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IPC2010MEETING THE GEOHAZARDS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES OF ANNEX N
Martin Zaleski Tom Greaves Jan Bracic BGC Engineering Inc. Pembina Pipeline Corp. Pembina Pipeline Corp. Vancouver, British Columbia, Calgary, Alberta, Canada Calgary, Alberta, Canada Canada ABSTRACT geohazard integrity management program, which is modeled The Canadian Standards Association’s Publication Z662after Annex N guidelines. Since 2007, Pembina Pipeline 07, Annex N provides guidelines for pipeline integrity Corporation (Pembina) has retained BGC Engineering Inc. management programs. Government agencies that regulate (BGC) to develop a centralized, standard program for riskpipelines in Alberta, British Columbia and other Canadian based management of natural hazards affecting their pipeline jurisdictions are increasingly using Annex N as the standard to systems. Central to the program is CambioTM: a geohazards database tool within which the inspection, maintenance, which pipeline operators are held. mitigation, detailed investigation and monitoring history are This paper describes the experience of Pembina Pipeline housed; and rankings for specific risk of pipeline impact or Corporation (Pembina) in implementing a geohazards exposure are calculated . Over the past three years, BGC management program to fulfill components of Annex N. geoscientists and engineers have used consistent methods to Central to Pembina’s program is a ground-based inspection identify and field-verify potential hazard sites, collect riskprogram that feeds a geohazards database designed to store ranking field information, provide risk control geotechnical and hydrotechnical site information and provide recommendations, and continually review and update the relative rankings of geohazard sites across the pipeline network. systems and procedures by which the geohazard sites are This geohazard management program fulfills several aspects of ranked. the Annex, particularly: record keeping; hazard identification In addition to meeting Annex N guidelines, a key reason and assessment; risk assessment and reduction; program behind Pembina’s decision to embark upon a systematic planning; inspections and monitoring; and mitigation. geohazard identification and risk management program was the Pembina’s experience in growing their geohazard recognition that traditional geohazard management protocols, inventory from 65 known sites to over 1300 systematically such as aerial reconnaissance to identify geohazards and inspected and catalogued sites in a span of approximately two detailed geotechnical investigation at sites with observed years is discussed. Also presented are methods by which pipeline impacts, provided predominantly reactive, rather than consultants and Pembina personnel contribute to the geohazard proactive, risk management. A reactive approach to geohazard inspection program and geohazard inventory, and how the risk management was judged to be unacceptable, particularly in ground inspection observations trigger follow-up inspections, light of the consequences experienced by Pembina and other monitoring and mitigation activities. pipeline operators following historic geohazard-related failures. Furthermore, it was recognized that the traditional risk INTRODUCTION management model resulted in inefficient allocation of Geohazard risk management is gaining broad acceptance company resources in maintenance and mitigation activities. A globally as standard practice for safe and efficient pipeline system-wide re-categorization of natural hazards using a operations . In 2007, the Canadian Standards Association consistent risk-based approach was judged to be a reasonable published guidelines for pipeline integrity management solution to these problems. programs as Annex N of Publication Z662-07 . Provincial Pembina’s experience in implementing a systematic and federal regulators of oil and gas pipeline facilities are geohazards management program to achieve compliance with increasingly relying upon these guidelines as a framework for Annex N, particularly their use of a risk-based geohazard operational regulations and permitting, and have become ranking system housed in the CambioTM database system, is mandatory in the provinces of Alberta  and British Columbia presented in this paper. Specific clauses of Annex N addressed . by Pembina’s and BGC’s jointly managed geohazards Several clauses within Annex N specify standards for management program are identified and discussed. A geohazard risk management. Figure 1 represents Pembina’s
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
including generalized means for allocating resources based on relative risk.background to the CambioTM database and inspection program is provided. Failure and External Interference Incident definitions are from CSA . NOMENCLATURE Terminology related to hazard and risk is largely adapted from Fell et al. Figure N. as well as seismic hazards. Hydrotechnical hazards 2 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . The geohazards discussed herein are subdivided into geotechnical and hydrotechnical hazards. Related clauses of Annex N are referenced . Geotechnical hazards refer to landslides and related phenomena as categorized by Cruden and Varnes . and record keeping protocols are discussed. modeled after Annex N. Pembina’s Geohazards Management Program flow chart. followed by discussions of Pembina’s experience in combining it with existing protocols to provide comprehensive geohazard risk management. Risk management program planning. Figure 1. . Hazard – The probability or likelihood of occurrence of a natural phenomenon that could lead to damage.1. The current status and plans for future work are summarized.
