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EH8/A3(112) Ser 1 0 2 3 1^7

^ 8 /sue 1952
From: Chief, Bureau of Ships 4o: Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Records and History - Op. 29) Sabj! An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships during World War II; forwarding of Bad; (1) Subject history

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for preservation as source Material and for future reference.


TABLE OF CONTENTS VCLUMEJI CHAPTER PARTI "BACKGROUND DURING PEACE" I. DECLINE OF SHIPBUILDING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I . . . ................ . . . . . ... ...... Isolation and. Depression. The New Naval Policy of 1 3 . 9? Lessons Between Wars . Basis for the Future. TEE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS . . .............,,,.,....... .. History of Two Shipbuilding Bureaus. Consolidation. Establishment of the Bureau: The Lav. Organization. Development. PART II "PRELUDE TO WAR" III. THE PRE-WAR WORLD AND -THE NAVY . . . . . . . ....... The International Situation Leading to War. The Balance of Fleets. Impact upon the Bureau. EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING . . ....... . . . .. .... Background . War Emergency Building. The Role of the Bureau, Birth of a Ship. Jurisdiction over Production. Effect of the Destroyer-Naval Base Exchange . EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES Over-All Expansion. Bureau of Ships Personnel: Civilian. Military. Expansion of Facilities. Navy Yards. ---97 I PAGE






APPENDIX VOLUMES (Bound separately. Available in the History Section of the Bureau of and in the office of the Director of Naval Records and History) NO, 1, 2, 3<, 4, 3, 6, 7, 8k 9, TITL3 Historyof Statistical Analysis in the Bureau of Ships Conservation Program of the Bureau of JShipa History of If* S, Navy Petroleum Inspection History of Chemistry Section, Research and Standards Branch** -M-: .,/ , -.;A'^/.? ' ',;:-. -/

Vessels Directed To Be Built and Construction Completed by Selected Type : 1938 thrg^#i 1943 Vessels Lost^ Transferred, Returned, Sold, Scrapped or Otherwise Disposed of from 1?40 throng 1?43. (Lead-Lease Vessels Bxcluded), Vessels Leased Bureau of Ships Plant ?acilities Expansion under Bureau of Ships'
Appropriations ., . ^ i, ;, ^

10, ContractsjwardedPrivateShipyarb^ for Construction of Nayal Vessels - 1 January 1934 to 13 January 1946 , 11, Vessels Assigned to Navy Yards and Miscellaneous Naval Activities for Construction, 1 January 1934 to 1 June 1943 12.. Ships LaidDo^mSince^ Washington Trea^ by Authorizing A^ 6 February 1922 to 1 October 1943 13, Chronolos** July 1939 to September 1943 according to General Events and Specific Military Engagements; Events within the Navy Department and Bureau of Ships; and Estimated Value of New Construction

TABLES Tal.le No, 1 ...... The U.S. Navy at minimum strength, by types and years, 1931-1932. ........ ........ . .r.v;.;,^. ..,.;, . , 2 ...... Naval Appropriations, fiscal years 1 2 - 9 4 ii. , . . . 9414. 3____, , New Construction Awarded, 1922-1941............... . . 4...... Major Combatant vessels of the UnitedtState&, on hand and under construction........ .............. 5, ..... Major Combatant vessels of the British Empire on hand and under construction ................ ...... 6....;. Major Combatant Vessels of Japan on hand and under construction............................., . , . . 7...... Balance of fleets, United States, Britain, Japan; on hand and under construction in . 1931, 1939 and 1940.......................- - -. ..... 92-93 8...... Emergency Shipbuilding, New Construction, Conversions, Acquisitions, 1933-1941. . . . . . . . . 101-02 ....... 9.....^ Emergency New Construction of Combat yessels,: i' 1933-1941----. . .. .^ . . . ....... .^ . . . . . : .... . . .... 103-03 ... .. 10- .... Authorized Appropriations, 1937^1941; . .^ . . A* ..^ ..... 107^11 11..... BuShips Personnel on Board, 1933-1941.. ............. 12 13 Navy Yard Personnel, Military and Civilian, Pre-War and Peak Assignments,, Pre-World War II Navy Yard Construction, 1934-1941 123 4 13 14

89 90 91

143 147-49

^ O

Chart Nc_^

I . . . . Organization Chart, BuEng, 1939 .....

II. Organization Chart, BuC&R, 1936.



Organization Diagram, Consolidated duties,

BuEng and BaC&R, 1939. Organization Chart, BaShips, August, 1940 Flow Chart: Control of Navy Yards, 1946. 33 48 139




The general,files of the Navy are the main source of naval history and their completion, arrangement, and preservation must be given continuous care. Documentation is, therefore, the basis

for the compilation of the History of Naval Operations and Administration during the Second World War.

Although the documents thus lay plete history, the history itself

the foundation for a comuntil the

cannot be written

events it records have been correlated tive. In the meantime,

and seen in true perspecmust be linked

the official documents

together in order form, and

that the files may be brought

into manageable of the most

provision made

for interpretive digests

significant events.

First draft narratives provide make the source material

the necessary linkage, and to responsible offiAs each first

readily available

cials as well as to the historians of the future. draft narrative is completed,

two copies are bound,

one for the

originating office and one for the Office of Naval History. Those /" ' important documents which properly form part of the narratives, as being essential as supplements. to their understanding, are bound separately

E. C. KALBFUS, Admiral, U. S. N., (Ret.), Director of Naval History.


This copy for


Adhering to the ancient proposition that "What is past is prologue", the United States Navy in the early stages of the Second World War commenced the compilation of historical records to serve as a chronicle of authoritative information for use in future planning rather than as a mere record of past achievement. Authorized by the Secretary of the Navy in September 1943, these histories increased in scope as the conflict with the Axis Powers confronted the Navy with problems on a scale never faced before problems as.great in administration, logistics, supply,

research and training as in strategy and tactics. With the dynamic wartime expansion wi<thin the Navy, one of the most comprehensive activities became the Bureau of Ships which ultimately concerned itself with far-reaching logistical problems of unprecedented latitudes. In the Navy, logistical function involves supplying the weapons of war which for Naval warfare center basically about the ship and its armament, plus the men and equipment to enable the ship and its armament to function at the time and place and in the manner required. building and maintaining of ships and for the supplying of equipment so vital to effective operations. Many other Bureaus and Offices of the Navy are concerned with the multitudinous It is upon the Bureau of Ships that responsibility falls for the


technical aspects of this job but this Bureau retains the management responsibility for the efficient and effective prosecution of its mission in servicing the Fleet. Under ibese broad functions of the Bureau of Ships fall the following responsibilities: Design of ships and equipment. Controlling the necessary facilities. Recruiting and training civilian labor. Procuring and allocating materials. Administering the field activities (under Bureau of Ships management control) which perform the following functions for the Bureau: Acquisition of ships, Activation and Reactivation of vessels, Disposal of surplus vessels, Maintenance of the Active fleet, Maintenance of the Reserve fleet, Material stocking and control, Electronic development and installation, Investigation and Test, Other logistic support to fleet as required in specific areas. In the fulfillment of tnis mission during the war, the Bureau of Ships became subject to that "province of uncertainty" characteristic of any military enterprise. It has been stated -that "three-fourths of the things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden". This became particularly true in the field of logistics upon which modern military operations depend to such a considerable degree. Logistic planning, therefore, proved to be of first magnitude in the successful prosecution of the lightning all-out war

characteristic of this age,where the entire complexion of the conflict can change with breath-taking and death-dealing rapidity.


Being of the essence, planning was based upon an estimate of possibilities and this in a war of almost unlimited variables.

The operational counterpart in combat of this logistic estimation of possibilities is calculated risk: the analysis of all factors which collectively indicate whether or not the consequences to ourselves will be more than compensated for by the damage to the enemy or interference with his plans. Both are based upon orderly

reasoning, but the time requirements of fulfillment cause the logistic estimation to be projected farther into the future than the operational calculated risk.thereby enhancing its chance of of error manyfold. In this vital, dynamic, and uncertain sphere

of World War II activities, the Bureau of Ships played a principal role. As has been stated by the wartime Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet: "The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics." Adhering to the purpose of this documentation for use in future planning, this history of the Bureau of Ships in the logistic warfare against the Axis Powers will concern itself with the presentation of administrative and operational problems, what solutions were attempted and found ineffective, and what policy changes resulted from the final determination of the correct solution. In order to view the problems in the light of contemporary conditioning factors, this history has been


set down chronologically/

The study of one of the Bureau's

functions, such as facilities or personnel for example, is of little interest per se except as a record of achievements in that field. In order for an analytical study to be made of the

solutions of problems encountered in these fields, all of the attendant contemporary conditioning factors must be included. In this manner the problem's relative importance in the over-all scheme of things may also be evaluated. is divided into five temporal parts: a) The background during the peace years including a summary of the shipbuilding decline following World War I and the origin and establishment of the Bureau of Ships; b) The prelude to World War II concerning all factors of shipbuilding and the attempt to improve our status in comparison with other Navies of the world; the defensive and turning In general the chronology

c) The first half of the war of the tide phases

and the contribution of the Bureau

of Ships in stemming the on-rushing Axis flood; d) The second half the offensive phases of the warand

The Bureau's overwhelming production program which crushed the enemy in every theater; e) The post-war era is concerned with a study of the effects of a new age upon the world and the Navy in general and

The Bureau of Ships in particular, with a resume of the Bureau's programs throughout the entire var in electronics, ship design, and research and development, activities vhich could not feasibly have been broken down into chronological phases. Such then is the chronological approach to the history of the Bureau of Ships. The many problems presented, the solutions attempted, and the lessons learned during the great conflict vill be revealed as this chronicle unfolds. Against the background of past experience and continuing obstacles, two major conclusions for the security of our post-war world become unequivocally obvious: the preservation of our unprecedented Naval strength built up during the war must be assured, and this, for economy's sake, through technical processes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau; and, the design and research program must be emphasized to keep our country foremost in technical developments. Since our Navy's traditional role as our country's first line of defense is as vital today as it was during the recent years of fighting, these Bureau responsibilities become paramount in the interest of world peace. The out-moded philosophy among nations: "To the Victors belong the Spoils" has gradually given way to a more enlightened proposition: "To the Victors belongs the responsibility of maintaining the peace". May this history present a means of fulfilling this responsibility.



Although the initiating authorization by the Secretary of the Navy for a record of "administrative experience" of the Bureau of Ships in World War II had looked toward the preparation merely of a rather brief historical survey, it became immediately apparent that a thorough exploration of problems was necessary if the project were to have real value. In accordance with this directive, Lt. Paul J. Strayer, USNR, formerly Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University, was assigned in 1943 to accomplish the writing of this history. A year after the cessation of hostilities, the first draft narrative had been completed and contained supporting articles by the following contributors: "Civilian Personnel" Mr. Theodore W. Taylor: Formerly head of the Civilian Personnel Section, Admin., Branch, Bureau of Ships. Lt. Comdr. H. Barry O'Neil. WAVE Officer, BuShips. Dr. Robert G. Albion, Asst. Director, Office of Naval History. Industrial Relations Section, Code 780, Shore Div., BuShips. Lt. Comdr. Mundell, USNR, CMP Section, BuShips. Lt. L. M. Bernstein, USNR, CMP Section, BuShips.

"WAVES Personnel" "Navy Yards"

"Industrial Relations" "Controlled Materials Plan" "Scheduling Components for Shipbldg., and Maintenance"

xx ill

In July 1947, Lt. Edward J. Pope Jr., USNR, historian and screenplay writer, received an assignment to rewrite the first draft narrative for final submission to the Office of Naval History. This was accomplished by the year's end under the :

.S ^.

supervision of Captain L. T. Haugen, USN, Director of Administration, Bureau of Ships. Articles by the following contributors were

included in the history as re-written: "Death and Rejuvenation at Pearl Harbor." Capt. Homer N. Wallin, USN, Taken from December 1946 issue "United States Naval Institute Proceedings", Based upon an article by Lt. R. E. Williams, USNR: "You can't Beat Them If You? Can't Sink Them". Excerpts from the official U. S. Navy reports. Based upon sub-sections' reports to the Director of Research, BuShips.

"Ship Repair Units"

"Operations Crossroads" "Research and Development Chapter"

Although .the names of specific individuals are not mentioned,

the policy in the re-written history was consistently followed of submitting the manuscript to be read by key officers in the divisions or sections whose programs were discussed. It proved

feasible to furnish to the men whose work came under survey an opportunity to disclose errors of fact and to dispute matters of opinion. This however, in no manner was accomplished for the "

purpose of shifting any element of responsibility from the historian.

xx iv

Personal interviews^ Bureau files, Bureau publications, the "United States Naval Institute Proceedings"^ and Admiral King's three official reports "B. S. Navy at War" provided most of the material for the preparation of this history as re-written^ If the reader finds this document deviating from the historical truth or unhappily inclined towards the darker side in several instances, he may find some source of consolation in the somewhat questionable position in which the historian has found himself in endeavoring to sum up such a comprehensive history. Perhaps the reader may find cheer in the writer's

hope that this document will prove to be to the future planners of the Navy what the railroad ticket meant to the brilliant but absent-minded Dwight Morrow who was searching frantically for his misplaced ducat. "That's alright, Mr. Morrow" consoled

the conductor when he recognized the famous attorney, "just mail it co the company or send a note." "Hell," bellowed the I'm trying

absent-minded lawyer, "that's not why I'm looking. to find out where I'm going!"

May the Navy discover in this history what Mr. Morrow wished to learn from his ticket!
In August, 1951, Mr. James Wi Boatman, historian, was assigned to proof-read the first draft narrative and to rewrite Chapter XII, "Ship Salvage and Foreign Ship Repair."




CHAPTER 1. THE DECLINE OF SHIPBUIIDING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I. A. ISOLATION AND DEPRESSION: The fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to guard the United States and its Continental and overseas possessions." In time of peace it is one thing to say that ve must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the Naval strength adequate for that purpose. For a number of years following World War I, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeablefuture appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a. comparatively small Navy. At the time of the ratification of the Washington Limitation of Armament Treaty ( $ 2 , however, the United l2) States still had the largest Navy in the world and a strong shipbuilding industry. Under the terms of the Washington Treaty, limitations upon capital ships and aircraft carriers were agreed upon, the ratio established being five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan, but it placed no limitation upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines or aircraft. At the time, the United States scrapped approximately $300,000,000 worth of Naval vessels because of the agreement to do so contained in that treaty.



In addition to seven new battleships and four new battle cruisers in process of construction, four dreadnaughts and fifteen pre-dreadnaughte were destroyed. Pursuant to that treaty, however, the United States vas permitted to convert the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, then under construction as battle cruisers, to aircraft carriers, whatever the other effects of the Treaty, that particular provision worked to our advantage, because those two ships, as battle cruisers, would have become obsolescent for World War II, but as aircraft carriers they proved effective units of our fleet. During the next eight years following the Washington Treaty, the American naval deterioration steadily continued until it reached a minimum strength indicated in Table 1. As an example of the idealism and isolationism prevalent in the United States, the following is quoted from the Congressional Record of July 19, 1930: "Following that conference (Washington) and up to January 1, 1929, the great powers of the world laid down and appropriated for naval expansion as follows: Japan, 125 naval vessels;

Great Britain, ?4 naval vessels; France, 119; Italy, 82; and, to the everlasting credit of our own country, the United States, exclusive of small river gunboats, 11." During these years from 1922 to 1930, expenditures for new construction never exceeded $40,000,000 in any one year and in 1926 the appropriations and expenditures fell as low as $ 7 0 0 0 0 1,0,0.



Office of Naval Intelligence Statistical Section 23 July 1947

The United States Navy at Minimum Strength^ By Types and Years. 1931-1932 Built January 1932 No . Tons 13 4340 3,0 Under Construction January 1932 July 1932 No . Tons No ^ TQpA

Type of Vessel Battleships Aircraft Carriers Heavy Cruisers


July 1931 No . Tons 13 4340 3,0


July 1932


July 1931 N<? Tons




3 9 10

77,300 80,230 70,300 66,230

3 9 10

77,300 1 80,230 7 70,300 ' 236,180 67.790

13,800 i

70,000 1 13,800

10 10
223 81

93,100 70,300
240,220 66,230

70,000 7

70,000 7,300

Light Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Total

7,300 3,800 3

236,180 222

3 3,8oo 3 87.600 16


344 1,002,970

986,080 341

987,620 11

93,ioo 13


In 1930, at London, the parties to the 1922 Treaty agreed upon further limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers and submarines. As a result of these tvo treaties, which reflected world conditions at the time, and also because of our decision to maintain our Navy at considerably less strength than allowed by the Treaty, we experienced a partial building holiday that threw our construction program out of balance. However serious the relative decline in our naval strength may have been, we suffered an even greater loss by the decline in our shipbuilding industry. By 1933? only six private shipyards remained in existence: the "Big Three", Bethlehem, New York Ship and Newport News; and three smaller companies, Bath Iron Works, Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, and Electric Boat Company. Although the Navy Yards had continued in existence, only six (Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia, New York, Norfolk and Puget Sound) had continued to build any significant quantities of new vessels. Mare Island had been acting primarily as a repair yard, and Charleston had practically closed. Commercial shipbuilding in this period had suffered as much as, or more than, the naval. When the Maritime Commission took office on 16 April 1937 only nine new cargo vessels of 2,000 tons and more had been constructed in the United States during the preceding ten years. * While the country ranked third in tonnage engaged in international trade, it ranked fourth as to speed and last among the principal maritime nations in age of vessels.


Severity of the crisis in naval shipbuilding is illustrated by the fact that after the bulk of the World War I program had been completed in 1926, the only nev naval construction until 1933 consisted of the completion of the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON and SARATOGA (mentioned previously) and only thirteen other vessels. The Cramp Shipbuilding Company in Philadelphia, vhich had been one of the Big Four, closed vhen it finished its share of the var program. Bath had also closed, but it reopened after having reorganized and received one Navy contract for a single destroyer. The Electric Boat Company had received a contract for one submarine and continued in existence, but the Lake Torpedo Boat Company was gone. The Nev York Shipbuilding Corporation changed hands and control several times, vhile Newport News was reputedly permitted to keep going solely because its owner proved willing to cover the losses. Another large company, Bethlehem Fore River Plant, also continued in existence solely through the support upon numerous occasions of its parent steel company. Fortunately, after it completed the LEXINGTON, the Fore River Plant received sufficient contracts for cruisers to maintain continued activity at a low workload throughout the difficult times. New York Shipbuilding proved more fortunate in receiving the contract for the completion of the SARATOGA and then for the cruisers SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, INDIANAPOLIS and TUSCALOOSA, which presented just sufficient work to keep that yard operating.


