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military authority and leverage.

Moreover, it appeared uninterested in reports that the Bosnian Serbs had committed genocide as part of their ethnic cleansing program. Flush from victory in the Gulf War, the Bush administration feared that military intervention in Yugoslavia could rapidly become another Vietnam quagmire as U.S. forces bogged down in the same difficult terrain that the Germans had encountered during World War II. Moreover, it did not believe that vital national interests were at stake and so could not count on sustained domestic support. Thus, in contrast to his adept handling of German reunification and Iraqi aggression, President Bush stumbled in Yugoslavia and bequeathed the Balkan imbroglio to his successor, Bill Clinton.

Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia


Another humanitarian crisis, in the Muslim East African nation of Somalia, unfolded almost simultaneously, and the Bush administration came under significant domestic pressure to alleviate the suffering caused by a severe famine. Television pictures of starving Somali infants and children began to appear during the summer of 1992 with Bush in the midst of his reelection campaign.Members of Congress such as the Black Caucus, but also Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), argued that the United States had a moral responsibility to intervene. The Reagan administration had given military aid to the anti-communist government of Siad Barre but had lost interest in Somalia with the termination of the Cold War. Barre had been overthrown in 1991 with several regional warlords attempting to gain effective political control of a chaotic situation. Indeed, these warlords had decided to manipulate the distribution of food as a means to achieve power. On August 14, President Bush decided to begin an emergency food airlift and to offer to transport 500 Pakistani troops under UN command to the capital of Mogadishu. But most of the food fell into the hands of the warring militias who used it for political purposes. In September, 2,500 U.S.Marines arrived off the coast to try and protect the UN soldiers, but this action provoked the ire of Mohamed Farrah Aidid, perhaps the strongest of the warlords and a long-time enemy of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The situation continued to deteriorate throughout the autumn, but Bush did not reassess American policy until after his electoral defeat. Then on November 25, 1992, he decided to mount a large-scale military intervention, dubbed Operation Restore Hope, that would involve about 30,000 ground troops. Its announced purpose was to ensure that starving Somalis received the food that the warlords had been intercepting and manipulating. According to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, the administration decided to act in Somalia rather than in the Balkans because the risks were lower, not because American interests were more substantial. President Bush evidently believed that U.S. forces would begin to withdraw before Clintons inauguration on January 20, 1993, but this timetable proved to be extremely unrealistic. First, the administration had difficulty deciding

whether American forces should disarm the militias or simply attempt to deliver food. Disarmament would involve taking sides and thus placing these forces at risk, but the mere delivery of food to areas controlled by the warlords meant that the supplies could be manipulated, and the famine would return as soon as the troops left. Second, the administration never fully debated whether the famine was primarily a natural or a man-made disaster. If the latter, then it would be very difficult to avoid becoming entangled in the intricacies of Somali politicsa prospect that Bush abhorred. As it turned out, no troop withdrawals could be made before Bush left office, and President Clinton inherited, as in Bosnia, an exceedingly volatile and complex situation.

Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election


With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and with the United States apparently in the midst of its unipolar moment, many Americans lost interest in international affairs. George Bush, the quintessential foreign policy president, faced an electorate that worried about a nagging recession, relatively high unemployment, and fears that countries like Mexico were stealing good jobs from hardworking Americans. As Bush began his reelection bid in early 1992, his considerable foreign policy accomplishments seemed to be liabilities, and he tried to convince the public that he genuinely cared about domestic issues. Bush, moreover, had alienated many conservative Republicans who accused him of abandoning Reagans social and economic agendas. Most galling to them was Bushs decision in November 1990 to renege on his 1988 campaign promise not to raise taxes despite enormous federal budget deficits. Patrick Buchanan, a former Nixon speechwriter, conservative columnist, and television pundit, posed Bushs chief challenge in the Republican primaries, blasting NAFTA and Operation Desert Storm. Essentially an anti-immigration isolationist, Buchanan failed to win any primary elections but also refused to drop out of the race, forcing Bush to expend valuable resources and distracting his attention from his main challengers, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot. Perot, a billionaire Texas businessman, announced his independent candidacy on CNNs Larry King Live on February 20, 1992. His rather quixotic campaign focused on the federal deficitwhich Perot promised to eliminateand his opposition to NAFTAwhich he likened to a great sucking sound of jobs leaving the United States for Mexico. After showing well in the early polls, he quit the race in late summer in the face of a strong Clinton run but reentered on October 1 in time to participate in the three presidential debates. 362 George Herbert Walker Bush Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton positioned himself as a centrist Democrat determined to reinvigorate the economy through a combination of federal investments, tax cuts, and improved public education. Although he devoted little attention to foreign policy during the campaign, Clinton