a separate version of CambioTM is maintained for each client. environmental features and/or economic activities in the area affected by a hazard. CambioTM was intended in part to fulfill the geohazard aspects of N. Inspections can be carried out by BGC engineers and geoscientists. The due date for implementation of the recommended action is calculated from the specific risk estimate at the geohazard site. Geotechnical and hydrotechnical hazards capable of causing a failure or external interference incident are identified by a combination of a review of historic inspection records. which are generally obtainable only by visiting a hydrotechnical hazard site. REVIEW OF HISTORIC RECORDS Clause N.6. structures. and Vulnerability. photographs and drawings are linked to related hazards and inspections. CambioTM is intended to be used to store and search geohazards records. Estimates of specific risk of exposure or impact at each field-confirmed geohazard site are calculated within CambioTM. 3 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . the Program covers pipeline networks extending from northern British Columbia through the United States Midwest for several pipeline operators based in western Canada. component. we refer to the combined use of ground inspections and the CambioTM database as the “Program”. construction.  and Leir . depth of cover measurements. but by inspectors or managers of district offices. Spatial Probability of Impact. without release of service fluid. location of the pipeline with respect to hazards. Methods used to analyze geospatial data to identify potential geotechnical and hydrotechnical hazard sites are described in detail by Ripley et al. avulsion. Hazard sites are considered “potential” hazards until ground-inspected and verified by geotechnical engineers or geoscientists in the field. or damage to the right-of-way resulting in a loss of support. Different levels of database access are provided to different categories of database users to maximize usability while minimizing inspection errors or inconsistency. Partial risk refers to the product of hazard and spatial probability of impact without an evaluation of vulnerability or the value of elements at risk. consequence is the product of Elements at Risk. operation and maintenance. BACKGROUND TO THE CAMBIO DATABASE AND GROUND INSPECTION PROGRAM CambioTM is an online database designed and maintained by BGC that houses and provides risk-based categorization of pipeline geohazard sites. For example. operations and maintenance personnel or thirdparty consultants. and presence of hazard stabilization or pipeline protection. The system is designed to be used not only by engineering personnel and integrity managers. In addition to the risk ranking functionality.include river erosion such as channel degradation. these observations include: hazard type and extent. Although methods for identifying geohazards and ranking specific risk are broadly consistent for all clients. geospatial analysis and field verification. The specific risk estimates use values or weights assigned to select observations that are generally obtainable only by conducting ground inspections. Risk – The product of hazard and consequence. Generally. BGC has been providing this Program to pipeline operators since 2002. are heavily utilized in specific risk estimates. differences in the risk ranking algorithms attributable to variability in geohazard environments or client risk tolerance criteria can be incorporated. Consequence – The result of hazard occurrence. Details on the functionality of CambioTM are described by Leir TM and Reed .2 by providing storage for such records pertaining to natural hazards. In terms of pipeline exposure to geohazards. Recommendations for hazard control and risk reduction are provided subjectively by the pipeline inspector at the time of the ground inspection. This supplements information managed separately by Pembina’s Pipeline Integrity Department pertaining to pipeline design.1 and N. Leir et al. To protect client confidentiality and allow clientspecific variability. transparent and defensible means of prioritizing hazard sites. External Interference Incident – Mechanical damage to a pipe. ranging from no loss to total loss. this section provides a brief summary only. The overall goal of the Program is to manage the change inherent in geohazards by providing a consistent. or coating. At present.6 requires operating companies to prepare and manage records related to pipeline design. All new or changed inspection records are reviewed by a BGC engineer or geoscientist before those changes are incorporated into updated risk assessments at each site. Elements at Risk: Population. allowing pipeline operators to reduce geohazard risk exposure and optimize geohazard risk control activities. Copies of digital reports. destroyed or interfered with. encroachment and scour that may affect pipelines at stream crossings. . Failure – an unplanned release of service fluid due to failure of a pipe or component by leak or rupture. riskbased. Vulnerability: The degree of potential loss of an element or elements resulting from hazard occurrence. In this paper addressing pipeline geohazard risk management. Spatial Probability of Impact: The likelihood that an element at risk is located within the area affected by a specific hazard. In one form or another. The relationship between specific risk and the action due date can be customized to each client based on that client’s risk acceptance standards. Pipeline operators can access database records for risk-based integrity management planning or reference purposes companywide. the result of the partial risk calculation is roughly equivalent to the specific risk of pipeline exposure (from hydrotechnical hazards) or impact (from geotechnical hazards). The database is used in conjunction with a geohazard identification and ground inspection protocol. In this paper. expressed in terms of the value of the elements damaged.6. bank erosion.