Nevport Neve fared, less veil because, after it delivered the WEST VIRGINIA in 1923, it had no Navy vork until 1927, vhen contracts for the cruisers HOUSTON and AUGUSTA vere avarded. These assignments, folloved by the RANGER, kept some Navy production in effect until the expansion started in 1933At one time or another during the period after WORLD WAR I nev construction completely disappeared from every Navy Yard except Portsmouth. The Nev York Yard vas vithout nev construction from 1922 to 1926 and again for four months in 1930. Puget Sound found itself

vithout nev construction for almost tvo years between 1924 and 1926. Philadelphia had to vait six years betveen 1924 and 1930 vithout laying a keel. Completing its last World War I ship in 1924, Boston received no more nev construction until 1932. Norfolk and Charleston

had no nev construction from the end of their World War I program until the NIRA expansion of 1933- Charleston had been very nearly closed dovn and Norfolk vas reduced to repair and manufacturing after

By 1933 the shipbuilding business had become a gamble vhich vould interest relatively fev young men of capacity and, vith fev exceptions, practically no one vith capital. Resulting from the decline in both naval and commercial shipbuilding, a very serious loss occurred in drafting and design forces capable of developing detailed designs required for nev construction. As the years had dragged on, drafting and design forces vere greatly reduced in all


activities and experienced men gradually drifted into other lines of endeavor. When the heavy cruiser program came along and vas awarded to the "Big Three" shipbuilders, not one of them possessed sufficient talent to do the job; it became necessary to establish a central design force set up as a subsidiary corporation to the "Big Three". Naval establishments exercised a similar expedient vith the establishment of a central drafting office in the Nev York Naigr Yard to handle the design of the NEW ORLEANS class. In the year of 1933 vith its worldwide economic crisis, President Roosevelt set aside for Naval-Defense purposes $ 3 , 0 , 0 from the large general relief fund granted him 280000 by Congress to provide employment during the depression and to bolster our declining naval strength. From this sum of money were built in

the following years thirty-two naval vessels (mostly replacements), including two new Aircraft carriers, four more cruisers, twenty destroyers and four submarines. The two carriers were considerably different in design from those previously built, while the new features of other types were more evolutionary. In connection with

the destroyer design, however, three of the shipbuilding companies, Federal, United Drydock, and Bath Iron Works, submitted bids, but all of these companies stated that they possessed no design drafting boards capable of performing the task. Federal proposed to use a design made by an independent design agency, Gibbs and Cox of New York; it had been used on eight destroyers of the FARRAGUT class laid down the year before.


In 1934, Congress passed the Vinson-Trammell act, which authorized further new naval construction up to tL^ full limits provided by the Naval Limitations Treaties. The appropriations authorized by this act, while not contributing any material expansion in strength, eventually resulted in the modernization of the Navy by replacement of obsolete vessels. This act established a nev naval policy, for it authorized the permanent maintenance of the Navy at treaty strength and provided that vessels should be replaced vhen they become over-age. It also authorized the President to procure naval aircraft commensurate vith a treaty Navy and specified that all profits made by shipbuilding companies in excess of 10% of the contract price should be returned to the treasury. In 1935 and 1936, destroyers, submarines and cruisers vere laid dovn under the replacement appropriation of the 13th February 1929 Act and the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934.


B. THE NEW NAVAL POLICY OF 1937 When the Washington Treaty and the London Treaty of 1930 for the limitation of naval armament expired on 31 December 1936, the naval building race started at full speed throughout the world. All the other great povers enjoyed a decided advantage over the United States at that time, for our Navy had been greatly weakened by the almost complete absence of effort to hold it to the strength to which our government was legally entitled under the treaties and to which the other powers had maintained theirs. In 1937) the Naval Shipbuilding Replacement Appropriation under the Act of 193^ continued with construction of destroyers and submarines and also with the laying down of the two 35,000 ton battleships, the NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON. To illustrate the


necessity of foresight in the balancing of naval strength; the original designs of these battleships were begun in 1935 and two years later, on 1 July 1937; the New York Navy Yard received the contract to lay these ships down. Not until over four years later, Immediately prior to our entry into the war, were these two warships delivered. In 1933, it had become apparent that in spite of all efforts on,the part of the United States to reach an agreement covering limitation of armaments, and thus to establish at least the probability of world peace, other nations were increasing their navies at accelerating rates. At that time, in spite of the fact that there was a general desire on the part of most people in all countries to *


remain at peace, the world sat on a powder keg towards which the flame of Axis aggression rapidly approached. In view of this situation, President Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress, recommended an increase of 20% in our naval strength, exclusive of replacements permitted under the Vinson-Trammell Act of 193^. In May 1933 the Congress authorized the recommended program, giving us on paper what appeared to be reasonably adequate naval strength. This constituted

the first step taken to increase the United States Navy above the strength permitted by the Washington and London naval treaties. This

act increased the number and tonnage allowances of combat vessels in the Navy by approximately 22%; it increased the number of useful aeroplanes from 2,050 to a total of not less than 3;000; it authorized the construction of 26 auxiliary vessels; and it authorized an appropriation of $15,000,000. to be expended at the discretion of the President for the purpose of experimenting with light surface craft. This last appropriation led to an extensive experimental program for patrol vessels in anti-submarine warfare and for motor torpedo boats. The so-called agreement at Munich was such as to require an upward revision of the defense requirements of this country. Subsequent events in 1939) resulting in the outbreak of the war in Europe, not only confirmed the necessity for these estimates but also spotlighted the need for speed in naval production. A great increase in

design activity, in preparation for later building programs, began at this time, for war had become virtually inevitable. On the 3rd of September 1939; the European War began.


Immediately thereafter the President of the United States declared a state of limited emergency to exist. This delaration proved important not only in fixing attention upon the condition of our armed and naval forces but also in calling attention to the status of our shipbuilding industry as a vhole. At this Juncture, the industry fortunately found itself in other than a moribund condition, for the contract awards continuing after 193^ provided all the Yards vith a backlog of vork sufficient to justify fairly long range planning on the part of the management. This was particu-

larly true in viev of the fact that building periods under peacetime conditions vere longer than under an emergency status. j.u 1- -"vh difficult to visualize that had the emergency building program vhich followed in 1940 and thereafter been attempted in 1933, utter confusion and turmoil would have continued for a considerable period. To illustrate the growth of shipbuilding appropriations and their relative position with regard to the entire naval appropriations throughout this pre-war period, Table 2 is included herewith, together with Table 3 listing the actual new construction awarded.

A'apa! approprMtom, j!*ra

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\'T '*K ) )< s ttt int'i'lr trust xi s]


, /fseo/ years

$ 1934 . . DBCLINE . .

$,9,0 $ 40700 3,5,0 09000

1,6,0 09600 1,4,0 08200 1,3,5 18720 1,3,0 25400 1,9,0 30000 1,0,5 34200

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932

28,444,000 38,275,000 23,700,000 48,2oo,ooo 48,550,000 49,400,000 7,450,000 35,063,000 43,910,785 40,619,334 132,905,000 168,500,000 130,000,000 190,613,150 281,604,712 1,047,770,351 3,584,500,000 6,796,260,385

30,400,000 $ 25,495,948 $ 25,565,300 33,330,000 23,949,650 36,675,000 36,275,000 36,100,480 36,824,700 40,888,800 40,217,700 37,300,540 33,851,000 33,380,750 39,204,200 39,800,000 40,550,000 41,539,300 59,681,590 34,072,000 228,898,180 i,497,470,ooo 1,708,979,935 1,735,880,000 23,220,347 23,911,700 24,195,836 24,981,877 27,970,361 35,383,298 22,143,940 2i,64o,64o 20,659,447 23.881,486 35,646,566 27,152,713 37,683,580 39,490,235 81,496,315 340,288,600 778,925,692 973,791,484

2,866,500 $ 14,647,174 .# ,141,870,802 130^190,000 3,138,000 15,150,000 i4o,8oo,ooo 2,745,500 14,790,000 19,865,000 143,734,500 3,515,300 4,740,500 5,4io,750 6,318,174 15,234,600 I2,i64,ooo 3,490,000 1,946,950 19,103,000 4,46i,ooo 6,839,000 27,681,000 64,398,550 454,618,475

5,7,8 00366

330,417,200 297,653,997 317,403,338 336,944,575 344,751,477 363,345,812 376,834,479 400,094,334 358,262,133 337,712,692 322,508,951 30740 1,3,% 491,700,806 528,467,832 529,139,808 623,526,194 943,360,249

1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

1939. B4EBGBNCY .

13,119,400 13,119,400 12,930,585 11,271,000 10,849,750 10,545,600 21,700,000 21,700,000 24,429,800 26,849,600 62,808,000 441,345,298 2,824,704,665 3,954,165,413

31,956,000 31,580,000 32,033,211 31,145,000


148,092,927 150,896,957 154,512,782 156,484,500 154,040,870 152,637,831 144,727,450 139,439,992 168,283,083 183,492,981 195,084,579 300,940,752 228,934,217 339,878,019 673,154,723 2,297,750,724 3,701,958,984

48,498,697 58,160,938 59,525,428 75,015,870 51,459,519 56,883,446 65,634,562 77,347,830 54,020,501 44,095,167 51,622,163 45,293,927 45,529,015 52,6o4,4i6 42,001,522 70,593,535 536,862,739 1,776,570,184 1,685,976,141 1,989,194,325

31,957,459 18,643,320 4o,732,3io 38,588,270 51,500,000 48,075,000 lli,459,ooo 452,319,950 6,189,444,100 5,257,981,470 4,583,725,000

1942... WAR ..


1,796,041,460 1,327,005,021 1,855,317,405

3,583,189,327 18,682,173,732 23,807,046,781 27,434,787,198


,7,0,0 9,118,120,000 3 4 6 8 0 0 0

NOTE.Does not Include trust and special accounts.

Table 3 New Construction Awarded Navy Yard Built

Private Yard Built

Fiscal Year 1922 1923 Decline 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934(lncl.N. I.R.A.) 1935(lncl.I.

Naval Shipbuilding Appropriations


0 0
$ 5,9.0 40700 30,950,000
0 1

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 1 10

28,275,000 23,700,000


1936 1937


1940 1941

48,200,000 48,550,000 49,400,000 7,450,000 35,063,000 43,910,785 4o,6i9,334 132,905,000 168,500,000 130,000,000 190,613,150 281,604,712 1,047,770,351

0 0


3 3 16
13 11 11 6 17 45 45

7 4 0 0 3 2 2 1 21

6 o o

7 4 5 4 37 24
24 20

13 9 8 57

14 74 57 386




Since the fundamental purpose of this history is to serve as a guide for future planning, it will prove feasible before moving to the emergency pre-war period to outline broadly several important and indisputable lessons learned in this era of peace. In general terms, these would include: The importance of constantly maintaining a healthy shipbuilding industry and adequate potential; the necessity of keeping design personnel active and abreast of modem research and developments; the urgency of assuring active scientific research; the need of maintaining a strategic information collection agency to keep the policy makers of our nation informed as to our possible enemies' developments and capacities; and, finally; the importance of maintaining a first-rate, first-line-of-defense naval fleet and air arm.


D. BASIS FOR TEE FUTURE: The adequate naval appropriations to be granted, the numerous ships already under construction, the small but growing fleet in existence, the stimulated activity in naval architecture and engineering, and the increasing capacity of shipbuilding facilities and personnel, all constituted the basis upon which the future Bureau of Ships, would build the strongest Navy in the history of the world.




A. 1.

THE ORIGIN HISTORY OF TWO SHIPBUILDING BUREAUS The 76th Congress "by Public Lav 644 established the Bureau of

Ships on 20 June 1940.

This Act, abolishing the Bureau of Construction

and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering, provided that their functions should be assumed by the Bureau of Ships. With the exception of the

creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915, it is fair to say that this vas one of the most important changes to be made in the Navy Department since the bureau system vas first established in 1342. It is the purpose of this chapter to indicate some of the steps

leading to the legislation of 20 June 1940 and the organization and administration of the nev Bureau thereby established. The Act of 1842, creating the original Bureaus of the Navy Department, established the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, to be responsible for the designing, building, and outfitting (except for ordnance) of ships of the Navy. The Bureau of Engineering, created in 1862, vas first called the Bureau of Steam Engineering. Although the first steam varship to perform regular service for the Navy vas contracted for in 1837; steam engineering developments vere somewhat delayed and not until after the Civil War did steam propulsion become considered fully ' reliable for varships. In all the early steam vessels, steam served as Not until the launching the PRINCETON

an auxiliary means of propulsion.

in 1842 had any varship been equipped vlth a screv propeller or designed vith engines belov the vater line for protection from gunfire.



The Civil War gave a tremendous impetus to the development of steam in the Navy and, after 1861, the use of sails became considered as auxiliary propulsion to steam. The proponents of sails were hard to down, however, for as late as 186$, the Navy Department General Orders stated: "Hereafter all vessels of the Navy vill be fitted with full sail power. The exception to this will be the tugs and dispatch vessels not fitted with sails", and not until 1875 did the Navy definitely decide to make the four-bladed propeller standard. A ship

sailed better with two blades and steamed better with four blades. There is, apparently, no question that, for some time after the creation of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Construction and Repair dominated the shipbuilding picture. The engine rested in a hull still designed for sailing and the complex relations between hull, machinery, and ordnance had not yet developed. New designs and improvements in technical knowledge soon made the originally simple relationships between Engineering and Construction and Repair more and more involved. As new questions of cognizance began to arise, decisions had to be made assigning responsibility to one bureau or the other. With little experience upon which to base these decisions, the authorities necessarily were required to assign functional jurisdictions which in some instances were controversial and not wholly definable. Out of these assignments grew inter-bureau discords. Gradually the principal control over shipbuilding as a whole held by Construction and Repair slipped somewhat from its hands to be shared with the Bureaus of Engineering and of Ordnance.


Recognition of these difficulties led to several recommendations to combine the two "bureaus. Secretary William E. Chandler in his annual report for 1883 took a strong stand in favor of the creation of single Bureau of Naval Construction. His statement of his position is as follows: "It is, however, beyond dispute that methods of naval construction change with the transition from wooden to steel vessels. It will be found Impossible for two Independent and equal bureau chiefs to design and supervise the construction of a modem vessel, the one that of the hull, and the other that of the machinery, and bring all parts together in one perfect ship, without differences of opinion which cannot longer be safely decided by a common superior who does not possess technical skill. The true solution of the conflict is to unite these two bureaus as a single Bureau of Naval Construction, having for its chief the most competent naval architect that can be found, whether among the present officers of the Navy or in civil life." In 1886, Admiral Porter recommended In his annual report as Admiral of the Navy the creation of a single Bureau of Construction, Steam Engineering and Repair to prevent caviling over the placing of engines, masts, etc., and to make one person responsible for mistakes committed in the construction and repair of ships and machinery. In 1899, Secretary John D. Long reopened the issue^ stating: "When a contract is made for the construction of a ship, it is made with one builder. It is not given part to a constructor of hulls, part to a steam engine manufacturer and part to an outfitting firm. Whatever various trades enter into the work are all under one head. This is the method of private shipyards which build the largest ships and which are not left to the administration of three heads between whom delicate questions of respective authority and responsibility are liable to arise, resulting in delays and too often in friction and lack of harmony of cooperation."


However, internal and external opposition to such a merger continued. Then, in 190$, a vacancy in the position of Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering occurred and Secretary of the Navy Truman H. Newberry grasped his opportunity. He appointed the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair to additional duty as Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering. This, however, was accomplished without the approval of Congress and was soon declared illegal. Therefore, before any real experience could be obtained, the Secretary was forced to countermand his order. Later Secretary Meyer more indirectly attempted to bring about greater coordination between the two bureaus by developing the aide system, including an aide for material, but as long as the bureaus had their separate congressional appropriations and the primary responsibility for the expenditure of appropriations remained in the hands of the bureaus, the aide or division in the Secretary's office could only enter into the case after a conflict had already developed. Following World War I, interest in naval affairs faded during the era of isolationism and idealism and the organization of the Bureaus (as indicated - Charts I and II) remained fairly unchanged. It was not until shortly before the final decision to merge the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering in 1940 that several developments occurred which added force to the logic behind previous attempts to accomplish the same purpose. Interest in

the Navy grew progressively as the European situation deteriorated. The intense personal interest that President F.D. Roosevelt showed in the Navy and his knowledge of it resulting from his experience


as Assistant Secretary in World War I also exerted a tremendous influence. By 1938 the Bureau of Engineering was as deep into the actual building of a Naval vessel as the Bureau of Construction and Repair. A report on the organization of the Bureau of Ships made by the firm of Booz, Fry, Allen and Hamilton included this comment: "In the gradual evolution of the two bureaus the distinct^ .. between 'hull' and 'machinery' became increasingly obscure. Hall ceased to be the dominant part of the ship, a container of guns and engines, and became part of an intricately mechanized unit into 'which armor, propulsion machinery, and mechanical and electrical power vere built as constituent features of an integral"whole." This resulted in overlapping and duplication of -work, inefficiency and confusion. At this time two extended controversies in "which the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering vere participants focused attention on the obvious objections to the division of responsibility between the two bureaus. These two controversies were the high-pressure, high-temperature steam controversy and the controversy over responsibility for the so-called top-heavy destroyers. In both cases, the issues, of great Importance to the reliability and performance of the battlefleet, were given extensive publicity in the press and were Imown and discussed in Congress. Controversy added to the deterioration in relationships between the personnel of the two bureaus and tended to make the degree of cooperation necessary for successful joint activity more and more difficult.


