   institutional   framework   or   regime   is   key   to   effectively   govern   the   new   risks   and   opportunities  posed  by  a  changing  climate.                                                                                                                    
150  Ribot,    Jesse,  “Vulnerability  does  not  Fall  from  the  Sky:  Towards  Multi-­‐Scale,  Pro-­‐Poor  Climate  Policy”,  In  

Social  Dimensions  of  Climate  Change:  Equity  and  Vulnerability  in  a  Warming  World,  Mearns,  Robin  and  Andrew   Norton  (eds.),  2010.    

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Yet  Africa’s  institutions  to  manage  development  challenges  and  build  in  channels  for   downward   accountability   remain   wanting   in   many   regards   (see   UNECA   Governance   Report  2005151;  also  Tall  2009152).  Efforts  towards  effective  power  decentralization   and   democratic   rules   of   the   game   that   ensure   electoral   turnover   of   legitimate   leaders  across  the  continent  remain  patchy  at  best.     Faced   with   the   sheer   magnitude   of   the   challenges   to   be   brought   about   by   Climate   Change,  countries  across  Africa,  and  institutions  within  them,  will  have  only  one  of   two   options:   to   Adapt   or   to   Perish,   in   metaphorical   terms.   Therein   lies   a   phenomenal   opportunity   for   countries   to   reform   their   governance   structures,   and   innovate  new  ways  of  ensuring  efficient  institutional  coordination,  spanning  local  to   national,  in  order  to  meet  local  development  priorities  and  effectively  deliver  on  the   CCA  imperative.     3.3.4 Disaster  Risk  Reduction     This  responsibility  becomes  even  more  primordial  given  the  projection  of  rising     HMDs.   In   light   of   the   looming   prospect   of   likely   shifts   in   global   climate   and   weather   patterns,   that   would   potentially   increase   intensity   and   frequency   of   extreme   weather   events   in   Africa153 ,   managing   the   causal   factors   of   disasters,   an   approach   known  as  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (DRR),  becomes  once  again  an  urgent  priority.   UNISDR  defines  DRR  as  the  concept  and  practice  of  reducing  disaster  risks  through   systematic   efforts   to   analyze   and   manage   the   causal   factors   of   disasters,   including   through   reduced   exposure   to   hazards,   lessened   vulnerability   of   people   and   property,   wise   management   of   land   and   the   environment,   and   improved   preparedness  for  adverse  events154.                                                                                                                    
151  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Africa,  Governance  Report  (2005)   152  Tall,  A.,  Learning  from  the  Pre-­colonial  Past  (2009)   153  IPCC,  SREX   154  UNISDR,  2009  

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The  projection  for  rising  climate-­‐related  disasters  puts  DRR  back  on  the  agenda  as   an  urgent  development  priority.  DRR  and  CCA  are  hence  interwoven  as  CCA-­‐DRR,  an   essential   joint   attempt   to   build   the   resilience,   coping   capability   and   adaptive   capacity   of   communities   vulnerable   to   exogenous   climate   shocks.   If   we   do   not   reduce   vulnerability   to   existing   climate   risks,   many   of   the   MDGs   do   not   stand   a   chance  of  being  met155.       In   the   context   of   Africa’s   fragile   states   however,   already   stretched   thin   with   many   public   responsibilities   that   they   are   not   fulfilling,   how   precisely   will   this   responsibility   be   carried   out?   Will   it   be   at   the   expense   of   other   primordial   state   duties,  with  a  diversion  of  the  state’s  development  funds  to  the  more  urgent  crisis   response  every  time  a  climate  crisis  will  strike?  Or  will  the  issue  not  be  addressed  at   all,  passed  on  to  international  donors  and  NGOs  to  address  it?  The  age-­‐old  dilemma   between  state  capacity  and  state  responsibility  is  reenacted  (see  World  Bank  1992   World  Development  Report  on  the  Role  of  the  State)156.     Where  should  responsibility  for  climate  change  adaptation  reside?  If  States  in  Africa   are   not   capable   of   taking   the   CCA   challenge   fully   on,   due   to   various   constraints,   should   private   mechanisms   be   taking   on   the   responsibility   of   safeguarding   persons,   communities  and  national  assets  in  light  of  the  projected  CC  risks?     Private   insurance   has   risen   in   recent   years   as   a   response   to   this   fundamental   question.   Multiple   examples   of   agricultural   weather-­‐index   based   insurance   schemes   can   thus   be   cited   across   the   context   (see  Suarez   and   Linnerooth-­‐Bayer   2010157;   also   Patt  et  al.,  2009158).  Even  these  insurance  pilots  had  the  State  play  major  roles,  co-­‐ convening   dialogue,   building   capacity,   managing   weather   stations   used   for   index                                                                                                                  
157
155  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  2007-­08   156  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1992  

Climate  Change  1  2  (2010):  271-­‐278  

 Suarez,  P.,  and  Linnerooth-­‐Bayer,  J.,  “Microinsurance  for  local  adaptation”,  Wiley  Interdisciplinary  Reviews:  

158  Patt,  A.G.,  Peterson,  N,  Carter.  M,  Velez,  M.,  Hess,  U.  and  Suarez,  P.,  “Making  index  insurance  attractive  to  

farmers”,  Mitigation  and  Adaptation  Strategies  for  Global  Change  14  (2009):  737-­‐757  

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94  

measurements,  etc.  In  the  context  of  Africa’s  poorest  constituencies,  the  promise  of   insurance  for  all  is  not  a  durable  solution  (Patt  et  al.,  2010159).  Furthermore,  what  of   the  areas  of  life  affected  by  climate  risks  beyond  livelihoods,  such  as  lives  (climate   disasters’   high   death   toll   can   be   cited   in   this   instance),   heritage   and   national   infrastructure?   These   lingering   questions   seem   to   point   that   much   responsibility   remains   with   States   to   take   on   a   part,   large   or   limited,   of   meeting   the   CCA   imperative.     3.3.5 The  Triple  Bottom  Line:  Governing  CCA-­DRR-­Development     Thus  with  CC,  the  African  State  finds  itself  with  more  work  to  do.  In  addition  to  its   traditional   development   mandate,   it   now   has   to   meet   the   triple   bottom   line   of   DRR-­CCA-­Development,   delivering   on   all   three   as   one   within   the   development   endeavor.    The  new  climate  change  challenge  brings  the  imperatives  of  eliminating   African  poverty,  climate  dependency  and  disaster  vulnerability  all  under  the  banner   of  the  development  endeavor.  As  such,  addressing  CC  will  have  to  be  done  within  the   prism   of   achieving   the   three   different   goals,   delivering   on   them   as   one   under   the   Development  agenda,  and  meeting  the  triple  bottom  line  of  CCA-­‐DRR-­‐Development.     Efficient   and   socially   beneficial   institutions   are   needed   however   to   deliver   on   this   new   triple   bottom-­‐line,   and   its   new   imperatives   put   on   the   table   by   a   changing   climate.   Before   a   new   issue   can   be   governed,   a   country   requires   sets   of   actors/networks,   rule   making   systems   and   formal   and   informal   rules   that   steer   societies   towards   pre-­‐defined   collective   goals160.   New   or   adapted   institutions,   or   rules   of   the   game,   clusters   of   rights   rules   and   decision-­‐making   procedures,   will   be   needed   to   effectively   confront   the   new   issue   of   CC,   and   ensure   that   appropriate                                                                                                                   159  Patt,  A.G.,  Suarez,  P.  and  Hess,  U.  How  much  do  smallholder  farmers  understand  and  want  insurance?  
160

Evidence  from  Africa.  Global  Environmental  Change  20  1  (2010):  153-­‐161    Heike,  Shroder,  Social  Dimensions  of  Global  Environmental  Change,  IHDP,  University  of  East  Anglia  

  •   95  

responses  and  adaptation  measures  are  provided  to  new  local/national  CC  risks  and   opportunities.     In   a   fast   changing   world,   the   issue   of   institutional   innovation   to   address   this   new   challenge   of   the   21st   century   in   Africa   is   an   important   one.   What   our   research   reveals   is   that   in   practice,   countries   have   already   begun   experimenting   with   new   climate   institutions;   whether   or   not   these   are   efficient   and   socially   beneficial   is   another  question.     3.3.6 Why   new/adapted   institutions   to   meet   the   triple   bottom   line?     Our   scoping   of   African   organizations   addressing   the   new   challenge   of   CC   reveals   that  as  of  now,  organizations  that  have  traditionally  existed  to  achieve  the  goals  of   each  subset  of  the  triple  bottom  line  (CCA-­‐DRR-­‐Development)  have  been  kept  apart.   Institutional  innovation  has  not  taken  place  by  and  large.     Development  planning  bodies  and  agencies  are  different  from  the  hubs  working  on   CC,   which   are   housed   under   a   ministry   different   from   the   one   that   addresses   disasters,   with   weak  cross-­‐institutional  linkages  between  the  three  different  sectors   kept  by  and  large  separate.       The   imperative   of   CCA   however   brings   all   three   sectors   together.   As   impacts   of   rising   climate-­‐related   disasters   are   felt   by   and   large   by   communities   at   the   frontlines,   the   latter   do   not  distinguish   between   whether   it   was   lack   of   CCA,   DRR   or   development  which  brought  about  the  severe  CC  impacts  they  experience.  All  three   are  needed  components  to  buffer  an  exacerbation  of  climate  impacts  at  community   level.   Thus,   there   is   an   urgent   need   to   bring   the   three   institutional   silos   and   approaches  in  line  to  build  community  and  national  resilience  in  light  of  projected   increase  in  HMDs.     •   96  

How   in   practice   though   should   this   be   achieved?   Much   variation   exists   already   within   African   countries’   innovations   address   the   triple   bottom   line.   A   look   into   African   countries’   endogenous   institutions   solutions   as   they’ve   begun   to   confront   more  frequent  HMDs  is  an  important  endeavor  to  derive  examples  of  solutions.  As   our  research  demonstrates,  such  solutions  can  be  found  in  Africa.     Following   that,   we   will   delve   into   the   crux   of   our   enquiry:   what   made   countries   embark  on  a  path  of  institutional  innovation  to  address  the  new  challenge  of  the  21St   century  in  Africa,  whereas  others  still  lag  behind?     Without   much   further   ado   let   us   expose   the   methods   used   to   test   our   hypotheses   of   institutional  change.       3.4  Glossary  of  Concepts,  Acronyms  And  Key  Terms     This   section   lays   down   the   definitions   of   all   key   terms   we   will   be   drawing   on   throughout  this  thesis,  and  the  meaning  in  which  we  will  be  using  them.      Adaptation:     Adaptation   in   human   systems   is   the   process   of   adjustment   to   actual   or   expected   climate   and   its   effects,   in   order   to   moderate   harm   or   exploit   beneficial   opportunities   In   natural   systems,   the   process   of   adjustment   to   actual   climate   and   its  effects;  human  intervention  may  facilitate  adjustment  to  expected  climate161.  It   is   the   capacity   of   a   country   or   society   to   adapt   to   new   climate   risks   and   equilibriums.      Adaptive  Capacity:                                                                                                                  
161  IPCC,  SREX  

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The  goal  of  adaptation  is  to  build  the  capacity  of  a  country  or  society  to  adapt  to  new   climate   risks   and   equilibriums   –a   term   coined   as   adaptive   capacity.   However   “adaptive  capacity  is  intimately  connected  to  social  and  economic  development  but   is  unevenly  distributed  across  and  within  societies”162.      CC:  Climate  Change     A  change  of  climate,  which  is  attributed   directly   or   indirectly   to   human   activity   that   alters  the  composition  of  the  global  atmosphere  and  which  is  in  addition  to  natural   climate  variability  observed  over  comparable  time  periods’163.        CCA:  Climate  Change  Adaptation   Process  of  safeguarding  oneself,  one’s  community  or  one’s  nation  from  the  impacts   of  exogenous  climate  shocks,  current  and  projected      Climate  Variability   Climate  variability  refers  to  shorter-­‐term  fluctuations  that  occur  at  the  timescale  of   a  season,  months  or  a  few  years  (refer  back  to  fig.  3.1).        Cyclone:   An  atmospheric  system  characterized  by  the  rapid  inward  circulation  of  air  masses   about   a   low-­‐pressure   center,   usually   accompanied   by   stormy,   often   destructive   weather.   Cyclones   circulate   counterclockwise   in   the   Northern   Hemisphere   and   clockwise  in  the  Southern  Hemisphere.  It  is  a  violent  tropical  storm,  especially  one   originating  in  the  southwestern  Pacific  Ocean  or  Indian  Ocean.      Development  Endeavor:   Building  the  resilience  of  poor  persons  and  communities  to  all  exogenous  shocks,   transforming   their   former   vulnerabilities   into   capacities,   safeguarding   their   assets,                                                                                                                  
162  IPCC,  Fourth  Assessment  Report   163  United  Nations,  UNFCCC,  1992  

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towards  the  goal  of  enabling  people  to  exert  their  full  capacities  and  lift  themselves   out  of  poverty.      Disaster:     A   disaster   is   a   severe   alteration   in   the   normal   functioning   of   a   community   or   a   society   due   to   hazardous   physical   events   interacting   with   vulnerable   social   conditions,   leading   to   widespread   adverse   human,   material,   economic,   or   environmental  effects  that  require  immediate  emergency  response  to  satisfy  critical   human  needs  and  that  may  require  external  support  for  recovery164.     We  follow  here  the  definition  of  a  Disaster  as  the  conjugation  of  a  naturally  driven   Hazard  and  human-­‐induced  Vulnerability.  We  understand  by  this  that  the  multiple   hazards  that  make  landfall  in  Mozambique  for  instance  turn  into  large-­‐scale   disasters  due  to  the  acute  socio-­‐economic  vulnerability  they  meet  on  the  ground.  
                        Hazard  *  Vulnerability      

Disaster  Risk  =            ___________________________                                                  Capacity  

A  hazard  also  only  becomes  disaster  if  it  overwhelms  local  capacities  to  cope.  Thus  a   disaster   can   also   be   understood   a   serious   disruption   of   the   functioning   of   a   community   or   a   society   causing   widespread   human,   material,   economic   or   environmental  losses  which  exceed  the  ability  of  the  affected  community  or  society   to   cope   using   its   own   resources.   It   results   from   the   combination   of   hazards,   conditions   of   vulnerability   and   insufficient   capacity   or   measures   to   reduce   the   potential  negative  consequences  of  risk165.      DRR:   Disaster   Risk   Reduction,   DRM:   Disaster   Risk   Management,   Disaster   Preparedness   UNISDR   defines   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   (DRR)   as   the   concept   and   practice   of                                                                                                                   164  IPCC,  SREX   165  UNISDR,  2009   • 99    

reducing   disaster   risks   through   systematic   efforts   to   analyze   and   manage   the   causal   factors   of   disasters,   including   through   reduced   exposure   to   hazards,   lessened   vulnerability   of   people   and   property,   wise   management   of   land   and   the   environment,  and  improved  preparedness  for  adverse  events166.     Disaster   Risk   Management   (DRM)   involves   the   systematic   development   and   application   of   policies,   strategies   and   practices   to   minimize   vulnerabilities   and   disaster   risks   in   order   to   avoid   or   limit   the   adverse   impacts   of   hazards   on   lives,   economic  and  social  developments  in  a  country.     Sustainable   development,   poverty   reduction,   good   governance   and   disaster   risk   reduction   are   mutually   supportive   objectives,   which   need   to   be   delivered   as   one   under   the   Development   endeavor.   In   order   to   meet   challenges   in   the   implementation  of  the  national  development  plan,  accelerated  efforts  must  be  made   to   build   the   necessary   capacities   at   community   and   national   levels   to   manage   and   reduce  risk.  The  main  objective  of  disaster  preparedness  is  to  ensure  that  in  times   of   disaster,   appropriate   administrative,   legislative   and   technical   measures   including   procedures   and   resources   are   in   place   to   assist   those   afflicted   by   the   disaster   and   enable  them  to  cope.  Disaster  preparedness  aims  to  minimize  the  adverse  effects  of   a   hazard   through   effective   precautionary   measures   and   to   ensure   timely,   appropriate  and  efficient  organization  and  delivery  of  emergency  relief  services167 .        Drought:     Drought   is   a   disaster   driven   by   a   prolonged   shortage   of   rainfall,   often   generated   by   dry   weather   conditions.   Drought   involves   many   other   factors   such   as   food   distribution   and   market   prices,   the   breakdown   of   which   may   lead   to   a   famine.   When   human   populations   are   dependent   on   rainfall   or   ill   prepared   for   rainfall   shortages,  drought  often  ensues.                                                                                                                   166  Ibidem   167  In  Uganda  National  Policy  for  Preparedness  and  Management  of  Disasters,  2010   • 100    

   Exposure:   The   presence   of   people,   livelihoods,   environmental   services   and   resources,   infrastructure,   and   economic,   social,   and   cultural   assets,   in   locations   that   could   be   adversely  affected.        Flooding:     Flooding  is  a  disaster  driven  by  excessive  or  concentrated  rainfall.  It  can  be  of  two   natures:   river   flooding   along   rivers   (when   a   river   rises   out   of   its   bed   and   spills   into   is   floodable   plain)   or   flash   flooding   following   periods   of   intense   rainfall   or   consecutive  days  of  rainfall  (wet  spells).  Most  flood  disasters  in  Africa  are  seasonal,   and   usually   occur   during   periods   of   intense   rainfall   as   well   as   on   el-­‐Niño   years   (for   East  and  West  Africa)  and  LA  Nina  years  (for  Southern  and  northern  Africa).      GHG:  Greenhouse  Gases  (GHG)     Grenhouse  gases  are  long-­‐life  gases  whose  increased  concentrations  in  the   atmosphere  mainly  cause  anthropogenic  Climate  Change.  The  main  GHG  responsible   for  CC  is  carbon  dioxide.  Methane,  nitrous  oxide  and  sulphur  hexafluoride  are  other   significant  contributors.  Altogether  combined,  these  gases  are  responsible  for  the   GHG-­‐induced  changes  to  the  global  atmosphere,  through  a  process  called  the   Greenhouse  effect.      Global  Warming:   Rise  in  the  global  average  temperature  that  occurs  when  Earth’s  energy  balance  is   set  off  equilibrium;  the  amount  of  energy  (shortwave  solar  radiation)  absorbed  by   Earth   becomes   greater   than   the   amount   of   energy   emitted   back   out   to   the   atmosphere   (long-­‐wave   radiation).   Excess   outgoing   heat   trapped   by   GHG   is   deflected  back  to  Earth,  causing  a  rise  in  global  average  temperatures.  Between  the  

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101  

decade   of   the   1970s   and   the   early   2000s   alone,   Earth’s   average   temperature   has   risen  by  0.7°168.          Governance:     Set   of   actors,   networks,   rule   making   systems   and   formal   and   informal   rules   that   steer  societies  towards  pre-­‐defined  collective  goals  169.      HMD:  Hydro-­‐Meteorological  Disaster=  Climate  shock=  Climate  hazard=  Climate-­‐ related  disaster=  Extreme  weather  event  or  climate-­‐related  event  

 

Used  indiscriminately  through  this  thesis  to  mean  the  same  thing:  the  occurrence  of   a  value  of  a  weather  or  climate  variable  above  (or  below)  a  threshold  value  near  the   upper  or  lower  ends  (“tails”)  of  the  range  of  observed  values  of  the  variable170.      Institution:   North   posits   that   institutions   indeed   define   the   rules   of   the   game,   both   politically   and   economically;   they   are   the   humanly   devised   constraints   that   shape   human   interaction171 .   These   constraints   can   be   both   formal   (rules,   laws)   and   informal   (behavior   codes,   cultural   norms),   and   serve   to   reduce   uncertainty   and   facilitate   exchange  in  the  presence  of  transaction  costs.        Landslide:     Landslides   and   mudslides   are   rapid   movement   of   a   large   mass   of   mud,   rocks,   formed   from   loose   soil   and   water.   It   usually   follows   heavy   rainfall   and   high   ground   water   flowing   through   cracked   bed   rocks   and   earth   quakes   and   lead   to   soil   movements.   Landslides   and   mudslides   are   very   difficult   to   predict   but   their   frequency   and   extent   can   be   estimated   by   use   of   information   on   the   area’s   geology,                                                                                                                   168  IPCC,  Third  Assessment  Report,  2001  
169  Heike,  Shroder,  Social  Dimensions  of  Global  Environmental  Change,  IHDP,  University  of  East  Anglia   170  IPCC,  SREX  

171

 North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  3   •

102  

 

geomorphology,   hydrology,   climate   and   vegetation   cover   and   traditional   knowledge.  Community  settlement  on  steep  slopes  and  other  uncontrolled  land  use   practices  increase  the  likelihood  of  landslides  and  mudslides  prevalence.        Organization:   North   distinguishes   "institutions",   which   are   the   rules   of   the   game,   from   "organizations",  which  are  the  actors,  or  players  in  the  game.  According  to  North,  "it   is   the   interaction   between   institutions   and   organizations   that   shapes   the   institutional  evolution  of  an  economy"172,  or  a  society  at  large.      SLR:  Sea  Level  Rise   Sea-­‐Level   Rise   is   a   rise   in   global   ocean   levels,   directly   resulting   from   Global   Warming.      Vulnerability:     Vulnerability  is  the  propensity  or  predisposition  to  be  adversely  affected.                                                                                                                                                       •  
172  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  6  

103  

              PART  III:  

   

METHODS  

 
                                      •   104  

CHAPTER  4:     INQUIRY  INTO  AFRICA’S  GOVERNANCE  OF  CLIMATE  RISKS       This  chapter  exposes  in  detail  our  research  design  and  methodology.       In  this  dissertation,  we  set  out  to  answer  the  following  Research  Question:  How  is   CC   governed   in   Africa?   What   factors   prompt   African   countries   to   adopt   new   socially   beneficial  institutions  to  rise  up  to  the  new  challenge  of  CC?     We  have  hypothesized  many  potential  causal  factors,  or  independent  variables,  chief   among   which,   the   role   of   self-­‐interested   rational   organizations   in   bringing   about   incremental   change   within   the   historically-­‐determined   institutional   framework   in   order   to   increase   their   private   gains   –leading   to   new   institutions   or   rules   of   the   game   in   African   countries   to   manage   climate   shocks   when   the   establishment   of   these   matched   organizations’   private   interests   (structural   institutional   change   theory).   Other   possible   drivers   of   climate   institutional   adaptation   could   be:   conjuncture  or  accidents  of  history,  for  instance,  a  severe  national  disaster  (North),   geography  (Engerman/Sokoloff),  institutional  legacies  (Bates);  eg:  State  capacity  or   yet  again,  the  presence  of  a  strong  media.     More   agent-­‐based   explanations   of   climate   institutional   change   could   also   be   individual   agents’   desire   for   improved   societal   performance   which   brings   private   interests  in  line  with  public  ones  (Grindle;  for  instance  a  politician  very  dedicated  to   climate  change  resilience);  new  political  configurations/constraints  at  the  local  level   that   force   national   leaders   to   put   CCA   local   demands   on   the   national   agenda   (Boone).  Also,  the  role  of  strong  endogenously-­‐developed  institutions,  downwardly   accountable  and  coherently  integrated  with  local  institutions  could  important.     105  

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In   order   to   test   all   these   hypotheses,   we   have   devised   an   experimental   design   for   our   research   that   rigorously   isolates   spurious   causal   factors   from   competing   independent   variables,   and   attempts   to   take   the   measure   of   each   potential   independent  variable  to  the  extent  possible  in  the  natural,  non-­‐laboratory  world,  in   order   to   fully   elicit   the   pathways   of   cause   and   effect   between   climate   impacts,   institutional   change,   and   ensuing   political   institutions.   The   following   section   describes  our  experimental  design.     4.1 Research  Design      Research   Question:   What   factors   prompt   African   countries   to   govern   new   the   challenge  of  CC  through  socially  beneficial  institutions?        Main  Hypotheses:  Our  main  hypotheses  are  summarized  in  Fig.  4.1.    

• Cyclone   • Flood   • Drought   • Storm   • Landslide  

Competing   Independent   Variables  (cause):  
• HMD  frequency/ magnitude   • Donor  demand  for   improved  CCA-­‐DRR   • CLIMATE  FINANCE:  Aid   invlowing  to  country   earmarked  for  CCA-­‐DRR   • State  capacity  /  GDP/ capita     • Dedicated  leadership   • Key  political  bastion  at   risk   • Extensive  Media  coverage   of  disaster  impacts    

Dependent  Variable   (effect):  
• Institutional  change  in  the   management  of  climate   risks:    adoption  of  socially   benevicial  institutions  to   address  the  new  challenge   of  CCA-­‐DRR  

Climate  Hazard  Hits  

 

 
Figure  4.1:  Hypothesized  Independent  Variables,  and  pathway  of  cause  and  effect.  

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A  two-­‐phase  research  plan  enabled  us  to  answer  our  research  question:  phase  one  is   dedicated   to   identifying   policies   in   place   to   confront   HMDs   across   Africa,   basis   for   our  country  case  selection;  phase  two  proceeds  with  an  analysis  of  the  national-­‐level   policy   to   reduce   HMD   impacts   in   place   in   each   our   case   studies   (policy   analysis),   while   phase   three   delves   into   an   incentives   analysis   of   why   a   given   policy   in   each   country  came  to  be.       Each   phase   used   its   own   mixed   design   (of   both   quantitative   and   qualitative   methods)   in   order   to   answer   its   set   research   question,   involving   two   units   of   analysis:  the  nation-­‐state  (for  phases  1  and  3)  and  the  community  (for  phase  3).         4.2 Phase  1:  Identification  of  Climate  Disaster  Management  Policies  Across   Africa       In  this  section,  we  delve  into  the  methods  utilized  to  conduct  our  cross-­‐continental   identification   of   climate-­‐related   disaster   policies   across   Africa,   and   present   the   results  of  this  classification,  basis  of  our  country  case  selection.       4.2.1 Country  Case  Selection  Protocol:  The  Spectrum  of  DRM     Country   cases   have   been   selected   based   on   a   continent-­‐wide   classification   of   the   different  climate-­‐related  disaster  management  policies  in  place  at  the  national-­‐level.       Currently,   knowledge   and   data   collection   on   the   climate   disaster   management   infrastructures   and   policy   contexts   of   African   countries   is   generally   quite   poor;   against  this  paucity  of  knowledge  on  existing  national  disaster  management  policies,   most   programs   supporting   CCA-­‐DRR   assume   a   policy   vacuum   and   are   applied   as   standardized   policy   prescriptions   across   all   African   countries,   with   the   concomitant   expectation  that  all  target  countries  will  experience  similar  uptake  of  their  CCA-­‐DRR   programs,  provided  similar  inputs  from  international  donors.     • 107    

  In   reality   however,   African   countries   display   great   heterogeneity   in   their   disaster   management   landscapes   and   national   policies,   one   that   reflects   the   different   vulnerability   profiles,   policy   contexts   and   political   incentives   systems   in   place   in   Africa’s  fifty-­‐five  countries.       On  the  spectrum  towards  effective  disaster  management,  they  lay  at  different  levels.   Some   are   akin   to   Unprepared   firefighters   in   their   response   to   disasters,   improvising   and   intervening   only   after   calamities   strike;   while   others   are   rather   more   similar   to   Prepared   firefighters,   with   disaster   preparedness   plans   adopted   and   rehearsed,   and   contingency   plans   in   place   to   face   all   possible   calamities;   whereas   a   third,   smaller   group   of   countries   are   Disaster   averters,   who   fulfill   all   the   ‘prepared   firefighter’   conditions,   but   also   invest   in   risk   reduction.   The   latter   countries  experienced  a  paradigm  shift  in  their  approach  to  disasters,  moving  focus   away  from  the  hazard  towards  the  underlying  risk  factors.       In  this  dissertation,  we  introduce  this  three-­‐tiered  classification  of  African  countries   as:   ‘Unprepared   firefighters’,   ‘Prepared   Firefighters’   and   ‘Disaster   Averters’.   Ultimately,   there   is   a   need   to   improve   our   understanding   of   how   and   why   countries   move   from   being   “Unprepared   firefighters”   (policy   type   I   in   our   hypothesized   classification   of   African   countries’   climate   disaster   management   policies),   to   “Prepared  Firefighters”  (policy  type  II)  and  Disaster  Averters  (policy  type  III).       Our  classification  was  conducted  using  indicators  of  ranked  importance  chosen  on   the   basis   of   well-­‐reasoned   assumptions   about   what   constitutes   good,   effective   Disaster   Risk   Management   (DRM;   see   table   4.1).   It   is   important   to   note   that   we   made   every   effort   not   to   select   outcome-­‐driven   indicators   (e.g.:   number   left   dead   under   DM   policy   type   I)   or   indicators   based   on   data   availability;   countries   were   ranked  according  to  what  we  believed  to  be  good,  measurable  indicators  that  reveal   the   actual   policies   currently   devised   by   African   governments   to   address   climate-­‐ related  disasters  and  their  impacts.     •   108  

Summarized   in   table   4.1   is   the   hypothesized   typology   of   disaster   management   policies   we   used   to   examine   and   classify   African   countries’   disaster   management   effectiveness.    
         POLICY                      Ex-­‐post  response  ONLY                  TYPE                 Policy   Indicators   INDICATORS:   -­‐  No  mandated  disaster   -­‐  National  mandated  disaster   -­‐  All  of  type  II  policy  indicators   +   -­‐  Use  of  scientific   knowledge/climate   information  to  anticipate   disasters   informed  by  climate   information   -­‐  Functioning  Early  Warning   Systems  exist   -­‐  Rigorous  risk  and   vulnerability  assessments/   cartography  are  conducted  to   inform  long-­‐term  risk-­‐proofing   and  disaster  prevention   -­‐  Disaster  prevention  is   mentioned  in  National  PRSP   and  streamlined  into   management  (DM)  unit  exists;   management  (DM)  unit  exists   or  if  it  does:  it  does  not   effectively  coordinate  across   government  institutions  to   ensure  good  disaster   response   -­‐  No  dedicated  budget  line  for   disaster     -­‐  No  rehearsed  established   procedures/responsibilities   for  disaster  response     -­‐  No  national  DM  strategy  in   for  disaster  response   -­‐  No  drills   -­‐  Track  record  of  delayed  and   ineffective  response  (relief   >3days  after  disaster  event)   -­‐  It  has  a  budget/dedicated   budget  line;  relief  supplies  in   stock   -­‐  DM  unit  is  at  cabinet  level   office);  effectively  coordinates   across  institutions   -­‐  Established   procedures/responsibilities   for  disaster  response  exist;   -­‐  National  DM  strategy/law  is   disaster  response   responsibilities     -­‐  Disaster  response  drills  are   conducted   -­‐  Contingency  planning  is  a             Policy  Type  I:     Unprepared  Firefighters   Ex-­‐post  response  +  Ex-­‐ante   preparedness  for  disasters           Policy  Type  II:    Prepared  Firefighters   Ex-­‐post  response  +  Ex-­‐ante   preparedness  for  disasters  +   Use  of  scientific  knowledge  to   inform  Disaster  planning  and   prevention     Policy  Type  III:     Disaster  Averters  

(directly  under  PM/President’s   -­‐  Contingency  planning  

place  outlining  responsibilities   in  place,  clearly  outlines  

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[Bad,  delayed,  ineffective   responders]  

regular  exercise   -­‐  Track  record  of  good   response  (1-­‐3  days  within   disaster  event)   -­‐  No  prevention  or  use  of   scientific  knowledge/  climate   information  to  anticipate   climate-­‐related  disasters   [Good  responders]      

development  plans   -­‐  Resources  are  allocated  for   disaster  recovery/post   disaster  reconstruction  (DRR   included)   [Disaster  Averters]    

Table  4.1:  Policy  typology:  Firefighters  vs.  Prepared  firefighters  vs.  Disaster  Averters  

  In   brief,   countries   with   Policy   type   I,   II   or   III   are   characterized   by   the   following   attributes:   1) Ex-­‐post   response   only   (the   “Unprepared   Firefighters”   policy):   countries   choosing   not   to,   or   unable,   to   address   disasters   until   they   occur.   Countries   in   this  category  solely  respond  to  disasters  after  they  have  occurred,  mobilizing   any  personnel  on  duty  and  dispatching  them  to  disaster  sites.  For  this  reason   we   label   them:   the   Unprepared   Firefighters!   Official   emergency   response   in   the   countries   of   this   category   is   characterized   by   amateurism   and   improvisation,   and   there   are   no   pre-­‐established   well-­‐rehearsed   procedures   to   follow.   Also   included   in   this   category   are   countries   with   a   dedicated   agency   for   Disaster   Management   but   one   without   capacity,   ability   for   efficient  inter-­‐ministerial  planning  and  coordination,  or  no  budget  line.   2) Ex-­‐post   response   +   ex-­‐ante   disaster   preparedness   (The   “Prepared   Firefighters”   policy):   Countries   in   this   category   have   shifted   from   response   (responding  to  disasters  only  after  they  occur),  to  preparedness  for  disasters   before   they   occur,   so   as   to   ensure   more   efficiency   and   swiftness   in   disaster   response  and  relief  operations.  They  have  the  following  attributes:  a  national   Disaster   Management   Strategy   or   law   adopted   with   clearly   defined   and   appropriated   procedures   and   responsibilities   for   disaster   response;   in   the   national  budget  a  dedicated  budget  line  exists  for  disaster  preparedness  and   •   110  

emergency   response;   a   mandated   agency   for   disaster   management   exists,   able   to   coordinate   across   ministries   and   administrations   and   effectively   command  disaster  response  activities  during  an  Emergency.  Generally,  for  all   countries   in   this   category   an   annual   Contingency   plan   is   elaborated,   and   delineates   the   procedures,   actions   and   responsibilities   to   be   carried   out   in   the   advent   of   all   possible   disasters;   furthermore   regular   drills   of   these   disaster  response  procedures  take  place.  As  a  result,  countries  in  this  policy   category  take  no  more  than  three  to  deliver  needed  relief  to  disaster-­‐affected   citizens.   3) The   “Disaster   Averters”   (combining   effective   disaster   ex-­‐post   response,   ex-­‐ ante   preparedness   AND   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   based   on   scientific   knowledge  and  climate  information):  Finally  countries  in  this  third  category   have  experienced  a  paradigm  shift  in  their  strategy  to  address  disasters  and   have  transitioned  from  disaster  preparedness  to  prevention.  They  engage  in   pro-­‐active   Disaster   Prevention   and   have   shifted   the   focus   away   from   the   disaster  event  itself  towards  the  underlying   risk   factors   that   create   disasters.   Countries   in   this   category   focus   on   pre-­‐empting   disasters   by   reducing   disaster   risk   and   vulnerability   so   that   Hazards   do   not   turn   into   disasters,   bringing  to  bear  weather  forecasts,  early  warning  systems,  risk/vulnerability   mapping,   and   other   relevant   tools/initiatives   for   climate   risk   management.   Indeed   in   these   countries,   disasters   are   identified   as   a   crosscutting,   transversal   threat   to   development,   often   inscribed   in   national   Poverty   Reduction   Strategy   Papers   (PRSPs).   Hence,   there   is   strong   political   commitment   to   bring   all   of   the   nation’s   forces/segments   together   in   order   to   reduce   the   country’s   vulnerability   to   disasters   and   minimize   the   consequences  of  disasters  on  vulnerable  segments  of  the  population.  Some  of   these   initiatives   include,   but   are   not   limited   to:   the   of   climate   and   meteorological   risk   information   to   inform   disaster   planning,   national/   sub-­‐ national   contingency   plan(s)   based   on   seasonal   climate/weather   forecasts,   functional   multi-­‐hazard   Early   Warning   –   Early   Action   systems,   elaboration   •   111  

and  enforcement  of  long-­‐term  disaster  risk  reduction  plans  based  on  sound   scientific   research   (risk   identification,   resilient   building   codes,   mapping   of   risk  zones,  legislative  bans  on  building/human  settlement  in  risk  zones,  etc.),   dedicated   and   sufficient   resources   allocated   for   the   implementation   of   DRR   plans  at  all  administrative  levels.    In  brief  countries  in  this  category  take  the   threat   of   disasters   very   seriously   and   invest   in   building   the   country’s   resilience  to  disasters,  managing  disaster  risk  with  all  means  at  hand.       4.2.2 Methodological  Framework:  The  Spectrum  of  Effective  Disaster  Risk   Management  in  Africa     Based   on   the   above   storyline   of   what   constitutes   an   Unprepared   Firefighter,   a   Prepared   Firefighter   and   an   effective   Disaster   Averter,   we   defined   three   correspondent   policy   types   (I,   II   and   III)   and   a   series   of   twenty   (20)   measurable   indicators   to   proxy   and   reveal   the   existence   or   not   of   the   attributes   of   each   policy   type,  as  well  as  capture  the  spectrum  of  disaster  management  measures  practiced  in   Africa.        

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  Fig  4.3:  The  Spectrum  of  Disaster  Risk  Management  (DRM)  Policies  in  Africa  

  Our   methodological   framework,   depicted   in   figure   3,   overlaps   in   many   regards   with   standard   theoretical   frameworks   on   what   constitutes   effective   disaster   risk   management.   To   use   only   the   World   Meteorological   Organization’s   (fig.   4.4),   exhorting   countries   to   implement   effective   disaster   risk   reduction   (DRR),   we   see   that   all   proposed   measures   for   DRR   (Risk   identification,   Risk   reduction   and   Risk   transfer)   are   encapsulated   in   our   “Policy   Type   III:   Disaster   Averters”,   countries   that   effectively   identify,   reduce   and   transfer   disaster   risk,   abiding   by   all   the   guidelines   highlighted  in  the  Hyogo  Framework  for  Action.  

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  Fig  4.4:  Framework  for  Effective  Disaster  Risk  Management  derived  from  the  Hyogo  Framework   Action  (HFA).  Source:  World  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO)173  

  Our  first  two  policy  types  on  the  other  hand  –  The  “Unprepared  firefighters”  and   “Prepared  firefighters”  (Red  and  yellow  respectively  in  our  classification)–  both   would  simply  fall  under  the  category  of  Ineffective  disaster  risk  management  in  the   standard  DRR  theoretical  frameworks.  We  amended  these  however  and  introduced   a  tripartite  differentiation  in  replacement  of  the  standard  binary  DRR  framework   commonly  used,  in  order  to  capture  the  full  variation  that  one  sees  when  analyzing   African  countries.       Indeed,  the  default  baseline  in  Africa  is  that  of  ex-­‐post  disaster  response  (whether   effective   or   not).   Most   countries   in   Africa   do   not   have   any   of   the   Disaster   Risk   Management   measures   called   for   by   the   standard   international   DRR   frameworks.   Some  have  some  elements:  the  Prepared  firefighters  (policy  type  II),  countries  that   are   in   practice   quite   effective   disaster   responders,   building   preparedness   for   disasters   but   not   making   use   of   existing   scientific   knowledge   to   inform   their   preparedness  efforts.  At  the  top  end  of  our  classification  are  African  countries  that   bring   in   climate   information   and   knowledge   to   reduce   vulnerability   to   climate-­‐ related   disasters   and   losses,   making   provisions   for   risk   identification,   financial   protection,  post-­‐disaster  risk  reduction  and  Early  Warning  Systems;  these  countries                                                                                                                  
173  World  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO),  accessed  March  10,  2011.  www.wmo.int  

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are  called  the  Disaster  averters.  This  maps  into  a  sequential  spectrum  where  some   countries  have  very  little  in  place  by  way  of  Disaster  Risk  Management  and  others   have   much   more   in   place;   hence   generating   a   continuum   of   Disaster   Risk   Management   (RM)   effectiveness   ranging   from   the   most   unprepared   of   firefighters   (with  a  score  of  0)  to  the  effective  Disaster  Averter  (score  of  20).  This  constituted  a   much   more   cogent   way   of   analyzing   African   countries’   disaster   management   policies  in  our  sense.     As  we  shall  see  in  the  results  section,  the  highest  score  attained  in  Africa  was  a  17,   and   the   lowest   was   a   0,   thus   this   spectrum   allows   us   to   effectively   capture   the   variation   that   exists   within   Africa,   while   still   calibrating   it   to   global   standards   for   what  constitutes  effective  DRM,  as  well  as  leaving  the  space  open  for  possible  future   regional  comparisons.     4.2.3 Indicators,  data  sources  &  classification  methodology     The  twenty  (20)  indicators  we  used  to  classify  Africa’s  fifty-­‐five  (55)  countries  into   our   three   Disaster   Management   (DM)   policy   types   are   displayed   in   box   3.   Each   country   was   assessed   on   each   of   these   twenty   questions/indicators,   and   answers   to   each  question  were  scored  on  a  binary  scale  of  0-­‐1,  then  totaled  to  compute  a  final   “DM  score”  for  each  country.    
1. DM  unit  exists/there  is  an  institutional  basis  for  implementation  of  DRR-­‐CCA     Source:  RC,  PfA1  +  country  events  analysis   2. National   disaster   response   plan   exists   clearly   defining   roles   and   responsibilities   during   emergency     Source:  PfA1  (1),  country  events  analysis  +  IFRC  WPNS   3. National  disaster  management  law  has  been  ratified,  promulgating  into  law  of  the  land  the   different  roles  and  responsibilities  for  DM,  legal  backing  for  DM  (year  law  was  adopted)   Source:  PfA1  (1),  country  events  analysis  +  IFRC  WPNS   4. DM  unit  or  platform  is  at  cabinet-­‐level/mandated  to  coordinate  across-­‐institutions   Source:  PfA  1  (4)  

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5.

DM   unit   has   financial   capacity:   Budget   line   for   DM   in   national   budget/Dedicated   and   adequate  resources  for  DM  are  available  at  all  administrative  levels     Source:  PfA5  (1);  2004  reports  in  preparation  for  WCDR  

6. 7. 8.

DM  unit  with  human  capacity:  enough  staff?  Well  trained?     Source:  PfA5  (1)   National  Disaster  Preparedness  Contingency  plan  is  elaborated  and  regularly  updated   Source:  PfA5  (2)   Regular   training   drills   and   tests   are   held/DM   responsibilities   are   well   rehearsed   at   all   levels  of  intervention  (national  to  community)   Source:  PfA5  (2)  

9.

Track   record   of   efficient   response   (government   has   strong   ability   to   respond);   relief   provided  within  2days  of  disaster  occurrence   Data  source:  RC  

10. DM  responsibilities  decentralized  +  adequate  resources  devolved  to  local  level  for  DRR-­‐CCA   Source:  PfA1  (3)   11. Most  vulnerable  are  targeted  in  disaster  interventions   Source:  VFL  indicator  #6  +  HFA     12. Risk   assessments   (national/local)   conducted   based   on   climate   knowledge,   hazard   data   and   vulnerability  mapping     Source:  PfA  2  (1)   13. Functional  multi-­‐hazard  EWS  exist  (with  outreach  to  communities)   Source:  PfA2  (3)   14. Trans-­‐boundary  risk  assessments  conducted     Source:  PfA2  (4)   15. Disaster   Risks   included   in   school   curricula/relevant   info   on   climate   disasters   is   available   nation-­‐wide     Source:  PfA  3  (1,2,4)   16. Infrastructural   Disaster   Prevention   initiatives   exist:   climate-­‐proofing   of   infrastructure,   cities   Source:  PfA  4   17. Legislative  Disaster  Prevention  initiatives  exist:  building  codes,  bans  on  human  settlement   in  risk  zones,  etc.  Source:  PfA  4  (4)   18. DRM  is  explicitly  mentionned  in  PRSPs/national  development  strategy  papers,  impacts  on   development  are  rightfully  seen   Source:  PfA4  (2  +  see  perspectives  futures);  World  Bank  national  PRSPs   19. Recovery  efforts  include  DRR  measures  and  mechanisms  to  prevent  future  disasters      

•  

116  

Source:  PfA  4  (5)   20. Financial  reserves  for  recovery  exist  /  risk  transfer  mechanisms   Source:  PfA5  (3)  
Table  4.2:  20  indicators  of  DRM  policies  in  Africa  and  data  sources  for  each  (Red  indicators  correspond   to  policy  type  I;  Yellow  indicators  correspond  to  policy  type  II  and  Green  indicators  correspond  to  policy   type  III)     Key  to  data  sources:  PfA=Hyogo  Framework  Priority  for  Action:  triangulation  of  responses  from  HFA  Mid-­‐Term   Review   and   Views   from   the   Frontline   (VFL)   2009-­‐2010   assessment   surveys,   where   available;   International   Federation  of  the  Red  Coss/Red  Crescent  (IFRC)  WPNS=  Well-­‐Prepared   National   Societies   Questionnaire   (2009-­‐ 2010);   World   Bank   PRSP=   Poverty   Reduction   Strategy   Papers,   2010   or   latest   available;   RC=   Answers   to   Questionnaire  to  Red  Cross  National  Societies  Disaster  Management  Unit.  

  4.2.3.1  Data  Sources:     We   resorted   to   a   wide   array   of   data   sources   to   be   able   to   get   answers   to   each   question/indicator   selected   in   accordance   with   our   typology   of   disaster   management  policies.  We  thus  identified  several  data  sources  for  each  indicator  in   order   to   attain   high   confidence/robustness,   for   each   of   Africa’s   countries.   The   paucity   of   data   on   national   disaster   management   is   a   notable   fact   about   Africa;   thus   setting  out  to  gather  data  for  our  selected  indicators  was  a  formidable  feat.     Through  qualitative  data  mining—expert  interviews  by  email,  phone  and  in-­‐person   and   survey   questionnaires   emailed   to   all   Red   Cross   National   Societies—,   country   events   analysis   and   use   of   existing   country-­‐level   data   from   previous   assessments   (mainly,  the  Hyogo  Framework  for  Action-­‐HFA  mid-­‐term  review  and  Views  from  the   Frontline-­‐VFL   national   progress   reports),   we   gathered   data   for   each   country   on   indicators/questions  1  through  20.     A   total   of   fifty-­‐two   respondents   were   interviewed   on   the   DM   policies   in   place   in   their   countries.   Additionally   fifty   news   articles   and   sixty-­‐six   official   documents   (government   reports,   declarations   and   legislations)   were   consulted,   for   a   total   of   108  data  sources,  to  arrive  at  a  final  score  for  each  indicator  (using  a  binary  scoring:   1  when  indicator  is  met,  0  when  not).     •   117  

  To   generate   survey   data,   climate   change   adaptation   experts   gathered   at   the   Africa   Climate  Change  Collective  Action  forum  held  in  Dar-­‐es-­‐Salaam,  Tanzania  from  June   25-­‐30th   2010,   were   administered   an   initial   round   of   an   expert   questionnaire   protocol   in   order   to   gather   their   views   on   their   countries’   use   of   scientific   knowledge   to   inform   national   disaster   preparedness   plans;   this   led   to   the   initial   hypothesizing  of  the  spectrum  of  DRM  policies  in  Africa,  and  generated  answers  for   indicators  12  and  13  (see  survey  protocol  in  Appendix).     Additionally,   Red   Cross   national   disaster   managers   from   Africa’s   fifity-­‐five   countries,  best  poised  to  characterize  the  practice  of  disaster  management  in  their   respective   countries,   being   auxiliaries   to   the   State   and   often   the   first   to   be   on   site   in   the  advent  of  a  disaster,  were  contacted  with  three  key  questions:  1)  How  long  does   the  government  generally  take  to  respond  to  climate-­‐related  disasters?  How  many   days   before  or   after  the   Red   Cross   has   it   taken   them   in   past   disasters   to   get   to   affected  sites?  2)  How  would  you  qualify  your  government's  response  to  disasters:   are   they   firefighters   (their   response   is   late,   ineffective   and   delayed)?   are   they   prepared   firefighters   (effective   disaster   responders)?   or   rather   do   they   have   strategies   in   place   to   anticipate/prevent   disasters   using   available   scientific   information   (disaster   averters)?   3)   What   institution   is   in   charge   of   disaster   management   in   your   country?   Is   the   Red   Cross   part   of   any   national   platform   to   better  manage  disasters?     Answers   to   these   three   questions   served   to   inform   indicators   1   through   11.   This   questionnaire  was  administered  online,  translated  in  French,  English  or  Portuguese   depending   on   the   country’s   official   language.   Furthermore,   reports   of   the   International   Federation   of   the   Red   Cross   and   Red   Crescent   National   Societies   (IFRC)  Well-­‐Prepared  National  Societies  Questionnaire  (2009-­‐2010)  were  consulted   to  further  confirm  assessments  of  National  Society  disaster  managers,  and  provide   insights  on  indicators  2  and  3.     •   118  

Moreover,   ordinary   citizens,   government   disaster   managers   and   civil   society   representatives  from  each  country,  whenever  available,  were  asked  to  confirm  our   assessment  of  their  national  DRM  policies.     Finally,   insights   from   HFA   mid-­‐term   review   national   reports,   and   their   bottom-­‐up   counterpart,   the   VFL   national   assessment   reports,   where   confronted   in   all   the   countries   where   they   were   available,   providing   information   for   indicators   12   through   20—countries’   progress   in   implementing   HFA-­‐recommended   DRR   measures.     All  in  all,  this  enabled  us  to  conduct  a  through  assessment  and  generate  a  complete   cross-­‐continental   picture   of   the   national   DM   policy   currently   in   place   in   each   country,   one   computed   using   at   least   two   and   up   to   five   credible   data   sources   for   each   country,   confronted   and   triangulated   to   give   a   substantiated   score   on   each   indicator.  On  the  basis  of  country  scores  on  each  of  the  20  indicators,  we  computed   an  overall  DM  policy  score  for  each  country  under  review.     Once  all  the  data  collected  on  each  indicator  for  the  fifty-­‐six  countries  under  study,   we  were  able  to  classify  countries  using  our  classification  method.     4.2.3.2   To  be  classified  as  an  ‘Unprepared  firefighter’,  countries  needed  to  satisfy  indicators   1-­‐4,  in  accordance  with  our  storyline  for  what  constitutes  an  unprepared  firefighter,   and/or   obtain   a   total   score   of   4   or   below.   ‘Prepared   firefighters’   needed   to   satisfy   indicators   5-­‐11,   and   have   an   overall   score   between   5   and   11.   Finally   ‘Disaster   averters’  satisfied  indicators  11-­‐20  and  scored  above  11  points.     Of  the  20  indicators,  we  weighed  four  more  heavily  however:      Financial   and   human   capacity   (indicators   5   and   6):   Scoring   a   1   on   these   was   a   pre-­‐requisite  needed  to  qualify  as  a  type  II  country  (‘Prepared  Firefighters’);     • 119      Classification  Method  &  Weighing:  

 Use   of   knowledge   to   conduct   risk   assessments   and   existence   of   effective   early   warning  systems  (indicators  12  and  13):  Scoring  a  1  on  these  was  a  pre-­‐requisite   to  qualify  as  a  type  III  country  (‘Disaster  Averters’).     We   weighed   these   four   indicators   more   heavily   using   a   qualitative   method.   We   maintaining  countries  in  one  policy  category,  until  they  scored  positively  on  one  of   the   threshold   indicators   (5-­‐6   and   12-­‐13),   which   became   de   facto   cut-­‐off   points   to   graduate   to   the   next   policy   type.   Scoring   positively   on   indicators   5-­‐6   was   thus   needed   to   move   up   to   policy   type   II;   similarly   scoring   positively   on   indicators   12-­‐13   was  a  requisite  to  move  up  to  category  III.  A  country  such  as  Djibouti  for  instance   had   a   total   DM   policy   score   of   7—which   ought   to   have   immediately   placed   it   among   the  ‘Prepared  Firefighters’.  However  because  it  did  not  meet  indicators  5-­‐6  (its  DM   unit  did  not  have  the  financial  and  human  capacity  to  carry  out  its  duties),  it  could   not   justifiably   be   ranked   as   a   ‘Prepared   Firefighter’.   As   a   result   it   was   maintained   in   the  Unprepared  Firefighter  category.     When  all  countries  under  study  were  rigorously  assessed,  on  each  indicator  out  of   the   20   selected,   then   classified   according   to   their   total   DM   policy   score   and   then   weighed   according   to   whether   or   not   they   met   the   indicators   of   most   importance,   it   became   easy   to   generate   a   continental   map   of   African   countries   by   national   disaster   management  policy  in  place:  “Firefighters”  shown  in  red,  ‘Prepared  Firefighters’  in   yellow  and  ‘Disaster  Averters’  in  green    (see  chapter  5).    

