You are on page 1of 211

j DoD 5 1 0 0 .

5 2 - M

NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT
RESPONSE PROCEDURES
(NARP)

MANUAL

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

SEPTEMBER 1990

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050
DoD 5100. 52-M

[ A T O M I C E N E R G Y ) September 4, 1990
FOREWORD

This Manual has been developed by the Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA) under the authority of DoD Directive 5100.52, “DoD Response
to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive
Material s,” December 21, 1989, and supersedes DNA 5100.1,
!rNuclear Weapon A c c i d e n t Response p r o c e d u r e s (NARP) M a n u a l , ”
January 1984.

This Manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of
D e f e n s e (OSD) ; t h e M i l i t a r y D e p a r t m e n t s ; t h e C h a i r m a n { J o i n t
C h i e f s o f S t a f f a n d J o i n t S t a f f ; t h e U n i f i e d a n d SPeclfled
Commands; and the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities that
support response to a nuclear weapon accident (hereafter referred
to collectively as “DoD Components”) . This Manual is effective
immediately.

The purpose of this Manual is to provide the On-Scene
Com~ander a n d h i s o r h e r p l a n n i n g s t a f f w i t h a s i n g l e ,
comprehensive document that summarizes procedural guidance,
technical information, and DoD responsibilities for responding to
an accident involving nuclear weapons. The NARP also describes
the substantial resources in other Federal Agencies that can be
made available to assist in the response effort.

This Manual should be widely disseminated and made available
to all commanders and staff who may be called upon to respond to
a nuclear weapon accident. It should serve as a guide for more
detailed planning for nuclear weapon accident response, and can
be used to improve training and exercise programs.

Suggestions to update or improve this Manual are solicited.
Send proposed changes through appropriate channels to:

Headquarters, Defense Nuclear Agency
Attn: NOEA
6801 Telegraph Road
A l e x a n d r i a , VA 2 2 3 1 0 - 3 3 9 8

DoD Components may obtain copies of this Manual through
their own publications channels. Other Federal Agencies and the
public may obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
N a t i o n a l T e c h n i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , 5 2 8 5 P o r t Royal R o a d ,
Springfield, VA 22161.

%?
Robert B. Barker
,

Doll 51 OO.52-M

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

1-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-2 Purpose and Scope of the NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-3 Organization and Us.eofthe NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1-4 Nuclear. Weapon Accident Response Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
1-5 The Phases of Response to a Nuclear Weapon Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1-6 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1-7 Change Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

APPENDIX I-A RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l-A-l
APPENDIX 1-B INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . 1-B- I
APPENDIX 1-C RESPONSE FORCE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l-c-l
APPENDIX 1-D RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
ON-SCENE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND
PERSONNEL PERMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-D- I
APPENDIX 1-E SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO
SUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-E- I
APPENDIX 1-F RADIATION HAZARDS AND BASIC RADIATION
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-F- I
APPENDIX 1-G QUICK REFERENCE EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l-G-l

CHAPTER 2- RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2-3 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

CHAPTER 3- RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES
3-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-3 Department of Energy (DoE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3-4 Department of State (DoS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3-5 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3-6 Department of Agriculture (USDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 .
3-7 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
3-8 Department of Commerce (DoC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-9 Department of Interior (DoI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3-1o Department of Transportation (DoT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-11 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3-12 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) . . . . . .‘. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Page

3-13 Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-14 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-15 General Services Administration (GSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-16 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3-18 State/ Local Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

CHAPTER 4- MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENT RESPONSE

4-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4-4 Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
4-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
4-6 Accident Response Plan Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

APPENDIX 4-A ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-A-1

CHAPTER 5- RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

5-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5-5 Concept of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 5-2
5-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

APPENDIX5-A RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-A-1
APPENDIX 5-B ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-B-1
APPENDIX 5-C SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, RADIAC REPAIR,
AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT/ CAPABILITIES TEAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-c-1
APPENDIX 5-D AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-D-1
APPENDIX 5-E RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT,
AND CONTROL FORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-E-1

CHAPTER 6- RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

CHAPTER 7- CONTAMINATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

CHAPTER 8- BIOASSAY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

CHAPTER 9- RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS
AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

CHAPTER 10- SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

APPENDIX 1O-A SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1O-A-1
APPENDIX IO-B SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL . . . . . . 1O-B-1

...
111

. . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) Page CHAPTER 11 . .WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS 15-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COMMUNICATIONS 12-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 12-4 Resources . . 14-1 14-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-6 APPENDIX 14-A NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 154 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 12-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 CHAPTER 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-3 Specific Requirements . . . .CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 15-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-4 CHAPTER 16. . . . . . . . . . . 14-6 14-7 SpecializedCourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 / CHAPTER 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 12-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13-1 13-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PUBLIC AFFAIRS 16-1 General . 14-1 14-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-2 15-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 12-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SECURITY 13-1 General . . 12-1 12-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-7 CHAPTER 13. . . . . . . . 13-1 13-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 13-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2 14-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . 13-1 13-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .MEDICAL 14-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I CHAPTER 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 iv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-3 APPENDIX 20-A POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 18-1 18-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LOGISTICS SUPPORT 17-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5 CHAPTER 20. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-4 Department of Defense (DoD) . . . . . . . . . 18-A-1 CHAPTER 19. . . .. 18-1 18-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-2 APPENDIX 18-A PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-1 19-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-2 17-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-3 20-6 Federal Emergencey Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-3 20-7 Other Federal Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) Page 16-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . 17-3 APPENDIX 17-A LOGISTICS RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-A-1 APPENDIX 16-B RADIATION FACT SHEETS . . 20-A-1 v . . . . . 19-1 19-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-2 19-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-2 Purpose and Scope . . 20-1 20-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-1 19-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-2 APPENDIX 16-A PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONTINGENCY RELEASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . 17-1 17-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-A-1 CHAPTER 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SITE RESTORATION 19-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1 18-2 Purpose and Scope . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-3 “~ Utilization . . . . . . . .LEGAL 18-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-1 20-5 Department of Energy (DoE) . 19-1 19-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . .SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 20-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-B-1 CHAPTER 17. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1 16-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-4 Training Courses . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 -! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1 21-3 Organizational Training . . . . . . . . . .TRAINING 21-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) CHAPTER 21 . . . .

. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1-3 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 5-A. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-c-lo 5-E-1 Personal Data Form .1 ARACPlot .52-M FIGURES FIGURE TITLE PAGE l-l Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification F1OW (Simplified) .. . . . . . . . 4-3 4-2 Service Response Force Functions and Interagency Relationships (Example) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .1 Air Sampler Placement . . . . . . . . . . 5-E-19 5-E-8 FIDLER Data Form . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 4-4 4-3 Sample Accident Site Organization .. . 5-E-5 5-E-3 Bioassay Screening Log . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 7-3 7-2 Vehicle Contamination Control Sttion (Example) . . . . ... . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 5-E-21 7-1 Contamination Control Station (Example) . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 7-4 8-1 Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs 8-2 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1-7 4-1 Initial Response Force (Example) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 5-E-17 5-E-7 Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form . . . . . . . . . . .Deposition . . . . . . . . 5-E-1 5’ 5-E-6 TLD Measurement Collection and Analysis Form . . . . . . 5-E-9 5-E-4 Radiation Health History . . 5-E-3 5-E-2 Radiological Control Area Log . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-4 5-B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-B-2 5-c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . 5-c-7 5-c-3 AMS Plot (Example) . .. . .. .Lung Dose . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . DoD 51 OO. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .1-I Spectral Plot .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 5-5 5-A. 5-E-13 5-E-5 Field Monitoring Data Log . . . 4-8 5-1 Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization . . . .”. . . . . I -5 1-2 Relationship of Initial Actions During a Nuclear Weapon Accident Response .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEO) (Sample Contents) . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 12-6 vii . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 5-C-6 5-C-2 ARAC Plot ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 6-2 Protective Devices for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I-5 11-5 Conversion Table to S1 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 11-3 Conversion Table (CPM to #g/mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 Alpha Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. DoD 51 OO. . . . . . . 11-4 11-4 Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 5-c-3 6-1 Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a Function of Airborne Contamination . . . . . . . . . . 20-2 21-1 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..52-M — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .2 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..1-2 5-B-1 Air Sample Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-3 Decontamination Methods . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 11-2 Conversion Table (CPM to #g/ mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 56 Alpha Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-I Commonly Considered Radioactive Contaminants and Their Primary Associated Radioactive Emissions . . . . .. . . . . . 8-4 11-1 Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 5-A. . . . . . 11-5 14-1 Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines . . 19-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 8-2 Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-B-3 5-C-1 ‘ Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes Program Name Description . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .—— —- TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 5-A. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 . . . . 19-14 20-1 Organization/Team Capabilities/ Service Matrix . . . . . . . . . .. 14-5 19-1 Radioactive Contamination Guides . . . . . . 5-B-1 5-B-2 Air Sample Piacement . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . WH . . . . . 6-2 8-1 Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 19-5 19-2 Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DoD 51OO.52-M ACRONYMS AAC Ambient Air Concentration AF Air Force AFB Air Force Base AFOC Air Force Operations Center AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute’ AIMS Aerial Measurement System AOC Army Operations Center ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ARG Accident Response Group ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) ATRAP Air Transportable RADIAC Package ATSD(AE) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network AUTOSEVOCOM Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network AUTOVON Automatic Voice Network Bq Becquerel CAT Crisis Action Team CCA Contamination Control Area ccc Crisis Coordination Center CCG Combat Communications Group Ccs Contamination Control Station CDCE Contamination Disposal Coordinating Element CDRH Center for Devices and Radiological Health CEAT Community Emergency Action Team CEOI Communications Electronic Operating Instruction CF Composite Fiber CINC Commander-in-Chief CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information COM Chief of Mission COMSEC Communications Security CP Command Post CPM Counts Per Minute CPX Command Post Exercise DCE Disaster Control Element DCO Disaster Control Officer DCS Defense Communications System DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DNA Defense Nuclear Agency DNAAT Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team DoC Department of Commerce DoD Department of Defense DoE Department of Energy DoE/ AL Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations DoE/NV Department of Energy/Nevada Operations DoI Department of the Interior DOMS Director of Military ‘Support ‘ DoS Department of State ix .

ACRONYMS (CONTINUED)

DoT Department of Transportation
DPM/ m3 Disintegrations Per Minute Per Cubic Meter
DRF Disaster Response Force
DSFO Deputy Senior FEMA Official
EAC Emergency Action Committee
ECS Exercise Control Staff
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center (FEMA)
EMR Electro-Magnetic Radiation
EMT Emergency Medical Team
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
ERT Emergency Response Team
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCDNA Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FONAC Flag Officers’ Nuclear Accident Course
FRC Federal Response Center
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan
FTS Federal Telecommunications System
FTX Field Training Exercise
GMF Ground Mobile Force
GSA General Services Administration
HE High Explosive
HEPA High Efficiency Particle Air
HF High Frequency
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HDNA Headquarters, Defense Nuclear Agency
HOT SPOT Department of Energy Mobile Counting Laboratory
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
Ic Inhaled Concentration
Icc Interstate Commerce Commission
IND Improvised Nuclear Device
INWS Interservice Nuclear Weapons School
IRF Initial Response Force
.JA Judge Advocate
JACC/ CP Joint Airborne Communications Center) Command Post
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JHEC Joint Hazard Evaluation Center
.
JIC Joint Information Center
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center

x

ACRONYMS (CONTINUED)

JS Joint Staff
JSCP Joint Strategic Capability Plan
keV Thousand Electron Volts
LOS Limit of Sensitivity
MAC Military Airlift Command
MARD Mobile Accident Response Development
MeV Million Electron Volts
MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration
MRAT Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team
MRT Medical Radiology Team
NAIR Nuclear Accident Incident Response
NARCL Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing
NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures Manual
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVMED Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
NCA National Command Authority
NCAIC Nuclear Chemical Accident/ Incident Control
NCC National Coordinating Center
NCC Navy Command Center
NCS National Communications System
NDA National Defense Area
NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NMCC National Military Command Center
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOS National Ocean Service
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA National Security Area
NSC National Security Council
NSN National Stock Number
NTS Nevada Test Site
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NUWAX Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercise
NWS National Weather Service
OAR Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OEHL Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory
OEMT Operational Emergency Management Team
Osc On-Scene Commander
PAG Protective Action Guide
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PAR Protective Action Recommendation
PLA Principal Legal Advisor
PRP Personnel Reliability Program
QD Quantity Distance
R Roentgen .
RADCON Radiological Control
RAMT Radiological Advisory Medical Team

xi

ACRONYMS (CONTINUED)

RAP Radiological Assistance Program (DoE)
RCA Radiological Control Area
RCL Radiological Control Line
REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
RER Re-entry Recommendations
RRF Regional Response Force
RSP Render Safe Procedures
SAAM Special Assignments Airlift Mission
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SECORD Secure Cord Switchboard
SENAC Senior Executive Nuclear Accident Course
SFO Senior FEMA Official
SONAC Senior Officers’ Nuclear Accident Course
SRF Service Response Force
SRP Site Restoration Plan
SSN or SSAN Social Security Number
TELEX Telephone Exchange
TWX Teletypewriter Exchange
3
uCi/ m Microcuries per cubic meter
UHF Ultra High Frequency
us United States
USCINC U.S. Commander-in-Chief
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
VHF Very High Frequency
WATS Wide Area Telephone Service

.

xii

DoD 51 OO.52-M

REFERENCES

(a) DoD Directive 5100.52, DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive
Materials, 21 Dec 89.
(b) DoD Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance, 7 Feb 83.
(c) Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), Federal Register, 50 Fed. Reg. 46542,
8 Nov 85.
(d) DoD Directive 5148.2, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), 4 Feb 86.
(e) DoD Directive 5200.8, Security of Military Installations and Resources, 29 Jul 80.
(f) DoD Directive 4000.19, Interservice, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support, 14 Ott 80.
(!3) Public Law 93-288,22 May 74, amended by Public Law 100-107,23 Nov 88.
(h) DoD Directive 3025.1, Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies within the
United States, its Territories, and Possessions, 23 May 80.
(i) EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88.
0) JCS Publication 1-03.6, Joint Reporting Structure Event/Incident Report, Nov 80.
(k) TP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(1) Army TM 39-20-11, General Fire fighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(m) Navy S WOP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(n) Air Force T.O. 1lN-20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.
(o) Lawrence Livermore National Lab Report M-161, 1982.
(P) NSTM 079-39.137.
(q) AR 40-14, Control and Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,
Sep 84.
(r) NAVMED P-5055, Radiation Health Protection Manual, Nov 86.
(s) AFR 161-8, Control and Recording Procedures-Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, Sep 66.
(t) AFR 161-28, Rrsonnel Dosimetry Program and the USAF Master Radiation Exposure Registery,
Ott 73.
(u) OPNAVINST 3440.15, Minimum Criteria and Standards for Navy and Marine Corps Nuclear
Weapons Accident and Incident Response, 13 Jun 83.
(v) BUMEDINST 6470.10, Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated I%rsonnel, 5 Dec 79.
(w) JCS MOP 167, Mobile/Transportable Communications Assets Controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 1978. .
(x) Allied Communications Publication 134, Communications Assets, Jan 75.
(Y) U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1, Joint Communication Deployment and Employment, Jun 80.
(z) FM 24-2, Radio Frequency Management, Sep 85.
(aa) AFR 100-31, Frequency Management and Electromagnetic Comparability, Sep 85.
(ah) Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 USC 797).
(at) DoD Directive 5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapon Security Manuai, Sep 87.
(ad) DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 23 Sep 88.
(se) DoD Regulation 5200. l-R, Information Security Program Regulation, Jun 86.
(m DoD Directive 5210.2, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, 12 Jan 78.
(ag) AR 380-150, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, Sep 78.
(ah) AFR 205-1, Information Security Program, Apr 87.
(ai) AR 40-13, MedicaI Support-Nuclear/ ChemicakAccidents and Incidents, 1 Feb 85.
(aj) AR 600’10, The Army Casualty System, Aug 87.
(ak) AFR 30-25, Casualty Services, Aug 87.
(al) BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, Personnel Casualty Reporting, Feb 82.
(am) NACP Report #37, June 1980.
(an) DA Circular 40-82-3, Prevention of Heat Injury. “
(so) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training Publications 60-1.

...
X111

l-L.29. > xiv .25. Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing. (aq) DoD Directive 4000.l-M. May 87. REFERENCES (CONTINUED) (ap) Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.52. Military Standards Requisitioning and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP). . Ott 89. (ar) DNA 5100. January 1984.

Accident Response Group (ARG). A DoD term to identify and Alpha Team. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). and is also a control device to prevent the spread of contamination. produced by naturally occurring radioactivity and cosmic rays. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal or hair cap. 5100. tional and Environmental Health Laboratory (USAF Background radiation due to cosmic rays and natural OEHL). spare parts. the position of the aircraft is integrated into the system. Air Sampler. official or the senior representative xv . The team is capable of responding worldwide radioactivity is always present.52. The foreign consisting of coveralls.52. and technical personnel and of contaminants. providing on-site health physics consultation BecquereL The unit of activity of a radionuclide. and hood government agency. tive material other than the one under consideration. Radiation arising from radioac- physics technicians established at the USAF Occupa. .52-M DEFINITIONS Access Procedures. In the Army Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). The Department of A respirator can be worn with the anti-contamination Energy (DoE) Accident Response Group consists of clothing which provides protection against the inhalation qualified scientific. equal and instrumentation for the detection. A field qualified team of health physicists and health Background Radiation. A and Air Force. this term includes a “significant incident” collection of RADIAC equipment. which a single signal initiates the action for a nuclear detonation. A term used in the DoD to identify radioactive particulate suspended in the air. Aerial Measurement System (AMS). Clothing C*gnizant Agency Authority or Official. See nuclear weapon(s) accident. A large areas by utilizing instrumentation for detecting and DoE asset capable of providing a computer generated recording gamma radiation. The background count includes radiation suspended in the atmosphere. capability. The team is identified or nuclear component. See nuclear weapon trained instrument repair technicians maintained in an incident. The method(s) for determining the amount to supplement the local RADIAC equipment and repair of internaI contamination received by an individual. medical. An Army team possessing an alpha report an accident involving a nuclear weapon/warhead radiation monitoring capability. one spontaneous nuclear transition per second. Anti-Contamination Clothing (Anti-C’s). identification. shoe covers. Background Count. alert status by the Air Force Logistics Command for airlift to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident/incident Bioassay. gloves. both as gross count rates model of the most probable path of the radioactive and gamma energy spectra.A device used to collect a sample of the BENT SPEAR. DoD 51 OO. Equipment for determining contamination released at an accident site. Anti-contamination clothing provides Procedures. (In connection with health Airborne Radioactivity. with air transportable equipment to radiation accidents/ incidents. specialized equipment designated to execute DoE’s response operations upon notification of a nuclear Armed. Any radioactive material protection). BROKEN ARROW. and to the activity of a quantity of a radionuclide having quantification of any possible radiation hazard. Symbolized Bq. and report a nuclear incident involving a nuclear weapon/ warhead or nuclear component. Performs aerial measurements of ground and airborne radioactivity over Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). protection for the user from alpha radiation. In the Navy this includes a usually as part of a Nuclear Accident and Incident “signflcant incidentm as defined in DoD Directive Control (NAIC) Team. and as defined in DoD Directive 5100. The configuration of a nuclear weapon in weapon accident/incident.

Develop or evaluate recommendations for public concept is employed at the Contamination Control protective action measures off site. Also custody includes the maintenance of weapons and components. or chemical agents or Custody. or of the whole body. demolition munition. test. The total dose resulting transferred to FEMA by mutual agreement. The decrease in the radiation nuclear. and Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA). fissionable. warhead. transfer and hazardous materials on. Specifically excluded is information concerning arming. or objects. or test device. The process of making any person. both off and xvi . from repeated exposure to radiation in the same region. Contamination Control Line (CCL). Decay (Radioactive). or render harmless. materials contamination. For military radiation control area. The deposit and/ or absorption of radioactive material. A building or location control station is operational. Contamination. maintain. operate. a. TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA or SECRET RESTRICTED DATA revealing the theory Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT). biological. Responsibility for the control of. The outer boundary of the assistance to disaster relief operations. (CNWDI). person/ object and outside the Contamination Control Station. or Foreign precluding mechanical transfer of contamination on a government. structures. the known/ suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of safety. the izing. A team of operation or design of the components of a of response and local experts that operates out of the thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb. The area b. and the White House until Cumulative Dose (Radiation). Decontamination. . Coordinate initially the release of information to the public. and high of the weapon at the time of the accident. fusing. limited life components.of the involved country’s government at an accident/ Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information’ incident site. Initially. Conduct and manage Federal on-site actions. to the meticulous clothing/ equipment removal procedures appropriate State and /or local officials . reduce.The Cognizant firing systems. chemical agent and hazardous intensity of any radioactive material with respect to time. and access to. Contamination Control Station (CCS). d. temporarily or permanently. The coordinator Control Station is at Chapter 5. Among excluded items are is responsible to: the components which Service personnel set. this line is the outer equipped and organized to cleanse personnel and boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from material of chemical. in coordination with FEMA. the Secretary of Contamination Control Station is the contamination the Army is the DoD Executive Agent. contaminants. weapons and components. Contamination Control. or radiological the cIean area. making harmless. neutral- surrounding the radiological control area. Procedures to avoid. control line. One who acts or facility) specifically designated for controlling ingress on behalf of the Secretary of Defense with his authority and egress of personnel and equipment to/from the over the military services and DoD agencies. structured. The concept uses supervised. movement of. or removing hazardous materials contamination control line extends 100 meters beyond clinging to or around it. personnel... Once the contamination Decontamination Station. The CFA explosive materials by type. and totally Federal Agency is that Federal agency having custody contained quantities of fissionable. Station to eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) contamination adhering to personnel in the contami- c. and the inner boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line. Congress. destroying. or replace. areas. Contamination Reduction Area (CRA). An area (tent Department of Defense Executive Agent. Present recommendations for off-site protective nated area. JIC and is available to assist the local community. or area safe by absorbing. and action measures. and by. biological. A control line object. biological. remove. An illustration of the Contamination Department of Energy Team Leader. of all Department of Energy matters.

Dosimetry. Measures taken before. and/ or disposal of explosive ordnance which has become Disaster Control Officer (DCO). torpedoes. Those actions to locate exactly nuclear. This ordnance includes bombs and Directorate of Military Support (DOMS). rendering-safe. Those actions to recover organization which responds to disasters/accidents for unexploded ordnance.on-site. disposition of a. to operations. organized joint staff formed to support the planning. The final disposal of techniques. diagram. A line on a map. technical service assembly them to a practicable conclusion within the established operations. pyrotechnics. methods. identification. which constitutes a hazard unauthorized entry. or material. after hostile action. Disaster Response Force (DRF). or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. and execution of military support to propellant actuated devices. clusters and dispensers. or other appropriate or more nuclear weapons or components. personnel. area to establish isodose lines and all types of monitoring. These charges. to reduce the probability of damage. establishing command and control. actions include initial and subsequent reporting response. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). including Department of Energy Accident Explosive Ordnance. electro-explosive devices. The USAF base level b. The detection. and depth charges. and tools to provide the interruption of or overlay joining all points at which the radiation dose functions or separation of essential components of rate at a given time is the same. of personnel assigned to routine disposal. Any designated area containing one place. c. and contaminated items. unexploded ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. Also. public information. rendering-safe. natural or man-made disasters. The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal Dose Rate Contour Line. which may include demolition or burning in Exclusion Area. Those action on the weapon(s). sives. Explosive Ordnance Disposal procedural Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. A physical barrier surrounding the or detected presence of unexploded ordnance. and final disposaI of explosive hazards caused by the accident. includes all mines. clandestine and improvised explosive devices. explosive ordnance by explosive ordnance disposal p$rsonnel. installation. Action warheads. removal to a disposal area. Final Disposal Procedures. and to gain access to unexploded ordnance. agency for the Secretary of the Army when acting in rocket. personnel and area decontamination. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident. cartridges and coordination. field evaluation. The DCO is the DoD hazardous by damage or deterioration when the disposal point of contact with FEMA at the disaster scene for of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities providing DoD support to disaster recovery operations. Control of the accident ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an caused hazards include: survey of the incident/accident explosive ordnance disposal incident. and control of recovery. and initiate recovery. Recovery Procedures. medical aspects. means. or the laying of mines and demolition security. All munitions containing explo- Response Group operations. ordnance the capacity of DoD Executive Agent. domestic disaster relief operations. artillery. and to support disaster operations. legal and particular courses or modes of action for access to. or nature. nuclear fission. minimize its effects. xvii . The measurement of radiation doses as it applies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and to the d. Directs a task. during. That series of actions to control other conditions that develop during the manufacture and manage nuclear incidents or accidents and bring of high explosive material. or accident scene where control is established to preclude damaged explosive ordnance. The suspected Disaster Cordon. and all similar or related items or components explosive in Disaster Control. appropriate security. high explosive. Render Safe Procedures. Not included in this definition are the accidental arming or Disaster Preparedness. mortar. guided and ballistic missiles. response and recovery framework. Access Procedures. and small arms ammunition.

Exposure. radioactive. The exposure at a given point is a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan measurement of radiation in relation to its ability to (FRMAP). centers as long as its operations can be coordinated with sance agents.The FEMA the military utilization of atomic weapons and that such headquarters team that carries out notification activation information can be safeguarded adequately as national and coordination procedures from the FEMA EICC. 288 to coordinate the overall Federal response. conducts the FRMAP response..Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. corrosive. marking. This center need not initial identification. unduly magnetic. biological research material. local. for coordinating the Federal response to and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident. Any material that is flammable. Staffed by DoE NV. A photographic film packet or badge control and coordination of Federal and state emergency carried by personnel. detection. local. A center established near the scene of a radiological emergency responsible for off-site Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. planning. and support of the SFO. Center (FRMAC). and reporting of suspected be located near the on-site or Federal-State operations unexploded ordnance. as amended). to determine further action. nuclear. and assistance Representatives of other Federal. The on-site focal Federal Emergency Management Agency point established by the Senior FEMA Official (SFO). staff support of the FEMA Director. ordnance (such as bombs. Its primary role in a nuclear weapon accident is one of coordinating FIDLER (Field Instrument for the Detection of Low Federal. and functions of executive agencies. security information (Section 142d. $tiological. Information removed situation and then provide FEMA’s primary response from the Restricted Data category upon determination capability. Personnel with response to a radiological emergency in the U. (FRERP). Emergency Information and Coordination Center detecting low energy gamma and X-rays. or any other material that. A plan to provide coordinated radiological produce ionization. monitoring and assessment assistance to the State and local governments in response to radiolo~cal emergen- Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). location. S. (EICC) . for measuring and recording services response/ recovery to a radiological accident or gamma ray dosage permanently. jointly by the Department of Energy and Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to c. and booby traps) safe. The Federal plan to assist State and local “ a chemical agent. state agencies in their emergency planning. capable of a. authorized by 44 CFR Part 351. mitigation. See Explosive Ordnance b. Film Badge. mines. Plan. coordination. state. This agency establishes Federal policies for as required. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment and supervise the safe removal thereof. official appointed by the President upon declaration of supersedes the Interagency Radiological Assistance a major disaster or emergency under Public Law 93. management.The FEMA Disposal Procedures. used with the PRM-5 and other supporting instrument packages. team deployed to a radiological emergency scene by the FEMA Director to make an initial assessment of the Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). make intelligence reports on such ordnance. Emergency Response Team (ERT) . Emergency Support Team (EST) . The Federal cies. projectiles. them. because of XVill . an oxidizing agent. and volunteer response actions. explosive. com- government officials or other Federal agencies in the pressed gases. poison- Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan ous. state. FEMA assists local and volunteer agencies will be located in the center. This plan. Hazardous Materials. A probe. (FEMA). Federal Response Center (FRC). Final Disposal Procedures. toxic. DC and piovides overall direction. emergency. Atomic Energy Act The EST is responsible for Federal agency headquarters of 1954. by explosive ordnance reconnais.The EICC is located in FEMA Headquarters in Washington. Reconnaissance radiological response from which the FRMAC Director involving the investigation. Energy Radiation). its special training and equipment who render explosive possessions and territories.

which would frequency radio. Is an event radiological safety/health physics matters on-site. The DoD and DoE operate coordinating d. Functions which the initial response force is tasked to perform (within its Joint Information Center (JIC). Licensed Material. nuclear weapon component or the fabrication and used. A facility. facilities. properties. DoS. and/or foreign b. are: of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident to coordinate all public affairs. or activities. manual secure voice command and control on-site pending arrival of the and other equipment. resulting from a deliberate act. or packaging. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). and other Federal agencies. as well as state. The means by which a person at radiation dose to be received over a spec~lc period of the accident area or downwind is subjected to respiratory time by members of the command. issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a state. Service or agency response force. c. These centers are separated geographically. local. The means by which a person is Maximum Permissible Dose. or loss of a nuclear weapon or radiological material. Firefighting. Rescue operations. consistent with radiation exposure. Source material. may endanger contaminated and the side away from the accident as human life or property. DoD. an area of reduced contamination. Hot Line. and communications. governments. Monitoring. given isotope in the body is the time in which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). . staffed by representatives from each of the agencies g. centers for exchanging and maintaining information about radiological assistance capabilities and activities. secure and super high frequency Initial Response Force (IRF). take emergency response actions necessary to maintain automatic digital network terminals. The time required for the activity of a given Hot Spot. “HOT property of each radioactive species and is independent SPOT” also refers to the DoE Accident Mobile Counting of its amount or condition. special nuclear seizure. tropospheric scatter terminals. Radiation monitoring. Public “affairs activities. Accident site security. radiation and the measurement thereof with radiation The station personnel use the line as the inner side being measuring instruments. conducting hazard survey and radiological operations. The half-life is a characteristic greater than in neighboring regions in the area. e. which a military commander or other appropriate authority may prescribe as the limiting cumulative Inhalation Pathway. The region in a contaminated area in which radioactive species to decrease to half of its initial value the level of radioactive contamination is considerably due to radioactive decay. That radiation dose exposed to radiation through the food chain. or by product material received. The Hot Line is the inner boundary of the . theft. entation from DoE. very high frequency. communications element that provides high frequency. operational military considerations. (NARCL). belonging to DoD or Assets. The communications station provides high DoE installations. control. Establishment of. command. The effective half-life of a Laboratory and Mobile Support Equipment. for the coordination of hazard survey data and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. involving nuclear weapons or nuclear materials which include the sabotage. Ingestion Pathway.its quantity. possessed. Half-Life. or transferred under a general or specific license employment of an IND or a credible threat of either. Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). A radioactive decay and biological elimination. but linked by direct communications networks. An element. The JIC includes repres- a. The act of detecting the presence of contamination control station. marked with tape or line. capabilities are listed in the Nuclear Accident Response Joint Communications Contingency Station Capabilities Listing. Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures. f. whose satellite terminals and other equipment. FEMA. A facility at the scene capabilities).

or both. its possessions or territories. field communications. All nuclear radiations are ionizing mark it with a physical barrier. or protect- ing DoD equipment and /or material. weapon accident site. atomic nuclei. The landowner’s consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible. for safeguarding classified Nuclear Safing. that the intended a nuclear capable weapons system. recipient must have access to the information to perform his official duties. hazardous effects. control of the DoE and results only from an emergency event. rays. non-Federal lands located within the United States. An area established on prediction. are alpha and beta particles. shape. d. The important nuclear radiations. An area established Nuclear Detonation. and size. The senior weapons standpoint. The prevention of a nuclear yield in and /or restricted data information. Nuclear Accident and Incident Control Team (NAIC). as part of the total energy released by the accidental explosion of a nuclear Nticjear Weapon Incident. Radioactive contamination. or unexplained nuclear detonation. The landowner’s consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible. supported allied forces of to establish. for the purpose of such as from a nuclear weapon. radiations. or territories. however. and post warning signs. is a DoE asset with specialized equipment for conducting and size of the NDA. EOD support. results in any of the following: . The NEST will dictate the final decision regarding location. its possessions. Particulate and electromagnetic a National Defense Area temporarily places such non.S. An unexpected event weapon. either f~sion or fusion. shape. Need-to-Know. gamma DoD representative at the scene will define the boundary. A device in which the explosion of the material at the scene will define the boundary. nuclear fission or fusion reactions. bomb/weapon diagnostics. results from the energy released by reaction involving mark it with a physical barrier. however. An unexpected event necessity will dictate the final decision regarding involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that location. or component xx . An Army team organized to minimize and c. forces or U. to secure classitled material. Explosive energy released by f. radiation survey and detection. b. component. and destruction of property. Establishment of an NSA explosive assembly weapon or ignition of the propellant temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the of a gun assembly weapon. Establishment of Nuclear Radiation. and neutrons. hazard National Security Area (NSA). unauthorized. actual or perceived. The senior DoE representative having custody Nuclear Weapon. National Defense Area (NDA). A nuclear explosion resulting on non-Federal lands located within the United States. and (NARCL). or protecting DoE the event of accidental detonation of the HE of a high equipment and/ or material.. and post warning signs. Accidental or unauthorized launching. military necessity Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). Public hazard. or which requires the custodians of classified information use by U.Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing or more pounds of TNT is considered significant. An accidental. or activities with nuclear accident/incident radiological and toxic hazards present at a nuclear response and radiation detection capabilities. firing. but the converse is not true. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear prevent the loss of life. radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear Federal lands under the effective control of the DoD processes.S. damage mitigation. from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials. personal injury. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to four involving a nuclear weapon. would add beta and gamma radiation hazards to other facilities. and decontamination. and to enhance and maintain the public’s confidence in the Army’s ability to respond effectively to a nuclear e. A listing of DoD and DoE installations. from the and results only from an emergency event. weapon or nuclear component. safeguarding classified defense information. Nuclear Contribution. operational Nuclear Weapon Accident. facility. A criterion in security procedures a. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon “or nuclear accident or incident. prior to disclosure.

and to safeguard them against OEHL is called the AFRAT. but not constituting Off-Site. The energy released in the detonation have access to. headquarters that coordinates the initial FRMAP response to radiological emergencies. A DoD pro- gram implemented for all personnel who control. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. The program covers selection. or On-Scene Commander (OSC). including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA. The program seeks to ensure that personnel coming under its purview are mentally and Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory emotionally stable and. damage. that has been. That area beyond the boundaries of a DoD a nuclear weapon(s) accident: installation or DoE facility. That part of security concerned with occupational. That area around the scene of a nuclear components or a nuclear weapon transport or launch weapon accident or significant incident under the vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated. various nuclear duties. DoD OSC. A detonation of HE (High or transportation of equipment. and documents. testing. (OEMT). c. (OEHL). and theft. handle. c. The category but: on-site area includes any area which has been established as a NDA or NSA. Any act of God. Officer designated to command the DoD response efforts at the accident site. or a. xxi . and/or the malfunc. or examina. The physical measures designed to safeguard personnel. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon On-Site. or condition resulting in damage to a weapon. board that does not fall in the nuclear weapon accident facility manager. and analytical support in radiological. The radiological field unit of the material. May result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or inadvertent release of classified information. or control access to nuclear weapon of a nuclear weapon. loading. Oralloy. Radiation in the form of particles (for example. An increase in the possibility of explosion or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or radioactive contamination.reliable. or DoE team leader. b. or on operational control of the installation commander. espionage. facility. screening. A USAF unit that provides consultant. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component to the extent Operational E m e r g e n c y M a n a g e m e n t T e a m that major rework. loaded. or increased dud of producing a nuclear yield of more than four pounds probability. “ Particulate Radiation. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). sabotage. and environmental health programs. One-Point Detonation. warrants that senior national officials or agencies be informed or take action. unfavorable environment. electrons. significant incident. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and beta particles) as opposed to electromagnetic radiation. radiological problems. of TNT (equivalent energy release) when the high explosive is initiated and detonated at any single point. facilities. Explosives) initiated at a single point. The criterion for design safety that arming and /or firing sequence. One of the primary fissionable materials in nuclear weapons. tioning of equipment and material which could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon One-Point Safe.resulting in any of the following. alpha and d. The DoE senior management team at tion or recertification by the DoE is required. engineering. to USAF unit offers a multitude of technical services on prevent unauthorized access to equipment. Nuclear Yield. Physical Security. measured in terms of the kilotons systems. a. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security. The Flag or General component. complete replacement. and or megatons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required to continuous evaluation of the personnel assigned to produce an equivalent energy release. Errors committed in the assembly. neutrons. or which could lead to a weapon must have less than one chance in a million a substantial change in yield. b. Enriched uranium.

The control area encompassing all known. The spontaneous emission of radiation. represents the absorption of 0. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination. All data (information) Radiological “Assistance. Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). . Nuclear remains after steps have been taken to remove it. which provides training courses. A radiation exposure d. Team personnel will advise on contamination to decay naturally. Navy organized to provide technical assistance and advice in RADIAC. Tennessee. advice to appropriate authorities. The directed effort to determine indication and computation. manufacture. material. Minimize damaging effects on property. Minimize safety hazards to the public.Plutonium (Pu). Advice provided Radioactivity. avoid. sal Procedures. Disseminate technical information and medical reduce exposure to radiation. radiological teams of the U. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS). railways. radiological health hazards and exposure level criteria. These Accident and Incident Control Officer. Protective Action Guide (PAG). Special material or tissue. after an accident involving radioactive materials to: a. Radiological Control Area (RCA). and other installations. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation or level or range established by appropriate Federal or State radioactive material. or utilization of nuclear a. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid. c. at Oak Ridge. See Explosive Ordnance Dispo- radiation emergencies. Army and U. DoE teams available through DoE regional can be stored and the proximity of such storage to offices to assist in radiological emergencies. highways. Re-entry Recommendations (RERs). Radiological Survey.” and is normally an the distribution of radiological material and dose rates adjective. e.S. xxii . Evaluate the radiological hazard. One rad contamination at a nuclear weapon accident. A term designating various types of radiological emergencies. either permanently or for short-term emergency actions. A treatment and consultative team for Recovery Procedures. U. Render Safe Procedures.S. the State” on emergency measures it should consider in determining action for the public to take. buildings. magazines. to the State concerning guidance that may be issued generally alpha or beta particles. An artificially produced fissile b. weapons. Contamination which Services Command. (This term is derived from the words “radioactivity detection. in an area. often accompanied by to members of the public on returning to an area affected gamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope. by a radiological emergency. Quantity/Distance (QD) Safety Standards. Old unit of absorbed dose radiation. or g. radiological measuring instruments or equipment. or Commander steps may consist of nothing more than allowing the of a military hospital. Advice to f. See Explosive Ordnance Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Restricted Data (RD). special team established at Walter Reed Army Medical Center under the Commander. The Pu-239 isotope is primarily used in nuclear weapons. radiological RAD. agencies beyond which protective action should be considered. available to the OSC. Directives Radiological Assistance Program Team (RAP pertaining to the amounts and kinds of explosives that Team).” Design.01 joule of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation energy per kilogram of the absorbing Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. A Disposal Procedures. That assistance provided concerning. or suspected.S. Army Health Residual Contamination.

the metal becomes coated with a layer Security Area. Xxlll . the and coordinate all actions necessary to control and materials used for the casing. as amended). A obsolete unit of exposure of gamma (or Tuballoy (TU). Special nuclear material in the production of energy actinide series). custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear and removing. One roentgen is metal containing U-238 and U-235 in natural propor- essentially equal to one rad. agreements. and able to perform weapon after it has exploded or burned. Act of 1954. therefore. detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to “the task to be performed. tions. In air. and other components recover from an accident or significant incident. This term is sometimes applied to depleted uranium. The area surrounding the accident site of oxide that will make it appear from a golden-yellow in an overseas country where a two-person security policy color to almost black. projectile. of British origin. produces access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain a physiological effect equivalent to that produced by designated components by requiring the presence at all the absorption of one (1) roentgen of X-ray or gamma times of at least two authorized persons capable o f radiation. A completely assembled . Having an atomic number greater than that of uranium (The known elements belonging to the c. high explosive system. radioac- tive metal. The Warhead. Uranium is an alpha emitter. One rem is the quantity of ionizing radiation of any type which. but shall not include data declassified or removed from the restricted data category pursuant to Section 142 of Tritium. The of the weapon. packaging. changing from a state of readiness for initiation to a safe condition. equipment or material. specific purpose of a Service/agency response force is together with fission products. A term. b. or inert materials intended to inflict damage. . A DoD response force Weapon Debris (nuclear). the term is considered ambiguous and its use is discouraged. As applied to weapons and ammunition. The residue of a nuclear appropriately manned. Service Response Force (SRF). Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen the Atomic Energy Act (Section 11 W. Includes a comprehensive assess- and maintained by those Services or agencies which have ment of the accident. Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (rem). Roentgen. torpedo. for uranium X-ray) radiation in field dosimetry. The S1 unit replaced the rem. Uranium is a heavy. Tritium is a beta emitter. chemical or biological agents. plus unexpended plutonium or uranium. that is. See uranium. A person appointed by Warhead Section (WHS). Transuranic. or other munition which contains either the consent should be obtained prior through host nation nuclear or thermonuclear system. Senior FEMA Official (SFO). Atomic Energy having one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. Service/ agency response forces are organized Weapons Recovery. to provide nuclear weapon accident/significant incident assistance. the Director of FEMA to coordinate the Federal warhead including appropriate skin sections and related response to a civil emergency. is established to prevent unauthorized access to classified defense information. . A system designed to prohibit when absorbed by man or other mammals. if any. cooperation by local authorities and host countries rocket. silvery white. equipped. Uranium. Also referred to Safing.. the as the two-man concept or policy. Two-Person Policy.. That part of a missile. “ hazards. and shipping of the weapon “weapon components. Production of special nuclear material. components. neutralizing the weapon hazards.

capabilities in nuclear weapon accident response/ (DNA) to develop a technical document for nuclear recovery. or use of mated. international/ bilateral agreements tion or recertijlcation by the DoE is required. The document is (3) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear designed to standardize where appropriate and integrate weapon or nuclear component. that major rework. General guidance “An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons for overseas areas is included. supported allied forces This manual consolidates procedural guidance and of a nuclear capable weapons system. This manual DoD Directive 5100.S. Group (ARG) responsibilities/ procedures. A Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident is: current interagency support agreements. DoD methods with Department of State (DoS) (4) Radioactive contamination. forces or U. This chapter introduces the NARP and provides (4) Could. jiring. Federal instructions. lead to a nuclear weapon accident and checklists for On-Scene Commanders (OSCS) and their warrants that senior national officials or agencies be staffs.S. or loaded on board that does not fall in the a nuclear capable weapon system. This manual is designed to furnish a general approach to nuclear (1) Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon weapon accident response. procedures.52. or examina. The Nuclear Weapon for response and recovery procedures. and DoE Accident Response component. Chapters 2 and 3 describe responsibilities” of the informed or take action. while Chapters 1-1 . or nuclear components that results in any of the following: 1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE NARP (I) Accidental or unauthorized launching. or a nuclear weapon Procedures will not be addressed for response to transport or launch vehicle when a nuckar weapon is accidental or unauthorized launching. the Federal Radiological Emergency (5) Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear Response Plan (FRERP). or for response and nuclear weapon accident category but: recovery of seized or stolen weapons. A Nuclear Weapon Accident is: States and its territories or possessions. DoD 51 OO. unauthorized. actual or perceived. or use by U. Portions of (6) Public hazard. ” DoD and other Federal agencies and provide general information on foreign governments’ responsibilities/ This directive also directs the Defense Nuclear Agency . or unexplained for nuclear weapon accident response and in responding nuclear detonation. provides response summarizes DoD responsibilities and provides procedu- guidance and the following definitions: ral guidance for a joint response to accidents involving nuclear weapons or components thereof in the United a. nuclear weapon components. the document may be useful to DoD elements responding to non-DoD radiological accidents or incidents under b. to a DoD nuclear weapon accident. firing. State/ local plans. (2) Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security. and theater policy to be effective. The procedures must be used or radiological nuclear weapon component to the extent in conjunction with DoD directives. ” technical information to assist DoD forces in preparing (2) An accidental. “An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons. (3) May result in adverse public reaction (national 1-3 ORGANIZATION AND USE OF THE NARP or internationa~ or inadvertent release of classljled information.52-M CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 GENERAL Accident Response Procedures (NARP) manual has been developed for this requirement. complete replacement. reference (a). Chapter 4 discusses the concept of operations weapon accident response.

security. Response teams will be required to define extent of contamination. The procedures/ plans will affairs. heavy . Other aspects. and characterize the site contamination. If support. oxidizers. and local radiological response metals. contamination may sures to be taken by residents in potentially contaminated be released that could create long term public health areas.5 through 14 address radiological/hazardous material implemented to prevent alpha radiation from entering safety aspects._ fuel fire /explosion) there may be limit radiation exposures to personnel. legal implications. but temporary. weapons involved in the accident are the highest priority (c) Identify. to respond to a nuclear weapon accident by gaining Action to accomplish these tasks should be included familiarity with this manual. in response force accident procedures/plans. scene. additional resources will be employed. radiological contamination. Chapter radioactive contamination occurs as a result of the 20 lists specialized units and organizations discussed accident. and site restoration. or is caused during weapon recovery operations. procedures must include evacuation or sheltering protect the public. the first radiological response should be to throughout the document. The primary hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. The response force must obtain factual information to define the actual details of the In a nuclear weapon accident. public affairs. state. A nuclear weapon accident can contamination using the Atmospheric Release Advisory result in an immediate. and weapons identify limitations on the response organization’s recovery are the critical concerns facing the response capability to perform such actions and will state addi- force. Therefore. or concerns. (g) Fix highly contaminated areas as appropriate the resultant contamination may settle or disperse in to minimize resuspension. minimize any continuing radiological hazard to Potential OSCS and their staffs will enhance their ability residents. legal implications. hazardous materials. weapons recovery. ”radiological contamination may exist. If the weapon is breached by external forces (for (d) Establish” a radiological controls program to example. identify the initially affected area and personnel. high explosives. Air sampling (f) Establish a bioassay program to quantify for radiation downwind of the accident may not be radiation doses. and return the area to normal use. if required. Rapid determination of the (e) Determine the various levels of contamination presence or absence of radiological contamination is a present within the contaminated area. Specitlc actions ications and response force integration are areas that to resolve the radiological problem include must also be addressed. communications. health and safety. tional resource requirements. Restoring a accident involves a nuclear yield. monitor. diluting. or emit alpha radiation. threat to public safety from toxic or explosive hazards (b) Disseminate precautionary/ protective mea- associated with the accident. measures should be fixing contamination at levels which are not detrimental 1-2 . Chapter 21 addresses training. personnel at the accident scene and first will not occur. critical element of initial accident response. classified information security. Initial ground radiation surveys will probably be the means of determining the presence/ (2) Hazardous Materials Response. and plastics. commun. Rapid initial safing actions on the nuclear evacuation. specialized Federal. unless the [3) Site Decontamination/ Restoration. (1) Radiological Safety. propellants. if available. security. logistics protection principles are described in Appendix l-F. In general. site restoration. are materials which contaminated area may include removing. feasible because once the explosion and/ or fire is over. for example. Should conventional explosives in the responders who may have already departed the accident weapon detonate. the extent of contamination is over-estimated initially to provide the greatest margin of safety for the public 1-4 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE and then refined as actual measurement of contam- OVERVIEW ination is obtained. if so that subsequent detonations and site contamination necessary. An accident absence of contamination. public contamination problem. nonradiological Capability (ARAC). notification. a few hours. (a) Estimate the boundaries of radiological a. such as medical assistance. medical the body. impact. If a radiological problem involving a weapon system can release non-nuclear exists. recommendations to local officials and identifying. Radiation hazards and basic radiation assistance. Health and Safety. and how logistics. and decontaminate. for example. sheltering. Also. marking and containing of hazardous/toxic materials. their availability.

consequently. as much contamination. involvement and degree of responsibility are situation . Safety and security procedures for inated areas with regard food.to health over a lifetime of exposure. the weapon recovery effort. reference (b). water. its components.is essential to minimize risk to personnel. and which will (b) Second. Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and the DoE ARG ing the accident and its long term effects. nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at a specific location.16. Public Affairs encompasses much exist. The OSC is authorized to invoke d. in general. nuclear weapon accident response and will be a (c) No other variations from DoD policy are coordinated Federal. and a need for appropriate security for the weapon and (d) Precautions to be taken by those in contam. its territories.S. (1) Public concerns which can be expected follow. operations. program designed to gain public understanding of accident response efforts. actions must be been invoked. This presence of the weapon. c. cotilrmation of the presence of a several organizations. a technical problem to be addressed by Explosive (c) Credibility of information provided concern. livestock safety. water. accurately documented. and possessions. and radiological response that. ARG. the OSC must have the concurrence of the more than the release of information to the public. The extent of endangered. both within and without the DoD. (Through documented evacuated from their homes. packaging. Response Forces Integration and Coordination two exceptions: and Associated Areas of Concern. weapon recovery. or detonate during recovery accident. (a) First. Coordination between (2) DoD Directive 5230. It will involve preparation of the presence of the weapon should be made as soon of protective measures. Security and weapon safety concerns should not preclude ing an accident with a nuclear weapon include: or interfere with the performance of basic medical and humanitarian response to accident victims. the OSC may confirm or deny the be technically achievable and financially acceptable. Weapons involved in an accident may have effects on the health of any persons exposed to been subjected to severe stress. it is DoD policy neither to confirm personnel . Public affairs (a) Danger to those involved in or responding and health issues must be addressed concurrently with to the accident. State. have some form of weapon problem. The weapon presents both (b) Treatment of casualties. nuclear weapons are documented in EOD and security (e) Adequacy of contamination diagnoses and publications. and (g) Safety of U.) If the high explosives detonate (i) Reparations for damages caused by the during the accident. confirmation country government effort. by definition. The Assistant difficult steps will be selection of criteria to determine Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) and when site restoration is complete. prior to exercising the is an important element in a comprehensive public affairs exceptions above. ~ time as necessary should be taken to permit a thorough (f) Availability of shelter. and his public affairs the approval of the host government through the U. shipment of weapon(s) and/or weapon components to (h) Decontamination of contaminated areas. reentry recommendations and as possible to preclude undue public concern and to development of restoration procedures. unless bilateral agreements b. as necessary. nuclear weapon is appropriate when public safety is kill be involved in the response effort. states EOD. food. and assessment of possible damage by qualified EOD and clothing if the accident situation results in people being DoE response personnel. If the exceptions are invoked. nuclear weapons. Many of the legal local government officials should be notified in advance claims against the government will be related to the site or advised as soon as possible that an exception has restoration procesy consequently. their final destination. (d) In locations outside the United States. All nuclear weapon accidents will. his staff. the OSC can ensure safe removal. to allay public process will be the most time consuming portion of alarm. Public Affairs. The appropriate theater Commander-in~Chief (CINC) and relationships of the OSC. searching for classified and hazardous components may be necessary. Weapon(s) Recovery. local and/ or involved authorized. One of the most establish response force credibility.S. From the initial report of the accident until the final actions of site restoration. officials with the news media and the general public Chief of Mission (COM). and security of their planning and close coordination between EOD and DoE possessions.

VA 22310-3398. and assessment of the hazards to public of the current situation. and achievable/ financially acceptable condition using the equipment) needed or provided. The checklists’ installation with only a humanitarian emergency paragraphs are not all inclusive or arranged in priority response capability. or select members centers. The second level is that of the Service order. usefulness. assessment of control. The following concerns and actions must be considered: illustrates the inter-relationship of initial actions. operation centers is shown in Figure 1-1. the appropriate and paragraph of the text. and to health and safety. 6801 Telegraph Road. actions in progress. Figure 1-3 (centerfold). The response effort of these order of response force actions. an exchange and treatment of casualties. . and costs. These actions include fire suppression. classified material. and others assisting in the response. or Service and specialized teams are alerted and provide for evaluation of the recommended change. The first level is document are contained in Chapter 1. The initial phase includes accident and the approximate time of their occurrence. conduct of all operations required to recover the communications. and extensive adminis. depicts the various response actions a. The IRF may be through I-F as a guide for the OSC in monitoring the a small force on-scene if an accident occurs near an progress of an accident response. results automatically from accident notification. Sufficient detail and response forces are identified and tasked by the Unified justification should be provided to ensure understanding Commands. notification and immediate emergency measures taken Figure 1-3 may be of assistance in accident response by the nearest DoD/ DoE installation to provide a planning. accidents must be reported immediately using and comments which may enhance this manual’s the most expeditious means available (secure if possible). legal. Federal presence and’”humanitarian support. forces can be divided into two phases: Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Opera- tions Flow Diagram. decisions. Initiation of nuclear weapon accident response actions by the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Defense the initial accident report to NMCC and/or Service Nuclear Agency. the supporting military installation and command liaison officers may be exchanged. A simplified notification chain resulting from Service channels to Director. Also. Also. Comments should be keyed to a specific page Upon receipt of accident notification. ATTN: NOEA. public affairs. the accident situation will dictate the priority and Response Force (SRF). Initial Phase. Service 1-7 CHANGE PROCEDURES operations centers. the initial Alexandria. of briefings should occur to apprise the arriving team reconnaissance. To ensure a coordinated effort. lodging. 1-6 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE 1-5 THE PHASES OF RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR CHECKLISTS WEAPON ACCIDENT Checklists derived from the primary nuclear weapon The response procedures addressed throughout this accident response requirements identified in this document consider two force levels. site. although not all-inclusive. Follow-on Phase. rescue identification of arriving response teams. and providing security for of one team may be integrated into the lead team’s staff. but all forces must be integrated totally to phase requires defining and stabilizing the situation by ensure effective use of their capabilities. events. Appendices 1-A that of Initial Response Force (IRF). Other actions of immediate concern inform the OSC about the capabilities of the newly include establishing communications with the accident arrived response teams. clothing. Users are encouraged to submit recommended changes Therefore. initial identification and security clearance level of response team members with follow-on actions to ensure b. Figure 1-2. Following initial the IRF. Headquarters. restoration and weapon(s) and restore the environment to a technically logistical support (for example.dependent. 1-4 . The follow-on phase includes the rapid recurring access to the accident site: medical. combined assets of the various agencies and organiza- trative support to ensure complete documentation of tions in the response and recovery. security. and prepared for deployment by the Service operations Comments should be forwarded through command and center.

. .. El Reporting Unit Lowest level of Local Host . .. Figure 1-1.. .> command having Authority / Nation I knowledge of the I event I I I I I I I I I I I : ~ Fl+. . .. -~ FEMA (EICC) t j Deployment of Deployment of Senior FEMA Appropriate Official and DOE Assets Emergency Response Directed Team Directed . . . .. ... .=~l “! I I I I . I ~ ● I---m + Appropriate Service Operations Center(s) Service National Military Direct Deployment of 4-> Operation 4-N Command Center SRF and Specialized Center (NMCC) Other Agencies Teams (IAW DoDD 51 DO. > 4 . 1-5 .. Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow (Simplified).. .52) 1 I 4-> (JNACC) HQ DNA I DOE (EOC) DOS 4 . . ... ..

- I Withdraw all personnel Remove live for possible weapons. Designate SRF. Cl Deploy Reconnaissance Team. 1 I 1 * Figure 1-2. Relationship of Initial Actions During a Nuclear Weapon Accident Response. observing or having Evaluate potential level and extent of contamination. contamination. (ACCii3ENT3 + I I NMCC Notified. Make preliminary situ- ation estimated based on observations and debrief of civil authorities. and of confirmation. I r-l lRF/SRF onsite. casualties. Monitor people Notify Emergency Response Personnel. YES YES Seek ASD(PA) guidance on public affairs policy. P Information Center. Withdraw nonessential personnel to safe distance. Eliminate hazard. P Debrief personnel observing or having access to accident. 1-6 . r Confirm presence Advise ASD(PA) Establish Joint — of nuclear weapons.

% .. LCc..W’.. . ..IA1 (ON CONTROL :OMW)N( CATIONS 2 or.).7.--s..! .../’ ‘_H E“. +48HR OAY 6 +IHR +3HR + 18HR .TWA. . Arf AIRs m* -— —00Mh4UNICATIONS CmRDINJ >~~=~==”’” .. “.....m ..[../ . .:+ r.www cAwr!Es LCc..” ?. M.cs — ACTIVITY FLOW .a.m w (m.s .

Actions required upon arrival on-scene are correct. Reception plans for support teams are adequate. Ready for short notice deployment. 2. Procedures/authority are addressed for public a. e. Proposed response force equipment is appropriate and adequate for the mission. Verify readiness through periodic response force f. 4. cials/ authorities. authorities and other federal agencies. DoD 51 OO. identified. Recommended guidance for involving civil offi. Procedures exist for establishing communications from on-base: off-base. Notification procedures and telephone numbers are b. i. Potential assistance is identified from civil officials/ field and command post exercises. Inspect response force equipment to ensure it is: d. g. 3. 1 -A-1 . Review accident response plans to ensure: h. Fully serviceable/operable. Response force personnel roster is current. .52-M APPENDIX 1-A RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST 1. departure of incumbent. Personnel/equipment deployment plans are current Replacements are appointed and trained promptly upon and functional. release of information. a. j. b. or remote sites. Trained personnel are assigned to key positions. c.

Coordinate communications procedures with home equipment. if necessary. Review accident notification message (OPREP-3). Augment response force. Assess situation. Dispatch advance party. Ensure other agencies are aware of response force forecast for accident site. 6. Ensure arrangements are being made for required as appropriate. 4. Contact authorities on-scene. 5. if available for the accident. 12. additional information. and OSC’S status. Request ARAC plot.52-M APPENDIX 1-B INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST 1. 3. 11. 10. I-B. logistics support. Obtain weather data at time of accident and weather 13. Recall response force personnel and assemble 8. DoD 51 OO. Provide advice on possible hazards to on-scene officials.I . if possible. if appropriate. 7. 2. for 9. base/station. Ensure proper travel route is established and obtain security escort.