In addition to the two major issues over steam and stability, considerable publicity was given to various defects of nev ships, defects ranging from cracked stem posts to excessive rolling of the early heavy cruisers. Much of this sort of difficulty might have been expected as a nev building program got under way, but it all served to direct attention to the fundamental weakness of the administrative organization. The steam controversy became important when the Bureau of Engineering, after installing high-pressure, high-temperature equipment on the new destroyers of the Mahan class, decided to adopt even higher temperature and pressure for other ships under construction or planned. Mr. Edison, in charge of the whole shipbuilding program, and the Bureau of Engineering generally agreed and praised the new ships. The Board of Inspection and Survey, however, took the opposite viewpoint. Although

wartime operation supported the advocates of high-pressure, high-temperature steam, the damage in terms of intra-departmental friction had already been done and the taking of sides spread to the private shipyards . During the 1938 investigation of the propriety of adopting highpressure, high-temperature steam, Rear Admiral Bowen stated to the General Board another cause for argument existing within the service:


"I -would be derelict In By duty if I did not invite your attention to the fact that there is a great schism jn the marine engineering profession of the United States. Some of the elements of this schism are so deep and so fundamental that, in my opinion, it is a vital necessity that the General Board shall consider them in their deliberations. The turbine manufacturers in this country, for both marine and power turbines, are General Electric, Meetinghouse, Allis-Chaljners, and DeLaval. All but AllisChalmerB also make gears. It has been the practice of the so-called 'Big Three' shipbuilders, Bethlehem, New York Ship, and Newport News, to manufacture their own machinery, although I have been assured by Newport Neva and by Bethlehem that they have no policy at all which prevents them from buying their main machinery when such action seems expedient. It has been the practice of the 'Little Three', Bath, Federal, and United, which has now diminished to the 'Little Two', Bath and Federal, to operate, as far as Naval vessels are concerned as assembly plants. Bath and Federal and formerly United Drydocks, prefer to buy their machinery. In view of the plant investment of the 'Big Three' it is only natural that they should prefer to make their own machinery. Contrariwise is true of the 'Little Two'. About four years ago the Bureau of Engineering under my predecessor, notified the ^Big Three' shipbuilders that the Bureau of Engineering had decided to enforce the provisions of the Espionage Act and that, therefore, they would have to sever their licenses under Parsons, Limited, if they wished to proceed under any future Naval contracts. Since that date I an not aware that any shipyard in the United States has spent any money whatsoever in connection with the research and development of turbine design. **** On the other hand I have seen the tremendous effort which is being made by the General Electric Company first and Westinghouse second, to do everything that can possibly be done to further the development of turbine design in the United States in order that this country may be entirely free from any necessity of resorting to English or continental design. I am informed that Allis-Chalmers has also accomplished much development." In addition to the steam controversy, the new destroyers proved a constant thorn in the aide of the Navy Department, not only concerning the engineering equipment and delays in construction, but also over the stability characteristics of the new ships,, which served as a source of much recrimination and unfavorable publicity for the new


program. The first so-called, top-heavy destroyer was the ANDERSON ( I 4 l . D)l) As the plans for the ANDERSON were substantially duplicated in 35 other destroyers, the magnitude of the defect found on testing the ANDERSON enlarged to serious proportions. Although the public impression that the destroyers might turn over at any time was much exaggerated, the stability of these ships proved such that danger did exist when fuel oil, ammunition, and stores ran low and a ship approached its extreme light condition. Unfortunately, following the original tests, the authorities

held no debate as to the sufficiency of reserve stability in this class destroyers and the major issue thereafter became the placing of responsibility for the undesirable characteristic and in deciding what steps could be taken to correct the original design. When columnists took the opportunity to comment in the press, thereby making the Departmental split a public issue, it effectively aided the merger of Bureaus.for the public exerted heavy pressure on their Congressional representatives for reform. Investigation proved that material or equipment coming under the cognizance, of all the bureaus concerned was overweight, but that the greater part of the excess 'was on items falling under the jurisdiction of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering. In a letter dated 3 January 1940 to Chairman Walsh of the Naval Affairs Committee, Secretary Edison -was frank to admit that the contractor, through its design agent, Gibbs and Cox, had warned the Bureau of Construction and Repair of their belief that the ships would be lacking in


stability as early as 19 March 193^? and quoted a letter dated 9 April 1937 which held that DDs 397*399 and subsequent destroyers vere overweight. However, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which was responsible for general design and stability of vessels, did not believe that the excess weight would impair the stability of the vessels. Previously, as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Edison had attempted to bring the Bureau together by having representatives from each acting as his independent advisors, but lack of legal authority proved a serious handicap and, as long as bureaus retained their independent appropriations, the Secretary's office could not exert authority for revision. His next step was to recommend that a Director of Shore Activities be given control over the industrial activities of the Navy, but Congress and the bureaus opposed it. At this same time, an interchange of correspondence between the President and the Assistant Secretary is of such interest that it is reproduced in full: * The White House Washington March 16, 1938 MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDISON "On the Construction Report, I notice that on account of ships building at Navy Yards, the following: Heavy cruiser WICHITA, Philadelphia. Should have been completed January 1, 1938. Completion date now reported February 1, 1939Light cruiser HONOLULU, New York Navy Yard - 3 months late Light cruiser HELENA - 6-1/2 months late.


The record on submarines is not so bad. On the 1500-ton destroyers the record, also, is not so bad though In most cases the ships are in the early stages of construction and it is too soon to tell. In the case of the three cruisers, however, the Philadelphia Navy Yard and to a less degree, the New York Navy Yard need to be told that the Commander-in-Chief is much dissatisfied."

/s/ FDR

In reply, Assistant Secretary Edison sent the following memorandum to the President on 1 April 1938: "Attached is a brief factual statement in regard to delays on the WICHITA, HONOHJUJ and BEIENA. Most of the causes for delay appear to be something over which the building yard had no control. The situation in regard to delays in shipbuilding is regrettable not only on the above ships but on many others. Yesterday, Secretary Swanson placed the responsibility for coordinating all phases of the Shipbuilding Program squarely on me and announced this to the Bureaus. It may be said that I already had this obligation but it was all rather vague to the Bureaus and many times I did not get a chance to get in on some decision or lack of it until I stumbled over a situation. Now, with everybody aware of the fact that there is one point of focus, it is my hope that some improvement may be effected in our building schedules."

Seeking to reduce the frequent changes in design which he believed were responsible for much of the delay common at that time, Assistant Secretary Edison required that all changes however small in the plans and specifications of the destroyers then building or a part of the 1939


program be stopped unless "written approval was first received from the Assistant Secretary. Routine issuance of directives^ however, proved not sufficient to correct the deficiencies in organization, A statement prepared by Assistant Secretary Edison on the "History of the Reorganization Effort" reviewed the situation as follows: "*** Early in the spring of 1939 there became apparent a lack of cooperation between the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering. As this lack of cooperation seemed to be based rather on personalities than on organization, I made an endeavor to make certain changes but was prevented from doing so because the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Shore Establishments advised the Secretary of the Navy to the contrary. This clash between the two principal shipbuilding Bureaus was brought to the surface and to my attention through a difference of opinion concerning the use of higher pressure and temperature steam conditions in the main machinery installations in the new ships. Later on in the spring of 1939 I received unofficial word that one of the new Destroyers had failed to successfully pass her inclining test, Indicating a deficiency in her reserve stability. This matter came officially and formally to my attention in July, 1939. *** nere was a glaring example of the lack of coordination and cooperation between the Bureaus responsible for the construction of a ship, and also an example of the need for a change in organization and procedure which would preclude the possibility of a re-occurrence of a condition of this kind. To preclude the possibility of a re-occurrence of this situation, and to make the necessary organization changes and refinements, I took the following administrative action: (1) (2) I removed the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and transferred him to other duty. I issued an order on August 11, 1939, effecting a consolidation of the Design Divisions within the Bureaus of Engineering and Construction and Repair.



I directed that the Bureaus submit to the Acting Secretary of the Navy, for his approval; an administrative plan for effecting thia consolidation not later than 1 September 1939. This was done. In view of the fact that since the death of the Secretary of the Navy I had to assume, as Acting Secretary, the duties of both the Secretary and the Assistant, I issued orders to Rear Admiral Samuel M. Robinson, who had recently been appointed Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, to assume the duties of the Coordinator of Shipbuilding In addition to normal duties as Chief of the Bureau of Engineering. On September 29, 1939, I directed the Chairman of the General Board to conduct a study of the proposed reorganization of the Navy Department as submitted to the Department with comments by the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. * * *"



This account of the Acting Secretary leaves out the important step of appointing a Board headed by Rear Admiral Robinson to consider plans of consolidation submitted by the two Bureaus. This board, appointed 31 August 1939, the day before the European war declaration, was the result of the failure of the two Bureaus to get together to agree on a mutually satisfactory plan for consolidation. In addition to Admiral Robinson, soon to become Chief of the Bureau of Engineering for a second time, the board included Captain Lewis B. McBride, ( . . ; Commander Edward L. Cochrane, CC) ( . . ; and Lieutenant Commander Paul F. Lee. Although they had been CC) directed to consider the plans for the combination of the Design Divisions, the Robinson Board found so many objections to such a partial solution of the problem that they decided to abandon consideration of the plans submitted and recommended the complete consolidation of the two Bureaus on 12 September 1<?39. In part, the report states the case for a merger in these words:


"As you know, however, ships of the Navy have become extremely complicated, and in their earnestness, each design group or unit has properly and commendably striven to perfect that element or feature of the ship for which the unit is responsible; each considering its part as of governing importance and without the means or perspective to evaluate its effect on the ship as a whole. *** *** We are convinced however, that the best results will come from a complete unification and consolidation of the two Bureaus. *** Such a complete reorganization will gain the benefit of consolidating all the parallel functions of the two present Bureaus and assure common policies and uniform administrative procedure and above all will eliminate the potentially difficult situation of a single agency reporting to tvo coequal but independent superiors." Perhaps the merger would have come in time, but to have it sponsored by a joint board representing both bureaus made the accomplishment much easier and less disruptive. The additional burdens falling on Mr. Edison with the death of Secretary Swanson made him receptive to the delegation and occasioned his transfer of duties as coordinator of Shipbuilding to Admiral Robinson. Rear Adminal Robinson was made Chief of the Bureau of Engineering on 13 September and Coordinator of Shipbuilding on 14 September 1939. Rear Admiral A. H. Van Keuren was made Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair on 18 September 1939 and- Assistant Coordinator of Shipbuilding on 21 September 1939Given the necessary authority, the two chiefs

immediately started to bring their Bureaus as close together as possible without Congressional action, as indicated in Chart III.


.CONSOLIDATION (Chart in) The Organization Manual issued 5 October 1939 assigned consolidated duties to the following four principal divisions: (1) The (2) The (3) The (4) The Design Division Production Division Ma-intenance Division War Plans Division

Following the practice of the Bureau of Engineering, administrative matters were assigned to offices reporting to the Office of the Coordinator of Shipbuilding as follows: (l) Office of the Administrative Assistant (in charge of civilian personnel, public relations, and security). f2) The Contracts Office (3) The Personnel Office (in charge of naval personnel). (4) The Financial Office (5) The Office of the General Inspector A joint memorandum issued 7 October 1939 corrected the organization outline given above by abolishing the separate Contracts Office and establishing a Contracts Section in the Production Division. This transfer did not change the functions of the Contracts group but did Involve a change in personnel responsible for the vork. The most important change in the new consolidated organization was the establishment of a separate Design Division. In both the Bureau of

Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering the design and shipbuilding functions had been combined in a single division. The change instituted in the new organization was, of course, the result of emphasis


on the need for "better cooperation and more effective work in the design field that had precipitated the final move to consolidate the bureaus. Another important change was the allocation of responsibility for radio and sound work to a branch of the Design Division. Other changes Included the decision to leave matters of administration and personnel to an office rather than a division. Although the recommendation of the Robinson Board to appoint three assistant Rear Admirals of the Upper HnH* was not followed, the separate Divisions had been given a relatively free hanc and made responsible for the major part of their own administrative vork. While Admiral Robinson and Admiral Van Eeuren were proceeding to take the preliminary steps necessary to bring their bureaus together under a unified control, the interested authorities in the Navy Department and in Congress were considering legislation to completely merge the bureaus. The new Bureau Chiefs being fully in accord with the proposed merger, the major issues that remained were the question of armor cognizance and the effect of the consolidation on the personnel of the two bureaus. Bringing into the new bureau all activities related to ships necessarily involved transfer of armor cognizance from the Bureau of Ordnance. Although, as might be expected, the Bureau of Ordnance strongly opposed such a transfer, Secretary Edison ordered armor to come under the cognizance of the new Bureau. This precipitated an avalanche of protest


from interested Naval groups, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs; on 24 June 19^0, the President over-rode the directive of his Secretary of Navy. The effect on personnel, however, proved an even more volcanic topic in the consolidation. The bulk of the officer personnel of the Bureau of Engineering vere line officers, many with the designation "Engineering Duty only." On the other hand, the Bureau of Construction

and Repair was manned by a staff group known as the Construction Corps. Both groups had developed a strong feeling of pride in their respective organizations and had thought of their future in the Navy as members of one of these groups. To have left these two personnel groups, with

their different systems of selection and promotion, within the Bureau of Ships would have perpetuated the same sort of rivalry and differences in outlook that had been one of the main reasons for the reorganization. The difficulties involved in this issue were deep-seated and were the result of differences in training and assignment within the Navy as well as loyalty to a particular corps or line designation. Constructors were picked from among the very top of the classes at the Naval Academy and were trained to pursue a career in the fields of naval architecture and management of shipyards. They were set apart by the fact that they did not have to go to sea for a regular tour after they had been selected for the Construction Corps early in their Naval careers. The Engineers were


regularly assigned to sea, although they did not have the right to assume command and were selected for engineering duty only much later than the Constructors. The Robinson Board being unable to come to conclusions as to the solution to this personnel problem, Congress on 2 May 1939 resolved that another Board be formed to study this matter. Rear Admiral Ernest J. Eing having been appointed senior member of the Board, it became known thereafter as the King Board. The result of over four months deliberation, their report reached the Secretary of the Navy on 9 December 1<?39. The Board split 6 to 3^ with the majority favoring the creation of a "Line Specialist Corpsv with three principal groups: "'Line Specialists (Construction)' 'Line Specialists (Engineering)', and 'Line Specialists (Aeronautical Engineering)'". A Bgaarity report submitted by three members of the Eing Board, stressing the need for greater unity within the Havy and a closer relation of the constructors, engineers and other specialists to the men who n?m and operate the ships and aircraft of the Navy, believed that this important goal could be best achieved by giving additional number line status to the technical specialists. The Chiefs of the two bureaus most immediately concerned with the problem, supported this belief,stating that officers of the Construction Corps transferred to the line might be better able to absorb the point of view of the line, and the line, in turn, be able to appreciate the technical point of view of the constructors.


In addition to the division in the Board, Rear Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, did not vant to amalgamate the engineers and constructors and favored transfer of the construction corps to the line if higher authority insisted on some action. The Secretary of the Navy, hovever, favored the amalgamation of Naval constructors and the Engineering Duty Only officers; his decision vas definitive. The final approval of the consolidation of the tvo bureaus vas given by Act of Congress on 20 June 1940 (Public 644). The amalgamation

of the personnel of the Construction Corps and the EDO's received approval on 2$ June 1940 (Public 65?)One more action remained to be

taken. That was the transfer by the Secretary of the Navy of certain functions from the cognizance of the Bureau of Ordnance, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and the Bureau of Navigation to the newly created Bureau of Ships. This action involved the following items: "equipage, supplies, and services and repairs to equipage relating to the maintenance and operation of vessels from the Bureaus of Navigation and Supplies and Accounts to the Bureau of Ships, consumable supplies (not technical ordnance), regularly drawn from the Naval Supply Account afloat for use in the ordnance department of a vessel, from the Bureau of Ordnance to the Bureau of Ships...." This action, taken by the Secretary in a letter dated 20 June 1940, became effective 1 July 1$40. The wisdom of this merger, taken after years

of struggling to overcome a myriad of barriers and conflicts, was open to judgment immediately, for in June 1$40 the newly formed Bureau of Ships

was faced with the problem of meeting the demands for a two ocean na*vy. Its principal mission being the construction of ships, the Bureau felt the full responsibility of protecting our country from the danger that suddenly became evident with the fall of France.




Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department, the ?6th Congress in Public Lav 644 dated 20 June 1940 stated that "the duties of the Bureau of Ships shall be assigned by the Secretary of the Navy and performed under his authority and the orders of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and shall have full force and effect as such." It further specified "The Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be appointed by the President, by and vith the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years, from among the officers of the active list of the Navy who are specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture." The same

qualifications were required of the Assistant Chief and his rank while serving was specified as rear admiral. The law further provided that if the Chief of the Bureau is specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering, the Assistant Chief must be qualified in naval architecture, and vice versa. In accordance with Congressional decree, the Navy effected this change and incorporated within The Regulations for the Government of the Navy the regulations, concerning the new Bureau, which follow in full.


Art. 517


"The Bureau of Ships, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, is charged with and responsible for the design,construction, and oaintenance of all ships of the Navy (except district craft assigned to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and aircraft). These duties and responsibilities vill cover the following: (a) All that relates to details of design, construction, conversion, fitting out, and maintenance of hulls of vessels including small boats and district craft (except those assigned to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and aircraft). (b) All that pertains to the design, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of all main propelling machinery, together vith its auxiliaries. (c) Except as specifically assigned to other cognizance, all that pertains to the design, construction, provision, Installation, and maintenance of exterior and interior communication systems, electric wiring and cable, auxiliary machinery, appliances, articles of equipage on approved allowance lists. (d) It is charged vith the design, development, and procurement of materials and appliances for defense against warfare chemicals (except as specifically assigned to other cognizance), diving gear, experimental diving units, respiratory protective devices, paravanes, and minesweeping gear. It is also responsible for the design and preparation of block ships. (e) It is charged vith the design, development, and procurement of materials and appliances for fire protection and firefighting equipment in ships and boats; submarine rescue methods and equipment; submarine escape training facilities. (f) It is charged with management control of all activities comprising the U.S. Naval Shipyards, and of any other similar shore stations that may hereafter be established. CNR2,? ...42.


It is charged vith the design, manufacture, installation, and maintenance of all radio and sound equipage, ashore and afloat, including an appliances used by the Naval Communication Service, except such material as is assigned to other cognizance. CNR2. ...7

It is charged with the research, design, development, preparation of detailed specifications and manufacture of all nev aircraft radio sets, but such research, design, development, detailed specifications, and manufacture mnst be satisfactory to the Bureau of Aeronautics. The term "aircraft radio" as used herein "^11 comprise all radio equipment designed and manufactured especially for use in aircraft for communication and navigational purposes. It does not include plane interior communication systems, generators, and other electrical equipment.

It shall prepare and submit outline preliminary plans, approximate data, or both, shoving the designs of a nev ship in accordance vith the military characteristics recommended by 1&e General Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

For the purpose of preparing the outline preliminary plans, it Hh*ni consult the other bureaus of the Navy Department vith regard to the features under their respective cognizances.

The outline preliminary plans vhen completed and the approximate data necessary for an understanding thereof shall be forvarded by it together vith such comment and recommendation as may appear necessary to the Secretary of the Navy, vho vill refer the same to the General Board for consideration and recommendation.

During the preparations of the final designs of a nev vessel, each bureau shall prepare a detailed statement of all objects under its cognizance which it is proposed to install durjb3g construction and fitting out complete for sea of the vessel. A copy oJR'gach statement shall be furnished to the Bureau of Ships vhen requested


by that Bureau, together with such itemized estimates of weight and position of centers of gravity as may be required by that Bureau. This statement and estimates of -weights and positions of centers of gravity shall be furnished in sufficient time before the final plans are due to be submitted to the Chief of Bureau of Ships for approval to permit the Bureau of Ships to prepare such plans without delay and to determine fully the matters of displacement, trim, stability, and strength.

Within three months after the commissioning of a new vessel, a detailed statement, itemized as above, aTiAii be furnished the Bureau of Ships by each other bureau concerned, in which the actual weights and revised estimates of the positions of centers of gravity shall be given where necessary.

, i

It shall be responsible for the provision of facilities and arrangements for salvage of vessels.

It shall have administrative supervision of the drydocking of all vessels and district craft and of the operating and cleaning of drydocks and marine railways, other than those installations constructed and used primarily for aircraft.

It shall prepare specifications for fuel other than for aircraft and be responsible for its inspection.

It is charged with the upkeep and operation and also repair, except as excluded in article 484, of the following laboratories: Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Maryland; U.S. Navy Radio and Sound Laboratory, San Diego, California; Naval Boiler and Turbine laboratory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Material Laboratory, Navy Yard, New York; and the experimental model basins at the Navy Yard, Washington, and at Carderock, Ml.

It shall keep the Secretary of the Navy advised as to the adequacy of all shipbuilding facilities and shall, from time to time, inform him when the need for additional facilities develops.


The Chief of the Bureau of Ships is also designated Coordinator of Shipbuilding for the Naval Establishment, and the Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ships as the Assistant Coordinator of Shipbuilding for the Naval Establishment vith authority to issue all orders incident to the performance of this duty.

Any written ordera or instructions relating to the coordination of shipbuilding for the Naval Establishment issued by the Coordinator of Shipbuilding shall be by direction of, and shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy."