did castigate Bush for coddling the butchers of Beijing and pledged to oppose granting China permanent most favored nation trading status, called on the president to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and to order air strikes of Serb positions, contended that more should be done to help starving Somalis, criticized Bush for his policy of forcibly returning fleeing Haitian refugees to their island homeland, and suggested that the United Nations be given additional peacekeeping and peacemaking responsibilities. Eventually, he lent his support to NAFTA but warned that workers rights and environmental concerns needed to be addressed. Notwithstanding this rhetoric, however, foreign policy played the smallest role in the 1992 election of any since the Great Depression. Bush failed to overcome perceptions that he simply did not care much about domestic issues and won only 38 percent of the vote. Perot garnered 19 percent, an exceedingly strong showing for a third party candidate, while Clinton received 43 percent as well as an Electoral College landslide.

Legacy
George H.W. Bush, by background, training, and temperament very comfortable with the verities of the Cold War, probably would have preferred to pursue a strategy of Soviet containment. Indeed, he spent much of 1989 attempting to slow down the momentum of the ReaganGorbachev express. But at the Malta meeting in December of that year, Bush concluded that he could do business with Gorbachev and decided to initiate a set of strategic objectives designed to ease the transition to a postCold War world. Among these goals was German reunification, and the administration orchestrated that process with adroitness, patience, imagination, and aplomb. After continuing to pursue Ronald Reagans policy of dtente with Iraq in an effort to balance the power of Iran, Bush appeared startled by Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Yet by creating and leading an unlikely international coalition and then by carefully cultivating domestic support for military action in the Persian Gulf, Bush performed masterfully, and a grateful American public made him the most popular president since the advent of approval ratings. But from this pinnacle of February 1991, Bush stumbled badly. Instead of engaging in a national debate over Americas role in his new world order, he retreated into merely celebrating and re-celebrating the victory in Operation Desert Storm. Furthermore, the administration ceded leadership in the Yugoslav cauldron to the European Union, shrank from doing much to assist the new postcommunist governments in Eastern Europe, and appeared reluctant to genuinely assist Boris Yeltsin. In large part, this timidity was driven by Bushs perceptions of the 1992 presidential campaign. Dogged by the widespread view that he cared little for domestic issues and plagued by a recession that lingered longer than expected, President Bush came to regard his foreign policy accomplishments and aspirations

as impediments to his reelection chances. Nevertheless, this transitional president bequeathed to his immediate successors a set of global priorities for the worlds sole superpower. That agenda featured efforts to retard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the further expansion of free trade areas with the United States serving as the fulcrum, primary reliance on American military power to provide regional stability in East Asia and the Middle East, perhaps a greater inclination to involve international organizations in U.S. initiatives, and the assertion that the new democratic peace depended on American global leadership. Richard Melanson