Determine the status and location of all weapons. Prepare appropriate press releases with Service and Station Assets or other appropriate communication DoD Directives.rnent. Seek the assistance of civilian authorities/officials 2. 13. Identify and record names. radiological. Establish control of the accident site to: and advise them of any possible hazards and precautions. site. I%form emergency render safe procedures on (2) Navy Radiological Control Team weapons if necessary. Package (6) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team b. Request HAMMER ACE.52-M APPENDIX 1-C RESPONSE FORCE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS CHECKLIST 1. if necessary. and evacuate (7) Department of Energy Accident Response casualties. accident site) with assistance of the Federal Aviation Authority or host country. Safeguard classified material. using secure means when possible. identify. of Mission. DoD 51OO. Identify a forward operating or staging base and 5. 4. Establish a continuous and secure communications c. Reduce any immediate hazards (such as fires). 9. or other hazards. of persons possibly contaminated. 10. with DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center or NMCC in 11. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). addresses. dent. Keep the Service operations centers and/or National toxic. f. Establish liaison with Host Nation through Chief Service operations center. Identify civil and military forces present and their (5) Air Force Air Transportable Radiac Assistance capabilities. and locations e. if toll free number for information request. Joint Communications addition to the Service operation center. Advise the NMCC of the TELEFAX phone number d. 8. Support Ele. c. (Notify NMCC immediately). Protect personnel from explosive. Determine actions to treat. Place air samplers up and downwind of the acci. d. 1 -c-1 . Joint Communications Contingency 3. a. b. b. Group c. Secure airspace (that is. (1) Army Radiological Control Team ~6. Military Command Center informed of conditions at the accident scene. 7. Through NMCC recommend deployment to the scene of the specialized teams from the appropriate 15. a. Determine if contamination has been released. Establish a command post: (3) Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (4) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team a. possible. prohibited area over casualties the type of actual or possible contamination. systems. for ARAC plot delivery. Determine actual weather conditions at the accident if possible. If contamination is present: reception center for follow-on forces. Establish internal and external communications. link with the military communications system. Advise medical treatment facilities receiving 14. Establish direct communications with the Office of 12.

. For overseas authorities/ officials. l-D-l . Initiate actions to use supporting response force requirements. Transport/ship weapon(s) and components to 4. Coordinate actions with local/host 18. (CEAT). by establishing a 20. 12. Initiate systematic search to re-establish accounta- Federal. Provide advice to civil authorities or affected country is retained for an accident investigation board. 11. Establish a Joint Hazard Evaluation Center to appropriate disposal areas. of all on-site activities which could impact off-site and establish continuing 8. Establish a standardized access control system. and civil 16. toxic. Document actions taken and ensure that evidence 9. Direct activities of a JIC to interfam with DoS. at the accident site. 5. prevention program. . 6. this facility will be in coordination with the agencies. upon arrival. 3. as ination. government specialists. radiological h. include the appropriate packaging requirements if required. Establish the approximate perimeter of the contam. if requested. Inform the Senior FEMA official or foreign nation police and public health officials. 17. 14. to Area” in coordination with affected country officials. Establish the Community Emergency Action Team 10. near the scene of the accident. FRMAC. Initiate surveys and determine extent of contam. Establish an environmental exposure injury matters in supporting on-site operations. bility for all the weapon(s) and weapon(s) components. Establish a claims processing facility. or other hazard safety measures and radiological monitoring and health physics 15. 21. state. 13. DoD 51 OO. Develop and implement a weapons recovery plan. Perform render safe procedures on weapon(s). 19. materials have been removed). Conduct weapon(s) damage assessment. coordinate explosive. ment public affairs. ’22. required. to contamination. or “Security in conjunction and coordination with DoE ARG. 2. 7. government officials. Establish liaison with the FRC.alth program for any civilian personnel who may have internal contamination. Control exposure of public/ response force personnel to contamination.52-M APPENDIX 1-D RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON-SCENE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL PERMIT 1. Establish a National Defense Area. Determine availability of assets and facilities at or ination area. and law enforcement accidents. legal. Consider applying fixatives to highly contaminated lar program for response forces and people stationed areas to reduce resuspension. or local and/or affected country govern. Establish a simi. Identify individuals who may have been exposed liaison. Embassy and involved host government. (Dissolve the designated area and return consistent with final disposition/ disposal requirements control to civil authorities/officials after all classified of the weapon(s).

Establish channels for coordination of technical legal matters with higher headquarters and principal legal advisors of other participating Federal departments and 20. Discuss with the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) the agencies andl or involved country officials. and 21. Publish a Communications-Electronics Operating activities or intelligence collection efforts. Ensure actions are taken to begin preparations of Coordinate with State and local officials through a draft site restoration strategy. Establish coordination with Service and National Transportation Safety Board accident investigation 14. 22. This monitoring will be defined 4. technically achievable and financially acceptable. 10. FEMA.I . Request a Service Project Code for fund cites. restoration radiation monitoring and assessment with site restoration plans. Assess levels of public understanding and identjfy/ 13. Government property. Consider transition of Federal responsibility for the disestablishment of the NDA and site restoration. possible transfer of responsibility for the Joint Information Center to the SFO. 18. who is responsible for coordinating and managing telecommunications 16. Coordinate site restoration planning/action with FRMAC. FEMA. logistic support (including that needed by DoE response organizations). responsible state civil authorities.S. 9. Conduct decontamination operations. 17. and 11. requirements of all response organizations. 1-E. Restore contaminated area to a condition that is respond to concerns about nuclear issues. 2. Be prepared to coordinate such actions with a representative of the 15.52-M APPENDIX 1-E SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION 1. administrative. Obtain ad~itional communications assets. Provide necessary operational security. Establish personnel replacement /rotation program 6. DoD 51 OO. if required. Instruction for use by alI response organizations. to minimize radiation exposure to radiation workers. Debrief personnel with access to classified information. support for Federal agencies during a radiological emergency. Coordinate communications assets and frequency by restoration agreements. Request frequency clearances. Conduct environmental impact assessments. 12. as required. Provide required medical. . Coordinate environment protection plans for post- teams. 8. 7. as appropriate. Ensure protection of U. Counter potential terrorist and/ or radical group 5. military organizations and/ or involved host government officials. 3. to support long term operations and. 19. National Communications System.

contamination may be carried into (Bq/ mj). With no nuclear detonation. and shielding. involved would normally be required for external radiation to in the accident or at the accident site initially. Time. The exposure rate from probability that delayed effects. Field measurements of quantity once the explosion and/ or fire is over and the resulting are normally expressed in instrument-dependent units contamination has settled or dispersed (approximately of counts per minute (CPM) or counts per second (CPS) two/ three hours). beta/ gamma emitters are present. d. exposure to the material for months or years contamination of wounds involves personnel. Ingestion of radioactive fissile material (for example. the explosion can radioactive material is in. per cubic meter @Ci/ mj) or becquerels per cubic meter If a weapon burns. The primary radiation threat in a weapon accident is from greatest hazard from inhalation occurs immediately after inhalation. distance. b. radiation levels will concentration and isotope. Quantity of radioactive material will be an accident when contamination is released. or if respiratory plutonium or uranium) is a minimal problem. Exposure time to the radioactive materials EOD personnel and associated workers may suffer present at a nuclear weapon accident is related to a health injuries within the contaminated area. for the measure create a cloud of contamination which gradually of radioactive material in air. exposure time is not a critical materials are not absorbed appreciably across the lining factor in nuclear weapon accident response when no of the gastrointestinal tract. The primary pathway for introduction of alpha. For the types of radioactive materials present at nuclear weapons accidents. In either case. If a expressed in units depending upon the medium the weapon’s high explosives detonate. the units are the air by the smoke and thermal currents from the microcuries per square meter @Ci/ mz) or becquerels per fire and again be dispersed by the wind. If no airborne contamination exists. since these protection is being worn. The rate at which contamination maybe inhaled serious injuries is of primary importance. the remaining inhalation hazard from and must be converted to definitive units such as resuspension of “radioactive particles is significantly pCi/ mz or Bq/ m2 for meaningful comparison. For the type and c. time. is highest during the initial period following the accident when a substantial quantity of contamination is airborne. These four factors are interrelated. the total quantity present normally does not b. for ground measurement. Any radioactive material will emit a known amount of radiation per unit time. will occur a radioactive material is related directly to the amount “years later. those responding always deposited in the lungs through inhalation over a period should be aware that administration of first aid for of time. present a significant external radiation hazard. The emitting radiological contamination is inhalation. responding be a hazard. or quantity of the material present. such as cancer. DoD 51 OO. Concentration and Isotope. Radioactive contamination can be introduced into quantities of radiation present at a nuclear weapon the body through wounds. the units are microcuries dissipates and settles from the air as it moves downwind. Do not delay or omit life or limb-saving measures because of radiation or contamination to keep low the a.52-M APPENDIX 1-F RADIATION HAZARDS AND BASIC RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES l-F-l RADIATION HAZARDS l-F-2 RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES Four basic radiation protection principles involve a. The greatest potential for accident. square meter (Bq/mZ). l-F-l . be too low to cause immediate (acute) biological effects. for example. reduced. When responding hazard primarily through the amount of material to an accident involving injury.

Assuming there is no nuclear yield. where particles. The protective principle of distance. will travel about two primary type of radiation dispersed fo[lowing a nuclear to three centimeters in air from its source. l-F-2 “ . ination of underlying clothing or the body will provide d. applies primarily to gamma radiation of skin. while gamma emissions may require several problem in a nuclear weapon accident). emissions of primary concern in a nuclear radiation intensity varies inversely with the square of the weapon accident. hence. Alpha particles. c. can be stopped by paper. The alpha radiation. Alpha emitters are the the primary radiological prob~em. or cotton distance (if the distance doubles the intensity is reduced clothing. Shielding. The emissions will not penetrate the outer layer by a factor of four). distance weapon accident. any light clothing or gloves used to prevent contam- Note: The source material could travel long distances. inches of lead to be stopped. Beta emissions can be stopped by a sheet of (not normally a significant part of the radiological aluminum. Shielding results from the ability of a protection automatically from this type of external material to attenuate or stop radiation. will not be a significant radiation protection factor. Distance.

52-M APPENDIX 1-G QUICK REFERENCE EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) National Military Command Center (NMCC) AUTOVON 227-6340 Commercial 703-697-6340 Crisis Coordination Center AUTOVON 364-9320 Commercial 202-769-9320 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVON 221-2102 Center (DoD-JNACC) Commercial 703-325-2102 U. Navy Command Center AUTOVON 225-0231 Commercial 703-695-023 I U. Marine Corps Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7366 Commercial 703-695-7366 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) AUTOVON 227-5131 Commercial 703-697-5131 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) HQ DoE Emergency Operation Center Commercial 202-586-8100 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVON 245-4667 Center (DoE-JNACC) Commercial 505-845-4667 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Commercial 703-557-2380 Training Site (REAC/TS) FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Emergency Information and Coordination AUTOVON 544-7721 / 7720 Center (EICC) Commercial 202-646-2400 National Emergency Coordinating Center (NECC) AUTOVON 380-6100 Commercial 202-898-6100 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS) .S. Air Force Operations Center (AFOC) AUTOVON 227-6103 Commercial 703-697-6103 U..S. DoD 51 OO.S.I .S. Army Operations Center (AOC) AUTOVON 227-0218 Commercial 703-697-0218 U. Operations Center Commercial 202-647-1512 1-G.

52. every other year. as (CCC). including the management respon. On-Scene Commanders (OSC)S. and technical capabilities of the various Federal DoD response policy recognizes the response roles of response elements. and the responsibilities (b) When the accident occurs beyond the of the Joint J Nticlear Accident Coordinating Center boundaries of DoD installations. interdepartmental responsi- requiring the development of well-trained and equipped bilities and the Federal radiological emergency response . outlines respon- sibilities for on-site command and control at the scene (a) Establish. reference (c).8. available radiological 2-1 . character- ities. responsibility shall rest (JNACC) and interface requirements as stated in the with the Secretary of the Department or Theater Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan Commander in Chief having custody of the radioactive (FRERP). reference (d). assembly. (a) Establish policy and exercise staff and transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear coordination for DoD radiological response and weapon components in DoD custody. including nuclear weapons. [ATSD(AE)) in the acquisition and dissemination of and logistical support (including communications and information about the accident. responsibility shall rest DoD organizations. safe handling. and the sovereignty of foreign Commanders of Unified Commands shall have primary governments concerning accidents on their territory. the command and control responsibilities of Directive 5200. as follows: rank On-Scene Commander and Service Response Force(s) to manage all actions required to recover from (1) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) the effects of a radiological accident. military transportation) and other . reference (e). Inherent in this assistance matters in furtherance of the responsibilities responsibility is the requirement to protect personnel assigned by DoD Directive 5148.accident. nuclear weapon owners or custodians. storage. the DoD has issued policy guidance and plans istics. if required. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (b) Provide available administrative. and provide required support to the a minimum. (4) The Secretary of the Military Department or 2-3 RESPONSIBILITIES Commander of Unified Commands having primary responsibility for DoD response to an accident shall: DoD Directive 5100. Principals regarding weapons composition. as follows: 2-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (a) When the accident occurs on a DoD instal- This chapter describes the responsibilities of various lation. serve as could ensue from an accident or significant incident technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and OSD involving nuclear weapons.52-M CHAPTER 2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2-1 GENERAL (2) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (ASTD(AE)) shall: The Department of Defense (DoD) is charged with the security. medical. the statutory responsibilities of various Federal agencies.2. and exercise a flag of a nuclear accident or significant incident. materials at the time of the occurrence. maintenance. and property from any health or safety hazards which (b) In the event of a nuclear. DoD 51 OO. Service response (USD(P)) shall activate the Crisis Coordination Center forces and On-Scene Commanders will be exercised. and safety features. including ships at sea. with the Secretary of the Department or Theater sibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the military Commander in Chief concerned in accordance with DoD Services. nuclear weapon accident response organizations. reference (a). maintain. of State and (3) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and local governments. The system. To fulfill these responsibil.. fund. responsibility for responding to an accident involving radioactive materiais.

Military Airlift Command (MAC). its territories. property. reference (h). coordination shall be handled in accordance (c) Serve as an advisor to the ATSD(AE) and with DoD Directive 3025. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). If PL 93-288.19.1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on procedures for response to accidents involving nuclear weapons. equipment. (c) Ensure that the JNACC is advised of all (8) The Chairman. (b) Make notification of radiological accidents (d) Provide radiological assistance within exist- and significant incidents as stated in DoD Directive ing capabilities to DoE or FEMA. keep the OSD CCC staff radioactive materials not in DoD custody without informed of the radiological accident response. shall become the DoD Executive Agent for military support to civilian authorities through (10) The Heads of DoD Componentsshall: FEMA in accordance with reference (h). provide the command and control for response to (e) Upon request. accidents involving radioactive materials and requests shall: for radiological assistance. (5) The Secretary of the Army. reactor considerations and develop planning guidance in coordination with the other Military Departments (b) Ensure that all public information concerning for dealing with accidents involving DoD mobile accidents involving radioactive materials and DoD reactors. be responsible for and teams that can be used for response to accidents implementing the DoD response to radiological involving radioactive materials. accidents. reference (g). and the FRERP. shall: response organizations supporting a non-DoD radio- logical accident. response organizations. 2-2 . or Commander in dealing with technical aspects of a nuclear possessions. facilities. through the released in accordance with DoD Directive 5230. and caused listed above. ponents for incurred costs for requested radiological (e) Assemble a Joint Nuclear Accident Response assistance that are not included in their normal operating Team (JNAIRT) as appropriate to accomplish tasks expenses and that are directly chargeable to. reimburse other DoD Com- radiological accidents within the respective theater. reference (l). references (b) and support for deployment of DoD and interdepartmental (c). (c) Coordinate all military support requirements to civilian authorities with FEMA for domestic accidents (b) Develop and maintain a deployable (techni- or through the Department of State for accidents cal) advisory team than can assist the DoD On-Scene occurring outside the United States. requirements. creating additional personnel. as set forth in 5100.16. ing Center (JNACC) in coordination with the DoE. in accordance with enclosure 3 to DoD (a) Operate a Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinat- Directive 4000. is involved. upon Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency under (d) Provide liaison to the JNAIRT and CCC. shall plan for and which authorizes the OSC to confirm the presence of provide Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) nuclear weapons. personnel. Provide the JNACC with information necessary to maintain current records (a) In coordination with the Theater Commands reflecting the location and capability of specialized units and appropriate Defense Agencies. in the event of an accident involving (c) Through the NMCC. by. as amended.response resources to the DoE and other Federal (9) The Director. reference (f). reference (c). Defense Nuclear Agency.52. (6) The Secretary of the Navy shall provide a (a) Ensure that accidents and significant inci- representative to the Federal Radiological Coordinating dents involving radioactive materials are reported in Committees and joint working groups to address naval accordance with reference (i). or other resources is (7) The Secretary of the Air Force. or funding (d) Through the overseas theater commander. accident or incident. the assistance provided. reference (a).

DoD 51 OO. accident response. Albuquerque weapons and radiological health and safety matters. (2) Determining the extent of any on-site hazards. The ARG provides technical advice and assistance ment may be as a direct result of their responsibilities. and mitigating radioactive and Center (JHEC) for the OSC. A of Defense (DoD) have roles in a nuclear weapon definition of on-site is found in the GLOSSARY.52-M CHAPTER 3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES 3-1 GENERAL c. The ARG provides liaison to the Joint Information ready for short notice dispatch to the scene of a nuclear Center (JIC). individual to help manage the Joint Hazard Evaluation collecting. 3-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY e. theater policy. The DoE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) will be a part of the ARG. to the scene of a DoD or DoE nuclear weapon accident or incident. technical specialists. Their involve. Other DoE assets. The (1) Coordinate the activities of all DoE response specific elements%d equipment will be tailored by DoE elements. b. or foreign country have capabilities useful to response organizations. crisis managers. the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). to best meet the accident or incident situation. and will (2) Advise the DoD OSC of DoE response be coordinated with the DoE Joint Nuclear Accident capabilities available at the scene or which may be Coordinating Center (JNACC). The DoE is responsible for dispatching appropriate who will: DoE response elements. (1) Supporting Explosive Ordinance Disposal bilateral agreements. The ARG will be headed by the DoE Team Leader a. on request. design information and other restricted data. The DoE has established an Accident Response f. but do (6) Discussing with State. ing of weapon components. or in response to (EOD) teams in weapon render safe and recovery a request for assistance. the Aerial Measurement System (AMS). reference (c). (7) Explaining public affairs matters. some agencies have no specific response roles. handling. Conversely. d. Each agency ’s/organization’s responsibilities are situation dependent. identifying.. and dispos. when required. weapon debris. Operations Office and is comprised of scientists. Regional Coordinating Offices responding to a nuclear 3-1 . other weapons associated hazards. and equipment g. “ i. for example. government officials matters of special DoE competence. The DoE and FEMA have numerous (5) Identifying and protecting nuclear weapon nuclear weapon accident responsibilities. (3) Minimizing hazards to on-site workers and the 3-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE public. The ARG will advise and assist the DoD On- Scene Commander (OSC) through the DoE Team h. accident. the ARG provides technical support to the DoD and will support all needs Several agencies/ organizations outside the Department and policies of the DoD OSC for on-site activities. local. to the OSC in: interagency agreements. particularly in weapons and radiological hazards. (4) Collecting. The ARG includes a Senior Scientific Advisor who Group (ARG) as its primary accident response element. procedures. will provide technical advice and assistance regarding The ARG is managed by the Manager. The ARG provides one or more experienced “ Leader in weapon recovery operations and in evaluating. capabilities. and the and local government agency responsibilities. packaging. obtained. and resulting radioactive material. While at a DoD accident. This chapter provides an overview of Federal. State.

In fulfilling outside the NDA. NEST assets may be included as a part of the effect into Canada or Mexico. as directed by the Director. The NEST has special equipment for conducting radiation searches and When the F’RERP is implemented.. From the onset of the accident/incident. The NEST is managed by governments during a nuclear weapon accident in the the Manager. the COM States shall: and USCINC will consult regarding military operations in view of their potential impact on U. the ERT consists of a deputy SFO (DSFO). field communications. and/or causing an Nevada. S. (2) Has the overall responsibility for U. at a minimum. Headquarters DoE be relayed immediately to Washington for resolution Operational Emergency Management Team (OEMT). political (1) Support the DoE ARG through the DoE Team interests. The SFO will establish a Federal Response Center ment diplomatic actions responding to a nuclear weapon (FRC) at a location either pre-selected with the State(s) accident / incident and will direct the activities of the U. The COM: outside of DoD or DoE facility boundaries. agencies and assistance requests from State and local tion. and DoD or established at the time of the emergency embassy and its constituent posts. its territories and possessions. response to a nuclear weapon(s) accident outside implemented by a Senior FEMA Official (SFO). if requested. FEMA will dispatch the SFO and an Emergency Chief of Mission (COM) who will be the focal point Response Team (ERT) to the scene of a nuclear weapon for diplomatic and ‘political decisions of the U. Las Vegas. response/recovery the situation. its territories. information copies to other concerned parties.weapon accident or significant incident in the United b. FEMA ensures that off-site actions and response activities of Federal. the are mutually supportive and coordinated with the on- D& exercises diplomatic and political control of the site actions of DoD and DoE. of the accident include coordinating requests from State and local governments for assistance from Federal 3-4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS) agencies. Secretary of State.S.S. bomb/ for coordinating response actions among Federal weapon diagnostics. damage mitiga. and from the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) local authorities. In addition to the SFO. j. and local officials Under the direction of the Secretary of State. to avoid restrictions on access by those responsibilities. a communication with officials of the government involved public information officer. and others as required by with whom he will coordinate U. a communications officer. responsibiIities rest specifically with the U. The DoS activates an accident/incident task force (4) Initiate monitoring off-site as outlined in the in the Operations Center and provides liaison officers FRERP. Also. government official in an administrative officer. c. The Service Response 3-2 . Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).S. to agencies as agreed in existing plans or at the time of the accident. S.S. Each Federal agency at the scene is with augmentation required by the situation. with forces through the DoE Team Leader. EOD support. and technicians trained and organized to provide rapid 3-5 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT technical assistance in locating nuclear weapons or AGENCY (FEMA) special nuclear material. govern. State. if first on the scene. (f) Will be the senior U. Nevada Operations Office. until the DoE Team Leader arrives. The FRC may also have officers from the embassy will be provided to assist the representation from State emergency services organiza- OSC and the MC. Any differences not resolved in theater will Leader. FEMA is responsible detection. the U. a. and Chairman. and decontamination.S. the COM will be assisted by a team representatives from other Federal agencies.S. Secretary of State. local. State. (3) Represent the DoE. Activities at the scene DoE ARG. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the host country. hazard prediction.. and county government emergency response Defense. engineers. (3) Shares with the Unified Commander the The FRC will be located near the accident scene. in joint messages which will include as action addressees (2) Provide technical advice and assistance to the the White House. actions. U.S. or possessions. The NEST is a DoE team of scientists. b. tions and volunteer agencies. Liaison represented in the FRC. accident or incident when the accident has an effect government. at a location identified in conjunction with the State. reference (c). This FEMA role is Us. but responsibility for resolution of the situation.

Provide assistance through regular USDA pro- Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The SFO will supply coordinated information on 1. by radioactive material. local officials regarding protective measures for food and animal feeds. f. in developing and evaluating protective action food processors and distributors to aid in returning to recommendations. d. radiation effects. (5) Assistance. products. The SFO or DSFO will assist the OSC. Ensure the wholesomeness of meat and meat contaminated by. a. Provide emergency food coupon assistance in for evacuees. in coordination with consumption. Assist in coordinating with HHS and EPA. normal after a radiological emergency. in tation of protective measures to minimize exposure by developing technical recommendations for State and contaminated food ingestion. grams if legally adaptable to radiological emergencies. and egg (3) Advice and guidance to State and local officials products identified for interstate commerce. a radiological emergency. minimizing losses to agricultural resources from tative to the OSC. k. o. Assist DoE at the FRMAC in collecting agricul- tural samples within the 50-mile Ingestion Pathway a. storage. HHS and EPA. including dosage. (4) Resources. Assist in providing available temporary housing b. Provide information and assistance to farmers. and other government officials. or e. officially designated disaster areas when a threshold of need is determined by State and Federal officials and 3-7 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN the commercial food system is sufficient to accommodate SERVICES (HHS) food coupons. d. in assessing the consequences of radiological accidents on the health of persons in the affected area. The SFO or DSFO will provide a liaison represen. in coordination with USDA. in conjunction with the USDA.Force (SRF) should assign a liaison officer to the FRC i. Provide listings of locations of alternate sources of livestock feed. and/ or coordinate information exchange. poultry and poultry products. outlets to emergency food centers. j. Provide advise to State and local officials regarding and projected radiation doses which warrant usage of the disposition of livestock and poultry contaminated such drugs. accident include the following areas: n. These are foods donated to various outlets through USDA food programs administered by the Food and Nutrition 3-6 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA) Service. processing. The functions and capabilities of the USDA to provide m. Assess damage to agricultural resources. Provide advice to State and local officials on c. as requested. The HHS can provide: c. Provide a liaison to State agricultural agencies to radiological assistance in the event of a nuclear weapon keep State and local officials informed of Federal efforts. (2) Advice to medical care personnel regarding proper medical treatment of people exposed to. local schools. and b. Provide for the procurement of food. Assist State and local officials. (1) Guidance to State and local governments on the use of radio-protective substances. Assist in reallocation of USDA donated food the Federal response to the State and/or local supplies from warehouses. in the recommendation and implemen. h. in the emergency production. radioactive material. The Center for Devices and Radiological Health distribution of food through the wholesale level during ~CDRH) is responsible for radiological health activities . e. conducted in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 3-3 . ensuring that food and animal feeds are safe for g.

regional and field-level contingency plans. (3) Cooperate with relevant Federal. and local radiological response authorities and coordinate b. The 3-10 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Weather Service (NWS) is the focal point for (DoT) radiological emergency coordination. State. and advise on the actions required for 3-4 . a. The NWS maintains coordination with the National Ocean Service a. (3) Provide a representative to both the on-site and (2) Respond to requests for assistance from the off-site radiological monitoring agencies to coordinate Cognizant Federal Agency. The FDA prescribes contamination levels for canned and/ or packaged foods} a. and State and local meteorological and hydrological information and to officials to the extent its mission and resources allow. In 3-8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DoC) addition. and other meteorological and available consists of monitoring teams to measure hydrological factors affecting the transport or dispersion environmental radiation. DoI coordinates emergency plans for DoI- managed park and recreation areas with State and local a. DoI manages over 500 million acres of Federal materials. It is DoI policy to: layer mixing. upon request.and provides the major source of radiation expertise 3-9 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (DoI) within the Public Health Service. its jurisdiction or resources. State. State. low-level for radiological assistance. the National Marine Fisheries Service consignors and consignees of shipments to or from the (NMFS). these offices take collective action to focus DoC resources and b. The expertise to assist Federal. forecasts in connection with the emergency. (2) Disseminating weather and emergency informa- tion via NOAA Weather Radio. In an actual emergency. boundary request. The Office of Radiation Programs of the EPA has (4) Providing current and forecast meteorological responsibility for coordinating EPA response to requests information about wind speed and direction. precipitation. DoT participation during a nuclear weapon (NOS) and Coastal Zone Management. hydrologic and natural resources. SFO. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. The FAA~s principal nuclear accident function is to direct. State. DoI provides advice and assistance concerning industrial sector. and local organizations. NOAA’s main responsibilities include: functions. lands and thousands of Federal natural resource facilities. and theO@ce of Oceanic and Atmospheric accident. DoC response functions for accidents involving authorities and operates DoI water resource projects to nuclear weapons are: protect municipal and agricultural water supplies in cases of radiological emergencies. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). contamination. including fish and (2) Provide current and forecast meteorological wildlife. and local governments upon information about wind direction and speed. 3-11 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (3) Assisting the FDA in assessing the safety of (EPA) marine fishery products from radiological contam- ination. precipitation. DoI is responsible for these lands and facilities when threatened by a radiological emergency. and any other meteorological and hydrological parameters affecting radiological (1) Respond to incidents that affect or may affect contamination. air traffic in and around the (1) Acquiring weather data and providing weather affected area. (1) Estimate the damage to industrial resources and recommend measures to deal with problems of the b. and local government Associate Administrator for Air Traffic and Airway offices in controlling and resolving a radiological Facilities coordinates all FAA crisis management emergency. The radiological assistance stability. Research (OAR). arrange for supplemental meteorological measurements. istration (NOAA) is the primary agent within DoC responsible for providing radiological emergency assistance to Federal. to Federal. evaluate the extent of the of radiological materials. the National accident will be limited primarily to arranging special Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service transportation activities and assistance in contacting (NESDIS).

Off-site authority and responsibility at a nuclear weapon Specifically. NASA coordinates the response and recovery operations c. will revert to State control upon transportation of people and property. the ICC establishes priorities and expedites accident rests with State and local officials.protection of the public health and safety. The NRC provides this information to the Service directives. materials. environmental contamination and has public informa- tion personnel and technical experts who can be used 3-13 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION to assist in public information efforts. 3-5 . The EPA has the responsibility available resources. the general public and to provide guidance for Federal agencies. The State governor is responsible for the health. EPA has prescribed guidelines for monitoring radioactive contamination of drinking water and 3-16 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE exposures to the general population from nuclear ADMINISTRATION (NASA) activities. It is emergency surface transportation of people and property important to recognize that land placed temporarily to or from areas impacted by the accident. a military accident its potential on and off-site effects on public health and investigation will be conducted in accordance with safety. Also. (ICC) 3-18 STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT/ The ICC assists in arranging for or expediting emergency HOST NATION transportation of people or property moving interstate or of foreign commerce to or from distressed areas. The OSC will DEVELOPMENT (HUD) assist the State in ensuring that the public is protected. Under the under Federal control by the establishment of NDA or coordinating authority of the Secretary of Trans. the NRC assist and support the accident investigation to the has radiological monitoring equipment and mobile maximum extent that public safety and weapon(s) radiological laboratories to assist in the analysis of recovery permits. disestablishment of the NDA or NSA. for coordinating the intermediate and long term radiological monitoring function at a mutually agreed 3-15 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION upon time with DoE. In any case. Government material or classified portation. the ICC establishes the priorities for all surface property and materials. is responsible for establishing radiation levels to protect and equipment within available resources. safety. safety. The Host Nation retains Sovereignty over its soil and HUD provides information on available housing/shelter the responsibility for the health. Nevada. The EPA has radiological assistance teams located for downed NASA spacecraft which may carry nuclear in Montgomery. facilities. Each team planning for and placing homeless victims by providing can collect samples for subsequent processing and emergency housing and technical support staff within analysis at its laboratory.S. 3-12 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 3-17 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BOARD (NTSB) (NRC) The NTSB is responsible for transportation safety and The NRC provides personnel who can quickly assess may conduct or assist in an investigation of the accident the nature and extent of the radiological emergency and and issue a report. Alabama and Las Vegas. administrative supplies. and welfare df individuals within the territorial limits of the State 3-14 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN during periods of emergency or crisis. NSA to protect U. The Director of Criteria and Standards of EPA GSA provides service. The OSC should make provisions to appropriate State and local agencies. (GSA) b. and welfare of for disaster victims or displaced persons and assists in its citizens.

accident /incident involving nuclear weapons results in a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or ~ b. When overseas.. If the accident occurs outside these boundaries. on-site includes any This chapter provides guidance on interagency relation- area established as a National Defense Area (NDA) or ships at the accident site suggested response force National Security Area (NSA). resources. If an accident site. facility manager. resources and coordinating DoD actions with civilian as appropriate.52-M CHAPTER 4 MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENT RESPONSE 4-1 GENERAL (FCO) to coordinate the overall Federal response. installation commander. rests with the host country government. 4. control at. accidents/ incidents in a country outside the If the accident occurs outside the 48 contiguous states. emergency. The discussions in this chapter are applicable agreement and will be referred in this document as a to the IRF and the SRF On-Scene Commanders (OSC) Security Area. although not equivalent to and their staffs. states the President will appoint a Federal Coordinating Office c. uses local authorities to restrict people from the ire-mediate area of the accident for their protection and the safeguarding of weapon systems. Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Army will become the DoD Executive a. affected by a nuclear weapon accident/ IRF and SRF OSC’S though they vary in scope and incident. Public Law 93-288. the Service or agency having custody of the weapon c. capabilities. The responsibility for security and command and at the time of the accident has command and control. “On-site” is that area around a nuclear authorities/ officials providing response to any domestic weapon accident under the operational control of the emergency. This area. its territories or possessions. 4-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS “Off-site” is defined as that area beyond the boundaries of a DoD/ military installation or DoE facility. Civil authorities/officials have primary responsi. On-Scene Commander (OSC). or 4-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE host government official. The Senior FEMA official (SFO) coordinates requests for Federal a. DoD 51 OO. reference (g). As a minimum. If the accident Force (IRF) and Service Response Force (SRF) at a occurs outside the US or its territories. Provide life saving/humanitarian. NSA or a a nuclear weapon accident response are similar for the Security Area. subject to the military of the facility or geographic area where the accident missions and priorities of DoD. manning. S. or Depart- ment of Energy Team Leader (at a DoE accident).assistance at the assistance to ensure that assistance is provided. this on. Specific actions taken by the respective response forces will vary because of differences in b. magnitude.S. the Unified nuclear weapon accident involves directing DoD Commander will coordinate with the State Department. and training between bility for command and control off-site and will request the IRF and SRF. responsibility for directing the US response shall rest with the Unified Commander in Chief in whose area d. Safeguard classified material. Establish command and control. Command and control for the Initial Response of responsibility the accident occurred. occurs. organization and actions required during an accident site secure area should be defined in the host nation response. For accidents/ incidents in the U. the IRF and SRF Federal assistance and assets through the Federal OSC’S are required to: Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Command and control on-site at the scene of a Agent for providing additional military support (off- nuclear weapon accident rests with the agency in charge site) to the FCO as required. including The basic requirements for command and control of the area beyond the boundary of a NDA. U. the NDA or NSA.I .

and (h) Integrating civilian authorities/ officials/ communications. officials/ representatives as required. Protect the public and mitigate public health and Command. and protection of the that special teams arriving at the accident scene are public.S. Establish an operations area. and approving public informa- remain the OSC until relieved by the SRF OSC. Initiate public affairs procedures and establish (a) Safeguarding national security materials and direct communications with the Office of the Assistant information. requesting that local authorities establish a Security Area to provide a disaster cordon and security for classified g. (i) Assessing protective action measures and re- b. representatives into the response force. Overseas. When overseas. 6 and shall manage the information flow between the site. (m) Establishing the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) and initiating an on-site hazard and (1) OSC. determines if hazardous materials and/or radioactive coordination must be completed between civilian contamination are present. 4-4 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS “ (c) Establishing priorities for response/ recovery Military and civilian response organizations which may efforts. Seek the assistance and cooperation of civilian is responsible for all SRF actions at the accident site authorities/ officials and advise them of possible hazards. Embassy to the OSC. accident site security. 2 . and if so. response/ recovery operations. 6. and frequency assignments allocated to all response teams. weapons recovery. including: f. authorities establish a Security Area to provide a cordon (b) Establishing command and control. The IRF initiates EOD procedures. integrated into the response force with a clear chain of command and that their capabilities are known by h. public affairs activities establish command. USCINC as appropriate. He will usually coordinating. safety and envir- officer appointed by the responsible Service/ UnKled onmental monitoring 4 . as established by Service policy. advisors. ships is at Figure 4-2. which will possible hazards. Establishing direct communi- (2) The IRF performs the following functions: cations with the (OASD(PA)) or American Embassy/ rescue operations. Service Response Force (SR~. The SRF consists entry recommendations developed by the State. The OSC e. of a military and DoD civilian staff. Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)). Communications must a contamination control area. A response force civilian authorities/ officials and advising them of the belonging to the nearest DoD activity/unit. A Deputy OSC should be in grade of O- safety hazards. An illustration of (g) Establishing a public affairs program for a typical response force is at Figure 4-1. and DoS. Ensuring for security of classified material. d. news releases. impact off-site. be present at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident (d) Assessing hazards involving public health and are: safety. and establishes procedures to control the by the SFO to the OSC. headquarter’s operation centers. Overseas. minimizes its authorities/ officials. control. As a minimum. Initial Response Force (IRF). fug fighting. Establish a NDA. take emergency response actions to establish command (f) Notifying civilian authorities/officials of the and control on-site pending arrival of the SRF. be provided by the U. tion and. An example of the (1) Obtaining assets required to support SRF functional organization and interagency relation. The response force (j) Coordinating with the SFO and civilian may be augmented by DoE scientific and technical officials to develop a site restoration plan. request that local material. a base camp. and all cleared personnel on the SRF. ~ (e) Seeking the assistance and cooperation of a. precautions and other measures required for the protection of public health and safety and potential (1) The IRF OSC will generally be an O-5 or O. (k) Coordinating with the accident investigation FEMA personnel andl or host country government board or team. be established with the NMCC and other levels of authority. Establishing a NDA or NSA. The SRF OSC will be a flag/general rank radiafion health. A liaison officer will be provided spread. a liaison officer will exposure of personnel to contamination. and by specialized teams from other Services. reviewing.

... . :: ~ I .:... . . ....:.. . .. ..-. ..” .:.. . . .. .. .. . . . . .... . .. ..... Initial Response Force (Example)..: . Control fi~~~....’ . ..-.: j Representatives I1.:. .. ..:’:.... . . . .-.: ~ M-’--....... ....... . .. . ... . .... . . Center Figure 4-1. . .. .... . .... .. ... .. . ... .... ... . . . . ... ... . . \ :.. . ... ..... .... .’.: ... Local Agency :..... ... ... .. .y. ..:.: .x.. . . . ... ...%w. . .. O t h e r Federal ~ ~ State and . .. .!.. . ~g@g”>HEc “.. . . . . ... . ~ .:’. J NYW . .::.. . .. . .: n . Flrefightin9 ..... .. . . .. .. ... . .. ... ... .-... . ----. .FRM4~. .. ....) . ..Coordination W&W%# fi~~:~ Functional :.... .. ON-Scene .y. J... .....’:.... . ... . . ::::. .... .. .:’....::. . . . .+x. . ... -... . .. . . ...:. .... . ... . -.. .. . +.. .-.. .. ... . W:. w..-.. .. .. ..~ . ~. .. . ..... ... I Pubiic Affairs 1 ~d:j[ w 1 ~Z:~s fifi~~JiC .....W. .:.. Commander :....:. . .. . ......-.}: . ..... .. . . . .... .... . .. . — Command and Control ---. . . .:. ...... ..... . .. .. . .. .... . .. ... . ... . .i!ii . . ..~fifi~~ . ...... ---- ..... ..... T \‘ c1. .. _.. .. .. n= 1 I Y 1 Medicai/Casuaity Communications ~. . .. .x”. . .’:..

Coordination . Control :MY::::W: Center Figure 4-2. Service Response Force Functions and Interagency . Chief of Staff I t 1 I 1 J ! L 1 i Messing/Billeting Public Affairs I ]~ JzE!Eia h I H EOD 1 Personnel/ Administration Transportation/POL Heavy Equipment Legal Meteorology DNAAT GC Engineering/Survey - Chaplain Y Medical 4 RAMT I Congressional Liaison — Command --.Support ~j$jfi Functional f~jjjj$.

including specialized equip. Response force officials and the Embassy representative will assist in e. and specialists OSC should support the activities and administration/ to assess the situation and determine what additional documentation requirements of these teams. public upon request and can deploy as soon as transportation affairs. if appropriate. These teams are discussed in DoD OSC. legal to the OSC and include expertise in hazardous materials implications and site restoration. Other Organizations senior civil and military officials. materials and radiological related activities. Representatives from DoE. In an off-installation site activities at a DoD nuclear weapon accident.JNACC) and the the DoE Team Leader. State and local authorities Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan establish control over any portion of the hazardous and (FRERP). (1) Accident Investigation Boards. personnel will be coordinated through the DoD Joint it is responsible to the OSC. authorit-ies. reference (c). Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). S. or through Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will ment. of individuals within the country. (2) The Services and the DoE maintain various teams with specialized training applicable to nuclear (1) Deployment of additional equipment and weapon accident response. The accident investigation board. DoE assets are required. its DoD on-scene command post have similar functions and territories. The FRC and the (4) For accidents/ incidents outside the U. logistics. radiological control area which extends beyond the NDA or NSA. Members are responsible physics. Protocol officers should facilitate visits to the accident scene by f. accident or incident. In accident. military installations). (2) The ARG is responsible to the OSC for on. (o) Providing required medical. will be selected to meet the requirements of the dispatch investigation teams to the accident site. the ERT will include a General Services (n) Assisting the involved country government Administration (GSA) representative to assist the official/ representative in ensuring the health and safety response force in obtaining local services and supplies. and legal areas.. and local authorities will become the controlling FEMA will establish a Federal Response Center (FRC) authority for any portion of the accident site not under at a location selected in cooperation with State and local Federal control (e. as support to the state and local agencies. The response organizations. Team (ERT) deployed by FEMA. DoE Accident Response Group (ARG). State and local police.. public affairs. Senior Scientific Advisor. Defense Nuclear Agency Accident Advisory Team implementing measures that satisfy host government (DNAAT). The FRC will be Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center concerned primarily with nonradiological off-site (FRMAC) and civilian authority response elements. The SRF authorities. The FRC located near the accident scene OSC should provide essential information to state and will initially be manned by an Emergency Response local . requirements. either directly. and (1) The DNAAT assists an OSC and his or her staff administrative support. advisory team is composed of personnel knowledgeable in nuclear accident response requirements. (3) State and Local Response. the team is JHEC. Upon dissolution of the NDA or NSA. EOD. health (2) SRF Staff Members. and medical the event of an accident or significant incident affecting treatment personnel may be the first to respond.program. becomes available. radiation medicine. request. and possessions: 4-5 . the Team Leader. State d. A Service c. This team is available and radiological safety. the composition of the ARG. and. When a team is deployed. the ARG will deploy a Commensurate with personnel and public safety. Initially. including that needed by DoE in the response operations following an accident. firefighters. When deployed. Chapter 20. medical. and the site restoration planning group should responsible to the OSC. the DoE Team Leader has specific IRF should coordinate directly with personnel from responsibilities and activities implemented through the State and local agencies. Off-site coordination will be with the Federal represent atives should be exchanged. More than one person may be required about the DNAAT should be directed to the DoD to keep the OSC apprised of all on-going hazardous JNACC.g. At FEMA’s appropriate. The off-site areas. security. serve as staff members to improve response force (2) Request for services or additional information effectiveness.

radiological hazard may be disproportionately larger humanitarian support and assistance. continues those actions initiated by the IRF.16. government presence. The Amer- released due to weapon system damage. or mechanical action. Command Center (NMCC) and/or the Service oper. public involvement. safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. components at a specific location. Public perception of the installation to provide a U. confirm nor deny the presence of nucIear weapons or Figure 1-1. through the American Embassy. of plutonium. The problem ican Embassy provides the diplomatic and political focal may consist of variom hazardous materials. or high (b) The host government officials/ representa- explosives. for example. such confirmation (2) Follow-on Phase. An immediate. the need for velocity and other meteorological conditions. Response can be divided into has fallen to the ground. A high explosive detonation could disperse tives will ensure the health and safety of individuals hazardous materials several hundred meters around an within the country and will be assisted by the response accident site. Included in this phase are those the general public. The materials would satisfy host government requirements. the height extensive deployed communications support. As the OSC assesses the 5230. uranium. and commences long term actions to return the In locations outside the United States. classified materials must those public concerns related to nuclear accidents as be located. and terrai~ all influence the extent to which contamination may be spread. prior to exercising the exceptions (reference: DoD Directive b. Upon toxic or explosive hazards associated with the accident. Accidents will be expeditiously reported directly to the National Military (3) Public Affairs. government. Aerosolized hazardous materials could be force staff or the Embassy to implement measures to released and dispersed downwind. Although DoD policy is to neither simplified notification plan is illustrated in Chapter 1. Media interest and public scrutiny will be (1) Classified Material. The toxic materials may 4-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS present a serious hazard to the general public and require immediate and effective reaction by public affairs The concept of operations presents actions of the IRF personnel to allay public apprehension. the appropriate IRF and However. After the contaminant a.. weapon/ components accident/ incident rests with the (a) Non-radiological hazardous materials may be host Government officials/ representatives. In accidents involving inten>e. the following differences between a nuclear Guidance).S. the less immediate radiological hazard has SRF will be identi~e@and tasked. the OSC must have the approval of the recovery and site restoration are the primary objectives appropriate Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and host of this phase. or removal. that is. oxidizers. they assess the accident situation. and deployment of a response force. but temporary. remain in the area unless diffused by aeration. (b) The radiological hazards released by the a nuclear weapon accident off a military installation with burning or high explosive detonation of a nuclear the spread of contamination. Also the concept presents weapon or weapon components may consist of isotopes difficult weapon recovery problems. point to the host government. actions to assess specific risk must immediate measures taken by the nearest DoE or DoD be promptly initiated. during the follow. and designation than the actual hazard. its territories and environment to an acceptable condition. A and the general public. Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs accident. (a) On and off-site authority for a nuclear (2) Contamination. and of the cloud or plume containing the radioactive complex site restoration problems. Weapon(s) possessions. and SRF and assumes a “worst case” accident. solid or Iiquid missile propellants. and of what can and is being done considered: to reduce the risk. Response Phases. recovered and protected. The long term carcinogenic effects of inhaled plutonium represents the greatest hazard to (1) Initial Phase. neutralization.6. threat to the safety of the nearby public may exist from ations center in accordance with JCS Pub 1-03. Early notification of actual accident weapon accident and other accidents should be associated hazards. Response Considerations. Wind extensive logistic support requirements. and possibly tntium. The SRF. material. and specialized teams historically been of greatest concern to civil authorities alerted and prepared for immediate deployment. shall be made either when required to protect public on phase. is a key issue in allaying” public concern. 4-6 . it may be resuspended by wind two phases. the OSC and his staff must prepare to address nuclear weapons/components. receipt of accident notification.

When contamination at the accident scene. The initial actions of the If for any reason. (6) Identification of Public Health Hazards. (m). and with Federal. TM 39-20-11. This action is time sensitive and force. Once specific relay instructions should be included in an evaluation has been made. with higher authorities. consideration should be given to using fire extinguishment. The OSC must establish or between the accident site. Specific firefighting (1) Command Post (CP). For this reason. Response Force Actions. c. the response force does not arrive response force upon arrival at the accident scene will on-scene soon after the accident. ensure direct communication with OASD/ PA. Among the various agen. The FRC and CP will exchange the extent of the hazard(s). (b) Communications. Hazardous materials which may be present The CP should be established by the lRF with adequate are discussed in Chapter 9. the OSC should have air sampler(s) radio or telephone through the nearest military placed downwind from the accident. The OSC determines the accident Consideration should be given to establishing the CP. involved in the accident pose a danger to firefighters. The response expands. and NMCC. Communica. If required. the DoE ARG operations center. A Joint Information Center (JIC) must be established and public (2) Fire Suppression. accurate and consistent information is available at the 4-7 . Air sampling provides an cies. The OSC assesses of classified information. Ensure of compliance the direction and distance of the CP from the accident with DoD notification procedures. accident response elements liaison representatives to coordinate off-site actions and must report to the CP which will facilitate continuity concerns. casualties should be command and control during the transition from IRF considered as having been contaminated by radioactive to SRF. Also. Until record communications are established. Within approxi- establishing initial communications from an off-base mately 1 hour after the high explosive detonation or accident site. focal point of command and control as the accident (3) Casualty Identification and Treatment. Determination and reporting of whether contamination tions center in a restricted area to simplify the protection was released is of highest priority. All safety precau- of the actions required: tions should be taken including electromagnetic radiation (EMR) restrictions. officials at hospitals and clinics to which casualties are evacuated should be notified of (a) The CP may be located within the NDA or the possibility of radioactive contamination so that NSA. situation. Radiological hazards and and local and /or involved country agencies responding possible actions to minimize hazards are discussed in to the accident is essential to command and control. Casualty operations and require relocating the CP. SRF. will be provided for channels may provide a viable initial communications personnel positioning air samplers. and implications of the accident. Weapons and other materials affairs measures implemented to ensure that timely. communications to maintain command and control (7) Public Affairs. Chapter 5. effective means of determining airborne and downwind tions at the accident site may be limited initially. Access routes and prevailing winds will determine proper measures can be taken. All accident response elements must rescue and treatment of casualties should receive high report to the CP which will facilitate continuity of priority. as appropriate. civilian firefighters be directed toward stabilizing the situation and defining should be advised of the possible presence of hazardous the problem. Monitoring and installation. As soon as the scene and contaminated area. references (k). Until proven otherwise. and consideration should and the potential impact of the hazards to public health be given to conference calls to keep all concerned must be determined. the effect of any hazards telephonic communications. including high explosives. (4) Assessment. relay via local police communications decontamination. State must be completed rapidly. and the communica. (l). these officials should be advised. The CP should be located presence or absence of radioactive contamination is so that normal wind shifts will not interfere with confirmed. and (n). (5) Air Sampling. The following paragraphs describe some materials. Navy SWOP 20-11. material. status. channel. coordination should commands informed. The IRF should establish guidance is contained in Technical Publication TP 20- a CP to accommodate the arriving personnel and 11. provides a sample accident site organizational diagram. This facility should serve as the 20-11. of command and control during the transition from IRF to SRF. Figure 4-3 handling procedures are described in Chapter 14. Situation reporting according to be made with civilian officials to inform the public of Service/ agency directives should be initiated as soon as protective action measures to minimize undesirable possible. Effective communication within the response effects on the public. Air Force TO 1 lN- equipment of the SRF. frequency management is important.

4-8 . // /’ f .

establish radiological control declared safe. should . However. As a safety precaution. and civil authorities can be advised of the may not be possible until fires are extinguished. explosions. The initial reconnaissance (a) Radiation Monitoring/ Control. The first should provide enough information to determine priority is to determine if contamination has been subsequent actions and priorities. team need not wait for the contamination control station j. if required. Casualties (injured and deceased) not control station should be established as soon as previously found. determine the actual area which is contaminated so that appropriate actions can (a) Confirmation of weapon location and status be taken. the site. Injured people will be moved to a safe area. The OSC will approve all actions should be initiated to obtain information on the entries into the exclusion area prior to the weapons being extent of contamination. Additionally. and the in developing the weapon recovery procedures. the wait extent of the problem. contamination is present. Positive OSC must establish priorities based on the hazard to measures should be taken to prevent electromagnetic the general public and responding forces. Vehicles and be generated at the accident site and more than one equipment used in a contaminated area during organization will be collecting and analyzing data. Since a great deal of information will to outside listeners. released. unsecure radio transmission and the use of classified ~. but must be information must be coordinated within the JIC before checked for contamination before leaving the accident release to the media or general public. Prior to departing for the accident site. and extent of equipment and personnel are on-scene unless it has been injuries. If (8) Reconnaissance Operations. and the wreckage can be examined. and notify medical treatment facilities which may person entering the accident site should be the initial have contaminated casualties or emergency response reconnaissance team chief. determined that all weapons are intact and that there ~. and/ or re-entry recommendations on the area to assist in planning the survey. all reconnaissance may be left for future use. Upon making this determination. initial perimeter survey of the contaminated area are Reconnaissance and Render Safe Procedures by EOD discussed in Chapter 5. document findings. the information and data which may cause undue alarm response force. and EOD entry procedures in Chapter 15. The initial reconnais. A contamination ~. Atmospheric Release Advisory personnel should commence as soon as possible. the provided to civil authorities/ foreign government following should be considered by the OSC: establish officials by the OSC or his designated representative. If contamination is present. Procedures for completing the time is observed. heavy sance should provide or confirm the following: demands will be p[aced upon available radiation detection instruments and personnel. be offered. if not on the notification system. an initial or cursory contamination control line at least Public affairs actions are discussed in more detail in 100 meters upwind of the initial contaminant or hazard. should be processed through the initial contamination control (b) Other specialists or emergency personnel may line or the contamination control station upon exit from be part of the initial reconnaissance team if the OSC the area. Also. their number. protective measures 5C will provide a worst case estimate of the contaminated requirements. or potentially contaminated area. so that exiting initial reconnaissance team members can be monitored and decontaminated. the levels of it. still photography should be used to depict equipment available to the response force may preclude the accident site and area. actions to determine the extent of contamination should be initiated immediately. monitoring and decontaminating response forces should and other procedures before entering the accident site.accident scene. initial entry are discussed in Chapter 5. Weapons and components condition. (9) Hazard Assessment. If resources are available. assistance in that team members are briefed on emergency. 4-9 . reconnaissance team and any civilian personnel in the ~. safety. Ex@osive hazards present. The amount of radiation monitoring If possible. (RF) energy from initiating explosive devices. The radiological control area need not be established public affairs officer must be informed of all information prior to reconnaissance team entry. Chapter 16. location. The team chief should ensure equipment. Capability (ARAC) projections discussed in Appendix Radiological considerations. should be avoided. and assist simultaneous accomplishment of all actions. and chance of. loca. Existence of radioactive contamination and to be established before entering the are% however. immediate considers them essential. contaminated. the senior EOD lines. The reconnaissance tion. was no spread of contamination. When contamination is present.

Until this action is taken by certified technicians. Operate the contamination control all personnel with aczess to classified information. actions. procedural deviations. (10) Weapon Recovery Operations. comprehensive debriefing procedure should be estab- ~.c. Weapon recovery operations commence with reconnaissance and (12) Protective Measures. and cordon or a Security Area. This area should be performed to achieve site stabilization. in the event of a wind change. the on-site phone number should (a) A security perimeter should be established as be provided for direct data receipt.provide its Service operations center with an appropriate integral part of these procedl. ~. The recommendations will be incorporated positioning security guards and other personnel. Monitor and decontaminate response with local authorities allows establishment of a disaster personnel/ vehicles. These actions determining the status . Specific accident soon as possible. The re-entry recommendations include location and status of the weapons can be determined. Equipment and personnel limitations may agencies should be conducted to ensure that adequate preclude the response force from conducting detailed security is provided for the weapons until the response radiation surveys of the accident site. If a TELEFAX device is deployed to the accident site. force personnel who observed the accident and its aftermath. security posts lished to gain all possible information from response are in the contaminated area. -although not affected medical treatment facilities. subsequent accident investigations and aid in planning for initial response actions. nation depositions. If contamination force arrives. . area without the OSC’S approval. The protective measures continue until the weapons and/ or components have recommendations include procedures to protect been removed from the accident site. utilizes local authorities ~. should be considered. if any. This area.wes and must be approved TELEFAX phone number for delivery of ARAC by the OSC prior to implementation. establishing a contamination control area. procedures to remove or decontaminate materials and fragmentation distarkes should be considered when establishing the CP. NSA or Security Area and to return contaminated land/resources to an acceptable condition. protective measures. (11) Security (Physical and Classified Material). recovery and restoration functions. Upon arrival of the response force. In overseas areas. Until the evacuation. The operations area unless situations or conditions dictate a need for provides facilities for the OSC. the area is out of the SRF and DoE ARG can arrive. . cooperation g. (b) Debriefings. Re-Entry Recommenda- tions and Recovery Plan. or who were in the accident area.of the weapons and weapon include notitlcation. Coordination with civilian law enforcement ~. Only emergency RSP actions response. NDA. A station. If site will be located far enough from the accident site to ensure stabilization has been achieved. bystanders. Necessary weapon the contamination area. command and control. Locating and personnel and resources in the hazard area. projections of downwind radiation doses and contami. continuation of RSP that the operations area is free of airborne contamination beyond emergency procedures should be suspended until and. Specific EOD books (series 6) cover RSP operations and must be followed (a) The Operations Area. Space (an area approximately 100 meters damaged weapon(s) or their components will be an x 150 meters) is furnished for the following functions 4-1o . Determine which. Civilian response personnel will data provided in Appendix 5C should be provided to establish some form of control to keep nonessential ARAC directly. Include an evaluation of gained from these debriefings may also assist in all the hazardous materials present. is present. Information (b) Hazard Evaluation. Render safe procedures (RSP) shall be conducted by EOD into the recovery pkn. personnel. The OSC is required to debrief . Plans for packaging and shipping the . no personnel should be allowed into the (13) SRF Organization and Operation of the Accident Scene. Perform an initial perimeter survey to to restrict personnel from the accident site for their determine the extent of contamination and position for protection and safeguarding weapon systems. nearby residents. Figure 4-3 provides a sample recovery procedures should then be developed jointly accident site organizational diagram. equivalent to the NDA or NSA. available radiation monitoring equipment will establishment of a NDA or NSA as discussed in Chapter be needed to: 13. and controlled components should receive a high priority. by EOD and ARG personnel and modified to assure maximum safety. or through the Service operations center personnel from interfering with the civilian response or JNACC.Details on protective measures and recovery are contained in Chapter 5.

point after weapons recovery. All members of the response force should remain minimum: on-scene until the OSC determines that they are no longer required. travel plans. and management of site restoration operations. Multiple processing lines will Q JHEC be used to facilitate personnel processing. FEMA. coordinated 4-11 . The (2) Public Affairs. (c) As soon as all radiological data is known. JIC. Vehicle park. IRF. specialized teams on-scene.) The IRF unit cover the status. the com- Rest area. (c) The Contamination Control Area. personnel and equipment processing g. Considera- Q. (d) Initial communications capabilities on-scene i3 Billeting area. (a) Upon designation of the SRF. Contaminated materials and run-off will be contained and maintained ~. government officials must be included in the planning Clean clothing and bulk issue area. and support commander or the nearest Installation Commander will requirements of all organizations. The CCA incorporates the terparts or equivalents as appropriate: contamination control line (hot line). state. agencies. and set up and operate the base camp. capabilities. addressed below. Messing. and initiates additional actions as required. Control and Communications. 7. FEMA. provided as required. . The base camp includes those logistical. Mess] ration breakdown point. Other facilities which should be provided for DoD disposition. the SRF continues actions initiated by the Control group briefing area. and material/casualty transfer point. the SRF support recovery and restoration requirements. setup of the contamination control station and and/ or the EOD team). Service Response Force. OSC or DoE Team Leader. On-Scene CP. and support requirements are obtained through the Service operations center or ~. contamination control line. composition. ~. preparation of a site recovery and restoration plan should Helipad be directed. administrative. The base camp will be located farther from site is recommended. as possible. Specitlc Personnel and dosimeter control point. 1. (e) Congressional relations support must be i Water and POL point. operations and actions of concern to the SRF are Radiation equipment repair area. accident site.with the DoE. the SRF commander should assume the duties the accident. An overflight of the accident ~. and recreation functions to (b) Upon arrival at the accident site. Shower and latrines. resources and vehicles. tion should be given for using building(s) or tent(s) for g. Administrative vehicle park area. force or the response force’s base command center to obtain all ~ossible information and coordinate SRF arrival and ‘expected requirements. The DoE ARG (b) The base camp. “ may be inadequate and should be improved as soon h. Upon completion of turnover the accident than the operations area is located from briefings. and civilian authorities coun. a. (The distance from the installation authorities or host-country officials. the contamination control station. and local authorities and host Material receiving point. The CEAT. functions. billeting. d. VIP/ visitor reception/briefing area. On-Scene Control Group (DoE ARG. JNACC. The OSC should form a Contamination Control Area (CCA) includes facilities Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT) at some for monitoring and decontaminating personnel. Medical control point. Upon arrival at the Communications area. lines. The commander should be briefed by the IRF OSC and meet nearest military installation should be used as the base with senior State and local emergency response camp if practicable. Base camp facilities will include as a of OSC. (1) Command. mander establishes communications with the response Latrines. Personnel control point. The briefing should or terrain may require setup in the field.

until sufficient civilian equipment and personnel are and explosive hazards. 4-12 . State. A badging and the NDA. components. Ground &veys are required to confirm and security is required for temporary weapon storage areas. refine the results of aerial surveys. and other classified materials are removed remove. The JHEC assesses the authorities. and are responsible suffered substantial internal structural damage. Also. NSA or Security Area. the SRF’S arrival. on-site radiological monitoring and priority given to weapon recovery operations does not surveying must be coordinated by the JHEC. The high data available. Accident con- provide a direct interface with the public through a ditions. ~. When for control of off-site contaminated areas. but within the NDA. a respiratory protection program should be be established where people can gain access easily and established to ensure the health and safety of each person is m~tually agreeable to local officials. When DoD resources. DoE is responsible for coordinating off. civil authorities may conduct (a) Weapons involved in an accident may have monitoring and survey operations. justification for an NDA. the availability of qualified EOD personnel determine to what extent RSP have been accomplished prior to (3) Hazard Evaluation. Site security is established by the be coordinated with the DoE team leader. for assessment and results in contamination will generate a large number ultimate clean-up of radiological and non-radiological of claims by civilians. initial identification system should be implemented to facilitate ground surveys should be performed within . joint EOD and DoE inspection and a consolidated and consistent presentation of the best assessment of weapon damage is desirable. The radiological hazard to utmost importance. Survey (AMS) capability that can determine the extent and severity of contamination. Safety is of described in Chapter 5. DoE and and stored until shipment may be made. by the response force.5 days of passage of civilian and military response personnel and the accident because the contamination may migrate into teams. (6) Claims. where weapons. would (4) Weapon Recovery Operations. held in abeyance until the SRF and DoE ARG arrive. radiological and non-radiological hazards at a nuclear . transition from military control should be coordinated with civil (b) Hazard Assessment. The DoE has an Aerial Measurement Search procedures are discussed in Chapter 15. the time required to locate the weapon(s). as inherently imply a need for rapid action. (c) A large number of personnel maybe required military assistance can be offered and may be required to conduct searches for weapons. and local authorities and the contaminated area. Therefore. If the weapon(s) were in a stable environment and time permitted. The USAF Air Transportable Radiac Package from the accident site. weapon components. A claims processing facility should materials. host country government personnel are responsible for monitoring and treating the general publiq however. or NSA (ATRAP) team can field. This capability should (5) Security. Also. State. must be publicized. searches by available personnel on-site after providing appropriate briefings on search and safety procedures. If possible. have not been located when the SRF arrives. Military assistance the communications center. be kept informed. If all weapons and components site operations. A nuclear weapon accident which weapons accident/ incident. and other areas where may be requested for ground surveys conducted outside classified material is kept or discussed.with FEMA or affected country representatives. radiological hazard may still exist.ties. although a instruments to provide standardization. surfaces and become more difficult to measure and components. an extensive site radiological monitoring and assessment activities of search may be required to find them. and variety of means that could include town meetings. response force and/ or civil autho~. To obtain time permits. even if RSP were performed to contamination. This location entering the controlled area. response personnel and the general public are a major (b) A staging area should be established outside concern of Federal. RSP may have been (a) Radiation Monitoring/ Hazard Control. calibrate. EOD personnel will supervise available. or host involve country government officials. The SRF is responsible for all on. All personnel must government Security Area. Additional ~. such as nuclear weapons. Radiological surveys are required to define the The condition of the weapons should be assessed contamination area and identify any personnel exposed carefully prior to movement. An effective health safety program and hazardous material can be packaged for shipment should be initiated as soon as possible. and repair all with military control no longer exists. Federal agencies through the FRMAC in accordance with reference (c).

recognize the need to provide information up the chain- of-command to keep the Washington policy organization c. Procedures for liaison with other agencies’ (b) Status of weapon recovery operations. Identification of those activities responsible for units and teams on-scene should be information expected operations and methods for coordinating addressees on situation reports. The plan should establish priorities for determine the type and amount of logistic support expected actions. agencies and officials may include: responsibilities. plot of the contaminated area is essential for developing (d) Status and results of personnel monitoring. The OSC staff must elements. an accurate site restoration plan. for historical records. provide procedures to be followed. (7) Site Restoration. in accidents with little or no spread of contamination. Information expected or requested by various d. 4-13 . (a) On-scene response forces by Service or Agency. communication to the site will be established to obtain status. Early in the accident response. necessary because questions concerning the accident may billeting. and for sanitation facilities at or near the arise many years later. of the accident response itself should be documented to permit improvement of response procedures. Identification of required equipment and personnel informed. and required. and service/agency of all and host country government officials. complete documentation of radiological surveys is (1) Arrangements must be made for feeding. direct for the operations center. all aspects the state is coordinated by the SFO. The operations annex to the accident response plan should include: (I) Repo~s “me prepared according to applicable Service directives. ~ e. including number of people contaminated. and the expected duration of response operations. and procedures for the response operations. In addition to the documentation require- performing site restoration work. Most of the site participants and visitors. during planning and training. Even e. radiological and plan which may be accident specific completed as soon site restoration operations. and the up levels will be a major issue and require the radiation doses received. all personnel should arrive with sufficient personal items 4-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN to meet their needs for a period of 2 to 3 days without DEVELOPMENT significant external support. Reporting and Documentation. the number of personnel involved. considered when establishing response force commun- ication capabilities. A description of all expected operations and their the DoE has reporting requirements that should be interrelationships. a. The accident response plan outlined in Appendix 4-A should not be confused with the site restoration plan developed in conjunction f. SSN. A description of the operations center organization. with civil authorities. In addition to the reports of the OSC. operations centers (for example. environ. Determination of clean. In remote areas. Until messing and billeting arrangements are established. If adequate information is not provided. extremely austere conditions should be anticipated with only Development of the accident response plan should begin limited support for 7 to 10 days. restoration work occurs after weapon or components removal. The SRF and the appropriate response force (2) Documentation of the accident response effort elements will assist civil authorities/ officials in is essential. Federal assistance to ments of the accident investigation teams. A comprehensive and detailed (c) Status and results of radiological surveys. and those portions of the (2) Weapon recovery operations. The extent and specific requirements for a responsible official should be tasked with the primary these facilities depend primarily on location. accident site. Logistic Support. Parent organizations of specialized b. responsibility for documenting events and recording data mental conditions. Historical data supports initial planning for identify what coordination may be required with other 1000 people for up to 6 months. and base camp requirements as practicable. concurrence/ agreement of Federal and State authorities (e) Names. accident response organizations. FEMA and State).