•  

120  

 
Fig.   4.6:   Results   of   Cross-­continental   classification:   The   Patchwork   of   Disaster   Management   policies   across  Africa  (Left  insert:  un-­weighted  map;  Right:  weighted  map)  

  4.3 Resulting  Country  case  selection     Following   our   classification   of   all   of   Africa’s   countries   according   to   their   disaster   management  policy  type,  I  selected  a  country  case  study  from  each  policy  group,  and   used   that   country   to   make   inferences   for   the   entire   policy   group.   Indeed,   our   comparative   analysis   required   only   one   country   per   policy   group:   one   Firefighter   case,  one  Prepared  Firefighter  case  and  one  Disaster  averter  case.     However,  looking  at  the  maps  in  fig.  4.6,  we  were  still  left  with  multiple  options  for   country   case   selection,   namely:   thirty-­‐three   (33)   country   case   options   to   infer   for   the   countries   shown   in   red,   or   Unprepared   Firefighters;   nine   (9)   for   countries   shown   in   yellow,   the   ‘Prepared   firefighters’;   and   six   (6)   country   options   for   countries  shown  in  green,  or  the  “Disaster  Averters”.  How  to  select  among  these  to   come  up  with  three  country  cases,  and  proceed  with  our  comparative  analysis?     The   only   subjectivity   in   the   entire   case   selection   was   introduced   at   this   stage.   When   selecting   among   different   country   options   within   each   policy   group,   two   main   criteria   were   followed.   First,   were   personal   preferences   and   ability   to   conduct   research   safely   and   successfully   in   certain   countries   relative   to   others.   Secondly,   •   121  

came  the  concern  to  keep  selected  countries  as  comparable  as  possible  and  similar   on  at  least  a  few  variables  (see  country  comparability  matrix  4.5)  in  order  to  control   for   competing   independent   variables   that   could   explain   differing   institutional   change   trajectories.   Keeping   in   mind   these   determining   factors,   we   narrowed   our   list  of  country  case  options  to  five  countries:  Senegal  for  the  ‘Unprepared  firefighter’   country  group  (in  red,  selected  due  to  existing  field  research  connections  and  easier   access   to   key   informants);   Mozambique   to   infer   for   the   ‘Disaster   averter’   country   group   (in   green,   selected   following   the   chance   of   a   concurrent   UNDP   research   program   in   Mozambique,   which   our   research   was   tagged   onto   in   with   ease);   and   finally   Uganda/Ethiopia/Morocco   as   options   left   for   the   ‘Prepared   firefighter’   country  representative,  displayed  in  yellow.       Table   4.5   was   used   to   adjudicate   and   come   to   a   final   decision   on   the   Yellow   country   case.    
N   Senegal   Moz-­‐   ambique   Ugan-­‐   da?   Ethio-­‐   pia?   Morocco?   Most   comparable   country?   (frequency   count)   Ug  (22)     Eth  (12)   Mor  (6)   Uganda  

Regime  type   (Source:   Economist   Democracy   Index  2010)   Country   size   (surface   area,   thousand   km2)   Human   Development   Index  Ranking   Population   (m)   Population   growth  (%)  

Semi-­‐ Democrat ic   (Hybrid   regime)   196.7  

Semi-­‐ Democrati c   (Hybrid   regime)   799.4  

Semi-­‐ Authori Democratic   tarian   (Hybrid   regime)   241.038     1,104.3  

Authoritaria n  

446.6  

Uganda  

Low   (Rank   155)   12.5   2.6  

Low     (Rank   184)   22.89   2.3  

Low   (Rank   Low   161)   (Rank   174)   33.4   82.8   3.2   2.6  

Medium   (Rank  130)   32   1.2  

Uganda   Ethiopia   Morocco   Ethiopia  

•  

122  

GDP   (current   12.8   US$)  (billions)   GDP   per   capita   1,020   (current  US$)   GDP   growth   2.2   (annual  %)   Income   share   6.2   held   by   (2005   lowest  20%   estimate)   Births   attended   by   skilled   health   staff   (%   of   total  births)   Life   exp.   at   birth  (years)   Mortality   rate,   under-­‐5   (per  1,000)   Literacy   rate,   youth   female   (%   of   females   ages  15-­‐24)   Primary   completion   rate,   total   (%   of   relevant   age  group)   Mobile   cellular   subscriptions   (per   100   people)   Agricultural   land   (%   of   land  area)   52   (2005   estimate)   59   93  

9.79   428  

17.01   509  

32   386  

91.37   2,771  

Uganda   Uganda   Ethiopia   Uganda   Uganda   Morocco  

6.4   5.2   (2008   estimate)   55   (2008   estimate)  

5.6   5.8   (2009   estimate)   42   (2006   estimate)  

8.8   9.3   (2005   estimat e)   6   (2005   estimat e)   59   104  

4.9   6.5   (2006   estimate)   -­‐  

Uganda  

50   142  

53   9  

72   38  

Uganda   Ethiopia   Uganda   Ethiopia   Uganda  

63.7   56   57   57  

6.5   (2009   estimate)   85  

33.3  

72  

55  

80  

Ethiopia  

55  

26  

38  

5  

79  

Uganda  

47.5   (2008   estimate)  

62.0  

70  

34.5   (2008   estimat e)   51  

67.2   (2008   estimate)   16  

Uganda   Ethiopia  

Agriculture,   value   added   17   (%  of  GDP)   Industry,   value   added   22   (%  of  GDP)   Services,   etc.,   62   value   added  

31  

24  

29   24   45   25   50   11   39   55  

Uganda   Morocco     Uganda  

Uganda   Ethiopia  

•  

123  

(%  of  GDP)   Exports   of   goods   and   services   (%   of   GDP)   Imports   of   goods   and   services   (%   of   GDP)   Coastline   length   –area   at   risk   from   SLR   %   of   population   within   100km   of  the  coast   (Data   source:   Earthtrends,   WRI)   Total   Number   of  HMDs   (1960-­‐2010   period;   source:CRED,   EM-­‐DAT)   %  change  in   average   number  of   HMDs  (1960-­‐ 1994  vs.   1995-­‐2010)   Effective   decentralizati on   policy?   Y/N   Total   annual   influx   of   climate   finance   (m   USD)   Net   official   development   assistance   and   official   aid   received   (current   US$)  

29   24   25   24   11   39   44   700  km   44   2,470  km   34   0km   (landlocked )   0   29   0km   (landloc ked)   0   1,835  km  

Uganda  

Uganda   Ethiopia   Morocco   Morocco  

83%  

59%  

65%  

Morocco  

26  

58  

29  

63  

36  

+0.2  

+1.1  

+7.7   +1.3   (exponentia l   rise   in   HMDs)  

+0.8  

Ethiopia   (closer   to   Moz)   Uganda   (closer   to   Senegal)     Ethiopia   (closer   to   Moz)    

N  

Y  

Y  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

-­‐  

1,018  

2,013  

2,934  

3,820  

912  

Uganda   Ethiopia  

•  

124  

(millions)   Total   public   spending   on   education   (%   of   government   expenditure)   Ease   of   access   to   key   informants   /   conducting   research?  Y/N   19   (2008   estimate)   21   (2006   estimate)   20.3     23.3   (2007   estimat e)   25.7   (2008   estimate)   Uganda   Ethiopia  

Y  

Y  

Y  

N  

N  

Uganda  

 
Table   4.5:   Country   comparability   matrix:   Side-­by-­Side   country   comparison   -­   Comparing   oranges  &  oranges  (World  Development  Indicators,  2011  estimates  unless  otherwise  noted)  

  4.3.1  Resulting  Country  case  selection:     Thus   we   arrived   at   our   three   principal   country   cases   of   Senegal   (representing   the   ‘Unprepared   firefighter’   policy   group),   Uganda   (to   infer   for   the   ‘Prepared   Firefighter’   group)   and   Mozambique   (representing   the   ‘Disaster   averters’).   On   this   basis,   we   could   proceed   with   our   cross-­‐country   comparison   of   triggers   of   institutional  adaptation  to  meet  the  new  challenge  of  CCA.     Thus,   in   each   country   we   asked:   what   were   the   impacts   of   climate   related   shocks   in   1995-­‐2010  and  how  were  they  governed?  How  well  did  the  national  policy  in  place   address   local   adaptation   needs?   What   factors   prompted   national   governments   to   implement   the   disaster   management   policy   and   institutional   framework   that   they   adopted?     4.4  Phase  2:  Zooming  In  At  Community-­Level  To  Elicit  Adequacy  Of  National-­ Level  Climate  DM  Policies     This   research   involved   large   amounts   of   fieldwork   at   both   the   national   and   community  level  in  order  to  identify  priority  adaptation  needs.  In  Mozambique,  we   •   125  

conducted   fieldwork   between   March   –   May   2011,   including   three   weeks   at   the   community-­‐level   spent   surveying   in   the   seven   community   cases   along   the   Mozambican  2,500km  long  coastline,  between  April  9th  –  May  1st  2011.       In   Senegal,   fieldwork   spanned   the   entire   two   years   of   this   research,   beginning   in   September   2010   and   only   ending   in   October   2011,   with   national   interviews   and   community   data   collection   spread   throughout   this   period.   The   first   set   of   VCAs   took   place  in  Senegal  in  October  2010  (concerning  three  villages  in  the  Northern  region   of  Saint-­‐Louis),  whereas  the  second  round  concerning  three  villages  in  the  eastern   central  part  of  the  country  (Kaffrine  region)  only  took  place  in  June  2011.   In   Uganda,   the   last   field   site,   fieldwork   was   clustered   in   the   month   of   October   2011,   including   2   weeks   of   community   data   collection   in   Bulambuli   district,   east   central   Uganda;   there   data   collection   proceeded   much   faster   thanks   to   a   larger   team   of   VCA   researchers.     4.4.1 Community  cases  selection  protocol         In  order  to  fully  understand  the  impacts  of  disasters  on  communities,  I  also  carried   out   extended   fieldwork   in   severely   impacted   communities   within   my   principal   country   cases.   Random   selection   was   used   to   select   amongst   different   climate   disaster  hotspots  in  each  country–communities   most   severely   impacted   by   HMDs   in   each  country  case.       Within   the   selected   communities,   a   significant   sample   of   the   population   was   surveyed  (an  average  of  30%  of  all  households  in  each  target  community),  using  a   community-­‐based   Vulnerability   and   Capacity   Assessment   (VCA)   methodology   toolbox   that   utilizes   both   a   standard   questionnaire   gathering   data   about   my   key   variables   under   study,   as   well   extended   focus   group   interviews   with   male   and   female  members  of  the  community.       •   126  

In  each  selected  community,  households  were  in  turn  selected  for  the  survey  using   random  sampling  (every  5th  household  on  my  way,  walking).       Seven   vulnerable   communities   at   risk   from   rising   HMDs   were   thus   surveyed   in   Mozambique  working  with  a  research  team  of  5  people;  six  communities  in  Senegal   working   with   a   research   team   composed   of   24   Red   Cross   volunteers;   and   5   in   Uganda  working  with  a  research  team  composed  of  24  Red  Cross  volunteers.      The  VCA  methodology       The   tools   we   employed   to   generate   our   community   vulnerability   data   are   derived   from  a  participatory  methods  toolbox  for  assessing  communities’  vulnerability  and   capacities  to  climate  hazards,  devised  by  the  Red  Cross/Red  Crescent  movement  for   use   by   its   community-­‐level   volunteers   for   community   work   programming:   the   Vulnerability  and  Capacity  Assessment  (VCA)  tools  (IFRC  2009).     The   Vulnerability   and   Capacity   Assessment   (VCA)   toolbox   uses   a   range   of   different  tools,  which  like  the  hammer,  scaffold  and  measuring  meter  that  one  uses   to   construct   a   house,   are   the   aides   we   have   used   to   access   data   across   different   segments   of   the   community   studied   and   build   a   complete   picture   of   the   community’s  Vulnerabilities  to  and  Capacities  to  address  climate  changes.     All  the  data  generated  across  groups  using  the  VCA  tools  were  then  triangulated  to   draw  to  a  complete  picture  as  close  to  the  local  reality  as  possible.     The   main   attractions   of   this   methodology   are   its   ability   to   access   the   most   vulnerable  groups  (women,  youth,  elders)  and  give  them  a  voice  within  the  process   of   collective   solution   design,   as   well   as   its   emphasis   on   local   capacities   to   address   local   vulnerabilities,   before   recourse   to   external   interventions   is   considered.   Additionally  is  the  belief  at  the  center  of  the  VCA  methodology  that  vulnerability  is   the   product   of   multiple   stressors,   historically   derived   from   the   socio-­‐economic   • 127    

characteristics   of   the   community;   climate   variability   under   this   understanding   is   thus   solely   one   factor   of   vulnerability,   out   of   many   others.   The   output   is   data   on   climate  vulnerability  in  the  context  of  the  community’s  wider  vulnerability.     The   VCA   serves   first   and   foremost   as   a   planning   tool,   at   the   very   beginning   of   the   project   cycle,   a   useful   method   to   identify/understand   the   problem   before   devising   solutions/policy  interventions,  and  to  involve  communities  from  the  very  outset:  in   the  design  of  the  project’s  activities,  for  their  future  ownership  of  these  (see  fig.  1).    

    One   final   note   to   make   is   that   throughout   our   assessments,   we   have   paid   a   lot   of   attention   to   gender-­‐specificity.   Indeed,   generating   gender-­‐disaggregated   data   was   an   output   of   our   assessments.   Generating   data   on   all   vulnerable   segments   in   the   community   was   an   important   endeavor   in   order   to   place   the   gender-­‐specific   data   in   context,   as   well   as   set   the   entire   community   on   a   sustainable   track   of   identifying   their  own  vulnerabilities  to  climate  risks,  articulating  by  themselves  who  the  most   vulnerable   groups   are   and   developing   a   communal   strategy   to   address   these   vulnerabilities.   The   rationale   is   that   transforming   women’s   vulnerabilities   into   opportunities   will   require   action   by   both   men   and   women,   and   if   men   are   moved   to   become   the   champions   of   women’s   vulnerabilities,   they   will   be   their   first   allies   in   working  to  demolish  them.   •   128  

  More   on   the   specific   Vulnerability   and   Capacities   Assessment   (VCA)   tools   we   have   used   for   our   community   assessments   are   in   table   1   below.   All   the   activities   detailed   in  table  below  were  conducted  within  focus  groups  (men,  women,  elders  and  youth   as  relevant),  save  for  the  final  community  data  validation  meeting  that  brought  the   entire  community  together.     Highlighted   in   Yellow   in   table   4.6   are   exercises   specifically   designed   to   access   gender-­‐specific  data.  In  Red  are  exercises  specially  aimed  at  collecting  information   on  Climate  Variability  &  Change.  

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Table  4.6:  Vulnerability  and  Capacity  Assessment  (VCA)  Tools  employed  to  assess  vulnerability  in  each   target  community  (climate-­vulnerable  communities  in  Senegal,  Uganda  and  Mozambique)   Exercise     Target  sub-­ Purpose  of  Exercise   (references  in  VCA  manual)   segment  to   Head   This   exercise   will   serve   to   generate   data   on   how   DAY   TWO:   Household   Data   Household   participate  ien)  &   households  and  their  assets  are  vulnerable  to  climate  risks.     sampling   (Women  –  M n   Household     &   Village   exercise     members   This   exercise   also   makes   apparent     inter   vs.   intra-­‐ Vulnerability  Assessment   Community  introduction       (surveyed   Village  authorities   Introduction  of  Research  aeam  ato  rof  purpose  of  research   household  differences  in   tccess   nd   esources.   (p.  107  in  Manual)   separately   by     (Mix,  all)   Refer   to   Household   Data   3   gender)     Transect  walk   guides:   1   Research   team   to   walk   through   community   scoping   and   Questionnaire   &   Collection   Woman,   1   Man,   1   taking  note  on  its  most  salient  features  of  vulnerability  and     (pp.  86-­‐92  in  Manual)   Sheets   Youth   capacities,  accompanied  by  3  guides  (one  woman,  man  and     youth).   DAY   TWO   (Household   Data   Household   Men   –   How   do   women   specifically   cope   with  to   the   surface  when   Community  Mapping:   Women   –   Head   Mapping   exercises   will   serve   to   bring   climate   risks   men,   sampling  cont’d)   1) Spatial   Hazard/Risk   (Women  –  Men)  &   these   occur?   Which  perspectives  institutional   and   social   Youth     women,   and   youth’s   particular   on   their   community,   as   Livelihoods   coping   members   mechanisms   are   triggered   in   response?   What   are   be   map   and   they   see   it.   Results   from   these   mapping   exercises   will  the   strategies  analysis     pathways  of  cause  and  effect?   2) Vulnerability   maps   (surveyed   confronted  across  focus  groups,  towards  a  more  complete   (see  pp.  109-­‐119  nd  people)   separately   by   picture  of  vulnerabilities  and  co   the   heart   ohe  nderstanding   This   specific   exercise   gets   us   t apacities  in  t f   u community.   (places  a in  Manual)   Refer   to   Household   Data   gender)   the  ways  in  which  different  members  of  the  household  are   3) Capacities  map   Questionnaire   &   Collection   specifically   affected   by   climate   related   disasters,   which   (pp.  75-­‐86  in  Manual)   Sheets   assets  they  sacrifice  in   the   cope,  and  w of   women’s   Seasonal   calendar:   past   &   Women   –   Men   –   Exercise   to   reveal   order  to  seasonality   hich  safety  nets     they  resort  to  i relative   to   present  trends   Youth     vulnerabilities  n  order  cope.  those   of   men-­‐   during   which   Final   Community   Restitution     Whole   The   final   community   meeting   at   the   at  their   the   study   (p.  92-­‐97  in  Manual)   times  of  the  year  are  climate  impacts  felt  end   of   peak?   meeting:     community   reveals   sense   o vulnerabilities,   capacities   and   gaps   that   Historical    profile   Elders  &  Youth     To   get   a  all   the   f   the   community’s   history,   cultural   identity   -­‐   V Environmental   Hazards   emerged  by  vulnerable  sub-­‐segment   n  t ut   community  and   &   alidation   of   Vulnerabilities,     and  environmental  profile.  Essential  tio  phe  data  in  context.   Capacities,  Gaps  (summary  of   (at   least   50   In   this   exercise,   we   ask   the   group:   front   of   the   entire   brings   them   to   the   surface   in   1)   General   historical   profile   data  collected),  with  breakout   community   community,   the   community;   2)   apacity   aps  &  relevant   (pp.  98-­‐105  in  Manual)   markers   of  for  final  validation  of  CHistory  Gof   hazards   in   session  with  Women   members:     vulnerability-­‐reducing/capacity-­‐building   strategies   in   community;   3)   How   have   you   coped   with   hazards  by   the   -­‐   Identification   of   relevant   Men   -­‐   Women   –   past?   community.     resilience-­‐building   Community   Organizations   Youth  –  E–   Men   –   At   the  the   focus   group   for   this   exercise,   men   and   women   Women   lders-­‐   During   end   of   this   meeting,   community   members   interventions  Social   network   Youth       identify/validate   relevant   rdifferent   groups   iand   list   the   Mapping   /   are   separated   into   two   esilience-­‐building   nterventions   -­‐   Prioritization   of   and  prioritize  these  using  the  Ranking  matrix  (refer  to  data   Analysis   (Venn   diagram)  +   institutions   and   social   networks   that   frame   their   lives   in   interventions:  capacity   of   key   Ranking   collection  sheet  7).   Following   this   initial   scoping,   the   Assessing   the   their   community.   matrix   (see   rganizations   Data   collection   Refreshments/light  main  to  be  organized  for  this  meeting.   community  O capacity   of   the   food   local   organizations   and   social   sheet  pp.   119-­‐125   and     pp.   7)     (see   networks   identified   is   assessed   (see   data   collection   sheet   In  tin  order   to  gauge  nheir  aomen  ao  anot  speaking  educe  the   128-­‐132  in  Manual)   6),   he  event   hat  you   t ote  w bility  t re   ddress  and  r up.  Break   the  community  meeting  into  two  focus  groups  to  give  space   Refer   to   data   collection   Sheet   vulnerabilities  of  women  producers.   for  women  to  express  themselves   6   A   comparison   of   the   different   diagrams   drawn   by   men   and   women   will   show   differences   in   the   way   men   and   women  perceive  the  patterns  of  relationships  within  the   community.   Direct  observation   Men   –   Women   –   This  activity  will  be  most  critical  to  the  understanding  and   (p.  71  in  manual)   Youth  -­‐  Elders     generation   of   reliable   data   on   the   particular   climate-­‐ related   vulnerabilities   that   people   face   at   the   community-­‐ level.   The   purpose   of   this   exercise   is   to   “soak”   in   the   community   and   bear   eyewitness   to   the   vulnerabilities/capacities   highlighted   by   the   women   and   other   sub-­‐communities,   following   the   anthropological   participant-­‐observant  method.       All  observations  from  this  exercise  will  be  duly  noted  every   day  and  will  serve  as  qualitative  input  to  contextualize  the   quantitative   gender-­‐disaggregated   community-­‐level   data   generated.   DAY   TWO:   Household   Data   Household   Head   This   exercise   will   serve   to   generate   data   on   how   sampling   (Women  –  Men)  &   households  and  their  assets  are  vulnerable  to  climate  risks.     Household     &   Village   members   This   exercise   also   makes   apparent     inter   vs.   intra-­‐ Vulnerability  Assessment     (surveyed   household  differences  in  access  to  resources.   (p.  107  in  Manual)   separately   by     • 130   Refer   to   Household   Data   gender)     Questionnaire   &   Collection       Sheets    

 Community  CCA-­DRR  needs  appraisal:     Then   in   each   community   we   asked:   what   are   local   needs   for   adaptation   to   rising   HMDs,   in   excess   of   local   capacity   to   cope   with   their   impacts?   How   relevant   and   adequate   are   local   and   national   plans/policies   in   place   to   meet   these   local   needs   for   adaptation?  Based  on  answers  to  these  questions,  we  reached  a  final  assessment  of   each   community’   CCA-­‐DRR   needs,   and   were   able   to   proceed   with   our   appraisal   of   the   adequacy   of   current   national   plans   and   programs   aiming   to   manage   climate   related   risks,   for   the   basic   CCA-­‐DRR   needs   identified   by   the   communities   we’ve   surveyed.     4.5 Phase  3:  Incentives  analysis     Following   part   I   which   enabled   our   selection   of   country   cases   by   policy   type,   and   part   II   that   offered   us   the   opportunity   for   an   in-­‐depth   analysis   of   the   adequacy   of   national  policies  to  meet  community  needs,  we  arrived  at  a  characterization  of  the   national  policy  in  each  of  our  country  case  studies.     In   each   of   these   countries,   what   factors   prompt   governments   to   adopt   the   climate   disaster   management   policies   and   institutions   they   did?   This   question   is   the   crux   of   the  final  part  of  our  research  plan.     Part  3  of  our  analysis  explores  the  factors  prompting/deterring  policy  change  in  the   context  of  Africa’s  governance  and  delves  into  an  incentives  analysis  of  why  a  given   policy  in  each  country  came  to  be,  and  what  factors  prompted  /  obstacles  impeded   the  adoption  of  new  socially  beneficial  institutions  and  policies  to  address  the  new   challenge  of  CC,  in  the  context  of  Africa’s  governance  incentives.     We  relied  heavily  on  expert  interviews  using  the  snowballing  interviewing  method   in   each   country   case.   We   thus   interviewed   iteratively   a   total   of   nine   informants,   various  experts  on  CCA-­‐DRR,  in  Mozambique;  seven  in  Senegal  and  five  in  Uganda.   • 131    

Each   interview   lasted   an   average   of   an   hour   and   half.   The   questionnaire   protocol   included  in  Annex  I  was  dispensed  in  person  to  each  in-­‐country  informant,  yielding   a   precious   goldmine   of   qualitative   data   on   what   prompts   governments   to   adopt   a   given  CCA-­‐DRR  policy,  and  deliver  adequate  disaster  relief/prevention,  posited  here   as  a  public  good.  Oft  times,  an  expert  was  interviewed  multiple  times,  and  called  on   to  provide  additional  insights  as  the  research  developed.       In  addition  to  expert  interviews,  an  extensive  events  analysis  was  conducted  in  each   country   case,   based   on   the   review   of   newspaper   clips   from   prominent   national   newspapers   in   order   to   enable   an   adequate   process   tracing   of   public   response   to   HMDs  between  1995-­‐2010.     In   Mozambique,   our   events   analysis   is   based   on   the   review   of   78   newspaper   clips   that  matched  our  keyword  search,  from  the  archives  of  two  of  the  country’s  major   newspapers   (Notícias   and   J.   do   Domingo),   catalogued   in   chronological   order   from   1995  to  2010.  In  Senegal,  we  consulted  95  newspaper  articles  drawn  from  three  of   the   main   national   newspapers:   Le   Soleil,   Populaire   and   Sud   Quotidien.   Finally   one   hundred   and   fifty   (150)   newspaper   clips   underpinned   our   events   analysis   in   Uganda,  drawn  mainly  from  the  Daily  Motion  and  New  Vision.     This   overall   wealth   of   data   formed   the   basis   of   our   in-­‐country   analysis,   and   enabled   us  to  conduct  our  process  tracing  of  the  circumstances,  factors  and  variables  that  led   to   institutional   change   in   CCA-­‐DRR   in   each   of   the   countries   where   such   a   change   occurred.   We   provide   more   specific   details   on   these   in   the   individual   country   chapters.            

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PART  III:  

   

    RESULTS       &       COUNTRY  FINDINGS    
                                         

   

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  CHAPTER  5:  

 

  CLIMATE-­RELATED  DISASTER  MANAGEMENT  POLICIES  ACROSS  AFRICA         5.1 Results  of  Africa-­wide  classification       Our   country   classification   by   climate-­‐related   disaster   management   policy   type   reveals   that   in   Africa:   thirty-­‐three   (33)   countries   are   ‘Unprepared   Firefighters’,   nine   (9)   are   ‘Prepared   firefighters’   and   only   six   (6)   countries   qualify   as   ‘Disaster   Averters’.  A  total  of  forty-­‐eight  (48)  African  countries  were  assessed  and  classified,   and  seven  (7)  countries  remained  unclassified  because  we  could  not  obtain  credible   data,   either   because   they   were   war-­‐torn   territories   or   countries   just   recovering   from  a  crisis.  Table  5.1,  which  presents  each  country’s  point-­‐based  score  on  each  of   our   twenty   indicators   for   national   disaster   policy,   provides   further   details   on   how   each   African   country   is   preparing   for   climate-­‐related   disasters,   and   which   countries   are  doing  more  than  others,  have  more  in  place  by  way  of  disaster  risk  management   frameworks  and  institutional  arrangements,  our  initial  research  question.      
COUNTRY   RANK   NAME   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   Mozambique   Algeria   Madagascar   South  Africa   Mauritius   Cape  Verde   Morocco   Sudan   Lesotho   Botswana   Tanzania   OVERALL  DM   POLICY  SCORE   17   16   15   14   13   12   10   9   9   8   8   FINAL  SCORE   (WEIGHED)   17   16   15   14   13   12   10   9   9   8   8       POLICY   TYPE   3   3   3   3   3   3   2   2   2   2   2  

POLICY  TYPE  NAME     Disaster  Averters   Disaster  Averters   Disaster  Averters   Disaster  Averters   Disaster  Averters   Disaster  Averters   Prepared  Firefighters   Prepared  Firefighters   Prepared  firefighters   Prepared  Firefighters   Prepared  firefighters  

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12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41  

Uganda   Namibia   Tunisia   Ethiopia   Egypt   Djibouti   Mauritania   Comores   Swaziland   Sierra  Leone   Senegal   Malawi   Liberia   Gambia   Zambia   Rwanda   Nigeria   Mali   Ghana   Côte  d'Ivoire   Cameroon   Burundi   Angola   Togo   Kenya   Guinea   DR  Congo   (Kinshasa)   Burkina  Faso   Benin   Zimbabwe  

8   7   6   6   8   7   5   5   4   4   4   4   4   4   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   2   2   2   2   2   2   1  

8   7   6   6   4  

2   2   2   2   1   1  

Prepared  Firefighters   Prepared  firefighters   Prepared  firefighters   Prepared  firefighters     Unprepared   Firefighters   (weighted)*   Unprepared   Firefighters   (weighted)*   Unprepared   Firefighters   (weighted)*   Unprepared   Firefighters   (weighted)*   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters  

4   1   4   1   4   4   4   4   4   4   4   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   2   2   2   2   2   2   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1  

Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters  

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42   43   44   45   46   47   48   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  

Somaliland   Somalia   Niger   Gabon   Chad   Congo-­‐Brazza   Central  African   Republic   Equatorial   Guinea   Eritrea   Guinea-­‐Bissau   Libya  

1   1   1   1   1   0   0          

1   1   1   1   1   0   0  

1   1   1   1   1   1   1  

Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters   Unprepared  Firefighters  

  -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐               Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data   Insufficient  data  

Sahrawi  Arab  Democratic  Republic                                          -­‐   São  Tomé  and  Príncipe   Seychelles     -­‐   -­‐  

  Table  5.1:  Final  Africa-­wide  country  ranking  by  Disaster  Management  policy  score  (weighted;  from  most   proactive  Disaster  averters  to  least  prepared  firefighters  in  Africa)  
Note:  Even  though  these  countries  have  an  overall  policy  score  of  5  or  above,  they  do  not  satisfy  key  indicators  5-­‐6  (financial   and  human  capacity  to  conduct  DM  duties);  thus  their  weighted  score  classifies  them  as  Unprepared  firefighters.        

Disaster   Averters   11%   (6  countries)  

Unclassified   13%   (7  countries)  

Unprepared   Firefighters   62%   (33  countries)   Prepared   Firefighters:   Effecgve   Disaster   Responders   14%   (9  countries)  
 

Fig.  5.1:  Distribution  of  African  countries  by  Disaster  Management  Policy  Type  

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  Fig.  5.2:  The  Patchwork  of  Disaster  Management  policies  in  Africa,  basis  of  our  country  case  selection    

    5.2 Discussion  of  Cross-­continental  Results     The   overwhelming   red   hue   of   fig.   5.2   confirms   previous   opinions   about   disaster   management  in  Africa:  the  large  majority  of  countries  are  at  the  very  lowest  rungs   on   the   spectrum   towards   effective   disaster   management.   However,   what   our   classification   lays   bare,   and   table   3   in   particular,   is   that   great   variation   exists   nonetheless  within  all  these  countries;  for  instance  the  Central  African  Republic  and   Congo—respectively  ranked  47  and  48  on  the  Africa-­‐wide  classification  of  countries,   with  an  overall  policy  score  of  0  –countries  that  do  not  have  as  much  as  a  standing   Disaster  Management  body,  can  not  be  assimilated  to  Mauritania,  Swaziland  or  the   Comores,   respectively   ranked   17,   18   and   19th   in   our   classification.   Though   all   Unprepared   Firefighters,   the   latter   three   countries   are   critically   more   advanced   in   the   establishment   of   institutional   arrangements   to   address   climate-­‐related   •   137  

disasters,  even  if  these  are  still  poorly  funded  and  staffed.  Albeit  being  all  at  the  very   lowest   levels   of   progress   towards   implementing   recommended   HFA   recommendations   for   disaster-­‐resilient   societies,   the   latter   countries   lie   at   very   different   levels   in   terms   of   their   national   commitments   and   efforts   already   endeavored   towards   DRR.   Thus   it   would   be   a   mistake   to   group   them   indiscriminately   under   one   category,   and   apply   the   same   standardized   policy   prescriptions  to  them  all.       As   fig.   5.1   further   demonstrates,   African   countries   lay   at   different   levels   on   the   spectrum   of   effective   Disaster   Risk   management,   and   great   variation   and   heterogeneity   exist   from   country   to   country.   Our   results   demonstrate   this   heterogeneity   and   reveal   where   each   country   stands   on   20   standard   criteria   revealing   progress   towards   effective   Disaster   risk   Management   (DRM)   and   implementation   of   the   goals   of   the   Hyogo   Framework   for   Action   (HFA).   Differing   baselines   ought   to   now   inform   differentiated   DRR-­‐promotion   measures   in   Africa.   Differential   progress   towards   achieving   HFA   goals   across   the   continent   begs   for   custom-­‐tailored   programs   designed   to   support   African   countries’   on   the   critical   areas/criterions  where  their  progress  is  still  slow  (see  table  5.1).     5.3 Limitations     5.3.1 Classification,  work  in  constant  progress:   The   first   limitation   of   our   Africa-­‐wide   classification   is   its   coverage   only   up   until   September   2010,   date   on   which   research   and   classification   were   completed,   often   using  data  dating  back  as  far  as  2004  as  information  sources.  Thus  our  classification   runs  the  risk  of  being  outdated,  every  time  a  country  adopts  a  new  DRM  legislation   or   revamps   its   disaster   response,   passing   from   delayed   to   effective   disaster   response.   In   this   sense,   classification   is   a   work   in   constant   motion,   and   our   classification   is   no   exception:   it   only   provides   an   adequate   depiction   of   climate-­‐

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related   disaster   management   policies   across   Africa   only   up   until   the   point   we   stopped  classifying.     In   the   short   time   window   between   the   end   of   our   classification   and   submission   of   this   manuscript   alone,   one   new   country   was   born   in   Africa,   Southern   Sudan,   driving   the  number  of  countries  to  be  assessed  on  the  continent  to  56,  and  one  additional   country  adopted  a  new  legislation  on  DRR,  Tanzania,  giving  the  country  technically   one  more  point  in  our  point-­‐based  ranking,  making  it  sit  more  comfortably  among   the   Prepared   Firefighters.   Assessment   being   intrinsically   a   revolving   exercise,   our   classification  contains  this  major  time  coverage  limitation.       Nonetheless,   our   classification   provides   an   adequate   picture   of   the   overall   distribution   and   heterogeneity   of   policies   to   address   climate-­‐related   disasters   in   Africa,  one  that  is  unlikely  to  change  drastically  over  the  next  five  years.     Furthermore  it  offers  an  innovative  qualitative  method  to  assess  progress  towards   DRR  at  the  national  and  sub-­‐national  levels,  one  that  can  be  built  upon  to  integrate   newer   developments   in   each   country,   as   well   as   extended   to   other   countries   /   regions   not   assessed,   beyond   the   scope   of   this   paper,   enabling   cross-­‐country   and   cross-­‐regional   comparisons.   Indeed,   the   sequential   spectrum   of   DRM   put   forth   in   this  paper  ensures  that  countries  with  the  slowest  progress  towards  achieving  HFA   goals  and  effectively  managing  disaster  risk  (many  of  Africa’s  countries  for  instance)   are   not   left   out   in   classification,   homogenized   under   the   label   of   ineffective   DRR   which  current  binary  DRR  paradigms  label  them  as  (see  fig.  3  for  an  example).  Our   three-­‐partite   continuum   of   Disaster   Risk   Management   effectiveness   ranging   from   the  most  unprepared  of  firefighters  (with  a  score  of  0)  to  the  most  effective  Disaster   Averter  (score  of  20)  offers  a  means  to  capture  the  full  variation  and  patchwork  of   policies   that   one   sees   at   the   national   level   and   demonstrates   comparatively   which   countries   have   very   little   in   place   by   way   of   Disaster   Risk   Management   and   which   others   have   much   more   in   place.   This   constitutes   a   much   more   cogent   way   of   analyzing  developing  countries’  national  disaster  management  policies  in  our  sense,   • 139    

enabling   cross-­‐country   and   cross-­‐regional   comparisons,   and   allowing   for   policy   recommendation   and   donor-­‐supported   strategies   that   are   better   tailored   to   the   nuance  and  texture  of  national  realities  in  disaster  management  policy     5.3.2 Note  on  confidence  levels,  data  limitations  and  shortages:       ID   Out   of   the   total   thirty-­‐five   countries   assessed,   39   Country  name   Togo     thirty-­‐one   were   classified   with   high   confidence   (4  or  more  data  credible  sources  were  used  to   generate   final   country   classification);   twelve   were  with  Medium  confidence  (3  credible  data   sources   used);   five   with   Low   confidence   (1-­‐2   credible   data   sources   used)   and   seven   countries   were   unclassified   because   no   credible   data   sources   could   be   accessed   from   country  (country  at  war,  in  crisis  or  otherwise   inaccessible).  Table  5.2  summarizes  confidence   levels  for  each  country  classified.  
Table  5.2:  Classification  confidence  levels  for  each   African  country  classified       Key:  High  confidence=4  or  more  credible  data  sources  used   as  basis  for  classification;  Medium=  2-­‐3  data  credible  sources   used;  Low=  1-­‐2  credible  data  sources  used.    
1   40   2   41   3   42   4   43   5   6   44   7   45   8   46   9   47   10   48   11   12   49   50   13   51   14   52   15   53   16   54   17   55   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   Algeria   Tunisia     Botswana   Uganda     Burkina  Faso   Zambia     Burundi   Zimbabwe   Cape  Verde   Comores  frican  Republic   Central  A Côte  d'Ivoire   Chad   Djibouti     Egypt     Ethiopia     Mauritania     Gabon     Rwanda   Gambia     Ghana     Equatorial  Guinea     Eritrea   Kenya     Guinea-­‐Bissau   Madagascar     Libya     Malawi   Western  S Mauritius  ahrawi  A.D.  Rep.   São  Tomé   Morocco     and  Príncipe   Seychelles   Namibia     Nigeria     Senegal     Sierra  Leone     Somalia     Somaliland   South  Africa     Sudan     Swaziland     Mozambique     Niger     Benin   Cameroon   Angola   Congo-­‐Brazza   DR  Congo  (Congo-­‐Kinshasa)   Guinea     Lesotho     Liberia     Mali     Tanzania    

Classification   Medium   Confidence  level   High   Medium   High   Medium   High   Medium   High   Medium   High   Low   High   High   Low   High   Low  

High   Low   High   Low   High   No  Data   High   No  D High  ata   No  D High  ata   No  D High  ata   No  D High  ata   No  D High  ata   No  D High  ata   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   High   Medium   Medium   Medium   Medium   Medium   Medium   Medium   Medium  

Though   relatively   numerous,   the   countries   classified   with   high-­‐to-­‐medium   confidence   (a   total   of   43)   are   the   only   African   countries   we   can   venture   to   make   inferences   about;   the   remaining   12   need   further   research   and   data   mining   on   to   be   able   to   yield   conclusive   insights   about   their   national   disaster   management  policies.   •  

27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   38  

140  

A  further  limitation  in  the  interpretation  of  our  results  is  the  reliance  on  HFA  mid-­‐ term   national   progress   reports   and   VFL   national   reports   to   generate   insights   for   indicators   11-­‐20   (indicators   of   DRR   measures);   for   lack   of   other   data   sources,   we   resorted   to   the   HFA   (self-­‐assessments)   and   VFL   (bottom-­‐up   assessments).   This   unfortunately  replicated  the  methodological  flaws  decried  about  these  two  reports,   namely   that   they   reflect   the   reporting   biases   of   the   government   officials   who   responded   to   the   self-­‐assessment   reports   on   the   one   hand   (HFA)   and   those   of   national   organizations   delegated   to   conduct   survey   work   on   the   other   (VFL).   In   addition,  bottom-­‐up  perspectives  were  only  gathered  for  nine  countries  evaluated  in   Africa   (VFL).   We   attempted   to   circumvent   duplicating   these   two   reports’   flaws   as   much   as   possible   however   by   confronting   them   against   each   other   to   generate   a   balanced  account  of  countries’  progress  towards  implementing  DRR  measures  and   triangulating   their   respective   data,   as   well   as   supplementing   them   with   as   many   other  qualitative  assessments  and  informants’  views  as  possible.     Data  access  remains  a  major  challenge  for  studies  about  Africa,  and  the  qualitative   assessment   we   have   here   presented   shows   a   way   forward   to   generate   new   meaningful  insights  and  methodological  frameworks  for  the  continent  by  accessing   key   informants   (eg:   Red   Cross   disaster   managers,   civil   society   representatives   following   closely   the   evolution   of   disaster   management   policies   in   their   countries,   etc.),  and  confronting  their  different  accounts  of  the  national  public  policy  in  place  in   their  countries  with  public  documents  and  declarations.     Finally,   a   note   on   our   chosen   indicators   and   their   respective   weighting   in   the   classification  process  of  African  countries  is  called  for.  It  is  important  to  recall  that   our   twenty   indicators   were   chosen   in   accordance   with   our   storyline   of   what   constitutes   effective   disaster   management   in   Africa   and   worldwide,   a   storyline   compatible  with  the  major  DRR  frameworks  and  initiatives  currently  subscribed  to   by  African  countries,  most  notably  the  Hyogo  Framework  for  Action,  and  the  World   Meteorological   Organization   recommendations.   When   analyzing   African   countries,   converting   this   horizontal   framework   to   the   form   of   a   continuum   was   important   • 141    

however  to  be  able  to  capture  the  variation  existing  among  Africa’s  countries,  often   all   uniformly   classified   as   low   progress   countries   towards   implementing   Hyogo   recommendations,  offering  no  way  to  rate  African  countries  against  each  other.     By   defining   a   spectrum   with   a   baseline   as   not   ineffective   DRR,   but   rather   the   lowest   progressing   African   countries   so   that   it   could   be   accounted   for   in   our   appraisal   (countries   whose   score   is   0),   we   enable   a   cross-­‐country   comparison   of   Africa’s   disaster  management  policies.  One  needs  to  be  cautious  however  when  interpreting   our  results  to  not  mistake  Mozambique  (with  a  score  of  17)  as  a  perfect  instance  of   effective   DRR.   Indeed,   Mozambique   is   a   high-­‐performer,   compared   to   Equatorial   Guinea   for   instance.   However   Mozambique   still   pales   in   comparison   to   other   countries  not  on  the  continent  that  may  have  attained  a  perfect  score  of  20  on  our   spectrum  of  effective  DRM,  and  have  higher  levels  of  DRM  achievement.     Based   on   this   rigorous   cross-­‐continental   identification   of   disaster   management   policies  in  Africa,  and  country  classification  by  national  disaster  management  type,   we  selected  three  country  cases  to  underpin  our  institutional  comparative  analysis:   Senegal,  to  represent  the  ‘Unprepared  firefighter’  policy  group,  Uganda  to  infer  for   the   ‘Prepared   firefighter’   country   group,   and   finally   Mozambique   to   better   understand  the  characteristics  of  the  accomplished  ‘Disaster  averters’  policy  group.    

                             

Fig.  5.3:  Selected  country  cases  where  fieldwork  was  conducted  between  September  2010  – October  2011  

 

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We   now   turn   to   the   findings   from   these   three   country   cases   to   understand   what   factors  spurred  them  to  adopt  the  policies  and  institutions  that  they  did  to  address   rising  climate  risks  in  their  countries.                                    

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  CHAPTER  6     SENEGAL  COUNTRY  CHAPTER:   What  thwarts  Institutional  Change  for  effective  CCA-­DRR  in  Senegal?       Senegal  was  selected  to  represent  the  group  of  ‘Unprepared  firefighters’,  ineffective   responders   to   hydro-­‐meteorological   disasters.   Does   the   country   in   fact   merit   this   classification?   If   so,   what   systemic   factors   render   the   country   an   ‘Unprepared   Firefighter’,  and  thwart  its  engagement  in  the  path  of  resolute  institutional  change   to   tackle   the   rising   impacts   of   a   changing   climate?   The   present   chapter   elicits   answers  to  these  questions.         6.1  Country  Profile     As   mentioned   earlier,   the   Constitution   of   Senegal   sanctifies   the   State’s   primal   responsibility   to   ensure   security,   well-­‐being   and   integrity   of   all   of   its   citizens   in   peace  time  and  in  time  of  crisis.  The  Law  n°64  -­‐53  of  10  July  1964,  promulgated  a   mere   four   years   after   the   country’s   Independence,   further   confirms   our   interpretation.   Enacting   the   general   organization   of   civil   protection   in   Senegal,   the   1964   Law   states   that:   “At   all   times   the   State   must   look   after   the   protection   of   goods   and  physical  persons  and  resources  of  the  country”174.     Both  these  texts  make  it  a  constitutional  responsibility  of  the  State  to  provide  relief   to  victims  in  times  of  national  disasters,  or  otherwise  pro-­‐actively  address  disasters,   and   posit   disaster   management   as   a   public   good   to   be   delivered   to   all   citizens,   regardless  of  their  sex,  origin  or  birth  place.                                                                                                                    
174  Constitution  of  Senegal,  2001  

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Yet  in  practice,  it  is  noticeable  that  the  Government  of  Senegal  (GoS)  has  shirked  this   responsibility.   Over   the   past   30   years   (1980   to   2009),   flooding,   the   main   climate   hazard,  has  affected  over  900,000  people  in  Senegal,  caused  the  death  of  45  people   and  caused  damage  estimated  at  over  USD  142  million.  In  the  suburbs  of  Dakar  most   particularly,  flooding  has  become  almost  an  omnipresent  reality  since  2005,  directly   affecting   the   poor175.   During   these   times   however,   when   thousands   of   people   are   impacted   both   in   rural   and   urban   areas,   live   in   flooded   homes   knee-­‐deep   in   green   stagnant   waters,   and   recourse   from   the   State   is   needed   most,   it   has   been   noticed   between   1995-­‐2010   that   the   GoS   has   not   been,   by   and   large,   the   guarantor   of   rights   to  security,  protection  and  physical  integrity.    On  the  contrary,  during  these  times  of   crises  when  the  State  is  most  needed  are  when  the  State  has  been  least  visible  on  the   ground.   Instead,   donors   and   NGOs   took   the   lead   in   relief   operations,  and   the   State   found   scapegoats   to   attempt   to   shirk   its   constitutional   responsibility   in   times   of   crises,  until  this  responsibility  could  no  longer  be  evaded  in  2009.       This   chapter   offers   a   tale   of   how   politics,   popular   pressure   and   public   goods   control   are   intertwined   in   time   of   climate   crisis   to   force   the   State   to   deliver   on   its   responsibilities.  This  tale  offers  mostly  insights  on  what  systemic  factors  explain  the   inability  of  the  State  of  Senegal,  typical  in  many  ways  of  many  in  sub-­‐Saharan  Africa,   to  handle  complex  climate  crisis  situations,  and  what  enabling  factors  can  contribute   to  undo  the  situation.  What  conditions  the  government’s  inability  to  handle  climate-­‐ related   shocks?   Is   it   merely   lack   of   resources   as   is   often   purported,   or   does   it   go   beyond?   What   are   the   systemic   obstacles   thwarting   the   efficient   handling   of   climate   shocks,  and  provision  of  needed  relief  to  vulnerable  groups  during  climate  crises?       These  are  the  questions  we  address  in  this  chapter.  We  aim  to  find  what  plans  are  in   place   to   address   HMDs,   before   turning   to   how   the   GoS   has   handled   each   climate   shock   between   1995-­‐2010.   We   rest   our   analysis   on   two   main   case   studies:   floods   in   the  cities  of  Dakar  and  Saint  Louis  where  the  GoS  has  clustered  its  few  interventions                                                                                                                   175  World  Bank/Government  of  Senegal,  Rapport  d’Evaluation  des  Besoins  Post-­Catastrophe  Inondations  
Urbaines  à  Dakar  2009  (Dakar:  World  Bank,  2010)  

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in   response   to   climate-­‐related   shocks.   Following   our   description   and   analysis   of   the   State’s   flood   response   interventions,   we   will   attempt   to   understand   the   systemic   reasons  for  the  Senegalese  government’s  inability  to  handle  climate-­‐related  shocks.   What  can  be  done  to  unlock  government  ability  to  properly  take  account  of  climate   risks  before  they  turn  into  full-­‐blown  crises?       First,  however,  we  delve  into  Senegal’s  specific  vulnerability  to  climate  shocks;  and   why  climate  crises  became  a  rising  issue  on  the  national  agenda  in  the  past  decade.     6.1.1 Vulnerability  Context     The   westernmost   country   in   Africa,   situated   on   the   Western   tip   of   the   continent   between   12.5°   and   16.5°   north   latitude,   Senegal   is   bordered   by   the   Islamic   Republic   of  Mauritania  in  the  North,  by  Mali  to  the  East,  by  Guinea  Bissau  and  the  Republic  of   Guinea   to   the   South,   and   by   the   North   Atlantic   Ocean   to   the   West.   The   country   covers   a   total   area   of   196,712   km2,   with   the   Gambia   forming   an   enclave   within   Senegal  on  the  lower  river  of  the  same  name.  