With the Congressional Law and the Navy Regulations defining the Bureau's responsibilities but not any specific pattern of organization, it is natural that the temporary organization established under the Coordinator of Shipbuilding in 1939 should be followed. Chart indicates the broad outline of the Bureau as of 15 August 19^0. For purposes of this analysis, a firm of management engineers, Booz, Fry, Allen and Hamilton, started a "Survey of Administration of the Bureau of Ships" in the fall of 1940 and submitted a complete report 1 August 19*H. Their objective description of the organization 4

and of some of the organizational difficulties existing at that time follows in full for this report will provide excellent reference for future organizational surveys and will serve to analyze the structure as established.




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"TEE ORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS" an excerpt from "Survey of Administration of the Bureau of Ships"

Booz, Fry, Allen and. Hamilton

* * **

"THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION" The Administrative Division ig the office management and service unit of the Bureau. Thirteen officers and 430 civilians are organized into four branches - Finance, Officer Personnel, Publications, and Civil Personnel - and four sections - Mail and Files, Duplicating and Printing, Supply Section, and Stenographic Pool. This is the largest division of the bureau outside the Design Division. The detailed work of each section can be summarized as follows: (1) Finance - handles the preparation of budgets and allotments as veil as budgetary accounting. Acts as the fiscal control for the Chief of Bureau. (2) Officer Personnel - Responsible for the recruitment, placement and some training of regular and reserve officers. Keeps officer personnel records and is the liaison with Navigation (now Bureau of Naval Personnel.)


(3) Publications - edits and issues all bureau publications and orders. Supervises bureau security activities. (4) Civil Personnel - responsible for the recruitment, placement, training and personnel actions involving civilian personnel. Keeps personnel records. Prepares bureau civilian payrolls. (5) Mail and Files - receives and distributes all general and confidential mail and dispatches. Handles all outgoing mail and dispatches of the same classification. Maintains bureau general and confidential files. (6) Duplicating and Printing - handles all reproduction work except printing. Orders printing and paper from the Government Printing Office. (?) Supply - orders, stocks and issues all office supplies and equipment for the bureau. (8) Stenographic Pool - handles large typing jobs. Details stenographers and typists to other sections. Serves as a personnel reservoir. The Administrative Division also handles such problems as space and parking. It relieves the division heads of hundreds of details. The Division essentially provides the tools with which much of the bureau work is done. THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DESIGN DIVISION The work of the Division is that of designing, planning, and supervising the construction of combatant ships, auxiliary machinery and equipment, including radio and radio equipment. The work and organization are broken down into five branches: Research, Preliminary Design, Contract Design, Development Design, and Radio and Sound. The five branches are, in turn, broken down into 55 sections comprising 124 officers and 952 civilian employees as of June 30, 194l. The Division comprises a little more than half the personnel of the entire Bureau of Ships.


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A ship starts out as a proposal in Preliminary Design. At the end of her trial runs, that are finally arranged and supervised by Development Design, a ship has passed through every branch and section of the Division from the status of a memorandum on paper to the status of a battle unit. The extraordinary superiority or the fundamental weakness of a ship is already in it when it leaves the designing boards and the calculating machines of this Division. 1. The Research Branch of Design

In the Research Branch, the study of any practical problem of hydrodynamics and shipbuilding may be undertaken, and the practical results of solutions effected fan out in all directions. Officially the activities of Research are confined to the administration of the practical research problems of the Bureau except for the research problems of the Radio Branch, vhich are handled by the Radio Branch itself. In practice, the activities administered by Research are to some extent spread all over the Naval establishment. The Naval Research Laboratory at Belleview is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy. But, in technical matters and in the allotment of funds, the Engineering Experimental Station (Annapolis), the David W. Taylor Model Basin (Carderock), the Naval Boiler Laboratory (Philadelphia), and the Materials Laboratory (Nev York Navy Yard), and numerous other smaller laboratories are all working under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Ships and the Research Branch. (1) The Technical Investigations Section of the branch concerns itself with the Bureau's basic projects of applied research. The Section lists 333 such projects (l April 19^0) and most of them are critical in the progress and operations of the Navy. (2) The Standards and Tests Section, of which there are five sub-sections, administers and furnishes directives for the laboratory testing of all materials and equipment used by the Bureau. The administration of materials testing is well organized, and is carried out under the direction of thoroughly competent materials engineers.



f-Person Boat RUBBER RESEARCH, EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND NEW DESIGN The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. LCR(s) Landing Craft Rubber (Small)

(3) In addition this section ultimately determines standards, and prepares and publishes vhat are termed the Leaflet (standard) Specifications for all materials and equipment. 2* The Preliminary Design Branch

Beginning in Preliminary Design, a ship is ordinarily nothing more than a proposed solution to a set of military problems. These problems may be posed by the General Naval Board or by high ranking officers. But before the design of a ship can even be started, the ship's general feasibility must be determined. When the feasibility and effectiveness of a proposed ship is approved here, naval architects in this Branch block out the general outlines and contours, the masses, veights, and stability of a ship. The basic character throughout is determined and established. Thereafter, these preliminary plans are turned over to the Contract Design Branch. Upon the men of this department rest the hopes and plans for a great ship. They are men of vorId-vide fame, great skill, and high professional standing. The vork of the branch is almost exclusively professional and technical. The Branch has very little correspondence and most of that is vith the General Board covering discussion of proposed ships. The unit is highly self-contained and of necessity maintains its own files. Its vork is in current condition. A ship protection section of the Branch is engaged in fundamental study of the military damage of various forms to vhich menof-var are exposed. It collects, studies, and analyzes the reports on actual var damage and on the extensive experimental research vhich the Bureau conducts. It keeps in convenient form for reference and ready use the data necessary to the design of protective features for nev ships and to the planning of changes in existing ships. 3. The Contract Des i%n Branch

The Contract Design Branch picks up ship plans as they come from Preliminary Design and carries to a high degree of completion the details of designing, drafting, and specification vriting. The basic character of the ship that comes from Preliminary Design is, in Contract Design, converted to specifications upon vhich a builder can bid.


There are two things especially to be noted about the work of this branch: First, in the design of a ship, the mass of detailed and highly specialized work that must be done begins to develop and to be ramified in this branch, and, secondly, the degree of completion of detail to which the vork may be carried in this branch is to some extent variable. The various kinds of specialized work begin to show up in the organization and vork of highly specialized sections. Of the 10 sections in this branch, 4 specialize in the vork to be done on "hull", and 6 of the sections specialize in "machinery" design and computations. The four "hull" sections are: Hull Plans, Stability and Computing, Standard Plans and Small Boats Design, and Hull Specifications. Tvo of these sections call for discussion here. (1) Stability and Computing is a section devoted to computations that determine both the static and dynamic stability of a ship. This section vorks very closely with the Preliminary Design Branch. In fact, when the feasibility of a ship vas being determined in Preliminary Design that feasibility depended to a large extent upon presumed factors of stability. This section also must of necessity vork very closely vith the War Plans Division of the Bureau since one of the biggest problems in the redesigning and refitting of merchant ships requisitioned by the Navy is the problem of retaining stability vhen the character of the ship is greatly changed. (2) Hull Specifications is a section engaged in converting the designs of Hull Plans to the vritten specifications (Detail Specifications) necessary to the letting of a contract. "Hull specifications" and "machinery specifications" can not nov be vritten up in one, unified form, "ship specifications". The purchase (detail) specifications for "hull" are prepared in a volume titled "Detail Specification for Hull". And the corresponding specifications for the "machinery" of a ship are titled "Special Specifications for Machinery".


The filing and referencing system of each is different. "Hull" uses the old Construction and Repair filing system while "machinery" uses Navy Manual filing as a base for all filing and referencing. The plans of each are also keyed, numbered, referenced, and filed differently. Because of this some striking duplications occur, and the various engineering systems of a ship can not be treated as vhole systems. Thus, separate piping and valve specifications must be prepared for both "hull specifications" and "machinery specifications". "Hull Specifications" vill carry a pipe up to a certain elbov or union, but beyond the particular elbow or union, the same pipe is no longer "hull piping" It is now "machinery piping", and the specifications from there on have to be written up in "machinery specifications". This same duplication exists in numerous other places. In electrical specifications, for instance, "Hull Specifications" will carry one part of a wiring system while "Machinery Specifications" will carry another part of the same system. The six "Machinery" and Computing Sections in Contract Design are: Machinery Plans, Electrical Plans, Machinery Computations, Propellers, Machinery Specifications, and Weights. Two of these sections call for discussion here. (1) Electrical Plans is a section engaged in electrical drafting, the making of standard plans, and the preparation of weight estimates. Presumedly, this section prepares and writes the electrical contract plans and specifications for all ships. Actually, the greater part of the electrical specifications are prepared by the electrical technical sections in Development Design. After the contract for a ship is let, the work of this section is practically finished. (2) The Propellers section has full cognizance of that subject including design and drafting. In addition, the Section acts as do technical sections (discussed




under Development Design) in that it takes plan action on contract changes during the building period of a ship. In like manner it takes plan action for the Shipbuilding, Maintenance, and Ma**" Plans Divisions. 4. The Development Design Branch

Development Design is the largest and most complex branch of the Design Division. In this branch, specifications are prepared in detail; materials, and changes and developments in building, are supervised and approved; requisitions are approved; and approval is given for the award of contracts. In addition, trial programs are arranged and carried out under the direction of this branch. The branch comprises more than half of the Design Division. The detailed and highly specialized vork of modem naval construction that began to show up in Contract Design runs its course in Development Design. Thus ve find here two kinds of activity, both highly ramified, that converge and flow together. These two kinds of activity are centered in (a) Ship Type Desks, and (b) Technical Sections. Ship Tyj)e Desks Administer the Building of the Different Kinds of Ships In Development Design the specialization in different kinds of ships is represented in the ship type desks -- 8 of them, one each for battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, patrol craft, auxiliary vessels, and district craft. The different kinds of naval vessels call for widely different application, at times, of all that the various technologies embrace and indicate as necessary. For instance, all the main power demands of our latest battleships are for alternating electrical current, but submarine power demands are for direct current. Again, there are constant changes in technologic details of each type of vessel. All these developmental modifications that unfold in the building of a ship of highly specialized character are administered and controlled by the ship type desk. The ship type desk for a cruiser pulls together in one line of action all that the various technologies (technical sections) have to offer in the building of that ship. The ship type desk thinks of the cruiser "as a whole". In either building or maintenance, "the ship is the thing" for the ship type desk as well as


for the Bureau. Ship type desks are, therefore, characteristically a part of the Bureau's "vertical" organization. Each "desk" has at present one or several officers, for both "hull" and "machinery", but in most instances the senior officer is a "hull" man. Two observations should be made here. (1) These desks are undermanned at present. (2) The plan of organization of ship type desks under the new Bureau of Ships has not, generally speaking, been worked out in full. Whether the "Hull" officer and the "machinery" officer are to act administratively as a unit (be administrative alter egos) or each, in his own field ("hull" or "machinery") is to act as superior is an unsettled question. The tendency is toward the establishment of administrative alter egos, but investigation of the work of each "desk", and statements made on the question by various officers of the Division are sometimes contradictory. The Technical Sections Pass Upon Changes in the Specialized Technologies The second kind of activity in Development Design results from the fact that the various technologies themselves are forever multiplying and then breaking down into sub-technologies of extreme specialization. For instance, an electrical engineer was formerly an expert in everything electrical. Later, the application of electrical power became more diverse, and an electrical engineer became an expert, not in everything electrical, but in motors or generators or communications. Soon, an electrical engineer will not be an expert in motors, but an expert in direct current motors or alternating current motors etc., etc. The administration of changes in the specialized technologies, changes of application, and the expression of expert opinion in the various technologies is centered in the technical sections. (l) The increasing specialization in technology is now represented by the following 19 technical sections: Electrical (gen.), Fire Control and Interior Communications, Gyro Compass, Boilers, Turbines and Gears, Heat Arrangements, Equipment Design, Auxiliary Machinery, Internal Combustion Engines, Hull


Structure, Welding and Casting, Air Conditioning, Piping and Valves, Damage Control and Chemical Defense, the Change Desk, Hull Plan Files, and Machinery Plan Files. Several of these sections have already broken up into sub-sections that bid fair to become technical sections themselves. Technical Sections are "Horizontal" Organizations The technical sections are, what might be termed, "service sections". Each technical section has cognizance of only a detail of any ship. If a line of action producing a type of ship (the action of a ship type desk) is termed "vertical" then the line of action that cuts across the ship production line properly may be termed "horizontal". To the ship type desk a specific type of "ship is the thing". The electrical generator, for instance, is an incidental matter. But to a technical section, the specific generator in any ship is "the thing"; the ship is an incidental matter. The two groups of organizations, ship type desks and technical sections, think, plan and act right across each other. The activity of the technical sections not only cuts across the activity of the type desks in the Development Design Branch but technical section activity also cuts across the activity of other branches in the Division and other divisions in the Bureau. On matters in which a technical section has cognizance, it takes plan action not only for Design but for the Shipbuilding or Maintenance divisions as veil. There is Still Some Unnecessary Duplication of Effort in Technical Sections Each of the former bureaus had technical sections. In the merger most of the obvious duplications were eliminated or compromised. The Welding and Castings Section is an example of a complete merger of two such sections. Piping and Valve's is a partial merger of two old sections. Auxiliary Machinery is another. In some instances new sections had to be organized along somewhat different lines in order to pull related work together. Machinery Arrangements is such a section. All duplication of effort or material cognizance has by no means been eliminated. This results in one of the real "bottlenecks" in Bureau work. There is no clearly formulated distinction between functional cognizance and material cognizance.




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It was previously stated that the plan of organization of ship type desks under the merger is not worked out in detail. In addition, there is some question of the relation between technical sections and ship type desks; some question of hov they should interact. From a functional point of view it might appear the ship type desk would take action on all matters relating to production of the ship; and that the technical section would take administrative or plan action only on matters relating to the independent development of specific machines or materials. However, this is not the case. Technical sections take both administrative and plan action on matters relating directly to production of the ship. Both groups take administrative action or act aa expert technologists, and action in many instances is overlapping. 5. The Radio Branch

The Radio Branch in its present organization is highly autonomous, and its activities spread over a wider range than is ordinary in branch organization. It has responsibility for all radio and underwater sound equipment. It designs, develops, and tests radio equipment for ships, aircraft, and shore establishments and for the Marine Corps. It also designs, develops, and tests underwater sound equipment. In these activities it does not differ greatly from other design branches having cognizance of other materials and equipment. Here, however, the parallel ends. The Radio Branch conducts all of its own research, prepares all of its own material specifications. The Research Branch of the Division does no research work or specification writing for Radio. Besides preparing its own material specifications, this branch.prepares its own requisitions and gives directions for procurement, either by purchase or by manufacture. The Branch also supervises distribution, installation, maintenance, and alteration of radio and sound equipment on ships and on shore. Beyond delivery, it does not install, maintain, etc. on aircraft -- the Bureau of Aeronautics being responsible for that. In all these things, the Branch steps outside the usual branch organization of the Division. The main reason for this divergence derives to a large extent from two things:


(1) Radio and Sound was formerly a division of the old Bureau of Engineering, and in the merger many of the prerogatives of a division have been retained for the Branch. (2) The major developments in radio and underwater sound apparatus are recent, and there has been scant opportunity to reduce activities in these fields to veil routined procedure. WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SHIPBUILDING DIVISION In a general way, the Shipbuilding Division handles the "business end" of the acquisition of ships and the procurement of materials and equipment for the Bureau. When merchant ships are acquired for conversion to naval auxiliaries the Division decides what Navy Yards or private yards shall do the work. It supervises conversion of such ships when plans are approved by the Design and War Plans divisions. In this activity, however, the actual cognizance of the Division is often in doubt. The Division accumulates a great deal of data on shipbuilding, shipbuilding facilities, naval and industrial production, and on materials costs and availability. It carries on a variety of activities of an "expediting" or follow-up nature. But, again, in most of these activities the Division has no real authority, and is in many instances duplicating the activities of other divisions or bureaus. Personnel in the Division has more rapidly than any other Division 59 officers assigned to the Division 236 civilians were employed. A year third of that number. increased very rapidly, much in the Bureau. There were on June 30, and at that time ago there were less than a

The work of the Division is divided among four branches: Departmental Contracts, Procurement, Progress and Shipbuilding Facilities. A fifth organization, the Lease-Lend Section is attached directly ot the office of the Head of the Division. 1. The Departmental Contracts Branch

Departmental Contracts was specifically designated by orders setting up the organization of the Bureau as a branch that should handle all legal matters involving the Bureau. Such legal matters


almost invariably attach to procurement activities. In consultation with the office of the Judge Advocate General, this Branch prepares all departmental contracts for the purchase, acquisition, and conversion of ships and for the procurement of materials and equipment. This Branch also advises the Procurement Branch on all matters relating to NOs Contracts Supplies & Accounts Contracts. All recommendations vith regard to awards, changes in departmental contract terms, liquidation of damage agreements, and settlement of claims are prepared by this Branch. In addition the Branch passes upon earnings under adjusted compensation clauses, and upon adjustments for labor and materials variations in cost. The Branch follows and comments on all existing or pending !.:^r.slation affecting the Bureau. 2. The Procurement Branch

The Procurement Branch of Shipbuilding is responsible for all purchases of the Bureau made through the Bureau of Supplies & Accounts. Specific exceptions are made for certain materials purchased for Ships Equipment (Maintenance), machine tools for Navy Yards, and for certain Radio, and Sound purchases. Even in Radio and Sound purchases, however, Procurement assists in the following of requisitions and NOs Contracts. This Branch is organized very simply and s.oundly in three sections: Requisitions, Contracts, and Stocks and Materials. (1) The Requisitions Section prepares all requisitions from specifications furnished by other divisions of the Bureau; follows through all requisitions until recommendations for award are made to Supplies & Accounts; and maintains files of all requisitions and schedules. A requisition follow-up "desk" operates directly under the head of the Requisitions Section. Its duties are to check on the progress of the requisitions and contracts through the Shipbuilding Division and the Bureau of Supplies & Accounts. Inquiries on progress are answered here and a visible card file is used to indicate schedules and deliveries on contracts. (2) The Contracts Section picks up all NOs Contracts as soon as they are made by Supplies & Accounts; authorizes inspection; handles liquidation of damages, penalties, and bonuses; exercises options in the contract; and follows up delivery.