(NDA). give a nications links. Information part of the response force. or other farming enterprises). Execution. Every nuclear weapon accident has its own unique (2) The number of military and civilian personnel requirements. The situation section should provide response force based upon the element’s functional facts surrounding the accident and accident location. summary of the tentative plan. through site restoration and the return home of the response forces. procedures may not be required. or requested. Scattering of weapon parts by high explosive detona- tions. the specific injured or killed and the disposition of all casualties. assign specific tasks to each element of the a. either projected or in advance. the method of execution. major roads or thoroughfares. numerous unpredictable variables are involved in a (4) A summary of initial response actions and nuclear accident. and problems. The response plan is intended to identify actions and (9) Civil and military response organizations or procedures to be used at the accident scene commencing teams on scene. Many actions and procedures required in icant events. However. and commu. and other hazards type and amount of support required. This section contains a statement of the should be included as an annex to the SRF accident tasks and objectives to be accomplished by the accident response plans to assist in preparation of site restoration response force. guidance on the 4-A. The plan must delineate the which might be contained in this section. including chronology of signif- planning. working in the NTDA or Security prepared. Moreover. objectives: weapon(s) recovery and site restoration. All organizations and teams. (8) Status of arrangements with civilian authorities This appendix provides basic guidelines and information including establishment of National Defense Area which should be contained in an accident response plan.1 . and if. priorities. some planned actions and surveyed. In the first subparagraph. response to an accident are known and can be planned (5) The area of contamination. called upon. capabilities. and their specific functions with the arrival of.52-M APPENDIX 4-A ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 4-A-1 GENERAL (1) The number. and other key planning factors which may Area or reporting to the OSC should be considered a have an impact on mission accomplishment. the key to a successful response is problems encountered. (7) Public awareness of the presence of nuclear weapons. situation. impact on operations or be affected significantly by the All response forces should draft as much of an accident accident (for example. In subsequent subpa- ragraphs. and location of weapons and weapons components involved. as will the (3) Radiological. if known. DoD 51OO. either by official announcement or observa- 4-A-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE tion assumption. command relationships. or may require (6) Habitation and terrain features which may modification to meet specific circumstances encountered. type. or Security Area if required. whether the status of response efforts at the time the plan was civilian or military. nearby residences or response plan and its associated annexes as possible to population centers. watersheds. and specific site restoration 4-A-3 BASIC ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN objectives are factors to be considered when stating the The basic accident response plan should state the mission. Situation. the response force and continuing or capabilities. an unlocated weapon. Although expected to be encountered. explosive. Also. be prepared when. logistics arrangements. animal feed lots. c. ‘reporting structure and responsibilities of the various includes: response force elements. Normally there will be two major plans in conjunction with civil authorities. condition. Possible site restoration procedures b. forces responding to each accident will vary. Mission. the mission.

tation. At a minimum tions. Integrating the actions of the multitude of units and h.e. Accident Advisory Team. Organizational relationships will and the plan should identify the response force role in vary as the response operation progresses. Operations. This annex should identify those Additionally. transpor. i. and as civilian security forces relieving the military security forces following removal of weapons. establish procedures for coordinating and controlling all actions at the accident site. and OPSEC requirements should be identified. or not ready for inclusion when the rest including the Senior FEMA Official. most notably joint activities. Many organizations and elements with a hazard/radiological capability and will arrive with some degree of organic communications establish a comprehensive hazard/radiation control which should be coordinated by thjs plan. The Task the JIC. If desired. Annexes to the accident response plan should provide e. or event at which such changes will occur. They should include all actions which must be performed. Task Organization (if not included in basic plan). Logistics and Administration. Areas in which annexes g. and their relationships. (1) Initial Response Force. and airheads or other key supply points/routes (3) Department of Energy Accident Response to support the operation should be identified. FRC. changes should be stated within areas. FRC liaison officer. weapon compo. The Public Affairs Annex should organizations. These changes may be in overall command. Comman”d accident. Security. annex should define the responsibilities of all agencies tions supporting the response force. ments applicable to the operation. This annex should include: 4-A-2 . Medical. or may be required. This section contains a statement of the administrative and logistic arrange. i. Hazard/Radiological Safety/ Health Physics. Billeting. Communications. determined what equipment is required to restore the (5) Federal Emergency Management Agency. a final subparagraph headed “Coordinating Instruc. site. ” the following units and organizations should be considered: d. Public Affairs. nents. Weapons Operations.interface with civilian authorities should be provided.. and with organiza.. both civilian and military. including f. this section may be issued (6) Defense Nuclear Agency Nuclear Weapon separately. the JHEC. responding to provide procedures for the coordination and release of a nuclear weapon accident is essential to an efficient public affairs information. relationships for the entire operation should be stated (8) Civilian/ Host country agencies responding to with expected changes of command indicated. This annex should establish communications requirements and communications 4-A-4 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNE”XES operating procedures. such as public safety. and other classified information from the accident site. such actions which will. and time the accident. This participants’ parent organizations. Plans should ensure communications links between all organizations participating in the response force. of the plan is completed. This annex should describe responsibilities supplementary information indicating which actions and special procedures used by the medical staff. a. assign responsibilities for execution of identified actions. If lengthy. b. require coordination with other elements to insure safety and/ or optimum use of assets. (2) Service Response Force. Command and Communications. requirements may not be known until engineers have (4) Specialized Service Teams. (7) Other Federal agencies responding to the e. COMSEC program. response operation. Some Group. and when the NDA or Security Area is dissolved. such as would occur when the SRF commander relieves the IRF commander. d. instructions applicable to two or Organization annex should identify all units and more elements of the response force may be placed in organizations responding to a nuclear weapon accident. This annex should describe the respon- in-depth guidance for operations in functional areas sibilities and procedures of the security forces. with c.e. their capabilities. which are applicable to the response effort. The Weapons Operations may be desired are: Annex should establish the procedures used for weapons recovery operations.

State. Plan will be developed in coordination with Federal. (1) Procedures to ensure that all press releases are j. and site and contaminated area. Site Restoration. . Chapter 16 contains members prior to release. 4-A-3 .16. The Site Restoration Annex shouId provide should provide procedures for establishing and information to guide the response force and be of use maintaining support for response force operations. Chapter 19 Chapter 17 provides guidance and recommended discusses site restoration issues which may assist in procedures for the development of this annex. Logistic Support. This annex should provide procedures for coordinated properly with the OSC and other key staff establishment of a claims center. in drafting a site restoration strategy. repres. A separate Site Restoration checklists prescribed by DoD Directive 5230. preparation of the Site Restoration-Annex. The Site Restoration Annex (3) Pre-coordinated contingency releases for should identify possible methods to restore an accident confirming the presence of nuclear weapons. entation to. and operation of the Joint Information Center. and local authorities and will probably require that an environmental assessment and engineering study i. The logistic Support Annex be made. . k. a discussion of legal problems which maybe encountered (2) Guidance on selecting the location for. reference (b). following a nuclear weapon accident. Legal.

52-M CHAPTER 5 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 5-1 GENERAL 5-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS A nuclear weapon aczident is different from other acci. A good health physics program provides for civil authority/ official involve. the hazards and characteristics of radioactive materials present. and suggested methods for e. 5-4 RESOURCES lead. weapon systems contain non- radioactive toxic materials. DoD 51 OO. data collected for the most accurate and complete hazard/ radiological assessment. c. Sufficient quantities of assessment. Determine levels of contamination present and on- hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. Also site boundaries of the contaminated areas through included is information on the radiological control ground and air surveys. These hazards are discussed in Chapter 9. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated 5-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE personnel on-site. high explosives. The FRMAC have a full complement of operable and calibrated radio- supports the OSC with off-site monitoring and logical monitoring equipment. propellants. the DoD establishes a of public understanding regarding radiological hazards. The JHEC a. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures detecting these hazards and protecting personnel from during personnel decontamination and restoration them. This chapter provides information on health physics and guidance concerning the radiological safety and other d. Determine if radioactive contamination has been physics program to manage the health safety aspects released. and establish a bioassay program. Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation to dents due to the possibility of radioactive contamination protect response force personnel and the public from at the immediate accident site and extending “beyond on-site hazards associated with a nuclear weapon the accident vicinity. The complexities of a nuclear accident and to mitigate potential health and safety weapon accident are compounded further by general lack problems. Response Force Resources. b. Advise the OSC of precautionary measures for ment in the cooperative development of response efforts residents and other persons in potentially contaminated and a site restoration plan. JHEC with the following objectives: The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must therefore. This information assists the OSC in the operations operations. and assistance Assessment Center (FRMAC) in coordinating and plan- to civil authorities with jurisdiction over areas affected ning the site restoration plan. areas. advice. under his control. The chapter furnishes g. such as beryllium. lithium. The Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) is the OSC’S organizational means to task on. oxidizers and plastics. by the accident. including decontamination efforts. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent site hazard and radiological data collection and analyze spread of radioactive contamination. f. Assist the Federal Radiological Monitoring and recommendations. materials should also be available for replacement or 5-1 . To accomplish this. sample forms. Response forces should coordinates closely with the FRMAC. quickly establish a vigorous and comprehensive health a. of a nuclear weapons accident. resources avrdable. Also.

should be made. provide adequate technical a. if (d) U. and notify officials/ personnel of radiological response-efforts. Additionally. constraints of available resources. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team delivery arrangements should be made for an Atmos- (AFRAT). Several specialized teams are The on-site and off-site distinction should be considered available within the DoD and DoE with substantial only when assigning areas to monitoring teams. Additionally. Specialized teams when integrated into the Service Response Force (SRF).S.repair of critical or high failure rate components such (g) Department of Energy Mobile Accident as mylar probe faces. (i) Department of Energy Radiological Air Though response forces are equipped and trained to Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab (RASCAL). DoD specialized teams should assist in the off-site riate news releases.S. (a) U. at the time of the accident. radiation detection instrumentation should be carried to ensure (1) The U.S. A conversion table for various measurements meaningful correlation of radiological data. operational needs after a large release of contamination. like rocks. (a) Prior to departing for the accident site. Moreover. A detailed discussion of ARAC is in 5-2 . The distinc- contamination levels might be measured or reported. during the flight. Air “Force Air Transportable RADIAC available. plots will provide the (f) Department of Energy Atmospheric Release expelted location and level of contamination deposition Advisory Capability (ARAC). Integration of specialized team operations hazards to the public and response force personnel. Possible radiological monitoring. should be integrated problem and its nature. and decontaminate them as necessa~. the entire is provided in Chapter 11. If responding by air. and wet surfaces. (c) U. they can of operations. Specialized teams are: potential hazards. (b) U.S. it is difficult to do over rough surfaces tion Station. hazard assessment. AIQ4C plots will provide theoretical (e) Department of Energy Aerial Measurement estimates of the radiation dose to personnel downwind System (AMS). personnel resulted in release of contamination to areas beyond should be cognizant of the various units in which the immediate vicinity of the accident site. Also. be available to the initial response force. Army Radiological Advisory Medical that personnel and aircraft are not contaminated. to assist in determining possible areas of Package (ATRAP). on the ground. Replacement plans are necessary Response Group Unit (HOT SPOT). however. pheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) plot. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. region of contamination must be treated as an entity. Initial Response Force (IRF) Actions.operations assumes that an accident has capabilities and limitations. IRF action should logical hazards. (1) Pre-Deployment Actions. Only limited equipment and expertise may provide field laboratories and analytical facilities. plants. appropriate ground support should be provided discussed in detail in Chapter 20: upon landing if personnel and aircraft become contaminated. provide approp- site. When not required on. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. equipped to conduct low level contamination monitor- ing. and monitoring should wait until the teams arrive. Specialized DoD (k) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team. determine the absence or presence of any radiological which have off-site responsibilities. tion between on-site and off-site is significant for security and of the method of converting from one unit to and legal purposes. minimize possible radiation into the SRF. because radiation detection equipment (RADIACS) (h) Department of Energy RANGER Environ- available to initial response forces will not meet initial mental Monitoring Capability. contamination. Appendix 5-A contains a list of radiological monitoring 5-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS equipment used by the Services with a summary of their This concept of. conduct radiation surveys for low levels of radioactive (j) Department of Energy Mobile Decontamina- contamination. and Department of Energy (DoE) teams are better (1) DoD EOD Teams. to avoid contam- (2) The following specialized teams or resources are ination. and response force actions are addressed first in this concept instrument repair capabilities. specialized DoE teams. Within the resources to make a complete assessment of the radio.S. is accomplished best through establishment of a JHEC identify all persons who may have been contaminated as discussed in paragraph 5-5. for effective collection and another. Specialized Teams. Efforts Team (RAMT) is discussed in Chapter 14. b.

Additional explosive (d) Initiate air sampling. when the accident scene. rapid assessment of streets or roads in the area and the “Authorities should be notified and the assistance of types and uses of potentially effected property. civil moved for better access to the area. which should be initiated include: measure levels of contamination. “should be reported immediately to the provided at established personnel processing points. and boots are necessary to (c) If radiation detection instruments are not yet ‘protect response personnel from contamination and to on-scene. During specialized radiological teams and the DoE Aerial Mea- helicopter operations. At this point. or authorities/ officials should have monitoring assistance the lack of it. dispatch a monitor to determine if the hazards “’are identified. observations from firefighters and witnesses prevent its spread to uncontaminated areas. clothing). As it becomes known. Later. is 610 meters (2000 feet). deploys by weapon recovery operations. have not been implemented to reduce the hazard to the (b) After arrival at the site. indicates whether anti-contamination or respiratory (b) Prepare appropriate news release. The landing zone should of radiation contamination. and go preventing undue public alarm. at least one ~. How many intact weapons or containers dispersed and to confirm that no beta and/or gamma have been observed? hazard exists. civil authorities/ officials should be advised of should enter the accident site to inspect the area for the situation and consider possible actions. If available. may extend beyond this distance. specific accident and the condition of the wreckage or debris may indicate data described in the appendices should be provided contamination. accident. Anticipated questions that may be asked to the ARAC facility at Lawrence Livermore National to evaluate the release of contamination are: Laboratory. Protective coveralls (anti-contamination suspect area. OSC. flights should remain above or surement System requested. The approach to the scene should be from an (a) Dispatch monitor teams. the easier it will be to tainers appear to have been involved in an explosion develop a plan of action and communicate with involved or fire? civil authorities. The earlier that confirmation of released ~. the control line may be a personnel monitoring program. ~. from the accident site. Has a weapon undergone sustained burning? ments to determine if alpha emitting contamination was ~. If not. the remaining radiological response becomes preparations for response in the event of a release during (a) If the OSC. The highest priority should clear of any smoke. accepted explosive safety distance for nuclear weapons minimize the spread of contamination are described in. protection is required for the initial entry team. The accident situation possible. with radios if upwind direction if at all possible. Anti-contamination clothing and respiratory (g) Implement procedures to protect response protection should always be donned before entering a personnel. Was there a high explosives detonation? trained person should have radiation detection instru. Do broken or damaged weapons or con- contamination is established. If airborne 5-3 . a reconnaissance team public. the contamination Chapter 14. helicopter to the accident site. and at a sufficient altitude to prevent be actions to initiate general public hazard abatement. an overflight of the accident scene and the downwind area can provide a (3) Actions to be taken if contamination is detected. or an advance party. Every (c) Determine if medical treatment facilities with consideration should be given to protecting the initial casualties have a suitable radiation monitoring entry team. boundary of the contaminated area is defined and (f) Establish a contamination control station and explosive hazards are known. hoods. gloves. witnesses. a temporary contamination officials. The generally Procedures a medical treatment facility may use to . bystanders. determ~ne the type(s) of contamination present. or crosswind. to conduct an initial survey of the security area. (b) If an advance party is deployed. and assess weapon status. safety distances may be found in classified EOD (e) Identify.. resuspension from the downdraft when flying over Do not delay or omit any life-saving measures because potentially contaminated areas. Also assist in ensuring should enter the possible contamination or fragmenta. Until capability. Contamination. that contamination has not spread in the facility. If precautionary measures be upwind. and others present at the control line should be considered. however. in conjunction with civil authorities/ publications. (d) If no contamination was released by the (2) Initial Actions. tion area of the specific weapon(s). only essential personnel the casualties were contaminated. Appendix 5-C. Actions hazards.

it provides accurate and complete on- by determining a control area and limiting access and site hazard/ radiological recommendations. Administrative controls (1) Joint Hazard Evaluation Center. The JHEC exit through a Contamination Control Station (CCS). This control is usually established analyzing data. Data area until monitored and decontaminated. efforts. correlation. Director should be knowledgeable about data on-site The perimeter of the contamination control area will and how to best employ the technical resources available. requirements for personnel working in or entering the (i) Establishing the location and initial operation on-site contamination control area. logs and records. the SRF should ards and monitor the safety procedures of all partic- continue to provide assistance and radiation monitoring ipating in weapon recovery operations. such as a magazine. civil officials. Representatives from the DoE. 5-4 . are the primary off-site health and safety ~. surveys and air sampling. Refer all unofficial requests b. support. the results of radiation further investigation. radiological response assets ~. Review and correlate records from contam- Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Envir. Implement OSC’S health and safety stand- interface with the public. however. They and up actions are taken. and safety measures. and protect response force personnel and radiological data collection and assessment efforts. A case-by-case initial response. be in the vicinity of the line defined by the perimeter The recommended functional organtifation is shown at survey. and complete radiological Personnel and equipment should not leave the control information to both military and civil users. Upon for contamination information to the Joint Information arrival on-scene.contamination exists. casualties. The JHEC should: of the Command Post. most rapid. organization. firefighting and other special actions radiological response organization to participate in require a positive pressure self-contained breathing FRMAC operation. and Base Camp is discussed in Chapter 4. Collect radiological and hazard data required by the OSC on-site. Service Respon~e Force (SRF) Actions. The OSC should working directly with the weapon need take precautions integrate DoE ARG radiological assets into the JHEC against tritium. This arrangement can be by using Service approved protective masks. the SRF personnel review the initial Center (JIC). ination control stations and other personnel processing onmental Protection Agency (EPA) will be on-scene points to ensure bioassays or other appropriate follow- within a few hours after the response force. (h) Develop and implement plans for controlling the spread of contamination. During those periods early in the ~. early in the response before a full Figure 5-1. After the the extent their condition permits. Off-site radiological surveys require coordination Respiratory protection can be provided in most instances with civil authorities. However. If the control area extends beyond the and further distributed by the JHEC to the FRMAC. Operations Area. If extremely understood by explaining the role of the JI+EC and high contamination levels of tritium are suspected in FRMAC. a buffer zone may be (a) On-site collected data is processed through considered. response force actions. respiratory protection is required. Provide contamination plots and other on-scene or expected. Federal ~. and by inviting the civil government/approved a confined area. National Defense Area (NDA) or Security Area the (b) JHEC is the single control point for all assistance of civil authorities/officials will be required hazard/ radiological on-site data and will provide the to establish and maintain the control area perimeter. Injured provided to the JHEC for analysis. and the location required data to the OSC. Analyze and correlate all contamination identification and care of potentially contaminated data collected to identify inconsistencies which require people. as necessary. the JHEC establishes a radiation and exception to this policy is necessary in life threatening dosimetry program which meets Service needs and situations. ~. The JHEC is must stop contamination from being spread by personnel the organization that oversees the on-site hazard and or equipment. and fatalities. for the JHEC. Actions include: the status of ~. and personnel should be monitored and decontaminated to validation includes all hazard data on-site. Brief and train people not designated response when Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) previously as radiation workers who will be working operations limit access to the accident site. DoD specialized teams and the apparatus. radiological in” the contaminated area on personal protective survey teams should only support the weapon recovery equipment. JHEC. hazards. Unless an accident is contained within an Department of Energy Accident Response Group (DoE enclosed space. only those personnel ARG) are integral parts of the SRF. accurate. perimeter survey is completed. By the general public.

JHEC Director FRMAC Liaison Senior Health OSC Liaison and Deputy Director Weapon Recovery Safety Advisor Liaison Chief of Staff I ● I Security Site Logistics Restoration Administration I I I I u! (n “EzIzizlm P . RAD Survey Teams . Joint Harard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization . Overview ● RAD SAFE SUPPOrt (Radiography) . Ranger . Fixative Application . Industrial Safety . Industrial Hygiene bration and Repair . Data Control /QA . Equipment DECON Assessment Sampling. Dispersion ● Dosimetry ModeI (ARAC) . Instrument Cali- Assessment and Evaluation . Medical Figure 5-1. Contamination Control Station . Environmental . Meteorology ● A M S . Evaluation and . Waste Control . Plotting ● Air Sampling . Personnel Decon . etc. Mobile Laboratories . . Bioassy .

Directive 5230. The JHEC is responsible people without respiratory protection may have received. and at the contamination control station. (3) Work Force Protection. basis for estimating the radiation dose/exposure which or unduly impair operations. in terms which 5-6 . initiation. in radiation areas should be implemented.’ should be given specific guidance. frequency. guidance for personnel protection during the first few days. Site charac- samplers should be placed downwind of the accident. Air other radiological data are required by the OSC and sampling will verify the resuspension hazard during civil authorities/ officials to identify actions to minimize response and recovery operations. To achieve this. and to assure those who did not receive a dose property. and resource/facility surveys. (5) Radiological Advisory to the JIC. JHEC personnel and resources may be in Chapter 8. sample to weeks to compIete. and the age of the ination/ recovery c(jmjletion. integrated into FRMAC operations. per Appendix 5-B. the contaminated area to verify background readings. Surveys include After this. Consideration must be given to participating organizations or Services ~. reference (b). vegetation and swipe sampling FRMAC for implementation to meet this requirement of surfaces are required. for example. the following must be completed: select Samples must be taken also at locations remote from appropriate detection equipment. Bioassays methods estimate the amount of hazard resulting from a nuclear weapon accident will radioactive material deposited in the body. and restoration dependent on wind velocity approximately 500 meters planning will also need this information. The methods produce intense media concern and public scrutiny of use either direct measurement.16. if not trained to work in a radiation contamination. of contamination are expected. and in Appendix 5-D and forms are at Appendix 5-E. Also it provides a as their procedures do not jeopardize health and safety. Soil. Personnel monitoring and bioassay programs (d) When the National Defense Area (NDA) is are discussed in this paragraph and bioassay techniques dissolved. and made through the JIC. Standard radiation accident and incident response procedures provide (2) Materials Sampling. will (4) Radiological Surveys. migration and dispersion and to substantiate decontam. terization and decontamination. As conditions stabilize. understandable recommended to determine if any internal dose was explanations of methods to protect their health and received. All public release of information will be processed by DoD “ (b) Bioassay Program. Any portion of the mucous. The JHEC will determine fissile materials. The survey process can require days on-site sampling parameters. The recovery process to determine radioactive material survey results are complicated by sensitivity y/ fragilit y of. method. Public interest in the actual or perceived radiological j. regulations governing work (a) Environmental Sampling. and determine the background readings. Personnel entering the no data being obtained during the initial release of contaminated areas. Radiological surveys and result in a sample of airborne contamination. Radiological upwind. The JIC requires assistance from placed over the chest (lung counting) and/ or other the JHEC and FRMAC in preparing press releases to organs. public which may have been advised to take precau- ~. for implementing the OSC’S health and safety standards The reaction time to an accident combined with the time and monitoring closely the safety procedures of all par- required to initiate air sampling will result in little or ticipating organizations. Air sampling is conducted to determine if dosage calculation methods and previous dosages as long airborne contamination is present. area. size. Implementation of through the JIC and the Community Emergency Action a bioassay program and the documented results will be Team (CEAT) explaining all real hazards. Sampling should be initiated in an expeditious manner. background readings. Later placement of a sampler downwind the accident. equipment. water. The public must be provided information that their health was not impaired. Survey procedures are located location(s). volume of sample. (c) Consolidate all radiological assessment important in the equitable settlement of any legal actions information for on-site recovery operations and provide that may occur in the years following a nuclear weapon it to the OSC. calibrate instruments. samples are required periodically during the NDA perimeter. It is at this period that the highest levels environment. or detection of radioactivity y in the excreta (nasal minimize and allay these concerns. hazards to the response force and the public. A bioassay program for all individuals is tionary measures will seek clear. feces or urine). accident. Prior to extensive survey in the contaminated area soon after the accident. sensitive x-ray detectors response operations. survey and data requirements must be given to the ~.

Atmospheric Release Advisory financially acceptable condition begins early in the Capability (ARAC). procedures. Anti-contamination clothing may be laundered operations. Exposure to resuspended contaminants normally results topographical. (9) Logistics Support for Recovery/ Radiological If water is readily available. The in special laundry facilities (discussed in Appendix 17- DoE ARG can provide information on the advantages A) and reused. Site restoration becomes a major issue provides a theoretical projection of the maximum after classitled information. and respirator may enhance or hinder decontamination and restoration filters. required between the JHEC and the SRF supply officer. from exposure. Provisions. exposures is the primary method of estimating the In the process of determining the weapon condition. varied sizes of polyethylene bags. when established. (8) Disposal of Contaminated Waste. The primary radiological hazard associated with a nuclear weapon accident is from (a) Recovery. two-inch contaminated areas. particularly by those residing near as possible. The two-person rule must be enforced strictly at a nuclear weapon accident. To control and minimize exposure. Fixatives maybe used of site restoration in Chapter 19. be based on limited information. a significant health problem will not normally be present nents. are required therefore. Several factors have outdoors without respiratory protection from the time significant influence on site restoration decisions and of release to the effective time of the ARAC plot. The which may cause a long term increase in the probability EOD team advises the OSC of the safest and most of radiation related diseases. Consideration of possible radiation preliminary weapon(s) status and hazards in the area. Other more permanent sufficient supplies to last a few days. This activity includes the initial the fissile material. reconnaissance. following all of the required (1) Radiological Hazard Assessment. and affect radiation survey procedures. The turnaround time. geological. Restoration will include those the accident should not normally affect the safety of measures to remove or neutralize the contamination. weapon debris. level contamination is usually inappropriate. Procedures for standing of radiation and its effects. the disposal of contaminated waste are addressed as part (6) Fixing of Contaminants.recognize the populace’s knowledge level and under. until it can be moved to a disposal site. will. to store this waste temporarily in the contaminated area radioactive contaminants must be prevented from 5-7 . The use of fixatives in areas of low masking or duct tape. Procedures/methods to assumptions. Fixatives marking tape for contaminated materials. hazard Sufficient quantities of beta/gamma emitters to pose removal. Radiological Hazards. Contam. and worst case projections of possible return the accident scene to a technically achievable and radiation doses received. However. c. If no beta/ gamma radiation is search may be required to find the weapon(s). to reduce resuspension and the spread of contamination. the render safe procedures. hydrological. when working with nuclear weapons. The hazard ination control staticm operations and JHEC field assessment must be followed quickly by recommended laboratory operations creates considerable quantities of . Close liaison will be to application of permanent fixatives. Initial hazard assessments reliable means for neutralizing weapon hazards. The OSC present. They should be consulted prior contamination clothing required. the primary risk is inhalation of alpha emitters directs the initiation of the render safe procedures. described in Appendix 5-C. Other important aspects would be received from exposure to the initial release are utilization of the area and civil authorities/officials for the same time period. Contamination released by prerogatives for the area. High use items fixatives may be used to reduce the spread of which soon require resupply include hundreds of sets contamination by resuspension and run-off from highly of anti-contamination clothing each day. Radiological response assets arrive with fixative to reduce resuspension. internal radiation dose people may have received if and other hazards are removed. response effort. the OSC outset. weapons. From flhe security measures may be difficult. (7) Recovery/ Restoration. meteorological in doses which are a small fraction of that dose which and demographic information. it may be used as a temporary Operations. of necessity. and disposition of the weapons and compo. and disadvantages of different types of fiiatives and determines the approximate amount of anti- methods of application. In the early stages of accident response. potential health hazard. (2) Reduction of Public Exposure. precautionary and safety measures to protect the public contaminated waste. such as size of the contaminated area. particularly the alpha emitters. The initial entry will determine the the accident site. public water systems with adequate water treatment capability. concern exists about the potential health hazard should implement necessary security procedures as soon to the general public. (b) Sitey Restoration.

action. Shel. even though the service The removal is most time consuming and requires an response force personnel may not arrive for some time. Immediate evacua. coordination ~. occur automatically or at the direction of civilian law tion of downwind personnel should be discouraged since enforcement personnel. problem. the implementation of precaution. Radiation Surveys. and response plan include 5-8 . The PARs and RERs will have been coordinated/ tering is implemented by advising the people to seek reviewed by the cognizant federal authority (DoD) and shelter and the procedures to follow. and replace the top soil. discussion. civil authorities/ officials. When contamination has been released. water run-off. Extensive radiation surveys will international issues are likely to be involved. some fixing procedures may be necessary long before site restoration plans are 5-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX implemented. in the’ Radiological Hazard Safety annex to the accident tion of the general public. as immediate evacuation would then be required. Fixing Areas of High Contamination. Refer to Appendix systematically. toring point immediately. The notification in the accident area would implemented by civil authorities. or movement of evacuation is found on the next page. response force members. contamination are appropriate. people. Although fixing of contamination is part of the site restoration process. the ultimate be required to identify and characterize the area so that decisions on measures to be taken should be made based decontamination and restoration plans may be deve- on health and safety considerations. or through. a minimum. PARs for initial j. Procedures and information appropriate for inclusion d. loped and the results evaluated. if release occurred. Protec. Civil authorities will occur via visual means or word-of-mouth. or when probable cause exists to believe that contam- ination was released. f. Sheltering. ~. decontaminate. Areas and approval sections (the format should be site and of high contamination must be controlled to prevent situation specific). Monitoring is (b) Protective measures include: required during the removal process to verify that ~. The PARs and of sheltering depends on following the procedures RERs will consider Protective Action Guides issued by provided. scene to determine that the cleanup levels are achieved. priority must be given provide technical assistance until appropriate civilian to the actions to identify and minimize the hazards to assets arrive. Although political and possibly e. Sheltering is used to minimize h. public. Determining that (a) The initial response force may need to advise contamination was released by the accident is very civil authorities/ officials of recommended actions and important. Evacuation be responsible for the evacuation but may require of approximately a 600 meter disaster cordon might radiological advice and assistance. The PAR/ RER format may include. the public should be implemented by. if appropriate. Methods for reducing the exposure to 5-D for additional guidance. Site restoration involves negotiat- ary measures to reduce exposure to radiation or ing cleanup levels and fixing or removing contamination. The decontamination effectiveness access to the area. EPA and state agencies. The effectiveness responsible civilian authorities/ officials. These actions are included in Appendix 5-E.entering the body and confined to specific geographic workers in the accident area from exposure through areas so that the contamination can be removed inhalation is extremely important. Explosive or toxic materials may present an subsequent release of hazardous materials or radioactive immediate hazard to people near the accident site and contamination. personnel. In an accident. Evacuation. Establishing a contamination control area. Any vehicles or people exiting the will be verified by remonitoring/ resurveying the accident area should be identified and directed to go to a moni. Respiratory and Whole Body Protection. extensive workload to collect. Contaminated areas must be notification or evacuation would likely not be prepared defined and an evacuation procedure developed and formally. cleanup has been achieved. A PAR for a controlled the probability of inhalation of contaminants may evacuation could be formalized in anticipation of a increase. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and exposure to the initial rdease of contamination as it re-entry recommendations (RERs) provide appropriate moves downwind. Verification. Site Restoration. A sample PAR for controlled spread by resuspension. and to minimize exposure to protective action and re-entry recommendations to the resuspended contamination prior to an evacuation. This operation requires identifying people in the area at the time of the accident/incident or and restricting g. remove.

(Indicate the specific area to be vacated and a schedule indicating evacuation start. 5-9 . or school may be a temporary holding area for evacuees. the following area will be evacuated. the personnel would return to their houses/businesses. Protective Action Recommendation for Major Accident at (location Issued by: Problem: An accident involving missile system re-entry vehicle occurred at (Time. In the unlikely event of an explosion. YMCA. for example. completion. gymnasium. A holding area. Upon successful completion of maintenance. . As a result. Also. Discussion: It is possible. that the second stage could explode. the evacuees could be released for shopping or other activities outside the area. Note: Release of this “Protective Action Recommendation” cannot precede confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon by the OSC and should b< coordinated with local officials and PAO prior to release. debris could be thrown yards/ meters. though highly improbable. Action: With the possibility of the explosion of the missile second stage during removal operations. verification of evacuation. Maintenance technicians have experienced complications in removing the missile second stage from the missile launch facility. maintenance work start. work completion and return to the area). an evacuation of (outline the specific area) has been ordered by Civilian Authority Office. date and location). Note: All personnel are required to sign in at a specific location(s) during evacuation to help local law enforcement/ SRF personnel verify that all personnel are out of the area prior to maintenance start.

b. screened. i. FRMAC. 5-1o . and treated. Procedures for JHEC and FRMAC interfacing. air samplers). A description of the JHEC organization and f. Guidelines for determining radiation survey and j. a. g. personnel working in the contaminated area are properly protected. Procedures for recording. personnel. correlating. and plotting personnel possibly exposed to contamination are the results of radiological surveys and data collection identified. Procedures for ensuring that response force responsibilities. e. Procedures for operation of the JHEC. become DoE and/ or civilian responsibility as time progresses. Procedures for establishing and maintaining the data for the radiological safety of response force contamination control line. d. Procedures for JHEC incorporation into the decontamination priorities. This function will instrumentation (for example. Procedures for recording and maintaining pertinent c. Procedures for ensuring that all indigenous h.

and use aq Self-Reading Ionization Chamber Ionization Chamber 0. Chamber Dosimeter “ Limitations: False positive readings due to charge leakage and sensitivity to mechanical shock. automatic scale switching.“ TRITHJM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Instrument Capability Scale Indicator 3 T-446 Tritium o to 10 pCi/ m Portable. Dosimeter Film Badge Provides measurement and permanent record of beta and gamma radiation doses over wide dosage range. Accurate to within a factor of two when the energy of the neutrons is unknown. aging. humidity. has urinalysis capability for tritium with 5-minute response. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to processing time. 5-A. Has particulate filter with filters down to 0.and/or gamma radiation. Additional Limitations: Requires reading device.3 microns (eliminates sensitivity to smoke and paint fumes). . and exposure to x-radiation. External battery pack is available for cold weather operations. Limitations: Sensitive to light. and temperatures >115° degrees F reduce sensitivity. damaged or bent cards delay processing. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to central processing of TLDs. static electric discharge causes spurious readings.52-M APPENDIX 5-A RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT DOSIMETERS Instrument Capability/Limitations Self Reading Ionization Reusable device for measuring exposure to X. T-290A Tritium 0 to 1.000 flCi/m3 3 ranges Concentration of gas in chamber Portable.I . Thermoluminescent The TLD (thermoluminescent dosimeter) provides measurement of gamma Dosimeter (TLD) radiation dose equivalents up to 10000 rem. Limitations: after long periods of exposure (* mrem). air sampler. Ten (10) percent dose accuracy depending on quality control during development. and trickle charger for nickel cadmium F cells. Weighs 22 pounds. limitations. Sensitive to smoke and paint fumes. and detects presence of radioactive gas. Special neutron films are available. <. With adapter kit. Weighs 17 pounds Must be rezeroed after 15 minutes of operation and once an hour thereafter. DoD 51 OO. tritium detector. Non-Self Reading Same capabilities. Dosimeter.

high and low-range instrument. Accompanying x-ray probe is calibrated for 17 KeV with associated meter scale from O-10 mg/ m2 in four ranges. Mylar probe face is extremely fragile and a puncture disables the instrument until repaired.000 flCi/mJ 3 ranges Portable air monitor designed to detect gaseous radioactivity in ambient air. AN/ PDR-60 Alpha Scintillation O to 2. -“ TRITIUM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS (CONTINUED) Instrument Capability Scale Indicator Ic-T2/PAB(M) Tritium . gamma detector will continue to function. weighs eight pounds. The FIDLER probe has significantly greater sensitivity than other probes. 10 to 100 KeV and FIDLER probe O to 100 Kev. May use plutonium gamma detector (pG-l) for inclement weather. intermediate gamma range. 0 to 100.4 pounds. PG-2 probe. the instrument is calibrated directly in terms of tritium activity but may also be used to detect other radiogases or to monitor gamma radiation if appropriate calibration factors are applied to the meter reading. Very few units other than specialized Service and DoE teams possess the FIDLER. ALPHA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator AN/ PDR-56 Alpha Scintillation O to 1. AN/ PDR-60 or PAC-IS has identical alpha capabilities but does not have the gamma detection capability. Mylar probe face is delicate and puncture disables alpha monitor capability until repaired. Also. CPM/ 60 cmz (PAC-ISAGA) G a m m a G-M tube 4 ranges R/ hr Capable of measuring gamma utilizing the 2R range. Alarm sounds at preset meter readings. for detecting alpha contamination through measurement of the associated X-rays and low energy gamma radiation.000K . Intermediate and high-range alpha survey. The instrument is battery operated (D cells) and has an audible alarm when radioactivity exceeds a preset level. This exercise is done with probes with separate ranges. PRM-5 Alpha Scintillation O to 500K CPM 4 ranges Portable.000K CPM/ 17 cmz 4 ianges A small auxiliary probe provided for monitoring irregular objects. PRM-5 probes are effective in inclement weather and are much less subject to damage during field use than other alpha meter probes. 3 AN/ PDR-74 Tritium O to lOOK pCi/ m 3 ranges The portable RADIAC set contains an IM-246 light weight tritium air monitor to detect airborne radioactive gases. 5-A-2 . Weighs 5.

ALPHA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS (CONTINUED)
Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator

Ludlum Alpha/ Beta/ Gamma Scintillation O to 400K cpm
Model 3 G-M Tube O to 200mR/h mR/ h

Portable, high and low range analyzer for detecting alpha, beta and gamma emissions. The Model 3 is an electronic
package similar in operation and function to the PDR-60 analyzer. Probe 43-5 detects alpha via scintillation, the
probe surface area is 50 cmz. Probe 44-6 (Hot Dog) uses a G-M tube to detect beta and gamma. Probe 44-9
(Pancake Probe) detects low energy gamma, O to 200 mR/h.
Ludlum Alpha Scintillation O to 500K cpm
Model 2220 4 ranges

The Model 2220 is an alpha detector electronics package that has a liquid crystal display and integral digital readout.
The unit weighs 3.5 pounds and has an adjustable high voltage and adjustable lower level discrimination feature.
VIOLINIST II - HIVOLT-PREAMP FIDLER INSTRUMENT SET. This instrument set includes the FIDLER,
high voltage power supply and preamplifier and the Violinist H. The Violinist 11 consists of a battery operated
256 multi-channel analyzer and a preprogrammed microprocessor. This instrument set, when calibrated appropriately,
measures and determines surface contamination levels of plutonium and amencum-241 in pCi/ m2.
RANGER. The instrument set includes the FIDLER/ Violinist 11 and a position determining system. The microwave
ranging system uses a base station, fixed repeaters and mobile units. The mobile units transmit FIDLER radiation
data to the repeaters and base station. The microprocessor develops in near real time radiation readings, contamination
density, and isopleths. The microwave ranging system is limited to near line-of-sight. Dense vegetation, building,
and hilly terrain may effect the ranging signal.

BETA/GAMMA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator

AN/ PDR-27 Measures gamma on Geiger-Muller o to 500 mR/h
all scales. Detects beta 4 ranges
two lower scales.

Low range; weighs eight pounds; beta window on probe to detect beta, and suitable for personnel monitoring.
May saturate and read zero in high-radiation fields (over 1,000 r/ hr).
AN/ PDR-43 Measures gamma. Geiger-Muller o to 500 R/h
Detects beta on 3 ranges
all scales.

High range; weighs 4.5 pounds, and will not saturate in high-radiation area. Readings in gamma fields other than
CO-60 may have inaccuracies greater than 20 percent.
IM-174/PD Gamma Integrating 0.1 to 10 R/h
ion chamber o to 500

High range; weighs 3 pounds; logarithmic scale, and temperature sensitive.
Ludlum Gamma Scintillation O to 5 mrl hr uR)h
Model 19

5-A-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

-’

APPENDIX 5-A. I

RADIATION DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT

(The Inference of Piutonium Contamination using the FIDLER)

5-A.1-1 OVERVIEW to serve as a “user’s manual” for the various instruments.
. .
However, it includes sufficient detail to provide an
a. Quantltattve measurements of radioactive contam- understanding of the limitations of field measurement
ination m the field are extremely difficult. Particles techniques and thus provides for proper application and
having short ranges, such as alpha and low energy beta the use of techniques in case of an emergency. For
radiation, are significantly and incalculably affected by completeness, some elementary characteristics of
minute amounts of overburden, for example, dust or different kinds of radiation are included. Throughout
precipitation. Therefore, detection rather than measure- this appendix the word “radiation” will refer only to
ment is a more realistic goal for alpha-beta surveys. More nuclear radiations found at a nuclear incident/accident.
penetrating radiations, such as gamma and higher energy
x-rays, are effected less by such overburden; however, b. Detection versus Measurement.
these elements require special attention to field
calibration techniques in order to convert meter readings (1) Nuclear radiation cannot be detected easily.
to contamination estimates. Thus, radiation detection is always a multi-step, highly
indirect process. For example, in a scintillation detector,
b. Field survey of uranium is best accomplished incident radiation excites a floresc.ent material that de-
through measurement of x-rays in the 60-80 thousand excites by emitting photons of light. The light is focused
electron volt (keV) range emitted by uranium isotopes onto the photocathode of a photomultiplier tube that
and daughters. For plutonium, the best technique is to triggers an electron avalanche. The electron shower
detect the accompanying contaminant Am-24 1, which produces an electrical pulse which activates a meter read
emits a strong 60 keV gamma-ray. Knowing the original by the operator. Not surprisingly, the quantitative
assay and the age of the weapon, the ratio of plutonium relationship between the amount of radiation actually
to americium can be calculated accurately and thus the emitted and the reading on the meter is a complex
total plutonium contamination determined. function of many factors. Since control of those factors
can only be accomplished well within a laboratory, only
c. Many of the factors which cannot be controlled in a laboratory setting can true measurements be made.
in a field environment can be managed in a mobile (2) On the other hand, detection is the qualitative
laboratory which can be brought to an accident/ incident determination that radioactivity is or is not present.
site. Typically, the capabilities include gamma spectros- Although the evaluation of minimum levels of detec-
copy, low background counting for very thin alpha- and tability is a considerable quantitative challenge for
beta-emitting samples and liquid scintillation counters instrumentation engineers, the task of determining
for extremely low energy beta emitters such as tritium. whether a meter records anything is considered much
easier than the quantitative interpretation of that
reading.
5-A.1-2 GENERAL (3) The above discussion suggests that the same
equipment can be used for either detection or measure-
a. Scope. This appendix provides detailed informa- ment. In fact generally, detectors have meters from which
tion from LLNL Report M-161 and Steven G. Hamann, numbers can be extracted. However, to the extent that
references (o) and (p) on the instrumentation and the user is unable to control factors which influence
associated techniques used to perform radiological the readings, those readings must be recognized as
monitoring at an incident/accident involving the release indications of the presents of activity (detection) only
of radioactive material. This appendix is not intended and not measurements.

5-A. I-1

(4) In the discussions that follow, personnel mu~t d. Gamma and x-radiation. Gamma rays are a form
be aware of the limitations imposed by field conditions of electromagnetic radiation and as such, are the most
and their implications on the meaning of readings taken. penetrating of the four radiations and easiest to detect.
Therefore, instructions are careful to indicate the extent Once emitted, gamma rays differ from x-rays only in
to which various instruments may be used as measure- their energies, with x-rays generally ly”ing below a few
ment devices or can be used only as detectors. 100 keV. As a result, x-rays are less penetrating and
harder to detect. However, even a 60 keV gamma-ray
has a typical range of a hundred meters in air, and might
penetrate a centimeter of aluminum. In situations in
5-A.1-3 TYPES OF RADIATION
which several kinds of radiations are present, these
penetration properties make x-ray/gamma ray detection
a. General. Four major forms of radiation are the technique of choice.
commonly found emanating from radioactive matter:
alpha, beta, gamma and x-radiation. The marked e. Radiations from the Common Contaminants. The
differences in the characteristics of these radiations following table lists some of the commonly considered
strongly influence their difficulty in detection and radioactive contaminants and their p@nary associated
consequently the detection methods used. radiations.

b. Alpha. An alpha particle is the heaviest and most TABLE 5-A.1-1. Commonly Considered Radioactive
Contaminants and Their Primary Asso-
highly charged of the common nuclear radiations. As
ciated Radioactive Emissions
a result, alpha particles very quickly give up their energy
to any medium through which they pass, rapidly coming Beta Gamma X-rays
Alpha
to equilibrium with and disappearing in the medium.
Since nearly all common alpha radioactive contaminants Ac-227 x x
emit particles of approximately the same energy, 5 Am-241 x x x
million electron volt (MeV), some general statements Cd-109 x
can be made about the penetration length of alpha C-14 x

radiation. Generally speaking, a sheet of paper, a thin
co-57 x
layer (a few hundredths of a millimeter) of dust, any CO-60 x x
coating of water or less than four (4) centimeters of H-3 x
air are sufficient to stop alpha radiation. As a result, I- 125 x
alpha radiation is the most difficult to detect. Moreover,
since even traces of such materials are sufficient to stop I- 129 x x
some of the alpha particles and thus change detector 1-131 x x
readings, quantitative measurement of alpha radiation K-40 x x
is impossible outside of a laboratory environment where Pa-23 1 x
special care can be given to sample preparation and
detector efficiency. Pm-147 x
PO-21O x
Pu-239 x
c. Beta. Beta particles are energetic electrons emitted Ra-224 x
from the nuclei of many natural and man-made
materials. Being much lighter than alpha particles, beta Ra-226 x
particles are much more penetrating. For example, a Ra-228 x x
500 keV beta particle has a range in air that is orders Sr-90 x

of magnitude longer than that of the alpha particle from Th-228 x

plutonium, even though the latter has ten times more
Th-230 x
energy. However, many beta-active elements emit Th-232 x
particles with very low energies. For example, tritium U (nat.) x x
emits a (maximum energy) 18.6 keV beta particle. At U-235 x
this low an energy, beta particles are less penetrating
than common alpha particles, requiring very special U-228 x x
techniques for detection. (See Chapter 7). Y-90 x

5-A. 1-2

.’
5-A.1-4 ALPHA DETECTION noted. It was found that a drop of water, a heavy piece
of lint or a single thickness of tissue paper totally
a. Because of the extremely low penetration of alpha eliminated all readings. A light spray of water,
particles, special techniques must be employed to allow comparable to a light dew, reduced readings by 40-50
the particles to enter the active region of a detector. percent. A layer of dust that was just visible on the
In the most common field instruments (AN/ PDR-56 shiny source had minimal effect on the count rate;
and -60), an extremely thin piece of aluminized mylar however, a dust level that was only thick enough to
film is used on the face of the detector probe to cover show finger tracks reduced readings by 25 percent. These
a thin layer of fluorescent material. Energy attenuation simple demonstrations reinforced the knowledge that
of the incident alpha radiation by the mylar is estimated detection of alpha particles in any but the most ideal
to be less than ten (10) percent. However, use of this situations is most problematical. The leaching or settling
film makes the detector extremely fragile. Thus, contact of contaminants into a grassy area or the dust stirred
with literally any hard object, such as a blade of hard up by vehicular traffic on paved areas will significantly
grass, can puncture the film allowing ambient light to decrease or eliminate alpha detection.
enter the detection region and overwhelm the photo-
multiplier and meter. (Even sudden temperature changes
have been shown to introduce stresses that can destroy 5-A.1-5 BETA/GAMMA DET~CTION
a film). In addition, contact with a contaminated item
could transfer contamination onto the detector. Thus, a. Gamma rays and high energy (>1 MeV) beta
monitoring techniques must be used which keep the particles are highly penetrating radiations. As a result,
detector from contacting any surface. However, recall the major problems listed for alpha detection do not
that the range of the alpha radiation is less than four apply. Furthermore, at the energies of concern in nuclear
(4) centimeters in air. This requirement to be within weapon accidents/ incidents, detection efficiency for
a few centimeters of monitored locations without ever most detectors is relatively high. Thus, beta/gamma
touching one makes use of such detectors impractical detection is relatively easy.
except for special, controlled situations (for example,
monitoring of individuals at the hotline or air sampler b. From a detection standpoint, unfortunately, high
filters). energy beta and gamma radiation are not produced in
the most likely radioactive contaminants (for example,
b. As discussed above, the sensitivity (minimum Plutonium, Uranium or Tritium). Rather, the major
detectability) of an alpha detector is not dictated by potential source of beta/gamma emitters is from fission
the ability of the active region of the detector to respond product radioelements which could be produced in the
to the passage of an alpha particle; counting efficiency extremely unlikely event of a partial nuclear yield. Beta/
for alpha detectors is 25-60 percent of the alpha particles gamma detection, therefore, has no quantitative use in
from a distributed source that reach the detector probe. determining the extent of plutonium or uranium
Fortunately, -alpha detectors” in good repair normally contamination, but is used as a safety precaution to
have a fairly low background: there are few counts from determine any areas containing hazardous fission
cosmic and other spurious radiation sources and the products.
elimination of most electronic noise is easy with current
state-of-the-art instruments. As a result, count rates in c. Common gamma detectors are scintillation
the order of a few hundred counts per minute are easily detectors (using scintillation media different from that
detectable on instruments such as the AN/ PDR-60. described above for alpha detection) or gas ionization
However, the detectability is dominated by the ability type detectors (ion chambers, proportional counters or
of the alpha particles to get into the active region of Geiger counters). In either case, the high penetrability
the detector, which depends upon such factors as of the radiation allows the detector to have reasonably
overburden (amount of dust and/or moisture lying heavy aluminum, beryllium or plastic windows and to
between the alpha emitters and the detector), and the be carried at a 0.5-1 .Om height. Dimensions of the active
proximity of the detector to the emitters. region of the detector (for example, the thickness of
a scintillation crystal) can be made larger to increase
c. In demonstrations conducted in the laboratory, a sensitivity. Because the detection efficiencies are
sealed alpha source (Am-24 1) was monitored with a well reasonably insensitive to energies in the energy regions
maintained AN/ PDR-60 alpha probe and meter. Dust of interest, the detectors can be calibrated in terms of
and water were sprinkled onto the source and changes dosage (rads or rem), rather than in terms of activity:

5-A.1-3

the signals from 5-A. desired x-rays and that small amount of background this corresponds to a few hundredths of a millirem per that happens to fall in the same pulse-size region. therefore. background. the scintillation produce a distribution of pulse sizes which cluster about detector is again the instrument of choice. These factors increase detector response. Unfortunately.5 cm and 190 m respectively. Window a mean pulse size. electronics must be quite sensitive. For 60 keV x-rays. an x-ray detector and its technique is described in the following section. it is also useful to discard all pulses whose radiation field that produces readings two to three times size is greater than a user-selectable upper level. thereby masking the true signals. Thus. rather. the half-thickness for mean pulse size. it is impossible to specify one setting for the energy of the x-ray. In fact. The greater than the background (no-contaminant. In cases of high (natural) probe. hour. such a detector is sensitive also to the myriad of radiations d. readings from a given contamination. tion. since the width of the pulse size distribution depends in a b. This has a most important all similar instruments. Furthermore. Minimum detectability for such a detector is a background. “a large fraction of the desired pulses absorption of 17 keV x-rays in aluminum is 0.14 . pulse-height discrimination is not as “easy” as described above. Thus.5 m) above the contaminated a qualitative judgment which can significantly affect the surface. developed to establish the sensitivity of a given detector. -’ this practice reflects the common use for beta/ gamma noise. Because of the relatively low (10s of keV) energy with its electronics. circuitry is installed in the meter to d. setting the discriminator rapidly with energy.1-1: Spectral Plot (Showing Normal Spread Of Pulses From A Mono-energetic Source Mixed With A Typical Background Spectrum and Indicating Typical Discriminator Settings). are only those from the radiation plus electronic noise) reading. This of the x-rays of interest. for x. In spite of the above complications. See Figure rays above 15 keV.4 mm will be eliminated. a large number of such detections will a. the scintillation from natural sources and to common low-level electronic detector remains the instrument of choice for detection Photo Peak } ‘Typical~ Discriminator Senings Figure 5-A. the setting of discriminator levels requires a comfortable height (0. though not as much as with slightly below and the upper level slightly above the alpha particles. natural accepted pulses. commonly called pulse-height discrimina. Rather. c. The size of an electronic pulse produced by an most complicated way upon the condition and age of x-ray in a scintillation-type detector is proportional to the detector. an x-ray detector can be held at 5-A. 1-1. the distances levels far from the mean will admit too much become 2. However. Typical of a beta/gamma detector is the Ludlum ignore all pulses whose size lies below a user-selectable Model 3 with a Ludlum 44-9 “pancake” (Geiger-Muller) lower level (threshold). Customarily. For example. To remove the unwanted signals. resulting in a significant decrease in and in air is about four meters.1-6 X-RAY DETECTION the detection of identical x-rays will not be identical in size. The result is a deluge of signals that overwhelm detectors the pulses from sought-after x-rays. techniques have been application. If one sets the lower-level discriminate or thickness is again a factor. in a field environment. 5-A. Unfortunately. For low energy (17-100 keV) x-rays.

apparently depending upon external configuration and subtle internal details of a detector. As a result. The detection of uranium contamination is fairly the process of calibrating an x-ray detector (the Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation). private communication. in good condition. HOT SPOT Codes. Am-241 2220 electronics package. a most grade mix for a medium-aged weapon. However. whereas overburden and its effect on alpha any other field technique. as well as the HP-41 calculator systems. To facilitate the calculations and calibration needed AND PLUTONIUM to measure plutonium contamination by x-ray detection in the field. Pu-241 beta decays. to Am-241. Confidence in the accuracy of provision to aid in the measurement of the geometric these measurements is in the p/ -25 percent range. and low energy x-radiation are not. like the 80 keV x-ray of uranium. For this reason. Although uranium and plutonium are alpha atory has produced a series of utility codes called the emitters. Lawrence Lkermore Laboratory Report M-161 (April 1985). mated to a Ludlum with a half-life of 14. Plutonium-239 and its daughters emit a value of K(h) for h = 30cm can vary from less than 17 keV x-ray which can be detected with a FIDLER 0. lSteven G. HOT SPOT Codes include an interactive. The determination of plutonium contam. Among the radiations emitted in the the FIDLER code is applicable to any x-ray detector decay of Uranium-235 and its daughters is an 80 keV if the full calibration technique. this mix would sensitive technique for the detection of weapons grade correspond to about one microcurie of plutonium per plutonium is to detect the contaminant Am-241 and infer square meter. 5-A. However. Homann. Thus. decay amount of radiation. the for detection of these elements is a scintillation detector.1-7 DETECTION OF URANIUM d. absorption of that relatively low particular FIDLER probe.2 microcuries per meter. and infer the actual amount of times. factor for any specific detector. 2Steven G. HOT SJ?3T Health Physics Codes. -“ of x-ray emitting radioactive contamination.1 Available for IBM-compatible Therefore. with far greater confidence than with quantities. the safeguards community has standardized upon the detection of plutonium via its americium daughter. count rate. The detection of plutonium is somewhat more Livermore National Laboratory have shown that the complicated. This value was chosen to give a relatively ination can be made more confidently through the conservative reading indication of contamination per following. such as knowledge of the age and monitor can make quantitative measurements of the original assay of the weapon material. since the x-rays are much the accompanying plutonium. indirect technique. straightforward. Lawremx Ltvermore National Laboratory. can detect 60 keV activity as subsequently decays with the emission of a 60-keV x-ray which. Set-up and field calibration of the detector as americium calibration source. One such (1) Weapons grade plutonium contains several detector is !he Field Instrument for Detection of Low isotopes: in addition to the dominant Pu-239. less affected by overburden than are alpha particles. In a typical weapon- easy to detect under field conditions. 1-5 . always a trace amount of Pu-241. The code provides also a default value technique. the instrument of choice computers.0 m2. Measurements made at the Ballistic Research Laboratory arid the Lawrence c. Furthermore. is relatively low as 0. described in this chapter allows measurement of the x-ray activity per square meter and thus evaluation of the e.4 m2 to over 1.35 years. Homann. weapon age and assay-are known or controllable contamination. they and their daughters also emit x-radiation. of 0. the Lawrence Livermore National Labor- a. user-friendly utility routine called FIDLER which steps a user through b. 5-A. there is Energy Radiation (FIDLER). the plentiful isotope. the FIDLER energy x-ray by overburden plus interference by code contains both a detailed laboratory procedure and background signals in the same range as the desired a field-expedient procedure for determining K(h) for a x-ray make measurement of the 17 keV a highly uncertain given detector.5 m2. NaI (Tl)) probe. Particularly useful in the FIDLER code is the uranium contamination. this technique requires more informa- radiation monitor has much better control of the factors tion than the direct detection of radiation from the most which influence his meter readings. the (2) Clearly. Thus. involving a known x-ray. A FIDLER (4*x1 mm. is used. Hazard Control Department. as discussed above.