 
Figure  1:  Senegal  and  its  regions.  Source:  Official  website  of  the  Government  of  Senegal176.  

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176  Saint-­‐Louis  region  was  halved  in  2002,  to  create  Matam,  Senegal’s  youngest  region  as  of  2002.    Other  

reconfigurations  followed,  bringing  the  total  number  of  regions  to  14  as  of  2012.    

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 Development  challenges:  past  &  present   A   country   of   12.8   million   inhabitants   classified   as   lower   middle   income,   Senegal   has   a  GDP/capita  of  a  little  over  1,000  USD  and  an  annual  GDP  growth  rate  of  4,1%177.   Formerly  one  of  the  prosperous  countries  in  West  Africa  between  1990  and  2005, Senegal  has  been  experiencing  an  economic  downturn  since  2006178.     Senegal  remains  a  poor  country  with  more  than  half  of  its  population  (54%)  living   below  the  poverty  line.  It  lies  in  the  lower  rungs  of  the  human  development  ladder,   classified   155th   out   of   187   countries   ranked   by   the   United   Nations   Development   Program   Human   Development   Index   ranking179.   High   unemployment   (48%   of   the   labor  force),  most  acute  among  the  country’s  predominantly  young  population  (58%   of  population  is  below  20  years  of  age)  continues  to  prompt  illegal  migrants  to  flee   Senegal   in   search   of   better   job   opportunities   in   Europe.   Poverty   is   most   predominant   in   the   rural   areas,   where   65%   of   the   country’s   poor   live,   while   making   up  less  than  55%  of  the  total  population.       Country  size  (km2)  :   Population  (million):   Population  growth  (%):   GDP  (billions,  current  US$):   GDP  per  capita  (current  US$):   GDP  growth  (annual  %):   Income  share  held  by  lowest  20%:     (2005  estimate)   Births  attended  by  skilled  health  staff  (%  of  total)   (2005  estimate)   Life  expectancy  at  birth,  total  (years)   Mortality  rate,  under-­‐5  (per  1,000)   HIV  prevalence  rate  (2009  estimate)   Literacy  rate,  youth  female  (%  of  females  ages  15-­‐24)   Primary  completion  rate,  total  (%  of  relevant  age  group)                                                                                                                   196,700   12.8   2.6   12.9     1,040     4.2     6.2   52     59   75   1   56   57  

177  National  Statistics  and  Demography  Agency  Senegal,  accessed  March  25,  2011.  http://www.ansd.sn/   178  World  Bank,  “Senegal  Country  Brief”,  accessed  December  01,  2011.    http://go.worldbank.org/PO6JPCB5P0   179  The  United  Nations  Development  Program  Human  Development  Index  (HDI)  is  a  composite  index  measuring  

life  expectancy  at  birth,  adult  literacy  rate,  poverty,  gender  inequality,  sustainability  (impacts  of  natural   disasters  and  carbon  emissions  per  capita)  and  gross  domestic  product  per  capita,  to  provide  a  measure  of   countries’  human  development  levels.  

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Mobile  cellular  subscriptions  (per  100  people)   Agricultural  land  (%  of  land  area)  (2008  estimate)   Agriculture,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   Industry,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   Services,  etc.,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   Exports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)   Imports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)  

67   47.5   17   22   62   24   44  

  Table   6.1:   Senegal’s   Development   at   a   Glance.     Sources:   World   Bank   World   Development   Indicators   and   Senegal   National   Statistics   and   Demography   Agency   (2010   estimates,   unless   otherwise  noted)  

 A  country  with  uneven  development   The  Senegalese  economy  is  based  primarily  on  trade  and  services  (for  62%  of  GDP),   and   to   a   limited   extent   on   Industry   (22%   of   GDP),   while   the   primary   sector   (agriculture)   –dominated   by   groundnut   production,   cash   crop   introduced   under   French  colonization  –  contributes  only  17%  to  GDP  but  employs  the  largest  share  of   the  population  (77.5%).       Following  the  devaluation  of  the  CFA  franc  in  January  1994,  Senegal  grew  rapidly  by   2.5%   followed   by   a   sustained   annual   GDP   growth   of   over   5%   between   1995   and   2001.  In  2002,  Senegal's  economy  was  marked  by  a  sharp  contraction  of  business,   with   GDP   growth   dipping   down   to   1.1%.   This   was   mainly   due   to   difficulties   faced   in   the   agricultural   sector.   The   country   resumed   with   growth   in   2003   with   a   rate   of   6.3%,   due   to   improvements   in   the   agricultural   sector.   Dependence   on   petroleum   imports   for   energy   production   and   recurrent   power   cuts   since   2005   constrain,   however,  economic  performance  and  foreign  investment.  This  also  drives  Senegal's   trade  balance  in  deficit,  including  foreign  trade,  in  large  part  owing  to  the  import  of   oil  (petroleum),  food  and  beverages  (notably,  rice,  its  staple  food)  and  capital  goods.       The   debt   burden   is   also   a   major   handicap,   leading   to   reduced   capacity   for   redistribution   of   state   revenue   and   slowing   the   development   of   social   infrastructure.   The   external   public   debt   service   as   a   percentage   of   state   revenue,   increased   from   16.2%   in   2000   to   17.6%   in   2002.   Since   June   2000,   Senegal   has   been   •   148  

eligible   for   IMF’s   Highly   Indebted   Poor   Countries   initiative   (HIPC)   debt   relief   program,   which   wiped   out   two-­‐thirds   of   its   bilateral,   multilateral   and   private   sector   debt180.   However,   with   the   energy   sector   heavily   dominated   by   imports   of   petroleum  products  (oil  bill  doubled  since  2000,  nearing  861  million  USD  in  2005),   the  debt  cancellation  has  had  only  a  modest  effect  on  social  development.       As  for  domestic  energy  consumption,  Senegalese  households  mainly  use  wood  and   charcoal   (56%   of   total   energy   use),   to   the   detriment   of   timber   resources   that   are   becoming   increasingly   depleted   by   climatic   and   demographic   pressures.   Senegal’s   deforestation   rate   is   estimated   to   be   of   45,000   hectares   per   year181.   Senegal’s   predominantly   rural   population   –   more   than   three-­‐quarters   of   the   workforce   are   farmers   –   is   indeed   heavily   dependent   on   natural   resources.   The   demographic   pressure  on  these  resources,  correlated  with  a  worsening  climate,  creates  shortages   and   resource   degradation,   which   exacerbate   pauperization   and   render   resource-­‐ dependent   populations   more   vulnerable,   especially   in   rural   areas,   where   they   face   the  negative  impacts  of  a  changing  climate182.     6.1.2 Vulnerability  To  Climate  Change  and  Variability       6.2.2.1 Physical  vulnerability    

The   variety   of   bio-­‐climatic   conditions   and   diversity   of   geological   substrata   in   Senegal,  from  the  semi-­‐desert  of  the  Northern  regions  bordering  the  Sahara,  to  the   lush   green   forests   of   Southern   Casamance,   including   a   700-­‐km   long   sea   interface   with  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  have  endowed  Senegal  with  several  soil  types  with  unequal   ecologic  usefulness  –from  the  dry,  sandy  soils  of  the  Sahel  to  the  Sudanian  laterites  

                                                                                                               
180  NAPA  Senegal,  2006   182  NAPA  Senegal,  2006   181  FAO,  Statistic  Yearbook  2009  

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of   the   Casamance.   Overall,   the   soils   are   infertile   and   often   fragile,   susceptible   to   wind  and  water  erosion183.     Senegal’s   climate   is   generally   Sudano-­‐Sahelian,   characterized   by   the   alternation   of   a   dry   season   typically   from   November   to   May,   and   a   rainy   season   from   June   to   October.  Average  annual  rainfall  follows  an  increasing  gradient  from  North  to  South,   going  from  300  mm  in  the  semi-­‐desert  of  the  North  to  1200  mm  in  the  South,  with   strong  inter-­‐annual  variations.       Senegal’s  climate  is  subject  however  to  both  geographic  and  atmospheric  influences.   Indeed,   the   presence   of   a   coastline   of   700   kilometers   leads   to   climatic   differences   between   coastal   and   interior   regions.   Also,   atmospheric   circulation,   facilitated   by   the  absence  of  mountainous  obstacles  mountainous,  places  the  territory  under  the   effects   of   maritime   trade   winds,   the   Harmattan   blowing   from   the   Sahara   and   the   West  African  monsoon184.       Three   main   rivers   flow   through   the   country:   the   Senegal,   Gambia   and   Casamançe,   which   all   originate   in   the   Fouta   Jallon   mounts   of   Guinea.   Generally   replete   with   water   throughout   the   year,   the   rivers   still   suffer   the   effects   of   the   dry   season.   The   construction  of  major  dams,  Diama  in  particular,  built  to  develop  irrigation,  animal   husbandry   and   economic   activities   along   River   Senegal,   and   which   Senegal   shares   with  Mali  and  Mauritania,  has  impacted  river  flows  and  water  availability.     Finally,  the  country  is  highly  vulnerable  to  Sea-­Level  Rise.  Indeed  with  a  700-­ km   long   coastal   area   at   risk,   as   well   as   83%   of   Senegal's   total   population   of   12.8   million   and   economic   activities   clustered   within   100k   of   the   coastline,   even   slight   increases   in   sea   level   can   have   devastating  effects   on   the   country.   Figure   6.2   depicts   coastal  areas  at  risk  from  a  1m  rise  in  sea-­‐level  rise.                                                                                                                    
183  Ibidem   184  African  Monsoon  Multidisciplinary  Analyses  (AMMA),  2007  

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Figure  6.2:  Vulnerability  of  Senegal’s  coastline.  Areas  of  heightened  vulnerability  to  sea-­level   rise  are  hatched  in  green,  areas  of  acute  vulnerability  in  Red.  Source:  Niang-­Diop,  1994.  

  As   the   following   section   demonstrates,   Climate   Change   is   projected   to   impact   water   availability  and  exposure  to  sea  level  rise  even  further.   6.2.2.2 Projected  CC  Impacts,  Across  Timescales  and  Sectors    

Senegal’s   National   Adaptation   Plan   of   Action   offers   the   most   up-­‐to-­‐date   characterization   of   projected   impacts   of   Climate   Change   and   variability   on   the   country   (NAPA   Senegal,   2006).     Projected   climate   change   impacts   for   Senegal   consist  mainly  of:     Table  6.2  further  details  each  area  of  vulnerability.   A  rise  in  sea  level,     Decreasing  rainfall,     Increased  variability  in  rainfall,     Exacerbated  evapo-­‐transpiration,     And  a  rise  in  temperatures  (warming  trend).  

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Fig.  6.3:  Observed  changes  in  Senegal’s  average  Temperature,  1950-­2005.  Source:  NAPA,  2006  

                   
Fig  6.4:  Water  resources  availability:  Observed  changes  in  Senegal  River  discharge  levels  as   measured  upstream  (in  Bakel)  and  downstream  (in  Kolda),  1960-­2005.  Source:  NAPA,  2006.                                      Sector  at  Risk   Variable  

Water  resources   &  security  
 Access  to  clean   drinking  water   remains  major   hardship,  mostly   for  rural   households.    Only  56%  of  rural   and  78%  of  urban   households  have   access  to  clean   drinking  water    Depleted   groundwater  table   in  many  areas   across  country,   mostly  in  arid  

Agriculture  &   Food  Security  

Coastal  Zones    (Sea-­level  rise)  

Sector   Vulnerability  

 High  dependance  of    83%  of  population   on  rain-­‐fed   clustered  within  100km  of   agriculture     country’s  700-­‐km  long    Limited  irrigation   coastline   infrastructure    Concentration  of   economic  activities  in   coastal  areas    Fisheries,  coastal   infrastructure  and  tourist   industry  particularly   sensitive  to  coastal  risk    45th  amongst  countries   most  vulnerable  to  sea-­‐ level  rise  (SLR),  out  of  181   contries  examined   (Misdorp  et  al.,  1990)  

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North  and  Center.  

Observed  changes  

 Consistent  rise  in   temperature   between  1950  –   2005,  from  26.5°C   to  28.5°C  (fig.  6.3)    Consistent   decrease  in  river   Senegal  discharge   levels  between   1960  -­‐2005  (fig.   6.4)      Rise  in  average   temperature  by  2   to  4°C  between   2050  et  2100    Decrease  in  mean   annual  rainfall  by   5  to  25%,  with     most  dramatic   drying  projected  in   the  South  ;  up  to   58%  decrease  in   mean  annual   rainfall  by  2100   (Parton  et  al.  2004)      -­‐17%  decrease  in   rainfall  associated   with  a  +2.5°   increase  in   temperature    Significant   reduction  in  river   flows  and   aquifer  levels,  by  5-­‐ 10m  in  the  North   and  15-­‐20m  in  the   South    Significant   reduction  in  water   availability  &   security.    Rational   management  of   water  resources    Infrastructure  for   water  retention   (water  harvesting,     recharge  areas  of  

Projection  

 35%  decrease  in   rainfall  quantity,   reduction  of  rainy   season  length   between  1950-­‐65   and  1970-­‐95      30%  reduction  in   plant  species    Rapid  loss  in  soil   organic  content    Low  regeneration   capacity  of  forests    Decrease  in   agricultural  yields,   leading  to   hightened  food   insecurity    Loss  of  agricultural   land    Loss  of  cloud  cover   by  5  to  10%,  with   concommitent  rise   in  evapo-­‐ transpiration      

 Fishing,  one  of  country’s   main  exports,  at  risk  from   ocean  temperature   changes    Currently  observed  rate  of   change  :  1-­‐2m  annual   withdrawal  of  shoreline   along  sandy  beaches    In  the  case  of  the  Lagoba   breach  in  the  Sangomar   Arrow  (Saloum  region),   rate  of  degradation  has   been  even  more  dramatic  :   100-­‐150m  per  year.    

Proposed   adaptation   strategies  

 A  minimum  21  to  48  cm   rise  in  sea  level  by  2100   (note:  global  modeling  of   coastal  zones  project  a  1m   rise),  Continued   withdrawal  of  shoreline      Destruction  of  seaside   infrastructure  /  homes    Exacerbation  of  Sea  – water  inundation,  coastal   erosion,  soil  salinisation,   mangrove  loss,  reduction   in  fish  resources      Main  coastal  zones  to  be   affected:  Saint-­‐Louis,   Bargny-­‐Mbao  sector,  Small   Coast  between  Ndangane   and  Djifer.    Increase  in  swells  (high   waves)  heights,  with   potential  to  lead  to   acceleration  of  rate  of   breaching  of  coastline   arrows  and  further   shoreline  withdrawal    Warming  of  ocean  waters,   associated  changes  in   marine  specie  composition    Changed  structure  of     upwellings,  impacts  on   fishing     Urgent  need  to  de-­‐ •    For  1m  SLR:  1,350  km  of   link  agriculture  and   coast  will  need  to  be   rainfall,  through:   protected  for  a  total  cost  of    Irrigation;  Storage   1,596  millions  USD     infrastructure  for   •  For  6m  SLR:  7,450  km2  of   rainwater/collection   land  area  and  approx.  3.7    Diffusion  of  agro-­‐ million  people  at  risk,  for  a  

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aquifers)    Protection  of   available  reserves,   through  pollution   controls,   sewer  system  for   houses,  monitored   extraction     of  groundwater  

Medium.   Low,  no  consistent   Agreement  over   assessment  of  most  likely   increase  in   scenario  of  climate  risk  in   temperature,   Senegal     decrease  in  rainfall   and  increased   rainfall  variability.   However,  envelope   of  uncertainty   remains  to  be   determined.   Table  6.2:  Climate  Change  impacts  in  Senegal:  Observed  and  Projected.  Sources:  NAPA,  2006;   UNDP,  2007  (unless  otherwise  noted).  

Confidence  level  

forestry  techniques    Crop  diversification   Also  :    Short  cycle/  Saline   tolerant  crops    Forest  fire  controls      Reasonable   fertilizer  use    Functional  early   warning  systems      Training  on  CC   Low,  no  consistent   assessment  of  most   likely  scenario  of   climate  risk  in   Senegal    

total  cost  of  protection  of   3,623  millions  USD  (1.72%   of  current  GDP).   •  Halt  to  beach  sand   extraction  and  enforcement   of  law    against  this  practice.  

 

 

Photo  6.1:  Fallen  protective  sea  wall  along  the   shoreline  of  Rufisque,  Senegal’s  Small  coast.   Rufisque’s  coastal  dwellers  have  already  begun  to   suffer  from  advancing  sea  levels  and  sea  water   inundation  into  their  homes.     Source:  Rufisque  News.  

    6.2.2.3 Socio-­Economic  Vulnerability  To  Climate  Variability  and  Change  

Senegal   is   a   country   where   climate   variability   on   the   seasonal-­‐to-­‐interannual   timescale   constitutes   a   practical   problem   with   monumental   humanitarian   ramifications.   With   77.5%,   more   than   three-­‐quarters,   of   the   country’s   active   •   154  

population  working  in  the  agricultural  sector185,  a  sector  that  is  still  highly  climate-­‐ sensitive   and   dependent   on   rainfall,   vulnerability   of   agricultural   production   and   livelihoods   to   rainfall   changes   is   endemic.   Indeed   only   2   percent   of   the   total   cultivated  land  in  Senegal  is  irrigated  or  under  some  form  of  water  management,  the   remaining  98%  being  exclusively  rain-­‐fed186.     A   growing   majority   of   the   Senegalese   population   also   lives   in   unplanned   shantytowns   built   on   flood   plains   outside   of   the   country’s   major   cities   and   coastal   areas.  These  shanty  towns  were  settled  during  the  prolonged  drought  period  of  the   early   1970s   to   the   late   1980s   (see   Dai   et   al.   2004187   and   Hulme   2001188),   that   drove   peasants   out   of   the   countryside   and   into   peri-­‐urban   settlements   that   were   not   designed   to   welcome   them   (no   existing   drainage   systems,   no   planned   infrastructure),   in   fact   flood   plains   and   water   passages   that   had   dried   up   during   the   prolonged  drought.  During  the  two  decades  that  the  drought  lasted,  waves  of  rural   migrants   settled   these   flood   plains   at   the   periphery   of   Dakar   and   Saint-­‐Louis,   obstructing   natural   water   passageways   that   were   soon   to   claim   their   right   of   way   with  the  return  of  the  rains  in  the  mid-­‐1990s.  In  these  shantytowns,  they  are  today   exposed   to   the   vagaries   of   changing   rainfall   regimes   (see   Pelling   and   Wisner   2009189;   Diagne   2007190).   With   the   return   of   heavier   rains   in   the   late   1990s   and   2000s191,  the   vulnerability   of   these  rural  migrants  to  urban  flooding  has  become  a   serious  problem.   Against   such   high   vulnerability   (high   dependence   on   and   exposure   to   climate   factors)   and   limited   capacity   to   cope   with   climate   shocks   (poverty   and   low   adaptive                                                                                                                  
185  FAO,  Statistical  Yearbook  2009   186  Ibidem   187  Dai,  A.,  P.  J.  Lamb,  K.  E.  Trenberth,  M.  Hulme,  P.  D.  Jones  and  P.  Xie,  “The  Recent  Sahel  drought  is  Real”,  Int.  J.  

Climatol.  24  (2004):  1323–1331  
188   Hulme,   M.,   “Climatic   perspectives   on   Sahelian   desiccation:   1973–1998”,   Global   Environmental   Change   11   1   189  Pelling,  Mark  and  Ben  Wisner:  Disaster  Risk  Reduction:  cases  from  Urban  Africa.  London:  Earthscan,  2009  

(2001):  19-­‐29.  

190

 Diagne,  K.,  “Governance  and  Natural  Disasters:  addressing  floods  in  Saint  Louis,  Senegal”,  Environment  and  

Urbanization,  19  2  (2009):  552-­‐562   191  Giannini  et  al.,  “A  Climate  Model-­‐Based  Review  of  Drought  In  The  Sahel:  Desertification,  The  Re-­‐Greening  And   Climate  Change”  

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capacity),   when   a   climate   hazard   strikes   in   Senegal,   a   disaster   of   significant   proportions   often   results,   ones   that   further   exacerbates   the   poverty   of   vulnerable   populations  in  both  rural  areas  and  urban  centers.   The  effects  of  climate-­‐related  disasters  are  most  manifest  when  it  comes  to  floods.   Highly   convective   clouds   more   frequent   since   the   mid-­‐1990s   passing   over   the   country   have   led   to   flood   disasters   that   have,   in   rural   areas,   destroyed   harvests   and   deprived   agriculture-­‐dependent   families   of   needed   income,   sending   many   into   immigration;   and   in   urban   centers,   compelled   the   urban   poor   living   in   the   ill-­‐ planned   shanty   towns   at   the   periphery   Dakar   and   Saint-­‐Louis   to   live   in   flooded   homes,  exposed  to  stagnant  waters  and  the  diseases  they  bear.    

Fig.  6.5:  The  return  of  heavier  rains  in  Senegal  since  the  mid-­1990s.  Source:  NAPA,  2006  

The   opposite   also   holds,   with   equally   disastrous   impacts:   dry   spells   (consecutive   days   of   rainfall   deficit)   have   generated   impacts   that   are   as   detrimental   as   those   of   wet   spells   –the   1970s-­‐80s   drought   in   the   Sahel   serving   as   an   eloquent   illustration   with   its   host   of   famines,   rural   exodus,   cattle   deaths,   food   price   speculations   and   shortages  it  carted  along192.        

                                                                                                               

192  Though  we  make  the  distinction  here  that  it  is  not  the  dry  spells  themselves  that  led  to  famines;  rather  it  is  

the  other  conditions  of  vulnerability  inherent  to  the  society  in  which  they  occur  (e.g.:  social  inequalities  in  food   distribution,  poor  protective  mechanisms,  propensity  for  food  speculation,  etc.)  that,  when  compounded  with   rainfall  deficits,  generate  famines.  Sen,  Amartya.  Poverty  as  Deprivation,  1999.  

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In  Senegal,  and  across  the  region,  rainfall  variability  and  changing  climate  patterns   affect   at   once   large   sections   of   society   dependent   on   climate   factors   for   their   livelihoods,  food,  health  and  well-­‐being.   6.2  HMDs  in  Senegal  and  Government  Response:  1995-­2010       6.2.1 Main  climate  hazards  in  Senegal  and  impacts     Major   climate-­‐related   disasters   and   calamitous   events   have   struck   Senegal   between   1995   and   2010.   1995   marks   the   return   of   heavier   rainfall   in   the   country   (see   fig.   6.5),  and  has  been  chosen  as  the  inception  point  of  our  analysis  in  order  to  assess   the   adequacy   of   Government’s   responses   to   rising   climate-­‐related   shocks.   For   the   purposes   of   this   analysis,   the   impacts   of   the   preceding   period   of   drought   (1970-­‐ 1990)  are  not  taken  into  account.     Noteworthy  climate  shocks  have  included:    River  Senegal  flooding  in  Saint-­‐Louis  in  1994,  caused  by  above-­‐normal  rains   and  the  rise  of  River  Senegal  out  of  its,  leading  to  the  inundation  of  its  flood   plain  where  the  city  of  Saint-­‐Louis  is  settled,  and  generating  severe  damages   in  the  city,  which  was  unprepared  for  them;    Storm   Cindy   in   1999   in   Casamance   (South   region)   and   Joal   (Thies   region),   which   caused   the   death   of   99   fishermen,   10   disappearances,   and   considerable  material  losses  (Civil  Protection  Department,  2007);    Out  of  season  rains  in  January  2002  in  the  regions  of  Saint-­‐Louis  and  Louga   that  claimed  30  lives,  caused  significant  material  losses,  including  hundreds   of  collapsed  homes,  destruction  of  harvests  and  important  cattle  loss;    Acridian  (locust)  invasions  between  1998  and  2004  that  destroyed  hectares   of   cultivated   land   and   caused   significant   damages   to   production   in   seven   regions  of  the  country;    Recurrent   flash   floods   that   affect   annually   multiple   locations   across   the   country,   with   important   impacts   on   populations   and   goods,   and   in   some   •   157  

instances  human  life  loss.  These  floods  are  mostly  an  urban  problem,  caused   by   human   settlement   in   depression   areas   that   used   to   be   riverbeds   before   the   thirty-­‐year   drought,   and   which   nature   claimed   back   since   the   return   of   the   rains   in   the   mid-­‐1990s.   Flood   impacts   are   unfortunately   very   poorly   assessed.   The   best   assessment   of   flash   flood   impacts   to   date   is   the   World   Bank-­‐led   Government   report   that   quantifies   in   CFA   francs   and   US   dollars   the   impacts  of  the  2009  floods  on  the  country’s  economic  sectors  (see  table  6.3).    

 
Table  6.3:  Estimate  of  losses  during  2009  Floods  in  Senegal:  Impacts  of  disaster  nation-­wide   by  sector  (in  CFA  francs  and  USD).  Source:  World  Bank/Government  of  Senegal,  2010  

  However  even  this  report  under-­‐estimates  the  real  consequences  of  the  2009  flood   on   the   finances   of   local   community   groups.   “Flooding   had   a   limited   negative   macroeconomic   impact”   the   report   notes,   “the   reduction   in   economic   growth   in   2009  resulting  from  the  flooding  is  estimated  at  only  0.07  %,  reducing  the  economic   growth   forecast   to   1.4   %   compared   with   1.47   %   before   the   floods.   Damages   represent   only   0.4   %   of   2008   GDP,   and   losses   represent   0.3   %.   In   addition,   the   flooding  did  not  change  the  fiscal  position  of  central  government  because  it  had  no   •   158  

impact   on   government   finance   in   2009.   However,   the   impact   was   felt   more   strongly   by  local  community  groups,  whose  losses  represented  over  10  percent  of  the  2009   provisional  budget”193 .     The  report  goes  on  to  explain:  “flooding  had  a  considerable  impact  on  households.   Surveys  conducted  in  these  areas  show  that  the  affected  households  have  lived  in  a   more   precarious   situation   after   the   flooding.   During   the   2008   floods,   which   were   less   extensive   than   those   of   2009,   27%   of   flooded   households   in   Pikine   and   Guédiawaye   suffered   food   insecurity.   In   2009,   total   revenue   lost   by   the   affected   populations   is   estimated   at   14%   of   average   annual   household   revenue.   The   post-­‐ flood  coping  strategies  adopted  by  households  show  that  they  had  to  temporarily  or   permanently   forgo   meeting   some   of   their   vital   needs,   for   example   by   decreasing   the   number   of   daily   meals”   (World   Bank-­‐GoS,   2010).   The   most   critical   impacts   of   the   2009  flash  flood  on  vulnerable  communities  can  thus  only  be  gleaned,  and  are  not   accounted  for  in  Table  6.3,  leaving  total  damages  much  higher  than  104  million  USD.     The   hazards   and   calamities   that   occurred   in   Senegal   between   1995-­‐2010   have   impacted   all   sectors   of   socio-­‐economic   human   activity,   mostly   in   urban   centers,   and   have   constituted   threats   that   one   can   hypothesize   jeopardized   development   gains.   Table   2   summarizes   our   assessment   of   known   HMD   impacts   in   Senegal   between   1995-­‐2010,  based  on  our  events  analysis.  

                                                                                                               
193  World  Bank/GoS,  2010  

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Photo   6.2:   Distribution   of   flood   zones   in   Dakar   following   the   2009   floods.   Source:   GeoEye   satellite  image,  14  October,  2009.       Climate  Shock   Impacts   1994:  River  flooding  in  Saint-­‐Louis   No  data   Coastal  erosion     No  data   Impacts  in  Dakar,  Rufisque,  Mbour,  Joal,   Saint-­‐Louis,  Saloum  Isld  and  Casamance     1999:  Storm  Cindy     99   fishermen   dead   at   sea,   10   disappearances,   and   Impacts  in  Casamance  and  Joal     considerable  material  losses   January   2002:   Out   of   season   rains   30  dead,  significant  material  losses,  including  hundreds  of   Regions   of   Saint-­‐Louis   and   Louga   collapsed   houses,   destruction   of   harvests   and   important   impacted   loss  of  cattle   Acridian   invasions   between   1998   and   Hectares   of   cultivated   land   destroyed   by   the   2004:  7  regions  impacted   grasshoppers,  significant  damages  to  production     2003  flooding:  Saint-­‐Louis  impacted   50,300  people  affected  (DPC)   2005  flooding   200,000   people   affected,   more   than   20,000   houses   Saint-­‐Louis,   Joal,   Kaolack,   Fatick   and   collapsed  or  flooded  (DPC)   Dakar   suburbs   (districts   of   Pikine   et   30  dead,  1,700  households  relocated  to  Keur  Massar  and   Guédiawaye)     significant  material  losses   52  billion  CFA  Francs  disbursed  by  central  government  to   relocate  flood  victims  to  Keur  Massar   2008  flash  flooding   Around   2,882   households   impacted,   or   about   23,593   By   mid-­‐August   most   Dakar   suburbs   people   stayed   in   their   flooded   homes   and   necessitated   flooded     emergency   assistance   (Senegal   Red   Cross/IFRC)   by   September  25   Some   houses   completely   inaccessible,   inhabitants   contaminated   by   use   of   tap   water   for   hygiene   and   from   being  in  constant  contact  with  stagnant  waters,  sewerage,   solid  waste  and  worms.   Water-­‐borne   diseases   explosion   (cholera,   malaria   and  

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rash)  (Views  from  the  Frontline  Report,  2009)   2009  flash  flooding   In  Dakar,  7  dead  by  drowning,  814  families  displaced,  500   Dakar   suburbs,   and   other   locations   swallowed  up  by  rain  flood  waters  (Le  Quotidien,  15  May   across  the  country  impacted   2009;   ISE,   2009).   Cost   of   2009   flooding   in   Senegal   is   estimated   at   104   million   USD,   including   almost   56   million   in  damages  and  47  million  in  losses.  Sectors  most  affected   by   damages   were   housing   (49   %),   health   (14   %),   agriculture  (11  %),  education  (10  %)  and  transport  (8  %).   Houses,   schools,   health   centers   and   roads   were   severely   damaged.   Losses   mainly   concerned   trade   (20   %),   public   urban  infrastructure  (15  %),  housing  (16  %),  energy  (14   %)   and   transport   (14   %)   and   these   sectors   account   for   almost   80   %   of   losses.   The   private   sector   was   worst   hit,   bearing  65  %  of  all  damages  and  64  %  of  the  losses.   Location-­‐wise,   Peri-­‐urban   areas   of   Dakar   were   most   affected.  Cost  of  flooding  estimated  at  $82  million  therein.   According   to   Government   figures,   about   360,000   people   were   directly   affected   in   the   peri-­‐urban   areas   of   Dakar,   particularly   in   districts   of   Pikine   and   Guédiawaye,   125,000  were  directly  affected  in  the  rest  of  the  country.   Those   affected   include   most   vulnerable   groups   of   people   living  in  Senegal  (World  Bank-­‐GoS,  2010)   2010  flash  flooding  –Dakar  suburbs  hit   3.000  families  displaced  (Le  Soleil,  July  26  2010)   Table  6.4:  Climate  shocks  in  Senegal  and  their  impacts,  1995-­2010  

  As   table   6.4   demonstrates,   floods   generate   the   most   severe   climate   impacts   in   Senegal.   Over   the   past   30   years   (1980   to   2009   inclusive),   flooding   has   affected   over   900,000  people,  caused  the  death  of  45  people  and  caused  damage  estimated  at  over   142   million   USD,   according   to   World   Bank   estimates.   In   the   suburbs   of   Dakar,   flooding  has  become  almost  an  omnipresent  reality  directly  affecting  the  poor194.       For  the  purposes  of  our  study,  we  will  circumscribe  our  analysis  to  the  analysis  of   Government’s   response   to   recurrent   flooding   disasters,   on   which   we   rest   our   present  analysis.       We   will   thus   look   at   the   two   types   of   floods   that   afflict   Senegal:   the   first   type   occurring   when   the   water   level   of   a   river   rises   beyond   its   bed   and   fills   its   floodplain   (river  flooding)  and  the  second  type  concerning  low  elevation  areas  with  a  replete   groundwater  table  that  receive  more  rain  than  can  be  absorbed  by  the  ground  and   the   water   table   level   consequently   rising   to   above   ground   level   (flash   floods   in                                                                                                                  
194  World  Bank/GoS,  2010  

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Senegal’s   peri-­‐urban   settlements).   Both   of   these   types   of   floods,   although   there   is   rural   flooding   in   Senegal,   are   primarily   urban   problems   arising   from   unplanned   urbanization   that   has   become   problematic   when   conjugated   with   climate   drivers.   “Humans  settled  in  flood  zones,  and  the  spontaneous  nature  of  their  settlement  has   resulted  in  development  without  installation  of  public  works  such  as  closed  sewer   systems,  rain  drainage  networks,  paved  roads,  etc.”195 .  When  the  rains  returned  in   the   mid-­‐1990s   and   found   these   high   population   densities   of   poor,   uneducated   Senegalese   in   flood   plains   on   the   peripheries   of   urban   centers,   the   disasters   that   resulted  were  monumental.       In  the  next  section,  we  describe  how  the  Government  of  Senegal  (GoS)  has  organized   itself   to   handle   each   type   of   flood,   year   after   year.   Beforehand,   we   diagnose   the   root   causes  of  flooding  in  Senegal  however,  an  explosive  consequence  of  existing  human-­‐ induced  vulnerability  combined  with  new  rainfall  increases.       6.2.2 Floods  in  Focus:  Causes  of  Flooding  In  Senegal      River  flooding  in  Saint  Louis:  the  Senegal  River  basin     Written   records   of   flooding   along   Senegalese   rivers   go   back   to   French   exploration   logs   of   the   territory.   One   such   log   kept   during   a   1658-­‐1660   voyage   recounts   that   during   the   rainy   season   the   Senegal   River   rose   so   high   that   one-­‐storey   dwellings   on   the   floodplains   were   completely   washed   away196.   This   type   of   record   is   not   uncommon;  the  French  catalogued  weather  conditions  in  the  territory  during  their   years   of   colonization.   Most   of   their   records   concern   conditions   along   the   Senegal   River   near   the   city   of   Saint-­‐Louis,   an   island   at   the   mouth   of   River   Senegal   that   served   as   the   capital   of   Senegal   and   of   the   entire   French   West   African   colonial                                                                                                                  
195  Boudreau,  Laura,  Flood  Management  in  Senegal:  Past,  Present,  and  Future,  2009   196  Dia,  Aliou  M.,  "Crues  Et  Inondations  Dans  Le  Bassin  Du  Fleuve  Sénégal:  Apport  De  La  Télédétection  Et  Des  SIG  

à  La  Cartographie  Des  Zones  Affectées  Dans  l'Estuaire  (Application  Sur  La  Ville  De  Saint-­‐Louis)",  Diss.,  Université   de  Marne  la  Vallée:  Institut  Francilien  des  Géosciences,  2004  

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empire   for   many   years.   During   the   19th   and   early   20th   centuries,   when   Saint-­‐Louis   was  very  active  as  the  French  port  of  entry  to  the  African  continent,  the  French  took   extensive  flood  risk  mitigation  actions  near  the  city197.       All   flood   mitigation   measures   employed   by   the   French,   however,   were   forgotten   when   French   control   over   Senegal   ceased   in   1960.   Soon   after   Senegalese   independence  on  April  4th  1960,  the  rains  stopped  and  the  era  known  as  the  30-­‐year   drought   began.   The   result   of   this   succession   of   events   was   that   the   Senegalese   government  was  not  challenged  by  floods  early  on  to  develop  policies  or  protocol  to   mitigate  and  cope  with  flooding198.     Concentrated  in  the  Saint-­‐Louis  region  today  through  which  River  Senegal  flows  on   its   march   to   the   sea   in   Northern   Senegal,   the   problem   of   river   flooding   extends   to   the  entire  Senegal  River  Valley,  occasionally  affecting  Richard  Toll  and  other  towns   along   River   Senegal.   It   must   also   be   noted   that   flooding   in   Senegal   is   not   confined   to   imprudently   urbanized   zones,   but   is   also   common   along   rivers   in   rural   areas   throughout  the  country199.  Because  rural  villages  have  a  long  experience  in  coping   with   yearly   floods   and   often   incorporate   them   into   their   crop   rotations   however,   this  type  of  flooding  seldom  reaches  problematic  proportions  and  is  often  handled   using  the  affected  communities’  own  resources  and  capacities200.      Flash  floods  in  Dakar’s  peri-­urban  settlements     During   the   30-­‐year   drought   many   of   the   conditions   were   created   to   turn   Dakar’s   peri-­‐urban  settlements  into  a  ticking  bomb,  and  render  flooding  a  major  issue  today.   Over  the  years  the  landscape  changed;  riverbeds  shrunk,  and  areas  that  were  once   uninhabitable   because   of   high   water   levels   appeared   to   be   open   for   settlement.   These  changes  were  accompanied  by  rapid  urbanization:  many  of  Senegal’s  poorest                                                                                                                  
198  Ibidem   199  Ibidem   200  Ibidem   197  Boudreau,  Laura,  Flood  Management  in  Senegal:  Past,  Present,  and  Future  

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rural  residents  fled  to  cities,  a  phenomenon  known  as  rural  exodus,  looking  for  work   because  they  could  no  longer  grow  their  crops,  keep  livestock,  or  feed  their  families.   Initially,   it   was   primarily   young   Senegalese   men   who   came,   but   full   families   eventually  followed.  Settlement  of  these  poor  migrants  was  spontaneous  and  done   without   thought   of   land   ownership,   a   nonexistent   concept   in   rural   villages201.   There   was  little  to  no  government  oversight  or  regulation  of  these  settlements;  they  grew   without  urban  planning  or  public  works  installations.  This  trend  lasted  two  decades,   resulting   in   high   population   densities   of   poor,   uneducated   Senegalese   in   floodable   zones  on  the  peripheries  of  urban  centers202.     When  normal  rainy  seasons  resumed  in  the  mid-­‐1990s,  these  areas  began  to  suffer   yearly   flooding:   their   underlying   vulnerability   interacted   with   the   new   climatic   driver,   and   the   bomb   exploded,   rendering   flooding   an   omnipresent   problem   defining   the   lives   of   the   inhabitants   of   Dakar’s   suburbs.   Flooding   in   these   imprudently   urbanized   zones203   occurs   today   in   varying   degrees   in   cities   and   large   towns   around   Senegal.   Flash   flood   problems   are   common   in   and/or   around   the   following  urban  centers,  ranked  from  most  to  least  severely  affected:  Dakar,  Thies,   Kaolack,   Joal,   Tambacounda,   and   Ziguinchor   (refer   to   map   of   Senegal   in   fig.   6.1).   Around   Dakar,   flooding   problems   extend   through   the   suburbs,   along   the   corridor   leading  to  the  nearby  city  of  Thies.       How  the  Government  handles  these  flood  crises  is  the  concern  of  the  next  section,   and  opens  a  door  to  inside  Senegalese  realpolitik.                                                                                                                                
201  Coly,  Adrien,  Inondations  et  Processus  d’Urbanisation,     202  Boudreau,  Laura,  Flood  Management  in  Senegal:  Past,  Present,  and  Future   203  Diouf,  Diouf,  Catastrophes  Naturelles  Et  Leurs  Effets:  Le  Contexte  Sénégalais,  Presentation  by  Ministry  of  the  

Interior,  Civil  Protection  Department,  2005  

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6.2.3 National  institutions  to  address  HMDs      Institutional  set-­up  of  disaster  response  in  Senegal     Since  its  accession  to  Independence,  the  State  of  Senegal  has  implemented  a  number   of   laws   and   established   institutions   to   take   charge   of   climate   shocks   afflicting   the   country,  and  to  a  larger  extent  to  manage  all  risks  and  national  emergencies  (natural   or  otherwise)  when  these  occur.     Firstly,  the  Law  n°64  -­‐53  of  10  July  1964,  promulgated  four  years  after  the  country’s   Independence,   defines   the   general   organization   of   civil   protection   in   Senegal,   and   was   shortly   followed   by   a   presidential   Decree   n°64-­‐563   twenty   days   later   that   instated   the   Department   of   Civil   Protection   (DCP),   in   charge   of   organizing   and   carrying   out   rescue   operations,   with   the   National   Command   of   Firefighters.   The   1964   Law   asserted   that:   “at   all   times   the   State   is   mandated   to   look   after   the   protection  of  goods  and  physical  persons  and  resources  of  the  country.”   Furthermore,   the   Law   of   28   February   1993   created   the   High   Commission   for   Civil   Protection,  a  consultative  body  in  charge  of  prevention  and  organization  of  disasters   in  peacetime  as  well  as  during  crises.       Finally  in  1999,  a  presidential  decree  instituted  the  Plan  d’ORganisation  des  SECours,   the  Plan  ORSEC,  or  National  Emergency  Management  Plan.     Each   organization   in   this   Emergency   management   institutional   architecture   has   a   role  to  play,  as  clearly  outlined  in  the  ORSEC  plan  and  detailed  below.             •   165  

  

The  National  Emergency  Plan,  Plan  ORSEC:  coordination  of  relief  operations  in   times  of  crisis  

The   Plan   ORSEC   serves   as   the   main   master   plan   for   the   organization   of   disaster   response  operations  in  Senegal.  It  was  borne  of  the  desire  of  different  government   bodies,   in   particular   the   Firefighters   Command   Unit,   to   have   a   commonly   agreed-­‐ upon   National   Plan   to   coordinate   disaster   operations   in   time   of   crisis.   It   offers   a   good   disaster   preparedness   plan,   indispensable   to   prepare   operations   in   advance   of   serious   events   susceptible   of   jeopardizing   human   lives,   goods   or   the   environment,   and  it  is  surprising  that  it  took  so  many  years  for  the  Plan  to  be  devised.  One  may   read   into   this   the   lack   of   a   need   for   a   national   Emergency   management   plan   between   1960-­‐1996,   perhaps   because   of   the   paucity   of   multiple   complex   emergencies  during  this  period  correspondent  with  the  thirty-­‐year  drought.     Instated  by  presidential  Decree  n°  99  –  172  of  March  4  1999,  updating  and  replacing   decree   n°   93-­‐   1288   of   November   17   1996,   Plan   ORSEC   defines   the   organization   of   rescue   operations   at   the   district,   regional   and   national   levels.   Particularly,   it   establishes  a  plan  in  advance  in  each  of  Senegal’s  43  districts  to  allow  for  the  rapid   and  effective  summoning  of  all  private  and  public  means  for  rescue  in  the  district204.                                                                                                                    
204  Administratively,  Senegal  is  cut  out  into  14  regions,  consisting  each  of  three  districts  or  

départements  (except  for  the  region  of  Dakar,  which  comprise  four),  for  a  total  of  43  districts,  which   are  subdivided  in  a  number  of  arrondissements  that  are  in  turn  each  made  up  of  villages  (see  fig.  8.5).     Départements  or  districts  in  Senegal  bear  no  political  power,  and  are  mere  extensions  of  the  central   state,  in  charge  of  carrying  out  administrative  functions  (such  as  tax  collection,  paperwork   processing,  etc).       Each  département  or  district  is  in  turn  composed  of  a  given  number  of  arrondissements,  set  by   presidential  decree  according  to  its  demographic  size.  Continuing  down  the  flowchart,  each   arrondissement  is  made  up  of  multiple  villages,  which  constitute  the  bottom  of  the  administrative   ladder.     The  system  is  devised  in  such  a  way  that  State  agents  (extensions  of  the  central  State  authority  at  the   local  level)  reside  at  each  level  within  the  region  to  oversee  and  regulate  the  functioning  of  their   political  counterparts  (the  communes  and  rural  communities).  Thus  each  geographic  unit  in  Senegal   has  both  an  elected  political  leader,  and  an  appointed  decentralized  administrator:  the  region  is   administratively  headed  by  a  governor,  each  département  by  the  Préfet  and  each  arrondissement  by   the  sous-­préfet.     The  ORSEC  Plan  established  an  Emergency  Plan  at  the  level  of  each  département  or  district,   coordinated  by  the  Préfet.  

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DEPARTMENT 1 DAKAR Préfet DEPARTMENT 2   PIKINE Préfet   DEPARTMENT 3 RUFISQUE Préfet     DEPARTMENT 4 GUEDIAWAYE Préfet

Region of Dakar Governor

     

4 ARRONDISSMENTS

2 ARRONDISSMENTS

     

2 ARRONDISSMENTS

2 ARRONDISSMENTS

Sous-préfet     VILLAGES
Village chiefs

Sous-préfet

Sous-préfet

Sous-préfet

     

VILLAGES
Village chiefs

VILLAGES
Village chiefs

VILLAGES
Village chiefs

 
Fig.  8.5:  Understanding  Senegal’s  Administrative  Partitioning:  Example  of  the  Region  of  Dakar.   Taking  the  example  of  Dakar  as  an  illustration,  Dakar  region  has  four  départements  or  districts   (Dakar,  Pikine,  Guédiawaye  and  Rufisque),  which  are  each  sub-­‐divided  into  arrondissements  (leading   up  to  a  total  of  ten  arrondissements  for  the  region).  The  arrondissements,  just  as  the  départments  or   districts,  hold  no  political  power;  they  are  mere  local  administrative  extensions  of  the  central  State.    

