j DoD 5 1 0 0 .

5 2 - M





WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050
DoD 5100. 52-M

[ A T O M I C E N E R G Y ) September 4, 1990

This Manual has been developed by the Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA) under the authority of DoD Directive 5100.52, “DoD Response
to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive
Material s,” December 21, 1989, and supersedes DNA 5100.1,
!rNuclear Weapon A c c i d e n t Response p r o c e d u r e s (NARP) M a n u a l , ”
January 1984.

This Manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of
D e f e n s e (OSD) ; t h e M i l i t a r y D e p a r t m e n t s ; t h e C h a i r m a n { J o i n t
C h i e f s o f S t a f f a n d J o i n t S t a f f ; t h e U n i f i e d a n d SPeclfled
Commands; and the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities that
support response to a nuclear weapon accident (hereafter referred
to collectively as “DoD Components”) . This Manual is effective

The purpose of this Manual is to provide the On-Scene
Com~ander a n d h i s o r h e r p l a n n i n g s t a f f w i t h a s i n g l e ,
comprehensive document that summarizes procedural guidance,
technical information, and DoD responsibilities for responding to
an accident involving nuclear weapons. The NARP also describes
the substantial resources in other Federal Agencies that can be
made available to assist in the response effort.

This Manual should be widely disseminated and made available
to all commanders and staff who may be called upon to respond to
a nuclear weapon accident. It should serve as a guide for more
detailed planning for nuclear weapon accident response, and can
be used to improve training and exercise programs.

Suggestions to update or improve this Manual are solicited.
Send proposed changes through appropriate channels to:

Headquarters, Defense Nuclear Agency
Attn: NOEA
6801 Telegraph Road
A l e x a n d r i a , VA 2 2 3 1 0 - 3 3 9 8

DoD Components may obtain copies of this Manual through
their own publications channels. Other Federal Agencies and the
public may obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
N a t i o n a l T e c h n i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , 5 2 8 5 P o r t Royal R o a d ,
Springfield, VA 22161.

Robert B. Barker

Doll 51 OO.52-M





1-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-2 Purpose and Scope of the NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-3 Organization and Us.eofthe NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-4 Nuclear. Weapon Accident Response Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
1-5 The Phases of Response to a Nuclear Weapon Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1-6 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1-7 Change Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

APPENDIX I-A RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l-A-l
PERSONNEL PERMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-D- I
SUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-E- I
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-F- I


2-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2-3 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

3-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-3 Department of Energy (DoE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-4 Department of State (DoS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3-5 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3-6 Department of Agriculture (USDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 .
3-7 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
3-8 Department of Commerce (DoC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-9 Department of Interior (DoI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3-1o Department of Transportation (DoT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-11 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-12 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) . . . . . .‘. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5




3-13 Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-14 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-15 General Services Administration (GSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-16 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-18 State/ Local Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5


4-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-4 Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
4-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
4-6 Accident Response Plan Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

APPENDIX 4-A ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-A-1


5-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-5 Concept of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 5-2
5-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

APPENDIX5-A RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-A-1
APPENDIX 5-B ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-B-1
APPENDIX 5-D AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-D-1
AND CONTROL FORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-E-1

CHAPTER 6- RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

CHAPTER 7- CONTAMINATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

CHAPTER 8- BIOASSAY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

CHAPTER 10- SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

APPENDIX 1O-A SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1O-A-1


. . . . 12-7 CHAPTER 13. . . . . . . . . . 15-4 CHAPTER 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 154 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-6 APPENDIX 14-A NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . 14-A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) Page CHAPTER 11 . . . . .SECURITY 13-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I CHAPTER 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 CHAPTER 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 13-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM . . 14-1 14-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 iv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COMMUNICATIONS 12-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 12-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .MEDICAL 14-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 12-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 12-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2 14-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PUBLIC AFFAIRS 16-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS 15-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 / CHAPTER 14. . . . . . . . . . 14-6 14-7 SpecializedCourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-2 15-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 12-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 12-4 Resources . . .

.. . . . . . . . 17-2 17-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-A-1 v . . . . . . . . .SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 20-1 General . . . . 18-A-1 CHAPTER 19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .LOGISTICS SUPPORT 17-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-A-1 APPENDIX 16-B RADIATION FACT SHEETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LEGAL 18-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 20-3 20-7 Other Federal Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-2 19-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-1 19-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-3 APPENDIX 20-A POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 19-1 19-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-1 17-5 Concept of Operations . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-2 APPENDIX 18-A PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-1 19-4 Resources . . 20-3 20-6 Federal Emergencey Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) Page 16-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-3 “~ Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-B-1 CHAPTER 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5 CHAPTER 20. . . 18-1 18-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-2 APPENDIX 16-A PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONTINGENCY RELEASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-4 Department of Defense (DoD) . . 17-A-1 CHAPTER 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SITE RESTORATION 19-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-3 APPENDIX 17-A LOGISTICS RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 19-1 19-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-5 Department of Energy (DoE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .”. . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-4 Resources . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) CHAPTER 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 -! . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-4 Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-3 Organizational Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TRAINING 21-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 5-E-1 5’ 5-E-6 TLD Measurement Collection and Analysis Form . . . . 7-4 8-1 Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs 8-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-E-19 5-E-8 FIDLER Data Form . . . . . . . . . .. . . 5-E-13 5-E-5 Field Monitoring Data Log . . . . . ..Deposition . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Air Sampler Placement . . 5-5 5-A. . 5-E-3 5-E-2 Radiological Control Area Log . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . ..Lung Dose . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 5-c-7 5-c-3 AMS Plot (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .52-M FIGURES FIGURE TITLE PAGE l-l Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification F1OW (Simplified) . . .. 1-7 4-1 Initial Response Force (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . 5-E-17 5-E-7 Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form . . . . . . . . . .”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 5-E-5 5-E-3 Bioassay Screening Log .. . . 4-3 4-2 Service Response Force Functions and Interagency Relationships (Example) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 5-E-21 7-1 Contamination Control Station (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEO) (Sample Contents) . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 5-B-2 5-c.. . . . . .. .1-4 5-B. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . DoD 51 OO. . . .. 5-c-lo 5-E-1 Personal Data Form . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 5-A. 4-8 5-1 Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization . . 5-E-9 5-E-4 Radiation Health History . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . ... . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-C-6 5-C-2 ARAC Plot ... . . .. . . . .. . . . . . 7-3 7-2 Vehicle Contamination Control Sttion (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-6 vii . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 1-6 1-3 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .1-I Spectral Plot . . . . . . . . 4-4 4-3 Sample Accident Site Organization . . . . . . . .. . . . .1 ARACPlot . . I -5 1-2 Relationship of Initial Actions During a Nuclear Weapon Accident Response . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .

. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-2 21-1 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 8-1 Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling . . . . . . 6-2 6-2 Protective Devices for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface Contamination . . . 8-4 11-1 Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5 19-1 Radioactive Contamination Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .1-I Commonly Considered Radioactive Contaminants and Their Primary Associated Radioactive Emissions . 8-3 8-2 Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays . . .1-2 5-B-1 Air Sample Calibration . . . . . . 2 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WH . . 5-B-1 5-B-2 Air Sample Piacement . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-3 Decontamination Methods . . . . . . . 5-B-3 5-C-1 ‘ Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes Program Name Description . . . . 19-14 20-1 Organization/Team Capabilities/ Service Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 11-5 14-1 Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I-5 11-5 Conversion Table to S1 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5 19-2 Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52-M — . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-c-3 6-1 Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a Function of Airborne Contamination . . . . . . . . . 11-3 11-3 Conversion Table (CPM to #g/mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 Alpha Meter . . . . . .. DoD 51 OO. . 11-1 11-2 Conversion Table (CPM to #g/ mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 56 Alpha Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .—— —- TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 5-A. . . . . . . . . . . . 5-A. . . . . . . . 11-4 11-4 Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .

DoD 51OO.52-M ACRONYMS AAC Ambient Air Concentration AF Air Force AFB Air Force Base AFOC Air Force Operations Center AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute’ AIMS Aerial Measurement System AOC Army Operations Center ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ARG Accident Response Group ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) ATRAP Air Transportable RADIAC Package ATSD(AE) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network AUTOSEVOCOM Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network AUTOVON Automatic Voice Network Bq Becquerel CAT Crisis Action Team CCA Contamination Control Area ccc Crisis Coordination Center CCG Combat Communications Group Ccs Contamination Control Station CDCE Contamination Disposal Coordinating Element CDRH Center for Devices and Radiological Health CEAT Community Emergency Action Team CEOI Communications Electronic Operating Instruction CF Composite Fiber CINC Commander-in-Chief CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information COM Chief of Mission COMSEC Communications Security CP Command Post CPM Counts Per Minute CPX Command Post Exercise DCE Disaster Control Element DCO Disaster Control Officer DCS Defense Communications System DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DNA Defense Nuclear Agency DNAAT Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team DoC Department of Commerce DoD Department of Defense DoE Department of Energy DoE/ AL Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations DoE/NV Department of Energy/Nevada Operations DoI Department of the Interior DOMS Director of Military ‘Support ‘ DoS Department of State ix .


DoT Department of Transportation
DPM/ m3 Disintegrations Per Minute Per Cubic Meter
DRF Disaster Response Force
DSFO Deputy Senior FEMA Official
EAC Emergency Action Committee
ECS Exercise Control Staff
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center (FEMA)
EMR Electro-Magnetic Radiation
EMT Emergency Medical Team
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
ERT Emergency Response Team
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCDNA Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FONAC Flag Officers’ Nuclear Accident Course
FRC Federal Response Center
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan
FTS Federal Telecommunications System
FTX Field Training Exercise
GMF Ground Mobile Force
GSA General Services Administration
HE High Explosive
HEPA High Efficiency Particle Air
HF High Frequency
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HDNA Headquarters, Defense Nuclear Agency
HOT SPOT Department of Energy Mobile Counting Laboratory
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
Ic Inhaled Concentration
Icc Interstate Commerce Commission
IND Improvised Nuclear Device
INWS Interservice Nuclear Weapons School
IRF Initial Response Force
.JA Judge Advocate
JACC/ CP Joint Airborne Communications Center) Command Post
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JHEC Joint Hazard Evaluation Center
JIC Joint Information Center
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center



JS Joint Staff
JSCP Joint Strategic Capability Plan
keV Thousand Electron Volts
LOS Limit of Sensitivity
MAC Military Airlift Command
MARD Mobile Accident Response Development
MeV Million Electron Volts
MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration
MRAT Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team
MRT Medical Radiology Team
NAIR Nuclear Accident Incident Response
NARCL Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing
NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures Manual
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVMED Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
NCA National Command Authority
NCAIC Nuclear Chemical Accident/ Incident Control
NCC National Coordinating Center
NCC Navy Command Center
NCS National Communications System
NDA National Defense Area
NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NMCC National Military Command Center
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOS National Ocean Service
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA National Security Area
NSC National Security Council
NSN National Stock Number
NTS Nevada Test Site
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NUWAX Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercise
NWS National Weather Service
OAR Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OEHL Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory
OEMT Operational Emergency Management Team
Osc On-Scene Commander
PAG Protective Action Guide
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PAR Protective Action Recommendation
PLA Principal Legal Advisor
PRP Personnel Reliability Program
QD Quantity Distance
R Roentgen .
RADCON Radiological Control
RAMT Radiological Advisory Medical Team



RAP Radiological Assistance Program (DoE)
RCA Radiological Control Area
RCL Radiological Control Line
REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
RER Re-entry Recommendations
RRF Regional Response Force
RSP Render Safe Procedures
SAAM Special Assignments Airlift Mission
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SECORD Secure Cord Switchboard
SENAC Senior Executive Nuclear Accident Course
SFO Senior FEMA Official
SONAC Senior Officers’ Nuclear Accident Course
SRF Service Response Force
SRP Site Restoration Plan
SSN or SSAN Social Security Number
TELEX Telephone Exchange
TWX Teletypewriter Exchange
uCi/ m Microcuries per cubic meter
UHF Ultra High Frequency
us United States
USCINC U.S. Commander-in-Chief
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
VHF Very High Frequency
WATS Wide Area Telephone Service



DoD 51 OO.52-M


(a) DoD Directive 5100.52, DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive
Materials, 21 Dec 89.
(b) DoD Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance, 7 Feb 83.
(c) Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), Federal Register, 50 Fed. Reg. 46542,
8 Nov 85.
(d) DoD Directive 5148.2, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), 4 Feb 86.
(e) DoD Directive 5200.8, Security of Military Installations and Resources, 29 Jul 80.
(f) DoD Directive 4000.19, Interservice, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support, 14 Ott 80.
(!3) Public Law 93-288,22 May 74, amended by Public Law 100-107,23 Nov 88.
(h) DoD Directive 3025.1, Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies within the
United States, its Territories, and Possessions, 23 May 80.
(i) EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88.
0) JCS Publication 1-03.6, Joint Reporting Structure Event/Incident Report, Nov 80.
(k) TP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(1) Army TM 39-20-11, General Fire fighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(m) Navy S WOP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(n) Air Force T.O. 1lN-20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(o) Lawrence Livermore National Lab Report M-161, 1982.
(P) NSTM 079-39.137.
(q) AR 40-14, Control and Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,
Sep 84.
(r) NAVMED P-5055, Radiation Health Protection Manual, Nov 86.
(s) AFR 161-8, Control and Recording Procedures-Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, Sep 66.
(t) AFR 161-28, Rrsonnel Dosimetry Program and the USAF Master Radiation Exposure Registery,
Ott 73.
(u) OPNAVINST 3440.15, Minimum Criteria and Standards for Navy and Marine Corps Nuclear
Weapons Accident and Incident Response, 13 Jun 83.
(v) BUMEDINST 6470.10, Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated I%rsonnel, 5 Dec 79.
(w) JCS MOP 167, Mobile/Transportable Communications Assets Controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 1978. .
(x) Allied Communications Publication 134, Communications Assets, Jan 75.
(Y) U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1, Joint Communication Deployment and Employment, Jun 80.
(z) FM 24-2, Radio Frequency Management, Sep 85.
(aa) AFR 100-31, Frequency Management and Electromagnetic Comparability, Sep 85.
(ah) Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 USC 797).
(at) DoD Directive 5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapon Security Manuai, Sep 87.
(ad) DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 23 Sep 88.
(se) DoD Regulation 5200. l-R, Information Security Program Regulation, Jun 86.
(m DoD Directive 5210.2, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, 12 Jan 78.
(ag) AR 380-150, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, Sep 78.
(ah) AFR 205-1, Information Security Program, Apr 87.
(ai) AR 40-13, MedicaI Support-Nuclear/ ChemicakAccidents and Incidents, 1 Feb 85.
(aj) AR 600’10, The Army Casualty System, Aug 87.
(ak) AFR 30-25, Casualty Services, Aug 87.
(al) BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, Personnel Casualty Reporting, Feb 82.
(am) NACP Report #37, June 1980.
(an) DA Circular 40-82-3, Prevention of Heat Injury. “
(so) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training Publications 60-1.


REFERENCES (CONTINUED) (ap) Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8. January 1984.52. > xiv . Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing. Ott 89.25. (ar) DNA 5100. . (aq) DoD Directive 4000. Military Standards Requisitioning and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP). May 87. l-L.29.l-M.

Accident Response Group (ARG). and as defined in DoD Directive 5100.A device used to collect a sample of the BENT SPEAR. alert status by the Air Force Logistics Command for airlift to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident/incident Bioassay. with air transportable equipment to radiation accidents/ incidents. Symbolized Bq. (In connection with health Airborne Radioactivity. providing on-site health physics consultation BecquereL The unit of activity of a radionuclide. A field qualified team of health physicists and health Background Radiation. which a single signal initiates the action for a nuclear detonation. tional and Environmental Health Laboratory (USAF Background radiation due to cosmic rays and natural OEHL). See nuclear weapon trained instrument repair technicians maintained in an incident. and technical personnel and of contaminants. BROKEN ARROW. A term used in the DoD to identify radioactive particulate suspended in the air. spare parts. and to the activity of a quantity of a radionuclide having quantification of any possible radiation hazard. medical. The method(s) for determining the amount to supplement the local RADIAC equipment and repair of internaI contamination received by an individual. produced by naturally occurring radioactivity and cosmic rays. Aerial Measurement System (AMS). protection for the user from alpha radiation. gloves. the position of the aircraft is integrated into the system. Air Sampler. this term includes a “significant incident” collection of RADIAC equipment. tive material other than the one under consideration. Radiation arising from radioac- physics technicians established at the USAF Occupa. Any radioactive material protection). Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). specialized equipment designated to execute DoE’s response operations upon notification of a nuclear Armed. DoD 51 OO. official or the senior representative xv . In the Army Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). and hood government agency. . A large areas by utilizing instrumentation for detecting and DoE asset capable of providing a computer generated recording gamma radiation. The team is capable of responding worldwide radioactivity is always present. In the Navy this includes a usually as part of a Nuclear Accident and Incident “signflcant incidentm as defined in DoD Directive Control (NAIC) Team. one spontaneous nuclear transition per second. Equipment for determining contamination released at an accident site.52-M DEFINITIONS Access Procedures. An Army team possessing an alpha report an accident involving a nuclear weapon/warhead radiation monitoring capability.52. shoe covers. The Department of A respirator can be worn with the anti-contamination Energy (DoE) Accident Response Group consists of clothing which provides protection against the inhalation qualified scientific. A DoD term to identify and Alpha Team. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal or hair cap. capability. Clothing C*gnizant Agency Authority or Official. and report a nuclear incident involving a nuclear weapon/ warhead or nuclear component. Anti-Contamination Clothing (Anti-C’s). and is also a control device to prevent the spread of contamination. A and Air Force. The foreign consisting of coveralls. both as gross count rates model of the most probable path of the radioactive and gamma energy spectra. Performs aerial measurements of ground and airborne radioactivity over Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). The configuration of a nuclear weapon in weapon accident/incident.52. equal and instrumentation for the detection. See nuclear weapon(s) accident. The background count includes radiation suspended in the atmosphere. The team is identified or nuclear component. identification. Background Count. 5100. Anti-contamination clothing provides Procedures.

Conduct and manage Federal on-site actions. temporarily or permanently. The process of making any person. The area b. biological. One who acts or facility) specifically designated for controlling ingress on behalf of the Secretary of Defense with his authority and egress of personnel and equipment to/from the over the military services and DoD agencies. Also custody includes the maintenance of weapons and components. fusing. Contamination.. and high of the weapon at the time of the accident. An illustration of the Contamination Department of Energy Team Leader. Contamination Control Station (CCS). chemical agent and hazardous intensity of any radioactive material with respect to time. structures. TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA or SECRET RESTRICTED DATA revealing the theory Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT). from repeated exposure to radiation in the same region. limited life components. maintain. Procedures to avoid. or removing hazardous materials contamination control line extends 100 meters beyond clinging to or around it. making harmless. and Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA). The deposit and/ or absorption of radioactive material. remove. and action measures. or render harmless. and totally Federal Agency is that Federal agency having custody contained quantities of fissionable.of the involved country’s government at an accident/ Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information’ incident site. contaminants. . JIC and is available to assist the local community. personnel. the izing. to the meticulous clothing/ equipment removal procedures appropriate State and /or local officials . in coordination with FEMA. Station to eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) contamination adhering to personnel in the contami- c. a. or area safe by absorbing. A team of operation or design of the components of a of response and local experts that operates out of the thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb. movement of. test. The total dose resulting transferred to FEMA by mutual agreement. or radiological the cIean area. Responsibility for the control of. A building or location control station is operational. The coordinator Control Station is at Chapter 5. Initially. Contamination Control. Decontamination. Decay (Radioactive). Contamination Control Line (CCL). control line. or chemical agents or Custody. Specifically excluded is information concerning arming. or test device. materials contamination. Among excluded items are is responsible to: the components which Service personnel set. fissionable. warhead. both off and xvi . The outer boundary of the assistance to disaster relief operations. The concept uses supervised. biological. Congress.The Cognizant firing systems. Contamination Reduction Area (CRA). reduce. transfer and hazardous materials on. of all Department of Energy matters. Develop or evaluate recommendations for public concept is employed at the Contamination Control protective action measures off site. or objects. weapons and components. areas. destroying. d. and the inner boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line. operate. A control line object.. The decrease in the radiation nuclear. For military radiation control area. or of the whole body. and by. Present recommendations for off-site protective nated area. structured. and the White House until Cumulative Dose (Radiation). demolition munition. Once the contamination Decontamination Station. and access to. biological. (CNWDI). Coordinate initially the release of information to the public. person/ object and outside the Contamination Control Station. this line is the outer equipped and organized to cleanse personnel and boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from material of chemical. The CFA explosive materials by type. or replace. the Secretary of Contamination Control Station is the contamination the Army is the DoD Executive Agent. the known/ suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of safety. An area (tent Department of Defense Executive Agent. neutral- surrounding the radiological control area. or Foreign precluding mechanical transfer of contamination on a government.

domestic disaster relief operations. public information. The detection. Disaster Response Force (DRF). The USAF base level b. Those actions to recover organization which responds to disasters/accidents for unexploded ordnance. means. and all similar or related items or components explosive in Disaster Control. of personnel assigned to routine disposal. and small arms ammunition. establishing command and control. response and recovery framework. or nature. The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal Dose Rate Contour Line. technical service assembly them to a practicable conclusion within the established operations. guided and ballistic missiles. actions include initial and subsequent reporting response. and initiate recovery. Any designated area containing one place. and contaminated items. Access Procedures. or the laying of mines and demolition security. or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. Render Safe Procedures. which may include demolition or burning in Exclusion Area. rendering-safe. or accident scene where control is established to preclude damaged explosive ordnance. A line on a map. unexploded ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. medical aspects. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). clandestine and improvised explosive devices. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident. cartridges and coordination. to reduce the probability of damage. xvii . includes all mines. disposition of a. Measures taken before. during. natural or man-made disasters. Also. These charges. electro-explosive devices. Not included in this definition are the accidental arming or Disaster Preparedness. removal to a disposal area. clusters and dispensers. This ordnance includes bombs and Directorate of Military Support (DOMS). sives. rendering-safe. and final disposaI of explosive hazards caused by the accident. and control of recovery. and tools to provide the interruption of or overlay joining all points at which the radiation dose functions or separation of essential components of rate at a given time is the same. high explosive. identification. organized joint staff formed to support the planning. and to gain access to unexploded ordnance. field evaluation. legal and particular courses or modes of action for access to. The DCO is the DoD hazardous by damage or deterioration when the disposal point of contact with FEMA at the disaster scene for of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities providing DoD support to disaster recovery operations. installation. and execution of military support to propellant actuated devices. The measurement of radiation doses as it applies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and to the d. minimize its effects. pyrotechnics. Control of the accident ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an caused hazards include: survey of the incident/accident explosive ordnance disposal incident. Explosive Ordnance Disposal procedural Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. and/ or disposal of explosive ordnance which has become Disaster Control Officer (DCO). or other appropriate or more nuclear weapons or components. All munitions containing explo- Response Group operations. The suspected Disaster Cordon. The final disposal of techniques. torpedoes. explosive ordnance by explosive ordnance disposal p$rsonnel. which constitutes a hazard unauthorized entry. mortar. diagram. Final Disposal Procedures. and depth charges. to operations. A physical barrier surrounding the or detected presence of unexploded ordnance. or material. Recovery Procedures. Directs a task. Those actions to locate exactly nuclear. methods. agency for the Secretary of the Army when acting in rocket.on-site. personnel and area decontamination. personnel. including Department of Energy Accident Explosive Ordnance. appropriate security. ordnance the capacity of DoD Executive Agent. c. Dosimetry. That series of actions to control other conditions that develop during the manufacture and manage nuclear incidents or accidents and bring of high explosive material. and to support disaster operations. nuclear fission. Those action on the weapon(s). Action warheads. after hostile action. area to establish isodose lines and all types of monitoring. artillery.

radioactive. explosive. This center need not initial identification. state agencies in their emergency planning. toxic. Personnel with response to a radiological emergency in the U.The FEMA the military utilization of atomic weapons and that such headquarters team that carries out notification activation information can be safeguarded adequately as national and coordination procedures from the FEMA EICC.The EICC is located in FEMA Headquarters in Washington. emergency. A plan to provide coordinated radiological produce ionization. Exposure. and reporting of suspected be located near the on-site or Federal-State operations unexploded ordnance. FEMA assists local and volunteer agencies will be located in the center. because of XVill . ordnance (such as bombs. Emergency Support Team (EST) . to determine further action. Federal Response Center (FRC). staff support of the FEMA Director. or any other material that.The FEMA Disposal Procedures. coordination. This agency establishes Federal policies for as required. biological research material. location. for measuring and recording services response/ recovery to a radiological accident or gamma ray dosage permanently. monitoring and assessment assistance to the State and local governments in response to radiolo~cal emergen- Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). by explosive ordnance reconnais. Hazardous Materials. and assistance Representatives of other Federal. See Explosive Ordnance b. and functions of executive agencies. $tiological. S. unduly magnetic. Emergency Response Team (ERT) . management. Film Badge. Information removed situation and then provide FEMA’s primary response from the Restricted Data category upon determination capability. mines. team deployed to a radiological emergency scene by the FEMA Director to make an initial assessment of the Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). its special training and equipment who render explosive possessions and territories. Any material that is flammable. projectiles. Energy Radiation). mitigation. poison- Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan ous. jointly by the Department of Energy and Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to c. (EICC) . Final Disposal Procedures. security information (Section 142d. and volunteer response actions. capable of a. A center established near the scene of a radiological emergency responsible for off-site Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. The Federal plan to assist State and local “ a chemical agent. an oxidizing agent. This plan. The on-site focal Federal Emergency Management Agency point established by the Senior FEMA Official (SFO). Reconnaissance radiological response from which the FRMAC Director involving the investigation. and support of the SFO. Center (FRMAC). as amended).. Staffed by DoE NV. state. A probe. marking. official appointed by the President upon declaration of supersedes the Interagency Radiological Assistance a major disaster or emergency under Public Law 93. them. 288 to coordinate the overall Federal response. Its primary role in a nuclear weapon accident is one of coordinating FIDLER (Field Instrument for the Detection of Low Federal. state. Emergency Information and Coordination Center detecting low energy gamma and X-rays. make intelligence reports on such ordnance. local. and booby traps) safe. authorized by 44 CFR Part 351. Plan. com- government officials or other Federal agencies in the pressed gases. The exposure at a given point is a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan measurement of radiation in relation to its ability to (FRMAP). nuclear. centers as long as its operations can be coordinated with sance agents. (FRERP). A photographic film packet or badge control and coordination of Federal and state emergency carried by personnel. planning.Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. conducts the FRMAP response. (FEMA). used with the PRM-5 and other supporting instrument packages. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment and supervise the safe removal thereof. for coordinating the Federal response to and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident. local. DC and piovides overall direction. corrosive. The Federal cies. detection. Atomic Energy Act The EST is responsible for Federal agency headquarters of 1954.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). given isotope in the body is the time in which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Half-Life. Rescue operations. whose satellite terminals and other equipment. . or by product material received. nuclear weapon component or the fabrication and used. which would frequency radio. Public “affairs activities. Licensed Material. A facility. or transferred under a general or specific license employment of an IND or a credible threat of either. Accident site security. Source material. control. or packaging. for the coordination of hazard survey data and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. Establishment of. or loss of a nuclear weapon or radiological material. Firefighting. c. Functions which the initial response force is tasked to perform (within its Joint Information Center (JIC). take emergency response actions necessary to maintain automatic digital network terminals. belonging to DoD or Assets. Hot Line. A radioactive decay and biological elimination. are: of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident to coordinate all public affairs. or activities. manual secure voice command and control on-site pending arrival of the and other equipment. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). Is an event radiological safety/health physics matters on-site. which a military commander or other appropriate authority may prescribe as the limiting cumulative Inhalation Pathway. FEMA. A facility at the scene capabilities). issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a state.its quantity. governments. local. facilities. Monitoring. resulting from a deliberate act. “HOT property of each radioactive species and is independent SPOT” also refers to the DoE Accident Mobile Counting of its amount or condition. capabilities are listed in the Nuclear Accident Response Joint Communications Contingency Station Capabilities Listing. special nuclear seizure. very high frequency. command. An element. marked with tape or line. but linked by direct communications networks. The act of detecting the presence of contamination control station. centers for exchanging and maintaining information about radiological assistance capabilities and activities. Ingestion Pathway. DoS. The DoD and DoE operate coordinating d. radiation and the measurement thereof with radiation The station personnel use the line as the inner side being measuring instruments. e. The half-life is a characteristic greater than in neighboring regions in the area. Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures. The JIC includes repres- a. properties. and other Federal agencies. theft. operational military considerations. consistent with radiation exposure. The means by which a person at radiation dose to be received over a spec~lc period of the accident area or downwind is subjected to respiratory time by members of the command. may endanger contaminated and the side away from the accident as human life or property. possessed. (NARCL). an area of reduced contamination. and/or foreign b. Service or agency response force. The time required for the activity of a given Hot Spot. entation from DoE. involving nuclear weapons or nuclear materials which include the sabotage. tropospheric scatter terminals. The region in a contaminated area in which radioactive species to decrease to half of its initial value the level of radioactive contamination is considerably due to radioactive decay. conducting hazard survey and radiological operations. Radiation monitoring. communications element that provides high frequency. and communications. The effective half-life of a Laboratory and Mobile Support Equipment. secure and super high frequency Initial Response Force (IRF). The means by which a person is Maximum Permissible Dose. The Hot Line is the inner boundary of the . That radiation dose exposed to radiation through the food chain. The communications station provides high DoE installations. These centers are separated geographically. staffed by representatives from each of the agencies g. as well as state. f. DoD.

however. facility. Radioactive contamination. or unexplained nuclear detonation. Particulate and electromagnetic a National Defense Area temporarily places such non. operational Nuclear Weapon Accident. shape. and post warning signs. and neutrons. nuclear fission or fusion reactions. An area established on prediction. weapon or nuclear component.S. atomic nuclei. or both. actual or perceived. results from the energy released by reaction involving mark it with a physical barrier. An unexpected event weapon. The landowner’s consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible. non-Federal lands located within the United States. firing. All nuclear radiations are ionizing mark it with a physical barrier. control of the DoE and results only from an emergency event. from the and results only from an emergency event. as part of the total energy released by the accidental explosion of a nuclear Nticjear Weapon Incident. An Army team organized to minimize and c. are alpha and beta particles. or activities with nuclear accident/incident radiological and toxic hazards present at a nuclear response and radiation detection capabilities. and destruction of property. forces or U. component. would add beta and gamma radiation hazards to other facilities. rays. bomb/weapon diagnostics. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear prevent the loss of life. The important nuclear radiations. An area established Nuclear Detonation. radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear Federal lands under the effective control of the DoD processes.. and size. National Defense Area (NDA). shape. Explosive energy released by f. Need-to-Know. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon “or nuclear accident or incident. its possessions or territories. supported allied forces of to establish. A device in which the explosion of the material at the scene will define the boundary. b.Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing or more pounds of TNT is considered significant. and to enhance and maintain the public’s confidence in the Army’s ability to respond effectively to a nuclear e. Accidental or unauthorized launching. to secure classitled material. A criterion in security procedures a. A listing of DoD and DoE installations. field communications. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to four involving a nuclear weapon. The landowner’s consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible. military necessity Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). unauthorized. or component xx . and (NARCL). Nuclear Accident and Incident Control Team (NAIC). but the converse is not true. that the intended a nuclear capable weapons system. damage mitigation. An unexpected event necessity will dictate the final decision regarding involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that location. EOD support. An accidental. prior to disclosure. or protect- ing DoD equipment and /or material. hazard National Security Area (NSA). gamma DoD representative at the scene will define the boundary. The senior DoE representative having custody Nuclear Weapon. or protecting DoE the event of accidental detonation of the HE of a high equipment and/ or material. The prevention of a nuclear yield in and /or restricted data information. and post warning signs. recipient must have access to the information to perform his official duties. results in any of the following: . safeguarding classified defense information. Establishment of an NSA explosive assembly weapon or ignition of the propellant temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the of a gun assembly weapon. radiation survey and detection. for the purpose of such as from a nuclear weapon. radiations. and decontamination. is a DoE asset with specialized equipment for conducting and size of the NDA. its possessions. for safeguarding classified Nuclear Safing. A nuclear explosion resulting on non-Federal lands located within the United States. d. or territories. The senior weapons standpoint. Establishment of Nuclear Radiation. either f~sion or fusion. however.S. Public hazard. The NEST will dictate the final decision regarding location. weapon accident site. hazardous effects. from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials. Nuclear Contribution. personal injury. or which requires the custodians of classified information use by U.

sabotage. One of the primary fissionable materials in nuclear weapons. or control access to nuclear weapon of a nuclear weapon. damage. Any act of God. That area beyond the boundaries of a DoD a nuclear weapon(s) accident: installation or DoE facility. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon On-Site. and theft. or examina. and or megatons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required to continuous evaluation of the personnel assigned to produce an equivalent energy release. DoD OSC. or increased dud of producing a nuclear yield of more than four pounds probability. board that does not fall in the nuclear weapon accident facility manager. measured in terms of the kilotons systems. testing. c. to USAF unit offers a multitude of technical services on prevent unauthorized access to equipment. Physical Security. and/or the malfunc. that has been. loading. May result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or inadvertent release of classified information. The program seeks to ensure that personnel coming under its purview are mentally and Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory emotionally stable and. (OEMT). Officer designated to command the DoD response efforts at the accident site. warrants that senior national officials or agencies be informed or take action. or DoE team leader. Radiation in the form of particles (for example. significant incident. including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA. The physical measures designed to safeguard personnel.reliable. facility. Oralloy. Enriched uranium. Explosives) initiated at a single point. electrons. A DoD pro- gram implemented for all personnel who control. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and beta particles) as opposed to electromagnetic radiation. unfavorable environment. The category but: on-site area includes any area which has been established as a NDA or NSA. espionage. The radiological field unit of the material. The criterion for design safety that arming and /or firing sequence. tioning of equipment and material which could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon One-Point Safe. and documents. and to safeguard them against OEHL is called the AFRAT. A USAF unit that provides consultant. (OEHL). and analytical support in radiological. various nuclear duties. radiological problems. screening. alpha and d. Nuclear Yield. The program covers selection. A detonation of HE (High or transportation of equipment. One-Point Detonation. or on operational control of the installation commander. The Flag or General component. engineering. b. but not constituting Off-Site. loaded. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component to the extent Operational E m e r g e n c y M a n a g e m e n t T e a m that major rework. handle. An increase in the possibility of explosion or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or radioactive contamination. or a. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. a. That area around the scene of a nuclear components or a nuclear weapon transport or launch weapon accident or significant incident under the vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated. or which could lead to a weapon must have less than one chance in a million a substantial change in yield. “ Particulate Radiation.resulting in any of the following. or condition resulting in damage to a weapon. of TNT (equivalent energy release) when the high explosive is initiated and detonated at any single point. That part of security concerned with occupational. b. complete replacement. c. and environmental health programs. or On-Scene Commander (OSC). Errors committed in the assembly. The DoE senior management team at tion or recertification by the DoE is required. facilities. headquarters that coordinates the initial FRMAP response to radiological emergencies. xxi . neutrons. The energy released in the detonation have access to.

or Commander steps may consist of nothing more than allowing the of a military hospital. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation or level or range established by appropriate Federal or State radioactive material. Quantity/Distance (QD) Safety Standards. Advice provided Radioactivity. railways. One rad contamination at a nuclear weapon accident. Special material or tissue. The control area encompassing all known. Team personnel will advise on contamination to decay naturally. Directives Radiological Assistance Program Team (RAP pertaining to the amounts and kinds of explosives that Team). radiological teams of the U. weapons. Re-entry Recommendations (RERs). or suspected. Contamination which Services Command. often accompanied by to members of the public on returning to an area affected gamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope. The spontaneous emission of radiation. See Explosive Ordnance Dispo- radiation emergencies.Plutonium (Pu). The Pu-239 isotope is primarily used in nuclear weapons. Radiological Control Area (RCA). Protective Action Guide (PAG). Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS).S. sal Procedures. special team established at Walter Reed Army Medical Center under the Commander.01 joule of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation energy per kilogram of the absorbing Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. material. .” Design. after an accident involving radioactive materials to: a. Radiological Survey. Army Health Residual Contamination. U. Minimize safety hazards to the public. Old unit of absorbed dose radiation. in an area. to the State concerning guidance that may be issued generally alpha or beta particles. buildings. Navy organized to provide technical assistance and advice in RADIAC. A radiation exposure d. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid. See Explosive Ordnance Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Render Safe Procedures. These Accident and Incident Control Officer. Tennessee. either permanently or for short-term emergency actions. An artificially produced fissile b. radiological measuring instruments or equipment. (This term is derived from the words “radioactivity detection. the State” on emergency measures it should consider in determining action for the public to take. A Disposal Procedures. highways. DoE teams available through DoE regional can be stored and the proximity of such storage to offices to assist in radiological emergencies. Disseminate technical information and medical reduce exposure to radiation. Advice to f. xxii . available to the OSC. The directed effort to determine indication and computation. advice to appropriate authorities. represents the absorption of 0. That assistance provided concerning.S. agencies beyond which protective action should be considered. Evaluate the radiological hazard. Army and U.” and is normally an the distribution of radiological material and dose rates adjective. or utilization of nuclear a. manufacture. at Oak Ridge. or g. and other installations. Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). c. radiological health hazards and exposure level criteria. e. by a radiological emergency. Restricted Data (RD). Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination. radiological RAD. A treatment and consultative team for Recovery Procedures. Nuclear remains after steps have been taken to remove it. magazines. Minimize damaging effects on property. All data (information) Radiological “Assistance.S. avoid. A term designating various types of radiological emergencies. which provides training courses.

the term is considered ambiguous and its use is discouraged. custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear and removing. Senior FEMA Official (SFO). Act of 1954. packaging. . The residue of a nuclear appropriately manned. A term. changing from a state of readiness for initiation to a safe condition. A person appointed by Warhead Section (WHS). Two-Person Policy. Uranium is an alpha emitter. torpedo. as amended). but shall not include data declassified or removed from the restricted data category pursuant to Section 142 of Tritium. silvery white. One roentgen is metal containing U-238 and U-235 in natural propor- essentially equal to one rad. chemical or biological agents. The Warhead. the Director of FEMA to coordinate the Federal warhead including appropriate skin sections and related response to a civil emergency. The S1 unit replaced the rem. Uranium is a heavy. or other munition which contains either the consent should be obtained prior through host nation nuclear or thermonuclear system. Service/ agency response forces are organized Weapons Recovery. high explosive system. of British origin. Atomic Energy having one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. A completely assembled . agreements. that is. if any. Uranium. . Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen the Atomic Energy Act (Section 11 W. equipped. specific purpose of a Service/agency response force is together with fission products. See uranium. Tritium is a beta emitter. As applied to weapons and ammunition. A system designed to prohibit when absorbed by man or other mammals. or inert materials intended to inflict damage. Having an atomic number greater than that of uranium (The known elements belonging to the c. radioac- tive metal. In air. The of the weapon. A obsolete unit of exposure of gamma (or Tuballoy (TU). Also referred to Safing. Roentgen. This term is sometimes applied to depleted uranium. components. That part of a missile. Xxlll . to provide nuclear weapon accident/significant incident assistance.. plus unexpended plutonium or uranium. Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (rem). One rem is the quantity of ionizing radiation of any type which. Includes a comprehensive assess- and maintained by those Services or agencies which have ment of the accident. equipment or material. cooperation by local authorities and host countries rocket. neutralizing the weapon hazards. and other components recover from an accident or significant incident. the and coordinate all actions necessary to control and materials used for the casing. The area surrounding the accident site of oxide that will make it appear from a golden-yellow in an overseas country where a two-person security policy color to almost black. b. and shipping of the weapon “weapon components. tions. projectile. and able to perform weapon after it has exploded or burned. Transuranic. the as the two-man concept or policy. produces access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain a physiological effect equivalent to that produced by designated components by requiring the presence at all the absorption of one (1) roentgen of X-ray or gamma times of at least two authorized persons capable o f radiation. “ hazards. Service Response Force (SRF). for uranium X-ray) radiation in field dosimetry.. Special nuclear material in the production of energy actinide series). A DoD response force Weapon Debris (nuclear). Production of special nuclear material. the metal becomes coated with a layer Security Area. is established to prevent unauthorized access to classified defense information. detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to “the task to be performed. therefore.

while Chapters 1-1 . and theater policy to be effective. lead to a nuclear weapon accident and checklists for On-Scene Commanders (OSCS) and their warrants that senior national officials or agencies be staffs.S. (2) Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security. A Nuclear Weapon Accident is: States and its territories or possessions. forces or U. nuclear weapon components. or use of mated. that major rework. This chapter introduces the NARP and provides (4) Could. This manual DoD Directive 5100.52-M CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 GENERAL Accident Response Procedures (NARP) manual has been developed for this requirement.capabilities in nuclear weapon accident response/ (DNA) to develop a technical document for nuclear recovery. or examina. unauthorized. Portions of (6) Public hazard. or use by U. State/ local plans. reference (a). or loaded on board that does not fall in the a nuclear capable weapon system. “An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons. actual or perceived. or for response and nuclear weapon accident category but: recovery of seized or stolen weapons. The document is (3) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear designed to standardize where appropriate and integrate weapon or nuclear component. ” technical information to assist DoD forces in preparing (2) An accidental. to a DoD nuclear weapon accident. the document may be useful to DoD elements responding to non-DoD radiological accidents or incidents under b. the Federal Radiological Emergency (5) Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear Response Plan (FRERP). complete replacement. and DoE Accident Response component. This manual is designed to furnish a general approach to nuclear (1) Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon weapon accident response. Chapter 4 discusses the concept of operations weapon accident response. or unexplained for nuclear weapon accident response and in responding nuclear detonation. or a nuclear weapon Procedures will not be addressed for response to transport or launch vehicle when a nuckar weapon is accidental or unauthorized launching. The Nuclear Weapon for response and recovery procedures. DoD 51 OO. The procedures must be used or radiological nuclear weapon component to the extent in conjunction with DoD directives.S. firing. Group (ARG) responsibilities/ procedures. supported allied forces This manual consolidates procedural guidance and of a nuclear capable weapons system.52. ” DoD and other Federal agencies and provide general information on foreign governments’ responsibilities/ This directive also directs the Defense Nuclear Agency . jiring. Federal instructions. Chapters 2 and 3 describe responsibilities” of the informed or take action. provides response summarizes DoD responsibilities and provides procedu- guidance and the following definitions: ral guidance for a joint response to accidents involving nuclear weapons or components thereof in the United a. A Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident is: current interagency support agreements. General guidance “An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons for overseas areas is included. (3) May result in adverse public reaction (national 1-3 ORGANIZATION AND USE OF THE NARP or internationa~ or inadvertent release of classljled information. international/ bilateral agreements tion or recertijlcation by the DoE is required. or nuclear components that results in any of the following: 1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE NARP (I) Accidental or unauthorized launching. procedures. DoD methods with Department of State (DoS) (4) Radioactive contamination.

classified information security. the extent of contamination is over-estimated initially to provide the greatest margin of safety for the public 1-4 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE and then refined as actual measurement of contam- OVERVIEW ination is obtained. and return the area to normal use. and how logistics. health and safety. The response force must obtain factual information to define the actual details of the In a nuclear weapon accident. security. feasible because once the explosion and/ or fire is over. are materials which contaminated area may include removing. Health and Safety. legal implications. communications. if so that subsequent detonations and site contamination necessary. Rapid determination of the (e) Determine the various levels of contamination presence or absence of radiological contamination is a present within the contaminated area. contamination may sures to be taken by residents in potentially contaminated be released that could create long term public health areas. legal implications. The primary hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. Restoring a accident involves a nuclear yield. Air sampling (f) Establish a bioassay program to quantify for radiation downwind of the accident may not be radiation doses. radiological contamination. monitor. weapons recovery. minimize any continuing radiological hazard to Potential OSCS and their staffs will enhance their ability residents. public affairs. for example. hazardous materials. oxidizers. measures should be fixing contamination at levels which are not detrimental 1-2 . medical the body. or emit alpha radiation. and characterize the site contamination. Chapter radioactive contamination occurs as a result of the 20 lists specialized units and organizations discussed accident. commun. scene._ fuel fire /explosion) there may be limit radiation exposures to personnel. nonradiological Capability (ARAC). to respond to a nuclear weapon accident by gaining Action to accomplish these tasks should be included familiarity with this manual. unless the [3) Site Decontamination/ Restoration. marking and containing of hazardous/toxic materials. public contamination problem. If support.5 through 14 address radiological/hazardous material implemented to prevent alpha radiation from entering safety aspects. Initial ground radiation surveys will probably be the means of determining the presence/ (2) Hazardous Materials Response. procedures must include evacuation or sheltering protect the public. if available. and weapons identify limitations on the response organization’s recovery are the critical concerns facing the response capability to perform such actions and will state addi- force. In general. recommendations to local officials and identifying. security. If the weapon is breached by external forces (for (d) Establish” a radiological controls program to example. for example. Radiation hazards and basic radiation assistance. high explosives. notification. their availability. An accident absence of contamination. (g) Fix highly contaminated areas as appropriate the resultant contamination may settle or disperse in to minimize resuspension. and site restoration. ”radiological contamination may exist. additional resources will be employed. Chapter 21 addresses training. Should conventional explosives in the responders who may have already departed the accident weapon detonate. The procedures/ plans will affairs. tional resource requirements. Other aspects. and plastics. but temporary. site restoration. and local radiological response metals. sheltering. in response force accident procedures/plans. logistics protection principles are described in Appendix l-F. or is caused during weapon recovery operations. (a) Estimate the boundaries of radiological a. If a radiological problem involving a weapon system can release non-nuclear exists. a few hours. the first radiological response should be to throughout the document. threat to public safety from toxic or explosive hazards (b) Disseminate precautionary/ protective mea- associated with the accident. personnel at the accident scene and first will not occur. Response teams will be required to define extent of contamination. if required. state. Also. A nuclear weapon accident can contamination using the Atmospheric Release Advisory result in an immediate. such as medical assistance. or concerns. specialized Federal. (1) Radiological Safety. propellants. diluting. weapons involved in the accident are the highest priority (c) Identify. heavy . identify the initially affected area and personnel. Therefore. Rapid initial safing actions on the nuclear evacuation. impact. Specitlc actions ications and response force integration are areas that to resolve the radiological problem include must also be addressed. and decontaminate. critical element of initial accident response.

packaging. This presence of the weapon. or detonate during recovery accident. as much contamination. Weapon(s) Recovery. nuclear weapons are documented in EOD and security (e) Adequacy of contamination diagnoses and publications. officials with the news media and the general public Chief of Mission (COM). its components. and (g) Safety of U. Safety and security procedures for inated areas with regard food. Many of the legal local government officials should be notified in advance claims against the government will be related to the site or advised as soon as possible that an exception has restoration procesy consequently. State. The appropriate theater Commander-in~Chief (CINC) and relationships of the OSC. (a) First. (Through documented evacuated from their homes. shipment of weapon(s) and/or weapon components to (h) Decontamination of contaminated areas. a technical problem to be addressed by Explosive (c) Credibility of information provided concern. The weapon presents both (b) Treatment of casualties. food. and his public affairs the approval of the host government through the U. have some form of weapon problem. actions must be been invoked. by definition. livestock safety. and which will (b) Second. his staff. operations. unless bilateral agreements b. nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at a specific location. Coordination between (2) DoD Directive 5230. It will involve preparation of the presence of the weapon should be made as soon of protective measures. the weapon recovery effort. From the initial report of the accident until the final actions of site restoration. The OSC is authorized to invoke d. The extent of endangered. and security of their planning and close coordination between EOD and DoE possessions. water.S.S. cotilrmation of the presence of a several organizations. reference (b). (d) In locations outside the United States. the OSC may confirm or deny the be technically achievable and financially acceptable. to allay public process will be the most time consuming portion of alarm. as necessary. Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and the DoE ARG ing the accident and its long term effects. and a need for appropriate security for the weapon and (d) Precautions to be taken by those in contam. and radiological response that. Weapons involved in an accident may have effects on the health of any persons exposed to been subjected to severe stress. The Assistant difficult steps will be selection of criteria to determine Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) and when site restoration is complete. ~ time as necessary should be taken to permit a thorough (f) Availability of shelter. nuclear weapon accident response and will be a (c) No other variations from DoD policy are coordinated Federal.is essential to minimize risk to personnel. nuclear weapon is appropriate when public safety is kill be involved in the response effort. its territories. c. and assessment of possible damage by qualified EOD and clothing if the accident situation results in people being DoE response personnel. water.to health over a lifetime of exposure. accurately documented. their final destination. Response Forces Integration and Coordination two exceptions: and Associated Areas of Concern. weapon recovery. confirmation country government effort. nuclear weapons.) If the high explosives detonate (i) Reparations for damages caused by the during the accident. consequently. involvement and degree of responsibility are situation . and possessions. it is DoD policy neither to confirm personnel . both within and without the DoD. All nuclear weapon accidents will.16. ARG. the OSC can ensure safe removal. states EOD. the OSC must have the concurrence of the more than the release of information to the public. in general. One of the most establish response force credibility. Public affairs (a) Danger to those involved in or responding and health issues must be addressed concurrently with to the accident. program designed to gain public understanding of accident response efforts. reentry recommendations and as possible to preclude undue public concern and to development of restoration procedures. (1) Public concerns which can be expected follow. prior to exercising the is an important element in a comprehensive public affairs exceptions above. Security and weapon safety concerns should not preclude ing an accident with a nuclear weapon include: or interfere with the performance of basic medical and humanitarian response to accident victims. Public Affairs encompasses much exist. local and/ or involved authorized. If the exceptions are invoked. Public Affairs. searching for classified and hazardous components may be necessary.

clothing. notification and immediate emergency measures taken Figure 1-3 may be of assistance in accident response by the nearest DoD/ DoE installation to provide a planning. Service 1-7 CHANGE PROCEDURES operations centers. Defense the initial accident report to NMCC and/or Service Nuclear Agency. and providing security for of one team may be integrated into the lead team’s staff. although not all-inclusive. Figure 1-3 (centerfold). The first level is document are contained in Chapter 1. and others assisting in the response. forces can be divided into two phases: Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Opera- tions Flow Diagram. classified material. A simplified notification chain resulting from Service channels to Director. accidents must be reported immediately using and comments which may enhance this manual’s the most expeditious means available (secure if possible). The following concerns and actions must be considered: illustrates the inter-relationship of initial actions. VA 22310-3398. the initial Alexandria. Initial Phase. and to health and safety. conduct of all operations required to recover the communications. and prepared for deployment by the Service operations Comments should be forwarded through command and center. The initial phase includes accident and the approximate time of their occurrence. Follow-on Phase. and costs. and extensive adminis. or Service and specialized teams are alerted and provide for evaluation of the recommended change. Initiation of nuclear weapon accident response actions by the National Military Command Center (NMCC). site. and achievable/ financially acceptable condition using the equipment) needed or provided. Also. Figure 1-2. Also. The second level is that of the Service order. Following initial the IRF. legal. public affairs. but all forces must be integrated totally to phase requires defining and stabilizing the situation by ensure effective use of their capabilities. The response effort of these order of response force actions. ATTN: NOEA. . the appropriate and paragraph of the text. The IRF may be through I-F as a guide for the OSC in monitoring the a small force on-scene if an accident occurs near an progress of an accident response. results automatically from accident notification. usefulness. 1-4 . the accident situation will dictate the priority and Response Force (SRF). or select members centers. an exchange and treatment of casualties. security. operation centers is shown in Figure 1-1. The follow-on phase includes the rapid recurring access to the accident site: medical. Users are encouraged to submit recommended changes Therefore. of briefings should occur to apprise the arriving team reconnaissance. actions in progress. Federal presence and’”humanitarian support. combined assets of the various agencies and organiza- trative support to ensure complete documentation of tions in the response and recovery. 1-6 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE 1-5 THE PHASES OF RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR CHECKLISTS WEAPON ACCIDENT Checklists derived from the primary nuclear weapon The response procedures addressed throughout this accident response requirements identified in this document consider two force levels. Headquarters. Comments should be keyed to a specific page Upon receipt of accident notification. 6801 Telegraph Road. depicts the various response actions a. and assessment of the hazards to public of the current situation. To ensure a coordinated effort. events. These actions include fire suppression.dependent. initial identification and security clearance level of response team members with follow-on actions to ensure b. The checklists’ installation with only a humanitarian emergency paragraphs are not all inclusive or arranged in priority response capability. Appendices 1-A that of Initial Response Force (IRF). Other actions of immediate concern inform the OSC about the capabilities of the newly include establishing communications with the accident arrived response teams. lodging. decisions. restoration and weapon(s) and restore the environment to a technically logistical support (for example. the supporting military installation and command liaison officers may be exchanged. Sufficient detail and response forces are identified and tasked by the Unified justification should be provided to ensure understanding Commands. assessment of control. rescue identification of arriving response teams.

. . .. . . .. El Reporting Unit Lowest level of Local Host . . . . I ~ ● I---m + Appropriate Service Operations Center(s) Service National Military Direct Deployment of 4-> Operation 4-N Command Center SRF and Specialized Center (NMCC) Other Agencies Teams (IAW DoDD 51 DO. Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow (Simplified). .. ... .> command having Authority / Nation I knowledge of the I event I I I I I I I I I I I : ~ Fl+.=~l “! I I I I . . .. . -~ FEMA (EICC) t j Deployment of Deployment of Senior FEMA Appropriate Official and DOE Assets Emergency Response Directed Team Directed ..52) 1 I 4-> (JNACC) HQ DNA I DOE (EOC) DOS 4 ... . > 4 .. 1-5 .. Figure 1-1.

- I Withdraw all personnel Remove live for possible weapons. and of confirmation. Withdraw nonessential personnel to safe distance. Eliminate hazard. P Debrief personnel observing or having access to accident. P Information Center. Monitor people Notify Emergency Response Personnel. 1 I 1 * Figure 1-2. observing or having Evaluate potential level and extent of contamination. Designate SRF. Make preliminary situ- ation estimated based on observations and debrief of civil authorities. casualties. r Confirm presence Advise ASD(PA) Establish Joint — of nuclear weapons. I r-l lRF/SRF onsite. 1-6 . (ACCii3ENT3 + I I NMCC Notified. Relationship of Initial Actions During a Nuclear Weapon Accident Response. Cl Deploy Reconnaissance Team. YES YES Seek ASD(PA) guidance on public affairs policy. contamination.

/’ ‘_H E“.7.TWA..IA1 (ON CONTROL :OMW)N( CATIONS 2 or...W’.” ?..s ... ..! . “..m . ... M..:+ r.www cAwr!Es LCc./ . LCc.[. .m w (m.a.--s. .)... +48HR OAY 6 +IHR +3HR + 18HR .. Arf AIRs m* -— —00Mh4UNICATIONS CmRDINJ >~~=~==”’” .% ..cs — ACTIVITY FLOW .

Ready for short notice deployment. authorities and other federal agencies. Inspect response force equipment to ensure it is: d. departure of incumbent. i. 4. Proposed response force equipment is appropriate and adequate for the mission. or remote sites. Review accident response plans to ensure: h. Verify readiness through periodic response force f. Trained personnel are assigned to key positions. 3.52-M APPENDIX 1-A RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST 1. Recommended guidance for involving civil offi. g. Response force personnel roster is current. release of information. 1 -A-1 . b. Procedures/authority are addressed for public a. Reception plans for support teams are adequate. cials/ authorities. Potential assistance is identified from civil officials/ field and command post exercises. identified. Notification procedures and telephone numbers are b. a. j. e. Personnel/equipment deployment plans are current Replacements are appointed and trained promptly upon and functional. Actions required upon arrival on-scene are correct. c. . DoD 51 OO. 2. Procedures exist for establishing communications from on-base: off-base. Fully serviceable/operable.

if available for the accident. Coordinate communications procedures with home equipment. Contact authorities on-scene. if appropriate. if necessary. 3. Obtain weather data at time of accident and weather 13. Recall response force personnel and assemble 8. Ensure other agencies are aware of response force forecast for accident site. 2. for 9. if possible. 6. logistics support. 5.52-M APPENDIX 1-B INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST 1.I . Request ARAC plot. Dispatch advance party. 12. 10. additional information. Review accident notification message (OPREP-3). Augment response force. DoD 51 OO. base/station. 4. Ensure proper travel route is established and obtain security escort. I-B. 7. Provide advice on possible hazards to on-scene officials. Ensure arrangements are being made for required as appropriate. and OSC’S status. Assess situation. 11.

Determine actions to treat. Establish liaison with Host Nation through Chief Service operations center. identify. 8. Secure airspace (that is. or other hazards. 9. (Notify NMCC immediately). and evacuate (7) Department of Energy Accident Response casualties. Keep the Service operations centers and/or National toxic. Determine the status and location of all weapons. If contamination is present: reception center for follow-on forces. Advise medical treatment facilities receiving 14. Prepare appropriate press releases with Service and Station Assets or other appropriate communication DoD Directives. if necessary. Advise the NMCC of the TELEFAX phone number d. Determine if contamination has been released. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Determine actual weather conditions at the accident if possible. Identify civil and military forces present and their (5) Air Force Air Transportable Radiac Assistance capabilities.rnent. possible. Establish a continuous and secure communications c. Support Ele. b. Identify and record names. with DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center or NMCC in 11. Establish a command post: (3) Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (4) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team a. Joint Communications addition to the Service operation center. c. site. for ARAC plot delivery. Reduce any immediate hazards (such as fires). Package (6) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team b. radiological.52-M APPENDIX 1-C RESPONSE FORCE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS CHECKLIST 1. of Mission. if toll free number for information request. Military Command Center informed of conditions at the accident scene. Establish control of the accident site to: and advise them of any possible hazards and precautions. link with the military communications system. Group c. (1) Army Radiological Control Team ~6. 13. addresses. 10. 7. d. accident site) with assistance of the Federal Aviation Authority or host country. Request HAMMER ACE. 4. using secure means when possible. systems. DoD 51OO. Identify a forward operating or staging base and 5. dent. a. Establish direct communications with the Office of 12. Establish internal and external communications. Seek the assistance of civilian authorities/officials 2. and locations e. Joint Communications Contingency 3. Protect personnel from explosive. b. prohibited area over casualties the type of actual or possible contamination. f. a. of persons possibly contaminated. Safeguard classified material. 1 -c-1 . Through NMCC recommend deployment to the scene of the specialized teams from the appropriate 15. Place air samplers up and downwind of the acci. I%form emergency render safe procedures on (2) Navy Radiological Control Team weapons if necessary.