-“ 5-A. it is possible to very thin. The major tools activity. Knowing the geometry of the experiment gathered without large amounts of local dirt.1-8 LABORATORY TECHNIQUES permits translating the count rate to an absolute evaluation of sample activity. accurately determine the energies of the gamma and x. such as a thin layer of ZnS mated to immersed totally in scintillation liquid in such a way a photomultiplier tube. In one. results in a reasonably accurate determination most common technique for liquid scintillation sample of the absolute amount of contamination in a sample. 1-6 . a sample holder. (2) Again. the energy of the radiation is amounts of various isotopes present in the contaminant so low . photomultipliers. the cloth can be replaced by a special plastic into the chamber under the detector. In these devices. Scintillation liquids are extremely sensitive to most impurities which tend (1) Another laboratory technique. categories: gamma and x-ray spectroscopy. laboratory procedures are necessary (2) Another alpha-beta technique involves gas-floy to make quantitative measurements of radiation proportional counters. evaporation of the solvent leaves a channel analyzer. is inserted natively. available within DoD and DoE for deployment to an Any emitted radiation causes ionization of the gas in accident site. a sample is contamination. A sample. the relative radiation from tritium. Alter- made very thin to minimize self-absorption. reasonably high resolution gamma/ x-ray detector (such Techniques used include dissolution of the sample onto as a GeLi or selectively high resolution NaI) and a multi. With this equipment. liquid can then be placed in a dark chamber and the 241 to Pu-239. notably in the detection of beta standard spectral unfolding techniques. Glass vials of such allows determination of the relative abundance of Am. the photomultipliers in the analysis chamber. The cloth can then be beta detector. is mounted in a chamber that that subsequent light emission will be visible to one of is shielded to remove background radiation. difficult. in the preceding sections. microcuries) in a sample. and liquid scintillation. the outstanding difficulty with this b. mobile laboratories are inserted ‘into the chamber of a proportional counter. dissolving the contaminant in a seen for such information: For example. the absorption of the radiation. the counting. by adjusting for the energy dependence of detection efficiencies and using (1) In a few cases. a reasonably sensitive alpha. gathering is to wipe a fixed area (typically 100 square Two types of counters are common and both are fairly centimeters) of a hard surface in the contaminated area simple in principle. resulting in accurate calibration of the resulting scintillation light pulses counted using most sensitive (FIDLER) survey techniques. For this reason. Liquid Scintillation. Although specific instrumentation will the counter which is electronically amplified and vary. spectroscopic techniques are not used for absolute measurements of amount of contamination (for example. sensitive part of the experiment is the sample preparation. absorption of the radiation must be minimized involved in gamma and x-ray spectroscopy are a by the overburden caused by the sample itself. The count rate is then technique works best when the contamination can be measured. c. material that dissoIves in scintillation liquid without air is evacuated from the chamber to eliminate air significantly quenching light output. time- radiation emitted by a contaminated sample. immediate application can be In these cases. Clearly. etc. quantitative alpha-beta counting is a difficult. Alpha-Beta Counting. Recalling the discussions solid samples cannot be used for quantitative analysis. the most counting. process is in the sample preparation.and the resultant absorption is so high . with a small piece of cloth. negligibly absorbing sample. Gamma and X-ray Spectroscopy. consuming process. 5-A. As discussed above. alpha-beta (3) In both types of alpha-beta counter. In either case.that may be determined accurately. spectroscopy scintillating liquid may be possible. To achieve absolute measurements of a. Generally. In some apparatus. However. alpha-beta to quench the output of light pulses. oil. the types of laboratory analyses fall into three counted. As a result.

Most air sampling data obtained during an accident response will reflect airborne 5-B-2 AIR SAMPLING TIME contamination caused by resuspension. the accuracy with samplers are positioned soon enough. The time required to respond to an accident and initiate 4“ TFA #41 CKHV 18 CFM 55 min an air sampling program will result normally in little 4“ TFA #21 33 CKHV 36 CFM 28 min 49. when the interest is in rapid When using filtration to collect particulate samples. the recommended priorities determines the volume of air sampled. air samplers are properly calibrated (see Table 5-B-l). or high volume samples on a monitor stands. personnel to deploy regular basis. The JHEC will provide direction for sampling proce. an air sampling program include sufficient air monitors (battery powered or a should be established to obtain 24 hour samples sufficient number of portable electric generators). It Operation provides a basis for estimating the radiation dose which Filter Type Cal. sample collected. Once that data required for establishing an air sampling program. precision of results. offset. Staplex air samplers use the CKHV calibrator for 4“ dures. Priority should. Even though this discussion is directed primarily at airborne contamina. be given to initiation of an air sampling the size of the sample. the evaluation of air contamination to identify areas where selection of filter medium is extremely important. Increasing sample time presents no real air sampling data will be needed immediately to assess difficulty when the interest is in long-term average the hazard to people still in the area. x- air. dependent.Kit Flow Rate Time people without respiratory protection may have received. which contaminants on the filter can be measured. as will be the case to identify actions required to fix the contaminant to during decontamination and restoration operations. in part. This plan would prompt evaluation is obtained. water. The results then may be used for the formu. TFA “S33 CKHV 70 CFM 15 min or no data being obtained during the initial release of 8“ X 10” TFA-81O CKHV-81O 50 CFM 20 min contamination when the highest levels of airborne contamination are expected. samplers should be operated long enough to sample a minimum b. The high concentrations of airborne contamination could filter used must have a high collection efficiency for pose a hazard to unprotected persons in relatively short particle sizes that will deposit readily in the lung (5 periods of time. and therefore. Variables which and procedures will permit as much information as affect the accuracy of air sampling results include the possible to be collected on the initial release if air type of sampling equipment used. During the initial response. analysis capability and a method to mark and secure the area monitors against The collection and analysis of samples provides tampering. Air Sampling. 5-B-1 . The sum of the errors can be program as soon as possible after arrival on-scene. air (equipment permitting). reduce the airborne hazard and spread of contamination. When taking samples for rapid evaluation. vegetation. short sampling times are appropriate. soil. Also important is a means to ensure that numerical data which describes a particular situation. Normally. Table 5-B-1. filter paper. and swipe sampies. Air sampling is conducted to determine if airborne contamination is present. Air Sample Calibration a. This appendix addresses results. Response plans should include provisions for of 1000 cubic feet of air. by increasing the total volume of the Whether or not data is obtained on the initial release. microns or less). 1000 CFM of air must be sampled for accurate lation of a course of action. The sampling criteria will be situation and site filter and CKHV-81O calibrator for the 8“ x 10” filters.52-M APPENDIX 5-B ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING 5-B-1 GENERAL samplers and collect filters. or in detection of and operations which require respiratory protection and very low levels of contamination. The period of time over which an air sample is collected tion caused by resuspension. to identify areas concentrations. DoD 51 OO.

or until an air sampling b. 5-B-2 . The amount of airborne contamination caused by During the initial response. and that actions taken upwind of the location u Command Post ‘3 & +$’ (Background) & 4: / 0 (Contamination Control Station) . number or symbol on a stake. To provide the nearby populated areas and microclimatology. :. 2 is placed downwind from the response actions or evacuation) will be known and accident at a distance dependent upon the wind velocity. Sampler positioning is directed toward the first 24-48 hours following an accident. so that data may be correlated with other information in the following days. . The main variables in determining the see Table 5-B-2. controlled. Placement sampler No. All air samplers available will be limited.<. the location of contamination levels and wind speed.. Down- quickest and most accurate estimate of the maximum wind samplers should be operated until it can be concentrations of airborne contamination. 1 is placed resuspension will vary from location to location as a downwind from the accident site to determine the hazard function of surface type. . surface wind in the immediate area of the accident and should operate patterns. and the level of contamination on the ground. a.her throughout the area. Figure 5-B-1 shows the recommended placement program tailored to the specific situation can be of air samplers. priority determined that no airborne contamination exists at their should therefore be given to placing an air sampler at. and that the should be coordinated with EOD personnel. continuously. and should be placed sampling locations should “be marked with a unique to obtain the maximum amount of information possible. The distance should be modified in a Recommendations on the initial placement of samplers downwind direction if necessary to permit access by a assume that the mix of surface t ypes is relatively constant clear path for placement and periodic readings and f. _ b % 1 @ (Contamination) &’2 (Downwind Hazard) Figure 5-B-1. Air Sampler location of physical activity in the area (for example. The sampler number indicates the implemented. locations. sampler No. 5-B-3 AIR SAMPLER PLACEMENT or near. Air Sampler Placement. the most highly contaminated area which is accessible. The time of readings and/or filter changes to minimize any localized wind effects. Modifications to this location should amount of airborne contamination will be ground be considered based on accessibility. that air samplers will be placed changes. physical activity. During this period the number of air priority which should be given to placement.

. The following equation may be used for initial field a. Field readings on filter and time made. if possible. When falters are changed. An air sampling log response. evaluation of air sampling data to obtain rough estimates of airborne contamination utilizing the AN/ PDR-60 or b. 3) from the gross activity areas are in. The three-day decay placed in a plastic bag for laboratory analysis and time precludes checking for thoron during the initial annotated with items a . including ident~lcation of AN/ PDR-56 (with the large probe attached) and 8 x field marking (stake) used to mark location. Location of sampler. Date. the contaminated area. The calculations shown operations since personnel leaving the contaminated area below are for field use in calculating gross activity on may carry and resuspend contaminants. particularly if readings were taken without changing falter. a.- and outside the contamination control area to obtain i. if available. radon. 4 is placed Air sampler filters can be analyzed using radioanalytical at the contamination control station and operated techniques by DoE. RADCON. 3 is placed the filter. For air sampling data used in the overall radiological Re-measurement after these times permits identification assessment and confirmation of field calculations. all elements. Air sampler No. The radon chain may be considered completely decayed after almost four hours. Start and stop time of sample. response.100 g Type of filter. or near. to be small. The amount the filter. During the initial phases of response. results may also be obtained by letting the naturally occurring radon. Background corrected. and of the amount of sample activity caused by these confirmed or validated later by laboratory analysis. in downwind locations to calculation is done by subtracting the gross activity of supplement sampler No. 16-20 14-17 2.500 8. and AFRAT personnel continuously during contamination control station or by using a calculation method. or when. Air Sample Placement (No. (MPH) (Knots) (Meters) (Feet) f. 10 inch or 4-inch (round) Whatman #41 filters. the check for radon is appropriate if. This samplers. Background samples should be collected concurrently with the sample of interest.f. and the thoron chain after almost three days. 5-B-3 . approximately 610 meters upwind of all contamination .500 5. .’ Table 5-B-2.600 Above 20 Above 17 2. Approximate Downwind d. Type and serial number of sampler. containing all of the folIowing data should be levels of airborne contamination detected are at or maintained. Wind Speed Distance e. Average flow rate and/ or volume of air.200 h. thoron. as the amount of naturally occurring 5-B-5 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS airborne radioactive particulate may vary as a function of time due to wind changes. 2) c. During rapid field calculations early in the pertinent data must be recorded.000 6. Any background radiation from naturally of contamination resuspended in this manner is expected occurring radionuclides (for example. 2. Wind direction and weather conditions.300 11-IS 10-13 1. and their 5-B-4 AIR SAMPLE DATA RECORDING daughters decay to background. Laboratory facility to which the filter was sent for simultaneous background air samples for use in processing. and their daughters) should be subtracted when applying consideration should be given to using all additional the calculated results to protection standards. Including radiation detection instrument type and serial number or changes in meteorological conditions will not result as well as designation of attached probe used to monitor in airborne contamination. thoron.000 3. particularly when populated the background sampler (No. 6-10 4-9 1. Sampler No. of the sampler of interest when making rapid evaluations. interpretation of other readings. they should be slightly above the established levels.

Vegetation. unfolded. FSN 6640- counts per minute 00-836-6870. Each swipe 2 specifications) should be taken from an area of about 100 cm by gently Ef = Collection efficiency of filter used rubbing two or three times with the dry filter paper (from manufacturer’s specifications) disc. rection factors. (3) For a specific alpha and/or beta radionuclide. The swipe is then placed. Place a small “x” instrument (same units as Af) IN PENCIL ONLY on the outer edge of the filter paper F = Alpha absorption factor for filter on the side which is to touch the radioactive source used (from manufacturer’s or area being tested for contamination. < - 200 and 800 for the AN/ PDR-60 and AN/ PDR-56 respectively. If forms meters are unavailable. (round) filter paper. 0. Soil sampling procedures depend on the purpose of the sampling program. If this is A~ = Area of filter used (any units) unavailable. (1) Surface and/ or waste discharge sources-two liters. 5-B-4 . If other alpha instruments or filters are being used (2) Drinking water sources—one liter. Swipes. Filter paper discs are used for taking swipe where cpm = alpha meter reading on air filter in tests. cpm x CF — Background 5-B-6 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES dpm/m3 = AFR x T (rein) Reading a. a plain envelope containing the required Ec = Efficiency of counting instrument collection information may be substituted. b. The following A F R = Average Flow Rate of the air sampler minimum quantities are necessary for analysis: in cubic feet per minute T= Time in minutes the air sampler was (1) Gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha and/or gross beta—two kilograms of soil (approximately one running CF = Conversion factor (1000 for AN/ square foot area three inches deep). area cor. other filter paper with a maximum diameter Ac = Area of filter actually counted by the of 1 3/4 inches may be substituted. (2) Gross alpha and/ or gross beta only—100 grams. Soil. 4000 for AN/ PDR-56) includes unit conversions. careful where cpm = alpha meter reading on air filter in selection of control (background) samples is required counts per minute to allow interpretation of results.5xm3x FxEfx Ecx A~ d. The minimum sample volume is three liters of densely packed sample and should be double cpm x Af plastic bagged or packed in a one-gallon wide-mouth dpm/ mj = plastic jar. 41 filter paper. in a properly m3 = Total volume of sampled air in cubic completed Service form for a Swipe Container. and other constants. the following equation should be used for field evaluation of air sampling data. Water. Whatman No. the conversion factors are b. 4. is recommended for swipes. #41 filter paper. In all cases. c. PDR-60.25 cm. particularly Pu-239 (plutonium) —consult the approp- assuming use of 8 x 10 inch Whatman riate Service laboratory. For 4-inch.

Environmental Health Laboratory. and gamma radiatio+. Texas. The rad-iological characterization of the accident team aw. a finite defiriition of authorized access to Restricted Data and Critical the accident area is needed to plan. The detection/measurement of different types of (e) Supervise and provide technical advice for radiation and the inherent difficulties have been decontamination operations. (d) Control and supervise radiological safety services. Radiological Control c. a radiation equipment repair team) and on (c) Provide health physics services. The need or preliminary data on the absencel nation at an accident site. AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS 5-C-1 GENERAL (a) Perform detailed radiological surveys for alpha. initiate. Many military units and some civilian firms/ agencies possess (2) The RADCON Team will consist as a minimum alpha and gamma detection capabilities. and gamma radiation. The RADCON Team is a specialized team located services for portable instruments used and owned by at Aberdeen Proving Ground.S.52-M . U. However. a. Air Force Occupational and Environmental available to enable theoretical. DoD 51 OO. All team members have a minimum security clearance of Secret and are preliminary survey data. preliminary. U. a qualified health physicist. in the event of an incident/ (f) Supervise and provide technical advice for the accident. (3) Requests for additional information shouid be directed to RADCON personnel. enumerated. 78235. site restoration. (2) Maintains the USAF stock of low energy photon field survey instruments with trained operators to (1) The RADCON Team is organized to: support disaster operations.S. Brooks AFB. and organized the USAF Medical Service for. APPENDIX 5-C SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING. This appendix provides information on service (b) Control and supervise waste disposal radiation monitoring teams (health physics and bioassay measures. radiation detection/ measurement must be control and containment of the radiological contami- completed. specialists. RADIAC REPAIR. beta.istance may be requested through the Army site is an iterative process involving the systematic Operations Center or the JNACC. The following describes those resources b. beta. DoE and related monitoring and assessment capabilities. and complete Nuclear Weapons Design Information. 5-c-1 . traceable to the National a. in radiological emergencies. b. and eight firms have equipment and individual monitor capabil. integration of data produced by several assessment techniques. . provides many radiation protection services as follows: 5-C-2 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (1) Conducts calibration. The Occupation and definitive site characterization for the OSC. These units/ of a team leader. and minor repair Team. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Institute of Standards and Technology. the detection and to provide technical assistance and advice to the OSC measurement of electromagnetic and ionizing radiation. specialists qualified in air sampling and in monitoring ities that can provide radiation measurements and for alpha. Maryland. presence of radiation for the OSC is imperative. However. and Health Laboratory (OEHL).

Package (ATRAP). Air Force Air Transportable RADIAC RADIAC repair. (g) personnel dosimetry su~p. It is a collection (2) Request for additional information should be of RADIAC equipment. calibrate and issue DoE Team Leader. the JNACC.DCON Team can provide the type of radiation hazard. Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 1-G. short term evaluations of radiation exposures. and Hot Line management. worldwide to radiation accidents with air transportable equipment for detecting. uranium. alpha. Texas. use. and manufactured materials. ranging from general programs for downwind in water. HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes. and trained forwarded to the Director. U. biological. Radiolog- physicists. to more specific programs dealing with the release of (3) Requests for additional information should be plutonium. Naval Sea Systems status by the Air Force Logistics Command for airlift Command. and quantifying any (1) The Navy RA. radioisotope analysis of following capabilities:” selected environmental. and equipment ical Affairs Support Office (NAVSEADET RASO). The Air Transportable RADIAC Package is located at Kelly AFB. a week basis. identifying. d. These codes provide a activity commander in the event of a nuclear weapons first-order approximation of the radiation effects accident.S. At present. limited c. U. spare parts. requested through the Air Force Operations Center or (e) Reference library. The Services of DoE capabilities will be requested by the ATRAP team is prepared to repair.S. cation by the Air Force Operations Center. OEHL services may be the OSC. the JNACC. a.ort. seven days scene. (5) Request for additional information should be (d) RADCON and radiation health expertise to directed to OEHL personnel. assessment of accidents involving radioactive materials. (3) Deploys a field-qualified team of healt~ Naval Sea Systems Command Detachment. Radiological Controls instrument repair technicians maintained in an alert Program Office (SEA-06GN). ATRAP units will be moved by helicopter or assessment following the release of radioactive material by water/ sealift means. The ATRAP These codes are run on the Hewlett-Packard HP-41 will move over the road to sites within 150 miles of family of hand-held computers to allow for easy “field” Kelly AFB. (4) Conducts special projects dealing with long and (b) Environmental sample analysis. and on-site equipment maintenance and (a) Field survey and laboratory analysis for “ calibration. beta and gamma radiation emitters. 13 separate programs Command. or tritium to programs that directed to ATRAP personnel. The Air Transportable RADIAC Package is able to support forces responding to an accident or incident 5-C-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) by providing spare RADIAC sets and an on-scene repair shop for instruments used in radiological surveys. health physics technicians. (f) Air deployable assets. Navy RADCON Team. (c) Limited bioassay analysis. but requests may be made also RADIAC instruments to radiation survey teams at the through JNACC if the DoE Team Leader is not on- scene of the accident on a twenty-four hours. Beyond three hours driving time. ATRAP services may be estimate the dose commitment from the inhalation of requested through the Air Force Operations Center or various radionuclides. Also. (2) The HOT SPOT computer programs were created to provide Health Physics personnel with a fast. The Navy RADCON field-portable calculational aid for evaluating accidents Team provides health physics assistance to the OSC or involving radioactive materials. This team is capable of responding Yorktown Virginia. (1) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes were (2) The ATRAP will maintain in a ready status for developed for the Department of Energy’s Accident deployment to the scene of a nuclear accident/ Response Group (DoE ARG) to provide a quick initial radiological emergency within four hours after notifi. The Navy RADCON Team is located at the associated with the atmospheric release of radionuclides . For accident sites on inaccessible terrain or exist. to the scene of a nuclear accident or radiological incident. Texas. the codes are available in an IBM-PC the ATRAP will be airlifted by Military Airlift compatible version. called the AFRAT. (1) The OSC will coordinate support for the ATRAP and accompanying technicians.

D OSE Inhalation dose commitment. to atmospheric transport of radionuclides employ a expedite the initial assessment of accidents involving Gaussian plume-dispersal model. additional fine tuning of the model with plume-rise algorithms and similar modifications was deemed unwarranted. Several programs deal with body dose commitment). The manual is designed for and estimate the effects of a surface-burst detonation of a nuclear weapon. activity. Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Physics Codes Program Name Description PUEXP Downwind dose commitment and ground deposition estimates resulting from an explosive release of plutonium. however. FIDLER FJDLER calibration and data reduction. Individual organ and release fraction) are noted as appropriate. PUFIRE Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving plutonium. using ICRP-30 Library.within minutes of data input. (5) The dosimetric methods of ICRP have been used Key assumptions (for example. Programs involving the the release of plutonium. TRIT Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a tritium release. reference (o). using ICRP-30 Library. a dose-conversion factor can be input by the user. LUNG Lung screening for plutonium using a FIDLER detector. The will produce a consistent output for the same input source term can contain any or all of the radionuclides assumptions. the HOT SPOT programs will provide a explosive release. or an area contamination event. Although significant errors material as a result of the continuous or puff release. UFIRE Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving natural uranium of any enrichment of 235U. the HOT SPOT codes radionuclides selected from ICRP Publication 30. Also contains a subroutine for the determination of radionuclide weight fractions as a function of mix age. Should a desired radionuclide not reside in the database. particle-size distribution throughout the HOT SPOT programs. 5-c-3 . distribution is modeled using virtual source terms as EXPLUME. if applicable. RESUS General resuspension model. EXPLUM”E General explosive release dispersion model. using ICRP-30 Library. These reasonable level of accuracy for a timely initial three programs interact with a data-base containing 75 assessment. Resuspension Source Term. PLUME General Gaussian plume dispersion model. users of the codes and therefore does not contain detailed descriptions of algorithms used in the codes. and RESUS—allow for downwind dose needed. PURES Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from the resuspension of plutonium. and mitigation factor. are possible. a universal nomogram during an emergency situation. and tritium. equivalent whole- contained in reference (o). TABLE 5-C-1. for example. thus minimizing the potential errors in the database. BOMB Effects of a surface-burst fission weapon. each with its independent release associated with reading a graph incorrectly or scaling fraction. Three general programs: PLUME. uranium. dose values (unweighed) are produced. using ICRP-30 Library. modeling the initial distribution assessment following the release of any radioactive associated with an explosive release or area. RADWORK Determination of recommended workplaces for the handling of radioactive materials. Initial radionuclide nuclear weapons. Owing to the large uncertainties associa~ed with the source terms and diffusion coefficients. (3) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes oper. Other ating instructions and information are contained in programs estimate the dose commitment from inhalation Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) of any one of the radionuclides listed in the database Manual 161. More importantly. along with the (4) Table 5-C-1 is a summary of the programs committed dose equivalent (weighted.

etc. Conservative site system computer located at the installation. these refined projections may cover soon as it is available. provides support to emergency response teams during (b) Description of accident particulars. directed the time of the accident. Although (5) Every effort should be made to provide updated the initial projections are shown typically on a 30-by- or supplementary information to the ARAC Center as 30’ k~lometer grid. including accidents involving radioactive materials. completion of extensive radiation surveys and bioassays. and subsequent weather by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. information. Until time and equipment permit observers). b.initial estimates of the extent of to the general public until comprehensive radiation contamination can be ready for transmission from measurements and bioassays can be performed. contamination and dose. (a) Accident location. computer generated estimates of the location and such as mechanism of the release (high explosive contamination levels of deposited radiological material detonation or fire).). At this time ARAC close to an ARAC serviced site. explosive detonation). the ARAC Center projected whole-body effective dose to exposed persons will be alerted by the facilit y’s personnel using the ARAC in the downwind area will be available. city boundaries. assumptions are made in calculating the amount of immediately after the initial report to the NMCC is radiological material released so that these initial completed. Also. when exposed JNAIR Team. Desired information includes: either a larger or smaller area depending on the 5-c-4 . from a nuclear weapon accident. ARAC projections will assist in assessing the potential (6) Approximately 30 minutes after the ARAC impact of an accident and in identifying areas for initial facility has been notified of the necessary accident investigation by response force radiological teams. cation of ARAC. ARAC can generate a calculation based on a meteorological (4) Responses outside the hours listed above are forecast to give projected contamination patterns in case subject to an additional 60:90 minutes delay. ARAC approximately 30 minutes after ARAC has Projected deposition patterns will assist estimates of site received notification of the: restoration efforts. a computer generated estimate of maxi- (2) In the event of a nuclear weapon accident at mum credible ground-level-contamination spread and or near an ARAC-serviced facility. the initial projections can’t support OCONUS facilities in the same manner will probabiy not include geographic features (roads. (Estimates are now based on only those known to have undergone a high- Firefighting Guidance (C)]. by calling ARAC’S EMERGENCY number: released in an aerosolized form. Weapons at risk. duration of any fire. is to NMCC. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (a) Observed wind speed and wind direction at (ARAC). ARAC products include (c) Specific details of accident fire or explosion. However. all the nuclear directly by the installation initiating the OPREP-3 report material at risk (except that of the IHE item[s]). ARAC is a DoE and DoD resource. contamination. and height and and radiation dose to exposed population in the size of the plume or cloud (if available from reliable surrounding areas. if available. General risk released during the accident. If the accident location isn’t Livermore tie line extension 2-9100. type and amount of fuel involved and (1) ARAC provides the user with computer model measured contamination at specific locations with estimates of the contamination distribution resulting respect to the contamination source. Iine numbers for the specific weapon(s) releasing. that changes. as CONUS facilities. projections place an upper bound on levels of resulting remote from an ARAC serviced DoD installation. ARAC should be contacted to unusual stress during the accident undergo a non- nuclear high-explosive detonation. If the accident occurred in a CONUS area. of dispersal during a weapon-safing operation. a more refined projection will be (c) Type and quantity of weapons involved in available in somewhat less conservative assumptions are the accident [weapon information should be transmitted made in estimating the actual amount of material at using the line number(s) contained in TP-20-11. FTS 532-9100. excluding notification of ARAC will come through the NMCC’S insensitive high explosive (IHE) weapons. For consequence analyses. ARAC projected doses will assist (3) During normal working hours (currently 0730 initial response efforts in evaluating the potential hazard to 1615 Pacific Tirne)l. Similar conservative commercial (41 5) 422-9100. (7) Approximately 60 to 90 minutes after notifi- (b) Time of accident. or through assumptions are made where specific accident informa- AUTOVON by asking the Albuquerque operator for the tion is missing or unknown.

the area given for exceeding 25 rem is the sum projected deposition pattern. The following paragraphs greater than 600.” Projected doses apply only to people emanating from the release point which will. and networks and waterways.Prompt action computer estimation denoting either a “50 Year Whole required. in both kilometers and feet) comprise three separate & Greater than 6 pCi/ mz .Respiratory protec- display will be a legend.. graphic display area will be the title of the underlying ~ Greater than 25 rem . ARAC may be transmitted to deposition and four dose exposure levels for which the ARAC site system computer located at most ARAC. Note that ARAC considered within this area. (a) Geographic Contour Display. recommend sheltering. Release loca- tion is centered in this a~ea (refined projections may (9) The wording which accompanies the action have release location offset from center) with a 2000. 25. 1:50. the contour levels are calculated and displayed. overlay a geographic representation. of the area around the recommended actions are to reduce the projected dose accident site. of the area covered by the 25 and 150 rem contour patterns). The second line will denote the date and evacuation. issue sheltering instructions.5 rem . consider these notes. in most outdoors without respiratory protection from the time cases. If the site does not have a site system highest projected levels will be shown on any ARAC computer. the area (c) The wording of the preceding deposition covered by this particular pattern in square kilometers. the projections can be telefaxed to any CCITT plot. To the right of the contour & Greater than 5 rem .Consider produced. showing road of the accident until the valid time of the plot. Dose exposures are projected for levels greater “initial” projections shown in Figures 5-C.Immediate Time (GMT)). ‘ action levels was contracted because of space limitations and abbreviated. and 0. Line nine shows the radiological material action may be required until the contamination is modeled. to mark areas in the contour display where the dose or deposition is greater than the stated value. projections are made. than 150.I and 5-C-2.Immediate side of the graphics plot.5 rem. “Z” is equivalent to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) which has replaced the more familiar Greenwich Mean ~ Greater than 600 pCi/mz . possible controlled evacuation showing a particular contour cross hatch pattern used required.60. across the middle of the display directing the viewer to the ARAC Computer Estimation Notes on the right ~ Greater than 150 rem . (b) Descriptive Notes. The issue shelte~lng instructions. which refer to a 50 year whole body effective dose via the inhalation pathway. consider Body Effective Dose” or “Cumulative Deposition” plot. Lme seven identifies either the dose (b) Cumulative Deposition “Exposure Action integration period or total deposition period time as Levels. respiratory protection required. Greater than 60pCi/ m . 2 10 through 22 will show the specific computer estimation 2. The full wording follows: 5-c-5 . There are a maximum of three cumulative (8) When available. A maximum of three contoured areas will be shown sure Action Levels. etc. Printed across the top of each respiratory protection and evacuation recommended.000) for ease of overlaying the example. Lines three through six will be reserved for sheltering. Lines recommend controlled evacuation. The first line is a title line for tion required. sheltering or evacuation. 5.Supervised are% action levels as calculated for that particular plot. Within each block is an area access on need only basis. The display is always oriented with north toward the (a) 50-Yr Whole-Body Effective-Dose “Expo- top. recommend controlled next several lines (down to the scale of the display shown evacuation 2-14 days. generalized actions that may be on the ARAC plots. and the height above ground level at which stabilized or removed.” appropriate (NOTE: All times will be shown as “Z” time.Restricted are% blocks of information. Projected cumulative depositions are for levels Group 3 telecopier machine. levels in the legend follows: foot fragmentation circle drawn around the release point. general amplifying remarks about the computer - estimation. Only the areas with the three serviced sites. and 6 microCuries per square meter provide information regarding the ARAC example @Ci/ mz). Note that the area given can generate projection plots to match a given map scale will encompass the area of all higher levels shown (for (for example.downwind extent of the contamination. The words “SEE NOTES” will be printed to those people exposed. time that the specific computer model estimation was < Greater than 0.

....000 I 1 — y n . \ . .. . Figure 5-C-1: ARAC PLOT-Lung Dose. v v v v v RQC C o m p u t e r S i m u l a t i o n N o t e s ~en er ated: 31t19R89 2 3 3 2 2 T N Est m a t Eff. ~.. .. II= E .. I l\ I ‘. K / . . W B — Dose <R e m a r k s : I n i t i a l P l o t . ...... .... ........!. .. . . .. H E Det of all line items. — ‘) bcale = 1:200.:: s / . . k . . ...— . t . . /..v. . ‘& .

. ... —-~ . $... I 2000 A\ i“ FT —J L ) \ 1— otal D e p o s i t i o n : 0MQR89 2 2 9 0 Z t o 31MRR89 0 0 0 9 Z ateriul: PU-239 xposure Rct ion Leuels: /~kLeuel und Rrea Couered) Ixxxm 612E! uCi/mZ at 0. . .. 0 sq km te a c t i o n r e q u i r e d .. L I .0 m 2 . II ) 6B uCi/m2 1(3. 1 0 0 0 0 ... . — m: . .1 4 days. I Figure 5-C-2.... r e c o m m e n d [\ l e d e v a c u a t i o n 2 . 6 uCi/m2 4 6 .9 km Source Location: . ~. . 5..9 sq km s e d area. nd c o n t r o l l e d e v a c u a t i o n . 5 s q km Ezzzl’ Restricted area: Recess on need E \ only b a s i s .. he Itering i n s t r u c t i o n s .. 0 ft Len: 1 2 1 ° 5 5 ’ 4 9 ” H . B .. ARAC PLCJl_-Deposition. issue sheltering instructions. Possible controlled evacuation required. v v Lat: 37°42’04” N .. .

All activities should be considered carefully conducted after a weapon accident is likely to follow and supervised. Decontamination personnel and public health and safety staff should wear limited anti- & Radiological deposition outline. Controlled heaviest contamination. Residents should 1. Controlled evacuation should be considered and may have to occur between about two days and two weeks (b) The first radiological photography survey or more. hours (plus driving time) after notification. as needed. Also. Controlled evacua- ~ Direction of the plume centerline. positioning be from one to five days. data time required to complete this series of surveys may formatting and recording” equipment. a preliminary action requ~ed. Full anti. materials had been dispersed from the weapon. available 6 to 12 hours after the flight is completed or after the analysis laboratory arrives. (1) General.Supervised area. work. Additional data processing will and/ or meat and poultry must be controlled and further establish the identity and concentration of the isotopes action regarding them assessed. A variety of (d) The results of an aerial survey of Area 13 DoE owned aerial platforms (fixed-wing and helicopter) of the Nevada Test Site is shown in Figure 5-C-3. Urgent remedial action may be needed radiological survey would establish whether radioactive from within a few hours up to two days. hardware. is in progress or there is no significant airborne hazard ~ The helicopter would then be refueled and and none forecast to occur via resuspension. contamination clothing and respiratory protection Dispersion patterns and relative radiation intensities. The EG&G AMS has three capabilities ~ The analysis laboratory would arrive 4 avaiIable to support a weapon accident: aerial radio.Immediate (a) In. logical mapping. meteorological instruments. a coverage of large areas and yield average ground series of smaller area surveys would be initiated. depending upon the area to equipment. incident site maps. (2) Aerial Radiological Mapping. c. and aerial photography. All work on. may be should remain indoors with doors and windows closed. + Information from 3 would be transmitted by radio to base operations during the survey.. windy operations. sodium-iodide gamma-ray detectors. AMS personnel will assist evacuation of children and adults should be considered interpreting and correlating their information with other urgent. involved. was the site of a “one-point” detonation in the 1950s equipment capable of being mounted on a variety of to simulate a weapon accident. tion of residents. Instrumentation includes to map the contaminated area in detail. progress of clean-up operations. The aerial survey data DoD helicopters is available to perform survey missions . but appropriately line spacings. used to guide radiation survey teams to the areas of Room air conditioners should be turned off. and/or have serpentine pattern of survey lines 0. Greater than 600 pCi/m2 . a nuclear weapon accident. the crew would obtain instructions within two hours. The concentrations of the contaminant. is possible during q Approximate radiation levels along the decontamination if there is a possibility of airborne plume centerline. The helicopter would arrive six to ten remain indoors with windows closed unless evacuation hours follo=ng notification. Residents immediately available from the initial survey. Detailed radiological contours. and data ‘analysis equipment. Aerial radiolog- ical surveys provide rapid assessment and thorough (c) After the first. especially children.5 to five miles apart to determine: a need to be there. Full anti-contamination clothing and this protocol and time frame: respirators required for all personnel engaged in heavy work or dusty.Restricted area. Aerial Measurement System (AMS). Subsequent surveys could provide data on the ~ Greater than 60 pC1/ mt .were”analyzed for the 60 keV photopeak of Am241. ~ Greater than 6 pCi/ mz . required by all emergency staff in this area. agricultural products radiological survey data. & Dominant isotopes. contamination protective clothing. contamination via resuspension. aerial search for weapons and/ or ~ Full analysis of flight results would be weapon components. ~ A survey would then be conducted in a Entry restricted to those who live. The purpose of these surveys would be scaled. such as those shown in 5-C-8 . broad survey is completed. The system can also flight altitude would likely be 100 feet with 200 foot be used to quickly prepare crude. 1. direct readout be surveyed and the weather. The length of large-volume. or the use of. This are dedicated to supporting this mission.

area of contamination and the in helicopters. which 1.Figure 5-C-3 would be available five to eight hours after need to be employed. vegetation cover and the Hasselblad system can be produced and printed terrain effects. and 0. sample results should be done with caution. the appropriate flight parameters when notified of the (f) Comparison with ground-based survey and particular scenario.3 #Ci/ mz for both CS137 and 1131.000. The aerial survey results average. the aerial produced to map scales can be printed on-site generally search capabilities available from AMS capabilities may within hours of the completion of the flight. Experience has shown that the lower level of known detectability and normally requires low altitudes detectability y of Am241 can be expected to be 0. Aerial search personnel will be able to determine on the order of 1 to 10 flCi/ mz of plutonium. operates out of helicopters. ditches. 5-c-9 . This interference of other isotopes (both natural and man. Large prints up to 20” x 24” (3) Aerial Search. These consist of gamma and the completion of the previous survey flight. The area (4) Aerial Photography.000 times larger than the area sampled by an alpha produces detailed aerial photographs= The second system probe or a soil sample. The americium concentrations indicated represents knots).0 flCi/mz. under field conditions. In certain scenarios. capability may be useful only for certain sources of made).03 to (100 feet or less) and slow speeds (approximately 60 1. water bodies. One system consists of a large format aerial instrument at one (1) foot above the ground and mapping camera operated in fixed-wing aircraft.03 to 0. utilizing the Hasselblad scale averages and take into account the overall effect 70mm cameras to produce color photographs. neutron detector modules designed for the DoE owned (e) The sensitivity of the system depends upon BO-105 helicopters or portable modules that can be used the flight altitude. such as the UH-60 and U H. .1.000 times the area sampled by a FIDLER-type a site. Two major photographic sampled in a single aerial measurement is on the order systems are used to acquire detailed serial photos over of 1. Film from of roads.

. . . .. “WP? “ ” :2 v . .. ..”” . . . .. . ...” .. . . ..””’ . .. . 5-C-1O . . ” . ... .\ . .. .. . 3 a /.: /..LQ . . .’”” ... . . . b9 49 \ . ~ \ . ● .! .... .. . .. . .- ---- (!) w -. “.”” “ ”’. . . ...- .. \. . .

If FIDLERs are detection range of alpha radiation results in a high rate unavailable. The type and amount of low energy gamma comprehensive contamination characterization. Low energy gamma instru- released by the accident must be done immediately. Field use should be limited to only smooth surfaces like pavement and buildings. General. Alpha surveys are possible only under the perimeter. Extensive radiation predictions and (b) Low Energy Gamma Instruments. Each successive survey operation conducted prior to any rainfall. with ment of contamination on rough ground or other the x-ray probe attached. Under field conditions. Later surveys will be based on the initial survey data which will not normally be available until the specialized and AMS plots. a reading of twice background is dry conditions. When low and its detection may be blocked by nothing more than energy gamma/ x-ray instruments are used to establish surface moisture. For the best (perimeter survey) to permit identification of potentially detection efficiency. Selection of instru. and x-ray radiation present depends on the age of the plutonium. During the initial hours of the daughter. and if weather or field conditions preclude of instrument failure when field use requires measure.and area for decontamination and to develop and evaluate x-ray radiations from plutonium. the AN/ PDR-56F. FIDLERs are evaporated. whereas the required to identify and minimize the hazards to people. or only on the knowl.52-M APPENDIX 5-D AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS 5-D-1 SURVEYS monitoring at the hot line. if available. low energy gamma/x-ray surveys uses FIDLER probes. may be used to detect contamination. Instru- surveys will be required to identify and characterize the ments capable of detecting the low energy gamma. When alpha (a) Alpha Instruments. same level of contamination as that produced by a “new” determination of the location of measurements made. 5-D. the use of alpha instruments.I . Alpha instruments should therefore ‘were caused by the accident. migrating into the soil. and its americium restoration plans. Days will be required to complete teams arrive. and during the first five will be based in part on the information gained from days after the accident before part of the measurable earlier operations. available radiation survey instruments and energy gamma/ x-ray instruments are not subject to monitoring personnel for survey operations will be damage by surfaces being monitored and field surveys limited. identification of the edge of contamination. Many weapons will contain plutonium over b. resulting in higher signal strengths for the mentation. If fission products irregular surfaces. for example. therefore. weapon. 10 years old. with alpha most alpha instruments combined with the short instruments the second choice. DoD 51OO. Alpha instruments can instruments are used to establish the perimeter. Initial radiation surveys may be based low energy radiation present is screened by the plutonium on ARAC information. Low “ response. priority must be given to those actions field surveys of plutonium contamination. however. the recommended instruments for a release occurred. The fragility of the Mylar probe face on recommended to perform perimeter surveys. SPA 3 probe is more useful for measuring the medium These actions include identification of the affected area energy gamma radiation from uranium. (2) Perimeter Contamination Levels. The best instrumentation for edge that contamination will be dispersed downwind. after any morning dew has recommended to mark the perimeter. a. readings detect lower levels of contamination than low energy of 500 CPM are recommended for instruments with 60 gamma instruments. General Survey Procedures. The age of the plutonium in a weapon can be obtained from the DoE ARG. therefore. If ments are. as possible. priority should be given be used primarily for personnel and equipment to establishing a 10 mR/ hr perimeter. Determining whether contamination was can be rapidly conducted. may be used. (1) Selection of Instrumentation. the age of the plutonium and and data recorqing procedures are similar for most projected signal strength should be determined as soon survey operations. cm probe area and 105 CPM for instruments with 17 alpha radiation has an extremely short detection range cm probes be used to mark the perimeter. low energy x-ray surveys should be contaminated people.

or the position determined precisely for later although the location of rivers or other terrain features correlation of the data with other information. the same size or slightly smaller. Data location mark (stake number or other (6) Area Surveys. The radiation reading has not subtracted from the instrument first survey covering the entire area wiil be provided reading. a position report at the perimeter in urban areas. points. therefore pavement or other hard surfaces for later reference. as soon as possible upon which to base their actions. or any other reference which can be located on transmissiorr of radiation readings should be discouraged the maps being used. the full perimeter survey can result Monitoring and survey teams’ records should include in an expansion of the perimeter. to aid in identifying affected equipment may be unavailable to determine precise people. and projections. While not classified. Date and start/stop time of survey. If perimeter survey teams are equipped with a radio. not been subtracted. If a vehicle is used during the on unsecure nets. ~. Data points should be marked in some to the population in the area. actions. if available. required to cover. FIDLERs should be identifying positions in sparse[y populated areas. most times by the Aerial Measurement System~AMS). Estimated positions may be street addresses be adjusted accordingly. The On-Scene Commander and civil immediate need for radiological data may outweigh the authorities will need at least a rough plot of the perimeter time required to determine precise positions. use of widely separated monitoring points and a vehicle When engineering survey equipment is not being used. and perimeter survey procedures may ~. or the of contamination. the estimated distance down a street locations on each traverse will provide an immediate or road from an identifiable intersection. arrive and may take weeks to complete. Rapid identification the point where it is collected must be identifiable on of the perimeter of the contaminated area is required a map or aerial photo of the area. is “Gross. marking) when used. used when performing a full survey of the perimeter. (3) Fixing Survey Points. the odometer mileage from an intersection or other known point may be adequate for (b) Full Perimeter Survey. recording out along the edge of the area with readings being taken procedures must ensure that positional data being about every 50 feet. Streets and roads will manner so that the point can be later relocated for other normally provide rapid access to populated areas. the perimeter ~. and to establish controls to prevent the spread positions in the early phases of response. Instrument reading indicating if the reading area are required to identify areas requiring fixation. ~. or data collection record. (a) Initial Fkrimeter Survey. or “Net” meaning the background and jo determine decontamination effectiveness. initial perimeter survey. If an alpha instrument the following information: was used for the initial perimeter survey. This may not be possible until after the specialized teams (4) Recording Survey Data. perimeter survey. (a) For radiation monitoring data to be useful. Estimated or surveyed position. The contaminated area may be unique identification painted or otherwise marked on a mile or more wide and several miles long. 5-D-2 . Engineering survey to prevent undue alarm. to move between monitoring points should be considered the monitoring log. If weather or terrain require the recorded at the transit position and radiological data use of the AN/ PDR-56 x-ray probe on the initial being recorded by the monitors can be correlated. (5) Perimeter Surveys. The urgency of perimeter definition is directly related ~. compass location of the perimeter to the command center and bearings taken on two or more identified reference permit team progress to be tracked.” meaning background radiation reading has to support decontamination and restoration planning. Team member names. which may hinder access to portions of the potentially ~. A numbered or uniquely identified stake contaminated area must be considered when directing may be used to mark the location on soil. and a similar the perimeter survey. established by the fuIl perimeter survey should be about ~. will assist in determining the an estimated position to use immediately following data area and distance the perimeter survey teams may be collection. ~. (a) Radiological surveys of the contaminated Q. ARAC show the identification marking used at each point. The procedure (a) If an engi~eering survey is being performed most likely to be used will consist of monitoring in and concurrently with the radiological survey. should when directing the initiaI perimeter survey. Type instrument and serial number.

5-D-3 . If contamination absorbed by the swipe. The AMS plot requires for either building owners and/ or tenants. windows which is then monitored for contamination it absorbed. Initial building surveys should is found. or other openings (a) Radiological surveys of buildings within the during the initial cloud passage. Usually some form of grid survey will (for example. and stairs). such as a policeman. to is required to validate and support analysis of the plot. The sealing of doors. and whether or not people were in the complete a ground survey of the entire area. initial monitoring and screened from alpha instruments. accompany monitors when surveying building interiors. because of the time of year. Ground surveys to has been decontaminated. or on materials such during contamination of the surrounding area. the t ype of heating or cooling From several days to over a week may be required to system used. be performed only on the exterior unless the building Monitoring results from furnace and air conditioning is in use. and the desired precision. Ground building at the time of. . appropriate decontamination actions. on evacuated buildings in highly decontaminated areas use of FIDLERs may be necessary on surfaces which may minimize further contamination of the interior may damage alpha instruments. or swipe. methods which minimize support decontamination planning will be performed tracking of contamination into . of interior contamination are expected to be airborne (7) Building Surveys. halls. Ground survey data appropriate civil authority. and ventilators ments may be used on most building surfaces.The initial AMS data will be available four-five hours (b) Civil authorities should establish procedures after completion of survey flights. and other openings into the building.buildings should be used with FIDLERs. When as carpets where contamination maybe below the surface monitoring the interior of a building. additional monitoring should be performed. The primary source of contamination remaining. windows. and on top of horizontal by wiping surfaces with a piece of material. however. or an interpretation by trained analysts. Interior contamination levels will vary measurement errors associated with the instruments. surfaces near heating or cooling duct outlets. Some of the supporting ground data may be provided If interiors are surveyed before the surrounding area by the initial perimeter survey. Interior surveys validating decontamination effectiveness may contamination levels will be only a fraction of the require several months to complete due to the low levels exterior levels at the same location. and doors. Alpha instru. or following the accident. If no contami- Laboratory counting equipment should be used to nation is found at these locations it is very likely no determine the amount of removable contamination contamination entered the building. windows. chimneys. The amount of should be on the floor in the main traffic pattern removable contamination present must be determined (doorways. contaminants entering the building through heating or cooling systems. or contamination contaminated area will be required to determine the tracked or carried into the building by people or animals. cover shoes with plastic bag immediately be used with the grid size determined by the desired before entering buildings and ensure gioves are accuracy of estimated activity between grid points and uncontaminated). filters should be included in building survey records.

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 5-E

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT,

AND CONTROL FORMS

Accurate records should be maintained of exposure times and levels of exposure for all personnel entering and
exiting the accident area. Additionally, a complete radiological history should be made for each individual who
is actually contaminated. This appendix contains examples of forms that may be used to document and record
this information.

Form 1 - Personal Data Form
This form contains data which should be obtained from all personnel who enter the radiological
control area.

Form 2 - Radiological Control Area Log
This form is for use at the contamination control station.

Form 3 - Bioassay Screening Log
This form is for maintaining a record of all necessary bioassay screening performed and may be
used for both response force personnel and civilians who may have been contaminated as a result
of the accident.

Form 4 - Radiation Health History
This form is to assist in the screening of civilians who may have been contaminated as a result
of the accident.

Form 5 - Field Monitoring Data Log
This form is to assist in documenting field monitoring measurements by survey teams.

Form 6 - TLD Measurements
This form is to be used to document TLD readings.

Form 7 - Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation
This form is to be used to log samples taken from the surrounding environment.

Form 8 - FIDLER Data Form
This form is used when logging readings from the FIDLER.

5-E-1

5-E-2

FORM 1

PERSONAL DATA FORM

(P/em print or place “X” in boxes as appropriate)
Sa Ravarm for Additional Inarructlons

‘l) SOCSEC NO ‘2)NAME ‘3) BIRTH OATE
IIasr) (firrtl [m.i.l (dw)(month)(vr)

‘4) MALE0 o r FEMALE ❑
‘5 A) MILITARY ❑ or ‘5 B) CIVILIAN m

(6) “SA m ‘7 }
GFIAOE (9A) (9B) “SA
USAF
U S A F D (8) C#EC, ALITy CfJOE
or
000 ❑ USN (10) GRAOE (111.jERIEs
[ uSMC B]
USN m NEC/DESIGNATOR
( -j
USMC D I3RAOE SERIES
‘JOE cl---”~”n-n

OTHER D OTHER D––––––– PROFESSION AGENCY
ISpwlfv)
(Yes) (No)
(121HAv E YOU E1/ERWIJRN A FILM BAOGE OR OTHER 00 SIMETRIC 0EVICE7
c1 c 1

(13~HAVE yf)u EVER BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A’”RAOIATION WORKER”?
c1 c 1

‘14) HAVE YOU HAO TRAINING IN RESPIRATORY PROTECT IO NEOUIPMENT (MASK)? c1 n

(15)”Av Ey0uw0RKE0 1~ *NT,. contamination CLOT” ING ANO Respirators?
n n

116) HAVE YOU RECE,VEO AS, GN, F,CANT OIJsE OF RADIATION WITHIN THE LAST YEAR?
n u
(17)” AvEy0u BEEN BRE, FEO ONp RIJCEL)u REs FOR wORKING IN A CONTAMINATE AREA?
n n
~181youR ORGAN IZATION/BUSINESs AOORESS:

lUmt/Emplow Nnmo or Svmbol) lStraat, P.O. Box. Mail Stop, etc.l

.>
(CIrV or Milirw Base) [State or County) (ZIP Code)
(19) UNIT RESpONS, ELE FOR RECOROING yOu R RAIJIAT]ON OI)SIMETRY RESULTS
[Place “X” if unknown}
(201y0u R ORGANIZATION/BUSIN ESs TELEPHONE
(Area Code tmd Number)

(signature) IOa!e)

PERSONAL OATA FORM
FOR RAO HEALTH CENTER USE ACCOUNTING NUMBER

FILM BAOGENO

EXTERNAL OOSE

INTERNAL 00SE

T H I S FOWM SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT.

,-

Figure 5-E-1. Personal Data Form.

5-E-3

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NON-SELF EXPLANATORY ITEMS

ITEM COMMENT

3 Show day and year as numerical and month as alphabetical; e.g., 23 Jan 65 or 01 Jun 42.

5 Check either 5A or 50,

6 Foreign military and US Coast Guard check “OTHER. ”

7 Show alphabetical/numerical grade; e.g., E3 or 05, rather than rank; e.g., PFC or CDR.

8 Show “MOS,” “NE C,” “ AFSC, ” etc., of your current duty assignment.

9B Civilians with DOD agencies check “DOD” and appropriate service or “OTHER. ”

10 DOD and DOE employees show pay schedule and level; e.g., GS-10, SES-79.

11 US government civilians other than DOD or DOE, show grade and series for profession; other
civilians give short title for profession; e.g., health phys, rad monitor, or comp programmer.

12 Check “YES” if you were monitored by thermoluminescent dosimeter; i.e., TLD; check “YES”
if you worked with soft beta emitters and were monitored by some means other than film”
badge or TLD.

13 Check “YES” if an occupationally exposed individual or radiation worker.

14 Check “YES” if trained in use of Ml 7 or M 17A protective masks.
.

15 Check “YES” if anti-C work was participation in training courses with or without actual
radioactive contamination.

16 Check “YES” if you underwent medical treatment involving radiation or radioactive
materials, if your occupational exposure is near permissible limits and/or if an accident
response dose report is necessary to continue your regular radiation work.

19 Following codes may be used: “R” for Radiological Safety Officer or Radiological Protection
Officer, “M” for Medical Department, “C” for Commander, “F” for USAF Master Radiation
Registry.

20 In’lieu of commercial number, show “AVN” for AUTOVON or “FTS” for Federal Tele-
communications System.

5-E-4

Radiological Control Area Log. r v FORM 2 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG OP. .E CORDER 5sN F6LM . MI) NUMBER NUMe ER #N Ou T 50C S E C NO 5 46 47 48 49 s 51 5 m — s 67 60 6 I 5 46 4 7 484 565 1 59 6 0( i?6 3 6 4( 66 768[ lM. FIHST. S FOI+M 5UL3JECT 10 THE PR.oNTROL ❑ ADGE T I ME NAM E( LAST. VACV &CT. Figure 5-E-2. TE FAG=— ~F— T I M E .

● lx DATE PAGE — O F _ u o START STOP E o RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG (CONTINUATION SHEET) RECORDER u w SSN u’ WI h & \ 4 T H I S FORM S U B J E C T T O T H E P R IV A C Y ACT. . I .

articles taken should be noted in remarks. ” m L e. The number should be inidcated in Columns 77. If Personal clothing was confiscated during decontamination. If no contamination was detected state “none. c. Any unusual incidents or additional data deemed important for radiological safety should be described in the remarks section a n d sequentially numbered. Column 75 should be marked with a Y if contamination was found on body or personal clothing when exiting the control area If no yl contamination was detected state “none. 9. Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders change in mid sheet. Column 71 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing full anti-contamination clothing and a respirator. b. d. Column 73 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing street clothing. Column 76 should be marked with a ‘f if all detected contamination was removed from the person. Each day should be started with a new form and the total ”number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms. or street clothing without a r e s p i r a t o r . INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG a. ” f. 80. . Column 72 should be marked with an x if the person was wearing anti-contamination clothing without a respirator. N if not and remarks are mandatory.

5-E-8 .

v
FORM 3
BIOASSAY SCREENING LOG
,
I
:ONTROL
D E TECTEO
cOu NT NUMBER
D Am PhGE OF_


TIME a
c :
*ECORDER w In: I .1 I
: ; Xz
SSN
~ o ~ xl.
v ~ o t?
; o ; <u
- ● w !4
SOC SEC NO I L A S T N A M E z e e 1I “ ,

y“’
m
‘b L

THIS FOFt M S U B J E C T T O T H E P!?, vACY ACT

Figure 5-E:3. Bioassy Screen Log.