The initial ground inspections carried out by BGC on the list of potential geohazard sites are referred to as “baseline” inspections: they provide an up-to-date geohazards picture upon completion. BGC personnel attempted ground inspections at all the potential and previously documented geohazard sites to confirm geohazard presence and collect information for the specific risk assessments. and pipeline failures. Potential geotechnical hazards were identified by analysis of Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) that covered the pipeline area of interest to locate slopes that both intersected the pipeline and exceeded a pre-determined slope angle threshold value. the crude oil mainline through the Pine Pass area of British Columbia was included based on records of historic landslides. Potential hydrotechnical hazards were identified in GIS analyses. monitoring or mitigation based on an understanding of the hazard and consequence present at any given hazard site. an area susceptible to landslide geohazards. Pembina’s large-diameter oil sands pipelines. The first systems included in the geohazard management program in the summer of 2008 were located in the Peace region of northeast British Columbia. erosion. In general terms.10. SYSTEM INSPECTION PRIORITIZATION Pembina operates hydrocarbon pipelines over a broad geographical distribution with widely ranging product volumes and types. Site access information was recorded to simplify the process of conducting repeated inspections or more detailed work at the site in the future. These sites were distributed across the entire Pembina network. The general tendency was that the reports on file documented the initial pipeline engineering.construction. In some cases. carrying heavy crude oil from the Fort McMurray area to Edmonton. by intersecting pipe centre lines against stream drainage network layers. 4 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . Geohazards described in historic files were also added to this preliminary inventory of geohazards.10. Clause N.10. Risk assessments were rare except in general or qualitative terms. BGC’s criteria for including potential hazards that were successfully accessed on the ground included: ground surface or indirect evidence for past slope instability.3 requires decision making for further risk assessment. A characterization of Pembina’s oldest crude oil gathering system around the Drayton Valley area was completed. In others. In 2007. routing and construction activities. Stream crossings with basin sizes exceeding a threshold upstream of the crossing point were selected for field verification. numerous high-energy stream crossings (specifically 18 crossings of the Pine River). internal company preferences may have contributed to the priority of a given system (i. Without previous system-wide risk rankings in place. a historical rupture along a nearby pipeline could have spurred a particular pipeline system to be prioritized higher than the overall risk exposure would suggest. Slopes that met these criteria were selected for field verification. Also. The program was significantly expanded through the summer of 2009. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL Clauses N. connecting gas fields in Grande Prairie with one of the transmission lines to Edmonton covered in 2008.2 require that hazards and procedures for identifying them be documented in a systematic manner. tended to fall “off the radar”. In the summer of 2007. as well as sites identified as potentially hazardous by Pembina personnel during routine patrols. Pembina elected to test the program by requesting a ground inspection program on 67 sites judged subjectively to be the “highest priority”. The Peace natural gas liquids transmission and lateral system. Potential hazards were retained for risk analysis within CambioTM if a geohazard was present or could reasonably occur within the lifetime of the pipeline. or potential for such conditions to occur (geotechnical hazards). in fulfillment of remaining aspects of these clauses. Most of the risk assessments generated by observations mined from historic reports were out-of-date by the time they were compiled and entered into CambioTM. Follow-up inspections on newly constructed pipelines or mitigations were common for the first year or two after construction was complete. subsidence or settlement. most geohazard sites. decisions on prioritizing pipelines for inclusion in the ground inspection program had to be made using qualitative considerations. after more than two years. and represented geohazard sites with historically documented landslide-related failures or external interference incidents. Pembina and BGC began the process of compiling inspection and mitigation records from Pembina’s library and entering them as historic inspections with linked reports into CambioTM. highlighting the utility of applying a system-wide risk management program. As with any qualitative assessment. materials and cathodic protection.1 and N.e. CambioTM and the Program proved to be an extremely cost-effective way of