  These   départemental   or   district-­‐level   emergency   Plans   were   designed   to   work   as   follows:   only   the   Préfet   (representative   of   the   Central   State   in   the   district   and   coordinator  of  the  district  ORSEC  Command  Unit)  can  make  the  decision  to  trigger   the   district-­‐level   ORSEC   Plan,   since   this   plan   only   concerns   events   of   exceptional   proportions  that  overwhelm  local  capacity  to  cope  (refer  back  to  chapter  3  disaster   definition).  However,  even  in  the  presence  of  a  disaster  of  exceptional  proportions,   it   is   the   responsibility   of   the   Mayor   (elected   political   leader   of   the   commune,   •   167  

counterpart   of   the   district’s   Préfet)   to   deploy   all   available   communal   means   first,   before  calling  on  higher  administration  later.     Once   the   ORSEC   Plan   is   triggered,   the   Command   Unit   is   divided   into   two   components:   the   Operational   Command   unit   that   goes   in   proximity   to   the   disaster   zone   to   coordinate   relief   operations   there,   and   the   Fixed   Command   Unit   that   remains  at  the  Préfecture,  home  of  the  Préfet.     The   same   structure   is   replicated   along   all   the   administrative   levels   of   the   country:   the   Préfet   triggers   the   district-­‐level   Plan,   the   Governor   triggers   the   regional-­‐level   Plan,  and  the  President  (or  his  Minister  of  the  Interior,  head  of  the  National  ORSEC   Plan  Command  unit)  triggers  the  national  emergency  ORSEC  Plan.     Thus   is   designed   Senegal’s   disaster   response   architecture,   defining   an   intricate   interplay  of  administrative  (central  State)  and  political  (locally  elected)  officials,  and   clearly  outlining  the  responsibilities  of  each  stakeholder  at  each  geographical  scale,   towards  the  collective  goal  of  ensuring  effective  and  rapid  rescue  and  relief  delivery   in   times   of   disaster   crises.   As   we   shall   see   however,   this   elaborately   designed   response  plan  has  not  always  functioned  in  practice.  This  was  the  case  notably  when   opposition   political   parties   began   winning   local   elections,   and   local   power   was   transferred  to  the  hands  of  stakeholders  other  than  the  Central  ruling  party’s.        The   1996   Law   did   not   simply   institute   disaster   preparedness   in   time   of   crisis,   but   also  in  peacetime.  Thus  the  High  Commission  for  Civil  Protection  was  established,  in   charge  of  coordinating  all  aspects  of  disaster  prevention  and  advising  the  Minister  of   the  Interior  on  relevant  disaster  prevention  strategies  to  implement.  A  review  of  the   minutes  of  meetings  held  by  the  Commission  demonstrates  however  that  its  areas  of   intervention   were   circumscribed   to:   visits   of   public   buildings   (hotel   establishments,   fair   premises,   government   buildings,   etc.)   for   conformity   with   fire   and   safety   • 168     Disaster  prevention  in  peace  time  

regulations,  issuance  of  construction  authorizations  and,  in  recent  years,  television   ads   raising   awareness   on   road   safety   measures   and   dangerous   beaches   forbidden   for  swimming205     Non-­‐inclusion  of  climate-­‐related  disaster  prevention  is  a  noteworthy  omission  in  the   modus   operandi   of   the   organization,   one   that   explains   perhaps   the   lack   of   preparedness   of   Government   bodies   for   HMDs,   which   became   evident   when   recurrent  floods  began  to  inflict  Senegal  in  the  2000s.        Finally,   since   July   2007,   Senegal   is   equipped   with   a   National   Platform   for   Disaster   Risk   Reduction,   which   brings   together   in   concert   all   organizations   in   charge   of   disaster   response   and   management   (NGOs,   State   bodies,   civil   society,   private   sector),  towards  effective  nation-­‐wide  prevention  and  reduction  of  disaster  risks  ex-­ ante   of   the   disaster   events,   following   prescriptions   of   the   2005   Hyogo   Framework   for  Action  agreed  on  in  Kobe,  Japan,  of  which  Senegal  was  a  signatory.     A   United   Nations   Development   Program   (UNDP)-­‐funded   project   entitled,   "Support   to  the  National  Program  for  Prevention,  Risk  Reduction  and  Management  of  Major   Natural   Disasters   in   the   context   of   poverty   reduction   in   Senegal",   has   played   an   important  role  in  launching  this  platform,  and  helped  to  push  forward  the  agenda  of   the   Hyogo   Framework   for   Disaster   Risk   Reduction   in   Senegal,   which   aims   to   accompany  governments  worldwide  towards  a  new  paradigm  of  pro-­‐active  ex  ante   disaster   risk   management   and   preparation,   and   not   merely   disaster   response.   One   of  its  chief  realizations  has  been  the  initiation  of  the  national  platform  for  DRR,  and   the   elaboration   of   a   national   contingency   plan,   a   useful   preparedness   tool   which   delineates  roles  and  responsibilities  for  who  does  what  when  a  disaster  strikes.                                                                                                                     205  Civil  Protection  Department  (CPD),  Activities  of  the  CPD  2001-­2011   •   169   The  National  Hyogo  Platform  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (DRR)  

However,   “limited   resources   constrain   this   national   contingency   plan   and   prevent   it   from  being  operational”206 .  Furthermore,  the  national  DRR  Platform  fast  became  an   additional  institution  that  added  itself  to  all  the  existing  ones,  not  bringing  them  to   life  or  delivering  on  its  role  to  serve  as  a  catalyst/synergy  platform  for  all  existing   institutions  to  come  together  to  define  strategies  and  durable  solutions  to  the  issues   of  flooding  and  other  climate-­‐related  crises  in  Senegal.     Finally,  the  UNDP  Project  supported  the  development  of  a  national  strategy  for  DRR,   all   legislative   texts   for   this   strategy   are   today   in   place,   and   two   national   climate-­‐ informed  national  contingency  plans  have  been  developed  since  2007.       In  practice  however,  the  national  strategy  and  Platform  only  exist  on  paper.  When   floods   strike,   all   planned   procedures   are   set   aside.   The   disaster   relief   process   is   highly   politicized;   no   official   dares   to   trigger   the   ORSEC   plan207.   As   proof,   the   platform  member  institutions  met  once  only,  and  that  was  during  the  launch  of  the   Platform  on  July  2007.     When   it   comes   to   disaster   prevention,   in   practice,   the   Department   of   Civil   Protection,   in   charge   of   coordinating   the   platform,   due   notably   to   its   limited   financial   capacities   and   lack   of   personnel   trained   to   understand   the   complex   linkages   between   Climate   Change   Adaptation   –Disaster   Risk   Reduction,   suffices   itself   with   disaster   response   and   executing   the   ORSEC   Plan   when   it   is   triggered.   Non-­‐governmental  stakeholders  –such  as  Oxfam,  Plan  International,  the  Red  Cross  – bypass   the   State   and   go   straight   to   communities.   To   conduct   isolated   but   high-­‐ impact   disaster   prevention   initiatives   is   “the   only   way   to   have   impact”,   in   the   words   of  an  NGO  leader  in  Dakar,  “the  State  has  committed  suicide  in  Senegal”208 .                                                                                                                    
www.preventionweb.net    
207  Expert  Interview,  2011   208  Expert  Interview,  2011   206  UNISDR,  “Senegal  Hyogo  Framework  for  Action  mid-­‐term  review  report  2009”,  accessed  March  15,  2011.  

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6.2.4 Integration  of  local  needs  in  Disaster  Planning  and  Preparedness     A  further  zoom-­‐in  into  the  urgent  CCA-­‐DRR  needs  of  local  communities  surveyed  in   a  sample  of  Senegal’s  vulnerable  communities  uncovers  that  accountability  to  local   needs  is  also  in  practice  not  forthcoming  from  the  national  institutions  in  charge  of   climate   disaster   response   and   preparedness   in   Senegal.   The   national   institution   established   hitherto   to   cater   in   fact   is   blind   to   priority   community   needs.   It   appears   that   no   accountability   mechanisms   are   built   in   or   function   in   practice   to   channel   priority   local   needs   to   the   attention   of   national   decision-­‐makers,   and   link   countryside  with  center.     Table   6.5   reviews   the   priority   CCA-­‐DRR   needs   that   emanated   from   our   VCA   assessment   in   communities   vulnerable   to   both   river   and   flash   flooding   between   2009-­‐2011.       Hazards   Impacts   Endogenous   strategies     (local  capacities   to  cope)   Family   solidarity,   digging   of   traditional   canals,   loan,   migration,   sale   of   assets   (machine)   Displacement,   relocation   Gaps:  needed   adaptation   measures   Harvest   storage   facility,   Cash   transfer,   modern   canal,   availability   of  machines  

Strong  rains  

Destroyed  crops  

House  destroyed  

Construction   of   a     house   with   strong   walls   Loss  of  cattle   Sale   of   cattle,   Modern  canals   reduction   in   nutritional  intake   Difficult   access   to   Traditional  canals   Water  evacuation   fields   Loss  of  revenue   Family  solidarity   Modern   canals,   creation   of   alternative   income   generating   activities  (IGA)   • 171    

Research  raids   Early  warnings   Strengthening   of   Construction   of   homes   brick  houses     Crops   destroyed,   Resignation   Tree  replanting   harvested  seeds  lost   Cattle  lost   Solidarity   Construction   of   solid  enclosures   Loss  of  revenue   Sale   of   assets   Creation  of  IGAs   (machines)   Injured  people   Solidarity   Construction   of   stronger  houses   Water  run-­‐off  into   Land  destroyed   Family  solidarity   Sturdier   the  village   Construction     Cattle  loss       Loss  of  human  lives-­‐   Safekeeping  of  the   Modern  canals,   people  injured   children,  digging  of   Sturdier   traditional   construction   sewers/dykes   Loss  of  revenue   Expenditure   of   all   Construction   of   a   cash   and   assets,   strong   Dyke,   sale  of  necklaces   creation  of  IGAs  
Table   6.5:   Vulnerability   to   HMDs,   Local   capacities   to   cope   and   Priority   DRR-­CCA   needs   in   Kaffrine,  Senegal.  

Storms  

People  disappear   Houses  destroyed  

  We   see   that   a   wide   gap   exists   between   these   needs   and   the   national   CCA   plans   as   carried  out,  which  reflects  the  wider  disconnect  between  vulnerable  rural  areas  and   the  hubs  of  decision-­‐making  in  the  capital  city  of  Dakar,  in  Senegal.     6.2.5 Overall  Institutional  picture:  Senegal,  a  Firefighter?     From   our   overview   of   Senegal’s   institutional   infrastructure   for   climate   disaster   management  clearly  emerges  that  Senegal  has  on  paper  many  of  the  attributes  of  an   effective   Firefighter,   however   in   practice,   it   is   an   Unprepared   Firefighter.   Our   preliminary   classification   of   Senegal   is   thus   confirmed.   Table   6.5   summarizes   our   findings   on   national   institutions   for   climate   disaster   management   in   Senegal,   and   their  ability  to  respond  effectively  to  urgent  local  needs  in  the  face  of  rising  HMDs.    

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Indicator                                                                                                                                  Present?                                                                               of  Ex-­post  Disaster  Responders     (Present:  √   (The  “Unprepared  Firefighters”  policy)   Absent:  X)   A  national  Disaster  Management  Strategy  or  law  adopted,  with   clearly  defined  and  appropriated  procedures  and   responsibilities  for  disaster  response   In  the  national  budget  a  dedicated  budget  line  exists  for  disaster   preparedness  and  emergency  response   A  mandated  agency  for  disaster  management  exists,  able  to   coordinate  across  ministries  and  administrations  and  effectively   command  disaster  response  activities  during  an  Emergency   An  annual  Contingency  plan  is  elaborated,  and  delineates  the   procedures,  actions  and  responsibilities  to  be  carried  out  in  the   advent  of  all  possible  disasters   Regular  drills  of  these  disaster  response  procedures  take  place   No  more  than  three  (3)  to  deliver  needed  relief  to  disaster-­‐ affected  citizens   Overall:   Choosing  not  to,  or  unable,  to  address  disasters  until  they  occur.   Countries  in  this  category  solely  respond  to  disasters  after  they   have  occurred,  mobilizing  any  personnel  on  duty  and   dispatching  them  to  disaster  sites.  For  this  reason  we  label   them:  the  Unprepared  Firefighters!  Official  emergency  response   in  the  countries  of  this  category  is  characterized  by  amateurism   and  improvisation,  and  there  are  no  pre-­‐established  well-­‐ rehearsed  procedures  to  follow.  Also  included  in  this  category   are  countries  with  a  dedicated  agency  for  Disaster  Management   but  one  without  capacity,  ability  for  efficient  inter-­‐ministerial   planning  and  coordination,  or  no  budget  line.  
  Table  6.6:  Senegal,  an  Unprepared  Firefighter  in  practice    

X  

X   X  

X  

X   X   √  

 

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6.3 Incentives   Analysis:   Which   Factors   Thwart   Senegal’s   Institutional   Change   For  Effective  Flood  Risk  Management  And  Preparedness?     From   our   previous   overview   of   national   institutions   to   address   flood   shocks,   emanates   clearly   that   Senegal   sets   up,   but   does   not   implement.   Which   specific   factors  thwart  the  institutionalization  of  change  for  effective  flood  risk  management   and   preparedness?   What   determines   GoS   implementation,   or   lack   thereof,   of   the   various  elaborate  plans  devised  for  effective  disaster  preparedness  and  response  at   all  levels  geographic  levels  (from  the  national,  down  to  regional  and  district  levels)?     In   order   to   glean   answers   to   these   key   questions,   which   get   to   the   heart   of   our   investigation,  we  review  then  analyze  the  policy  responses  provided  by  the  GoS  to   flood  shocks.  What,  in  practice,  has  actually  taken  place  during  flood  events  between   1995-­‐2010?  How  has  the  GoS  handled  HMDs?  How  have  the  devised  existing  plans   (ORSEC,  flood  prevention  and  coordination  within  the  Platform)  been  executed?       6.3.1  Process  tracing:  GoS  Management  of  flood  crises  in  practice,  1995-­2010     The  attention  of  the  Government  of  Senegal  has  been  hailed  by  a  number  of  major   HMDs   and   calamitous   events   between   1995   -­‐2010   (see   table   6.4).   During   this   period,   a   total   of   4   national   flood   crises   have   occurred   (in   2005,   2008,   2009   and   2010),  added  on  to  2  localized  flood  crises  (in  Saint-­‐Louis  in  1994  and  2003).  The   national  ORSEC  Plan  has  been  triggered  during  3  of  those  times  (in  2005,  2008  and   2009),  while  the  district  ORSEC  Plan  had  only  been  activated  once  (1994).          1994:  Saint-­Louis  City  floods     Indeed   in   1994,   major   flooding   in   Saint-­‐Louis   saw   the   rise   of   River   Senegal   to   heights  alarming  for  the  safety  of  the  city  of  Saint-­‐Louis,  which  lies  at  its  mouth.  This   had  led  to  the  triggering  of  the  Saint-­‐Louis  district  ORSEC  Plan.   •   174  

  2003:  Saint-­Louis  City  floods  again     Close   to   ten   years   later,   in   2003,   Saint-­‐Louis   city   floods   again.   However,   Senegal’s    political  configuration  is  completely  changed  then.  We  are  three  years  into  the  new   regime   of   Abdoulaye   Wade,   the   popular   president   who   rose   victorious   from   the   historic  2000  election  that  saw  a  change  from  the  40-­‐year  old  Socialist  Party  regime   to   Wade’s   new   Democratic   Party   that   had   campaigned   on   the   platform   of   Sopi   –or   Change  in  Wolof.     Following  popular  grievances  and  political  tension  in  Saint-­‐Louis  due  to  the  floods,   the   central   government   of   Senegal   decides   to   intervene.   A   engineering   solution   is   decided  upon  to  permanently  resolve  the  flooding  issue  of  Saint-­‐Louis.  The  Langue   de   Barbarie   Breach   is   thus   opened   in   October   2003,   a   few   kilometers   away   from   the   island   of   Saint-­‐Louis,   relieving   the   city   dwellers   from   flooding,   but   sacrificing   the   inhabitants   of   neighboring   villages,   instantly   exposed   to   the   destructive   force   of   Atlantic  ocean  tidal  incursions  (see  Niang-­‐Diop  2003209  and  Tall  2009210).       The  following  year,  in  2004,  disaster  preparedness  efforts  begin  anew,  this  time  for   Dakar’s   suburbs.   On   8   Jan   2004,   within   the   auspices   of   the   ‘Commission   for   the   Prevention   and   Fight   Against   Floods’,   instructions   are   given   to   the   Minister   of   Urbanism   to   relocate   inhabitants   of   the   flooded   zones   of   Pikine211.   This   indicates   that  the  GoS  knew  what  exactly  to  do  as  early  as  2004.      2005:  Nation-­wide  flood  crisis    2004:  Renewing  with  flooding  in  Dakar  

                                                                                                                209  Niang-­‐Diop,  Isabelle,  "Les  Apprentis  Sorciers  à  l'Œuvre  Au  Canal  De  Dérivation",  Walf  Fadjri,  October  16,  
2003  
210  Tall,  Arame.  Climate  Change  Vulnerability  from  Global  to  Local  levels:  the  case  of  Doune  Baba  

Dieye  http://start.org/blog/disproportional-­‐impacts-­‐of-­‐climate-­‐change-­‐story-­‐of-­‐doune-­‐baba-­‐dieye.html  
211

 CPD,  Activities  of  the  CPD  2001-­2011   • 175  

 

In   2005,   Senegal   experienced   its   most   severe   floods,   with   unprecedented   impacts   (see   table   6.4).   The   National   ORSEC   Plan   is   triggered.   A   nation-­‐wide   flood   crisis   is   declared,  and  legislative  elections  due  to  take  place  that  year  are  pushed  back.  The   GoS   responds   by   declaring   that   the  52   billion   CFA   francs   initially   budgeted   for  the   2005   legislative   elections   will   be   reused   to   relocate   Dakar   suburban   flood   victims   and   build   3,000   new   houses   for   them   in   a   new   relocation   site   25-­‐km   outside   of   Dakar,   named   Jaxaay   –   or   Eagle   in   Wolof.   Thus   is   born   the   ‘Jaxaay   Plan’.   In   a   landmark   speech   on   August   28   2005,   Abdoulaye   Wade   speaks   of   needed   radical   measures   to   ensure   populations   no   longer   live   in   savage   slums   anywhere   in   the   country,  in  their  stead  modern  cities  will  rise:  populations  will  be  relocated  to  safer,   dry  grounds  in  a  new  modern  city  called  Jaxaay,  which  will  overlook  the  old  slums,   like  an  Eagle.  The  Jaxaay  relocation  plan  will  cost  52  billion  CFA  francs,  45  billions  of   which   will   be   drawn   from   three-­‐quarters   of   the   total   budget   that   had   been   set   aside   for  the  decentralized  Independence  festivities  of  2006.  Legislative  elections  will  be   postponed  to  2007212.     In   Abdoulaye   Wade’s   epic   declaration   at   the   height   of   the   2005   floods,   he   also   recalled  his  then  Prime  Minister,  Idrissa  Seck,  who  was  in  South  Africa  and  declared:   “that   the   Government   will   no   longer   be   taking   vacations   in   August   because   that   is   the  critical  time  of  the  rainy  season  when  populations  need  us  most“213 .  Following   the   rainy   season,   Government   also   began   the   construction   of   four   water   retention   basins   in   the   flooded   suburbs214   of   Dakar,   to   stock   water   during   rainy   season.   Construction   began   in   the   districts   of   Pikine   and   Guediawaye   –neighborhoods   of   Baghdad,  Gneeti-­‐Mbaar,  Wakhinan  Nimzat  and  Medina  Gounass215.                                                                                                                       
212  Le  Soleil,  26  July  2010   213  Ibidem   214  Ibidem   215  Expert  Interview,  2011  

2007:  Flood  prevention  at  a  standstill  

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176  

Senegal   then   undergoes   two   years   without   any   major   flood   crisis.   Floodwaters   from   the   2005   disaster   are   still   stagnant   in   many   neighborhoods   of   Dakar’s   suburbs.     Disaster   prevention   activities   come   to   a   standstill   in   the   country.   In   2007,   the   political   context   is   shaken   again   by   the   postponed   legislative   elections   combined   with   a   presidential   election,   which   Abdoulaye   Wade   wins   again,   but   this   time   with   a   close  margin  and  in  a  victory  contested  by  the  opposition  camp.        In   2008,   Senegal   experiences   major   floods   again,   with   Dakar   being   hardest   hit.   By   mid-­‐August,   one   month   into   the   rainy   season,   most   of   Dakar’s   suburbs   are   under   water.   The   National   ORSEC   Plan   is   triggered.   Faced   with   the   severity   of   the   floods,   a   Law  rectifying  the  yearly  budget  is  introduced  in  front  of  the  National  Assembly,  and   1   billion   100   million   CFA   francs   are   gathered   to   fight   against   floods   that   year.   1,700   firefighters   are   deployed   across   the   country216,   700   alone   in   Dakar.   Firefighters   come  fast  to  the  realization  however  that  the  problem  is  more  structural.  “There  are   enough  diesel  pumps  to  pump  waters  out  of  flooded  homes,  but  not  enough  canals   to  evacuate  the  waters”  declares  Firefighter  Captain  Seck217.     The  West  Africa  seasonal  rainfall  outlook  Forecast  had  been  diffused,  though,  prior   to   the   beginning   of   the   season   in   May-­‐June,   warning   of   a   probable   above-­‐normal   season  and  recommending  prevention  measures218.        The   year   later,   on   22   March   in   2009,   local   elections   take   place,   and   opposition   coalition  ‘Benno  Siggil  Senegal’  –which  means  ‘Together  to  Uplift  Senegal'  –wins  in   landslide   victory.   In   Dakar’s   suburbs,   where   many   continue   to   dwell   in   homes   flooded  since  2005  and  soaked  anew  in  2008,  only  one  pro-­‐Wade  mayor  is  elected.                                                                                                                  
216  Sud  Quotidien,  November  7  2008   217  APS,  Oct.  2008   218  Le  Soleil,  26  July  2010  

2008:  Massive  flooding  

2009:  Destructive  flash  floods  amidst  local  election  opposition  victory  

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Dakar  city  is  said  to  have  lost  its  mayor  due  to  his  inability  and  lack  of  imagination   to   find   solutions   to   flooding.   A   new   opposition   mayor   is   elected   to   replace   him219.   Some  go  as  far  as  to  purport  that  the  Wade  regime  lost  municipal  elections  over  its   poor  management  of  the  2008  floods.     On   May   7,   Dakar’s   newly   elected   Regional   Council   President   (elected   counterpart   of   the   Governor   for   the   region)   launches   a   ‘National   Solidarity   Fund’,   constituted   by   private   contributions   and   partner   support   as   an   attempt   to   permanently   solution   the  flood  problem  in  Dakar.  Positively  seen  by  populations  as  a  creative  solution  to   end   the   flooding   problem   in   Dakar,   the   fund   seeks   to   establish   synergies   between   local   communities   and   ‘implement   prevention   measures   to   replace   ORSEC   responses’220.     As  the  newly  elected  and  locally  empowered  opposition  leaders  continue  their  local-­‐ level   flood   disaster   prevention   activities,   the   battle   over   responsibility   for   flood   management   begins.   It   is   the   first   time   since   his   election   in   2000   that   Dakar   locally-­‐ elected  officials  are  not  of  the  same  camp  as  the  Wade  regime  in  place.  Souleymane   N.   Ndiaye,   Prime   Minister   and   head   of   government   in   Senegal’s   presidential   system,   announces  on  National  television  that  management  of  floods  will  now  be  devolved   to  Local  collectivities  from  then  onwards,  in  the  name  of  decentralization.       Immediately  following  the  Prime  minister’s  address,  Sitor  Ndour,  newly  appointed   Government   speaker,   in   his   first   speech   to   the   nation,   announces   that   local   collectivities   are   responsible   for   preliminary   flood   management   efforts   (e.g.:   rehabilitation   of   underground   canals   to   allow   easy   flow   of   rain   waters   which   he   highlights  as  solution  to  complex  issue),  according  to  articles  92  and  125  of  the  Code   of   Local   Collectivities,   which   transfer   responsibility   for   Sanitation   to   local   collectivities.   He   affirms   however   that   flood   management   is   not   a   transferred   competence,   in   the   literal   reading   of   the   texts,   and   that   the   central   State   will   be                                                                                                                  
219  Sud  Quotidien,  3-­‐4  April  2009   220    Sud  Quotidien,  3  May  2009  

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available  to  provide  help  to  the  local  governments.  In  his  own  words:  “Back  in  the   days  when  local  officials  were  from  the  same  camp  as  Government,  then  it  was  an   easy   negotiation.   Today   we’ll   have   to   see.   But   the   government   will   avail   itself   to   support  the  local  communities  that  request  assistance.”  Ndour  adds  that  this  is  not   political  retaliation  against  the  newly  elected  officials  of  the  Bennoo  opposition.  “If   we  wanted  to  fight  with  elected  opposition  leaders,  the  retribution  would  be  much   more   impactful”221.   “But   if   we   interpret   articles   92   and   125   of   Code   of   Local   Collectivites,   flood   management   is   under   the   general   prerogatives   of   Local   collectivities222.     Confusion   seizes   the   country,   a   few   months   only   ahead   of   another   rainy   season   which  local  populations  of  Dakar,  still  knee-­‐deep  in  last  year’s  waters,  are  dreading.     The  reaction  from  constitutionalists  in  Senegal  and  opposition  is  furious.  On  June  4,   PIT   opposition   party   leader   calls   to   Resistance   against   the   Executive   power’s   attempts   to   devolve   flood   management   to   local   collectivities   and   cut   off   fund   supplies   to   them.   “Flood   management   has   always   been   devolved   to   the   State”   (mentioning  the  Plan  ORSEC  and  Jaxaay  plans  as  evidence),  Why  suddenly  change?   And  mostly,  right  after  defeats  during  local  elections?”  (Amath  Dansokho  223 ).     Constitutional   lawyers   countrywide   dissect   the   issue.   Abdoulaye   Mattar   Diop,   former   minister   in   the   Socialist   regime   and   prominent   political   figure   states   that:   “The   debate   over   flood   responsibility   is   childish.   We   don’t   need   a   dictionary   to   fathom   that   flood   management   is   a   responsibility   of   the   State.   The   1996   decentralization  Laws  (Code  of  local  collectives  organizing  responsibilities  of  rural   communities,  municipalities  and  districts),  are  very  clear:  Article  125  only  mentions   floods,  and  instates  local  collectivities  to  endeavor  preventive  measures.  There  is  no   talk   of   evacuation   of   rainwaters   there.   Furthermore   by   tradition,   the   government                                                                                                                  
221    Le  Quotidien,  June  9  2009   222  Walfadjri,  9  June  2009   223  Ibidem  

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has   addressed   floods.   We   remember   Abdoulaye   Wade’s   epic   declaration   at   the   height  of  the  2005  floods,  where  he  recalled  his  then  PM,  Idrissa  Seck,   and  declared   that  the  Government  will  no  longer  be  taking  vacations  in  August  because  that  is  the   critical   time   of   the   rainy   season   when   populations   need   us   most”.   Mr.   Diop   continues   to   note   when   local   collectivities   were   in   the   hands   of   the   liberal   regime,   this  issue  of  decentralized  flood  management  responsibilities  was  never  raised224 .     The  reaction  from  flood  victims  in  Dakar  was  furious  too.  On  June  4:  Right  before  the   beginning   of   rainy   season,   Djeddah   Thiaroye   Kao   residents,   organized   in   a   Community-­‐based   Organization   named   ADDAD,   march   to   demand   that   central   State   government   take   action.     Not   reassured   by   Interior   Minister’s   announcement   that   Local   collectivities   are   the   sole   responsible   parties   for   flood   management,   they   demand   State   intervention   and   provision   of   water   evacuation   infrastructure   and   sanitation   equipment   (water   pumps):   “we   are   not   frogs!   We   demand   water   evacuation   equipment   and   water   pumps”.   Aliou   Sow,   then   Minister   of   Decentralization   and   Local   Collectivities,   reassures   them   the   State   will   be   by   their   side225;   Aliou   Sow   days   later   however   retracts   himself   to   corroborate   the   Prime   Minister’s   announcement   that   flood   management   is   the   responsibility   of   local   governments.     On   June   29   2009,   after   letting   the   polemic   go   on   for   a   month,   Abdoulaye   Wade   during   his   weekly   Counsel   of   Ministers,   announces   that   he   “instructed   the   Prime   Minister   to   support   the   action   of   local   collectivities   in   the   capital   in   favor   of   populations”  regarding  flood  relief  and  preparations.  Thus,  the  President  reasserted   Government’s  role  and  responsibility  to  manage  floods  “The  State  must  continue  to   play   its   role,   assuming   fully   its   responsibilities   in   the   cohabitation   of   competences”226                                                                                                                      
224  Walfadrji,  June  22  2010   225  Walfadjri,  June  4  2009     226  Le  Quotidien,  30  June  2009  

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While  the  constitutional  polemic  over  flood  management  responsibilities  was  raging   on,   the   West   Africa   rainfall   seasonal   forecast   for   the   June-­‐September   season   rainy   season   was   released,   warning   of   possible   below-­‐normal   rainfall   relative   to   2008:   “rainfall  will  be  less  abundant  than  last  year”227.     In   August   2009,   flash   floods   strike   again.   Rains   may   have   been   less   than   those   of   2008,  but  they  were  still  enough  to  trigger  major  flood  disasters;  this  time,  above-­‐ normal   rainfall   impacted   other   locations   across   the   country,   but   Dakar’s   suburbs,   still   reeling   from   past   year   flood   impacts,   remained   hardest   hit.   On   August   26,   severe   floods   hit   Dakar.   Neighborhoods   of   Almadies   and   Grand   Medine   (in   central   Dakar,   not   the   suburbs)   are   under   water.   The   Patte   d’Oie   retention   basin   is   submerged,   and   floodwaters   take   over   the   main   roads   and   oil   stations.   The   Diameguene   retention   basin   floods   and   spills   out   onto   the   principal   national   highway.  It’s  the  deluge  in  Dakar.  Flood  disasters  ensue  in  other  regions  across  the   country  as  well:  in  Mbour  where  a  record  137mm  of  rainfall  fell  in  a  day,  Bambey,   Touba,  Kaolack...  It  is  a  full-­‐fledged  flood  disaster228     Impacts   of   the   2009   floods   also   reverberate   on   the   academic   year.   Indeed   many   schools   are   flooded   still   in   end   September,   while   served   as   temporary   relocation   grounds   for   flood   victims   who   would   not   leave   once   the   schools   re-­‐opened.   The   2009-­‐2010  academic  year  was  delayed  as  a  resulted.     As   a   result,   many   people   begin   to   discredit   climate   forecasts.   Were   the   seasonal   forecasts  wrong  for  2009,  or  did  Dakar  indeed  receive  less  rain  relative  to  2008,  but   the  accumulation  of  rain  waters  and  the  gradual  saturation  of  Dakar’s  groundwater   table  (return  of  old  lakes  from  the  1970s)  caused  flooding  nonetheless?        

                                                                                                               
227  Walfadjri,  12  June  2009   228  Le  Quotidien,  26  August  2009  

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On   August   29,   faced   with   the   severity   of   the   flooding,   the   National   ORSEC   Plan   is   triggered.  2  billion  CFA  francs  are  disbursed  by  the  Central  Government  to  support   in  ORSEC  Plan  in  2009,  with  provisions  for  disbursement  every  year  thereafter.       Yet   the   sentiment   of   neglect   from   Dakar   suburbs   flooded   victims   could   not   be   shaken   off.   In   Gounass,   Boune,   Keur   Massar,   the   administration   was   invisible   on   the   field;   despite   the   2   billions   they   hear   were   disbursed   to   combat   floods   and   organize   firefighting   activities.   The   motive?   Populations   are   convinced   this   is   in   retribution   for   their   non-­‐vote   for   Wade   during   municipal   elections,   where   populations   voted   massively  for  the  opposition  alliance  of  Benno229.     Furthermore,   of   the   2   billion   CFA   francs   set   aside   for   the   ORSEC   Plan,   the   Firefighters  Administration  only  received  125  millions230.  Rumors  of  corruption  and   fraud   on   ORSEC   funds   stained   the   reputation   and   credibility   of   the   ORSEC   process231 .  In  light  of  the  local  protests,  the  Prime  Minister  is  advised  to  cancel  his   visit  of  sympathy  to  suburbs  to  thwart  risk  of  stoning232 .     2010:  Floods  hit  again;  ex-­ante  flood  preparedness  begins  in  earnest     In  2010,  floods  again  hit,  not  giving  respite  to  the  suburbs  of  Dakar,  Joal,  Mbour  or    Thies  reeling  from  the  impacts  of  yearly  floods  since  2005.         On  14  January  during  the  Counsel  of  Ministers,  Abdoulaye  Wade  declares  that  flood   zones  are  a  real  danger  for  populations  that  have  chosen  to  erect  houses  therein.  The   president   announces   a   draft   law   that   would   determine   the   areas   that   will   not   be   authorized  for  the  construction  of  houses233 .  Three  months  later,  on  March  18,  the   President  instructs  to  make  the  fight  against  floods  a  national  priority.  This  marks                                                                                                                  
229  Le  Quotidien,  26  August  2009   230  Le  Quotidien,  26  August  2009   231  Expert  Interview,  2011   232  Le  Quotidien,  26  August  2009   233  Le  Soleil,  15  January  2010  

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the  beginning  of  the  era  when  Government  decides  to  take  flood  disaster  prevention   and  risk  management  seriously.     In  April,  the  National  Committee  for  the  Fight  against  floods  meets  at  a  Saly  seaside   resort   to   elaborate   the   Program   for   the   definite   eradication   of   Floods,   with   a   host   of   activities   on   schedule:   rehabilitation   and   revitalization   of   old   natural   lakes,   inter-­‐ linking  of  basins  and  lakes  using  canals,  construction  of  underground  water  passage   ways,  new  resettlement  sites/tents  and  pre-­‐made  housing  in  Tivavouane  Peulh  and   Thiaroye/sangalkam,   additional   water   pumps.   Total   cost   of   this   new   initiative   is   estimated  167  Billions234.     In   May   20,   two   important   meetings   take   place   simultaneously   at   the   local   and   highest   policy   levels.   First   is   an   Inter-­‐ministerial   committee   held   on   flood   prevention;  at  the  end  of  it  8.7  billons  are  set  aside  for  pumping  and  connection  of   basins   and   lakes.   This   was   the   first   time   that   an   Inter-­‐ministerial   committee   was   ever  convened  on  the  topic  of  ex-­ante  flood  disaster  prevention,  and  that  money  was   set   aside   before   the   flood   disaster.   Simultaneously,   in   Pikine,   recurrent   flooding   hotspot,  the  local  development  committee  was  also  meeting  on  the  topic  of  how  to   prevent  flood  disasters  during  the  2011  rainy  season235.     As   a   result   of   the   Inter-­‐Ministerial   committee,   in   end,   pro-­‐active   flood   preparedness   activities   began   in   earnest,   two   months   ahead   of   the   rainy   season.   A   second   high   level  Inter-­‐ministerial  meeting  is  held  on  Flood  prevention,  during  which  the  Prime   Minister   decrees   that   the   army   will   be   mobilized   to   support   the   resettlement   of   inhabitants   of   flood   zones,   pumping   of   water   basins   and   evacuation   of   waters   to   the   sea,   and   to   help   in   the   construction   of   major   works,   namely   new   canals   linking   different  water  retention  basins  in  the  Suburbs  to  adjoining  lakes,  that  will  then  be  

                                                                                                               
234  Le  Soleil,  July  26  2010   235  Le  Soleil,  May  20  2010  

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srained   into   the   nearby   Ocean.   The   total   price   tag   for   this   operation   is   9.2   billion   CFA  francs236.     Flood   prevention   and   finding   “durable   definitive   solutions   to   recurrent   flooding”   now  makes  headline  news.  Le  Soleil  (government  paper)  dedicates  its  entire  special   supplement  to  the  issue  in  its  June  3  2010  edition.  Ill  urbanization,  changing  climate   patterns   (old   lakes   and   water   passages   claiming   their   old   territory   again)   and   history  of  ill  occupation  of  flood  plains  are  heralded  as  culprits.  The  focus  of  the  day   is  on  the  definitive  eradication  of  floods  in  Dakar,  and  a  complete  media  and  popular   campaign   is   launched   to   win   the   hearts   and   minds   to   this   new   endeavor.   The   government’s  campaign  against  floods  is  widely  highlighted  and  publicized.     The  State  was  finally  realizing  that  floods  could  make  its  regime  fall,  and  that  they   needed  to  address  the  issue237.    

 
Picture  6.5:  Abdoulaye  Wade’s  caravan,  half  in  flood  waters,  during  a  sympathy  visit  to  Dakar   suburbs  flood  victims  (Le  Quotidien,  15  May  2009).  

                                                                                                                 
236  Le  Soleil,  May  28,  2011   237  Expert  interview,  2011  

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In   July   26,   as   the   first   effects   of   the   2010   flooding   set   in,   an   Emergency   Inter-­‐ ministerial   counsel   on   flooding   was   held,   to   find   solutions   and   position   temporary   shelter   for   the   victims.   Prime   Minister,   Ndene   Ndiaye   proposes   pre-­‐made   houses,   to   be  delivered  in  6  weeks  to  relieve  flood  victims238.     On   August   17,   35   to   58mm   of   rainwater   register   in   Pikine   district;   Aghrymet,   the   regional  forecasting  authority,  alerts  on  possible  overflowing  of  the  Senegal  River239.   On  August  19,  “Dakar  is  under  siege!”  headlines  Sud  Quotidien,  a  Dakar  independent   daily.   Diluvian   rains   hit   Dakar   and   its   suburbs.   The   road   tunnel   built   by   President   Wade’s  son,  Karim,  is  submerged  by  the  floodwaters.  This  is  a  point  of  irony  which   all   local   papers   pick   up   on   –built   in   preparation   for   the   2008   Islamic   Organization   Meeting   held   in   Dakar,   for   which   Wade   put   his   son   forward   entrusting   him   with   increasing   national   responsibilities,   the   tunnel   cost   a   total   cost   22   billion   of   national   francs,  double  the  amount  needed  to  solution  Dakar’s  flooding  problem.  By  August   20,  Dakar  and  its  suburbs  are  under  water240.  As  squatters  –flood  evicted  victims–   linger  on  school  grounds,  schools’  opening  are  delayed  once  again.     The   opposition   coalition,   Benoo,   stages   a   protest   march   to   denounce   the   government’s   poor   management   of   floods   and   recurrent   power   cuts   beginning   in   Senegal241.  

                                                                                                               
238  Sud  Quotidien,  July  7  2010   239  Sud  Quotidien,  August  17  2010   240  Sud  Quotidien,  20  August  2010   241  Walfadjri,  July  30  2010  

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Photo  6.3:     Drowning  car  in   Rufisque,  during  the   2010  floods,    and   stranded  people  in   the  background.   Source:  Sud   Quotidien,  August   19,  2010    

     2011:  Population  still  in  flood  waters  

 

Though   2011   is   not   included   in   our   analysis,   we   review   the   outcome   of   the   Government’s  budding  flood  prevention  measures  endeavored  in  2010.  On  January   6  2011,  close  to  4months  after  the  end  of  the  rainy  season,  populations  of  Dakar’s   suburbs   are   still   at   risk242 .   Pumping   in   retention   basins   has   stopped,   basins   are   replete,   and   the   water   table   in   Dakar’s   suburbs   is   increasingly   filling   up   causing   septic  tanks  to  retch  out  onto  houses.  Populations  are  afraid  of  a  cholera  outbreak.   They   resort   to   defecation   pots   for   their   natural   needs.   Furthermore,   the   roads   destroyed   by   floods   make   life   a   nightmare   for   drivers   and   populations   alike   commuting   between   Dakar   and   suburbs,   or   anyone   leaving   Dakar.     This   is   a   particular  hardship  for  the  proletariat  classes  that  have  to  go  into  Dakar  every  day   for  work.    

                                                                                                               
242  Le  PoPulaire,  Jan  6  2011  

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Picture  6.4:  Months  after  the  rainy  season  ends,  flood  victims  in  Dakar’s  suburbs  still  under   water.  Source:  Le  Populaire,  Jan  6  2011      

6.3.2 Analysis:  Senegal’s  Flood  crisis  management  in  review     As  a  cursory  reading  of  section  6.3.1  demonstrates,  Senegal’s  policy  towards  HMDs   is   one   of   response   to   flood   crises,   one   that   we   can   characterize   as   inefficient,   disorganized,  as  well  as  ad-­‐hoc  and  delayed.  There  is,  by  and  large,  no  preparedness   in   practice,   and   disaster   preparedness   seems   inexistent   in   light   of   the   nature   of   responses  provided  to  each  flood  shock  that  has  occurred  between  1995-­‐2010.     It   clearly   emanates   from   our   review   of   public   responses   to   flooding   that   only   two   stand   out   as   drafts   of   long-­‐term   solutions   to   permanently   resolve   the   issue   of   flooding  in  Senegal:  the  Jaxaay  Plan  in  2005  and  geotechnical  works  endeavored  in   2010.  We  analyze  their  adequacy  in  light  of  the  severity  of  the  floods  that  took  place.   •   187  

  

2005:  The  Jaxaay  resettlement  Plan  

The  Jaxaay  Plan  started  off  as  a  very  innovative  solution  to  end  flooding  in  Dakar’s   suburbs.   Residents   initially   hailed   Plan   Jaxaay   as   their   savior;   however,   they   soon   became   disillusioned   with   it   as   little   progress   was   made.   Four   years   after   the   beginning   of   the   plan,   the   Senegalese   consider   Plan   Jaxaay   a   failure,   and   many   of   those  whom  it  was  supposed  to  help  blame  it  for  worsening  their  position243.  A  little   over   1000   of   the   3000   planned   homes   have   been   completed,   and   the   retention   basins   planned   for   the   flood-­‐prone   communities   have   been   abandoned   in   various   stages  of  completion.  The  public  blames  corruption  for  the  poor  progress  made  on   Plan  Jaxaay,  which  did  probably  contribute  to  the  depletion  of  project  funds.         For   instance,   when   the   2005   flood   victims   who   had   preferred   to   return   to   their   homes   after   2005   (for   various   reasons),   were   faced   with   flooding   again   in   2008   floods,  many  wanted  to  claim  their  old  Jaxaay  house  allocation  back;  however  they   found   their   old   attributed   homes   had   been   given   away.   30   houses   had   been   given   away  by  Abdoulaye  Wade’s  son  agency  for  the  Organization  of  the  Islamic  Summit  in   Dakar  (ANOCI)  to  resettled  residents  who  lived  behind  presidency244.     Among  the  reasons  why  flood  victims  did  not  rally  the  Jaxaay  homes,  and  preferred   to  stay  in  their  old  flooded  homes  are  the  fact  that  Jaxaay  homes  were  2  bedroom   homes,   whereas   the   average   family   size   in   Senegal   of   10people;   this   was   highly   inadequate  and  led  to  dislocated  families.  Isolation  and  distance  from  Dakar,  work   hub  where  suburbian  proletariat  has  its  professional  activities  clustered,  were  also   factors.   Furthermore,   the   paucity   of   social   infrastructures   in   Jaxaay   city,   added   to   the  fact  that  flood  victims  were  asked  to  abandon  25-­‐30  years  of  their  life,  and  the   lack   of   systematic   destruction   of   old   flooded   houses   and   their  

                                                                                                                243  Boudreau,  Laura,  Flood  Management  in  Senegal:  Past,  Present,  and  Future  
244  Le  Quotidien,  15  May  2009  

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transformation/valorization   into   lakes   and   parks,   all   made   it   so   that   did   not   go   to   the  Jaxaay  homes,  preferring  to  stay  in  their  old  houses,  feet  under  water.     As   of   June   3   2010,   the   government   claims   that   1763   houses   (out   of   the   3000   planned)  were  finalized  and  delivered245,  with  2012  houses  close  to  finished.  In  sum   between  2005-­‐2010  over  45  billion  CFA  francs  were  spent  on  Jaxaay,  parcels  ceded   for   5million   to   each   owner   payable   over   20years,   Jaxaay   city   equipped   with   high   school,  waterways,  health  center  and  electricity246.     The   failure   of   the   government   to   follow   through   on   Plan   Jaxaay   has   had   the   disheartening   effect   of   causing   Dakar   suburbs   residents   to   loose   trust   in   the   Senegalese  government.          “The   ORSEC   Plan   is   a   great   Plan   on   paper,   but   in   practice   it   faces   a   plethora   of   difficulties   in   its   execution:   financial,   political   and   human   blockages”247 .   DCP   staff   themselves,  in  charge  of  executing  the  Plan,  admit  these  difficulties.     Between   2008-­‐2010,   a   total   of   6   billions   CFA   have   been   injected   into   relief   operations.   “Every   time   the   ORSEC   Plan   is   triggered,   the   Finance   Ministry   puts   at   our  disposal  2  billions  to  conduct  operations”  (Becaye  Diop,  Minister  of  Interior  in   Le  Soleil,  26  July  2010)248.       Not   all   this   money   reaches   the   implementers   of   the   Plan   however,   most   likely   because   of   corruption   and   diversion   of   funds249.   In   2008   for   instance,   300   million   were   disbursed   for   ORSEC,   but   only   125million   reached   the   administrator   of   the                                                                                                                  
245  Le  Soleil,  June  3  2010   246  Le  Soleil,  July  26  2010   247  DCP,  Activities  2001-­2010   248  Le  Soleil,  26  July  2010   249  Expert  interview,  2011  

The  ORSEC  Plan  

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National   firefighters   grouping.   Furthermore,   most   of   the   disbursed   funds   went   to   buying   diesel   for   the   operation   of   water   pumps.   In   2009   as   well,   money   went   to   repair  broken  water  pumps.  Paraphrasing  the  words  of  a  popular  newspaper,  ‘The   ORSEC  plan  is  broken’250.     It  has  also  come  to  be  called  the  “Plan  Weurseuk”,  meaning  the  Plan  of  Good  Luck,   because   every   time   it   is   triggered,   a   number   of   government   officials   seem   to   be   able   to   build   two-­‐story   buildings   overnight   and   buy   luxury   cars.   “The   rodents   around   flood   management   are   NOT   looking   forward   to   a   durable   solution   to   the   issue   of   floods:   they   thrive   on   the   chaos.   It   is   difficult   to   have   a   Long-­‐term   vision,   define   coherent   strategies   and   get   country   on   dry   land   when   you   thrive   on   the   money   destined  to  the  disaster  victims  and  cash  in  every  time  there  is  a  disaster”251.     These   corruption   allegations   cannot   be   confirmed,   however   they   pose   a   credible   hypothesis  to  explain  the  lack  of  a  coherent  exit  strategy  out  of  recurrent  floods  in   Senegal,  even  when  a  major  electoral  bastion  (such  as  Dakar’s  suburbs)  is  at  risk.     Furthermore,   an   anecdote   during   the   2009   floods   is   revealing   of   the   lack   of   institutional  appropriation  of  the  ORSEC  Plan.  In  2009,  Abdoulaye  Wade  was  absent   on   annual   holiday   in   August,   the   height   of   the   flood   season,   and   the   Minister   of   Interior,  Becaye  Diop,  did  not  even  dare  trigger  the  National  ORSEC  plan  in  Wade’s   absence.   “You   want   me   to   get   fired?’’   he   retorted   to   one   request   to   trigger   the   national  ORSEC252.  The  then  Minister  of  Interior  during  2009   floods,   had   to   wait   for   the   return   of   the   President,   who   was   on   vacation   in   Switzerland,   since   only   his   chief   of  staff  had  received  instructions  allowing  him  to  call  him  in  Switzerland.     Such   an   episode,   though   anecdotal,   demonstrates   the   extent   of   personalization   of   the  Senegalese  political  system,  which  is  in  effect  centered  around  one  person,  the                                                                                                                  
250  Le  Quotidien,  26  August  2009   251  Expert  interview,  2011   252  Expert  interview,  2011  