(3) The Stocks and Materials Section handles all shipment orders and stocking of materials and equipment in Naval establishments; is especially responsible for the development, specification, and testing of ballistic steel (up to 3"); and handles all shipment of Navy furnished materials to private shipbuilders. The Section also keeps up the Bureau of Ships section of the Standard Stock Catalogue. 3The Progress and Estimating Branch

The responsibilities and activities of the Progress Branch of the Division are numerous, varied and not very clearly defined. Originally, organization orders made the Branch responsible for t^e "expeditious prosecution of work" on major shipbuilding projects, including new construction, conversions and maintenance and repair. "Expeditious prosecution" is not a very tangible or objective phrase. Interpretive memoranda have been issued repeatedly in order to clarify duties and responsibilities, especially to give explicit cognizance to the various ship type desks set up in the Branch. These interpretations have not, hovever, been much more explicit than the original orders, and in any event, they have not eliminated duplication of effort and conflict vith other divisions of the Bureau. The activities of the Branch are, at present, organized in three sections: (a) Ship Type Desks, (b) Priorities, and (c) a Scheduling and Estimating Section. (1) The Ship Type Desks are presumed to have responsibility for "progressing" construction, conversion, and maintenance and repair of the principal types of naval vessels. Actually the type desk officers are "expediting" delivery of materials and equipment, in so far as any two of them are doing the same kind of job. On one type desk, the desk handling all combatant ships except submarines, the energies of the officer in charge are almost vholly used up in "expeditious prosecution" of the delivery of armor. When the Shipbuilding Division acquires a merchant vessel or a private ship for conversion to a naval auxiliary, the Auxiliaries Ship Type Desk has cognizance of, and supervises, the conversion within the limits of plans submitted by the War Plan Division. In like manner,


ships acquired to be converted, to district craft are turned over to the District Craft Desk, Both desks are instructed to refer to the Design Division any question of fundamental change in design. Again, the term "fundamental change in design" is not explicit. The management of the Auxiliaries Desk has turned in a remarkable performance record in conversions under conditions of extraordinary stress. However, it should be noted that the good record is a tribute to the individual abilities of the present management rather than to the soundness of organization of vork in the Branch. (The District Craft Desk also supervises the building of certain nev ships, especially smaller vessels.) After such conversions, the type desks in Shipbuilding turn the ships over to corresponding ship type desks in the Maintenance Division. Often the conversions have not been completed when the ships are turned over to Maintenance. Maintenance must, then, finish the conversion. Incidentally, Maintenance supervises all conversions of vessels already in naval service. (2) The Priorities Section is at present a small, nev section. This section "expedites" priorities for materials needed by the Navy or by producers for the Navy. The Section maintains for the Navy liaison with all the federal priorities groups, and the head of the Section is included in several such committees or sub-committees. (3) The Scheduling and Estimating Section is a service section. It prepares numerous reports covering progress in shipbuilding, erection schedules, and acquisition of critical materials. The section accumulates cost records and prepares cost estimates. Because of its excellent organization and interpretation of this basic data, the section is in a position to recommend allocation and assignment of major construction projects.


This section was the Progress and Estimating Section of the former Bureau of Engineering. It was attached directly to the office of Chief of Bureau and it actually had responsibility for scheduling critical materials and delivery dates, and for selection and assignment of building facilities. In the present Shipbuilding Division, all responsibility for scheduling of materials and for selection of construction facilities has been taken away from the Section'. Yet an examination of the quality and thoroughness of the work done in the Section will reveal no section better prepared to bear the responsibility. The man in charge of the section for several years shows a thorough comprehension of scheduling and estimating problems. 4. The Shipbuilding Facilities Branch

The responsibilities, duties, and activities, of this branch fall into two categories. First, records are maintained and reports made covering all shipbuilding activities, private and governmental. Secondly, on the basis of these records, recommendations are made covering appropriations, allotments, and assignment of major shipbuilding projects. Running records are compiled and maintained covering all shipbuilding facilities those in use, those available for use, and those that are inactive. Studies of private yard developments are made, and continuing records are kept of all Navy Yard and Naval Station projects for the Bureau of Ships. This Branch reports all Bureau of Ships financial obligations for Yard and Station projects, and prepares the Bureau's report for the Shore Station Development Board. This Branch makes recommendations covering allocation of major production programs. This* calls for recommendations of appropriation for such things as machine tools for Navy Yards and Stations. In the present emergency, it also makes recommendations of financial subsidy for private shipbuilding facilities. The various activities of the Branch are organized in five sections. Some of them cover the activities of Naval establishments; others cover similar activities in private yards and plants.



The Lease-Lend Section

Recently a Lease-Lend. Section has been established in the Shipbuilding Division under the direct administration of an assistant to the Head of the Division. Organization of the work and activities of this section is not complete, but the Section has been set up on the premise that it should act as a central agency for the compilation and coordination of all reports made under cognizance of the Bureau of Ships for Lease-Lend activities. This section handles procurement of all Bureau of Ships requisitions coming under the Lease-Lend Lav except repairs to vessels. In the course of its activities it prepares Lease-Lend requisitions, requests funds to cover them, recommends award of contracts, and supervises contracts. WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION When a naval ship has been turned over to the Fleet by the Design Division or the Shipbuilding Division, it is transferred to the cognizance of the Maintenance Division. It remains in the cognizance of the Maintenance Division until for any reason it is stricken from the roster of U.S. Naval vessels. Even when a ship is decommissioned, it remains the responsibility of, and within the cognizance of, the Maintenance Division. The Maintenance Division of the Bureau concerns itself with, and is responsible for, three principal activities: (l) the maintenance of naval ships; (2) the equipment of Ships; and (3) the salvage of ships. Thirty-seven officers and 118 civilians are assigned to the performance of this work and the Division is closely associated in its work with the Design Division and the Shipbuilding Division. 1. The Ship Maintenance Branch

Maintenance of naval vessels includes upkeep, overhaul, alterations, conversion, modernization, and repair. Admittedly these terms are loose, and major overhauls or alterations might change the basic design of the ship. Certainly modernization does. In cases where basic design is changed, the Maintenance Division refers all questions or problems of design to the Design Division for approval. In the cases, recently, of several large modernization projects, the whole problem of redesign of the ships was returned to the Design Division.


In conversion activity, a peculiar situation develops. If the ship "be already in= or previously in, naval service, the whole conversion job is the responsibility of Maintenance, excepting only when basic design is changed. Here, again, Maintenance seeks the advice and recommendations of Design, and ultimately proceeds on the approval of the.Design Division. Maintenance is, therefore, thoroughly experienced in conversions. But if the ship be a merchant vessel acquired by the Navy for conversion, the conversion is handled by one of the ship type desks in the Shipbuilding Division. This produces a highly anomalous situation in which there is considerable duplication of effort. All the work in the Ship Maintenance Branch of the Division is organized and handled through a series of ship type desks, each of which is responsible for a certain type or types of vessel. There are seven such ship type desks, one each for berttleships (and carriers), cruisers, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, auxiliaries, and patrol boats and district craft. (l) The ship type desk organization in Maintenance is similar to that in Development Design. Each "desk" has a "hull" and a "machinery" officer, and it is presumed that each, in the absence of the other, will administer the "desk". In survey of the Maintenance Branch it was clearly indicated that the ship type desks were manned by thoroughly competent and experienced personnel that went about the work with a clear cut knowledge of proper procedure. In the performance of work and in the discharge of responsibilities, the ship type desks in Maintenance call upon technical sections for technical advice and recommendations just as the ship type desks in Development Design do, and technical sections will take plan action for Maintenance just as they do for Design or Shipbuilding. Maintenance ship type desks are also responsible for recommending the allotment of Maintenance funds, the preparation of estimates for the Bureau budget, and for recommendations and approval of allowance lists for naval ships.



The ShipsJ Equipment Branch

The Ships' Equipment Branch of the Division is charged with responsibility for approval of all ships' allowance lists, the issue of equipment, and the stocking and issuing of special items of hull and machinery materials. The work of this Branch is organized along lines strictly of material cognizance. Three sections of the Branch handle, respectively, (a) general equipment, (b) allowances, and (c) special equipment. (1) The General Equipment Section handles, among other things, ships' boats (hulls and engines), ground tackle, and minesweeping paravanes. It maintains complete records of boats, boat engines and life floats. Similar records are kept on ground tackle, paravanes, minesweeping gear, and such materials as towing bridles. (2) The Allowance Section handles all ships allowances including type ships' allowance lists and individual ships' allowance lists. This includes ordinary hull and machinery allowances, flags, mess gear and labor saving devices, and navigational equipment and supplies. (3) The Special Materials Section handles all materials not usually or regularly included in allowance lists or equipment. A fourth section in the Equipment Branch, Navigational Equipment, is really a technical section that passes on technical questions of navigational equipment. The Section is located at the Naval Observatory. 3* The Salvage Branch

The Salvage Branch is largely a "paper organization" set up to function in certain situations of national emergency or war. At present the Branch comprises one officer and one clerk, but there is little doubt that the Branch will of necessity be greatly enlarged. The Branch is set up to be responsible for the provision of facilities and arrangements for salvage of vessels. It is presumed that this will be accomplished by the organization and employment of salvage contractors through annual salvage contracts. The Branch is charged with the responsibility of preparing plans for salvage work in case of war.


s; -I'

<.t<-'' .,,--



The officer in charge of this Branch has just recently returned from England where he made an extensive study of salvage activities under war time conditions. THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR PLANS DIYISION The War Plans Division was organized and functions principally for the purpose of collecting and collating all data and information available on merchant ships and critical materials that may "be required "by the Navy in time of war. With regard to merchant ships that may be required, this calls for the collection and organization of all obtainable data and specifications of merchant ships already in service. It also calls for the Rtudy of plans and specifications of merchant vessels proposed by the Maritime Commission so that recommendation may be made covering types of merchant vessel best suited to naval purposes in time of war. The Division prepares structural, mechanical, and electrical plans and specifications for the conversion of merchant ships to naval auxiliaries. In addition, it is presumed that the Division will prepare data covering the possibilities of reproduction of certain types of naval vessels. War Plans maintains a running record of decommissioned naval vessels, and a record of the priority with which they will be recommissioned by order of the Chief of Naval Operations, in case of need. In the matter of critical materials that will be required by the Navy in time of war, the Division prepares material estimates relating to shipbuilding plans of the Bureau of Ships, to plans for conversion of merchant vessels, and to recommissioning plans. This also requires study of sources of supply of critical materials, and preparation of records of availability of such materials. This section will shortly be transferred to the Shipbuilding Division. As a matter of security, the Division handles the distribution of all secret correspondence and documents in the Bureau of Ships and maintains files for this material. Organization of the Division To carry out these responsibilities the War Plans Division has an organization of 40 employees (4 officers and 36 civilians) in Washington and a separate but related organization of 55 employees at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.


The Division organization in Washington has been divided into 4 sections: Administrative, Hull, Engineering, and Materials Estimates. The latter section will soon be transferred to the Shipbuilding Division. It was customary for the Washington unit to vork up only the general or skeleton plans and type specifications for conversions in case of need. The plans were then referred to Philadelphia where detail plans were prepared. Under the present emergency, however, the Washington unit is working up detailed plans for immediate conversions of merchant vessels, and the present situation has put a heavy pressure on the Division. The conversion work of this Division has all been predicated upon the assumption that merchant ship data including detailed plans and specifications, and especially stability and weight factors, would be obtainable and susceptible to good organization. Actually, in the case of stability and weight factors, for instance, satisfactory data has not been available or where available it has not been obtained because of shortage of field personnel. The result is that in most conversion jobs now being done, the Bureau must still rely on empiric data. As a result some converted ships may not live up to the original expectations or purposes.


3- DEVELOH4EMT OF THE BUREAU: This in general summarizes the original organization of the Bureau of Ships as in effect 15 August 1940. In the Bureau history of World

War II 'which follows, one fact should be kept in mind throughout: that is, the eiqpansion in the war effort made it incumbent on the Bureau of Ships to adjust its organization continually. What would have been good practice in August 19^0 at its formation vould not be acceptable in the middle or at the end of the -war.

The survey made by private management engineers pointed out three basic organizational problems: (a) What should be the relation between the different sets of ship type desks, the Design, Maintenance, and Shipbuilding Divisions each having a set? (b) What should be the proper interrelation of the ship type desks of the three Divisions and the technical sections in Design? (c) What were the proper duties and responsibilities of the operating Divisions, particularly the Shipbuilding Division?

These basic problems became evident throughout the development of the Bureau, not only Immediately in the expansion period prior to our entry into the war but also during the pressing war years. The impact upon the organizational structure of the Bureau during these periods and the changes effected are discussed in the applicable chronological phases of this history.






In time of peace, it is frequently difficult to evaluate the threat posed by foreign powers and the ships, planes, and trained men needed to provide reasonable safety to the nation. In any study of the expansion of navel power, therefom, it may be veil to study first the international situation provoking it. Chapter I indicated the decline in shipbuilding following

World War I and the extent to which the United States denuded itself of naval power. The following excerpts from Admiral

King's report to the Secretary of the Navy on 27 March 1944 will indicate the situation which occasioned the shipbuilding expansion in an effort to conform with the fundamental United States naval policy: "To maintain the Navy la strength

and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."



THE INTERNATIONAL^SITUATION LEADING TO WAR "As a result of German's policy of expansion by political,

economic and military aggression, culminating in the invasion of Poland, the European war began on 3 September 1 3 . While our 99 position was for the time being.not clearly established, it vaa nevertheless apparent that this war would affect the United States in a degree which might extend to our becoming involved in a var for our national existence. A. THE LIMITED EMERGENCY "The first atep taken by the United States vas the declaration of the limited emergency by the President on 8 September 1 3 . The 99 immediate effect of this, so far aa the Navy vaa concerned, vas to fix the authorized enlisted personnel strength of the Navy at 1 1 0 0 9,0 instead of 1 1 4 $ and to authorize the recall to active duty of 3,8, officers and men and nurses on the retired and reserve lists of the Navy and Marine Corps. Other direct effects vere that the procurement of materials and equipment, and the taking over of land needed for military purposes, could be accomplished more readily. Also, the Coast Guard could be made a part of the Navy if it appeared desirable, by Presidential order. Indirectly, the limited emergency vas responsible

for changes in contracting authority vhich eliminated competitive bidding, and for the suspension of certain labor provisions relating to hours of vork on government contracts.


U.S. Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New York Once more the great naval shipyards resounded with workers' voices and the pounding of hammers.


NEUTRALITY On 2 October 1939, the Congress of American Republics assembled

at Panama agreed upon a resolution which establiphed a neutral zone surrounding the Americas, with the exception of Canada, at an,average distance of 300 miles. By the terms of the resolution, belligerent raiders and submarines were to be prevented from operating close to the Western Hemisphere, as they had done in World War I, the thought responsible for the resolution being that if belligerent operations took place in that area, the United States and her Latin American neighbors might veil become involved in the war. The United States Navy being the only armed force equal to the task of maintaining petrol in this extensive area, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the proclamation was obvious. The patrol was in fact taken by the United States Navy, and at that time a portion of the 111 decommissioned destroyers vere recommissioned for the purpose of making it effective. Preceded by heated debates, during which it was argued that, for insufficient reason, we would be abandoning our traditional policy of freedom of the seas, the Neutrality Act of 1$39 became law on 4 November 1939, and American vessels and citizens were thereby prohibited from entering combat zones. The Act also established a so-called cash and carry policy, under which all belligerents were required to do their own transporting of goods purchased in the United States, and pay for them before being granted clearance. In addition, it authorized the

President to place restrictions on the use of ports and territorial


waters of the United States by submarines or merchant vessels of foreign states (pursuant to vhich he prohibited their nee by foreign submarines of belligerent states, except when there by force majeure) and prohibited the use of United States ports as bases for furnishing men and supplies to ships of belligerent states lying off those ports. Other consequences of the Neutrality Act were to make effective certain lavs previously enacted, having for their purpose the maintenance of neutrality. These included prohibitions against sending our armed

vessels for delivery to belligerents, and contained provisions for detaining armed vessels or vessels manifestly built for warlike purposes or conversion thereto. Included, also, insofar as detention and permissible length of stay were concerned, were lavs covering the use of our ports by foreign vessels. C. NAVAL EXPANSION "in view of the situation, our requirements as to naval strength were again presented to the Congress, in January 1940. At that time,

the part the United States was to play in the war was still not clear, but with due regard for our national safety and with aggressor nations disregarding treaties and pacts without hesitation - the immediate result being rapid changes in the international situation - Congress recognized that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves. Coupled with this uncertainty was the knowledge that the international situation had been very difficult to predict. Many keen observers were certain that no European war would break out in 1939, and there were others who felt that we would be able to stay out of the war.


Pursuant to the recommendation of the Navy Department, and following a careful examination of world conditions, the Congress authorized an expansion of 11 per cent in our combatant ships, and the President signed the bill on 14 June 1940. "Meanvhlle^ the aggressor nations had succeeded in imposing their will upon numerous European countries. Germany had disposed of France and had overrun the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Poland, and stood on t . Channel coast, poised for an all out attack on Britain, In 'a view of that alarming situation, the Congress passed the so-called TwoOcean Navy Bill, which we signed by the President on 1$ July 1940s The increase in our naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,323,000 tone of combatant ships-by far the largest naval expansion ever authorized, This authorization was followed by the necessary appropriations in dne course, and^ in the making, we bad a Navy commensurate with our needs.


"During the summer of 1$40, the Battle of Britain was in its initial stages and. the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted with telling effect. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had suffered severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the retreat from Dunkirk. Faced with this situation^ Great Britain entered into an agreement with the United States, under the terms of which 50 of our older destroyers no longer suited for the type of fleet service for which they had been designed, 'but still adequately suited for antisubmarine duty, were exchanged for certain


rights in various localities suitable for the establishment of naval bases in the Atlantic area, and essential to the national defense. In

addition to the bases acquired in return for the $0 destroyers, we were granted .reely and without consideration' similar rights with respect

to the leasing of bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.


This acquisition of bases operated to advance our sea frontier

several hundred miles in the direction of our potential enemies in the Atlantic, and as the bases were leased for a term of $9 years, we could profit by their strategic importance to the United States not only immediately, but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange.
-9< '^:


LEND-LEASE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION " On 11 March 1941, the so-called "Lend-Lease" .Act was signed by

the President. The provisions and effects of that Act are too well known to require comment in this report. Naturally, we were unwilling to see a large part of the material built with our labor and money lost io transit, and our only recourse was to give the British assistance in escorting the convoys carrying that material within North American waters. "incident to our decision, the United States entered Into an agreement with Denmark on 9 April 1941 relative to the defense of Greenland, and on that day our Marines were landed there to prevent its being used by Axis raiders. The Coast Guard cutter CAYUGA had already landed a party there to conduct a survey with respect to airfields, seaplane bases, radio stations, meteorological stations and additions to navigation, and on 1 June, the first of the Greenland patrols was organized, consisting chiefly of Coast Guard vessels and personnel.


On 2? ^by 1941, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed by the Resident. "On 7 July l$4l, United States Marines were landed in Iceland and relieved some of the British forces stationed there. ' On 11 August 1941, on board the United States cruiser AUGUSTA, the President and Brlme Minister of Great Britain agreed upon a joint declaration covering the principles of mutual interest to the two countries, "For soine months, for the purpose of ensuring safe passage of goods shipped under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, our naval forces had been patrolling waters in the vicinity of the convoy routes, and had been broadcasting information relative to the presence of raiders,. On 4 September 1941, GREER, a four-stack United States destroyer was enroute to Iceland, with nail, passengers and freights When about 175 miles south of Iceland, she detected a submarine ahead. The submarine fired a torpedo at her and missed, whereupon GHEER counterattacked with depth charges. Another torpedo was fired at GREER but it also missed^, and GREER continued to Iceland. As a result of this incident, our naval forces were ordered by the President to ahoot on sight any vessel attempting to interfere with American shipping, or with any shipping under American escort. "On 15 October, KEARNY., a new destroyer, one of a number of vessels escorting a convoy from Iceland to North America, was torpedoed amidships. Eleven of her crew were killed and seven were wounded, and the ship was badly damaged but able to make port.