Embassy and involved host government.alth program for any civilian personnel who may have internal contamination. by establishing a 20. Establish a claims processing facility. Establish liaison with the FRC. at the accident site. Document actions taken and ensure that evidence 9. Establish the approximate perimeter of the contam. of all on-site activities which could impact off-site and establish continuing 8. Perform render safe procedures on weapon(s). include the appropriate packaging requirements if required.52-M APPENDIX 1-D RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON-SCENE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL PERMIT 1. or local and/or affected country govern. Initiate systematic search to re-establish accounta- Federal. 17. Initiate surveys and determine extent of contam. 12. ’22. Establish a Joint Hazard Evaluation Center to appropriate disposal areas. Conduct weapon(s) damage assessment. 11. toxic. For overseas authorities/ officials. if requested. Control exposure of public/ response force personnel to contamination. ment public affairs. DoD 51 OO. Initiate actions to use supporting response force requirements. Establish a National Defense Area. 5. Provide advice to civil authorities or affected country is retained for an accident investigation board. 14. materials have been removed). 21. FRMAC. 3. prevention program. Determine availability of assets and facilities at or ination area. bility for all the weapon(s) and weapon(s) components. Direct activities of a JIC to interfam with DoS. Establish the Community Emergency Action Team 10. to contamination. Transport/ship weapon(s) and components to 4. government officials. legal. and law enforcement accidents. and civil 16. to Area” in coordination with affected country officials. 7. or other hazard safety measures and radiological monitoring and health physics 15. near the scene of the accident. (CEAT). (Dissolve the designated area and return consistent with final disposition/ disposal requirements control to civil authorities/officials after all classified of the weapon(s). Establish a standardized access control system. as ination. Establish an environmental exposure injury matters in supporting on-site operations. or “Security in conjunction and coordination with DoE ARG. Inform the Senior FEMA official or foreign nation police and public health officials. 2. state. 19. Consider applying fixatives to highly contaminated lar program for response forces and people stationed areas to reduce resuspension. . upon arrival. required. Identify individuals who may have been exposed liaison. this facility will be in coordination with the agencies. 13. coordinate explosive. Establish a simi. radiological h. l-D-l . 6.. government specialists. Develop and implement a weapons recovery plan. Coordinate actions with local/host 18.

2. Consider transition of Federal responsibility for the disestablishment of the NDA and site restoration. logistic support (including that needed by DoE response organizations). Conduct decontamination operations. 18. to support long term operations and.S. Conduct environmental impact assessments. 3. as required. Be prepared to coordinate such actions with a representative of the 15. DoD 51 OO. Ensure protection of U. FEMA. 10. Provide required medical. administrative. and 21. technically achievable and financially acceptable. 1-E. Government property. requirements of all response organizations. This monitoring will be defined 4. Assess levels of public understanding and identjfy/ 13. 17. Request a Service Project Code for fund cites. and 11. 22. to minimize radiation exposure to radiation workers. 19. Coordinate communications assets and frequency by restoration agreements. 8. Counter potential terrorist and/ or radical group 5. 7. Ensure actions are taken to begin preparations of Coordinate with State and local officials through a draft site restoration strategy. if required.I . possible transfer of responsibility for the Joint Information Center to the SFO. Request frequency clearances. Restore contaminated area to a condition that is respond to concerns about nuclear issues. 12. who is responsible for coordinating and managing telecommunications 16. Coordinate site restoration planning/action with FRMAC. restoration radiation monitoring and assessment with site restoration plans. Establish personnel replacement /rotation program 6. as appropriate. . Instruction for use by alI response organizations. National Communications System. Establish coordination with Service and National Transportation Safety Board accident investigation 14. Establish channels for coordination of technical legal matters with higher headquarters and principal legal advisors of other participating Federal departments and 20. military organizations and/ or involved host government officials. 9. Coordinate environment protection plans for post- teams. Obtain ad~itional communications assets. Provide necessary operational security. support for Federal agencies during a radiological emergency. FEMA. responsible state civil authorities. Discuss with the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) the agencies andl or involved country officials. Publish a Communications-Electronics Operating activities or intelligence collection efforts. Debrief personnel with access to classified information.52-M APPENDIX 1-E SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION 1.

for ground measurement. Concentration and Isotope. will occur a radioactive material is related directly to the amount “years later. the units are microcuries dissipates and settles from the air as it moves downwind. present a significant external radiation hazard. Any radioactive material will emit a known amount of radiation per unit time. is highest during the initial period following the accident when a substantial quantity of contamination is airborne. exposure time is not a critical materials are not absorbed appreciably across the lining factor in nuclear weapon accident response when no of the gastrointestinal tract. Ingestion of radioactive fissile material (for example. radiation levels will concentration and isotope. DoD 51 OO. involved would normally be required for external radiation to in the accident or at the accident site initially.52-M APPENDIX 1-F RADIATION HAZARDS AND BASIC RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES l-F-l RADIATION HAZARDS l-F-2 RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES Four basic radiation protection principles involve a. The exposure rate from probability that delayed effects. Do not delay or omit life or limb-saving measures because of radiation or contamination to keep low the a. If a expressed in units depending upon the medium the weapon’s high explosives detonate. time. The primary radiation threat in a weapon accident is from greatest hazard from inhalation occurs immediately after inhalation. such as cancer. and shielding. The primary pathway for introduction of alpha. With no nuclear detonation. For the type and c. contamination may be carried into (Bq/ mj). the explosion can radioactive material is in. square meter (Bq/mZ). per cubic meter @Ci/ mj) or becquerels per cubic meter If a weapon burns. The emitting radiological contamination is inhalation. In either case. or quantity of the material present. These four factors are interrelated. those responding always deposited in the lungs through inhalation over a period should be aware that administration of first aid for of time. The greatest potential for accident. Exposure time to the radioactive materials EOD personnel and associated workers may suffer present at a nuclear weapon accident is related to a health injuries within the contaminated area. The rate at which contamination maybe inhaled serious injuries is of primary importance. For the types of radioactive materials present at nuclear weapons accidents. distance. l-F-l . the total quantity present normally does not b. be too low to cause immediate (acute) biological effects. b. If no airborne contamination exists. Radioactive contamination can be introduced into quantities of radiation present at a nuclear weapon the body through wounds. responding be a hazard. When responding hazard primarily through the amount of material to an accident involving injury. Time. for the measure create a cloud of contamination which gradually of radioactive material in air. the remaining inhalation hazard from and must be converted to definitive units such as resuspension of “radioactive particles is significantly pCi/ mz or Bq/ m2 for meaningful comparison. Field measurements of quantity once the explosion and/ or fire is over and the resulting are normally expressed in instrument-dependent units contamination has settled or dispersed (approximately of counts per minute (CPM) or counts per second (CPS) two/ three hours). or if respiratory plutonium or uranium) is a minimal problem. exposure to the material for months or years contamination of wounds involves personnel. beta/ gamma emitters are present. d. the units are the air by the smoke and thermal currents from the microcuries per square meter @Ci/ mz) or becquerels per fire and again be dispersed by the wind. reduced. since these protection is being worn. for example. Quantity of radioactive material will be an accident when contamination is released.

The protective principle of distance. inches of lead to be stopped. Alpha particles. will travel about two primary type of radiation dispersed fo[lowing a nuclear to three centimeters in air from its source. where particles. while gamma emissions may require several problem in a nuclear weapon accident). or cotton distance (if the distance doubles the intensity is reduced clothing. applies primarily to gamma radiation of skin. ination of underlying clothing or the body will provide d. will not be a significant radiation protection factor. emissions of primary concern in a nuclear radiation intensity varies inversely with the square of the weapon accident. Shielding. distance weapon accident. l-F-2 “ . Beta emissions can be stopped by a sheet of (not normally a significant part of the radiological aluminum. c. can be stopped by paper. The emissions will not penetrate the outer layer by a factor of four). any light clothing or gloves used to prevent contam- Note: The source material could travel long distances. Assuming there is no nuclear yield. hence. Alpha emitters are the the primary radiological prob~em. Shielding results from the ability of a protection automatically from this type of external material to attenuate or stop radiation. Distance. The alpha radiation.

Operations Center Commercial 202-647-1512 1-G.. Army Operations Center (AOC) AUTOVON 227-0218 Commercial 703-697-0218 U.S. DoD 51 OO.52-M APPENDIX 1-G QUICK REFERENCE EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) National Military Command Center (NMCC) AUTOVON 227-6340 Commercial 703-697-6340 Crisis Coordination Center AUTOVON 364-9320 Commercial 202-769-9320 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVON 221-2102 Center (DoD-JNACC) Commercial 703-325-2102 U. Navy Command Center AUTOVON 225-0231 Commercial 703-695-023 I U. Air Force Operations Center (AFOC) AUTOVON 227-6103 Commercial 703-697-6103 U.S.S. Marine Corps Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7366 Commercial 703-695-7366 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) AUTOVON 227-5131 Commercial 703-697-5131 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) HQ DoE Emergency Operation Center Commercial 202-586-8100 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVON 245-4667 Center (DoE-JNACC) Commercial 505-845-4667 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Commercial 703-557-2380 Training Site (REAC/TS) FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Emergency Information and Coordination AUTOVON 544-7721 / 7720 Center (EICC) Commercial 202-646-2400 National Emergency Coordinating Center (NECC) AUTOVON 380-6100 Commercial 202-898-6100 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS) .S.I .

Service response (USD(P)) shall activate the Crisis Coordination Center forces and On-Scene Commanders will be exercised. of State and (3) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and local governments.8. including nuclear weapons. To fulfill these responsibil. storage. responsibility for responding to an accident involving radioactive materiais. fund. [ATSD(AE)) in the acquisition and dissemination of and logistical support (including communications and information about the accident. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (b) Provide available administrative. (4) The Secretary of the Military Department or 2-3 RESPONSIBILITIES Commander of Unified Commands having primary responsibility for DoD response to an accident shall: DoD Directive 5100. responsibility shall rest (JNACC) and interface requirements as stated in the with the Secretary of the Department or Theater Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan Commander in Chief having custody of the radioactive (FRERP).. Principals regarding weapons composition. including the management respon. the statutory responsibilities of various Federal agencies. nuclear weapon owners or custodians. (a) Establish policy and exercise staff and transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear coordination for DoD radiological response and weapon components in DoD custody. if required. and exercise a flag of a nuclear accident or significant incident. the command and control responsibilities of Directive 5200. outlines respon- sibilities for on-site command and control at the scene (a) Establish. and the sovereignty of foreign Commanders of Unified Commands shall have primary governments concerning accidents on their territory. assembly. DoD 51 OO. and the responsibilities (b) When the accident occurs beyond the of the Joint J Nticlear Accident Coordinating Center boundaries of DoD installations. responsibility shall rest DoD organizations. including ships at sea. reference (e).52. reference (d). Inherent in this assistance matters in furtherance of the responsibilities responsibility is the requirement to protect personnel assigned by DoD Directive 5148. and provide required support to the a minimum. On-Scene Commanders (OSC)S. maintenance.2. and technical capabilities of the various Federal DoD response policy recognizes the response roles of response elements. military transportation) and other . as follows: 2-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (a) When the accident occurs on a DoD instal- This chapter describes the responsibilities of various lation. medical. every other year. and property from any health or safety hazards which (b) In the event of a nuclear. character- ities. available radiological 2-1 . with the Secretary of the Department or Theater sibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the military Commander in Chief concerned in accordance with DoD Services. nuclear weapon accident response organizations. the DoD has issued policy guidance and plans istics. The system. maintain. as (CCC). and safety features. as follows: rank On-Scene Commander and Service Response Force(s) to manage all actions required to recover from (1) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) the effects of a radiological accident. safe handling.52-M CHAPTER 2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2-1 GENERAL (2) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (ASTD(AE)) shall: The Department of Defense (DoD) is charged with the security. interdepartmental responsi- requiring the development of well-trained and equipped bilities and the Federal radiological emergency response .accident. reference (a). serve as could ensue from an accident or significant incident technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and OSD involving nuclear weapons. reference (c). materials at the time of the occurrence.

(6) The Secretary of the Navy shall provide a (a) Ensure that accidents and significant inci- representative to the Federal Radiological Coordinating dents involving radioactive materials are reported in Committees and joint working groups to address naval accordance with reference (i). reactor considerations and develop planning guidance in coordination with the other Military Departments (b) Ensure that all public information concerning for dealing with accidents involving DoD mobile accidents involving radioactive materials and DoD reactors. facilities. through the released in accordance with DoD Directive 5230. personnel. and the FRERP. property.1. reference (a).19. or Commander in dealing with technical aspects of a nuclear possessions. If PL 93-288. as amended. shall become the DoD Executive Agent for military support to civilian authorities through (10) The Heads of DoD Componentsshall: FEMA in accordance with reference (h). creating additional personnel. ing Center (JNACC) in coordination with the DoE. by. reference (g). keep the OSD CCC staff radioactive materials not in DoD custody without informed of the radiological accident response. as set forth in 5100. or funding (d) Through the overseas theater commander. the assistance provided. in accordance with enclosure 3 to DoD (a) Operate a Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinat- Directive 4000. reimburse other DoD Com- radiological accidents within the respective theater. accidents. (b) Make notification of radiological accidents (d) Provide radiological assistance within exist- and significant incidents as stated in DoD Directive ing capabilities to DoE or FEMA. Defense Nuclear Agency. ponents for incurred costs for requested radiological (e) Assemble a Joint Nuclear Accident Response assistance that are not included in their normal operating Team (JNAIRT) as appropriate to accomplish tasks expenses and that are directly chargeable to. is involved. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on procedures for response to accidents involving nuclear weapons. provide the command and control for response to (e) Upon request. and caused listed above. equipment.16. reference (l).response resources to the DoE and other Federal (9) The Director. its territories. shall plan for and which authorizes the OSC to confirm the presence of provide Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) nuclear weapons. 2-2 . in the event of an accident involving (c) Through the NMCC. be responsible for and teams that can be used for response to accidents implementing the DoD response to radiological involving radioactive materials. response organizations. Military Airlift Command (MAC). references (b) and support for deployment of DoD and interdepartmental (c). (5) The Secretary of the Army.52. reference (c). Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). accident or incident. or other resources is (7) The Secretary of the Air Force. reference (h). (c) Ensure that the JNACC is advised of all (8) The Chairman. requirements. (c) Coordinate all military support requirements to civilian authorities with FEMA for domestic accidents (b) Develop and maintain a deployable (techni- or through the Department of State for accidents cal) advisory team than can assist the DoD On-Scene occurring outside the United States. Provide the JNACC with information necessary to maintain current records (a) In coordination with the Theater Commands reflecting the location and capability of specialized units and appropriate Defense Agencies. accidents involving radioactive materials and requests shall: for radiological assistance. reference (f). coordination shall be handled in accordance (c) Serve as an advisor to the ATSD(AE) and with DoD Directive 3025. shall: response organizations supporting a non-DoD radio- logical accident. upon Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency under (d) Provide liaison to the JNAIRT and CCC.

packaging. b. The DoE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) will be a part of the ARG. but do (6) Discussing with State. when required. (4) Collecting. and dispos. This chapter provides an overview of Federal. The ARG includes a Senior Scientific Advisor who Group (ARG) as its primary accident response element. or in response to (EOD) teams in weapon render safe and recovery a request for assistance. to the OSC in: interagency agreements. The DoE has established an Accident Response f. A of Defense (DoD) have roles in a nuclear weapon definition of on-site is found in the GLOSSARY. some agencies have no specific response roles. local. Other DoE assets. DoD 51 OO. for example. The ARG will be headed by the DoE Team Leader a. and the and local government agency responsibilities. to best meet the accident or incident situation. Operations Office and is comprised of scientists. and equipment g. handling. Conversely. The ARG provides technical advice and assistance ment may be as a direct result of their responsibilities. government officials matters of special DoE competence. crisis managers. obtained. the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).52-M CHAPTER 3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES 3-1 GENERAL c. capabilities. accident. and will (2) Advise the DoD OSC of DoE response be coordinated with the DoE Joint Nuclear Accident capabilities available at the scene or which may be Coordinating Center (JNACC). other weapons associated hazards. procedures. 3-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY e. (1) Supporting Explosive Ordinance Disposal bilateral agreements. Their involve. accident response. technical specialists. and resulting radioactive material. and mitigating radioactive and Center (JHEC) for the OSC. The DoE and FEMA have numerous (5) Identifying and protecting nuclear weapon nuclear weapon accident responsibilities. weapon debris. Regional Coordinating Offices responding to a nuclear 3-1 . particularly in weapons and radiological hazards. Albuquerque weapons and radiological health and safety matters. d.. theater policy. The DoE is responsible for dispatching appropriate who will: DoE response elements. The (1) Coordinate the activities of all DoE response specific elements%d equipment will be tailored by DoE elements. The ARG will advise and assist the DoD On- Scene Commander (OSC) through the DoE Team h. will provide technical advice and assistance regarding The ARG is managed by the Manager. (2) Determining the extent of any on-site hazards. to the scene of a DoD or DoE nuclear weapon accident or incident. the ARG provides technical support to the DoD and will support all needs Several agencies/ organizations outside the Department and policies of the DoD OSC for on-site activities. identifying. The ARG provides one or more experienced “ Leader in weapon recovery operations and in evaluating. individual to help manage the Joint Hazard Evaluation collecting. State. or foreign country have capabilities useful to response organizations. (3) Minimizing hazards to on-site workers and the 3-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE public. design information and other restricted data. The ARG provides liaison to the Joint Information ready for short notice dispatch to the scene of a nuclear Center (JIC). Each agency ’s/organization’s responsibilities are situation dependent. reference (c). ing of weapon components. (7) Explaining public affairs matters. While at a DoD accident. the Aerial Measurement System (AMS). on request. “ i.

S. and from the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) local authorities. The SFO will establish a Federal Response Center ment diplomatic actions responding to a nuclear weapon (FRC) at a location either pre-selected with the State(s) accident / incident and will direct the activities of the U. political (1) Support the DoE ARG through the DoE Team interests.S. Activities at the scene DoE ARG. and/or causing an Nevada. of the accident include coordinating requests from State and local governments for assistance from Federal 3-4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS) agencies. FEMA will dispatch the SFO and an Emergency Chief of Mission (COM) who will be the focal point Response Team (ERT) to the scene of a nuclear weapon for diplomatic and ‘political decisions of the U. its territories. response/recovery the situation. at a location identified in conjunction with the State. This FEMA role is Us. State. a. the COM States shall: and USCINC will consult regarding military operations in view of their potential impact on U. Joint Chiefs of Staff. S. tions and volunteer agencies. (2) Has the overall responsibility for U.S. as directed by the Director. Nevada Operations Office. NEST assets may be included as a part of the effect into Canada or Mexico. engineers. (3) Shares with the Unified Commander the The FRC will be located near the accident scene.. at a minimum. and decontamination. hazard prediction. (f) Will be the senior U. (3) Represent the DoE. State. The NEST has special equipment for conducting radiation searches and When the F’RERP is implemented. if requested. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).S. local. reference (c). From the onset of the accident/incident. government official in an administrative officer. response to a nuclear weapon(s) accident outside implemented by a Senior FEMA Official (SFO).. The NEST is a DoE team of scientists.S.S. in joint messages which will include as action addressees (2) Provide technical advice and assistance to the the White House. Also. Each Federal agency at the scene is with augmentation required by the situation. or possessions. c. to avoid restrictions on access by those responsibilities. the COM will be assisted by a team representatives from other Federal agencies. damage mitiga. bomb/ for coordinating response actions among Federal weapon diagnostics. In addition to the SFO. b. In the host country. the U. S. the ERT consists of a deputy SFO (DSFO). and others as required by with whom he will coordinate U. accident or incident when the accident has an effect government. to agencies as agreed in existing plans or at the time of the accident. Headquarters DoE be relayed immediately to Washington for resolution Operational Emergency Management Team (OEMT). Liaison represented in the FRC. the are mutually supportive and coordinated with the on- D& exercises diplomatic and political control of the site actions of DoD and DoE. and county government emergency response Defense. responsibiIities rest specifically with the U. Secretary of State. FEMA is responsible detection. Las Vegas. field communications. and Chairman. j. U. if first on the scene. govern. its territories and possessions. The COM: outside of DoD or DoE facility boundaries. The NEST is managed by governments during a nuclear weapon accident in the the Manager. The FRC may also have officers from the embassy will be provided to assist the representation from State emergency services organiza- OSC and the MC. and technicians trained and organized to provide rapid 3-5 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT technical assistance in locating nuclear weapons or AGENCY (FEMA) special nuclear material. Any differences not resolved in theater will Leader. The DoS activates an accident/incident task force (4) Initiate monitoring off-site as outlined in the in the Operations Center and provides liaison officers FRERP. with forces through the DoE Team Leader. actions. a communication with officials of the government involved public information officer. but responsibility for resolution of the situation.weapon accident or significant incident in the United b. a communications officer. Secretary of State. The Service Response 3-2 . until the DoE Team Leader arrives. In fulfilling outside the NDA. and local officials Under the direction of the Secretary of State. agencies and assistance requests from State and local tion. FEMA ensures that off-site actions and response activities of Federal.S. information copies to other concerned parties. EOD support. and DoD or established at the time of the emergency embassy and its constituent posts.

a radiological emergency. (5) Assistance. Assist State and local officials. conducted in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 3-3 . accident include the following areas: n. or e. radioactive material. local schools. e. Provide advise to State and local officials regarding and projected radiation doses which warrant usage of the disposition of livestock and poultry contaminated such drugs. The Center for Devices and Radiological Health distribution of food through the wholesale level during ~CDRH) is responsible for radiological health activities . and other government officials. in tation of protective measures to minimize exposure by developing technical recommendations for State and contaminated food ingestion. grams if legally adaptable to radiological emergencies. j. f. o. officially designated disaster areas when a threshold of need is determined by State and Federal officials and 3-7 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN the commercial food system is sufficient to accommodate SERVICES (HHS) food coupons. ensuring that food and animal feeds are safe for g. as requested. in coordination with USDA. HHS and EPA. by radioactive material. Assess damage to agricultural resources. d. d. The SFO will supply coordinated information on 1. Assist in reallocation of USDA donated food the Federal response to the State and/or local supplies from warehouses. normal after a radiological emergency. Provide emergency food coupon assistance in for evacuees. storage. Provide for the procurement of food. poultry and poultry products. Provide listings of locations of alternate sources of livestock feed. These are foods donated to various outlets through USDA food programs administered by the Food and Nutrition 3-6 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA) Service. (1) Guidance to State and local governments on the use of radio-protective substances. in assessing the consequences of radiological accidents on the health of persons in the affected area. (4) Resources. and b. radiation effects. and/ or coordinate information exchange. processing. Assist in coordinating with HHS and EPA. products. Provide assistance through regular USDA pro- Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The SFO or DSFO will provide a liaison represen. The functions and capabilities of the USDA to provide m. (2) Advice to medical care personnel regarding proper medical treatment of people exposed to.Force (SRF) should assign a liaison officer to the FRC i. including dosage. outlets to emergency food centers. The HHS can provide: c. in developing and evaluating protective action food processors and distributors to aid in returning to recommendations. k. and egg (3) Advice and guidance to State and local officials products identified for interstate commerce. in the recommendation and implemen. in coordination with consumption. minimizing losses to agricultural resources from tative to the OSC. Assist DoE at the FRMAC in collecting agricul- tural samples within the 50-mile Ingestion Pathway a. The SFO or DSFO will assist the OSC. Provide information and assistance to farmers. in conjunction with the USDA. local officials regarding protective measures for food and animal feeds. a. Provide advice to State and local officials on c. in the emergency production. Ensure the wholesomeness of meat and meat contaminated by. h. Assist in providing available temporary housing b. Provide a liaison to State agricultural agencies to radiological assistance in the event of a nuclear weapon keep State and local officials informed of Federal efforts.

including fish and (2) Provide current and forecast meteorological wildlife. istration (NOAA) is the primary agent within DoC responsible for providing radiological emergency assistance to Federal. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). precipitation. DoI is responsible for these lands and facilities when threatened by a radiological emergency. to Federal. and local government Associate Administrator for Air Traffic and Airway offices in controlling and resolving a radiological Facilities coordinates all FAA crisis management emergency. the National accident will be limited primarily to arranging special Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service transportation activities and assistance in contacting (NESDIS). (2) Disseminating weather and emergency informa- tion via NOAA Weather Radio. State. DoC response functions for accidents involving authorities and operates DoI water resource projects to nuclear weapons are: protect municipal and agricultural water supplies in cases of radiological emergencies. (1) Estimate the damage to industrial resources and recommend measures to deal with problems of the b. regional and field-level contingency plans. arrange for supplemental meteorological measurements. a. upon request. these offices take collective action to focus DoC resources and b. its jurisdiction or resources. NOAA’s main responsibilities include: functions. contamination. State. The FDA prescribes contamination levels for canned and/ or packaged foods} a. air traffic in and around the (1) Acquiring weather data and providing weather affected area. In 3-8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DoC) addition. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. The 3-10 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Weather Service (NWS) is the focal point for (DoT) radiological emergency coordination. the National Marine Fisheries Service consignors and consignees of shipments to or from the (NMFS). (3) Provide a representative to both the on-site and (2) Respond to requests for assistance from the off-site radiological monitoring agencies to coordinate Cognizant Federal Agency. and theO@ce of Oceanic and Atmospheric accident. and advise on the actions required for 3-4 . DoT participation during a nuclear weapon (NOS) and Coastal Zone Management. and local organizations. evaluate the extent of the of radiological materials. (3) Cooperate with relevant Federal. boundary request. forecasts in connection with the emergency. and State and local meteorological and hydrological information and to officials to the extent its mission and resources allow. SFO. State. 3-11 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (3) Assisting the FDA in assessing the safety of (EPA) marine fishery products from radiological contam- ination. The expertise to assist Federal.and provides the major source of radiation expertise 3-9 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (DoI) within the Public Health Service. It is DoI policy to: layer mixing. DoI provides advice and assistance concerning industrial sector. low-level for radiological assistance. DoI manages over 500 million acres of Federal materials. and other meteorological and available consists of monitoring teams to measure hydrological factors affecting the transport or dispersion environmental radiation. The FAA~s principal nuclear accident function is to direct. DoI coordinates emergency plans for DoI- managed park and recreation areas with State and local a. and local radiological response authorities and coordinate b. precipitation. lands and thousands of Federal natural resource facilities. Research (OAR). In an actual emergency. and local governments upon information about wind direction and speed. State. hydrologic and natural resources. The radiological assistance stability. The NWS maintains coordination with the National Ocean Service a. and any other meteorological and hydrological parameters affecting radiological (1) Respond to incidents that affect or may affect contamination. The Office of Radiation Programs of the EPA has (4) Providing current and forecast meteorological responsibility for coordinating EPA response to requests information about wind speed and direction.

The NRC provides this information to the Service directives. The EPA has radiological assistance teams located for downed NASA spacecraft which may carry nuclear in Montgomery. for coordinating the intermediate and long term radiological monitoring function at a mutually agreed 3-15 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION upon time with DoE. safety. The OSC will DEVELOPMENT (HUD) assist the State in ensuring that the public is protected. The EPA has the responsibility available resources. Also. Off-site authority and responsibility at a nuclear weapon Specifically. facilities. The Host Nation retains Sovereignty over its soil and HUD provides information on available housing/shelter the responsibility for the health.S. Alabama and Las Vegas. Each team planning for and placing homeless victims by providing can collect samples for subsequent processing and emergency housing and technical support staff within analysis at its laboratory. The Director of Criteria and Standards of EPA GSA provides service. will revert to State control upon transportation of people and property.protection of the public health and safety. EPA has prescribed guidelines for monitoring radioactive contamination of drinking water and 3-16 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE exposures to the general population from nuclear ADMINISTRATION (NASA) activities. Under the under Federal control by the establishment of NDA or coordinating authority of the Secretary of Trans. the ICC establishes the priorities for all surface property and materials. The OSC should make provisions to appropriate State and local agencies. The State governor is responsible for the health. NSA to protect U. the ICC establishes priorities and expedites accident rests with State and local officials. Nevada. disestablishment of the NDA or NSA. the NRC assist and support the accident investigation to the has radiological monitoring equipment and mobile maximum extent that public safety and weapon(s) radiological laboratories to assist in the analysis of recovery permits. is responsible for establishing radiation levels to protect and equipment within available resources. environmental contamination and has public informa- tion personnel and technical experts who can be used 3-13 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION to assist in public information efforts. and welfare of for disaster victims or displaced persons and assists in its citizens. It is emergency surface transportation of people and property important to recognize that land placed temporarily to or from areas impacted by the accident. a military accident its potential on and off-site effects on public health and investigation will be conducted in accordance with safety. Government material or classified portation. 3-12 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 3-17 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BOARD (NTSB) (NRC) The NTSB is responsible for transportation safety and The NRC provides personnel who can quickly assess may conduct or assist in an investigation of the accident the nature and extent of the radiological emergency and and issue a report. 3-5 . In any case. administrative supplies. the general public and to provide guidance for Federal agencies. and welfare df individuals within the territorial limits of the State 3-14 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN during periods of emergency or crisis. safety. NASA coordinates the response and recovery operations c. (ICC) 3-18 STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT/ The ICC assists in arranging for or expediting emergency HOST NATION transportation of people or property moving interstate or of foreign commerce to or from distressed areas. materials. (GSA) b.

Safeguard classified material. affected by a nuclear weapon accident/ IRF and SRF OSC’S though they vary in scope and incident. 4. The Senior FEMA official (SFO) coordinates requests for Federal a. manning. capabilities. NSA or a a nuclear weapon accident response are similar for the Security Area. uses local authorities to restrict people from the ire-mediate area of the accident for their protection and the safeguarding of weapon systems. Civil authorities/officials have primary responsi. rests with the host country government. “On-site” is that area around a nuclear authorities/ officials providing response to any domestic weapon accident under the operational control of the emergency. Establish command and control. The Secretary of the Army will become the DoD Executive a. Command and control on-site at the scene of a Agent for providing additional military support (off- nuclear weapon accident rests with the agency in charge site) to the FCO as required. Specific actions taken by the respective response forces will vary because of differences in b.I . the Service or agency having custody of the weapon c. resources and coordinating DoD actions with civilian as appropriate. facility manager. subject to the military of the facility or geographic area where the accident missions and priorities of DoD.assistance at the assistance to ensure that assistance is provided. or Depart- ment of Energy Team Leader (at a DoE accident). When overseas. If the accident Force (IRF) and Service Response Force (SRF) at a occurs outside the US or its territories. 4-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS “Off-site” is defined as that area beyond the boundaries of a DoD/ military installation or DoE facility. Provide life saving/humanitarian. the IRF and SRF Federal assistance and assets through the Federal OSC’S are required to: Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). installation commander. and training between bility for command and control off-site and will request the IRF and SRF. S. this on. If the accident occurs outside these boundaries. For accidents/ incidents in the U. occurs. the NDA or NSA. although not equivalent to and their staffs. If an accident site. As a minimum. or 4-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE host government official. emergency. This area. reference (g). The discussions in this chapter are applicable agreement and will be referred in this document as a to the IRF and the SRF On-Scene Commanders (OSC) Security Area. Command and control for the Initial Response of responsibility the accident occurred. control at. organization and actions required during an accident site secure area should be defined in the host nation response. U. The responsibility for security and command and at the time of the accident has command and control. resources. Public Law 93-288. magnitude. its territories or possessions. including The basic requirements for command and control of the area beyond the boundary of a NDA. on-site includes any This chapter provides guidance on interagency relation- area established as a National Defense Area (NDA) or ships at the accident site suggested response force National Security Area (NSA). accident /incident involving nuclear weapons results in a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or ~ b. states the President will appoint a Federal Coordinating Office c. accidents/ incidents in a country outside the If the accident occurs outside the 48 contiguous states. DoD 51 OO..S. the Unified nuclear weapon accident involves directing DoD Commander will coordinate with the State Department. Department of Defense.52-M CHAPTER 4 MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENT RESPONSE 4-1 GENERAL (FCO) to coordinate the overall Federal response. responsibility for directing the US response shall rest with the Unified Commander in Chief in whose area d. On-Scene Commander (OSC).

determines if hazardous materials and/or radioactive coordination must be completed between civilian contamination are present. request that local material. Ensuring for security of classified material. He will usually coordinating. ships is at Figure 4-2. As a minimum. a base camp. 6. d. of a military and DoD civilian staff. reviewing. impact off-site. weapons recovery. advisors. tion and. Establishing direct communi- (2) The IRF performs the following functions: cations with the (OASD(PA)) or American Embassy/ rescue operations. When overseas. be provided by the U. integrated into the response force with a clear chain of command and that their capabilities are known by h. authorities establish a Security Area to provide a cordon (b) Establishing command and control. A Deputy OSC should be in grade of O- safety hazards. headquarter’s operation centers. 2 . which will possible hazards. and by specialized teams from other Services. and establishes procedures to control the by the SFO to the OSC. Service Response Force (SR~. ~ (e) Seeking the assistance and cooperation of a. and approving public informa- remain the OSC until relieved by the SRF OSC. The OSC e. response/ recovery operations. news releases. Embassy to the OSC. including: f. Overseas. A response force civilian authorities/ officials and advising them of the belonging to the nearest DoD activity/unit. and all cleared personnel on the SRF. take emergency response actions to establish command (f) Notifying civilian authorities/officials of the and control on-site pending arrival of the SRF. precautions and other measures required for the protection of public health and safety and potential (1) The IRF OSC will generally be an O-5 or O. representatives into the response force. control. Initiate public affairs procedures and establish (a) Safeguarding national security materials and direct communications with the Office of the Assistant information. Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)). The IRF initiates EOD procedures. A liaison officer will be provided spread. USCINC as appropriate. fug fighting. and frequency assignments allocated to all response teams. a liaison officer will exposure of personnel to contamination. (k) Coordinating with the accident investigation FEMA personnel andl or host country government board or team.S. Establishing a NDA or NSA. public affairs activities establish command. 6 and shall manage the information flow between the site. officials/ representatives as required. Overseas. be established with the NMCC and other levels of authority. and (h) Integrating civilian authorities/ officials/ communications. An illustration of (g) Establishing a public affairs program for a typical response force is at Figure 4-1. be present at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident (d) Assessing hazards involving public health and are: safety. and DoS. and protection of the that special teams arriving at the accident scene are public. safety and envir- officer appointed by the responsible Service/ UnKled onmental monitoring 4 . The SRF consists entry recommendations developed by the State. and if so. Establish an operations area. An example of the (1) Obtaining assets required to support SRF functional organization and interagency relation. Establish a NDA. as established by Service policy. The response force (j) Coordinating with the SFO and civilian may be augmented by DoE scientific and technical officials to develop a site restoration plan. The SRF OSC will be a flag/general rank radiafion health. accident site security. Communications must a contamination control area. Initial Response Force (IRF). Protect the public and mitigate public health and Command. Seek the assistance and cooperation of civilian is responsible for all SRF actions at the accident site authorities/ officials and advise them of possible hazards. 4-4 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS “ (c) Establishing priorities for response/ recovery Military and civilian response organizations which may efforts. requesting that local authorities establish a Security Area to provide a disaster cordon and security for classified g. (i) Assessing protective action measures and re- b. minimizes its authorities/ officials. (m) Establishing the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) and initiating an on-site hazard and (1) OSC.

.. . .. .. .’:.:’. . .. . .. ..... . . . ... . . . -.... .. ..~fifi~~ . -. — Command and Control ---.. .:.. T \‘ c1. . ... . .. ON-Scene . . . .. .. .. . .::.:..... ... ....... ... ... . .... .. . . w. ... .: . .-. .. .. ... J NYW ..... .. ... . W:. ... .... . .. .. .. ... . _.. ...’ .-....... ... .: n . ..... . ..:. . ~.... .y.... . ... . ..... . I Pubiic Affairs 1 ~d:j[ w 1 ~Z:~s fifi~~JiC .. .... ...’:.. ---- . :: ~ I .:’:. . ... .......... . . ~g@g”>HEc “.:... . ... .......::. .. . .... ... J.-. .. .: ~ M-’--. . .. . . O t h e r Federal ~ ~ State and .-. . .. .) .. . Commander :... .......:. . .. ..:. . Center Figure 4-1. . ....... .... . ...’... .... ... . . .. . ...... ..!. . . .:.. ----. ::::. .. n= 1 I Y 1 Medicai/Casuaity Communications ~. . . . . . ... .-..... .:’.. . ..... . . .... Control fi~~~. .. . . .. .. . . . . ...... . ...: . . ....... .. .. . . . .. ... ..%w.. . \ :. ....-. . . ... .. . ... .. .-.. . .: . . . . . .. . .W.....x”.:....+x. . .~ . . .i!ii .Coordination W&W%# fi~~:~ Functional :.... .....FRM4~.. Initial Response Force (Example).. . .: j Representatives I1. Local Agency :. ..}: . . .y.. Flrefightin9 ... . .x..:. ...... ..” . .. ... +. . ~ .

Service Response Force Functions and Interagency .Support ~j$jfi Functional f~jjjj$. Control :MY::::W: Center Figure 4-2. Chief of Staff I t 1 I 1 J ! L 1 i Messing/Billeting Public Affairs I ]~ JzE!Eia h I H EOD 1 Personnel/ Administration Transportation/POL Heavy Equipment Legal Meteorology DNAAT GC Engineering/Survey - Chaplain Y Medical 4 RAMT I Congressional Liaison — Command --.Coordination .

Upon dissolution of the NDA or NSA. DoE Accident Response Group (ARG). (o) Providing required medical. (1) Accident Investigation Boards. security. military installations).. The off-site areas. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Other Organizations senior civil and military officials. radiation medicine. State and local police. or through Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (.program. The SRF authorities. requirements. medical. Team (ERT) deployed by FEMA. When a team is deployed. including that needed by DoE in the response operations following an accident. In accident. A Service c. Members are responsible physics. Response force officials and the Embassy representative will assist in e. and legal areas. EOD.. When deployed. public upon request and can deploy as soon as transportation affairs. of individuals within the country. The FRC and the (4) For accidents/ incidents outside the U. legal to the OSC and include expertise in hazardous materials implications and site restoration. accident or incident. reference (c). request. firefighters. public affairs.g. At FEMA’s appropriate. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will ment. authorit-ies. (2) The ARG is responsible to the OSC for on. The FRC located near the accident scene OSC should provide essential information to state and will initially be manned by an Emergency Response local . and local authorities will become the controlling FEMA will establish a Federal Response Center (FRC) authority for any portion of the accident site not under at a location selected in cooperation with State and local Federal control (e. The response organizations. if appropriate. This team is available and radiological safety. the composition of the ARG. will be selected to meet the requirements of the dispatch investigation teams to the accident site. its DoD on-scene command post have similar functions and territories. More than one person may be required about the DNAAT should be directed to the DoD to keep the OSC apprised of all on-going hazardous JNACC. the ERT will include a General Services (n) Assisting the involved country government Administration (GSA) representative to assist the official/ representative in ensuring the health and safety response force in obtaining local services and supplies. and (1) The DNAAT assists an OSC and his or her staff administrative support. personnel will be coordinated through the DoD Joint it is responsible to the OSC. either directly. as support to the state and local agencies. the ARG will deploy a Commensurate with personnel and public safety. The FRC will be Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center concerned primarily with nonradiological off-site (FRMAC) and civilian authority response elements. S. the team is JHEC. and medical the event of an accident or significant incident affecting treatment personnel may be the first to respond. health (2) SRF Staff Members. Senior Scientific Advisor. including specialized equip. Chapter 20. becomes available. logistics. radiological control area which extends beyond the NDA or NSA. (2) The Services and the DoE maintain various teams with specialized training applicable to nuclear (1) Deployment of additional equipment and weapon accident response. Representatives from DoE. State and local authorities Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan establish control over any portion of the hazardous and (FRERP). In an off-installation site activities at a DoD nuclear weapon accident. Protocol officers should facilitate visits to the accident scene by f. Defense Nuclear Agency Accident Advisory Team implementing measures that satisfy host government (DNAAT). State d. the DoE Team Leader has specific IRF should coordinate directly with personnel from responsibilities and activities implemented through the State and local agencies. materials and radiological related activities. advisory team is composed of personnel knowledgeable in nuclear accident response requirements. Initially. serve as staff members to improve response force (2) Request for services or additional information effectiveness. DoE assets are required. These teams are discussed in DoD OSC. (3) State and Local Response. and specialists OSC should support the activities and administration/ to assess the situation and determine what additional documentation requirements of these teams. Off-site coordination will be with the Federal represent atives should be exchanged. and possessions: 4-5 . and the site restoration planning group should responsible to the OSC. and. The accident investigation board. the Team Leader.JNACC) and the the DoE Team Leader.

An immediate. or mechanical action. weapon/ components accident/ incident rests with the (a) Non-radiological hazardous materials may be host Government officials/ representatives. 4-6 . public involvement. Weapon(s) possessions. government. Early notification of actual accident weapon accident and other accidents should be associated hazards. of plutonium. Response can be divided into has fallen to the ground. and terrai~ all influence the extent to which contamination may be spread. solid or Iiquid missile propellants. that is. and of what can and is being done considered: to reduce the risk. confirm nor deny the presence of nucIear weapons or Figure 1-1. material. receipt of accident notification. Although DoD policy is to neither simplified notification plan is illustrated in Chapter 1. and specialized teams historically been of greatest concern to civil authorities alerted and prepared for immediate deployment. and commences long term actions to return the In locations outside the United States. threat to the safety of the nearby public may exist from ations center in accordance with JCS Pub 1-03. is a key issue in allaying” public concern. and SRF and assumes a “worst case” accident. the need for velocity and other meteorological conditions. (b) The radiological hazards released by the a nuclear weapon accident off a military installation with burning or high explosive detonation of a nuclear the spread of contamination. The long term carcinogenic effects of inhaled plutonium represents the greatest hazard to (1) Initial Phase. The materials would satisfy host government requirements. Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs accident. Response Phases. Command Center (NMCC) and/or the Service oper.6. the OSC and his staff must prepare to address nuclear weapons/components. the height extensive deployed communications support. actions to assess specific risk must immediate measures taken by the nearest DoE or DoD be promptly initiated. radiological hazard may be disproportionately larger humanitarian support and assistance.16. Included in this phase are those the general public. Public perception of the installation to provide a U. point to the host government. through the American Embassy. Aerosolized hazardous materials could be force staff or the Embassy to implement measures to released and dispersed downwind. A high explosive detonation could disperse tives will ensure the health and safety of individuals hazardous materials several hundred meters around an within the country and will be assisted by the response accident site. or high (b) The host government officials/ representa- explosives. and deployment of a response force. prior to exercising the exceptions (reference: DoD Directive b. and of the cloud or plume containing the radioactive complex site restoration problems. they assess the accident situation. oxidizers.. during the follow. and possibly tntium. recovered and protected. components at a specific location. its territories and environment to an acceptable condition. the OSC must have the approval of the recovery and site restoration are the primary objectives appropriate Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and host of this phase. such confirmation (2) Follow-on Phase. The Amer- released due to weapon system damage. The problem ican Embassy provides the diplomatic and political focal may consist of variom hazardous materials. Response Considerations. Media interest and public scrutiny will be (1) Classified Material. it may be resuspended by wind two phases. classified materials must those public concerns related to nuclear accidents as be located. In accidents involving inten>e. As the OSC assesses the 5230. safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. continues those actions initiated by the IRF. government presence. The SRF. and designation than the actual hazard. the following differences between a nuclear Guidance). but temporary. Accidents will be expeditiously reported directly to the National Military (3) Public Affairs. the appropriate IRF and However. The toxic materials may 4-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS present a serious hazard to the general public and require immediate and effective reaction by public affairs The concept of operations presents actions of the IRF personnel to allay public apprehension. or removal.S. Upon toxic or explosive hazards associated with the accident. Wind extensive logistic support requirements. After the contaminant a. Also the concept presents weapon or weapon components may consist of isotopes difficult weapon recovery problems. uranium. remain in the area unless diffused by aeration. for example. (a) On and off-site authority for a nuclear (2) Contamination. A and the general public. shall be made either when required to protect public on phase. the less immediate radiological hazard has SRF will be identi~e@and tasked. neutralization.

Among the various agen. focal point of command and control as the accident (3) Casualty Identification and Treatment. these officials should be advised. (b) Communications. (4) Assessment. as appropriate. c. Radiological hazards and and local and /or involved country agencies responding possible actions to minimize hazards are discussed in to the accident is essential to command and control. Situation reporting according to be made with civilian officials to inform the public of Service/ agency directives should be initiated as soon as protective action measures to minimize undesirable possible. situation. and (n). The OSC must establish or between the accident site. officials at hospitals and clinics to which casualties are evacuated should be notified of (a) The CP may be located within the NDA or the possibility of radioactive contamination so that NSA. All safety precau- of the actions required: tions should be taken including electromagnetic radiation (EMR) restrictions. Determination and reporting of whether contamination tions center in a restricted area to simplify the protection was released is of highest priority. A Joint Information Center (JIC) must be established and public (2) Fire Suppression. Navy SWOP 20-11. SRF. and with Federal. The FRC and CP will exchange the extent of the hazard(s). of command and control during the transition from IRF to SRF. Casualty operations and require relocating the CP. The following paragraphs describe some materials. Figure 4-3 handling procedures are described in Chapter 14. the OSC should have air sampler(s) radio or telephone through the nearest military placed downwind from the accident. State must be completed rapidly. consideration should be given to using fire extinguishment. relay via local police communications decontamination. As soon as the scene and contaminated area. Access routes and prevailing winds will determine proper measures can be taken. Until record communications are established. When contamination at the accident scene. Monitoring and installation. The initial actions of the If for any reason. accurate and consistent information is available at the 4-7 . will be provided for channels may provide a viable initial communications personnel positioning air samplers. The response expands. frequency management is important. Once specific relay instructions should be included in an evaluation has been made. references (k). This facility should serve as the 20-11. accident response elements liaison representatives to coordinate off-site actions and must report to the CP which will facilitate continuity concerns. Response Force Actions. The CP should be located presence or absence of radioactive contamination is so that normal wind shifts will not interfere with confirmed. involved in the accident pose a danger to firefighters. communications to maintain command and control (7) Public Affairs. Hazardous materials which may be present The CP should be established by the lRF with adequate are discussed in Chapter 9. the response force does not arrive response force upon arrival at the accident scene will on-scene soon after the accident. For this reason. the effect of any hazards telephonic communications. casualties should be command and control during the transition from IRF considered as having been contaminated by radioactive to SRF. (m). The OSC determines the accident Consideration should be given to establishing the CP. The OSC assesses of classified information. ensure direct communication with OASD/ PA. the DoE ARG operations center. and implications of the accident. All accident response elements must rescue and treatment of casualties should receive high report to the CP which will facilitate continuity of priority. provides a sample accident site organizational diagram. Within approxi- establishing initial communications from an off-base mately 1 hour after the high explosive detonation or accident site. TM 39-20-11. material. Weapons and other materials affairs measures implemented to ensure that timely. The IRF should establish guidance is contained in Technical Publication TP 20- a CP to accommodate the arriving personnel and 11. Ensure of compliance the direction and distance of the CP from the accident with DoD notification procedures. Specific firefighting (1) Command Post (CP). including high explosives. status. Until proven otherwise. effective means of determining airborne and downwind tions at the accident site may be limited initially. and NMCC. (l). and consideration should and the potential impact of the hazards to public health be given to conference calls to keep all concerned must be determined. Also. and the communica. civilian firefighters be directed toward stabilizing the situation and defining should be advised of the possible presence of hazardous the problem. with higher authorities. coordination should commands informed. Air sampling provides an cies. Effective communication within the response effects on the public. Chapter 5. Air Force TO 1 lN- equipment of the SRF. channel. This action is time sensitive and force. Communica. (6) Identification of Public Health Hazards. (5) Air Sampling. If required.

4-8 . // /’ f .

assistance in that team members are briefed on emergency. Additionally. the levels of it. still photography should be used to depict equipment available to the response force may preclude the accident site and area. should . However. The team chief should ensure equipment. team need not wait for the contamination control station j. and/ or re-entry recommendations on the area to assist in planning the survey. and the wreckage can be examined. if not on the notification system. Atmospheric Release Advisory personnel should commence as soon as possible. and assist simultaneous accomplishment of all actions. If contamination is present. the provided to civil authorities/ foreign government following should be considered by the OSC: establish officials by the OSC or his designated representative. The OSC will approve all actions should be initiated to obtain information on the entries into the exclusion area prior to the weapons being extent of contamination. Procedures for completing the time is observed. and the in developing the weapon recovery procedures. the senior EOD lines. safety. be offered. contaminated. Prior to departing for the accident site. monitoring and decontaminating response forces should and other procedures before entering the accident site. if required. heavy sance should provide or confirm the following: demands will be p[aced upon available radiation detection instruments and personnel. unsecure radio transmission and the use of classified ~. The initial reconnais. should be avoided. or potentially contaminated area. explosions. When contamination is present. released. Weapons and components condition. The first should provide enough information to determine priority is to determine if contamination has been subsequent actions and priorities. document findings. A contamination ~. Upon making this determination. (RF) energy from initiating explosive devices. Since a great deal of information will to outside listeners. Injured people will be moved to a safe area. Positive OSC must establish priorities based on the hazard to measures should be taken to prevent electromagnetic the general public and responding forces. and civil authorities can be advised of the may not be possible until fires are extinguished. Casualties (injured and deceased) not control station should be established as soon as previously found. establish radiological control declared safe. Capability (ARAC) projections discussed in Appendix Radiological considerations. immediate considers them essential. contamination is present. but must be information must be coordinated within the JIC before checked for contamination before leaving the accident release to the media or general public. and EOD entry procedures in Chapter 15. initial perimeter survey of the contaminated area are Reconnaissance and Render Safe Procedures by EOD discussed in Chapter 5.accident scene. (9) Hazard Assessment. If (8) Reconnaissance Operations. Vehicles and be generated at the accident site and more than one equipment used in a contaminated area during organization will be collecting and analyzing data. Ex@osive hazards present. The reconnaissance tion. so that exiting initial reconnaissance team members can be monitored and decontaminated. The amount of radiation monitoring If possible. their number. all reconnaissance may be left for future use. should be processed through the initial contamination control (b) Other specialists or emergency personnel may line or the contamination control station upon exit from be part of the initial reconnaissance team if the OSC the area. 4-9 . The initial reconnaissance (a) Radiation Monitoring/ Control. determined that all weapons are intact and that there ~. the site. actions to determine the extent of contamination should be initiated immediately. As a safety precaution. an initial or cursory contamination control line at least Public affairs actions are discussed in more detail in 100 meters upwind of the initial contaminant or hazard. protective measures 5C will provide a worst case estimate of the contaminated requirements. If resources are available. and extent of equipment and personnel are on-scene unless it has been injuries. determine the actual area which is contaminated so that appropriate actions can (a) Confirmation of weapon location and status be taken. and chance of. initial entry are discussed in Chapter 5. Also. the wait extent of the problem. reconnaissance team and any civilian personnel in the ~. The radiological control area need not be established public affairs officer must be informed of all information prior to reconnaissance team entry. loca. location. was no spread of contamination. Existence of radioactive contamination and to be established before entering the are% however. the information and data which may cause undue alarm response force. Chapter 16. and notify medical treatment facilities which may person entering the accident site should be the initial have contaminated casualties or emergency response reconnaissance team chief.

Upon arrival of the response force. If contamination force arrives. security posts lished to gain all possible information from response are in the contaminated area. . Render safe procedures (RSP) shall be conducted by EOD into the recovery pkn. The protective measures continue until the weapons and/ or components have recommendations include procedures to protect been removed from the accident site. Space (an area approximately 100 meters damaged weapon(s) or their components will be an x 150 meters) is furnished for the following functions 4-1o . (10) Weapon Recovery Operations. If site will be located far enough from the accident site to ensure stabilization has been achieved. NDA. area without the OSC’S approval. Plans for packaging and shipping the . Equipment and personnel limitations may agencies should be conducted to ensure that adequate preclude the response force from conducting detailed security is provided for the weapons until the response radiation surveys of the accident site. The re-entry recommendations include location and status of the weapons can be determined. procedural deviations. Re-Entry Recommenda- tions and Recovery Plan. ~.wes and must be approved TELEFAX phone number for delivery of ARAC by the OSC prior to implementation.of the weapons and weapon include notitlcation. (b) Debriefings. by EOD and ARG personnel and modified to assure maximum safety. Civilian response personnel will data provided in Appendix 5C should be provided to establish some form of control to keep nonessential ARAC directly. bystanders.provide its Service operations center with an appropriate integral part of these procedl. available radiation monitoring equipment will establishment of a NDA or NSA as discussed in Chapter be needed to: 13. -although not affected medical treatment facilities. in the event of a wind change. the area is out of the SRF and DoE ARG can arrive. The OSC is required to debrief . establishing a contamination control area. command and control. If a TELEFAX device is deployed to the accident site. Monitor and decontaminate response with local authorities allows establishment of a disaster personnel/ vehicles. the on-site phone number should (a) A security perimeter should be established as be provided for direct data receipt. Figure 4-3 provides a sample recovery procedures should then be developed jointly accident site organizational diagram. A station. procedures to remove or decontaminate materials and fragmentation distarkes should be considered when establishing the CP. utilizes local authorities ~.Details on protective measures and recovery are contained in Chapter 5. nation depositions. . Determine which. These actions determining the status . if any. Locating and personnel and resources in the hazard area. This area. and controlled components should receive a high priority. continuation of RSP that the operations area is free of airborne contamination beyond emergency procedures should be suspended until and. should be considered. or who were in the accident area. actions. comprehensive debriefing procedure should be estab- ~. This area should be performed to achieve site stabilization. Operate the contamination control all personnel with aczess to classified information. equivalent to the NDA or NSA. Weapon recovery operations commence with reconnaissance and (12) Protective Measures. Include an evaluation of gained from these debriefings may also assist in all the hazardous materials present. NSA or Security Area and to return contaminated land/resources to an acceptable condition. Specific accident soon as possible. Until the evacuation. recovery and restoration functions. Information (b) Hazard Evaluation. Only emergency RSP actions response. no personnel should be allowed into the (13) SRF Organization and Operation of the Accident Scene. Perform an initial perimeter survey to to restrict personnel from the accident site for their determine the extent of contamination and position for protection and safeguarding weapon systems. projections of downwind radiation doses and contami. In overseas areas. Coordination with civilian law enforcement ~. nearby residents. personnel. Specific EOD books (series 6) cover RSP operations and must be followed (a) The Operations Area.c. is present. force personnel who observed the accident and its aftermath. Necessary weapon the contamination area. The operations area unless situations or conditions dictate a need for provides facilities for the OSC. protective measures. Until this action is taken by certified technicians. cooperation g. or through the Service operations center personnel from interfering with the civilian response or JNACC. and cordon or a Security Area. (11) Security (Physical and Classified Material). subsequent accident investigations and aid in planning for initial response actions. The recommendations will be incorporated positioning security guards and other personnel.

d. the com- Rest area. capabilities. . (c) The Contamination Control Area. tion should be given for using building(s) or tent(s) for g. Mess] ration breakdown point. accident site. Upon arrival at the Communications area. The base camp will be located farther from site is recommended. state. Contaminated materials and run-off will be contained and maintained ~. a. (c) As soon as all radiological data is known. (d) Initial communications capabilities on-scene i3 Billeting area. IRF. FEMA. force or the response force’s base command center to obtain all ~ossible information and coordinate SRF arrival and ‘expected requirements. agencies. The briefing should or terrain may require setup in the field. The OSC should form a Contamination Control Area (CCA) includes facilities Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT) at some for monitoring and decontaminating personnel. The (2) Public Affairs. and civilian authorities coun. The CCA incorporates the terparts or equivalents as appropriate: contamination control line (hot line). Upon completion of turnover the accident than the operations area is located from briefings. JIC. Vehicle park. Base camp facilities will include as a of OSC. and material/casualty transfer point.with the DoE. Personnel control point. An overflight of the accident ~. functions. (1) Command. resources and vehicles. “ may be inadequate and should be improved as soon h. and management of site restoration operations. Service Response Force. JNACC. Shower and latrines. Administrative vehicle park area. composition. contamination control line. as possible. OSC or DoE Team Leader. Control and Communications. addressed below. (e) Congressional relations support must be i Water and POL point. Considera- Q. On-Scene Control Group (DoE ARG. and set up and operate the base camp. personnel and equipment processing g. the contamination control station. (The distance from the installation authorities or host-country officials. specialized teams on-scene. On-Scene CP. 7. administrative. and support commander or the nearest Installation Commander will requirements of all organizations. setup of the contamination control station and and/ or the EOD team). travel plans. The DoE ARG (b) The base camp. and support requirements are obtained through the Service operations center or ~. Other facilities which should be provided for DoD disposition. 1. The CEAT. Specitlc Personnel and dosimeter control point. provided as required. government officials must be included in the planning Clean clothing and bulk issue area. operations and actions of concern to the SRF are Radiation equipment repair area. and local authorities and host Material receiving point. preparation of a site recovery and restoration plan should Helipad be directed. Messing. coordinated 4-11 . All members of the response force should remain minimum: on-scene until the OSC determines that they are no longer required. The commander should be briefed by the IRF OSC and meet nearest military installation should be used as the base with senior State and local emergency response camp if practicable. (a) Upon designation of the SRF. billeting. ~. the SRF support recovery and restoration requirements. VIP/ visitor reception/briefing area.) The IRF unit cover the status. the SRF commander should assume the duties the accident. and recreation functions to (b) Upon arrival at the accident site. the SRF continues actions initiated by the Control group briefing area. point after weapons recovery. Multiple processing lines will Q JHEC be used to facilitate personnel processing. FEMA. and initiates additional actions as required. Medical control point. lines. The base camp includes those logistical. mander establishes communications with the response Latrines.