building and maintaining a database of geohazards. non-technical and nonquantitative factors weighed in on the prioritization rankings. the “squeaky wheel” effect). and as discussed in more detail by Leir (2009). and follow-up mitigations. From the initial exercise Pembina gained insight into the spatial distribution of the 67 sites and could then draw conclusions on where next to allocate resources. even those with historic problems. or potential for appreciable channelized flow (hydrotechnical hazards). Two main transmission lines leading into Pembina’s Edmonton terminal through Northwest Alberta were also included based on relative geohazard occurrence and high product volumes. however. Finally. was included because of high product volumes and numerous documented hazards. were included because of the high product volumes and resulting high financial cost of a potential service interruption.. Over 400 reports were reviewed for information that could be added as historic inspections. This further highlighted the importance of a systematic riskbased approach to integrity management.
Public relations considerations may also elevate the level of risk.11. and pipeline dents and cracks). Environmental risk was assessed either directly from the pipeline (for example in the event of a product release). Using these means of access increased the cost of conducting repeat inspections. detailed investigations. and existing protection or stabilization [8. and by observations from periodic aerial or ground reconnaissance that occurs outside of the systematic geohazards management program. Because the variability of conditions between sites is nearly impossible to generalize in a purely quantitative manner. At the outset of the ground inspection program. than if such an event occurred in an unpopulated area.4). the consequence of line shut-down was less of an issue. as not enough data were present to make a reliable calculation. Consequences such as revenue loss and volume of product loss were assessed on a pipeline by pipeline basis: the highestrevenue or highest-volume pipelines have the opportunity for the costliest mitigations to be performed. consequently. Using pipe exposure or impact statistics compiled from Pembina’s historic records and from the inspection program. This “prescription” can then be reviewed by field staff and engineers for constructability. the consequence of failure is much higher to Pembina. a higher risk was assigned to the line and mitigation was performed proactively to ensure service remained uninterrupted and the pipeline did not experience a shut-down for any length of time not permitted by the contract. These options may include repeated ground inspections. mitigation or maintenance. Hazards that fall outside the scope of geohazards include third parties (other pipeline companies. It is important to note that the systematic application of this method is likely to capture most but not all geotechnical and hydrotechnical hazards that could affect a pipeline. the due date for the recommended action was guided by Pembina’s risk tolerance criteria. RISK ASSESSMENT Information to support preliminary geohazard risk evaluation and decision making for risk analysis refinement and reduction (N. was assigned to each inspected site based on the calculated specific risk. A return period for a recommended action intended to manage risk. a protocol to provide land agents with a complete list of field sites with enough lead time to contact all landowners was developed. ranging from six months to five years. or other obligations.9]. For low-volume pipelines. stress corrosion cracking. instrumentation monitoring. After the first couple of field inspection seasons. however. This is in contrast with BGC’s inspection program.3 through N.5) was compiled from the review of historic records and observations made during ground inspections for each confirmed geohazard site. If a pipeline exists in a highly populated area such as a city or a park. the location and depth of the subject pipelines. Due dates for the recommended actions are directly correlated to the 5 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . low return period events generally are not included in the geohazards management program because of their low activity and prohibitive mitigation costs. however. Pembina engaged in additional assessments to refine the vulnerability and consequence of pipeline exposure or impact. contracts. landowners. CambioTM is geared toward prioritizing each identified site in terms of specific risk of pipeline exposure or impact using observations of geomorphic or hydrologic hazard causal factors. which covers a large area in a relatively short time. both from a health perspective and an image of company good-will. OPTIONS FOR GEOHAZARD CONTROL AND RISK REDUCTION The Program provides options for hazard control and risk reduction associated with natural hazards (N. or indirectly from the right of way.12. only one landowner is involved at a time. suggestions for access alternatives were provided. no passable roads existed near these