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Supreme   leader,   and   is   in   practice   run   as   a   one-­‐man   show.   This   corroborates   the   literature   on   Neo-­‐patrimonialism   ran   on   African   States   to   which   Senegal   is   no   exception.       In  time  of  crisis,  when  leadership  and  strong  institutions  are  most  needed,  is  when   the  vacuum  of  functioning  and  appropriated  institutions  becomes  most  salient.  The   unfolding   of   flood   events   in   Senegal,   and   government’s   poor   inadequate   response   demonstrates  it.      Conclusion:  which  determinant  factors  thwart  institutional  change?     A   review   of   Senegal’s   response   to   flood   crises   between   1995-­‐2010   –since   national   policy   is   reduced   to   just   that:   ex-­‐post   hurried   responses   to   flood   events   wherever   they  occurred,  according  to  where  political  tension  was  most  rife  and  urgent,  with   no  thought  for  pre-­‐established  protocol  or  action  plans,  and  poor  ability  for  effective   disaster   planning,   response   and   rehabilitation   –reveals   an   interesting   tale   of   political  motivations  and  a  non-­‐responsive  central  State  non-­‐committed  to  facing  an   issue  of  rising  importance,  until  it  could  no  longer  be  avoided.  It  demonstrates  how   intertwined  climate  crisis  management  is  with  politics,  and  the  political  treatment  of   crises  only  when  they  compromise  political  interests.     In   2003,   the   Saint   Louis   breach   was   opened   only   when   floods   became   an   issue   threatening   the   city.   However   breach   was   not   a   long-­‐term   solution,   but   rather   a   publicity   spot   that   got   political   results,   appeasing   rising   grievances   by   Saint   Louis   populations,   but   did   not   really   solve   the   issue   of   flooding.   As   proof:   severe   floods   recurred  in  Saint-­‐Louis  in  2010.  Political  disaffection  there  could  have  motivated  the   State’s  response.         Furthermore,   the   fact   that   the   State   devised   a   solution   that   resolved   only   the   problems   of   the   city   dwellers   of   Saint-­‐Louis,   at   the   cost   of   aggravating   the   environmental  challenges  of  neighboring  rural  communities  around  Saint-­‐Louis  (for   • 191    

instance,   Doune   Baba   Dieye   residents)   exposed   by   the   engineered   Langue   de   Babarie  Breach  opening  to  destructive  Atlantic  Ocean  tidal  incursions,  also  appears   consistent  with  the  claims  that  State  only  reacts  when  a  key  electoral  bastion  is  at   risk.   Those   were   the   early   days   of   the   Wade   honeymoon   with   his   people,   and   he   could  not  fall  short  of  the  expectations  from  his  new  regime  in  a  city  as  important  as   Saint-­‐Louis.     In   2005   following   the   Dakar   floods,   the   Jaxaay   plan   was   launched.   Politicians   jumped  on  this  opportunity,  in  a  context  of  high  loss  of  political  ground,  to  postpone   legislative  elections.  Retention  basins  were  built,  however  these  basins  are  reported   to  have  filled  up  as  early  as  the  next  year253  (Expert  interview,  2011).  This  was  not  a   durable   solution   either;   rather   it   appears   as   though   the   Government   simply   was   trying  to  appease  contention.     In   2009,   after   three   years   of   relative   calm   when   flood   preparedness   got   off   the   national   agenda,   further   floods   occurred,   in   a   context   where   municipalities   fell   to   the   opposition.   Government’s   response   here   is   interesting.   In   order   to   enervate   a   newly   empowered   political   opposition   that   had   won   all   of   the   municipal   election   seats,   the   central   ruling   Government   tried   to   dodge   its   responsibilities   for   flood   management,  using  the  decentralization  scapegoat,  to  claim  that  Sanitation  (implied   flood  management)  is  one  among  the  competences  decentralized  to  municipalities.   These  newly  elected  opposition  local  leaders  thus  ought  to  be  in  charge  of  the  well-­‐ being  and  security  of  their  local  municipalities.       However  this  strategy  backfired,  and  served  only  to  pit  local  flood  victims  against  a   government   which   they   found   increasingly   detached   from   their   immediate   needs   and  concerned  (living  in  green  stagnant  waters).  Faced  with  the  fury  of  the  victims   themselves  who  took  to  the  streets,  mostly  in  Dakar,  the  State  backed  down  on  this   decision,  and  reclaimed  its  responsibility  of  Flood  management.                                                                                                                  
253  Walfadjri,  9  June  2009  

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Just  as  the  State  did,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  opposition  also  instrumentalized   floods  and  attempted  to  use  them  as  political  capital.  Also  as  floods  intensified,  and   people  were  in  deep  distress,  we  saw  instances  of  flooding  used  as  political  capital   by   both   ruling   and   opposition   camps.   A   case   in   point   was   the   film   entitled   “Plan   Jaxaay!”   screened   at   opposition   party   house   in   2007,   in   order   to   discredit   Wade’s   regime   and   rally   the   people   to   demand   “financial   accountability”;   however   no   further   efforts   from   the   part   of   the   opposition   were   endeavored   to   find   real   solutions  for  local  communities.     Thus  the  State,  attempted  to  shirk  its  responsibilities  on  climate  crisis  management   until   the   issue   could   no   longer   be   evaded,   and   it   became  a  hot  potato  on  the  agenda.   As  commented  by  one  expert  interviewed,  the  State  came  to  the  realization  that  its   regime   could   fall   over   the   flood   issue254.   2010   marks   as   such   the   break   year   with   regards  to  flood  management  in  Dakar.  Indeed,  that  is  the  year  when  not  just  show   construction  works,  but  meaningful  long-­‐term  actions  began  to  be  posed  to  resolve   the   Dakar   flooding   problem.   For   instance,   upon   the   request   of   the   Department   of   Civil   Protection,   a   study   was   instigated   to   map   out   Dakar   suburbs’   hydrographic   network,   towards   a   feasibility   study   for   the   digging   of   canals   linking   the   5   former   natural  lakes  together,  to  reinstate  natural  (obstructed)  hydrographic  system.  This   project   was   in   addition   to   the   one   pursuing   continued   pumping   of   water   in   the   largest  lake  (Wouye)  for  drainage  of  excess  waters  into  the  nearby  ocean,  freeing  52   neighborhoods  of  Dakar  from  the  hell  of  stagnant  rainwater.  Thus,  it  is  noteworthy   that   in   2010,   Knowledge   began   to   be   utilized   to   inform   disaster   management   strategies  and  prevention,  a  major  innovation.     However  outside  of  Dakar:  no  change  in  policies  occurred.  In  Saint  Louis,  which  at   least   had   received   some   attention   in   2003,   the   ensuing   flood   events   garnered   no   public   attention   (notably   the   severe   2010   floods   for   which   government   refused   to   trigger   national   ORSEC   Plan).   Elsewhere   in   the   country,   in   rural   communities                                                                                                                  
254  Expert  interview,  2011  

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impacted   recurrently   (such   as   Malem   Hoddar)   no   actions   have   been   posed   to   address  those  citizens’  needs,  and  deliver  flood  risk  reduction  to  them  as  well.     From   this   analysis   we   see   a   trend   arising.   As   floods   intensified,   most   particularly   during   the   2005-­‐2010   period   when   floods   recurring   almost   yearly   became   an   omnipresent   strain   on   the   local   populations,   the   urgency   of   meaningful   flood   preparedness   actions   could   no   longer   shirked.   The   most   vocal   demands   for   such   action  (public  good  delivery)  from  the  Central  State  came  from  the  aggrieved  flood   victims   of   Dakar’s   suburbs,   who   faced   higher   densities   of   vulnerability   to   yearly   flooding   disasters,   and   were   better   mobilized   by   the   opposition.   The   central   Government   of   Senegal   could   no   longer   ignore   these   local   demands;   they   had   to   deliver  on  flood  preparedness  measures,  and  respond  to  popular  pressures,  which   they  finally  did  in  2010.  However  as  our  preliminary  review  of  the  outcome  of  the   2010   preparedness   measures   shows,   the   minute   the   State   can   get   away   with   no   longer  delivering  on  the  public  good,  it  will  (e.g.:  pumps  no  longer  function  4  months   after   flood   disaster,   while   populations   of   Pikine   still   at   risk   from   flood-­‐related   injuries  and  epidemics).     Thus  here,  THE  LOCAL  PRESSURE  AND  DEMAND  HYPOTHESIS  obtains.  Faced  with   repeated  strain  from  intensifying  HMDs  that  became  a  yearly  reality  in  Dakar  since   the   2005   record   flood,   which   in   turn   led   to   stronger   local   pressures   from   a   mobilized   and   aggrieved   local   population,   the   State   was   forced   to   act   on   Disaster   preparedness.  It  could  not  shirk  its  responsibilities  any  longer.       Also  pressure  from  donors,  including  the  World  Bank  with  whom  the  Government  of   Senegal   jointly   assessed   flood   damage   in   2009,   and   called   upon   yearly   to   contribute   to  flood  disaster  response  operations,  possibly  weighed  on  the  balance,  adding  in  an   additional   voice   to   demand   for   more   effective   and   rational   flood   management   measures  to  avoid  the  yearly  disasters.     •   194  

Finally,   our   analysis   also   suggests   an   ELECTORAL   BASTION   HYPOTHESIS.   In   15   years   of   flood   management   (1995-­‐2010),   flood   disaster   preparedness   was   only   delivered   to   two   cities:   Senegal   and   Saint-­‐Louis,   two   major   electoral   hubs   for   the   Wadist  regime.    This  theory  is  a  second-­‐order  one  however,  which  has  to  be  tested   more   systematically   and   rigorously   across   different   cases   within   Senegal,   and   outside,   using   data   on   electoral   results   in   search   for   systemic   correlations   with   areas   where   public   good   delivery   on   CCA-­‐DRR   was   forthcoming.   Furthermore,   a   counter-­‐argument  that  raises  concerns  on  the  validity  of  the  electoral  bastion  at  risk   theory   is   that   other   parts   of   Senegal,   somewhat   as   equally   important   electoral   bastions  (Thies  city  for  instance),  only  received  flood  response;  there  no  DRR-­‐CCA   measures  aligned  with  local  needs  were  forthcoming.       In  light  of  these  arguments,  the  first  theory  ‘local  pressure  and  demands  as  means  of   enacting   effective   CCA-­‐DRR   from   the   State,   appears   as   a   more   cogent   explanation   of   State’s  delivery  on  CCA-­‐DRR  measures.  In  2003,  a  Saint-­‐Louis  engineering  solution   to   flooding   was   delivered   as   a   result   of   local   demands   and   protests.   Long-­‐term   solutions   to   Pikine   flooding   were   also   endeavored   in   response   to   the   severity   of   the   floods   that   gripped   this   area   of   Dakar’s   suburbs   from   2005,   and   to   the   ensuing   popular  grievances  and  calls  for  State  action  therein.  The  State  as  such  only  appears   to   react   where   local   demand   is   rife.   However,   it   is   important   to   note   that   whereas   localized   solutions   to   Pikine   flooding   began   in   earnest   in   2010,   they   were   never   generalized   to   the   entire   country.   They   were   never   institutionalized   or   translated   into  nation  wide  policy  for  improved  effective  disaster  preparedness  and  relief.  This   confirms   our   theory   on   localized   popular   pressure   as   a   trigger;   and   begs   the   question  of  scale:  how  much  and  how  widespread  local  demand  is  needed  to  trigger   national  institutional  change  in  the  face  of  more  intensive  HMDs?     In  the  final  section  of  our  study,  we  bring  our  analysis  to  a  close  with  a  listing  of  all   the  factors  that  seem  to  have  come  into  play  in  Senegal’s  management  of  floods,  to   have  contributed  to  the  2010  inception  of  long-­‐term  flood  prevention  measures,  and   •   195  

the  notable  absence  of  such  plans  in  other  parts  of  the  country,  as  vulnerable  if  not   more.     6.4 Summary   of   Variables   that   Potentially   Explain   The   GoS’   Inability   to   Handle   Complex  Climate  Shocks  in  Senegal     Our   case   suggests   that   the   government   of   Senegal   does   not   manage   climate   crises   well;   rather   it   manages   these   in   an   ad-­‐hoc   fashion,   handles   crises   as   they   arrive,   running   from   one   to   another,   according   to   where   political   pressure   is   strongest;   without   any   foresight   or   effort   at   anticipating,   and   that   without   this   political   pressure,  they  will  not  act.     It  is  governing  through  response;  when  in  fact,  governing  is  the  art  of  planning.     Today  science  offers  ways  to  anticipate  climate  risks,  monitor  vulnerability  factors,   so   that   hazards   do   not   turn   into   full-­‐blown   disasters   that   disrupt   local   lives   livelihoods,  and  jeopardize  feeble  development  gains.  Yet,  it  is  unfortunate  to  note   that   the   government,   despite   availability   of   international   support,   is   unable   to   manage  climate  risks  well.     From   our   study,   the   main   systemic   factors   that   seem   to   explain   this   inability   and   obstruct   the   adoption   of   meaningful   long-­‐term   solutions   to   the   issue   of   recurrent   flooding,  is  the  lack  of  Political  will  to  tackle  the  issue  resolutely,  and  deliver  on  CCA-­‐ DRR.  Our  case  suggests  that  this  lack  of  political  is  caused  by:   1) Differing   timescales   between   needed   flood   interventions   and   political   rationales:   politicians   abide   by   a   political   rationale   (short   term,   electorally   motivated),   whereas   the   imperatives   and   policy   planning   needs   for   flood   prevention   are   in   the   long   term.     Indeed,   Politics   in   Senegal   as   in   many   other   neighboring   countries   is   the   medium   to   rise   from   nothingness   to   the   heights.   Politicians   have   a   short-­‐term   view   as   a   result  of  this,  and  will  pillage  public  coffers,  and  do  everything  necessary   • 196    

to   ensure   their   reelection/stay   in   power.   In   such   a   context,   long   term   planning  is  difficult.   2) Overpoliticization   and   instrumentalization   of   floods:   by   the   government   as  well  as  by  the  opposition  leaders   3) Corruption-­‐   Government   officials   thriving   on   corruption   around   inflowing   disaster   relief   money,   notably   during   the   Plan   ORSEC’s   implementation;     4) Institutional  vacuum:  institutions  exist  for  the  effective  preparedness  and   response   delivery   on   disasters,   but   they   do   not   come   to   life,   no   institutional  synergies  are  weaved  around  the  issue.  Existing  institutions   would  rather  send  a  fax  warning,  than  implement  innovative  strategies  to   get  the  information  to  vulnerable  communities  at  risk,  such  as  SMS       In  2010  however  a  shift  in  policy  occurred  in  Senegal’s  climate  crisis  management,   from   inefficient   delayed   ex-­‐post   response   to   the   seeds   of   a   disaster   prevention   strategy,  at  least  in  a  localized  turf  of  the  territory.       The  factors  that  seem  to  have  enabled  such  a  shift  are  as  follows:     1) A  key  electoral  bastion  was  at  risk:  Dakar’s  suburb  of  Pikine   It   could   be   that   Abdoulaye   Wade’s   regime   lost   2009   local   elections   as   a   result   of   cumulated   frustrations   from   populations   over   an   array   of   issues   (increasing   inflation,  the  Islamic  Summit  wastes,  permanent  electricity  shortages,  etc.);  however   it  is  clear  that  flood  grievances  played  an  important  role  as  well  in  Wade’s  defeat  at   elections  in  2009.     Thus   making   politicians’   incentives   align   with   CC   policy   planning   incentives   (build   political  interest  for  handling  issue)  seems  to  be  a  way  forward  to  force  government   to  implement  adequate  climate  crisis  management  policies.  It’s  been  demonstrated   to   work   in   Senegal,   when   Dakar’s   suburb   of   Pikine,   important   electoral   bastion   •   197  

became   at   risk,   the   government   took   on   the   issue   and   placed   it   on   the   national   agenda.     2) International  pressure  and  donor  funding  also  seemed  to  have  played  a  key   role.   Indeed,   the   World   Bank   2009   report   was   instrumental   in   bringing   the   State   in   front   of   its   responsibilities   after   2009;   furthermore   funding   from   the   UNDP  and  UN-­‐ISDR  enabled  capacity  building  to  place  the  issue  of  floods  on   the  agenda;     3) Finally,   the   most   important   lessons   from   this   case   is   that   once   the   flood   afflicted   populations   of   Pikine   took   their   grievances   in   their   own   hands,   in   the   streets   and   at   the   polls,   the   Government   had   no   other   choice   but   to   move   to  action.  The  government’s  defeat  at  the  2009  elections  served  as  eloquent   illustration   of   the   power   of   the   people   to   reclaim   their   destiny,   when   a   government  is  unresponsive  to  their  needs.     Will   this   policy   of   climate   crisis   prevention   be   sustained?   That   is   a   question   that   future  generations  of  scholars  researching  this  question,  as  more  and  more  disasters   hit  Senegal  and  the  rest  of  the  continent  and  climate  crises  prevention  moves  onto   national  agendas,  will  have  to  answer.     The  Senegal  case  suggests  a  pathway  for  institutional  change  to  effectively  address   the  challenge  of  intensifying  HMDs  however,  in  this  case  flooding  (see  fig.  6.6).  Our   next  investigation  next  takes  us  to  Uganda,  where  we  will  assess  whether  the  same   triggers  of  institutional  change  on  CCA-­‐DRR  hold.     It   is   important   to   note   the   limitations   of   the   present   study   are   that   the   floods   between   2008-­‐2010   are   the   most   documented   (a   total   of   30   newspaper   articles   between  2008-­‐2010),  and  as  such  received  more  attention  in  their  treatment.       •   198  

6.8   Pathway   of   Change   According   to   the   Senegal   Experience:   Enabling   Conditions   for   the   Adoption   of   Socially   Beneficial   Institutions   to   Address   the   Challenge  of  CCA-­DRR  

LOCAL   demand  for   effective  vlood   management      

Donor   support  

Political  will   to  address   CCA-­‐DRR    

 
Rise  in  HMD  
• 2005  massive   vlooding  in  Dakar   • 2008  food   • Floods  yearly   after  
Donor   Support  

Political  will   to  address   CCA-­‐DRR  

Rising   Popular   disaffection  

LOCAL   Demand  for   improved   vlood   management  

 
Fig.  6.6:  Pathway  of  Institution  Change  for  effective  Climate  Change  Governance,  based  on  the   Senegal   experience   of   managing   intensifying   floods,   1995-­2010.   Note:   Rise   in   Popular   disaffection   as   an   Intervening   Variable,   the   Independent   Variable   (nd   true   driver)   being   intensifying  HMD.  

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CHAPTER  7         UGANDA  COUNTRY  CHAPTER:     What  Triggered  Institutional  Change  on  CCA-­DRR  in  Uganda?       Our   investigation   of   national   triggers   of   institutional   change   in   the   face   of   rising   climate   hazards   now   takes   us   to   Uganda,   in   the   heart   of   East   Africa.   Uganda   was   selected   as   the   country   case   to   infer   for   the   Yellow   policy   group   of   ‘Prepared   Firefighters’,  the  efficient  responders  to  hydro-­‐meteorological  disasters  (HMDs).  Is   this  classification  verified  by  facts?  If  so,  what  factors  led  to  Uganda’s  transition  to   the  category  of  a  Prepared  Firefighter?     7.1  Country  Profile    

 
     Fig.  7.1:  Uganda  in  East  Africa  

  Embedded  in  the  Great  Lakes  Region  of  Center-­‐East  Africa,  Uganda  is  a  lush  green   country   of   rolling   hills   that   straddles   the   equator,   and   occupies   241,038   km2,   of   which   43,941   km2   of   open   water   and   swamps   (18.2%   of   the   country’s   total   area).   • 200    

Landlocked  and  bordered  in  the  North  by  Africa’s  youngest  Republic  of  South  Sudan,   in  the  east  by  Kenya,  in  the  West  by  Congo  (Zaire)  and  in  the  South  by  Tanzania  and   Rwanda,  Uganda  comprises  45%  of  the  world’s  second  largest  freshwater  lake,  and   Africa’s   largest   lake:   Lake   Victoria,   source   of   the   White   Nile   (see   fig.   7.1)   and   largest   inland  fishery  on  the  continent.     A  British  colony  until   its  independence  in  1962,  Uganda  is  often  referred  to  as  the   Pearl   of   Africa   for   its   natural   beauty.   Africa’s   fruit   basket   would   have   been   more   adequate.   With   humid   and   hot   equatorial   climate   throughout   the   year,   Uganda   is   endowed   with   two   rainy   seasons   in   the   year   (one   from   March   to   June,   while   the   second   season   is   from   August   to   November),   which   merge   into   one   long   rainy   season  as  you  move  northwards  from  the  equator.  Mean  annual  rainfall  ranges  from   700mm   in   the   drier   areas   to   about   1,500mm   in   the   humid   areas.   Most   parts   of   Uganda  are  also  in  altitude,  with  an  average  height  of  1,200m  above  sea  level.  The   lowest  altitude  is  620m  (in  the  Albert  Nile)  and  the  highest  altitude  (Mt.  Rwenzori   Peak)  is  5,110m  above  sea  level.       7.1.1 Vulnerability  Context     Uganda  is  a  low-­‐income  country  of  close  to  33  million  and  a  half  inhabitants,  with  a   low   GDP/capita   of   503   USD,   albeit   a   strong   annual   GDP   growth   rate   of   5.2%255.   Uganda   was   one   of   the   first   Sub-­‐Saharan   African   countries   to   embark   on   liberalization,   structural   reforms   and   pro-­‐market   policies   in   the   late   1980s,   at   the   end   of   its   Civil   war   in   1986,   which   firmly   instated   the   power   of   President   Yoweri   Museveni.   Since   then,   the   government   has   maintained   a   stable   macroeconomic   environment,  accelerated  growth  from  an  average  of  6.5%  in  the  1990s  to  over  7%   during  the  decade  of  the  2000s,  and  sustained  private-­‐sector  oriented  reforms  that   graduated  Uganda  into  a  mature  reformer  in  2006.  Uganda’s  growth  over  the  years                                                                                                                   •  

255  World  Development  Indicators,  2010/2011  

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has  remained  well  above  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa  average256.        However,  rapid  population  growth  over  the  years,  one  of  the  highest  in  the  world,   has  limited  the  distribution  of  the  fruits  of  growth,  driving  real  GDP  per  capita  down   to  its  current  levels.  Furthermore,  progress  in  primary  education  completion,  child   and  maternal  mortality,  access  to  reproductive  health  and  incidence  of  malaria  and   other   diseases   have   been   slow   (see   table   7.1).   Uganda’s   urbanization   rate   is   low   compared   to   other   African   countries,   with   over   80%   of   Uganda’s   population   still   rural   and   dependent   on   rain-­‐fed   agriculture257.   The   Ugandan   government   is   becoming   increasingly   concerned   about   this   uneven   progress   and   the   distinct   geographical   patterns   of   outcomes   in   health   and   education   resulting   from   unequal   access   to   services,   which   pose   challenges   to   Uganda’s   aspiration   to   become   a   middle-­‐income  country  within  one  generation.       Nonetheless,   strong   national   economic   growth   enabled   substantial   poverty   reduction   and   progress   towards   MDGs.   With   the   proportion   of   people   living   in   poverty   at   25   percent   in   2009/10,   Uganda   has   surpassed   the   2015   Millennium   Development   Goal   of   halving   the   56   percent   poverty   rate   recorded   in   1992/93258.   There  is  also  significant  progress  towards  reducing  the  share  of  population  suffering   from  hunger.  Uganda  may  achieve  the  goals  of  universal  primary  education,  gender   parity,   and   combating   HIV/AIDS   –which   was   also   slashed   from   a   record   29%   prevalence  rate  in  urban  areas  in  the  late  1980s  to  the  current  rate  of  6.5%,  through   strong   government   leadership,   broad-­‐based   partnerships   and   effective   public   education  campaigns259.       Thus,   while   Uganda   has   been   one   of   the   few   durable   success   stories   of   Africa,   its                                                                                                                  
256    World  Bank,  “Uganda  Country  Profile”,  accessed  Dec  1,  2011.  http://go.worldbank.org/8XKQR04V10   257    NAPA  Mozambique,  2007   258    World  Bank,  “Uganda  Country  Profile”   259  Avert  Uganda,  accessed  Dec  1,  2011.  http://www.avert.org/aids-­‐uganda.htm  

Development  challenges:  past  &  present    

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current  development  challenges  consist  of  sustaining  macroeconomic  stability  while   moving  the  economy  to  a  higher  productivity  level,  inclusive  of  all  regions  into  the   development  process.  Ensuring  equal  access  to  quality  social  services,  in  particular   education   and   health,   while   promoting   growth   through   infrastructure   investments   in  places  where  it  will  earn  the  highest  return  are  key  priorities260 .     One   of   the   country’s   newest   challenges   as   well   is   to   manage   its   resources,   in   particular  its  fast  growing  youthful  population  and  newly  discovered  oil.  According   to  the  World  Bank,  in  order  to  reap  the  demographic  dividend,  Uganda  must  invest   in  fertility  reduction,  quality  education  and  skills  development,  and  job  creation.  To   reap  the  oil  dividend,  Uganda  must  maximize  the  social  benefits  through  adequate   investment   and   prudent   macroeconomic   management   of   the   oil   sector,   as   well   as   transparency  and  management  of  expectations261.     Unfortunately,   perceived   mal-­‐governance   and   increase   in   corruption   threatens   to   deteriorate   Uganda’s   image   as   a   development   model   and   trustworthiness   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   its   development   partners   and   donors.   Indeed,   the   country   needs   to   decisively   address  increasing  petty  corruption,  the  perceived  growing  culture  of  impunity  for   grand  corruption  and  pervasive  “quiet  corruption”—the  failure  of  public  servants  to   deliver  goods  or  services  paid  for  by  governments—such  as  unchecked  teacher  and   health  worker  absenteeism262.     Uganda  remains  a  poor  country  with  a  low  level  human  development,  and  lies  in  the   lower  rungs  of  the  human  development  ladder,  classified  161st  out  of  187  countries   ranked  by  the  Human  Development  Index  ranking263.                                                                                                                  
261    Ibidem   262    Ibidem   263  The  United  Nations  Development  Program  Human  Development  Index  (HDI)  is  a  composite  index  measuring  

260    World  Bank,  “Uganda  Country  Profile”  

life  expectancy  at  birth,  adult  literacy  rate,  poverty,  gender  inequality,  sustainability  (impacts  of  natural   disasters  and  carbon  emissions  per  capita)  and  gross  domestic  product  per  capita,  to  provide  a  measure  of   countries’  human  development  levels.  

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Table:  Uganda’s  Development  Indicators   Country  size  (surface  area,  thousand  km2)   241.038   Human  Development  Index  Ranking   Low  (Rank  161)   Population  (million)   33.4   Population  growth  (%)   3.2   GDP  (current  US$)  (billions)   17.01   GDP  per  capita  (current  US$)   509   GDP  growth  (annual  %)   5.6   Income  share  held  by  lowest  20%   5.8  (2009  estimate)   Births  attended  by  skilled  health  staff  (%  of  total  births)   42  (2006  estimate)   Life  expectancy  at  birth,  total  (years)   53  (2009  estimate)   Mortality  rate,  under-­5  (per  1,000)   99   HIV  prevalence  (%  of  population  ages  15-­49)   6.5  (2009  estimate)   Literacy  rate,  youth  female  (%  of  females  age  group  15-­24)   85   Primary  completion  rate,  total  (%  of  relevant  age  group)   57   Mobile  cellular  subscriptions  (per  100  people)   38   Agricultural  land  (%  of  land  area)   70   Agriculture,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   24   Industry,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   25   Services,  etc.,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   50   Exports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)   24   Imports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)   34   Coastline  length  –area  at  risk  from  SLR   0  km  (landlocked)   Water  bodies  (%  of  total  land  area)   18.2   Total  Number  of  HMDs  (1960-­2011);  source:  CRED   29   %  change  in  average  number  of  HMDs     +7.7   (1960-­1994  vs.  1995-­2011)   (Exponential  rise)   Net  official  development  assistance  and  official  aid   1,786   received  (current  US$)  (millions)   (2009  estimate)  

 
Table  7.1:  World  Development  Indicators,  Uganda  (2010  est.,  unless  otherwise  noted)    

7.1.2 History  &  Political  Context     Uganda   features   a   diverse   ethnic   and   cultural   mosaic,   with   more   than   40   different   ethnic   groups   and   over   30   distinct   indigenous   languages264.   It   is   not   surprising   in                                                                                                                  
264   The   largest   ethnic   group   in   Uganda   is   the   Baganda,   comprising   about   17%   of   the   population,   and   located  

largely  in  the  central  region,  followed  by  the  Banyankole  and  Bahima  (10%),  the  Bakiga  (7%),  the  Banyarwanda   (6%),  the  Bunyoro  (3%)  and  the  Batoro  (3%)  in  the  southwest.  In  the  North  live  the  Langi  (6%)  and  the  Acholi   (5%).   In   the   northwest   are   the   Lugbara   (4%).   The   Karamojong   (2%)   occupy   the   considerably   drier,   largely   pastoral  territory  in  the  northeast.  In  the  east  dwell  the  Basoga  (8%)  and  the  Bagisu  (5%)  (US  State  Department   Background  Notes:  Uganda,  2011).  

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this   context   that   when   Ugandans   speak   about   “pluralism”,   they   think   of   ethnic   diversity.   Colonial   boundaries   grouped   diverse   ethnic   groups   that   had   distinctive   political  systems  and  territories.     When   Arab   traders   moved   inland   along   the   Indian   Ocean   coast   of   East   Africa   and   reached   the   interior   of   Uganda   in   the   1830s,   they   found   several   African   kingdoms   with   well-­‐developed   political   institutions   dating   back   several   centuries.   These   traders  were  followed  in  the  1860s  by  British  explorers  searching  for  the  source  of   the   Nile   River.   Protestant   missionaries   entered   the   country   in   1877,   followed   by   Catholic   missionaries   in   1879.    In   1888,   control   of   the   emerging   British   "sphere   of   interest"   in   East   Africa   was   assigned   by   royal   charter   to   the   Imperial   British   East   Africa   Company,   strengthened   in   1890   by   an   Anglo-­‐German   agreement   confirming   British   dominance   over   Kenya   and   Uganda.   In   1894,   the   Kingdom   of   Buganda   was   placed  under  British  protectorate265.    Institutional  soul-­searching  in  the  wake  of  the  new  nation  

In   1962,   the   country   became   independent   from   British   colonial   rule,   without   having   to  fight  for  it.  Indeed,  the  British  determined  a  timetable  for  withdrawal  before  local   groups  had  organized  an  effective  nationalist  movement.  Uganda's  political  parties   thus   emerged   in   response   to   impending   independence,   rather   than   as   a   means   of   winning   it266.   In   part   due   to   the   result   of   this   fairly   smooth   transition   to   independence,   the   near   absence   of   nationalism   among   Uganda's   diverse   ethnic   groups  led  to  a  series  of  political  compromises.     The   first   of   these   compromises   was   a   federal   government   composed   of   coalitions   of   local  and  regional  interest  groups,  loosely  organized  into  political  parties.  Following   the   Uganda   Constitutional   Conference   held   in   London   in   1961,   Uganda   achieved   internal   self-­‐government   and   organized   legislative   elections   in   March   1961.   A   first                                                                                                                  
265  US  State  Department  Background  Notes,  2011   266  Encyclopædia  Britannica  Online,  2011  

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institutional  solution  of  a  National  assembly  was  attempted  then,  headed  by  a  Chief   Minister,  Benedicto  Kiwanuka,  leader  of  the  Catholic  Democratic  Party.  However  in   April   1962,   new   elections   were   held   (where   turnout   was   higher   among   the   Buganda)   and   Kiwanuka   lost   to   a   coalition   of   the   Baganda   royalist   party,   Kabaka   Yekka,   and   Milton   Obote’s   Uganda   People’s   Congress   (with   support   mainly   from   the   West   and   North).   The   Chief   Minister   position   was   dissolved.   A   new   national   government   was   formed,   led   by   a   ceremonial   king,   and   presided   over   by   a   prime   minister  whose  principal  role  appeared  to  be  that  of  a  broker,  trading  patronage  and   development   projects-­‐-­‐such   as   roads,   schools,   and   dispensaries-­‐-­‐to   local   or   regional   interest   groups   in   return   for   political   support.   It   was   not   the   strong,   directive,   ideologically   clothed   central   government   desired   by   most   African   political   leaders,   but  it  functioned.  This  system  might  reasonably  have  been  expected  to  continue  to   function,  because  there  were  exchanges  and  payoffs  at  all  levels  and  to  all  regions.  In   the   wake   of   full   independence   on   October   9   1962,   Edward   Mutesa,   King   of   the   Buganda,   became   the   first   ceremonial   president   and   Milton   Obote,   the   first   executive  Prime  Minister.     Uganda   experienced   a   short-­‐lived   period   of   political   and   economic   stability   thereafter.   In   February   1966,   Prime   Minister   Milton   Obote   suspended   the   constitution   and   assumed   all   government   powers,   removing   the   positions   of   president   and   vice   president.   In   September   1967,   a   new   constitution   proclaimed   Uganda   a   Republic,   gave   the   president   even   greater   powers,   and   abolished   traditional  kingdoms.  This  marked  the  beginning  of  tyranny  and  oppression.        In   1971,   while   Obote   was   away   at   the   Commonwealth   Heads   of   State   meeting   in   Singapore,   then   army   officer   Idi   Amin   conducted   a   military   coup,   which   settled   Uganda   on   a   trajectory   of   violence,   terror   and   mismanagement,   and   reduced   the   The  reign  of  terror  

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country   to   a   failed   state   and   a   collapsed   economy267.   In   1972   notably,   Idy   Amin’s   regime  expelled  50,000  Asians,  the  largest  non-­‐indigenous  ethnic  group  in  Uganda,   who  had  been  engaged  in  trade,  industry,  and  various  professions,  and  seized  their   property   for   personal   gain.   The   legend   of   Idy   Amin’s   cruelty   and   dictatorship   extended  beyond  the  borders  of  Uganda,  when  he  invaded  Tanzania  to  distract  away   for  his  country’s  collapsing  economy.     Political  and  economic  turmoil  continued  between  1979  and  1985,  with  successive   coups,  one  of  which  ousted  Idy  Amin,  and  a  disputed  election  in  1980  that  brought   Milton   Obote   back   to   power   for   a   second   time,   and   led   to   civil   conflict   across   the   country.  In  1986,  the  National  Resistance  Army  (NRA),  led  by  Yoweri  Museveni,  took   power  after  a  coup  d’état.  Then  began  a  period  of  sustained  economic  and  political   renewal.   National   Resistance   Army   (NRA)   was   transformed   into   the   National   Resistance  Movement  (NRM),  and  a  one-­‐party  system  was  established.     During  the  first  decade  of  NRM  rule,  the  government  focused  on  reconstructing  the   economy  through  pro-­‐market  reforms  and  increasing  the  legitimacy  of  government   institutions   through   political   liberalization,   to   the   contentment   of   Uganda’s   new   strategic  partners,  the  US,  in  a  context  dominated  by  Cold  War  politics.       However,   in   1987   a   brutal   civil   war   erupted   in   Northern   Uganda,   waged   by   the   Lord’s   Resistance   Army   (LRA)   of   Joseph   Kony   who   mobilized   on   the   basis   of   Holy   Spirit   fanaticism,   preaching   among   frustrated   Northerners,   mainly   Acholi.   The   Acholi   since   Independence   had   felt   as   second-­‐class   citizens   sidelined   from   the   benefits   of   agricultural   development   and   growth,   centered   in   the   country’s   south.   The   civil   war   left   thousands   dead   and  millions   displaced,   constraining   economic   activity  and  entrenching  poverty  in  the  North.       After  twenty  years  of  protracted  peace  efforts,  the  LRA  was  pushed  out  of  Uganda  in                                                                                                                   •  

267    World  Bank,  “World  Bank,  “Uganda  Country  Profile”  

207  

2005.  Since  then,  there  have  been  no  major  security  incidents.  Economic  activity  has   resumed   in   northern   Uganda,   and   most   internally   displaced   persons   have   left   IDP   camps   and   returned   to   their   land.   This   greatly   contributed   to   the   reduction   in   poverty  from  60  percent  in  2005/06  to  45  percent  in  2009/10268.     Uganda  has  also  slowly  progressed  towards  multi-­‐party  democracy.  In  1995  a  new   constitution   was   promulgated,   opening   the   political   sphere   to   elections.   President   Museveni  was  elected  to  a  first  term  through  a  non-­‐party  election  in  1996.  He  was   re-­‐elected  in  a  contested  election  in  2001.  The  constitutional  amendments  approved   by   a   referendum   in   July   2005   introduced   multi-­‐partyism   and   Parliament   lifted   the   two  (5-­‐year)  presidential  term  limits,  which  allowed  President  Museveni  to  seek  a   third  term  in  office  and  his  NRM  Party  to  win  the  first  multi-­‐party  elections  in  2006.   On   February   28,   2011   President   Museveni   was   re-­‐elected   for   another   5-­‐year   term   after   garnering   68   percent   of   the   vote,   with   his   party   having   an   overwhelming   majority  in  Parliament.  Serving  his  25th  year  in  power,  President  Museveni  is  one  of   the  longest  serving  leaders  in  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa269.      Decentralization  Context  and  State  of  Accountability       Uganda  is  administratively  and  politically  subdivided  into  112  districts  (see  fig.  7.2),  

then   counties,   sub   counties   and   villages   as   the   lowest   political   administrative  unit.  Each  district  has  a  District  council,  a  Municipal  council  with  
Division   councils,   Town   councils   and   multiple   Sub   County   councils.   The   Chief   Administrative  Officer  (CAO)  heads  all  the  technical  teams  in  the  councils.  Below  the   CAO  at  the  district  level,  are  11  directorates  with  several  departments.  The  technical   teams   at   the   local   governments   are   headed   by   Administrative   Officers,   below   who   are   extension   officers.   The   political   arm   is   responsible   for   policy   implementation  

                                                                                                               
268    World  Bank,  “Uganda  Country  Profile”   269    Ibidem  

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208  

while  the  technical  teams  undertake  the  implementation  of  lawful  decisions  of  the   councils.  

         

 

Fig.  7.2:  Uganda’s  112  districts  in  the  four  regions  (Central,  East,  West  and  North).   Source:  Wikipedia  Commons,  2011.      

7.1.3 Vulnerability  To  Climate  Change  and  variability    

Uganda  is  a  country  highly  sensitive  to  both  longer-­‐term  Climate  change  and  annual   and  inter-­‐annual  climate  variability.         
Uganda’s   main   strength   is   that   it   is   richly   endowed   with   the   bounties   of   nature:   good   soils   and   biodiversity,  ample  vegetation  cover,  attractive  climate  and  abundant  water  resources.  In  some  areas,   these  gifts  of  nature  still  remain  intact,  thereby  availing  the  opportunity  to  utilize  them  sustainably270      

Physical  vulnerability    

                                                                                                                •  

270  Government  of  Uganda,  Vision  2025  

209  

Climate,   perhaps   Uganda’s   most   valuable   natural   resource,   is   the   most   neglected.   The  climate  of  Uganda  is  not  only  a  natural  resource,  but  a  key  determinant  of  the   status   of   other   natural   resources,   such   as   water   resources,   forest,   agriculture,   ecotourism  and  wildlife.       Uganda’s  climate  can  be  broadly  subdivided  into:   • Highland   climate:   cool   temperatures   (as   low   as   4   degrees   in   some   parts   of   the  highlands)  and  moderate  rainfall  (mean  annual  rainfall  of  over  900mm).   In  the  Rwenzori  Mountains,  which  have  a  permanent  ice  cap,  temperatures  of   below   0   degrees   Centigrade   are   experienced.   The   beauty   of   this   climate   zone   is  reflected  in  its  plentiful  waterfalls  as  illustrated  by  figure  7.3;   • Savannah   tropical   climate,   including   the   lake   basin   climate:   with   moderate   average   temperatures   of   28°   C   and   high   mean   annual   rainfall   of   over   1200mm.   The   tropical   rainforest   is   found   in   this   climate.   Swamps,   found   mostly  in  this  climatic  zone,  provide  an  excellent  habitat  for  birds;  the  most   notable  being  the  Crested  Crane,  national  bird  of  Uganda;   • Semi-­‐arid   climate,   with   relatively   high   average   temperatures,   ranging   from   26.3   to   29.0°   C   and   a   relatively   low   mean   annual   rainfall,   between   887  –   905   mm.  Animal  rearing  is  the  dominant  activity  in  this  climate.  The  high  animal   population   has   led   to   serious   land   degradation.   Although   the   mean   annual   rainfall  is  relatively  low,  some  drought-­‐tolerant  land  crops  can  still  grow.    

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210  

 
           Fig.  7.3:  Luzzi  waterfall,  Bulambuli  district,  one  of  the  multiple  waterfalls  in  the  highlands                  of  Mt.  Elgon  (Photo:  Arame  Tall)  

  Each   bioclimatic   region   thus   features   distinctive   climate-­‐determined   biotopes   and   environmental   conditions.   The   subdivision   of   the   Ugandan   climate   also   conditions   the  distribution  of  natural  resources  such  as  water,  forest  and  vegetation.  Uganda’s   great   climatic   diversity   explains   then   how   we   can   have   within   the   same   country   temperatures   below   0°C   on   the   mountain   ranges   of   Rwenzori   and   mount   Elgon   (Rwenzori   has   a   permanent   ice   cap),   while   Gulu,   Kitgum   and   Moroto   in   the   north   and  North  Eastern  part  of  the  country  can  experience  temperatures  over  30°C.    CLIMATIC  CHANGE   The  same  diversity  in  rainfall  regimes  is  also  true  (see  Figure  7.4)  

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211  

Fig.  7.4:  Mean  annual  rainfall  in  Uganda.  Source:  Uganda  Department  of  Meteorology.  

 

  One  particularly  fragile  ecosystem,  dependent  on  rainwater  for  human  consumption   and   production,   is   the   Cattle   Corridor   (see   fig.   7.5).   Stretching   from   the   northeast   to   the   southwest,   The   Cattle   Corridor   lies   in   the   semi-­‐arid   climate   zone,   and   is   predominantly   a   pastoralist   area.   The   prolonged   drought   of   1999/2000   caused   severe   water   shortage   in   this   area,   animal   loss,   decreased   milk   production,   food   insecurity  and  increased  food  prices.  Frequent  droughts  result  in  lowering  the  water   table  and  drying  boreholes.    

 
Fig.  7.5:  The  Cattle  Corridor  (shaded  brown).  Source:  NAPA,  2007.  

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  

Socio-­economic  vulnerability    

Natural   resources   constitute   the   primary   source   of   livelihood   for   the   majority   of   Ugandans.   Indeed,   the   economy   of   Uganda   depends   on   exploiting   its   natural   resources   and   will   remain   so   for   the   foreseeable   future   (See   Uganda   Vision   2025271 ;   also   Mozambique   NAPA   2007272).   Management   of   these   natural   resources   is   therefore   important   and   critical   to   Uganda’s   long-­‐term   development.   Forest   products   for   instance   (timber,   poles,   rattan,   bamboo,   food,   fodder,   medicine,   and   firewood)   and   services   (biodiversity   habitat,   moderation   of   micro-­‐climate,   shade/wind  breaks  for  enhancing  agricultural  productivity)  play  an  important  role   in   the   soco-­‐economic   development   of   Uganda,   contributing   6.1%   of   national   GDP.   Forests  are  especially  critical  to  rural  community  livelihoods.  Over  99%  of  Uganda’s   rural   people   use   wood   or   charcoal   as   fuel.   In   economic   terms,   the   work   by   subsistence   users   of   firewood   and   charcoal   is   equivalent   to   about   725,000   jobs273.   Similarly,  commercial  users  of  forest  products  provide  work  equivalent  to  120,000   jobs274.     High  Sensitivity  to  Rainfall  fluctuations     Social  and  economic  activities  in  Uganda  are  most  affected  by  rainfall  variations,  the   most   sensitive   climate   variable.   The   rainfall   regime   allows   two   planting   and   harvesting  seasons  a  year  in  most  parts  of  the  country,  without  the  use  of  irrigation.   Fig.   7.4   shows   mean   annual   rainfall   distribution   in   Uganda.   The   typically   wettest   districts   are   located   within   the   Lake   Victoria   Basin,   the   eastern   and   the   northwestern   parts   of   Uganda.   These   areas   include   Kalangala,   Kampala,   Mpigi,   Mukono,   Jinja,   part   of   Masaka   and   Bugiri   (Lake   Basin),   Mbale   and   Kapchorwa   (eastern)  and  Arua  (northwestern).  In  recent  years  however,  it  has  been  observed   that   rainfall   is   heavier   and   more   violent   on   the   one   hand;   on   the   other,   the   western,                                                                                                                  
271  Government  of  Uganda,  Vision  2025   272  Uganda  NAPA,  2007   273  Ibidem   274

 Moyini,  2005  

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213  

northern   and   northeastern   districts   are   experiencing   long   droughts,   which   are   becoming   more   frequent.   Increasingly   erratic   rainfall   coupled   with   increasing   frequency  of  droughts  has  made  Uganda  more  vulnerable  to  climate  changes275.     Water  resources   About   34%   of   the   country   is   covered   in   wetlands   with   a   dense   network   of   rivers,   lakes  and  swamps.    Indeed,  Uganda  has  abundant  water  resources,  with  up  to  15%   of  Uganda’s  total  area  covered  with  water  (80%  of  which  is  accounted  for  by  Lake   Victoria)   and   a   mean   annual   rainfall   ranging   from   700mm   in   drier   areas   to   about   1500mm   in   the   humid   areas.   However   its   distribution   is   not   even,   particularly   in   semi-­‐arid  areas.        The  semi-­‐arid  areas  of  the  country  experience  water  stress.  Prolonged  and  severe   droughts   led   to   lower   water   levels   in   rivers,   underground   aquifers   and   reservoirs,   affecting   the   hydrology,   biodiversity   and   water   supply.   The   severe   drought   of   2004/05  notably  contributed  to  the  reduction  of  the  Lake  and  Nile  River  levels  with   serious   impacts   on   power   generation,   leading   to   power   rationing   in   the   domestic   and   commercial   sectors,   and   resulting   in   the   interruption   of   economic   activities   and   to  a  decline  in  manufacturing  outputs276.     Furthermore,  the  rural  poor  depend  on  streams  and  swamps.  A  large  proportion  of   the  population  depends  on  streams,  which  tend  to  dry  up  during  droughts  causing   serious   water   stress   for   a   significant   proportion   of   rural   communities.   Water   scarcity   in   such   areas   has   resulted   in   population   movements   into   neighboring   districts  in  search  for  pasture  and  water.  These  movements  have  frequently  led  to   ethnic   conflicts   and   disruption   of   production,   affecting   community   development.   Water  scarcity  in  dry  lands  is  likely  to  worsen  with  CC277.                                                                                                                     275  Uganda  NAPA,  2007   276 Ibidem  
277

 Ibidem  

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214  

Agriculture   Agriculture  is  the  backbone  of  Uganda’s  economy.  It  constitutes  about  42%  of  GDP,   over   90%   of   export   earnings   and   employs   over   80%   of   the   labor   force.   Uganda’s   agriculture   however   is   subsistent,   rain-­‐fed   and,   therefore,   vulnerable   to   climate   variability   and   climate   change.   The   contribution   of   agriculture   to   total   GDP   has   decreased   from   45.7   percent   in   1995/96   to   41.5   percent   in   1999/00.   The   decline   in   agricultural   contribution   to   GDP   is   not   a   sign   of   a   diversified   economy,   but   due   to   the  impact  of  the  factors  that  influence  agricultural  production.  These  include  soils,   climate,   agricultural   implements,   management   practices   and   access   to   markets   (both   domestic   and   international).   The   decline   in   agricultural   production   is   also   partly   explained   by   the   1999/2000   drought   that   caused   severe   water   shortage   leading   to   animal   loss,   decreased   milk   production,   food   insecurity,   increased   food   prices  and  generally  negative  effects  on  the  economy.       Prolonged  droughts  can  have  serious  impacts  on  agricultural  production.  Even  long   dry   spells   during   the   rainy   season   are   sufficient   to   reduce   agricultural   production,   thus   seriously   impacting   livelihoods   of   rural   communities.   Poor   agricultural   production   has   direct   negative   effects   on   the   national   economy;   increasing   food   prices  and  resulting  into  inflation  and  an  unstable  macro-­‐economy,  which  not  only   discourages  foreign  investment  but  also  leads  to  frequent  health  breakdowns,  thus   affecting  production  and  decreasing  standards  of  living278.     Although  it  is  predicted  that  climate  change  will  likely  lead  to  increased  rainfall  in   Uganda279,   its   distribution   during   a   season   is   critical   to   agricultural   production.   Erratic   rain   seasons   have   been   observed   in   recent   few   years,   and   rainfall   seasons   have  been  more  variable.  Floods  have  led  to  waterlogged  fields  or  washing  away  of   crops.   Poor   people   frequently   settle   in   or   close   to   wetlands;   during   floods,   such   families   are   vulnerable   since   their   livelihood   source   is   no   longer   accessible   for                                                                                                                  
278

 Ibidem  

279

 Ibidem   • 215  

 

agricultural  production.     In  agriculture,  there  is  also  high  crop  sensitivity  to  temperature  increases,  the  most   likely  impact  of  global  Climate  Change.     Other   factors   that   make   the   sector   vulnerable,   beyond   climate   variability,   include   land   degradation,   following   subsistence   fallow   agriculture,   and   demographic   pressures   on   the   resource   base.   Indeed,   the   increase   in   human   population   has   increased  demand  for  food,  putting  additional  pressure  on  natural  ecosystems.     Non-­‐  traditional  crops  such  as  maize,  sesame  and  soya  beans  have  gained  value  in   the  last  ten  years,  which  has  enabled  farmers  to  make  a  choice  of  what  type  of  crop   to  grow  depending  on  demand,  thus  improving  their  incomes.       However   overall,   agricultural   performance   fluctuates   with   climate   variability   and   climate  change,  and  is  adversely  affected  by  rudimentary  means  of  production,  poor   markets   and   storage   facilities.   Any   serious   efforts   for   poverty   eradication   in   Uganda   will   have   to   target   the   agricultural   sector,   and   build   its   resilience   to   withstand   climate-­‐related  shocks.     Fishing   Fishing  is  a  key  sector  in  the  Ugandan  economy,  representing  over  80million  USD  in   2002,   as   well   as   source   of   food   for   the   population.   It   contributes   to   food   security,   increased  household  income  and  economic  growth.  It  is  estimated  that  over  200,000   people,   most   of   who   poor   men   and   women,   are   directly   involved   in   the   fishing   industry.   As   such   the   industry   is   particularly   sensitive   to   changes   in   sea   level   and   sea   temperatures,   driving   associated   modifications   in   upwelling   mechanisms   and   in   the  composition  of  marine  ecosystems  (and  consequently  fish  availability).     Health   •   216  

Uganda   is   characterized   by   high   vulnerability   to   water-­‐borne   epidemics   linked   to   flood   disasters   (malaria   and   cholera   chiefly).   Temperature   rise   would   have   significant  impacts  on  health  as  well  as  agriculture.  People  in  the  highlands  have  not   developed  immunity  for  malaria  and  have  therefore  been  susceptible  to  it.       7.1.4 Projected  Climate  Change  impacts,  across  timescales,  across  sectors       Climate  Change,  which  has  started  manifesting  itself  through  increased  frequency  of   extreme   weather   events,   such   as   droughts,   floods   and   landslides,   poses   a   serious   threat   to   Uganda’s   natural   resources,   as   well   as   its   socio-­‐economic   development.   The   events   of   the   past   few   years   clearly   illustrated   the   magnitude   of   the   problem.   Although  rigorous  and  detailed  vulnerability  and  adaptation  options  were  not  done   for  Uganda,  the  literature  review  of  empirical  information  and  observations  by  the   communities  surveyed  during  Uganda’s  NAPA  participatory  rural  appraisal  process   has  given  interesting  results280.      