Also. and local authorities and the contaminated area. justification for an NDA. have not been located when the SRF arrives. State. joint EOD and DoE inspection and a consolidated and consistent presentation of the best assessment of weapon damage is desirable. State. must be publicized. Accident con- provide a direct interface with the public through a ditions. but within the NDA. and other areas where may be requested for ground surveys conducted outside classified material is kept or discussed. DoE is responsible for coordinating off. Ground &veys are required to confirm and security is required for temporary weapon storage areas. a respiratory protection program should be be established where people can gain access easily and established to ensure the health and safety of each person is m~tually agreeable to local officials. for assessment and results in contamination will generate a large number ultimate clean-up of radiological and non-radiological of claims by civilians. If all weapons and components site operations. or host involve country government officials. (c) A large number of personnel maybe required military assistance can be offered and may be required to conduct searches for weapons. where weapons. be kept informed. Military assistance the communications center. would (4) Weapon Recovery Operations. The high data available. Radiological surveys are required to define the The condition of the weapons should be assessed contamination area and identify any personnel exposed carefully prior to movement. radiological and non-radiological hazards at a nuclear . response personnel and the general public are a major (b) A staging area should be established outside concern of Federal. and other classified materials are removed remove. The SRF is responsible for all on. Federal agencies through the FRMAC in accordance with reference (c). host country government personnel are responsible for monitoring and treating the general publiq however. radiological hazard may still exist. Also. The DoE has an Aerial Measurement Search procedures are discussed in Chapter 15. When for control of off-site contaminated areas. ~. This capability should (5) Security. until sufficient civilian equipment and personnel are and explosive hazards. DoE and and stored until shipment may be made. Survey (AMS) capability that can determine the extent and severity of contamination. EOD personnel will supervise available. searches by available personnel on-site after providing appropriate briefings on search and safety procedures. the availability of qualified EOD personnel determine to what extent RSP have been accomplished prior to (3) Hazard Evaluation. To obtain time permits.ties. the time required to locate the weapon(s). even if RSP were performed to contamination. such as nuclear weapons. response force and/ or civil autho~. RSP may have been (a) Radiation Monitoring/ Hazard Control. as inherently imply a need for rapid action. If possible. A claims processing facility should materials. If the weapon(s) were in a stable environment and time permitted. an extensive site radiological monitoring and assessment activities of search may be required to find them. The USAF Air Transportable Radiac Package from the accident site. The radiological hazard to utmost importance. the SRF’S arrival. weapon components. Site security is established by the be coordinated with the DoE team leader. A nuclear weapon accident which weapons accident/ incident. surfaces and become more difficult to measure and components. transition from military control should be coordinated with civil (b) Hazard Assessment. components. This location entering the controlled area. NSA or Security Area. on-site radiological monitoring and priority given to weapon recovery operations does not surveying must be coordinated by the JHEC. and variety of means that could include town meetings.with FEMA or affected country representatives. All personnel must government Security Area. held in abeyance until the SRF and DoE ARG arrive. 4-12 . Additional ~. An effective health safety program and hazardous material can be packaged for shipment should be initiated as soon as possible. and repair all with military control no longer exists. Safety is of described in Chapter 5. When DoD resources. A badging and the NDA. (6) Claims. The JHEC assesses the authorities. by the response force. and are responsible suffered substantial internal structural damage. initial identification system should be implemented to facilitate ground surveys should be performed within . civil authorities may conduct (a) Weapons involved in an accident may have monitoring and survey operations. refine the results of aerial surveys. or NSA (ATRAP) team can field. Therefore. calibrate.5 days of passage of civilian and military response personnel and the accident because the contamination may migrate into teams. although a instruments to provide standardization.

and the expected duration of response operations. accident response organizations. considered when establishing response force commun- ication capabilities. environ. Federal assistance to ments of the accident investigation teams. and service/agency of all and host country government officials. Determination of clean. communication to the site will be established to obtain status. Reporting and Documentation. Historical data supports initial planning for identify what coordination may be required with other 1000 people for up to 6 months. accident site. all aspects the state is coordinated by the SFO. Procedures for liaison with other agencies’ (b) Status of weapon recovery operations. In remote areas. agencies and officials may include: responsibilities. concurrence/ agreement of Federal and State authorities (e) Names. provide procedures to be followed. and for sanitation facilities at or near the arise many years later. plot of the contaminated area is essential for developing (d) Status and results of personnel monitoring. including number of people contaminated. extremely austere conditions should be anticipated with only Development of the accident response plan should begin limited support for 7 to 10 days. The extent and specific requirements for a responsible official should be tasked with the primary these facilities depend primarily on location. the number of personnel involved. FEMA and State). radiological and plan which may be accident specific completed as soon site restoration operations. 4-13 . operations centers (for example. A comprehensive and detailed (c) Status and results of radiological surveys. The operations annex to the accident response plan should include: (I) Repo~s “me prepared according to applicable Service directives. SSN. during planning and training. direct for the operations center. of the accident response itself should be documented to permit improvement of response procedures. In addition to the reports of the OSC. (a) On-scene response forces by Service or Agency. The accident response plan outlined in Appendix 4-A should not be confused with the site restoration plan developed in conjunction f. In addition to the documentation require- performing site restoration work. If adequate information is not provided. A description of the operations center organization. Most of the site participants and visitors. Parent organizations of specialized b. recognize the need to provide information up the chain- of-command to keep the Washington policy organization c. Even e. The plan should establish priorities for determine the type and amount of logistic support expected actions. in accidents with little or no spread of contamination. The OSC staff must elements. Identification of required equipment and personnel informed. Information expected or requested by various d. all personnel should arrive with sufficient personal items 4-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN to meet their needs for a period of 2 to 3 days without DEVELOPMENT significant external support. The SRF and the appropriate response force (2) Documentation of the accident response effort elements will assist civil authorities/ officials in is essential. Logistic Support. and the up levels will be a major issue and require the radiation doses received. responsibility for documenting events and recording data mental conditions. and required. complete documentation of radiological surveys is (1) Arrangements must be made for feeding. Until messing and billeting arrangements are established. Identification of those activities responsible for units and teams on-scene should be information expected operations and methods for coordinating addressees on situation reports. ~ e. an accurate site restoration plan. (7) Site Restoration. Early in the accident response. and procedures for the response operations. and base camp requirements as practicable. a. and those portions of the (2) Weapon recovery operations. necessary because questions concerning the accident may billeting. with civil authorities. A description of all expected operations and their the DoE has reporting requirements that should be interrelationships. for historical records. restoration work occurs after weapon or components removal.

as will the (3) Radiological. All organizations and teams. through site restoration and the return home of the response forces. and other key planning factors which may Area or reporting to the OSC should be considered a have an impact on mission accomplishment. Possible site restoration procedures b. Execution. This section contains a statement of the should be included as an annex to the SRF accident tasks and objectives to be accomplished by the accident response plans to assist in preparation of site restoration response force. and commu. In the first subparagraph. and problems. an unlocated weapon. working in the NTDA or Security prepared. The response plan is intended to identify actions and (9) Civil and military response organizations or procedures to be used at the accident scene commencing teams on scene.1 . nearby residences or response plan and its associated annexes as possible to population centers. Many actions and procedures required in icant events. Situation. watersheds. The situation section should provide response force based upon the element’s functional facts surrounding the accident and accident location. response to an accident are known and can be planned (5) The area of contamination. and location of weapons and weapons components involved. capabilities. forces responding to each accident will vary. ‘reporting structure and responsibilities of the various includes: response force elements. guidance on the 4-A. (7) Public awareness of the presence of nuclear weapons. and their specific functions with the arrival of. command relationships. numerous unpredictable variables are involved in a (4) A summary of initial response actions and nuclear accident. and if. procedures may not be required. situation. animal feed lots. objectives: weapon(s) recovery and site restoration. the specific injured or killed and the disposition of all casualties. (NDA). give a nications links. Mission. impact on operations or be affected significantly by the All response forces should draft as much of an accident accident (for example. In subsequent subpa- ragraphs. logistics arrangements. the mission. priorities. explosive. Although expected to be encountered. if known. and other hazards type and amount of support required. summary of the tentative plan. the method of execution. condition. Information part of the response force. However. Also. including chronology of signif- planning. some planned actions and surveyed. be prepared when. Normally there will be two major plans in conjunction with civil authorities. or may require (6) Habitation and terrain features which may modification to meet specific circumstances encountered. either projected or in advance. c.52-M APPENDIX 4-A ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 4-A-1 GENERAL (1) The number. The plan must delineate the which might be contained in this section. major roads or thoroughfares. assign specific tasks to each element of the a. the response force and continuing or capabilities. either by official announcement or observa- 4-A-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE tion assumption. or other farming enterprises). Scattering of weapon parts by high explosive detona- tions. type. Moreover. or Security Area if required. (8) Status of arrangements with civilian authorities This appendix provides basic guidelines and information including establishment of National Defense Area which should be contained in an accident response plan. and specific site restoration 4-A-3 BASIC ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN objectives are factors to be considered when stating the The basic accident response plan should state the mission. Every nuclear weapon accident has its own unique (2) The number of military and civilian personnel requirements. the key to a successful response is problems encountered. whether the status of response efforts at the time the plan was civilian or military. or requested. DoD 51OO. called upon.

instructions applicable to two or Organization annex should identify all units and more elements of the response force may be placed in organizations responding to a nuclear weapon accident. Many organizations and elements with a hazard/radiological capability and will arrive with some degree of organic communications establish a comprehensive hazard/radiation control which should be coordinated by thjs plan. Command and Communications. such as public safety. Organizational relationships will and the plan should identify the response force role in vary as the response operation progresses. determined what equipment is required to restore the (5) Federal Emergency Management Agency. COMSEC program. (7) Other Federal agencies responding to the e. requirements may not be known until engineers have (4) Specialized Service Teams. including f. Public Affairs.e. their capabilities.. i. a. this section may be issued (6) Defense Nuclear Agency Nuclear Weapon separately. the JHEC. This annex should establish communications requirements and communications 4-A-4 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNE”XES operating procedures. Accident Advisory Team. d. response operation. Integrating the actions of the multitude of units and h. responding to provide procedures for the coordination and release of a nuclear weapon accident is essential to an efficient public affairs information. tation. Task Organization (if not included in basic plan). This annex should include: 4-A-2 . Weapons Operations. and other classified information from the accident site. Operations. and airheads or other key supply points/routes (3) Department of Energy Accident Response to support the operation should be identified. They should include all actions which must be performed. and time the accident. The Task the JIC.. such as would occur when the SRF commander relieves the IRF commander. Areas in which annexes g. and OPSEC requirements should be identified. which are applicable to the response effort. nents. site. establish procedures for coordinating and controlling all actions at the accident site. FRC.e. If desired. or not ready for inclusion when the rest including the Senior FEMA Official. Communications. annex should define the responsibilities of all agencies tions supporting the response force. changes should be stated within areas. This section contains a statement of the administrative and logistic arrange. with c. weapon compo. require coordination with other elements to insure safety and/ or optimum use of assets. These changes may be in overall command. ments applicable to the operation. Annexes to the accident response plan should provide e. and when the NDA or Security Area is dissolved.interface with civilian authorities should be provided. of the plan is completed. and as civilian security forces relieving the military security forces following removal of weapons. or event at which such changes will occur. This annex should describe the respon- in-depth guidance for operations in functional areas sibilities and procedures of the security forces. Plans should ensure communications links between all organizations participating in the response force. most notably joint activities. Some Group. and with organiza. The Weapons Operations may be desired are: Annex should establish the procedures used for weapons recovery operations. FRC liaison officer. This participants’ parent organizations. i. Security. such actions which will. ” the following units and organizations should be considered: d. transpor. both civilian and military. The Public Affairs Annex should organizations. This annex should describe responsibilities supplementary information indicating which actions and special procedures used by the medical staff. If lengthy. or may be required. Billeting. relationships for the entire operation should be stated (8) Civilian/ Host country agencies responding to with expected changes of command indicated. and their relationships. b. (2) Service Response Force. This annex should identify those Additionally. Hazard/Radiological Safety/ Health Physics. Comman”d accident. (1) Initial Response Force. At a minimum tions. Medical. a final subparagraph headed “Coordinating Instruc. Logistics and Administration. assign responsibilities for execution of identified actions.

a discussion of legal problems which maybe encountered (2) Guidance on selecting the location for. Chapter 19 Chapter 17 provides guidance and recommended discusses site restoration issues which may assist in procedures for the development of this annex. . k. in drafting a site restoration strategy. The logistic Support Annex be made. Logistic Support. The Site Restoration Annex shouId provide should provide procedures for establishing and information to guide the response force and be of use maintaining support for response force operations. preparation of the Site Restoration-Annex. and local authorities and will probably require that an environmental assessment and engineering study i. and site and contaminated area. 4-A-3 . A separate Site Restoration checklists prescribed by DoD Directive 5230. The Site Restoration Annex (3) Pre-coordinated contingency releases for should identify possible methods to restore an accident confirming the presence of nuclear weapons. Site Restoration. and operation of the Joint Information Center. reference (b).16. following a nuclear weapon accident. (1) Procedures to ensure that all press releases are j. . repres. State. Legal. Chapter 16 contains members prior to release. Plan will be developed in coordination with Federal. entation to. This annex should provide procedures for coordinated properly with the OSC and other key staff establishment of a claims center.

data collected for the most accurate and complete hazard/ radiological assessment. The complexities of a nuclear accident and to mitigate potential health and safety weapon accident are compounded further by general lack problems. Advise the OSC of precautionary measures for ment in the cooperative development of response efforts residents and other persons in potentially contaminated and a site restoration plan. areas. weapon systems contain non- radioactive toxic materials. the DoD establishes a of public understanding regarding radiological hazards. by the accident. Also. Response Force Resources. Response forces should coordinates closely with the FRMAC. b. propellants. The JHEC a. Determine levels of contamination present and on- hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. DoD 51 OO. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures detecting these hazards and protecting personnel from during personnel decontamination and restoration them. To accomplish this. the hazards and characteristics of radioactive materials present. and suggested methods for e. The FRMAC have a full complement of operable and calibrated radio- supports the OSC with off-site monitoring and logical monitoring equipment. f. A good health physics program provides for civil authority/ official involve. of a nuclear weapons accident. and establish a bioassay program. Determine if radioactive contamination has been physics program to manage the health safety aspects released. materials should also be available for replacement or 5-1 . JHEC with the following objectives: The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must therefore. and assistance Assessment Center (FRMAC) in coordinating and plan- to civil authorities with jurisdiction over areas affected ning the site restoration plan. 5-4 RESOURCES lead. high explosives. The chapter furnishes g. Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation to dents due to the possibility of radioactive contamination protect response force personnel and the public from at the immediate accident site and extending “beyond on-site hazards associated with a nuclear weapon the accident vicinity. c. This chapter provides information on health physics and guidance concerning the radiological safety and other d. such as beryllium. oxidizers and plastics.52-M CHAPTER 5 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 5-1 GENERAL 5-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS A nuclear weapon aczident is different from other acci. Also site boundaries of the contaminated areas through included is information on the radiological control ground and air surveys. resources avrdable. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent site hazard and radiological data collection and analyze spread of radioactive contamination. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated 5-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE personnel on-site. Assist the Federal Radiological Monitoring and recommendations. under his control. sample forms. advice. quickly establish a vigorous and comprehensive health a. Sufficient quantities of assessment. including decontamination efforts. lithium. These hazards are discussed in Chapter 9. This information assists the OSC in the operations operations. The Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) is the OSC’S organizational means to task on.

plots will provide the (f) Department of Energy Atmospheric Release expelted location and level of contamination deposition Advisory Capability (ARAC). Replacement plans are necessary Response Group Unit (HOT SPOT).repair of critical or high failure rate components such (g) Department of Energy Mobile Accident as mylar probe faces. to assist in determining possible areas of Package (ATRAP). equipped to conduct low level contamination monitor- ing. Additionally. (a) U. is accomplished best through establishment of a JHEC identify all persons who may have been contaminated as discussed in paragraph 5-5. however. and decontaminate them as necessa~. for effective collection and another. at the time of the accident. Air “Force Air Transportable RADIAC available. tion between on-site and off-site is significant for security and of the method of converting from one unit to and legal purposes. Appendix 5-A contains a list of radiological monitoring 5-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS equipment used by the Services with a summary of their This concept of. Integration of specialized team operations hazards to the public and response force personnel. (i) Department of Energy Radiological Air Though response forces are equipped and trained to Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab (RASCAL). DoD specialized teams should assist in the off-site riate news releases. Several specialized teams are The on-site and off-site distinction should be considered available within the DoD and DoE with substantial only when assigning areas to monitoring teams. and Department of Energy (DoE) teams are better (1) DoD EOD Teams. should be made.S. (c) U. operational needs after a large release of contamination. Within the resources to make a complete assessment of the radio. hazard assessment. conduct radiation surveys for low levels of radioactive (j) Department of Energy Mobile Decontamina- contamination. they can of operations. (a) Prior to departing for the accident site. (b) U. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. Efforts Team (RAMT) is discussed in Chapter 14. the entire is provided in Chapter 11.S. minimize possible radiation into the SRF. Specialized teams when integrated into the Service Response Force (SRF). A conversion table for various measurements meaningful correlation of radiological data. like rocks. be available to the initial response force. if (d) U. Initial Response Force (IRF) Actions. The distinc- contamination levels might be measured or reported. constraints of available resources. Specialized teams are: potential hazards.operations assumes that an accident has capabilities and limitations. Also. AIQ4C plots will provide theoretical (e) Department of Energy Aerial Measurement estimates of the radiation dose to personnel downwind System (AMS). Army Radiological Advisory Medical that personnel and aircraft are not contaminated. during the flight. Possible radiological monitoring. determine the absence or presence of any radiological which have off-site responsibilities. because radiation detection equipment (RADIACS) (h) Department of Energy RANGER Environ- available to initial response forces will not meet initial mental Monitoring Capability. contamination. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. and wet surfaces. Only limited equipment and expertise may provide field laboratories and analytical facilities. Additionally. plants. radiation detection instrumentation should be carried to ensure (1) The U. and response force actions are addressed first in this concept instrument repair capabilities. on the ground.S. provide adequate technical a. and monitoring should wait until the teams arrive. IRF action should logical hazards. and notify officials/ personnel of radiological response-efforts. pheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) plot. appropriate ground support should be provided discussed in detail in Chapter 20: upon landing if personnel and aircraft become contaminated. personnel resulted in release of contamination to areas beyond should be cognizant of the various units in which the immediate vicinity of the accident site. region of contamination must be treated as an entity. Specialized DoD (k) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team. When not required on. Specialized Teams. specialized DoE teams. it is difficult to do over rough surfaces tion Station. If responding by air. should be integrated problem and its nature. b.S.S. (1) Pre-Deployment Actions. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team delivery arrangements should be made for an Atmos- (AFRAT). provide approp- site. A detailed discussion of ARAC is in 5-2 . to avoid contam- (2) The following specialized teams or resources are ination. Moreover.

Also assist in ensuring should enter the possible contamination or fragmenta. witnesses. accepted explosive safety distance for nuclear weapons minimize the spread of contamination are described in. boundary of the contaminated area is defined and (f) Establish a contamination control station and explosive hazards are known. Later. in conjunction with civil authorities/ publications. and others present at the control line should be considered. or authorities/ officials should have monitoring assistance the lack of it. How many intact weapons or containers dispersed and to confirm that no beta and/or gamma have been observed? hazard exists. a temporary contamination officials. hoods. If precautionary measures be upwind. The generally Procedures a medical treatment facility may use to . at least one ~. and boots are necessary to (c) If radiation detection instruments are not yet ‘protect response personnel from contamination and to on-scene. If available. the contamination Chapter 14. indicates whether anti-contamination or respiratory (b) Prepare appropriate news release. to conduct an initial survey of the security area. civil moved for better access to the area. tion area of the specific weapon(s). clothing). ~. At this point. bystanders. Anticipated questions that may be asked to the ARAC facility at Lawrence Livermore National to evaluate the release of contamination are: Laboratory. Do broken or damaged weapons or con- contamination is established. rapid assessment of streets or roads in the area and the “Authorities should be notified and the assistance of types and uses of potentially effected property. deploys by weapon recovery operations. observations from firefighters and witnesses prevent its spread to uncontaminated areas. protection is required for the initial entry team. Every (c) Determine if medical treatment facilities with consideration should be given to protecting the initial casualties have a suitable radiation monitoring entry team. civil authorities/ officials should be advised of should enter the accident site to inspect the area for the situation and consider possible actions. which should be initiated include: measure levels of contamination. resuspension from the downdraft when flying over Do not delay or omit any life-saving measures because potentially contaminated areas. helicopter to the accident site. dispatch a monitor to determine if the hazards “’are identified. with radios if upwind direction if at all possible. If not. Contamination. (b) If an advance party is deployed. As it becomes known. only essential personnel the casualties were contaminated. Until capability. If airborne 5-3 . the remaining radiological response becomes preparations for response in the event of a release during (a) If the OSC. specific accident and the condition of the wreckage or debris may indicate data described in the appendices should be provided contamination. the easier it will be to tainers appear to have been involved in an explosion develop a plan of action and communicate with involved or fire? civil authorities. “should be reported immediately to the provided at established personnel processing points. determ~ne the type(s) of contamination present. Anti-contamination clothing and respiratory (g) Implement procedures to protect response protection should always be donned before entering a personnel. however. accident.. the control line may be a personnel monitoring program. Protective coveralls (anti-contamination suspect area. Was there a high explosives detonation? trained person should have radiation detection instru. have not been implemented to reduce the hazard to the (b) After arrival at the site. or an advance party. Appendix 5-C. During specialized radiological teams and the DoE Aerial Mea- helicopter operations. flights should remain above or surement System requested. may extend beyond this distance. Has a weapon undergone sustained burning? ments to determine if alpha emitting contamination was ~. The landing zone should of radiation contamination. The approach to the scene should be from an (a) Dispatch monitor teams. The accident situation possible. from the accident site. an overflight of the accident scene and the downwind area can provide a (3) Actions to be taken if contamination is detected. a reconnaissance team public. safety distances may be found in classified EOD (e) Identify. The earlier that confirmation of released ~. when the accident scene. that contamination has not spread in the facility. is 610 meters (2000 feet). and go preventing undue public alarm. Additional explosive (d) Initiate air sampling. The highest priority should clear of any smoke. Actions hazards. gloves. OSC. or crosswind. and at a sufficient altitude to prevent be actions to initiate general public hazard abatement. and assess weapon status. (d) If no contamination was released by the (2) Initial Actions.

The JHEC exit through a Contamination Control Station (CCS). and protect response force personnel and radiological data collection and assessment efforts. it provides accurate and complete on- by determining a control area and limiting access and site hazard/ radiological recommendations. and Base Camp is discussed in Chapter 4. are the primary off-site health and safety ~. Data area until monitored and decontaminated. If the control area extends beyond the and further distributed by the JHEC to the FRMAC. and personnel should be monitored and decontaminated to validation includes all hazard data on-site. response force actions. be in the vicinity of the line defined by the perimeter The recommended functional organtifation is shown at survey. ination control stations and other personnel processing onmental Protection Agency (EPA) will be on-scene points to ensure bioassays or other appropriate follow- within a few hours after the response force. organization. Federal ~. Unless an accident is contained within an Department of Energy Accident Response Group (DoE enclosed space. hazards. such as a magazine. a buffer zone may be (a) On-site collected data is processed through considered. accurate. the JHEC establishes a radiation and exception to this policy is necessary in life threatening dosimetry program which meets Service needs and situations. efforts. radiological in” the contaminated area on personal protective survey teams should only support the weapon recovery equipment. only those personnel ARG) are integral parts of the SRF. A case-by-case initial response. correlation. (h) Develop and implement plans for controlling the spread of contamination. DoD specialized teams and the apparatus. logs and records. respiratory protection is required. The JHEC is must stop contamination from being spread by personnel the organization that oversees the on-site hazard and or equipment. Analyze and correlate all contamination identification and care of potentially contaminated data collected to identify inconsistencies which require people. Representatives from the DoE. surveys and air sampling. During those periods early in the ~. and fatalities. They and up actions are taken. the results of radiation further investigation. Director should be knowledgeable about data on-site The perimeter of the contamination control area will and how to best employ the technical resources available. Off-site radiological surveys require coordination Respiratory protection can be provided in most instances with civil authorities. requirements for personnel working in or entering the (i) Establishing the location and initial operation on-site contamination control area. Implement OSC’S health and safety stand- interface with the public. Actions include: the status of ~. 5-4 . National Defense Area (NDA) or Security Area the (b) JHEC is the single control point for all assistance of civil authorities/officials will be required hazard/ radiological on-site data and will provide the to establish and maintain the control area perimeter. Service Respon~e Force (SRF) Actions. JHEC. By the general public. early in the response before a full Figure 5-1. ~. as necessary. Collect radiological and hazard data required by the OSC on-site. the SRF personnel review the initial Center (JIC). Provide contamination plots and other on-scene or expected.contamination exists. and complete radiological Personnel and equipment should not leave the control information to both military and civil users. and the location required data to the OSC. perimeter survey is completed. Refer all unofficial requests b. Operations Area. However. The OSC should working directly with the weapon need take precautions integrate DoE ARG radiological assets into the JHEC against tritium. most rapid. Upon for contamination information to the Joint Information arrival on-scene. the SRF should ards and monitor the safety procedures of all partic- continue to provide assistance and radiation monitoring ipating in weapon recovery operations. After the the extent their condition permits. and by inviting the civil government/approved a confined area. radiological response assets ~. however. casualties. Injured provided to the JHEC for analysis. Review and correlate records from contam- Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Envir. The JHEC should: of the Command Post. civil officials. If extremely understood by explaining the role of the JI+EC and high contamination levels of tritium are suspected in FRMAC. This arrangement can be by using Service approved protective masks. for the JHEC. This control is usually established analyzing data. support. Administrative controls (1) Joint Hazard Evaluation Center. Brief and train people not designated response when Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) previously as radiation workers who will be working operations limit access to the accident site. firefighting and other special actions radiological response organization to participate in require a positive pressure self-contained breathing FRMAC operation. and safety measures.

etc. Joint Harard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization . Waste Control . Industrial Hygiene bration and Repair . Plotting ● Air Sampling . Environmental . Evaluation and . Contamination Control Station . Industrial Safety . JHEC Director FRMAC Liaison Senior Health OSC Liaison and Deputy Director Weapon Recovery Safety Advisor Liaison Chief of Staff I ● I Security Site Logistics Restoration Administration I I I I u! (n “EzIzizlm P . Overview ● RAD SAFE SUPPOrt (Radiography) . Equipment DECON Assessment Sampling. Data Control /QA . Ranger . Fixative Application . Instrument Cali- Assessment and Evaluation . Mobile Laboratories . Dispersion ● Dosimetry ModeI (ARAC) . . Medical Figure 5-1. Bioassy . Meteorology ● A M S . RAD Survey Teams . Personnel Decon .

The public must be provided information that their health was not impaired. of contamination are expected. feces or urine). Implementation of through the JIC and the Community Emergency Action a bioassay program and the documented results will be Team (CEAT) explaining all real hazards. Directive 5230. Site charac- samplers should be placed downwind of the accident. in radiation areas should be implemented. basis for estimating the radiation dose/exposure which or unduly impair operations. for implementing the OSC’S health and safety standards The reaction time to an accident combined with the time and monitoring closely the safety procedures of all par- required to initiate air sampling will result in little or ticipating organizations. The JIC requires assistance from placed over the chest (lung counting) and/ or other the JHEC and FRMAC in preparing press releases to organs. and made through the JIC. A bioassay program for all individuals is tionary measures will seek clear. or detection of radioactivity y in the excreta (nasal minimize and allay these concerns. Air other radiological data are required by the OSC and sampling will verify the resuspension hazard during civil authorities/ officials to identify actions to minimize response and recovery operations. for example. Soil. Sampling should be initiated in an expeditious manner. regulations governing work (a) Environmental Sampling. initiation. hazards to the response force and the public. (c) Consolidate all radiological assessment important in the equitable settlement of any legal actions information for on-site recovery operations and provide that may occur in the years following a nuclear weapon it to the OSC. sample to weeks to compIete. public which may have been advised to take precau- ~. per Appendix 5-B. guidance for personnel protection during the first few days. and resource/facility surveys. JHEC personnel and resources may be in Chapter 8. integrated into FRMAC operations. Radiological surveys and result in a sample of airborne contamination.’ should be given specific guidance. All public release of information will be processed by DoD “ (b) Bioassay Program. Air sampling is conducted to determine if dosage calculation methods and previous dosages as long airborne contamination is present. Any portion of the mucous. The methods produce intense media concern and public scrutiny of use either direct measurement. background readings. samples are required periodically during the NDA perimeter.16. The survey process can require days on-site sampling parameters. understandable recommended to determine if any internal dose was explanations of methods to protect their health and received. equipment. if not trained to work in a radiation contamination. vegetation and swipe sampling FRMAC for implementation to meet this requirement of surfaces are required. and to assure those who did not receive a dose property. volume of sample. survey and data requirements must be given to the ~. sensitive x-ray detectors response operations. Radiological upwind. the following must be completed: select Samples must be taken also at locations remote from appropriate detection equipment. The JHEC is responsible people without respiratory protection may have received. frequency. To achieve this. Later placement of a sampler downwind the accident. water. reference (b). and at the contamination control station. accident. size. and restoration dependent on wind velocity approximately 500 meters planning will also need this information. terization and decontamination. (3) Work Force Protection. Bioassays methods estimate the amount of hazard resulting from a nuclear weapon accident will radioactive material deposited in the body. the contaminated area to verify background readings. migration and dispersion and to substantiate decontam. calibrate instruments. Survey procedures are located location(s). Also it provides a as their procedures do not jeopardize health and safety. Public interest in the actual or perceived radiological j. area. (5) Radiological Advisory to the JIC. The recovery process to determine radioactive material survey results are complicated by sensitivity y/ fragilit y of. The JHEC will determine fissile materials. will (4) Radiological Surveys. Prior to extensive survey in the contaminated area soon after the accident. Personnel entering the no data being obtained during the initial release of contaminated areas. Personnel monitoring and bioassay programs (d) When the National Defense Area (NDA) is are discussed in this paragraph and bioassay techniques dissolved. and determine the background readings. Consideration must be given to participating organizations or Services ~. As conditions stabilize. and the age of the ination/ recovery c(jmjletion. in terms which 5-6 . Standard radiation accident and incident response procedures provide (2) Materials Sampling. Surveys include After this. and in Appendix 5-D and forms are at Appendix 5-E. method. It is at this period that the highest levels environment.

recognize the populace’s knowledge level and under. Procedures/methods to assumptions. and affect radiation survey procedures. required between the JHEC and the SRF supply officer. particularly by those residing near as possible. In the early stages of accident response. Contam. procedures. To control and minimize exposure. when working with nuclear weapons. are required therefore. From flhe security measures may be difficult. The OSC present. and respirator may enhance or hinder decontamination and restoration filters. the primary risk is inhalation of alpha emitters directs the initiation of the render safe procedures. c. Fixatives marking tape for contaminated materials. Initial hazard assessments reliable means for neutralizing weapon hazards. internal radiation dose people may have received if and other hazards are removed. (7) Recovery/ Restoration. The primary radiological hazard associated with a nuclear weapon accident is from (a) Recovery. hydrological. If no beta/ gamma radiation is search may be required to find the weapon(s). Fixatives maybe used of site restoration in Chapter 19. when established. concern exists about the potential health hazard should implement necessary security procedures as soon to the general public. The two-person rule must be enforced strictly at a nuclear weapon accident. the OSC outset. Other important aspects would be received from exposure to the initial release are utilization of the area and civil authorities/officials for the same time period. The initial entry will determine the the accident site. The turnaround time. response effort. The in special laundry facilities (discussed in Appendix 17- DoE ARG can provide information on the advantages A) and reused. potential health hazard. level contamination is usually inappropriate. such as size of the contaminated area. The hazard ination control staticm operations and JHEC field assessment must be followed quickly by recommended laboratory operations creates considerable quantities of . it may be used as a temporary Operations. following all of the required (1) Radiological Hazard Assessment. the disposal of contaminated waste are addressed as part (6) Fixing of Contaminants. Restoration will include those the accident should not normally affect the safety of measures to remove or neutralize the contamination. Other more permanent sufficient supplies to last a few days. Provisions. They should be consulted prior contamination clothing required. a significant health problem will not normally be present nents. described in Appendix 5-C. Contamination released by prerogatives for the area. exposures is the primary method of estimating the In the process of determining the weapon condition. (b) Sitey Restoration. Close liaison will be to application of permanent fixatives. until it can be moved to a disposal site. Procedures for standing of radiation and its effects. from exposure. public water systems with adequate water treatment capability. High use items fixatives may be used to reduce the spread of which soon require resupply include hundreds of sets contamination by resuspension and run-off from highly of anti-contamination clothing each day. Radiological response assets arrive with fixative to reduce resuspension. Anti-contamination clothing may be laundered operations. Atmospheric Release Advisory financially acceptable condition begins early in the Capability (ARAC). will. Exposure to resuspended contaminants normally results topographical. the render safe procedures. and disadvantages of different types of fiiatives and determines the approximate amount of anti- methods of application. meteorological in doses which are a small fraction of that dose which and demographic information. be based on limited information. weapons. to store this waste temporarily in the contaminated area radioactive contaminants must be prevented from 5-7 . to reduce resuspension and the spread of contamination. geological. Site restoration becomes a major issue provides a theoretical projection of the maximum after classitled information. (2) Reduction of Public Exposure. Radiological Hazards. precautionary and safety measures to protect the public contaminated waste. hazard Sufficient quantities of beta/gamma emitters to pose removal. The which may cause a long term increase in the probability EOD team advises the OSC of the safest and most of radiation related diseases. Several factors have outdoors without respiratory protection from the time significant influence on site restoration decisions and of release to the effective time of the ARAC plot. However. (8) Disposal of Contaminated Waste. varied sizes of polyethylene bags. (9) Logistics Support for Recovery/ Radiological If water is readily available. and disposition of the weapons and compo. particularly the alpha emitters. reconnaissance. weapon debris. two-inch contaminated areas. This activity includes the initial the fissile material. of necessity. Consideration of possible radiation preliminary weapon(s) status and hazards in the area. The use of fixatives in areas of low masking or duct tape. and worst case projections of possible return the accident scene to a technically achievable and radiation doses received.

~. or when probable cause exists to believe that contam- ination was released. EPA and state agencies. In an accident. Radiation Surveys. and to minimize exposure to protective action and re-entry recommendations to the resuspended contamination prior to an evacuation. or movement of evacuation is found on the next page. When contamination has been released. in the’ Radiological Hazard Safety annex to the accident tion of the general public. Sheltering is used to minimize h. civil authorities/ officials. A PAR for a controlled the probability of inhalation of contaminants may evacuation could be formalized in anticipation of a increase. Although fixing of contamination is part of the site restoration process.entering the body and confined to specific geographic workers in the accident area from exposure through areas so that the contamination can be removed inhalation is extremely important. public. Methods for reducing the exposure to 5-D for additional guidance. extensive workload to collect. even though the service The removal is most time consuming and requires an response force personnel may not arrive for some time. occur automatically or at the direction of civilian law tion of downwind personnel should be discouraged since enforcement personnel. Shel. problem. Although political and possibly e. or through. The PARs and RERs will have been coordinated/ tering is implemented by advising the people to seek reviewed by the cognizant federal authority (DoD) and shelter and the procedures to follow. Explosive or toxic materials may present an subsequent release of hazardous materials or radioactive immediate hazard to people near the accident site and contamination. Fixing Areas of High Contamination. Areas and approval sections (the format should be site and of high contamination must be controlled to prevent situation specific). Respiratory and Whole Body Protection. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and exposure to the initial rdease of contamination as it re-entry recommendations (RERs) provide appropriate moves downwind. discussion. Protec. cleanup has been achieved. Refer to Appendix systematically. Verification. action. A sample PAR for controlled spread by resuspension. the ultimate be required to identify and characterize the area so that decisions on measures to be taken should be made based decontamination and restoration plans may be deve- on health and safety considerations. decontaminate. Evacuation. Monitoring is (b) Protective measures include: required during the removal process to verify that ~. Evacuation be responsible for the evacuation but may require of approximately a 600 meter disaster cordon might radiological advice and assistance. Site Restoration. water run-off. toring point immediately. The notification in the accident area would implemented by civil authorities. PARs for initial j. Any vehicles or people exiting the will be verified by remonitoring/ resurveying the accident area should be identified and directed to go to a moni. f. the implementation of precaution. Civil authorities will occur via visual means or word-of-mouth. priority must be given provide technical assistance until appropriate civilian to the actions to identify and minimize the hazards to assets arrive. The effectiveness responsible civilian authorities/ officials. a minimum. loped and the results evaluated. some fixing procedures may be necessary long before site restoration plans are 5-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX implemented. scene to determine that the cleanup levels are achieved. the public should be implemented by. if release occurred. Extensive radiation surveys will international issues are likely to be involved. people. and response plan include 5-8 . contamination are appropriate. personnel. Contaminated areas must be notification or evacuation would likely not be prepared defined and an evacuation procedure developed and formally. These actions are included in Appendix 5-E. Site restoration involves negotiat- ary measures to reduce exposure to radiation or ing cleanup levels and fixing or removing contamination. The decontamination effectiveness access to the area. Establishing a contamination control area. response force members. if appropriate. Immediate evacua. Determining that (a) The initial response force may need to advise contamination was released by the accident is very civil authorities/ officials of recommended actions and important. as immediate evacuation would then be required. coordination ~. The PAR/ RER format may include. and replace the top soil. The PARs and of sheltering depends on following the procedures RERs will consider Protective Action Guides issued by provided. This operation requires identifying people in the area at the time of the accident/incident or and restricting g. remove. Procedures and information appropriate for inclusion d. Sheltering.

or school may be a temporary holding area for evacuees. debris could be thrown yards/ meters. an evacuation of (outline the specific area) has been ordered by Civilian Authority Office. 5-9 . Action: With the possibility of the explosion of the missile second stage during removal operations. Note: Release of this “Protective Action Recommendation” cannot precede confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon by the OSC and should b< coordinated with local officials and PAO prior to release. In the unlikely event of an explosion. As a result. the following area will be evacuated. though highly improbable. maintenance work start. the personnel would return to their houses/businesses. work completion and return to the area). the evacuees could be released for shopping or other activities outside the area. date and location). gymnasium. Protective Action Recommendation for Major Accident at (location Issued by: Problem: An accident involving missile system re-entry vehicle occurred at (Time. Discussion: It is possible. (Indicate the specific area to be vacated and a schedule indicating evacuation start. Maintenance technicians have experienced complications in removing the missile second stage from the missile launch facility. A holding area. that the second stage could explode. verification of evacuation. Also. Note: All personnel are required to sign in at a specific location(s) during evacuation to help local law enforcement/ SRF personnel verify that all personnel are out of the area prior to maintenance start. for example. Upon successful completion of maintenance. YMCA. completion. .

Guidelines for determining radiation survey and j. FRMAC. Procedures for recording. Procedures for JHEC incorporation into the decontamination priorities. 5-1o . i. Procedures for operation of the JHEC. A description of the JHEC organization and f. This function will instrumentation (for example. correlating. Procedures for recording and maintaining pertinent c. e. and treated. b. a. g. air samplers). Procedures for JHEC and FRMAC interfacing. and plotting personnel possibly exposed to contamination are the results of radiological surveys and data collection identified. Procedures for establishing and maintaining the data for the radiological safety of response force contamination control line. personnel. become DoE and/ or civilian responsibility as time progresses. Procedures for ensuring that all indigenous h. personnel working in the contaminated area are properly protected. screened. Procedures for ensuring that response force responsibilities. d.

Ten (10) percent dose accuracy depending on quality control during development. Sensitive to smoke and paint fumes. Weighs 17 pounds Must be rezeroed after 15 minutes of operation and once an hour thereafter.and/or gamma radiation. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to central processing of TLDs. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to processing time. static electric discharge causes spurious readings. and use aq Self-Reading Ionization Chamber Ionization Chamber 0.I . . air sampler.“ TRITHJM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Instrument Capability Scale Indicator 3 T-446 Tritium o to 10 pCi/ m Portable. T-290A Tritium 0 to 1. Limitations: Sensitive to light. and detects presence of radioactive gas. Chamber Dosimeter “ Limitations: False positive readings due to charge leakage and sensitivity to mechanical shock.3 microns (eliminates sensitivity to smoke and paint fumes). 5-A. Non-Self Reading Same capabilities. <. Additional Limitations: Requires reading device. Thermoluminescent The TLD (thermoluminescent dosimeter) provides measurement of gamma Dosimeter (TLD) radiation dose equivalents up to 10000 rem. limitations. tritium detector. humidity. damaged or bent cards delay processing. Weighs 22 pounds. DoD 51 OO. has urinalysis capability for tritium with 5-minute response. automatic scale switching.000 flCi/m3 3 ranges Concentration of gas in chamber Portable. and trickle charger for nickel cadmium F cells. aging. Dosimeter. Special neutron films are available.52-M APPENDIX 5-A RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT DOSIMETERS Instrument Capability/Limitations Self Reading Ionization Reusable device for measuring exposure to X. Accurate to within a factor of two when the energy of the neutrons is unknown. Has particulate filter with filters down to 0. External battery pack is available for cold weather operations. With adapter kit. and temperatures >115° degrees F reduce sensitivity. Dosimeter Film Badge Provides measurement and permanent record of beta and gamma radiation doses over wide dosage range. Limitations: after long periods of exposure (* mrem). and exposure to x-radiation.

the instrument is calibrated directly in terms of tritium activity but may also be used to detect other radiogases or to monitor gamma radiation if appropriate calibration factors are applied to the meter reading. weighs eight pounds. 10 to 100 KeV and FIDLER probe O to 100 Kev. Mylar probe face is extremely fragile and a puncture disables the instrument until repaired. Also. AN/ PDR-60 or PAC-IS has identical alpha capabilities but does not have the gamma detection capability. 3 AN/ PDR-74 Tritium O to lOOK pCi/ m 3 ranges The portable RADIAC set contains an IM-246 light weight tritium air monitor to detect airborne radioactive gases. CPM/ 60 cmz (PAC-ISAGA) G a m m a G-M tube 4 ranges R/ hr Capable of measuring gamma utilizing the 2R range.000 flCi/mJ 3 ranges Portable air monitor designed to detect gaseous radioactivity in ambient air. 5-A-2 . Weighs 5. gamma detector will continue to function. for detecting alpha contamination through measurement of the associated X-rays and low energy gamma radiation. May use plutonium gamma detector (pG-l) for inclement weather. This exercise is done with probes with separate ranges. Mylar probe face is delicate and puncture disables alpha monitor capability until repaired.4 pounds. Very few units other than specialized Service and DoE teams possess the FIDLER. 0 to 100. The FIDLER probe has significantly greater sensitivity than other probes.000K CPM/ 17 cmz 4 ianges A small auxiliary probe provided for monitoring irregular objects. Intermediate and high-range alpha survey. PG-2 probe. -“ TRITIUM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS (CONTINUED) Instrument Capability Scale Indicator Ic-T2/PAB(M) Tritium . The instrument is battery operated (D cells) and has an audible alarm when radioactivity exceeds a preset level. Alarm sounds at preset meter readings. intermediate gamma range.000K . AN/ PDR-60 Alpha Scintillation O to 2. ALPHA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator AN/ PDR-56 Alpha Scintillation O to 1. Accompanying x-ray probe is calibrated for 17 KeV with associated meter scale from O-10 mg/ m2 in four ranges. PRM-5 probes are effective in inclement weather and are much less subject to damage during field use than other alpha meter probes. PRM-5 Alpha Scintillation O to 500K CPM 4 ranges Portable. high and low-range instrument.

Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator

Ludlum Alpha/ Beta/ Gamma Scintillation O to 400K cpm
Model 3 G-M Tube O to 200mR/h mR/ h

Portable, high and low range analyzer for detecting alpha, beta and gamma emissions. The Model 3 is an electronic
package similar in operation and function to the PDR-60 analyzer. Probe 43-5 detects alpha via scintillation, the
probe surface area is 50 cmz. Probe 44-6 (Hot Dog) uses a G-M tube to detect beta and gamma. Probe 44-9
(Pancake Probe) detects low energy gamma, O to 200 mR/h.
Ludlum Alpha Scintillation O to 500K cpm
Model 2220 4 ranges

The Model 2220 is an alpha detector electronics package that has a liquid crystal display and integral digital readout.
The unit weighs 3.5 pounds and has an adjustable high voltage and adjustable lower level discrimination feature.
high voltage power supply and preamplifier and the Violinist H. The Violinist 11 consists of a battery operated
256 multi-channel analyzer and a preprogrammed microprocessor. This instrument set, when calibrated appropriately,
measures and determines surface contamination levels of plutonium and amencum-241 in pCi/ m2.
RANGER. The instrument set includes the FIDLER/ Violinist 11 and a position determining system. The microwave
ranging system uses a base station, fixed repeaters and mobile units. The mobile units transmit FIDLER radiation
data to the repeaters and base station. The microprocessor develops in near real time radiation readings, contamination
density, and isopleths. The microwave ranging system is limited to near line-of-sight. Dense vegetation, building,
and hilly terrain may effect the ranging signal.

Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator

AN/ PDR-27 Measures gamma on Geiger-Muller o to 500 mR/h
all scales. Detects beta 4 ranges
two lower scales.

Low range; weighs eight pounds; beta window on probe to detect beta, and suitable for personnel monitoring.
May saturate and read zero in high-radiation fields (over 1,000 r/ hr).
AN/ PDR-43 Measures gamma. Geiger-Muller o to 500 R/h
Detects beta on 3 ranges
all scales.

High range; weighs 4.5 pounds, and will not saturate in high-radiation area. Readings in gamma fields other than
CO-60 may have inaccuracies greater than 20 percent.
IM-174/PD Gamma Integrating 0.1 to 10 R/h
ion chamber o to 500

High range; weighs 3 pounds; logarithmic scale, and temperature sensitive.
Ludlum Gamma Scintillation O to 5 mrl hr uR)h
Model 19


DoD 51 OO.52-M




(The Inference of Piutonium Contamination using the FIDLER)

5-A.1-1 OVERVIEW to serve as a “user’s manual” for the various instruments.
. .
However, it includes sufficient detail to provide an
a. Quantltattve measurements of radioactive contam- understanding of the limitations of field measurement
ination m the field are extremely difficult. Particles techniques and thus provides for proper application and
having short ranges, such as alpha and low energy beta the use of techniques in case of an emergency. For
radiation, are significantly and incalculably affected by completeness, some elementary characteristics of
minute amounts of overburden, for example, dust or different kinds of radiation are included. Throughout
precipitation. Therefore, detection rather than measure- this appendix the word “radiation” will refer only to
ment is a more realistic goal for alpha-beta surveys. More nuclear radiations found at a nuclear incident/accident.
penetrating radiations, such as gamma and higher energy
x-rays, are effected less by such overburden; however, b. Detection versus Measurement.
these elements require special attention to field
calibration techniques in order to convert meter readings (1) Nuclear radiation cannot be detected easily.
to contamination estimates. Thus, radiation detection is always a multi-step, highly
indirect process. For example, in a scintillation detector,
b. Field survey of uranium is best accomplished incident radiation excites a floresc.ent material that de-
through measurement of x-rays in the 60-80 thousand excites by emitting photons of light. The light is focused
electron volt (keV) range emitted by uranium isotopes onto the photocathode of a photomultiplier tube that
and daughters. For plutonium, the best technique is to triggers an electron avalanche. The electron shower
detect the accompanying contaminant Am-24 1, which produces an electrical pulse which activates a meter read
emits a strong 60 keV gamma-ray. Knowing the original by the operator. Not surprisingly, the quantitative
assay and the age of the weapon, the ratio of plutonium relationship between the amount of radiation actually
to americium can be calculated accurately and thus the emitted and the reading on the meter is a complex
total plutonium contamination determined. function of many factors. Since control of those factors
can only be accomplished well within a laboratory, only
c. Many of the factors which cannot be controlled in a laboratory setting can true measurements be made.
in a field environment can be managed in a mobile (2) On the other hand, detection is the qualitative
laboratory which can be brought to an accident/ incident determination that radioactivity is or is not present.
site. Typically, the capabilities include gamma spectros- Although the evaluation of minimum levels of detec-
copy, low background counting for very thin alpha- and tability is a considerable quantitative challenge for
beta-emitting samples and liquid scintillation counters instrumentation engineers, the task of determining
for extremely low energy beta emitters such as tritium. whether a meter records anything is considered much
easier than the quantitative interpretation of that
5-A.1-2 GENERAL (3) The above discussion suggests that the same
equipment can be used for either detection or measure-
a. Scope. This appendix provides detailed informa- ment. In fact generally, detectors have meters from which
tion from LLNL Report M-161 and Steven G. Hamann, numbers can be extracted. However, to the extent that
references (o) and (p) on the instrumentation and the user is unable to control factors which influence
associated techniques used to perform radiological the readings, those readings must be recognized as
monitoring at an incident/accident involving the release indications of the presents of activity (detection) only
of radioactive material. This appendix is not intended and not measurements.

5-A. I-1

(4) In the discussions that follow, personnel mu~t d. Gamma and x-radiation. Gamma rays are a form
be aware of the limitations imposed by field conditions of electromagnetic radiation and as such, are the most
and their implications on the meaning of readings taken. penetrating of the four radiations and easiest to detect.
Therefore, instructions are careful to indicate the extent Once emitted, gamma rays differ from x-rays only in
to which various instruments may be used as measure- their energies, with x-rays generally ly”ing below a few
ment devices or can be used only as detectors. 100 keV. As a result, x-rays are less penetrating and
harder to detect. However, even a 60 keV gamma-ray
has a typical range of a hundred meters in air, and might
penetrate a centimeter of aluminum. In situations in
which several kinds of radiations are present, these
penetration properties make x-ray/gamma ray detection
a. General. Four major forms of radiation are the technique of choice.
commonly found emanating from radioactive matter:
alpha, beta, gamma and x-radiation. The marked e. Radiations from the Common Contaminants. The
differences in the characteristics of these radiations following table lists some of the commonly considered
strongly influence their difficulty in detection and radioactive contaminants and their p@nary associated
consequently the detection methods used. radiations.

b. Alpha. An alpha particle is the heaviest and most TABLE 5-A.1-1. Commonly Considered Radioactive
Contaminants and Their Primary Asso-
highly charged of the common nuclear radiations. As
ciated Radioactive Emissions
a result, alpha particles very quickly give up their energy
to any medium through which they pass, rapidly coming Beta Gamma X-rays
to equilibrium with and disappearing in the medium.
Since nearly all common alpha radioactive contaminants Ac-227 x x
emit particles of approximately the same energy, 5 Am-241 x x x
million electron volt (MeV), some general statements Cd-109 x
can be made about the penetration length of alpha C-14 x

radiation. Generally speaking, a sheet of paper, a thin
co-57 x
layer (a few hundredths of a millimeter) of dust, any CO-60 x x
coating of water or less than four (4) centimeters of H-3 x
air are sufficient to stop alpha radiation. As a result, I- 125 x
alpha radiation is the most difficult to detect. Moreover,
since even traces of such materials are sufficient to stop I- 129 x x
some of the alpha particles and thus change detector 1-131 x x
readings, quantitative measurement of alpha radiation K-40 x x
is impossible outside of a laboratory environment where Pa-23 1 x
special care can be given to sample preparation and
detector efficiency. Pm-147 x
PO-21O x
Pu-239 x
c. Beta. Beta particles are energetic electrons emitted Ra-224 x
from the nuclei of many natural and man-made
materials. Being much lighter than alpha particles, beta Ra-226 x
particles are much more penetrating. For example, a Ra-228 x x
500 keV beta particle has a range in air that is orders Sr-90 x

of magnitude longer than that of the alpha particle from Th-228 x

plutonium, even though the latter has ten times more
Th-230 x
energy. However, many beta-active elements emit Th-232 x
particles with very low energies. For example, tritium U (nat.) x x
emits a (maximum energy) 18.6 keV beta particle. At U-235 x
this low an energy, beta particles are less penetrating
than common alpha particles, requiring very special U-228 x x
techniques for detection. (See Chapter 7). Y-90 x

5-A. 1-2

5-A.1-4 ALPHA DETECTION noted. It was found that a drop of water, a heavy piece
of lint or a single thickness of tissue paper totally
a. Because of the extremely low penetration of alpha eliminated all readings. A light spray of water,
particles, special techniques must be employed to allow comparable to a light dew, reduced readings by 40-50
the particles to enter the active region of a detector. percent. A layer of dust that was just visible on the
In the most common field instruments (AN/ PDR-56 shiny source had minimal effect on the count rate;
and -60), an extremely thin piece of aluminized mylar however, a dust level that was only thick enough to
film is used on the face of the detector probe to cover show finger tracks reduced readings by 25 percent. These
a thin layer of fluorescent material. Energy attenuation simple demonstrations reinforced the knowledge that
of the incident alpha radiation by the mylar is estimated detection of alpha particles in any but the most ideal
to be less than ten (10) percent. However, use of this situations is most problematical. The leaching or settling
film makes the detector extremely fragile. Thus, contact of contaminants into a grassy area or the dust stirred
with literally any hard object, such as a blade of hard up by vehicular traffic on paved areas will significantly
grass, can puncture the film allowing ambient light to decrease or eliminate alpha detection.
enter the detection region and overwhelm the photo-
multiplier and meter. (Even sudden temperature changes
have been shown to introduce stresses that can destroy 5-A.1-5 BETA/GAMMA DET~CTION
a film). In addition, contact with a contaminated item
could transfer contamination onto the detector. Thus, a. Gamma rays and high energy (>1 MeV) beta
monitoring techniques must be used which keep the particles are highly penetrating radiations. As a result,
detector from contacting any surface. However, recall the major problems listed for alpha detection do not
that the range of the alpha radiation is less than four apply. Furthermore, at the energies of concern in nuclear
(4) centimeters in air. This requirement to be within weapon accidents/ incidents, detection efficiency for
a few centimeters of monitored locations without ever most detectors is relatively high. Thus, beta/gamma
touching one makes use of such detectors impractical detection is relatively easy.
except for special, controlled situations (for example,
monitoring of individuals at the hotline or air sampler b. From a detection standpoint, unfortunately, high
filters). energy beta and gamma radiation are not produced in
the most likely radioactive contaminants (for example,
b. As discussed above, the sensitivity (minimum Plutonium, Uranium or Tritium). Rather, the major
detectability) of an alpha detector is not dictated by potential source of beta/gamma emitters is from fission
the ability of the active region of the detector to respond product radioelements which could be produced in the
to the passage of an alpha particle; counting efficiency extremely unlikely event of a partial nuclear yield. Beta/
for alpha detectors is 25-60 percent of the alpha particles gamma detection, therefore, has no quantitative use in
from a distributed source that reach the detector probe. determining the extent of plutonium or uranium
Fortunately, -alpha detectors” in good repair normally contamination, but is used as a safety precaution to
have a fairly low background: there are few counts from determine any areas containing hazardous fission
cosmic and other spurious radiation sources and the products.
elimination of most electronic noise is easy with current
state-of-the-art instruments. As a result, count rates in c. Common gamma detectors are scintillation
the order of a few hundred counts per minute are easily detectors (using scintillation media different from that
detectable on instruments such as the AN/ PDR-60. described above for alpha detection) or gas ionization
However, the detectability is dominated by the ability type detectors (ion chambers, proportional counters or
of the alpha particles to get into the active region of Geiger counters). In either case, the high penetrability
the detector, which depends upon such factors as of the radiation allows the detector to have reasonably
overburden (amount of dust and/or moisture lying heavy aluminum, beryllium or plastic windows and to
between the alpha emitters and the detector), and the be carried at a 0.5-1 .Om height. Dimensions of the active
proximity of the detector to the emitters. region of the detector (for example, the thickness of
a scintillation crystal) can be made larger to increase
c. In demonstrations conducted in the laboratory, a sensitivity. Because the detection efficiencies are
sealed alpha source (Am-24 1) was monitored with a well reasonably insensitive to energies in the energy regions
maintained AN/ PDR-60 alpha probe and meter. Dust of interest, the detectors can be calibrated in terms of
and water were sprinkled onto the source and changes dosage (rads or rem), rather than in terms of activity:


Because of the relatively low (10s of keV) energy with its electronics. it is also useful to discard all pulses whose radiation field that produces readings two to three times size is greater than a user-selectable upper level. Unfortunately. though not as much as with slightly below and the upper level slightly above the alpha particles. Unfortunately. See Figure rays above 15 keV. desired x-rays and that small amount of background this corresponds to a few hundredths of a millirem per that happens to fall in the same pulse-size region. However. Thus. These factors increase detector response. the scintillation from natural sources and to common low-level electronic detector remains the instrument of choice for detection Photo Peak } ‘Typical~ Discriminator Senings Figure 5-A. c.14 . the half-thickness for mean pulse size. developed to establish the sensitivity of a given detector. since the width of the pulse size distribution depends in a b. The size of an electronic pulse produced by an most complicated way upon the condition and age of x-ray in a scintillation-type detector is proportional to the detector. For 60 keV x-rays.1-6 X-RAY DETECTION the detection of identical x-rays will not be identical in size. tion. Typical of a beta/gamma detector is the Ludlum ignore all pulses whose size lies below a user-selectable Model 3 with a Ludlum 44-9 “pancake” (Geiger-Muller) lower level (threshold). the setting of discriminator levels requires a comfortable height (0. This of the x-rays of interest. Rather. Minimum detectability for such a detector is a background. To remove the unwanted signals. commonly called pulse-height discrimina. it is impossible to specify one setting for the energy of the x-ray. circuitry is installed in the meter to d. This has a most important all similar instruments. are only those from the radiation plus electronic noise) reading. Customarily. “a large fraction of the desired pulses absorption of 17 keV x-rays in aluminum is 0.5 m) above the contaminated a qualitative judgment which can significantly affect the surface. the scintillation produce a distribution of pulse sizes which cluster about detector is again the instrument of choice. readings from a given contamination.5 cm and 190 m respectively. hour. a large number of such detections will a. For low energy (17-100 keV) x-rays.4 mm will be eliminated. the signals from 5-A. resulting in a significant decrease in and in air is about four meters. Furthermore. setting the discriminator rapidly with energy. electronics must be quite sensitive. in a field environment. In fact. Window a mean pulse size. 5-A. an x-ray detector and its technique is described in the following section. In spite of the above complications. -’ this practice reflects the common use for beta/ gamma noise. The result is a deluge of signals that overwhelm detectors the pulses from sought-after x-rays. therefore. The greater than the background (no-contaminant. thereby masking the true signals. such a detector is sensitive also to the myriad of radiations d.1-1: Spectral Plot (Showing Normal Spread Of Pulses From A Mono-energetic Source Mixed With A Typical Background Spectrum and Indicating Typical Discriminator Settings). rather. pulse-height discrimination is not as “easy” as described above. techniques have been application. the distances levels far from the mean will admit too much become 2. If one sets the lower-level discriminate or thickness is again a factor. For example. an x-ray detector can be held at 5-A. natural accepted pulses. background. 1-1. In cases of high (natural) probe. for x. Thus.