Chronology
1989 February 6: Polish government agrees to talks with opposition. March 26: Multiparty elections in the Soviet Union end over seven decades of Communist Party monopoly. April 15: In China student pro-democracy demonstrations begin. April 25: Soviet Union begins withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. May 4: Hungary opens its border with Austria, thousands of East Germans flee to the West. May 25: Soviet Congress of Peoples Deputies elects Gorbachev president of the Supreme Soviet. June 34: Chinese army attacks student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, hundreds are killed. June 5: President Bush protests repression in China, imposes sanctions. July 1319: G-7 summit leaders offer financial aid to Poland and Hungary. August 17: Gorbachev proposes autonomy for Soviet republics. October 6: Gorbachev advises East Germany to reform its government. October 18: Hungarian National Assembly ends Communist Party monopoly. November 9: East German border with West Germany opens, destruction of Berlin Wall begins. George Herbert Walker Bush 363 November 28: Mass demonstrations in Prague; Communist Party agrees to share power with oppostition Civic Forum. December 13: Bush and Gorbachev discuss trade and arms control in Malta. December 19: East and West Germany agree to plan for reunification. December 20: United States invades Panama toppling Noriega regime. December 20: Gorbachev opposes Lithuanian independence. December 2225: Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu is overthrown and summarily shot. December 28: Elections in Czechoslovakia end Communist rule. 1990

January 23: Yugoslavia dissolves League of Communists. February 2: South African government legalizes the African National Congress (ANC). February 12: 2+4 Plan for German reunification is established. February 25: Violeta Chamorro wins Nicaraguan elections, ousting Sandinista regime. February 2527: United States urges European Community to cope with Yugoslav crisis. March 18: East German elections endorse speedy reunification. May 29: Boris Yeltsin is elected president of the Russian Federation. June 9: Reformers win Czechoslovakian parliamentary elections. July 5: In Yugoslavia the Serb Republic assumes direct control over the province of Kosovo. August 2: Iraq invades Kuwait; United States and Soviet Union condemn Iraqs aggression. August 6: Bush deploys U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield. August 25: UN Security Council authorizes naval and air blockades of Iraq. September 12: 2+4 talks adopt a treaty, Settlement with Respect to Germany, for German reunification. September 20: East and West Germany are officially reunified. November 29: UN Security Council authorizes all necessary means to end Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. December 2: Germany hold first elections since reunification; Chancellor Kohls Christian Democrats win. 1991 January 12: Congress authorizes military force against Iraq. January 16: Operation Desert Storm begins; twenty-eightnation coalition begins the liberation of Kuwait. February 2328: One hundred-hour ground offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait ends in Iraqi defeat. March 3: Iraqi military signs UN cease-fire terms. March 6: In a speech to Congress Bush heralds new world order. March 6: Uprisings by Shiites and Kurds in Iraq are crushed. April 18: Iraq accepts cease-fire terms of UNSC Resolution 687. May 29: Bush vows to ban all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the Middle East. July 31: Bush and Gorbachev sign START I Treaty. August 16: Baghdad rejects UN oil-for-food program. August 19: Attempted coup against Soviet President Gorbachev is defeated. August 20: Three Soviet Baltic republics declare independence. September 7: Croatia and Slovenia declare independence from Yugoslavia. September 25: UN Security Council embargoes arms sales to Yugoslavia. November 8: NATO approves postCold War strategic concepts.

December 8: Three former Soviet republics form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). December 23: Germany recognizes independence of Croatia and Slovenia. 1992 January 31: UN Security Council plans higher profile in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. February 5: UN Security Council reinstates economic sanctions against Iraq. March 17: UN fails to stop fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. March 26: Germany suspends all arms deliveries to Turkey. April 6: United States and European Community recognize Bosnia-Herzogovina. April 24: UN sends observers to Somalia to monitor cease-fire. May: France and Germany agree to 35,000 member joint military force under NATO. May 23: United States agrees with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to abide by START I. June 2: UN sends peacekeeping force to Sarajevo. July 3: Croats in Bosnia proclaim an independent state. July 16: Germanys central bank raises interest rates. 364 George Herbert Walker Bush August 6: United States seeks humanitarian aid for Sarajevo, rejects military action. August 27: EC-UN conference fails to end fighting in Bosnia. September: Britain withdraws from EMS due to Sterlings crash against the Deutschmark. October 3: United States airlifts food and medicine to Sarajevo. November 3:William Clinton is elected president; Albert Gore Jr. is vice president. November 25: Czechoslovakian assembly votes for separate Czech and Slovak republics. December 3: UN approves U.S.-led humanitarian mission to Somalia. December 17: United States, Canada, and Mexico sign North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). December 17: Germany provides Russia with debt-relief and housing finance. 1993 January 3: United States and Russia sign START II Treaty.