IA
Y
E
I DAT~
START
pAGE —OF~
STOP. B I O A S S A Y S C R E E N I N G L O G (C O N T I N U A T I ON S H E E T)
: R E C O R D E R
w
K S S N

,....,
L

ti 1
Ii I
1

4

1 I J
THIS FORM SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT,

I N S T R U C T I O N S F O R T H E USE OF THE BIOASSAY SCREENING L O G

a, Columns O-23. If more than 14 characters in last name truncate as necessary.
w
t). Column ; 1 indicate with M or C,

c. Column 25 should be marked with Y if person is normally classified as a radiation worker by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
leave blank for all others.

d, Column 26 should be marked Y if person is not associated with a DC)D, Federal or state accident response organization, leave blank
for all others.

e. Column 27. Insure all persons marked Y in Column 26 have completed a Radiation I+ealth History form and check, leave blank for
all others.

f, Columns 28-39 should be marked Y where appropriate if contamination was found and column number and associated reading
recorded in the remarks section. All personal articles and clothing retained for decontamination or disposal should be recorded in the
y)
remarks section. If no contamination was detected leave blank,
m
A
9. COIUmn 40 should be marked Y if all detected contamination was removed from the person, N if not and remarks are mandatory, If
no contamination was detected leave blank,

h, Columns 41, 46, and 47 mark with Y if bioassay samples collected, N if not.

i, Columns 42-45, 48-51, 52-56, and 57-61 enter units used in column headers and measurements in appropriate columns.

j. Columns 62-65 enter time bioassay sample was collected.

k, Column 71 mark Y if additional bioassay samples or other data is required and specify in remarks section.

1. Any unusual incidents or other data deemed important should be described in the remarks section and sequentially numbered, The
number should be indicated in Columns 77-80, Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders change in mid sheet.

m. Each day should be started with a new form and the total number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms.

y
qll .

) - (3A) BIRTH DA E (3B) M A En o r FEMALEU sfaylrnolyr (4) TEMPORARY ADDRESS TELEPHONE “ (5) PERMANENT AIICIRESS TELEPHONE (6) NAME& AD ORESSOF EMPLOYER (7) HAVE YOIJ EVER BEEN TREATED WITH X-RAYS OR RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES? ‘Escl ‘on (7A) REASON FOR TREATMENT (7B) DATE OF TREATMENT mo/yr (7C) PLACE OF TREATMENT (8) HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY CANCER OR OTHER MALIGNANCY? YKI Non (8A) INDICATE TYPE -. FORM 4 RADIATION HEALTH HISTORY (Please print or place “X” in boxes as appropriate) (1) SOCSEC N O (2) NAME (last) (first) (m. . LEUKEMIAD BREAST ❑ THYROID ❑ LUNG ❑ STOMACH ❑ BONE ❑ INTESTINESO OTHER ❑ Specify type (8B) DATE OF OIAGNOSIS molyr THIS FORM S U B J E C T TO THE PRIVACY ACT.- Figure 5-E-4. S-E-13 .i. Radiation Health History.

bathing.-. -.n .--.. etc. .-....-. .. type work. . . -. .. sleeping......n (13) OATE & TIME OF POSSIBLE OR ACTUAL EXPOSURE IU HAUIAI lUN&UNIAMINAll UN AM u or r~u day/mo/yr time (14) DURATION OF EXPOSURE HOURS MINUTES (15) ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD OF EXPOSURE (Meals. BROTHERS OR SISTERS) EVER HAD CANCER OR LEUKEMIA? YES ❑ NO ❑ TYPE (lo) ARE YOU NOW TAKING MEDICATION? YES ❑ NO O (1OA) WHAT MEDICATION (11) DO YOU HAVE ANY ALLERGIES? YES D NO ❑ (11A) WHAT ALLERGIES (12) NAME & ADDRESS OF FAMILY PHYSICIAN -. .! . PARENTS. ) (161 LOCATION OURING PERIOO OF EXPOSURE — — (17) DO YOU OWN A PET? YES D ho ❑ TYPE LOCATION (18) WHO WAS WITH YOU WHEN YOU MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATEO? NAME AODRESS TELEPHONE 5-E-14 .-.(9) HAVE ANY BLOOD RELATE D MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY (G RANDPARENTS.

. Form 5 Page _ _ _ .7! I Figure 5-E-5. Incldenl _ 0?18 . Field Monitoring Data Log.. Wmr Unlta Noled Condillons. . NAMES Time Olspalched: Or $:rial !i8 !. Meler Rcadlng ReadlnQ Closed 3 II Mtler TImdlng ICPMI Filler Filler No. . . Momr Open 4 In. —— llme Returned: .. Ou8ntlty 100 CM1 Ileadlng.–—— 2. _ I I I I t L L/l I 1 1 f I . FIELD MONITORING DATA 10G NOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BACKGROUND LEVEL OR MOL Alfl MONITORING SAMPLE COILICTION SMEM _ CIMI _ M i n . tic. Background Pl{llc”la16 Parllc”lala Ttg Soil. No.01 _—_ Orlg Ilnam Ref.—.. S#mplo m COMMINTS Window Maiohl Gross CPM Crou C?M CPM Pet flfidlcate Flclors Such k: PeIk toclllon wllh wllhoul Type. CIOUO Passage Grid Coordinalas.. Milk and Unless Inslrumenl ml Wtalh!r TIME Crossroads. and Olher OaIeI ==H=H= u! h .. .

. 5-E-16 .

.-— .—— —— —-— I -. I TIME GROUNO OATE TIME OOSE OATE TIME ----1 —. .—— . . . .—-— Figure 5-E-6. UNITS )TORAGE COMMENTS ORGANIZATION REAIJING COORDINATES. ETC. . —.— .— — —c — I . . TLDMeasurement Collection and Analysis Form.— — - ‘----t-- -J ‘--’_i —---—–––4––– . .—— — .—..— . Form 6 TLD MEASUREMENTS COLLECTION ANO ANALYSIS I INCIDENT ‘ -.——I __ ——— I -1 —. — ------+- —____—l.— . — . . -“------+ A — ——— . 1 .d ——. GRID FIEAEIING BACK. . .—.-_. . _____ ._ I —. LABORATORY PAGE ______ OF ______ LAB MANAGER ROUTETO _ OEA —— –--’————l——~ I 1 -L LOCATION PLACEO FIETRIEVEO ASSUMED READOUT “RANSITI TEAMI NET [BE SPECIFIC.—— _ _ _ . .— I I — -1. .._ —. . ..

5-E-18 .

Team/Monitor _ Detector Type Model No. Milk. Serial No. Cloud Passage. Inslrtimenl Time Crossroads.WEAPONS ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION ALPHA PROBE DATA FORM NOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BKG OR MDL Incident Date Data Type: Alpha _ _ B e t a _. Instrument BKG _ Calibration Date Conversion Factor Instrument MDL Sample COlleciiOn Commenls Locations Type: Soil. Weapons Accident Environ”mental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form. Air Filter and Weather Conditions. ’ Figure 5-E-7. etc. [Indicates Factors Such As Peak Grid Coordinates. 5-E-19 . Waler. Reading. and Olher Data] -% . Gamma — Agency /Org. Reading Units Tag No.

20 . . . 5-E.

5-E-2 1 . 1 = 100% Aborption) Source-to-Detector Height cm 1 pCi Am-241 = Alpha pCi Pu Mix (excludes PI-I-241 (Beta)) Alpha Activity Mix If Scaler CPM or Coun~{$Ume $ & Time Location Reading Counts ~2 Comments 1 . Form 8 FIDLER DATA FORM Incident D a t e _ _ FIDLER SItd Agency /Org. __ Team/Monitor — Check One: — Scaler –— Rate Meter Calibration Date Radionuclide Check Source: Quantity – pCi Background Counting Time: —_ Minutes RC Time Constant: _ Minutes Energy Window Background Check Source K-Factor [keV) ICPM) [CPM] [rrrz] 17 60 Other Self Shielding (17 keV) (O -1: 0 = No Absorption in Check Source. Figure 5-E-8. FIDLER Data Form. .

. . 5-E-22 .

The guidelines provided are intended for Resuspension is highly dependent upon specific use until health physics personnel at the scene can conditions (for example. respiratory protection devices can result of level of activity and exposure time. Protection Factors (PF). Table 6-1 provides respiratory protection facility/ chamber using probe equipped test masks in a guidelines to use when air sampling data provides a basis chamber containing a nontoxic contaminant is required for assessing airborne contamination levels. or respirators which filter of 40 picocuries/ cubic meter (pCi/ mj) per 40 hour week. if a person suffers heat stroke the respirator Protection factors vary primarily as a function of should be removed immediately to meet the urgent anthropometrical data. Protective Action Guidelines (PAG). 6-1 . and time since develop situation specific instructions. moisture present.e. protective it is assumed a PF above the nominal value is achieved. If the mask passes a This chapter addresses protective clothing and respira. Demand type SCBA (air supplied on inhalation) cause negative mask pressure during inhalation and provide 6-2 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION no more protection from contaminants than a respirator. be permitted to enter an area of higher activity without adequate respiratory protection for a shorter period of a. Radiation dose is a function hot climates. PAG are shortly thereafter. Pressure demand SCBA (i. . mask fit and mask design. source of airborne radioactivity at an accident site. A deployable fit test facility may be obtained activity before entering the table. PF’s of up to 2.000 can be achieved with properly fitted respirators. thus PF = AAC/IC. a PF of 100 was assumed and the maximum Respiratory protection prevents airborne contamination permissible concentration (MPC) of activity in the air from entering the lungs and is provided by self contained being inhaled was based on a MPC for radiation workers breathing apparatus (SCBA). Calculated for quantitative tests to determine the PF for each ‘activity levels should be corrected for background individual. and their use is not recommended except times greater than the one (1) pCi/ m3/ 168 hour week when airborne ~ontamination is present or expected. A test is inhaled. including death. particulate out of the ambient air. and a heat injury prevention program as discussed in paragraph 14-5 exposure time of workers is being tracked. Del) 51 OO. The amount of protection time without exceeding dose limits. Respiratory This calculation assumes possible exposures at this rate protection devices adversely affect productivity and over the period of a year and is approximately ten (10) effectiveness. These particulate may be present in the cloud and smoke from a breached or burning weapon. riate. The time versus dose from inhaling airborne particulate contaminants approach should be applied in emergencies as approp- provided by a given device is called its protection factor. guidelines. medical requirement to cool the person since the short Protection factors are determined by dividing the unprotected exposure during evacuation from the area ambient air concentrations (AAC) of a contaminant by for treatment will limit the amount of contaminant which “ the inhaled concentration (IC) or amount of contaminant which enters the mask. In deriving the deposition) and is difficult to measure and predict.000. In MPC for the general public..52-M CHAPTER 6 RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION 6-1 GENERAL through JNACC. vegetation. upon limits. a person could should be implemented when temperatures exceed 70°F. but settle to the ground b. action guide and resuspension factors. Therefore. if in heat injuries. type and condition of soil or surface. The radioactive particles may become developed to identify protective devices to limit exposure resuspended in the air by surface winds and by soil to the lungs from inhalation of contaminants to agreed disturbing operations including vehicular traffic. qualitative smoke test around the edges of the mask tory protection including protection factors. that is. always under positive Plutonium and uranium particulate are the most serious pressure) provide a nominal PF of 10.

2.000 Below 2. Resuspension Factors. airborne radioactivity is caused as soon as possible.000. Conversions from microcurie per meter squared @Ci/ mz) to counts per minute (CPM) were made using The method of computing airborne contamination levels the equation in Appendix 5 conversion factor charts is contained in the air sampling appendix. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels downwind area until after the contamination cloud for Emergency Workers as a Function of released by the accident has dispersed (several hours Airborne Contamination after the fire is extinguished or the explosion). tial personnel wearing a full- face respiratory.000. 100-10. the contaminated area has varied levels of public alarm. Using Table 6-2 is appropriate the surface is assumed to have an infinite plane of during the initial approach to the area when using uniform texture with a uniform level of contamination. For wind hazard. Commonly referred to as a STAPLEX. In theory.) per unit volume (usually mg) divided available air sampling data may not be applicable.000 dpm/ m3 Pressure demand SCBA or limited entry restricted to essen- contamination with field survey instruments. Field estimates of airborne contamination can be derived from measurement of filter Above 10. usually m-l.000 Pressure demand SCBA. Source . is finite in size.- of contamination should be fixed as soon as possible. or limited entry restricted to essential personnel wearing a full-face respiratory. If contamination levels detected during contamination. and may contain a variety the initial approach-in#icate high levels of contamination of surfaces with different resuspension characteristics. etc.01 needed.TABLE 6-1. Protective Mask or civilian Cellulose filters are used normally and retained for equivalent) laboratory analysis. Table resuspension factor is then inverse length. 1. only entering the contaminated area is recommended until those surfaces within approximately 200 meters can air sampling data is available to assess the actual airborne contribute to the airborne contamination. can be expected. pCi.5-450 10. Other than during the initial contamination should be fixed release of contamination. During the resuspension factor is defined as the activity in the air initial response. respirators in uncontaminated areas may create undue In practice. Above 450 Above 1. wearing of respirators by people For wind speeds below 20 miles per hour (mph).000. microns in diameter depending on the filter paper used. and when working in areas where @Ci.000 250.000 dpm/m3 Full-face respiratory (M-series A flow meter is used to determine rate of air flow. One means of estimating the potential airborne hazard caused by a given level of surface Air sampling data is unavailable until some time after contamination is by using resuspension factors. Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination FIDLER Determined Alpha Reading CPM Contamination pCi/m2 60cmz Probe 17cmZ Probe Protection Below 4. Table 6-2 guidelines should not be used in the speeds over 30 mph. The response personnel have arrived on-scene. surfaces as much as 900 meters TABLE 6-2.000 Above 250. The dimension of the on measurements of surface contamination levels. by resuspension. 6-2 is based upon surface contamination leveis which could produce the airborne contamination levels in Table airborne activity — dpm/ mg = m-l RF = 6-1 assuming a resuspension factor of 10-S per meter ground activity – dpm/ mz (m-’). for measurements on soil.500. Airborne Alpha Activity 3 dpm/ m above background Respiratory Protection c.5 Below 10. the TF-I A is Below 100 dpm/ m3 No respiratory protection capable of sampling air for particles down to 0. Air Sampler Equipment. dpm. Table by the activity on the ground below expressed in the 6-2 provides guidelines for protective requirements based same activity unit per unit area.000 full-face respirator. Source of d.500 Shoe covers. Anti-contamination clothing. 6-2 . gloves recommended 4. TF-1 A Air Particles.

6-3 . Resuspension factors may provide factors by 10 to 100 times or more. gloves. Averaging of ground activity levels (3) Rain or Moisture. mask and hood. When using resuspension factors due to the shielding action of the moisture. such as vehicular traffic may increase resuspen. . boot covers. written on tape and placed on their back and chest. Surface and airborne a method of roughly estimating airborne contamination alpha contamination levels may not be measurable with levels for use with Table 6-1 in areas where air sampling an alpha meter for some time after rain or sprinkling data is unavailable.on pavement. The deposited on soil and up to 10. Resuspension factors vary proportionally identification. the person’s name and team should be to the cube of the wind speed. outfit includes: The standard anti-contamination Resuspension factors are affected by the following: coveralls. openings should be taped using masking or other bance. to estimate airborne contamination Ievels. appropriate adhesive tape. Resuspension Protection from contamination can be provided by any 5 7 factors may vary from 10.away may contribute. Leaching of plutonium into from these areas may be considered when computing the soil by rain or sprinkling may reduce resuspension resuspension factors.for plutonium newly 3 close weave cotton material or disposable suits.to 10. . Mechanical distur. be used provided the outfit openings are taped. Disposable suit or the battle sion factors by as much as 100 times in the vicinity dress uniforms or equivalent with a hood and mask may of the disturbance. For (2) Wind. The outfit (1) Soil Disturbing Operations.the types and levels of contamination on surfaces in the area where the resuspension factor was computed and those in the 6-3 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING area of interest should be considered.

(2) Contamination Control Station (CCS). and to assist in decontam- priority in response actions.52-M CHAPTER 7 CONTAMINATION CONTROL 7-1 CONTAMINATION CONTROL a station separate from that used for response force personnel. if so. spread of contamination. General. plastic. as appropriate. Initially. The CRA is used to eliminate (or people may be identified. If sufficient resources exist to support screened to determine whether decontamination or other multiple stations. Therefore. facilities and the transportation resources used should be notified of the potential problem. and measures taken to prevent reduce to an acceptable level) contamination of the contamination of additional people. It consists of following an accident. to prevent include casualties. established (1) Monitoring and Decontaminating Potentially operating procedures must be followed to achieve the Exposed Medical Treatment Facilities. however during the initial contamination clothing. state radiation control in a facility or tent to minimize dispersing by the wind personnel or civilian authorities/ representatives as they of contaminants on boots. or drop ing of personnel is normally done at a Contamination cloths to collect contamination that may fall from anti- Control Station (CCS). judgments must be made as to whether (3) Strict contamination control line procedures to casualties have been removed from the contaminated control contamination spread during response/ recov. and meticulous anti-contamination suits instruments and monitoring personnel is limited. a. the OSC may decide to establish more known contaminated areas must be identified and than one CCS. or post-accident monitoring team to check the vehicles and facilities entry into the contaminated area should be given a high involved for contamination. Therefore. area and. suits. Those ery/ restoration operations. DoD 51 OO. what facilities are involved.to determine the a hospital or morgue without being monitored for preliminary site characterization and personnel contamination. business priority. The potential contamination of a contamination. Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination. gloves. With the military may have the only effective radiation detection processing of personnel through the CCS. Normally this action is done contaminated civilian residents may be desirable through at a CCS. of people are involved. Immediately objective of contamination control. Paragraph 14-5 b. and residents. there is the instruments at :he scene and may monitor potentially possibility of a movement of contamination upwind contaminated clvdians. the personnel operating in the contaminated area. processing contaminated or potentially Corrective action is required. Depending on resources and (b) Persons present at the accident site or in requirements. the CCS uses supervised. Initial definition of the perimeter of the contaminated area was discussed previously. and /or clothing removal procedures to preclude a alternative procedures must be devised if large numbers mechanical transfer of contamination outside the CCS. injured personnel maybe removed for medical treatment. Monitor. employees and customers in the contaminated area. describes procedures a medical facility may use to control Personnel who were potentially exposed during the the spread of contamination. therefore. Casualties should be monitored and 7-l . People to be considered ination or other measures. The CCS employs kraft paper. Dispatch of a radiological accident. Contamination control minimizes the spread of contamination. response when the number of radiation detection structured. the CCS should be set up civilians will shift to the DoE. Early definition of the (a) The CC$ employs a contamination reduction perimeter is jrnportant so potentially contaminated area (CRA) c&cept. or anti-contamination arrive on-scene with appropriate instruments. or fatalities may be moved to (1) Initial monitoring upon arrival. bystanders and sightseers. Responsibility for monitoring through the CCS. military the spread of contamination should be given the highest and civilian response personnel. Also. rigid. medical treatment facility or ambulance could present (2) Anti-contamination procedures to minimize the a health problem for the staff and other patients. subsequent cloud passage.

towels. Contamination of the hands. detectable instruments and monitoring personnel may be inade. All outer surfaces and the air filter may have been contaminated by airborne contamination. Therefore. Soap. People ~. Vehicles used by the response ~. shampoo. use of an abbreviated be relatively easy to perform. It should be in an area relatively free of should be monitored before being moved away from weeds. shower and shampoo the people. If members of the public in the rendered safe. 7-2 . rapid decontamination and return of private or lower legs may be caused by handling contaminated vehicles may reassure the public “that consideration is objects or moving and sitting in contaminated areas. and others whose presence or be retained by the individual. Procedures for handling contaminated If radiation detection instruments are unavailable to casualties are in paragraph 14-5. to the CCS or other accident site if appropriate. A paved or flat. processing points using their own vehicles. while (3) Alternative Procedures. and their collected clothing. and contamination. The location of the contamination control need exists to assure the people that they are being cared station should be governed by the following constraints: for. if feasible. the CCS may be moved closer to the contaminated area are sent. tires. If to monitor them later when instruments are available. When processing people whose and issue replacement clothing. A priority system should be established jewelry. the vehicle ~. additional lines Such a procedure would require provisions to collect should be established in the station to process large and receipt for clothing. the clothing should should be bagged separately. and shoes Also. contamination of the interior is most likely on those quate to process the people fully and quickly. Uncontam- dictate another location. being given to their interests and property. should not be highly contaminated. available radiation detection windows were down. Each article of clothing personal clothing is contaminated. Unless the potentially contaminated. and the rear end may be contaminated near a populated area and several hundred people are from driving across contaminated areas. seat. however. it must be far inated clothing should be returned at the ear!iest possible enough away to prevent airborne or resuspended time. Provisions should be made every four minutes if no contamination is found. but terrain or other considerations may should be monitored as soon as possible. numbers of people. It must be located in an area free of for processing people. Vehicle Monitoring. Initially. articles retained. When processing a large group inate all people coming from the contaminated area of people. compacted the area. If not upwind. An example of a vehicle CCS is shown in surface is recommended. and the contents of pockets and pocketbooks to permit immediate processing of EOD personnel. If only external surfaces are not response personnel. or ventilators open. for assumption is that the potentially contaminated people example. Figure 7-2. and should monitor team leaders. equipment and monitors are available. decontamination shouId detection instruments are available. stocks of replacement clothing must be obtained. this type station will process a person about should be used immediately. the accident. procedures to decontam- is shown in Figure 7-1. The surfaces in contact with the vehicle occupants.decontaminated to the extent injuries permit. and all clothing be bagged separately and a receipt issued for those placed in a single large bag and a receipt issued. Watches. if at all. processing. An example of a CCS monitor the people involved. bushes. a gym or other facility with dressing rooms and high capacity showers may be appropriate J. may be necessary. or go. It ideally will be located directly upwind of processed in this manner. Although the contami- information is needed to facilitate other response nation may be retained wjth the clothing. If an accident occurs wheel wells. an over-riding operations. it should be located outside the force in the contaminated area will remain there for fragmentation zone as well as beyond the perimeter of future use and not require immediate monitoring or the contaminated area. [f only a few radiation of a vehicle are contaminated. contamination from entering the CCS. c. Contamination of the upper chest or neck and head urgent medical treatment has priority and exceptions area is indicative of exposure to airborne contamination. floorboards and seats. if done before bonding monitoring procedure may be considered to expedite between the contaminant and the vehicles paint occurs. After all explosives have been decontamination. and rocks.

20M (1 Masks Sump Decontamination I B \ S t a t i o n Water Wash Station I. n -Soap Towels Contaminated Waste contamination Control Line t 61 O-1OOOM (2000’-3000’) El. Contamination Control Station (Example). Contamination Area Line t Wind Direction I Contaminated Chair Shoe Covers Chair m Equipment ❑ om (Hot Line) o DroD Clothing “cl Chair ❑ Chair n R Air Sampler t — 100-6 )M . 7-3 . Medical Station Instrument Repair CLEAN AREA 5 ~ Buffer Zone ~ Disaster Cordon Figure 7-1.

Contamination Area Line Wind Direction Hot Line E Parking Area Initial Monitoring u Sump Washing Area L )’ Contamination Control Line Final Monitoring I Vehicle Exit CLEAN AREA n Parking Area Figure 7-2. Vehicle Contamination Control Station Example. 74 .

Urine sampling is a less sensitive indicator of plutonium exposure. Department of Energy (DoE) in a few days).52-M CHAPTER 8 BIOASSAY PROCEDURES 8-1 BIOASSAY (2) Urine Sampling. Low authorities conducting initial screening in advising energy gamma radiation sensors such as the FIDLER individuals contaminated when requested to provide can be used to estimate the plutonium content. Fecal sampling is a detectable radiation dose when contaminated. but screening for very high levels can be done in the field. commercially. Administration of a bioassay program for effected can be evaluated in the field. amount of radioactive material deposited in the body. Samples taken during the first detectors placed over the chest (lung counting) and/ or five days after the exposure will not reflect the quantity other organs. Lung counting is the direct Organ(s) containing the material measurement of emitted x-rays and gamma radiation Distribution pattern from the body with a sensitive low energy photon Organ(s) mass(es) detector. Therefore. or by detection of radioactivity in the of plutonium inhaled due to the time requir:d for excreta (feces and urine). The guidelines in Table 8- passage of the contamination through the intestinal tract 1 are provided to assist the response force or civiiian and should be submitted in well-sealed plastic bags. Elapsed time from intake (3) Lung Counting. DoD 51 OO. Plutonium is retained of material present in the body. Chemical form Samples should be submitted in plastic or glass bottles Route of intake with well-sealed tops. using sensitive x-ray in the original aerosol. Advisors explain that definitive results. Each method has specific in the lung for a very long time. This fraction also depends on volubility of the plutonium either by direct measurement. Urine samples taken up must be known in addition to the quantity and isotopic to 200 days after the exposure can be used for analysis. Lung counters Particle size of the original material are used at National Laboratories. Bioassays are procedures which estimate the fraction of the amount inhaled is excreted through urine. physicists responding to the accident. every effort should be made to commitment to the lungs based on contamination . When bioassay Figure 8-1 may be used to estimate the frst year dose samples are collected. Fecal sampling is an effective bioassay method which has the advantage that samples a. a number of factors movement through the body. Samples should not be civilians may be the responsibility of the state or Federal taken until at least 48 hours after exposure to permit agency or effected country. and Decay scheme of the radioisotope at some hospitals and universities. advantages and disadvantages and the specific methods in any given situation will be determined by the health physicists. clothing. only a tiny a. chemical separation and low level sample analysis will determine if the individual received counting techniques must be used. or skin. The especially effective during the first few days. Three methods are used to determine the amount patient must be sent to the facility. distribution of the material to make an accurate estimate Urine samples must be processed in a chemistry of the dose. Probably.. laboratory before quantification is possible. from the environment. and the b. For more urine or fecal samples for analysis. Since tritium 8-1 .keep samples and their containers free of contamination detected in feces. 8-2 BIOASSAY PROCEDURES (1) Fecal Sampling. Most lung counters are immobile systems using large shielded rooms (special Complex mathematical models have been developed that trailer mounted systems can be obtained through the take each of these into account. but can bioassay procedures used will be established by health be done at any time during the first year after exposure. lung counting is the most accurate Biological half-life method of determining internal exposure.

TheMDLforfecal samplesis.0 W-l AMAO 25X U VOLUBILITY CLASS 75X Y VOLUBILITY CLASS OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ICRP-30 METABOLIC MOOEL DOSE CALCULATED FOR MINIMUM DETECTABLE LEVEL (MDLI fN BIOASSAY MOL FOR URINE ANALYS[S = O 095 PC1 /SAMPLE MOL FOR FECAL ANALYSIS = O 95 PCI/SAMPLE MOL FOR IN-VIVO LUNG COUNT = 500 PC I AM-2+1 OUAL 1 TY FACTOR FOR ALPHA = ?0 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 95 50 T ME OF S A M P L E (DAYS A F T E R I N T A K E ) Use ofChart. 4. Steps 1-3 give a Dose Equivalent Scale value of 4 x 10 . 4 x 10-4 x 1000= . Draw vertical line tocumefor sample type. 3.) . 3. Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs.889 rem (The estimated fust year dose to the lung.45pCi. 4 5 Andy@ ofawmple taken from themmeperson (mmefirst yeadow) 10daysafter theaccident would beexpected to read only 20 ~i. assuming the individual inhafed contamination only on the day of the accident. -4 2. PARTICLE SIZE 3. Enter chart with the time ofsample.wmrs. FIRST YEAR DOSE COMMITMENT TO LUNG — r-—--’ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘– 1 I FCCAL . Divide thevalueobtained from theDose Equivalent scalebytheMDL for the sample type and multipiy this vahreby the contamination level of thesrsmple inpicocuries to get theestimatedfust year dose to the lung. s INTAKE ASSUMPTIONS L. 2. Draw horizontal iineto Dose Equivalent scale. . 1.JEAPONS GRAOE P L U T O N I U M Am-at IWJRITY 1200 pm. .- Figure 8-1. 1. Example: Measurement ofafecd nmpletaken 5daystiter theaccident read lOOO~i.

if they Program and the USAF Master Radiation Exposure have bathed or changed clothes since the time of possible Registry. Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling. If initial alpha meter screening This program will determine if any dose was received indicates probable plutonium inhalation. bioassay data. documentation identifying people who were or were not lines for the assignment of priorities for bioassay contaminated should be provided to the Joint Hazard analysis. or who may have been exposed to assuring that those with the greatest possibility of contamination downwind from the accident. NAVMED P-5055. other Table 8-2. (r). program is recommended for all individuals without respiratory protection and found to be contaminated. Feces Urine Suspected Optimum Sampling Optimum Sampling Radioactive Time After Time After Sample Material Exposure Exposure @. occurs near a populated area. a nasal smear is a reliable indicator only people never in contaminated areas will request tests if collected during the first hour after t he exposure. initial alpha monitoring which identifies recording data on personnel working in the radiological contaminated personnel also can provide a method for control area. obtained on non-DoD personnel should be coordinated with the OSC’S legal officer. Ionizing Radiation. Control and Conversely. some nasal mucus. A record must be made and retained . results of both alpha meter screening and bioassays.shall be retained and become part of the individual’s for future reference of all personnel screened and the permanent medical record. Documentation should be maintained on all personnel NOTE: Since it is virtually impossible for a significant who enter the radiological control area. This data file is subject to Privacy Act regulations. required. Personnel Exposure and Bioassay Records. during screening. a nasal smear and provides assurance to those who did not receive shall be collected for analysis by specialized teams when a dose that their health was not effected. To ensure alpha meter readings Recording Procedures Occupational Exposure to provide a valid guide for assignment of priorities. or potentially exposed people. Contamination on a wipe (Q-Tip) similar assurance to all people in the contaminated area. exposure to airborne contamination which Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to produces a surface contamination level in the LO Ionizing Radiation. Data obtained on DoD Personnel falling in the HI priority category in Table personnel will be needed to satisfy Service-specific 8-2 may have had a substantial plutonium intake. a copy of all CCS logs. Therefore. Bioassays for response force personnel will be and must be retained as part of the permanent accident performed in accordance with Service regulations and records. references (q). When to ensure they were not effected by the accident. These records contamination. (s). provides recommended guide. from inside the nasal passage is a possible indicator of bioassays may be appropriate even for people who plutonium inhalation.?!@l! Plutonium 2 days 2-3 weeks 24 hours total Uranium 2 days 24 hours 24 hours total Tritium N/A 4-8 hours 1 voiding . applicable only to people not wearing processing station records. obtaining bioassay samples from large numbers of people may be necessary. Radiation category will be less likely to result in a significant Health Protection Manual. and (t). or who may amount of plutonium to be incorporated into the body have been contaminated prior to establishment of a without gross contamination of skin or clothing also radiological control area. Personnel Dosimetry individuals should be asked. AFR 161-8. A bioassay Forms contained in Appendix 5-E should be considered. AFR 161-28. 8-3 . procedures for handling data as directed by the On-Scene Commander. Use anyone suspected of having been exposed to tritium of the Radiation Health History and Bioassay Screening should follow the guidelines in Table 8-1. when file. b. requirements contained in AR 40-14. are radiation exposures which may affect their health are contained in Appendix 5-E. and other respiratory protection. To provide they arrive on-site. follow-up actions are completed on all exposed. (2) Nasal Smears. Due to the biological half-life of weren’t found to be contaminated. medical personnel collect nasal smears. moreover. contamination cannot be detected by CCS monitoring. To ensure appropriate given priority treatment. Control and deposition in the lungs. If a nuclear weapon accident alpha particle counting. Examples of forms used for occurring. TABLE 8-1. Response force personnel will normally be Evaluation Center for consolidation into a single data equipped with protective clothing and respirators. the Q-tip must be free from any gels or other material that will prohibit (1) Bioassay Priorities.

000 cpm 8-4 .500-75.000 Cpm Above 75.000 Cpm HI 50. Alpha Contamination Level on Clothing or Skin 60 cmz probe 17 cmz probe E!@.000 cpm 12.500 cpm LO Below 50.@ Above 300. TABLE 8-2.000 cpm MED Below 12.000-300. Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays.

However. Bone deposition b. and enriched uranium. to several thousand grams. Because both the physical and biological products present in a nuclear weapon containing half-lives of plutonium are extremely long. may produce bone diseases (including cancer) many lives of the plutonium isotopes and significant daughter years later. Pu-239. (2) Weapons grade plutonium (including ameri- cium) will emit two detectable photons. an alpha emitter. Plutonium is a heavy metal associated with an accident involving nuclear weapons with a shiny appearance (similar to stainless steel) when containing plutonium. Most of the plutonium that eventually enters the blood stream is deposited in the bone and liver. 9-1 .4 is a very slow process. radiation which is detectable even after such migration. depleted uranium. or after rain. the plutonium. some Am-24 1 432 of the plutonium retained in the body may be reduced significantly. General Characteristics. Radiological Characteristics. Hazards and Health Considerations: Plutonium is considered the most significant radiological hazard a. (1) All of the isotopes listed above are primarily (2) A properly sized and fitted protective mask and alpha emitters except Pu-241. When exposed to the atmosphere for a short period. Surveys plotting the 17 keV x-ray data must be done within the fust five days. Therefore. it has the appearance of stainless Gamma radiation can be detected at distances of several steel. the measurable low energy radiation may be shielded as the contaminant migrates a. CHARACTERISTICS. if a person is given Pu-242 3.76 X 105 prompt hospital treatment with a chelating agent. b. 2. it will plutonium are as follows: essentially be held within the body for a lifetime.!!PS Half-life (years) comparable to those of plutonium. it will oxidize to a golden-yellow color and from that (3) A critical mass can range from several hundred to black. DoD 51 OO. 9-2 URANIUM (U) After this time. meters by many survey instruments. The radiological half.When uranium is separated assembled. the resulting mixture of uranium is referred . depending on the geometry of the container and the material surrounding. When first machined. grams. results from-entry into the body a short period of time. coordinate with knowledgeable scientific advisors from the DoE ARG to ensure a critical mass is not being “ (1) Natural Uranium .52-M CHAPTER 9 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. americium-241 (Am-241). it will oxidize to a dark brown by inhalation and subsequent deposition in the lungs. The primary hazard of pluto- freshly machined. Am-24 1 provides the 60 keV gamma element which occurs in nature in significant quantities. or black appearance. recovery personnel uranium have been used in nuclear weapons—natural should consult EOD technical publications and/or uranium.41 X 104 Pu-240 6. Radiological Characteristics: Three forms of or near.57 X 103 (1) The elimination of plutonium from the body Pu-241 14. expected at an accident site. Pu-241 is an important consideration because personnel against levels of plutonium contamination of its daughter product. The hazards from americium taken inside the body are &!. HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS 9-1 PLUTONIUM (Pu) c. a 17 keV x- ray and 60 keV gamma ray. General Characteristics: Uranium is a heavy into the ground. from its ore. which is primarily a beta standard anti-contamination clothing will protect emitter. After exposure to the atmosphere for nium.

This turnover time or biological when involved in a fire. Enriched uranium has been used as the nuclear material in some c. care must be taken during the recovery responding to an accident that has occurred in an of enriched uranium so that a critical mass is not enclosed space. -may vary up to over 90 percent U-235. Radiological Characteristics: Tritium has a amount of its U-235 extracted is known as “depleted radiological half-life of 12.006 21. Hazards and Health Considerations The radiolog. snow. a critical gaseous state. in specific weapon render-safe procedures. a relatively large amount of tritium to be a significant ical hazards associated with any of the isotopes of radiation hazard. and medical supervision is personnel adequately against uranium hazards. can combine combustively with air forming water and release great amounts of heat. inated with radioactive material. maintain the body’s water content by imbibing the same amount as that excreted a. uranium will melt and form half-life varies with the fluid intake. It is manmade and the enrichment. tritium is not absorbed by the skin to mass of enriched uranium can range from several any significant degree. become radioactive. ” Natural uranium consists of with a measurable diffusion rate even through very dense the following three alpha-emitting isotopes: materials such as steel. An M 17 protective mask be reduced to about three days. and lung contamination due normally eliminates and renews 50 percent of its water to inhalation can cause a long term hazard. However.e. in about 8-12 days. Depleted stable helium-3 atom by emission of a weak beta particle. If forced-fluid treatment and standard anti-contamination clothing will protect is deemed necessary. The radioactive water that enters the mass is not being assembled. material (grease or oil). In general. The human body metal poisoning may occur. Tritium combines chemically with a number of elements liberating heat in the process. Although it takes c. 9-2 . body is chemically identical to ordinary water and is distributed throughout the body tissue.5 X IOs the surface of the metal) and by hydriding (the chemical combination of tritium with the metal). causing these materials to -that is the concentration of the U-235 in the uranium. Medical isotope of hydrogen and diffuses very rapidly in the air assistance should be obtained as soon as possible. caution should be taken.284 4.1 x 108 process by which a thin film of tritium is deposited on U-234 0. With the proper catalyst i. personnel should consult EOD technical publications Tritium water vapor (TO or HTO) is readily absorbed and/or coordinate with knowledgeable scientific by the body. (2) Depleted Uranium . and during accidents which have assembled. is water.26 years and decays into a uranium” (for example.Uranium with some b. Since tritium oxide a slag with only a portion of it oxidizing.5 x 109 Metals react with tritium in two ways by plating (the U-235 0. a recommended procedure is to have the patient drink one quart of water within one-half hour 9-3 TRITIUM (T) after exposure. both through inhalation and absorption advisors from the DoE ARG to ensure that a critical through the skin. the biological half-life may against inhalation or ingestion.. a type of heavy solid materials is a contact hazard. U-238 99.to as “natural uranium. uranium is called “DU*’ and “D-38”. tritium combines (3) Enriched Uranium . its residence time in the body may be the possibility of hazardous airborne contamination significantly reduced by increasing the fluid intake. Depending on the material associated with occurred in rain. recovery is due to its ability to combine with other materials. If uranium is taken internally. Tritium which uranium are less severe generally than those of has plated out on a surface or combined chemically with plutonium.. Thereafter. when Like plutonium. General Characteristics: Tritium is a radioactive until medical assistance can be obtained. or in a body of water. depleted in U-235). In either Natural uranium in a metal form has been called reaction. The hazardous nature of tritium hundred to several thousand grams. In its the uranium and the geometry of the container. and E!wPs Abundance Half-life (years) like normal hydrogen. unavailable. exists and protective measures must be taken to protect Under medical supervision. Therefore.710 7. Hazards and Health Considerations: Tritium weapons and is called “oralloy” at certain enrichment constitutes a health hazard when personnel are engaged percentages (for example.“Enriched uranium” is spontaneously with oxygen in the air and will also replace uranium containing more than the naturally--occurring ordinary hydrogen in water or other hydrogenous amount of U-235. the surface of the metal will become contam- “tuballoy”. 40 percent and 93 percent). fire.

000 CPM on monitoring. An estimate of in portable gas lights. a. and to further complicate the situation. Radiological Characteristics: Thorium-232 is the detonation as a result of an accident is unlikely. the light. with atomic The materials considered thus far are used in weapons masses ranging from 223 through 235. fission products are beta and gamma years. General Characteristics: Thorium is a heavy. Thirteen isotopes are known. Mantle ash from a personal hazard results because of the ease with which single mantle will provide even higher readings.Although the biological half-life of tritium is short. A logically. the same as plutonium. Due to weapon design. . An unburned mantle will provide the hazard may be obtained by beta and gamma an alpha indication of approximately 15. tritium water vapor is absorbed and its rapid distribution throughout the body tissue. it causes heavy metal poisoning similar to lead filter mask such as M 17 has no protective value for or the uranium isotopes. Because of this property. in pure forms and in combinations with other elements. If fission principal isotope. Toxico- against tritium absorption for short periods of time. It decays by a series of alpha emissions occurs. An M 17 protective mask and standard anti-contamination 9-4 THORIUM (Th) clothing will adequately protect against thorium. To predict and estimate the quantity of fission bombardment. thorium accum- tritium. even when external to the reactors to produce fissionable uranium-233 by neutron body. A non-nuclear property of thorium is products is difficult since the amount of fission is that when heated in air. the probability of a nuclear b.- 9-3 .1 billion hazard. A self-contained breathing c. it glows with a dazzling white unknown. the products of the reaction may pose a severe to radium-225. Hazards and Health Considerations: Thorium apparatus and protective clothing will protect personnel presents both a toxic and radiological hazard. Thorium-232 is not fissionable. In general. standard alpha survey instruments. whose radiological half-life of 14. Biologically. ulates in the skeletal system where it has a biological half-life of 200 years. but it is used in emitters and are hazardous. dense 9-5 FISSION PRODUCTS gray metal which is about three times as abundant as uranium. one of the major uses relative isotopic abundances will change with time as of thorium has been in the Welbach lantern mantel used the shorter lived radioisotopes decay.

this team performs emergency weapon A shipboard nuclear weapon accident differs from land. port facilities -The key to responding to a nuclear weapon accident throughout the world and are trained to respond to a is planning.52-M CHAPTER 10 SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE 10-1 GENERAL b. trained to operate RADIAC instruments and man the .Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment .Composed of one officer and four enlisted EOD specialists or detachments are embarked ‘on CVs/ CVNS. The AN/ PDR-56 alpha survey instrument is protecting the public from health hazards. and keeping the ship’s primary RADIAC instrument used in nuclear the chain-of-command informed of the situation. whether from a nuclear contamination control stations or decontamination weapon or some other source (for example. The functions of these instruments are discussed in Appendix 1O-B.S. Also. depending on the damage sustained. this response element is and documented in Repair Party Training and Proce. Weapon Safing Team . material detection equipment. VA and can provide on-scene advice when in port. A significant difference location at the time of the accident. dures Manuals. The ability of the sea increases the importance of correct and adequate detachment to respond rapidly depends on the ship’s response by shipboard personnel. training. EOD teams have equipment for detection of gaseous radioactivity. tritium. Again depending is that the ship may.This team is located at NAVSEADET RASO. A fire or explosion associated with the accident has the potential to cause c. and adhering to precautionary nuclear weapon accident. Explosive . on the remoteness of the accident. The availability of air A ship’s damage control organization will provide the monitoring equipment to a ship depends on the ship’s initial response to a shipboard nuclear weapon accident weapons maintenance capability for airborne radioactive and will be augmented by the following. The AN/ PDR-43 high range beta- gamma survey instrument is also available and may be used to determine high beta-gamma dose rates. 10-5 PRE-ACCIDENT PREPARATION AEs. The Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team Although the initial response by shipboard personnel . a. if 10-3 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS required. measures during critical stages. safing procedures in the absence of an EOD team. Explosions. Results of shipboard fires are well known members of the ship’s crew.Composed of members of the ship’s crew. based scenarios in severai aspects. In addition to possessing iO-1 . detachments are permanently assigned to major U. be tasked to respond. The AN/ PDR-27 low range chapter provides guidance concerning aspects of a beta-gamma survey instrument is used primarily by nuclear weapon accident response unique to the initial entry teams to determine gamma dose rate and shipboard environment. Radiation Monitoring Team . petroleum stations. fuels or conventional weapons) can cause severe damage effecting the safety and seaworthiness of the ship. and AOES during deployments. d. the Commanding Officer The AN/ PDR-73 and IC/T2-PAB(M) are used to detect (CO) will focus attention on saving the ship and crew.Comprised of loss of the ship. will be the same wliether an accident occurs at sea or Yorktown. is carried by all ships. the frequent lack of immediate assistance at radioactive contamination is released. DoD 51 OO. 10-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 10-4 EQUIPMENT In a nuclear weapon accident. the same response be directed to another location for weapon recovery organizations described in Chapters 3 through 14 may operations and decontamination. This weapons accident response.

that an accident has occurred in weapons handling personnel. Have Damage Control parties alerted with be defined by securing hatches to a compartment. Establish a sound powered phone link between ~. Initiate standard shipboard damage control Some additional assistance by specialized units may be procedures including initiating a radiation plot. when required. d. as appropriate. Make preparation if in an in-port status for the senior person present shaIl take charge at the scene assisting the OSC designated by the Fleet Commander. These procedures should be done as a last resort action. EOD detachments identifying route(s) to DECON station. (a) When a nuclear accident or incident occurs. ~. ~. . Notify the bridge of the accident location response force will be derived from the activity in which and recommend to the commanding officer the state the accident occurred (in this case the ship) and of readiness and heading to which the ship should be augmentation will be provided by a SRF. during weapons movements when the chance for a j. 10-6 ACCIDENT (b) Upon notification of an accident or incident. “NO EATING. Establish a security perimeter surrounding nuclear weapon accident is at its peak: the accident scene. and passageway. Central recommendation. or hangar deck. In all cases. by the nature of their official duties. At sea. may become directly or indirectly involved in a nuclear (c) The bridge/strike operations center. compartment/ passageway/ hangar deck (by compart- ment and frame number). The initial ~. protective equipment. Damage Control parties and expedient means. are the most crucial in gaining control of a nuclear 4. ~. Attempt. upon accident or incident are trained to perform the following notification of an accident or incident shall: procedures: ~. ~. Prepare to initiate battle dressing and accident or incident. the possibility of augmentation by a Service ALLOWED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. When an accident occurs in port. Near shore releases (1) Initial Response Procedures. Act. the movement. ~. Direct all personnel at the scene to take emergency breathing precautions. ~. Ensure that the medical department and EOD personnel shall cover their noses and mouths with a detachment (when available) are on alert. c. Accordingly. Notify Damage Control Central. Continue OPREP-3 situation reports. toxic gases. The security perimeter aboard ship may a. to extinguish a fire . once the hatches firefighting equipment. calibrated RADIAC.” Response Force will be diminished and the action by the ship’s forces in effecting the response will be critical. Also. have been secured.5. Station security forces in the immediate area of scene. ships should take the following preventive measures Appendix 1O-A. changes to ships heading to vent smoke. on Damage Control involved. and direct available personnel to: ~. via most Damage Control Central. These brought. procedures have been established in previous chapters. Initiate initial OPREP-3 report. Bring the ship to appropriate condition of readiness. Initiate routine announcements over the The major differences in port lay in the flexibility 1 MC as follows: provided by the ship. Damage Control Central shall: a. provided by ships in the vicinity. only personnel authorized by the senior person present shall be allowed at the accident b. as involving weapons or radioactive material using the required.. personnel who. handkerchief or similar item to minimize inhalation of hazardous materials and smoke. it shouId be handled similar to the one that occurs ashore. all ships forc~ decontamination station procedures. and contaminated firefighting water. Attempt to save the lives of personnel ~. As a minimum. recommend may be parachuted into the area.a well exercised shipboard ‘Nuclear Weapon Accident firefighting guidance provided in S WOP 20-11 and bill. DRINKING OR SMOKING IS b. limiting access to authorized personnel only.

contamination from many parties in the decontamination of affected areas. in conditions.. the ship must be provided information on constant surveillance of the instrument to detect the estimated time of arrival. The in the accident investigation and debriefed to assess responsibility of executing these procedures rests with potential internal damage to the weapon. ~. if not removing. The amount of ~. and will follow procedures described in to their debarking or using MARS. the senior person at the scene until relieved by (f) Follow-on Response at Sea. to the extremities of the accident scene. Request if required. decontamination of high value items. unauthorized access. particularly those personnel who observed the extent However. information as to the cause of the accident. All ship’s crew members with (2) Follow-on Response Procedures. the shore establishments hazards to the ship and crew. maintaining Moreover. and dures are an extension of the initial response procedures. Public Affairs will be the responsibility of the Fleet Commander. the ship’s or a suitable ship in the vicinity for direct assistance Weapon Safety Team may perform emergency proce. and the time required designated OSC. due to damage. should be identified to assist providing positive control of an accident scene. providing the weapons are not too severely damaged. I o-3 . Any radiation reading assistance being sent. by the Fleet Commander and the higher authority must RADCON AN-/ PDR-27 monitors should then proceed have estimates of damage to the ship and weapon(s). to get either expert assistance onboard or move the ship to suitable facilities. (b) In the absence of EOD personnel. The property (d) Security. Weather and sea appropriately qualified damage control personnel or. on procedures for Chapters 4 through 19.. 2. In and/ or weapon(s) has destroyed the normal security general. Report via sound powered telephone and to operate the Contamination Control Station. Decontamination techniques are described in Chapter 19. j. Enter the compartment where the accident operations to minimize any hazards to ship’s personnel occurred and render the weapons/ materials safe using and damage to critical equipment. guidance will be provided should conduct beta/gamma detection operations. Logistics. will all effect the specific follow- (a) As soon as practicable after notification of on response actions which the Commanding Officer an accident or incident. at sea. Much of the technical assistance discussed in to Damage Control Central. Ship Decontamination. of the surfaces on a ship. as directed by the CO. remaining the case of an in-port accident. Any contaminated personal property will be coordinated by Fleet Commander or his belonging to ship’s personnel should be collected and designated area’ coordinator. publication. contamination. responding to requests for information from the press or from families. Chapters 5 and 17 may be airlifted to the accident ship. The (g) Follow-on Response in Port. dures outlined in applicable SWOPS or technical or other conditions. the extent of damage to the ship. additional security will not which the owner cannot easily replace. At sea. Unless accident damage to the ship must be replaced if it cannot be decontaminated. the nature of any technical increases in gamma radiation. The follow-on Commanding Officer is responsible for informing the response in port will be the responsibility of the shore ship’s crew regarding public affairs releases and prior establishment. Additional security is provided if required. (e) Debriefings. when dictated. Priority should be given to performing J_. approved procedures and equipment. must not be be needed. Resources will be limited to those onboard. to monitor and remonitor surfaces being decontaminated ~. Also. Identify the types of containers/materials decontamination ship’s personnel will be able to perform accredited for packaging explosives and radioactive will be limited by the number of RADIACS available materials. and be directed to an appropriate above normal background shall be reported immediately port. (c) Public Affairs. helicopter/parachute to ensure continued weapon protection and to prevent insertion of nearest EOD Detachment. marked with the owner’s identification. including RADIACS. or items provisions for the weapon(s). damage control RADCON might direct while at sea. public affairs (3) Claims. When the ship is in port. These proce. they include more detailed procedures for of damage to the weapon(s). completion of EOD procedures to Damage Control Simple cleaning techniques are frequently effective in Central and be available to assist and advise repair reducing. ‘ ~ttempted by ships personnel.

When using foam Recommend use of “snorkel hosing” with high capacity to fight a fire surrounding an intact weapo~ water should filters in conjunction with portable blowers to reduce not be used to cool the weapon because water will float possible contamination to portable blowers and ensure the foam away which could allow reignition of the fire. the magazine sprinkling system (1) Extinguishing the fire has priority. The primary suppressant for a fire involving a water should be controlled to the extent possible. caustic. all response personnel going not be done if it results in contamination being spread below decks will wear a self-contained breathing to nearby shore establishments or communities. This factor does not preclude the use of foam. Fires involving nuclear weapons in enclosed C02. apparatus (for example. Other hosemen and be on the leeward side of the ship. teams at the scene. Navy as soon as practical to deplete toxic. g. Red Devil Blowers) cool the weapon and its high explosive contents until should be used if there is no installed blowout system. a. For below deck fires. and nuclear weapon is high velocity water fog (low velocity dewatering operations should not be performed in port fog for submarines). and some may cause the retention of heat within the weapon. The propellants used in any weapon. produce oxygen once ignited. or rescue.52-M APPENDIX 1O-A SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING 1O-A-I team. should be relieved as soon as possible. the exhaust vent should one hoseman will wear OBA’S. Involvement of a the fire should be placed in a designated area until nuclear weapon does not require additional protective monitoring and necessary decontamination can be clothing for firefighting personnel.” however. care should be taken to minimize the possible contamination of the exterior of the ship. Ordnance magazine sprinkling systems in or near with the following provisions: the affected area shall be manned and made ready to be activated. the weapon is at ambient temperature. the normal exhaust system shall shouid be sprayed over the complete length of the be secured and emergency ventilation procedures used. or other petroleum fuel fires presence of radioactive gases. In all cases. the nozzleman and number the skin of the ship. The flow of potentially contaminated b. In the event c. contaminated water will be ship and situation unique. and the Standard Fuel Oil (NSFO). f. High velocity water fog. conventional or nuclear.137. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures will apply to fires involving nuclear weapons e. For weather-deck fires. reference (p). surfaces considered contaminated until monitoring can be performed. must not be activated without specific orders from the (2) Cooling of any weapons involved in the fire Commanding Officer. When venting shipboard which involve a nuclear weapon. Purple-K. spaces. Any firefighters weapon. weapon(s) and/ or both sides in a sweeping motion to Portable blowers (for example. Potentially contaminated equipment used to fight NSTM 079-39. or in close proximity should be performed to the maximum extent that fire hoses permit. a reflash watch will be set to provide an responding initially without respiratory protection immediate response to any reoccurrence of the fire. unfiltered venting should masks. will be prepared to relieve. OBA and Scott Air Pack). The best method of controlling the potentially They cannot be extinguished with smothering agents. Aqueous Filming Forming Foam shipboard spaces should be vented to the atmosphere (AFFF) or other suppressants on aircraft fuel. top h. IO-A-1 . contamination in smoke exhausted is directed outside d. After the fire is response personnel will be equipped with OBA’S or gas extinguished and when in port. During firefighting actions. Repair party personnel will wear protective clothing as specified in i. DoD 51 OO. until testing determines if the water is contaminated. Upon extinguishing a fire involving a nuclear side personnel will wear gas masks. A backup firefighting performed. the flow of potentially (3) Cooling should be continued after the fire is contaminated water should be noted and the wetted extinguished until the weapon is at ambient temperature. with appropriate respiratory protection. or a firefighting agent of a magazine accident.

Then personnel should be advised of these boundaries the hands and feet) should be made with the probe 1/ and the procedures for crossing them if required for 8-1 / 16th inch from the monitored surface. Standard damage minimize their movement through clean areas should control procedures should be used to limit damage and be established. If contamination was released 27 and the AN/ PDR-56. nose and mouth are% directed toward the expected contaminated area. DoD 51 OO. and the person’s skin dried prior contamination will be the most reliable indicator of to evaluation for the presence of alpha contamination.001 vice the 0. IO-B-1 . Then monitors should be check of the forehead. If radioactivity is found. airborne contamination. many ships are not equipped with detection is probable. initial personnel monitoring must be performed Contamination. Contamination tracked. or by wiping and backs of hands. and legs. it should be confirmed that portions radiation is confkmed. Most ships and to prevent the spread of “radioactive material to will have insufficient RADIAC instruments to support uncontaminated parts of the ship. routes to a. Additionally. so the wind is on the beam and carrying (1) Until the absence of gamma radiation is any contamination away from the ship. and other monitoring. the monitoring process. ladders. If no contamination. The monitoring continues to determine the extent of the contamination control station will be normally located contaminated area. outset of an accident. b. if possible. Damp clothing should be removed. damp cloth. confirmed by monitoring at the accident site. Access to the CCS must be possible from the spread of contamination. cheeks. inaccurate alpha contamination evaluation and will allow. the ship should be maneuvered. personnel should be monitored at the CCS with the AN/ PDR- (1) Ship Monitoring. is used. its location should of damage or inadvertent probe contamination during be marked for decontamination and remonitoring. The and finally the ankles and feet. air samplers. torso. Control of Contamination. at a fire boundary for below deck accidents. or carried. Monitoring surfaces for loose surface assumed contaminated. contact readings may (2) Air Monitoring. The user’s attention is not focused on the locations where most personnel would place their hands RADIAC’S meter movement. in the areas most likely to be contaminated (for example. The preliminary readings boundaries of the contaminated area should be defined. If clothing toring shall be conducted to the extent instrumentation is damp. If Table 6-2. Contamination Control Station (CCS). This practice results in easier. lessening the possibility or feet. The wash facilities need to prevent the spread of contamination and minimize not be in the immediate vicinity of the CCS although the effects of structural damage. If the person essential ship operations. use of the ANI PDR-27 is no of the ship thought to be uncontaminated are in fact longer necessary. Airborne radiological moni. Protective Devices (3) To conserve the expenditure of protective for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface cfothing. a thorough with a clean. If contamination is found. Personnel monitors are to identify at a compartment entrance for topside accidents and contaminated personnel who require decontamination. and and wash basin should be designated for use in material conditions ZEBRA and Circle WILLIAM set decontamination procedures. identify radioactive material. Once the absence of gamma during the accident. The use of earphones with RADIACS “clean. A shower set and maintained to prevent the spread of fire. at the such a location is preferable. doors. be used for the remainder of the monitoring. more than one CCS. If potentially contaminated personnel are both above and below decks. However. onto hard surfaces (2) Personnel monitoring should include: the front can be usually removed with soap and water. forearms.” Monitors should be directed initially to check is required. is not obviously contaminated. Fire boundaries shall be both contaminated and uncontaminated areas. table values should be divided prior to the removal of the clothing. more accurate passageways at hatches.52-M APPENDIX 1O-B SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL 1O-B-1 by 100 to correct for the higher resuspension factors (0.00005 used to develop the table) which Monitoring for radioactivity is performed initially to can be expected from shipboard surfaces.