 
Fig.  7.6:  Potential  impacts  of  temperature  rise  on  coffee  growing  

                                                                                                                280  Uganda  NAPA,  2007   •   217  

Current   temperatures   and   rainfall   permit   the   cultivation   of   coffee   in   most   parts   of   Uganda.   However,   an   increase   of   2   degrees   Centigrade   can   have   significant   impact   on   coffee   growing   (fig.   7.6).   Other   crops   like   cassava   and   soya   may   be   sensitive   to   temperature   increases.   Increase   in   temperatures   may   lead   to   emergence   of   new   pests.   There   is,   therefore,   need   to   orient   and   widen   the   research   focus   to   meet   future  challenges.     A  changing  climate  is  projected  to  impact  the  following  variables  and  sectors  most   decisively:         Table  7.2  summarizes  the  observed  and  projected  changes  on  each  variable.    
  Observed   Changes   HMDs   Increase  in   drought   frequency.  7   droughts   experienced   between   1991-­‐2000   (fig.  7.7-­‐8)     W estern,   northern  and   northeastern   districts   experiencing   long  and   increasingly   frequent   droughts     Increase  in   climate   variability       More   intense  and  
  

Hydro-­‐Meteorological  disasters  (HMDs)   Temperature   Rainfall  &  water  resources   Highlands  

Temperature   Previously   malaria-­‐free   highlands  are   now  invaded  by   malaria       Higher  yields  of   potatoes,   sorghum,  maize   and  wheat   reported  in  the   highland   ecosystems  of   Mbale,   Kapchorwa,   Kisoro  and   Kabale  
  

Rainfall     Rainfall  seasons   have  become   more  variable       Observed   heavier  and  more   violent  rainfall       Erratic  onset   and  cessation  of   rainfall  seasons  in   recent  years        
  

Projected   Climate   Change   impacts  

Increase  of  2°C   likely  to  have   dramatic  impact   on  coffee   growing  areas  
  

Highlands   Increase  in   intensities  and   frequency  of   heavy  rains,   floods,  landslides   in  highland  areas   and  outbreaks  of   waterborne   diseases.       Decreased  yield   of  certain  crops   (Arabica  coffee),   rise  in  the  yields   of  others   (potatoes,   sorghum,  maize   and  wheat)     Increased   Rwenzori  Mt.’s   rainfall  in  Uganda   permanent  ice   Consistent  with   cap  vulnerable  to   IPCCC  prediction   global  warming   that  wetter  areas  
  

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(see  fig.  7.6);   will  become   also  applies  to   wetter.     other  crops.       Likely     Temperature   exacerbation  of   rise  likely  to  lead   water  scarcity,   to  new   particularly  in   pests/diseases  &   semi-­‐arid  areas     change  in  crop     Projected  flood   growing  areas   increase  may     Possible  higher   pollute  sources  of   yields  for  crops   drinking  water   such  as  potatoes,   and  lead  to   with   outbreaks  of   indeterminate   waterborne   growth  habit,   diseases  (cholera,   provided  rising   typhoid,   Ts  do  not  exceed   dysentery),  with   optimum  T  for   the  poor  being   crop   most  affected   development     Projection   Low   Robust  for   Low   Low   Confidence   coffee;  Low   level   otherwise  with   large  remaining   uncertainties   Table  7.2:  Observed  and  Projected  climate  changes  in  Uganda.  Source:  NAPA,  2007  

frequent   extreme   weather   events   (drought,   flood,   landslides   and  heat   waves)     Dry   conditions   and  more   frequent,   prolonged   droughts   frequently   likely  to  lead   to  outbreaks   of  forest  fires  

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7.2  Hydro-­Meteorological  Disasters  and  Government  Response:  1995  –  2010     7.2.1 Main  climate  hazards  in  Uganda:  1995-­2010     Uganda   is   most   affected   by   droughts   followed   by   storms,   floods   and   landslides– which  are  confined  to  highland  ecosystems.       Droughts   (frequent   and   prolonged)   represent   the   highest   percentage   of   total   disaster   impacts   in   Uganda-­‐   about   36%281 .   The   most   drought-­‐prone   areas   are   the   districts  in  the  Cattle  Corridor.  In  extreme  cases,  particularly  in  the  Karamoja  region   (North-­‐east),  frequent  failure  of  the  rains  leads  to  starvation.  Severe  drought  results   in   human   and   livestock   deaths,   as   well   as   a   reduced   water   table   and   dwindling   water  levels  in  the  major  lakes  and  crop  failure282.       The   next   most   frequent   disaster   is   flooding.   Floods   in   Uganda   are   seasonal   and   usually  occur  during  periods  of  intense  rainfall  as  well  as  on  el-­‐Niño  years.  They  are   associated  with  death  and  injury  to  human  population.  Besides  causing  death  due  to   drowning,   floods   destroy   public   health   facilities   such   as   water   sources   and   sanitation   facilities.   Floods   also   trigger   outbreaks   of   water-­‐borne   diseases   and   malaria,  hence  compounding  community  vulnerability  to  health  hazards.  They  cause   physical   damage   by   washing   away   structures,   crops,   animals   and   submerging   human  settlements283.       Direct  loss  of  lives  is  particularly  high  in  the  highlands  where  floods  and  landslides   merge  to  create  human  tragedies.  At  national  level,  during  the  1997/8  El  Niño  event,   about   1,000   people   died   in   flood-­‐related   accidents,   and   150,000   were   displaced   from  their  homes.  In  Mbale  and  Kapchorwa,  a  further  60  people  were  injured  and  33                                                                                                                   281  Uganda  NAPA,  2007  
282  MRDPR,  2010   283  Ibidem  

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died.   1998   floods   were   followed   by   severe   drought   in   the   western   region,   with   Mbarara  being  the  most  affected.  The  rest  of  the  country  had  good  seasons.  In  2000,   Uganda  again  experienced  widespread  drought.  Drought  was  more  severe  in  eastern   and   northern   regions   with   Arua   district   being   the   most   affected,   while   western   region  experienced  good  seasons284.       Analysis  of  rainfall  variability  over  the  years  clearly  indicates  that  not  all  parts  of  the   country   are   affected   by   drought   at   any   given   time.   Therefore   overall   impact   of   climate   variability   and   climate   change   can   significantly   be   mitigated   through   provision   of   climate   information   and   promoting   its   utilization   so   as   to   take   advantage   of   good   seasons   in   some   parts   of   the   country285.   Figure   7.7   shows   the   alternation   of   dry   and   wet   years   in   Uganda,   variability   in   Uganda’s   climate   system   that  has  become  more  frequent  in  recent  years.     Floods   are   also   becoming   more   frequent,   a   prime   example   being   the   Teso   region,   which  received  its  heaviest  rainfall  in  35  years  in  2007.  At  that  time,  floods  and  food   insecurity   due   to   harvest   loss   affected   an   estimated   50,000   households.     In   March   2010,   some   parts   of   Eastern   Uganda   also   experienced   unusually   heavy   and   prolonged   rains   that   resulted   into   floods   and   landslides.   For   example,   in   Butaleja   District   floods   submerged   crop   fields   and   vital   infrastructure,   including   some   schools  and  houses286 .       Finally,  landslides,  storms  (rain,  wind  and  hail)  and  thunder  are  major  hazards  that   cause  significant  damage  when  they  strike.  The  areas  mostly  affected  by  landslides   are   the   Mt.   Elgon,   Rwenzori   region   and   Kigezi   regions.   In   March   2010   a   tragic   landslide  occurred  in  Bududa  on  the  slopes  of  Mt.  Elgon,  burying  three  villages  and  

                                                                                                               
284

285

 Uganda  NAPA,  2007   Ibidem  

286  UNDP,  2011      

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killing   81,   including   35   pupils   who   could   not   walk   to   school,   and   destroying   property.       In  2005,  hailstorms  hit  in  Rakai,  resulting  in  three  deaths  and  displacement  of  2,800   people.  Violent  windstorms  also  claimed  many  lives  when  boats  capsized  on  lakes.   In   one   incident,   21   people   lost   their   lives   when   a   boat   traveling   to   Kalangala   capsized  on  Lake  Victoria.  

 
Fig.  7.7:  Regional  dry  and  wet  years  in  Uganda,  1943-­1999.  Source:  State  of  the   Environment  Report  2000-­01  in  NAPA,  2007.  

 

7.2.2 A  Rising  HMD  trend     In   recent   years   however,   the   number   of   HMDs   recorded   in   Uganda   has   risen   exponentially,  by  a  staggering  7.7%  positive  change  in  average  number  of  disasters   from  the  1960  –  1994  period  (when  the  average  number  of  HMDs  to  hit  Uganda  was   •   222  

0.8)   to   a   6.5   average   number   of   HMDs   during   the   1995   –   2011   period.   Of   all   the   countries   in   Africa   surveyed,   Uganda   records   the   most   exponential   rise   in   HMDs   from   1960-­‐1994   to   the   recent   period   of   1995   -­‐   2011287.   Figure   7.8   and   table   7.3   confirm   our   initial   intuition   to   focus   on   the   period   of   1995-­‐2010   to   study   the   impacts  of  more  frequent  disasters  in  the  country.       1960 -1994 1995 -2011 HMDs in Uganda period period Drought 3 6 Flood 0 16 Storm 0 4 Total 3 26 Average for period 0.75 6.5 Source: EM-DAT (1960 – 2011)   Total 9 16 4 29 3.6

  Table  7.3:  Exponential  rise  in  selected  HMDs  in  Uganda  between  1960  –  1994  and  1995  –  2011  

 

Fig.  7.8:  Drought  occurrence  in  Uganda  throughout  the  20th  century.     Source:  Department  of  Meteorology,  in  NAPA,  2007.  

 

                                                                                                               
287    CRED,  2011  

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7.2.3 Understanding  HMD  impacts  in  Uganda     7.2.3.1   In  1995-­‐2010,  impacts  of  rising  disasters  at  both  the  national  and  community-­‐levels   have  been  felt  heavily  across  Uganda.  Annex  7.1  details  the  impacts  of  HMDs  that  hit   Uganda   during   our   period   of   study,   in   terms   of   lives   lost,   property   destroyed,   population  displaced  or  otherwise  affected  by  flood,  drought,  famine  and  landslides.  
 

Impacts  at  national  level  

7.2.3.2  

Zooming  in:  Impacts  at  the  community  level  and  priority  community   CCA-­DRR  needs  

In   Uganda,   the   2007   NAPA,   which   rested   heavily   on   Participatory   Rural   Appraisal   (PRA)  methods  and  extensively  collected  community  perspectives  on  CCA  across  the   country,   offers   a   very   good   initial   snapshot   of   community   DRR-­‐CCA   needs.   In   the   communities  sampled  during  the  NAPA,  table  7.4  displays  the  disasters  reported  as   most   recurrent   (rank-­‐ordered),   and   their   associated   main   impacts.  

 

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Table   7.4:   Major   impacts   of   HMDs   in   communities   surveyed   by   the   NAPA.   Source:   NAPA,  2007.  

 

The   NAPA   study   concludes   that   in   the   communities   sampled,   the   priority   community  adaptation  needs  and  intervention  areas  are  as  follows  (rank-­‐ordered):     1)   Indigenous   Knowledge   documentation   and   awareness   creation288;   2)   Farm   forestry;   3)   Water   resources   management;   4)   Weather   and   climate   information   provision,   access   and   use;   5)   Policy,   legislation   and   planning;   6)   Land   and   soil   management;   7)   Disaster   preparedness;   8)   Alternative   livelihoods;   9)   Health;   and   10)  Infrastructure.     The   NAPA   study   remains   shallow   nonetheless   in   its   appraisal   of   community   vulnerabilities   in   relation   to   their   already   existent   capacities   to   cope   with   HMDs,   and   identification   of   what   outstanding   CCA-­‐DRR   needs   are,   above   existing   local   capacity   to   cope.   Through   our   community   fieldwork   conducted   in   Uganda   from   October   24   –   30th   2011,   we   investigated   these   precise   needs   in   relation   to   local   capacities   to   cope.   In   the   following   section   we   present   the   critical   community   resilience-­‐building   needs   that   have   emanated   from   our   community   climate   Vulnerability  and  Capacity  Assessments  (VCAs)  to  address  rising  HMDs.                                                                                                                  
288  Communities  used  to  know  their  local  climate  relatively  well  and  indeed  relied  on  this  knowledge  for  

planning  of  their  farming  activities.  Knowledge  of  local  climate  was  augmented  by  indigenous  knowledge  such  as   appearances  of  specific  bird  species,  sprouting  of  particular  plants  and  flowers.  NAPA,  2007.  For  a  more  in-­‐depth   study  of  the  value  of  local  /  indigenous  knowledge  in  CCA,  see  Kniveton  et  al.,  forthcoming.  

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Case  selection  criteria:    

Bulambuli   district,   in   Center-­‐East   Uganda,   one   of   Uganda’s   newest   districts,   was   selected   as   the   site   for   our   community   vulnerability   assessments   to   impacts   of   HMDs.  Bulambuli  is  hit  by  all  three  major  hazards  that  afflict  Uganda:  drought  and   floods   in   the   lowlands,   as   well   as   deadly   landslides   in   the   highlands.   Bulambuli   is   found  at  the  foothills  of  Mount  Elgon,  30km  away  from  the  commercial  hub  of  Mbale   town,  capital  of  the  Bugisu  sub-­‐region.  

 
Fig.  7.9:  Bulambuli  in  Uganda.  Source:  Wikipedia  Commons  

  Until   July   1st   2010   when   a   parliamentary   instruction   mandated   its   split289,   Bulambuli   used   to   be   part   of   the   district   of   Sironko,   which   in   turn   composed   the   larger   district   of   Mbale,   with   which   it   still   shares   the   same   common   attributes.   With   a   total   population   of   955,247   and   a   population   growth   rate   of   3.4%   per   annum,   it   is   one   of   the   most   densely   populated   zones   in   the   country.   Over   90%   of   the   area’s   population  live  in  the  rural  areas  and  rely  heavily  on  the  natural  resources  base.  The   climate  in  the  region  is  humid  tropical  with  a  fairly  uniform  temperature  throughout   the  year.  Average  rainfall  around  Mbale  town  varies  from  880  to  1,775  mm  per  year   with   a   mean   of   1,186   mm.   The   average   rainfall   increases   to   2,000   mm   around   Mt.   Elgon,  where  all  of  the  rivers  of  the  region  originate.    

                                                                                                               

289  In  2009,  Uganda’s  Parliament  voted  to  create  six  more  new  districts,  which  became  effective  on  July  1,  2010  

(New  Vision,  January  1,  2010).  Many  purport  that  the  creation  of  the  new  bill  was  to  secure  additional  wins  in   the  areas  (turned  into  new  districts)  where  Museveni  had  a  sure  majority  (Expert  interview,  October  2011).  

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Agriculture   is   the   principal   economic   activity,   engaging   over   77%   of   the   adult   population  compared  with  a  national  average  of  72%.  Most  agriculture  in  the  region   is  centred  on  maize  and  beans  as  principal  crops:  but,  with  the  intervention  of  the   National   Agricultural   Advisory   Services   (NAADs),   there   is   a   shift   towards   commercialised   agricultural   production   of   high-­‐value   crops   such   as   carrots,   potatoes,   arabica   coffee,   and   horticultural   crops   in   the   upland   areas;   and   rice,   bananas  and  coffee  with  horticultural  crops  in  the  lowlands.     Under   its   former   denomination,   Mbale   district’s   economic   growth   stalled   during   the   period   of   civil   strife   in   the   1970s-­‐1980s.   The   region   boasted   high-­‐quality   coffee   production   in   the   1960s   and   early   1970s.   The   coffee   industry   has   suffered   from   climate  variations,  in  particular  higher  temperatures  and  unpredictable  rainfall,  and   the   decline   of   global   coffee   prices.   Nonetheless,   high-­‐quality   Fair   Trade   coffee   is   produced  by  some  farmers  on  the  slopes  of  Mt  Elgon.  Most  of  the  funding  for  local   government   plans   (nearly   98%)   comes   from   central   government   in   form   of   conditional  grants.    These  include  the  Plan  for  Modernisation  of  Agriculture  (PMA),   the   National   Agricultural   Advisory   Services   (NAADS)   and   the   Local   Government   Development   Programme,   and   Poverty   Allevation   Funds   (PAF).   PAF   funds   are   for   central   government   priorities   focused   on   poverty   alleviation.   Local   Government   Development   Program   funds   mainly   support   government   priorities,   which   are   education   (construction   of   schools,   teachers’   houses,   furnishing   schools),   health/sanitation  and  road  construction.     With  79%  of  the  region’s  population  living  in  the  rural  areas  and  21%  in  the  urban,   the   region’s   leadership   is   convinced   that   agricultural   growth   is   essential   for   economic   growth,   particularly   as   it   will   stimulate   growth   in   other   sectors   and   improve  food  security,  employment  and  poverty  alleviation290.                                                                                                                    
290  Mbale  Region  draft  Climate  Change  framework  Plan,  2009  

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We   selected   five   drought,   flood   and   landslide   prone   communities   in   the   low   and   highlands  of  Mount  Elgon  in  Bulambuli  as  target  sites  for  our  VCAs,  to  represent  the   diversity  of  vulnerability  contexts  in  Bulambli.     Table  7.5  describes  the  communities  where  VCAs  took  place  in  Bulambuli  district.       Community   Hazard  Type   Name   1   Bufumbula   Flood   2   Wanga   3   Busangai   5   Namungu   Flood   Bufumbula   Nabongo   Bufumbula   Bufumbula   Bulambuli   Bulambuli   Muyembe   Bulambuli   Parish   Sub-­‐county   County   District  

Drought/Flood   Buwebele   Landslide   Luzzi  

Bunambutye   Bulambuli   Bulambuli   Bunambutye   Bulambuli   Bulambuli   Bulambuli   Bulambuli   Bulambuli  

4   Bunambale   Drought/Flood   Buwebele  

Table  7.5:  Communities  at  risk  in  the  district  of  Bulambuli  selected  for  climate  VCAs,   Center  east  Uganda,  October  2011  

     Critical  community  adaptation  needs  emanating  from  our  VCAs:  
Community  where  intervention  is  needed   Bufumbula   Wanga   Busangai   Bunambale   Namungu   (Luzzi)       X   X   XX   X       X   X   Priority  Intervention  
Relocation  to  lower-­risk   zones     Support  for  tree  replanting,   with  provision  of  seeds  and   training  on  tree  replanting   techniques   Dig  trenches  to  divert   floodwaters   Support  to  build  strong   permanent  houses  resistant   to  heavy  rainfall  and   landslides   Build  water  sources  –   (eg:  dig  borehole)  /   protect  existing  water   sources   Scale-­up  local  irrigation   from  river  

X    

X    

  X  

  X  

X    

 

 

X  

X  

 

 

 

X  

 

 

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Food  security  program  with   food  storage  support  and   income  diversification   IGA/  Credit  access  to  secure   income  during  climate   disasters  when  agricultural   income  is  affected   (gender-­specificity)   Agricultural  support  to:   -­  access  and  plant   drought/flood  resilient   seeds  (fast  maturing   crops/drought-­resilient   crops)                                    -­  access   advisories  for  early     planting   Support  local  irrigation   using  river  water   Lightening   protection/shelters   Early  Warning   Medicine  to  health  center   Sensitization  and  awareness   on  hygiene  and  sanitation   practices  

   

   

X   X  

  X  

   

X  

X   (drought   resilient)  

 

 

X  

X         X    

         

X    

X   X   X    

X    

   

X   X  

   

Support  with  building  of         X     latrines     Table  7.6:  Aggregation  of  common  priority  CCA-­DRR  needs  across  5  target  communities  

Farmers   surveyed   confirmed   that   rainfall   is   already   becoming   more   intense.   The   particularly   heavy   rains   of   late   2007   across   northern   and   central   Uganda   may   be   an   omen   of   a   future   climate   regime.   As   such,   future   generations   may   see   a   switch   away   from  the  current  pattern  of  two  rainy  seasons  across  much  of  the  country  towards  a   new  pattern,  of  a  unimodal  and  much  more  pronounced  rainy  season  (with  heavier   rains)  later  in  the  year,  with  the  rest  of  the  year  hotter  and  drier  than  at  present.   Climatic   changes   are   thus   happening   in   Uganda.   On   the   one   hand   there   is   more   erratic   rainfall   in   the   March   to   June   rainy   season,   bringing   dry   spells   and   reductions   in  crop  yields  and  plant  varieties,  on  the  other  hand  rainfall,  especially  in  the  later  

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rains  towards  the  end  of  the  year  (June-­‐November)  is  reported  as  coming  in  as  more   intense  and  destructive  downpours,  carting  along  floods,  landslides  and  soil  erosion.   7.2.4 National  CCA-­DRR  Policy  Analysis     In  the  face  of  the  dramatic  impacts  of  HMDs  in  recent  years,  both  at  the  national  and   community  levels,  what  is  the  Government  of  Uganda  (GoU)  doing?  What  measures   has   it   adopted   to   address   rising   climate   risks?   How   has   it   organized   itself   to   meet   the   CCA-­‐DRR   challenge?   How   adequate   are   these   measures   to   meet   the   priority   CCA-­‐DRR  needs  of  base  communities,  affected  by  HMDs  year  after  year?     This  section  attempts  to  understand  and  characterize  the  national  climate  disaster   management  architecture  of  Uganda.  We  had  concluded  from  our  cross-­‐continental   mapping  that  Uganda  was  in  the  yellow  policy  group:  is  this  verified  in  practice?     7.2.4.1   In  Uganda,  “the  primary  responsibility  for  disaster  risk  management  in  Uganda  rests   with   citizens.   Government   plays   a   supportive   role”291.   Paragraph   XXIII   of   the   National   Objectives   and   Directive   Principles   of   State   Policy   of   the   1995   Constitution   obliges   the   state   to   institute   effective   machinery   for   dealing   with   any   hazard   or   disaster   arising   out   of   natural   calamities   or   any   situation   resulting   in   the   general   displacement   of   people   or   general   disruption   of   normal   life.   Aware   that   disasters   disrupt   the   productive   capacity   of   her   people,   destroy   the   infrastructure   and   resources,   divert   the   planned   use   of   meager   resources   and   so   interrupt   programs   and  retard  the  pace  of  development,  government  is  therefore,  committed  to  creating   and   promoting   a   disaster   preparedness   and   management   system   that   safeguards   the   country   against   disasters   and   ensures   continued   productive   capacity   of   her   people.                                                                                                                  
291  National  Policy  for  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management,  2010  

Introspection  into  Uganda’s  Climate  Disaster  Management  Policy:    

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The   State’s   responsibility   to   institute   an   effective   machinery   for   dealing   with   any   hazard   or   disaster   arising   out   of   natural   calamities   has   not   be   delivered   homogeneously  across  time,  however.       Before   1999,   Uganda’s   policy   towards   HMDs   has   mainly   been   that   of   response   to   disasters;   response   that   was   inefficient   and   delayed,   in   practice   a   Firefighting   country  (refer  to  Annex  7.1,  HMDs  before  1999).       In   1999   however,   the   Ministry   of   Disaster   Preparedness,   Management   and   Refugees   was   established,   with   a   Department   for   Preparedness,   under   the   Office   of   the   Prime   Minister   (OPM).   DP/OPM   was   mainly   established   with   a   mandate   to   address   the   massive   internal   refugees   problem   following   the   end   of   the   civil   war.   This   new   institution  was  to  take  charge  of  all  affairs  related  to  disaster  management.     In   2010,   after   much   drafting   and   re-­‐drafting,   Uganda   adopted   its   National   Policy   for   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Management,   an   ambitious   national   plan   to   holistically   prepare   for   and   manage   the   multiple   hazards   hitting   Uganda.   This   plan   offered   a   comprehensive   blueprint   for   planning   and   coordinating   disaster   operations   across   multiple   sectors   and   agencies,   in   collaboration   with   all   government   ministries,   humanitarian  and  development  partners,  the  private  sector,  local  governments  and   vulnerable   communities.   The   objective   of   this   plan   was   to   ensure   that   in   times   of   disaster,   appropriate   administrative,   legislative   and   technical   measures   including   procedures   and   resources   are   in   place   to   assist   those   afflicted   by   the   disaster   and   enable  them  to  cope.         In   effect,   this   plan   proposed   a   new   institutional   framework,   or   under   North’s   definition,   new   rules   of   the   game,   to   manage   climate-­‐related   risks   in   the   country,   defining   the   roles   and   boundaries   of   different   organizations   within   Uganda’s   DM   institutional  landscape  towards  improved  public  delivery  on  national  and  local  CCA-­‐ DRR  needs.     •   231  

What  led  to  the  initiation  of  this  new  institutional  framework,  the  new  rules  of  the   game  so  to  say?  We  get  to  this  question  in  our  next  sections.  Before  we  delve  into   the   heart   of   our   question,   let   us   first   attempt   to   understand   the   provisions   of   Uganda’s   new   policy   for   disaster   preparedness,   and   its   adequacy   to   meet   fundamental  community  needs  in  DRR-­‐CCA.      Provisions  of  the  national  policy:       Initiated   by   the   Directorate   of   Relief,   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Refugees   (DRDPR/OPM),  Office  of  the  Prime  Minister,  mandated  unit  to  address  disasters  in   Uganda,   the   National   Policy   for   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Management   (NPDPM)   was  approved  in  September  2010.     The  goal  of  the  NPDPM  was  to  establish  institutions  and  mechanisms  to  reduce  the   vulnerability   of   people,   livestock,   plants   and   wildlife   to   disasters   in   Uganda.   The   specific  policy  objectives  were  to:   i.   ii.   iii.   iv.   v.   vi.   vii.     •   232   Establish   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Management   institutions   at   national   Equip  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management  institutions  and  ensure  that  the   Integrate  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management  into  development  processes   Promote  research  and  technology  in  disaster  risk  reduction   Generate   and   disseminate   information   on   early   warning   for   disasters   and   Promote   public,   private   partnerships   in   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Create   timely,   coordinated   and   effective   emergency   responses   at   national,   and  local  government  levels;   country  is  prepared  at  all  times  to  cope  with  and  manage  disasters;   at  all  levels;  

hazard  trend  analysis   Management.   district  and  lower  level  local  governments.  

What  is  noteworthy  about  this  policy  is  its  recognition  of  the  growing  role  of  Climate   Change  in  shifting  disaster  hazard  trends,  explicitly  stating  the  connection  between   CCA   and   DRR   and   the   need   for   disaster   management   to   be   an   integral   part   of   the   development   process,   from   the   local   to   the   national   levels.   It   also   recognizes   the   country’s   hitherto   poor   efforts   to   address   disasters   efficiently.   As   detailed   in   the   Policy  document:     Owing  to  meager  resources,  the  administrative  and  technical  measures  necessary  for   disaster   preparedness   and   management   in   the   country   are   scanty   and   hampered   by   poor   equipment.   The   country   lacks   a   depository   and   repository   of   vital   data   on   the   incidence  of  disasters  and  their  effects  on  the  communities.  Enforcement  of  legislation   on  risk  avoidance  is  weak  such  that  disruptions  arising  from  disasters  have  continued   to  grow  without  corresponding  measures.  This  policy,  therefore,  is  an  effort  to  put  in   place   a   systematic   disaster   prevention,   mitigation,   preparedness   and   management   framework  for  the  country     (National  Policy  for  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management,  2010)        The   National   Policy   most   of   all   established   clear   rules   of   the   game   for   the   management  of  HMDs  in  Uganda,  a  social  contract  from  the  national  to  the  very  local   levels.     At   the   national   level,   the   Ministry   responsible   for   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Refugees   in   the   Office   of   the   Prime   Minister   is   the   lead   agency   responsible   for   disaster   preparedness   and   management   in   the   country.   It   coordinates   risk   reduction,  prevention,  preparedness,  mitigation  and  response  actions  in  the  country   in  consultation  with  other  line  ministries,  humanitarian  and  development  partners,   Local   Governments   and   the   Private   sector.     The   Minister   responsible   for   relief,   disaster  preparedness  and  refugees  links  the  Department  to  Cabinet,  which  directs   policy   and   advises   the   President.     On   day-­‐to-­‐day   and   routine   matters,   the   Minister   makes   rules   and   regulations   on   the   management   of   likely   disasters   and   presents   annual  reports  relating  to  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management  to  Cabinet.     The   •   233   Institutional  framework  for  CCA-­DRR:  

Minister   also   links   the   Office   of   the   Prime   Minister   to   inter-­‐governmental   organizations,   the   donor   community,   the   private   sector,   regional   and   international   frameworks  (OPM,  2011).     The   following   flowchart   depicts   how   disaster   preparedness   responsibilities   are   devolved   and   coordinated,   as   nationally   mandated,   from   the   supreme   authority   in   the  country,  President,  to  the  basic  community  level  where  HMDs  occur,  reflecting   Uganda’s   conception   of   DM   as   a   shared   responsibility   between   the   State   and   citizens.  

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234  

  Fig.  7.10:  Organization  of  Disaster  Preparedness  (2010  National  Policy)  

     -­  The  president:  Article  110  of  the  1995  Constitution  gives  the  President  the  mandate   to  declare  a  state  of  emergency  in  any  part  of  the  country  in  the  event  of  a  disaster.     The  Minister  in  charge  of  disaster  preparedness  and  management  shall  provide  the   President   with   all   the   relevant   details   on   the   cause   and   effects   of   the   disaster   and   mitigation  and  relief  measures  to  be  undertaken;  in  a  situation  where  the  disaster  is   • 235     Roles  in  the  National  CCA-­DRR  Institutional  Framework:  

caused  by  a  natural  or  human-­‐induced  hazard.    The  President  in  consultation  with   Cabinet  shall  declare  an  area  or  the  nation  to  be  in  a  state  of  disaster.   A   declaration   of   a   state   of   disaster   shall   mean   the   provision   of   the   required   relief   services   and   goods   to   the   affected   population   takes   precedence   over   all   other   programs   of   government,   thus   calling   for   immediate   re-­‐programming   and   re-­‐ allocation   of   resources   from   other   sectors   until   such   a   time   when   the   President   declares  the  end  of  the  state  of  disaster  in  the  defined  part  of  the  country.       -­  The  cabinet:  Advises  the  president  on  all  disaster  related  issues.     -­   The   Ministerial   Policy   Committee   (MPC):   This   standing   committee   of   Cabinet   handles   cross-­‐sectoral   matters   relating   to   disaster   preparedness   and   management.   The   committee   is   responsible   for   ensuring   that   disaster   preparedness  and  management  is  mainstreamed  in  governance.       Chaired   by   the   minister   responsible   for   relief,   disaster   preparedness   and   refugees,   the   MPC   composed   of   the   following   ministers,   whom   have   each   been   designated   as   lead   institution   in   the   advent   of   a   specific   disaster   pertaining  to  their  area  of  expertise:     Minister  of  Relief,  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Refugees  (Chair)   Minister  of  Internal  Affairs;   Minister  of  Finance,  Planning  and  Economic  Development;   Minister   of   Agriculture,   Animal   Industry   and   Fisheries   (lead   institution   in   advent  of  famine/food  insecurity);   Minister  of  Health  (Lead  Institution  on  Epidemics);   Minister  of  Water  and  Environment  (Lead  Institution  on  Drought,  floods   and  storms,  as  well  as  landslides  through  its  subsidiary  body,    NEMA);   • 236    

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Minister  of  Defence;   Minister  of  Education;   Minister  of  Local  Government;   Minister  of  Gender,  Labour  and  Social  Development;   Minister  of  Justice  and  Constitutional  Affairs;   Minister  of  Works,  and  Communications;   Minister  of  Information  and  National  Guidance   Minister  of  Lands,  Housing  and  Urban  Development    

The   National   Environmental   Management   Authority   (NEMA),   that   does   not   sit  on  the  MPC  is  the  lead  institution  on  Landslides  and  mudslides.   -­‐  The  National  Emergency  Coordination  and  Operations  Centre  (NECOC):  The   NECOC   is   responsible   for   the   effective   coordination   and   networking   of   the   various   emergency   response   institutions   of   government   such   as   the   fire   brigade,   Police   Rapid   Response   Units,   UPDF   Emergency   Support   Units,   Uganda   Red   Cross   Society,   hospitals   emergency   units   and   the   private   emergency   firms.     NECOC   is   established   under   the   Office   of   the   Prime   Minister-­‐  Directorate  of  Relief,  Disaster  Preparedness  and  Refugees.       Finally,   at   the   community   level,   every   district   was   mandated   by   law   to   form   its   District   Disaster   Management   Committee   (DDMC),   to   serve   as   the   community   platform   for   disaster   preparedness   and   response.   Across   Uganda,   many   DDMCs   have   been   established,   but   have   yet   to   be   rendered   operational   through   capacity-­‐ building  of  district  administrators  and  community  members  on  the  stakes  of  ex-­‐ante   disaster  management  and  contingency  planning  (expert  interview,  February  2012).    

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7.2.4.2  

Institutional   Coordination   and   Coherence   in   the   Arrangement   of   Organizations  to  Deliver  on  Climate  Change  Adaptation  

Prior   to   the   adoption   of   the   2010   national   policy,   no  institutional   coordination   for   effective  disaster  response  existed.  Disasters  were  responded  to  by  the  NECOC  in  a   delayed,   and   ineffective   fashion.   Following   the   2007   floods,   it   is   related   that   State   rescue   services   did   not   get   to   afflicted   sites.   The   Ugandan   Red   Cross   (URCS)   was   consistently  the  first  organization  on  the  disaster  site292.     The  relative  novelty  of  Uganda’s  new  institutional  architecture  on  CCA-­‐DRR  (2010)   however  hinders  our  ability  to  rate  its  effectiveness.  Its  concrete  implementation  at   the   local   level,   through   the   local   committees   for   Disaster   Management   in   every   village,   will   in   all   likelihood   take   time   to   realize,   with   the   support   of   donors   and   partners  in  DRR-­‐CCA.  However  what  we  can  state  is  that  it  is  a  major  effort  in  the   direction   of   institutionalization   of   better   coordination   and   preparedness   of   HMDs,   which   lifted   the   blockages   thwarting   cross-­‐institutional   integration   for   improved   delivery  on  CCA-­‐DRR  and  gave  a  national  mandate  for  disaster  preparedness.     7.2.5 Overall  Policy  picture:  Uganda,  an  Effective  responder       Thus,   Uganda   qualifies   for   all   of   the   attributes   we   had   initially   hypothesized   to   characterize  a  Prepared  Firefighter  (see  table  7.7).  For  the  purposes  of  our  study,  we   can   then   proceed   to   use   the   country   case   as   an   adequate   representative   of   the   “Prepared  Firefighter”  policy  group.  The  only  concern  remains  the  relative  novelty   of  the  country’s  effective  transition  to  the  Yellow  policy  group  (begun  in  1999,  but   effectively  completed  only  in  2010).  However  institutional  change  being  inherently   incremental  and  a  process,  we  are  confident  using  Uganda,  to  understand  the  factors   that  turn  a  country  into  a  Yellow  case.                                                                                                                  
292  Expert  interview,  Oct.  2011  

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Indicator   for  Ex-­post  response+  ex-­ante  disaster  preparedness     (The  “Prepared  Firefighters”  policy)   A   national   Disaster   Management   Strategy   or   law   adopted,   with   clearly   defined   and   appropriated   procedures   and   responsibilities  for  disaster  response   In  the  national  budget  a  dedicated  budget  line  exists  for  disaster   preparedness  and  emergency  response   A   mandated   agency   for   disaster   management   exists,   able   to   coordinate  across  ministries  and  administrations  and  effectively   command  disaster  response  activities  during  an  Emergency   An   annual   Contingency   plan   is   elaborated,   and   delineates   the   procedures,  actions  and  responsibilities  to  be  carried  out  in  the   advent  of  all  possible  disasters   Regular  drills  of  these  disaster  response  procedures  take  place   No  more  than  3  days  to  deliver  disaster  relief  to  affected  citizens   Overall:   Country   in   this   category   have   shifted   from   response   (responding   to   disasters   only   after   they   occur),   to   preparedness   for  disasters  before  they  occur,  so  as  to  ensure  more  efficiency   and  swiftness  in  disaster  response  and  relief  operations  
  Table  7.7:  Uganda,  a  Prepared  Firefighter  as  of  2010  

Present?   (Present:  √   Absent:  X)   √  

√   √  

√  

√   √   √  

    What  led  to  Uganda’s  directional  shift  in  the  management  of  disasters?  We  now  turn   to  this  fundamental  question.            

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7.3 Incentives   Analysis:   which   factors   prompted   institutional   change   for   effective  CCA-­in  Uganda?     After  reviewing  government  institutions  in  place  to  address  rising  HMDs,   we   realize   that  the  GoU  has  adopted  bold  measures  since  1999  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of   its   response   to   HMDs.   Now   we   turn   to   the   central   question   of   our   investigation.   What  triggered  such  a  change  in  government  institutions  towards  HMDs  in  Uganda?   What  are  the  systemic  enabling  conditions?     To   answer   this   question,   we   first   review   government   responses   to   the   impacts   of   rising   HMDs   that   hit   Uganda   during   our   period   of   study,   proxy   for   impacts   of   a   changing  climate  in  this  highly  disaster-­‐prone  country  of  the  African  great  lakes.  We   then  proceed  to  retrace  the  process  of  response  of  the  GoU  to  each  HMD  during  the   period   1995-­‐2010,   focusing   on   the   identification   of   the   critical   break   years   and   disasters   during   which   a   transition   occurred   in   the   public   policies   towards   hydro-­‐ meteorological   disasters.   Finally,   we   end   with   an   analysis   of   government   institutional   change   towards   HMDs   during   the   period   of   study,   when   these   began   to   increase.   We   derive   from   our   analysis   the   factors   that   may   explain   breaks   in   the   continuity   of   public   policies   and   institutions   towards   the   management   of   HMDs   in   Uganda.     Our   analysis   rests   on   a   thorough   event   analysis   based   on   115   newspaper   articles   that  matched  our  keyword  search  on  two  of  the  country’s  major  newspapers  (New   Vision  and  Daily  Monitor),  catalogued  in  chronological  order  from  1995  to  2010.  We   then   confronted   the   information   from   our   events   analysis   with   insights   from   iterative   interviews   with   five   experts   on   DRR-­‐CCA   in   Uganda,   who   were   pivotal   actors   in   the   country’s   transition   from   “Firefighters”   to   “Prepared   Firefighters”   in   the  end  1990s.  We  also  consulted  secondary  literature  at  great  length,  in  search  of   areas  of  agreement  and  triangulation.  Only  the  findings  confirmed  by  both  sources   of  information  (events  analysis  and  expert  interviews)  are  presented  in  the  sections   following.     •   240  

7.3.1 Process  Tracing:  Review  of  Government  responses  to  HMDs,  1995-­2010     A   quick   glance   at   the   GoU’s   response   to   HMDs   that   made   landfall   with   increasing   frequency  and  magnitude  during  the  1995  –  2010  period  (see  Annex  II,  7.2),  reveals   that  three  main  moments  characterize  Uganda’s  response  to  rising  climate  risks:     1) Pre-­  1999:  Period  of  the  Firefighter’s  Response   Indeed   before   1999,   the   GoU’s   response   to   disasters   was   in   practice   that   of   a   Firefighter.   Its   response   to   HMDs   was   disorganized,   uncoordinated   and   characterized   by   amateurism   and   poor   efficiency.   A   look   at   government   response   to   disasters  pre-­‐1999  (see  Annex  II)  proves  this  point  adequately.     Management   of   the   1994   earthquake   illustrates   the   GoU’s   inadequate   response   to   disasters.   Not   included   in   our   log   of   HMDs   in   annex   II   (7.2)   due   to   its   non-­‐climate   related   nature,   the   1994   earthquake   is   still   important   to   recall   because   of   its   impact   on   the   country’s   institutional   evolution   on   the   governance   of   HMDs.   Indeed   the   1994   earthquake   marks   the   very   first   trigger   of   Uganda’s   awakening   to   the   importance   of   a   new   and   improved   institution   to   manage   disasters.   A   severe   earthquake   (magnitude:   6.2   on   Richter   scale)   rocked   many   parts   of   Uganda   on  6   February   1994,   causing   extensive   damage   to   three   western   districts   of   Kabarole,   Bundibugyo   and   Kasese.   While   casualties   were   limited   to   seven   deaths,   heavy   damage  was  inflicted  to  private,  commercial  and  public  buildings  (such  as  schools,   churches  and  hospitals).  As  a  result,  many  people  were  left  homeless  and  forced  into   displacement.    The  government  of  Uganda  requested  the  United  Nations  to  assist  in   damage  assessment,  provision  of  relief  and  co-­‐ordination  of  donor  activities.       The   government  set   up   a   national   earthquake   disaster   committee   chaired   by   the   Ministry   of   Labour   and   Social   Affairs.   Furthermore   each   affected   district   had   a   disaster   committee.  UN   agencies,   bilateral   donors   and  NGOs   collaborated   with   the   government  through  and  with  the  UN  disaster  management  team,  chaired  by  the  UN   Resident  Coordinator  and  DHA  representative.  In  practice,  the  Government  stepped   • 241    

aside   and   allowed   the   UN   system,   more   efficiently   organized,   to   conduct   relief   operations.  This  is  reminiscent  of  the  Senegal  case.     Shocked,  however,  by  the  sheer  damage  caused  by  this  earthquake,  the  Government   of   Uganda   decided   to   form   a   Commission   to   institute   an   effective   machinery   for   dealing  with  any  hazard  or  disaster  arising  out  of  natural  calamities  or  any  situation   resulting   in   general   displacement   of   people   or   serious   disruption   of   their   normal   life.   The   1995   constitutional   revamping,   the   first   of   its   kind   under   Musevini’s   rule,   offered  the  opportunity  to  instate  such  a  Commission,  and  provisions  were  included   in  the  1995  Constitution  for  a  Disaster  preparedness  Commission.       Chapter   17   Article   249   in   the   1995   Constitution   thus   stated   that"   There   shall   be   a   Disaster  Preparedness  and  Management  Commission  for  Uganda  to  deal  with  both   natural   and   man   made   disasters"293.   Its   formation   was   due   to   the   need   for   an   effective  institution  to  deal  with  hazards  and  disasters,  as  there  was  none  in  place  in   the  country  prior  to  its  formation.         However,  the  Commission  was  never  operational  although  there  was  a  provision  for   it   in   the   Constitution.   One   of   the   reasons   for   this   was   that   the   composition   of   the   Commission   was   top   heavy   that   is,   it   had   too   many   partners   from   different   departments  and  ministries  and  the  costs  involved  were  exorbitant294.     This   first   attempt   at   institutional   reform   in   1995   in   favor   of   improved   disaster   preparedness  thus  died  in  the  shell.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  period  corresponded   to   a   relative   lull   in   the   occurrence   of   disasters,   between   1994-­‐5   to   the   1998   flood   event  (see  Annex  7.1).  This  correlation  seems  to  indicate  that  the  loss  of  momentum   may  have  been  driven  by  the  lack  of  disaster  occurrence,  and  hence  lack  of  urgent   need  for  the  establishment  of  decisive  new  institutions  to  manage  HMDs.                                                                                                                  
293  Uganda  Constitution,  1995   294  Expert  interview,  February  2012  

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2) 1999:  New  institutional  agreement  to  better  manage  Disasters     In   1999   however,   following   the   1998   severe   flooding   and   1999   droughts,   another   momentum   for   institutional   change   came.   In   1999,   Cabinet   approves   a   National   Disaster   Preparedness   Policy   and   Institutional   Framework,   to   be   later   revised   in   2003.   This   led   to   the   creation   within   the   Office   of   the   Prime   Minister   (OPM)   of   a   Ministry   of   Disaster   Preparedness,   Management   &   Refugees,   with   a   Deputy   Minister   for   Disaster   Preparedness,   coordinating   the   Department   of   Disaster   Preparedness   and  Management  (DDPM).       The   DDPM   was   formed   in   1999   after   a   merger   of   two   departments:   the   Department   of  Relief  and  Resettlement  (under  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Affairs)  whose  main   role  was  to  provide  relief  to  and  resettle  citizens  from  over-­‐populated  areas  (Kabale,   Rukungiri,   Bushenyi,   Busia   in   Western   Uganda)   to   less   populated   areas   within   the   country;   and   the   Directorate   of   Refugees   and   Resettlement   (under   the   Ministry   of   Local   Government)   whose   main   role   was   to   provide   relief   to   and   resettle   victims   and   displaced   populations   from   the   LRA   war   in   Northern   Uganda   and   ADF   rebellion   in  Western  Uganda.  It  also  provided  relief  to  refugees  within  the  country.   However,   the   two   departments   had   the   same   mandate  although   they   were   in   different   ministries   and   this   at   times   created   duplication   of   activities   and   interventions.  In  order  to  ease  planning  and  as  a  result  of  the  roles  compatibility,  the   Permanent  Secretaries  in  the  two  ministries  sought  to  combine  both  departments  to   form   the   Department   of   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Management   (DDPM)   with   a   Minister   for   Relief,   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Refugees.   Its   elevation   to   a   department  under  the  Office  of  the  Prime  Minister  created  the  conditions  for  cross-­‐ ministry  coordination  on  the  issue.     Many  purport  that  the  first  successful  attempt  at  institutional  change  of  1999  mostly   ensued  as  a  response  to  the  massive  man-­‐made  disaster  of  the  1990s  in  Uganda:  the   civil   war   with   LRA   in   the   Northern   region   of   Acholi,   which   displaced   1.2   million,   •   243  

creating   about   half   a   million   refugees   to   be   dealt   with.   This   was   a   monumental   national   problem   that   the   State   was   ill   equipped   to   deal   with.   An   efficient   cross-­‐ ministerial  framework  was  needed  to  handle  the  surge  of  internal  refugees.  It  was  in   response  to  this  initial  national  demand  that  the  DDPM  was  created295.  The  title  of   Refugees   that   still   lingers   on   to   the   Department’s   name   is   indicative   of   the   nature   of   the  initial  impetus  that  led  to  its  creation.  In  addition  Uganda  has  in  place  a  National   Policy   on   Internal   Displacement   of   Persons   and   is   writing   a   National   Policy   on   Conflict  Resolution  and  Peace  Building296.     Today,  the  war  is  over,  and  most  if  not  all  IDPs  have  returned  to  their  initial  districts   of  origin.  The  refugee  problem  is  in  effect  solved  in  Uganda.  However  the  institution,   which   confirms   the   hypothesis   of   path   dependence,   in   this   case   the   accident   of   nature   that   led   to   the   creation   of   the   institution   being   the   very   unfortunate   Nothern   Uganda   war,   and   its   host   of   refugees,   but   which,   in   turn,   set   Uganda   on   a   track   of   holistic   management   of   large-­‐scale   national   disasters,   bringing   to   bear   all   o   the   sector  expertise  and  ministerial  abilities  in  the  nation.     The   United   Nations   also   played   a   significant   role   in   the   institutional   shift   of   1999.     The   UN   system   in   Uganda   played   a   key   support   role,   notably   through   UNDP’s   Bureau  for  Crisis  Prevention  and  Recovery  (BCPR)297.  The  1990s  also  coincided  with   the   UN   Decade   on   Natural   Disasters,   a   global   initiative   that   actively   advocated   across  all  countries  of  the  world  in  the  1990s  for  a  paradigm  shift  from  response  to   natural   calamities   to   the   prevention   of   disaster   risks   and   efficient   disaster   preparedness  for  a  changing  climate.     3)   1999-­2010:   Consolidation   era:   changes   and   adjustments   to   the   new   DM   institution                                                                                                                  
295  Expert  interviews,  October  2011   296