References and Further Reading


Baker, James A., III, with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution,War, and Peace. New York: Putnam, 1995. Beschloss,Michael, and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Random House, 1998. Gow, James. Triumph of the Lack ofWill: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of George Bush. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995. Hurst, Steven. The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. London and New York: Cassell, 1999. Quandt,William B. Peace Process.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001. Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and Americas Purpose. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992. Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Zelikow, Philip, and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. BOX 9.1: Case study: US intervention in Somalia, 1992-3
The US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) during the crisis in Somalia 1991-2 was a seminal event both in terms of intervention during a humanitarian crisis and the role of media in US foreign policy formulation. The crisis in Somalia had developed due to civil war, the collapse of central government, and ensuing mass starvation. By 1992, the crisis was attracting a significant degree of international attention and the USAstarted to become increasingly involved. By December 1992, 28,000 US troops were deployed in Somalia in order to support the provision of aid. As well as apparently cementing a new norm of humanitarian intervention, the intervention was a major news event remembered perhaps most for the graphic images of starvation and conflict in Somalia and the images of US marines being greeted on the beeches of Mogadishu, not by hostile gunmen, but by the world's press. By the end of the operation, with the worldwide broadcast of a dead US marine being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the intervention was indelibly etched on US memory. As a case study in media, public opinion, and US foreign policy, the intervention highlights the various roles media and public opinion might play. In terms of the initial intervention, many have argued that the decision to intervene was caused by the CNN effect whereby graphic and emotive images of starving people created a cry to 'do something' from the American public, ti iereby compelling US policy makers to ti1k~ action (e.g. Kennan: 99,3). Others have claimed thatthe attention of US media to the suffering in Somalia helped to build a domestic constituency for the intervention which policy makers were then able to draw upon to support the intervention (Robinson 2002: 59-62). As such, the media and public opinion had an enabling effect with respect to the decision to intervene. Once the intervention was under way, US media coverage helped to mobilize support amongst the US public for the operation by portraying US actions in a positive light, emphasizing

the role US soldiers and aid workers were playing in saving Somali lives (Robinson 2002: 59-62). By mid-tolate 1993, however, the operation had evolved beyond supporting aid delivery to include military action against specific factions within Somalia. The now infamous 'Black Hawk Down' incident, which involved the deaths of 18 US soldiers and up to 1,000 Somalis, was a pivotal moment vis-a-vis the perceived failure of the intervention and US withdrawal from the country. In particular, images of a dead US combatant being dragged through the streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu were broadcast on US media and generated, according to some (e.g. Kennan 1993), a political imperative to withdraw from the country. As such, at this stage of the intervention, media may have come to have an impediment effect on policy makers whereby images of dead US soldiers turned public opinion against involvement in Somalia. Beyond the specifics of the intervention and withdrawal, and any role public opinion and '\'edia played in these, the Somalia intervention and its ignominious end have become embedded in US foreign policy thinking as an example of US military failure in the context of humanitarian intervention.