Qa 30 October^ the naval tanker SALINAS was hit by two torpedoes about 700 miles east of Newfoundland. There were no casualties to personnel, and SALINAS reached port safely. "On 31 October in the same vicinity REUBEN JAMES; another old destroyer, was atruck amidships by a torpedo. The ship was broken in tvo; the forward, part at once, "but the after part stayed afloat

long enough to enable 4$ men to reach the deck and launch life rafts from which they were rescued. About 100 men were lost in this sinking, "Whatever the situation technically, the Navy in the Atlantic was taking a realistic viewpoint of the situation. During the month of November, further steps were taken to enable our naval forces to meet the steadily growing emergency. On 1 November the Coast Guard was made a part of the Navy. Prior to that time ten Coast Guard cutters were transferred to the British. On 17 November sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939 were repealed by an act of Congress, thereby permitting the arming of United States merchant vessels and their passage to belligerent ports anywhere. "Another effect of the European war, of major importance to the United States, was the alliance by which on 27 September 1940 Japan became one of the Axis powers. "For many years it had been predicted and expected that eventually Japan's policy of expansion would conflict with our interests in the Pacific. Recognition of that possibility, plus Japan's growing naval strength, were indicated by her being a party to the 1922 treaty on limitation of armaments, and to subsequent treaties dealing with that subject.

'At the time of the 1922 treaty Pearl Harbor and Manila were fortified bases, and Guam was being fortified. None of our other Pacific territories and possessions was fortified. When, therefore, the parties to that treaty agreed to maintain the fortification of certain Pacific islands in status quo, the fortification of Guam was halted. Subsequently conforming to the treaty provisions, we maintained the status quo at Guam and Corregidor, and confined our precautionary measures in the Pacific to the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and our vest coaat bases. "Our foresight in developing Pearl Harbor and our vest coast bases has increased, immeasurably, our ability to carry on the var in the Pacific. Whether or not Guam could have been made sufficiently strong to withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problematical, but we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if we are to have outlying possessions ve must be prepared to defend them* "when, in the winter of 1 3 - 9 , the Japanese declared themselves 951% no longer willing to abide by existing treaty provisions or be a party to further negotiations, it gave rise to a feeling of uneasiness concerning the trend of Japanese policy and activities. Unfortunately, the full import of that move did not become apparent until later. "in 1931; Japan had embarked on a policy of aggression by the seizure of Manchuria. This was followed by other conquests in China, and as ve have since learned, was accompanied by the fortifying of certain islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, in direct violation of the treaty provisions. A complete history of our relations with Japan


during the period. 1931-1941 was issued by the State Department in the so-called "White Paper" dated 2 January 19^3. "Continuing her aggression, Japan moved into French-Indo China in 1940. In 1941, the United States was engaged in protesting these and

other moves, and vhile conversations with the Japanese vere being held, the German offensive in Russia was being successfully pressed. It seems

likely that this influenced the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor. "Whatever the reasons, Japan, vhile her representatives in Washington vere still engaged in discussions, presumably vith a. viev to finding a means of preventing var, on the morning of 7 December 19^1 attacked our ships at Pearl Harbor. * * * "A fev hours later a similar but less damaging attack vas made on the Philippines. * * *

"On the f olloving day ve declared.. .'that a state of var vhich has thus been thrust upon the United States by the Imperial Government of Japan is hereby formally declared.' On 11 December a similar declaration vas made concerning Germany and Italy."


II. BALANCE OF FLEETS. By 1931-1932 the American Navy had declined to its lowest point but in the late thirties the pendulum reversed itself and the United States vith the rest of the nations of the vorld began to re-arm. Warfare, however, being a situation of relative strengths, this decline and renaissance must be viewed in relation to the major naval powers with which this country was to become allied or opposed. In the naval warfare of World War II, only three countries played major roles: Japan on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other. The comparisons with regard to major combatant vessels of these nations are presented in Tables 4 to ^ for the years 1931 (lowest point) and 1938, 1939, and 1940 (the major periods of emergency building and wartime expansion).



On Hand. Year Airct. Carriers Heavy Cruisers Battleships Tons No. Tons No. Tons ! No. Light Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Total No. Tons No . Tona No. Tona No. Tona


1931 1938 1939 1940

13 15 15 15

455,400 464,300 464,300 464,300

3 3 5 6

77,500 8,0 050 1010 2,0 1480 3,0

10 17 18 33

93,100 1120 6,0 1120 7,0 1120 7,0

10 10 17 19

70,500 70,500 137,775 157,775


225 203 221 159

240,220 81 66,250 243,340 85 77,365 273,490 89 8 , 7 315 216,950 104 105,010

344 1,002,970 333 1,097,205 365 i,250,o4o 321 1,250,035 87,600 ! 322,290 482,130 2,162,445

Under Conatruction

1931 1938

1939 1940

2 8 17

7,0 000 3000 0,0 7000 7,0

1 3 2 12

13,800 7 5^,500 1 34,500 311,300 14

7,0 000 1,0 000


9 6 4o

90,000 49 76,050 44,ooo 43 6,8 830 368,000 166 325,470

3 3,8oo 11 15 21,740 79 25 35,250 84 81 121,675 330

On Hand and. Under Conatruction

1931 1938 1939


15 17 23 32

455.400 4 534,300 6 764,300 7 1,234,300 18

91,300 135,000 154,600 446,ioo

17 18 18 32

163,100 171,200 171,200 437,200

10 19 23 59

70,500 160,500 181,775 525,775

225 252 264 325

240,220 319,390 341,870 5240 4,2

84 100 114 185

70,050 99,105 118,425 226,685

355 412 449 651

1,090.570 ! 1,419,495 ; 1,732,170 3,4i2,48o


On Band. Year Battleships No. Tons 19 15 13 15 5130 8,0 4470 7,0 4470 7,0 394,250 Airet. Carriers Hea-vy Cruisers No. Tons No. Tons 6 6 7 8 115,300 115,350 1690 3,0 1090 6,0 Light Cruisers Destroyers No. Tons No. Tons Submarines Total No. Tons No. Tons 60 54 55 49 5 , 8 306 729 55,909 295 56,919 317 51,360 321

1931 1938 1939 1940

O t

19 15 15 15

186,226 145,120 145,620 145,620

39 44 47 30

177,685 266,540 294,635 326,065

163 161 178 184

175,065 200,529 233,339 258,459

12285 ,9,6 1,258,148

1,342,133 13664 ,3,5

Under Ccinstruction

1931 1938

1939 1940

5 7 8

175,000 5 255,000 5 300,000 3

1400 1,0 115,000 69,000

fs TT*.J J! Tt-J

4 17 21 19

26,000 21 123,500 33 146,500 37 129,050 6

28,591 2 57,350 18 69,350 14 9,220 28

2,400 27 18,415 78 15,690 84 16,216 64

488,265 601,540 523,486


1931 1938 1939 1940

19 20 22 23

581,300 6 649,700 11 729,700 12 694,250 11

113,300 19 229,330 15 251,900 15

229,900 15

186,226 43 1*3,120 61 145,620 68 145,620 69

203,685 390, o4o 441,135 455,115

134 203,656 194 257,879 215 302,709 190 267,679

62 39,689 333 1,349,856 72 74,324 373 1,746,413 69 72,609 401 1,943,673 77 67,576 385 i,86o,3,4o

TABLE 6 MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF JAPAN ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION Kand On ] Year Battleships No. Tona 10 Alrct. Carriers Heavy Cruisers No. Tons No. Tons Ll^tt Cruisers Destroyers No. Tons No. Tons 17 17 17 17 8,0 183 8,0 185 8,0 185 8,0 185 52 81 87 94 7,0 845 1005 2,0 129,905 1145 4,0 Submarines Total No. Tons No. Tons 44

1931 1938 1939 1940


312,000 6
3200 1,0 312,000

3200 1,0

10 10

6 7

61,270 8 88,470 17 88,470 18 103,470 18

82,000 202,500 217,000 217,000

60 76,943 191 881,723 60 76,943 198 906,123

52,613 134 209

6803 6,9 939,083

63 83,403
3 U

Under Construction

1931 1938
1939 1940

1 l l

1 45,000 2 45,000 3 45,000 3

7,100 ; 5 59,600 1 74,600 74,6oo

78,000 14,500
1 6,000

7 13 15 19

1,0 180 2,5 140 24,750 35,350

6,46o 23,990

16 17 22 35

102,070 140,550 150,810 184,940

On Hand and. I& ConstructionL der

1931 1938 1939 1940

10 11 11 11

312,000 357,ooo 357,000 357,ooo

4 8 9 10

68,370 148,070 163,070 178,070,

13 18 18 18

1000 6,0 217,000 217,000 217,000

17 17 17 18

8,0 1 8 5 59 8,0 1 8 5 94 8 , 0 102 185 8 , 0 H3 785

90,205 141,455 154,655 176,755

47 57,733 60 76,943 63 83,403 74 107,393

150 770,163 208 1,022,273

220 1,056,933 244 1,124,023




JAPAN No. Tons

JABAN U.S. GR. BR. No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons

No. Tons ON HAND

GR. BR. No. Tons

U.S. No. Tons

GR. BR. JAPAN No. Tons No. Tons

Battleships Aircraft Carriers Heavy Cruisers Light, Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Total

15 3 10 10 225 81

581 10 312 15 464 455 19 77 6 115 3 61 5 120 186 8 82 18 171 93 19 81 17 137 70 39 177 17 24o 163 175 52 78 221 273 66 60 57 44 52 89 83 1,002 306 1,292 134 668 365 1,250

15 474 10 312 15 6 7 136 6 88 15 145 18 217 18 47 294 17 81 19 178 233 87 129 159 55 56 60 76 104

317 1,342 198 -

45 74 24 6

15 394 10 8 160 7 15 145 18 50 326 17 184 258 94 49 51 63 321 1,230 321 1,336 209
17 12 14 40 166 81

464 134 171 137 216 105


103 217 81 141 83 939

45 7* "6 35 23

UNDER CONSTRUCTION Battleships Aircraft Carriers Heavy Cruisers Lig&t Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Total

1 7

13 70

3 11

4 21 3 2 87 27

26 28 7 2 3 56 16

i 5

7 233 3 11-5 6 44 21 146 68 37 69 11 43 5 25 35 14 15 102 84 482 } 84 601 7 78

8 300 2 34

l 3
15 3

770 311 266 368 325 121



8 300 1 3 69 3 19 329 1 6 9 19 28 16 11 64 323 35


TABLE 7, Cont'd

1931 U.S.
No. Tons

JABAN No. Tons

1940 U.S.
No. Tons GR. BR. JAPAN

No. Tons

GR. BR. ! JAPAN No. Tons! No. Tons

No. Tons

No. Tons No. Tons

ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION Battleships Aircraft Carriers Hea*vy Cruisers Light Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Total

15 4 17 10 255 84

455 91 163 70 24o 70

19 6 19 43 184 62

581 115' 186 ' 203 203 i 59 ^

4 13 17 59 47



68 7 160 18 81 23 90 264 57 114

764 22 154 12 171 15 181 68 341 215 118 69

729 11 357 32 251 9 163 18 145 18 217 32 441 17 81 59 302 102 154 325 83 185 72 63 651

355 1,090 333 1,349 3.50 1

770 449 1,732 4oi 1,943 220 1,056

11 357 10 178 18 217 18 87 U3 176 67 74 107 3,412 385 1,860 244 1,124

1,234 23 446 11 437 15 525 69 542 190 226 77

694 229 1*5 455 267

- 2-

Careful study of these charts reveal many interesting facts the magnitude of the Allies' shipbuilding expansion being exceeded as the most outstanding fact only by the figures indicating the comparative ship building stagnation on the part of the Japanese. Our enemy's

steady growth in the earlier years indicates their long range preparation for the outbreak of war. American expansion, however, was rapid. Naturally, some classes of ships were stressed more strongly than others. As illustrated by

the preceding tables, from 1938 to 1940tlienumbercf the United States' battleships under construction jumped from 2 to 17 J During this same period, the aircraft carrier program expanded from 3 to 12, the cruiser program from 10 to $4, the destroyer program from 4$ to 166, and the submarine program from 15 to 81J In tonnage, this building program sky-rocketed from less than one-third million tons in 1938 to well over two million tons in 1940. Great Britain's construction remained almost constant from 1937 until after our entry into the war. In like manner, Japan suffered no

"Topsy"-like expansion, but continued steadily to increase her construction program from 1934 on. No particular class of vessel received special emphasis, although, if one must be chosen, the data indicates that the most marked increase occunxd in the submarine program.


Baaed upon the above figures and upon further data, Chapter VI vill compere in more detail the major fleets as they stood in late 1941, for in these statistica of relative sea pavers may be found reasons for the premeditated Japanese attack on Pearl Hajrbor. Before that, however, ve may first study the problems encountered by our country under the emergency shipbuilding program and the concomitant expansion of personnel and facilities under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships.




IMPACT UPON THE BUREAU During the period 1940-41 major organizational developments

did not occur within the embryonic Bureau of Ships. The youth of the organization, the desire of those in control to gain experience in management of such an organization, end the tremendous increase in work load made any major changes impractical? Minor modifications, however, did occur. One in particular, concerning Division status, reflected changing Bureau responsibilities. The War Plans Division

was disbanded on 6 September 1941; its duties and personnel were transferred to other Divisions in the Bureau. This move was dictated by the fact that preparation for war had reached a point where the planning of the conversion of merchant ships and procurement planning, which had been the main functions of the Division, were no longer matters to be left to a staff office. Instead, they had become major operating

responsibilities and had to be tied into the new construction and procurement program of the Bureau as a whole. Somewhat earlier, on 21 July 1941, the Statistical Section of the War Plans Division had been consolidated with the Scheduling and Estimating Sections and designated Scheduling and Statistics Section of the Shipbuilding Division. This

action proved to be one of the first indications of the merging of the Bureau's planning and operating functions as the national defense program gathered momentum.


CHAPTER IV EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING A. BACKGROUND With the outbreak of the European War on September 9; 1939; the United States found itself in an inferior status with respect to the other world powers' naval strengths. As explained in Chapter I, the NIRA $ 3 , 0 , 0 appropriation by President Roosevelt and the Vinson280000 Trammel Act of 1934 authorizing.the construction of a fleet of treaty strength provided first impetus to the revival of our shipbuilding program. At this time Japan's warring on Manchuria and Hitler's rise to power in Germany constituted far off threats to our national security. Appropriations sky-rocketed in 1936 and 1937, followed by the Act of May 1 3 98 providing an increase of 20 percent in our naval strength, exclusive of replacements permitted under the Vinson-Trammel Act of


B. WAR EMERGENCY BUILDING Constituting the first step taken to increase the United States Navy above the strength permitted by the treaties, the Act of 1938 increased the number and tonnage allowances of combat vessels in the Navy by approximately 22$; increased the number of useful aeroplanes from 2,050 to a total of not less than 3;000; authorized the construction of 26 auxiliary vessels; and authorized an appropriation of $15,000,000 to be expended at the discretion of the President for the purpose of experimenting vith light surface craft. This act, however, indicated a compromise in the thinking of our political leaders. On the one hand, it provided for a great expansion, but hardly a building program of wartime magnitude;*on the other hand, it reflected a nev attitude towards shipbuilding appropriations, since it provided a general fund which the Commander-in-Chief might use to whatever advantage he and the armed services wished. In peace time the amount of discretion left to the Navy inevitably proved to be very limited. If the Navy desired new vessel construction, it had first to present its request to the Bureau of the Budget for approval. After approval by the Bureau of Budget, the request went to the House Naval Affairs Committee, although under the rules this legislation may have originated in the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. With any authorization given, it then became necessary to go through the identical procedure for the necessary appropriation authority. In both cases the authority granted carried specific limitations as to the type and number of snipe to be built.


The Act of 1938 altered this authorization procedure with the $15,000,000 for "experimental small craft". The only definition in the act stated "no single ship may exceed 3,000 tons". Although the amount proved meager, the precedent had been established and became of great value as the emergency shipbuilding program grew. With the 1939 unprecedented appropriation for naval shipbuilding of almoat $200,000,000 the new construction awarded to Navy Yards and private yards jumped over night. During 1939 the Navy Yards built 17 combatant vessels and the newly expanded private yards constructed 57. All of these vessels did not come under the nev appropriations, but the increase indicated the healthier state of our building facilities and of our preparations for defense. The major change, however, came vith the passage of the 11 percent Expansion Act of June 1940 which increased the combatant strength of the Navy by 167,000 tons in the following amounts: 79?500 tons 66,500 tons 21,000 tons aircraft carriers cruisers submarines

It provided for variations of tonnage for the various types by 33?400 tons in the aggregate. The next month another piece of legislation, the 70% Expansion Act of July 1940, followed the same procedure but permitted the transfer of tonnage to the extent of 30 percent of the total. The terms, following the practice of allowing the Navy to exercise its discretion, . stated: "1,325,000 tons of combatant vessels, 100,000 tons of auxiliary vessels, and patrol craft, and $93,000,000 to remain available until



As is customary, the actual production did not follov the

appropriations, for money grants extend over periods of years. During the fiscal year of 1940 the Navy Yard nev construction jumped to 4$ ships, while private yards production slipped back to 12. Following the 70% Expansion Act in July, authorizations steadily poured from the Congressional chambers to the Navy Department: 9 September 1<?40: 31 January 1941: 5 April 1941: 24 May 1941: 21 November 1941: 186,640 tons auxiliary vessels 400 patrol, mine, and small craft 77,164 tons auxiliary vessels 550,000 tons auxiliary vessels 400 patrol, mine, and small craft

Indicative of the war feeling which pervaded the entire world as hostilities raged in the Orient and Europe, the shipbuilding industry during the fiscal year 1941 produced the first emergency mass construction, with the activated Navy Yards turning out another 4$ ships, while off the ways of the established private shipyards and of the many new companies springing up throughout the country came the unprecedented total of 34l ships. The emergency ship production during the critical years of 1938 to 194l, together with construction completed during the previous five years of recovery are depicted by the following Tables 8 and 9.




1933 - 1938
19 No. Vessels Tonnage

No. Vessels Tonnage 10 69,215

No^ Vessels


114 127


9 4





910 910






150 186

436.7 71,971-7

134 150

443.9 9,718.9

No. Vessels Tonnage 74,410 27

No. Vessels 20


No. Vessels Tonnage 22 42,010




9 1


3 4 1 1 250

538 215

2 1



2 2

9.8 9.8
727.3 48,664.1

753 4.9 4.9 955.3

3 3 154

825 14.7

235 271

14.7 567.5 98,942.2




Table S Continued



1939 - 1941 1939

No. No.
Tonnage 6,7 505 Vessels Tonnage 56,900



)34< No. Vessels Tonnage




154,458 26,712
2,8 224 533,887 34,345 20,915 55,260


2,764 130,891


127 ,6

23 32



6 1


4,847 2,064

202 124 326


79.8 79.8

114 114 842

584.0 1,042 584.0 1,042 2,521.3 1,252 200,571.3 2,913

7,950.8 7,950.8 5,275.0 85868 0,2.



