I affirm, the resolution posits the question of what’s permissible.
Permissibility does not imply an obligation; hence we need active reason to make something impermissible, therefore the Neg has the burden to prove prohibition. If I prove that there is no moral prohibition, then we can default to permissibility. PRESUME affirmative and this interpretation absent egregious abuse because 1) Time skew a. My opponent can just run theory on one caveat, thereby forcing me to undercover the substantial arguments b. I have less time in addressing the NC and the attack of the AC, I shouldn’t be expected to defend a Caunter Interpretation in just 4 minutes 2) Blind speech a. The negative gets to tailor his speech to my advocacy, thereby being able to use all of its prep ground while I walk into the round blind. 3) Balanced strategy a. At TOC bid tournaments, the Aff loses on average about 64 % percent of the time. b. This interpretation is just trying to get it to be a 50-50 chance. 4) Truth Testing a. Rigor is required when testing the hypothesis of moral prohibition Zarefsky 1
[Zarefsky, David. Argument as Hypothesis Testing. 1976. Quarterly Journal of Speech.]
the proposition is the hypothesis being put to the test. Any different statement of a proposition assumes the character of an alternative hypothesis. In order for the proposition X to withstand the challenge that alternative hypothesis Y could account equally well for the phenomena being discussed, a specific defense must be made for proposition X-not just for a "change" or even for a direction in which change should proceed. Hence, the genre of
By contrast the wording of the proposition is of central importance, since "justification" arguments is of special significance. For example. the proposition that the Federal Government should establish, finance, and administer programs to control air and water pollution fails if reason cannot be given for each of the three indicated actions, for actions by the federal government and for controls over both air and water pollution. To do less might call for an alternative proposition, but not the specific one at hand. Or, as Trapp summarizes, the key question for the judge is, "Does the Affirmative case provide sufficient reason to
Presumption is placed against the specific proposition being debated. This procedure, as described above, assures a rigorous test of the proposition. b. The risk if far greater to accept the hypothesis of moral prohibiton Zarefsky 2
affirm or justify all of the terms of the resolution?" One might ask why rigor is served by placing presumption always against the proposition; indeed, it might seem that to do so is to fail to test rigorously the arguments advanced by the negative., the Rejecting the proposition
meaning that we can no longer access the benefits of any other theoretical standards. the educational value attained through debate helps us in the real world. Paul Strait and Brett Wallace. it is appropriate to locate presumption against the proposition. thereby nullifying any Topical preround prep 3. some do it for social purposes. An alternative hypothesis may be proposed for testing originally hypothesis may be refined and then re-examined. Education is more important because it has outside value. It deters bad theory and checks on abusive ones 2. By contrast. Next. Education comes before Fairness 1. to
Since rejection involves fewer risks than does acceptance. C. and so forth. The text is what triggers topic specific education through the literature 4. further study may be undertaken. The Aff should get the RVI because 1.pdf] mgt
Why debate? Seine do it for scholarships. Such reasoning is analogues to that by which the scientist presumes the null hypothesis.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/2007/The %20Scope%20of%20Negative%20Fiat%20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Decision %20Making. Debater’s Research Guide. Education is evaluated first because if debates aren’t educational then school will lose their incentive to fund teams and debaters will lose their incentive to compete. Textuality should be the basis for advocacies 1.wfu. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team. DRG 07 george Mason University and George Washington University. THEORETICAL PREMPTS
affirm the proposition is to make a personal commitment that it is probably true. Theory destroys clash. but as debate theorists they
the focus of our concern. Our concern is ﬁnding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of
A. Ignoring the resolution kills education because it discourages understanding of both the topic literature and discourages critical thinking about the logical structure of propositions. 2007["The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making" http://groups. Strait and Wallace
L. and many just believe it is fun. whereas fairness is only valuable in a hypothetical debate setting. The negative should only defend textually sound advocacies 2. GMU and GWU.does not preclude taking any other position. 2. The text is the only basis for predictability 3. hence theory should be a dead on voting issue B. Time skew cause the aff to undercover substantial debate.