This value was chosen to give a relatively ination can be made more confidently through the conservative reading indication of contamination per following. The detection of uranium contamination is fairly the process of calibrating an x-ray detector (the Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation). is used. In a typical weapon- easy to detect under field conditions. can detect 60 keV activity as subsequently decays with the emission of a 60-keV x-ray which. Lawremx Ltvermore National Laboratory. Plutonium-239 and its daughters emit a value of K(h) for h = 30cm can vary from less than 17 keV x-ray which can be detected with a FIDLER 0. the safeguards community has standardized upon the detection of plutonium via its americium daughter. private communication. Particularly useful in the FIDLER code is the uranium contamination.1 Available for IBM-compatible Therefore. Hazard Control Department. straightforward. with far greater confidence than with quantities. the for detection of these elements is a scintillation detector. lSteven G. 5-A. As a result. 5-A. HOT SPOT Codes. the plentiful isotope.35 years.5 m2. there is Energy Radiation (FIDLER). For this reason. and low energy x-radiation are not. like the 80 keV x-ray of uranium. The code provides also a default value technique. and infer the actual amount of times. weapon age and assay-are known or controllable contamination. 1-5 . involving a known x-ray. Thus.2 microcuries per meter.0 m2. mated to a Ludlum with a half-life of 14. always a trace amount of Pu-241. the FIDLER energy x-ray by overburden plus interference by code contains both a detailed laboratory procedure and background signals in the same range as the desired a field-expedient procedure for determining K(h) for a x-ray make measurement of the 17 keV a highly uncertain given detector. user-friendly utility routine called FIDLER which steps a user through b. However. Furthermore. the (2) Clearly. they and their daughters also emit x-radiation. Among the radiations emitted in the the FIDLER code is applicable to any x-ray detector decay of Uranium-235 and its daughters is an 80 keV if the full calibration technique. Although uranium and plutonium are alpha atory has produced a series of utility codes called the emitters. as discussed above. HOT SJ?3T Health Physics Codes. Lawrence Lkermore Laboratory Report M-161 (April 1985). One such (1) Weapons grade plutonium contains several detector is !he Field Instrument for Detection of Low isotopes: in addition to the dominant Pu-239. -“ of x-ray emitting radioactive contamination. since the x-rays are much the accompanying plutonium. To facilitate the calculations and calibration needed AND PLUTONIUM to measure plutonium contamination by x-ray detection in the field. Homann. count rate. A FIDLER (4*x1 mm. Confidence in the accuracy of provision to aid in the measurement of the geometric these measurements is in the p/ -25 percent range. factor for any specific detector. Measurements made at the Ballistic Research Laboratory arid the Lawrence c. of 0. is relatively low as 0. a most grade mix for a medium-aged weapon. absorption of that relatively low particular FIDLER probe. decay amount of radiation. the instrument of choice computers.1-7 DETECTION OF URANIUM d. such as knowledge of the age and monitor can make quantitative measurements of the original assay of the weapon material. this technique requires more informa- radiation monitor has much better control of the factors tion than the direct detection of radiation from the most which influence his meter readings. Am-241 2220 electronics package. less affected by overburden than are alpha particles. 2Steven G. Homann.4 m2 to over 1. this mix would sensitive technique for the detection of weapons grade correspond to about one microcurie of plutonium per plutonium is to detect the contaminant Am-241 and infer square meter. However. indirect technique. The detection of plutonium is somewhat more Livermore National Laboratory have shown that the complicated. in good condition. Thus. whereas overburden and its effect on alpha any other field technique. NaI (Tl)) probe. to Am-241. Pu-241 beta decays. HOT SPOT Codes include an interactive. as well as the HP-41 calculator systems. The determination of plutonium contam. described in this chapter allows measurement of the x-ray activity per square meter and thus evaluation of the e. the Lawrence Livermore National Labor- a. apparently depending upon external configuration and subtle internal details of a detector. Set-up and field calibration of the detector as americium calibration source.

reasonably high resolution gamma/ x-ray detector (such Techniques used include dissolution of the sample onto as a GeLi or selectively high resolution NaI) and a multi. process is in the sample preparation. The major tools activity. Glass vials of such allows determination of the relative abundance of Am. Generally. As discussed above. the most counting. the photomultipliers in the analysis chamber. consuming process. -“ 5-A. microcuries) in a sample. is mounted in a chamber that that subsequent light emission will be visible to one of is shielded to remove background radiation. However. resulting in accurate calibration of the resulting scintillation light pulses counted using most sensitive (FIDLER) survey techniques. spectroscopic techniques are not used for absolute measurements of amount of contamination (for example. quantitative alpha-beta counting is a difficult. dissolving the contaminant in a seen for such information: For example. gathering is to wipe a fixed area (typically 100 square Two types of counters are common and both are fairly centimeters) of a hard surface in the contaminated area simple in principle. the cloth can be replaced by a special plastic into the chamber under the detector. and liquid scintillation. mobile laboratories are inserted ‘into the chamber of a proportional counter. is inserted natively. available within DoD and DoE for deployment to an Any emitted radiation causes ionization of the gas in accident site. absorption of the radiation must be minimized involved in gamma and x-ray spectroscopy are a by the overburden caused by the sample itself. photomultipliers. evaporation of the solvent leaves a channel analyzer. Alpha-Beta Counting. a sample holder. difficult. a sample is contamination. material that dissoIves in scintillation liquid without air is evacuated from the chamber to eliminate air significantly quenching light output. by adjusting for the energy dependence of detection efficiencies and using (1) In a few cases. time- radiation emitted by a contaminated sample. the absorption of the radiation. Alter- made very thin to minimize self-absorption. the outstanding difficulty with this b.1-8 LABORATORY TECHNIQUES permits translating the count rate to an absolute evaluation of sample activity. Knowing the geometry of the experiment gathered without large amounts of local dirt. A sample. immediate application can be In these cases. categories: gamma and x-ray spectroscopy. The cloth can then be beta detector. Although specific instrumentation will the counter which is electronically amplified and vary. accurately determine the energies of the gamma and x. notably in the detection of beta standard spectral unfolding techniques.that may be determined accurately. alpha-beta to quench the output of light pulses. In either case. Gamma and X-ray Spectroscopy. As a result. it is possible to very thin. the counting. etc. c. (2) Again. results in a reasonably accurate determination most common technique for liquid scintillation sample of the absolute amount of contamination in a sample. alpha-beta (3) In both types of alpha-beta counter. such as a thin layer of ZnS mated to immersed totally in scintillation liquid in such a way a photomultiplier tube. sensitive part of the experiment is the sample preparation. Liquid Scintillation. the relative radiation from tritium. liquid can then be placed in a dark chamber and the 241 to Pu-239. with a small piece of cloth. Recalling the discussions solid samples cannot be used for quantitative analysis. spectroscopy scintillating liquid may be possible. a reasonably sensitive alpha.and the resultant absorption is so high . the types of laboratory analyses fall into three counted. negligibly absorbing sample. 1-6 . in the preceding sections. In some apparatus. In these devices. For this reason. the energy of the radiation is amounts of various isotopes present in the contaminant so low . In one. 5-A. Scintillation liquids are extremely sensitive to most impurities which tend (1) Another laboratory technique. The count rate is then technique works best when the contamination can be measured. With this equipment. To achieve absolute measurements of a. laboratory procedures are necessary (2) Another alpha-beta technique involves gas-floy to make quantitative measurements of radiation proportional counters. Clearly. oil.

to identify areas concentrations. Also important is a means to ensure that numerical data which describes a particular situation. It Operation provides a basis for estimating the radiation dose which Filter Type Cal. Air Sample Calibration a. the evaluation of air contamination to identify areas where selection of filter medium is extremely important. which contaminants on the filter can be measured. Once that data required for establishing an air sampling program. 1000 CFM of air must be sampled for accurate lation of a course of action. samplers should be operated long enough to sample a minimum b. an air sampling program include sufficient air monitors (battery powered or a should be established to obtain 24 hour samples sufficient number of portable electric generators). This plan would prompt evaluation is obtained. as will be the case to identify actions required to fix the contaminant to during decontamination and restoration operations. the accuracy with samplers are positioned soon enough. short sampling times are appropriate. Variables which and procedures will permit as much information as affect the accuracy of air sampling results include the possible to be collected on the initial release if air type of sampling equipment used. Even though this discussion is directed primarily at airborne contamina. The sum of the errors can be program as soon as possible after arrival on-scene. sample collected. The time required to respond to an accident and initiate 4“ TFA #41 CKHV 18 CFM 55 min an air sampling program will result normally in little 4“ TFA #21 33 CKHV 36 CFM 28 min 49. analysis capability and a method to mark and secure the area monitors against The collection and analysis of samples provides tampering. DoD 51 OO. reduce the airborne hazard and spread of contamination. and therefore. Priority should. be given to initiation of an air sampling the size of the sample. TFA “S33 CKHV 70 CFM 15 min or no data being obtained during the initial release of 8“ X 10” TFA-81O CKHV-81O 50 CFM 20 min contamination when the highest levels of airborne contamination are expected. This appendix addresses results. Increasing sample time presents no real air sampling data will be needed immediately to assess difficulty when the interest is in long-term average the hazard to people still in the area. offset. Response plans should include provisions for of 1000 cubic feet of air. when the interest is in rapid When using filtration to collect particulate samples. air samplers are properly calibrated (see Table 5-B-l). When taking samples for rapid evaluation. in part. and swipe sampies. The high concentrations of airborne contamination could filter used must have a high collection efficiency for pose a hazard to unprotected persons in relatively short particle sizes that will deposit readily in the lung (5 periods of time. Staplex air samplers use the CKHV calibrator for 4“ dures. air (equipment permitting). Table 5-B-1. the recommended priorities determines the volume of air sampled. or high volume samples on a monitor stands. The JHEC will provide direction for sampling proce. Most air sampling data obtained during an accident response will reflect airborne 5-B-2 AIR SAMPLING TIME contamination caused by resuspension. Air sampling is conducted to determine if airborne contamination is present. by increasing the total volume of the Whether or not data is obtained on the initial release. Air Sampling. x- air. vegetation. The results then may be used for the formu.Kit Flow Rate Time people without respiratory protection may have received. microns or less).52-M APPENDIX 5-B ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING 5-B-1 GENERAL samplers and collect filters. or in detection of and operations which require respiratory protection and very low levels of contamination. soil. The sampling criteria will be situation and site filter and CKHV-81O calibrator for the 8“ x 10” filters. personnel to deploy regular basis. The period of time over which an air sample is collected tion caused by resuspension. dependent. 5-B-1 . filter paper. precision of results. Normally. water. During the initial response.

continuously. 5-B-3 AIR SAMPLER PLACEMENT or near. and that the should be coordinated with EOD personnel. and that actions taken upwind of the location u Command Post ‘3 & +$’ (Background) & 4: / 0 (Contamination Control Station) . physical activity. controlled. _ b % 1 @ (Contamination) &’2 (Downwind Hazard) Figure 5-B-1. To provide the nearby populated areas and microclimatology. 1 is placed resuspension will vary from location to location as a downwind from the accident site to determine the hazard function of surface type. sampler No. The amount of airborne contamination caused by During the initial response. a. number or symbol on a stake. Air Sampler location of physical activity in the area (for example. Air Sampler Placement. and the level of contamination on the ground. and should be placed sampling locations should “be marked with a unique to obtain the maximum amount of information possible. the location of contamination levels and wind speed. the most highly contaminated area which is accessible. 2 is placed downwind from the response actions or evacuation) will be known and accident at a distance dependent upon the wind velocity. Sampler positioning is directed toward the first 24-48 hours following an accident. . surface wind in the immediate area of the accident and should operate patterns. . The sampler number indicates the implemented. During this period the number of air priority which should be given to placement. The time of readings and/or filter changes to minimize any localized wind effects. locations. The main variables in determining the see Table 5-B-2. 5-B-2 . Figure 5-B-1 shows the recommended placement program tailored to the specific situation can be of air samplers. priority determined that no airborne contamination exists at their should therefore be given to placing an air sampler at. so that data may be correlated with other information in the following days. All air samplers available will be limited. The distance should be modified in a Recommendations on the initial placement of samplers downwind direction if necessary to permit access by a assume that the mix of surface t ypes is relatively constant clear path for placement and periodic readings and f. or until an air sampling b. that air samplers will be placed changes.her throughout the area.. Modifications to this location should amount of airborne contamination will be ground be considered based on accessibility. :. Placement sampler No.<. Down- quickest and most accurate estimate of the maximum wind samplers should be operated until it can be concentrations of airborne contamination.

10 inch or 4-inch (round) Whatman #41 filters. Location of sampler. Start and stop time of sample. thoron. Including radiation detection instrument type and serial number or changes in meteorological conditions will not result as well as designation of attached probe used to monitor in airborne contamination. During the initial phases of response. For air sampling data used in the overall radiological Re-measurement after these times permits identification assessment and confirmation of field calculations. or near. and AFRAT personnel continuously during contamination control station or by using a calculation method. if available. all elements. response. Background samples should be collected concurrently with the sample of interest. The radon chain may be considered completely decayed after almost four hours.. containing all of the folIowing data should be levels of airborne contamination detected are at or maintained. the contaminated area.’ Table 5-B-2. to be small. thoron. 6-10 4-9 1. if possible. Average flow rate and/ or volume of air. as the amount of naturally occurring 5-B-5 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS airborne radioactive particulate may vary as a function of time due to wind changes.500 5. 3 is placed the filter. The three-day decay placed in a plastic bag for laboratory analysis and time precludes checking for thoron during the initial annotated with items a . Air Sample Placement (No. of the sampler of interest when making rapid evaluations. particularly when populated the background sampler (No. The calculations shown operations since personnel leaving the contaminated area below are for field use in calculating gross activity on may carry and resuspend contaminants. approximately 610 meters upwind of all contamination .- and outside the contamination control area to obtain i. Sampler No. radon. and their 5-B-4 AIR SAMPLE DATA RECORDING daughters decay to background. Laboratory facility to which the filter was sent for simultaneous background air samples for use in processing. interpretation of other readings.f. Approximate Downwind d. (MPH) (Knots) (Meters) (Feet) f. a. Background corrected. During rapid field calculations early in the pertinent data must be recorded. Air sampler No. evaluation of air sampling data to obtain rough estimates of airborne contamination utilizing the AN/ PDR-60 or b. results may also be obtained by letting the naturally occurring radon. 2. the check for radon is appropriate if. 16-20 14-17 2. particularly if readings were taken without changing falter.500 8.000 3. 5-B-3 . they should be slightly above the established levels. Any background radiation from naturally of contamination resuspended in this manner is expected occurring radionuclides (for example. An air sampling log response. and their daughters) should be subtracted when applying consideration should be given to using all additional the calculated results to protection standards. When falters are changed. RADCON.200 h. Wind direction and weather conditions. Field readings on filter and time made. 4 is placed Air sampler filters can be analyzed using radioanalytical at the contamination control station and operated techniques by DoE. 2) c. 3) from the gross activity areas are in. or when.000 6. including ident~lcation of AN/ PDR-56 (with the large probe attached) and 8 x field marking (stake) used to mark location. in downwind locations to calculation is done by subtracting the gross activity of supplement sampler No. and of the amount of sample activity caused by these confirmed or validated later by laboratory analysis.100 g Type of filter. The amount the filter. and the thoron chain after almost three days. The following equation may be used for initial field a.600 Above 20 Above 17 2.300 11-IS 10-13 1. . This samplers. Wind Speed Distance e. Type and serial number of sampler. Date.

41 filter paper. Filter paper discs are used for taking swipe where cpm = alpha meter reading on air filter in tests. and other constants. (3) For a specific alpha and/or beta radionuclide. If forms meters are unavailable. < - 200 and 800 for the AN/ PDR-60 and AN/ PDR-56 respectively. particularly Pu-239 (plutonium) —consult the approp- assuming use of 8 x 10 inch Whatman riate Service laboratory. Whatman No. (2) Gross alpha and/ or gross beta only—100 grams. 4. Vegetation. is recommended for swipes. PDR-60. (1) Surface and/ or waste discharge sources-two liters. If other alpha instruments or filters are being used (2) Drinking water sources—one liter. 4000 for AN/ PDR-56) includes unit conversions. Soil. Water. cpm x CF — Background 5-B-6 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES dpm/m3 = AFR x T (rein) Reading a. Place a small “x” instrument (same units as Af) IN PENCIL ONLY on the outer edge of the filter paper F = Alpha absorption factor for filter on the side which is to touch the radioactive source used (from manufacturer’s or area being tested for contamination. in a properly m3 = Total volume of sampled air in cubic completed Service form for a Swipe Container. In all cases. Soil sampling procedures depend on the purpose of the sampling program. a plain envelope containing the required Ec = Efficiency of counting instrument collection information may be substituted. #41 filter paper. 0. If this is A~ = Area of filter used (any units) unavailable. Swipes. 5-B-4 . the following equation should be used for field evaluation of air sampling data. The following A F R = Average Flow Rate of the air sampler minimum quantities are necessary for analysis: in cubic feet per minute T= Time in minutes the air sampler was (1) Gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha and/or gross beta—two kilograms of soil (approximately one running CF = Conversion factor (1000 for AN/ square foot area three inches deep). FSN 6640- counts per minute 00-836-6870. The minimum sample volume is three liters of densely packed sample and should be double cpm x Af plastic bagged or packed in a one-gallon wide-mouth dpm/ mj = plastic jar. c. careful where cpm = alpha meter reading on air filter in selection of control (background) samples is required counts per minute to allow interpretation of results. unfolded.5xm3x FxEfx Ecx A~ d. For 4-inch. the conversion factors are b. (round) filter paper.25 cm. Each swipe 2 specifications) should be taken from an area of about 100 cm by gently Ef = Collection efficiency of filter used rubbing two or three times with the dry filter paper (from manufacturer’s specifications) disc. rection factors. area cor. other filter paper with a maximum diameter Ac = Area of filter actually counted by the of 1 3/4 inches may be substituted. b. The swipe is then placed.

Maryland. and eight firms have equipment and individual monitor capabil. a qualified health physicist. (3) Requests for additional information shouid be directed to RADCON personnel. in the event of an incident/ (f) Supervise and provide technical advice for the accident. and Health Laboratory (OEHL). The Occupation and definitive site characterization for the OSC. This appendix provides information on service (b) Control and supervise waste disposal radiation monitoring teams (health physics and bioassay measures. beta. Texas. (d) Control and supervise radiological safety services. AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS 5-C-1 GENERAL (a) Perform detailed radiological surveys for alpha. . Radiological Control c. U. traceable to the National a. in radiological emergencies. a finite defiriition of authorized access to Restricted Data and Critical the accident area is needed to plan. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Institute of Standards and Technology. initiate. These units/ of a team leader.S. a. The RADCON Team is a specialized team located services for portable instruments used and owned by at Aberdeen Proving Ground. presence of radiation for the OSC is imperative. DoE and related monitoring and assessment capabilities. a radiation equipment repair team) and on (c) Provide health physics services. and gamma radiatio+. Environmental Health Laboratory. However. (2) Maintains the USAF stock of low energy photon field survey instruments with trained operators to (1) The RADCON Team is organized to: support disaster operations.S. Many military units and some civilian firms/ agencies possess (2) The RADCON Team will consist as a minimum alpha and gamma detection capabilities. The following describes those resources b. All team members have a minimum security clearance of Secret and are preliminary survey data. Air Force Occupational and Environmental available to enable theoretical. 78235. The detection/measurement of different types of (e) Supervise and provide technical advice for radiation and the inherent difficulties have been decontamination operations.istance may be requested through the Army site is an iterative process involving the systematic Operations Center or the JNACC. site restoration. However. radiation detection/ measurement must be control and containment of the radiological contami- completed. preliminary. provides many radiation protection services as follows: 5-C-2 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (1) Conducts calibration. integration of data produced by several assessment techniques. enumerated. U. The need or preliminary data on the absencel nation at an accident site. b. specialists. Brooks AFB. DoD 51 OO.52-M . APPENDIX 5-C SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING. The rad-iological characterization of the accident team aw. and minor repair Team. and gamma radiation. 5-c-1 . RADIAC REPAIR. and organized the USAF Medical Service for. beta. the detection and to provide technical assistance and advice to the OSC measurement of electromagnetic and ionizing radiation. and complete Nuclear Weapons Design Information. specialists qualified in air sampling and in monitoring ities that can provide radiation measurements and for alpha.

the codes are available in an IBM-PC the ATRAP will be airlifted by Military Airlift compatible version. and quantifying any (1) The Navy RA. d. (f) Air deployable assets. The Navy RADCON Team is located at the associated with the atmospheric release of radionuclides . OEHL services may be the OSC. (3) Deploys a field-qualified team of healt~ Naval Sea Systems Command Detachment.S. (1) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes were (2) The ATRAP will maintain in a ready status for developed for the Department of Energy’s Accident deployment to the scene of a nuclear accident/ Response Group (DoE ARG) to provide a quick initial radiological emergency within four hours after notifi. ATRAP units will be moved by helicopter or assessment following the release of radioactive material by water/ sealift means. ATRAP services may be estimate the dose commitment from the inhalation of requested through the Air Force Operations Center or various radionuclides. At present. beta and gamma radiation emitters. (5) Request for additional information should be (d) RADCON and radiation health expertise to directed to OEHL personnel. The Navy RADCON field-portable calculational aid for evaluating accidents Team provides health physics assistance to the OSC or involving radioactive materials. to the scene of a nuclear accident or radiological incident. health physics technicians. to more specific programs dealing with the release of (3) Requests for additional information should be plutonium. U. uranium. identifying. a week basis. (4) Conducts special projects dealing with long and (b) Environmental sample analysis. alpha.S. The Services of DoE capabilities will be requested by the ATRAP team is prepared to repair. assessment of accidents involving radioactive materials.DCON Team can provide the type of radiation hazard. spare parts. Radiological Controls instrument repair technicians maintained in an alert Program Office (SEA-06GN). short term evaluations of radiation exposures. and equipment ical Affairs Support Office (NAVSEADET RASO). HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes. the JNACC. Texas. a. worldwide to radiation accidents with air transportable equipment for detecting. or tritium to programs that directed to ATRAP personnel. Air Force Air Transportable RADIAC RADIAC repair. (c) Limited bioassay analysis. limited c. ranging from general programs for downwind in water. The Air Transportable RADIAC Package is able to support forces responding to an accident or incident 5-C-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) by providing spare RADIAC sets and an on-scene repair shop for instruments used in radiological surveys. It is a collection (2) Request for additional information should be of RADIAC equipment. called the AFRAT. This team is capable of responding Yorktown Virginia. Radiolog- physicists. (g) personnel dosimetry su~p. (2) The HOT SPOT computer programs were created to provide Health Physics personnel with a fast. biological. Package (ATRAP). U. Beyond three hours driving time. and on-site equipment maintenance and (a) Field survey and laboratory analysis for “ calibration. and manufactured materials. and trained forwarded to the Director. The ATRAP These codes are run on the Hewlett-Packard HP-41 will move over the road to sites within 150 miles of family of hand-held computers to allow for easy “field” Kelly AFB. These codes provide a activity commander in the event of a nuclear weapons first-order approximation of the radiation effects accident. the JNACC. seven days scene. Also. For accident sites on inaccessible terrain or exist. (1) The OSC will coordinate support for the ATRAP and accompanying technicians. Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 1-G. requested through the Air Force Operations Center or (e) Reference library. Navy RADCON Team. The Air Transportable RADIAC Package is located at Kelly AFB. Naval Sea Systems status by the Air Force Logistics Command for airlift Command. cation by the Air Force Operations Center. Texas. use. but requests may be made also RADIAC instruments to radiation survey teams at the through JNACC if the DoE Team Leader is not on- scene of the accident on a twenty-four hours. 13 separate programs Command.ort. calibrate and issue DoE Team Leader. radioisotope analysis of following capabilities:” selected environmental. and Hot Line management.

if applicable. Programs involving the the release of plutonium. along with the (4) Table 5-C-1 is a summary of the programs committed dose equivalent (weighted. Owing to the large uncertainties associa~ed with the source terms and diffusion coefficients. dose values (unweighed) are produced. D OSE Inhalation dose commitment. and tritium. a universal nomogram during an emergency situation. however. Should a desired radionuclide not reside in the database. for example. (5) The dosimetric methods of ICRP have been used Key assumptions (for example. reference (o). and mitigation factor. distribution is modeled using virtual source terms as EXPLUME. and RESUS—allow for downwind dose needed. a dose-conversion factor can be input by the user. More importantly. 5-c-3 . RESUS General resuspension model. TRIT Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a tritium release. Individual organ and release fraction) are noted as appropriate. Three general programs: PLUME. PURES Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from the resuspension of plutonium. Other ating instructions and information are contained in programs estimate the dose commitment from inhalation Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) of any one of the radionuclides listed in the database Manual 161. using ICRP-30 Library. are possible. or an area contamination event. UFIRE Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving natural uranium of any enrichment of 235U. The manual is designed for and estimate the effects of a surface-burst detonation of a nuclear weapon. Although significant errors material as a result of the continuous or puff release. the HOT SPOT codes radionuclides selected from ICRP Publication 30. Resuspension Source Term. modeling the initial distribution assessment following the release of any radioactive associated with an explosive release or area. the HOT SPOT programs will provide a explosive release. users of the codes and therefore does not contain detailed descriptions of algorithms used in the codes. additional fine tuning of the model with plume-rise algorithms and similar modifications was deemed unwarranted. BOMB Effects of a surface-burst fission weapon. using ICRP-30 Library. Several programs deal with body dose commitment). Also contains a subroutine for the determination of radionuclide weight fractions as a function of mix age. TABLE 5-C-1. PUFIRE Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving plutonium. uranium. FIDLER FJDLER calibration and data reduction. each with its independent release associated with reading a graph incorrectly or scaling fraction. Initial radionuclide nuclear weapons. to atmospheric transport of radionuclides employ a expedite the initial assessment of accidents involving Gaussian plume-dispersal model. (3) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes oper. thus minimizing the potential errors in the database. activity. EXPLUM”E General explosive release dispersion model. Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Physics Codes Program Name Description PUEXP Downwind dose commitment and ground deposition estimates resulting from an explosive release of plutonium. using ICRP-30 Library. The will produce a consistent output for the same input source term can contain any or all of the radionuclides assumptions. These reasonable level of accuracy for a timely initial three programs interact with a data-base containing 75 assessment.within minutes of data input. RADWORK Determination of recommended workplaces for the handling of radioactive materials. equivalent whole- contained in reference (o). particle-size distribution throughout the HOT SPOT programs. LUNG Lung screening for plutonium using a FIDLER detector. using ICRP-30 Library. PLUME General Gaussian plume dispersion model.

). a more refined projection will be (c) Type and quantity of weapons involved in available in somewhat less conservative assumptions are the accident [weapon information should be transmitted made in estimating the actual amount of material at using the line number(s) contained in TP-20-11. all the nuclear directly by the installation initiating the OPREP-3 report material at risk (except that of the IHE item[s]). a computer generated estimate of maxi- (2) In the event of a nuclear weapon accident at mum credible ground-level-contamination spread and or near an ARAC-serviced facility. General risk released during the accident. contamination and dose. information. ARAC projections will assist in assessing the potential (6) Approximately 30 minutes after the ARAC impact of an accident and in identifying areas for initial facility has been notified of the necessary accident investigation by response force radiological teams. Conservative site system computer located at the installation. Desired information includes: either a larger or smaller area depending on the 5-c-4 . Also. duration of any fire. excluding notification of ARAC will come through the NMCC’S insensitive high explosive (IHE) weapons. However. Similar conservative commercial (41 5) 422-9100. type and amount of fuel involved and (1) ARAC provides the user with computer model measured contamination at specific locations with estimates of the contamination distribution resulting respect to the contamination source. and subsequent weather by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. ARAC approximately 30 minutes after ARAC has Projected deposition patterns will assist estimates of site received notification of the: restoration efforts. At this time ARAC close to an ARAC serviced site. ARAC projected doses will assist (3) During normal working hours (currently 0730 initial response efforts in evaluating the potential hazard to 1615 Pacific Tirne)l. Although (5) Every effort should be made to provide updated the initial projections are shown typically on a 30-by- or supplementary information to the ARAC Center as 30’ k~lometer grid. FTS 532-9100. b. if available. If the accident occurred in a CONUS area. ARAC can generate a calculation based on a meteorological (4) Responses outside the hours listed above are forecast to give projected contamination patterns in case subject to an additional 60:90 minutes delay. Until time and equipment permit observers). directed the time of the accident. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (a) Observed wind speed and wind direction at (ARAC). from a nuclear weapon accident. and height and and radiation dose to exposed population in the size of the plume or cloud (if available from reliable surrounding areas. that changes. the initial projections can’t support OCONUS facilities in the same manner will probabiy not include geographic features (roads. as CONUS facilities. (a) Accident location. etc. (Estimates are now based on only those known to have undergone a high- Firefighting Guidance (C)]. contamination. completion of extensive radiation surveys and bioassays.initial estimates of the extent of to the general public until comprehensive radiation contamination can be ready for transmission from measurements and bioassays can be performed. If the accident location isn’t Livermore tie line extension 2-9100. Weapons at risk. provides support to emergency response teams during (b) Description of accident particulars. city boundaries. computer generated estimates of the location and such as mechanism of the release (high explosive contamination levels of deposited radiological material detonation or fire). when exposed JNAIR Team. ARAC is a DoE and DoD resource. Iine numbers for the specific weapon(s) releasing. these refined projections may cover soon as it is available. (7) Approximately 60 to 90 minutes after notifi- (b) Time of accident. explosive detonation). ARAC products include (c) Specific details of accident fire or explosion. For consequence analyses. by calling ARAC’S EMERGENCY number: released in an aerosolized form. ARAC should be contacted to unusual stress during the accident undergo a non- nuclear high-explosive detonation. the ARAC Center projected whole-body effective dose to exposed persons will be alerted by the facilit y’s personnel using the ARAC in the downwind area will be available. of dispersal during a weapon-safing operation. or through assumptions are made where specific accident informa- AUTOVON by asking the Albuquerque operator for the tion is missing or unknown. is to NMCC. cation of ARAC. including accidents involving radioactive materials. assumptions are made in calculating the amount of immediately after the initial report to the NMCC is radiological material released so that these initial completed. projections place an upper bound on levels of resulting remote from an ARAC serviced DoD installation.

Line nine shows the radiological material action may be required until the contamination is modeled. Lines three through six will be reserved for sheltering.000) for ease of overlaying the example. to mark areas in the contour display where the dose or deposition is greater than the stated value. and 6 microCuries per square meter provide information regarding the ARAC example @Ci/ mz). of the area covered by the 25 and 150 rem contour patterns). Lme seven identifies either the dose (b) Cumulative Deposition “Exposure Action integration period or total deposition period time as Levels. time that the specific computer model estimation was < Greater than 0.Immediate Time (GMT)).Consider produced. respiratory protection required. overlay a geographic representation.Respiratory protec- display will be a legend. Projected cumulative depositions are for levels Group 3 telecopier machine. Note that ARAC considered within this area.5 rem. 25. 1:50.downwind extent of the contamination. which refer to a 50 year whole body effective dose via the inhalation pathway. Lines recommend controlled evacuation. generalized actions that may be on the ARAC plots. There are a maximum of three cumulative (8) When available. The first line is a title line for tion required.5 rem .60. Printed across the top of each respiratory protection and evacuation recommended. Release loca- tion is centered in this a~ea (refined projections may (9) The wording which accompanies the action have release location offset from center) with a 2000. A maximum of three contoured areas will be shown sure Action Levels. consider these notes. ‘ action levels was contracted because of space limitations and abbreviated. 5. (b) Descriptive Notes.” appropriate (NOTE: All times will be shown as “Z” time. and networks and waterways. across the middle of the display directing the viewer to the ARAC Computer Estimation Notes on the right ~ Greater than 150 rem . If the site does not have a site system highest projected levels will be shown on any ARAC computer. and the height above ground level at which stabilized or removed.Supervised are% action levels as calculated for that particular plot. possible controlled evacuation showing a particular contour cross hatch pattern used required. etc. the contour levels are calculated and displayed. Greater than 60pCi/ m . graphic display area will be the title of the underlying ~ Greater than 25 rem . The full wording follows: 5-c-5 . the area given for exceeding 25 rem is the sum projected deposition pattern. Within each block is an area access on need only basis. than 150. the area (c) The wording of the preceding deposition covered by this particular pattern in square kilometers. showing road of the accident until the valid time of the plot. in both kilometers and feet) comprise three separate & Greater than 6 pCi/ mz .” Projected doses apply only to people emanating from the release point which will. Only the areas with the three serviced sites.. of the area around the recommended actions are to reduce the projected dose accident site.Restricted are% blocks of information. sheltering or evacuation. 2 10 through 22 will show the specific computer estimation 2. levels in the legend follows: foot fragmentation circle drawn around the release point. general amplifying remarks about the computer - estimation. To the right of the contour & Greater than 5 rem . (a) Geographic Contour Display. The issue shelte~lng instructions. Dose exposures are projected for levels greater “initial” projections shown in Figures 5-C. recommend sheltering. and 0.Prompt action computer estimation denoting either a “50 Year Whole required. projections are made. The second line will denote the date and evacuation. Note that the area given can generate projection plots to match a given map scale will encompass the area of all higher levels shown (for (for example. ARAC may be transmitted to deposition and four dose exposure levels for which the ARAC site system computer located at most ARAC. “Z” is equivalent to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) which has replaced the more familiar Greenwich Mean ~ Greater than 600 pCi/mz . The display is always oriented with north toward the (a) 50-Yr Whole-Body Effective-Dose “Expo- top. the projections can be telefaxed to any CCITT plot. The words “SEE NOTES” will be printed to those people exposed. The following paragraphs greater than 600.Immediate side of the graphics plot.I and 5-C-2. in most outdoors without respiratory protection from the time cases. recommend controlled next several lines (down to the scale of the display shown evacuation 2-14 days. issue sheltering instructions. consider Body Effective Dose” or “Cumulative Deposition” plot.

000 I 1 — y n . . . ... ... .v.. . k . v v v v v RQC C o m p u t e r S i m u l a t i o n N o t e s ~en er ated: 31t19R89 2 3 3 2 2 T N Est m a t Eff.. I l\ I ‘. /... ~. . H E Det of all line items..!.. ..... — ‘) bcale = 1:200...:: s / . .. \ ... ..... II= E . . ‘& .. . W B — Dose <R e m a r k s : I n i t i a l P l o t . .— . K / .. . .. t .. Figure 5-C-1: ARAC PLOT-Lung Dose.. .

B . 6 uCi/m2 4 6 .. issue sheltering instructions.1 4 days... ~. ... v v Lat: 37°42’04” N .9 km Source Location: . 0 ft Len: 1 2 1 ° 5 5 ’ 4 9 ” H . ... .. nd c o n t r o l l e d e v a c u a t i o n . —-~ . . $.. r e c o m m e n d [\ l e d e v a c u a t i o n 2 . 1 0 0 0 0 .9 sq km s e d area. . 0 sq km te a c t i o n r e q u i r e d . II ) 6B uCi/m2 1(3. . .. ... 5. — m: . ARAC PLCJl_-Deposition. 5 s q km Ezzzl’ Restricted area: Recess on need E \ only b a s i s . I Figure 5-C-2.0 m 2 . he Itering i n s t r u c t i o n s ... Possible controlled evacuation required. I 2000 A\ i“ FT —J L ) \ 1— otal D e p o s i t i o n : 0MQR89 2 2 9 0 Z t o 31MRR89 0 0 0 9 Z ateriul: PU-239 xposure Rct ion Leuels: /~kLeuel und Rrea Couered) Ixxxm 612E! uCi/mZ at 0.. L I ..

materials had been dispersed from the weapon. A variety of (d) The results of an aerial survey of Area 13 DoE owned aerial platforms (fixed-wing and helicopter) of the Nevada Test Site is shown in Figure 5-C-3. & Dominant isotopes. Controlled evacuation should be considered and may have to occur between about two days and two weeks (b) The first radiological photography survey or more. This are dedicated to supporting this mission. was the site of a “one-point” detonation in the 1950s equipment capable of being mounted on a variety of to simulate a weapon accident. c. The EG&G AMS has three capabilities ~ The analysis laboratory would arrive 4 avaiIable to support a weapon accident: aerial radio. Controlled evacua- ~ Direction of the plume centerline. used to guide radiation survey teams to the areas of Room air conditioners should be turned off. contamination protective clothing. Detailed radiological contours. All work on. ~ Greater than 6 pCi/ mz . Instrumentation includes to map the contaminated area in detail. hours (plus driving time) after notification. Also.Supervised area. Additional data processing will and/ or meat and poultry must be controlled and further establish the identity and concentration of the isotopes action regarding them assessed. but appropriately line spacings. logical mapping. hardware. Controlled heaviest contamination. ~ A survey would then be conducted in a Entry restricted to those who live.were”analyzed for the 60 keV photopeak of Am241.5 to five miles apart to determine: a need to be there. contamination clothing and respiratory protection Dispersion patterns and relative radiation intensities. a preliminary action requ~ed. and/or have serpentine pattern of survey lines 0. The length of large-volume. involved. contamination via resuspension. (2) Aerial Radiological Mapping. Residents immediately available from the initial survey. may be should remain indoors with doors and windows closed. incident site maps. The aerial survey data DoD helicopters is available to perform survey missions . All activities should be considered carefully conducted after a weapon accident is likely to follow and supervised. tion of residents. Decontamination personnel and public health and safety staff should wear limited anti- & Radiological deposition outline. and aerial photography. data time required to complete this series of surveys may formatting and recording” equipment. agricultural products radiological survey data. progress of clean-up operations. 1. Full anti-contamination clothing and this protocol and time frame: respirators required for all personnel engaged in heavy work or dusty. The helicopter would arrive six to ten remain indoors with windows closed unless evacuation hours follo=ng notification. as needed. The purpose of these surveys would be scaled. available 6 to 12 hours after the flight is completed or after the analysis laboratory arrives. direct readout be surveyed and the weather. a coverage of large areas and yield average ground series of smaller area surveys would be initiated.. broad survey is completed. The concentrations of the contaminant. Urgent remedial action may be needed radiological survey would establish whether radioactive from within a few hours up to two days. Aerial Measurement System (AMS). (1) General. Aerial radiolog- ical surveys provide rapid assessment and thorough (c) After the first. a nuclear weapon accident. Full anti. Subsequent surveys could provide data on the ~ Greater than 60 pC1/ mt . especially children.Restricted area. work. aerial search for weapons and/ or ~ Full analysis of flight results would be weapon components. sodium-iodide gamma-ray detectors. depending upon the area to equipment. windy operations. Residents should 1. meteorological instruments. The system can also flight altitude would likely be 100 feet with 200 foot be used to quickly prepare crude. Greater than 600 pCi/m2 . required by all emergency staff in this area. + Information from 3 would be transmitted by radio to base operations during the survey. is in progress or there is no significant airborne hazard ~ The helicopter would then be refueled and and none forecast to occur via resuspension. or the use of. such as those shown in 5-C-8 . is possible during q Approximate radiation levels along the decontamination if there is a possibility of airborne plume centerline. AMS personnel will assist evacuation of children and adults should be considered interpreting and correlating their information with other urgent. positioning be from one to five days. the crew would obtain instructions within two hours.Immediate (a) In. and data ‘analysis equipment.

The americium concentrations indicated represents knots).0 flCi/mz. area of contamination and the in helicopters. The aerial survey results average. Experience has shown that the lower level of known detectability and normally requires low altitudes detectability y of Am241 can be expected to be 0. ditches. Aerial search personnel will be able to determine on the order of 1 to 10 flCi/ mz of plutonium. capability may be useful only for certain sources of made).1. such as the UH-60 and U H. operates out of helicopters.000. under field conditions.000 times the area sampled by a FIDLER-type a site.03 to (100 feet or less) and slow speeds (approximately 60 1.3 #Ci/ mz for both CS137 and 1131.000 times larger than the area sampled by an alpha produces detailed aerial photographs= The second system probe or a soil sample. The area (4) Aerial Photography. These consist of gamma and the completion of the previous survey flight. and 0. utilizing the Hasselblad scale averages and take into account the overall effect 70mm cameras to produce color photographs. This interference of other isotopes (both natural and man. In certain scenarios. Two major photographic sampled in a single aerial measurement is on the order systems are used to acquire detailed serial photos over of 1. sample results should be done with caution. which 1. vegetation cover and the Hasselblad system can be produced and printed terrain effects. One system consists of a large format aerial instrument at one (1) foot above the ground and mapping camera operated in fixed-wing aircraft. the aerial produced to map scales can be printed on-site generally search capabilities available from AMS capabilities may within hours of the completion of the flight.03 to 0. neutron detector modules designed for the DoE owned (e) The sensitivity of the system depends upon BO-105 helicopters or portable modules that can be used the flight altitude. water bodies. .Figure 5-C-3 would be available five to eight hours after need to be employed. the appropriate flight parameters when notified of the (f) Comparison with ground-based survey and particular scenario. Large prints up to 20” x 24” (3) Aerial Search. 5-c-9 . Film from of roads.

...” . “. ... . . . b9 49 \ . . . .: /.LQ . .- ..\ . 3 a /. . .. . ~ \ .. ... ..’”” . .- ---- (!) w -. . .. .! . . . .. . .. ... . ...”” “ ”’... . . ” . 5-C-1O .. “WP? “ ” :2 v .. . . . .. . . ● .. .””’ .”” .. . \. .

SPA 3 probe is more useful for measuring the medium These actions include identification of the affected area energy gamma radiation from uranium.52-M APPENDIX 5-D AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS 5-D-1 SURVEYS monitoring at the hot line. may be used to detect contamination. readings detect lower levels of contamination than low energy of 500 CPM are recommended for instruments with 60 gamma instruments. Alpha instruments can instruments are used to establish the perimeter. If ments are. and if weather or field conditions preclude of instrument failure when field use requires measure. same level of contamination as that produced by a “new” determination of the location of measurements made. priority should be given be used primarily for personnel and equipment to establishing a 10 mR/ hr perimeter. General. migrating into the soil. For the best (perimeter survey) to permit identification of potentially detection efficiency. may be used. priority must be given to those actions field surveys of plutonium contamination. the use of alpha instruments. weapon. The fragility of the Mylar probe face on recommended to perform perimeter surveys. therefore. (1) Selection of Instrumentation. If fission products irregular surfaces. or only on the knowl. whereas the required to identify and minimize the hazards to people. Each successive survey operation conducted prior to any rainfall. Later surveys will be based on the initial survey data which will not normally be available until the specialized and AMS plots. Field use should be limited to only smooth surfaces like pavement and buildings. Days will be required to complete teams arrive. The best instrumentation for edge that contamination will be dispersed downwind. Alpha surveys are possible only under the perimeter. Selection of instru. low energy gamma/x-ray surveys uses FIDLER probes. 10 years old. cm probe area and 105 CPM for instruments with 17 alpha radiation has an extremely short detection range cm probes be used to mark the perimeter. a. Low energy gamma instru- released by the accident must be done immediately. and x-ray radiation present depends on the age of the plutonium. low energy x-ray surveys should be contaminated people. as possible. Alpha instruments should therefore ‘were caused by the accident. and during the first five will be based in part on the information gained from days after the accident before part of the measurable earlier operations. available radiation survey instruments and energy gamma/ x-ray instruments are not subject to monitoring personnel for survey operations will be damage by surfaces being monitored and field surveys limited. with ment of contamination on rough ground or other the x-ray probe attached. Under field conditions. During the initial hours of the daughter. and its americium restoration plans. FIDLERs are evaporated.and area for decontamination and to develop and evaluate x-ray radiations from plutonium. The type and amount of low energy gamma comprehensive contamination characterization. however.I . Initial radiation surveys may be based low energy radiation present is screened by the plutonium on ARAC information. resulting in higher signal strengths for the mentation. (2) Perimeter Contamination Levels. the recommended instruments for a release occurred. Determining whether contamination was can be rapidly conducted. identification of the edge of contamination. If FIDLERs are detection range of alpha radiation results in a high rate unavailable. if available. therefore. When low and its detection may be blocked by nothing more than energy gamma/ x-ray instruments are used to establish surface moisture. DoD 51OO. Extensive radiation predictions and (b) Low Energy Gamma Instruments. a reading of twice background is dry conditions. When alpha (a) Alpha Instruments. 5-D. Many weapons will contain plutonium over b. for example. with alpha most alpha instruments combined with the short instruments the second choice. Instru- surveys will be required to identify and characterize the ments capable of detecting the low energy gamma. the age of the plutonium and and data recorqing procedures are similar for most projected signal strength should be determined as soon survey operations. the AN/ PDR-56F. Low “ response. after any morning dew has recommended to mark the perimeter. General Survey Procedures. The age of the plutonium in a weapon can be obtained from the DoE ARG.

use of widely separated monitoring points and a vehicle When engineering survey equipment is not being used. and perimeter survey procedures may ~. ARAC show the identification marking used at each point. compass location of the perimeter to the command center and bearings taken on two or more identified reference permit team progress to be tracked. While not classified. This may not be possible until after the specialized teams (4) Recording Survey Data. The On-Scene Commander and civil immediate need for radiological data may outweigh the authorities will need at least a rough plot of the perimeter time required to determine precise positions. will assist in determining the an estimated position to use immediately following data area and distance the perimeter survey teams may be collection. to aid in identifying affected equipment may be unavailable to determine precise people. A numbered or uniquely identified stake contaminated area must be considered when directing may be used to mark the location on soil.” meaning background radiation reading has to support decontamination and restoration planning. to move between monitoring points should be considered the monitoring log. Estimated positions may be street addresses be adjusted accordingly. Data location mark (stake number or other (6) Area Surveys. most times by the Aerial Measurement System~AMS). The urgency of perimeter definition is directly related ~. initial perimeter survey. FIDLERs should be identifying positions in sparse[y populated areas. or the position determined precisely for later although the location of rivers or other terrain features correlation of the data with other information. Engineering survey to prevent undue alarm. used when performing a full survey of the perimeter. the perimeter ~. (a) For radiation monitoring data to be useful. the estimated distance down a street locations on each traverse will provide an immediate or road from an identifiable intersection. and projections. the same size or slightly smaller. the odometer mileage from an intersection or other known point may be adequate for (b) Full Perimeter Survey. Instrument reading indicating if the reading area are required to identify areas requiring fixation. therefore pavement or other hard surfaces for later reference. as soon as possible upon which to base their actions. which may hinder access to portions of the potentially ~. If perimeter survey teams are equipped with a radio. If weather or terrain require the recorded at the transit position and radiological data use of the AN/ PDR-56 x-ray probe on the initial being recorded by the monitors can be correlated. Data points should be marked in some to the population in the area. (5) Perimeter Surveys. Team member names. (3) Fixing Survey Points. ~. or “Net” meaning the background and jo determine decontamination effectiveness. required to cover. and a similar the perimeter survey. actions. arrive and may take weeks to complete. ~. and to establish controls to prevent the spread positions in the early phases of response. established by the fuIl perimeter survey should be about ~. if available. The procedure (a) If an engi~eering survey is being performed most likely to be used will consist of monitoring in and concurrently with the radiological survey. Streets and roads will manner so that the point can be later relocated for other normally provide rapid access to populated areas. The radiation reading has not subtracted from the instrument first survey covering the entire area wiil be provided reading. a position report at the perimeter in urban areas. Rapid identification the point where it is collected must be identifiable on of the perimeter of the contaminated area is required a map or aerial photo of the area. If a vehicle is used during the on unsecure nets. If an alpha instrument the following information: was used for the initial perimeter survey. Type instrument and serial number. ~. Date and start/stop time of survey. points. or the of contamination. not been subtracted. or data collection record. 5-D-2 . marking) when used. Estimated or surveyed position. should when directing the initiaI perimeter survey. is “Gross. the full perimeter survey can result Monitoring and survey teams’ records should include in an expansion of the perimeter. or any other reference which can be located on transmissiorr of radiation readings should be discouraged the maps being used. recording out along the edge of the area with readings being taken procedures must ensure that positional data being about every 50 feet. (a) Radiological surveys of the contaminated Q. (a) Initial Fkrimeter Survey. perimeter survey. The contaminated area may be unique identification painted or otherwise marked on a mile or more wide and several miles long.

halls. contaminants entering the building through heating or cooling systems.buildings should be used with FIDLERs. and on top of horizontal by wiping surfaces with a piece of material. windows. windows which is then monitored for contamination it absorbed. When as carpets where contamination maybe below the surface monitoring the interior of a building. be performed only on the exterior unless the building Monitoring results from furnace and air conditioning is in use. windows. such as a policeman. If contamination absorbed by the swipe. Interior contamination levels will vary measurement errors associated with the instruments. and ventilators ments may be used on most building surfaces. methods which minimize support decontamination planning will be performed tracking of contamination into . or on materials such during contamination of the surrounding area. to is required to validate and support analysis of the plot. and whether or not people were in the complete a ground survey of the entire area. Some of the supporting ground data may be provided If interiors are surveyed before the surrounding area by the initial perimeter survey. The amount of should be on the floor in the main traffic pattern removable contamination present must be determined (doorways. initial monitoring and screened from alpha instruments. Initial building surveys should is found. . Ground survey data appropriate civil authority. Usually some form of grid survey will (for example. chimneys. The sealing of doors. surfaces near heating or cooling duct outlets. filters should be included in building survey records. 5-D-3 . Interior surveys validating decontamination effectiveness may contamination levels will be only a fraction of the require several months to complete due to the low levels exterior levels at the same location. The AMS plot requires for either building owners and/ or tenants. Ground building at the time of. or following the accident. Ground surveys to has been decontaminated. If no contami- Laboratory counting equipment should be used to nation is found at these locations it is very likely no determine the amount of removable contamination contamination entered the building. appropriate decontamination actions. additional monitoring should be performed. the t ype of heating or cooling From several days to over a week may be required to system used. of interior contamination are expected to be airborne (7) Building Surveys. Alpha instru. however. or contamination contaminated area will be required to determine the tracked or carried into the building by people or animals. and doors. accompany monitors when surveying building interiors. because of the time of year. on evacuated buildings in highly decontaminated areas use of FIDLERs may be necessary on surfaces which may minimize further contamination of the interior may damage alpha instruments. and the desired precision.The initial AMS data will be available four-five hours (b) Civil authorities should establish procedures after completion of survey flights. The primary source of contamination remaining. cover shoes with plastic bag immediately be used with the grid size determined by the desired before entering buildings and ensure gioves are accuracy of estimated activity between grid points and uncontaminated). or an interpretation by trained analysts. or swipe. and stairs). or other openings (a) Radiological surveys of buildings within the during the initial cloud passage. and other openings into the building.

DoD 51 OO.52-M




Accurate records should be maintained of exposure times and levels of exposure for all personnel entering and
exiting the accident area. Additionally, a complete radiological history should be made for each individual who
is actually contaminated. This appendix contains examples of forms that may be used to document and record
this information.

Form 1 - Personal Data Form
This form contains data which should be obtained from all personnel who enter the radiological
control area.

Form 2 - Radiological Control Area Log
This form is for use at the contamination control station.

Form 3 - Bioassay Screening Log
This form is for maintaining a record of all necessary bioassay screening performed and may be
used for both response force personnel and civilians who may have been contaminated as a result
of the accident.

Form 4 - Radiation Health History
This form is to assist in the screening of civilians who may have been contaminated as a result
of the accident.

Form 5 - Field Monitoring Data Log
This form is to assist in documenting field monitoring measurements by survey teams.

Form 6 - TLD Measurements
This form is to be used to document TLD readings.

Form 7 - Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation
This form is to be used to log samples taken from the surrounding environment.

Form 8 - FIDLER Data Form
This form is used when logging readings from the FIDLER.





(P/em print or place “X” in boxes as appropriate)
Sa Ravarm for Additional Inarructlons

IIasr) (firrtl [m.i.l (dw)(month)(vr)

‘4) MALE0 o r FEMALE ❑
‘5 A) MILITARY ❑ or ‘5 B) CIVILIAN m

(6) “SA m ‘7 }
GFIAOE (9A) (9B) “SA
000 ❑ USN (10) GRAOE (111.jERIEs
[ uSMC B]
( -j
‘JOE cl---”~”n-n

(Yes) (No)
c1 c 1

c1 c 1


(15)”Av Ey0uw0RKE0 1~ *NT,. contamination CLOT” ING ANO Respirators?
n n

n u
n n

lUmt/Emplow Nnmo or Svmbol) lStraat, P.O. Box. Mail Stop, etc.l

(CIrV or Milirw Base) [State or County) (ZIP Code)
[Place “X” if unknown}
(Area Code tmd Number)

(signature) IOa!e)







Figure 5-E-1. Personal Data Form.




3 Show day and year as numerical and month as alphabetical; e.g., 23 Jan 65 or 01 Jun 42.

5 Check either 5A or 50,

6 Foreign military and US Coast Guard check “OTHER. ”

7 Show alphabetical/numerical grade; e.g., E3 or 05, rather than rank; e.g., PFC or CDR.

8 Show “MOS,” “NE C,” “ AFSC, ” etc., of your current duty assignment.

9B Civilians with DOD agencies check “DOD” and appropriate service or “OTHER. ”

10 DOD and DOE employees show pay schedule and level; e.g., GS-10, SES-79.

11 US government civilians other than DOD or DOE, show grade and series for profession; other
civilians give short title for profession; e.g., health phys, rad monitor, or comp programmer.

12 Check “YES” if you were monitored by thermoluminescent dosimeter; i.e., TLD; check “YES”
if you worked with soft beta emitters and were monitored by some means other than film”
badge or TLD.

13 Check “YES” if an occupationally exposed individual or radiation worker.

14 Check “YES” if trained in use of Ml 7 or M 17A protective masks.

15 Check “YES” if anti-C work was participation in training courses with or without actual
radioactive contamination.

16 Check “YES” if you underwent medical treatment involving radiation or radioactive
materials, if your occupational exposure is near permissible limits and/or if an accident
response dose report is necessary to continue your regular radiation work.

19 Following codes may be used: “R” for Radiological Safety Officer or Radiological Protection
Officer, “M” for Medical Department, “C” for Commander, “F” for USAF Master Radiation

20 In’lieu of commercial number, show “AVN” for AUTOVON or “FTS” for Federal Tele-
communications System.


Radiological Control Area Log. Figure 5-E-2. MI) NUMBER NUMe ER #N Ou T 50C S E C NO 5 46 47 48 49 s 51 5 m — s 67 60 6 I 5 46 4 7 484 565 1 59 6 0( i?6 3 6 4( 66 768[ lM. r v FORM 2 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG OP.E CORDER 5sN F6LM . VACV &CT. S FOI+M 5UL3JECT 10 THE PR. FIHST. TE FAG=— ~F— T I M E .oNTROL ❑ ADGE T I ME NAM E( LAST. .


Column 76 should be marked with a ‘f if all detected contamination was removed from the person. Column 75 should be marked with a Y if contamination was found on body or personal clothing when exiting the control area If no yl contamination was detected state “none. 9. 80. c. If Personal clothing was confiscated during decontamination. If no contamination was detected state “none. or street clothing without a r e s p i r a t o r . Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders change in mid sheet. N if not and remarks are mandatory. Any unusual incidents or additional data deemed important for radiological safety should be described in the remarks section a n d sequentially numbered. Column 72 should be marked with an x if the person was wearing anti-contamination clothing without a respirator. The number should be inidcated in Columns 77. d. Column 71 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing full anti-contamination clothing and a respirator. Each day should be started with a new form and the total ”number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms. . b. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG a. Column 73 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing street clothing. ” m L e. articles taken should be noted in remarks. ” f.

5-E-8 .


c :
*ECORDER w In: I .1 I
: ; Xz
~ o ~ xl.
v ~ o t?
; o ; <u
- ● w !4
SOC SEC NO I L A S T N A M E z e e 1I “ ,

‘b L


Figure 5-E:3. Bioassy Screen Log.