The limited stock of washing. Machines used to Iaunder and the Commanding Officer should be advised. protective clothing and other launderable equipment determine if the procedure removed the alpha contam. When working protective clothing should be removed and placed in in a wet environment. If anti-contamination protective clothing. contaminated clothing should not be used for normal Disposition of the contaminated individual(s) will be laundry until after they have been fully cycled empty. Clothing Decontamination. removed. Shampoo contaminated hair several times. Much (4) Personnel who had contamination on their of the protection provided by coveralls will be lost if protective clothing should be remonitored after the material becomes soaked. they will aid in keeping washers free be referred to the Medical Department for further of contamination. from contamination. 10-B-2 . Automatic washing monitoring should be made with the probe in contact machines should be clean and free of soap scum to with the skin. the clothing should be of the clothing.15. provides detailed guidance contamination. it should be removed and placed clothing is unavailable.or contamination below the acceptable emergency c. If contamination is clothing can carry contamination from the outer surface also on their personal clothing. Following each washing. Final equipment or the washing machine. When d. Protective Clothing. dried. it can normally be removed by washing with nonabrasive soap and water. be sure not to puncture or abrade the skin protective clothing on board a ship may be exhausted through excess scrubbing. Items contaminated above acceptable on personnel decontamination procedures and should emergency levels given in reference (u) and that do not be available to the Medical Department. coveralls are recommended for in containers for clothing to be reused. When removing contaminated clothing. After laundered items have completely decontamination under medical supervision. At skin should be thoroughly dried before monitoring to sea. When all show any appreciable contamination reduction after contamination cannot be removed. BUME. contamination is on the skin. without damage to the ination. the residual level three successive launderings should be packaged for should be recorded in medical records. If contamination levels greater damage or perform decontamination operations. disposal as radioactive waste. the rapidly during decontamination operations at sea. waterproof clothing should be a container marked for contaminated clothing. Liquids soaking the removing the protective clothing. used for anti-contamination clothing if possible. they must be checked for any remaining DINST 6470. If decontaminating ination levels on the skin or hair. If two washings do not reduce contam. the Openings in the clothing should be taped. can be laundered. Booties and gloves personnel entering the contaminated area to repair should be kept separate.10. If from contacting the skin. the CCS log. and the fact noted in the CCS log. reference (r). individuals should agents are used. are found on the from alpha contamination. placed in a plastic bag labeled as contaminated care should be taken to prevent the outside of the clothing clothing. prevent deposition of contamination. than those levels shown in reference (u) are found. Any close knit clothing should remaining levels of contamination identified in prevent contamination of the skin and provide protection OPNAVINST 3440. and monitored to ensure they are free BUMED. determined by the Medical Department cooperating with allowed to dry. if necessary. reference (u).

uCi/ m W m2 13 pCi/mz dpm/m2 2.3 dpm/g pCi/m2 . .5X 104 11-1 .1 X 10- 2 dpm/cm2 ‘ dpm/niz 104 dpm/cm2 dpm/g 0.0 x IO-11 dpm/m2 pCi/g 3. DoD 51 OO.Lfg/ m 2 0.5 x 10-3 dpm/cm2 Pg/m “ 6. To Convert ~ Multiply by 2 .0 x 10-7 dpm/cm2 pCi/g 0.7X 105 2 Pgl m dpm/cm2 17 2 flgl m dpm/g 11 2 Pg/ m pCi/g 5x 10-’ 2 t.fgl m 2 6.091 dpm/g dpm/mZ 1. Conversions are for weapons grade plutonium only with no Americium 2. Contamination of soil is to the depth of 1 cm.2 X 10-6 flCi/m2 dpm/cm2 220 pCi/ mz dpm/g 150 2 pCi/ m flCi/g 6. “ 3.7 X 10-5 dpm/m2 pCi/g” 3.67 .075 Ci/g.5 x 10-7 dpm/m2 t.0 x 10-5 dpm/cm2 pCi/ m 2 4. Density of soil 1.fgl m pCi/g 5 dpm/m2 #Ci/ m 2 4.5 g/cmj. TABLE 11-1.8 x 103 dpm/g .7 X 10- 5 2 pCi/ m pCi/g 67 2 Pgl m pCi/ m2 0.52-M CHAPTER 11 CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM Assumptions: 1.1 X 10-6 dpm/ m2 dpm/cm2 10-4 dpm/m2 dpm/g 6. dpm/cm~ pCi/g 3. Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium. Specific activity (alpha only) 0.075 2 Pgl m dpm/ m* 1. 6. 4.

and assume a 60 sq cm probe area (AN/ PDR-60 or PAC.004 Stainless Steel .5 x IO-2 pCi/g W m2 0.5 x 10-7 dprn/g pCi/g 0.pre.1 S).3 x 10” pCi/g dpm/cmZ 3. TABLE 11-1: Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium (Continued) To Convert Into Multiply by dpm/g dpm/cmz 1.ceding conversion table and equation for users of the ANI PDR-56 and AN I PDR-60.3 x 10IO pCi/ g dpm/cmz 3.2 X 106 pCi/g pCi/g lo6 pCi/ g pCi/ m 2 1. The table below provides approximate factors for conversion of alpha readings in cpm into ~gi mz for various surfaces using the following equation: /Jg/ m2 .5 dpm/g flCi/g 4. a surface sample from the area measured should be analyzed with laboratory equipment and the conversion factor for that area computed. Correction factors should be multiplied by 4 for use with the ANI PDR-56. respectively.45 4 .correction factor x c p m I TYPE OF SURFACE CORRECTION FACTOR Soil .3 pCi/g dpm/g 2. nominal instrument efficiency during field use.5 x 10 5 flCi/g pg/m2 2 x 10 flCi/g dpm/mZ 3. For accurate conversions. 11-2 .3 x 106 flCi/g dpm/g 2.20 pCi/g dpm/mz 3.006 Concrete . Tables 11-2 and 11-3 were prepared from the .2 pCi/g flCi/g ] 0-6 p units units 10-6 units # units 106 The conversion of alpha instrument readings in cprn into quantifiable units is affected by the type of surface and meter efficiency.005 Plywood .uCi/g flCi/m21.0025 The correction factors consider unit and area conversions.

75 8.0 .72 8.0 2.75 40.00 3000.000 4800.0 4.0 9.0 90.40 120.00 2000.7 x 10IJ.2 3.0 75.48 4.000 240.60 80.0 56.000 43.0 18.0 19.0 .20 12.80 220.0 1.0 1.6 .000 7200.4 .6 .0 3.0 9.000 24.60 6.96 8.0 120.0 60.0 2.2 2.8 2.06 .0 90.0 .0 4.50 200.8 .00 64.200 52.50 16.70 30.44 16.0 1.0 450.0 180.0 .0 21.0 14.0 8.40 160.00 128.8 3.60 1.0 240.- 11-3 .13 1.50 400.0 270.15 400 9.50 176.0 135.18 2.0 360.12 1.0 1.00 3200.30 35.2 1.00 1600.0 6.30 3.0 3.50 1200.70 28.00 100.00 1500.00 25.0 6.90 9.20 10.8 3.0 .0 37.80 15.00 50.00 4000.0 5.2 5.96 44.25 12.00 750.00 200.00 100.000 3600.0 7.0 1.0 .0 540.20 110.0 18.0 .0 3.50 48. Conversion Table (CPM to pg/mz or pCi/mz) AN/PDR 56 Alpha Meter.0 300.0 15.80 40.60 30.45 800 19.00 3000.000 72.80 20.0 45.0 180.500 60.200 28.25 4.16 18.0 2.72 6.000 120.4 .O 225.500 36.o 75.0 225.24 2.0 1.00 300.5 .36 4.08 12.0 6.0 .88 2.000 264.00 1000.00 160.90 1.038 100 2.00 6000.00 800.16 24.20 80. TABLE 11-2. STAINLESS CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLYWOOD SIEEL pCi/m2 mUm2 pCi/m2 Wfn2 flCi/m2 @m2 pCi/m2 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 50 1.0 .0 14.0 112.0 4.35 2.0 1.0 7.15 1.0 360.0 150.75 1.10 3.00 1500.00 250.8 .000 1800.00 4800.0 2.0 .0 37.50 80.0 150.0 1.4 1.0 30.24 36.000 288.00 25.0 1.0 1.0 .0 3.6 .0 13.00 192.80 19.0 3.00 5.075 .50 11.8 2.65 2.60 240.2 .36 “ 28.00 500.0 3.09 1.00 2000.00 10. .000 192.075 200 4.64 22.8 .000 96.40 60.2 1.00 NOTE: To convert pCi/ mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.0 9.25 100.00 2400.000 600.00 500.00 150.000 2400.0 .50 75.04 56.0 2.0 12.20 44.0 16.800 67.2 .0 7.50 50.0 112.0 4.75 50>000 1200.0 18.30 600 14.44 12.00 IOoo.25 24.0 12.

00 800. 2 3 2.0 1.2 .i13 800 4.18 2.0 2.5 2.0 28.40 20.8 .0 .50 62.2 .69 50.18 1.2 .0 3.50 300.84 7.0 45.00 500.019 200 1.000 300.0 3.13 44.200 7.0 . TABLE 11-3.66 5.0 112.5 .06 12.000 24.28 1.34 2.15 1.45 3.0 1.99 11.200 13.000 600.35 15.40 60.0 .50 10>000 60.0 4.0 . Conversion Table (CPM to pg/ml or pCi/ml) AN/PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 Alpha Meter STAINLESS CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLY WOOD SIEEL AN/ PDR 60 fig/ml flCi/m2 bgl m2 pCi/ mz flg/m2 gCi/m2 m/m2 pCi/m2 AN/ PDR 54 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 50 0.50 750.000 900.36 3.500 15.0 60.009 100 0.36 4.0 .00 500.30 27.0 4.38 100.60 30.0 45.13 12.25 125.5 .94 10.38 4.500 9.24 2.13 200.68 7.0 90.000 1800.00 750.88 I I .25 .0 1.25 25.8 .000 66.0 4.000 150.0 3.0 18.0 .81 9.0 1.4 .038 400 2.5 .50 187.75 375.5 .5 14.50 400.000 6.800 10.075 600 3.0 .56 6.0 .5 .0 37.25 25.26 14.23 1.0 37.3 .800 16.0 .000 18.41 2.8 .38 .000 72.0 .05 11.2 .00 250.0 .5 .00 1500.80 20.75 6.5 .000 48.75 40.0 67.125 .15 1.5 4.00 25.20 10.50 48.0 1.5 .50 .0 7.0 5.000 30.45 5.25 NOTE: To convert #Ci/mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.0 3.75 5.8 .68 7.0 56.0 33.38 75.7 x 10IJ.0 2.54 6.075 .0 2.0 .0 75.0 .53 3.50 250.06 .30 2.0 3.0 18.0 1.06 100.6 .8 .0 28.015 .50 12.0 .6 .0 1.12 1.2 .56 4.54 4.0 .25 .2 .0 .0 1.45 4.5 .0 . 11-4 .0 22.27 3.00 375.75 200.0 22.023 .94 8.03 .8 .90 7.0 4.4 .019 .95 55.0 3.0 11.0 1.00 1000.0 30.0 1.0 15.19 1.83 8.00 32.0 90.13 12.0 .2 .50 16.09 I .50 1200.3 .4 .6 .50 50.47 2.0 9.0 56.00 125.25 600.30 3.045 .0 1.0 135.0 9.60 40.13 300.88 20.8 1.000 1200.75 150.0 .000 450.

3 8. 7 189 . 1 Ci = 3. 8 220 2000 54.6 16. TABLE 11-4.62 0.9 100 2.8 70 1.5 80 2.6 200 5.1 60 1.9 24 300 8.7 x 1O-II Ci 1 REM = 10J Sv 1 Sv = 100 REM 1 RAD = 10-2 Gy 1 Gy = 100 RADs S1 Units: Becquerels (Bq) Sieverts (Sv) Grey (Gy) 11:5 . 9 240 3000 81.2 2 54 500 13.2 5.7 40 1.1 2. Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi).4 0.4 0.8 0.08 TABLE 11-5.89 0.4 10. I 000 27.35 0.16 0.6 4 108 700 18.2 90 2. Conversion To S1 Units. 6 162 900 24.8 21. 20 540 5000 135.1 0.5 1 27 400 10. mCi uCi 7000 189.7 x 10!’2 Bq 1 Bq = 2.5 13. 10 270 4000 108.9 3 81 600 16.4 50 1.7 0. 30 810 6000 162. 5 135 800 21.7 18.

. telephone. a. Equally critical to effective of command are necessary to keep key personnel command and control is the timely establishment of informed. Establish external communications. Fast. Also included are organizations to prevent interference and radio treatments of various capabilities and hardware operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may (telephone. laboratory instruments. satellite. for example. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accident (1) Telephone communications between fixed site relies heavily on a communications officer knowledge locations. Several minimum nets. 12-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (2) Multiple telephone lines to support response force elements. the operations center and the about secure and non-secure tactical. security. Response Force (SRF) must take immediate action to ensure that appropriate communications equipment is Communication requirements: identified and requested early in response operations. State and/or civilian officials establish their own communications. (3) Secure voice via satellite. particularly can be met by unsecure voice communications. Create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field available. Coordinate frequency usage of all response distances (external corhmunications).or HF. and SRF are “discussed. radio. the National Military Command mutual support and eliminate interference. securing adequate internal commun- activities. and visual signal) that are. accident site. Moreover. (3) UHF/VHF nets. and Joint Information Center (JIC). Establish internal communications. near existing communications systems. . c. and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). the DoE. commercial communications systems. He or she should be equally adept at establishing command (secure desirable). including personnel at the accident scene (internal communications) and at long c. radiological operations (secure desirable). DoD 51 OO. weapons recovery opera- communications support in remote locations. and ensure that required communications are available. He or she must (2) Field phones for EOD operations (secure be able to apply conventional and imaginative methods phones are desirable). . FE MA. however. The requirements of both the IRF for record communications.52-M CHAPTER 12 COMMUNICATIONS 12-1 GENERAL 12-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS The On-Scene Commander (OSC) requires internal a. Conferencing may suffice early in the response. 12-1 . or in areas tions (secure). strategic. b. External communications with higher echelons ications to support activities at the accident scene is a time-sensitive operation. public affairs will be required. Center. the communications both secure voice and record communications are officers of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service required early in the response. This chapter provides guidance for establishing (4) Access to the Defense Communications System communications systems and capabilities to support response operations. Careful (1) Telephone communications with the Service attention must be afforded these installations to ensure operations center. In addition to military communications at the b. Therefore. Many initial communications requirements external communications to higher echelons. in the Washington arena. reliable and accurate communications are communications with the operations center and with essential for nuclear weapon accident response opera- forces in the field to control and keep abreast of response tions.

The AMCC van is . Navy. and limited data communications. available communications media may be used to submit the request. c. Record communications can be “air. ~. via HF radio. is capable of battery operations. These units are maintained in a (a) HAMMER ACE. if any. HAMMER ACE equipment can be transported tions (AMCC). “be directed to HQ AFCC/ DOXZ. in conjunction with the OSC. transportable airliners. the DoD. For this reason. Situation. HAMMER ACE equipment as sophisticated as satellite capable secure voice radio. response organizations. additional widely. Air Force. a small mobile on C-21. respectively. Service Assets. Capabilities include secure satellite system for equipment shelter with two separately configured 55 kw voice. The team can deploy within three hours and establish communications within 30 minutes of arrival (a) Ashore Mobile Contingency Communica- on-site. evaluate the nuclear weapon accident recovery operations vary situation and determine what. verbal requests must be followed a. Because the same equipment supports numerous contingencies.S. two via HF radio).S. Resources are as familiar as the telephone or capabilities are required. Any sources. Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix l-G. U. or commercial communications unit contained in one. AUTOVON. HAMMER ACE The communications capabilities and resources for personnel. VA. 12-2 . Remarks concerning any unusual condi- (1) U. The land mobile radios can interface with the secure satellite system. mobile radio network with a repeater/base station for local communications. “ in-Chief has control of ashore mobile contingency communication units. including type of emergency. ications Division.S. and record commun.S. The Military Services maintain in writing within 24 hours. and commercial telephone systems simul~aneously: through the HAMMER ACE operations center at Scott ~. Information about specific assets as well as procedures for requesting and a. remote locations. Obtain frequency clearances. other Federal organizations. Scott AFB. or commercial Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 20-A. as necessary. gapped” to AUTODIN through the HAMMER ACE operations center. Army signal units have tions for wh~ch the team should prepare. Illinois. Prepare a Communication-Electronics Operating ground communications and a privacy feature. Other capabilities include air-to- e. and division operations including wire/ telephone ~.S. brigade. The following on deployment of generators or additional batteries is presents a variety of communications resources for required for longer operations. Army. or equivalent-type aircraft. facsimile. including coordi- tasking Service assets can be obtained from the respective nates if avaiiabie. are available from both Combat Communication Groups and HAMMER ACE as described in paragraph (a) (3) U. Service operations centers. and operation in. Resources are available from (AFCC Command Center) or through the JNACC. Deployment location. or alternatively. d. Requests for additional information should switchboards. equipment. multichannel radios. only those assets ~. and enough batteries Communications assets must be capable of deployment are deployed to sustain 72-hour operation. Illinois. Tactical communications assets are listed in Appendix 20-A. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACE required for a specific nuclear weapon accident response support should be made directly to HQ AFCC/COXC effort should be requested. The limited 12-4 RESOURCES capability provided by HAMMER ACE is an initial capability only. HAMMER ACE is a state of readiness to permit deployment within 24 hours rapidly deployable team of engineers and technicians by COMMNAVSTA Philippines and NAVCAMSLANT equipped with advanced technology communications Norfolk. Navy Fleet Commanders- below. as well as for contingency assets. The van contains sufficient secure satellite link can interface with AUTOSEVOCOM. Special Commun~’ ication systems. A follow- to. equipment to maintain the following circuits STU-11. Points of contact. The mobile diesel generators. or operational commanders. Two secure full duplex teletype circuits (one AFB. communications assets to support battalion. Each U. however. land Instruction for use by all response organizations. Phone numbers (2) U. ~. The requesting agency must communications assets organic to combat support units provide the following information with the request.

KY-70 and KY-75 secure voice devices. The JACC/ CP can be deployed within 24 information regarding these assets can be obtained from hours from the time the JCS issues deployment approval the JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division. and until it kilohertz (3 SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its returns to its host command. The voice radio system may be connected. Florida. any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a JCS contingency support communications resources are JACC/CP radio. The 12-3 . A wide trolled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (CJCS MOP 3) lowboy trailer must be used to transport the vans any and in Allied Communications Publication 134. radios. consists of several pieces of equipment for the AMCC. single sideband (HF/ SSB) voice or teletype approved by the Fleet CINC based on requests submitted communication channel over its one-kilowatt transceiv- by subordinate commands. it is under the custody 10 kw system. ~. under the accessory trailer. references (w) and (x). commonly referred t’o helicopter. four major components—operations center. Navy. ~. 28 voice security equipment. commun- an additional prime mover is required. operational control of the respective Fleet Commanders. Arizona. ~. four-wire/two-wire telephone switchboard. communication systems. One PARKHILL narrow band secure voice (g) UHF and SHF satellite terminals.the U. ~. ~. one CH-53 ter/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). plans for deployment of mobile/transportable commun- reference (y). AN/ARC-54 (VHF/FM) and AN/ ARC-51BX (VHF/AM). Army concepts capabilities and logistics requirements. UHF satellite fleet broadcast receiver (AN/ (e) Secure record communications terminals. A complete AMCC unit can ~. During normal at McDill AFB. Power source must be 440V. additional information can be obtained from support unit consisting of Army. SSR-I receiver only). messages.S. The JACC/ CP has if transported by helicopter. wire. 20-line. at all times. distance or over other than paved/gravel roads. units have multichannel radio. HF High Command (HICOM) net. generator. Ft Huachuca. Contingency requests should ers or high frequency. The Joint Airborne Communication& Cen- be transported via one C-130 aircraft.S. The JCSE is a contingency duty hours. three phase. 60 Hz. The JACC/ CP also contains three command. and . a AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM). When transported via truck. for (4) U. in a winch equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. ications control. The 10 kw system is limited to ground and operational control of the designated supported operations only. Supplement 1. Details of the JCSE deployment/employment tions Assets. via satellite with KG-36 security equipment. (b) HF radio. When the AMCC is deployed. Two UHF secure voice circuits with KY. or from tions equipment including: their EOC. (f) Weather dissemination equipment. (h) Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412). requested according to procedures contained in ~. The JACC/CP can provide one high in-Chief (CINCS). if needed. and (b) When deployed. (d) UHF and VHF radios (secure and non- ~. Contingency Branch. (1) Joint Communications Support Element (2) JCS-Joint Controlled Tactical Communica- (JCSE). to a 10-fine. Additional ~. the AMCC uses local power (j) The AN/ URC Joint Airborne Communica- where available. (c) Microwave/ troposcatter radios. Marine Corps (USMC). The complete JACC/ CP can be transported “Mobile/ Transportable Communications Assets Con. requires an additional lift mounted in air transportable vans. The USMC signal ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. (i) KY-65. The mobile generators as JACKPOT.S. Otherwise. One narrow band secure voice (CV-3333) (a) Switchboards. mobile generators supplied with the AMCC units will be used. All deployments of the AMCC are frequency. tions Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). ~. or 30-line. double independent sideband be forwarded to the Fleet CINC as expeditiously as (HF/ ISB) with a total of four independent three- possible. Details on the JCCSA are In the U. or one 6x65-ton truck. and an air conditioner/ (c) The AMCC units are. and record 3. Phone numbers are in Appendix 20-A. Two VINSON secure voice devices. can be obtained by contacting the JCSE ications assets controlled by the JCS. secure). Air Force. Army Information Systems Command Marine Corps personnel and a variety of communica. The switchboard can connect b. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Controlled Assets. circuit via HF or UHF satellite.

Most SHF provide communications to a remote area via transpor- satellite terminals are under JCS deployment control. The van control arrangements of those forces. the U.S. and to carry on from that local area networks and high speed transmission. Tinker AFB. HF/ VHF radio networks (with action. or close to. maintains UHF and SH F research and devel. the commun- FEMA regional office level. facsimile. Also. DC. facsimile. and U. are included communications officer is to determine the commun- for advance party use and emergency backup. This concept of operations focuses on the actions of the military response force(s)” c. are available in Jersey. (1) HF Radio (voice only) for external commun. Secure ications assets at. Although the specific ications officer should use these resources with deployed equipment varies between FEMA regions. Coordination Center (EICC) in Washington. contribute to the is outsized and requires C-5 aircraft transport. carrier systems. (2) VHF radio to support on-scene Federal ment which can be deployed separately or in packages Response Center (FRC) (internal) communications. and data communications to include accomplished prior to arrival. the initial communication capability may consist of only hand held. complexity of the problems. or civilian and still video operations. with data interface. KY-3 Several factors. Commercial carriers can (3) Other JCS Controlled Assets. air transportable communications services and items of concern sequentially without regard to whether hardware. Guard. The DoE maintains emergency communications officer(s). Leased These terminals include the Ground Mobile Forces services. Oklahoma. Commercial Assets.JCCSA consists of heavy mobile/transportable equip. Telephone Exchange (TELEX). Deployable communication assets capabilities for long haul and local communications. Equipment in the van logistical. Air National Nuclear weapon accidents present a variety of technical. telephone company. and the command and which will interface with AUTOSEVO(DM. (a) Switchboards The quantities of these assets will vary depending on (b) HF radio the size of the FEMA response contingent. or ication to their regional office. Systems include a multi-point telephone the IRF or the SRF communications officer takes the switch. or cable. State/ local officials. used by FEMA response groups are maintained at the Once existing capabilities are determined. data Teletypewriter (GMF) te~minals assigned to the military Services. Incumbent upon the SRF communications pagers). including telephone. (c) Troposcatter radios (d) Medium speed AUTODIN terminals e. and a narrow band (HY-2) trunk the response force involved. and the Emergency Information and . secure voice terminals. multi-channel satellite system is available to provide long-haul transmission capability. The local communications include voice. most locations. The Exchange (TWX). opment satellite terminals which can be deployed for contingency operations and exercises. and the d. video teleconferencing. suitcase repeater and suitcase base station with telephone interconnect. teletype. A juncture. Equipment includes: Equipment includes hand-held radios. if an accident occurs headquarters. Conversely. the FEMA assets to establish an effective communications network. Monmouth. authorities can provide information on the commun- ication infrastructure near the accident scene. American Telephone and Telegraph AT&T) is possible. New Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS). the State disaster response wire (field phones). a coin operated telephone.close’to a populated area. FEMA Assets. The approach is to present response. portable HF radios. communications problems. short range VHF/ FM radios. In the CONUS. response contingent usually arrives with the following capabilities: (1) In remote or sparsely populated areas. acquisition of (e) Manual secure voice switch and terminals supporting communications systems from commercial (f) SHF satellite terminals carriers (for example. a point-to-point officer is the responsibility to ascertain what has been microwave system. DoE Assets. table microwave. by C-141/ C-5 aircraft. Army 235th Signal Company. Single-channel a. the accident site. Ft. The initial task of the response force INMARSAT terminals. Initial Actions. Air Force has communication assets similar to those in the 12-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS JCCSA. includes a secure cord switchboard (SECORD). and operational. They are located at 3rd Combat Communi- cations Group (CCG) and the 281st CCG.S. or even a business or private telephone may be available 12-4 . including the location of the accident. data.

Compilations of individually unclassified from the command post.” or U. As a minimum. if requested at the earliest possible time. references (z) considered when meeting overall communication and (aa). In either case. Additional communication assets. and then by acting to preclude interception wire integration capability into the local switchboard or exploitation of this information. The instructions should be unclassified. The staff directors for to prevent exploitation of EEFIs may include using support and operations. Radio unfriendly elements may be able to compile these items.S. each military department has a As this build-up occurs. telephone routing instructions. but in most cases these ications officer should establish and maintain a list of offices have delegated the authority to assign frequencies communications assets and capabilities on-scene. Army FM 24-2. items concerning weapons communicated during ications officer must. the DoD JNACC. authorities/ officials agencies possessing on-scene officer advised. additional a Communications-Electronic Operating Instruction leased communications such as WATS can be obtained (CEOI). the CEOI. assets are limited. and a support base camp Communications:Electronics Board (Joint Frequency is established”. the response force commun- frequency management office. more containing the capabilities and limitations of equipment time is required to provide leased assets to remote areas. If defeat this threat by determining the EEFI for the possible. routing those assets into the appropriate users hands (5) One of the more complex problems facing the ~ “ is of primary importance as the response organization response force communications officer is preparation of grows. (2) Another method of communications for message handling instructions and routing indicators. Each Service@s membership on be deployed or acquired concurrent with the build-up.immediately for emergency use. they deployment of mobile communications provides the shouId include system descriptions (charts and diagrams response force with additional local telephone and radio. Air Force ference. Further. therefore. When requested by the Services. authorizations could result in interferenw with other critical communications. The response force commun. the requirements must be identified and systems. The CEOI should be an easy-to-use instruction to augment available communications. additional communication resources will Management Office). Air Force Regulation 700-14. Moreover. plan communication recovery procedures may well be classified. particularly if radio procedures and call signs. the board. dialing and as well as long haul secure voice and record capabilities. and methods to support the mobility of the OSC. (4) The communications officer must take prompt action to obtain frequency clearances. “Radio Frequency Manage. the communications officer must plan to sufficient range and be capable of frequent use. systems and traffic used for response to nuclear weapon (3) The OSC may spend considerable time away accidents. The use of unauthorized. Failure to obtain valid frequency communication systems. As additional response forces are managed at the national level by the Military deploy to the accident scene. are helpful).S. Radio frequencies b. Coordination should be made with the should coordinate frequency requirements through their appropriate representative from Federal and civilian own channeIs and keep the military communications . Follow-On Actions. external (long haul) communications. primarily in 12-5 . DoD JNACC arranges Enemy or dissident elements may be able to intercept for transportation of specialized communications and exploit command and control communications resources. increasing the quantity of communications assets and Government.S. friendly information (EEFIs). message addresses. non-DoD agencies identifying potential mutual inter- ment. communications disci- should be included in this net. the net should be secure and have a radio/ operation. secure voice procedures. and detailed “how-to-use” procedures for all available Therefore. the DoD JNACC will assist by relaying (6) Although COMSEC instructions are a part of information or coordinating with other forces/agencies. DoE and FEMA communications personnel requirements. and should ensure that all possible assets are Radio Spectrum Frequency Management. (1) As emphasized throughout this chapter. The to area coordinators. An outline of a typical if communication can be established from the site to CEOI is at Figure 12-1. Follow-on possible. nets provided for OSC communications should have Therefore. is the telephone conferencing and communications security (COMSEC) operations capability of Service operations centers and/or the security procedures including essential elements of National Military Command Center (NMCC). pline. and the special staff advisors secure transmission facilities. codes and authenticators. frequencies could lead to embarrassment for the U. an on-site telephone directory. and widely distributed. COMSEC actions and long haul voice circuits. Naturally. Additional details maybe obtained list should include assets and frequencies belonging to from U. and changing call signs. COMSEC deserves additional emphasis.

Figure 2-2: Hot Line Routing Diagram . . . Figure 3-1: Message Example . . . . . . . . .cs Operating Instruction (CEO).Tie Line Network Dialing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Radio Communications Instructions . . . . . . . B-4 . Net #1 Grader . . . . . . Net #3 Catcher . . . . .Message Communications Instruction . . . . .Off-Site Contact Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . . . . Intercom #4 . . . . .On-Site Telephone Diagram. . . . 12-6 . . . . Communications-Electro. . . . . Net #2 Looker . . . [ntercorn # 2 . . . . . . N e t # 6 Angel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SECTION ? . . . Net #7 Red . . . . . . . . . . ANN EXA-Response Force Traffic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANNEX D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #. . . . . . Intercom #3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANNEX B . . . . Figure 3-?: Eyes Only Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3 . . . . . . . . . . . .Telephone Communications . . . . . . . . . . . SECTION 4. . . .I : Telephone Routing Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net #4 Ivory . .Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI) (Sample Contents) SECTION 1.Radio Call Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2. . . . . . . . .Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Intercom Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SECTION 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intercom #1 . . . . . . . . . . .DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Blue . . . . . . . .> Figure 12-1. . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2. . ANNEX C . . . . . .

After the weapon(s) and weapon components are removed from the site. communications annex to the accident response plan include: i. through site restoration. 12-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX g. . As the response from remote locations. radiological monitoring and site restoration operations. However. communications support provided on-site during the e. Procedures for establishing local radio nets and early response and weapon recovery should continue assignment of call signs. Procedures for obtaining Service and JCS to communicate by secure voice. and to support and the location of assets to fill requirements. are needed a. so will the with the NMCC and Defense Communications System communications support required. transitions into site restoration. Procedures for obtaining leased commercial (MILSTRIP) messages. messages. record deployable communications assets. Procedures for using secure/clear fax resources.the form of telephones and VHF/FM radios. little or no need will exist d. Prepare an integrated communications plan.- 12-7 . and other administrative communications. b. Procedures for establishing communications links (2) As the response operations peak. Procedures and information appropriate for the h. Procedures for obtaining frequency cleara~ces. Procedures for coordinating communications with non-DoD agencies. supply c. f. the primary commun- ications should be routine situation reports. A description of actual or projected requirements for effective operation of the JIC.

Also. and protection of classified information and of the NDA. The IRF should provide security personnel with This chapter provides guidance for planning and anti-contamination clothing and protective masks in the conducting security operations at the scene of a nuclear event that security requires their presence within the weapon accident and discusses security requirements. response depends on the location of the accident site. Installations with safety. radiological control area. accident involving DoE equipment/ materials is a NSA. there is no equivalent to the NDA. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group accident site requires implementation of an effective activities or intelligence collection efforts. be notified and may be on-scene when the IRF arrives. be prepared to meet all security requirements on a 24 hour basis without degrading the alertness and capability b. to restrict entry and to provide for public personnel are in supervisory positions. close coordination with civil law property. of his or her personnel to respond. Protect other classified materials and information. The On. c. Additionally. 13-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS b. canteens. Civilian Response. Normally. The security officer should a. c. The SRF security officer should assess manpower requirements and ensure The security program at the accident scene should meet that sufficient additional security personnel are included the following requirements: in the SRF. ammunition. Protect nuclear weapons and components. Provide effective control of the accident area. The presence of nuclear weapons or components at an g. If the accident occurs off a military installation near e. of people attracted to the accident scene. The IRF will have a National Defense Area (NDA) to permit control of a security element for perimeter security. This requirement should include rope and stanchions for barricading the accident 13-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE site. augmentation may be required. security assistance may need to be obtained from civil authorities/officials until 13-4 RESOURCES sufficient military forces arrive.enforcement agencies/ host nation law agencies. cold weather gear. local police. Provide necessary operational security (OPSEC). and care should Scene Commander will establish a disaster cordon or be exercised to ensure that only experienced security Security Area. Provide effective coordination with civil law ‘a populated area. and rescue units will . off- installation accidents could require the establishment of a. protective masks.52-M CHAPTER 13 SECURITY 13-1 GENERAL f. and helmets. 13-1 . security chapter outlines a concept of operations to satisfy these personnel possess equipment such as weapons and requirements. a nuclear weapon capability should maintain equipment to control an accident site. NDA and entry control point signs. “Since sufficient personnel will not likely be enforcement agencies is essential to an effective security included in the IRF security elements responding to a program. the available if crowd control is required. Security forces can expect to encounter large numbers Overseas. IRF security personnel may become part of the SRF security element. Even after establishment control. Civilian law enforcement d. and portable lights. Initial Response Force (IRF). When an accident occurs at a military installation. Protect government property. DoD 51 OO. Service Response Force (SRF). hand- held radios. Riot control gear should be many unique to a nuclear weapon accident. security program as soon as possible. The equivalent DoE area for an incident/ nuclear weapon accident. fire. entry and exit civilian land by military forces.

Only IRF and SRF OSCS are site. however. Area boundaries are officials will be requested to establish a Security Area established to minimize interference with other lawful (Disaster Cordon) to ensure public safety and approp- activities on and uses of the property. types and quantities of vehicles). or toxic chemicals). personnel should use the minimum degree of control (6) Accident hazards (high explosives. anything. Warning signs as described confused with the National Defense Area (NDA) which in DoD 5210. Civilians distances. (5) Contamination (radiation intensity and extent (5) In maintaining security of the NDA. While the assessment is made. contamination. care be provided by civilian authorities/officials. No one should be allowed to remove b. requests for interviews and queries concerning the (10) Safety of security personnel (fragmentation accident are referred to public affairs personnel. 13-2 . provides the basis for establishing an NDA only in the 13-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS United States. should be treated courteously. In areas where languages other elements in his assessment: than English are spoken. (remote. and provides the foundation for the security decisions regarding establishment. controls should be implemented to ensure routes. and Section 21 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Initially. which is with the DoS Chief of Mission. obtaining such features). ionsent is not a prerequisite for establishing the NDA. the OSC should secure the landowners’ (4) Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating consent and cooperation. Accident Assessment.Civilian law enforcement personnel may augment (1) An NDA may be required any time an accident military security personnel if requested. security should modification of the NDA. urban).41-M should be posted at the entry control may not yet be established and may be different in size. The be considered when posting initial security personnel boundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier. When overseas. station and along the boundary and be visible from any The security officer should consider the following direction of approach. the civilian authorities/ define and mark its boundary. that public affairs policy is strictly adhered to. Department of Energy. Upon arrival at the accident non-Federal land. suburban. and then only to assessment includes an evaluation of ongoing emergency safeguard government resources. sensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident. rural. cold/ hot weather). rocket and force necessary. around the scene. The OSC should seek legal advice on any agencies.8. and that (9) Structures in accident area (type and quantity). however. and in a helpful. This area is established specifically to enhance safeguarding government property located on a. (8) Transportation network in accident area (access Moreover. encompass the entire radiological control area. Security gency Search Team (NEST) communications pod is of any portion of the radiological control area existing equipped with a slow scan TV system. However. National Defense Area (NDA). involving nuclear weapons or components occurs on non-Federal property. bilinguaI signs should be considered. rope and wire. or program. The DoE Nuclear Emer. irrespective of other response operations and actions of local law enforcement factors. thoroughly and given specific instructions for dealing (7) Local meteorological conditions (include with civilians. or may not. This authorized to designate an NDA. the riate security. This system may outside the NDA is a matter of public safety and should be very useful in surveillance operations. military and other hazardous materials). references (e) and (ah). If possible. advise civil authorities/ officials of the authority and the (3) Demographics and accident environment need for the NDA and the security controls in effect. be established at the accident site in cooperation with (3) The OSC designating the NDA must clearly “ civil authorities. The NDA may. All personnel should be aware of the prevailing winds). Fragmentation hazard necessary until more specific information is available distances and the possibility of contamination should regarding the location of the government material. activities are not transmitted in the clear. the security officer must assess the situation. (4) The OSC who establishes the NDA should (2) Location (on or off military installation). nor touch any suspicious objects. (1) Threat (real and potential danger to the secure area). must be taken to ensure that classified components or military assist ante may be requested. This initial security is not to be for example. disestablishment. (2) DoD Directive 5200. but witcfiful manner. d. This must be done in close coordination dimensions of the NDA may be quite large. Sentries should be briefed motors.

incident/ accident in a country outside the United States. over and order has been established. In the event of a nuclear personnel may be unavailable to form such a force. (2) Individuals with varying degrees of knowledge d. must be enforced. protected from sight and overhead photographic tatives except that the United States shall maintain surveillance. to them. as response operations progress. Security Considerations. and a record personnel do not constitute a violation of the Posse of all personnel entering the accident area made and Comitatus Act which prohibits use of DoD personnel ret ained. fire suppression. unless authorized (3) A security operations center or control point by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. and appreciation for security requirements will assist in response operations. (3) Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information Each guard should have a means of summoning (CNWDI) access verification may have to be waived assistance. references (af). Government respects the sovereignty of the e. preferably a radio. When the urgency of the initial response is obtaining portable intrusion detection system sensors. On reveal classified information by their shape. Representatives of” all been removed. Specified c~assified components must be incident rests with such Government officials/ represen. As soon as possible. and defined in the GLOSSARY. (ag).3 . of each apprehension and the actions taken. and other emergency activities the NDA. to ensure that visual contact can be maintained at night. State. authorities are unavailable. The security An identification and badging system should be officer must ensure that actions of on-scene military implemented. Accidents Overseas. form. Apprehension or arrest of civilian personnel may temporarily take priority over security procedures. effort. who violate any security requirements at the NDA should However. should be established as the focal point for security (7) When all government resources have been operations and be located close to the entry control point. or refuse to give assistance.41. and (ah). A comprehensive and effective (1) Sentry posts around the NDA should be in information security program is available as outlined locations that enable guards to maintain good visual in DoD Directive 5200. entry and “ (4) The two-person policy is addressed in DoD and exit of emergency units and other personnel may be Service directives. compliance with This type of equipment will reduce security personnel DoD Directive 5210. necessary life entry and in removing unauthorized personnel who enter saving. The content of the information security program that none of the guards violate the two-man rule. should be briefed to everyone in the weapon recovery Lighting should be provided. and AFR 205-1. to execute local.S. standard normally be done by civilian authorities. The security officer should to assist military personnel in preventing unauthorized recognize that during initial response. leaders The Senior FEMA Official (SFO) should be notified of the groups should be escorted to the operations center. government of that country. Security Procedures. should prevail. When violators or trespassers. although early in the accident response. or be in contact with temporarily during the initial phases of accident someone who does. and should contact. located. Civil authorities there will be asked to establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon) (1) Some components in nuclear weapons may to restrict access and to provide for public safety. Early participating law enforcement agencies should be located coordination with State and local officials permits an at the security operations center and able to commun- orderly transfer of responsibility to State and local icate with their personnel. the U. (6) Local civil authorities/ officials should be asked largely uncontrolled. on-scene military personnel should apprehend and detain an entry control point should be established. This action prevents unauthorized persons from be promulgated in coordination with the DoE Team entering the NDA undetected between posts and ensures Leader. or Federal laws. or and off-site authority at a nuclear weapon accidentj outline. Consideration should be given in response. If local civil security measures specified in DoD Directive 5210. custody of the weapon(s) and/or classified components. The 13-. reference (se). When all classified government resources have familiar with the location.IF. OPNAVINST requirements and the possibility of radiation exposure 5510. (4) A security alert force should be considered. sufficient c. AR 380-150. authorities/ agencies arrive at the control point.2. (2) During the initial emergency response. l-R. the NDA could be disestablished. Disposition should be completed personnel from various Federal and/ or civilian quickly following coordination with the legal officer. agencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA. the OSC should consider reducing the size of Its location should be fixed so that personnel become the NDA. or guard spacing adjusted. reference (ad). entry control logs established.

separate intelligence annex. Procedures for locating and operating the security security functions.security officer must ensure that procedures provide for (5) Advice and assistance to the OSC and the two-man rule compliance for all nuclear weapons and security staff on matters of personnel and information applicable components at the accident site. traffic control signs should be b. The security officer must ensure that adequate a National Defense Area or Security Area. hostile this and related information may be included in a intelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities). areas will be established for storage of classified a. When certified personnel are available. security. threats to response operations (for example. establishing and. posted. restriction of curiosity separate appendix to be expanded in the event of an seekers. State. such as special Investigation (FBI). g. forces may prepare an annex in advance which could (6) An area should be available within the security be modified to fit the circumstances. Security Area. Verification of contact and phone numbers may be contained in a of vehicle trip authorization. security necessary to maintain high standards of security. Intelligence personnel should d. (5) In the initial emergency response. communications and clothing requirements. Military Intelligence. expected immediate security interest to the OSC and the security amounts of rope. (7) If a base camp is established to support the response operation. and use of deadly force. recovered weapons.maintaining nents. including. discipline within the camp may be parts of base camp c. stanchions. Security operating procedures to include perimeter documents. Also. resuspension of contaminants during wind shifts. Administrative and logistic requirements: for (4) Investigating and reporting incidents of example. they should be used in security positions which require them. 134 . f. law enforcement procedures developed. A description of the subversive/unfriendly threat. maintenanw of entry logs and badges. Descriptions of the interface with Federal. information security is provided for these areas. rules of engagement. f. and maintaining order and accident. and a and civilian law enforcement officials. IRF and SRF should be used on the perimeter if available. PRP personnel and procedures of the security forces. and local agencies and civilian authorities{ officials. Specific points base camp entry control point established. and weapon compo. on including an impact assessment on response operations. (3) Coordination and advice to the OSC and security staff regarding operations security. operation center. access/ entry procedures. but not limited to: e. The security annex perimeter where EOD and DoE personnel can discuss should include: CNWDI related to weapon(s) recovery operations. in the overall security posture. be waived due to a lack of PRP certified personnel. (2) Liaison and coordination with Federal. Security 13-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX personnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weapons The security annex should describe the responsibilities and components must be PRP certified. Personnel (6) Requests for large scale photographic coverage Reliability Program (PRP) requirements may have to of the accident site. and signs to establish and staff (in cooperation with the local Federal Bureau of maintain the NDA. Guidance for handling unprotected personnel be used to the fullest extent and incorporated actively encountered in contaminated areas. access to the camp. State. Procedures for coordinating with radiological control personnel to ensure that sentry posts outside (1) Advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the radiological control area are not affected by the the OSC and security staff.

training must be conducted prior to g. Specifically. simplified. To accomplish this. 14-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE This chapter provides guidance concerning the medical 14-4 RESOURCES requirements resulting from a nuclear weapon accident. Assist in casualty decontamination and supervise accident response force medical personnel. people who may be contaminated.al a. all may not be required for response to a given 14-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS accident. through the DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). and safety programs to support response operations over . In some program. instances. contamination. coordination with radiological personnel. medic. On other the decontamination of personnel when initial decon- occasions. and measures which can be taken to other weapon specific nonradioactive toxic hazards may prevent its spread.”” w nen Medical personnel will assist in accident related an accident occurs.S. numbers and categories of injuries. difficult external exposure data becomes part of the ‘health problems result. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident. d. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team personnel will be required to: (RAMT). sophisticated treatment available only at tamination efforts fail to achieve desired results. a. su$pected contamination. or illnesses. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of all an accident. the for example. Treatment of contaminated patients requires special techniques and e. of possible Even without the presence of radioactive contamination. an extended period of time. special medical facilities will be required. Establish a heat/cold exposure prevention training as done for highly contagious patients. in accident where radioactive contamination is not a factor. TITAN 11 explosion at Damascus. In instances when radioactive b. and how to obtain them are Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) discussed also. September. including civilians in the surrounding community exposed to radiation or contamination as a result of the accident. exist. RAMTs are located at Walter Reed. Radioactive contamination may be a result of a nuclear weapon accident. U. assets should be requested when emergency medical treatment and in establishing health needed. specialized in radiological In addition to recommended procedures. emergency life saving procedures in any major disaster are applicable to a nuclear weapon c. these special techniques can be applied by the f. Medical support assistance. Implement the collection of bioassay samples from response personnel. DoD 51 OO. As with any response function.52-M CHAPTER 14 MEDICAL 14-1 GENERAL a. and medical personnel must now treat records. personnel involved in accident response. contamination is not dispersed (for example. and ensure that bioassay and b. available health matters. Resources discussed in the following para- graphs should be studied and reviewed in advance. their location. Army 14-1 . life-saving procedures should not be delayed or omitted due to radiation contamination. and priority for transport to Arkansas). the medical requirements were greatly a medical facility. Although numerous resources are available. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties. Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries. is available from the Department of resources. However. 1980. If radioactive contaminants are dispersed.

or responsible medical officials.Medical Center. If needed. 20307 or by referring to AR 40-13. The MRAT is deployed with the DNAAT. Armed Forces potential health hazards from exposure to sources of Radiobiology Research Institute. presence. All team members have a Response Group (ARG). This response. assist. MD 20814- 5145. or the JNACC. Their mission is to provide the the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service Response medical groups responding to radiobiological emergen. The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Other factors such as a delayed initial response time maintains a Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (that is. military-relevant radiobiology Medical Laboratory. The (2) Each RAMT is comprised of a team leader. Medical problems resulting from a nuclear weapon accident vary in complexity depending primarily on the b. On-Scene Commander (OSC) or other responsible hematology. biological response modifiers. Force (SRF). personnel can add to the difficulty of proper medical ogy advice supporting a nuclear accident response.. Additional REAC/TS assistance can be requested (3) Additional information can be obtained from through either the DoE Team Leader. dosimetry and behavioral analyses. RAMT services 14-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS should be requested through the Army Operations Center. cies with the most current medical guidance regarding a. FRG. Pre-Accident Preparation. reference (ai). Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Oak Ridge.. Tennessee. liaison with other medical centers and laboratories specializing in radiobiology can be facilitated. and medical equipment. REAC/TS personnel will Also. extended operations. D. hours. and the loth derived from validated. the response forces (IRF or SRF) medical officer 14-2 . medical treatment facilities. Before an accident the treatment of radiation casualties. Through (1) The RAMT provides the following functions: means of telephone communications (available 24-hours a day). a remote accident) or nonavailability of medical (MRAT) to provide state-of-the-art medical radiobiol. Bethesda. Upon request of the OSC guidance to the responsible officials utilizing radiolog. if needed. within 24 hours. to deploy and provide advice at an accident site or (b) Evaluation of survey data to provide technical medical treatment facility. two qualified technicians are on the team with normally deploy to the accident site with an initial stock experience and training in radiation detection and of chelating agents as a part of the DoE Accident measurement techniques. Additional information about the MRAT can (d) Advising the commander regarding the be obtained by contacting the Director. expert advice and assistance. the Commander. The RAMT can be augmented for may be obtained through the REAC/TS center. is prepared to deal in monitoring and radiation dose evaluation. ionizing radiation and the decontamination of personnel. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site who is a nuclear medical science officer with training (REAC/TS). infectious officials at an accident site and to local medical disease. The teams are research and is within reasonably accepted standards specially trained to assist and furnish guidance to the of care. advice on the treatment of contaminated patients required training. Department of Energy. the MRAT provides radiobiology advice to (a) Guidance relative to the potential health medical staffs and OSCS within a response time of 4 hazards to personnel from radiological contamination. laboratory have medical support capabilities which. Washington. C. c. may and clinical procedures. injuries. DoE facilities that handle radio- (f) Assisting the OSC with the bioassay program. authorities concerning radiological health hazards. C. and is applicable to both radiobiology research. Major DoE installations (e) Advising on early. In addition. HSHL-QHP/ RAMT. of radioactive contamination. for example. Washington. D. This advice is occurs. and a with all types of radiation exposure and can provide medical officer with appropriate training and experience. the physician members ically contaminated areas. or JNACC. and follow-up. Additionally. Subject areas of expertise include.. logical material routinely are equipped to administer medical treatment for radiological casualties. or absence. of the MRAT supplement the designated primary (c) Monitoring medical facilities and equipment medical treatment teams in the treatment of radiation where contaminated patients have been evacuated. Until REAC/ TS personnel minimum security clearance of SECRET and attend arrive. Landstuhl. the team is prepared or exposure to ionizing radiation. This concept of operations is directed toward team consists of physicians and scientists working in the medical response function.

transported to the receiving medical facility. HE DOES NOT POSE A THREAT to a nuclear weapon accident follow: OF SPREADING CONTAMINATION AND COM- PROMISING THE CONTAMINATION CONTROL (1) Assess and assure an open airway. since these materials can cause and toxic hazards. However. the IRF is equipped (Prophylactic precautionary IV’s should be delayed and manned to provide emergency medical treatment. equipment identified. mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. (9) No medical personnel or equipment should Protective clothing shall be worn by emergency medical leave the contaminated area without monitoring for personnel. Respiratory protective devices shall be worn based on the non-radiological hazards (smoke or fumes) contamination. explosive.is identified. Note and record the location or fumes from various plastics. A high priority contamination if the wound is uncontaminated or to at any accident is the rescue and treatment of casualties. Emergency Rescue and Treatment. weapon render safe chemical burns. Respiratory protection should decontaminate him. the NAICO will allow these patients to and circulation of the victims. The patient can then be loaded procedures (drugs. positive pressure ventilator. Lead (Pb) and smoke transporting to the hospital. into the (8) Determine if corrosive materials were present accident site to assist in avoiding radioactive. at the accident scene. medical card. consider medical existing medical treatment facilities to the accident site or toxic causes since radiation exposure does not cause is a factor in determining the size and capabilities of unconsciousness or immediate visible signs of injury. Take all possible precautions to prevent operations may preclude EOD personnel from accom. or. If possible. wrap the patient in a clean sheet the greater the probability that casualties will have been to contain any loose contamination during evacuation. The proximity of (5) If a victim is unconscious. Categories for emergent or on the hazards and procedures for treatment of radiation immediate evacuation. while the SRF should be equipped and manned to (4) Control hemorrhage and stabilize fractures. Lithium (Li). However. and health considera. MAS Trousers) because of radio. using a bag-mask. Of primary concern monitor the victim for possible contamination before are Beryllium (Be). the medical support element actually deployed. Generally. All (6) Triage or sort the casualties by priority of life medical personnel at the accident site shall be trained or limb threatening injury. breathing. and be logical contamination. Finally. utilized by the on-site medical team. “into the ambulance or evacuation vehicle. support a long term response effort. then be transferred” to the “clean” side of the hot line (2) Move victims if possible. In addition to radioactive materials. Do not delay customary life saving ination Control Line. contraindicated. transporting the seriously or as required by the guidelines in Chapter 5 when injured victim should not be delayed to monitor or entering the accident area. which are toxic hazards to personnel. The longer it takes to get to the accident. Administer CPR if be evacuated without decontamination. accompany emergency medical personnel. several other weapon specific substances may be present (7) After the immediate medical needs are met. introduction of contaminated materials into the mouth. supporting medical personnel assigned and (3) Administer intravenous fluids for shock. or performed in a medical treatment facility. 14-3 . Hence. away from the and placed in the charge of “clea~’ medical personnel contaminated area by scoop stretchers. hazards. removing and handling patient’s clothing. Then place this card in a plastic bag and tions associated with these substances is presented in attach to the patient’s protective mask or in another Appendix 14-A. The patient will necessary. contain the contamination if the wound is contaminated. A discussion of the and extent (in cpm) of the contamination on a field general characteristics. because of possible contamination of the skin). delayed and dead should be accident victims. Also ensure that open wounds are covered with a field dressing to keep out b. fashion that will prevent loss. but care should be exercised in the patients through the Contamination Control Line. panying medical personnel into the accident site. LINE. Casualty decontamination. treated and removed by civilian authorities. particularly wound decon- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and/or tamination. Take routine residing on the uncontaminated side of the Contam- precautions. of seriously injured patients is best radiation monitors should mark a clear path. The probability of response force involvement in the Removal of contaminated clothing is advisable provided initial rescue and treatment procedures depends on the medical authority decides that their removal is not response time. not be required when treating patients outside the (10) Attendant medical personnel will then process contaminated area. Suggested AS LONG AS THE PATIENT REMAINS WRAPPED casualty handling procedures for emergency response IN THE SHEET.

conducted with area medical facilities to ensure that proper procedures are taken to prevent the spread of (12) Upon arrival at the hospital. Emergency and (e) may be determined enroute to the evacuation of contaminated casualties may have medical facility if radiation detection instru. (11) To ensure that the receiving facility is prepared of removing patient clothing in an NBC environment. Any radiological support sleeves and trouser legs and folding the contamination for au?opsies should be arranged on a case-by-case basis. in general. Prior to entry of procedures may be used by medical facilities not the patient into the hospital. The remains of deceased (13) The decontamination of the patients may then accident victims should. be treated with the begin. for the arrival of the victims. prior to release wrapping surrounding the patient avoiding spreading for burial. c. if (14) The ambulance or evacuation vehicle will known. and masks. hair. liaison must be dered if a facility has sufficient capacity. precautions. It must be determined if local medical immediately to the area designated for the receipt of facilities have the ability to monitor and decontaminate contaminated patients. decontamination and cleanup. as well as other exposed (e) Any evidence of internal contamination. Liaison With Civil Authorities. However.. Processing of Fatalities. and decontaminated if necessary. tion is to be done before an autopsy. the use of monitoring equipment and then removed by (c) Extent of contamination. confirmed by the RAMT team. should be involved in the treatment of patients). The following the patients to the emergency room. appropriate for protection against alpha contamination. controls were implemented. If so. contamination. if known. areas of the body due to injuries or torn clothing. some may have medical care. shoe covers. (d) That personnel are wearing proper protective (5) Use contagious disease control procedures (for clothing. but are not limited to: (1) Use rooms with an isolated air supply. Additionally. Use of a single medical facility arrived from the contaminated area before appropriate for contaminated casualties should be consi. and hands. attendant medical personnel prepared for radiological emergencies and to reduce the will ensure that the hospital has instituted the proper spread of contamination. shoe covers. and by what instrument it was measured. d. and they are versed in the use of this (4) Use plastic sheeting on floors to facilitate equipment. not be returned to normal service until it is monitored (g) Any exposure to non-radiological toxic and decontaminated and such efforts have been materials. (d). These precautions include. notify the facility of the These articles of clothing will then be bagged to contain following: the contamination. The removal of contaminated clothing may remove up to 90 percent of the (a) Number of victims. and rubber (a) The room used has an isolated air supply. (c) Ensuring that personnel have the appropriate (3) Obtain radiation monitoring assistance for radiation detection instrumentation. face and neck. This method parallels the standard methods Service procedures for handling casualties are contained 14-4 . all fatalities must be monitored for contam- (a) Carefully opening the sheet or plastic ination. Suspect areas include the (d) Areas of greatest contamination. The determination of whether decontamina- any contamination. should be made (b) Removing clothing by cutting away the by the examining authorities. take patients contamination. and (c) Remaining contamination can be located with triage category. If no such area exists then take their facilities or if assistance is required. gloves. These measures include: same respect and procedures used in any accident. in on itself. (b) Covering the area with plastic sheeting or or materials which may have come in contact with the “chucks” to contain loose contamination. lation detectors. sheets . i. limiting the access and numbers of people gowns.e. and bag them and any other clothing. (2) Use scrub clothes. (b) Area of injuries. washing with soap and water. gloves. (f) The radionuclide and the chemical form. detecting plutonium or uranium. alpha scintil. but not at the expense of at an off-base accident. Note: Procedures listed in above paragraphs (c). patient when leaving the room. occurred prior to the arrival of response force personnel ments are available. surgical example. vital signs (if known). For this type of accident scenario.

Table 14-1 is taken from response force injuries. and (al). Medical Clearing Facility. All medical staff guidance on where samples should be sent for analysis. AFR 30-25. Base Camp Medical Support. and if required. Additional technical tures. personnel are informed of medical information provided to medical facilities receiving potentially contaminated (1) The reduction in natural cooling of the body patients and that queries for non-medical information caused by wearing full anti-contamination clothing with are referred to public affairs personnel. and coordinated with the JIC as discussed in Chapter 16.in AR 600-10. Botsball Heat Water Intake Work/rest Temperature Condition (qts/hr) Cycle (rein) 80-83 Green 0. Wet Globe Temperature. (ak). Collection of Bioassay Samples. A separate first aid station may be needed (2) Specialized personnel cooling equipment (for to support the base camp. f. and respiratory equipment of required bioassay samples from response force presents severe demands on personnel.5-2. reference (an). scheduling of adequate rest or cooling periods. Heat injuries (stroke. Hot/Cold Weather Operational Conditions. Adequate water intake is the single Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements most important factor in avoidance of heat injuries. or of those who have a positive nasal wipe.0-1. Collection contamination clothing.0 20/ 30 Above 88 Black 2. example. Although ambient e. must be notified of any civilian casualties as quickly proper intake of salt and water. Minimum response force medical staffing after guidelines as a function of Botsball temperature.0 20/40 14-5 . avoidance of predis- as possible. Public Affairs Considerations. Personnel must personnel is normally a responsibility of medical be monitored closely to prevent frostbite and other cold personnel. the injured person from the measured Botsball temperature when protective should be brought to the contamination control station clothing is’ worn. Procedures for collecting and marking weather effects. Preventive 4210100. monitoring of tempera- deceased prior to decontamination. Civil authorities measures to reduce heat injuries include acclimatization. samples should be coordinated with the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). and using the adjusted Botsball and clearing facility by personnel and vehicles already temperature to determine preventive actions to be taken. on call. or cramps) i. Medical personnel should ensure that public affairs g.0 50/ 10 83-86 Yellow . urine samples may issues surrounding a nuclear weapon accident. All public be required of all personnel who enter the radiological release of information should be approved by the OSC control area. Should an injury occur within the radiological The circular recommends subtracting ten (10) degrees control area and injuries permit. personnel should be aware of the sensitive nature of Depending on Service procedures. These the initial emergency response should include a medic. in the area. reference (am). hoods and respirators increases the probability of heat injuries. and BUPERS Manual Article 700 when wearing full protective gear. who are normally dressed and working at a heavy rate.LE 14-1. 1. Bioassay programs (3) The use of cold weather gear. The JHEC will also provide h. (NCRP) Report. guidance concerning the handling of radioactively and educating the work force on heat injury symptoms contaminated fatalities can be found in the National and remedial actions. and to assist in decontamination DA Circular 40-82-3. and provides of skin. and medically trained health physicist. Number 37. is a more effective method of control station with supplies for medical treatment of monitoring heat conditions.5-1. guidelines assume fully acclimatized and fit personnel with a physician. or facility should be established near the contamination Botsball temperature.5 45/ 15 86-88 Red 1. A medical clearing temperature may be used. exhaustion. aid in identification of the posing factors to heat illness. cooling vest) should be used to allow additional stay-time for personnel in extreme heat conditions. Base camp support can occur with the ambient air temperature as low as requirements include treatment of on-the-job injuries TAB. references (aj). Frequent drinks are more effective than the same quantity of water taken all at once. anti- and techniques are discussed in Chapter 8. Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines. .