Harvard University. It thus contains the danger of providing little protection against the unfairness of the smaller (instead of the larger) groups. It is
the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing.A. Fairness
can be a trap and a cover for promoting separation. 4. that of the measure of fairness. going to be learned through debate in one way or another. Without a master unity. I mention only one problem here.D. B. Equality of opportunity as a measure of fairness contains strong leanings toward sameness. Fairness requires that we be willing to acknowledge
as part of our cultural common sense that we all are part of the same group. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education" and “kritik education. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It suggests separation and minimizes sameness yet provides little in the way of mechanisms for mediating situations where difference would overcome any sense of meta-group cohesion. M. It
can provide less protection against abuse by the dominant in a society of difference. Fairness can be a tool for oppression Backer
(Larry Cata Backer.
Moving on to my case. there is not way to determine violations. is the key skill.P.skills. either within a group or between groups.” it makes irrelevant
and it transcends questions of what substantial content a debate round should contain. 1982 Columbia University University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review Summer. Unless my opponent can prove that Fairness has an objective standard of evaluation along with it. Much has been made of the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of result. it is the skills we learn. 1979 Kennedy School of Government. our differences can overcome us.serving competitive equity. while at the same time pre. Executive Director at the Tulsa Comparative & International Law Center. 1977 Brandeis University. It suggests the power of cultural veto by the smallest minority. It suggests unity and
minimizes difference yet provides little in the way of mechanisms for mediating situations where difference has an effect on the quality of opportunity. that can best improve all of our lives. It can provide less protection against abuse by non. At its limit it can suggest explosion of difference and provide a potent cultural weapon for separation. the burden of the Aff is to prove on the a priori level that there is no moral prohibition.dominant groups and can result in reverse hegemony. argumentation or debate.P. while the Neg has the burden to prove the converse. Fairness is a condition with perhaps an immutable definition but with a complex and transitory application. but fairness ought not to tolerate disadvantage. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions. J. n107 On the [*875] other hand. Professor of Law. 1999)
Our goal must be fairness. n105 Both contain within them culturally significant risk. equality of result as a measure of fairness contains strong leanings toward difference.
3. Fairness tolerates difference. At its limit it can suggest implosion of difference and provide a potent cultural weapon for involuntary assimilation n106 and disappearance. University of Tulsa College of Law. those skills are use.less if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1
. While policy comparison skills are
considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers. not the content of our arguments.
CONT. in principle. Edward N. it may. One member of the class is not pitted against another. 1977. come to an end. of or philosophical skepticism. they exist to justify the mannerisms of the individual or society: Mackie 1
[Mackie. "Skepticism". But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence. does not. they are created not to objectively codify right and wrong. that the justification is provided solely by some non-experiential source. Zalta (ed. 121). in case of doubt we have to default on the presumption. URL = <http://plato.
Disagreement about moral codes
.Russell.stanford.” which implies that it must be
independent of empirical evidence. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality. Thus. As Laurence BonJour says. Peter. since it is a priori. URL = <> http://plato.).stanford. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. "A Priori Justification and Knowledge". and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. and of
anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. philosophic doubt
In contrast. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical
differences between first order moral judgments make it difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.
Hence I do not need a value or other formats to win because my argument is questioning the very notion of the truth of the resolution. Zalta (ed. It allows that experience might defeat that a priori justification.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/apriori/ But why think that all-things-considered a priori justification implies either that a person who
has that sort of justification is entitled to ignore empirical information or that it is always rational for her to believe what she does no matter what the empirical evidence is? A priori justification must be “independent of experience. John. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). But there is an interpretation of that sort of independence that does not imply that the person is entitled to ignore empirical information or that her justification will remain no matter what the empirical evidence is. Fellow at Oxford University]
The argument from relativity has as its premise in the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another. if I win this argument then I should thereby win the round. Or so the philosophic skeptic will claim!
Thus. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2
Klein. Suppose being justified independent of experience simply means that experiential sources do not provide the justification. 1 Variations in moral codes and views follow from the way of life of the individual.
philosophical skepticism attempts to render doubtful every member of a class propositions that we think falls within our ken. That does not imply that the justification will remain where experience is not silent.). But it is not the mere
occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. In other circumstances. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). as opposed to ordinary incredulity. The grounds for either withholding assent to the claim that we can have such knowledge or denying that we can have such knowledge are such that there is no possible way to either answer them or neutralize them by appealing to another member of the class because the same doubt applies to each and every member of the class. My thesis and sole contention is that morality does not have the strength to enforce prohibition. Edward N. Bruce.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/skepticism/>. That
does not imply that the experiential evidence could not defeat that non-experiential justification. Ethics Inventing Right and Wrong. for a priori justification “… it is enough if it is
capable of warranting belief where experience is silent” (BonJour 1998. Penguin Books.