: R E C O R D E R


ti 1
Ii I


1 I J


a, Columns O-23. If more than 14 characters in last name truncate as necessary.
t). Column ; 1 indicate with M or C,

c. Column 25 should be marked with Y if person is normally classified as a radiation worker by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
leave blank for all others.

d, Column 26 should be marked Y if person is not associated with a DC)D, Federal or state accident response organization, leave blank
for all others.

e. Column 27. Insure all persons marked Y in Column 26 have completed a Radiation I+ealth History form and check, leave blank for
all others.

f, Columns 28-39 should be marked Y where appropriate if contamination was found and column number and associated reading
recorded in the remarks section. All personal articles and clothing retained for decontamination or disposal should be recorded in the
remarks section. If no contamination was detected leave blank,
9. COIUmn 40 should be marked Y if all detected contamination was removed from the person, N if not and remarks are mandatory, If
no contamination was detected leave blank,

h, Columns 41, 46, and 47 mark with Y if bioassay samples collected, N if not.

i, Columns 42-45, 48-51, 52-56, and 57-61 enter units used in column headers and measurements in appropriate columns.

j. Columns 62-65 enter time bioassay sample was collected.

k, Column 71 mark Y if additional bioassay samples or other data is required and specify in remarks section.

1. Any unusual incidents or other data deemed important should be described in the remarks section and sequentially numbered, The
number should be indicated in Columns 77-80, Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders change in mid sheet.

m. Each day should be started with a new form and the total number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms.

qll .



. .–—— 2. Field Monitoring Data Log.. Milk and Unless Inslrumenl ml Wtalh!r TIME Crossroads. —— llme Returned: . Meler Rcadlng ReadlnQ Closed 3 II Mtler TImdlng ICPMI Filler Filler No. CIOUO Passage Grid Coordinalas. S#mplo m COMMINTS Window Maiohl Gross CPM Crou C?M CPM Pet flfidlcate Flclors Such k: PeIk toclllon wllh wllhoul Type.. Ou8ntlty 100 CM1 Ileadlng.01 _—_ Orlg Ilnam Ref... . Background Pl{llc”la16 Parllc”lala Ttg Soil. . Form 5 Page _ _ _ .. Wmr Unlta Noled Condillons. Incldenl _ 0?18 .7! I Figure 5-E-5. NAMES Time Olspalched: Or $:rial !i8 !. No.—. tic. . _ I I I I t L L/l I 1 1 f I . and Olher OaIeI ==H=H= u! h . FIELD MONITORING DATA 10G NOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BACKGROUND LEVEL OR MOL Alfl MONITORING SAMPLE COILICTION SMEM _ CIMI _ M i n . Momr Open 4 In.

. 5-E-16 .

.—-— Figure 5-E-6.—— .— I I — -1.—.—. . . . .-— . -“------+ A — ——— .— — - ‘----t-- -J ‘--’_i —---—–––4––– .d ——.-_..— — —c — I . . UNITS )TORAGE COMMENTS ORGANIZATION REAIJING COORDINATES. . I TIME GROUNO OATE TIME OOSE OATE TIME ----1 —. TLDMeasurement Collection and Analysis Form...——I __ ——— I -1 —.—— —— —-— I -. Form 6 TLD MEASUREMENTS COLLECTION ANO ANALYSIS I INCIDENT ‘ -. . . . — ------+- —____—l. _____ .— . . .— .. —.—— — . ._ I —. ETC. LABORATORY PAGE ______ OF ______ LAB MANAGER ROUTETO _ OEA —— –--’————l——~ I 1 -L LOCATION PLACEO FIETRIEVEO ASSUMED READOUT “RANSITI TEAMI NET [BE SPECIFIC.— . — . GRID FIEAEIING BACK. .—— _ _ _ ._ —. . 1 .

5-E-18 .

Waler. Air Filter and Weather Conditions. [Indicates Factors Such As Peak Grid Coordinates. Serial No. Instrument BKG _ Calibration Date Conversion Factor Instrument MDL Sample COlleciiOn Commenls Locations Type: Soil. Weapons Accident Environ”mental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form. Reading Units Tag No. Cloud Passage. 5-E-19 . etc.WEAPONS ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION ALPHA PROBE DATA FORM NOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BKG OR MDL Incident Date Data Type: Alpha _ _ B e t a _. and Olher Data] -% . ’ Figure 5-E-7. Milk. Inslrtimenl Time Crossroads. Gamma — Agency /Org. Team/Monitor _ Detector Type Model No. Reading.

. 5-E. .20 .

FIDLER Data Form. . 1 = 100% Aborption) Source-to-Detector Height cm 1 pCi Am-241 = Alpha pCi Pu Mix (excludes PI-I-241 (Beta)) Alpha Activity Mix If Scaler CPM or Coun~{$Ume $ & Time Location Reading Counts ~2 Comments 1 . 5-E-2 1 . Form 8 FIDLER DATA FORM Incident D a t e _ _ FIDLER SItd Agency /Org. Figure 5-E-8. __ Team/Monitor — Check One: — Scaler –— Rate Meter Calibration Date Radionuclide Check Source: Quantity – pCi Background Counting Time: —_ Minutes RC Time Constant: _ Minutes Energy Window Background Check Source K-Factor [keV) ICPM) [CPM] [rrrz] 17 60 Other Self Shielding (17 keV) (O -1: 0 = No Absorption in Check Source.

.. 5-E-22 .

including death.. qualitative smoke test around the edges of the mask tory protection including protection factors. medical requirement to cool the person since the short Protection factors are determined by dividing the unprotected exposure during evacuation from the area ambient air concentrations (AAC) of a contaminant by for treatment will limit the amount of contaminant which “ the inhaled concentration (IC) or amount of contaminant which enters the mask. moisture present. In deriving the deposition) and is difficult to measure and predict. Pressure demand SCBA (i. Table 6-1 provides respiratory protection facility/ chamber using probe equipped test masks in a guidelines to use when air sampling data provides a basis chamber containing a nontoxic contaminant is required for assessing airborne contamination levels. but settle to the ground b. If the mask passes a This chapter addresses protective clothing and respira. source of airborne radioactivity at an accident site. Therefore. action guide and resuspension factors. a PF of 100 was assumed and the maximum Respiratory protection prevents airborne contamination permissible concentration (MPC) of activity in the air from entering the lungs and is provided by self contained being inhaled was based on a MPC for radiation workers breathing apparatus (SCBA). The time versus dose from inhaling airborne particulate contaminants approach should be applied in emergencies as approp- provided by a given device is called its protection factor. and time since develop situation specific instructions. PF’s of up to 2. protective it is assumed a PF above the nominal value is achieved. if in heat injuries.000 can be achieved with properly fitted respirators. In MPC for the general public. . riate. respiratory protection devices can result of level of activity and exposure time. vegetation. particulate out of the ambient air. mask fit and mask design. Protective Action Guidelines (PAG). A test is inhaled. and their use is not recommended except times greater than the one (1) pCi/ m3/ 168 hour week when airborne ~ontamination is present or expected. 6-1 . that is. The guidelines provided are intended for Resuspension is highly dependent upon specific use until health physics personnel at the scene can conditions (for example.52-M CHAPTER 6 RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION 6-1 GENERAL through JNACC.000. A deployable fit test facility may be obtained activity before entering the table. Protection Factors (PF). or respirators which filter of 40 picocuries/ cubic meter (pCi/ mj) per 40 hour week. guidelines. be permitted to enter an area of higher activity without adequate respiratory protection for a shorter period of a. a person could should be implemented when temperatures exceed 70°F.e. These particulate may be present in the cloud and smoke from a breached or burning weapon. upon limits. Radiation dose is a function hot climates. thus PF = AAC/IC. always under positive Plutonium and uranium particulate are the most serious pressure) provide a nominal PF of 10. PAG are shortly thereafter. Demand type SCBA (air supplied on inhalation) cause negative mask pressure during inhalation and provide 6-2 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION no more protection from contaminants than a respirator. Respiratory This calculation assumes possible exposures at this rate protection devices adversely affect productivity and over the period of a year and is approximately ten (10) effectiveness. if a person suffers heat stroke the respirator Protection factors vary primarily as a function of should be removed immediately to meet the urgent anthropometrical data. Calculated for quantitative tests to determine the PF for each ‘activity levels should be corrected for background individual. The radioactive particles may become developed to identify protective devices to limit exposure resuspended in the air by surface winds and by soil to the lungs from inhalation of contaminants to agreed disturbing operations including vehicular traffic. Del) 51 OO. The amount of protection time without exceeding dose limits. type and condition of soil or surface. and a heat injury prevention program as discussed in paragraph 14-5 exposure time of workers is being tracked.

etc. Resuspension Factors.01 needed. Air Sampler Equipment. wearing of respirators by people For wind speeds below 20 miles per hour (mph). Anti-contamination clothing.000.000 Above 250. by resuspension. One means of estimating the potential airborne hazard caused by a given level of surface Air sampling data is unavailable until some time after contamination is by using resuspension factors. In theory. Source .000 full-face respirator. During the resuspension factor is defined as the activity in the air initial response. Using Table 6-2 is appropriate the surface is assumed to have an infinite plane of during the initial approach to the area when using uniform texture with a uniform level of contamination. usually m-l. respirators in uncontaminated areas may create undue In practice. the contaminated area has varied levels of public alarm. only entering the contaminated area is recommended until those surfaces within approximately 200 meters can air sampling data is available to assess the actual airborne contribute to the airborne contamination. Source of d. Table resuspension factor is then inverse length.000 Pressure demand SCBA. Table 6-2 guidelines should not be used in the speeds over 30 mph.000 Below 2. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels downwind area until after the contamination cloud for Emergency Workers as a Function of released by the accident has dispersed (several hours Airborne Contamination after the fire is extinguished or the explosion). The dimension of the on measurements of surface contamination levels. Field estimates of airborne contamination can be derived from measurement of filter Above 10.000 dpm/m3 Full-face respiratory (M-series A flow meter is used to determine rate of air flow. can be expected.000. For wind hazard. Above 450 Above 1. surfaces as much as 900 meters TABLE 6-2. 2. Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination FIDLER Determined Alpha Reading CPM Contamination pCi/m2 60cmz Probe 17cmZ Probe Protection Below 4. Protective Mask or civilian Cellulose filters are used normally and retained for equivalent) laboratory analysis. for measurements on soil. 1. tial personnel wearing a full- face respiratory.000 dpm/ m3 Pressure demand SCBA or limited entry restricted to essen- contamination with field survey instruments. microns in diameter depending on the filter paper used. dpm. Airborne Alpha Activity 3 dpm/ m above background Respiratory Protection c. is finite in size. and when working in areas where @Ci. the TF-I A is Below 100 dpm/ m3 No respiratory protection capable of sampling air for particles down to 0. If contamination levels detected during contamination. Table by the activity on the ground below expressed in the 6-2 provides guidelines for protective requirements based same activity unit per unit area. Conversions from microcurie per meter squared @Ci/ mz) to counts per minute (CPM) were made using The method of computing airborne contamination levels the equation in Appendix 5 conversion factor charts is contained in the air sampling appendix. and may contain a variety the initial approach-in#icate high levels of contamination of surfaces with different resuspension characteristics.000. TF-1 A Air Particles. 100-10.) per unit volume (usually mg) divided available air sampling data may not be applicable. Commonly referred to as a STAPLEX. pCi.5-450 10. The response personnel have arrived on-scene.5 Below 10.500. Other than during the initial contamination should be fixed release of contamination. 6-2 . airborne radioactivity is caused as soon as possible. gloves recommended 4. 6-2 is based upon surface contamination leveis which could produce the airborne contamination levels in Table airborne activity — dpm/ mg = m-l RF = 6-1 assuming a resuspension factor of 10-S per meter ground activity – dpm/ mz (m-’).500 Shoe covers.- of contamination should be fixed as soon as possible. or limited entry restricted to essential personnel wearing a full-face respiratory.000 250.TABLE 6-1.

the types and levels of contamination on surfaces in the area where the resuspension factor was computed and those in the 6-3 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING area of interest should be considered. Mechanical distur. Surface and airborne a method of roughly estimating airborne contamination alpha contamination levels may not be measurable with levels for use with Table 6-1 in areas where air sampling an alpha meter for some time after rain or sprinkling data is unavailable. to estimate airborne contamination Ievels. . 6-3 . boot covers. Averaging of ground activity levels (3) Rain or Moisture. The deposited on soil and up to 10. the person’s name and team should be to the cube of the wind speed. .for plutonium newly 3 close weave cotton material or disposable suits. Leaching of plutonium into from these areas may be considered when computing the soil by rain or sprinkling may reduce resuspension resuspension factors. When using resuspension factors due to the shielding action of the moisture.on pavement. Disposable suit or the battle sion factors by as much as 100 times in the vicinity dress uniforms or equivalent with a hood and mask may of the disturbance. The outfit (1) Soil Disturbing Operations. appropriate adhesive tape. outfit includes: The standard anti-contamination Resuspension factors are affected by the following: coveralls. For (2) Wind. Resuspension factors may provide factors by 10 to 100 times or more. gloves. Resuspension Protection from contamination can be provided by any 5 7 factors may vary from 10. Resuspension factors vary proportionally identification. such as vehicular traffic may increase resuspen.away may contribute. written on tape and placed on their back and chest. mask and hood. openings should be taped using masking or other bance. be used provided the outfit openings are taped.to 10.

People to be considered ination or other measures. Depending on resources and (b) Persons present at the accident site or in requirements. Responsibility for monitoring through the CCS. Immediately objective of contamination control.52-M CHAPTER 7 CONTAMINATION CONTROL 7-1 CONTAMINATION CONTROL a station separate from that used for response force personnel. It consists of following an accident. If sufficient resources exist to support screened to determine whether decontamination or other multiple stations. plastic. or drop ing of personnel is normally done at a Contamination cloths to collect contamination that may fall from anti- Control Station (CCS). as appropriate. rigid. the personnel operating in the contaminated area. Also. Casualties should be monitored and 7-l . bystanders and sightseers. and meticulous anti-contamination suits instruments and monitoring personnel is limited. (2) Contamination Control Station (CCS). suits. the CCS uses supervised. there is the instruments at :he scene and may monitor potentially possibility of a movement of contamination upwind contaminated clvdians. or post-accident monitoring team to check the vehicles and facilities entry into the contaminated area should be given a high involved for contamination. The potential contamination of a contamination. employees and customers in the contaminated area.to determine the a hospital or morgue without being monitored for preliminary site characterization and personnel contamination. or anti-contamination arrive on-scene with appropriate instruments. state radiation control in a facility or tent to minimize dispersing by the wind personnel or civilian authorities/ representatives as they of contaminants on boots. of people are involved. Normally this action is done contaminated civilian residents may be desirable through at a CCS. however during the initial contamination clothing. therefore. Dispatch of a radiological accident. and /or clothing removal procedures to preclude a alternative procedures must be devised if large numbers mechanical transfer of contamination outside the CCS. Early definition of the (a) The CC$ employs a contamination reduction perimeter is jrnportant so potentially contaminated area (CRA) c&cept. subsequent cloud passage. the CCS should be set up civilians will shift to the DoE. Contamination control minimizes the spread of contamination. military the spread of contamination should be given the highest and civilian response personnel. DoD 51 OO. the OSC may decide to establish more known contaminated areas must be identified and than one CCS. to prevent include casualties. facilities and the transportation resources used should be notified of the potential problem. Initially. and residents. Initial definition of the perimeter of the contaminated area was discussed previously. Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination. Paragraph 14-5 b. Therefore. what facilities are involved. medical treatment facility or ambulance could present (2) Anti-contamination procedures to minimize the a health problem for the staff and other patients. Those ery/ restoration operations. if so. established (1) Monitoring and Decontaminating Potentially operating procedures must be followed to achieve the Exposed Medical Treatment Facilities. and measures taken to prevent reduce to an acceptable level) contamination of the contamination of additional people. describes procedures a medical facility may use to control Personnel who were potentially exposed during the the spread of contamination. The CCS employs kraft paper. processing contaminated or potentially Corrective action is required. gloves. response when the number of radiation detection structured. judgments must be made as to whether (3) Strict contamination control line procedures to casualties have been removed from the contaminated control contamination spread during response/ recov. Monitor. The CRA is used to eliminate (or people may be identified. or fatalities may be moved to (1) Initial monitoring upon arrival. and to assist in decontam- priority in response actions. injured personnel maybe removed for medical treatment. a. General. With the military may have the only effective radiation detection processing of personnel through the CCS. spread of contamination. Therefore. area and. business priority.

a gym or other facility with dressing rooms and high capacity showers may be appropriate J. should not be highly contaminated. an over-riding operations. Unless the potentially contaminated. c. If not upwind. If an accident occurs wheel wells. available radiation detection windows were down. the CCS may be moved closer to the contaminated area are sent. it must be far inated clothing should be returned at the ear!iest possible enough away to prevent airborne or resuspended time. shower and shampoo the people. additional lines Such a procedure would require provisions to collect should be established in the station to process large and receipt for clothing. contamination from entering the CCS. the vehicle ~. When processing people whose and issue replacement clothing. to the CCS or other accident site if appropriate. for assumption is that the potentially contaminated people example. however. tires. Watches. After all explosives have been decontamination. The surfaces in contact with the vehicle occupants. contamination of the interior is most likely on those quate to process the people fully and quickly. It must be located in an area free of for processing people. and the contents of pockets and pocketbooks to permit immediate processing of EOD personnel. Provisions should be made every four minutes if no contamination is found. use of an abbreviated be relatively easy to perform. and rocks. floorboards and seats. People ~. Contamination of the upper chest or neck and head urgent medical treatment has priority and exceptions area is indicative of exposure to airborne contamination. Each article of clothing personal clothing is contaminated. it should be located outside the force in the contaminated area will remain there for fragmentation zone as well as beyond the perimeter of future use and not require immediate monitoring or the contaminated area. equipment and monitors are available. stocks of replacement clothing must be obtained. 7-2 . When processing a large group inate all people coming from the contaminated area of people. Procedures for handling contaminated If radiation detection instruments are unavailable to casualties are in paragraph 14-5. Therefore. A priority system should be established jewelry.decontaminated to the extent injuries permit. or go. Vehicles used by the response ~. and all clothing be bagged separately and a receipt issued for those placed in a single large bag and a receipt issued. A paved or flat. and the rear end may be contaminated near a populated area and several hundred people are from driving across contaminated areas. It should be in an area relatively free of should be monitored before being moved away from weeds. bushes. If to monitor them later when instruments are available. may be necessary. if done before bonding monitoring procedure may be considered to expedite between the contaminant and the vehicles paint occurs. and should monitor team leaders. Soap. but terrain or other considerations may should be monitored as soon as possible. Figure 7-2. processing points using their own vehicles. Uncontam- dictate another location. or ventilators open. decontamination shouId detection instruments are available. processing. numbers of people. An example of a CCS monitor the people involved. and contamination. towels. articles retained. the accident. If only external surfaces are not response personnel. procedures to decontam- is shown in Figure 7-1. and their collected clothing. Vehicle Monitoring. detectable instruments and monitoring personnel may be inade. Although the contami- information is needed to facilitate other response nation may be retained wjth the clothing. shampoo. rapid decontamination and return of private or lower legs may be caused by handling contaminated vehicles may reassure the public “that consideration is objects or moving and sitting in contaminated areas. and shoes Also. while (3) Alternative Procedures. if at all. compacted the area. if feasible. this type station will process a person about should be used immediately. Initially. [f only a few radiation of a vehicle are contaminated. All outer surfaces and the air filter may have been contaminated by airborne contamination. It ideally will be located directly upwind of processed in this manner. and others whose presence or be retained by the individual. An example of a vehicle CCS is shown in surface is recommended. seat. Contamination of the hands. The location of the contamination control need exists to assure the people that they are being cared station should be governed by the following constraints: for. being given to their interests and property. the clothing should should be bagged separately. If members of the public in the rendered safe.

Contamination Control Station (Example). Contamination Area Line t Wind Direction I Contaminated Chair Shoe Covers Chair m Equipment ❑ om (Hot Line) o DroD Clothing “cl Chair ❑ Chair n R Air Sampler t — 100-6 )M . 7-3 . 20M (1 Masks Sump Decontamination I B \ S t a t i o n Water Wash Station I. n -Soap Towels Contaminated Waste contamination Control Line t 61 O-1OOOM (2000’-3000’) El. Medical Station Instrument Repair CLEAN AREA 5 ~ Buffer Zone ~ Disaster Cordon Figure 7-1.

Contamination Area Line Wind Direction Hot Line E Parking Area Initial Monitoring u Sump Washing Area L )’ Contamination Control Line Final Monitoring I Vehicle Exit CLEAN AREA n Parking Area Figure 7-2. 74 . Vehicle Contamination Control Station Example.

but can bioassay procedures used will be established by health be done at any time during the first year after exposure. or by detection of radioactivity in the of plutonium inhaled due to the time requir:d for excreta (feces and urine). Three methods are used to determine the amount patient must be sent to the facility. Fecal sampling is an effective bioassay method which has the advantage that samples a. distribution of the material to make an accurate estimate Urine samples must be processed in a chemistry of the dose.. Most lung counters are immobile systems using large shielded rooms (special Complex mathematical models have been developed that trailer mounted systems can be obtained through the take each of these into account. chemical separation and low level sample analysis will determine if the individual received counting techniques must be used. clothing. When bioassay Figure 8-1 may be used to estimate the frst year dose samples are collected. Low authorities conducting initial screening in advising energy gamma radiation sensors such as the FIDLER individuals contaminated when requested to provide can be used to estimate the plutonium content. Samples taken during the first detectors placed over the chest (lung counting) and/ or five days after the exposure will not reflect the quantity other organs. Fecal sampling is a detectable radiation dose when contaminated. lung counting is the most accurate Biological half-life method of determining internal exposure. DoD 51 OO. Therefore. Chemical form Samples should be submitted in plastic or glass bottles Route of intake with well-sealed tops. from the environment. Since tritium 8-1 . 8-2 BIOASSAY PROCEDURES (1) Fecal Sampling. amount of radioactive material deposited in the body. Samples should not be civilians may be the responsibility of the state or Federal taken until at least 48 hours after exposure to permit agency or effected country. advantages and disadvantages and the specific methods in any given situation will be determined by the health physicists. laboratory before quantification is possible. The guidelines in Table 8- passage of the contamination through the intestinal tract 1 are provided to assist the response force or civiiian and should be submitted in well-sealed plastic bags. and Decay scheme of the radioisotope at some hospitals and universities. commercially. This fraction also depends on volubility of the plutonium either by direct measurement. and the b. Urine samples taken up must be known in addition to the quantity and isotopic to 200 days after the exposure can be used for analysis. Elapsed time from intake (3) Lung Counting. The especially effective during the first few days. Lung counters Particle size of the original material are used at National Laboratories. a number of factors movement through the body. Lung counting is the direct Organ(s) containing the material measurement of emitted x-rays and gamma radiation Distribution pattern from the body with a sensitive low energy photon Organ(s) mass(es) detector.keep samples and their containers free of contamination detected in feces. or skin. but screening for very high levels can be done in the field. Advisors explain that definitive results.52-M CHAPTER 8 BIOASSAY PROCEDURES 8-1 BIOASSAY (2) Urine Sampling. physicists responding to the accident. For more urine or fecal samples for analysis. Bioassays are procedures which estimate the fraction of the amount inhaled is excreted through urine. Each method has specific in the lung for a very long time. only a tiny a. Probably. Administration of a bioassay program for effected can be evaluated in the field. Plutonium is retained of material present in the body. Department of Energy (DoE) in a few days). every effort should be made to commitment to the lungs based on contamination . Urine sampling is a less sensitive indicator of plutonium exposure. using sensitive x-ray in the original aerosol.

4 x 10-4 x 1000= . Divide thevalueobtained from theDose Equivalent scalebytheMDL for the sample type and multipiy this vahreby the contamination level of thesrsmple inpicocuries to get theestimatedfust year dose to the lung.45pCi. Draw horizontal iineto Dose Equivalent scale.- Figure 8-1. Enter chart with the time ofsample. 2. 3. 4 5 Andy@ ofawmple taken from themmeperson (mmefirst yeadow) 10daysafter theaccident would beexpected to read only 20 ~i. 1. TheMDLforfecal samplesis.JEAPONS GRAOE P L U T O N I U M Am-at IWJRITY 1200 pm. -4 2.) . .0 W-l AMAO 25X U VOLUBILITY CLASS 75X Y VOLUBILITY CLASS OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ICRP-30 METABOLIC MOOEL DOSE CALCULATED FOR MINIMUM DETECTABLE LEVEL (MDLI fN BIOASSAY MOL FOR URINE ANALYS[S = O 095 PC1 /SAMPLE MOL FOR FECAL ANALYSIS = O 95 PCI/SAMPLE MOL FOR IN-VIVO LUNG COUNT = 500 PC I AM-2+1 OUAL 1 TY FACTOR FOR ALPHA = ?0 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 95 50 T ME OF S A M P L E (DAYS A F T E R I N T A K E ) Use ofChart. Draw vertical line tocumefor sample type. . 3. Example: Measurement ofafecd nmpletaken 5daystiter theaccident read lOOO~i. 1. Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs.889 rem (The estimated fust year dose to the lung.wmrs. assuming the individual inhafed contamination only on the day of the accident. PARTICLE SIZE 3. s INTAKE ASSUMPTIONS L. FIRST YEAR DOSE COMMITMENT TO LUNG — r-—--’ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘– 1 I FCCAL . Steps 1-3 give a Dose Equivalent Scale value of 4 x 10 . 4.

some nasal mucus. AFR 161-8. A bioassay Forms contained in Appendix 5-E should be considered. These records contamination. other Table 8-2. Radiation category will be less likely to result in a significant Health Protection Manual. from inside the nasal passage is a possible indicator of bioassays may be appropriate even for people who plutonium inhalation. references (q). and (t). program is recommended for all individuals without respiratory protection and found to be contaminated. occurs near a populated area. or who may amount of plutonium to be incorporated into the body have been contaminated prior to establishment of a without gross contamination of skin or clothing also radiological control area. during screening. Ionizing Radiation. Contamination on a wipe (Q-Tip) similar assurance to all people in the contaminated area. a nasal smear is a reliable indicator only people never in contaminated areas will request tests if collected during the first hour after t he exposure. TABLE 8-1. requirements contained in AR 40-14. 8-3 . Documentation should be maintained on all personnel NOTE: Since it is virtually impossible for a significant who enter the radiological control area. Examples of forms used for occurring. Personnel Exposure and Bioassay Records. This data file is subject to Privacy Act regulations. Response force personnel will normally be Evaluation Center for consolidation into a single data equipped with protective clothing and respirators. when file. (2) Nasal Smears. results of both alpha meter screening and bioassays. a copy of all CCS logs.shall be retained and become part of the individual’s for future reference of all personnel screened and the permanent medical record. To provide they arrive on-site. applicable only to people not wearing processing station records. initial alpha monitoring which identifies recording data on personnel working in the radiological contaminated personnel also can provide a method for control area. AFR 161-28. Data obtained on DoD Personnel falling in the HI priority category in Table personnel will be needed to satisfy Service-specific 8-2 may have had a substantial plutonium intake. required. b. procedures for handling data as directed by the On-Scene Commander. (s). provides recommended guide. if they Program and the USAF Master Radiation Exposure have bathed or changed clothes since the time of possible Registry.?!@l! Plutonium 2 days 2-3 weeks 24 hours total Uranium 2 days 24 hours 24 hours total Tritium N/A 4-8 hours 1 voiding . or potentially exposed people. Bioassays for response force personnel will be and must be retained as part of the permanent accident performed in accordance with Service regulations and records. contamination cannot be detected by CCS monitoring. or who may have been exposed to assuring that those with the greatest possibility of contamination downwind from the accident. documentation identifying people who were or were not lines for the assignment of priorities for bioassay contaminated should be provided to the Joint Hazard analysis. Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling. Control and deposition in the lungs. the Q-tip must be free from any gels or other material that will prohibit (1) Bioassay Priorities. obtained on non-DoD personnel should be coordinated with the OSC’S legal officer. To ensure alpha meter readings Recording Procedures Occupational Exposure to provide a valid guide for assignment of priorities. NAVMED P-5055. Feces Urine Suspected Optimum Sampling Optimum Sampling Radioactive Time After Time After Sample Material Exposure Exposure @. If initial alpha meter screening This program will determine if any dose was received indicates probable plutonium inhalation. medical personnel collect nasal smears. Due to the biological half-life of weren’t found to be contaminated. obtaining bioassay samples from large numbers of people may be necessary. To ensure appropriate given priority treatment. a nasal smear and provides assurance to those who did not receive shall be collected for analysis by specialized teams when a dose that their health was not effected. bioassay data. Therefore. If a nuclear weapon accident alpha particle counting. Control and Conversely. (r). follow-up actions are completed on all exposed. exposure to airborne contamination which Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to produces a surface contamination level in the LO Ionizing Radiation. are radiation exposures which may affect their health are contained in Appendix 5-E. moreover. Personnel Dosimetry individuals should be asked. and other respiratory protection. Use anyone suspected of having been exposed to tritium of the Radiation Health History and Bioassay Screening should follow the guidelines in Table 8-1. A record must be made and retained . When to ensure they were not effected by the accident.

000 Cpm Above 75. Alpha Contamination Level on Clothing or Skin 60 cmz probe 17 cmz probe E!@.500-75.000 cpm 8-4 .000 cpm MED Below 12.000-300. Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays.000 Cpm HI 50.@ Above 300.000 cpm 12.500 cpm LO Below 50. TABLE 8-2.

4 is a very slow process. grams. americium-241 (Am-241). Because both the physical and biological products present in a nuclear weapon containing half-lives of plutonium are extremely long. However. radiation which is detectable even after such migration.When uranium is separated assembled. the measurable low energy radiation may be shielded as the contaminant migrates a. When first machined. which is primarily a beta standard anti-contamination clothing will protect emitter. Therefore. an alpha emitter. (1) All of the isotopes listed above are primarily (2) A properly sized and fitted protective mask and alpha emitters except Pu-241. CHARACTERISTICS. depleted uranium. it will oxidize to a golden-yellow color and from that (3) A critical mass can range from several hundred to black. 9-1 . from its ore. Plutonium is a heavy metal associated with an accident involving nuclear weapons with a shiny appearance (similar to stainless steel) when containing plutonium. After exposure to the atmosphere for nium. HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS 9-1 PLUTONIUM (Pu) c. may produce bone diseases (including cancer) many lives of the plutonium isotopes and significant daughter years later. depending on the geometry of the container and the material surrounding. When exposed to the atmosphere for a short period. The primary hazard of pluto- freshly machined.57 X 103 (1) The elimination of plutonium from the body Pu-241 14. it will plutonium are as follows: essentially be held within the body for a lifetime. DoD 51 OO. General Characteristics. Surveys plotting the 17 keV x-ray data must be done within the fust five days.41 X 104 Pu-240 6. Radiological Characteristics: Three forms of or near.!!PS Half-life (years) comparable to those of plutonium. the plutonium. meters by many survey instruments. Bone deposition b. The radiological half.76 X 105 prompt hospital treatment with a chelating agent. a 17 keV x- ray and 60 keV gamma ray. it has the appearance of stainless Gamma radiation can be detected at distances of several steel. if a person is given Pu-242 3. Hazards and Health Considerations: Plutonium is considered the most significant radiological hazard a. Pu-239. 2. and enriched uranium.52-M CHAPTER 9 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. or after rain. or black appearance. Most of the plutonium that eventually enters the blood stream is deposited in the bone and liver. results from-entry into the body a short period of time. The hazards from americium taken inside the body are &!. coordinate with knowledgeable scientific advisors from the DoE ARG to ensure a critical mass is not being “ (1) Natural Uranium . Radiological Characteristics. Pu-241 is an important consideration because personnel against levels of plutonium contamination of its daughter product. (2) Weapons grade plutonium (including ameri- cium) will emit two detectable photons. General Characteristics: Uranium is a heavy into the ground. to several thousand grams. expected at an accident site. recovery personnel uranium have been used in nuclear weapons—natural should consult EOD technical publications and/or uranium. it will oxidize to a dark brown by inhalation and subsequent deposition in the lungs. 9-2 URANIUM (U) After this time. b. Am-24 1 provides the 60 keV gamma element which occurs in nature in significant quantities. the resulting mixture of uranium is referred . some Am-24 1 432 of the plutonium retained in the body may be reduced significantly.

inated with radioactive material. Although it takes c. personnel should consult EOD technical publications Tritium water vapor (TO or HTO) is readily absorbed and/or coordinate with knowledgeable scientific by the body. in specific weapon render-safe procedures. In general.Uranium with some b. -may vary up to over 90 percent U-235.e. Thereafter. Since tritium oxide a slag with only a portion of it oxidizing. It is manmade and the enrichment. Tritium combines chemically with a number of elements liberating heat in the process. and during accidents which have assembled. the surface of the metal will become contam- “tuballoy”. The radioactive water that enters the mass is not being assembled. The hazardous nature of tritium hundred to several thousand grams. Therefore. and E!wPs Abundance Half-life (years) like normal hydrogen.. and lung contamination due normally eliminates and renews 50 percent of its water to inhalation can cause a long term hazard. ” Natural uranium consists of with a measurable diffusion rate even through very dense the following three alpha-emitting isotopes: materials such as steel.006 21. fire. uranium will melt and form half-life varies with the fluid intake. Hazards and Health Considerations: Tritium weapons and is called “oralloy” at certain enrichment constitutes a health hazard when personnel are engaged percentages (for example.“Enriched uranium” is spontaneously with oxygen in the air and will also replace uranium containing more than the naturally--occurring ordinary hydrogen in water or other hydrogenous amount of U-235. However. body is chemically identical to ordinary water and is distributed throughout the body tissue. caution should be taken. If forced-fluid treatment and standard anti-contamination clothing will protect is deemed necessary. Depending on the material associated with occurred in rain. a recommended procedure is to have the patient drink one quart of water within one-half hour 9-3 TRITIUM (T) after exposure.710 7.284 4. maintain the body’s water content by imbibing the same amount as that excreted a.. the biological half-life may against inhalation or ingestion. This turnover time or biological when involved in a fire. An M 17 protective mask be reduced to about three days. If uranium is taken internally. Medical isotope of hydrogen and diffuses very rapidly in the air assistance should be obtained as soon as possible. uranium is called “DU*’ and “D-38”. can combine combustively with air forming water and release great amounts of heat. recovery is due to its ability to combine with other materials.1 x 108 process by which a thin film of tritium is deposited on U-234 0.26 years and decays into a uranium” (for example. become radioactive. both through inhalation and absorption advisors from the DoE ARG to ensure that a critical through the skin. tritium combines (3) Enriched Uranium . and medical supervision is personnel adequately against uranium hazards. a type of heavy solid materials is a contact hazard.5 X IOs the surface of the metal) and by hydriding (the chemical combination of tritium with the metal). unavailable. Radiological Characteristics: Tritium has a amount of its U-235 extracted is known as “depleted radiological half-life of 12. 40 percent and 93 percent). (2) Depleted Uranium . The human body metal poisoning may occur. With the proper catalyst i. tritium is not absorbed by the skin to mass of enriched uranium can range from several any significant degree. material (grease or oil). General Characteristics: Tritium is a radioactive until medical assistance can be obtained. when Like plutonium. In either Natural uranium in a metal form has been called reaction. care must be taken during the recovery responding to an accident that has occurred in an of enriched uranium so that a critical mass is not enclosed space. In its the uranium and the geometry of the container. Hazards and Health Considerations The radiolog. causing these materials to -that is the concentration of the U-235 in the uranium. is water. a critical gaseous state. Tritium which uranium are less severe generally than those of has plated out on a surface or combined chemically with plutonium. snow. Depleted stable helium-3 atom by emission of a weak beta particle. or in a body of water.to as “natural uranium. a relatively large amount of tritium to be a significant ical hazards associated with any of the isotopes of radiation hazard. exists and protective measures must be taken to protect Under medical supervision. Enriched uranium has been used as the nuclear material in some c.5 x 109 Metals react with tritium in two ways by plating (the U-235 0. depleted in U-235). its residence time in the body may be the possibility of hazardous airborne contamination significantly reduced by increasing the fluid intake. 9-2 . in about 8-12 days. U-238 99.

Radiological Characteristics: Thorium-232 is the detonation as a result of an accident is unlikely. Toxico- against tritium absorption for short periods of time. the products of the reaction may pose a severe to radium-225.1 billion hazard. with atomic The materials considered thus far are used in weapons masses ranging from 223 through 235. it glows with a dazzling white unknown.000 CPM on monitoring. in pure forms and in combinations with other elements. but it is used in emitters and are hazardous. even when external to the reactors to produce fissionable uranium-233 by neutron body.Although the biological half-life of tritium is short. tritium water vapor is absorbed and its rapid distribution throughout the body tissue. a. dense 9-5 FISSION PRODUCTS gray metal which is about three times as abundant as uranium. Mantle ash from a personal hazard results because of the ease with which single mantle will provide even higher readings. it causes heavy metal poisoning similar to lead filter mask such as M 17 has no protective value for or the uranium isotopes. An unburned mantle will provide the hazard may be obtained by beta and gamma an alpha indication of approximately 15. Because of this property. . thorium accum- tritium. Thirteen isotopes are known. General Characteristics: Thorium is a heavy. the light. An M 17 protective mask and standard anti-contamination 9-4 THORIUM (Th) clothing will adequately protect against thorium. fission products are beta and gamma years. In general. A non-nuclear property of thorium is products is difficult since the amount of fission is that when heated in air. the same as plutonium. Due to weapon design. It decays by a series of alpha emissions occurs. standard alpha survey instruments. whose radiological half-life of 14. A self-contained breathing c. Thorium-232 is not fissionable. Hazards and Health Considerations: Thorium apparatus and protective clothing will protect personnel presents both a toxic and radiological hazard. ulates in the skeletal system where it has a biological half-life of 200 years. A logically. An estimate of in portable gas lights. and to further complicate the situation. one of the major uses relative isotopic abundances will change with time as of thorium has been in the Welbach lantern mantel used the shorter lived radioisotopes decay. To predict and estimate the quantity of fission bombardment. the probability of a nuclear b. Biologically.- 9-3 . If fission principal isotope.

will be the same wliether an accident occurs at sea or Yorktown. tritium. the Commanding Officer The AN/ PDR-73 and IC/T2-PAB(M) are used to detect (CO) will focus attention on saving the ship and crew.Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment . on the remoteness of the accident. depending on the damage sustained. The availability of air A ship’s damage control organization will provide the monitoring equipment to a ship depends on the ship’s initial response to a shipboard nuclear weapon accident weapons maintenance capability for airborne radioactive and will be augmented by the following. A fire or explosion associated with the accident has the potential to cause c. d. This weapons accident response. petroleum stations. fuels or conventional weapons) can cause severe damage effecting the safety and seaworthiness of the ship.Comprised of loss of the ship. The AN/ PDR-27 low range chapter provides guidance concerning aspects of a beta-gamma survey instrument is used primarily by nuclear weapon accident response unique to the initial entry teams to determine gamma dose rate and shipboard environment. the same response be directed to another location for weapon recovery organizations described in Chapters 3 through 14 may operations and decontamination. EOD teams have equipment for detection of gaseous radioactivity. and AOES during deployments. The ability of the sea increases the importance of correct and adequate detachment to respond rapidly depends on the ship’s response by shipboard personnel. training. this team performs emergency weapon A shipboard nuclear weapon accident differs from land. dures Manuals. The AN/ PDR-56 alpha survey instrument is protecting the public from health hazards. based scenarios in severai aspects. In addition to possessing iO-1 .Composed of members of the ship’s crew.S. The AN/ PDR-43 high range beta- gamma survey instrument is also available and may be used to determine high beta-gamma dose rates. Explosions. DoD 51 OO. Results of shipboard fires are well known members of the ship’s crew. the frequent lack of immediate assistance at radioactive contamination is released. The Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team Although the initial response by shipboard personnel . The functions of these instruments are discussed in Appendix 1O-B. if 10-3 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS required. and keeping the ship’s primary RADIAC instrument used in nuclear the chain-of-command informed of the situation. Weapon Safing Team . VA and can provide on-scene advice when in port.52-M CHAPTER 10 SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE 10-1 GENERAL b. this response element is and documented in Repair Party Training and Proce. port facilities -The key to responding to a nuclear weapon accident throughout the world and are trained to respond to a is planning. measures during critical stages.This team is located at NAVSEADET RASO. Radiation Monitoring Team . material detection equipment. be tasked to respond. a. whether from a nuclear contamination control stations or decontamination weapon or some other source (for example. Again depending is that the ship may. and adhering to precautionary nuclear weapon accident. 10-5 PRE-ACCIDENT PREPARATION AEs. 10-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 10-4 EQUIPMENT In a nuclear weapon accident. A significant difference location at the time of the accident. detachments are permanently assigned to major U. Also. Explosive .Composed of one officer and four enlisted EOD specialists or detachments are embarked ‘on CVs/ CVNS. trained to operate RADIAC instruments and man the . is carried by all ships. safing procedures in the absence of an EOD team.

Establish a sound powered phone link between ~. recommend may be parachuted into the area. Attempt to save the lives of personnel ~. Continue OPREP-3 situation reports. The security perimeter aboard ship may a. ~. Notify Damage Control Central. personnel who. all ships forc~ decontamination station procedures. Bring the ship to appropriate condition of readiness. Have Damage Control parties alerted with be defined by securing hatches to a compartment. and direct available personnel to: ~. Act. ~. that an accident has occurred in weapons handling personnel.” Response Force will be diminished and the action by the ship’s forces in effecting the response will be critical. Ensure that the medical department and EOD personnel shall cover their noses and mouths with a detachment (when available) are on alert. ~. provided by ships in the vicinity. upon accident or incident are trained to perform the following notification of an accident or incident shall: procedures: ~. Initiate routine announcements over the The major differences in port lay in the flexibility 1 MC as follows: provided by the ship. have been secured. Initiate standard shipboard damage control Some additional assistance by specialized units may be procedures including initiating a radiation plot. only personnel authorized by the senior person present shall be allowed at the accident b. The initial ~. compartment/ passageway/ hangar deck (by compart- ment and frame number). ships should take the following preventive measures Appendix 1O-A. As a minimum.5. via most Damage Control Central. DRINKING OR SMOKING IS b. as involving weapons or radioactive material using the required. Station security forces in the immediate area of scene. it shouId be handled similar to the one that occurs ashore. Direct all personnel at the scene to take emergency breathing precautions. changes to ships heading to vent smoke. as appropriate. on Damage Control involved. Near shore releases (1) Initial Response Procedures. ~. and contaminated firefighting water. Damage Control Central shall: a. the movement. In all cases. or hangar deck. ~. may become directly or indirectly involved in a nuclear (c) The bridge/strike operations center. by the nature of their official duties. calibrated RADIAC. These procedures should be done as a last resort action. during weapons movements when the chance for a j. Initiate initial OPREP-3 report. when required. Attempt. Prepare to initiate battle dressing and accident or incident. Central recommendation. handkerchief or similar item to minimize inhalation of hazardous materials and smoke. When an accident occurs in port. protective equipment. Damage Control parties and expedient means. Make preparation if in an in-port status for the senior person present shaIl take charge at the scene assisting the OSC designated by the Fleet Commander. ~.. . d. Notify the bridge of the accident location response force will be derived from the activity in which and recommend to the commanding officer the state the accident occurred (in this case the ship) and of readiness and heading to which the ship should be augmentation will be provided by a SRF.a well exercised shipboard ‘Nuclear Weapon Accident firefighting guidance provided in S WOP 20-11 and bill. limiting access to authorized personnel only. procedures have been established in previous chapters. “NO EATING. Accordingly. At sea. (a) When a nuclear accident or incident occurs. to extinguish a fire . are the most crucial in gaining control of a nuclear 4. toxic gases. 10-6 ACCIDENT (b) Upon notification of an accident or incident. Establish a security perimeter surrounding nuclear weapon accident is at its peak: the accident scene. These brought. once the hatches firefighting equipment. the possibility of augmentation by a Service ALLOWED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. c. Also. EOD detachments identifying route(s) to DECON station. and passageway.

The (g) Follow-on Response in Port. damage control RADCON might direct while at sea. including RADIACS. and will follow procedures described in to their debarking or using MARS.. The property (d) Security. ~. The follow-on Commanding Officer is responsible for informing the response in port will be the responsibility of the shore ship’s crew regarding public affairs releases and prior establishment. at sea. helicopter/parachute to ensure continued weapon protection and to prevent insertion of nearest EOD Detachment. unauthorized access. Priority should be given to performing J_. At sea. the senior person at the scene until relieved by (f) Follow-on Response at Sea. they include more detailed procedures for of damage to the weapon(s). providing the weapons are not too severely damaged. to monitor and remonitor surfaces being decontaminated ~. and dures are an extension of the initial response procedures. (e) Debriefings. approved procedures and equipment. by the Fleet Commander and the higher authority must RADCON AN-/ PDR-27 monitors should then proceed have estimates of damage to the ship and weapon(s). if not removing. Report via sound powered telephone and to operate the Contamination Control Station. guidance will be provided should conduct beta/gamma detection operations. dures outlined in applicable SWOPS or technical or other conditions. on procedures for Chapters 4 through 19. Public Affairs will be the responsibility of the Fleet Commander. Decontamination techniques are described in Chapter 19. decontamination of high value items. Chapters 5 and 17 may be airlifted to the accident ship. Enter the compartment where the accident operations to minimize any hazards to ship’s personnel occurred and render the weapons/ materials safe using and damage to critical equipment. marked with the owner’s identification. (b) In the absence of EOD personnel. should be identified to assist providing positive control of an accident scene. I o-3 . the shore establishments hazards to the ship and crew. the ship’s or a suitable ship in the vicinity for direct assistance Weapon Safety Team may perform emergency proce. as directed by the CO. and be directed to an appropriate above normal background shall be reported immediately port. j. Also. Resources will be limited to those onboard. All ship’s crew members with (2) Follow-on Response Procedures. the extent of damage to the ship. Ship Decontamination. of the surfaces on a ship. and the time required designated OSC. information as to the cause of the accident. to the extremities of the accident scene. will all effect the specific follow- (a) As soon as practicable after notification of on response actions which the Commanding Officer an accident or incident. completion of EOD procedures to Damage Control Simple cleaning techniques are frequently effective in Central and be available to assist and advise repair reducing. due to damage. to get either expert assistance onboard or move the ship to suitable facilities.. These proce. Much of the technical assistance discussed in to Damage Control Central. The amount of ~. in conditions. the nature of any technical increases in gamma radiation. publication. contamination. public affairs (3) Claims. (c) Public Affairs. or items provisions for the weapon(s). When the ship is in port. Additional security is provided if required. maintaining Moreover. particularly those personnel who observed the extent However. In and/ or weapon(s) has destroyed the normal security general. when dictated. The in the accident investigation and debriefed to assess responsibility of executing these procedures rests with potential internal damage to the weapon. remaining the case of an in-port accident. contamination from many parties in the decontamination of affected areas. additional security will not which the owner cannot easily replace. Weather and sea appropriately qualified damage control personnel or. Unless accident damage to the ship must be replaced if it cannot be decontaminated. responding to requests for information from the press or from families. Request if required. Identify the types of containers/materials decontamination ship’s personnel will be able to perform accredited for packaging explosives and radioactive will be limited by the number of RADIACS available materials. Any contaminated personal property will be coordinated by Fleet Commander or his belonging to ship’s personnel should be collected and designated area’ coordinator. must not be be needed. 2. ‘ ~ttempted by ships personnel. Logistics. Any radiation reading assistance being sent. the ship must be provided information on constant surveillance of the instrument to detect the estimated time of arrival.

For below deck fires. all response personnel going not be done if it results in contamination being spread below decks will wear a self-contained breathing to nearby shore establishments or communities. Repair party personnel will wear protective clothing as specified in i. and the Standard Fuel Oil (NSFO). Upon extinguishing a fire involving a nuclear side personnel will wear gas masks. Any firefighters weapon. Navy as soon as practical to deplete toxic. This factor does not preclude the use of foam. A backup firefighting performed. When venting shipboard which involve a nuclear weapon. Other hosemen and be on the leeward side of the ship. Purple-K. weapon(s) and/ or both sides in a sweeping motion to Portable blowers (for example. produce oxygen once ignited. with appropriate respiratory protection. teams at the scene. the nozzleman and number the skin of the ship. The propellants used in any weapon. The best method of controlling the potentially They cannot be extinguished with smothering agents. contamination in smoke exhausted is directed outside d. and nuclear weapon is high velocity water fog (low velocity dewatering operations should not be performed in port fog for submarines). IO-A-1 . Involvement of a the fire should be placed in a designated area until nuclear weapon does not require additional protective monitoring and necessary decontamination can be clothing for firefighting personnel. should be relieved as soon as possible. will be prepared to relieve. apparatus (for example.” however. or other petroleum fuel fires presence of radioactive gases. The primary suppressant for a fire involving a water should be controlled to the extent possible. or in close proximity should be performed to the maximum extent that fire hoses permit. care should be taken to minimize the possible contamination of the exterior of the ship. the weapon is at ambient temperature. Fires involving nuclear weapons in enclosed C02. g. top h. spaces. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures will apply to fires involving nuclear weapons e. must not be activated without specific orders from the (2) Cooling of any weapons involved in the fire Commanding Officer. or rescue. High velocity water fog. After the fire is response personnel will be equipped with OBA’S or gas extinguished and when in port. OBA and Scott Air Pack). contaminated water will be ship and situation unique. and some may cause the retention of heat within the weapon. Red Devil Blowers) cool the weapon and its high explosive contents until should be used if there is no installed blowout system. the exhaust vent should one hoseman will wear OBA’S. The flow of potentially contaminated b. until testing determines if the water is contaminated. Potentially contaminated equipment used to fight NSTM 079-39. surfaces considered contaminated until monitoring can be performed. caustic. In the event c. During firefighting actions. the flow of potentially (3) Cooling should be continued after the fire is contaminated water should be noted and the wetted extinguished until the weapon is at ambient temperature. f.137.52-M APPENDIX 1O-A SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING 1O-A-I team. a reflash watch will be set to provide an responding initially without respiratory protection immediate response to any reoccurrence of the fire. Aqueous Filming Forming Foam shipboard spaces should be vented to the atmosphere (AFFF) or other suppressants on aircraft fuel. a. conventional or nuclear. reference (p). DoD 51 OO. the normal exhaust system shall shouid be sprayed over the complete length of the be secured and emergency ventilation procedures used. When using foam Recommend use of “snorkel hosing” with high capacity to fight a fire surrounding an intact weapo~ water should filters in conjunction with portable blowers to reduce not be used to cool the weapon because water will float possible contamination to portable blowers and ensure the foam away which could allow reignition of the fire. Ordnance magazine sprinkling systems in or near with the following provisions: the affected area shall be manned and made ready to be activated. the magazine sprinkling system (1) Extinguishing the fire has priority. unfiltered venting should masks. or a firefighting agent of a magazine accident. For weather-deck fires. In all cases.

nose and mouth are% directed toward the expected contaminated area. Monitoring surfaces for loose surface assumed contaminated. outset of an accident. Additionally. or by wiping and backs of hands. at the such a location is preferable. cheeks. The and finally the ankles and feet. air samplers. Standard damage minimize their movement through clean areas should control procedures should be used to limit damage and be established. in the areas most likely to be contaminated (for example. is used. onto hard surfaces (2) Personnel monitoring should include: the front can be usually removed with soap and water. and the person’s skin dried prior contamination will be the most reliable indicator of to evaluation for the presence of alpha contamination.001 vice the 0. A shower set and maintained to prevent the spread of fire. inaccurate alpha contamination evaluation and will allow. damp cloth. and legs. The preliminary readings boundaries of the contaminated area should be defined. its location should of damage or inadvertent probe contamination during be marked for decontamination and remonitoring. use of the ANI PDR-27 is no of the ship thought to be uncontaminated are in fact longer necessary. so the wind is on the beam and carrying (1) Until the absence of gamma radiation is any contamination away from the ship. However. Then monitors should be check of the forehead. Access to the CCS must be possible from the spread of contamination. or carried. Once the absence of gamma during the accident. contact readings may (2) Air Monitoring. Most ships and to prevent the spread of “radioactive material to will have insufficient RADIAC instruments to support uncontaminated parts of the ship. it should be confirmed that portions radiation is confkmed. forearms. be used for the remainder of the monitoring. Fire boundaries shall be both contaminated and uncontaminated areas. IO-B-1 . Then personnel should be advised of these boundaries the hands and feet) should be made with the probe 1/ and the procedures for crossing them if required for 8-1 / 16th inch from the monitored surface. DoD 51 OO. If Table 6-2. Personnel monitors are to identify at a compartment entrance for topside accidents and contaminated personnel who require decontamination. Contamination Control Station (CCS). doors. If no contamination. The user’s attention is not focused on the locations where most personnel would place their hands RADIAC’S meter movement. This practice results in easier. If potentially contaminated personnel are both above and below decks. table values should be divided prior to the removal of the clothing. lessening the possibility or feet. confirmed by monitoring at the accident site. If the person essential ship operations. Airborne radiological moni. The use of earphones with RADIACS “clean. a thorough with a clean. Protective Devices (3) To conserve the expenditure of protective for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface cfothing.00005 used to develop the table) which Monitoring for radioactivity is performed initially to can be expected from shipboard surfaces. The monitoring continues to determine the extent of the contamination control station will be normally located contaminated area. Contamination tracked. If contamination is found. more than one CCS. b. ladders. identify radioactive material.52-M APPENDIX 1O-B SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL 1O-B-1 by 100 to correct for the higher resuspension factors (0. more accurate passageways at hatches. routes to a. personnel should be monitored at the CCS with the AN/ PDR- (1) Ship Monitoring.” Monitors should be directed initially to check is required. initial personnel monitoring must be performed Contamination. torso. is not obviously contaminated. The wash facilities need to prevent the spread of contamination and minimize not be in the immediate vicinity of the CCS although the effects of structural damage. and other monitoring. Control of Contamination. If clothing toring shall be conducted to the extent instrumentation is damp. Damp clothing should be removed. the monitoring process. if possible. If contamination was released 27 and the AN/ PDR-56. airborne contamination. at a fire boundary for below deck accidents. and and wash basin should be designated for use in material conditions ZEBRA and Circle WILLIAM set decontamination procedures. the ship should be maneuvered. If radioactivity is found. many ships are not equipped with detection is probable.

and monitored to ensure they are free BUMED. The limited stock of washing. BUME. Items contaminated above acceptable on personnel decontamination procedures and should emergency levels given in reference (u) and that do not be available to the Medical Department. Much (4) Personnel who had contamination on their of the protection provided by coveralls will be lost if protective clothing should be remonitored after the material becomes soaked. the Openings in the clothing should be taped. Booties and gloves personnel entering the contaminated area to repair should be kept separate. When d. determined by the Medical Department cooperating with allowed to dry. If contamination levels greater damage or perform decontamination operations. it should be removed and placed clothing is unavailable. protective clothing and other launderable equipment determine if the procedure removed the alpha contam. Automatic washing monitoring should be made with the probe in contact machines should be clean and free of soap scum to with the skin. If decontaminating ination levels on the skin or hair. they will aid in keeping washers free be referred to the Medical Department for further of contamination. removed. When working protective clothing should be removed and placed in in a wet environment. than those levels shown in reference (u) are found. contaminated clothing should not be used for normal Disposition of the contaminated individual(s) will be laundry until after they have been fully cycled empty. are found on the from alpha contamination. If contamination is clothing can carry contamination from the outer surface also on their personal clothing. Following each washing. Protective Clothing. provides detailed guidance contamination. If from contacting the skin. When removing contaminated clothing. placed in a plastic bag labeled as contaminated care should be taken to prevent the outside of the clothing clothing. coveralls are recommended for in containers for clothing to be reused. without damage to the ination. can be laundered. If anti-contamination protective clothing. Final equipment or the washing machine. and the fact noted in the CCS log. If two washings do not reduce contam. disposal as radioactive waste. the residual level three successive launderings should be packaged for should be recorded in medical records. After laundered items have completely decontamination under medical supervision. contamination is on the skin. At skin should be thoroughly dried before monitoring to sea. the clothing should be of the clothing. from contamination. dried.or contamination below the acceptable emergency c. Liquids soaking the removing the protective clothing. Any close knit clothing should remaining levels of contamination identified in prevent contamination of the skin and provide protection OPNAVINST 3440. it can normally be removed by washing with nonabrasive soap and water. Clothing Decontamination. the rapidly during decontamination operations at sea. they must be checked for any remaining DINST 6470.10. used for anti-contamination clothing if possible. reference (r). Machines used to Iaunder and the Commanding Officer should be advised. be sure not to puncture or abrade the skin protective clothing on board a ship may be exhausted through excess scrubbing.15. prevent deposition of contamination. the CCS log. reference (u). 10-B-2 . individuals should agents are used. waterproof clothing should be a container marked for contaminated clothing. Shampoo contaminated hair several times. if necessary. When all show any appreciable contamination reduction after contamination cannot be removed.

5X 104 11-1 .1 X 10-6 dpm/ m2 dpm/cm2 10-4 dpm/m2 dpm/g 6.7 X 10-5 dpm/m2 pCi/g” 3. Specific activity (alpha only) 0.5 x 10-7 dpm/m2 t. TABLE 11-1. “ 3.3 dpm/g pCi/m2 . Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium.7X 105 2 Pgl m dpm/cm2 17 2 flgl m dpm/g 11 2 Pg/ m pCi/g 5x 10-’ 2 t.0 x IO-11 dpm/m2 pCi/g 3. Conversions are for weapons grade plutonium only with no Americium 2.0 x 10-7 dpm/cm2 pCi/g 0.Lfg/ m 2 0.2 X 10-6 flCi/m2 dpm/cm2 220 pCi/ mz dpm/g 150 2 pCi/ m flCi/g 6.5 x 10-3 dpm/cm2 Pg/m “ 6.52-M CHAPTER 11 CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM Assumptions: 1.1 X 10- 2 dpm/cm2 ‘ dpm/niz 104 dpm/cm2 dpm/g 0.5 g/cmj. . 6.7 X 10- 5 2 pCi/ m pCi/g 67 2 Pgl m pCi/ m2 0.8 x 103 dpm/g . 4.075 2 Pgl m dpm/ m* 1. Density of soil 1. To Convert ~ Multiply by 2 . Contamination of soil is to the depth of 1 cm. DoD 51 OO.67 .075 Ci/g.0 x 10-5 dpm/cm2 pCi/ m 2 4.fgl m 2 6.fgl m pCi/g 5 dpm/m2 #Ci/ m 2 4.uCi/ m W m2 13 pCi/mz dpm/m2 2. dpm/cm~ pCi/g 3.091 dpm/g dpm/mZ 1.