 DRDPR,  2004  

297  Expert  interview,  October  2011  

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The   National   Policy   drafted   with   UNDP   BCPR’s   support   has   gone   a   long   way   though   since   1999.   The   ratification   process   of   the   policy   was   a   long   odyssey   lined   with   multiple   successes   and   roll-­‐backs   (expert   interview,   October   2011).   Indeed,   in   2002-­‐03,   the   country,   still   coming   to   grips   with   the   large-­‐scale   refugee   problem   bequeathed  by  civil  war,  was  still  focused  on  IDP  policy.  This  sidelined  the  Disaster   National   Policy.   The   Policy   draft   still   continued   its   course   however,   fortifying   its   provisions  in  the  meantime.  In  2007,  the  draft  Policy  was  submitted  to  Cabinet  for   approval.  However  it  was  rejected,  on  the  grounds  that  Uganda  needed  to  first  learn   more  about  how  Disaster  Preparedness  and  prevention  should  be  done  well,  in  light   of   Uganda’s   weak   institutional   capacity   on   the   issue.   The   policy   draft   was   thus   returned   to   its   drafters   with   a   solid   list   of   recommendations.   The   DDPM   was   indeed   being  sent  back  to  the  drawing  board298.     Following   the   2007   rejection   of   the   Policy,   both   the   Disaster   Minister   and   his   Deputy,   along   with   a   team   of   technical   advisers   from   the   DDPM,   travelled   to   Bangladesh   on   exchange   visits   to   better   understand   how   that   small   Asian   country,   also   highly   exposed   to   multiple   HMDs,   succeeded   in   propping   up   its   national   preparedness   to   HMDs   and   establishing   effective   early   warning   systems   able   to   prevent  losses  and  destruction  from  HMDs.     It   can   also   be   hypothesized   that   the   severity   of   2007   floods   followed   by   the   2010   landslides  which  killed  more  than  300  people,  and  which  triggered  national  states  of   emergency  both  times,  played  a  key  role  in  bringing  back  on  the  political  agenda  the   urgency  for  a  National  Policy  of  Disaster  Preparedness,  focused  on  HMDs  this  time.     Thus,  in  2010,  following  many  years  of  drafting  and  redrafting,  the  Government  took   it   upon   itself   to   seriously   fulfill   its   constitutional   responsibility   for   establishing   an   efficient  machinery  for  dealing  with  natural  hazards  in  the  country  and  preventing   loss  of  life.  It  posed  two  significant  acts  to  this  effect.                                                                                                                    
298    Expert  interview,  October  2011  

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 Creation   of   the   National   Emergency   Coordination   and   Operations   Centre   (NECOC)       First   off,   it   created   the   National   Emergency   Coordination   and   Operations   Centre   (NECOC).   This   institution   was   created   to   coordinate   disaster   relief   and   disaster   operations.   Its   creation   was   a   significant   addition   in   an   institutional   landscape   where  relief  and  response  to  HMDs  were  still  disjointed  and  poorly  coordinated.     This  was  the  case  in  2007,  for  instance.  During  the  severe  flood  disaster  of  2007  that   disrupted  the  lives  of  400,000  people,  the  State,  overwhelmed  by  the  extent  of  the   disaster,   responded   in   a   very   disorganized   fashion.   As   one   of   interviewed   expert   who  was  a  key  actor  in  the  2007  relief  effort  depicts,  many  districts  in  the  Teso  sub-­‐ region   were   hit   (Amuria,   Katakwi,   Soroti,   Kaberamaido).   There   was   no   loss   of   life   but   20,000   people   were   affected   there,   with   roads   were   cut   off.   When   the   state   of   emergency   was   declared,   big   international   disaster   people   from   Kenya   Red   cross   came  in,  UNICEF  brought  in  tents  for  children,  UN  planes  came  in  to  drop  off  food.   Many   agencies   came   in   donations   were   received   through   Uganda   Red   Cross.   However   there   was   no   real   coordination   of   the   relief   effort,   which   led   to   much   inefficiency.  No  real  procedures  existed  to  be  followed.  Coordination  of  relief  efforts   was   ensured   by   OPM   with   UN   OCHA;   however   it   was   blatant   that   no   well-­‐rehearsed   pre-­‐existing  procedures  were  there  for  different  intervening  agencies  to  follow299.     Indeed,   in   the   2007   floods   President   Yoweri   Museveni   declared   a   90-­‐day   State   of   Emergency  in  the  flood-­‐hit  parts  of  eastern  and  northern  Uganda.  The  Government   and   partners   launched   a   US$   41   million   Flash   Appeal   for   the   Floods.   Some   US$   6   million   in   Immediate   funding   for   the   Appeal   was   made   available   from   the   United   Nations  Central  Emergency  Response  Fund  (CERF).    Over  the  next  three  months,  the   UN   clusters   delivered   life-­‐saving   emergency   assistance   to   those   affected   by   the   flooding,  achieving  success  in  preventing  loss  of  life,  malnutrition  and  disease.                                                                                                                        
299  Expert  interview,  October  2011  

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Emergency   responses   by   the   Uganda   Government   and   humanitarian   agencies   included  provision  of  temporary  shelter,  food,  drinkable  water,  sanitation  facilities,   medicines,   and   even   helicopters   and   boats   to   assist   those   in   hard   to   reach   areas.   Six   camps   were   created   for   Lira   flood   victims.   The   United   Nations   chartered   a   helicopter   to   airlift   emergency   supplies   to   areas   where   floods   rendered   roads   impassable.   The   World   Food   Programme   (WFP)   reached   129,152   flood-­‐affected   people,  39%  of  targeted  beneficiaries,  with  2,131  metric  tonnes  (MT)  of  food  aid  to   date.   Some   3,000   beneficiaries   received   food   aid   as   air   operations   resumed   out   of   Soroti   on   10   October.   As   of   December   2007,   the   emergency   response   has   been   replaced   by   longer-­‐term   recovery   and   disaster   preparedness   programming   across   the  flood-­‐affected  area.       From  all  this  clearly  appears  that  the  relief  effort  in  2007  was  driven  mostly  by  the   UN  system,  and  the  State,  overwhelmed,  abdicated  and  let  the  UN,  better  organized   and  more  capacitated,  take  over.     Thus   despite   the   1999   institutional   reform,   coordination   and   capacity   issues   remained   during   disaster   response,   as   evidenced   by   the   government’s   stunted   response  when  faced  with  the  massive  disaster  of  the  2007  floods.  Uganda  was  not   quite  prepared  enough  to  handle  large-­‐scale  HMDs.     Following   the   2007   floods   fiasco   in   disaster   response,   under   the   impetus   of   UN   OCHA,  the  NECOC  was  created  to  improve  disaster  coordination  before  and  during   disasters,   and   mandate   a   Government   leader,   to   serve   as   the   maestro   during   disaster   operations.   UN-­‐OCHA   also   played   a   large   role   in   bringing   about   the   NECOC300.   Still   a   relatively   new   institution,   the   NECOC   has   yet   to   show   its   true   mantle.   But   its   existence   already   bodes   of   brighter   days   to   come   for   Uganda’s   efficient  coordination  of  disaster  response.                                                                                                                    
300  Expert  interview,  October  2011  

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 Adoption  of  the  National  policy  for  disaster  preparedness  and  management     Finally,   in   2010,   Uganda’s   cabinet   adopted   its   National   policy   for   disaster   preparedness   and   management,   an   ambitious   national   plan   to   holistically   prepare   for   and   manage   the   multiple   hazards   hitting   Uganda.   This   plan   offered   a   comprehensive   blueprint   for   planning   and   coordinating   disaster   operations   across   multiple   sectors   and   agencies.   The   objective   of   this   plan   was   to   ensure   that   in   times   of   disaster,   appropriate   administrative,   legislative   and   technical   measures   including   procedures   and   resources   are   in   place   to   assist   those   afflicted   by   the   disaster   and   enable  them  to  cope301.         In   effect,   this   plan   proposed   a   new   institutional   framework,   or   under   North’s   definition   new   rules   of   the   game,   to   manage   climate-­‐related   risks   in   the   country,   defining   the   roles   and   boundaries   of   different   organizations   within   Uganda’s   DM   institutional  landscape  towards  improved  public  delivery  on  national  and  local  CCA-­‐ DRR  needs.     We   can   thus   claim   that   Uganda   only   achieved   full   transition   to   a   Prepared   Firefighter  in  2010.  The  transition  process  lasted  a  total  of  11  years,  from  1999  to   2010.     7.3.2 Analysis:  Uganda’s  pathway  of  Institutional  Change       From   our   analysis   of   the   events   that   led   to   substantive   institutional   change   towards   effective   Disaster   Preparedness   in   Uganda,   emanates   that   Uganda’s   institutional   transition   was   a   slow   and   staggered   process,   which   occurred   in   response   to   a   pressing  national  demand/need.                                                                                                                    
301  NPDPM,  2010  

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It   can   be   further   asserted   that   Uganda’s   was   a   two-­‐stepped   phased      transition   towards   effective   disaster   preparedness.   Step   one   occurred   in   1999   in   response  to  the  national  refugee  crisis,  whereas  step  2  waited  until  2010,  when  the   large-­‐scale   impacts   of   rising   recurrent   HMDs   (floods,   droughts,   landslides)   on   communities  and  national  welfare  could  no  longer  be  ignored.      Step   1:   1999,   first   successful   institutional   change   in   Uganda’s   disaster   management   infrastructure   with   the   Cabinet’s   approval   of   a   National   Disaster  Preparedness  Policy  and  Institutional  Framework  and  the  creation   of   the   Department   of   Disaster   Preparedness   and   Management   (DDPM)   with   a   Ministry   of   Disaster   Preparedness,   Management   &   Refugees,   under   the   Office  of  the  Prime  Minister  (OPM)     However   this   change   in   the   rules   of   the   game   of   disaster   management   was   in   practice   restricted   to   the   management   of   war   refugees   (the   war   disaster).   Uganda   thus   did  not   fully   turn   into   an   accomplished   prepared   firefighter   right   after   1999.   It   still   was   not   capacitated   to   address   multiple   risks,   notably   HMDs,   as   poor   public   response   to   the   massive   2007   floods   demonstrates.   However,   1999   marks   the   moment   of   institutional   revolution,   and   triggered   the   process   of   change   to   the   institutional  framework  on  CCA-­‐DRR  in  Uganda,  which  was  to  be  completed  over  the   next  decade.     • •    Step   2:   2007-­2010:   re-­drafting   of   National   Disaster   Preparedness   policy   and  approval  by  Cabinet   We   indeed   had   to   wait   until   2010   to   see   Uganda   substantively   take   measures   to   place   itself   comfortably   in   the   Prepared   Firefighter   category,   notably   with   the   creation   of   its   National   Emergency   Coordination   and   Operations   Centre   (NECOC)   and   adoption   by   the   Cabinet,   in   September   2010,   of   the   National   Disaster   Preparedness  and  Management  Policy.   •   249   Trigger:  War  refugees  disaster  (at  the  end  of  civil  war  in  N.  Uganda)   Support  for  formulation  provided  by:  UNDP  BCPR  

Trigger:   Severity   and   magnitude   of   HMDs   in   the   decade   of   the   2000s   (2007  floods,  2010  landslides)   Support:  UN-­OCHA  

•  

2007-­2010:     Incremental   changes     Revision  of   National  Policy   for  Diaster   Preparedness  &   Management  

2010:  Uganda   becomes  a   Prepared   Firevighter   NECOC  created,     National  Policy   for  Diaster   Preparedness   and   Management   adopted    

1999:     Ministry  of   Disaster   Preparedness  &   Refugees   created,  under   Ofvice  of  Prime   Minister  

1995:     Constitutional   provisions  for  a   Disaster  Preparedness   &Management   Commission,  but  never   materializes  

   

Fig.  7.11:  Uganda’s  transition  to  become  Prepared  Firefighter:  a  long  and  phased  process  

    7.3.3 Identification  of  relevant  Independent  Variables     What  we  retain  is  that  both  spurts  of  institutional  change  in  Uganda’s  management   of  disasters  –first  building  capacity  to  handle  war  refugee  disaster,  second  building   preparedness   for   HMDs–   were   driven   by   a   national   need.   Indeed,   both   phases   in   Uganda’s   transition   towards   becoming   a   “Prepared   firefighter”   responded   to   an   urgent   national   problem,   which   the   country   had   to   deal   with,   or   perish.   The   institutional   solution   devised   endogenously   by   the   GoU   was   driven  by  the  existence  of  a  need.       •   250  

As  such,  our  Uganda  case  confirms  the  finding  from  the  Senegal  case  that  the  most   critical  triggers  of  institutional  change  on  CCA-­‐DRR  are:   1) The  occurrence  of  more  frequent  high-­‐impact  disasters;   2) The  rise  in  the  frequency  of  HMDs  in  turn  led  to  demands  for  a  new  climate   risks/disaster  management  institutional  framework.  This  became  a  national   need  (country-­‐driven-­‐ness);   3) Donor   and   development   partners’   technical   and   financial   support   to   country’s  desire  to  formulate  a  new  national  institutional  framework.     Both   Senegal   and   Ugandan   cases   thus   appear   to   suggest   that   the   “country-­‐driven-­‐ ness”   of   institutional   change   is   fundamental,   and   that   key   is   a   country’s   appropriation  of  the  desire  to  adopt  effective  rules  of  the  game  to  govern  the  new   issue   of   Climate   Change.   This   desire   under   both   instances   is,   itself,   driven   by   the   sheer   increase   in   HMDs,   which   places   CCA-­‐DRR,   and   the   search   for   more   effective   institutional   arrangements   to   manage   and   prevent   the   impacts   of   HDMs,   as   a   priority  on  the  national  agenda.  National  leaders  first  had  to  experience  the  effects   of  not  addressing  HMDs  properly  and  not  climate-­‐proofing  development  grains  from   the   rising   impacts   of   climate   risks   (climate-­‐compatible   development),   before   they   began  to  offer  seriously  engage  with  the  battle  of  HMDs.     In   the   context   of   Uganda’s   hypertrophied   Executive   branch,   where   the   same   president,   Yoweri   Musevini,   has   been   in   power   since   1986,   this   finding   is   not   surprising.   In   a   system   revolved   around   one-­‐man   rule,   the   one   leader   and   executive   manager   of   the   patrimony   needs   to   perceive   the   dangers   and   risks   to   the   patrimony   caused   by   HMDs,   before   he   can   react   decisively   and   place   the   issue   high   on   the   national   agenda.   In   Uganda,   in   turn   we   purport   that   national   will   to   tackle   rising   climate  risks  was  built  by  the  rise  in  frequency  and  severity  of  high-­‐impacts  HMDs  – floods,   droughts   and   landslides   in   the   2000s   decade,   which   increased   by   a   staggering  7.7%  relative  to  the  1960  –  1994  period.     •   251  

Also  in  Uganda,  when  they  decided  to  become  serious  on  HMDs,  those  in  charge  of   drafting  the  National  policy  even  had  to  go  and  seek  outside  expertise  to  learn  how   to  do  this  right  and  what  institutions  to  devise  to  rightfully  handle  the  new  nation   issue.   As   we   will   see   shortly,   this   pattern   was   also   replicated   in   Mozambique,   where   multiple   HMDs   also   took   the   country   by   surprise,   and   the   State   was   left   with   no   choice  but  to  confront  the  problem,  and  devise  new  institutions  or  rules  of  the  game,   to  handle  multiple  HMDs.  When  given  the  choice  between  Adapt  and  Perish,  these   countries  chose  to  Adapt.     This   determines   a   course   of   gradual   institutional   adaptation   as   countries   are   increasingly  faced  with  rising  climate-­‐related  risks  and  disasters.  It  bodes  negatively   though  of  countries’  abilities  to  engage  in  ex-­‐ante  action  until  the  projected  climate   impacts   have   started   to   hit   them.   This   theory   claims   that   countries   in   Africa,   and   elsewhere,   will   not   take   climate   impacts   seriously   until   these   begin   to   manifest   themselves.  They  will  not  learn  form  the  age-­‐old  wisdom  that  prevention  is  better   than  cure.       However   when   the   projected   predicament   will   hit   them,   then   countries   will   scramble   to   get   on   their   feet   and   seriously   begin   to   tackle   the   problem,   finally   implementing  all  of  the  known  recommendations  for  addressing  climate  impacts.   Faced  with  the  ultimate  choice  of  Adapting  or  Perishing:  they  will  finally  choose  to   Adapt.  However,  not  before  the  ultimatum  gets  down  to  that.     Will   Uganda   then   sustain   this   course,   and   continue   its   transition   up   the   spectrum   of   effective   disaster   risk   management   all   the   way   to   the   green   “Disaster   averter”   category?  Only  time  will  tell.  If  more  and  frequent  intense  disasters  occur  (which  we   do  not  wish  for  this  beautiful  country),  and  Uganda  intensifies  it  efforts  to  transition   towards  ex-­‐ante  prevention  on  top  of  its  existent  prearedness,  then  our  theory  will   be  proven.     •   252  

We  now  turn  to  our  investigation  of  the  factors  that  make  countries  transition  to  the   final   category   in   our   spectrum   of   effective   climate   disaster   management:   the   Disaster  Averters.  Are  there  any  additional  identified  causal  factors,  beyond  national   “drivenness”  to  address  HMDs  and  donor  support  with  this  endeavour?    

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  CHAPTER  8     MOZAMBIQUE  COUNTRY  CHAPTER:      

 

What  Triggered  Institutional  Change  for  Effective  Climate  Governance  in   Mozambique?         8.1  Country  Profile     The   Republic   of   Mozambique   is   a   thin,   elongated   stretch   of   land   situated   on   the   oriental   coast   of   Africa   in   the   southern   hemisphere,   between   longitudes   30°12   –   40°51   and   latitudes   10°27   –16°52.   Covering   a   total   land   area   of   799.380   square   kilometers   (km2),   of   which   786.380   km2   of   firm   land   and   13.000   km2   of   interior   waters,   Mozambique   is   a   coastal   country,   which   boasts   of   a   two   thousand   five   hundred   kilometer   (2,500   km)-­‐long   ocean   interface.   This   elongated   interface   with   the   Indian   Ocean,   right   at   the   Mozambique   Channel   separating   the   country   from   Madagascar,   renders   Mozambique   highly   vulnerable   to   multiple   HMDs,   among   which  drought,  flooding,  sea  level  rise  and  recurrent  cyclonic  activity.  It  is  the  third   country  in  Africa  most  vulnerable  to  weather-­‐related  hazard302.     Mozambique   is   endowed   with   a   tropical   climate   with   two   seasons,   a   wet   season   typically  from  October  to  March  and  a  dry  season  from  April  to  September.  Climate   conditions  vary,  however,  depending  on  altitude.  Rainfall  is  heavy  in  the  highlands   and   along   the   coast   and   decreases   in   the   north   and   south.   Annual   precipitation   varies   from   500   to   900   mm   depending   on   the   region,   with   a   national   average   of   590  mm.  Bordered   in   the   north   by  Tanzania,  in  the  West  (from  north  to  south)  by   Malawi,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe,  South  Africa  and  Swaziland,  and  in  the  South  by  South                                                                                                                  
302  Global  Facility  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (GFDRR),  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Prioritm  

Comntries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011,  97-­‐105  

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Africa’s  KwaZulu-­‐Natal  Province,  the  country  is  administratively  sub-­‐divided  into  11   provinces,   which   are   in   turn   each   subdivided   into   128   districts   (see   fig.   8.1).   The   country  also  boasts  of  many  cities,  among  which:  Maputo  (capital  city  and  province   of   its   own),   Beira,   Nampula,   Nacala,   Chimoio,   Quelimane,   Inhabane,   Tete,   Xai-­‐Xai,   and  Pemba303.    
             
           

Fig.  8.1:  Map  of  Mozambique  in  Africa,  and  its  11  provinces.  Source:  Mozambican  Ministry  of   Foreign  Affairs  and  Cooperation,  2011.  
 

8.1.1 Vulnerability  Context     8.1.1.1   Mozambique  is  a  country  of  23  million  inhabitants  classified  as  low-­‐income,  with  a   GDP/capita  of  $428  and  a  strong  annual  GDP  growth  rate  of  6.3%,  which  has  been   sustained   over   the   past   two   decades304.   One   of   the   poorest   countries   in   the   world   after   its   independence   in   1975,   Mozambique   has   emerged   from   two   decades   of   armed   civil   conflict   as   one   of   Africa’s   best-­‐performing   economies,   achieving   an   average   annual   rate   of   economic   growth   of   8%   between   1996   and   2008,   the   highest                                                                                                                   Development  challenges:  past  &  present  

303  Mozambique  National  Directorate  of  Statistics,  1994   304  World  Development  Indicators-­‐  Mozambique,  2010  

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growth   rate   among   African   oil-­‐importers305.   Mozambique   remains   a   poor   country   with   a   low   level   human   development,   and   lies   at   the   very   bottom   the   human   development   ladder,   classified   184th   out   of   187   countries   ranked   by   the   United   Nations  Development  Program  Human  Development  Index  ranking306.      A  country  devastated  by  civil  war  until  1992:   At   the   end   of   its   civil   war   in   1992,   Mozambique   was   left   with   decimated   infrastructure,   a   weak   economy,   a   citizenry   with   limited   skills   and   fragile   institutions.  Since  then,  the  country  has  made  significant  strides  in  its  development   endeavor307,  restoring  growth  and  improving  welfare.  Growth  was  primarily  driven   by  investments  in  physical  capital  –high  levels  of  public  spending  in  roads,  bridges   and  the  rehabilitation  of  infrastructure,  needed  to  gain  market  access.  In  turn,  public   spending   fueled   growth   in   rural   incomes.   Growth   was   sustained   by   the   positive   response  of  family  farms  and  family-­‐owned  businesses,  which  employ  more  than  90   %   of   the   labor   force   in   Mozambique,   to   the   pro-­‐growth   economic   policies   of   the   government,   which   held   down   inflation   while   reducing   the   cost   of   doing   business   and  lowering  restrictions  on  competition308.       According   to   Patt,   donors   were   ready   to   fund   good   projects   in   underserved   areas,   and   the   government   was   determined   to   get   these   funds   and   use   them   to   reduce   poverty.  The  greatest  successes  were  in  roads  and  in  education,  where  high  levels  of   spending  (20%  of  total  government  expenditures)  produced  sizeable  improvements   in  both  access  and  outcomes  for  poor  and  rural  families309.  Indeed,  investments  in   social   and   economic   infrastructure   extended   access   to   public   services,   reduced                                                                                                                   305  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”,  accessed  Dec  1,  2011.  http://go.worldbank.org/70UK6S1X30   306  Ibidem   307  Ibidem  
308  Instituto  Nacional  de  Gestao  de  Calamidades  (INGC),  “Study  on  the  Impact  of  Climate  Change  on  Disaster  Risk  

in  Mozambique:  Main  Report”,  Asante,  K.,  Brundrit,  G.,  Epstein,  P.,  Fernandes,  A.,  Marques,  M.R.,  Mavume,  A  ,   Metzger,  M.,  Patt,  A.,  Queface,  A.,  Sanchez  del  Valle,  R.,  Tadross,  M.,  Brito,  R.  (eds.),  2009.   309  Ibidem  

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welfare   inequalities,   and   supported   the   livelihoods   of   the   average   Mozambican310.   They   reduced   monetary   poverty   from   69%   of   the   population   in   1997   to   54%   in   2003311.     As   the   World   Bank   further   confirms,   net   primary   school   enrollment   reached   95   percent   in   2010,   and   infant   and   under-­‐five   child   mortality   decreased   from  201  per  1,000  in  1997  to  138  per  1,000  new  born  in  2008312.      Sustaining  pro-­poor  growth  into  the  21st  century,  a  major  challenge:   It  is  unclear  today  however  whether  Mozambique  is  continuing  to  beat  the  odds  on   shared   growth.   Results   of   the   latest   household   survey   indicate   that   poverty   reduction   has   stagnated.   The   latest   comprehensive   data   on   living   standards   are   from  2003,  when  about  half  the  population  was  classified  as  poor313.       Using   national   human   development   statistics   as   a   proxy   for   the   country’s   overall   vulnerability   today,   one’s   eye   is   caught   by   Mozambique’s   low   average   life   expectancy  at  birth  (49  years),  its  high  infant  mortality  rate  (135  out  of  1,000  live   births)   and   the   still   high   percentage   of   the   population   living   below   the   national   poverty   line   (55%   of   the   population).   These   figures   denote   of   a   still   restricted   success   in   the   development   endeavor,   with   many   more   gaps   needed   to   be   filled   before  full  national  /  local  capability  and  resilience  is  achieved  (see  table  8.1).     Mozambique’s   development   challenges   today   are   to   sustain   the   country’s   impressive  performance  over  the  last  two  decades,  notably  by  boosting  production   and   productivity   in   sectors   such   as   agriculture,   making   economic   growth   more   inclusive  and  stepping-­‐up  exports  and  job  creation314.                                                                                                                        
311  Ibidem   312  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”  

310  INGC,  “Study  on  the  Impact  of  Climate  Change  on  Disaster  Risk  in  Mozambique:  Main  Report”  

313 314

 INGC,  “Study  on  the  Impact  of  Climate  Change  on  Disaster  Risk  in  Mozambique:  Main  Report”    World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   • 257  

 

Mozambique-­‐  Country  Profile  
2000                           Overview   Population,  total  (millions)   18,2   Population  growth  (annual  %)   2,6   Poverty   headcount   ratio   at   national   poverty   ..   line  (%  of  population)   GNI,  Atlas  method  (current  US$)  (billions)   4,2   GNI  per  capita,  Atlas  method  (current  US$)   230   People   Income  share  held  by  lowest  20%   ..   Life  expectancy  at  birth,  total  (years)   47   Fertility  rate,  total  (births  per  woman)   5,7   Births   attended   by   skilled   health   staff   (%   of   ..   total)   Mortality  rate,  under-­‐5  (per  1,000)   177   Primary  completion  rate,  total  (%  of  relevant   16   age  group)   Ratio   of   girls   to   boys   in   primary   and   75   secondary  education  (%)   Prevalence   of   HIV,   total   (%   of   population   8,6   ages  15-­‐49)   Environment   Forest  area  (sq.  km)  (thousands)   411,9   Agricultural  land  (%  of  land  area)   61,2   Land   area   where   elevation   is   below   5   meters   1.8%   (%  of  total  land  area)   Improved   water   source   (%   of   population   42   with  access)   Improved   sanitation   facilities   (%   of   14   population  with  access)   Energy  use  (kg  of  oil  equivalent  per  capita)   394   CO2  emissions  (metric  tons  per  capita)   0,1   Electric   power   consumption   (kWh   per   122   capita)   Economy   GDP  (current  US$)  (billions)   4,3   GDP  growth  (annual  %)   1,1   Agriculture,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   24   Industry,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   25   Services,  etc.,  value  added  (%  of  GDP)   51   Exports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)   16   Imports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of  GDP)   37   Gross  capital  formation  (%  of  GDP)   31   Revenue,  excluding  grants  (%  of  GDP)   ..   Cash  surplus/deficit  (%  of  GDP)   ..   States  and  markets   Time  required  to  start  a  business  (days)   ..   2005   20,8   2,6   ..   6,1   290   ..   48   5,3   ..   158   42   83   11,2   400,8   62,0     45   15   409   0,1   445   6,6   8,4   27   25   48   32   44   19   ..   ..   153   2008   22,3   2,4   54,7   8,6   380   5,2   49   5,1   55   144   59   87   11,4   ..   62,0     47   17   420   0,1   462   9,9   6,8   30   24   46   32   46   16   ..   ..   26   2009   22,9   2,3   ..   9,9   440   ..   49   5,0   ..   140   57   88   11,5   ..   ..     ..   ..   427   ..   ..   9,8   6,4   31   24   45   25   43   20   ..   ..   26   2010   23,4   2,3   ..   10,3   440   ..   ..   ..   ..   135   61   89   ..   390,2   ..     ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   9,6   7,2   32   23   45   25   43   24   ..   ..   13  

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Military  expenditure  (%  of  GDP)   1,3   0,9   0,8   0,9   ..   Mobile   cellular   subscriptions   (per   100   0   7   20   26   ..   people)   Internet  users  (per  100  people)   0,1   0,9   1,6   2,7   ..   Roads,  paved  (%  of  total  roads)   19   ..   21   ..   ..   Global  links   Merchandise  trade  (%  of  GDP)   35,8   63,7   67,3   60,4   ..   External   debt   stocks,   total   (DOD,   current   7  255   4  211   3  450   4  168   ..   US$)  (millions)   Total   debt   service   (%   of   exports   of   goods,   12,5   3,6   1,1   1,6   ..   services  and  income)   Net  migration  (thousands)   75   -­‐20   ..   ..   -­‐20   Workers'   remittances   and   compensation   of   37   57   116   111   132   employees,  received  (current  US$)  (millions)   Foreign   direct   investment,   net   inflows   (BoP,   139   108   592   881   789   current  US$)  (millions)   Net   official   development   assistance   and   906   1  297   1  996   2  013   ..   official  aid  received  (current  US$)  (millions)     Table   8.1:   Mozambique’s   socio-­development   indicators.   Source:   World   Development   Indicators  2010,  World  Bank    

  8.1.1.2   One   of   the   younger   nations   of   Africa,   Mozambique   won   its   independence   in   1975   from   the   Portuguese,   after   an   auspicious   military   coup   in   Lisbon   and   a   12-­‐year   guerilla   struggle   by   FRELIMO-­‐   the   Frente   de   Libertação   de   Moçambique.   Its   charismatic   leader   and   freedom   fighter,   Samora   Machel,   then   installed   a   hardliner   socialist,   single-­‐party   FRELIMO   government   and   harbored   other   freedom   fighters   from   the   neighboring   Zimbabwe   African   National   Union   (ZANU)     (then   Rhodesia)   and  from  South  Africa's  African  National  Congress  (ANC).  As  a  result,  Mozambique   was   embroiled   in   a   16-­‐year   civil   war   with   opposition   party   RENAMO-­‐   Resistência   Nacional   Moçambicana,   originally   sponsored   by   the   white   Rhodesian   government   and   then   the   South   African   apartheid   government.   A   peace   treaty   was   signed   between   the   two   parties   in   1992,   under   the   leadership   of   Joaquim   Chissano,   Machel’s  successor,  and  the  country’s  first  multi-­‐party  elections  were  held  in  1994.   Mozambique  has  enjoyed  relative  peace,  stability  and  prosperity  since.       •   259   History  &  Political  Context  

Political  vulnerability  and  State  of  Accountability:  

Mozambique   is   a   multiparty   democratic   Republic315,   characterized   by   a   strong   presidential   system   and   weak   parliament.   To   date,   Mozambique   has   held   four   general  elections  (1994,  1999,  2004,  2009),  the  first  two  won  by  Joaquim  Chissano,   and   the   last   two   by   Armando   Guebuza;   three   municipal   elections   (1998,   2003,   2008);  and  one  provincial  election  in  2009.  Suffrage  is  universal  at  18  years  of  age.     A  strong  Executive   The   current   President   of   the   Republic,   H.E.   Armando   Guebuza,   was   elected   for   a   second   term   during   the   presidential   race   of   October   2009   and   was   inaugurated   in   January   2010.   His   ruling   party,   Frelimo,   has   held   power   since   independence,   and   secured   sizable   majorities   in   the   national   parliament   (about   75   percent),   and   provincial   assemblies   (80   percent).   Frelimo   also   controls   the   totality   of   municipal   assemblies,  and  holds  42  of  43  municipal  presidencies.  The  RENAMO  party,  led  by   presidential   hopeful   Afonso   Dhlakama,   never   succeeded   in   overtaking   FRELIMO   at   general  elections,  collecting  as  low  as  32%  of  the  general  vote  in  the  2009  elections.   The  next  municipal  elections  are  set  for  2013,  while  the  presidential  and  legislative   elections  will  take  place  in  2014.  In  the  meantime,  the  ruling  party  is  set  to  hold  its   congress  in  2012,  during  which  it  will  designate  a  presidential  candidate.         Legislative  power   The   country   has   three   legislative   bodies:   the   Assembly   of   the   Republic   with   250   deputies;  provincial  assemblies  with  over  800  delegates;  and  municipal  assemblies   in   43   municipalities.  The   ruling   party   has   large   majorities   in   all   three   legislative   bodies,   granting   the   president   a   de   facto   grasp   over   the   entire   political   system.   In   addition,   there   are   11   provincial   governors   appointed   by   the   President   and   who   are   a  part  of  the  executive.  Thus  in  practice,  the  legislative  cannot  serve  as  an  effective   check  to  the  power  of  the  president,  and  ruling  party.                                                                                                                  
315  For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  we  define  a  Republic  as  a  representative  democracy  in  which  the  people's  

elected  representatives  (deputies),  not  the  people  themselves,  vote  on  legislation  (CIA  world  fact  book).  

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260  

Three  Political  Parties   Besides  the  ruling  Frelimo  party,  originally  a  guerrilla  movement  credited  for  having   liberated   the   country   from   colonial   rule   in   1975,   the   largest   opposition   party   is   Renamo,  followed  by  the  Democratic  Movement  of  Mozambique  (MDM),  a  Renamo   breakaway  which  gained  seats  in  the  national  parliament  for  the  first  time  in  2009   elections.  MDM’s  leader,  Mr.  Davide  Simango,  had  been  elected  in  2008  as  mayor  of   Beira,  Mozambique’s  second  largest  city,  after  running  as  an  independent,  and  thus   becoming  the  first-­‐ever  independent  candidate  to  win  an  election  in  the  country.       Up   to   the   introduction   of   a   democratic   system   in   the   1990   constitution   and   the   holding   of   the   first   multiparty   elections   in   1994,   Frelimo   was   an   unchallenged   political  force  under  a  one-­‐party  system.  The  two  first  multiparty  elections  in  1994   and  1999  were  relatively  easy  victories  for  Frelimo,  although  its  popularity  started   to   crack   under   perceived   corruption   and   an   increasingly   vocal   independent   media   and   opposition.    In   the   2004   elections,   the   party   replaced   then   President   Chissano   with  Armando  Guebuza  who  led  a  vigorous  electoral  campaign  against  corruption,  a   new   theme   in   electoral   campaigning,   leading   to   an   easy   victory.     The   election   also   marked   the   start   of   Renamo’s   drop   in   popularity   as   it   struggled   with   internal   disputes.    Frelimo,  under  Guebuza,  made  it  a  priority  to  reinforce  its  political  base,   which  led  to  another  comfortable  victory  in  the  2009  elections.               Decentralization  policy   In   recent   years,   Mozambique   has   engaged   in   significant   efforts   toward   greater   de-­‐ concentration  and  devolution  of  power  to  local  levels.  The  decentralization  process   has   been   marked   by   the   introduction   in   1998   of   municipalities,   autonomous   political   circumscriptions   in   charge   of   administrating   the   country’s   cities,   led   by   a   mayor.       Indeed,  after  some  delays,  in  1998  the  country  held  its  first  local  elections  to  provide   for   local   representation   and   some   budgetary   authority   at   the   municipal   level.   RENAMO   boycotted   the   local   elections,   citing   flaws   in   the   registration   process.   • 261    

Independent   candidates   also   contested   the   elections   but   won   seats   in   municipal   assemblies.  Turnout  was  very  low.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  1998  local  elections,  the   FRELIMO  government  resolved  to  make  more  accommodations  to  the  opposition's   procedural  concerns  for  the  multiparty  national  elections  in  1999316.     In   2003,   Parliament   adopted   the   Decentralization   law   of   8/2003,   setting   the   principles   of   organization,   competencies   and   functioning   of   Local   State   authorities   at   the   provincial,   district,   localities   and   administrative   post   levels.   In   2009,   the   provincial  assemblies  were  introduced,  replicas  of  the  national  assembly  in  each  of   the   country’s   11   provinces.   The   roles   of   these   bodies   are   yet   to   be   broadly   understood   however   by   citizens   and   even   some   public   officials   at   the   municipal   level317.     Figures   8.2-­‐4   schematically   represent   the   partitioning   of   the   country,   and   decentralized  sub-­‐units  of  the  State  apparatus.  

                                                                                                               
316  US  State  Department  Background  Notes  Mozambique,  2011  

317

 World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   •

262  

 

Republic  of  Mozambique     President  of  the  Republic  

Province   Governor  

District                                             Administrador  de  District  

Administrative  Post  

Locality     Chefe  de  Localidad  

Circle  (rural)   Secretario  de   Circulo  

Community  Village   (rural)  Chefe  de   Aldeias  comunais  

Neighborhood   (urban)                                 Chefe  de  bairro  

Celula  

Zona  

  Fig.  8.2:  Administrative  Partitioning  of  the  country:  Flowchart318  

                                                                                                                 
318  The  title  in  italics  designates  the  function  of  the  officer  at  the  head  of  the  administrative  entity.  For  

example,  the  district  of  Pebane  in  the  province  of  Zambezia  province  is  headed  by  a  District   Administrator  or  Administrador  do  Distrito.  

•  

263  

Municipality  (eg:  Pemba)                           Presidente  de  Municipio  

Bairro                                 Chefe  de  bairro   Unidades                 Chefe  de  unidade  
  Fig.  8.3:  Political  Partitioning  of  the  country:  Flowchart    

 

Note:  Municipalities  serve  as  the  headquarters  of  Provinces,  but  are  considered  as   autonomous  entities,  whose  leaders  are  elected  by  the  municipal  citizens.  They  have   their   own   budget,   own   administration   and   heading   the   Municipality   is   the   Mayor   or   Presidente  de  Municipio.    
 

 
Community   Lider  Comunitario   (Regulo)   1st  level   Sub-­‐community   Lider  comunitario   (Regulo)   2nd  level  

Cellular   Secretario  de  Cellular  

Zona   Chefe  do  zona  

                                                                         TRADITIONAL                                                ADMINISTRATIVE/POLITICAL    
Fig.   8.4:   State   apparatus   extensions   in   rural   areas:   co-­habitation   between   elected   local   traditional  leaders  (Regulo)  and  appointed  politico-­administrative  leaders  (Secretario)  

•  

264  

8.1.2 Vulnerability  to  Climate  Changes     8.1.2.1   Due  to  its  geographical  localization  right  on  the  Mozambique  Channel  on  the  track  of   tropical   cyclones   borne   from   monsoonal   activity   in   the   Indian   Ocean,   and   lying   at   the  receiving  end  of  nine  major  international  rivers  making  their  way  to  the  Indian   Ocean   through   the   country,   Mozambique   is   subject   to   multiple   extreme   weather   events.  The  country  ranks  third  among  African  countries  most  exposed  to  weather-­‐ related   hazards.   Floods,   epidemics   and   cyclones   are   the   most   frequent   disasters,   although   drought   affects   by   far   the   largest   number   of   people,   with   sea   level   rise   emerging  as  a  significant  hazard319.     During  the  past  50  years,  Mozambique  has  suffered  from  a  total  of  68  major  hydro-­‐ meteorological  disasters,  which  have  killed  more  than  100,000  people  and  affected   up   to   28   million.   Up   to   25   percent   of   the   population   is   at   risk   from   natural   hazards320.       High   Exposure:   Mozambique,   3rd   African   country   most   exposed   to   HMDs  

           Fig.  8.5:  Disaster  Impacts  in  Mozambique.  Source:  GFDRR,  2011  

                                                                                                                  319  GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011   320  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   •   265  

Drought  is  the  most  severe  disaster  in  Mozambique.  Drought  occurs  primarily  in  the   southwestern  region  (west  from  the  Gaza  province)  and  in  the  central  region  (west   from   Tete   province),   with   a   frequency   of   7   and   4   in   10   years   respectively   (see   MICOA  2005321;  also  GFDRR  2011322).  Provinces  particularly  vulnerable  to  drought   are   Gaza,   Inhambane,   and   Maputo,   where   rainfall—even   when   above   average—is   often   insufficient   and   results   in   critical   water   shortages   and   limited   agricultural   productivity.   According   to   the   World   Bank,   between   1980   and   2000,   droughts   contributed   to   an   estimated   4,000   deaths.   Drought   disaster   costs   to   the   national   economy   have   been   estimated   at   $1.74   billion   during   1980–2003,   but   this   largely   underestimates  losses  and  impacts  on  the  poor323.     The   second   most   impactful   disaster   in   Mozambique   is   flooding.   Floods   in   Mozambique   occur   every   2-­‐3   years   and   can   last   up   to   several   months.   They   are   caused  by  a  number  of  geographical  factors.  Nine  major  international  hydrographic   systems   find   their   way   to   the   Indian   Ocean   through   Mozambique324. In   fact,   50   percent   of   the   water   in   Mozambique’s   rivers   originates   from   outside   the   country.   Flooding  is  linked  not  only  to  heavy  rainfall  events,  but  also  to  water  drainage  from   rivers  in  upstream  neighboring  countries.  Epidemics  have  been  generally  associated   with  flood  disasters325.     The   southern   and   central   regions   are   where   floods   have   been   most   recurrent,   in   river   basin   areas,   low-­‐lying   regions,   and   areas   with   poor   drainage   systems.     At   least   1.7  million  hectares,  or  6  %  of  the  national  territory,  could  be  at  risk  from  flooding,   principally   along   the   coast   and   the   main   riverbeds326.   Areas   most   vulnerable   to                                                                                                                  
321  Ministry  for  the  Coordination  of  Environmental  Affairs  (MICOA),  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  

2007  
322 323

 GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011    World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”    GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011    MICOA,  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  2007   • 266  

324  These  are  the  Buzi,  Incomati,  Limpopo,  Maputo,  Pungoé,  Save,  Rovuma,  Umbeluzi  and  Zambezi  rivers.  For  all  

325 326

but  Rovuma,  the  flood  plains  are  inside  Mozambique  (GFDRR,  2009).  

 

flooding   are,   but   not   limited   to,   areas   close   to   the   coast.   In   2000,   Mozambique   experienced   its   worst   floods   in   50   years,   killing   about   800   people   and   displacing   540,000327.     Finally,   Mozambique   is   subject   to   three   or   four   cyclones   every   year,   which   travel   up   the   Mozambique   Channel   due   to   monsoonal   activity   in   the   Indian   Ocean,   from   October  to  April.  The  whole  coast  is  affected,  but  areas  most  affected  by  cyclones  are   located   between   Pemba   and   Angoche,   on   the   northern   coast   of   Mozambique328.   In   addition   to   the   extreme   wind   and   rainfall   brought   by   these   cyclones,   cyclonal   activity   can   exacerbate   seawater   inundation   and   storm   surge   threats.   It   also   warrants   noting   that   in   the   last   decades,   the   southern   parts   have   been   hit   recurrently  by  Cyclones  such  as  in  2000,  2001  and  2007.     Other   significant   climate-­‐related   hazards   are   coastal   erosion,   tidal   incursions   and   storm   surges.   More   than   60%   of   Mozambique’s   population   of   23million   live   in   coastal   areas,   and   is   therefore   highly   vulnerable   to   seawater   inundation   along   its   2,700   km   coastline.   Seawater   inundation   includes   saline   intrusion   deep   into   river   mouths,  beach  erosion,  and  short  extreme  rises  in  sea  level  due  to  tropical  storms   and   cyclones.   Saline   intrusion   of   the   coastal   aquifers   and   estuaries   holds   serious   ecological   and   economic   implications   for   agriculturalists   settled   along   rivers.   This   is   partly   due   to   the   fact   that   some   areas   in   the   country   are   below   sea   level   such   as   Beira.       The   issue   of   beach   erosion   is   also   very   serious,   threatening   coastal   infrastructure   such   as   roads   and   housing   as   well   as   tourism.   In   some   portions   of   Beira   (central   region),   30   to   40   meters   of   beach   have   been   eroded   in   the   past   15   to   20   years,   destroying   natural   mangroves   and   encroaching   on   homes,   roads   and   touristic  

                                                                                                                327  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   328  MICOA,  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  2007   •  

267  

establishments329.  Finally,  storm  surges  pose  a  huge  threat  to  coastal  infrastructure   as   they   can   temporarily   raise   sea   level   as   much   as   5   meters.   While   many   of   the   major  coastal  cities  of  Mozambique  have  infrastructure  in  place  to  stem  the  effects   of  such  an  extreme  event,  many  are  in  need  of  serious  maintenance330.       All  in  all,  areas  highly  exposed  to  multiple  HMDs  in  Mozambique  are:  coastal  areas   which  lie  at  the  receiving  end  of  the  nine  hydrographic  basin  and  are  thus  triply  at   risk:  from  flooding,  sea  level  rise  and  cyclones.  Areas  particularly  prone  to  rainfall   deficits  are  the  Southern  and  Central  regions.     8.1.2.2   Following  from  our  definition  of  a  Disaster  as  the  conjugation  of  a  naturally  driven   Hazard   and   human   Vulnerability,   we   understand   that   multiple   hazards   that   make   landfall   in   Mozambique   turn   into   large-­‐scale   disasters   not   only   because   of   high   exposure,  but  also  due  to  acute  socio-­‐economic  vulnerability  they  meet  on  ground.     This  is  particularly  obvious  in  the  case  of  drought,  where  areas  experiencing  rainfall   deficit   (hazard)   do   not   necessarily   correspond   to   areas   suffering   from   drought   disasters.   Provinces   particularly   vulnerable   to   drought   are   Gaza,   Inhambane,   and   Maputo,  where  rainfall—even  when  above  average—is  often  insufficient  and  results   in  critical  water  shortages  and  limited  agricultural  productivity.  The  SETSAN  nation-­‐ wide   study   of   food   security   conducted   in   2008   confirms   these   insights.   The   study   found   that   Sofala,   Tete   and   Nampula   provinces   suffer   from   acute   food   insecurity,   reflecting  their  vulnerability  to  the  adverse  effects  of  climate-­‐related  disasters  and   limited  adaptive  capacity;  while  the  provinces  of  Zambézia,  Tete  and  Maputo,  on  the   other  hand,  feature  the  highest  level  of  chronic  food  insecurity,  a  result  of  persistent   High  socio-­economic  vulnerability,  Low  Adaptive  Capacity  

                                                                                                                329  MICOA,  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  2007   330  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   •  

268  

poverty   and   systemic   food   access   issues   (see   SETSAN   2008)331.   Therein,   an   estimated   35%   of   the   population   is   thought   to   be   chronically   food   insecure.   Economic   impacts   of   drought   disasters   have   been   most   significant   in   Zambézia   Province,   where   production   losses   could   range   between   $12-­‐$170   million   for   maize   alone,  depending  on  the  severity  of  the  drought332 .   Despite   strong   economic   growth   (6,3%   in   2010),   over   80%   of   the   population   continues   to   depend   on   agriculture   for   subsistence.   High   rates   of   poverty   (55%   in   2010),  malnutrition,  HIV/AIDS,  and  endemic  diseases  contribute  to  what  is  already   a  high  physical  vulnerability333.  Furthermore,  above  60%  of  the  population  lives  on   the  2,700km  coastline,  rendering  the  coastal  areas  hotspots  of  multiple  hazards  334.     Characterizing  Mozambique’s  adaptive  capacity  in  the  face  of  HMDs  remains  a  tricky   endeavor.   Vulnerability   to   HMDs   can   only   be   assessed   using   proxies   of   overall   inherent  or  social  vulnerability  assumed  to  compose  vulnerability  to  HMDs,  such  as   level  of  poverty,  access  to  health,  education  and  food  security.  However  evidence  on   vulnerability  at  the  sub-­‐national  level  in  Mozambique  is  rare;  information  related  to   the  exposure  of  Mozambique  is  available  at  a  geographically  disaggregated  level,  but   the   same   does   not   hold   for   sensitivity335.   Most   data   available   on   sensitivity   is   focused  at  the  national  level,  or  zooms  in  on  a  particular  local  case  study,  providing   no   basis   for   comparison.   A   thorough   vulnerability   mapping   of   the   country   of   Mozambique  will  require  access  to  detailed  and  reliable  datasets  on  both  exposure   and  sensitivity  336.    

                                                                                                               
331  SETSAN  (Technical  Secretariat  for  Food  Security  and  Nutrition),  “Report  on  the  Monitory  of  Food  and  

Nutrition  in  Mozambique”,  May  2008  
332 333

 World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”    GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011   334  Ibidem   335  Ibidem   336  Ibidem   • 269    

Table   8.6   from   Furguson’s   in-­‐depth   study   in   the   district   of   Buzi   provides   a   rare   snapshot  of  local  vulnerability,  and  low  adaptive  capacity,  to  HMDs.      