319 383

68,679.1 1,069



193? - 1935 1933

Type Battleships (BB) Aircraft Carriers


No. Vessels

No. Vessels Tonnage

No. Vessels






Deetroyera (DD) Destroyers Escort (DE) Destroyer Escort (British)(BDE) Submarines (SS) TOTAL COMBATANT 2








Table 9 Continued


1936 - 1938 1936 No. Vessels Tonnage

No. Vessels Tonnage

No. Veaaele

Type Battleships (HB) Aircraft Carriers









1 1

9,400 9,700 28,850 6 7 57,575 11,550 -

Destroyers (DD)
Destroyers Escort (BE) Destroyer Escort (British)(BDE) Submarines (SS) TOTAL COMBATANT




5 22

6,580 42,010

5 27

6,660 74,410



v^Table 9 Continued


1939 - 19M 1939 1940

No. Vessels

Battleships (BB) Aircraft Carriers

No. Vessels Tonnage

No. Vessels Tonnage


70,000 14,700 19,800



Cruisers CA 1 10,000

CL Destroyers (DD) Destroyers Escort (DE) Destroyer Escort (British) (BDE) bmarines (SS) TOTAL COMBATANT 8 26 11,655 65,075 7 28 10,, 300 56,900 11 31 14,998 136,878 2 15 20,000 23,420 20 31,900 1 16 6,000 26,080




This nev construction, which proved the "backbone of our naval defense when the United States joined the Allied Powers in declared warfare against the Axis, came under the cognizance of the newly formed Bureau of Ships. As explained in Chapter II of this history, the merger of two separate Bureaus into one unified entity on June 20, 1940 placed the full burden of bringing our Navy up to an adequate wartime strength under one jurisdiction. Appropriations are one thing but production another. With a stimulated building industry at its disposal, the new Bureau began an intensive, unified program to utilize to the full the expanded facilities and'to take advantage of the Congressional financial grants in order to bring the United States naval strength to an unsurpassed position in the world. The

production effected from 1937 until our entry into the war is tabulated in Table 10 according to the authorized appropriations under which these vessels were built. This well illustrates the lag between appropriation and actual construction.




NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 17 MAY 1938 15 JUTE 1938 APRIL 1939

ACT OF 25 JULY 1939

11%EXP. ACT 14 JUNE 1940

ACTS OP 26 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941

70% IKP. ACT 19 JULY 1940

ACT OF ACT OF 31 9 SEPT 1940 JAN 1941

ACT C# ** 5 APRIL 1941

1937 NoTT^ (20 Comb't) 1938 No. 4 (12 Comb't 2 Aux.)

12 Deatroyere 6 ERAs 2 Battleahipa 3 Destroyer a 4 Subs 1 Seapl. Tdr. 1 Dost. Tdr.

ND. 5

(23 Comb't 14 Aux. )

4 2 8 6

Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Subs

1 Sub. Tdr. 1 Oiler 1 Fit. Tug IMineSv.

2 Cruisers 1 Carrier IDest. Tdr. 3 Seapl. Tdr. 2 Oilers IMineSv. 2 Fit. Tugs 1 Mine Lay. 1 Catap. Lter. 5 Subchasers 20MTB's 12MBSubch.

1939 No. 6 Experlmt. Program

1940 No. 7 (20 Comb't 3 Aux.)

2 2 8 8 1 2

Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Subs Repair Sh. Seapl. Tdr.


FISCAL YEAR & 20 VimON-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY PROGRAM NO. AUGUST 1916 27 MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937 1940 ( Cent 'd) No. 8 (2 Comb't)
No. 8A (2 Aux.)

NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 17 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 Modernization 2 Carriers 1 Misc. Aux. 1 Transport

11%EXP. ACT 14 JUNE 1940

ACTS OF 26 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941

70%EXP. ACT 19 JULY 1940

ACT OF 19 SEPT 1940

ACT OF 31 JAN 1941


1941 r!b. 9 (19 Comb't 5 Aux.)

1 Battleship 4 Subs

1 Battleship 1 Carrier 2 Cruisers 8 Destroy. 2 Subs IMineSw. 1 Sub Tdr. 3Seapl. Tdr. 3 Subs Moderni zation 5 Battleships Major Over* haul 3 Battleships 2 Cruisers 7 Destroyers 3 Carriers 5 Cruisers 14 Subs

No. 10 No. 11 No. 12

No. 13 1 Transport (1st Supple) 6 Cruisers (67 Comb't 22 Destroyers lAux.) 7 Subs



NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 17 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939

11%EXP. ACT 14 JUNE 1940

ACTS OF 26JUNE1940 17 MARCH 1941 2Mtb Tdrs. 1 Net Carto Ship 15 Minesweepers 60 Coastal Minesv. 1 Coast Minelay. 2 Minelay. 3 Unclass. 2 Gunboats 9 Yachts 19 Coastal Yachts 19 Out Patrol 159 Small Craft 7Auxil.

70%EXP. ACT 19 JULY 1940

ACT OF 19 SEPT 1940

ACT OF' 31 JAN 1941

ACT OF ** 5 APRIL 1941

1941 Nb. 15 (1st Supple 130 Ships OldNEF)

No. 16

(159 Sm.Cr.)
Nb. 17 (7 Aux.) Nb. 18 (2nd Supplemt) (252 Comb't 56Aux.)

2 Battleships

2 1 2 1 2

Best. Tdr. Minesv. Oilers Sub Tdr. Seapl. Tdr.

2 Mtb. Tdrs. 7 Minesw. 4GasTkrs. 3 LCV 9 Sea. Tdr. IRep. Sh. 1 Sub Tdr.

1 Battleship 16 Carriers 24 Cruisers 155 Destr. 46 Subs 1 Best. Tdr. 3 Oilers 1 Gas Tk. 2 LSV iTrana. 2 Rep. Ships



20 VINSON-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT AUGUST 1916 27 MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937 1? MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940

ACTS OF 26 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941

70% ISP. ACT 19 JULY 1940

ACT OF 9 SEPT 1940

ACT OF 31 JAN 1941


No. 18 (2nd. Suppl.) (Cent'A) (252 Comb't. % Aux.) No. 19 (24 Aux.) (Old ANV) 1 6 6 0 T. 8,4

3 Sub. Tdre. 5 Sub. Res.Bte. 4 Carrier Eacs. IMisc. Bt. 3 Cargo Ships 9 Transports Att. 2 Transports 1 Repair Ship 3 Sub Tdrs. 2 Seapl. Tdrs. 1 Carrier Esc. 1 Gunboat 1 Harbor Tug 1 Repair Ship .^) Minesweepers 7 Fit Minesvs. 14 Coast .Mine&ws. 2 Fit Tugs 40 Sub Chasers 4MTBs. 1 Diving Tdr. 17 Mtr. Minesvs. 2 Misc. Ves. 7 Sub Chasers (Control) 4 Sub Chasers (Control) 110' 2 2 2 4 2 Destryr. Tdrs Amm. Ships Provsn.St.Shs. Aux.Car.Shs. Car.Shs. & Aircraft Ferry

No. 20 (4th Suppl.). (400 Patrol & Diet. Crft.)

No. 21 (12 Aux.) (old ANV) 77,164 Tons



""*** 20 VIN30N-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY AUGUST 1916 2? MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937

' A C T S OF 70% NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT 26 JUNE 1940 330?. ACT 17 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 AERIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940 1? MARCH 1941 19 JULY 1940 16 Sub Chasers 1 MTB 4 Sub Chasers (Control)

ACT OF 9 SEPT 1940

ACT OF 31 JAN 1941


1941 (4 Suppl.) (Cont'd) No. 22 (72 Patrol Craft)


D. BIRTH OF A SHIP Upon receiving financial appropriations from Congress baaed, upon requests from the Navy, the Bureau of Ships could then place a contract for the construction of naval vessels-, Prior to this, however, several authorities within the Navy Department of necessity had to concern themselves with the planning of any proposed shipbuilding programs. The Chief of Naval Operations determined the operational needs of the Fleet and the Ship Characteristics Board, composed of personnel possessing fleet service experience, worked out the characteristics of the ship in order to comply with the purposes of the plan. These specifications

were drawn up in coordination with the preliminary design section of the Bureau of Ships to determine whether or not the Bureau was able to accomplish what was desired. The recommendations then passed to the General Board composed of naval officers appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to serve as his advisers. After forwarding their recommendations to the Secretary, he passed the conclusions on, together with his comments, to the Chief of Naval Operations for his final perusal. If approved, the

entire plan reverted back to the Bureau of Ships and only then did work commence on the preliminary design. 1. PRELIMINARY DESIGN. With the feasibility and effectiveness of a proposed ship already approved, naval architects in the preliminary design branch of the Bureau of Ships blocked out the general outlines and contours, the masses, weights and stability of the proposed ship. By this operation the basic character of the ship is fully determined and established.





CONTRACT DESIGN. The Contract Design Branch of the Bureau of Ships picks up ship

plans as they come from Preliminary Design and carries to a high degree of completion the details of designing, drafting and specification writing. The basic character of the ship that comes from Preliminary

Design is converted in Contract Design to specifications upon which a builder can bid.. 3* DEVELOPMENT DESIGN. In this branch specifications are prepared in detail. Materials

and changes and developments of building are supervised and approved, requisitions are passed upon, and approval is given for the award of contract. In addition, trial programs are arranged and carried out Now that contracts have been let,

under the direction of this branch.

two kinds of activity, both highly ramified and coverging, center on two subdivisions of the Development Design Branch: (a) (b) The Ship Type Desk, Technical Sections. The Ship Type Desk specializes in different types of ships, one being set up for each of the following: battleships, carriers, cruisers,

destroyers, submarines, patrol craft, auxiliary vessels and district craft. All of the developmental modifications that unfold in the building of a ship of highly specialized character are administered and controlled by this desk. This activity thinks of the ship "as a whole". The second kind of activity in development design, however, results from the fact that various technologies themselves are forever multiplying and.


then breaking down into sub-technologies of extreme specialization. Ri order to handle these problems, technical or service sections exist within the Bureau of Ships.each having cognizance of similar componentsof any ship under construction, i.e., air conditioning, piping, propellers, anchors, etc. 4. MAINTENANCE. When a naval ship has been turned over to the fleet by the Design Section of the Shipbuilding Division it is transferred to the cognizance of the Maintenance Division. It remains under this cognizance until, for any reason, it is stricken from the roster of U.S. Naval Vessels, and even when a ship is decommissioned it continues to be the responsibility of and within the cognizance of this division. The Maintenance Division of the Bureau of Ships concerns itself with and is responsible for three principal activities: (1) the maintenance of naval ships, (2) the equip^**^

ment of ships, and (3) the salvage of ships.


E. JURISDICTION OVER PRODUCTION. After the Navy has received its Congressional financial appropriation and the Bureau of Ships its directive to proceed with design and building, there still remain the questions of the rate of production and the relative importance of the early completion of all vessels in the program vhich were controlled by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Master precedence lists were established which assigned a position of relative importance to all vessels which the Bureau was directed to build and, in some cases of extreme urgency where large numbers of vessels were involved, monthly rates of production were established. In the development of the construction program, the data available in the Bureau on availability of facilities and building periods was used by Operations but the final decision was made outside of the Bureau.


Consuming veil over tvo years in construction alone, this largest of naval vessels was "based upon long range requirements of the fleet.


F. THE DESTROYER-NAVAL BASE EXCHANGE. In viev of the relationships between Great Britain and. the United States, the planning of the American shipbuilding program took into account not only the naval strength and requirements of possible allies but also the relative strength and composition of possible enemies. As already discussed in Chapter III, during the summer of 1940 the Battle of Britain

was in its initial stages and the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted vith telling effect. At the beginning of the war, Great Britain had suffered severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the retreat from Dunkirk. Faced vith this situation, Great Britain entered into an agreement vith the United States under the terms of vhich $0 old destroyers, no longer suited for the type of fleet service for vhich they had been designed but still adequately suited for antisubmarine duty, vere exchanged for certain rights at various localities suited for the establishment of naval bases in the Atlantic area and essential to the national defense. In addition to the bases acquired in return for the 50 destroyers, the United States vas granted "freely and without consideration" similar rights vith respect to the leasing of bases in Nev Foundland and Bermuda. This acquisition of bases operated to advance America's sea frontier several hundred miles in the direction of its potential enemies in the Atlantic and, as the bases vere leased for a term of 99 years, the United States could profit by their strategic importance not only immediately but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange. This loss of fifty destroyers naturally had a considerable effect upon the shipbuilding program of the Bureau of Ships.



CHAPTER V EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES A. OVER AIJ^ E^ANSION: With the deterioration of diplomatic relationships throughout the world and the United States' swinging away from isolationism prior to the outbreak of World War II, an expansion occurred in every phase of American naval activity. Chapters I and IV described the renaissance of the United States' Naval shipbuilding program and indicated the widespread reactions occasioned by this growth. The Bureau of Ships personnel and its associated activitiesNavy Yards and shipbuilding facilitiesexpanded coincident in time and at a rate corresponding with the expansion of the Navy. In view of the dynamic wartime situation existing as regards the Bureau's personnel and the nation's shipbuilding facilities, our study here will be confined solely to general trends and facts concerning these topics before our entry into the war, permitting a comprehensive survey to be conducted in Chapters VIII and IX concerning our wartime personnel and facilities expansion and organization.


As more ships began to near completion like the U.S.S. WASHINGTON under the impetus of the emergency program, an unprecedented expansion of personnel and facilities came to pass.

B. BUREAU OF SHIPS PERSONNEL 1. GENERAL: Within the Bureaus of the Navy Department, personnel are broken down into two general groups: civilian and military. Prior

to June 1940, when the Bureau of Ships came into existence, personnel concerned vith shipbuilding was divided between the Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair. The

breakdown of personnel from 1933 to the United States' entry into World War II is presented in Table 11. In general, military officers assume charge of officers, and civilians come under the jurisdiction of civilian officials. Discussion of the relationships and of the difficulties occasioned by this type of command is covered fully in Chapter VIII. 2. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS: As illustrated in Table 11 from 1933 to 1941 the total civilian complement engaged in shipbuilding increased from 269 to 2200 for the Bureau of Ships headquarters office in Washington. The eight-fold increase in civilian capacities as compared to officers four-fold multiplication may be readily understood in view of the expansion within the clerical echelons. The below listed table presents a breakdown of employees by type of service for the years 1940 and 1941 to illustrate the relative and factual proportions employed:



31 Dec


31 Dec

% of

onal eesional Clerical Custodial 1 472 86

Total 32.2%



795 113

5.9% 34.2% 7-7%




Total employees on "board. Since the most dynamic personnel situation occurred after our entry into the war, the administration of the civilian personnel and. their development vithin the organizational structure of the Bureau are fully discussed in Chapter VIII.



Date June 1933 June 1934 June 1935 June 1936 June 1937 June 1938 June 1939 June 1940 June 1941
End 1941

Total Personnel

OFFICER Ships Eng C&R Total

CIVILIAN % Ships Eng C&R Total





133 136
162 208



445 531 607 637 696 884


53 54
62 62

27 25

75 75 81 86 96 99 117
221 298

17 14

370 83 456 86 526 87 551 87 600 86 787 89 990 89

190 266
224 237

302 314

32 34 37 46

13 14 11 11 11

288 312 353 432 449 541

1787 2200


221 298


1787 89 2200 88


3. MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS In June 1940, 11? officers were on duty in the Bureau of Ships and 77 officers on duty in the two main groups of field officers of the Bureau; namely, the Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of Machinery. By 194$ these numbers had grown to 1,533 and 1,102, respectively, and in addition to these activities the Bureau of Ships was interested in the procurement and training of officers to fill billets in the industrial departments of the Navy Yards and other naval activities, as well as being directly concerned with various laboratories and certain degaussing stations. While the story of this incredible expansion is fully discussed in Chapter VIII, this chapter will summarize briefly the expansion during the pre-war period as illustrated by table 11. In time of peace the shipbuilding divisions of the Navy Department, like the operating fleet of the Navy, are manned almost entirely by officers of the Regular Navy, most of whom are graduates of the Academy. Several years before the war, the Navy set up an over-all program for the training of prospective officers since the supply of regular Navy Officers would prove wholly inadequate for wartime needs. Emphasis rested particularly upon the preparation of line officers under the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps units established at various colleges throughout the country and, with the declaration of a limited emergency, these officers were the first to be ordered to active duty. In order to meet the demand for specialists, the Bureau of Ships first made a survey of the retired and reserve officers who might be ordered to active duty. Valuable additions to the staff were obtained


as the result of this survey, "but few reservists had teen trained, as constructors or engineers and. many of those who might have been used, in these capacities proved too valuable in their civilian jobs to be ordered to active duty. Among the regulars"', both on active duty and retired, fev were designated for engineering duty only and many of those were required for duty in their capacity with the Fleet. Although the Bureau immediately undertook to have additional officers designated for engineering duties from the regular line, the Bureau of Naval Personnel became reluctant to transfer man;/; as the forces afloat experienced equally pressing demand for officers. After the first survey had been made and the Bureau fully appreciated the nature of the officer personnel shortage, it cooperated vith other materiel bureaus and the Bureau of Naval Personnel to establish a program for the training and recruiting of qualified engineering students to become reserve officers. This program, initiated toward the end of 1$40 by the B&teriel bureaus, included the Bureau of Ships and came under the direction of Admiral Yarnell. Major engineering colleges in the country were visited and applications solicited fron qualified engineering students graduating in l$4l or the subsequent year. This program became the

forerunner of the various college training programs later developed to procure officers vith suitable qualifications. At approximately the sane time the Bureau found that applications for appointment in the Naval Reserve of former graduates of the Naval Academy who had resigned from the Navy was being discouraged.


As a result of the Bureau's recommendation, this policy soon changed and many valuable officers joined the reserve' organization. Prior to the emergency, appointments to the Naval Reserve had been processed through the offices of the various Naval District Commandants but,with a major recruiting campaign under way, this method proved too slow and uncertain. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, therefore, established the

offices of Naval Officer Procurement to recruit reserve officers with skills needed by the various sections of the Navy. As this program progressed the Bureau of Ships never suffered from a shortage of candidates available for assignment to the Bureau. Nevertheless, it found that officers available did not have sufficient skill or training to do the vork required both in the Bureau and in the field. A partial solution of this problem was found by the establishment of training schools in naval architecture and other technical specialties, and in many cases the Bureau ordered specialists to specific limited duties which required little education or training outside of their particular field. For this reason, the turnover of officer personnel within the Bureau of Ships proved to be surprisingly small throughout the prosecution of the war. Although the Bureau established the general type of training required, each course was set up in collaboration with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the educational institution* offering its facilities and instruction staff. A comprehensive study of this training program is covered in "The Bureau of Naval Personnel History, Training Division, Volume 4". From this procurement procedure the Bureau of Ships learned one valus.ble lesson: to keep the specialist officers under its jurisdiction


in a state of readiness by encouraging participation of its officers in reserve activities and by keeping them informed of the latest developments in the particular field in which they might be interested or in which they might prove valuable in the event of any future emergency. To reap the

reward of this lesson, the Bureau has established an active office within its organization to assure continued contact with its cognizant reserve officers on inactive duty and liaison with the Bureau of Naval Personnel in all matters pertaining to the Bureau of Ships reserve program. In the chart listed herewith, the part which reserve officers played in the expansion of the Bureau under emergency conditions is well illustrated. Sixteen months after the declaration of a limited emergency reserve officers still formed only 23.4% of the Bureau of Ships military personnel. Twelve months later they constituted $4%, having increased fourfold. At the end of the war, it reached 90%. BUREAU OF SHIPS OFFICER PERSONNEL DATE June 1940 June 1941 July 1941

USN x 128 138





100 167 230 298


77% 60% 46%


23% 4o% 54%

67% 4o% 30%



By the peak at war's end, the number of officers within the Bureau and under its jurisdiction at Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Machinery posts amounted to 2,666, which does not include numerous other activities with which the Bureau directly concerned itself. A detailed study of this expansion of military personnel within the Bureau of Ships and its cognizant activities is fully covered in another section of this history.