5 dpm/g flCi/g 4.004 Stainless Steel .3 x 10IO pCi/ g dpm/cmz 3. nominal instrument efficiency during field use. and assume a 60 sq cm probe area (AN/ PDR-60 or PAC.1 S).2 X 106 pCi/g pCi/g lo6 pCi/ g pCi/ m 2 1.20 pCi/g dpm/mz 3.5 x IO-2 pCi/g W m2 0.0025 The correction factors consider unit and area conversions.pre.correction factor x c p m I TYPE OF SURFACE CORRECTION FACTOR Soil .3 pCi/g dpm/g 2.005 Plywood .ceding conversion table and equation for users of the ANI PDR-56 and AN I PDR-60.5 x 10-7 dprn/g pCi/g 0. The table below provides approximate factors for conversion of alpha readings in cpm into ~gi mz for various surfaces using the following equation: /Jg/ m2 .006 Concrete . 11-2 . For accurate conversions. respectively. TABLE 11-1: Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium (Continued) To Convert Into Multiply by dpm/g dpm/cmz 1.5 x 10 5 flCi/g pg/m2 2 x 10 flCi/g dpm/mZ 3.uCi/g flCi/m21.3 x 10” pCi/g dpm/cmZ 3.3 x 106 flCi/g dpm/g 2. a surface sample from the area measured should be analyzed with laboratory equipment and the conversion factor for that area computed. Correction factors should be multiplied by 4 for use with the ANI PDR-56. Tables 11-2 and 11-3 were prepared from the .45 4 .2 pCi/g flCi/g ] 0-6 p units units 10-6 units # units 106 The conversion of alpha instrument readings in cprn into quantifiable units is affected by the type of surface and meter efficiency.

0 1.200 52.96 8.40 160.0 4.0 14.000 7200.0 3.0 2.75 50>000 1200.0 21.60 240.0 3.96 44.0 14.50 11.25 4.0 1.00 192.06 .65 2.800 67. TABLE 11-2.90 1.0 3.00 1500.8 3.10 3.0 15.36 “ 28. STAINLESS CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLYWOOD SIEEL pCi/m2 mUm2 pCi/m2 Wfn2 flCi/m2 @m2 pCi/m2 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 50 1.0 120.0 135.0 .O 225.50 48.0 1.0 2.00 50.200 28.0 . .70 28.0 270.0 7.038 100 2.60 80.0 4.8 .25 24.500 36.075 .2 1.13 1.0 .0 .00 750.0 1.000 72.000 240.00 IOoo.5 .00 25.0 4.15 400 9.80 19.0 30.16 24.0 360.80 220.0 9.60 6.0 1.00 1600.64 22.00 64.0 150.08 12.0 7.50 400.20 80.0 .0 3.6 . Conversion Table (CPM to pg/mz or pCi/mz) AN/PDR 56 Alpha Meter.75 8.15 1.00 800.50 16.80 40.000 600.0 180.2 1.75 1.000 120.48 4.88 2.0 7.000 264.0 12.24 2.0 37.75 40.0 90.6 .0 18.4 .40 60.0 180.0 1.0 3.o 75.16 18.00 500.09 1.0 .00 200.0 37.0 2.0 .- 11-3 .20 10.0 8.075 200 4.8 .0 225.000 192.50 176.0 18.72 8.60 1.00 100.0 1.44 16.000 24.000 43.70 30.00 128.0 2.72 6.0 1.2 .25 12.8 2.00 5.0 6.12 1.0 .0 240.0 9.0 9.2 5.36 4.30 600 14.0 1.00 3000.40 120.0 3.00 1000.8 2.0 6.0 300.00 3000.00 4800.4 .000 1800.00 3200.000 4800.0 2.60 30.00 NOTE: To convert pCi/ mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.0 6.00 10.500 60.0 540.0 18.90 9.7 x 10IJ.50 80.0 60.2 2.00 100.0 75.20 110.0 .24 36.00 150.44 12.00 500.0 5.45 800 19.50 75.0 56.0 150.25 100.0 450.0 19.20 44.0 4.0 112.50 50.0 .04 56.18 2.0 45.0 90.80 20.0 12.00 1500.000 2400.000 288.00 250.000 96.8 .00 2400.0 360.0 .0 13.00 6000.00 25.00 160.30 3.80 15.8 3.20 12.0 .50 1200.00 4000.30 35.00 2000.2 .50 200.0 1.0 112.00 300.35 2.0 16.000 3600.2 3.4 1.6 .00 2000.

80 20.84 7.200 7.0 28.00 1000.2 .0 .2 .5 14.0 1.88 20.0 .30 3.50 16.56 4.4 .09 I .27 3.000 1800.0 18.0 1.15 1.30 27.00 750.00 375.0 1.045 .54 4.8 .0 67.75 6.0 .000 450.8 1.19 1. 2 3 2.75 150.0 56.0 45.00 500.30 2.2 .125 .26 14.i13 800 4.50 62.800 10.500 9.95 55.0 15.25 NOTE: To convert #Ci/mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.019 200 1.8 .000 900.83 8.45 4.2 .45 3.6 .15 1.0 4.38 75.5 .00 32.50 12.20 10.54 6.23 1.0 3.06 12.0 .0 .0 2.34 2.56 6.38 4.5 .50 .0 1.25 . Conversion Table (CPM to pg/ml or pCi/ml) AN/PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 Alpha Meter STAINLESS CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLY WOOD SIEEL AN/ PDR 60 fig/ml flCi/m2 bgl m2 pCi/ mz flg/m2 gCi/m2 m/m2 pCi/m2 AN/ PDR 54 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 50 0.0 .03 .5 .0 56.06 .000 48.2 .0 45.800 16.13 44.12 1.18 2.60 40.0 .0 1.50 187.2 .0 3.0 .5 .000 24. 11-4 .5 .00 800.000 66.50 50.60 30.8 .4 .81 9.6 .75 200.000 6.36 4.13 12.25 600.0 .023 .0 5.3 .0 .36 3.2 .0 90.40 60.075 600 3.75 40.38 .13 12.0 .500 15.94 8.000 600.0 30.7 x 10IJ.8 .5 2.0 3.05 11.3 .0 1.13 300.00 250.68 7.5 .009 100 0.0 37.0 4.8 .075 .0 4.0 112.0 1.25 25.00 25.00 125.38 100.0 .25 .0 135.8 .6 .000 72.0 1.0 28.019 .50 1200.0 4.47 2.0 11.35 15.000 18.0 90.015 .0 7.0 .68 7.75 5.0 3.0 75.5 .0 60.0 33.0 .0 1.000 150.4 .200 13.00 500.50 300.25 25.90 7.24 2.18 1.50 400.75 375.0 3.13 200.40 20.25 125.0 22.50 48.0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 9.0 1.0 9.0 .5 .0 18.50 250. TABLE 11-3.0 3.0 37.06 100.88 I I .94 10.99 11.5 .000 30.69 50.0 .41 2.0 22.5 4.28 1.0 2.038 400 2.000 300.000 1200.66 5.50 10>000 60.0 2.53 3.50 750.00 1500.45 5.

9 24 300 8.5 13.35 0. 1 Ci = 3. 5 135 800 21.1 60 1.3 8.5 1 27 400 10. 20 540 5000 135.1 2. 30 810 6000 162.7 40 1.08 TABLE 11-5.2 90 2. TABLE 11-4. 6 162 900 24.7 18.6 200 5.4 50 1.8 70 1. 10 270 4000 108.62 0.7 x 1O-II Ci 1 REM = 10J Sv 1 Sv = 100 REM 1 RAD = 10-2 Gy 1 Gy = 100 RADs S1 Units: Becquerels (Bq) Sieverts (Sv) Grey (Gy) 11:5 .1 0.4 0.16 0.2 5.9 3 81 600 16. 8 220 2000 54.6 16.89 0.7 0. mCi uCi 7000 189.7 x 10!’2 Bq 1 Bq = 2.4 0. 9 240 3000 81.8 0. I 000 27.4 10. Conversion To S1 Units.5 80 2. 7 189 .6 4 108 700 18.8 21.2 2 54 500 13. Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi).9 100 2.

or in areas tions (secure). Establish external communications. b. weapons recovery opera- communications support in remote locations. securing adequate internal commun- activities. satellite. Also included are organizations to prevent interference and radio treatments of various capabilities and hardware operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may (telephone. public affairs will be required. accident site. strategic. however. radiological operations (secure desirable). for example. Careful (1) Telephone communications with the Service attention must be afforded these installations to ensure operations center. reliable and accurate communications are communications with the operations center and with essential for nuclear weapon accident response opera- forces in the field to control and keep abreast of response tions. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accident (1) Telephone communications between fixed site relies heavily on a communications officer knowledge locations. commercial communications systems. Center. The requirements of both the IRF for record communications. External communications with higher echelons ications to support activities at the accident scene is a time-sensitive operation. telephone. State and/or civilian officials establish their own communications. and visual signal) that are. 12-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (2) Multiple telephone lines to support response force elements. (3) UHF/VHF nets. laboratory instruments. . the communications both secure voice and record communications are officers of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service required early in the response. Equally critical to effective of command are necessary to keep key personnel command and control is the timely establishment of informed. Establish internal communications. and SRF are “discussed. . particularly can be met by unsecure voice communications. the operations center and the about secure and non-secure tactical. Create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field available. FE MA. In addition to military communications at the b.52-M CHAPTER 12 COMMUNICATIONS 12-1 GENERAL 12-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS The On-Scene Commander (OSC) requires internal a. He or she should be equally adept at establishing command (secure desirable). security. Therefore. Coordinate frequency usage of all response distances (external corhmunications). Many initial communications requirements external communications to higher echelons. including personnel at the accident scene (internal communications) and at long c.or HF. the DoE. and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). radio. DoD 51 OO. Response Force (SRF) must take immediate action to ensure that appropriate communications equipment is Communication requirements: identified and requested early in response operations. in the Washington arena. near existing communications systems. and ensure that required communications are available. a. . and Joint Information Center (JIC). Conferencing may suffice early in the response. (3) Secure voice via satellite. This chapter provides guidance for establishing (4) Access to the Defense Communications System communications systems and capabilities to support response operations. He or she must (2) Field phones for EOD operations (secure be able to apply conventional and imaginative methods phones are desirable). Several minimum nets. Fast. the National Military Command mutual support and eliminate interference. c. 12-1 . Moreover.

and commercial telephone systems simul~aneously: through the HAMMER ACE operations center at Scott ~. mobile radio network with a repeater/base station for local communications. Air Force. U. Tactical communications assets are listed in Appendix 20-A. response organizations. VA.S. the DoD. respectively. Service Assets. Resources are as familiar as the telephone or capabilities are required. however. including type of emergency. ications Division. available communications media may be used to submit the request. via HF radio. as well as for contingency assets. The land mobile radios can interface with the secure satellite system. or commercial Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 20-A. c. AUTOVON. Record communications can be “air. Two secure full duplex teletype circuits (one AFB. only those assets ~. Any sources. verbal requests must be followed a. and enough batteries Communications assets must be capable of deployment are deployed to sustain 72-hour operation. two via HF radio). or commercial communications unit contained in one. remote locations. Scott AFB. ~. These units are maintained in a (a) HAMMER ACE. Resources are available from (AFCC Command Center) or through the JNACC. The Military Services maintain in writing within 24 hours. Army. if any. or equivalent-type aircraft. Phone numbers (2) U. multichannel radios. equipment. HAMMER ACE The communications capabilities and resources for personnel. The following on deployment of generators or additional batteries is presents a variety of communications resources for required for longer operations. is capable of battery operations. The team can deploy within three hours and establish communications within 30 minutes of arrival (a) Ashore Mobile Contingency Communica- on-site. A follow- to. Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix l-G. and limited data communications. and operation in. in conjunction with the OSC. For this reason. The mobile diesel generators. The limited 12-4 RESOURCES capability provided by HAMMER ACE is an initial capability only. HAMMER ACE is a state of readiness to permit deployment within 24 hours rapidly deployable team of engineers and technicians by COMMNAVSTA Philippines and NAVCAMSLANT equipped with advanced technology communications Norfolk. Service operations centers. gapped” to AUTODIN through the HAMMER ACE operations center. Navy Fleet Commanders- below. other Federal organizations. Other capabilities include air-to- e. d. transportable airliners.S. Information about specific assets as well as procedures for requesting and a.S. Capabilities include secure satellite system for equipment shelter with two separately configured 55 kw voice. Obtain frequency clearances. Navy. HAMMER ACE equipment as sophisticated as satellite capable secure voice radio. Illinois. or alternatively. Requests for additional information should switchboards. equipment to maintain the following circuits STU-11. The AMCC van is . Illinois. The van contains sufficient secure satellite link can interface with AUTOSEVOCOM. Remarks concerning any unusual condi- (1) U. a small mobile on C-21. Special Commun~’ ication systems. land Instruction for use by all response organizations. including coordi- tasking Service assets can be obtained from the respective nates if avaiiabie. Prepare a Communication-Electronics Operating ground communications and a privacy feature. “be directed to HQ AFCC/ DOXZ. ~. Each U. Deployment location. communications assets to support battalion. 12-2 . brigade.S. Because the same equipment supports numerous contingencies. “ in-Chief has control of ashore mobile contingency communication units.S. additional widely. are available from both Combat Communication Groups and HAMMER ACE as described in paragraph (a) (3) U. as necessary. facsimile. and record commun. or operational commanders. The requesting agency must communications assets organic to combat support units provide the following information with the request. Points of contact. evaluate the nuclear weapon accident recovery operations vary situation and determine what. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACE required for a specific nuclear weapon accident response support should be made directly to HQ AFCC/COXC effort should be requested. HAMMER ACE equipment can be transported tions (AMCC). Army signal units have tions for wh~ch the team should prepare. Situation. and division operations including wire/ telephone ~.

requires an additional lift mounted in air transportable vans. Supplement 1. and an air conditioner/ (c) The AMCC units are. for (4) U. Details on the JCCSA are In the U. Arizona. requested according to procedures contained in ~. The voice radio system may be connected. commun- an additional prime mover is required.S. ~. A wide trolled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (CJCS MOP 3) lowboy trailer must be used to transport the vans any and in Allied Communications Publication 134.S. The JACC/ CP can be deployed within 24 information regarding these assets can be obtained from hours from the time the JCS issues deployment approval the JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division. radios. During normal at McDill AFB. Florida. additional information can be obtained from support unit consisting of Army. UHF satellite fleet broadcast receiver (AN/ (e) Secure record communications terminals. and until it kilohertz (3 SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its returns to its host command. Otherwise. AN/ARC-54 (VHF/FM) and AN/ ARC-51BX (VHF/AM). operational control of the respective Fleet Commanders. (f) Weather dissemination equipment. four-wire/two-wire telephone switchboard. wire. Marine Corps (USMC). The 12-3 . KY-70 and KY-75 secure voice devices. commonly referred t’o helicopter. consists of several pieces of equipment for the AMCC. plans for deployment of mobile/transportable commun- reference (y). ~. under the accessory trailer. Two UHF secure voice circuits with KY. (c) Microwave/ troposcatter radios. Air Force. Army concepts capabilities and logistics requirements. tions Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). and . secure). or one 6x65-ton truck. Two VINSON secure voice devices.the U. 60 Hz. ~. it is under the custody 10 kw system. Contingency requests should ers or high frequency. circuit via HF or UHF satellite. via satellite with KG-36 security equipment. Phone numbers are in Appendix 20-A. The JACC/ CP has if transported by helicopter. One narrow band secure voice (CV-3333) (a) Switchboards. (b) HF radio. Army Information Systems Command Marine Corps personnel and a variety of communica. ~. four major components—operations center. the AMCC uses local power (j) The AN/ URC Joint Airborne Communica- where available. references (w) and (x). 28 voice security equipment. The JACC/ CP also contains three command. messages. One PARKHILL narrow band secure voice (g) UHF and SHF satellite terminals. double independent sideband be forwarded to the Fleet CINC as expeditiously as (HF/ ISB) with a total of four independent three- possible. or 30-line.S. ications control. Ft Huachuca. generator. Details of the JCSE deployment/employment tions Assets. single sideband (HF/ SSB) voice or teletype approved by the Fleet CINC based on requests submitted communication channel over its one-kilowatt transceiv- by subordinate commands. at all times. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Controlled Assets. The mobile generators as JACKPOT. (1) Joint Communications Support Element (2) JCS-Joint Controlled Tactical Communica- (JCSE). The JCSE is a contingency duty hours. HF High Command (HICOM) net. When transported via truck. can be obtained by contacting the JCSE ications assets controlled by the JCS. units have multichannel radio. (h) Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412). in a winch equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. Additional ~. and record 3. and (b) When deployed. The JACC/CP can provide one high in-Chief (CINCS). The complete JACC/ CP can be transported “Mobile/ Transportable Communications Assets Con. A complete AMCC unit can ~. (d) UHF and VHF radios (secure and non- ~. to a 10-fine. ~. any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a JCS contingency support communications resources are JACC/CP radio. The USMC signal ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. Contingency Branch. SSR-I receiver only). if needed. (i) KY-65. a AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM). 20-line. Navy. The Joint Airborne Communication& Cen- be transported via one C-130 aircraft. Power source must be 440V. three phase. or from tions equipment including: their EOC. mobile generators supplied with the AMCC units will be used. communication systems. All deployments of the AMCC are frequency. The switchboard can connect b. ~. When the AMCC is deployed. distance or over other than paved/gravel roads. The 10 kw system is limited to ground and operational control of the designated supported operations only. one CH-53 ter/ Command Post (JACC/ CP).

the State disaster response wire (field phones). and data communications to include accomplished prior to arrival. the initial communication capability may consist of only hand held. The local communications include voice. communications problems. by C-141/ C-5 aircraft. suitcase repeater and suitcase base station with telephone interconnect. A juncture. Although the specific ications officer should use these resources with deployed equipment varies between FEMA regions.S. (1) HF Radio (voice only) for external commun. if an accident occurs headquarters. and a narrow band (HY-2) trunk the response force involved. Conversely. The DoE maintains emergency communications officer(s). facsimile. contribute to the is outsized and requires C-5 aircraft transport. Single-channel a. response contingent usually arrives with the following capabilities: (1) In remote or sparsely populated areas. (c) Troposcatter radios (d) Medium speed AUTODIN terminals e. or even a business or private telephone may be available 12-4 . The Exchange (TWX). Most SHF provide communications to a remote area via transpor- satellite terminals are under JCS deployment control. Air Force has communication assets similar to those in the 12-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS JCCSA. Secure ications assets at. table microwave. Initial Actions. The van control arrangements of those forces. and the d.close’to a populated area. and operational. are included communications officer is to determine the commun- for advance party use and emergency backup. including the location of the accident. State/ local officials. Equipment includes: Equipment includes hand-held radios. and to carry on from that local area networks and high speed transmission. Incumbent upon the SRF communications pagers). including telephone. opment satellite terminals which can be deployed for contingency operations and exercises. most locations. and U. secure voice terminals. data. This concept of operations focuses on the actions of the military response force(s)” c. authorities can provide information on the commun- ication infrastructure near the accident scene. New Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS). Systems include a multi-point telephone the IRF or the SRF communications officer takes the switch. or close to. multi-channel satellite system is available to provide long-haul transmission capability. Monmouth. and the command and which will interface with AUTOSEVO(DM. In the CONUS. or cable. Oklahoma. data Teletypewriter (GMF) te~minals assigned to the military Services. video teleconferencing. facsimile. The approach is to present response. the accident site. a point-to-point officer is the responsibility to ascertain what has been microwave system. Air National Nuclear weapon accidents present a variety of technical. maintains UHF and SH F research and devel. FEMA Assets. the U.S. The initial task of the response force INMARSAT terminals. They are located at 3rd Combat Communi- cations Group (CCG) and the 281st CCG. (2) VHF radio to support on-scene Federal ment which can be deployed separately or in packages Response Center (FRC) (internal) communications. Tinker AFB. complexity of the problems. Guard. portable HF radios. Coordination Center (EICC) in Washington. a coin operated telephone. Commercial carriers can (3) Other JCS Controlled Assets. DC. with data interface. Leased These terminals include the Ground Mobile Forces services. HF/ VHF radio networks (with action. American Telephone and Telegraph AT&T) is possible. carrier systems. Also. and the Emergency Information and . short range VHF/ FM radios. DoE Assets. KY-3 Several factors. Telephone Exchange (TELEX). telephone company. includes a secure cord switchboard (SECORD). teletype. Ft. or ication to their regional office. the FEMA assets to establish an effective communications network. are available in Jersey. air transportable communications services and items of concern sequentially without regard to whether hardware. Commercial Assets. the commun- FEMA regional office level.JCCSA consists of heavy mobile/transportable equip. (a) Switchboards The quantities of these assets will vary depending on (b) HF radio the size of the FEMA response contingent. Army 235th Signal Company. Deployable communication assets capabilities for long haul and local communications. Equipment in the van logistical. used by FEMA response groups are maintained at the Once existing capabilities are determined. acquisition of (e) Manual secure voice switch and terminals supporting communications systems from commercial (f) SHF satellite terminals carriers (for example. or civilian and still video operations.

and a support base camp Communications:Electronics Board (Joint Frequency is established”. Additional details maybe obtained list should include assets and frequencies belonging to from U. Compilations of individually unclassified from the command post. Follow-On Actions. codes and authenticators. The use of unauthorized. and detailed “how-to-use” procedures for all available Therefore. Further.immediately for emergency use. In either case. frequencies could lead to embarrassment for the U. Moreover. telephone routing instructions. Radio frequencies b. non-DoD agencies identifying potential mutual inter- ment. Failure to obtain valid frequency communication systems. assets are limited. An outline of a typical if communication can be established from the site to CEOI is at Figure 12-1. primarily in 12-5 . When requested by the Services. The staff directors for to prevent exploitation of EEFIs may include using support and operations. and widely distributed. particularly if radio procedures and call signs. The instructions should be unclassified. and methods to support the mobility of the OSC. The response force commun. more containing the capabilities and limitations of equipment time is required to provide leased assets to remote areas.S. COMSEC deserves additional emphasis. The to area coordinators. The CEOI should be an easy-to-use instruction to augment available communications. and should ensure that all possible assets are Radio Spectrum Frequency Management. each military department has a As this build-up occurs. references (z) considered when meeting overall communication and (aa). Radio unfriendly elements may be able to compile these items. but in most cases these ications officer should establish and maintain a list of offices have delegated the authority to assign frequencies communications assets and capabilities on-scene. therefore.” or U. As additional response forces are managed at the national level by the Military deploy to the accident scene. if requested at the earliest possible time. the DoD JNACC. are helpful). the requirements must be identified and systems. As a minimum. the board. increasing the quantity of communications assets and Government. (4) The communications officer must take prompt action to obtain frequency clearances. the response force commun- frequency management office. message addresses. the CEOI. “Radio Frequency Manage. Air Force ference. (2) Another method of communications for message handling instructions and routing indicators. COMSEC actions and long haul voice circuits. If defeat this threat by determining the EEFI for the possible. dialing and as well as long haul secure voice and record capabilities. Air Force Regulation 700-14. Additional communication assets. additional a Communications-Electronic Operating Instruction leased communications such as WATS can be obtained (CEOI). and the special staff advisors secure transmission facilities. secure voice procedures. pline. the net should be secure and have a radio/ operation.S. DoE and FEMA communications personnel requirements. routing those assets into the appropriate users hands (5) One of the more complex problems facing the ~ “ is of primary importance as the response organization response force communications officer is preparation of grows. friendly information (EEFIs). (1) As emphasized throughout this chapter. communications disci- should be included in this net. is the telephone conferencing and communications security (COMSEC) operations capability of Service operations centers and/or the security procedures including essential elements of National Military Command Center (NMCC). the DoD JNACC will assist by relaying (6) Although COMSEC instructions are a part of information or coordinating with other forces/agencies.S. external (long haul) communications. plan communication recovery procedures may well be classified. Follow-on possible. an on-site telephone directory. DoD JNACC arranges Enemy or dissident elements may be able to intercept for transportation of specialized communications and exploit command and control communications resources. nets provided for OSC communications should have Therefore. items concerning weapons communicated during ications officer must. and then by acting to preclude interception wire integration capability into the local switchboard or exploitation of this information. and changing call signs. Army FM 24-2. additional communication resources will Management Office). authorizations could result in interferenw with other critical communications. authorities/ officials agencies possessing on-scene officer advised. they deployment of mobile communications provides the shouId include system descriptions (charts and diagrams response force with additional local telephone and radio. Coordination should be made with the should coordinate frequency requirements through their appropriate representative from Federal and civilian own channeIs and keep the military communications . Naturally. systems and traffic used for response to nuclear weapon (3) The OSC may spend considerable time away accidents. the communications officer must plan to sufficient range and be capable of frequent use. Each Service@s membership on be deployed or acquired concurrent with the build-up.

. . . . . . . . . . . .On-Site Telephone Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . ANNEX C . . . . . SECTION 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANNEX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .cs Operating Instruction (CEO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #3 Catcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intercom #1 . . . . . . .Communications Security . . . . . . Figure 3-1: Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #2 Looker . . . . . . . . . Figure 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 3-?: Eyes Only Message Example . . Communications-Electro. . 12-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI) (Sample Contents) SECTION 1. . . . . . . . . . .I : Telephone Routing Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ntercorn # 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Off-Site Contact Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . . .Radio Communications Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . .Intercom Systems . . . . .Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . ANNEX D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3 .Radio Call Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2-2: Hot Line Routing Diagram . .Telephone Communications . . . . . B-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #1 Grader . . . . . . .Tie Line Network Dialing Instructions . . . . . . .Message Communications Instruction . . . . . . . B-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANN EXA-Response Force Traffic Diagram . Intercom #3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .> Figure 12-1. . B-2. . . . . . . . . Net #4 Ivory . . . . . . Net #7 Red .DISTRIBUTION . SECTION ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #. N e t # 6 Angel . . . . . . . . . . Intercom #4 . SECTION 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Blue . .

little or no need will exist d. 12-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX g. Procedures for using secure/clear fax resources. and to support and the location of assets to fill requirements. However. the primary commun- ications should be routine situation reports. Procedures for obtaining frequency cleara~ces. transitions into site restoration. Procedures for obtaining leased commercial (MILSTRIP) messages. Prepare an integrated communications plan. Procedures for establishing communications links (2) As the response operations peak. After the weapon(s) and weapon components are removed from the site.- 12-7 . record deployable communications assets. b. so will the with the NMCC and Defense Communications System communications support required. Procedures for obtaining Service and JCS to communicate by secure voice. Procedures for coordinating communications with non-DoD agencies. . Procedures for establishing local radio nets and early response and weapon recovery should continue assignment of call signs. As the response from remote locations. f. radiological monitoring and site restoration operations. through site restoration. Procedures and information appropriate for the h. messages.the form of telephones and VHF/FM radios. communications annex to the accident response plan include: i. are needed a. and other administrative communications. communications support provided on-site during the e. supply c. A description of actual or projected requirements for effective operation of the JIC.

The presence of nuclear weapons or components at an g. Protect government property. c. The SRF security officer should assess manpower requirements and ensure The security program at the accident scene should meet that sufficient additional security personnel are included the following requirements: in the SRF. Riot control gear should be many unique to a nuclear weapon accident. Protect nuclear weapons and components. Provide necessary operational security (OPSEC). radiological control area. This requirement should include rope and stanchions for barricading the accident 13-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE site. hand- held radios. protective masks. The IRF should provide security personnel with This chapter provides guidance for planning and anti-contamination clothing and protective masks in the conducting security operations at the scene of a nuclear event that security requires their presence within the weapon accident and discusses security requirements. a nuclear weapon capability should maintain equipment to control an accident site. IRF security personnel may become part of the SRF security element.enforcement agencies/ host nation law agencies. entry and exit civilian land by military forces. The On. canteens. If the accident occurs off a military installation near e.52-M CHAPTER 13 SECURITY 13-1 GENERAL f. security program as soon as possible. augmentation may be required. Security forces can expect to encounter large numbers Overseas. and portable lights. Also. Provide effective control of the accident area. cold weather gear. Civilian Response. The equivalent DoE area for an incident/ nuclear weapon accident. and rescue units will . off- installation accidents could require the establishment of a. security chapter outlines a concept of operations to satisfy these personnel possess equipment such as weapons and requirements. NDA and entry control point signs. Normally. of his or her personnel to respond. ammunition. be prepared to meet all security requirements on a 24 hour basis without degrading the alertness and capability b. c. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group accident site requires implementation of an effective activities or intelligence collection efforts. “Since sufficient personnel will not likely be enforcement agencies is essential to an effective security included in the IRF security elements responding to a program. Initial Response Force (IRF). fire. the available if crowd control is required. to restrict entry and to provide for public personnel are in supervisory positions. accident involving DoE equipment/ materials is a NSA. of people attracted to the accident scene. and protection of classified information and of the NDA. Additionally. and helmets. security assistance may need to be obtained from civil authorities/officials until 13-4 RESOURCES sufficient military forces arrive. local police. there is no equivalent to the NDA. When an accident occurs at a military installation. Civilian law enforcement d. The IRF will have a National Defense Area (NDA) to permit control of a security element for perimeter security. and care should Scene Commander will establish a disaster cordon or be exercised to ensure that only experienced security Security Area. Even after establishment control. Installations with safety. close coordination with civil law property. Provide effective coordination with civil law ‘a populated area. 13-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS b. be notified and may be on-scene when the IRF arrives. DoD 51 OO. The security officer should a. response depends on the location of the accident site. 13-1 . Protect other classified materials and information. Service Response Force (SRF).

While the assessment is made. cold/ hot weather). types and quantities of vehicles). rope and wire. Fragmentation hazard necessary until more specific information is available distances and the possibility of contamination should regarding the location of the government material. the security officer must assess the situation. and that (9) Structures in accident area (type and quantity). However. (4) The OSC who establishes the NDA should (2) Location (on or off military installation). (8) Transportation network in accident area (access Moreover. urban). and in a helpful. Security gency Search Team (NEST) communications pod is of any portion of the radiological control area existing equipped with a slow scan TV system. advise civil authorities/ officials of the authority and the (3) Demographics and accident environment need for the NDA and the security controls in effect. bilinguaI signs should be considered. Civilians distances. be established at the accident site in cooperation with (3) The OSC designating the NDA must clearly “ civil authorities. Accident Assessment. however. If possible. When overseas. and Section 21 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. which is with the DoS Chief of Mission. and provides the foundation for the security decisions regarding establishment. military and other hazardous materials). 13-2 . or toxic chemicals). references (e) and (ah).41-M should be posted at the entry control may not yet be established and may be different in size. (5) Contamination (radiation intensity and extent (5) In maintaining security of the NDA. suburban. irrespective of other response operations and actions of local law enforcement factors. This authorized to designate an NDA.8. (1) Threat (real and potential danger to the secure area). (remote. Sentries should be briefed motors. Warning signs as described confused with the National Defense Area (NDA) which in DoD 5210. This initial security is not to be for example. anything. the civilian authorities/ define and mark its boundary. Only IRF and SRF OSCS are site. involving nuclear weapons or components occurs on non-Federal property. Upon arrival at the accident non-Federal land. National Defense Area (NDA). care be provided by civilian authorities/officials. security should modification of the NDA. personnel should use the minimum degree of control (6) Accident hazards (high explosives. This system may outside the NDA is a matter of public safety and should be very useful in surveillance operations. No one should be allowed to remove b. obtaining such features). and then only to assessment includes an evaluation of ongoing emergency safeguard government resources. around the scene. Initially. The OSC should seek legal advice on any agencies. rocket and force necessary. rural. This area is established specifically to enhance safeguarding government property located on a. the OSC should secure the landowners’ (4) Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating consent and cooperation. encompass the entire radiological control area. controls should be implemented to ensure routes. The NDA may. but witcfiful manner. In areas where languages other elements in his assessment: than English are spoken. Department of Energy. provides the basis for establishing an NDA only in the 13-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS United States. that public affairs policy is strictly adhered to. The be considered when posting initial security personnel boundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier. or program. the riate security. disestablishment. (2) DoD Directive 5200. This must be done in close coordination dimensions of the NDA may be quite large. Area boundaries are officials will be requested to establish a Security Area established to minimize interference with other lawful (Disaster Cordon) to ensure public safety and approp- activities on and uses of the property.Civilian law enforcement personnel may augment (1) An NDA may be required any time an accident military security personnel if requested. activities are not transmitted in the clear. must be taken to ensure that classified components or military assist ante may be requested. ionsent is not a prerequisite for establishing the NDA. requests for interviews and queries concerning the (10) Safety of security personnel (fragmentation accident are referred to public affairs personnel. The DoE Nuclear Emer. however. station and along the boundary and be visible from any The security officer should consider the following direction of approach. thoroughly and given specific instructions for dealing (7) Local meteorological conditions (include with civilians. contamination. or may not. sensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident. d. should be treated courteously. nor touch any suspicious objects. All personnel should be aware of the prevailing winds).

This action prevents unauthorized persons from be promulgated in coordination with the DoE Team entering the NDA undetected between posts and ensures Leader. The 13-. Accidents Overseas. and appreciation for security requirements will assist in response operations. should be established as the focal point for security (7) When all government resources have been operations and be located close to the entry control point. sufficient c. form. or Federal laws. and AFR 205-1. Specified c~assified components must be incident rests with such Government officials/ represen. and should contact. The security An identification and badging system should be officer must ensure that actions of on-scene military implemented.2. Early participating law enforcement agencies should be located coordination with State and local officials permits an at the security operations center and able to commun- orderly transfer of responsibility to State and local icate with their personnel.3 . (6) Local civil authorities/ officials should be asked largely uncontrolled. l-R. As soon as possible. agencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA. should prevail. preferably a radio. and a record personnel do not constitute a violation of the Posse of all personnel entering the accident area made and Comitatus Act which prohibits use of DoD personnel ret ained. (4) A security alert force should be considered. or and off-site authority at a nuclear weapon accidentj outline. (3) Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information Each guard should have a means of summoning (CNWDI) access verification may have to be waived assistance. references (af). and defined in the GLOSSARY. Security Procedures. incident/ accident in a country outside the United States. Civil authorities there will be asked to establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon) (1) Some components in nuclear weapons may to restrict access and to provide for public safety. as response operations progress. or refuse to give assistance. AR 380-150. or be in contact with temporarily during the initial phases of accident someone who does. unless authorized (3) A security operations center or control point by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. the U. effort. authorities are unavailable.S. On reveal classified information by their shape. of each apprehension and the actions taken. When all classified government resources have familiar with the location. over and order has been established. Apprehension or arrest of civilian personnel may temporarily take priority over security procedures. protected from sight and overhead photographic tatives except that the United States shall maintain surveillance. entry control logs established. Representatives of” all been removed. compliance with This type of equipment will reduce security personnel DoD Directive 5210. to ensure that visual contact can be maintained at night. State. and other emergency activities the NDA. (2) Individuals with varying degrees of knowledge d. custody of the weapon(s) and/or classified components. reference (ad). authorities/ agencies arrive at the control point. entry and “ (4) The two-person policy is addressed in DoD and exit of emergency units and other personnel may be Service directives. who violate any security requirements at the NDA should However. although early in the accident response. standard normally be done by civilian authorities. fire suppression. Security Considerations. OPNAVINST requirements and the possibility of radiation exposure 5510. the NDA could be disestablished. necessary life entry and in removing unauthorized personnel who enter saving. or guard spacing adjusted. The content of the information security program that none of the guards violate the two-man rule. Government respects the sovereignty of the e. (ag).41. Consideration should be given in response. should be briefed to everyone in the weapon recovery Lighting should be provided.IF. on-scene military personnel should apprehend and detain an entry control point should be established. When the urgency of the initial response is obtaining portable intrusion detection system sensors. to them. to execute local. The security officer should to assist military personnel in preventing unauthorized recognize that during initial response. must be enforced. reference (se). and (ah). the OSC should consider reducing the size of Its location should be fixed so that personnel become the NDA. (2) During the initial emergency response. located. Disposition should be completed personnel from various Federal and/ or civilian quickly following coordination with the legal officer. A comprehensive and effective (1) Sentry posts around the NDA should be in information security program is available as outlined locations that enable guards to maintain good visual in DoD Directive 5200. When violators or trespassers. leaders The Senior FEMA Official (SFO) should be notified of the groups should be escorted to the operations center. If local civil security measures specified in DoD Directive 5210. In the event of a nuclear personnel may be unavailable to form such a force. government of that country.

The security annex perimeter where EOD and DoE personnel can discuss should include: CNWDI related to weapon(s) recovery operations. f. (5) In the initial emergency response. A description of the subversive/unfriendly threat. forces may prepare an annex in advance which could (6) An area should be available within the security be modified to fit the circumstances. and signs to establish and staff (in cooperation with the local Federal Bureau of maintain the NDA. Also. Security operating procedures to include perimeter documents. security necessary to maintain high standards of security. but not limited to: e. communications and clothing requirements. Security 13-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX personnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weapons The security annex should describe the responsibilities and components must be PRP certified. Administrative and logistic requirements: for (4) Investigating and reporting incidents of example. State. Descriptions of the interface with Federal. establishing and. areas will be established for storage of classified a. rules of engagement. Intelligence personnel should d. and weapon compo. be waived due to a lack of PRP certified personnel. (7) If a base camp is established to support the response operation. 134 . Specific points base camp entry control point established. IRF and SRF should be used on the perimeter if available. g. Verification of contact and phone numbers may be contained in a of vehicle trip authorization.security officer must ensure that procedures provide for (5) Advice and assistance to the OSC and the two-man rule compliance for all nuclear weapons and security staff on matters of personnel and information applicable components at the accident site. and use of deadly force. Procedures for coordinating with radiological control personnel to ensure that sentry posts outside (1) Advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the radiological control area are not affected by the the OSC and security staff. maintenanw of entry logs and badges. they should be used in security positions which require them. access/ entry procedures. operation center. Personnel (6) Requests for large scale photographic coverage Reliability Program (PRP) requirements may have to of the accident site. State. such as special Investigation (FBI). separate intelligence annex. stanchions. information security is provided for these areas. The security officer must ensure that adequate a National Defense Area or Security Area. and a and civilian law enforcement officials. (3) Coordination and advice to the OSC and security staff regarding operations security. traffic control signs should be b. Guidance for handling unprotected personnel be used to the fullest extent and incorporated actively encountered in contaminated areas. and local agencies and civilian authorities{ officials. Procedures for locating and operating the security security functions. expected immediate security interest to the OSC and the security amounts of rope. Military Intelligence. threats to response operations (for example. discipline within the camp may be parts of base camp c. access to the camp. including. security. and maintaining order and accident. law enforcement procedures developed. f. in the overall security posture. restriction of curiosity separate appendix to be expanded in the event of an seekers. resuspension of contaminants during wind shifts. Security Area.maintaining nents. posted. (2) Liaison and coordination with Federal. When certified personnel are available. PRP personnel and procedures of the security forces. recovered weapons. hostile this and related information may be included in a intelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities). on including an impact assessment on response operations.

training must be conducted prior to g. d. contamination is not dispersed (for example. and ensure that bioassay and b. life-saving procedures should not be delayed or omitted due to radiation contamination. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team personnel will be required to: (RAMT). available health matters. all may not be required for response to a given 14-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS accident. and safety programs to support response operations over . Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries. is available from the Department of resources. exist. TITAN 11 explosion at Damascus. or illnesses. a. sophisticated treatment available only at tamination efforts fail to achieve desired results. coordination with radiological personnel. numbers and categories of injuries. As with any response function. medic. Assist in casualty decontamination and supervise accident response force medical personnel. Treatment of contaminated patients requires special techniques and e. through the DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). Radioactive contamination may be a result of a nuclear weapon accident.52-M CHAPTER 14 MEDICAL 14-1 GENERAL a. DoD 51 OO. simplified. Medical support assistance. Although numerous resources are available. su$pected contamination. In instances when radioactive b.S. Specifically. their location. difficult external exposure data becomes part of the ‘health problems result. assets should be requested when emergency medical treatment and in establishing health needed. To accomplish this. On other the decontamination of personnel when initial decon- occasions. special medical facilities will be required. specialized in radiological In addition to recommended procedures. However. 1980.al a. Resources discussed in the following para- graphs should be studied and reviewed in advance. contamination. Establish a heat/cold exposure prevention training as done for highly contagious patients. emergency life saving procedures in any major disaster are applicable to a nuclear weapon c. RAMTs are located at Walter Reed. of possible Even without the presence of radioactive contamination. In some program. personnel involved in accident response. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident.”” w nen Medical personnel will assist in accident related an accident occurs. 14-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE This chapter provides guidance concerning the medical 14-4 RESOURCES requirements resulting from a nuclear weapon accident. If radioactive contaminants are dispersed. instances. in accident where radioactive contamination is not a factor. September. and priority for transport to Arkansas). including civilians in the surrounding community exposed to radiation or contamination as a result of the accident. and how to obtain them are Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) discussed also. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of all an accident. Implement the collection of bioassay samples from response personnel. the for example. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties. U. these special techniques can be applied by the f. Army 14-1 . and medical personnel must now treat records. an extended period of time. the medical requirements were greatly a medical facility. people who may be contaminated. and measures which can be taken to other weapon specific nonradioactive toxic hazards may prevent its spread.

the response forces (IRF or SRF) medical officer 14-2 . Washington. may and clinical procedures. RAMT services 14-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS should be requested through the Army Operations Center. and a with all types of radiation exposure and can provide medical officer with appropriate training and experience. if needed. the team is prepared or exposure to ionizing radiation. personnel can add to the difficulty of proper medical ogy advice supporting a nuclear accident response. injuries. Washington. authorities concerning radiological health hazards. presence. to deploy and provide advice at an accident site or (b) Evaluation of survey data to provide technical medical treatment facility. The RAMT can be augmented for may be obtained through the REAC/TS center. and follow-up. Additionally. MD 20814- 5145. C. or the JNACC. and is applicable to both radiobiology research.. D. is prepared to deal in monitoring and radiation dose evaluation. two qualified technicians are on the team with normally deploy to the accident site with an initial stock experience and training in radiation detection and of chelating agents as a part of the DoE Accident measurement techniques. or responsible medical officials. ionizing radiation and the decontamination of personnel. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site who is a nuclear medical science officer with training (REAC/TS). and the loth derived from validated.Medical Center. expert advice and assistance. for example. Subject areas of expertise include. within 24 hours. Upon request of the OSC guidance to the responsible officials utilizing radiolog. On-Scene Commander (OSC) or other responsible hematology. Additional information about the MRAT can (d) Advising the commander regarding the be obtained by contacting the Director. Oak Ridge. dosimetry and behavioral analyses. This advice is occurs. This concept of operations is directed toward team consists of physicians and scientists working in the medical response function. medical treatment facilities. logical material routinely are equipped to administer medical treatment for radiological casualties. and medical equipment. or absence. Additional REAC/TS assistance can be requested (3) Additional information can be obtained from through either the DoE Team Leader. Bethesda. HSHL-QHP/ RAMT. Before an accident the treatment of radiation casualties. assist. Force (SRF). the MRAT provides radiobiology advice to (a) Guidance relative to the potential health medical staffs and OSCS within a response time of 4 hazards to personnel from radiological contamination. REAC/TS personnel will Also. Armed Forces potential health hazards from exposure to sources of Radiobiology Research Institute. All team members have a Response Group (ARG). hours. c. reference (ai). D. Department of Energy. FRG. laboratory have medical support capabilities which. In addition. Landstuhl. The teams are research and is within reasonably accepted standards specially trained to assist and furnish guidance to the of care. Through (1) The RAMT provides the following functions: means of telephone communications (available 24-hours a day). DoE facilities that handle radio- (f) Assisting the OSC with the bioassay program. The MRAT is deployed with the DNAAT. The (2) Each RAMT is comprised of a team leader. the physician members ically contaminated areas. If needed. The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Other factors such as a delayed initial response time maintains a Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (that is. biological response modifiers. of radioactive contamination. This response. liaison with other medical centers and laboratories specializing in radiobiology can be facilitated. advice on the treatment of contaminated patients required training. infectious officials at an accident site and to local medical disease. Pre-Accident Preparation. Until REAC/ TS personnel minimum security clearance of SECRET and attend arrive. military-relevant radiobiology Medical Laboratory. cies with the most current medical guidance regarding a. or JNACC. extended operations. the Commander. 20307 or by referring to AR 40-13. Their mission is to provide the the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service Response medical groups responding to radiobiological emergen.. a remote accident) or nonavailability of medical (MRAT) to provide state-of-the-art medical radiobiol. Tennessee. Walter Reed Army Medical Center. of the MRAT supplement the designated primary (c) Monitoring medical facilities and equipment medical treatment teams in the treatment of radiation where contaminated patients have been evacuated.. Medical problems resulting from a nuclear weapon accident vary in complexity depending primarily on the b. C. Major DoE installations (e) Advising on early. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute.

the IRF is equipped (Prophylactic precautionary IV’s should be delayed and manned to provide emergency medical treatment. Administer CPR if be evacuated without decontamination. However. Suggested AS LONG AS THE PATIENT REMAINS WRAPPED casualty handling procedures for emergency response IN THE SHEET. into the (8) Determine if corrosive materials were present accident site to assist in avoiding radioactive. Lead (Pb) and smoke transporting to the hospital. introduction of contaminated materials into the mouth. In addition to radioactive materials. utilized by the on-site medical team. mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. The patient will necessary. while the SRF should be equipped and manned to (4) Control hemorrhage and stabilize fractures. Respiratory protective devices shall be worn based on the non-radiological hazards (smoke or fumes) contamination. HE DOES NOT POSE A THREAT to a nuclear weapon accident follow: OF SPREADING CONTAMINATION AND COM- PROMISING THE CONTAMINATION CONTROL (1) Assess and assure an open airway. The probability of response force involvement in the Removal of contaminated clothing is advisable provided initial rescue and treatment procedures depends on the medical authority decides that their removal is not response time. the medical support element actually deployed. “into the ambulance or evacuation vehicle. Take routine residing on the uncontaminated side of the Contam- precautions. wrap the patient in a clean sheet the greater the probability that casualties will have been to contain any loose contamination during evacuation. since these materials can cause and toxic hazards. which are toxic hazards to personnel. and be logical contamination. treated and removed by civilian authorities. Take all possible precautions to prevent operations may preclude EOD personnel from accom. because of possible contamination of the skin). A high priority contamination if the wound is uncontaminated or to at any accident is the rescue and treatment of casualties. breathing. but care should be exercised in the patients through the Contamination Control Line. Hence. contraindicated. then be transferred” to the “clean” side of the hot line (2) Move victims if possible. the NAICO will allow these patients to and circulation of the victims. accompany emergency medical personnel. Respiratory protection should decontaminate him. 14-3 . using a bag-mask. Then place this card in a plastic bag and tions associated with these substances is presented in attach to the patient’s protective mask or in another Appendix 14-A.is identified. Casualty decontamination. several other weapon specific substances may be present (7) After the immediate medical needs are met. Finally. The proximity of (5) If a victim is unconscious. hazards. transported to the receiving medical facility. of seriously injured patients is best radiation monitors should mark a clear path. support a long term response effort. Note and record the location or fumes from various plastics. or performed in a medical treatment facility. or. Do not delay customary life saving ination Control Line. The longer it takes to get to the accident. panying medical personnel into the accident site. explosive. removing and handling patient’s clothing. Emergency Rescue and Treatment. Of primary concern monitor the victim for possible contamination before are Beryllium (Be). Generally. LINE. at the accident scene. transporting the seriously or as required by the guidelines in Chapter 5 when injured victim should not be delayed to monitor or entering the accident area. However. away from the and placed in the charge of “clea~’ medical personnel contaminated area by scoop stretchers. Lithium (Li). medical card. weapon render safe chemical burns. Categories for emergent or on the hazards and procedures for treatment of radiation immediate evacuation. equipment identified. A discussion of the and extent (in cpm) of the contamination on a field general characteristics. fashion that will prevent loss. positive pressure ventilator. All (6) Triage or sort the casualties by priority of life medical personnel at the accident site shall be trained or limb threatening injury. particularly wound decon- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and/or tamination. delayed and dead should be accident victims. The patient can then be loaded procedures (drugs. If possible. and health considera. contain the contamination if the wound is contaminated. (9) No medical personnel or equipment should Protective clothing shall be worn by emergency medical leave the contaminated area without monitoring for personnel. MAS Trousers) because of radio. consider medical existing medical treatment facilities to the accident site or toxic causes since radiation exposure does not cause is a factor in determining the size and capabilities of unconsciousness or immediate visible signs of injury. Also ensure that open wounds are covered with a field dressing to keep out b. supporting medical personnel assigned and (3) Administer intravenous fluids for shock. not be required when treating patients outside the (10) Attendant medical personnel will then process contaminated area.

Note: Procedures listed in above paragraphs (c). should be made (b) Removing clothing by cutting away the by the examining authorities. notify the facility of the These articles of clothing will then be bagged to contain following: the contamination. (d) That personnel are wearing proper protective (5) Use contagious disease control procedures (for clothing. Prior to entry of procedures may be used by medical facilities not the patient into the hospital. Emergency and (e) may be determined enroute to the evacuation of contaminated casualties may have medical facility if radiation detection instru. The following the patients to the emergency room. lation detectors. If so. The removal of contaminated clothing may remove up to 90 percent of the (a) Number of victims. For this type of accident scenario. washing with soap and water. confirmed by the RAMT team. gloves. This method parallels the standard methods Service procedures for handling casualties are contained 14-4 . These precautions include. areas of the body due to injuries or torn clothing. and hands. and they are versed in the use of this (4) Use plastic sheeting on floors to facilitate equipment. if known. Processing of Fatalities. all fatalities must be monitored for contam- (a) Carefully opening the sheet or plastic ination. If no such area exists then take their facilities or if assistance is required. limiting the access and numbers of people gowns. occurred prior to the arrival of response force personnel ments are available.e. shoe covers. if (14) The ambulance or evacuation vehicle will known. controls were implemented. vital signs (if known). However. and (c) Remaining contamination can be located with triage category. and rubber (a) The room used has an isolated air supply. liaison must be dered if a facility has sufficient capacity. Additionally.. c. the use of monitoring equipment and then removed by (c) Extent of contamination. for the arrival of the victims. in on itself. (b) Covering the area with plastic sheeting or or materials which may have come in contact with the “chucks” to contain loose contamination. but not at the expense of at an off-base accident. shoe covers. (c) Ensuring that personnel have the appropriate (3) Obtain radiation monitoring assistance for radiation detection instrumentation. (f) The radionuclide and the chemical form. as well as other exposed (e) Any evidence of internal contamination. in general. but are not limited to: (1) Use rooms with an isolated air supply. Use of a single medical facility arrived from the contaminated area before appropriate for contaminated casualties should be consi. not be returned to normal service until it is monitored (g) Any exposure to non-radiological toxic and decontaminated and such efforts have been materials. (d). conducted with area medical facilities to ensure that proper procedures are taken to prevent the spread of (12) Upon arrival at the hospital. (2) Use scrub clothes. alpha scintil. (b) Area of injuries. gloves. The determination of whether decontamina- any contamination. attendant medical personnel prepared for radiological emergencies and to reduce the will ensure that the hospital has instituted the proper spread of contamination. appropriate for protection against alpha contamination. i. contamination. be treated with the begin. decontamination and cleanup. surgical example. The remains of deceased (13) The decontamination of the patients may then accident victims should. and decontaminated if necessary. and bag them and any other clothing. (11) To ensure that the receiving facility is prepared of removing patient clothing in an NBC environment. hair. tion is to be done before an autopsy. detecting plutonium or uranium. These measures include: same respect and procedures used in any accident. some may have medical care. sheets . Suspect areas include the (d) Areas of greatest contamination. precautions. It must be determined if local medical immediately to the area designated for the receipt of facilities have the ability to monitor and decontaminate contaminated patients. take patients contamination. Any radiological support sleeves and trouser legs and folding the contamination for au?opsies should be arranged on a case-by-case basis. and by what instrument it was measured. prior to release wrapping surrounding the patient avoiding spreading for burial. should be involved in the treatment of patients). face and neck. patient when leaving the room. Liaison With Civil Authorities. and masks. d.

hoods and respirators increases the probability of heat injuries.0 20/ 30 Above 88 Black 2. Personnel must personnel is normally a responsibility of medical be monitored closely to prevent frostbite and other cold personnel. anti- and techniques are discussed in Chapter 8. personnel should be aware of the sensitive nature of Depending on Service procedures. Although ambient e. or of those who have a positive nasal wipe.5-2. Wet Globe Temperature. on call. urine samples may issues surrounding a nuclear weapon accident. Medical Clearing Facility. Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines. the injured person from the measured Botsball temperature when protective should be brought to the contamination control station clothing is’ worn. who are normally dressed and working at a heavy rate. avoidance of predis- as possible. Medical personnel should ensure that public affairs g.in AR 600-10. Public Affairs Considerations. Adequate water intake is the single Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements most important factor in avoidance of heat injuries. is a more effective method of control station with supplies for medical treatment of monitoring heat conditions. Collection contamination clothing. Additional technical tures. Collection of Bioassay Samples. and using the adjusted Botsball and clearing facility by personnel and vehicles already temperature to determine preventive actions to be taken. reference (am). Base Camp Medical Support. Botsball Heat Water Intake Work/rest Temperature Condition (qts/hr) Cycle (rein) 80-83 Green 0. Number 37.0 20/40 14-5 . These the initial emergency response should include a medic. cooling vest) should be used to allow additional stay-time for personnel in extreme heat conditions.0-1. and medically trained health physicist. Should an injury occur within the radiological The circular recommends subtracting ten (10) degrees control area and injuries permit. and respiratory equipment of required bioassay samples from response force presents severe demands on personnel. and (al). monitoring of tempera- deceased prior to decontamination. Hot/Cold Weather Operational Conditions.5-1. exhaustion. A separate first aid station may be needed (2) Specialized personnel cooling equipment (for to support the base camp. A medical clearing temperature may be used. . samples should be coordinated with the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). Bioassay programs (3) The use of cold weather gear. reference (an).LE 14-1. AFR 30-25. Table 14-1 is taken from response force injuries. and provides of skin. example. The JHEC will also provide h. or cramps) i. scheduling of adequate rest or cooling periods. in the area. and coordinated with the JIC as discussed in Chapter 16. Base camp support can occur with the ambient air temperature as low as requirements include treatment of on-the-job injuries TAB. personnel are informed of medical information provided to medical facilities receiving potentially contaminated (1) The reduction in natural cooling of the body patients and that queries for non-medical information caused by wearing full anti-contamination clothing with are referred to public affairs personnel. and to assist in decontamination DA Circular 40-82-3. Procedures for collecting and marking weather effects. (NCRP) Report. or facility should be established near the contamination Botsball temperature.0 50/ 10 83-86 Yellow . Minimum response force medical staffing after guidelines as a function of Botsball temperature. Frequent drinks are more effective than the same quantity of water taken all at once. Civil authorities measures to reduce heat injuries include acclimatization. Heat injuries (stroke. All public be required of all personnel who enter the radiological release of information should be approved by the OSC control area. All medical staff guidance on where samples should be sent for analysis. and if required. (ak). must be notified of any civilian casualties as quickly proper intake of salt and water. guidance concerning the handling of radioactively and educating the work force on heat injury symptoms contaminated fatalities can be found in the National and remedial actions. and BUPERS Manual Article 700 when wearing full protective gear.5 45/ 15 86-88 Red 1. f. 1. aid in identification of the posing factors to heat illness. references (aj). Preventive 4210100. guidelines assume fully acclimatized and fit personnel with a physician.

hazards of explosive materials. and evaluation of the adequacy of latrine deceased. inspection of field billeting and messing f. to the accident. Nuclear Hazards Training Course.and sickness. 14-6 . NM. Identifying and locating facilities for treating Radiobiology Research Institute at various locations. This training includes the principles of b. o IRF Teams and in techniques in monitoring contam- inated areas. and water supply. injuries. facility at the accident scene. b. Decontaminating and processing the remains of facilities. Several classes should include procedures for: are scheduled each year at the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School. related hazards in a nuclear weapon accident or incident. sewage disposal. Medical Effects of Nuclear Weapons. facilities. Establishing the relationship of the response force prohibited from entering the contaminated area and their medical staff and specialized medical teams responding supervisors notified of the restriction. Week-long classes are scheduled each year by the Armed Forces d. Differentiating between medical and radiological provides training in the organization and functions of safety/ health physics personnel. medical operations in a nuclear environment. Those personnel treated for cuts or open sores should be g. The course a. and c. Evacuating contaminated casualties to major medical treatment of nuclear and nuclear-related medical facilities. This annex a. nuclear devices. Receiving and treating contaminated patients. Establishing and operating a medical clearing IRF operation. 14-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX 14-7 SPECIALIZED COURSES FOR MEDICAL RESPONSE PERSONNEL The medical annex shouId describe responsibilities and special procedures used by the medical staff. and e. radiological health problems. including isolation of contaminated patients. Kirtland AFB. Topics include biological effects of ionizing radiation.

explosively. Other commonly occurring signs and compounds presents a very serious hazard. Lead (Pb). naturally occurring lithium is always found chemically with other elements. hard and brittle. Inhalation A self-contained breathing apparatus is necessary if is the most significant means of entry into the body. Respiratory protection and fire (1) Beryllium is a light. terrain. occurs. its detection requires trations within the body have been reduced successfully chemical analysis in a properly equipped laboratory. when applicable. 14-A-2 PURPOSE Upon exposure to water. or skin absorption. exposed to fires involving lithium or lithium hydrides. is an acute or delayed type of pulmonary edema or ingestion.by using chelating agents. lithium hydroxide is a caustic agent which affects the body. hydrogen. DoD 51 OO. may be present at a nuclear weapon accident. and Decontamination of personnel. With a high body burden. One of the peculiarities of beryllium poisoning is that no specific c. . chronic cough. to be contaminated several specific characteristics and symptoms. lead will be liberated slowly gloves. Skin symptoms are ulceration and irritation of the skin. or facilities will constipation results. Inhalation of lead berylliosis. Also. or suspected. absorption is usually negligible since the readily absorbed shortness of breath. personnel against inhalation of lead compounds. is necessary when beryllium fumes or smoke are present. or equivalent protective mask/ into the bloodstream causing anemia and resulting in respirator. ing training programs for medical personnel responding hydroxide. cyanosis. The heat causes the hydrogen to burn to nuclear weapon accidents. An M 17. Pure lead and most of its compounds symptoms are apparent. in the same manner as lye (sodium or potassium hydroxide). fumes from burning lithium components are present. gray-white non-radioactive fighters clothing are required to protect personnel metal. The skin with beryllium dust. Beryllium (Be). a violent chemical reaction This appendix provides information useful in implement. 14-A. metallic taste in method.52-M APPENDIX 14-A NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS 14-A-1 GENERAL b. be handled with the bare hands but always with rubber From the bone deposits. and anti-contamination clothing must be a chronic toxic condition. An M 17 Mask will protect Direct detection in the field is impossible. especially the eyes. any fire or explosion involving Protection for the eyes and skin is necessary for beryllium liberates toxic fumes and smoke. Lead concen- Since beryllium is not radioactive. Due to its highly reactive nature. Beryllium or ‘its concentration to cause damage. (2) Hazards and Health Considerations. loss of compounds are seldom encountered in sufficient weight and extreme nervousness. Self-contained breathing apparatus of an exposed individual will turn yellowish and dry. a. using a his mouth and a dark blue coloring of the gums resulting cleaner with a high efficiency particle air (HEPA) filter. producing a great deal of damage. normally lithium be present as a result of a nuclear weapon accident. “oxygen. Because it oxidizes easily. from a deposition of black lead sulfide. ulceration often occurs. An effective exposed individual will have a sweet. Upon entry into the compounds.. Lead enters the “body through inhalation. (2) Hazards and Health Considerations. When beryllium enters the body through cuts. scratches or operations involving these materials. should ever body. The most common symptom are toxic. when in finely divided form. Lead poisoning displays worn in an area known. producing heat. and lithium. is vacuum cleaning. hydride. lead will concentrate in the kidneys and bones. Lithium (Li). Lith@m can react directly with the water contained in the body 14-A-3 NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS tissue causing severe chemical burns. and resembles magnesium. the be similar to radiological decontamination. abrasions on the skin.I . Several weapon specific non-radiological hazards may (1) Lithium and its compounds. Digestion is impaired with severe colicky pains.

as rust can also cause combustion. cured ammonia odor. and/ or minute particles produced. the fibers can cause diately and spray exposed area with water for 15 minutes. is two parts per million. However. f. The permissible strands can be emitted into the environment. Plastics. It is reddish brown. all plastics present Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/ varying degrees of toxic hazards due to the gases.- 14-A-2 . and it is toxic when inhaled. If rocket motors ignite or catch fire. CF are carbon. copious amounts of water. with the skin. boron. High Explosives (HE). after a DoE Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/ classi!lcation review. cast. e. composite package has broken open. This includes all nuclear and flammable vapors. wood compounds) present severe explosive hazards upon or cloth. Immediately after exposure. Fuming Red Nitric Acid. illness. although a lower concentration causes nasal irritation. liquid concentrations. remove clothing imme. it emits highly toxic fumes of NOX and will react should be approached on the assumption that toxic with water or steam to produce heat and toxic corrosive fumes and particles are present. fumes. hydrazine may cause damage to the Upon fire or breakage of the epoxy outer layer. Causing skin sensitization as well as packages which are integral aircraft structural members. h. It is a powerful explosive that when hydroxyl terminated polybutadine (HTPB) polymer. liquid concentrations. Hydrazine. in concentration causes nasal irritation. The CF exposure level is 0. d. Dangerous when heated to decomposi- involving plastics which are not known to be harmless tion. The permissible exposure level weapon fires. severe oxidizer for some missile systems. combustion. When hydrazine is mixed with equal parts of water. Training Publication 60-1. however i. eyes. or death if inhaled. oily fuming liquid with a sIightIy (composed of Dymeryl diisocyanate (DDI). Red nitric acid is an prostration initially. The gaseous or particulate products may produce dizziness and g.1 parts per million and a lower strands do not present a health hazard. After exposure to the immediate accident area or location where a hydrazine vapors or liquids. and mucous membranes. reference (so). absorbed through the skin or graphite fibers that are milled into composite epoxy taken internally. Self-igniting when absorbed on earth. the fuel burns when a spark produces accidental ignition. . Solid Fuel Rocket Motors. systemic poisoning. severe arcing and shorting of electrical equipment. Rocket motors Hydrazine is a colorless. severe irritation to the skin. When involved in a fire. placed in contact highly toxic corrosive liquid with a sharp. Information on pressed. Composite Fibers (CF). mild and severe dermatitis. CF liver or destruction of red blood cells. it will not burn. perchlorate or nitrate based reaction. Any fire pungent odor. ingested. butadiene. Hydrazine is used as a missile fuel or as a fuel in some aircraft emergency power units. or absorbed through the skin. heated to decomposition emits highly toxic nitrogen ammonium perchlorate and aluminum powder or other compounds and may explode by heat or chemical cyanate. irritating. any contact with an oxidized substance such evacuate to a safe distance. and insensitive HE will be extracted from EOD wash acid from skin with.