hazards.For potential hazard sites that could not be accessed in the baseline inspection program. such as trucking. excavation contractors. Where the estimate of specific risk was sufficiently high. Risk estimates were not applied to sites that were not visited on the ground. landowner conflicts have been minimal while conducting the ground inspection phase of this program. CambioTM defaults such sites as requiring another inspection attempt using the suggested access means within the following year. and helicopters or all-terrain vehicles were recommended. and often provides a plan within the same day as the inspection. At some remote sites. The inspector can provide recommendations based on observations gathered during the initial ground inspection. for example. In general. the selection of a class of future action was made subjectively by the inspector. Very high magnitude. In typical pipeline operational tasks. a protocol for notifying field offices and local landowners had not been developed. In the event of specific client needs. altered as needed and used to develop a cost estimate for management approval. every effort was made to identify reasonable access using trucks and short hikes where possible. pipe exposures have been found in Pembina’s network on streams with very small upstream basin area (washouts related to beaver activity being the most common of these). For example. sediment transport from the right of way into creeks and rivers during spring runoff. while lower-revenue pipelines require a combination of mitigation and monitoring to ensure the hazard was properly controlled. The list of potential hazard sites is therefore supplemented by known hazard sites identified during reviews of operational records. however. Some urban or rural sites on privately-held land were not accessed due to landowner concerns.11. especially if other alternatives exist to transport product. and ATVs and snowmobiles) and pipeline integrity hazards (corrosion. the return periods and specific risk weighting factors embedded in the database algorithms were re-calibrated annually so that each site had a pre-determined probability of an exposure or impact within the action interval. such as mitigations and detailed investigations.
15. usually to follow up on a detailed investigation. At river crossings hydraulic modeling specialists use the surveyed channel geometry and historical peak water flows to estimate the magnitude of local scour.6 requires operating companies to prepare and manage records related to pipeline design.2).14. Information stored within CambioTM is searchable by company engineers and geoscientists. pipe strain assessments. CambioTM forces a review of all new or changed inspection records by senior inspectors to ensure quality control of the inspection information. Slope inclinometers or survey monuments on an unstable slope may be repeatedly measured to construct a movement rate. implementation of the system-wide program is in progress. but the 16–inchdiameter pipeline only experienced 4 mm of movement. Each inspection provides an opportunity to re-evaluate site conditions. is usually the most expensive risk control option. that specific risk is continually reassessed at each inspection. Sub-centimeter accuracy surveys may be repeated over several seasons to determine if site conditions are changing and ultimately worsening. field operations and maintenance personnel. 6 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . Not all sites need remediation. This is significant because all surface ground movement does not necessarily translate into pipeline movement and strain. often one to three orders of magnitude over the cost of a detailed investigation or monitoring program. but are best suited for new or stress-relieved pipelines because only strain induced after gauge installation can be read: strain gauges cannot indicate the amount strain existing in the pipe prior to gauge installation. If ground movement adjacent to a pipeline is suspected. 2). Sites with due dates within the upcoming year are included in the annual program.2 by providing storage for such records pertaining to natural hazards. strain monitoring such as strain gauge equipment or strain analyses are utilized to approximate the state of strain in the pipeline itself. Documentation of mitigation works is added to the record of inspections for each hazard site.3). A scour analysis can help assess how long pipeline cover at a given crossing will last.13) depends on whether the baseline inspection program has been completed on a given pipeline. that the actions carried out at each site are documented. Once all systems have been included.risk at the site: high risk sites receive more timely attention than low risk sites (N. Some monitoring is carried out using instruments installed with mitigation works.6. planning is done annually using the results of the preceding geohazard inspection program. The pipeline centerline may be surveyed if pipe movement is suspected and the information fed into pipe strain models for analysis. with approximately 