B. EXPANSION OF FACILITIES The problem of expanding facilities to meet the needs of the Navy in World War II is one of the most important and interesting phases of the entire shipbuilding program. Without an adequate expansion of facilities the Bureau of Ships program vould have failed, making it impossible for the allied fleet at critical operational periods to engage the enemy forces. In view of its importance, therefore, a review of the difficulties

experienced in the expansion of facilities prior to and during World War II should prove of continuing interest for the future. The expansion of facilities, which began on a large scale after the legislation of June and July 1940, was concentrated at first in shipyard facilities. It was generally recognized that such an increase would have to be undertaken, but it wag not realized that facilities for the building of many ship components would likewise have to be expanded. Until Pearl Harbor, shipbuilding schedules and actual construction programs in the yards had not reached a point where serious delays or cut-backs were necessary and at no time were real delays experienced because of the shortage of shipbuilding facilities (ways) themselves. Up until Pearl Harbor, serious difficulties were experienced, however, in obtaining sufficient machine tools to equip yards and general industrial facilities and periodically crises would arise requiring special expediting efforts to obtain components or materials. Unfortunately, attention being fixed upon production, these difficulties were not regarded seriously until almost too late. This critical situation in component pro-

duction brought to force the ancient saying "Because of a nail the kingdom was lost", for in like manner, perhaps because of a gear or steel or ship shortage, naval battles and possibly the war might have been lost.


In 1938, Bear Admiral Bowen stated, to the General Board.: "I would, be derelict in my duty if I did. not invite your attention to the fact that there is a great schism in the marine engineering profession of the United. States. Some of the elements of this schism are so deep and. so fundamental that, in my opinion, it is a vital necessity that the General Board, shall consider them in their deliberations. The turbine manufacturers in this country, for both marine and power turbines, are General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis-Chaibners, and Delaval. All but Allis-Chalmers also make gears. It has been the practice of the so-called "Big Three" shipbuilders, Bethlehem, New York Ship, and Newport News, to manufacture their own machinery, although I have been assured by Newport News and by Bethlehem that they have no policy at all which prevents them from buying their main machinery when such action seems expedient. It has been the practice of the "Little Three", Bath, Federal, and United, which has now djbninished to the "Little Two", Bath and Federal, to operate, as far as Naval vessels are concerned as assembly plants. Bath and Federal and formerly United Drydocks, prefer to buy their machinery. In view of the plant investment of the "Big Three" it is only natural that they should prefer to make their own machinery. Contrariwise is true of the "Little Two". About four years ago the Bureau of Engineering under my predecessor, notified the "Big Three" shipbuilders that the Bureau of Engineering had decided to enforce the provisions of the Espionage Act and that, therefore, they would have to sever their licenses under Parsons, Limited, if they wished to proceed under any future Naval contracts, Evince that date I am not aware that any shipyard in the United States has spent any money whatsoever in connection with the research and development of turbine design. *** on the other hand I have seen the tremendous effort which is being made by the General Electric Company first and Westinghouse second, to do everything that can possibly be done to further the development of turbine design in the United States in order that this country may be entirely free from any necessity of resorting to English or continental design. I am informed that Allis-ChaJjners has also accomplished much development." This warning was not needed until after Pearl Harbor.

Also quoted in Chapter II of this history.


By December l$4l the number of yards engaged in new construction had increased to 1% and those concerned vith conversion and repair had expanded to ?6. The financing of this expansion of shipbuilding facilities resulted in a large measure from direct investment of funds by the Bureau under Bureau of Ships contracts. The subsequent total expenditures revealed this financing was divided fairly equally between Navy Yards and other naval establishments on the one hand and private shipbuilders on the other. Only a relatively meager sum had been invested

in general industry concerned vith producing components of the shipbuilding industry. An additional source of funds for the expansion of facilities resulted from legislation permitting private investment necessary for var vork to be amortized for tax purposes vithin a five year period. This vas made possible by a modification of the Internal Revenue Lav passed in October 1940. It provided that for facilities acquired or

constructed after 10 June 1940, an annual deduction of 20% of the cost could be taken at the election of the tax payer, if the expansion vere certified as necessary in the interest of national defense. Although

no government funds vere given directly to the contractor, the provision for such rapid amortization had substantially the same effect under the conditions existing from 1940 on.


u. s,

Naval (Norfolk) Ship1940-1941 Anns? - 1945

The Bureau of Ships under this lav however approved Certificates of Necessity with considerable reluctance, wishing to rest the effort on private competition and investment. During the first fiscal year of this emergency program from July 1, 1940 to July 1, 1941, the Bureau of Ships sponsored a total dollar value of $ 5 9 0 8 9 0 . Not included 7,1,2.0 in this figure is combined financing under Defense Plant Corporation, where the expansion worked to the benefit of several agencies. Although the overall facilities expansion is discussed at greater length in Chapter IX, one conclusion reemphasized in several portions of this history may be drawn at this time. This conclusion concerns the essential need for the healthy condition of facilities for the production of shipbuilding components, material or whatever, as well as for shipbuilding. One vital factor in the evaluation of the necessary

capacity thus needed is a careful breakdown of raw materials and components going into ships on a bill of material basis so that reasonably accurate estimates of needs may be prepared. During the war, failure to heed this factor led to a mountainous confusion regarding true requirements and led to an almost fatal number of bottlenecks.

C. NAVY YARDS A total of 8 continental Navy yards, 2 U. S. Naval Drydocks, and 1 Navy yard at Pearl Harbor have made a major contribution to the Shipbuilding program and particularly to the repair and maintenance of the fleet in World War II. Until the reorganization of the Navy yards and drydocka, made effective 14 September 194$, the role of the Bureau of Ships in management and supervision of the work in the Naval industrial establishments had been restricted, in spite of its predominant interest, and had been subject to qualifications and limitations growing out of the evolution of the field administrative organization of Naval establishment as a whole. 1. EARLY HISTORY* The origin of many of the difficulties in defining the Bureau of Ships role in Naval yards goes back to 1 July 1868 when Secretary Welles extended the Bureau system to the individual yards. In this

action each bureau was assigned its own department in each yard and was permitted to handle its own supplies and materials Each bureau dealt directly with its own yard department, with the result that cooperation often proved to be completely lacking. Although a

Commandant commanded each yard, primary allegiance of department heads gravitated towards their bureau. * This historical background is based on a memorandum prepared by Dr. Robert G. Albion, Assistant Director Office of Naval History, "Historical Background of Shore Establishment Administration."


This decentralized organization continued for its first fifteen years without being seriously questioned. By the early '80's however,.with the quickening spirit of the "New Navy" in the air, the inefficiency of the system began to attract attention. Secretary Chandler in his 1884 report advocated "placing one technical head - a competent shipbuilder - over all persons engaged in building or repairing the ships, over the hull, the machinery, and the equipment". One of these supervisory Naval constructors was to have charge at each of the three "Naval workshops". Secretary

Chandler also recommended that the three supervisory Naval Constructors should be made responsible to the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Construction and made fully accountable for all work carried on at their establishments. mendations. One of the first steps to bring order out of the chaotic Navy Yard situation was made in 1892 with the assignment of responsibility for work in the Navy Yards to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who also received authorization to approved reports of Boards of Wages and classified schedule of employees at Navy Yards. Another step was taken in 1904, when scattered departmental power plants were concentrated into a single plant in each yard. Following this a great deal of agitation concerning Nothing came, however, of these recom-


Navy yard control developed particularly an the result of the activity of the Naval Constructor Holden A. Evans, who in 1908 drew up a comprehensive set of recommendations coordinating Navy Yard control and submitted them directly toAseistant Secretary Newberry. Many of these recommendations were embodied in General Order ^9 issued 26 January 1909 by Secretary Newberry. This order stated that "all the mechanical departments, all the laborers of the yard, the care of buildings and grounds, and all civil engineering were placed under the direction of a manager, and a single payroll for the manufacturing department was created. Under the new plan the manager was able to reorganize the manufacturing and repair work, to reduce the number of shops, and to distribute more

economically the machinery and tools. The Commandant was left nominally in control, but with little real supervison over the manager." Many of these innovations made by Secretary Newberry were modified shortly thereafter when the Taft Administration appointed Secretary Meyer. As a consequence of decentralized, independent organizational growth and the different responsibilities of each Navy Yard, many variations existed in particular yards. The general organization established by "The Regulations for the Government of the Navy" proved a flexible blue-print and by the time of our entry into World

War II each naval activity differed from the other in many respects. Not until the end of the war was a xxm). ) indicates the controls

major change effected (See Chapter The flow chart (Chart 5

and lines of responsibility from the Navy Department organization to the Navy Yards as existing prior to and throughout the war. 2. TYPE NAVY YARD ORGANIZATION: The Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Virginia, discussed herewith, represents in general the form of organization followed by each of the yards. All of them varied in some phase of their structure, but this study will present some idea of the functional and jurisdictional complexities of. such an activity. THE COMMANDANT The Commandant is in command of the Navy Yard and is responsible for the administration of all its activities. This duty includes supervision of the condition and safety of buildings and equipment, the direction of ^all work and the general responsibility for all personnel, both military and civilian connected with the Yard. He is also responsible for all vessels out of commission. SHIPS IN COMMISSION The Commanding Officer of a ship in commission is responsible for his ship. His representative is the officer of the deck (O.O.D.)


aw aw






muTAw wsauws^Mmrs

! e ^^*<* ^***









THE MANAGER The Industrial Manager, commonly called the Manager, is senior industrial aide to the Commandant and is in charge of the Industrial Department. He is responsible for the planning of all construction, repair, and conversion work on ships. Planning of the work is done through the Planning Officer and the work is executed through the Production Officer. The Manager is also responsible for public works and for laboratory activities (materials). The Manager is responsible for the administration of the outlying industrial activities in the Naval District in the conversion, repair, and degaussing of naval ships. In these activities he is assisted by Assistant Industrial Managers. He is responsible for the general conditions and repair of all shops, facilities and equipment used by the Industrial Department and for finishing work on ships in time. He is responsible for the Personnel Relations Division which performs functions for all departments of the Yard. THE CAPTAIN OF THE YARD The Captain of the Yard is the executive officer and military aide to the Commandant. He is the head of the Military Department, responsible for Yard security, and in charge of all Yard military activities except Marine Barracks. The Operations Officep is an assistant to the Captain of the Yard and is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the Yard Craft (tugs, floating cranes, barges, etc.), the supervision of pilots and tugmasters, the inspection of the waterfront for cleanliness and good order and making recommendations for improvement of it. In case of strong winds or unusually high water he has frequent inspections made and renders assistance to insure safety of vessels and Yard Craft. All berthing and movement of ships, vessels and all floating equipment is under the control of the Operations Officer.

All serious infractions of the law occurring within the Yard and all occurrences which require investigation are to be reported immediately to the Captain of the Yard or the Military Duty Officer, Other officers or functions under the Captain of the Yard include: Executive Officer, Enlisted Personnel, Ship's Service Officer, Welfare Officer, officers in charge of the officers' quarters and messes, and the officer in charge of the Commissary Store. SUPPLY OFFICER The Supply Department procures all supplies, materials, equipment and apparatus to meet the specific needs of the Navy Yard; procures and maintains stocks of those items of materials for which this Yard is the designated source of supply for certain other Naval Activities; is responsible for the receipt, inspection, payment, storage, care and preservation, issue, shipment and accounting for all supplies, materials, etc.; and the disposition by sealed bid sales of condemned, excess and surplus materials. % Each of the groups is organized into divisions and sections,^ and. depending upon the complexity of their work, some sections are further sub-divided into units. SERVICE GROUP - The Service Group furnishes services to the various activities of the Supply Department, such as: The employment and distribution of labor and material handling equipment to various outside activities of the Supply Department; the General Correspondence Files; yearly and monthly budgetary estimates of funds for departmental operating and maintenance expenses; personnel records; time and attendance return for pay roll purposes; general messenger service; stores accounts and returns; and stock inventory. PURCHASE GROUP - Disposes, by sealed bid sales, of condemned, excess and surplus materials, Receives, from the Requisition and Order Section, Stock Control Division, all approved Purchase Requisitions for Materials and/or Services; issues proposals to prospective suppliers inviting bids, either formally or informally; makes awards to lowest satisfactory bidders; prepares contract and/or order, as appropriate; and passes the file folder to the

INCOMING STORES GROUP - which conducts follow-up with contractors on Yard contracts and/or orders, and Bureau contracts also, to insure receipt of deliveries of purchased materials by the due dates indicated therein; also follow-up shipments of materials due from other Naval and Governmental activities; receives and reports all materials arriving in the Yard; sees that all purchased materials are inspected; prepares Public Vouchers in payment for materials and services; keeps Stock Cards showing all receipts and issues; initiates procurement action when stock material balances are low; and performs other jobs related to the procurement and recording of receipts and issues of materials. ST'LAGE GROUP - Receives material from Receiver's Section of the Incoming Stores Group and Industrial Department Shops and is responsible for the storage, preservation and issue of all standard and special materials in the custody of the Supply Department, for use in new construction, repair, conversion, and maintenance of naval vessels; for the inventory and operation of shop stores, and the operation of the Salvage Yard. OUTGOING STORES GROUP - Receives and records all incoming ship's requisitions, Bureau shipment orders, shipment requests, and other forms of material orders from all activities without the Yard and initiates action to supply the materials covered thereby. Maintains complete files of Ships' Allowance Lists; initiates action to assemble and supply all authorized outfits for vessels scheduled for commissioning; maintains records of reservation and disposition of outfits delivered to store by vessels decommissioned; prepares and distributes all Store Invoices covering issues of materials; plans for and effects deliveries of material via motor trucks from and to storehouses, Industrial Department Shops, other Yard departments and to vessels at the Yard; handles, assembles and packs all materials and household effects for shipment; makes necessary arrangements for all shipments; prepares bills of lading and all other necessary shipping papers, plans for and effects deliveries of shipments to carriers' terminals and/or loading of cars, etc. THE ACCOUNTING OFFICER The Accounting Department computes earnings, retirement deductions and withholding tax from time reports (clock cards, clock tapes, or muster reports) submitted by shop or office. By subtracting from total earnings the retirement deductions


and withholding tax, plus any bond deduction authorized, it determines the amount of pay check and prepares the check and earnings statements for delivery to shop or office. It maintains a record of employment for retirement purposes, the amounts deducted from pay for retirement purposes, gross earnings and withholding tax for the calendar year, and at the end of the year furnishes the employee and the Collector of Internal Revenue a statement of earnings and the tax withheld. Materials are procured and labor is employed in the Yard only on specific or general authorization. The Accounting Department keeps a cumulative summary of expenditures under each appropriation, project or other form or allotment, and the balance under each, and submits periodic reports of status of allotments to Yard management and makes monthly reports of the expenditures to the various Bureaus of the Navy Department. It also calculates charges to Yard activities and ships for utilities furnished by the Yard Power Plant. THE DISBURSING OFFICER The Disbursing Officer's responsibilities include carrying the accounts of the officers of the Navy Yard and issuing pay checks, together with other fiscal duties. THE MEDICAL OFFICER The Medical Department, in order to keep as many employees continuously at work as possible, carries on the following activities. It treats employees for occupational injuries and diseases suffered from industrial hazards in the Yard. It is concerned with sanitation of the Yard and cooperates with civilian authorities in mosquito control. At the men's and women's examining rooms near the Labor Board it examines civil service applicants prior to their employment. It cooperates with the Safety Officer in. industrial hygiene and safety engineering.


It examines and treats patients under the joint jurisdiction of the Medical Department and the U. S. Employees Compensation Commission. In the Main Dispensary it carries out treatment for personal illness or non-service-connected injuries whenever such treatment will enable an employee to continue at vork. It maintains a Volunteer Blood Donors' Service of civilian employees for the benefit of these employees and dependent members of their families. 3. NAVY YARD PERSONNEL: Even with the declaration of a limited emergency in September 1939? the civilian personnel employed and the military personnel assigned to the Navy Yards proved by var-time standards to be exceedingly fev. Table 12 lists the pre-var civilian employment at the various yards as of July 1, 1938; and. for comparison purposes includes the peak number employed during the var. The military assignments to the yards are also enumerated, vith the figures broken down into officer and enlisted categories. To present the relative increase occasioned by our entry into the var, the peak for the over-all program (June 1, 19^5) is tabulated. These

figures include not only the Navy Yards within the continental limits, but also two domestic repair bases and three outside continental activities. All of these are affiliated directly with the Bureau of Ships and the officers assigned were principally components of the Bureau's specialist personnel.


FKE-WAR PEAK WAR EMPLOYMENT 20,461 50,128 69,128


Portsmouth, N.H. loston, Mass. New York, N.Y. Philadelphia, Pa. Norfolk, Va. Charleston, S.C. Terminal Island San Francisco Mare Island Puget Sound, Wash. Total,

3,273 2,860 6,876 5,636

60 91

37 70 65 80
225 70 -

552 976 560

149 486 971 274 906 392

102 653


46,454 42,372 26,014 15,971 17,174 39,736 32.643 360,081

83 -

5,179 1,632 4,756 3,469 33,681 1



104 106

390 432 276 666 518 ^006




1,974 -


113 48





87 -


New Orleans San Diego








NAVY YARD CONSTRUCTION - PRE-WAR: The deplorable condition into which our naval and

privately owned shipbuilding facilities were allowed to degenerate is fully covered in Chapter 1. Commercial and

government yards suffering equally in the decline, both shared in the expansion of our replacement naval construction program commencing to a slight degree in 1934 and accelerating in 1937 with the abandoning of the armaments limitation treaties. In 1938 with the 20% increase of our naval

strength, exclusive of replacements, the shipbuilding yards throughout the country were assured of long range programs which stimulated their activity accordingly. The decline and rejuvenation of the eight Navy Yards within the continental limits prior to our entry in World War II are indicated on Table 13 , showing the yearly

construction class of ship assigned to each yard from 1934

to 1941.




(1934 - 1941)



1936 1937
2 4

1938 193_9
2 2






2 l










1 1

6 4 l

6 7

2 4









1 l

1 2











TABLE 13, cent'd.. NORFOLK (VAJ TYPE 1934











2 2

Diet Cr. 1
Sm. Bts. 27

2 1 1 3

1 4









1 1 1 1


2 1

1 1 1 1 2
21 24 19 17 83


Sm. Bts. 19




7 1

SM. Bts.






TABLE 13, cont'd. TYPE











1 1



1 3

Dist Cr.

31 38 39

29 42



Sm. Bts. 29

9 i 90