Nuclear Hazards Training Course. Several classes should include procedures for: are scheduled each year at the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School. Identifying and locating facilities for treating Radiobiology Research Institute at various locations. nuclear devices. and e. medical operations in a nuclear environment. Kirtland AFB. injuries. Those personnel treated for cuts or open sores should be g. b. Week-long classes are scheduled each year by the Armed Forces d. radiological health problems. facility at the accident scene. This annex a. NM. Differentiating between medical and radiological provides training in the organization and functions of safety/ health physics personnel. related hazards in a nuclear weapon accident or incident. to the accident. This training includes the principles of b. including isolation of contaminated patients. and c. hazards of explosive materials. The course a. sewage disposal. Establishing the relationship of the response force prohibited from entering the contaminated area and their medical staff and specialized medical teams responding supervisors notified of the restriction.and sickness. and evaluation of the adequacy of latrine deceased. Decontaminating and processing the remains of facilities. facilities. 14-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX 14-7 SPECIALIZED COURSES FOR MEDICAL RESPONSE PERSONNEL The medical annex shouId describe responsibilities and special procedures used by the medical staff. Medical Effects of Nuclear Weapons. and water supply. Establishing and operating a medical clearing IRF operation. Topics include biological effects of ionizing radiation. o IRF Teams and in techniques in monitoring contam- inated areas. Receiving and treating contaminated patients. Evacuating contaminated casualties to major medical treatment of nuclear and nuclear-related medical facilities. 14-6 . inspection of field billeting and messing f.

Inhalation A self-contained breathing apparatus is necessary if is the most significant means of entry into the body. in the same manner as lye (sodium or potassium hydroxide).by using chelating agents. ing training programs for medical personnel responding hydroxide. Lithium (Li). and Decontamination of personnel. Self-contained breathing apparatus of an exposed individual will turn yellowish and dry. (2) Hazards and Health Considerations. to be contaminated several specific characteristics and symptoms. Upon entry into the compounds. DoD 51 OO. when applicable. abrasions on the skin. hydrogen. lithium hydroxide is a caustic agent which affects the body. Several weapon specific non-radiological hazards may (1) Lithium and its compounds. scratches or operations involving these materials. Lead enters the “body through inhalation. producing heat. Beryllium (Be). lead will concentrate in the kidneys and bones. is necessary when beryllium fumes or smoke are present. producing a great deal of damage. The heat causes the hydrogen to burn to nuclear weapon accidents. 14-A. or facilities will constipation results. Also. Lead poisoning displays worn in an area known. its detection requires trations within the body have been reduced successfully chemical analysis in a properly equipped laboratory. The skin with beryllium dust.52-M APPENDIX 14-A NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS 14-A-1 GENERAL b. naturally occurring lithium is always found chemically with other elements. exposed to fires involving lithium or lithium hydrides. Beryllium or ‘its concentration to cause damage. absorption is usually negligible since the readily absorbed shortness of breath. “oxygen. Lead concen- Since beryllium is not radioactive. should ever body. metallic taste in method. Due to its highly reactive nature. fumes from burning lithium components are present. Respiratory protection and fire (1) Beryllium is a light. and anti-contamination clothing must be a chronic toxic condition. personnel against inhalation of lead compounds. is vacuum cleaning. Pure lead and most of its compounds symptoms are apparent. One of the peculiarities of beryllium poisoning is that no specific c. An M 17 Mask will protect Direct detection in the field is impossible. lead will be liberated slowly gloves. loss of compounds are seldom encountered in sufficient weight and extreme nervousness. the be similar to radiological decontamination. chronic cough. explosively. or suspected. Because it oxidizes easily. gray-white non-radioactive fighters clothing are required to protect personnel metal. With a high body burden. hard and brittle. . and resembles magnesium. using a his mouth and a dark blue coloring of the gums resulting cleaner with a high efficiency particle air (HEPA) filter. ulceration often occurs. An effective exposed individual will have a sweet. Lead (Pb). may be present at a nuclear weapon accident. Inhalation of lead berylliosis.. Digestion is impaired with severe colicky pains. occurs. when in finely divided form. is an acute or delayed type of pulmonary edema or ingestion. a. hydride. any fire or explosion involving Protection for the eyes and skin is necessary for beryllium liberates toxic fumes and smoke. Lith@m can react directly with the water contained in the body 14-A-3 NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS tissue causing severe chemical burns. When beryllium enters the body through cuts. or equivalent protective mask/ into the bloodstream causing anemia and resulting in respirator. Other commonly occurring signs and compounds presents a very serious hazard.I . and lithium. or skin absorption. cyanosis. be handled with the bare hands but always with rubber From the bone deposits. (2) Hazards and Health Considerations. normally lithium be present as a result of a nuclear weapon accident. a violent chemical reaction This appendix provides information useful in implement. terrain. The most common symptom are toxic. especially the eyes. 14-A-2 PURPOSE Upon exposure to water. Skin symptoms are ulceration and irritation of the skin. from a deposition of black lead sulfide. An M 17.

Dangerous when heated to decomposi- involving plastics which are not known to be harmless tion. after a DoE Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/ classi!lcation review. with the skin. When hydrazine is mixed with equal parts of water. illness. mild and severe dermatitis. Training Publication 60-1. d. If rocket motors ignite or catch fire. severe irritation to the skin. it emits highly toxic fumes of NOX and will react should be approached on the assumption that toxic with water or steam to produce heat and toxic corrosive fumes and particles are present. in concentration causes nasal irritation. heated to decomposition emits highly toxic nitrogen ammonium perchlorate and aluminum powder or other compounds and may explode by heat or chemical cyanate. irritating. copious amounts of water. It is reddish brown. perchlorate or nitrate based reaction. However. absorbed through the skin or graphite fibers that are milled into composite epoxy taken internally. and insensitive HE will be extracted from EOD wash acid from skin with. or death if inhaled. After exposure to the immediate accident area or location where a hydrazine vapors or liquids. boron. cast. and/ or minute particles produced. Composite Fibers (CF). . systemic poisoning. e. however i. the fuel burns when a spark produces accidental ignition. reference (so). When involved in a fire. wood compounds) present severe explosive hazards upon or cloth. h. Information on pressed.- 14-A-2 . Rocket motors Hydrazine is a colorless. severe oxidizer for some missile systems. although a lower concentration causes nasal irritation. CF liver or destruction of red blood cells. f. combustion. eyes. all plastics present Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/ varying degrees of toxic hazards due to the gases. liquid concentrations. The gaseous or particulate products may produce dizziness and g. butadiene. Red nitric acid is an prostration initially. remove clothing imme. High Explosives (HE). oily fuming liquid with a sIightIy (composed of Dymeryl diisocyanate (DDI). placed in contact highly toxic corrosive liquid with a sharp.1 parts per million and a lower strands do not present a health hazard. it will not burn. the fibers can cause diately and spray exposed area with water for 15 minutes. ingested. Any fire pungent odor. It is a powerful explosive that when hydroxyl terminated polybutadine (HTPB) polymer. Hydrazine is used as a missile fuel or as a fuel in some aircraft emergency power units. CF are carbon. The CF exposure level is 0. Plastics. The permissible strands can be emitted into the environment. any contact with an oxidized substance such evacuate to a safe distance. Fuming Red Nitric Acid. severe arcing and shorting of electrical equipment. composite package has broken open. Self-igniting when absorbed on earth. The permissible exposure level weapon fires. and mucous membranes. Hydrazine. is two parts per million. Immediately after exposure. as rust can also cause combustion. cured ammonia odor. hydrazine may cause damage to the Upon fire or breakage of the epoxy outer layer. Solid Fuel Rocket Motors. liquid concentrations. This includes all nuclear and flammable vapors. Causing skin sensitization as well as packages which are integral aircraft structural members. and it is toxic when inhaled. or absorbed through the skin. fumes.

even intact weapon(s) may pose significant recovery responsibilities are Explosive Ordnance recovery problems with potential explosive and Disposal (EOD) Teams and the DoE Accident Response contamination hazards. They are trained in access techniques and are the only personnel qualified to b. If an extremely hazardous components. . situation is needed to determine the best method for conducting weapon recovery. or obtained. DoD 51 OO. contain and/or eliminate explosive. by the e. Also. and other hazardous materials. and control of hands-on weapon recovery operations. complexity of the problem is lessened considerably. or obtains from the appropriate weapon components. the initial responding EOD team with 15-I . Intensive training is conducted on render safe d. (5) The EOD team provided. c. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Service. (1) The Service or Unified Commander having requirements and planning are discussed to develop primary responsibility for command and control on-site operational plans for recovery of nuclear weapons.52-M CHAPTER 15 WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATION 15-1 GENERAL f. Initiate a systematic search until the location for procedures for weapons unique to their individual the weapon(s) and all weapon components is known. the extent of damage. Explosive Ordnance including whether high explosive detonations occurred. Service. The 15-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE following guidelines apply to the employment of EOD teams: This chapter provides information about weapon operations following a nuclear weapon accident. Also. and/ or final disposition. supervision. (4) EOD personnel. MD. personnel: trained in diving techniques. include all actions through transfer of weapon custody (3) Navy EOD teams recover weapons located to a designated Department of Energy (DoE) represen. graduates of the Navy School. 15-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS (2) All Service or Unified Command EOD teams provide emergency support until the designated EOD Service responsibilities for weapon recovery operations team arrives. the types of support during the acc. contam. they are trained to identify. EOD teams that are Service certified on the weapon(s). Disposal at Indian Head. and the location of weapons. perform render safe procedures. and other hazardous debris may be at a nuclear weapon accident site. EOD personnel are responsible for the actual performance. are a. Perform render safe procedures on the weapon(s). Perform necessary actions for transport or shipping of the weapon(s) and components for interim storage A mixture of weapons. officer and enlisted. and hazards are of primary concern. If the weapons appear to be intact. inants. The number and type of weapons. detect. During weapon recovery operations. Establish an area and develop procedures for Service having primary command and control respon- processing/ packaging contaminated weapon(s) and sibility will safe the weapon(s). Determine the status and location of the weapon(s). and The On-Scene Commander (OSC) can request many radioactive contaminants have not been dispersed. a. Assess weapon(s) damage.dent response operation. The principal resources available to meet weapon However. at the accident provides. radiological and toxic hazards associated with nuclear weapons. 15-4 RESOURCES weapon components. weapon components. A continuing assessment of the Group (ARG). under water because only Navy EOD personnel are tative. situation exists.

The OSC is responsible procedures developed. aircraft weapon design personnel and explosive experts familiar fire extinguisher cartridges. (d) Protection of personnel against hazards noted during detonation of explosives. monitoring techniques applicable to their operations. fluids. While tasks weapons and components. if hazards. (2) DoE aerial radiological surveys by the Aerial (6) The organization of EOD teams varies among Measurement System (AMS) assist in locating weapons Services as does the number and seniority of personnel and weapon components. vehicle. weapons and explosive detonation. Moreover. safe procedures. and ultimately for the proper implementation of any render authenticated as binding jointly by the DoD and DoE. oxidizers. Nuclear weapons and some components contain required. on the particular weapon(s) involved. This capability is addressed assigned. and composite materials/fibers present disposition of weapon components. and Army EOD units proceeds through the conduct of render safe procedures. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent further damage or explosions. decontamination. with weapons and associated hazards.S. Nuclear material may have been dispersed on impact. The two-person weapon safing and disposal. consideration may be given to the and most reliable means for neutralizing weapon DoE unique equipment to assess the applicability of these associated hazards. by priority are: necessary security procedures as soon as possible. The ARG pyrotechnics. nuclear weapon “publications. and viewing should do so. coordinated. The Los Alamos National should occur until a coordinated weapon recovery Laboratory (LANL) has fieldable radiographic units procedure has been developed by EOD personnel and 15-2 . The continuation of any render safe equipment. evaluated. (a) Prevention of nuclear detonation. film processing. or by combustion in in (a) through (c) above. The DoE ARG includes be encountered include conventional munitions. Render Safe Procedures. the OSC should implement (7) The EOD teams actions. all teams have the same basic in Appendix 5-C. engine starter cartridges. and technical advice and should mark hazards clearly. If the field diagnostics of damaged weapons in the event of weapon is in a stable environment. and egress or extraction devices. a fire. if required. Weapon recovery begins with the initial reconnaissance. hazards resulting from the accident or incident. and other DoE They have the necessary communications and personal capabilities may be obtained from the . detection. Department of Energy. operations only as directed by the OSC. Navy EOD teams maintain a complete inventory of all U. weapon debris.JNACC. however. assistance to EOD teams in render safe and recovery procedures. safety equipment to operate in an accident environment. personnel may find it difficult to follow all of the required security measures however. packaging. or missile wreckage present several (c) Identification. LLNL has an equivalent radiographic procedures are conducted by an EOD team qualified capability which serves as a back-up to the LANL unit. teams have a background in weapon design information enhanced by coordination with DoE 15-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS scientific advisors on arrival at the accident scene. the aircraft. and or torn metals. Leaking provides technical advice and assistance in the collection. propellants.the publications and capabilities to safe the weapon with accompanying film. they must operate within policy must be strictly enforced when working with the framework of the overall response group and conduct nuclear weapons. Other explosive items which may b. Each nuclear weapon has render safe b. and additional hazards. procedures. In the early stages of accident response. The initial reconnaissance team resulting radioactive materials. The EOD team evaluates and analyzes Since weapons may have been subjected to extreme stress the accident situation and advises the OSC of the safest during an accident. Handling of nuclear weapons in an accident (1) DoE radiographic capabilities are available for must be done according to written procedures. the AMS. Initial Entry. During the initial entry. no immediate actions an incident/ accident. liquid oxygen. These operations are assigned to EOD personnel are clearly in the realm of discussed in this concept of operations. shredded identification. the elimination of explosive and radiological conventional explosives and other hazardous materials. as soon as the reconnaissance has been completed. Render safe procedures may begin. containment and. (b) Prevention of a nuclear contribution or a high a. DoE radiographic capabilities. maintain publications for render safe procedures (RSP) and ends with hazard removal and disposal of the for all Services nuclear weapon systems. capabilities and are trained in radiological control and (3) Additional information concerning the ARG.

techniques to asseis personnel protection requirements due to resuspension and the potential impact on site d. Because of the technical information located. Search Techniques. access to classified information and proper control and (4) Visual Search. DoE radiographic equipment should coordinate with the ARG and make recommen- is used to assess internal damage and aid standard EOD dations to the OSC concerning additional search procedures. The OSC establishes priorities for removing all hazards area until accountability for all the weapons and weapon so that other response personnel may conduct opera- 15-3 . requirements during nuclear weapon operations. combined procedures which can be tried. Nuclear Weapon Security. (1) Coarse Search. Components may have documents at the accident scene may contain critical been buried during the accident or subsequently covered nuclear weapon design information (CNWDI). A road grader equipped with scarifies sensitive information contained in these documents (large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. monitoring personnel to search the accident area soon (5) The high priority given to weapon recovery after the accident has occurred. and photographed. The search method used by the OSC depends Consideration must be given to the following when on many factors including the number of personnel determining a course of action: available. Physical components were found previously. Metal and radiation The OSC should ensure that all personnel are familiar detectors monitor those areas where weapons or with the rule and that it is strictly enforced. The search may become approved by the OSC after coordination with the DoE a time consuming operation requiring numerous Team Leader and the senior member of the EOD Team. personnel.DoE ARG representatives. be enforced strictly when working with nuclear weapons. This method may security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized supplement the visual search. method. The location of all weapons decontamination and restoration. and final disposition of shipment should This technique is used by EOD and radiological be an integral part of the RSP planning phase. and the patterns designed to locate weapon components rapidly. but some minimum number of are found. and components must be determined. the position personnel may have to be exposed to hazards to complete recorded on a map. the EOD team leader (3) When available. provide the may be employed are: best method of determining a weapon’s condition before it is moved. weapons and weapon e. and at what point the with EOD team procedures and experience in render search for components will cease. packaging. The two-man rule must tography. operations does not inherently imply a need for rapid (2) Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey. Search techniques that safe procedures under hazardous conditions. safety and security permitting. Depending upon the accident circumstances. radioactive intensity to assist in locating missing weapon components and to provide high resolution pho- c. If exposing personnel to hazards. A systematic search may be required over a large. As components inherently dangerous. Another major step in weapon components may be scattered and/or buried over a large recovery begins with the removal of identified hazards. A search normally conducted by disposition of classified material must be strictly enforced a slow-moving line of personnel positioned abreast at during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon various intervals dependent upon the object to be components. Personnel and public safety must never be This technique is used to identify areas of signitlcant sacrificed solely for speed. be properly cleared and authorized until recovery Coordination must be made with the Joint Hazard discussions are complete and the items have been covered Evaluation Center (JHEC) prior to implementing or removed. (3) Instrument Search. topography. The by wind action. some (5) Scarifying Procedure. Search teams requires that security measures be implemented should follow the graders and conduct a visual and/ consistent with the highest classification assigned. or instrument search for missing components. type. be removed to a storage area after coordination with (2) Consequences should be evaluated before accident investigators. and environmental conditions. Hazard Removal. action. ARG capabilities and knowledge. Metal detectors and RADIAC equipment maybe needed (1) Explosive ordnance and accident debris are to locate all weapons and components. area. A search in loose crisscrossing (4) Staging.. These procedures must be components is re-established. all components are not found. The items should the mission. This Personnel working in an area containing CNWDI should system has proven successful in past search operations. decontamination. their location should be marked.

Storage of Explosives. g. weapon components. EOD procedures does not. 15-4 . these publications also address requirements for the custody of nuclear weapons c. DoD or DoE may be assigned the primary resuspension of contaminants. must be provided for weapons and weapon The weapon operations annex/ recovery plan should components. Disposal. Definition of the relationship between EOD considerations requires assignment of each item to a personnel and DoE weapon experts and their respective storage group based on compatibility characteristics. Shipment. Nuclear weapons sites should be large enough to minimize hazards to will be moved by the safest means and over the safest personnel in the event of a detonation. and/ or explosives damaged or subjected h. Procedures for re-establishing accountability for to extreme forces during accidents. weapons and weapon components. associated with nuclear weapons. Final disposition of d. Procedures for shipping weapons and components. Procedures for packaging weapon components. DoE. under EOD supervision to clear an area of broken. (1) On-site disposal of high explosives depends on j. Procedures for establishing a secure staging/ and weapon components. It is unsafe for anyone but task trained personnel weapon components. by the OSC and the DoE team leader.e. and/ or explosives are shipped. including made. shipping. h. and DoT. close coordi- nation between the OSC and the DoE team leader is . constitute transfer of custody to the EOD team. Storage area or disposal responsibility for moving the weapons. performance of storage area. marking and safety instruc- accident investigators. establish the procedures used during weapon operations. After the weapons are evaluated by EOD damage or explosions. Packaging and Marking. Therefore. consultation is required for weapon(s). Custody of damaged weapon(s) and components is transferred to the DoE at a point determined jointly f. When the disposition decision has been available space and hazards presented. This annex should include: g. and DoE as safe for movement and in coordination with special packing. Transportation specialist tion hazard areas. regulations from the DoD. that storage areas are separated from other operations Shipments of weapons/weapon components will be is determined by the type and amount of explosives routed to a DoE facility for examination. An isolated and segregated area should be set final disposition. Custody. Each Service has publications that b. Moreover. or resolidified high explosives. and safety aspects components and debris. Procedures for locating and identifying weapon address the storage. necessary throughout the weapon recovery phase. including satellite surveillance. Guidelines for establishing electromagnetic radia- i. tions. breaches the container and that the environment experienced during shipment will not cause further f. Before weapon(s). responsibilities. To ensure this requirement. analysis. of these devices to the DoE. a balance of safety and practical a. Movement should be kept to a minimum. protection from the 15-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX elements and information sensors. in itself. and “ stored. (2) If open storage is used. The distances routes. If explosive items cannot be stored separately. aside for the exclusive storage of exposed or damaged explosives. weapons are moved to a tions must be obtained to comply with transportation designated weapon storage area. they must be packaged to ensure that no contamination scattered. Procedures for moving weapons and components damaged weapon(s) and/ or components involves return to the secure staging/storage area. security.

Provide internal information/guidance. The OSC will: information and frequent updates are essential to keep the public informed and to maintain credibility. The OSC should devote considerable time to meetings with d. Within hours of the accident. Establish or ensure direct communications with OASD(PA) from the accident scene. indicated below. and private citizens. Department of Defense: The OASD(PA). news media. as the 16-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE senior DoD public affairs organization. a dynamic. Given the public’s apprehension and the news media’s widespread coverage The OSC has specific public affairs responsibilities as of radiation incidents/accidents. contains public affairs related qualified public affairs officers from the supporting information. coordinating with DoS. Protect classified information. reference (a). public information and e. state. accurate Service regulations. perhaps among the most critical aspects of the entire response effort.d agencies at the national level. news media will be at the scene. Other public affairs support is available from p r e v a i l . Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) public affairs issues which require immediate attention. If conflicts exist between guidance installation and/ or staff as members of the response contained in this manual and DoD directives and force. and fact sheets on radiation. Cognizant public affairs staffing is required to assist the commander with these programs. The OASD(PA) may procedures and issues which may be encountered at the be represented at the Crisis Coordination Center (CCC) 16-1 . and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) The DoD response element commander should have Agreement. g. These PAOS form part of the DoD element of agreements. Identify and respond to community relation needs. comprehen. The Joint DoD. DoD 51 OO. whether in a remote possessions or overseas). b.52-M CHAPTER 16 PUBLIC AFFAIRS 16-1 GENERAL scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident (occurring in the United States. and The On-Scene Commander (OSC) communicates or local authorities at the scene of the accident. An internal information program should be f. c. has immediate public impact. To gain the public confidence. All Department of Defense (DoD) response element commanders will face a wide range of complex b. DoE. the following: a. a. conducted to provide information about policies and daily operational status to all response elements. Department of Energy (DoE). and/or FEMA. affairs activities during the initial accident response are reference (b). Provide news media support at the accident scene. public officials. its territories and a. ensures communication with the Office. about nuclear issues. coordinates with the White House Press Office and other departments This chapter provides public affairs guidance on ~ a. Assess public understanding and identify concerns community relations programs must be established. guidance in the DoD document(s) should the JIC. Included are contingency press or populated area. A nuclear weapon accident. 16-4 RESOURCES d. Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)).16. Timely. The military Services may have imposed sive public affairs program must be conducted to ensure additional requirements contained in appropriate credibility of the response effort. Local citizens will seek information 16-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS as to how the accident affects them. Public releases extracted from the DoD Directive 5230. Assistant c.

DoD policy is stated in DoD Instruction public reaction. reference (b). the OSC operations. and possessions or overseas. a nuclear weapon accident. response to a nuclear weapon(s) be released should be coordinated with the OSC’S legal accident outside the U. informed of conditions and actions at the accident scene so they maybe prepared to respond accurately to queries b. The OASD(PA) should be notified in advance. They will be present in the JIC and provide a wide variety of skills in all public (1) The OSC is required to conjh the presence affairs operations dealing with disaster and emergency of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components operations.16. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) PAO is military and civilian. government. Policy. The public affairs personnel from DoE field operation offices. “whether in a remote or a populated area.hformation to control of the U. and knowledgeable in nuclear weapons matters. and DoE contractors may also be requested the accident and its consequences. Information released about the accident c. unless bilateral agreements exist. its territories. Any statement confirming the presence affairs personnel. The OSC should use technical U. The tions are considered. must have the concurrence of the appropriate theater 16-? . Health and Human Services. S.S. it should also be stated. liaison officers will be provided to the OSC provide effective public affairs activities at the scene of and the JIC. if practical. and FEMA’s corps authorities is required if the public is. S.S. and possessions representative (or oflicer) to ensure that legal implica- or if the accident has trans-boundry implications. although not part of the response of nuclear weapons should contain information about element. provide internal to augment the JIC operations. affairs personnel will accompany the senior FEMA Two exceptions to this policy are: official to the accident scene. its territories with augmentation as required by the situation. DoE PAOS are information to the members of the response force.. a credible public affairs program should scene and be present in the JIC. Chief of Mission (COM) will be the focal point advisors to respond to and/or address unclassified issues for diplomatic and political decisions of the U. and responsible State and local knowledgeable on nuclear weapons issues and will assist authorities and foreign government officials must be fully as a part of the DNA Advisory Team.. example. Other DoE public affairs be implemented immediately. It is also the DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear d. Members of will generate immediate public interest. The OASD(PA) will be e. The public must the military Service headquarters and major command be notified immediately in the event their safety or public affairs staffs may augment the OSC’S public affairs welfare is endangered. Notification of public from FEMA headquarters. regions. injury or radiation exposure is unlikely.or the accident scene during emergencies. both staff. if this 16-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS exception is used. It is the DoD policy to Additionally. If public. or may be. national personnel must handle media and public inquiries about laboratories. Department of Energy: A DoE public affairs officer from the media and the public. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Public weapons or nuclear components at any specific location. or as soon as possible thereafter. which outlines specific procedures from the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) for announcements of accidents in the U. its territories and A nuclear weapon accident and subsequent response possessions.S. Additional FEMA resources are available in the interest of public safety. Other: Public affairs officers from other Federal advised of the notification as soon as practical if this agencies involved in the Federal response effort (for exception is used. implement community relations support to the affected communities. The COM will be assisted by a team 5230. of a technical nature. Local and state public public alarm. and of nuclear weapons lo reduce or prevent widespread should be integrated into the JIC. All senior Federal officials. Department of (2) The OSC may conjhm or deny the presence Transportation) also may be present at the scene. Department of State: The DoS exercises diplomatic must be both accurate and consistent. S. should be invited to participate in the JIC to the possibility of injury from high explosive weapon provide coordinated responses to the media and general components and/ or potential radiation exposure. To gain the confidence will accompany the DoE Team Leader to the accident of the public. danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components. The COM will provide significant public affairs expertise and information on the host country’s a.. . (j) In locations outside the U. in of reserve PAOS.

Information on are contained in Appendix 16-A. territory accident or to establishes direct communications with OASD(PA) as the involved government following an overseas accident. Chief of Mission to assure a unified administrative). and other personnel from DoD complete the near and long-term follow-up monitoring and civil resources. and the host government. The OSC should consider forming a Community JIC until such time as responsibility may transition to Emergency Action Team (CEAT) composed of public affairs. Public Affairs Responsibilities. the general public coordination with DoS. responsible for reviewing all material. accurate information can be provided at the accident.S. security personnel. The OSC has chemical form). The media should be should be established with a published number for public briefed on the extent of support available. commun. However. the identify public concerns about DoD nuclear matters and Service chief of public affairs must be kept fully take appropriate action in the public affairs arena. responsible for public affairs planning and analyzing (2) Establish a JIC.S. direct communications ensures that is a continuing effort. before. FEMA. nuclear weapons and their storage is classified Restricted (5) Radiation information fact sheets for the Data/ Formerly Restricted Data and is very sensitive (for general public and medical personnel are in Appendix example. responsibility and authority is transferred to FEMA. DoE and other agencies (6) Personnel Guidance. The CEAT should function under duties. the appropriate agency and/ or affected country to administrative. Phone lines situation and available resources. during. office an internal information program. the OSC and operate out of the JIC to facilitate (3) Provide Support for News Media. Support civilian community. public affairs activities should be coordinated in advance modified. prior to exercising the exceptions above. necessitate the installation of additional phone lines. Moreover. The OSC provides primary leadership and direction to the c. The minimum general public (for example. The OSC should ensure represented in the JIC. All the affected public. the JIC serves as the focal point for personnel working with the response force) are briefed information about the accident. The CEAT activities should be will be the same as that authorized on a military coordinated through the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) reservation (for example. the pay telephone if military communication has final clearance responsibility in the classification is unavailable). and and/ or U. as appropriate. disclosing whether or not a weapon contains tritium. During the accident. it should be referred to DoD for consideration and coordinated with DoE. security. who example. Local officials should that the public affairs program is meeting the needs of be invited to provide representatives to the JIC. state and local and through community relations programs to ensure agencies officials. The OSC is of Mission. The OSC coordination. Programs should be initiated. Communications are essential since the area. DoE. This informed. and radiological survey or monitoring teams) dedicated telephone lines and a facsimile reproduction on how to respond to queries about the accident and capability. Also. Specific support will depend upon the jipproach in working with the community. hotel.CINC. Located in an area near the that all response force personnel (including civilian accident scene. with DoS and/ or FEMA. medical communications required by DoD in the JIC are two personnel. The OSC establishes a JIC in feedback received from the media. medical. Specific guidance building) is preferred due to support requirements. logistics. expeditiously as possible (Area Code (202) 697-5131. and after an timely. information concerning design of nuclear 16-B. weapons and components.S. 16-3 . logistical. When the JIC (1) Establish communications with OASD(PA). as required. OSC should provide dedicated administrative. Any means available should be used (for response are coordinated in advance with the OSC. These are: needed. A location in a on accident response and public affairs policy through permanent facility (for example. questions and information. news releases. OSC is the senior DoD representative at the scene and must have access to current policy guidance and (5) Assess Public Understanding. especially those who may come in contact with the ications. intense media interest likely will response operations. The should be provided to response force personnel. or stopped based on the data obtained. the JIC should be national level. communications. motel. The OSC should ensure that the public affairs office to an agency following a U. transportation. If declassification of information is specific public affairs responsibilities. The OSC should statements issued at the national level. Chief (4) Protect Classified Information. legal. and logistical support for the JIC. through the U. and (4) Contingency releases for the above exceptions information released to the public. all public affairs matters pertaining to the technical AV 227-5131). and its physical state and b. The purpose of the team is to make experts is authorized to provide support to the news media in various functional areas available to assist the affected covering a nuclear weapon incident/accident.

blast. with caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. and proper disposition. Fire. and the fire cannot be extinguished immediately (5 minutes). —— Ilf contact with the accident scene is established. There is no need for evacuation. rescue. (Neither confirms nor denies) Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized (Format of sample release to be used if public safety personnel from entering the site and picking up considerations require notifying local and State officials fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo. Use of A U. APPENDIX 16-A PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONTINGENCY RELEASES CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1 MINIMUM ANNOUNCEMENT “No Danger to the Public” A U. (Format of sample release to be used when no danger exists to the public from contamination or blast. evidence of explosion. If any that hazardous cargo has been involved in an accident. for example) crashed (or other the scene of the accident who can provide details on circumstances) approximately (location and time).S. If there is no immediate threat to life. and details are unknown). There is no danger EXPANDED ANNOUNCEMENT of nuclear detonation. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) water directly on the aircraft should be avoided unless carrying hazardous material (classified cargo or unarmed needed to save property or lives. Current information from the accident The public is requested to stay out of the area under scene will assist in evaluating the accident and providing surveillance by guards to preclude any remote possibility additional public safety guidance.) –Condition of accident site (fire. —Condition of aircraft (burning. the situation should make a telephone call to this number (local phone). Notify (authorities) for retrieval explosion. and other or nuclear components significantly prevents or reduces emergency services personnel should approach the area widespread public alarm). but Visitors are warned to stay out of the area of the accident when confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon in the interest of public safety. or damage) —Evidence of obvious cargo (shapes or containers) . Water as a firefighting agent should be used with caution due to “To notify local and State officials possible adverse reaction with materials involved in the When Public is Possibly in Danger” fire. 1 of hazard from the accident (or conventional high explosives detonation) and to aid removal operations. avoid further the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or contact or handling. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) (Confirms to reduce public alarm) carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum- stances) approximately (location) at (time).- Determine the need for a public announcement of nuclear weapons involvement based on the responses to the above 16-A-1 . etc. Any local official at nuclear weapon(s). fragments have been picked up already. determine the followin~. extent of damage.S. the fire should CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-A be contained and allowed to burn out.

(specify boundary where installation) is enroute to (has arrived at) the scene of possible) is encouraged to remain indoors. Again. As a precaution and until further by guards) in the interest of safety and to aid operations evaluations are made. Make the following you must go outside for critical or lifesaving activities. (Format of sample release to be used if public safety The most immediate danger in an accident of this kind considerations require making a PUBLIC RELEASE is the effect of the blast caused by detonation of the that hazardous cargo was involved in an accident. (Military Service) team from (name of downwind from this site. air conditioners. and details are unknown). (Does confirm) Trained monitoring teams will be moving through the area wearing special protective clothing and equipment (Format of sample release to be used if public safety to determine the extent of any possible contamination. This poses little A U. indicating any special risk to those indoors. the following shall be included or property damage. Local possibility exists for contamination due to fire or scattering of nuclear material in the form of finely divided explosion. the conventional high explosives in the weapon. The following precautionary measures are recommended tion is known. (If plutonium is involved): One of the materials involved is plutonium. by OSC or Deputy Director of Operations (DDO). Drink and “When Public is Probably in Danger” eat only canned or packaged foods that have been inside. the conventional high explosives in the weapon (have detonated. The accident involved already supervised and protected. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) risk to health unless taken into the body by breathing carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum. are burning.Military personnel have been dispatched (will be The public is warned to stay out of the area (or indicate dispatched) and will arrive (are scheduled to arrive) soon the area) (now under surveillance by guards) because at the site. hazard.S.S. a nuclear weapon that contains conventional high explosives and radioactive material. If you are ination is likely because of fire or conventional high outside. or swallowing. the accident. proceed to the nearest permanent structure. Plutonium is both a poison and a radiation There is no danger of a nuclear detonation. The most appropriate initial action is to remain calm CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3 and inside homes or office buildings. but there is a danger CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-B from the conventional high explosives in the weapon that (have detonated. may detonate). and it is considered unlikely that any stances) approximately (location) at (time). The radiation given off consists of alpha particles 16-A-2 . dust may have resulted near the accident site and downwind from the explosion (fire). It is important to remember that your movement outside could cause yourself greater An/ a (aircraft/ railroad train/truck/ other) accident exposure and possibly spread contamination to those occurred (state time and location). anyone within a (to be filled in at the accident scene. in the release. to minimize the risk to the public. breathing any dust.) Further announcements will be made as more informa. particularly A U. We have no details yet on civilian or military injuries (NOTE: If applicable. there is no danger of nuclear detonation. NMCC) radius of the accident site. statement locally or from competent authority if no local cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring up and authority is available). If explosive detonation of the weapon. The public person would inhale or swallow an amount that would is warned to stay out of the area (under surveillance cause illness. may detonate). are burning. Turn off fans. and forced-air heating units. To notify the general public “When Public is Possibly in Danger” An experienced Federal response team has been ordered (Neither confirms nor denies) to the scene of the accident. considerations require announcement that a nuclear The dress of these teams should not be interpreted as weapon has been involved in an accident and contam.

next 4-6 hours. short-term exposure to contamination outside the body will pose negligible health risk. not a radiological hazard. Reply: “It is Department of Defense policy neither to Continuous announcements will be made as more confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any information is known. if true) until The cause of the accident is under investigation. It is expected that these immediate particular location. If fragments have been picked up. any fragments found near the scene of the accident may be contaminated and should be left in place. As a result of the explosion IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY: (fire). Therefore. The (type of carrier) was enroute from (name of facility) to (name of facility). most clothing. or closed off by guards) (and.” 16-A-3 . (Service) team from (name of installation) is (If uranium is involved): One of the materials involved enroute to (has arrived at) the scene of the accident.which do not have sufficient energy to penetrate protective precautionary actions will be required for the buildings. now enroute to the site of the accident. or even the outer skin. The public is asked to stay out of the area (under surveillance.S. can survey the ground and determine the exact area affected by the accident. A U. avoid further handling Question: “Are nuclear weapons stored at (name of and notify (authorities) for proper retrieval and facility) or (name of facility)?” disposition. a monitoring team. to the lead poisoning associated with some paints). Contamination by uranium fragments or small particles dispersed by conventional (chemical) We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties explosions or burning of a weapon is primarily a (or give number only of civilian and military casualties) chemical health hazard (heavy metal poisoning similar or property damage. is uranium.

52-M APPENDIX 16-B RADIATION FACT SHEETS FACT SHEET 1 CHARACTERISTICS. which is abbreviated Pu. However. but in areas close to the accident. its spread to clean areas. Biological elimination of 16-E-1 . some actions absorption. That is. its presence may be assumed in dust and dirt on the which hasten the excretion of plutonium from the body ground or on flat surfaces.000 years. it be performed by a physician who has been in contact radiologically decays by the emission of an alpha particle. Radiological survey teams are from wounds is not a probable means of significant monitoring these suspected areas to determine the contamination either. No immediate danger exists to anyone. Alpha radiation can also a very slow process. or amounts of plutonium may have been spread by the two (2) of every 10. DoD 51 OO. elimination of plutonium from the body is contaminated with plutonium. The epidermis. is sufficient protection for exposure to this half-life means that its radioactivity does not decrease isotope from sources external to the body.000 atoms eaten. plutonium may not be readily seen compounds. only inhaling plutonium particles is likely may help prevent further contamination or minimize to result in any amount of internal radiation exposure. very small intestines. coated or fallen upon the surfaces of structures. a when freshly machined. and from ash resulting from via the urine. since contamination of a cut or presence of plutonium and to measure the levels if laceration will likely introduce only very small amounts present. Less than . since they are administered intravenously. HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS OF PLUTONIUM (For release to the general public) The accident at has resulted however. represent an internal radiation hazard when in the release of the radioactive substance plutonium. is not without some medical hazard to the individual. the since plutonium is very poorly absorbed through the ground. Inhaled plutonium is retained in the lungs in much the Plutonium. or outer dead layer half of its radioactivity) of over 24. eating contaminated food or getting become exposed to this substance by coming into contact contamination into a wound or cut. Alpha particles do not drugs. hazard exists to people walking through an area ~~ Likewise. or objects) from the mishap. plutonium is taken into the body by inhalation of Persons who are downwind from the accident may contaminated air. After exposure to the atmos. and should Plutonium is an alpha radiation emitter. and no of plutonium into the body. such as ethylene diamine trichlor acetic acid by.hazard to people as long as it remains length of time it takes for the plutonium to lose one external to the body. This “dust” settles in the lungs. absorption winds to adjacent areas. is a heavy metal same manner that people in a dust storm inhale dust. (EDTA) or diethylene triamine pent acetic acid (DTPA). penetrate materials very substantially. When released from a deposition can be prevented by using “chelation” weapons accident. Once in the lungs. Because of its poor medical intervention is necessary. This means that alpha Plutonium in a weapon has a radiological half-life (the radiation is not a. it will oxidize to a dark the bloodstream to the liver and the bones. This brown or black appearance. with appropriate agencies to coordinate the use of these a very heavy radioactive particle. low percentage of plutonium may be translocated by phere for any period of time.02 percent will be absorbed. similar to stainless steel. Their range in air is only a few inches at most. The use of these chelating compounds the accident fire. Also. Likewise. which has a shiny appearance. No external substantially by nuclear decay or disintegration. with contamination (radioactive material which has contamination from ingestion is unlikely to be a problem. the naked eye. This long of the skin. In actuality.

16-B-2 . Fruits and vegetables grown in the area should not be eaten. Very sensitive monitoring equipment is being there will be little if any hazard. Children should not play the chelating agents mentioned above. this will be made available to all in fresh air from the outside. air conditioners. outdoors. until the limits of contamination are some plutonium. Use them only to recirculate those who need it. Remain inside and brought into this area to survey the inhabitants of minimize opening doors and windows.plutonium can be improved significantly by the use of air already in the building. Turn off fans. should not be unduly concerned. The determined. the public is advised to follow a few simple inhalation of plutonium is not a immediate medical guidelines to minimize the spread of contamination. Individuals who think they have inhaled Therefore. and emergency. suspected contamination area(s) for inhaled radiation. . and forced air heating units that bring and once established.

the results have been relatively of such in the literature. In the case of matter of concern. from the lung is bronchopulmonary Iavage.. which can exhibit be saved for later counting to determine contamination five oxidation states. In spite of this. DTPA should be used as soon as possible The retention half-times are estimated to be 200 years after significant inhalation exposures since the oxides . and may result in the formation of a fibrous DTPA treatment given immediately following wound nodule. washings should REAC/TS. carefully weighed. be sought from Service medical command and dislodge the contamination. ingestion and contaminated intact skin are of excision and the total quantity in. some of the plutonium is circulation. disappointing. :fj-f3. The use of repeated lavages should remove 25 to 50 percent of the plutonium that would Treatment of plutonium contaminated wounds should otherwise be retained in the lung. this may not be true in humans. 100 years (skeleton) and 40 years (liver). FACT SHEET 2 MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON PLUTONIUM (Use with Characteristics. plutonium will be in the form of an oxide. and the other tissues (10 percent). than “4 nCi of Pu embedded in a wound would be considered a candidate for such treatment. Retention determination. Again. Attempts to stimulate phagocytosis and the mucociliary response or All medical treatment for plutonium contamination or to use expectorant drugs have not been successful in inhalation should be coordinated with the appropriate animal studies. or burn treatment has been shown to remove up to 96 ment of a sarcoma or carcinoma in such nodules is a percent of the remaining plutonium. REAC/ TS can be contacted effects from the estimated lung burden must be very at the following 24-hour number: (615) 481-1000. flushing with sterile saline or water will remove a great Absorption via wound contamination will result in a deal of contamination. Generally. Hazards and Health Considerations of the Plutonium Fact Sheet) Plutonium is a highly reactive element. It is not Inhalation is probably the most significant route of expected that the physician will need to make this contamination in a nuclear weapons accident. possible systemic absorption of Pu. Greater unimportant. DTPA the clearance of insoluble particles. If possible. including blood. liver (45 percent). since the oxide forms of Pu are transferred at a relative slow rate from the lungs into the systemic After entry into the body. in the extracellular spaces for effective chelation. in a weapons or her representative. Service medical department or with Radiation Emer- gency Assistance Center/ Training Site (REAC/ TS) The only demonstrated useful procedure in enchasing because of the hazard of the substances involved. it will be is never a time when a sizable systemic burden is available distributed by the blood to the skeleton (45 percent). however. Ultimately. from 3 to 7. The remainder will likely be translocation of some of the material to the skeleton removed when the eschar sloughs off. since a specialized team to perform such in the lungs depends on particle size and the chemical monitoring can be made available from the OSC or his form of plutonium involved.000 accomplished prior to surgical excision to prevent days. The possible develop. The majority will remain in the vicinity of the wound. within months to years. the difficulty wounds. (whole body). and is for chelation in the early period after exposure and there redistributed within the body. Immediate chelation therapy with accident. More extensive treatment by excision requires into the body are via inhalation and contaminated judgment in assessing the area involved. In burn cases. Thus little systemic burden of Pu is available solubilized by the body fluids.3 . may not be the only compound present. although there have been no reports inhaled plutonium. such as plutonium compounds are defined as investigational new drugs oxides. DTPA (consult REAC/TS for protocol) should be which has a pulmonary retention half-time of up to 1. advice should involve copious washing and irrigation to attempt to. The principal routes levels. and liver. The which require the advice and concurrence of REAC/ risk of this procedure versus the risk of future health TS before administration.the wound.

you will be assaulted by contamination hazard and a slight inhalation hazard.000 times less.. the airborne hazard for the workers inside the control utilizing all the available explosives.29. It will. Generally. Something as detonation. perhaps 10 to 100 times less. as general contamination. but you must be careful to avoid the be consulted to give the best approximation of the public impression of extreme hazard from the plutonium. You incident. risks outlined in the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8. wind to spraying with some sort of fixative to prevent direction and speed. Note that this is only from the cloud passage! civilian populace will be just that. the resuspension of plutonium in the original will generally have suffered low order detonations if they areas of contamination is not severe. the weapons Generally. however. there is little you can do to prevent the site. 1 6-B-4 .risk. and other ideas as outlined in the public guidance. such The cloud will deposit its radioactive material within as the AN/ PDR 56. Your . FACT SHEET 3 PLUTONIUM FACT SHEET (For Operational Commanders) As Operational Commander. depending on particle size. By the time you have arrived at the scene. Sheltering should be recommended for the downwind reference (ap). many needs at once in determining the actions to be Care should be taken not to increase tension over the taken in coping with a nuclear weapons accident. and this can be compared with the risks in the sheltering advisory should indicate that there is a guide. such as walking. early thought should be given over the area downwind. A secondary advantage is that this method lowers plots show the detonation of all weapons involved. area of cloud passage. plutonium from some alpha detection RADIACS. Utilize the local overestimates the total dispersion of plutonium. unless they are military areas anyway. based on up process move faster. You and your Public Affairs Office (PAO) should have had the opportunity to review the preceding should emphasize that people should remain indoors fact sheets for the general public and medical personnel. Unless it happens on base. and the authorities. release. these types of instruments minutes of the accident. keep houses closed to prevent Several facts are important to keep in mind. not site contamination surveys. After initial cloud In dealing with a nuclear weapons accident. This low order detonation produces very close to the accident site. The actual scenario boundaries and may help in making the eventual clean should be less. Doses from resuspension will be on the order of 100 The military has no authority in the contamination areas to 1. The Service/ DoE health physicists should population. Such an example would Energy (DoE) can calculate a dose equivalent for persons be keeping the population under tight sheltering in the area of the initial cloud passage. Therefore. . basing your Some concept of the exact magnitude of the risk people sheltering plans on these numbers can easily result in experience from the incident can be compared with the a significant overestimation of the real problem. as much as possible. some of passage. and have the FEMA representative assist dose estimate is based only on cloud passage. To prevent the spread a cloud of finely dispersed plutonium which falls out of material in this area. mask the the actual survey data from the site. these requirements or restricting traffic from the contamina- people will be in the area of hundreds of rem of exposure tion area downwind. Department of or may be counterproductive. the inhalation of material from the accident the concepts which are generally employed in handling is by resuspending the plutonium by operations in the injuries and/ or fatalities on board ship do not hold true. except for the area are going to do so. recommendations. resuspension of the plutonium. A very worst case situation is shown on simple as hand sprayers with vegetable oil may be used the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) to bind the plutonium into the soil/surface around the plots which are made available to you. and amount of explosives in the resuspension/ spread of the plutonium. inhalation from the cloud passage. or are within the The important point is that the ARAC plot generally National Defense Area (NDA). or are used only for monitoring people or material leaving you are at the scene. Generally. The initial ARAC site. not later in this function. Any recommendation for the to the lungs.

transportation. Transportation. and contaminated waste. and g. potable and/or non-potable. Logistical support unique to the Joint Information Center (JIC) (see Chapter 16. extensive contamination. Use of local facilities and equipment 17. Electrical power. equipment ment of Defense (DoD). availability of assets and facilities at. Sanitation facilities for response force personnel and news media. depends upon the location of the accident and the extent of contamination. k. or near. . base camp of accident response.52-M CHAPTER 17 LOGISTICS SUPPORT 17-1 GENERAL c. Department of Energy (DoE). The amount of logistics support recovery/ restoration operations. temporary and other Federal agencies with a radiological or disaster fixation of contamination by sprinkling. reference (aq) is used. and which are directly chargeable to.I .000 people may require j. and personnel decontamination stations. Included or the nearest military installation during early stages are discussions for establishing a project code. and supplemented by h. Rapid transport (air or ground) from the airhead matters peculiar to a nuclear weapon accident. Airhead cargo support for air delivery of supplies to a nuclear weapon accident should determine the to remote sites. the scene of the accident and initiate actions to obtain support p. upon request. Packaging and shipping materials for weapons. oil. response forces. support. l-M. the military Service or agency providing assistance or f. Laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontam- initially incurred within existing funds. Documentation of accident-related costs. and some radiological support. and leaching . to satisfy the following requirements: a. Maintenance support. Commanders and logistics officers of forces responding o. as feasible. Petroleum. caused by. The military Service or agency providing assistance or responding to a nuclear weapon accident will fund costs d. Heavy equipment for base camp construction and local service contracts. The military inated clothing.25. This chapter provides guidance on logistics support 1. DoD 4000. and lubricants. decontamination and restora- tion operations involving up to 1. and all required resources from the Depart- support personal by response force personnel. response. Response to a nuclear weapon accident is a high priority b. the accident is responsible for reimbursing.esponse capability are normally available to the accident operations. if any. Messing and billeting facilities for response force 17-4 RESOURCES personnel and news media. the incident/ accident. If an accident results in i. Sufficient water. Anti-contamination and other specialized clothing six months or more to complete. to operation. 17-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS n. Medical evacuation of acute casualties. climate dependent). 17-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE components. DoD 51 OO. Service or agency having possession of the nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons components at the time of e. m. Public Affairs). These costs are in addition to normal operating expenses.

Any military base within acceptable driving of the following: distance. A listing of DoE contaminated laundering facilities is in Appendix (1) The type of project code required (always 9 17-A.near the accident scene. If a power requisitions. (4) Proposed effective date. all other requisitions with the same priority designator. If required. Installation Support. requirement. The accident location mask filters. (1) A materiel control officer. messing. may be viable notification of a nuclear weapon accident. and billeting for response force project code from the Joint Material Priorities and personnel. a. Once HARVEST EAGLE. units and forces using the 17-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS project code should be included. Contaminated Laundering Facilities. The JCS -project code request includes the following information: c. Immediately upon and vehicles. Project Code Generation. assist in obtaining telephone service. A GSA representative may accompany Federal Emer. or unified or the establishment of a base camp for response personnel. specified command headquarters. The logistics staff officer in the development of the accident response plan from identifies military installations nearest the accident site its conception cannot be overemphasized. military Service Headquarters. Base Camp Establishment. contain the JCS project code. instructions to all concerned. Anti-Contamination Clothing. generating facility is required. Base camp potential support requirements. When establishing a base camp. Upon assignment of a JCS project code. support to assist in meeting urgent logistic requirements during the early days of the accident response. all response-related requisitions should package maintained by the Air Force. Planning. gency Management Agency (FEMA) personnel and can (5) Proposed termination. and” anti-contamination clothing. but as a minimum should consist can be used. the Service solutions to some of the logistic problems. Such items may include mylar for radiation instrument probe faces. For processing purposes. Military Response Force (SRF) logistics staff officer should installations near the accident site may provide a supply request assignment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) point. protective masks. it should be positioned 17-2 . such as National Guard armories b. The installations should be alerted of restoration operations are supportable. Details on HARVEST EAGLE capabilities and request requisitions with a JCS project code will be ranked above procedures are in Appendix 17-A. Planning is initiated to identify the Procedures for submitting requisitions and picking up location and availability of items not organic to the supplies from nearby military installations should be response organization and that might be a limiting factor established. should be considered before establishing a base camp. through the On-Scene-Commander (OSC). HARVEST EAGLE may be requested from the Air (2) Three or four administrative supply personnel Force. and hotels. as appropriate. If accident location dictates Staff (JS). (3) Service monitor or coordinator. and other administrative and support (7) Brief narrative background on the nature of the services. d. (2) Project name. building spaces. and is almost totally dependent on the number of consideration should be given to requesting helicopter personnel involved and the duration of the operation. Allocations Board. Joint a. office and other (6) Force/ activity designator. or if local facilities “ support requirements.” d. Base Camp Support. It is a basic and establishes liaison to determine their support responsibility to ensure that decontamination and capabilities. to the response effort. gymnasiums. and available local facilities. a mobile messing and billeting approved. an Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The determines if a base camp is needed for feeding and logistics staff at the accident site should be tailored to billeting response force personnel. Sources of anti. The importance of the logistics staff officer’s involvement c. (8) Where available. may be used. Alpha Alpha). General Services Administration (GSA) Support. If the nearest installation logistics support represents a rather routine situation is not within two to three hours driving distance. the Defense b. Logistics Agency will disseminate implementing contamination clothing are in Appendix 17-A. water supply to maintain the document register and submit and <anitation facilities must be considered.

Decontaminat- operations. If resources are obtained through a requests should be monitored and any problems contract. Phone A sufficient supply of GSA general use credit cards numbers are listed in Appendix l-G. This annex should include: g. decontamination criteria and hazardous working organization. Close within 48 hours following the accident. OSCS should be and transportation support for news media as authorized prepared to support from 7-12 persons in the ARC by DoD and Service directives. This information should inated vehicles may. consideration may be given to replacing tactical contaminated laundry facilities. both in tonnage and purpose. . Contaminated Laundry Support. Other 17-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX agencies should arrive on-site with an organic capability to support their personnel and operations a minimum The Logistic Support annex should provide procedures of three days. Vehicles in contaminated areas should made to ensure that all personnel or units responding not be removed for maintenance or returned to the to the accident are provided written information owning organization until after they have been describing procedures to follow in requesting logistical decontaminated. should be held or readily available for refueling vehicles used in areas where government fueling facilities may i. for establishing and maintaining support for response “ force operations. rotation of vehicles with the to assist in decontamination of area residents’ clothing. f. The Joint with the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center Information Center (JIC) should be provided full (JNACC) will help identify numbers of personnel and logistical support including transportation. b. (5) Laundry of non-contaminated clothes. Procedures for establishing and supporting a base (2) Water. . Early coordination (PAO) to determine specific requirements. facilities may be requested from the JNACC. If operations continue more than 30 days. providing organization is recommended. it may be necessary for the response force on-site to a minimum. The ARG has and non-expendable equipment. Base camp indicate clearly to whom requests should be submitted. oil. expendable type of support required by the ARG. Up to 70 ARG personnel may be at the site depending upon the severity of the accident. and supplies. The DoD j. The status of all heavy equipment. therefore. (1) Petroleum. ing and cleaning anti< ontamination clothing is a critical equipment maintenance may become a major consid. Provisions should be not be available. Assistance in arranging vehicles with GSA rental vans with six-nine passenger for work by these facilities. and lubricants (POL). are required to support response h. Procedures for obtaining appropriate JCS and/or for the following services: Service project codes. Advance planning is responsible for providing logistics support to the DoE should take into account the possible billeting. or administrative support. Accident Response Group (ARG). The number of media advance party who arrive within 12-24 hours after the personnel could vary from a small number to hundreds accident. depending on coordination is requued with the Public Affairs Office the level of DoE support required. and information on commercial ‘or vehicle mounted radio is not a specific requirement. Minor on-site maintenance of contam. Support for the Department of Energy. eration. and operations center areas. Specific a support coordinator who will work with the logistics requirements will be determined by the PAO. (4) Maintenance. Use of local service contracts to facilitate logistics support is recommended a. A wide variety of vehicles. News Media and JIC Support. Dissemination of Procedures. To reduce the number of maintenance personnel Additionally. and work will be done in the contaminated encountered reported to the requesting person or area. additional information on and cargo carrying capacity when an off-road capability their capabilities. Vehicular Support. Local Service Contracts. conditions should be addressed in the contract. . . staff to ensure that all ARG requirements are identified. Appendix 17-A provides a reference list of DoE native. requirement supporting accident response operations. be necessary. e. As an alter. camp in remote areas. The support coordinator will normally accompany the advance party of the ARG to the accident site. messing.so that it can provide power for both the base camp (3) Sanitation. construction and/ or site restoration may also require and who the approval authority is.

c.- 174 . Procedures for laundering contaminated clothing. Procedures for establishing maintenance support e. if required. to the accident site. or equipment rotation during extended operations. Procedures for delivery of requisitioned material including shipping. d. Sources of anti-contamination clothing. . f.

Each command has four kits. HARVEST EAGLE kits are designated war reserve (5) Elwood Nuclear “Safety material and are maintained by TAC. Windsor. OH 44240 configured in four separately deployable packages. cots. Georgia. and water purification equipment.O. and similar housekeeping 247 Addison Road items. BOX 658 and operate the field kitchens. Additional equipment includes generators. and the total 333 Martinel Drive kit can be transported on 14 C-141 B aircraft. the on-scene staff must make arrangements for personnel to unpack and (4) Durafab Disposable. Special teams.52-M APPENDIX 17-A LOGISTICS RESOURCES 17-A-1 HARVEST EAGLE KITS b. and to manage billeting space P. Robbins AFB. such as Cleburne. assemble the equipment. IL 60014 in a ready-to-deploy status in CONUS by the 4400 Comm (815) 455-3777 Mobility Support Flight. c. water storage Comm (800) 243-3847 bladders. Permanent Anti-Contamination Clothing. National stock numbers (NSN) for permanent anti- clothing is used for nuclear accident response. DoD 51 OO. and 2180 Elmwood Ave PACAF. NY 14216 Comm (7 16) 877-6621 17-A-2 ANTI-CONTAMINATION CLOTHING SOURCES c. HARVEST EAGLE P. These kits are under the operational control of HQ TAC/ LGX. TX 76031 USAF PRIME BEEF and PRIME RIB units can be Comm (817) 645-8851 requested to provide additional support. Inc. field kitchens. Each kit can support 1. CT 06095 2 “Lightalls”. HARVEST EAGLE kits are air transportable follows: I operations support sets for supporting units that operate in remote locations where propositioning is not politically or economically feasible. USAFE. Buffalo. a. The kits do not include vehicles. Sources for disposable anti-contamination clothing area as a. (3) Euclid Garment Manufacturing Company b. Disposable Anti-Contamination Clothing. Kits are Kent. personal equipment items (such as parkas.100 people. bedding or sleeping bags) or expendable (such (2) Nuclear Power Outfitter as food. fuel or medical supplies). each Comm (216) 673-7413 designed to support 275. people.O. If HARVEST EAGLE kits are required at an accident scene. Box 737 kits are designated war reserve materials and maintained Crystal Lake. The kits include (1) Defense Apparel tents. shower and laundry facilities. Either permanent or disposable anti-contamination . contamination clothing are: 17-A-I . NF.