4. Specific risk is re-evaluated following mitigation to re-establish a follow-up inspection or monitoring frequency.1 and N. integrity managers and authorized engineering consultants in accordance with their user level. Engineering design for mitigation works usually utilizes information obtained through detailed investigations and monitoring. Monitoring includes repeated measurements of specific features or instrumentation at a geohazard site. Hazard mapping. Using CambioTM for planning ensures that sites are prioritized for action based on specific risk.700 km pipeline network covered (see Fig. Mitigation (N. geohazard integrity management will be planned exclusively on the basis of specific risk. When rates of change are understood. geological drilling and sampling. construction. in order to evaluate the effectiveness of that mitigation. CambioTM fulfills the geohazard aspects of N. RECORD KEEPING Clause N. Some sites are advanced to more detailed studies to more accurately characterize the hazard and risk (N. additional consultants may be retained to perform this work as required. Costs for detailed investigation and monitoring activities are normally an order of magnitude higher than a repeated ground inspection.600 km of Pembina’s 8.6. Once geohazard risk is defined and the mitigation or monitoring plan is recommended for a particular site. Risk management can be addressed simply by continuing ground inspections at intervals suggested by the calculated specific risk. Strain gauges can provide continuous monitoring of pipeline strain over time. slope inclinometer or strain gauge installation. operation and maintenance. and their effectiveness is evaluated through follow-up inspections and monitoring. Where the program has been implemented. Mitigation has been recommended for only about 5% of the inspected sites and is usually employed when other risk control options are exhausted. At present. or strain gauges may be monitored to directly measure the pipeline vulnerability to rupture. PROGRAM PLANNING Planning the natural hazard management program (N. depth of cover and bathymetric surveys and detailed topographic mapping are examples of techniques employed in detailed investigations. Pipe monitoring was done using a plastic slope saddle tee installed at the point of maximum pipeline movement. Repeated observations or measurements of geohazard conditions or the performance of protection or stabilization around the pipeline can be documented and tracked to develop an understanding of their activity or performance. providing defensible justification for geohazard planning decisions company-wide. Mitigation. Detailed investigations are undertaken to more accurately define geohazard magnitude and activity (landslide dimensions and scour potential) or pipeline vulnerability.16) is employed when the residual risk associated with continuing inspection or monitoring exceeds Pembina’s risk tolerance. in which loosely compacted backfill experienced 90 mm of surface movement. the timing of more detailed hazard control and risk reduction activities can be optimized to minimize both cost and occurrence of failures or external interference incidents. often involving engineered mitigation works. and that no geohazard sites are missed. This was demonstrated at a Pembina site south of Fort McMurray.
Approximately 500 reports are linked to the hazards within CambioTM. quantifiable. Map showing progress on implementing the geohazards management program on Pembina’s pipeline systems. Solid lines represent completed pipeline systems. Simultaneously. Pembina plans to continue baseline hazard identification and inspections for the remainder of Pembina’s pipeline systems. detailed investigations and follow-up monitoring at about another 100. and mitigation at about 50. aerial inspections or office reviews at about 100. dashed lines represent systems yet to be completed. Pembina anticipates that the remainder of their pipeline network will be included by the end of 2012. Pembina’s database houses records for approximately 1. the remainder were identified through reviewing historic records.SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK Approximately 4. As part of 7 Copyright © 2010 by ASME .600 km of Pembina’s 8. repeat ground inspections are recommended at about 700. Of the 950 sites identified and added by BGC’s Program.700 km oil and gas pipeline network has been inspected and added to CambioTM (Fig. 2) by the end of 2009. accessible geohazards information that Pembina finds useful for planning and program review. depending on the estimated level of specific risk. The current iteration of CambioTM presents systematic. Pembina plans to execute the actions recommended during previous inspections at each geohazard site in accordance with the due date suggested by its specific risk ratings. Figure 2.300 geohazard sites. Since implementing the Program. about 950 records have been added through identifying and inspecting previously undocumented geohazards. Due dates for these actions range between 6 months and 5 years. At present.