Determine the status and location of the weapon(s). The 15-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE following guidelines apply to the employment of EOD teams: This chapter provides information about weapon operations following a nuclear weapon accident. and hazards are of primary concern. Intensive training is conducted on render safe d. they are trained to identify. Service. the types of support during the acc. MD. During weapon recovery operations. the initial responding EOD team with 15-I . c. EOD teams that are Service certified on the weapon(s). (1) The Service or Unified Commander having requirements and planning are discussed to develop primary responsibility for command and control on-site operational plans for recovery of nuclear weapons. weapon components. or obtains from the appropriate weapon components. The principal resources available to meet weapon However. under water because only Navy EOD personnel are tative. complexity of the problem is lessened considerably. situation is needed to determine the best method for conducting weapon recovery. (4) EOD personnel. The number and type of weapons. Perform render safe procedures on the weapon(s). or obtained. include all actions through transfer of weapon custody (3) Navy EOD teams recover weapons located to a designated Department of Energy (DoE) represen. EOD personnel are responsible for the actual performance. Assess weapon(s) damage. at the accident provides. and the location of weapons. and The On-Scene Commander (OSC) can request many radioactive contaminants have not been dispersed. personnel: trained in diving techniques. are a. situation exists. (5) The EOD team provided. 15-4 RESOURCES weapon components. and other hazardous materials. 15-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS (2) All Service or Unified Command EOD teams provide emergency support until the designated EOD Service responsibilities for weapon recovery operations team arrives. the extent of damage. Establish an area and develop procedures for Service having primary command and control respon- processing/ packaging contaminated weapon(s) and sibility will safe the weapon(s). a. If the weapons appear to be intact. Also. detect. Also. They are trained in access techniques and are the only personnel qualified to b. Disposal at Indian Head. contain and/or eliminate explosive. and/ or final disposition. graduates of the Navy School.dent response operation. inants. DoD 51 OO. Perform necessary actions for transport or shipping of the weapon(s) and components for interim storage A mixture of weapons. Service. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. contam. even intact weapon(s) may pose significant recovery responsibilities are Explosive Ordnance recovery problems with potential explosive and Disposal (EOD) Teams and the DoE Accident Response contamination hazards. supervision. perform render safe procedures. radiological and toxic hazards associated with nuclear weapons. A continuing assessment of the Group (ARG). by the e. officer and enlisted. Initiate a systematic search until the location for procedures for weapons unique to their individual the weapon(s) and all weapon components is known.52-M CHAPTER 15 WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATION 15-1 GENERAL f. and other hazardous debris may be at a nuclear weapon accident site. . If an extremely hazardous components. Explosive Ordnance including whether high explosive detonations occurred. and control of hands-on weapon recovery operations.

safe procedures. The two-person weapon safing and disposal. evaluated. If the field diagnostics of damaged weapons in the event of weapon is in a stable environment. propellants.S. coordinated. maintain publications for render safe procedures (RSP) and ends with hazard removal and disposal of the for all Services nuclear weapon systems. as soon as the reconnaissance has been completed. Leaking provides technical advice and assistance in the collection. or missile wreckage present several (c) Identification. no immediate actions an incident/ accident. These operations are assigned to EOD personnel are clearly in the realm of discussed in this concept of operations. assistance to EOD teams in render safe and recovery procedures. (d) Protection of personnel against hazards noted during detonation of explosives. Each nuclear weapon has render safe b. the AMS. engine starter cartridges. Render safe procedures may begin. operations only as directed by the OSC. detection. monitoring techniques applicable to their operations. shredded identification. Nuclear weapons and some components contain required. The Los Alamos National should occur until a coordinated weapon recovery Laboratory (LANL) has fieldable radiographic units procedure has been developed by EOD personnel and 15-2 . fluids. Weapon recovery begins with the initial reconnaissance. The EOD team evaluates and analyzes Since weapons may have been subjected to extreme stress the accident situation and advises the OSC of the safest during an accident. personnel may find it difficult to follow all of the required security measures however. consideration may be given to the and most reliable means for neutralizing weapon DoE unique equipment to assess the applicability of these associated hazards. the OSC should implement (7) The EOD teams actions. Initial Entry. all teams have the same basic in Appendix 5-C. and Army EOD units proceeds through the conduct of render safe procedures. (a) Prevention of nuclear detonation. and composite materials/fibers present disposition of weapon components. Department of Energy. The ARG pyrotechnics. Render Safe Procedures. Navy EOD teams maintain a complete inventory of all U. Nuclear material may have been dispersed on impact. film processing. a fire. on the particular weapon(s) involved. and other DoE They have the necessary communications and personal capabilities may be obtained from the . liquid oxygen. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent further damage or explosions. safety equipment to operate in an accident environment. however. Moreover. vehicle. weapon debris. In the early stages of accident response. decontamination. if required. the aircraft. procedures.JNACC. packaging. and technical advice and should mark hazards clearly. Other explosive items which may b. LLNL has an equivalent radiographic procedures are conducted by an EOD team qualified capability which serves as a back-up to the LANL unit. weapons and explosive detonation. The continuation of any render safe equipment. While tasks weapons and components. The DoE ARG includes be encountered include conventional munitions. teams have a background in weapon design information enhanced by coordination with DoE 15-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS scientific advisors on arrival at the accident scene. containment and. with weapons and associated hazards. The OSC is responsible procedures developed. by priority are: necessary security procedures as soon as possible. capabilities and are trained in radiological control and (3) Additional information concerning the ARG. During the initial entry. (b) Prevention of a nuclear contribution or a high a. or by combustion in in (a) through (c) above. the elimination of explosive and radiological conventional explosives and other hazardous materials. Handling of nuclear weapons in an accident (1) DoE radiographic capabilities are available for must be done according to written procedures. (2) DoE aerial radiological surveys by the Aerial (6) The organization of EOD teams varies among Measurement System (AMS) assist in locating weapons Services as does the number and seniority of personnel and weapon components. nuclear weapon “publications. hazards resulting from the accident or incident. DoE radiographic capabilities. aircraft weapon design personnel and explosive experts familiar fire extinguisher cartridges. if hazards. The initial reconnaissance team resulting radioactive materials. they must operate within policy must be strictly enforced when working with the framework of the overall response group and conduct nuclear weapons. and egress or extraction devices.the publications and capabilities to safe the weapon with accompanying film. oxidizers. and additional hazards. This capability is addressed assigned. and ultimately for the proper implementation of any render authenticated as binding jointly by the DoD and DoE. and or torn metals. and viewing should do so.

and environmental conditions. Because of the technical information located. be enforced strictly when working with nuclear weapons. Search teams requires that security measures be implemented should follow the graders and conduct a visual and/ consistent with the highest classification assigned. type. combined procedures which can be tried. The items should the mission. packaging. The search may become approved by the OSC after coordination with the DoE a time consuming operation requiring numerous Team Leader and the senior member of the EOD Team. personnel. and the patterns designed to locate weapon components rapidly. Search Techniques. The search method used by the OSC depends Consideration must be given to the following when on many factors including the number of personnel determining a course of action: available. topography. A search normally conducted by disposition of classified material must be strictly enforced a slow-moving line of personnel positioned abreast at during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon various intervals dependent upon the object to be components. some (5) Scarifying Procedure. The two-man rule must tography. weapons and weapon e. Search techniques that safe procedures under hazardous conditions. These procedures must be components is re-established. radioactive intensity to assist in locating missing weapon components and to provide high resolution pho- c. Physical components were found previously. A road grader equipped with scarifies sensitive information contained in these documents (large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. method. A search in loose crisscrossing (4) Staging. (1) Coarse Search. Metal detectors and RADIAC equipment maybe needed (1) Explosive ordnance and accident debris are to locate all weapons and components. and at what point the with EOD team procedures and experience in render search for components will cease. safety and security permitting. If exposing personnel to hazards. Personnel and public safety must never be This technique is used to identify areas of signitlcant sacrificed solely for speed. be properly cleared and authorized until recovery Coordination must be made with the Joint Hazard discussions are complete and the items have been covered Evaluation Center (JHEC) prior to implementing or removed. access to classified information and proper control and (4) Visual Search. Hazard Removal. A systematic search may be required over a large. monitoring personnel to search the accident area soon (5) The high priority given to weapon recovery after the accident has occurred. or instrument search for missing components. the EOD team leader (3) When available. and final disposition of shipment should This technique is used by EOD and radiological be an integral part of the RSP planning phase. The OSC establishes priorities for removing all hazards area until accountability for all the weapons and weapon so that other response personnel may conduct opera- 15-3 . all components are not found. Metal and radiation The OSC should ensure that all personnel are familiar detectors monitor those areas where weapons or with the rule and that it is strictly enforced. operations does not inherently imply a need for rapid (2) Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey.DoE ARG representatives. techniques to asseis personnel protection requirements due to resuspension and the potential impact on site d. The location of all weapons decontamination and restoration. This method may security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized supplement the visual search. but some minimum number of are found. be removed to a storage area after coordination with (2) Consequences should be evaluated before accident investigators. action. As components inherently dangerous. and components must be determined. Nuclear Weapon Security. The by wind action. (3) Instrument Search. area. DoE radiographic equipment should coordinate with the ARG and make recommen- is used to assess internal damage and aid standard EOD dations to the OSC concerning additional search procedures. This Personnel working in an area containing CNWDI should system has proven successful in past search operations. Another major step in weapon components may be scattered and/or buried over a large recovery begins with the removal of identified hazards. their location should be marked. Depending upon the accident circumstances. and photographed. provide the may be employed are: best method of determining a weapon’s condition before it is moved. the position personnel may have to be exposed to hazards to complete recorded on a map. decontamination. Components may have documents at the accident scene may contain critical been buried during the accident or subsequently covered nuclear weapon design information (CNWDI). ARG capabilities and knowledge.. requirements during nuclear weapon operations.

regulations from the DoD. Custody. aside for the exclusive storage of exposed or damaged explosives. EOD procedures does not. must be provided for weapons and weapon The weapon operations annex/ recovery plan should components. close coordi- nation between the OSC and the DoE team leader is . g. security. and DoT. DoD or DoE may be assigned the primary resuspension of contaminants. (2) If open storage is used. necessary throughout the weapon recovery phase. Definition of the relationship between EOD considerations requires assignment of each item to a personnel and DoE weapon experts and their respective storage group based on compatibility characteristics. Storage area or disposal responsibility for moving the weapons. performance of storage area. Procedures for locating and identifying weapon address the storage. they must be packaged to ensure that no contamination scattered. Each Service has publications that b. and/ or explosives are shipped. by the OSC and the DoE team leader. Transportation specialist tion hazard areas. weapons are moved to a tions must be obtained to comply with transportation designated weapon storage area. Disposal. It is unsafe for anyone but task trained personnel weapon components. analysis. Custody of damaged weapon(s) and components is transferred to the DoE at a point determined jointly f. in itself. tions. Therefore. breaches the container and that the environment experienced during shipment will not cause further f. a balance of safety and practical a. establish the procedures used during weapon operations. After the weapons are evaluated by EOD damage or explosions. To ensure this requirement. including made. including satellite surveillance. Shipment. If explosive items cannot be stored separately. responsibilities. Nuclear weapons sites should be large enough to minimize hazards to will be moved by the safest means and over the safest personnel in the event of a detonation. weapons and weapon components. Procedures for moving weapons and components damaged weapon(s) and/ or components involves return to the secure staging/storage area. 15-4 . or resolidified high explosives. h. these publications also address requirements for the custody of nuclear weapons c. consultation is required for weapon(s). DoE. Final disposition of d. Procedures for establishing a secure staging/ and weapon components. constitute transfer of custody to the EOD team. associated with nuclear weapons. and DoE as safe for movement and in coordination with special packing. and “ stored. Procedures for packaging weapon components. This annex should include: g. Procedures for shipping weapons and components. The distances routes. Storage of Explosives. Movement should be kept to a minimum. Procedures for re-establishing accountability for to extreme forces during accidents. protection from the 15-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX elements and information sensors. Packaging and Marking. marking and safety instruc- accident investigators. Guidelines for establishing electromagnetic radia- i. shipping. Before weapon(s). An isolated and segregated area should be set final disposition. under EOD supervision to clear an area of broken. of these devices to the DoE. and safety aspects components and debris. weapon components. Moreover. and/ or explosives damaged or subjected h.e. (1) On-site disposal of high explosives depends on j. that storage areas are separated from other operations Shipments of weapons/weapon components will be is determined by the type and amount of explosives routed to a DoE facility for examination. When the disposition decision has been available space and hazards presented.

52-M CHAPTER 16 PUBLIC AFFAIRS 16-1 GENERAL scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident (occurring in the United States. a. news media will be at the scene.d agencies at the national level. The OSC will: information and frequent updates are essential to keep the public informed and to maintain credibility. news media. the following: a. public officials. A nuclear weapon accident. The OSC should devote considerable time to meetings with d. accurate Service regulations. To gain the public confidence. state. Department of Energy (DoE). All Department of Defense (DoD) response element commanders will face a wide range of complex b. ensures communication with the Office. Within hours of the accident. coordinates with the White House Press Office and other departments This chapter provides public affairs guidance on ~ a. Cognizant public affairs staffing is required to assist the commander with these programs. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) public affairs issues which require immediate attention. g. 16-4 RESOURCES d. contains public affairs related qualified public affairs officers from the supporting information. The Joint DoD. DoE. and private citizens. Assistant c. Public releases extracted from the DoD Directive 5230. Assess public understanding and identify concerns community relations programs must be established. and fact sheets on radiation. perhaps among the most critical aspects of the entire response effort. affairs activities during the initial accident response are reference (b). The military Services may have imposed sive public affairs program must be conducted to ensure additional requirements contained in appropriate credibility of the response effort. and The On-Scene Commander (OSC) communicates or local authorities at the scene of the accident. reference (a). has immediate public impact. Identify and respond to community relation needs. Provide internal information/guidance. Given the public’s apprehension and the news media’s widespread coverage The OSC has specific public affairs responsibilities as of radiation incidents/accidents. These PAOS form part of the DoD element of agreements. public information and e. An internal information program should be f. Other public affairs support is available from p r e v a i l . Provide news media support at the accident scene. b. and/or FEMA. Timely. If conflicts exist between guidance installation and/ or staff as members of the response contained in this manual and DoD directives and force. whether in a remote possessions or overseas). Local citizens will seek information 16-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS as to how the accident affects them. DoD 51 OO. and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) The DoD response element commander should have Agreement. indicated below. Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)).16. as the 16-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE senior DoD public affairs organization. Department of Defense: The OASD(PA). comprehen. Included are contingency press or populated area. guidance in the DoD document(s) should the JIC. coordinating with DoS. about nuclear issues. its territories and a. a dynamic. Protect classified information. Establish or ensure direct communications with OASD(PA) from the accident scene. The OASD(PA) may procedures and issues which may be encountered at the be represented at the Crisis Coordination Center (CCC) 16-1 . c. conducted to provide information about policies and daily operational status to all response elements.

danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components. of a technical nature. S. although not part of the response of nuclear weapons should contain information about element. Policy. and of nuclear weapons lo reduce or prevent widespread should be integrated into the JIC. Department of Energy: A DoE public affairs officer from the media and the public. or may be. should be invited to participate in the JIC to the possibility of injury from high explosive weapon provide coordinated responses to the media and general components and/ or potential radiation exposure. DoD policy is stated in DoD Instruction public reaction. Members of will generate immediate public interest. Department of State: The DoS exercises diplomatic must be both accurate and consistent. The OASD(PA) should be notified in advance. The tions are considered. the OSC operations. S. and FEMA’s corps authorities is required if the public is. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) PAO is military and civilian. and possessions or overseas. implement community relations support to the affected communities. it should also be stated. “whether in a remote or a populated area. which outlines specific procedures from the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) for announcements of accidents in the U. Additional FEMA resources are available in the interest of public safety. Chief of Mission (COM) will be the focal point advisors to respond to and/or address unclassified issues for diplomatic and political decisions of the U. The public must the military Service headquarters and major command be notified immediately in the event their safety or public affairs staffs may augment the OSC’S public affairs welfare is endangered. if practical. national personnel must handle media and public inquiries about laboratories. its territories and A nuclear weapon accident and subsequent response possessions.or the accident scene during emergencies.. affairs personnel will accompany the senior FEMA Two exceptions to this policy are: official to the accident scene. All senior Federal officials. regions. and possessions representative (or oflicer) to ensure that legal implica- or if the accident has trans-boundry implications. Local and state public public alarm. DoE PAOS are information to the members of the response force. in of reserve PAOS. its territories with augmentation as required by the situation. unless bilateral agreements exist. Notification of public from FEMA headquarters. . It is the DoD policy to Additionally. Any statement confirming the presence affairs personnel. its territories. The OASD(PA) will be e. Department of (2) The OSC may conjhm or deny the presence Transportation) also may be present at the scene. reference (b). Information released about the accident c. or as soon as possible thereafter.S. If public. The public affairs personnel from DoE field operation offices. The OSC should use technical U.. They will be present in the JIC and provide a wide variety of skills in all public (1) The OSC is required to conjh the presence affairs operations dealing with disaster and emergency of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components operations. It is also the DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear d. Other DoE public affairs be implemented immediately. if this 16-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS exception is used. must have the concurrence of the appropriate theater 16-? . example. informed of conditions and actions at the accident scene so they maybe prepared to respond accurately to queries b. and responsible State and local knowledgeable on nuclear weapons issues and will assist authorities and foreign government officials must be fully as a part of the DNA Advisory Team. The COM will be assisted by a team 5230.16. To gain the confidence will accompany the DoE Team Leader to the accident of the public. a nuclear weapon accident. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Public weapons or nuclear components at any specific location. and knowledgeable in nuclear weapons matters. injury or radiation exposure is unlikely. a credible public affairs program should scene and be present in the JIC.S. (j) In locations outside the U. and DoE contractors may also be requested the accident and its consequences. liaison officers will be provided to the OSC provide effective public affairs activities at the scene of and the JIC. response to a nuclear weapon(s) be released should be coordinated with the OSC’S legal accident outside the U.. both staff. Other: Public affairs officers from other Federal advised of the notification as soon as practical if this agencies involved in the Federal response effort (for exception is used.S. government. provide internal to augment the JIC operations. Health and Human Services. The COM will provide significant public affairs expertise and information on the host country’s a. S.hformation to control of the U.

A location in a on accident response and public affairs policy through permanent facility (for example. The OSC establishes a JIC in feedback received from the media. accurate information can be provided at the accident. and the host government.S. and and/ or U. DoE. necessitate the installation of additional phone lines. expeditiously as possible (Area Code (202) 697-5131. communications. The minimum general public (for example. weapons and components. it should be referred to DoD for consideration and coordinated with DoE. 16-3 . and logistical support for the JIC. DoE and other agencies (6) Personnel Guidance. OSC is the senior DoD representative at the scene and must have access to current policy guidance and (5) Assess Public Understanding. the identify public concerns about DoD nuclear matters and Service chief of public affairs must be kept fully take appropriate action in the public affairs arena. as appropriate.S. Specific support will depend upon the jipproach in working with the community. The OSC is of Mission. security. Information on are contained in Appendix 16-A. direct communications ensures that is a continuing effort. office an internal information program. with DoS and/ or FEMA. and radiological survey or monitoring teams) dedicated telephone lines and a facsimile reproduction on how to respond to queries about the accident and capability. OSC should provide dedicated administrative. medical. especially those who may come in contact with the ications. questions and information. and other personnel from DoD complete the near and long-term follow-up monitoring and civil resources. Any means available should be used (for response are coordinated in advance with the OSC. Communications are essential since the area. Moreover. hotel. responsible for public affairs planning and analyzing (2) Establish a JIC. news releases. However. logistics. The OSC has chemical form). Specific guidance building) is preferred due to support requirements. Programs should be initiated. Chief of Mission to assure a unified administrative). through the U. as required. information concerning design of nuclear 16-B. prior to exercising the exceptions above. Public Affairs Responsibilities. during. all public affairs matters pertaining to the technical AV 227-5131). and after an timely. intense media interest likely will response operations. Support civilian community. the appropriate agency and/ or affected country to administrative.CINC. transportation. nuclear weapons and their storage is classified Restricted (5) Radiation information fact sheets for the Data/ Formerly Restricted Data and is very sensitive (for general public and medical personnel are in Appendix example. who example. and (4) Contingency releases for the above exceptions information released to the public. responsible for reviewing all material. and its physical state and b. the JIC should be national level. responsibility and authority is transferred to FEMA. The OSC coordination. or stopped based on the data obtained. state and local and through community relations programs to ensure agencies officials. The purpose of the team is to make experts is authorized to provide support to the news media in various functional areas available to assist the affected covering a nuclear weapon incident/accident. The should be provided to response force personnel. the pay telephone if military communication has final clearance responsibility in the classification is unavailable). If declassification of information is specific public affairs responsibilities. This informed. FEMA. Phone lines situation and available resources. All the affected public. security personnel. disclosing whether or not a weapon contains tritium. During the accident. legal. motel. the JIC serves as the focal point for personnel working with the response force) are briefed information about the accident. Located in an area near the that all response force personnel (including civilian accident scene.S. before. public affairs activities should be coordinated in advance modified. The OSC provides primary leadership and direction to the c. The OSC should statements issued at the national level. commun. The CEAT should function under duties. medical communications required by DoD in the JIC are two personnel. These are: needed. The CEAT activities should be will be the same as that authorized on a military coordinated through the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) reservation (for example. the OSC and operate out of the JIC to facilitate (3) Provide Support for News Media. The OSC should consider forming a Community JIC until such time as responsibility may transition to Emergency Action Team (CEAT) composed of public affairs. The media should be should be established with a published number for public briefed on the extent of support available. the general public coordination with DoS. Also. The OSC should ensure represented in the JIC. Local officials should that the public affairs program is meeting the needs of be invited to provide representatives to the JIC. The OSC should ensure that the public affairs office to an agency following a U. Chief (4) Protect Classified Information. When the JIC (1) Establish communications with OASD(PA). logistical. territory accident or to establishes direct communications with OASD(PA) as the involved government following an overseas accident.

the fire should CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-A be contained and allowed to burn out. etc. Notify (authorities) for retrieval explosion.) –Condition of accident site (fire. or damage) —Evidence of obvious cargo (shapes or containers) . avoid further the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or contact or handling. —— Ilf contact with the accident scene is established. extent of damage.S. fragments have been picked up already. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) water directly on the aircraft should be avoided unless carrying hazardous material (classified cargo or unarmed needed to save property or lives. (Neither confirms nor denies) Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized (Format of sample release to be used if public safety personnel from entering the site and picking up considerations require notifying local and State officials fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo.- Determine the need for a public announcement of nuclear weapons involvement based on the responses to the above 16-A-1 . and proper disposition. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) (Confirms to reduce public alarm) carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum- stances) approximately (location) at (time). blast. rescue. and other or nuclear components significantly prevents or reduces emergency services personnel should approach the area widespread public alarm).S. There is no danger EXPANDED ANNOUNCEMENT of nuclear detonation. 1 of hazard from the accident (or conventional high explosives detonation) and to aid removal operations. evidence of explosion. Water as a firefighting agent should be used with caution due to “To notify local and State officials possible adverse reaction with materials involved in the When Public is Possibly in Danger” fire. —Condition of aircraft (burning. the situation should make a telephone call to this number (local phone). Fire. Use of A U. If any that hazardous cargo has been involved in an accident. Any local official at nuclear weapon(s). determine the followin~. and the fire cannot be extinguished immediately (5 minutes). Current information from the accident The public is requested to stay out of the area under scene will assist in evaluating the accident and providing surveillance by guards to preclude any remote possibility additional public safety guidance. There is no need for evacuation. If there is no immediate threat to life. with caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. and details are unknown). but Visitors are warned to stay out of the area of the accident when confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon in the interest of public safety. (Format of sample release to be used when no danger exists to the public from contamination or blast. APPENDIX 16-A PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONTINGENCY RELEASES CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1 MINIMUM ANNOUNCEMENT “No Danger to the Public” A U. for example) crashed (or other the scene of the accident who can provide details on circumstances) approximately (location and time).

hazard.S. indicating any special risk to those indoors. anyone within a (to be filled in at the accident scene. and it is considered unlikely that any stances) approximately (location) at (time). and details are unknown). Again. there is no danger of nuclear detonation. The accident involved already supervised and protected. may detonate). proceed to the nearest permanent structure. Plutonium is both a poison and a radiation There is no danger of a nuclear detonation. are burning. a nuclear weapon that contains conventional high explosives and radioactive material. air conditioners. Local possibility exists for contamination due to fire or scattering of nuclear material in the form of finely divided explosion. the conventional high explosives in the weapon (have detonated. considerations require announcement that a nuclear The dress of these teams should not be interpreted as weapon has been involved in an accident and contam.) Further announcements will be made as more informa. particularly A U. As a precaution and until further by guards) in the interest of safety and to aid operations evaluations are made. Make the following you must go outside for critical or lifesaving activities. in the release. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) risk to health unless taken into the body by breathing carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum. but there is a danger CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-B from the conventional high explosives in the weapon that (have detonated. If you are ination is likely because of fire or conventional high outside.Military personnel have been dispatched (will be The public is warned to stay out of the area (or indicate dispatched) and will arrive (are scheduled to arrive) soon the area) (now under surveillance by guards) because at the site. It is important to remember that your movement outside could cause yourself greater An/ a (aircraft/ railroad train/truck/ other) accident exposure and possibly spread contamination to those occurred (state time and location). If explosive detonation of the weapon. (If plutonium is involved): One of the materials involved is plutonium. by OSC or Deputy Director of Operations (DDO). may detonate). the following shall be included or property damage. (Format of sample release to be used if public safety The most immediate danger in an accident of this kind considerations require making a PUBLIC RELEASE is the effect of the blast caused by detonation of the that hazardous cargo was involved in an accident. are burning. The most appropriate initial action is to remain calm CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3 and inside homes or office buildings. NMCC) radius of the accident site. the accident. the conventional high explosives in the weapon. statement locally or from competent authority if no local cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring up and authority is available). and forced-air heating units. to minimize the risk to the public. Turn off fans. We have no details yet on civilian or military injuries (NOTE: If applicable. (specify boundary where installation) is enroute to (has arrived at) the scene of possible) is encouraged to remain indoors. or swallowing. breathing any dust. dust may have resulted near the accident site and downwind from the explosion (fire). (Military Service) team from (name of downwind from this site. The public person would inhale or swallow an amount that would is warned to stay out of the area (under surveillance cause illness. (Does confirm) Trained monitoring teams will be moving through the area wearing special protective clothing and equipment (Format of sample release to be used if public safety to determine the extent of any possible contamination. Drink and “When Public is Probably in Danger” eat only canned or packaged foods that have been inside. The following precautionary measures are recommended tion is known. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles 16-A-2 .S. To notify the general public “When Public is Possibly in Danger” An experienced Federal response team has been ordered (Neither confirms nor denies) to the scene of the accident. This poses little A U.

can survey the ground and determine the exact area affected by the accident. or even the outer skin. next 4-6 hours. now enroute to the site of the accident. As a result of the explosion IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY: (fire). Therefore. or closed off by guards) (and. a monitoring team.which do not have sufficient energy to penetrate protective precautionary actions will be required for the buildings. The public is asked to stay out of the area (under surveillance. avoid further handling Question: “Are nuclear weapons stored at (name of and notify (authorities) for proper retrieval and facility) or (name of facility)?” disposition. any fragments found near the scene of the accident may be contaminated and should be left in place.” 16-A-3 . Reply: “It is Department of Defense policy neither to Continuous announcements will be made as more confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any information is known. It is expected that these immediate particular location. if true) until The cause of the accident is under investigation. (Service) team from (name of installation) is (If uranium is involved): One of the materials involved enroute to (has arrived at) the scene of the accident. is uranium. The (type of carrier) was enroute from (name of facility) to (name of facility). A U. to the lead poisoning associated with some paints). Contamination by uranium fragments or small particles dispersed by conventional (chemical) We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties explosions or burning of a weapon is primarily a (or give number only of civilian and military casualties) chemical health hazard (heavy metal poisoning similar or property damage. short-term exposure to contamination outside the body will pose negligible health risk.S. not a radiological hazard. most clothing. If fragments have been picked up.

Biological elimination of 16-E-1 . Less than .000 years. and from ash resulting from via the urine. some actions absorption. Inhaled plutonium is retained in the lungs in much the Plutonium. plutonium may not be readily seen compounds.02 percent will be absorbed. When released from a deposition can be prevented by using “chelation” weapons accident. The use of these chelating compounds the accident fire. since contamination of a cut or presence of plutonium and to measure the levels if laceration will likely introduce only very small amounts present. represent an internal radiation hazard when in the release of the radioactive substance plutonium. is not without some medical hazard to the individual. its presence may be assumed in dust and dirt on the which hasten the excretion of plutonium from the body ground or on flat surfaces. which has a shiny appearance. but in areas close to the accident. Also. is sufficient protection for exposure to this half-life means that its radioactivity does not decrease isotope from sources external to the body. the since plutonium is very poorly absorbed through the ground. In actuality. with appropriate agencies to coordinate the use of these a very heavy radioactive particle. Once in the lungs. its spread to clean areas. The epidermis. is a heavy metal same manner that people in a dust storm inhale dust. or objects) from the mishap. very small intestines. or outer dead layer half of its radioactivity) of over 24. similar to stainless steel. low percentage of plutonium may be translocated by phere for any period of time. No immediate danger exists to anyone. This long of the skin. the naked eye. That is. This brown or black appearance. plutonium is taken into the body by inhalation of Persons who are downwind from the accident may contaminated air. No external substantially by nuclear decay or disintegration. hazard exists to people walking through an area ~~ Likewise. a when freshly machined. This means that alpha Plutonium in a weapon has a radiological half-life (the radiation is not a. (EDTA) or diethylene triamine pent acetic acid (DTPA). DoD 51 OO.hazard to people as long as it remains length of time it takes for the plutonium to lose one external to the body. such as ethylene diamine trichlor acetic acid by. HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS OF PLUTONIUM (For release to the general public) The accident at has resulted however. Alpha radiation can also a very slow process. which is abbreviated Pu. with contamination (radioactive material which has contamination from ingestion is unlikely to be a problem. it be performed by a physician who has been in contact radiologically decays by the emission of an alpha particle. Their range in air is only a few inches at most. Alpha particles do not drugs. or amounts of plutonium may have been spread by the two (2) of every 10. penetrate materials very substantially. After exposure to the atmos. However. it will oxidize to a dark the bloodstream to the liver and the bones.000 atoms eaten. eating contaminated food or getting become exposed to this substance by coming into contact contamination into a wound or cut.52-M APPENDIX 16-B RADIATION FACT SHEETS FACT SHEET 1 CHARACTERISTICS. coated or fallen upon the surfaces of structures. Radiological survey teams are from wounds is not a probable means of significant monitoring these suspected areas to determine the contamination either. Likewise. since they are administered intravenously. absorption winds to adjacent areas. This “dust” settles in the lungs. Because of its poor medical intervention is necessary. only inhaling plutonium particles is likely may help prevent further contamination or minimize to result in any amount of internal radiation exposure. and should Plutonium is an alpha radiation emitter. and no of plutonium into the body. elimination of plutonium from the body is contaminated with plutonium.

The determined. 16-B-2 . Fruits and vegetables grown in the area should not be eaten. Remain inside and brought into this area to survey the inhabitants of minimize opening doors and windows. Children should not play the chelating agents mentioned above. until the limits of contamination are some plutonium. and emergency. . suspected contamination area(s) for inhaled radiation. air conditioners. outdoors. the public is advised to follow a few simple inhalation of plutonium is not a immediate medical guidelines to minimize the spread of contamination. this will be made available to all in fresh air from the outside.plutonium can be improved significantly by the use of air already in the building. and forced air heating units that bring and once established. Use them only to recirculate those who need it. Very sensitive monitoring equipment is being there will be little if any hazard. Individuals who think they have inhaled Therefore. Turn off fans. should not be unduly concerned.

from 3 to 7. it will be is never a time when a sizable systemic burden is available distributed by the blood to the skeleton (45 percent). Immediate chelation therapy with accident. some of the plutonium is circulation. Ultimately. The use of repeated lavages should remove 25 to 50 percent of the plutonium that would Treatment of plutonium contaminated wounds should otherwise be retained in the lung. although there have been no reports inhaled plutonium. The which require the advice and concurrence of REAC/ risk of this procedure versus the risk of future health TS before administration. and is for chelation in the early period after exposure and there redistributed within the body. since a specialized team to perform such in the lungs depends on particle size and the chemical monitoring can be made available from the OSC or his form of plutonium involved. Greater unimportant. Generally. In burn cases. Service medical department or with Radiation Emer- gency Assistance Center/ Training Site (REAC/ TS) The only demonstrated useful procedure in enchasing because of the hazard of the substances involved.the wound. liver (45 percent).. DTPA should be used as soon as possible The retention half-times are estimated to be 200 years after significant inhalation exposures since the oxides . It is not Inhalation is probably the most significant route of expected that the physician will need to make this contamination in a nuclear weapons accident. in a weapons or her representative. If possible. possible systemic absorption of Pu. FACT SHEET 2 MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON PLUTONIUM (Use with Characteristics. Again. washings should REAC/TS. More extensive treatment by excision requires into the body are via inhalation and contaminated judgment in assessing the area involved. or burn treatment has been shown to remove up to 96 ment of a sarcoma or carcinoma in such nodules is a percent of the remaining plutonium. 100 years (skeleton) and 40 years (liver). (whole body). :fj-f3. Retention determination.000 accomplished prior to surgical excision to prevent days. Thus little systemic burden of Pu is available solubilized by the body fluids. Attempts to stimulate phagocytosis and the mucociliary response or All medical treatment for plutonium contamination or to use expectorant drugs have not been successful in inhalation should be coordinated with the appropriate animal studies. flushing with sterile saline or water will remove a great Absorption via wound contamination will result in a deal of contamination. DTPA (consult REAC/TS for protocol) should be which has a pulmonary retention half-time of up to 1. such as plutonium compounds are defined as investigational new drugs oxides. however. The principal routes levels. which can exhibit be saved for later counting to determine contamination five oxidation states. including blood. than “4 nCi of Pu embedded in a wound would be considered a candidate for such treatment. be sought from Service medical command and dislodge the contamination. carefully weighed. and the other tissues (10 percent). REAC/ TS can be contacted effects from the estimated lung burden must be very at the following 24-hour number: (615) 481-1000. The remainder will likely be translocation of some of the material to the skeleton removed when the eschar sloughs off. The possible develop. may not be the only compound present. the results have been relatively of such in the literature. plutonium will be in the form of an oxide. DTPA the clearance of insoluble particles. within months to years. Hazards and Health Considerations of the Plutonium Fact Sheet) Plutonium is a highly reactive element. the difficulty wounds. and liver. In spite of this. in the extracellular spaces for effective chelation. ingestion and contaminated intact skin are of excision and the total quantity in. from the lung is bronchopulmonary Iavage. disappointing. since the oxide forms of Pu are transferred at a relative slow rate from the lungs into the systemic After entry into the body. advice should involve copious washing and irrigation to attempt to. In the case of matter of concern. this may not be true in humans. The majority will remain in the vicinity of the wound.3 . and may result in the formation of a fibrous DTPA treatment given immediately following wound nodule.

Utilize the local overestimates the total dispersion of plutonium. Sheltering should be recommended for the downwind reference (ap). The Service/ DoE health physicists should population. the inhalation of material from the accident the concepts which are generally employed in handling is by resuspending the plutonium by operations in the injuries and/ or fatalities on board ship do not hold true. To prevent the spread a cloud of finely dispersed plutonium which falls out of material in this area. some of passage. It will. FACT SHEET 3 PLUTONIUM FACT SHEET (For Operational Commanders) As Operational Commander. or are used only for monitoring people or material leaving you are at the scene. you will be assaulted by contamination hazard and a slight inhalation hazard. and amount of explosives in the resuspension/ spread of the plutonium. Something as detonation. Your . these types of instruments minutes of the accident. recommendations. except for the area are going to do so. as general contamination. resuspension of the plutonium. Generally. and the authorities. Unless it happens on base. Note that this is only from the cloud passage! civilian populace will be just that. mask the the actual survey data from the site. After initial cloud In dealing with a nuclear weapons accident. many needs at once in determining the actions to be Care should be taken not to increase tension over the taken in coping with a nuclear weapons accident. A secondary advantage is that this method lowers plots show the detonation of all weapons involved. You incident. keep houses closed to prevent Several facts are important to keep in mind. Such an example would Energy (DoE) can calculate a dose equivalent for persons be keeping the population under tight sheltering in the area of the initial cloud passage. and other ideas as outlined in the public guidance. these requirements or restricting traffic from the contamina- people will be in the area of hundreds of rem of exposure tion area downwind. but you must be careful to avoid the be consulted to give the best approximation of the public impression of extreme hazard from the plutonium. perhaps 10 to 100 times less. however. wind to spraying with some sort of fixative to prevent direction and speed. Any recommendation for the to the lungs. based on up process move faster. early thought should be given over the area downwind. unless they are military areas anyway. A very worst case situation is shown on simple as hand sprayers with vegetable oil may be used the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) to bind the plutonium into the soil/surface around the plots which are made available to you. Doses from resuspension will be on the order of 100 The military has no authority in the contamination areas to 1. The actual scenario boundaries and may help in making the eventual clean should be less. and have the FEMA representative assist dose estimate is based only on cloud passage. the weapons Generally.. You and your Public Affairs Office (PAO) should have had the opportunity to review the preceding should emphasize that people should remain indoors fact sheets for the general public and medical personnel. Generally. The initial ARAC site. there is little you can do to prevent the site. depending on particle size. such The cloud will deposit its radioactive material within as the AN/ PDR 56. By the time you have arrived at the scene. the airborne hazard for the workers inside the control utilizing all the available explosives. or are within the The important point is that the ARAC plot generally National Defense Area (NDA). and this can be compared with the risks in the sheltering advisory should indicate that there is a guide. such as walking. This low order detonation produces very close to the accident site. release.29. plutonium from some alpha detection RADIACS. the resuspension of plutonium in the original will generally have suffered low order detonations if they areas of contamination is not severe. basing your Some concept of the exact magnitude of the risk people sheltering plans on these numbers can easily result in experience from the incident can be compared with the a significant overestimation of the real problem. not site contamination surveys. . inhalation from the cloud passage. not later in this function.risk. area of cloud passage. risks outlined in the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8. 1 6-B-4 .000 times less. Therefore. as much as possible. Department of or may be counterproductive.

Included or the nearest military installation during early stages are discussions for establishing a project code. Response to a nuclear weapon accident is a high priority b. or near. depends upon the location of the accident and the extent of contamination. and supplemented by h. equipment ment of Defense (DoD). and leaching . Rapid transport (air or ground) from the airhead matters peculiar to a nuclear weapon accident.25. The military Service or agency providing assistance or responding to a nuclear weapon accident will fund costs d. if any.000 people may require j. Sanitation facilities for response force personnel and news media. Airhead cargo support for air delivery of supplies to a nuclear weapon accident should determine the to remote sites. Packaging and shipping materials for weapons. to operation. base camp of accident response. upon request. Documentation of accident-related costs. caused by. Public Affairs). DoD 51 OO. Medical evacuation of acute casualties. oil. These costs are in addition to normal operating expenses. Anti-contamination and other specialized clothing six months or more to complete. extensive contamination. the military Service or agency providing assistance or f.52-M CHAPTER 17 LOGISTICS SUPPORT 17-1 GENERAL c. Electrical power. potable and/or non-potable. Department of Energy (DoE). The amount of logistics support recovery/ restoration operations. support. as feasible. availability of assets and facilities at. and lubricants. Heavy equipment for base camp construction and local service contracts. Commanders and logistics officers of forces responding o. If an accident results in i. Logistical support unique to the Joint Information Center (JIC) (see Chapter 16. and all required resources from the Depart- support personal by response force personnel. DoD 4000. and personnel decontamination stations. l-M. Maintenance support. . Service or agency having possession of the nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons components at the time of e. reference (aq) is used. and contaminated waste. and some radiological support. Sufficient water. transportation. response. k.I . This chapter provides guidance on logistics support 1. climate dependent). 17-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS n. decontamination and restora- tion operations involving up to 1. the incident/ accident. Messing and billeting facilities for response force 17-4 RESOURCES personnel and news media. The military inated clothing. temporary and other Federal agencies with a radiological or disaster fixation of contamination by sprinkling. m. and which are directly chargeable to. the accident is responsible for reimbursing. Petroleum. response forces. and g. Use of local facilities and equipment 17. the scene of the accident and initiate actions to obtain support p. Transportation. 17-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE components. Laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontam- initially incurred within existing funds. to satisfy the following requirements: a.esponse capability are normally available to the accident operations.

gymnasiums. and hotels. gency Management Agency (FEMA) personnel and can (5) Proposed termination. Once HARVEST EAGLE. Contaminated Laundering Facilities. protective masks. The logistics staff officer in the development of the accident response plan from identifies military installations nearest the accident site its conception cannot be overemphasized. water supply to maintain the document register and submit and <anitation facilities must be considered. Planning. military Service Headquarters. The accident location mask filters. If accident location dictates Staff (JS). Details on HARVEST EAGLE capabilities and request requisitions with a JCS project code will be ranked above procedures are in Appendix 17-A. The installations should be alerted of restoration operations are supportable. it should be positioned 17-2 . The JCS -project code request includes the following information: c.near the accident scene. (4) Proposed effective date. a mobile messing and billeting approved.” d. Military Response Force (SRF) logistics staff officer should installations near the accident site may provide a supply request assignment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) point. all response-related requisitions should package maintained by the Air Force. Alpha Alpha). The determines if a base camp is needed for feeding and logistics staff at the accident site should be tailored to billeting response force personnel. Base Camp Establishment. as appropriate. and” anti-contamination clothing. to the response effort. the Defense b. Base camp potential support requirements. may be viable notification of a nuclear weapon accident. Sources of anti. (3) Service monitor or coordinator. the Service solutions to some of the logistic problems. and is almost totally dependent on the number of consideration should be given to requesting helicopter personnel involved and the duration of the operation. and other administrative and support (7) Brief narrative background on the nature of the services. (1) A materiel control officer. Project Code Generation. A listing of DoE contaminated laundering facilities is in Appendix (1) The type of project code required (always 9 17-A. Any military base within acceptable driving of the following: distance. Logistics Agency will disseminate implementing contamination clothing are in Appendix 17-A. (2) Project name. and available local facilities. contain the JCS project code. or unified or the establishment of a base camp for response personnel. or if local facilities “ support requirements. requirement. a. assist in obtaining telephone service. If a power requisitions. Allocations Board. HARVEST EAGLE may be requested from the Air (2) Three or four administrative supply personnel Force. Immediately upon and vehicles. units and forces using the 17-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS project code should be included. and billeting for response force project code from the Joint Material Priorities and personnel. office and other (6) Force/ activity designator. Base Camp Support. support to assist in meeting urgent logistic requirements during the early days of the accident response. instructions to all concerned. but as a minimum should consist can be used. specified command headquarters. an Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. messing. through the On-Scene-Commander (OSC). Joint a. If the nearest installation logistics support represents a rather routine situation is not within two to three hours driving distance. (8) Where available. Anti-Contamination Clothing. The importance of the logistics staff officer’s involvement c. A GSA representative may accompany Federal Emer. Installation Support. should be considered before establishing a base camp. Such items may include mylar for radiation instrument probe faces. d. such as National Guard armories b. It is a basic and establishes liaison to determine their support responsibility to ensure that decontamination and capabilities. Planning is initiated to identify the Procedures for submitting requisitions and picking up location and availability of items not organic to the supplies from nearby military installations should be response organization and that might be a limiting factor established. Upon assignment of a JCS project code. When establishing a base camp. may be used. General Services Administration (GSA) Support. all other requisitions with the same priority designator. For processing purposes. building spaces. If required. generating facility is required.

(5) Laundry of non-contaminated clothes. eration. and work will be done in the contaminated encountered reported to the requesting person or area. As an alter. The status of all heavy equipment. should be held or readily available for refueling vehicles used in areas where government fueling facilities may i. therefore. Early coordination (PAO) to determine specific requirements. construction and/ or site restoration may also require and who the approval authority is. requirement supporting accident response operations. Appendix 17-A provides a reference list of DoE native. Vehicles in contaminated areas should made to ensure that all personnel or units responding not be removed for maintenance or returned to the to the accident are provided written information owning organization until after they have been describing procedures to follow in requesting logistical decontaminated. Specific a support coordinator who will work with the logistics requirements will be determined by the PAO. Provisions should be not be available. Use of local service contracts to facilitate logistics support is recommended a. rotation of vehicles with the to assist in decontamination of area residents’ clothing. e. News Media and JIC Support. Contaminated Laundry Support. f. staff to ensure that all ARG requirements are identified. and lubricants (POL). Procedures for establishing and supporting a base (2) Water. . Up to 70 ARG personnel may be at the site depending upon the severity of the accident. Decontaminat- operations. be necessary. additional information on and cargo carrying capacity when an off-road capability their capabilities. The Joint with the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center Information Center (JIC) should be provided full (JNACC) will help identify numbers of personnel and logistical support including transportation. . The ARG has and non-expendable equipment. Other 17-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX agencies should arrive on-site with an organic capability to support their personnel and operations a minimum The Logistic Support annex should provide procedures of three days. (4) Maintenance. Accident Response Group (ARG). and information on commercial ‘or vehicle mounted radio is not a specific requirement. The support coordinator will normally accompany the advance party of the ARG to the accident site. camp in remote areas. depending on coordination is requued with the Public Affairs Office the level of DoE support required. Procedures for obtaining appropriate JCS and/or for the following services: Service project codes. oil. The number of media advance party who arrive within 12-24 hours after the personnel could vary from a small number to hundreds accident. b. . messing. Assistance in arranging vehicles with GSA rental vans with six-nine passenger for work by these facilities. (1) Petroleum.so that it can provide power for both the base camp (3) Sanitation. both in tonnage and purpose. This information should inated vehicles may. and supplies. To reduce the number of maintenance personnel Additionally. Close within 48 hours following the accident. for establishing and maintaining support for response “ force operations. decontamination criteria and hazardous working organization. and operations center areas. it may be necessary for the response force on-site to a minimum. Minor on-site maintenance of contam. conditions should be addressed in the contract. . Vehicular Support. or administrative support. Advance planning is responsible for providing logistics support to the DoE should take into account the possible billeting. Local Service Contracts. ing and cleaning anti< ontamination clothing is a critical equipment maintenance may become a major consid. are required to support response h. The DoD j. Support for the Department of Energy. Phone A sufficient supply of GSA general use credit cards numbers are listed in Appendix l-G. Dissemination of Procedures. If resources are obtained through a requests should be monitored and any problems contract. consideration may be given to replacing tactical contaminated laundry facilities. Base camp indicate clearly to whom requests should be submitted. A wide variety of vehicles. facilities may be requested from the JNACC. If operations continue more than 30 days. expendable type of support required by the ARG. providing organization is recommended. OSCS should be and transportation support for news media as authorized prepared to support from 7-12 persons in the ARC by DoD and Service directives. This annex should include: g.

f. . if required. Procedures for establishing maintenance support e. c.- 174 . Sources of anti-contamination clothing. to the accident site. or equipment rotation during extended operations. Procedures for laundering contaminated clothing. d. Procedures for delivery of requisitioned material including shipping.

NY 14216 Comm (7 16) 877-6621 17-A-2 ANTI-CONTAMINATION CLOTHING SOURCES c. Box 737 kits are designated war reserve materials and maintained Crystal Lake. HARVEST EAGLE P. These kits are under the operational control of HQ TAC/ LGX. and 2180 Elmwood Ave PACAF. Special teams. IL 60014 in a ready-to-deploy status in CONUS by the 4400 Comm (815) 455-3777 Mobility Support Flight. Disposable Anti-Contamination Clothing. c. Permanent Anti-Contamination Clothing. Buffalo. personal equipment items (such as parkas. The kits do not include vehicles. and the total 333 Martinel Drive kit can be transported on 14 C-141 B aircraft. Inc. Additional equipment includes generators. OH 44240 configured in four separately deployable packages.O. The kits include (1) Defense Apparel tents. and water purification equipment. and similar housekeeping 247 Addison Road items. USAFE. Either permanent or disposable anti-contamination . (3) Euclid Garment Manufacturing Company b.52-M APPENDIX 17-A LOGISTICS RESOURCES 17-A-1 HARVEST EAGLE KITS b. If HARVEST EAGLE kits are required at an accident scene. field kitchens. Sources for disposable anti-contamination clothing area as a. cots. Windsor. bedding or sleeping bags) or expendable (such (2) Nuclear Power Outfitter as food. Each command has four kits. assemble the equipment. DoD 51 OO. each Comm (216) 673-7413 designed to support 275. and to manage billeting space P. Georgia. Robbins AFB. BOX 658 and operate the field kitchens. Each kit can support 1. shower and laundry facilities. HARVEST EAGLE kits are designated war reserve (5) Elwood Nuclear “Safety material and are maintained by TAC. such as Cleburne. National stock numbers (NSN) for permanent anti- clothing is used for nuclear accident response. Kits are Kent. water storage Comm (800) 243-3847 bladders. NF. people. a. HARVEST EAGLE kits are air transportable follows: I operations support sets for supporting units that operate in remote locations where propositioning is not politically or economically feasible.O. the on-scene staff must make arrangements for personnel to unpack and (4) Durafab Disposable. contamination clothing are: 17-A-I . fuel or medical supplies). TX 76031 USAF PRIME BEEF and PRIME RIB units can be Comm (817) 645-8851 requested to provide additional support. CT 06095 2 “Lightalls”.100 people.

000 radiation workers per day) facilities may be used at various locations throughout (3) Chicago Operations Office the United States. Cloth 8415-00-634-5026 Gloves Shells.1 L. Las Vegas. Brookhaven.ITEM SIZE NSN Coveralls. Radioactive Large. Inc. LI New York Contamination Limit: Case-by-case basis Note: DoE laundry services should be arranged through Capacity: 15 suits/ hr the DoE JNACC. WA Capacity: 1. Radioactive Small/ Medium 8415-00-782-2815 Coveralls. Combat Small 8430-01-048-6305 17-A-3 CONTAMINATED LAUNDERING (4) Nevada Operations Office FACILITIES Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co.52. Radioactive Contaminant 8415-00-782-2808 Hood. SC Capacity: 1. 17-A-2 . OH Savannah River Plant (DuPont) Contamination Limit: 100. The DoD JNACC assists in identifying Brookhaven National Laboratory any commercial facilities near an accident site. NOTE: Additional information on Radiac Equipment and assets can be found in DNA 5100. . The Department of Energy (DoE) operates facilities Contamination Limit: 33 dpm/ cm2 capable of laundering plutonium contaminated clothing Capacity: 1.000 suits/ day co) (2) Richland Operations Office Amarillo.500 suits/day Contamination Limit 200 dpm/ cm2 (6) PANTEX Plant (Mason& Hanger-Silas Mason Capacity: 12.. Radioactive 8 through 8415-00-782-281 Contaminant 10 8415-00-782-2814 Shoe Covers Small through 8430-01-712-2872 Extra Large 8430-01-721-2876 Overshoe. Commercial contaminated clothing laundry servicing 3-5.000 dpm (average) Aiken. TX Rockwell Hanford Contamination Limih None established Richland. M6A2 4240-00-999-0420 Gloves. Extra Large 8415-00-782-2816 Hood.000 suits/day Contamination LimiP 667 dpm/ cm2 Capacity: Very large quantities (currently b. NV a..800 suits/day at the following locations: (5) Albuquerque Operations Office Mound Facilities (1) Savannah River Operations Office Miamisburg. reference (ar).