NV a. SC Capacity: 1. WA Capacity: 1.ITEM SIZE NSN Coveralls.800 suits/day at the following locations: (5) Albuquerque Operations Office Mound Facilities (1) Savannah River Operations Office Miamisburg. Extra Large 8415-00-782-2816 Hood.52. Las Vegas. 17-A-2 . reference (ar).. Radioactive 8 through 8415-00-782-281 Contaminant 10 8415-00-782-2814 Shoe Covers Small through 8430-01-712-2872 Extra Large 8430-01-721-2876 Overshoe. Combat Small 8430-01-048-6305 17-A-3 CONTAMINATED LAUNDERING (4) Nevada Operations Office FACILITIES Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co.000 suits/day Contamination LimiP 667 dpm/ cm2 Capacity: Very large quantities (currently b. Brookhaven. LI New York Contamination Limit: Case-by-case basis Note: DoE laundry services should be arranged through Capacity: 15 suits/ hr the DoE JNACC.000 suits/ day co) (2) Richland Operations Office Amarillo.500 suits/day Contamination Limit 200 dpm/ cm2 (6) PANTEX Plant (Mason& Hanger-Silas Mason Capacity: 12. .000 dpm (average) Aiken. Radioactive Contaminant 8415-00-782-2808 Hood.000 radiation workers per day) facilities may be used at various locations throughout (3) Chicago Operations Office the United States. TX Rockwell Hanford Contamination Limih None established Richland. Cloth 8415-00-634-5026 Gloves Shells. NOTE: Additional information on Radiac Equipment and assets can be found in DNA 5100. The DoD JNACC assists in identifying Brookhaven National Laboratory any commercial facilities near an accident site. M6A2 4240-00-999-0420 Gloves. Commercial contaminated clothing laundry servicing 3-5. Radioactive Large. Inc. Radioactive Small/ Medium 8415-00-782-2815 Coveralls. OH Savannah River Plant (DuPont) Contamination Limit: 100. The Department of Energy (DoE) operates facilities Contamination Limit: 33 dpm/ cm2 capable of laundering plutonium contaminated clothing Capacity: 1..1 L.

additional personnel may be required. Defense Nuclear Agency at the site of the accident. The General Counsel. The Senior communication among functional elements. and local officials. “ a. The provision of timely and sound legal advice and organization should include a legal element to advise assistance is dependent upon adequate personnel and and assist the OSC in resolving these issues. and national defense issues which evolve from a nuclear instructions. at a minimum.52-M CHAPTER 18 LEGAL 18-1 GENERAL f. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legal This concept establishes guidelines for the operation of advisors of other participating departments or agencies the PLA and his or her staff. concerning the authority and responsibility of the DoD 18-1 . Organize and supervise the legal functional element c. Planning. Provide legal advice and assistance to other Federal. and sufficiency and implications. The PLA must be knowledgeable officials upon request. Other Federal Departments and Agencies may include a legal advisor as an element of their response The PLA will: force. is a member of the DNA Advisory Team operating a claims processing facility. that the assigned legal element is aware and capable and actions to resolve legal issues. Predesignated response forces should ensure This Chapter identifies specific requirements. weapons accident as well as managing and administering a claims processing facility. The military member of the legal element responding with designated legal element of the SRF response force the staff of the OSC is the Department of Defense (DoD) should include. Government to the general public. The response force a. DoD 51 OO. The legal element of the IRF response force should remain at the site as an additional resource. Legal issues range from complex questions regarding jurisdiction and authority to exclude 18-4 RESOURCES the general public from specific areas. legal clerk. to payment of simple personal property claims. b.S. and the Service Response Force (SRF). the Executive departments. DoD PLA. Circumstances surrounding as required. Review proposed public statements for legal state. 18-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS d. c. resources. including establishing and (DNA). all legal advice and a. two attorneys and one Principal Legal Advisor (PLA) to the OSC. and will deploy to the accident site to provide expert advice and assistance to the PLA. g. (DNAAT). and circumstances 18-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE surrounding an accident. The OSC represents the U. Also it provides a of addressing the complex and politically sensitive reference list of statutory authorities. other federal agencies. To assure consistency. Coordinate technical legal matters with a higher authority when required. Depending upon the nature of. radiological safety. The occurrence of a nuclear weapon accident will present with emphasis on security. Advise the OSC and functional staff elements on assistance should be coordinated jointly through the any matters related to the accident. Review operational plans to identify potential legal problems and to ensure that they are legally sufficient. e. and a myriad of complex legal problems for the On-Scene documentation of factual evidence for use in resolving Commander (OSC) of the Initial Response Force (I RF) claims or in litigation. an accident are the driving force of the sequential order. regulations. 18-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS b.

the PLA should establish liaison with of references. 18-2 . Government in the cleanup (2) The provision of timely and legally sound advice process. PLA ensures that any information provided to claimants is according to established policies. Public Affairs. or have long-term political and financial and assistance is based primarily upon communication. implications that could undermine support for the therefore. Identifies technical channels of communication. and evidentiary information for both safety investiga- tions and claims resolution. and damage to remains at the scene until the response operation is public or private property. including those listed at Appendix 18-A. the legal element should be litigation. as well as (6) The PLA must identify and establish liaison jurisdictional principles. background for subject areas. which: (4) Claims processing personnel should be aware a. Provides guidelines for documentation of physical of claims or litigation. It is therefore major functional elements of the OSC’S staff to make essential that: all elements aware of the need for coordination of planned actions. site. accordingly. research facilities are unlikely to be available on-site. c. Dependent (2) All personnel involved in the response effort upon circumstances. security requirements. Inasmuch as requests for legal authorities. the claims processing facility PAO. As soon as the claims processing facility 18-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX is established. When possible. which may prove later to be significant in resolution d. Follow-on Actions. evacuation of civilians. in the actions of the U. the PLA should evidence which may be significant in “the resolution of take immediate action to ensure preservation of factual claims or litigation. more than one claims facility may are required to refer all queries for information to the be required. information regarding the location should be provided to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for Accident response plans should include a Legal Annex inclusion in a news release. The legal element. The PLA advises the OSC when the claims tailored to the respective Service or Agency. Describes procedures for establishing and operating and/ or videos. and adequate organizations. of radiological hazards and safety procedures. legal claims administration. legal advisors representing other federal agencies at the These references provide the authority and some accident site. Establishes a policy requiring all functional disturbance and/ or destruction of physical evidence elements to coordinate actions with the PLA. identi. Inherent in the accident scene. (5) Response efforts may necessarily result in the c. should be collocated with the civil emergency relief and assistance office. Identifies the resources to be deployed with the of the sensitive nature surrounding the accident. Adverse publicity is inherent to a nuclear weapon accident simply by its occurrence. and appropriate recording and this event are the relationships between local. and that queries for b. (7) To ensure that legal advice is timely. and immediately with local law enforcement officials.S. (1) Public statements are coordinated prior to (3) The claims processing facility should be release to ensure that no hidden legal implications will established at a location easily accessible to the public impact on response efforts. documentation a claims processing facility. processing facility should cease operation. or a representative use of force. The PLA. Accordingly. such as establishment of the National Defense Area (NDA). law enforcement.as well as that of the various other Federal departments fication of responding forces and civilians at or near and agencies in a nuclear weapon accident. national. result in a loss of confidence by the public located in or near the operations center/command post. and international authorities. The handbook should be complete. Provides a checklist or synopsis of the actions to any information other than claims procedures are be taken by the PLA immediately upon arrival at the referred to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). liaison must be established with all of the nation’s nuclear deterrent capability. Initial Actions d. State. designated legal elements should prepare a handbook and consistent. and mutually agreeable to local officials. receipting of property. and local and state emergency response advice require immediate response. f. This includes photographs e. b. (1) The OSC and staff must have immediate access Mishandling of public affairs-may impact on claims and to the PLA. responsive. interviews with witnesses.

S. 18 U.C.” 18-A-1 .C. 796. 50 Fed. “Use of Aircraft for Photo- graphing Defense Installations. S.” 3. S. S.C. 18 U. “Security of Military. DoD Directive 5210.” States. 18 U. Executive Order (EO) 12656.” 5. 46542.C. ” Civil Disorders.C. 18 U. Sec. S. 797.” CRIMINAL STATUTES 4. seq. Sec. 11.A. “National Contingency Plan. 18 U. 372. 18 U. 831. S. DoD Directive 5410.” 1.1. S.” 7. ” 6. DoD 51 OO.52-M APPENDIX 18-A PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT 4. 111. Sec. 42 U.A. Sec.A.C. Sec. “Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons. “Federal Radiological Emer. and Possessions. “Nuclear Accident and Records. Sec. 18 U.C. “Federally Protected Materials.C. “DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive 4.42 U. “Photographing and Sketching Defense Installations. 19 January 1988.” 10.8.” 3. amended by Public Law 100-107). A. S. “Cooperation with U.” 8.” News Media Representatives at the Scene of Military Accidents Occurring Outside Military Installations. S.C. “Conspiracy to Impede or During Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the United Injure Officer.A.C.” 2.56.” gency Response Plan (FRERP). Sec.16.” 1. Sec.C. “Federal Emergency Management.52. 50 U. Property or 9. EO 12148.A. S.A. ” Involving Nuclear Materials. Its Territories.” 8. S. Sec. Sec.C.A. “Use of Military Resources 5. 797. 641. “Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data.” AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREA TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 9. 18 U. Resisting or 5.2.A.” Photographs of Defense Installations? 3.41.A. or 10. “Gathering.C. “The Robert T. “Prohibited Transactions Installations and Resources. Sec.” Activities.. Subject “National System for Emergency Coordination. DoD Directive 5210. Transmitting. DoD Directive 5100. “Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. EO 12241.A. 18 U. ” 1. “Security Regulations. Reg.A. 793. 241. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.C. “Public Money. Sec.” 6. DoD Directive 5230. 795. 5121 et. S. S.” Impeding Certain Officers or Employees. “Conspiracy Against Rights. “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. “Assaulting.S. 18 U. 245.” Incident Public Affairs Guidance.” 7. 2271. 231. 2. Sec. (Public Law 93-288.14. DoD Directive 5210. “General Provisions.” 6. Losing Defense Information. “Publication and Sale of 2. DoD Directive 3025. Sec. S. 18 U. White House Memorandum.A.A. DoD Directive 5200.

331. “General Provisions.A. 227 l(b). “Powers of Federal Bureau United States of DoD Actions.C.A. as amended by EO 11991. “Environmental Effects in the 1. S. S.” 14. ” 2. Sec.C. 1362. ” 15. 2101. 2733-2737. 552b.A.” 10 U.” 19. “National Environ- b.C. Sec.C. S.Constitution 3. “privacy Act.A. 2672a.12. 552a. S.A.C. A. “Acquisition: Interests in Land When Need is Urgent.A. Compensation. S. 333.A. “Assault or Resistance. 10 U. 42 U. “Administrative Adjustment of Claims.A. EO 11514. ” 18. “Freedom of PROPERTY Information Act. S. Sec. 18 U. Sec.C.” 18-A-2 .” Activities of Department of the Army. Subset. 1361. S. 42 U. Navy or Air Force.C. 3052. Sec. 18 U. S. ” a. “Communication Lines.” 16. “Riots. 18 U. “Treason. “Federal Aid for State NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Governments. 18 U.” Amendment V . EO 12580. Sec. 42 U. 5 U. Sec. “Interference with State and 2. DoD Directive 6050.C. 18 U.C. “Protection and Enhance- AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF ment of Environmental Policy. Sec. 4321..C.C. Sec. Sec. Sec.” 5.A. 2231.” Environmental Response. and Liability Act of 1980.” c.C. S. seq. 332. Sec.C. DoD Directive 5100. Sec. Sec. S.A. 552. “Superfund Implementation.A.C.A.C.C.A.” 1.A. S.. 2381. 10 U. Naval or Coast Guard Property. 2672. et. Sec. Sec. S. 18 U. ” 1. 13. S.C.” 2. S.” MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACQUISITION OF LAND AND JUST COMPENSATION FOR 1.A. “Comprehensive Federal Law.1. 1382. 10 U. 9601 et. 1385. “Property Loss. S.A. S. S.” and Enhancement of Environmental Policy. “Seditious Conspiracy.C. Personal Injury or Death: Incident to Noncombat Stations or Systems. 18 U. as amended. “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus. “Government Property or AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS Contracts. “Protection 17. A. S.C.A. Sec.A. as amended. 18 U. 5 U. Sec.” 3. “Use of Militia and Armed mental Policy Act. 18 U. “Government in Sunshine Act. 2384.50. 28 U. S. S.” 4. ” INVESTIGATION 6. S. 5 U. “Entering Military.C.A. Sec. seq.” Forces to Enforce Federal Authority.C. ” 2.” of Investigation. Sec. 10 U.

when the National Defense d. A r e a (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) is disestablished. response effort. the The accidents at Thule. site restoration becomes the dominant task only after classified weapons. The precise resources This chapter provides guidance for accomplishing the required will depend on the specific contamination restoration of a nuclear weapon accident site contam. or overseas. respectively. the concentration. contaminated with radioactive materials. Such actions should be recognized. One example would be determining the extent of a. In this section. or removing the contaminant. or more precisely. taught us that site restoration of an area have extensive responsibilities described in Chapters 5. and prerogatives once the NDA is disestablished. fixing. g. activities. the Security Area is dissolved. scrubbing lesser amounts of contamination from surface areas. Development of a site restoration plan to return the accident area to a technically achievable/acceptable b. not included. Development of plans for post restoration radiation its topography/ demographics. Material resources necessary for site restoration contamination. the reoccupation of contaminated areas and follow-up staff element will contribute to the site restoration effort. for the most part. Several factors have significant influence on site f. However. to materials such as soaps and detergents for and the results incorporated into the plan. In addition to site restoration. each response force. and other hazards are removed. Restoring the contaminated area to normal use. and 18. However. b. Radiological Safety. Legal. and Palomares. The four elements are the 19-3 SPECIFIC REWIIREMENTS Radiological Safety. Some of the more prominent factors are: size of the contaminated area. problem and the decontamination method(s) selected. weapon c. available both commercially and within DoD. and Legal officers each Spain. the Staff Engineer easy. though not 17. several decontamination considerations are discussed as well as b. therefore. As described in other sections. A specific list of 19-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE all possible resources at this juncture could be misleading and is. Specifically. @ovides expert advice on the. Logistics. capabilities of various be required: pieces of heavy equipment to accomplish specific types 19-1 . classified components. c. DoD 51 OO. will range from heavy equipment for soil and vegetation therefore. four response force elements are the key to the On-Scene Commander’s (OSCS) effort to plan and execute site restoration. Greenland. Coordination between responsible civil and military organizations. and Engineer response elements. can be accomplished. Some actions otherwise performed in support of 19-4 RESOURCES the basic response effort are vital in site restoration. Determination of agreed-upon cleanup and condition begins early in the nuclear weapon ac~ident technically achievable/ financially acceptable levels. These resources are. Completion of decontamination. restoration decisions and procedures. or when overseas the Security Area is e. Logistics. a. Determination and plotting of contaminated areas. Completion of environmental assessment(s). inated with radioactive materials. The following actions will. reducing dissolved.52-M CHAPTER 19 SITE RESTORATION 19-1 GENERAL a. debris. during development of the site restoration plan removal. and the civil authority monitoring “and assessment.

Specifically. – ~. Ground Surveys). ~. Z Rate at which the DECON method is 19-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS applied. assist in protecting the public from radiological hazards ~. Land value. Dose commitment from surface exposure. Size of affected area (m2). Supporting Staff Engineers (Aerial Measurement System (AMS). recommend procedures. shall be reduced to a minimal practical forwarded for national-level review. nuclear weapons or devices posing an Program (S RP) to develop restoration options. State. the OSC must continue to inhalation and external dose. Specifically. phasized. to level or at least to a level which recognized scientific qtilize the SRP mentioned above. DoE. Accordingly. the Senior FEMA Official (SFO). 19-2 . and concepts to be included in site restoration. support requirements for restoration tasks. Type of equipment used in the method. and and other Federal agencies and representatives which local authorities or foreign government officials. Site restoration activities established which includes representatives from DoD. DECON method used on each surface. and State $. SFO the strategy options along with radiological map data for negotiations and final governmental resolution/ approval. DoD has adopted the policy that Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). Land use. and coordinate the conduct of engineering surveys discussed ~. they should be environment. Radiological Safety Standards. are undertaken in coordination with the Federal FEMA. The primacy and rights of civil authorities/ ~. which means technically achievable/ The OSC should provide the committee through the acceptable cleanup levels vary from locale to locale. Detailed mapping of the contaminated area later in this chapter. state and local governments. to an acceptable condition. Efficiency of the method in reducing Security Area. These options should be derived from by the OSC and staff to build the final site restoration his staff and advisors. (1) The OSC will develop various restoration (3) The final set of strategy options will be used strategy options. the advisoiy team must practite and knowledge indicates is safe for current and be provided extensive information in the foilowing area: reasonable projected use. Listing of any fixatives used to minimize site restoration computer program which operates in an resuspension. restoration of areas contaminated with radioactive policies. Coordinated Activities. Once actual or potential threat to populations. In the absence of Evaluation Center (JHEC). Consideration is given to request pl’an. or to the these options are developed on-site. nuclear materials. ~. The OSC’S responsibilities do not end with disestab- 5. lishment of the NDA or overseas the dissolution of the ~. j. Federal Radiological Federal guidance. Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). and local authorities or foreign government officials are critical in planning site restoration as well as to the (c) The information provided by the computer accomplishment of site restoration. Established cleanup level. Population/ Household size. providing information ranging from methods/costs to efficiencies. Major materials required. Dose to radiation workers. The team will use data from the Joint Hazard b. and requires 256K RAM. DoS. This committee will formulate the scope.S. (2) An ad hoc committee at the national level is a. for restoration. national or international. a Department of Energy (DoE) representative. includes 1. and local radiological contamination resulting from accidents demographics with a Site Restoration computer involving U. EPA. determine (a) RADIOLOGICAL. Type of labor used in the method. This program was designed to address a radiological contamination problem (b) DEMOGRAPHIC/TOPOGRAPHIC. interactive mode on an IBM PC or IBM compatible ~.of decontamination. officials concerning site restoration cannot be overem. and support the DoD contribution to returning the area ~. the DNA Advisory Team to assist in preparing these options. responsibilities in this area. There may have statutory responsibilities with regard to site are no guidelines. DNA provides the model 2.

follow-on ground monitoring.to be involved in the initiation of site restoration. should continue to be made until site restoration type and number of buildings. type and amount of vegetation in the area. but under certain environmental restoring the accident site. The principal use of a simple method may be effective. detailed surveys should be may be necessary. or reduce the level of contamination to return the affected area to an achievable/acceptable condition. These detailed an accident area may vary widely. all situations. Specifically. local and/or State officials and the Federal measurement surveys. the bulk of the contamination laboratory radioanalysis. water. to conducted to accurately determine the location of prevent the contaminants from spreading or being various intensities of radiation. immobilizing completed in the first few days of the response operation the contamination in heavily contaminated areas. Initial techniques employed is contained normally in the upper stratum (within one may involve both ground monitoring and aerial inch of the surface). Procedures. Effective decontamination has been completed. plants. the staff (3) Decontamination Considerations. Radiological surveys are key. and agencies or foreign government officials concerned. All initial measurements should be and/ or to facilitate removal. such as dams. begins with the use of the simplest method. or alpha radiation. (a) The outer perimeter of the contaminated area is determined by measuring either low energy gamma radiation. about using a particular fixative and its impact on both the environment and on subsequent site restoration (b) Soon after the perimeter of the contaminated operations. I 9-3 . If. For example. and level of contamination present. or a more objectives of the environmental assessment are to identify sophisticated technique may be required to remove the the effects on the ecosystems at the accident site and contamination. The procedural recommendations in the level and extent of contamination and are the basis the following paragraphs are limited to site restoration for determination of possible decontamination actions dealing with the locating. lower levels of contamination to identify various decontamination techniques used in are removed first. the systematic radiological surveys and engineering studies. c. aerial OSC. however. the SRF can expect. involvecollecting samples of air. removing the highest level first may be to the environmental assessment because they establish advisable to reduce the spread of contamination. dikes. A substantial engineer plays a major role in development of the site portion of the site restoration effort will be to remove restoration plan. as well as obtaining (b) Decontamination methods used to cleanup detailed ground radiation measurements. Advice should be obtained ble. when high levels of contamination are present. the Data used in determining the contaminated area may decontamination effort must be planned jointly by the be obtained during initial ground monitoring. and animals for laboratory analysis. handling. Control measures subsequent spread of contamination. If the (1) Identifying the Contaminated Area. immobilizing or “fixing” measurement survey to determine the main areas of contamination may be necessary to prevent spreading contamination. Such surveys may eroded. or ditches. Constructing physical containment features area has been established. As additional information becomes availa. and disposing techniques. type including collection of samples and radiation measure. (for before contamination migrates into the soil or surfaces example. Because site restoration depends heavily on civil engineering procedures. Other methods should be implemented immediately if there is any may be used such as spraying with water or fixative possibility that the contaminants may be spread. soon as the initial radiological survey has been Covering the concentration with fresh earth could completed. In air sampling. repetitive (2) Environmental Assessment. soil. The first contamination is contained exclusively on government step in site restoration identifies the contaminated or property. provide a temporary fixative. Normally. and corroborated by (a) In accidents. Some factors that surveys provide additional data from which site will influence the method chosen are type and use of restoration planning can be initiated. of radioactive contamination. craters) will decrease significantly the and becomes difficult to measure. the soil. contamination is on public or private property. the decontamination effort is planned and affected area. Other factors are ments. or as and/ or covering the concentration with plastic sheeting. Further surveys. therefore. ~onsiderations. This step is accomplished by conducting supported solely by military assets. re-evaluation must be made of the situation for from the Radiological Safety Officer and Staff Engineer possible modification of control measures in effect.

however. packaged and the mode of transportation. not planned for development. The quantity of material packaged and materials are moved in a safe and efficient manner and shipped may also create a large scale logistic problem. I 9-4 . The type of ~. The soil may then be returned to the location previous restoration efforts. or before reoccupation can be permitted. The depth of the proximate surface varies even be major considerations. if difficulty is encoun. reoccupation may be possible at a time when airborne burial action of plowing is enhanced further if the area activity is still two to three times the maximum is wetted before plowing as surface dust will be kept permissible steady state concentration. that all regulations/ requirements are followed. Scraping is probably the most effective container selected depends on the material to be method for removing contamination from land surfaces.. Decomposition of plant material can be and its acceptance criteria are necessary to determine accelerated by shredding and using quicklime. Contaminated buildings and other struc. If packaging and transportation requirements. Moreover. have been used in levels. possessions may be released to their owners. The logistics officer and/ or DoE personnel assist in (5) Reoccupation of Evacuated Areas. plowing may be an effective method of achieving permissible levels of contamination in the proximate (a) Resuspension. from rising and collecting on previously turned furrows. while the a whole year to determine the annual dose to the lung. contamination is that which has settled into a surface ~. levels will not permit use of other methods. reoccupation. shredders are used. will surface. Methods to all aspects of the site restoration plan have been decontaminate various surfaces are contained in Table accomplished.y will be responsible for long term radiological SFO and appropriate civilian authorities/ officials. magnitude of resuspension will decrease with time. . material. Surface contamination is divided into two categories: “fixed” 4 . removable is that which can permissible levels of fixed and removable contamination. the transported from the site to an acceptable radiological method of shipment selected should ensure that the disposal facility. it must be obtained from transportation specialists. advice must be tered in removing the contaminant. surface and airborne contamination remaining in an area will be factors determining when the ~ea is safe for ~. and Department of Transportation (DoT) inated soil removed by this method should be processed regulations and/ or country involved. ~. such as soil and vegetation. may require packaging in containers. 5. (4) Contaminated Waste Disposal. the ag&n.000-gallon fuel tanks. Levels of identifying and locating suitable shipping containers. The methods environmental. If dilution within the proximate surface is contemplated. Vegetation in the area should be washed or (a) Early identification of a waste disposal site removed. Containers This method should be used when high contamination used must meet the requirements of applicable DoD. Because the shipments will from which removed. care must be taken to control (b) Contaminated soil and building materials resuspension. when used singly or in complete. In light of this. be expunged if the surface is rubbed. Containers varying through a mechanical and/or chemical separator for in size from 55-gallon drums to large containers. stratum. Continued monitoring and analysis of 19-3. the site should be inspected to ensure that combination. the Nuclear within similar environments. (b) Surface contamination on objects with which Wetting and plowing will also tend to mix the people come in contact must be at acceptable levels contaminant in depth so that it is not left in a single before the items can be released for unrestricted use. monitoring. Table 19-1 provides guidelines on the and cannot be wiped off. and health standards have been and procedures for disposing of contaminated waste permanently and successfully achieved. a civil material will require coordination between the OSC. proximate surface for agricultural land generally is Recognizing that cleanup will continue. Normally. Contam. DoE. and that the generally defined by the depth of agricultural plowing. are contained in Tables 19-2. The fixation and/ or decontamination efficiency of the (6) Follow-Up Activities. Fixed removed and re-built. for removal of the contaminant to achievable/ acceptable example. After site restoration is methods discussed above. The proximate surface may Regulatory Commission guidance states that airborne be within one or two inches of the surface in a forest activity may be averaged over all of the air inhaled for or field. In areas with lesser contamination levels. and “removable. consist of contaminated materials. in severe cases. and people is necessary for long periods to ensure that radiation.” when determining if personal tures sho~d be decontaminated and. and resuspension factors.

Requires decontamin~tion F I 000 0. or the host country. Uncontrolled. Containers. State. Engine Drive Train. and U-238. and civil authorities and the accident response plan include: host government officials. Federal. F—Fixed R—Removed TABLE 19-2. 19-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX a. Prior to nonradioactive use. A separate Site Restoration Plan (SRP) will be b.lnformation and procedures which d. c.05 Probe R 200 400 Smear 2/ (2) Equipment Items: F 1000 2. and local agencies. of contaminated areas. Procedures for decontamination and/or fixation developed in coordination with representatives from Federal. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources The table includes decontamination efficiencies for the following land areas and resources. The Site Restora. Procedures for collection of environmental samples required to support restoration operations.. (In accordance wih NRC guidelines 4/ If Radium 226 is a contaminant. Vacant Land Exterior Wood Walls/ Brick Walls Agricultural Fields Concrete/ Wood Floors “ Wooded Land/ Lawns Interior Concrete Walls and Wood/ Plaster Walls Orchards Carpeted and Linoleum Floors Asphalt Streets/ Parking and other Paved Asphalt R?ofs Concrete Streets/ Parking and Other Paved Concrete ~~ ‘Automobiles. levels for alpha contamination should be increased by factors of 5. Facilities and Equipment 3/ 4 a. 100 cm~ Measurement 1. U-depleted. Controlled: ( I ) Facilities F I 000 . 3/ For U-natural. should be F 200 0. Auto Tires.2 Probe decontaminated if above: R None 100 Smear 2/ 2. Identification of requirements for site restoration may be appropriate for the Site Restoration annex to planning with State. Radioactive Contamination Guides. and Interior 19-5 . Procedures for the disposal of contaminated tion annex of the accident response plan should identify material.0 Probe R 200 2000 Smear 2/ I / Measured through not more than 7 milligrams per square centimeter of total absorber and averaged not more than 1 square meter 2/ Smears analyzed with a calibrated counting system. government officials/representatives. TABLE 19-1. Contamination Level Alpha Beta-gamma 1 / Fixed or dpm per dpm per mrad/hr dpm per Method of Contaminated Items and Indications for Actions Removable I 00 cm~ 100 cmz (@ I in. possible methods to restore an accident site and contaminated areas.2 Probe [f above: R I 00 100 Smear 2/ b. levels for alpha contamination should be reduced by a factor of 2.

8 Low Pressure Water (x3) 90.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.8 43.8 Low Pressure Water (x4) 95. 3“ Asphak & Cover with 6“ Soil 72 58 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Harvest 30 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleav Harvest 40 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Clea~ Harvest-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 96 96 Low Pressure Water 55 25 Low Pressure Water (x2) 79. Double Scrape 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Plow 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 96. Deep Plow.4 97 Clean Harvest-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 72 58 19-6 .4 74.92 Three-Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 60 40 Low Pressure Water-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 84. Cleaq Harvest.9 “ 68. DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXl”liKNAL Clear. .———.66 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil (x2) 84 64 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Plow 98 95 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.3 Low Pressure Water (x3).44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double Scrape-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99.8 Low Pressure Water (x4) 95.44 99.4 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.78 99.96 68..99 99.7 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 89. Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99. Double Scrape (x2) 99. FeCIj-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 97. .75 Low Pressure Water (x3) 90.9 57.44 99. TABLE 19-2. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 96.99 DECONTAMINATION OF AGRICULTURE FIELDS Low Pressure Water 55 25 Low Pressure Water (x2) 79.5 42 Leaching. Plow 92 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.4 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Leaching.6 Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 97 91 Deep Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) ‘ 99.4 79 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.8 73 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 57.92 99. EDTA 92 35 Clean Harvest 30 30 Scrape 4“ to 6“ 86 86 Plow 90 50 Deep Plow “ 98 60 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-CIea~ Harvest 40 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double Scrape 99.92 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 60 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 82 55 CIeaq Harvest. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Harvest Double Scrape. Clear. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND EFFICIENCY —.92 99.6 70 Scrape 4“ to 6“-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 94.4 91. 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 86 42 Low Pressure Water. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 91. . Deep Plow 98. Cleaq Harvest.5 65 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 66. Clear Harvest Double Scrape 99.8 43. CleaC Harvest 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil 76 64 Low Pressure Water (x2).

Harvest High Pressure Water 85 85 19-7 . Scrape 4“ to 6“ 99.5 34. Harvest. High Pressure Water 77. . Defoliate 48 00 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Harvest Double Scrape 89.5 65 DECONTAMINATION OF ORCHARDS Low Pressure Water 33 15 Low Pressure Water (x2) 47.6 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane.92 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plow 92 55 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Deep Plow 98.3 45 DECONTAMINATION OF WOODED LAND . Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place) 47.7 Low Pressure Water (x4) 57. Defoliate.5 41 Scrape 4“ to 6“ 48 48 Plow 51 27 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 80 68 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Double Scrape 90. High Pressure Water.Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 95 94. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 72 45. Radical Prune-Plow 93.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.4 78.9 66. Remove & Replace Scrape 4“ to 6“. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil(No Trees) (x2) 88 64 Three inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) (x3) 96. 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil 70 60 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 18 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane.Low Pressure Water 77.. Clear. P1OW 95.32 78 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 75 51 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“ . 42.4 Low Pressure Water (x2)-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) 93.5 67. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Scrape 4“ to 6“ .3 71 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 93.25 Surface Sealer/ Fixative: High Pressure Water 67.3 45 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape 4“ to 6“ .5 69.44 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.44 99.92 99.3 Low Pressure Water (x3) 54. Clear. Clear.7 95.1 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 50 0 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane. Scarify.25 89. Scarify. Radical Prune 72. clear. TABLE 19-2. Clear.2 Low Pressure Water.9 33 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 ~ Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 26. Radical Prune-Plow 93.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 50 00 Surface Sealer) Fixative. Harvest 65 40 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Harvest Scrape 4“ to 6“ 85 85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 42.3 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“ 96 96 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Double Scrape 99.56 Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place) 30 24 Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cover with 6“ Soil Trees in Place 33 25. Scarify. Double Scrape.6 93.

Scarify 99.9 Vacuum.6 97.25 Low Pressure Water 90 85 Vacuum.75 Double Vacuum. Foam.25 Double Vacuum. Remove Structure 99. Remove and Replace 99. Strippable Coating 99.72 99.65 Double Vacuum.75 Strippable Coating 40 35 Vacuum. High Pressure Water 99.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Foam 92 87 19-8 . Surface Sealer/ Fixative.83 98.30 99.99 99.25 Vacuum 99 94 Vacuum. Scarify 99. Foam.6 95.49 Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Low Pressure Water 91.99 Vacuum.5 DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR BRICK WALLS Vacuum 29 25 Double Vacuum 36.5 Double Vacuum.72 Double Vacuum.72 99. Remove and Replace 99. Remove and Replace 99.75 Vacuum.69 87.5 Strippable Coating 85 84 Double Vacuum.97 88.98 99.48 86. Foam 99.99 Vacuum.5 Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99. Remove Structure 99.3 94 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.38 Double Vacuum.48 87.78 92.45 92.7 97.5 High Pressure Water 98 93 Vacuum.3 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 65 00 Vacuum.29 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.93 Vacuum. High Pressure Water 91. Foam 92.7 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 92. Foam 99.1 30.9 99.69 86.99 “99.9 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Wash and Scrub 92. Low Pressure Water 99. Plane.74 99.8 98. Hydroblasting 96. Surface Sealer/ Fixative 99. High Pressure Water 95. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.98 Double Vacuum.19 88.86 99.6 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.67 Vacuum. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR WOOD WALLS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Low Pressure Water 90 85 Wash and Scrub 95 90 Low Pressure Water.9 88.84 Double Vacuum.26 Vacuum. Low Pressure Water 91. High Pressure Water 91.33 88. TABLE 19-2. Foam. Remove and Replace 99.25 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.45 Double Vacuum. Place. Hydroblasting 96.49 92. Foam 92. Remove and Replace 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.94 99. Wash and Scrub 94 90.

Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Remove and Replace 99.99 99.9 99. Wash and Scrub 79. Foam 80 75.2 78.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 85 00. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 95.99 99.99 Double Vacuum.85 99 Vacuum.98 StriPpable Coating 80 75 Vacuum.98 99. Steam Clean 72.98 99.94 Double Vacuum.86 99. Foam 99. Remove and Replace 99.6 97. Wash and Scrub 76 70.25 Vacuum.2 Vacuum.99 Strippable Coating 98 97 Vacuum.06 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Strippable Coating 99.9 73 19-9 .8 Double Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.97 99.16 Double Vacuum.96 Double Vacuum. Resurface 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Wash and Scrub 95 91 Vacuum. Foam 99.96 Double Vacuum.63 99.06 Double Vacuum.5 Double Vacuum./ 72 78. Surface Sealer/Fixative. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 “ 91 Wash and Scrub 92 87 Vacuum.4 Double Vacuum.52 99.56 Vacuum.99 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Wash & Scrub 99. Foam (x2) 86.8 67.99 99. Strippable Coating 97 94.3 96.99 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.35 Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Foam 83. Remove and Replace 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.99 99. High Pressure Water 95 90 DECONTAMINATION OF CARPETED FLOORS Vacuum 60 55 Double Vacuum 72 66.96 99. Resurface 99.46 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Foam.99 99. Foam. Foam 98.56 81. Remove and Replace 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 92.9 99. Foam. TABLE 19-2. Wash and Scrub 95.25 Double Vacuum. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF LINOLEUM FLOORS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Vacuum 99 95 Double Vacuum 99.25 Doub[e Vacuum.8 Vacuum.85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 80 00 DECONTAMINATION OF WOOD FLOORS Vacuum 90 85 Double Vacuum 94. Foam 97.25 Wash & Scrub 97 95 Vacuum.08 96. Steam Clean .25 Double Vacuum.97 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99. Resurface 99.

29 Vacuum. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.83 Double Vacuum.25 Double Vacuum. TABLE 19-2.15 Double Vacuum. Foam. High Pressure Water 96.6 Double Vacuum.45 Double Vacuum. Foam 97.43 Vacuum.5 93. Resurface 99. Resurface 99.6 97. DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION liX’l”EKNAL Vacuum 74 69 Double Vacuum 83.66 Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 94.96 97. .5 89.6 19-10 .—-—.06 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.86 88.99 99. Foam 99.99 97. High Pressure Water 96. Str. Remove and Replace 99.99 99.9 99.25 Wash and Scrub 9“1 95 Vacuum.4 95.35 Double Vacuum.79 99.1 78. Hydroblasting 97.69 95. Wash and Scrub 93. I 94. Strippable Coating 96. Foam 99.86 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.8 92. Strippable Coating 91. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Remove and Replace 99.97 99. High Pressure Water 94. Foam 95.42 Double Vacuum.62 94.1 Wash and Scrub 80 75 Vacuum. .01 Vacuum. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE FLOORS EFFICIENCY —. Remove and Replace 99. High Pressure Water 94 91. Wash and Scrub 99.96 99.. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 DECONTAMINATION OF 1NTER1OR WOOD/PLASTER WALLS Vacuum 99 95 Double Vacuum 99.41 Double Vacuum.9 99.61 Vacuum.0 I Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 95.75 Double Vacuum. Hydroblasting 97.25 Double Vacuum.56 Vacuum. Wash and Scrub 99. Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.94 Strippable Coating 90 85 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 97. Remove and Replace 99.96 Strippable Coating 95 90 Vacuum.61 Wash and Scrub 85 80 Vacuum.65 Vacuum.85 99 Vacuum. Strippable Coating 93.04 Double Vacuum.99 Strippable Coating 98 97 Vacuum.85 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 80 DECONTAMINATION OF INTERIOR CONCRETE WALIS Vacuum 70 65 Double Vacuum 79 74.79 95.79 Double Vacuum. Foam 95. Hydroblasting 98.52 Double Vacuum.3 88.83 99.8 94.3 96. Resurface 99.99 Double Vacuum.96 93. Foam. i 1 Double Vacuum.78 94.7 91. Surface Sealer/ Fixative.ippable Coating 99.63 96. Hydroblasting 98. .28 90.95 Vacuum. Foam 97. Wash and Scrub 92.76 99.45 Double Vacuum.3 95.30 95.

53 Vacuum.53 Vacuum.68 99.62 Double Vacuum.75 Double Vacuum. Foam 98. Foam.35 67.84 Strippable Coating 97.5 91.92 Vacuum. Foam.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum. Strippable Coating.5 93 Vacuum. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Foam 97. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION OF ASPHALT STREETS/PARKING Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99 49. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99.5 86. Strippable Coating 98. Remove and Replace 99.9 Double Vacuum.4 Double Vacuum.92 Double Vacuum.75 02 Double Vacuum.78 86.5 61. Remove and Replace 99.92 Vacuum.98 99. Remove and Replace 99.51 79.36 DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE STREETS/PARKING Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67.25 Vacuum.51 79.51 99.23 Double Vacuum.05 91.5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum.84 98.9 Double Vacuum.97 99. Resurface 99. Low Pressure Water 95. Foam. Resurface 99.25 98.84 Strippable Coating 97.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97.78 86.51 99.25 Vacuum.35 64. Remove and Replace 99. 3“ Asphalt with Cover with 6“ Soil 99.25 98.5 86. Resurface 99.5 99.97 99. TABLE 19-2.75 Double Vacuum.45 ‘ Double Vacuum. Resurface 99. Low Pressure Water 95.5 99.38 93. Low Pressure Water 95.5 61.68 99.58 Vacuum. Low Pressure Water 95. Foam. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99 53.23 Double Vacuum.5 93 Vacuum. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99.84 98. Resurface 99. Resurface 99.45 Double Vacuum. Strippable Coating 98 96. 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil 99. Strippable Coating 98.62 Double Vacuum.5 91.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum.05 91.38 93. Foam 97.4 Double Vacuum.8 Double Vacuum.66 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99. Strippable Coating. Foam 98.36 i9-11 .5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum.75 02 Double Vacuum. Foam 99. Strippable Coating 98 96.92 Double Vacuum.98 99. Foam 99. Remove and Replace 99.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97.25 71.4 Double Vacuum.25 71.98 Vacuum.98 Vacuum.

Remove and Replace 99 99 DECONTAMINATION OF OTHER PAVED ASPHALT Vacuum 50 45 Double Vacuum 67.5 93 Vacuum.06 Close Mowing 65 65 Remove and Replace 98 98 Leaching.68 99. Foam 97.62 Double Vacuum.75 02 Double Vacuum.5 61. Resurface 99.25 Remove and Replace 99.4 Double Vacuum. Foam.81 DECONTAMINATION OF LAWNS Double Vacuum 30 20 Low Pressure Water 85 75 Low Pressure Water (x2) 91 84 Low Pressure Water (x3) 93 86. Foam 98.5 Low Pressure Water 95 85 Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.92 Double Vacuum. Resurface 99. Low Pressure Water 99. Low Pressure Water 92 87. Resurface 99.46 Foam 97 90 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.92 Vacuum. Remove and Replace.23 Double Vacuum.36 19-f2 .9 99 Vacuum. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer 99.45 Double Vacuum. Remove and Replace 99.35 64. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) DECONTAMINATION OF ROOFS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Vacuum 60 50 Sandblasting 99 96 High Pressure Water 97 93 Foam 93 90 Strippable Coating 85 80 Low Pressure Water 90 85 Low Pressure Water (x2) 98 96.05 91.84 98. FeCIJ 99.84 Strippable Coating 97.88 Low Pressure Water (x4) 94 88.38 93.53 Vacuum. 98. Low Pressure Water 95.94 99.7 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.75 Double Vacuum.25 98.98 99.92 99. High Pressure Water 98 95 Vacuum. FeCIJ 85 80 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.5 91.97 99.25 Vacuum.5 99.58 Vacuum. Leaching.5 Surface Sealer/ Fixative. Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer “ 99 49.9 Surface Sealer/ Fixative.9 Double Vacuum. Strippable Coating .5 86. TABLE 19-2.51 99. Remove and Replace.15 Surface Sealer/ Fixative 97. Remove and Replace 99. Low Pressure Water 95. Foam. Strippable Coating.9 99. Strippable Coating 98 96.78 86. Foam 99.

Clean Engine with Solvent 97.5 94.5 Detailed Auto Cleaning 95 90 Detailed Auto Cleaning (x2) 96 92 Replace/ Reupholster 99 99 Vacuum.5 99.28 Repaint 99. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued) ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN AND INTERIORS AUTO EXTERIORS EFFICIENCY DECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL Water Wash 85 80 Water Wash (x2) 96.9 99.8 ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN Steam Clean 75 65 Steam Clean (x2) 92.75 Steam Clean.5 86 Clean Engine with Solvent 95 90 Steam Clean.9 99.95 INTERIORS Vacuum 75 70 Double Vacuum 92. TABLE 19-2. Remove Interior/ Clean/ Replace 98 97 TIRES Water Wash 80 50 Wash and Scrub 90 85 Replace 99.9 88 19-13 .63 98.5 89.9 Sandblasting 95. Clean Engine with 4 Solvent (x2) 99.25 93 Wash & Scrub 95 94 Wash and Scrub (x2) 99.

magnesium. Dissolves and erodes Hose with high pressure All water equipment Drainage must be con- faces (metal.) distance of 15 to 20 feet. Avoids water out of exhaust. WATER All nonporous sur. painted. Safest abrasion waste. Decontamination Methods METHOD SURFACE ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES CAUSTICS: Painted surfaces Softens paint Lye paint removal solution: Minimum contact with Personnel hazard (will Lye (sodium (horizontal) (harsh method) 10 gal. to avoid dust hazard. Spray vertictil surf’wxs at out from a distance. overhead) method) rubbing and wiping pro. Pqtassiurn on surface until paint is Should not be used on hydroxide sof’tened to the point where aluminum or magnesium. 4 lb lye. over area must be re- Collect used abrasive. used on aluminum or cations. TABLE 19-3. slow..’ dust is personnel hazard. keep surface damp level as desired.or covered. contaminated tamination. equipment. water. filing. is contaminated. Removes contaminated Use conventional vacuum Good on dry porous All dust must be filtered CLEANING dust by suction technique with efficient mrfaces. reduced to tolerance paint. Oiicd surfaces cannot . water at an optimum may be utilized. Allows trolled. Allow lye paint efficient on vertical or hydroxide remover solution to remain overhead surfaces.75 lb Easily stored. cause burns). Xrrface areas. Hold tool tlush to surface ~ontaminated waste Contamination of BLASTING porous surfaces traps and controls to prevent escape of con. penetration by moisture. etc. ready for disposal. it is not Calcium cornstarch. method. it may be washed off with water. \ SANDBLASTING Nonporous surfaces Removes surface Keep sand wet to lessen Practical for large Contamination spread spread of contamination. Machine filter reactions. Removes surface. VACUUM Porous and non.. ABRASION Nonporous surfaces Removes surface Use conventional procedures. Reaction hydroxide) boiler compound. thus. Trisodiurn Painted surfaces Softens paint (mild Apply hot 10% solution by Contamination may be Destructive effect on phosphate (vertical. and reduced to as low a surfaces because of chipping. Contaminated flush away with wate~. 0. VACUUM Dry surfaces ----. Should not be cw-ture (see DETERGENTS) in one or two appli. Contamination may be Impractibie for porous such as sanding. 6 lb contaminated surfaces. operation to be carried for porous materials. Remove remaining paint with Ionghandled scrapers. Not suitable plisstics.

Clean reduced by approxi. Not upwind to avoid spray. etc. concrete. applicable on porous Determine cleaning rate. TABLE 19-3. Work from for solutions of other (use vacuum).) wetting power of gent solution. Decontamination Methods (Continued) METtIOD SURFACE “ ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES WATER an angle of incidence of Contamination may be be decontaminated. surfaces wearing of waterproof The cleaning efficiency of outfits necessary. (Continued) 300 to 45”. May not be efficient water and cleaning with dry rag. STEAM Nonporous surfaces Dissolves and erodes Work from top to bottom Contamination may be Steam subject to same (especially painted and from upwind. if possible. Rub surface 1 minute with Dissolves industrial film May require personnel (metal. work from top reduced by 50%. Use clean sur. Water Not applicable on dry to bottom to avoid recon. experimentally. painted. equipment may be used contaminated surfaces tuminiition. tion. Moist application is all that is necessary. glass. zL DETERGENTS Nonporous surfaces Emulsifies contami. Use a power rotary brush with pressure feed for more efficient cleaning. surfaces such as wood. or oiled surfaces) surface at a rate of 4 mately 90% on painted Spray hazard makes the square feet per minute. Do not allow solution to drip onto othel surfaces. limitations as water. inated. canvas. nant and increases a rag moistened with deter. contamination. otherwise. Apply solution from a distance with a pressure proportioned. then wipe which hold con lamina. decontaminating agents. and other materials contact with surface. Contamination on long-standing efficiency of steam face of the rag for each may be reduced by 90%. steam will be greatly in- creased by using deter- gents. . application. WI \ plastic. use a rate of4 Spray will be contam- square feet per minute.

3 to 6% of corrosion inhibitors of toxicity and explosive circulistory pipe sulfuric acid). Wear ACIDS (especially with deposits movable items. Good i. tlush with plain water. Leave on to solution. of from I to 2 normal (9 to moderate by addition ventilation required because careous growth). corrosion if used with- detergent solution. More easily cautions as required for Citric Acid systems. Contamination may be Weathered surfaces may Hydrochloric (especially with deposits Mixture consists of O.. rust or cal. etc. ‘L porous deposits. Acid should and porous deposits. hour. Keep in 4 minutes on unweath. Completing agents may be used on vertical and overhead sur- faces by adding chemical foam (sodium carbonate or aluminum sulfate). goggles. Acid mixtures systems. weathered surfaces for I should not be heated. flush material off noncorrosive. and out inhibitors. and I gal.2 lb hour (unweathered ment. TABLE 19-3. surface moist for 30 min.) GENTS).) procedure [see DETER. Requires good ventila- SOLVENTS (greasy or waxed materials (oil. surfaces. handled than inorganic inorganic acids. gases. 0. then again with plain water. After 30 citrates are nontoxic. solvent or apply by wiping Recovery of solvent tion and tire precautions.. stored. 18% hydrochloric. Spray may be reduced by 75% penetrating power. surfaces). scrub with a water. Carbonates and tion periodically. Toxic to personnel. water. possible by distillation. ACID MIXTURES: Nonporous surfaces Dissolves porous Same as for inorganic acids. be kept at a concentration Corrosive action may be gloves.e. small value on weathered Citrates growth). utes by spraying with solu. Fhssh surface with Possibility of excessive water. paint or etc. a water-detergent solution. Sulfuric rinse. minutes. acid not effective on latory systems 2 to 4 calcareous deposits. Leave in pipe circu. rubber boots. Little Oxalatm ered surfaces. with water. plastic finishes. with-contaminated should contain 3% (by solution. and aprons. Same safety pre- Acetic Acid circulatory pipe sodium acetute. ORGANIC Nonporous surfisces Dissolves organic Immerse entire unit in Quick dissolving action. Acctutcs acid ”solutions. ered surfaces.1 gal. Easily surfaces. hours. of CiirbonOtes rust or calcareous surface with solution. Material bulky. Contamination 5 to 30 minutes. hydrochloric acid. reduced by 90% in 1 require prolonged treat- Sulfuric porous deposits).e. paint. no material weight) of agent. Citrates . i. INORGANIC Metal surfaces Dissolves porous Use dip-bath procedure for Corrosive action on metal Personnel hazard. Decontamination Methods (Continued) METHOD S“URFACE ACTION TECHNIQUE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES COMPLETING Nonporous surfaces Form soluble complexes Completing agent solution Hokfs contamination in Requires application for AGENTS (especiuily unweath.

United States Army. collapsible cots. and can assist and furnish guidance to the OSC. (4) Other Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Controlled This chapter provides a ready reference to units and Communication Assets. and trained instrument repair specialized units is provided. (1) Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Ground Mobile Force terminals. specialized capability. A part of the DNA capability is the Armed capabilities are discussed throughout this document. This team can and the capability or service they offer. Table 20-1 lists functions technicians. or additional information on with tents.S. spare parts. the AN/ URC Joint Airborne This team is trained specially in radiological problems Communications Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). ATRAP is a collection of RADIAC A summary of the capabilities of organizations and equipment. and o’ther organizational or specialized unit capabilities discussed housekeeping items. nce in radiological health matters. Appendix 20-A provides telephone numbers for kits consist of air transportable operations support sets requesting services. (4) HAMMER ACE. advice to the OSC in all kinds of radiological Team was established and trained to assist an On-Scene emergencies. DoD 51 OO. United States Air Force. HARVEST EAGLE units. consisting of Army. and other Each unit or organization is organized by title. AFRAT provides assista- a. 20-1 . 20-3 UTILIZATION (1) U. (2) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). terminals. This organization has a deployable team of health physicists. communications assets can also be deployed on request. A part of this equipment. (2) Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. and services provided by organizations or specialized (2) HARVEST EAGLE Kits. JCCSA is a communications asset equipped with advanced technology communications consisting of heavy mobile/transportable equipment equipment. in this document. assist medical personnel and commanders by providing state-of-t he-art medical radiobiology advice by tele- 20-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE phone or at the accident scene. (3) Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL). health physics technicians and 20-4 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) equipment. Air Force.52-M CHAPTER 20 SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 20-1 GENERAL Commander (OSC) and his staff in the management of recovery operations following a nuclear weapon Numerous units and organizations with specialized accident. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Controlled Assets. collectively called the Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). other consists of several pieces of equipment mounted in air officials. deployable by C-141/ C-5 aircraft. Forces Radiobiology Research Institute’s Medical This chapter summarizes these units and organizations Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT). Air Force Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). and local medical authorities. transportable vans. b. Super High Frequency satellite organizations that maintain specialized capabilities. and Marine Corps personnel and a variety of communications equipment. field kitchens. or service. See Chapter 12 for further discussion. The JCSE is a contingency support unit c. HAMMER ACE consists of (1) Joint Communications Contingency Station a rapid deployment team of engineers and technicians Assets (JCCSA). This (3) Defense Nuclear Agency’s (DNA)s Nuclear team is or~anized to ~rovide technical assistance and Weapon Accident Advisory ~eam~ The DNA Advisory .

Organization/Team Capabilities/Service Matrix Listed down the left side of this matrix are paragraph references in Chapter 20. ncDArsnactd7 nc nccracc . An X at the intersection of a line and column indicates that the capability or service may be provided by the referred to organization or team. Across the top are capabilities and services that may be needed to respond to a nuclear weapons accident. TABLE 20-1.

FEMA will dispatch a Senior FEMA Official specialists as needed. Equipment to perform field personnel decontamination.” identify.ornplete interface requirements. This as the Deputy SFO) and an emergency response team team is the primary DoE response element for threat (ERT) to . Department of Transportation (DoT). The FBI is the lead federal agency Training Site (REAC/TS). A system that can provide aerial radiological surveys and aerial b. The USDA Requests for these services should be coordinated with has the responsibility and the ability to determines the the DoE ARG Team Leader. Department of Health and Human Services photography. (1) Accident Response Group (ARG). d. DoE and environmental samples for radioactivity content and operated facilities are capable of laundering plutonium provide radiological advice. of the public health and safety. a. high explosive specialists. incidents involving improvised nuclear devices and lost or stolen nuclear weapons. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). is responsible for recovery of off-site classified nuclear (6) The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center weapon material. EPA has (HOT SPOT). purposes. The FBI weapons using cobalt or x-ray sources. This unit can provide computer generated assistance in contacting consignors and consignees of estimates of the distribution of radioactive contaminants shipments. 20-3 . amd capable of providing advice and assistance. released to the atmosphere. NEST assets maybe included as part of the DoE ARG. packaging. United States Navy. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). design specialists. safety of meat and poultry products for human consumption. a senior scientifw advisor (assigned by the design FEMA is responsible for coordinating the overall laboratory). a. (DHHS). and document tion and to advise of actions to be taken for the protection radioactive contamination. The RADCON Team can (7) RANGER. Two air transportable trucks and trailers monitoring teams to measure and evaluate contamina- with equipment to analyze. (SFO) (or designate a FEMA Region Official to act (2) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). incidence. Federal response in support of State and local health physicists. possessions. and archive safety) assistance to the OSC at a radiological accident. (4) Mobile Accident Response Mobile Laboratory d. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The DHHS has the capability to analyze food (2) Contaminated Laundering Facilities. and terrorist in treatment of all types of radiation exposure and nuclear-related activities in the U.S. c. Department of Energy Accident Response Teams. The ARG 20-6 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT is the primary DoE response element for a nuclear AGENCY (FEMA) weapon accident and will be composed of the DoE Team Leader. An air sampling system contained within a cargo van. A DoE facility specializing for improvised nuclear devices. Two units capable of taking and developing radiographs of e. (8) Mobile Decontamination Station. 20-7 OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES b. contaminated clothing. (1) Aerial Measurement System (AMS). The DoT (3) Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability can arrange special transportation activities and (ARAC). territories. Other DoE Accident Response Resources. (5) Radiolographic Response Capability. and other technical authorities. 20-5 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) (9) RASCAL. A ground based system used for provide expert health physics (radiation control and environmental monitoring sample tracking.

Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team (0800-1630) AUTOVON 298-4500 (1 630-0800 Commercial 301-678-4500 U.1 . Marine Corps Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7366 Commercial 703-695-7366 20-A-2 COORDINATION CENTERS: Office of the Secretary of Defense Crisis Coordination Center AUTOVON 364-9320/22 Commercial 202-769-9320/ 22 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Commemial 703-697-5131 Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center AUTOVON 221-2102/2103/2104 Department of Defense* Commercial 703-325-2102/ 2103/ 2104 Department of Energy AUTOVON 245-4667 Commercial 505-845-4667 FTS 844-4667 FEMA Emergency Information & Coordination Center Commercial 202-646-2400 FTS 646-2400 FEMA National Emergency Coordination Center AUTOVON 380-6100 Commercial 202-898-6100 20-A-3 INFC)RMATION ON DoI) SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division AUTOVON 227:0007 (JCS-Controlled contingency communications) Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) AUTOVON 968-4141 968-385 1/ 3852 JCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets AUTOVON 879-6591 /6925 U. Navy Operations Center AUTOVON 225-0231 Commercial 703-695-0231 U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) AUTOVON 291-5107 Commercial 301-427-5107 *DoD organizations should normally use DoD numbers even though requested services or information may relate to DoE.S. Air Force Operations Center AUTOVON 225-7220 Commercial 703-695-7220 U. Army Operations Center AUTOVON 227-0218 Commercial 703-697-0218 U.S.S. DoD 51 OO. 20-A.S.52-M APPENDIX 20-A POINTS OF CONTACT 20-A-1 MILITARY COMMAND CENTERS: National Military Command Center (NMCC) AUTOVON 227-6340 Commercial 703-697-6340 U.S.

Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team AUTOVON 332-7527 Commercial 703-602-7527 U. Air Force Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL) AUTOVON 240-2001 Headquarters Air Force Communications Command (HAMMER ACE) AUTOVON 576-2591 Emergency Operations Requests Commercial 618-256-2591 Information AUTOVON 576-3431 Commercial 618-256-3431 Headquarters Tactical Air Command/ LGX (HARVEST EAGLE) AUTOVON 432-5435/5436 20-A-4 OTHER AGENCIES: Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS) Oak Ridge Associated Universities Commercial 615-482-3131 REAC/TS (24 Hours) Commercial 615-481-1000 P. W.O. Tennessee. Air Force Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP) Information AUTOVON 945-6906 Emergency Request AUTOVON 945-6906 ~ SA-ALC/ MAW Emergency Operations Center AUTOVON 945-3046 U. Washington. ● “Accident response services should be requested through the FEMA EtCC. . DC 20460 . Box 117 Pager 241 Oak Ridge. . Points of contact are provided fOr coordination and reque$ts for info~ ation 20-A-2 .S. 37830 Department of Health and Human Services** Food and Drug Administration (Duty Hours) 301-443-1241 Center for Devices and Radiological Health (24 Hours) 202-857-8400 5600 Fishers Lane Rockville.AFRRI Medical Radiobiological Advisory Team (MRAT) Commercial 202-295-3909 U. Maryland 20857 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)** EPA Headquarters Commercial 703-557-2380 Office of Radiation Programs (24 Hours) 202-475-8383 Waterside East Tower 401 M Street S.S.S.

The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Response Plan Workshop (Course E358). with which nition Center School. The managemcxtt of nuclear weapon accident response 21-4 TRAINING COURSES depends on the availability of well trained and skilled personnel. (4) DoD Directive 5010. Army Defense Ammu- be given to inviting external organizations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency. July 28. These c. The INWS of responding well to a nuclear weapon accident. USAF 21-3 ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING Formal Schools Catalog. Savanna. Interservice Nuclear Weapons Sc_hool. (3) Air Force Regulation 50-5.16. 1972. NAVEDTRA 10500. 11. to observe or participate in the exercise. at Kirt land AFB. 21-1 .S. consideration should (5) Course Catalog. and other Federal government whose positions require special key personnel should attend appropriate courses offered skills and knowledge in nuclear weapon emergency by the Interservice Nuclear Weapon School (INWS) and situations. U. offers a variety of courses commanders of designated response forces should ensure designed to develop and maintain a nuclear weapon that their personnel have the knowledge and training emergency response capability. The Services have the responsibility to ensure that accident response personnel are efficiently trained. Service Schools. the exercising unit would expect to interface in an actual accident. These courses are necessary to fulfill their responsibilities.VO1. OSCS about training courses available in nuclear weapon Army Formal Schools Catalog. Vol. Defense Management When organizational nuclear weapon accident response Education and Training Catalog.S. therefore. exercises can provide the basis for developing draft National Emergency Training Center. DoD 51 OO. operational commitments permitting. Specific course information for 21-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE Service schools is found in the following This section informs senior staff planners and potential (1) Department of the Army Pamphlet 351-4. b. To achieve and maintain a posture capable a.52-M CHAPTER 21 TRAINING 21-1 GENERAL Center (JNACC) is willing to participate in organiza- tional training.SP11. recovery plans/ portions of plans that are not accident Maryland offers the Federal Radiological Emergency specific. available h all Service personnel and employees of the designated On-Scene Commanders (OSCS). New Mexico. training exercises are conducted. accident response. in Table 21-1. Emmittsburg. 111. A list of available courses at the INWS is the respective Services at the earliest opportunity. U. (2) Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CAN- TRAC).

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses SPECIAL COURSE GIVEN TO GRADE * DURATION FEATURES Flag Officers Nuclear Service response force on-scene o-7+ 2 days ● 4 hour CPX Accident Course commander and appropriate staff ● 2 hour field (FONAC) personnel as participants.2 hour CPX Training Course ● 1 day field \ (NHTC) exercise Nuclear Emergency Initial response twn leader and E-3 to o-3 9 days ● 3 hour CPX Team Operations members . . Randolph AFB. Information concerning class schedules and quotas for these lnttrscrvice Nuc]ear Weapons School courses can be obtained from Headquarters. orientation Senior Officers Nuclear On-scene commander’s immu. Texas.iiate O-4 to O-6 3 days ● 3 hour CPX Accident Course staff ● 1 day field (SONAC) exercise w L Nuclear Hazards Medical personnel E-4 to O-4 4 days . TABLE 21-1. 78148. Air Training Conlmand//TTPP//.4 day field (NETOPS) exercise Nuclear Emergency Team Training E-3 to 0-s 4 days ● 3 day field Team Exercise exercise (NETEX) *Grade waivers will be considered.