eds.K.L Schuster. Neil Ripley of BGC drafted the figures. M. “Natural Hazard Database Application – A Tool for Pipeline Decision Makers”. M. Annex N. REFERENCES  Savigny. Yaremko. Proc. IPC 2010. “OGC 06-12: Adoption of CAN/CSA Z662-03 Oil and Gas Pipeline System Annex N Guideline for Integrity Management Programs”. as Mandatory”.17).  British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (OGC). ASME. NorthWest Hydraulics Consulting. Measurement Sciences Inc. in order to provide an additional level of action prioritization for such sites.W. Proc. 1996. O.. AMSE. Compustress Engineering. 4th International Pipeline Conference. Porter.  Ripley. modeling and risk analysis of pipeline strain. 2010.. “Lessons learned from supporting a geohazards management program”.. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors acknowledge support from BGC Engineering involved with the creation of and contribution to Pembina’s Geohazard Management Program. R. “A framework for landslide risk assessment and management”. Eberhardt. programming and asset acquisition/sale decisions... and Varnes. 5th edition.. A.M. E.the program review process (N. “Field inspection module for hydrotechnical hazards”. 8 Copyright © 2010 by ASME . S. Balkema...S. N. London. Mississauga. M. IL. Continued development of CambioTM is intended to refine site prioritization and optimize Pembina’s resource allocation at each catalogued site. eds. and is intended to replace a system more focused on financial approvals.. IPC 2004. “Oil and gas pipeline systems”.. failure and mitigation cost records have guided long-term budgeting. Couture. BGC and Pembina plan to review relationships between observed pipeline exposures or impacts and failures or external interference incidents to calibrate the risk-based action due dates. M. UAA. Turner and R. Simpson.  Leir. Select data from CambioTM is to be incorporated into Pembina’s new corporate GIS. A new company-wide change management process (N.. K.8) is being implemented at Pembina in 2010..A. Additional acknowledgments are made to staff at AMEC Earth & Environmental Ltd. Pembina has found select aspects of CambioTM useful for general record keeping and planning in addition to its nominal purpose as a geohazards management tool. and all district field staff at Pembina’s offices throughout British Columbia and Alberta.. BGC has developed a weather reporting system that alerts Pembina when rivers that cross Pembina’s assets are susceptible to flooding.  Alberta Energy Resources Control Board (ERCB).  Fell. Following completion of the baseline program across all Pembina’s pipeline systems. New York. K. New York. Transportation Research Board. Proc. Cabot Surveys Ltd.. in press. Fell. Stantec. 2009. Mark Leir of BGC provided a review of this paper and Mr.  Canadian Standards Association (CSA). M. and Leroi.. and Urquhart. Mr.. M. 2004. 2002. “Directive 41: Adoption of CSA Z662-03.. Pembina’s geotechnical engineer uses CambioTM records to prepare an annual report summarizing the geohazards management program work completed during the year and construct budgets for the following year’s management program.. Landslides: Investigation and Mitigation. “Natural Hazard and Risk Management for Pipelines”.. Landslide Risk Management. “Landslide types and processes”. Chen. A systematic method to estimate the probability of pipeline failure at a geohazard site with an exposed or impacted pipeline is under development by BGC. M. E. and Leir. BGC monitors provincial websites that provide river warnings and alert Pembina district offices in the event of potential flood risks. Lacasse. Proc. ASME..J. 8th International Pipeline Conference. E.  Cruden. R. “Geohazard integrity management program for operating pipelines”. Washington. 9th International Symposium on Environmental Concerns in Rights-of-Way Management. 2006.  Leir. 4th International Pipeline Conference. Reed...K. AMSE. Champaign.. G. Hungr. M. A. Pembina participates in an annual users’ group workshop with BGC and other subscribing pipeline operators. 2007. Pembina’s Integrity and Technical Services Group. Fox-Tek. J. Proc.. 2002.. New York. Pembina has initiatives related to geohazard risk management that are largely independent from the CambioTM program. R.  Leir. and E. D. T. Reed. IPC 2002. 5th International Pipeline Conference. Pembina is researching and incorporating techniques for direct measurement. CSA. D. 2006. Ho... and the staff from Pembina Pipeline including Allan Charlesworth.. Statistical analyses of inspection. 2004. and Reed. IPC 2002. and Yaremko.
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