 
Fig.   8.6:   Risk   and   Vulnerability   to   climate-­related   hazards   in   Buzi,   Buzi   district.   Source:  Ferguson,  2005    

8.1.2.3  

Conclusion:   A   country   highly   sensitive   to   climate   change   and   variability  

The   literature   reviewed   provides   a   consistent   picture   that   Mozambique   is   particularly   vulnerable   to   climate   change   and   variability.   It   is   not   clear   whether   Mozambique   is   more   exposed   to   multiple   HMDs   than   other   countries   in   tropical   regions  (see  UNDP  2007),  however  its  particularly  high  vulnerability  to  the  multiple   HMDs  it  is  exposed  to  renders  national  adaptation  to  climate  change  and  variability   a  high  priority  for  Mozambique.     At   the   national-­‐level,   the   direct   impacts   of   extreme   weather   hazards   combined   with   acute   vulnerability   generate   severe   effects   on   Mozambique’s   developing   economy.   Indeed,   the   majority   of   the   population’s   reliance   on   rain-­‐fed   agriculture   for   •   270  

subsistence337,   absence   of   traditional   and   modern   irrigation   systems   to   mitigate   the   effect   of   erratic   rainfall   of   agricultural   yields,   inadequate   infrastructure   and   weak   institutional  framework  are  important  factors.  A  regression  analysis  over  the  period   1981–2004   suggests   that   Mozambique’s   GDP   growth   is   cut   by   an   average   of   5.5   percent   when   a   major   water   shock   occurs338 .   According   to   Bambaige   (see   UNDP   2007),   the   sectors   that   should   be   the   focus   of   adaptation   measures   in   order   to   increase   the   resilience   of   socio-­‐   economic   systems   are   agriculture,   water,   energy,   and  health339.     At   the   local   level,   multiple   HMDs   reduce   opportunities.   Natural   disasters   do   not   affect  all  communities  in  the  country  evenly,  as  their  impacts  are  correlated  to  the   ability  of  those  communities  to  withstand  them340.  Disaster  hotspots  in  Mozambique   are   areas   where   multiple   hazards   interplay   with   acute   poverty   –   for   instance,   subsistence   farmer   coastal   communities   in   Pebane   (Zambezia   province)   or   inner   city  neighborhoods  in  Pemba  (Cabo  Delagdo  province)  triply  at  risk  from  cyclones,   drought  and  flooding  are  a  prime  example.     Such  particularly  high  vulnerability,  combined  with  significant  exposure  to  extreme   weather  events,  makes  adaptation  of  utmost  importance  for  Mozambique.       A   look   at   regional   climate   model   projections   reveals   that   climate   change   is   expected   to   only   increase   the   frequency   and   magnitude   of   shocks,   while   cyclones   are   likely   to   continue  to  pose  large  threats  to  Mozambique’s  growth.                                                                                                                           337  MICOA,  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  2007   338  World  Bank,  “Mozambique  Country  Profile”   339  GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”,  2011   340  MICOA,  “National  Adaptation  Programme  of  Action”,  2007   • 271    

Drought Extreme temperature Flood Storm TOTAL AVERAGE

Ethiopia 14 0 49 0 63 15,75

Madagascar 6 0 6 45 57 14,25

Morocco 5 1 28 2 36 9

Mozambique 12 0 29 17 58 14,5

Niger 8 0 15 1 24 6

Senegal 6 0 17 3 26 6,5

South Africa 8 2 30 21 61 15,25

Tanzania Uni Rep 9 0 31 4 44 11

Uganda 9 0 16 4 29 7,25

1960-2011 Source: EM-DAT

Table  8.3:  Mozambique’s  exposure  to  HMDs,  as  compared  to  a  sample  of  other  African   nations  (data  source:  EM-­DAT)    

  8.1.3 Projected  Climate  Change  impacts  in  Mozambique     The   Mozambique   country   case   of   the   World   Bank’s   Economics   of   Adapting   to   Climate   Change   (EACC)   study   comprises   the   most   comprehensive   assessment   of   projected  Climate  Change  impacts  on  Mozambique341.       The   study   compares   growth   paths   “with   climate   change”   to   a   baseline   of   growth   “without   climate   change”,   considering   five   priority   sectors   impacted   by   climate   shocks:   (1)   agriculture;   (2)   hydropower   generation   and   water   availability;   (3)   transport   infrastructure,   notably   roads;   and   (4)   coastal   zones,   which   do   not   constitute  a  sector  per  se,  but  a  hotspot  of  climate  risk.  The  study  thus  projects  the   impacts   of   climate   change   in   these   priority   sectors   and   assesses   costs   of   adaptation.   Adaptation   is   defined   as   a   set   of   actions   designed   to   reduce   or   eliminate   the   deviation   from   the   baseline   development   path   caused   by   climate   change342.   It   needs   to   be   noted   that   this   assessment   of   the   impacts   of   climate   change   on   Mozambique   is   a   conservative   one,   as   it   does   not   project   impacts   on   other   sectors   such   as   ecosystem  services  or  health  (malaria  incidence).                                                                                                                    
342  Ibidem   341  World  Bank,  “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010  

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272  

Just   as   for   the   rest   of   Africa,   scientists   are   more   confident   about   projections   of   temperature  changes  over  Mozambique  than  projections  for  precipitation.  In  order   to   represent   the   full   range   of   uncertainty   in   the   climate   projections   derived   from   Global   Circulation   Models   (GCMs),   the   World   Bank   study   describes   for   Mozambique   a   “wet”   and   “dry”   scenario,   and   introduces   “Mozambique   wet”   and   “Mozambique   dry”   models   to   represent   the   range   of   possible   outcomes   for   Mozambique343.   The   picture  that  emanates  from  the  model  runs  for  Mozambique  are  as  follows.  By  2050,   Mozambique  is  projected  to  experience  an  increase  in  temperature  of  1–2  degrees   Celsius   according   to   both   Mozambique   Wet   and   Dry   scenarios;   more   precisely,   temperatures   will   increase   by   1.15   to   2.09   degrees   Celsius,   though   with   regional   variations  (see  figure  8.7).  

 
Fig.  8.7:  Mozambique  Temperature  in  2050  –  Dry  (left)  and  Wet  (right)  scenarios.     Source:  World  Bank  EACC,  2010  

With   regards   to   precipitation,   depending   on   the   scenario,   precipitation   in   the   southern  region  is  projected  to  either  decrease  relatively  little  (in  the  dry  scenario)   or  increase  dramatically  (in  the  wet  scenario).  Thus,  depending  on  the  model  used,   precipitation   will   either   increase   or   decrease,   again   with   regional   differences   (see                                                                                                                  
343  It  is  important  to  note  that  “Mozambique  wet”  (IPSL_cm4  sres_a2)  and  “Mozambique  dry”  

(UKMO_hadgem1  sres_a1b)  models  differ  from  the  two  “extreme”  GCMs  used  in  the  World  Bank’s   EACC  global  track  study,  labeled  “global  wet”  (NCAR-­CCSM  sres_a1b)  and  “global  dry”  (CSIRO-­ MK3.0  sres_a2).  Indeed,  a  globally  wet  scenario  is  not  necessarily  wet  in  Mozambique.  In  fact,  the   global  wet  scenario  projects  a  slight  drying  and  the  global  dry  is  in  fact  somewhat  wetter  in   Mozambique.  The  two  models  “Mozambique  wet”  and  “Mozambique  dry”  were  introduced  to  correct   this  discrepancy  and  display  the  range  of  possible  outcomes  specific  to  Mozambique.  World  Bank,   “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010  

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273  

figure   8.8).   The   main   message   here   is   that   climate   will   become   increasingly   variable   and   uncertain,   and   that   people   and   decision-­‐makers   need   to   plan   for   this   uncertainty344.  

Fig.  8.8:  Mozambique  Precipitation  in  2050  –  Dry  (left)  and  Wet  (right)  scenarios   Source:  World  Bank  EACC,  2010    

Comparing   Figures   8.7   and   8.8,   it   becomes   clear   that   regional   variation   in   precipitation   is   more   significant   than   regional   variation   in   temperature.   As   shown   by   the   maps   above,   regardless   of   the   model   used,   regional   variation   in   precipitation   between   northern   and   southern   regions   of   Mozambique   is   projected   to   remain   important345.   Finally,   changes   in   precipitation   and   temperature   from   the   four   GCMs   (the   two   global   scenarios   plus   two   extreme   scenarios   for   Mozambique-­‐   extreme   wet   and   extreme   dry)   were   used   to   estimate   for   the   2050   time   horizon:   (a)   the   changes   in   yield   each   year   for   both   irrigated   and   rain-­‐fed   crops,   as   well   as   irrigation   demand   for   six   cash   crops   and   eight   food   crops;   2)   changes   in   river   flow   into   hydropower   generation   facilities,   and   resulting   changes   in   generation   capacity;   3)   impacts   on   transport  infrastructure  and  the  increased  demand  and  costs  of  road  maintenance.   Simulations   of   sea   level   rise   were   constructed   independently   of   the   climate                                                                                                                  
344  World  Bank,  “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010   345  Ibidem  

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274  

scenarios,  using  both  an  integrated  model  of  coastal  systems  to  assess  the  risk  and   costs   of   sea   level   rise   in   Mozambique,   as   well   as   focused   analyses   of   interactions   between   cyclone   risk   and   sea   level   rise   in   two   coastal   city   cases   –Beira   and   Maputo,   the  two  largest  cities  in  Mozambique346.     Table   8.4   describes   results   of   climate   change   projections   for   each   key   sector   of   vulnerability  considered.     Sector   vulnerability   Agriculture  
Agriculture  in   Mozambique   accounts  for  24%   of  GDP  and  80%   of  employment.   Traditional  “slash   &  burn”  farming   techniques  plus   frequent   uncontrolled  fires   result  in  poor   soils  vulnerable  to   erosion—and   hence  to  further   productivity   losses  during   floods  /  drought.       In  all  scenarios,   net  national   average  crop  yield   lower  relative  to   baseline  yield   without  CC     2–4%  reduction   in  yields  of  major   crops,  especially   in  central  region     Agricultural  GDP   loss  of  4.5  –  9.8%  

Only  7%  of   Mozambicans   have  access  to   modern   electricity.  The   primary  source  of   energy  (the  grid)   is  hydropower   from  barrages  on   the  Zambezi  Basin.   Fuelwood  and  coal   were  not   considered  in  the   study.  

Energy   (hydropower   generation)  

Transport   (Roads)  
Mozambique  has   one  of  the  lowest   road  densities   per  person  of   any  African   country.  Losses   from  climate   change  projected   to  be  substantial,   in  large  part   because  of  the   importance  of   current  and   required   investments  in   the  sector.   Impacts  of   severe  rainfall   events  on  roads,   culverts,  and   bridges  would   lead  to  damage  /   loss  of  access       Reduction  in   stock  of  roads   (measured  in   km)  without   adaptation   estimated   between  -­‐2%     (Moz  dry   scenario)  and    -­‐ 12%    (Moz  wet   scenario);  -­‐9%   reduction  with  
    

Coastal  zones  
60%  of  Mozambique’s   population  is  clustered  in   the  country’s  2,700km-­‐ long  coastline  

Projected   Climate   Change   Impacts     by  2050   (highest   confidence)  

Under  all   scenarios  except   most  pessimistic,   1.4%  less  energy   generated  than   “without  CC”  (only   slight  negative   impact)     Potential  energy   deficit  due  to  CC  is   of  approx.  110,000   GWh  relative  to   baseline   generation  in   2005–50     Impacts  limited   by  new  energy   generation  plants’   integration  of  
  

By  2040s,  with  no   adaptation,  Mozambique   could  lose  up  to  4,850   km2  of  land  from  today   (0.6%  of  national   territory)       916,000  people  could   be  forced  to  migrate   away  from  coast  (2.3%  of   projected  2040s  pop.).         Worst-­‐case  scenario:   total  annual  damage   costs  to  reach  $103   million/year  in  the   2040s  –forced  migration   being  a  large  contributor   to  that  cost.       High  geographic   concentration  of  costs  in  
    

                                                                                                                •  

346  World  Bank,  “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010  

275  

Projected  costs  of   adaptation   (in  discounted   USD  billions,   const.  2003)  

Damage  avoidance   strategy:  Beach  shore   nourishment  &  river  and   sea  dike  building.     Cost:  $890  million/year   in  the  2040s  for  the  high   sea  level  rise  scenario.   Strategy  would  reduce   total  damage  expected  by   a  factor  of  four  (from   $103million  to   $24million/year    by   2040s),  reducing  total   land  area  lost  by  a  factor   of  80  (to  only  61km2)   and  number  of  forced   migrants  by  factor  of  140   (to  7,000  people).   However  costs  of  this   strategy  outweigh  its   economic  benefits  by  a   large  margin.     More  viable  adaptation   options:  strategic   construction  of  “hard”   protection  infrastructure   in  high  value  /   unmovable  vulnerable   locations  (e.g:  Port  of   Beira).  Costs:  $190  –   $470  million/year  in   the  2040s,  depending  on   the  sea  level  rise   scenario.   Table  8.4:  Projected  Impacts  of  Climate  in  Mozambique,  with  associated  levels  of  confidence.   Source:  World  Bank,  2010.    
          

Expanding   Irrigation.     Cost:  $  0.6  b.     Alternative  soft  &   less  costly   measures  advised   given  extent  of   land  requiring   irrigation:  Water   harvesting,   soil/moisture   conservation  and   agro-­‐forestry.       Agriculture  R&D.   Cost:  $  6.1  b.   Softer  resilience   building   strategies  include:   Support  for   improved  access   to  markets/   inputs,  value   addition  and   reduction  of  post-­‐ harvest  losses.  

changing  patterns   of  temperature   and  rainfall  in   planning     Main  source  of   negative  change:   increased  evapo-­‐ transpiration  in   the  reservoirs   (less  water   availability  for   electricity)     Across  all   sectors,  in  order  to   regain  remaining   loss  in  welfare:   Human  capital   accumulation   needed   (Education).     Cost:  $  6.1  b.  

adaptation.    

Zambezia,  Nampula,   Sofala  and  Maputo   provinces  (low-­‐lying,   densely  populated  areas)       Even  small  levels  of  sea   level  rise  dramatically   increase  the  probability   of  severe  storm  surge   events  

Sealing   unpaved  roads   and  culverts  in   highly  strategic   areas  (no-­‐regret   strategy   recommended   even  under  the   baseline).     Cost:  $  1.5  b.  

Using  a  dynamic  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model,  an  aggregate  picture   emerges  of  CC  impacts  on  Mozambique’s  macro-­‐economic  performance  as  a  whole,   across   all   sectors.   This   picture   points   to   significant   declines   in   national   welfare   by   •   276  

2050   and   slowing   rates   of   economic   growth.   In   the   worst-­‐case   scenario,   the   net   present   value   of   damages   (discounted   at   5%)   reaches   about   $7.6   billion   dollars,   which   is   equivalent   to   an   annual   payment   slightly   above   $400   million.   GDP   falls   between  4  and  14%  relative  to  baseline  growth  in  the  2040–50  decade  if  adaptation   strategies  are  not  implemented347.      

       
 

 

Fig.   8.9   (Left):   Projected   CC   impacts   for   Mozambique   using   four   models   (2   GCMs   and   two   Mozambique  specific),  by  priority  sector,  relative  to  baseline  of  “no  climate  change”.       Fig.  8.10  (Right):    Costs  of  adapting  to  Climate  Change  in  Mozambique     Source:  World  Bank,  2010.  

                                                                                                                        •  

347  World  Bank,  “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010  

277  

8.2  HMDs  and  Government  Response  in  Mozambique:  1995-­2010     8.2.1 Understanding  Impacts  of  HMDs  in  Mozambique,  1995-­2010     The   break   year   in   Mozambique   that   marks   the   accentuation   of   inter-­‐annual   variability   and   increase   of   HMDs   is   1994,   similar   to   the   trend   observed   across   Africa.   Figure   8.11   illustrates   eloquently   the   staggering   increase   in   HMDs   from   1994.  

Number  of  HMDs  that  hit   Mozambique,  1979-­1997  
350   300   250   200   150   100   50   0   n°  of  HMDs  

  Fig.  8.11:  Number  of  HMDs  that  hit  Mozambique  between  1979-­1997,  a  notable  hike   starting  in  1994348.  Source:  DesInventar  Mozambique  data,  GRIP-­Arendal.  

  We  now  turn  to  investigating  the  impacts  of  these  HMDs,  since  they  began  to  occur   with  increased  frequency,  at  both  the  national  and  community  levels.       8.2.1.1 Impacts  at  National  Level     Disaster  costs  to  the  national  economy  have  been  estimated  at  $1.74  billion  during   1980-­‐2003,   but   this   largely   underestimates   economic   losses   and   impacts   on   the                                                                                                                   348  HMDs  include:  drought,  floods,  heat  waves,  alluvions,  cyclones,  strong  winds,  rains  and  
tropical  depressions,  as  well  as  disaster-­‐related  epidemics.  

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poor349.   Table   8.5   reviews   HMDs   that   have   hit   Mozambique   during   our   period   of   study,   and   their   adverse   impacts   across   sectors,   from   local   to   national.   From   the   above   table   clearly   appears   that   central   and   southern   regions   bear   the   brunt   of   multiple   HMDs   (droughts,   floods,   cyclones)   hitting   Mozambique   simultaneously   within   the   same   year,   with   increasing   frequency,   and   causing   extensive   damage   in   terms  of  lives  lost,  livelihoods  interrupted  and  families  affected.    
  Climate  shock   1994-­1995:  Cyclone  Nádia  in  1994   affects  coastal  area  of  Nampula,   exacerbates  drought  that  occurs  in  1995     1995,  August  and  September:  Drought   Impacts  in  the  province  of  Tete     1997,  January  to  March:  Floods   Impacts  in  the  Zambezi  and  Shire  Rivers   1997  July:  Drought  and   Desertification   Impacts  in  almost  all  of  the  country,  but   serious  situation  for  the  provinces  of   Tete,  Manica  and  Sofala.     1998  June:  Desertification  and   drought  affects  six  provinces  (Maputo,   Gaza,  Inhambane,  Tete,  Manica,  Sofala)     2000:  Floods  affect  whole  country   Greatest  impact  in  Gaza  and  districts  in   the  Zambezi  valley   2000,  April:  Drought  in  the  north,   floods  in  southern  Manica     2002,  March:  Drought     Impacts  in  central  and  southern  regions     2003:  Drought  and  cyclones  between   October  and  March   Impacts  in  central  and  southern  regions      2003:  Cyclone  Japhet     Impact  on  some  parts  of  the  southern   and  central  regions,  particularly  north  of     Impacts   •  Anticipation  of  agricultural  crop  in  Nampula;   •  One  and  a  half  million  people  at  risk     •  Estimated  above  100  deaths  from  hunger;   •  1994/95  agricultural  campaign  affected;   •  200  animals  die  in  Tete  province  (in  the  districts  of   Changara,  Moatize  and  Chiuta).   •  24,800  families  affected  by  flooding  in  Mutarara.       •  Forced  migrations  of  populations  as  well  as  animals  from   their  natural  habitat  to  other  areas  of  the  country  and  to   neighboring  countries.     •  In  Inhambane,  60  000  people  are  affected;   •  Lack  of  water  for  consumption.   Access  routes  to  critical  areas  of  flooding  in  the  province  of   Gaza  are  cut  off;   •  307,000  people  are  affected  in  the  north  of  Gaza      700  people  died  and  half  a  million  lost  their   homes   •  3,000  ha  of  crop  in  Mussurize,  Sussundenga  and  Machaze   affected.   •  4,000  families  in  the  districts  of  Sussundenga  and   Mussorize  in  a  state  of  emergency.   •  More  than  500,000  people  affected  (114,000  families)   across  country,  of  which  60,000  in  central  and  south.   •  2.6  million  people  affected;   •  Lack  of  food  affects  1.5  million  people;   •  In  the  province  of  Gaza  nearly  60,000  suffer  from  hunger   and  25  000  ha  of  maize  have  affected  in  Chokwe  district   Destruction  of  Massangena  hospital  in  the  north  of  the   province  of  Gaza.  

                                                                                                                •  

349  World  Bank,  “Economics  of  Adapting  to  Climate  Change,  Mozambique”,  2010  

279  

the  province  of  Gaza  (in  Massangena)     2004:  Drought   Impact  on  the  provinces  of  Gaza,   Inhambane,  Manica  and  Sofala   2005:  Drought   Impact  on  southern  and  central  regions       2007:  Cyclone  Fávio     Occurrence  in  Inhambane      

 •  659  000  people  affected.     •  1,142,250  people  affected  in  seven  provinces.   About  183,000  people  were  affected  by  the  Cyclone;   •  Food  crisis  due  to  rupture  of  stock  in  the  warehouses  of   the  National  Disaster  Management  Institute  (INGC);   •  6,000  workers  in  the  hotel  industry  were  without  jobs  ;   •  42  touristic  establishments  in  Inhambane  destroyed  by   the  cyclone;   •  Destruction  of  20,800  hectares  of  crops.   •  Food  crisis  causes  a  rupture  of  stock  in  the  warehouses   of  the  INGC.   In  2007,  flooding  in  Mozambique  killed  at  least  29  people   and  affected  285,000  people,  the  worst  since  the  2000-­‐   2001  floods.     •  144,280  people  affected.   .     •  25  000  people  affected  by  floods  in  the  districts  of  Caia,   Morrumbala,  Mutarrara  and  Mopeia.   Heavy  rains  in  Zambia,  Zimbabwe  and  Malawi  caused   flooding  in  Mozambique  that  displaced  tens  of  thousands   of  people  and  destroyed  almost  100,000  hectares  of  crops.   As  a  result  of  the  floods  and  consecutive  droughts  in   2002/03,  2003/4  and  2007/08,  the  World  Food   Programme  placed  300,000  people  under  food  assistance   •  785  families  affected;   •  The  province  of  Inhambane  considered  the  most  severely   impacted  with  about  193  000  families  affected.   •  In  Chemba,  726  hectares  of  various  crops  were   destroyed  by  the  waters  of  the  Zambezi;   •  4  deaths  and  11,561  left  homeless;   •  229  thousand  hectares  of  various  crops  at  risk.  

2007:  Floods     Impact  in  the  provinces  of  Sofala,   Manica,  Tete,  Zambezia     2007,  March:  Drought   Impact  in  the  province  of  Gaza     2008:  Floods   Impacts  in  the  central  region    of  the   country  

2010  February:  Drought   Impacts  in  61  districts  across  the   country       2010:  Floods  impact  Central  region;   Drought  in  the  southern  region  

Table  8.5:  Impacts  of  HMDs  in  Mozambique,  1995-­2010  

  8.2.1.2   Through   our   community   fieldwork   conducted   in   Mozambique   from   March   20th   –   May   1st   2011,   we   elicited   impacts   of   HMDs   in   communities   along   the   Mozambican   coastline,   and   their   CCA-­‐DRR   needs,   using   the   Red   Cross   climate   Vulnerability   and   Capacity   Assessment   (VCA)   tool.   In   this   section   we   present   the   critical   community   resilience-­‐building  needs  that  have  emanated  from  our  community  study.       •   280    Zooming  in:  Impacts  at  the  community-­level  

Case  selection  criteria:    

Seven  communities  were  selected  at  random,  in  three  different  sites  along   Mozambique’s  coastline  from  North  (Pemba)  to  South  (Inharrime).  We  chose  to   focus  on  coastal  areas  for  these  VCAs  due  to  the  triple  vulnerability  of  coastal  areas   to  all  the  major  hazards  that  hit  Mozambique.  Thus  all  of  the  communities  that  were   selected  are  low-­‐income  fishing  or  peasant  communities,  ocean-­‐dependent  and   vulnerable  to  all  three  main  hazards  cyclones,  drought  and  flooding.  While  some  of   the  communities  identified  in  the  VCA  analysis  are  not  located  along  the  actual   coastline,  they  do  rely  on  the  coast  for  their  livelihoods.  Fig.  8.12  provides  a  visual   representation  of  the  location  of  the  three  sites  where  VCAs  were  conducted.    

 
Figure  8.12:  Geographic  location  of  the  selected  VCAs  sites  along  Mozambique’s  coastline.   Credit:  Daniel  Zakarias.  

     

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281  

Vulnerability  in  Pemba  Municipality  (urban,  northern  Mozambique)   The   city   of   Pemba   is   located   on   the   northern   coast   of   Mozambique,   bordered   by   the   Indian  Ocean,  whose  waters  and  crystal  white  sands  of  its  beaches  provide  beautiful   scenery.  The  municipal  area,  with  an  area  of  194  sq.  km,  occupies  a  peninsula  that   defines   the   Bay   of   Pemba,   the   third   largest   bay   in   the   world.   It   is   bounded   on   the   east  by  the  Indian  Ocean,  to  the  west  and  north  by  Pemba  Bay  and  in  the  South  by   the  District  of  Mecúfi  and  the  District  of  Pemba  Metuge.       The  peninsula  of  Pemba  is  situated  in  tropical  zone  and  has  a  hot  and  humid  climate   that   is   reinforced   by  its   location   on   the   shore   of   Pemba   Bay   and   its   proximity   to   the   Mozambique   Channel.   The   winds   associated   with   the   inter-­‐tropical   convergence   zone  typically  occur  in  summer,  mainly  in  January.  In  other  periods,  the  atmospheric   circulation  is  influenced  by  winds  blowing  from  east  and  anti-­‐cyclonic  actions.    The   action  of  storms  and  winds  is  the  main  driver  of  the  formation  and  maintenance  of   the  shoreline  through  the  deposition  of  sand.  Additionally  waves  and  ocean  currents   also   influence   the   dynamics   of   the   coast,   through   processes   of   confrontation   or   erosion,  including  wind,  caused  by  rains,  and  waves  of  marine  waters.     The   coast   of   Pemba   Bay   (the   mouth   and   inland)   is   characterized   by   low   cliffs   alternating  with  small  sandy  beaches  and  mangroves.  Predominate  in  the  inner  bay   water   areas,   salt   marshes   and   mangroves,   while   the   peninsula's   northern   coast   (mouth  of  the  Bay)  is  composed  of  rocky  areas  composed  of  fossil  coral,  and  small   sandy  beaches,  culminating  in  the  beautiful  beach  of  Wimbe.  The  Indian  Ocean  has   vast   beaches   of   fine   white   sand   and   clear   waters.   The   banks   and   reefs   run   along   the   entire  coastline  of  the  municipal  territory.  Tides  are  semi-­‐diurnal  with  a  maximum   width  of  4.5  meters  (INAHINA,  2002).  However,  the  movement  of  water  in  the  bay   has  not  been  studied.     Vulnerability  of  the  District  of  Pebane  (rural,  central  Mozambique)   Pebane  is  situated  at  the  north-­‐eastern  ocean  front  of  Zambézia  province.  It  covers  a   surface   of   10.086   sq.   km   with   a   population   trend   of   135.275   habitants   (in   1997);   • 282    

168.602   in   2005   and   185,333   in   2007   (National   Census,   2007).   This   population   is   young  (nearly  44%  of  the  population  is  below  15  years  old),  mainly  feminine  (51%)   and  mostly  rural  (only  6%  of  the  total  area  of  the  district  is  urban).     Climate   in   Pebane   is   predominatly   rainy   tropical   with   two   distinct   seasons,   and   average   precipitation   ranging   1.286   mm   and   the   reference   evapo-­‐transpiration   ranging   1.514   mm.   High   rainfall   occur   from   December   to   April   (nearly   75   to   80%   of   the  total  rainfall  in  the  district),  mostly  influenced  by  the  proximity  with  the  sea.     Its  geomorphology  is  dominantly  a  sedimentary  plain  with  sandy  cover  in  the  coast   and  consolidated  precambric  sediments  in  the  interior,  both  intercepted  by  natural   drainage   lines   where   much   recent   sediments   occur   (marine   and   estuarine   at   the   coast   and   aluvionary   in   the   interior   part   of   the   district).   The   coastal   strip   also   comprises  yellow  and  whitish  sandy  soils  locally  modified  by  hidromorphism.     There   are   two   options   to   access   Pebane,   by   car   or   by   boats,   although   accessibility   is   very   difficult.   Water   access   is   still   scarce   with   some   communities   travelling   nearly   12   km   to   fetch   25   litres   of   water.   There   are   111   schools   and   11   health   establishments.   Main   economic   activities   at   the   district   of   Pebane   are   agriculture   (small-­‐scale  rain-­‐fed  subsistence  agriculture),  small-­‐scale  fisheries  and  tourism.     Traditional   leadership   is   secured   by   the   representatives   of   the   government   at   the   local   level   such   as   secretaries   and   chiefs   of   districts,   heads   of   groups   of   villages,   heads  of  villages  and  other  persons  in  the  community  respected  and  legitimated  by   their   social,   economic,   cultural   and   religious   roles.   In   traditional   leadership   is   no   division   of   labor   and   responsibilities   between   the   different   community   leaders.   Thus,   the   secretaries   have   the   task   of   mobilizing   the   community   for   social   and   economic   tasks   and   the   traditional   leaders   dealing   mainly   of   traditional   aspects,   such  as  ceremonies,  rites  and  social  conflicts.     •   283  

The  district  of  Pebane  is  vulnerable  to  natural  hazards  (droughts,  floods,  cyclones).   Erosion,   uncontrolled   bush   fires   and   deforestation   of   mangroves   for   charcoal   production   are   the   major   threats   to   the   environmental   sustainability   of   local   resources.   Several   measures   have   been   developed   at   local   level   to   reverse   the   situation  and  improve  the  resilience  of  communities.     Apart  from  preventing  forest  fires,  planting  of  casuarina  trees  along  the  seafront  and   beach  accesses,  as  well  as  surveying  in  the  area  where  erosion  occurs,  sensitization   of   communities   to   spare   part   of   their   surplus   production,   practice   crop   drought-­‐ resistant,   choose   riverbanks   for   agricultural   production,   promotion   and   improvement  of  cashew,  production  and  distribution  of  cassava  cuttings  with  short   cycle   and   rot   resistant,   as   well   as   the   purchase   and   distribution   of   bananas   and   pineapples  are  some  actions  being  implemented.     Vulnerability  of  Závora  (rural,  southern  Mozambique)   Inharrime   district   (where   Zàvora   is   located)   is   situated   at   the   southern   border   of   Inhambane  province,  covering  an  area  of  2,744  sq.  km,  with  an  estimated  population   of  97,  950  inhabitants  in  2007.  The  population  is  young  (45%  of  the  total  population   is   under   15   years   of   age),   mostly   female   (approximately   54%   of   total   population)   and  with  rural  characteristics  (only  5%  of  the  total  area  of  the  district  is  urban).     Tropical   dry   zones   (inside)   and   moist   zones   (near   shore)   dominate   the   climate   of   the   district.   The   coastline,   with   permeable   soil   and   favorable   conditions   for   agriculture  and  livestock,  has  average  temperatures  between  18  º  and  33  º  C,  while   the  interior  features  sandy  and  clay  soils,   average  annual  rainfall  between  1000  and   1200  mm  and  high  temperatures  causing  water  shortages.     The  district  is  accessible  only  by  the  road  through  the  National  Road  1  (across  the   district),  while  access  to  the  interior  and  the  coastline  is  via  dirt  roads.  There  are  60   district   schools   and   6   clinics.   The  main  economic  activities  are  agriculture,  fisheries,   tourism  and  small-­‐scale.   •   284  

  

Aggregation  of  priority  DRR-­CCA  needs  across  7  target  communities:    

From  our  fieldwork  in  Pemba,  Pebane  and  Zavorra  emanated  a  clear  picture  of  the   priority   needs   of   multiply   exposed   coastal   communities   in   Mozambique.   Table   8.6   summarizes   the   priority   DRR-­‐CCA   needs   emanating   from   the   seven   target   communities   surveyed   along   the   Mozambican   coastline.   As   we   see   in   the   next   section,  many  of  these  priority  needs  are  addressed  by  the  National  CCA-­‐DRR  policy.    
Table  Key:   1. Chuiba  (Pemba  site)   2. Paquitequete  (Pemba  site)   3. Chuibuabuare  (Pemba  site)   4. Macuacuane  (Pebane  site)   5. Quichanga  (Pebane  site)   6. Malaua/Porto  (Pebane  site)   7. Sihane  (Inharrime  site)  

 
Intervention     1.Facilitate/  Enable   transition  to   alternative  climate-­‐ resilient  livelihoods     2.  Replant  trees,  grass   and  mangrove  along   coastline  to  thwart   coastal  erosion  and   break  force  of   cyclones/strong   winds     3.  Tailored   agricultural  extension   services  to   master/access   agricultural   techniques  adapted  to   increased  climate   variability  (drought  &   flood)       4.  Provide  training   and  equipment  for   construction  of  small-­‐ scale  water   management  works   for  irrigation  (water   pumps,  reservoirs)     5.  Community   Disaster  Risk   Management  support   (including   establish/equip  local      Needed  community  DRR-­CCA  interventions  (above  local  capacities  to  cope)   1   2   3   4   5   6   7                       

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committee  for  disaster   risk  management).     6.  Identification  &   mapping  of  Climate   risks  to  support   planning  and   programming  at  local,   district,  municipal   levels:     7.  Establishment  of  a   Sea  Level  Rise   Monitoring/surveillan ce  system   8.    Decision-­‐making   planning  informed  by   knowledge  of  risks   (develop  and   implement  urban   climate  risk   management  plan,   public  awareness   campaigns)   10.  Dig  a  new   canal/drainage  ways   to  take  care  of   problem  of  stagnant   waters  and  soil   erosion   11.  Administer  cure   for  dying  coconut   trees,  reservoir  of   nutrition,  knowledge   and  cultural  identity   for  the  local   community   12.  Capacity-­‐building   of  community   leadership  to  develop   community-­‐  based   adaptation  plan;     awareness-­‐raising   programs.     13.    Capacity-­‐building   of  district  leadership   to  carry  out  district-­‐ wide  awareness-­‐ raising  programs  on   CC  risks  

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  Table  8.6.  Mozambique  community  Vulnerability  and  Capacity  Assessments:    results  of   community  prioritization  of  climate  change  adaptation  interventions      

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8.2.2 National  Policy  Analysis       We   had   found   from   our   mapping   that   Mozambique   was   a   country   classified   as   a   “Disaster  Averter”.  However,  is  this  verified  in  practice?  What  has  the  government  of   Mozambique   done   to   confront   rising   climate   risks,   and   address   local   CCA-­‐DRR   priorities?  How  is  Mozambique  organized  to  deliver  on  the  CCA-­‐DRR  challenge?     8.2.2.1   Five   main   organizations   dominate   Mozambique’s   institutional   landscape   for   CCA-­‐ DRR,   composed   of   a   partnership   of   NGOs,   development   partners,   UN   agencies   and   civil  society  organizations.  These  are:  the  INGC,  CCGC,  INAM,  CENOE  and  MICOA.      INGC   The   National   Institute   of   Disaster   Management   (INGC),   established   in   1999,   coordinates   disaster   risk   management   activities   in   Mozambique.   INGC   operates   under   the   Ministry   of   State   Administration   (MAE)   and   is   mandated   to   coordinate   emergencies,   promote   disaster   prevention   through   population   and   government   mobilization;   protect   human   lives;   ensure   multisectoral   coordination   in   disaster   emergency;  coordinate  early  warning  systems;  carry  out  public  awareness;  and  re-­‐ utilize   arid   and   semi-­‐arid   zones.   INGC   is   responsible   for   coordinating   disaster   risk   management   at   the   national,   provincial   and   district   levels.   Three   regional   emergency   operation   centers   handle   cyclones   and   droughts   (Vilanculos),   floods   (Caia)   and   cyclones   (Nacala).   There   are   also   four   multiple   use   centers   (CERUM)   at   the   district   level   specializing   in   reducing   vulnerability   to   droughts.   At   the   community  level,  INGC  acts  through  local  committees  for  Disaster  Risk  Management   that  are  empowered  to  deal  with  both  disaster  prevention  and  preparedness.      CCGC   •   287   Institutional   landscape   of   CCA-­DRR   governance   in   Mozambique:   what  are  the  rules  of  the  game,  who  are  the  stakeholders?  

The   Coordinating   Council   for   Disaster   Management   (CCGC),   chaired   by   the   Prime   Minister,   ensures   multi-­‐   sectoral   coordination   in   disaster   prevention,   assistance   to   victims,   and   disaster   rehabilitation.   It   receives   advice   from   the   Technical   Council   for   Disaster   Management   (CTGC).   The   CTGC,   composed   of   technical   staff   from   sector   Ministries   represented   in   the   CCGC,   proposes   technical   responses   to   disasters,   which   are   then   submitted   for   analysis   and   approval   to   the   CCGC.  The  CCGG  decision  is  then  forwarded  to  the  operating  body  of  INGC  for  action   through  its  regional,  provincial  and  district  representatives.  The  CTGC  is  also  active   at   the   provincial   level,   where   it   advises   the   local   INGC   and   the   Provincial   Government  and  conducts  disaster  evaluations.      Sounding  the  Alarm:  INAM  and  SETSAN   Mozambique   has   a   well-­‐developed   Early   Warning   System.   INGC   holds   overall   coordination   responsibilities   for   the   system,   but   monitoring   is   carried   out   by   specialized   agencies.   Hence,   the   national   Directorate   of   Water   is   responsible   for   flood   forecasting,   in   collaboration   with   INGC   and   the   National   Institute   of   Meteorology   (INAM).   INAM   and   its   regional   centers   are   responsible   for   cyclone   monitoring.  Once  southern  Africa  climate  regional  climate  outlook  Forum  forecasts   are  released,  the  national  institutions  draw  specialized  forecasts,  and  INGC  launches   a  contingency  Plan  preparation.       The  Technical  Secretariat  for  Food  Security  and  Nutrition  platform  (SETSAN)  is   responsible   for   the   food   security   early   warning   system.   SETSAN   is   composed   of   most   ministerial   institutions   under   the   leadership   of   the   Ministries   of   Agriculture   and   Health.   It   carries   vulnerability   surveys   nationwide   to   assess   community   food   insecurity   and   requirements   for   emergency   relief.   GTZ/Munich-­‐Re   and   UNDP   fund   specialized  flood  early  warning  systems  in  the  basins  of  Save  and  Licungo  Rivers.      The  CENOE   The   National   Emergency   Operations   Center,   CENOE,   under   INGC,   coordinates   disaster   response   activities.   A   national   civil   Protection   unit   (UNAPROC)   supports   • 288    

CENOE   to   assist   with   search   and   rescue   activities.   INGC   prepares   annual   Contingency   Plans   in   a   participatory   manner   involving   central   and   regional   government,   donors,   the   UN   System   and   civil   society.   The   Plans   are   prepared   following   the   issuance   of   the   hydro-­‐   meteorological   forecast   by   the   Meteorological   national   institute   in   coordination   the   national   Directorate   of   Water   and   consider   four   main   hazards:   floods,   droughts,   cyclones   and   earthquakes.   They   include   a   profile  of  the  most  vulnerable  districts  and  priority  needs.     According   to   the   scenarios   established   by   the   Contingency   Plan,   pre-­‐positioning   of   goods   takes   place   in   the   most   vulnerable   and   least   accessible   areas.   The   early   warning   mechanism   is   refined   and   a   national,   regional   and   local   simulation   takes   place,   as   a   signal   to   launch   Mozambique’s   disaster   response.   Training   to   local   committees  for  risk  Management  is  accelerated.  In  addition,  CTGC  weekly  meetings   are   held   to   exchange   information   among   disaster   risk   response   stakeholders.   The   CENOE   information   team   is   activated   to   monitor   information   sharing   among   all   disaster   risk   reduction   institutions,   including   high-­‐level   decision   makers   who   are   members  of  the  CCGC,  chaired  by  the  Prime  Minister.  INGC,  UBDP,  GTZ  and  INWENT   are  currently  taking  the  lead  in  financing  the  strengthening  and  training  of  local  risk   management   committees   and   the   expansion   of   this   network   to   other   high-­‐risk   districts.      MICOA   The   Ministry   for   the   Coordination   of   Environmental   affairs   (MICOA)   is   the   mandated   UNFCCC   focal   point   in   Mozambique   and   designated   national   entity   for   climate   change   adaptation.   MICOA   finalized   a   National   Adaptation   Plan   for   Action   (NAPA)   in   2007.   However,   due   to   poor   institutional   integration   with   INGC,   the   country   lead   for   HMDs,   the   largest   impact   of   a   changing   climate   in   Mozambique,   MICOA  is  not  a  major  player  on  the  institutional  scene,  and  has  poor  visibility.  

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Figure   8.13:   Mozambique’s   national   institutional   framework   for   the   governance   of   climate-­ related  disasters.  Source:  GFDRR,  2011.  

    8.2.2.2   In  order  to  confront  the  multiple  climate-­‐related  disasters  that  affect  it,  current  as   well   as   future,   the   Government   of   Mozambique   (GoM)   has   undertaken   vigorous   steps  in  the  area  of  CCA-­‐DRR.  It  has  also  engaged  serious  measures  to  mainstream   management  of  climate  risks  into  existing  development  plans  and  strategies.        1999-­2006:   Adoption   of   National   Master   Plan   for   the   Prevention   and   Mitigation  of  Natural  Calamities     Firstly,  Mozambique  adopted  a  national  strategy  in  2006:  the  National  Master  Plan   for   Prevention   and   Mitigation   of   Natural   Calamities.   The   Master   Plan   followed   the   Disaster   Management   Policy   of   1999   and   became   the   country’s   operative   strategy   for   disaster   risk   management.   It   specifically   emphasizes   the   links   between   development   policies   and   disaster   preparedness,   prevention,   mitigation   and   •   290   Introspection   into   Mozambique’s   National   Climate   Disaster   Management  Policy  

vulnerability   reduction,   addressing   all   of   the   elements   of   effective   disaster   management.   Attention   is   paid   to   developing   arid   zones   through   the   introduction   of   conservation   agriculture   and   non-­‐agricultural   income   generation   activities,   water   supply   and   rainwater   harvesting.   For   flood   protection   in   risky   areas,   water   resources  infrastructure  such  as  dams  and  dikes  are  included  as  key  elements.     Furthermore,   the   Ministry   for   the   Coordination   of   Environmental   Affairs   (MICOA)   finalized  a  National  Adaptation  Plan  for  Action  (NAPA)  in  2007.  The  plan,  prepared   by  an  inter-­‐agency  NAPA  team,  reviewed  Mozambique’s  vulnerability  to  key  hazards   and   identified   four   adaptation   priorities:   1.   Strengthening   early   warning   systems;   2.   Strengthening   the   capacity   of   farmers   to   deal   with   climate   change;   3.   Reduction   of   climate  change  impacts  along  the  coastal  zone;  and  4.  Water  resources  management.   A   national   resettlement   program   coordinated   by   the   INGC   has   also   provided   infrastructure   for   people   to   move   from   harm’s   way,   preceded   by   an   assessment   and   identification  of  non-­aedificendi  zones  across  the  country350.     Despite  all  this  progress,  a  number  of  critical  institutional  weaknesses  remain:  the   2008   Interim   National   Progress   Report   on   the   Implementation   of   the   Hyogo   Framework  for  Action  cites  weak  institutional  capacity  to  manage  the  relationship   between  Disaster  Risk  Management,  and  climate  change  and  Environmental  issues.   The   main   capacity   constraints   are   unresolved   coordination   issues   between   INGC   and   MICOA   to   address   disasters   as   an   environmental   issue,   and   the   fact   that   most   line  ministries  lack  a  legal  mandate  to  participate  in  the  Master  Plan  (ISDR,  2009).  A   national   disaster   management   law   is   in   draft   form,   but   has   been   awaiting   ratification   by   parliament   for   a   number   of   years.   As   a   result   the   responsibilities   of   various   government   departments   in   disaster   risk   management   are   not   yet   clearly   defined.  Partially  as  a  consequence  of  this,  Mozambique  continues  to  depend  heavily  

                                                                                                               
350  Expert  interview,  2011  

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on   international   technical   assistance   to   implement   disaster   risk   management   plans351.        Mainstreaming  of  CCA-­DRR  into  development  plans:     Disaster  Risk  Management  is  integrated,  although  not  yet  fully  mainstreamed,  into   major   development   strategies   in   Mozambique.   The   Government’s   Five   Year   Plan   (2005-­‐2009)  addresses  some  of  the  challenges  related  to  disaster  risk  management   and   climate   change   adaptation.   It   identifies   as   priority   objectives   the   reduction   of   number  of  human  victims  and  amount  of  property  loss,  and  it  emphasizes  a  culture   of   prevention   and   mitigation.   As   part   of   the   Plan,   the   Government   committed   to   mapping   zones   at   high   risk,   strengthening   early   warning   systems,   increasing   resources   for   the   prevention   and   mitigation   of   natural   disasters,   reinforcing   capacities   for   inter-­‐sector   coordination,   strengthening   river   basin   management,   establishing   a   database   for   information   on   climate   change   trends   and   impacts,   promoting   water   storage   systems   in   drought-­‐prone   areas,   and   increasing   training   and  civic  education352.     The   national   Second   Poverty   Reduction   Support   Strategy   (PARPA-­‐II   2006-­‐2009)   recognizes   disaster   risk   management   as   a   cross   cutting   issue   thereby   acknowledging   the   need   for   a   long-­‐term   strategy   to   reducing   the   vulnerability   of   communities   and   infrastructure   exposed   to   extreme   natural   phenomena.   Disasters   are   also   part   of   the   Medium-­‐Term   Fiscal   Framework   (MTFF).   However,   the   priorities  identified  by  the  Master  Plan  for  Disaster  Prevention  and  Mitigation  were   not   reflected   in   the   PARPA   II.   With   the   release   of   the   NAPA   in   2007   and   INGC’s   “Study   on   Impact   of   Climate   Change   on   Disaster   Risk,”   adaptation   strategies   are   expected   to   be   much   more   closely   mainstreamed   into   the   next   Poverty   reduction  

                                                                                                                351  GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”  
352  Ibidem  

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support  strategy353.     Disaster   mitigation   and   enhanced   resilience   are   specific   objectives   under   the   World   Bank’s  Country  assistance  Strategy.  The  Mozambique  country  Partnership  strategy   (2008-­‐2011)  specifies  “mitigation  of  risks  from  disasters  and  shocks”  as  one  of  the   objectives  and  “enhanced  capacity  to  respond  to  disasters”  as  one  of  the  outcomes   under  the  pillar  on  sustainable  and  Broad-­‐Based  Growth.  The  establishment  of  early   warning   and   emergency   preparedness   systems   is   specified   as   a   goal.   The   Country   Partnership  also  recognizes  that  future  economic  growth  depends  on  the  prevention   of  a  major  natural  disaster.  The  Joint  staff  Advisory  note,  commenting  on  the  PRSP   progress,  indicates  a  need  to  integrate  disaster  risk  management  in  sectoral  plans  at   all   levels,   and   strengthen   inter-­‐sectoral   coordination.   While   it   compliments   Government   efforts   in   mitigating   the   impacts   of   climate   shocks   in   2007,   it   recognizes  the  financial  limitations  of  the  Government  in  facing  major  disasters,  and   therefore   recommends   the   establishment   of   a   national   Disaster   Fund,   including   mechanisms  for  risk  transfer354.     Furthermore,   the   Government   annually   provides   USD   $3.5-­‐   $5   million   to   INGC   for   disaster  risk  management  and  response,  which  may  be  increased  depending  on  the   magnitude   of   a   disaster.   This   is   equivalent   to   about   0.2%   of   the   annual   national   Budget.   International   donors   also   fund   the   Contingency   Plan.   Additional   resources   are   also   allocated   to   other   sectors   for   disaster   risk   management   activities,   such   as   irrigation   schemes,   small   dams,   construction   of   ponds   and   environmental   protection355.       Finally,   a   noteworthy   major   achievement   is   Mozambique’s   success   in   decentralizing   disaster  risk  management.  In  Mozambique  since  2006,  provinces  and  districts  have                                                                                                                  
353  GFDRR,  “Disaster  Risk  Management  Programs  For  Priority  Countries  Africa-­‐  Mozambique”  

354 355

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gradually  integrated  disaster  risk  management  into  their  annual  plans  and  budgets.   The   Government   allocates   direct   financing   to   provincial   and   district   plans   in   accordance   with   the   Decentralization   law   of   8/2003.   District   land   use   plans   have   been   developed   by   local   governments   (districts)   with   the   support   of   provincial   governments   and   integrated   into   District   Development   strategic   Plans.   However,   provincial  INGC  delegations  are  still  considered  to  be  weak  and   need  considerable   support  and  capacity  building  to  respond  adequately  to  the  numerous  disaster  risk   management   challenges.   Furthermore,   Mozambique   has   spearheaded   one   of   the   most  noteworthy  instances  of  community  based  disaster  risk  management  practices   in  Africa:  community-­‐based  DRM  project  in  the  Buzi  District,  with  the  establishment   of  a  functional  community-­‐based  earl  warning-­‐early  action  system  and  inclusion  of   traditional   knowledge   and   community   engagement,   which   has   become   a   model.   Finally,  equipped  and  capacitated  local  disaster  risk  management  committees  have   been   established   in   all   provinces   across   the   country,   as   well   as   in   most   districts,   the   most  basic  circumscriptions  in  the  country,  albeit  with  various  capacity  levels.     Despite   these   challenges,   disaster   risk   management   and   adaptation   to   climate   change   have   unquestionably   become   a   central   issue   to   economic   development   in   Mozambique,  and  are  expected  to  continue  to  grow  in  importance  in  the  future356.    A  comprehensive  program  to  reduce  disaster  risk  and  vulnerability     Finally,   Mozambique   has   developed   a   comprehensive   national   program   to   reduce   disaster   risk   and   factors   of   vulnerability   to   HMDs,   with   multiple   projects   ongoing.   Table  8.7  reviews  the  ma