the democratic process, to public opinion. The direct route refers to the process by which policy makers are directly affected by what they see and read in the media. So, for example, when images of civilian deaths during the Bosnian conflict were broadcast by CNN, some senior policy makers would react to such images on a personal level and be moved to 'do something' to prevent further loss of life. With respect to types of effect, four distinct categories of effect can be identified; a CNN effect, an accelerant effect, an enabling effect, and an impediment effect (Livingston 1997; Robinson 2002). The CNN effect occurs when media coverage plays a direct role in causing policy makers to adopt a particular policy.This does not.r.iean that media were the only reason that policy makers chose a particular policy option, but it does mean that without media pressure, the policy would not have been adopted. Generally, when academics talk of media influence, it is the CNN effect they have in mind. For example, George Kennan (1993) argued that it was emotive images of starvation that caused US policy makers to intervene in Somalia (see Box 9.1). In the absence of those images, no intervention would have occurred. In fact, evidence for the CNN effect has been hard to find. For example, a decade of research into this phenomenon has failed to provide consistent evidence of strategic foreign policy initiatives (for example humanitarian intervention) being caused by media pressure (Gilboa 2005). More commonly, research has found evidence of an accelerant effect, whereby the decision-making process is speeded up by media attention. However, whilst often cited by both

policy makers and academics, the accelerant effect does not entail media causing a particular policy outcome; rather this type of effect suggests that policy makers respond more quickly to a particular issue, but do so in precisely the same ways they would have done without media attention. For example, in relation to the crisis in northern Iraq 1991, media attention to the Kurdish crisis might have speeded up the US decision to intervene, but that decision would have, in any case, been made at some later point. Another effect is that media can enable policy makers to pursue a policy by building public support for that policy (Wheeler 2000: 165). For example, it could be argued that the 9/11 attacks on the USA, and the fact they were communicated to the US public in horrific real-time reporting, were crucial in helping to mobilize public support in favour of the Bush administration's war on terror and military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. The attacks, and their mass-mediated nature, therefore helped to build a constituency amongst US citizens for a more interventionist foreign policy. Finally, the impediment effect is linked to the Vietnam Syndrome. Here, it is a fear over negative media coverage of US casualties and its impact on public opinion that constrains policy makers and prevents them pursuing a policy. For example, during the air war against Serbia in 1999, the Clinton administration limited military options to air strikes in order to avoid US casualties. A factor in this decision was the desire to avoid negative publicity of US casualties during an already politically controversial operation.

Procedural criticism versus substantive criticism


In concluding our discussion of pluralist accounts, it is important to note that whilst claims about the
Chapter 9 Media and US foreign policy 171

influence of public opinion and media abound, academic research suggests actual influence wielded is more subtle and nuanced than is commonly assumed. As discussed, the influence of public opinion upon foreign policy, whilst receiving empirical support, needs to be moderated by the acknowledgement of the multitude of factors influencing policy making. At the same time, notions of a CNN effect need to be moderated through acknowledgement that a more subtle range of effects (e.g. the enabling effect) are occurring most of the time. Whilst it would be churlish to argue that media and public carry no influence, the question of whether that influence is sufficient from a liberal-democratic perspective is debatable. More significantly, much research on media influence

suggests that media influence occurs most often at the procedural level, rather than at a substantive level (Althaus 2003). The term procedurd(Ciescribes criticism and influence that relates to debate over the implementation of foreign policy. The term substantive is used to describe criticism and influence that relates to the underlying justification and rationale for particular foreign policies. For example, the Vietnam War was criticized by US media and public more often at a procedural level whereby the central question revolved arouJd whether the USA was winning or losing the war. Criticism, however, rarely raised the more substantive question of the justification for US involvement in Vietnam. Again, returning to the example of the 1999 air war against Serbia, most of the controversy within US media related to whether or not air power was enough to win the war. At the same time, debate over whether intervention could be justified at all remained marginal (Robinson 2002: 93-110). As we shall see in the next section, when we discuss elite/critical accounts of the public opinion/ media/foreign policy nexus, the primary focus of concern is precisely this lack of substantive debate over US foreign policy.