The OSC represents the U. Circumstances surrounding as required. Legal issues range from complex questions regarding jurisdiction and authority to exclude 18-4 RESOURCES the general public from specific areas. Review proposed public statements for legal state. other federal agencies.S.52-M CHAPTER 18 LEGAL 18-1 GENERAL f. To assure consistency. weapons accident as well as managing and administering a claims processing facility. and circumstances 18-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE surrounding an accident. The response force a. “ a. Government to the general public. c. concerning the authority and responsibility of the DoD 18-1 . 18-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS b. Depending upon the nature of. resources. Defense Nuclear Agency at the site of the accident. two attorneys and one Principal Legal Advisor (PLA) to the OSC. Advise the OSC and functional staff elements on assistance should be coordinated jointly through the any matters related to the accident. all legal advice and a. that the assigned legal element is aware and capable and actions to resolve legal issues. g. Review operational plans to identify potential legal problems and to ensure that they are legally sufficient. Organize and supervise the legal functional element c. including establishing and (DNA). The Senior communication among functional elements. Provide legal advice and assistance to other Federal. Predesignated response forces should ensure This Chapter identifies specific requirements. legal clerk. to payment of simple personal property claims. and sufficiency and implications. Also it provides a of addressing the complex and politically sensitive reference list of statutory authorities. The provision of timely and sound legal advice and organization should include a legal element to advise assistance is dependent upon adequate personnel and and assist the OSC in resolving these issues. and national defense issues which evolve from a nuclear instructions. The PLA must be knowledgeable officials upon request. (DNAAT). The military member of the legal element responding with designated legal element of the SRF response force the staff of the OSC is the Department of Defense (DoD) should include. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legal This concept establishes guidelines for the operation of advisors of other participating departments or agencies the PLA and his or her staff. e. 18-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS d. The occurrence of a nuclear weapon accident will present with emphasis on security. and will deploy to the accident site to provide expert advice and assistance to the PLA. radiological safety. DoD 51 OO. regulations. the Executive departments. additional personnel may be required. The legal element of the IRF response force should remain at the site as an additional resource. an accident are the driving force of the sequential order. and a myriad of complex legal problems for the On-Scene documentation of factual evidence for use in resolving Commander (OSC) of the Initial Response Force (I RF) claims or in litigation. and local officials. Planning. Other Federal Departments and Agencies may include a legal advisor as an element of their response The PLA will: force. b. at a minimum. DoD PLA. is a member of the DNA Advisory Team operating a claims processing facility. Coordinate technical legal matters with a higher authority when required. and the Service Response Force (SRF). The General Counsel.

national. (1) Public statements are coordinated prior to (3) The claims processing facility should be release to ensure that no hidden legal implications will established at a location easily accessible to the public impact on response efforts. the legal element should be litigation. Inasmuch as requests for legal authorities. should be collocated with the civil emergency relief and assistance office. which: (4) Claims processing personnel should be aware a. as well as (6) The PLA must identify and establish liaison jurisdictional principles. The handbook should be complete. identi. As soon as the claims processing facility 18-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX is established. legal claims administration. responsive.S. documentation a claims processing facility. Establishes a policy requiring all functional disturbance and/ or destruction of physical evidence elements to coordinate actions with the PLA. interviews with witnesses. including those listed at Appendix 18-A. the PLA should evidence which may be significant in “the resolution of take immediate action to ensure preservation of factual claims or litigation. 18-2 . The PLA. liaison must be established with all of the nation’s nuclear deterrent capability. more than one claims facility may are required to refer all queries for information to the be required. c. It is therefore major functional elements of the OSC’S staff to make essential that: all elements aware of the need for coordination of planned actions. or a representative use of force. implications that could undermine support for the therefore. Inherent in the accident scene. The PLA advises the OSC when the claims tailored to the respective Service or Agency. information regarding the location should be provided to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for Accident response plans should include a Legal Annex inclusion in a news release. of radiological hazards and safety procedures. which may prove later to be significant in resolution d. evacuation of civilians. processing facility should cease operation. and mutually agreeable to local officials. and evidentiary information for both safety investiga- tions and claims resolution.as well as that of the various other Federal departments fication of responding forces and civilians at or near and agencies in a nuclear weapon accident. and local and state emergency response advice require immediate response. and immediately with local law enforcement officials. and appropriate recording and this event are the relationships between local. the PLA should establish liaison with of references. accordingly. Accordingly. security requirements. site. Identifies technical channels of communication. legal advisors representing other federal agencies at the These references provide the authority and some accident site. The legal element. Identifies the resources to be deployed with the of the sensitive nature surrounding the accident. and international authorities. law enforcement. State. research facilities are unlikely to be available on-site. Public Affairs. (7) To ensure that legal advice is timely. Describes procedures for establishing and operating and/ or videos. (1) The OSC and staff must have immediate access Mishandling of public affairs-may impact on claims and to the PLA. and that queries for b. PLA ensures that any information provided to claimants is according to established policies. such as establishment of the National Defense Area (NDA). background for subject areas. f. Adverse publicity is inherent to a nuclear weapon accident simply by its occurrence. Initial Actions d. b. and adequate organizations. and damage to remains at the scene until the response operation is public or private property. Government in the cleanup (2) The provision of timely and legally sound advice process. Follow-on Actions. When possible. This includes photographs e. (5) Response efforts may necessarily result in the c. receipting of property. in the actions of the U. Dependent (2) All personnel involved in the response effort upon circumstances. result in a loss of confidence by the public located in or near the operations center/command post. Provides guidelines for documentation of physical of claims or litigation. designated legal elements should prepare a handbook and consistent. Provides a checklist or synopsis of the actions to any information other than claims procedures are be taken by the PLA immediately upon arrival at the referred to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). the claims processing facility PAO. or have long-term political and financial and assistance is based primarily upon communication.

seq. “Federally Protected Materials.52-M APPENDIX 18-A PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT 4. or 10. 18 U. 18 U. Sec. “Use of Military Resources 5.” 1. S. 372. DoD 51 OO. Reg.A.C. 50 Fed.. “Conspiracy Against Rights.” 3. (Public Law 93-288.” 2. 50 U. DoD Directive 5410. Losing Defense Information. “Prohibited Transactions Installations and Resources.C.” AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREA TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 9. 19 January 1988. 46542.” News Media Representatives at the Scene of Military Accidents Occurring Outside Military Installations.42 U.” 7. Property or 9.A.” 8. 18 U.A. S. 18 U. “Cooperation with U. 18 U. Sec. S.C. S. Sec. 797. 795.C. DoD Directive 5210. 797. “Assaulting. Sec. Its Territories.” 6. S. Subject “National System for Emergency Coordination. DoD Directive 5100.8. 245. “DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive 4. Resisting or 5.C.A.S.” States. Sec. S.A. White House Memorandum. DoD Directive 5210.56. DoD Directive 5200. Sec. DoD Directive 5230.” gency Response Plan (FRERP). Sec.” 10.” 8. A. ” 6. Sec. 5121 et.A. 831.” 18-A-1 . “National Contingency Plan. and Possessions. Sec. 796.C. “Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 641.C. 18 U. 793. 18 U. DoD Directive 3025.A. S. Sec.” Activities. Executive Order (EO) 12656. 18 U. ” Involving Nuclear Materials. S. Sec. 231.C. S.” 1. 11. amended by Public Law 100-107).C.52. “General Provisions.A. “Security Regulations. “Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons. 111. 2271. S. EO 12241.” 5. “Conspiracy to Impede or During Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the United Injure Officer.14.” CRIMINAL STATUTES 4. “Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data.” 6. “Publication and Sale of 2.” Photographs of Defense Installations? 3.A. 18 U. Sec. 42 U.C. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. “Federal Radiological Emer. “Federal Emergency Management. “Gathering. 18 U.” 7.C. 18 U. “Nuclear Accident and Records. “The Robert T.” Impeding Certain Officers or Employees. ” 1.A.C. “Photographing and Sketching Defense Installations.2.” Incident Public Affairs Guidance. S.C. “Public Money. “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. EO 12148. “Security of Military. “Use of Aircraft for Photo- graphing Defense Installations. Sec. ” Civil Disorders. 2. S.1.” 3. 241. Sec. S.C.41.16. Transmitting.A.A.A. S. DoD Directive 5210.

“Freedom of PROPERTY Information Act. S.C. as amended. S. 28 U. S. S. et. Sec. 18 U.A. ” 2. 2384. 18 U. 18 U. S. S. S. EO 11514. S. “Acquisition: Interests in Land When Need is Urgent. 333. S.C.C.C. Sec. Sec. Sec. “Comprehensive Federal Law. EO 12580. 1385. 5 U.C. Sec.” Forces to Enforce Federal Authority. 18 U. Navy or Air Force.C. 552a. “Entering Military. 552. A. ” a. Sec. “Environmental Effects in the 1. “Interference with State and 2. 1361.A. “Treason. 42 U.A.” 18-A-2 .C. ” 1.A. Sec. Sec. Sec..” of Investigation. 18 U.” 4. 2733-2737. seq. ” 2. Sec. S. Naval or Coast Guard Property. 13. S. 10 U. “Communication Lines. 9601 et. 331. S. “Government Property or AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS Contracts. 2672a. Sec.A.C. “Protection 17.” 10 U.A. 552b.C. “Administrative Adjustment of Claims. ” INVESTIGATION 6. 332. S. “Government in Sunshine Act.A. “National Environ- b. 1362. Sec. 227 l(b).Constitution 3. 42 U. “General Provisions.A. S. “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus.” 1.A. Compensation. S. Subset.C. 2101.C. and Liability Act of 1980. “Property Loss. S.C. 5 U. ” 15.A. “Use of Militia and Armed mental Policy Act.” and Enhancement of Environmental Policy.” Environmental Response.” 3.C. 2381.50.” MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACQUISITION OF LAND AND JUST COMPENSATION FOR 1. S. 10 U. DoD Directive 5100. Sec. 3052.” 5. Personal Injury or Death: Incident to Noncombat Stations or Systems.” 14.. 18 U. Sec. S. “Seditious Conspiracy. ” 18. S.A.” Activities of Department of the Army.” Amendment V . Sec. “Protection and Enhance- AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF ment of Environmental Policy. S. “Riots.A. DoD Directive 6050.” c. “Assault or Resistance. 42 U. seq.1. 10 U.C. 4321.C.A. as amended. Sec.” 16. “Powers of Federal Bureau United States of DoD Actions.C. Sec. A. 2672. 10 U. Sec.A. 2231.A. 18 U. S.C.A.A.A. “Superfund Implementation. 18 U.” 2. 5 U. 18 U.C. 1382. “privacy Act. “Federal Aid for State NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Governments.C. Sec.C. Sec. as amended by EO 11991.C.12.” 19.A.

though not 17. A specific list of 19-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE all possible resources at this juncture could be misleading and is. As described in other sections. response effort. Greenland. The four elements are the 19-3 SPECIFIC REWIIREMENTS Radiological Safety. DoD 51 OO. Some actions otherwise performed in support of 19-4 RESOURCES the basic response effort are vital in site restoration. the Staff Engineer easy. reducing dissolved. A r e a (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) is disestablished. Radiological Safety. activities. c. for the most part. Restoring the contaminated area to normal use. and 18. several decontamination considerations are discussed as well as b. or more precisely. and Engineer response elements. In addition to site restoration. a. However. to materials such as soaps and detergents for and the results incorporated into the plan. or removing the contaminant. weapon c. The precise resources This chapter provides guidance for accomplishing the required will depend on the specific contamination restoration of a nuclear weapon accident site contam. Several factors have significant influence on site f. respectively. during development of the site restoration plan removal. In this section. and other hazards are removed. four response force elements are the key to the On-Scene Commander’s (OSCS) effort to plan and execute site restoration. Completion of environmental assessment(s). and Palomares. b. or when overseas the Security Area is e. inated with radioactive materials. problem and the decontamination method(s) selected. Determination of agreed-upon cleanup and condition begins early in the nuclear weapon ac~ident technically achievable/ financially acceptable levels. Determination and plotting of contaminated areas. Such actions should be recognized. However. Some of the more prominent factors are: size of the contaminated area. scrubbing lesser amounts of contamination from surface areas. The following actions will. Legal. fixing. debris. site restoration becomes the dominant task only after classified weapons. One example would be determining the extent of a.52-M CHAPTER 19 SITE RESTORATION 19-1 GENERAL a. taught us that site restoration of an area have extensive responsibilities described in Chapters 5. the The accidents at Thule. Specifically. Material resources necessary for site restoration contamination. or overseas. each response force. Completion of decontamination. restoration decisions and procedures. and the civil authority monitoring “and assessment. available both commercially and within DoD. contaminated with radioactive materials. the Security Area is dissolved. Coordination between responsible civil and military organizations. when the National Defense d. Logistics. the concentration. classified components. @ovides expert advice on the. capabilities of various be required: pieces of heavy equipment to accomplish specific types 19-1 . the reoccupation of contaminated areas and follow-up staff element will contribute to the site restoration effort. therefore. can be accomplished. and Legal officers each Spain. not included. These resources are. Development of a site restoration plan to return the accident area to a technically achievable/acceptable b. Logistics. will range from heavy equipment for soil and vegetation therefore. g. Development of plans for post restoration radiation its topography/ demographics. and prerogatives once the NDA is disestablished.

to an acceptable condition. The team will use data from the Joint Hazard b. This program was designed to address a radiological contamination problem (b) DEMOGRAPHIC/TOPOGRAPHIC. Supporting Staff Engineers (Aerial Measurement System (AMS). DoD has adopted the policy that Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). lishment of the NDA or overseas the dissolution of the ~. This committee will formulate the scope. state and local governments. and requires 256K RAM. the OSC must continue to inhalation and external dose. Consideration is given to request pl’an. to level or at least to a level which recognized scientific qtilize the SRP mentioned above. and support the DoD contribution to returning the area ~. responsibilities in this area. ~. phasized. for restoration. (2) An ad hoc committee at the national level is a. Dose to radiation workers. Type of labor used in the method. EPA. DoS. The OSC’S responsibilities do not end with disestab- 5. Federal Radiological Federal guidance. nuclear weapons or devices posing an Program (S RP) to develop restoration options. Accordingly. Land use. Detailed mapping of the contaminated area later in this chapter. Radiological Safety Standards. interactive mode on an IBM PC or IBM compatible ~. and and other Federal agencies and representatives which local authorities or foreign government officials. includes 1. ~. nuclear materials. and local radiological contamination resulting from accidents demographics with a Site Restoration computer involving U. (1) The OSC will develop various restoration (3) The final set of strategy options will be used strategy options. determine (a) RADIOLOGICAL. support requirements for restoration tasks. – ~. 19-2 . Z Rate at which the DECON method is 19-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS applied. The primacy and rights of civil authorities/ ~. Established cleanup level. the Senior FEMA Official (SFO). Efficiency of the method in reducing Security Area. Specifically. Dose commitment from surface exposure. Size of affected area (m2). and coordinate the conduct of engineering surveys discussed ~. Site restoration activities established which includes representatives from DoD. assist in protecting the public from radiological hazards ~. Major materials required. Population/ Household size. Land value. In the absence of Evaluation Center (JHEC). shall be reduced to a minimal practical forwarded for national-level review. the advisoiy team must practite and knowledge indicates is safe for current and be provided extensive information in the foilowing area: reasonable projected use. There may have statutory responsibilities with regard to site are no guidelines. DNA provides the model 2. Once actual or potential threat to populations. and local authorities or foreign government officials are critical in planning site restoration as well as to the (c) The information provided by the computer accomplishment of site restoration. j. are undertaken in coordination with the Federal FEMA. and State $. which means technically achievable/ The OSC should provide the committee through the acceptable cleanup levels vary from locale to locale. the DNA Advisory Team to assist in preparing these options.of decontamination. DECON method used on each surface. officials concerning site restoration cannot be overem.S. Ground Surveys). Listing of any fixatives used to minimize site restoration computer program which operates in an resuspension. Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). SFO the strategy options along with radiological map data for negotiations and final governmental resolution/ approval. Coordinated Activities. restoration of areas contaminated with radioactive policies. DoE. and concepts to be included in site restoration. Specifically. These options should be derived from by the OSC and staff to build the final site restoration his staff and advisors. national or international. State. they should be environment. recommend procedures. Type of equipment used in the method. or to the these options are developed on-site. providing information ranging from methods/costs to efficiencies. a Department of Energy (DoE) representative.

the soil. and disposing techniques. when high levels of contamination are present. and animals for laboratory analysis. lower levels of contamination to identify various decontamination techniques used in are removed first. This step is accomplished by conducting supported solely by military assets. and level of contamination present. Such surveys may eroded. Some factors that surveys provide additional data from which site will influence the method chosen are type and use of restoration planning can be initiated. as well as obtaining (b) Decontamination methods used to cleanup detailed ground radiation measurements. the staff (3) Decontamination Considerations. follow-on ground monitoring. For example. Normally. (for before contamination migrates into the soil or surfaces example. If the (1) Identifying the Contaminated Area. such as dams. however. If. immobilizing completed in the first few days of the response operation the contamination in heavily contaminated areas. repetitive (2) Environmental Assessment. immobilizing or “fixing” measurement survey to determine the main areas of contamination may be necessary to prevent spreading contamination. therefore. Radiological surveys are key. and agencies or foreign government officials concerned. (a) The outer perimeter of the contaminated area is determined by measuring either low energy gamma radiation. The procedural recommendations in the level and extent of contamination and are the basis the following paragraphs are limited to site restoration for determination of possible decontamination actions dealing with the locating. All initial measurements should be and/ or to facilitate removal. I 9-3 . and corroborated by (a) In accidents. In air sampling. or reduce the level of contamination to return the affected area to an achievable/acceptable condition. but under certain environmental restoring the accident site. the Data used in determining the contaminated area may decontamination effort must be planned jointly by the be obtained during initial ground monitoring. of radioactive contamination. Constructing physical containment features area has been established. ~onsiderations. water. type including collection of samples and radiation measure. Specifically. Effective decontamination has been completed. local and/or State officials and the Federal measurement surveys. Advice should be obtained ble. Procedures.to be involved in the initiation of site restoration. the systematic radiological surveys and engineering studies. craters) will decrease significantly the and becomes difficult to measure. to conducted to accurately determine the location of prevent the contaminants from spreading or being various intensities of radiation. Other factors are ments. A substantial engineer plays a major role in development of the site portion of the site restoration effort will be to remove restoration plan. The first contamination is contained exclusively on government step in site restoration identifies the contaminated or property. or ditches. or as and/ or covering the concentration with plastic sheeting. These detailed an accident area may vary widely. the SRF can expect. soon as the initial radiological survey has been Covering the concentration with fresh earth could completed. handling. Because site restoration depends heavily on civil engineering procedures. type and amount of vegetation in the area. or alpha radiation. all situations. c. re-evaluation must be made of the situation for from the Radiological Safety Officer and Staff Engineer possible modification of control measures in effect. removing the highest level first may be to the environmental assessment because they establish advisable to reduce the spread of contamination. Further surveys. As additional information becomes availa. involvecollecting samples of air. the bulk of the contamination laboratory radioanalysis. dikes. The principal use of a simple method may be effective. Initial techniques employed is contained normally in the upper stratum (within one may involve both ground monitoring and aerial inch of the surface). soil. aerial OSC. detailed surveys should be may be necessary. should continue to be made until site restoration type and number of buildings. or a more objectives of the environmental assessment are to identify sophisticated technique may be required to remove the the effects on the ecosystems at the accident site and contamination. about using a particular fixative and its impact on both the environment and on subsequent site restoration (b) Soon after the perimeter of the contaminated operations. the decontamination effort is planned and affected area. begins with the use of the simplest method. contamination is on public or private property. plants. Other methods should be implemented immediately if there is any may be used such as spraying with water or fixative possibility that the contaminants may be spread. Control measures subsequent spread of contamination. provide a temporary fixative.

proximate surface for agricultural land generally is Recognizing that cleanup will continue. The fixation and/ or decontamination efficiency of the (6) Follow-Up Activities. The methods environmental. and that the generally defined by the depth of agricultural plowing. DoE. may require packaging in containers. (4) Contaminated Waste Disposal. have been used in levels. surface and airborne contamination remaining in an area will be factors determining when the ~ea is safe for ~. are contained in Tables 19-2. Methods to all aspects of the site restoration plan have been decontaminate various surfaces are contained in Table accomplished. The depth of the proximate surface varies even be major considerations. care must be taken to control (b) Contaminated soil and building materials resuspension. contamination is that which has settled into a surface ~. Because the shipments will from which removed. The type of ~. removable is that which can permissible levels of fixed and removable contamination. The proximate surface may Regulatory Commission guidance states that airborne be within one or two inches of the surface in a forest activity may be averaged over all of the air inhaled for or field. if difficulty is encoun. when used singly or in complete. If dilution within the proximate surface is contemplated. monitoring. Containers This method should be used when high contamination used must meet the requirements of applicable DoD. and Department of Transportation (DoT) inated soil removed by this method should be processed regulations and/ or country involved. Containers varying through a mechanical and/or chemical separator for in size from 55-gallon drums to large containers. levels will not permit use of other methods. and health standards have been and procedures for disposing of contaminated waste permanently and successfully achieved. stratum. while the a whole year to determine the annual dose to the lung. material. The logistics officer and/ or DoE personnel assist in (5) Reoccupation of Evacuated Areas. and people is necessary for long periods to ensure that radiation. plowing may be an effective method of achieving permissible levels of contamination in the proximate (a) Resuspension. In light of this.000-gallon fuel tanks. Continued monitoring and analysis of 19-3.. Moreover. consist of contaminated materials. or before reoccupation can be permitted. such as soil and vegetation. If packaging and transportation requirements. Fixed removed and re-built. packaged and the mode of transportation. in severe cases. possessions may be released to their owners. ~.y will be responsible for long term radiological SFO and appropriate civilian authorities/ officials. Decomposition of plant material can be and its acceptance criteria are necessary to determine accelerated by shredding and using quicklime. Vegetation in the area should be washed or (a) Early identification of a waste disposal site removed. from rising and collecting on previously turned furrows. advice must be tered in removing the contaminant. Surface contamination is divided into two categories: “fixed” 4 . Levels of identifying and locating suitable shipping containers. the transported from the site to an acceptable radiological method of shipment selected should ensure that the disposal facility. reoccupation. the ag&n. In areas with lesser contamination levels. and “removable. . not planned for development. Contam. 5. (b) Surface contamination on objects with which Wetting and plowing will also tend to mix the people come in contact must be at acceptable levels contaminant in depth so that it is not left in a single before the items can be released for unrestricted use. I 9-4 . that all regulations/ requirements are followed.” when determining if personal tures sho~d be decontaminated and. will surface. shredders are used. and resuspension factors. After site restoration is methods discussed above. Normally. Contaminated buildings and other struc. however. The soil may then be returned to the location previous restoration efforts. the site should be inspected to ensure that combination. magnitude of resuspension will decrease with time. be expunged if the surface is rubbed. reoccupation may be possible at a time when airborne burial action of plowing is enhanced further if the area activity is still two to three times the maximum is wetted before plowing as surface dust will be kept permissible steady state concentration. a civil material will require coordination between the OSC. Scraping is probably the most effective container selected depends on the material to be method for removing contamination from land surfaces. the Nuclear within similar environments. Table 19-1 provides guidelines on the and cannot be wiped off. it must be obtained from transportation specialists. for removal of the contaminant to achievable/ acceptable example. The quantity of material packaged and materials are moved in a safe and efficient manner and shipped may also create a large scale logistic problem.

05 Probe R 200 400 Smear 2/ (2) Equipment Items: F 1000 2. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources The table includes decontamination efficiencies for the following land areas and resources. Procedures for decontamination and/or fixation developed in coordination with representatives from Federal. Radioactive Contamination Guides. 3/ For U-natural.2 Probe [f above: R I 00 100 Smear 2/ b.. Prior to nonradioactive use. or the host country.0 Probe R 200 2000 Smear 2/ I / Measured through not more than 7 milligrams per square centimeter of total absorber and averaged not more than 1 square meter 2/ Smears analyzed with a calibrated counting system. A separate Site Restoration Plan (SRP) will be b. and local agencies. of contaminated areas. Engine Drive Train. Requires decontamin~tion F I 000 0. and Interior 19-5 . F—Fixed R—Removed TABLE 19-2. government officials/representatives. (In accordance wih NRC guidelines 4/ If Radium 226 is a contaminant. c. 100 cm~ Measurement 1. The Site Restora. and civil authorities and the accident response plan include: host government officials. State.lnformation and procedures which d. and U-238. Procedures for collection of environmental samples required to support restoration operations. Controlled: ( I ) Facilities F I 000 . levels for alpha contamination should be increased by factors of 5. should be F 200 0. Auto Tires. Identification of requirements for site restoration may be appropriate for the Site Restoration annex to planning with State. Vacant Land Exterior Wood Walls/ Brick Walls Agricultural Fields Concrete/ Wood Floors “ Wooded Land/ Lawns Interior Concrete Walls and Wood/ Plaster Walls Orchards Carpeted and Linoleum Floors Asphalt Streets/ Parking and other Paved Asphalt R?ofs Concrete Streets/ Parking and Other Paved Concrete ~~ ‘Automobiles. possible methods to restore an accident site and contaminated areas. 19-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX a. Uncontrolled. TABLE 19-1.2 Probe decontaminated if above: R None 100 Smear 2/ 2. Federal. Procedures for the disposal of contaminated tion annex of the accident response plan should identify material. Contamination Level Alpha Beta-gamma 1 / Fixed or dpm per dpm per mrad/hr dpm per Method of Contaminated Items and Indications for Actions Removable I 00 cm~ 100 cmz (@ I in. U-depleted. Containers. levels for alpha contamination should be reduced by a factor of 2. Facilities and Equipment 3/ 4 a.

92 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 60 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Deep Plow.8 Low Pressure Water (x3) 90. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 99.. .8 43.4 97 Clean Harvest-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 72 58 19-6 . Double Scrape (x2) 99. 3“ Asphak & Cover with 6“ Soil 72 58 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Clear Harvest Double Scrape 99.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Cleaq Harvest. Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 86 42 Low Pressure Water.92 Three-Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 60 40 Low Pressure Water-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 84.44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double Scrape-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99. . . TABLE 19-2.9 “ 68.9 66.4 79 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND EFFICIENCY —.44 99.8 Low Pressure Water (x4) 95. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 91.99 99.7 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 89.———. Deep Plow 98.3 Low Pressure Water (x3). Harvest 30 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleav Harvest 40 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Clea~ Harvest-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 96 96 Low Pressure Water 55 25 Low Pressure Water (x2) 79. Clear.6 Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 97 91 Deep Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) ‘ 99.4 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Leaching. Plow 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 96. EDTA 92 35 Clean Harvest 30 30 Scrape 4“ to 6“ 86 86 Plow 90 50 Deep Plow “ 98 60 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-CIea~ Harvest 40 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double Scrape 99.9 57.78 99.9 57.96 68.8 Low Pressure Water (x4) 95. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 96. Plow 92 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. FeCIj-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 97.92 99. Harvest Double Scrape.66 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil (x2) 84 64 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Plow 98 95 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 65 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 42 Leaching.4 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Cleaq Harvest.4 91. DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXl”liKNAL Clear.92 99. CleaC Harvest 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 76 64 Low Pressure Water (x2).8 73 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.99 DECONTAMINATION OF AGRICULTURE FIELDS Low Pressure Water 55 25 Low Pressure Water (x2) 79.4 74.8 43. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 82 55 CIeaq Harvest.75 Low Pressure Water (x3) 90. Double Scrape 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 99.6 70 Scrape 4“ to 6“-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 94.44 99.

Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil(No Trees) (x2) 88 64 Three inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) (x3) 96. High Pressure Water 77.92 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plow 92 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Deep Plow 98.92 99. 42.5 42.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 50 00 Surface Sealer) Fixative. Harvest Double Scrape 89.5 41 Scrape 4“ to 6“ 48 48 Plow 51 27 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 80 68 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Double Scrape 90. Double Scrape.7 Low Pressure Water (x4) 57.44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.7 95. .Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 95 94. Harvest Scrape 4“ to 6“ 85 85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Scrape 4“ to 6“ .3 45 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape 4“ to 6“ .25 89.5 34. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.32 78 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 75 51 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“ . Defoliate 48 00 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 69. Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99.5 65 DECONTAMINATION OF ORCHARDS Low Pressure Water 33 15 Low Pressure Water (x2) 47.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place) 47. Clear.44 99.9 33 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.Low Pressure Water 77.3 71 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 93.4 78. clear. Harvest. Radical Prune-Plow 93. Harvest 65 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 26. P1OW 95..3 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 96 96 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Double Scrape 99. High Pressure Water.5 67.56 Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place) 30 24 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cover with 6“ Soil Trees in Place 33 25.4 Low Pressure Water (x2)-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 93. Defoliate.3 Low Pressure Water (x3) 54. Scarify.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Radical Prune 72. TABLE 19-2.25 Surface Sealer/ Fixative: High Pressure Water 67. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 72 45.5 ~ Surface Sealer/ Fixative.6 93.1 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 50 0 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane. Harvest High Pressure Water 85 85 19-7 . Scarify. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 70 60 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Scarify. Radical Prune-Plow 93.9 66. Remove & Replace Scrape 4“ to 6“.2 Low Pressure Water.3 45 DECONTAMINATION OF WOODED LAND .5 18 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane. Clear. Clear. Clear.6 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane.

78 92. Place. Foam.94 99. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR WOOD WALLS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Low Pressure Water 90 85 Wash and Scrub 95 90 Low Pressure Water.75 Strippable Coating 40 35 Vacuum.84 Double Vacuum.67 Vacuum.72 99. Remove and Replace 99.25 Double Vacuum.69 87. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Hydroblasting 96.45 92. Hydroblasting 96. Remove and Replace 99. Wash and Scrub 99.25 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 92. Scarify 99.99 99.9 Vacuum.98 Double Vacuum.5 Vacuum.7 97.49 92.6 95.5 High Pressure Water 98 93 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.25 Vacuum 99 94 Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.6 97. Wash and Scrub 92. Low Pressure Water 91.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Foam 92 87 19-8 .97 88.49 Vacuum.5 Strippable Coating 85 84 Double Vacuum.75 Vacuum. Plane. High Pressure Water 99.74 99. Foam. Surface Sealer/ Fixative 99.7 Double Vacuum.98 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Foam 92. Remove Structure 99. Remove and Replace 99.1 30.83 98.65 Double Vacuum. High Pressure Water 91.86 99. Low Pressure Water 91.48 86.69 86.3 94 Vacuum. Foam.5 Double Vacuum.9 99.26 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 99.33 88.93 Vacuum.8 98.29 99.99 “99.3 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Vacuum. Foam 99.9 88. Wash and Scrub 94 90.48 87. Foam 92.72 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Foam 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.6 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.25 Low Pressure Water 90 85 Vacuum.99 Vacuum. Remove Structure 99.45 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.75 Double Vacuum. TABLE 19-2.72 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.5 DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR BRICK WALLS Vacuum 29 25 Double Vacuum 36. Low Pressure Water 99. Scarify 99.38 Double Vacuum.99 Vacuum.19 88. High Pressure Water 91.30 99. Remove and Replace 99. High Pressure Water 95.

5 95. Wash and Scrub 95.56 Vacuum. Foam 99.25 Double Vacuum.96 Double Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.56 81.5 “ 91 Wash and Scrub 92 87 Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 95 91 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 97 94.46 Double Vacuum.9 99.94 Double Vacuum.52 99.8 Vacuum. Foam (x2) 86. Resurface 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 99.25 Doub[e Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.06 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Foam 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.6 97. Remove and Replace 99.99 99. Steam Clean . Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Remove and Replace 99. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF LINOLEUM FLOORS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Vacuum 99 95 Double Vacuum 99. Foam. Wash & Scrub 99.97 Double Vacuum. Foam 97.96 Double Vacuum.99 Vacuum.3 96. Resurface 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 73 19-9 . Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Remove and Replace 99.98 99.9 92.86 99. Surface Sealer/Fixative.99 99. TABLE 19-2. High Pressure Water 95 90 DECONTAMINATION OF CARPETED FLOORS Vacuum 60 55 Double Vacuum 72 66. Foam. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.25 Wash & Scrub 97 95 Vacuum. Foam./ 72 78.98 StriPpable Coating 80 75 Vacuum.25 Double Vacuum.8 67.08 96. Foam 83. Remove and Replace 99.2 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 99.99 99.16 Double Vacuum. Steam Clean 72.99 Double Vacuum.63 99.99 99. Resurface 99. Foam 80 75. Remove and Replace 99.25 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.8 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Foam 98.35 Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 79.99 Double Vacuum.99 99.2 78.4 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99.99 Strippable Coating 98 97 Vacuum.06 Double Vacuum.85 99 Vacuum.98 99.5 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 76 70. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 85 00.97 99.85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 80 00 DECONTAMINATION OF WOOD FLOORS Vacuum 90 85 Double Vacuum 94.96 99.

Hydroblasting 98.79 95. Remove and Replace 99.99 97.—-—.6 Double Vacuum.85 99 Vacuum.75 Double Vacuum.28 90.63 96. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.79 Double Vacuum.5 93.45 Double Vacuum.61 Vacuum.56 Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99.96 97.85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 80 DECONTAMINATION OF INTERIOR CONCRETE WALIS Vacuum 70 65 Double Vacuum 79 74. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Hydroblasting 97.95 Vacuum.1 78. Strippable Coating 93. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.06 Vacuum. Resurface 99.45 Double Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.99 Strippable Coating 98 97 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 97. Resurface 99. Foam.3 96.99 99.6 97.62 94.99 99.43 Vacuum. Foam 95.1 Wash and Scrub 80 75 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.96 99.3 95.ippable Coating 99. High Pressure Water 94 91.25 Wash and Scrub 9“1 95 Vacuum. Str. Strippable Coating 96.76 99.52 Double Vacuum.69 95.. Remove and Replace 99.65 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 91. I 94.9 99.6 19-10 . Wash and Scrub 92. Foam. i 1 Double Vacuum. Foam 99. Hydroblasting 98.7 91.30 95. Hydroblasting 97.29 Vacuum. Foam 99. Wash and Scrub 93. Wash and Scrub 95.86 99.8 94. .96 93.97 99. High Pressure Water 96.25 Double Vacuum. TABLE 19-2. High Pressure Water 94.83 Double Vacuum.8 92. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 89.99 Double Vacuum.4 95.86 88. Resurface 99.01 Vacuum.78 94. Foam 97. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.66 Double Vacuum. .3 88. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE FLOORS EFFICIENCY —. Wash and Scrub 94.42 Double Vacuum.0 I Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. High Pressure Water 96.25 Double Vacuum.04 Double Vacuum.9 99. DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION liX’l”EKNAL Vacuum 74 69 Double Vacuum 83.35 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.96 Strippable Coating 95 90 Vacuum. Foam 97.5 DECONTAMINATION OF 1NTER1OR WOOD/PLASTER WALLS Vacuum 99 95 Double Vacuum 99.94 Strippable Coating 90 85 Vacuum.83 99.15 Double Vacuum.41 Double Vacuum. .79 99. Foam 95.61 Wash and Scrub 85 80 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Remove and Replace 99.

84 98.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum. Foam.25 71.5 61.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97.62 Double Vacuum.05 91.75 Double Vacuum. Resurface 99.25 Vacuum.25 98. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99.4 Double Vacuum.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum. Strippable Coating 98 96.25 98. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99 49. Remove and Replace 99. Foam 97. Resurface 99. Foam.5 86. Foam 97.68 99.5 99.53 Vacuum. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99 53.53 Vacuum.5 93 Vacuum.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97.38 93.4 Double Vacuum. Foam.5 99. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION OF ASPHALT STREETS/PARKING Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67.84 Strippable Coating 97.51 99. Strippable Coating 98. Foam.78 86. Strippable Coating 98 96. 3“ Asphalt with Cover with 6“ Soil 99.98 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 98.5 91.51 79.58 Vacuum.98 99.78 86. Low Pressure Water 95. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99.5 61. Remove and Replace 99.97 99. Strippable Coating.97 99. Resurface 99. Foam 98.5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum.35 64. Foam 99.51 79.98 99. Low Pressure Water 95.84 Strippable Coating 97.25 Vacuum.92 Vacuum.38 93. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Remove and Replace 99. Remove and Replace 99.5 86.5 91. Remove and Replace 99.75 02 Double Vacuum.98 Vacuum. Resurface 99. Low Pressure Water 95.23 Double Vacuum.45 ‘ Double Vacuum.75 Double Vacuum. Low Pressure Water 95.92 Vacuum.51 99.92 Double Vacuum.05 91. Resurface 99.36 DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE STREETS/PARKING Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67.4 Double Vacuum. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99. Foam 99.45 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.66 Vacuum.9 Double Vacuum.84 98.9 Double Vacuum.5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum. Resurface 99.92 Double Vacuum. TABLE 19-2.35 67.8 Double Vacuum.25 71.36 i9-11 . Foam 98.68 99.23 Double Vacuum. Strippable Coating.62 Double Vacuum.75 02 Double Vacuum.5 93 Vacuum.

92 Vacuum.06 Close Mowing 65 65 Remove and Replace 98 98 Leaching.5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum.5 93 Vacuum.62 Double Vacuum.23 Double Vacuum.9 99 Vacuum. Resurface 99.51 99.5 86. Remove and Replace 99.92 99. Remove and Replace. Low Pressure Water 99.9 99. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99. Low Pressure Water 95.35 64.81 DECONTAMINATION OF LAWNS Double Vacuum 30 20 Low Pressure Water 85 75 Low Pressure Water (x2) 91 84 Low Pressure Water (x3) 93 86.9 Double Vacuum. Leaching.38 93.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Strippable Coating . 98. Remove and Replace 99. Remove and Replace 99 99 DECONTAMINATION OF OTHER PAVED ASPHALT Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67.25 98. Resurface 99.68 99. Foam. Low Pressure Water 95. Resurface 99. Foam.5 91. FeCIJ 85 80 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. High Pressure Water 98 95 Vacuum. Foam 99.9 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.92 Double Vacuum.25 Remove and Replace 99.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Strippable Coating.84 98.75 02 Double Vacuum. FeCIJ 99.98 99. Remove and Replace.25 Vacuum.84 Strippable Coating 97.36 19-f2 . Strippable Coating 98 96.5 99.53 Vacuum.75 Double Vacuum.88 Low Pressure Water (x4) 94 88. Remove and Replace 99. TABLE 19-2.45 Double Vacuum.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97. Low Pressure Water 92 87. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer “ 99 49.94 99.97 99.58 Vacuum. Foam 98.05 91.5 61.4 Double Vacuum.78 86. Remove and Replace 99. Foam 97. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF ROOFS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Vacuum 60 50 Sandblasting 99 96 High Pressure Water 97 93 Foam 93 90 Strippable Coating 85 80 Low Pressure Water 90 85 Low Pressure Water (x2) 98 96.

5 94.9 99. Clean Engine with Solvent 97.63 98.5 86 Clean Engine with Solvent 95 90 Steam Clean.28 Repaint 99.75 Steam Clean.5 89.95 INTERIORS Vacuum 75 70 Double Vacuum 92. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN AND INTERIORS AUTO EXTERIORS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Water Wash 85 80 Water Wash (x2) 96.9 Sandblasting 95. TABLE 19-2.25 93 Wash & Scrub 95 94 Wash and Scrub (x2) 99. Remove Interior/ Clean/ Replace 98 97 TIRES Water Wash 80 50 Wash and Scrub 90 85 Replace 99.8 ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN Steam Clean 75 65 Steam Clean (x2) 92. Clean Engine with 4 Solvent (x2) 99.9 88 19-13 .5 Detailed Auto Cleaning 95 90 Detailed Auto Cleaning (x2) 96 92 Replace/ Reupholster 99 99 Vacuum.5 99.9 99.

Oiicd surfaces cannot . equipment. Xrrface areas. Safest abrasion waste. Allow lye paint efficient on vertical or hydroxide remover solution to remain overhead surfaces.) distance of 15 to 20 feet. cause burns). overhead) method) rubbing and wiping pro. 0. it is not Calcium cornstarch. penetration by moisture. water. TABLE 19-3. VACUUM Dry surfaces ----. Avoids water out of exhaust. keep surface damp level as desired.or covered. over area must be re- Collect used abrasive. contaminated tamination. Reaction hydroxide) boiler compound. Dissolves and erodes Hose with high pressure All water equipment Drainage must be con- faces (metal. VACUUM Porous and non. \ SANDBLASTING Nonporous surfaces Removes surface Keep sand wet to lessen Practical for large Contamination spread spread of contamination. Decontamination Methods METHOD SURFACE ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES CAUSTICS: Painted surfaces Softens paint Lye paint removal solution: Minimum contact with Personnel hazard (will Lye (sodium (horizontal) (harsh method) 10 gal. slow. operation to be carried for porous materials. Contaminated flush away with wate~. Trisodiurn Painted surfaces Softens paint (mild Apply hot 10% solution by Contamination may be Destructive effect on phosphate (vertical. Should not be cw-ture (see DETERGENTS) in one or two appli. water at an optimum may be utilized. thus. 4 lb lye. to avoid dust hazard. painted.. and reduced to as low a surfaces because of chipping. method. is contaminated.’ dust is personnel hazard. filing. magnesium. reduced to tolerance paint.. Removes surface. Hold tool tlush to surface ~ontaminated waste Contamination of BLASTING porous surfaces traps and controls to prevent escape of con. Allows trolled. Contamination may be Impractibie for porous such as sanding. Spray vertictil surf’wxs at out from a distance. WATER All nonporous sur. 6 lb contaminated surfaces. ABRASION Nonporous surfaces Removes surface Use conventional procedures. Not suitable plisstics. Machine filter reactions. used on aluminum or cations. Pqtassiurn on surface until paint is Should not be used on hydroxide sof’tened to the point where aluminum or magnesium. Remove remaining paint with Ionghandled scrapers. it may be washed off with water. etc.75 lb Easily stored. Removes contaminated Use conventional vacuum Good on dry porous All dust must be filtered CLEANING dust by suction technique with efficient mrfaces. ready for disposal.

Rub surface 1 minute with Dissolves industrial film May require personnel (metal. canvas.) wetting power of gent solution. inated. work from top reduced by 50%. Not upwind to avoid spray. applicable on porous Determine cleaning rate. WI \ plastic. contamination. limitations as water. then wipe which hold con lamina. use a rate of4 Spray will be contam- square feet per minute. May not be efficient water and cleaning with dry rag. . STEAM Nonporous surfaces Dissolves and erodes Work from top to bottom Contamination may be Steam subject to same (especially painted and from upwind. decontaminating agents. Work from for solutions of other (use vacuum). glass. Contamination on long-standing efficiency of steam face of the rag for each may be reduced by 90%. tion. application. Moist application is all that is necessary. equipment may be used contaminated surfaces tuminiition. etc. nant and increases a rag moistened with deter. TABLE 19-3. and other materials contact with surface. (Continued) 300 to 45”. Apply solution from a distance with a pressure proportioned. experimentally. Use a power rotary brush with pressure feed for more efficient cleaning. painted. steam will be greatly in- creased by using deter- gents. Do not allow solution to drip onto othel surfaces. Decontamination Methods (Continued) METtIOD SURFACE “ ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES WATER an angle of incidence of Contamination may be be decontaminated. Water Not applicable on dry to bottom to avoid recon. or oiled surfaces) surface at a rate of 4 mately 90% on painted Spray hazard makes the square feet per minute. Clean reduced by approxi. if possible. surfaces such as wood. surfaces wearing of waterproof The cleaning efficiency of outfits necessary. Use clean sur. otherwise. zL DETERGENTS Nonporous surfaces Emulsifies contami. concrete.

hour. Contamination may be Weathered surfaces may Hydrochloric (especially with deposits Mixture consists of O. gases. Leave on to solution. Acid mixtures systems. surfaces. Acid should and porous deposits. Easily surfaces. with water. goggles. corrosion if used with- detergent solution. tlush with plain water. Requires good ventila- SOLVENTS (greasy or waxed materials (oil. hydrochloric acid.) GENTS). possible by distillation. no material weight) of agent. with-contaminated should contain 3% (by solution. TABLE 19-3.) procedure [see DETER. INORGANIC Metal surfaces Dissolves porous Use dip-bath procedure for Corrosive action on metal Personnel hazard. handled than inorganic inorganic acids. 18% hydrochloric. and aprons.1 gal. Decontamination Methods (Continued) METHOD S“URFACE ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES COMPLETING Nonporous surfaces Form soluble complexes Completing agent solution Hokfs contamination in Requires application for AGENTS (especiuily unweath. Little Oxalatm ered surfaces. small value on weathered Citrates growth). surfaces). weathered surfaces for I should not be heated. and out inhibitors. paint. solvent or apply by wiping Recovery of solvent tion and tire precautions. Same safety pre- Acetic Acid circulatory pipe sodium acetute. Spray may be reduced by 75% penetrating power. scrub with a water. of CiirbonOtes rust or calcareous surface with solution. water. and I gal. ered surfaces. More easily cautions as required for Citric Acid systems. of from I to 2 normal (9 to moderate by addition ventilation required because careous growth). then again with plain water. rust or cal. flush material off noncorrosive. paint or etc. Fhssh surface with Possibility of excessive water.. Completing agents may be used on vertical and overhead sur- faces by adding chemical foam (sodium carbonate or aluminum sulfate). ACID MIXTURES: Nonporous surfaces Dissolves porous Same as for inorganic acids. Carbonates and tion periodically. be kept at a concentration Corrosive action may be gloves. 3 to 6% of corrosion inhibitors of toxicity and explosive circulistory pipe sulfuric acid). acid not effective on latory systems 2 to 4 calcareous deposits. Sulfuric rinse. Citrates .e.2 lb hour (unweathered ment. stored. plastic finishes. reduced by 90% in 1 require prolonged treat- Sulfuric porous deposits).. Acctutcs acid ”solutions. rubber boots. etc. minutes.e. 0. Wear ACIDS (especially with deposits movable items. utes by spraying with solu. Material bulky. Keep in 4 minutes on unweath. hours. surface moist for 30 min. Good i. Leave in pipe circu. i. a water-detergent solution. After 30 citrates are nontoxic. Contamination 5 to 30 minutes. ORGANIC Nonporous surfisces Dissolves organic Immerse entire unit in Quick dissolving action. ‘L porous deposits. Toxic to personnel.

spare parts. and services provided by organizations or specialized (2) HARVEST EAGLE Kits. and trained instrument repair specialized units is provided. JCCSA is a communications asset equipped with advanced technology communications consisting of heavy mobile/transportable equipment equipment. The JCSE is a contingency support unit c. or additional information on with tents. and o’ther organizational or specialized unit capabilities discussed housekeeping items. health physics technicians and 20-4 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) equipment. and Marine Corps personnel and a variety of communications equipment. Ground Mobile Force terminals. See Chapter 12 for further discussion. AFRAT provides assista- a. and other Each unit or organization is organized by title. United States Army. deployable by C-141/ C-5 aircraft. (4) Other Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Controlled This chapter provides a ready reference to units and Communication Assets. collectively called the Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). Super High Frequency satellite organizations that maintain specialized capabilities. terminals. or service. assist medical personnel and commanders by providing state-of-t he-art medical radiobiology advice by tele- 20-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE phone or at the accident scene.52-M CHAPTER 20 SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 20-1 GENERAL Commander (OSC) and his staff in the management of recovery operations following a nuclear weapon Numerous units and organizations with specialized accident. transportable vans. This organization has a deployable team of health physicists. (2) Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. This team can and the capability or service they offer. HARVEST EAGLE units.S. Forces Radiobiology Research Institute’s Medical This chapter summarizes these units and organizations Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT). collapsible cots. (3) Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL). Air Force. other consists of several pieces of equipment mounted in air officials. advice to the OSC in all kinds of radiological Team was established and trained to assist an On-Scene emergencies. A part of this equipment. (1) Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). field kitchens. HAMMER ACE consists of (1) Joint Communications Contingency Station a rapid deployment team of engineers and technicians Assets (JCCSA). consisting of Army. (4) HAMMER ACE. A part of the DNA capability is the Armed capabilities are discussed throughout this document. 20-3 UTILIZATION (1) U. Air Force Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). DoD 51 OO. ATRAP is a collection of RADIAC A summary of the capabilities of organizations and equipment. 20-1 . specialized capability. (2) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). This (3) Defense Nuclear Agency’s (DNA)s Nuclear team is or~anized to ~rovide technical assistance and Weapon Accident Advisory ~eam~ The DNA Advisory . Appendix 20-A provides telephone numbers for kits consist of air transportable operations support sets requesting services. Table 20-1 lists functions technicians. nce in radiological health matters. United States Air Force. and local medical authorities. in this document. the AN/ URC Joint Airborne This team is trained specially in radiological problems Communications Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). and can assist and furnish guidance to the OSC. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Controlled Assets. b. communications assets can also be deployed on request.

Organization/Team Capabilities/Service Matrix Listed down the left side of this matrix are paragraph references in Chapter 20. Across the top are capabilities and services that may be needed to respond to a nuclear weapons accident. TABLE 20-1. ncDArsnactd7 nc nccracc . An X at the intersection of a line and column indicates that the capability or service may be provided by the referred to organization or team.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (SFO) (or designate a FEMA Region Official to act (2) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). released to the atmosphere. and terrorist in treatment of all types of radiation exposure and nuclear-related activities in the U. (8) Mobile Decontamination Station. Other DoE Accident Response Resources. The FBI is the lead federal agency Training Site (REAC/TS). is responsible for recovery of off-site classified nuclear (6) The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center weapon material. incidence. and document tion and to advise of actions to be taken for the protection radioactive contamination. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The DoT (3) Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability can arrange special transportation activities and (ARAC). The RADCON Team can (7) RANGER. design specialists. 20-3 . (5) Radiolographic Response Capability. A ground based system used for provide expert health physics (radiation control and environmental monitoring sample tracking. incidents involving improvised nuclear devices and lost or stolen nuclear weapons. NEST assets maybe included as part of the DoE ARG. (4) Mobile Accident Response Mobile Laboratory d. FEMA will dispatch a Senior FEMA Official specialists as needed. d. Two air transportable trucks and trailers monitoring teams to measure and evaluate contamina- with equipment to analyze. a. packaging. 20-7 OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES b. Federal response in support of State and local health physicists. Two units capable of taking and developing radiographs of e. territories. Department of Energy Accident Response Teams. This as the Deputy SFO) and an emergency response team team is the primary DoE response element for threat (ERT) to . (1) Accident Response Group (ARG). Department of Transportation (DoT). Department of Agriculture (USDA). possessions. 20-5 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) (9) RASCAL.S. United States Navy. amd capable of providing advice and assistance. A DoE facility specializing for improvised nuclear devices. a senior scientifw advisor (assigned by the design FEMA is responsible for coordinating the overall laboratory).” identify. Department of Health and Human Services photography. The DHHS has the capability to analyze food (2) Contaminated Laundering Facilities. (1) Aerial Measurement System (AMS). The ARG 20-6 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT is the primary DoE response element for a nuclear AGENCY (FEMA) weapon accident and will be composed of the DoE Team Leader. The FBI weapons using cobalt or x-ray sources. DoE and environmental samples for radioactivity content and operated facilities are capable of laundering plutonium provide radiological advice. and archive safety) assistance to the OSC at a radiological accident. safety of meat and poultry products for human consumption. and other technical authorities. Equipment to perform field personnel decontamination. A system that can provide aerial radiological surveys and aerial b. purposes. c. a. The USDA Requests for these services should be coordinated with has the responsibility and the ability to determines the the DoE ARG Team Leader. high explosive specialists.ornplete interface requirements. (DHHS). EPA has (HOT SPOT). contaminated clothing. An air sampling system contained within a cargo van. of the public health and safety. This unit can provide computer generated assistance in contacting consignors and consignees of estimates of the distribution of radioactive contaminants shipments.

1 .S.S. Navy Operations Center AUTOVON 225-0231 Commercial 703-695-0231 U. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team (0800-1630) AUTOVON 298-4500 (1 630-0800 Commercial 301-678-4500 U.S. Marine Corps Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7366 Commercial 703-695-7366 20-A-2 COORDINATION CENTERS: Office of the Secretary of Defense Crisis Coordination Center AUTOVON 364-9320/22 Commercial 202-769-9320/ 22 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Commemial 703-697-5131 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center AUTOVON 221-2102/2103/2104 Department of Defense* Commercial 703-325-2102/ 2103/ 2104 Department of Energy AUTOVON 245-4667 Commercial 505-845-4667 FTS 844-4667 FEMA Emergency Information & Coordination Center Commercial 202-646-2400 FTS 646-2400 FEMA National Emergency Coordination Center AUTOVON 380-6100 Commercial 202-898-6100 20-A-3 INFC)RMATION ON DoI) SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division AUTOVON 227:0007 (JCS-Controlled contingency communications) Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) AUTOVON 968-4141 968-385 1/ 3852 JCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets AUTOVON 879-6591 /6925 U. Army Operations Center AUTOVON 227-0218 Commercial 703-697-0218 U.S.S.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) AUTOVON 291-5107 Commercial 301-427-5107 *DoD organizations should normally use DoD numbers even though requested services or information may relate to DoE. Air Force Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7220 Commercial 703-695-7220 U. DoD 51 OO.52-M APPENDIX 20-A POINTS OF CONTACT 20-A-1 MILITARY COMMAND CENTERS: National Military Command Center (NMCC) AUTOVON 227-6340 Commercial 703-697-6340 U. 20-A.

37830 Department of Health and Human Services** Food and Drug Administration (Duty Hours) 301-443-1241 Center for Devices and Radiological Health (24 Hours) 202-857-8400 5600 Fishers Lane Rockville. Air Force Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL) AUTOVON 240-2001 Headquarters Air Force Communications Command (HAMMER ACE) AUTOVON 576-2591 Emergency Operations Requests Commercial 618-256-2591 Information AUTOVON 576-3431 Commercial 618-256-3431 Headquarters Tactical Air Command/ LGX (HARVEST EAGLE) AUTOVON 432-5435/5436 20-A-4 OTHER AGENCIES: Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS) Oak Ridge Associated Universities Commercial 615-482-3131 REAC/TS (24 Hours) Commercial 615-481-1000 P. Points of contact are provided fOr coordination and reque$ts for info~ ation 20-A-2 . Air Force Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP) Information AUTOVON 945-6906 Emergency Request AUTOVON 945-6906 ~ SA-ALC/ MAW Emergency Operations Center AUTOVON 945-3046 U.S. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team AUTOVON 332-7527 Commercial 703-602-7527 U.O. Box 117 Pager 241 Oak Ridge. ● “Accident response services should be requested through the FEMA EtCC. Washington.S.AFRRI Medical Radiobiological Advisory Team (MRAT) Commercial 202-295-3909 U. W. DC 20460 . Maryland 20857 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)** EPA Headquarters Commercial 703-557-2380 Office of Radiation Programs (24 Hours) 202-475-8383 Waterside East Tower 401 M Street S. Tennessee.S. . .

accident response. July 28.S. in Table 21-1.16. Emmittsburg. DoD 51 OO. These courses are necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Response Plan Workshop (Course E358). Vol. (2) Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CAN- TRAC). Specific course information for 21-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE Service schools is found in the following This section informs senior staff planners and potential (1) Department of the Army Pamphlet 351-4. recovery plans/ portions of plans that are not accident Maryland offers the Federal Radiological Emergency specific. These c. Defense Management When organizational nuclear weapon accident response Education and Training Catalog. Savanna. USAF 21-3 ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING Formal Schools Catalog. 11. A list of available courses at the INWS is the respective Services at the earliest opportunity.52-M CHAPTER 21 TRAINING 21-1 GENERAL Center (JNACC) is willing to participate in organiza- tional training. and other Federal government whose positions require special key personnel should attend appropriate courses offered skills and knowledge in nuclear weapon emergency by the Interservice Nuclear Weapon School (INWS) and situations. 1972. to observe or participate in the exercise. the exercising unit would expect to interface in an actual accident. The managemcxtt of nuclear weapon accident response 21-4 TRAINING COURSES depends on the availability of well trained and skilled personnel. operational commitments permitting. 111. U. Army Defense Ammu- be given to inviting external organizations. at Kirt land AFB. The Services have the responsibility to ensure that accident response personnel are efficiently trained. training exercises are conducted. offers a variety of courses commanders of designated response forces should ensure designed to develop and maintain a nuclear weapon that their personnel have the knowledge and training emergency response capability. consideration should (5) Course Catalog. U. b.SP11. Interservice Nuclear Weapons Sc_hool. The INWS of responding well to a nuclear weapon accident. therefore. Service Schools. 21-1 .VO1.S. To achieve and maintain a posture capable a. NAVEDTRA 10500. OSCS about training courses available in nuclear weapon Army Formal Schools Catalog. (3) Air Force Regulation 50-5. with which nition Center School. New Mexico. The Federal Emergency Management Agency. exercises can provide the basis for developing draft National Emergency Training Center. available h all Service personnel and employees of the designated On-Scene Commanders (OSCS). (4) DoD Directive 5010.

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses SPECIAL COURSE GIVEN TO GRADE * DURATION FEATURES Flag Officers Nuclear Service response force on-scene o-7+ 2 days ● 4 hour CPX Accident Course commander and appropriate staff ● 2 hour field (FONAC) personnel as participants. Randolph AFB. orientation Senior Officers Nuclear On-scene commander’s immu. 78148.2 hour CPX Training Course ● 1 day field \ (NHTC) exercise Nuclear Emergency Initial response twn leader and E-3 to o-3 9 days ● 3 hour CPX Team Operations members .4 day field (NETOPS) exercise Nuclear Emergency Team Training E-3 to 0-s 4 days ● 3 day field Team Exercise exercise (NETEX) *Grade waivers will be considered.iiate O-4 to O-6 3 days ● 3 hour CPX Accident Course staff ● 1 day field (SONAC) exercise w L Nuclear Hazards Medical personnel E-4 to O-4 4 days . Information concerning class schedules and quotas for these lnttrscrvice Nuc]ear Weapons School courses can be obtained from Headquarters. Air Training Conlmand//TTPP//. TABLE 21-1. Texas. .

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