Moral disagreement pervades society. of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an
the argument from relativity has some force simply cause the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions. less rigid. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other cultures. The Challenge of Cultural Relativism. But this can usually be understood as the extension. all of which have been made by cultural relativists:
Annette Baier. The moral code of our own society has no special status. Meyer Santa Clara University http://www. Thus. S. if the moral code of a society says
that a certain action is right. Moral rules are often too vague to actually guide decisions and even if they were specific enough people will bend the rules to justify their skeptical.
existing way of life. than that of which it leads them to approve. This means the process of philosophical education is ultimately self-defeating. The only moral standards against which a society's practices can be judged are its own. Rachels
That is. same action may be morally right in one society but be morally wrong in another. self-interested beliefs. at least within that society. For the ethical relativist. 2000 As a beginning. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society. as they are not based on empirical evidence. seemed to them to be required consistency. 3. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they
participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Thomas Shanks. that is. In short. Then. 4.scu. most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/ethicalrelativism. Claire Andre. but rather are created justifications for the lifestyle of the society or individual in which they were conceived. On “Postures of the Mind. of objective values.J. In the real world we have no way of determining which ethical theory is true. one cannot evaluate any of the myriad moral theories that exist as true. there can be no common framework for resolving moral disputes or for reaching agreement on ethical matters among members of different societies.seems to reflect people's adherence to and participation in different ways of life. 5. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal code better than another. Although it may seem that these six propositions
. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other peoples. though new and unconventional. in ways which. 2. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers. Of course. there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples at all times. If ethical relativism is correct. Different societies have different moral codes.. There is no “universal truth” in ethics – that is. whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced. The
Ethical relativism is the theory that holds that morality
James Rachels. This is not to say that moral judgments are purely conventional. it is merely one among many. we may distinguish the following claims.standards that can be universally applied to all peoples at all times.html
is relative to the norms of one's culture. and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete. and Michael J. people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons. moral perception varies within cultures Velasquez
Manuel Velasquez. there are no universal moral standards -. the that action is right.
but it is the one to which the
headed objectivist is compelled to resort. or prefer one over another. will provide a satisfactory answer. 2) Default aff on theory to counteract negative presumption in the round because automatically restricts affirmative ground.go naturally together.” If the best explanation of our moral judgments appeals only to psychological facts about us. they are independent of one another. is the argument from queerness. and wealth constitute what is “evil. however
complex the real process.one metaphysical. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking.
. and by the intuitionists in their talk about “a faculty of moral intuition” Intuitionism has long been out of favour.
Insofar as there is no way to empirically verify any claims by moral codes. and certainly more generally applicable. none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception introspection or the and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis.
Leiter "Moral Skepticism and Moral /disagreement in Nietache. utterly different from our ordinary
parts. it will require(if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort. This has two
If there were objective values. if we were aware of them. nor adjudicate between differing moral claims as none of them can be followed back to their so-called objective source. we have no way to determine objective values for morality Mackie 2 furthers
Even more important. Lastly. Lastly. UChicago Law School) As I argued in my book (Leiter 2002: 148-149). either premises or forms of argument or both. then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort. is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. When we ask the awkward question. these kinds of remarks suggest a “best explanation” argument for anti-realism about moral value: the best explanation for our
moral experiences is not that they pick out objective moral features of phenomena. we have no cogent reason to accept any moral theory as logically consistent. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of non-natural qualities. ressentiment or what Neil Sinhababu has recently dubbed “vengeful
thinking” (Sinhababu 2007) to describe the mechanism by which „slavish‟ types come to believe strength. and need make no reference to
objective moral facts. Err aff on theory because: 1) Always err aff otherwise the negative can take advantage of the time skew by forcing me to cover bad theory. warranting a reciprocal affirmative advantage in theory. Correspondingly. but rather that they are caused by facts about our psychological make-up: for example. how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity. it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition. of the truth of these distinctively ethical premises or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning. the other epistemological. nobility. special sort of in is a lame answer. What is not so often stressed. then we have reason to be skeptical about the existence of moral facts. in the sense that some of them might be true even if others are false. utterly different from anything else in the universe. and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. ways of knowing everything else. or any combination of these. But. but is more important. however.