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Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), was a United States Supreme Court case appealed from the Supreme Court of Missouri concerning the Missouri law which ordained "Every male citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote." Virginia Minor, a leader of the women's suffrage movement in Missouri, alleged that the refusal of Reese Happersett, a Missouri state registrar, to allow her to register to vote was an infringement of her civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Decision The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the Missouri voting legislation saying that the limitation of suffrage to male citizens was not an infringement of Minor's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed and upheld the lower court's ruling on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment does not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen, and that historically "citizen" and "eligible voter" have not been synonymous. Since the United States Constitution did not proviand citizens. It rested solely on the lack of provisions within the Constitution for women's suffrage. Subsequent History Minor has not been explicitly overruled by another U.S. Supreme Court decision. In fact, Minor is still cited for the proposition that the Constitution does not confer the right to vote. However, as the decision relates to women's suffrage in particular, it is no longer good law. Holding: The Court held that voting is not a privilege of citizenship. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), held that convicted felons could be barred from voting without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Holding: Convicted felons may be constitutionally disenfranchised. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections: 360 U.S. 45 (1959), argued 18–19 May 1959, decided 8 June 1959 by vote of 9 to 0; Douglas for the Court. Lassiter is an important case in the history of the federal protection of voting rights. The Court rejected a black citizen's challenge to a state literacy test, finding that states have broad powers to determine the conditions of suffrage. The literacy test applied to voters of all races, and the Court would not draw the inference that it was being used to facilitate racial discrimination. Lassiter had to be addressed in assessing the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The act temporarily suspended literacy and other tests imposed as prerequisites to voting. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), the Court distinguished Lassiter on the ground that in most states covered by the 1965 act prerequisites to voting were instituted and administered in a discriminatory fashion for many years. In Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), New York tested the 1965 act's effective prohibition of application of an English literacy requirement to persons who completed the sixth grade in a non‐ English‐ speaking American school. The act thus gave voting privileges to many former residents of Puerto Rico who had migrated to New York. If the Court had adhered to its approach in Lassiter, it would have struck down the literacy requirement only if a court would conclude that the requirement discriminated against non‐ English‐ speakers. But the Court refused to ask the Lassiter‐ like question whether the judiciary would find the English literacy requirement unconstitutional. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment required only that legislation be appropriate to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was Congress's decision to make. The challenged provision sought to secure for the New York Puerto Rican community nondiscriminatory treatment and was appropriate to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Subsequent amendments to the Voting Rights Act prohibited all literacy tests as a prerequisite for voting.

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), was a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court found that Virginia's poll tax was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The Twenty-fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited poll taxes in federal elections; the Supreme Court extended this prohibition to state elections. Background The case was filed by Virginia resident Annie E. Harper, who was unable to register without having to pay a poll tax. She brought the suit on behalf of other poor residents and herself. After being dismissed by a U.S. district court, the case went to the United States Supreme Court.

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The Decision In a 6 to 3 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Ms. Harper. The Court noted that “a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth.” This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Court, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), which upheld the state's ability to impose poll taxes. Holding: Where a state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, it must be determined whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) was a United States Supreme Court decision in which a childless bachelor living with his parents in the Union School District challenged Section 2012 of the New York Education Law which stated that voters for school district elections must own or lease taxable realty property in the district or be parents or custodians of one or more children enrolled in a public school local to the district. New York's argument was to limited the franchise to those primarily affected by education. The other stipulations of Section 2012, which were not in dispute, were that to be a registered voter in a school district election, the person must be a U.S. citizen, be a resident of the school district, and be at least 21 years old. Lower courts had dismissed the claim but the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on appeal finding the additional stipulations of realty property and parent or custodian of a child in a school in the district to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to vote. Holding: Where a state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, it must be determined whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549 (1946), argued 7–8 Mar. 1946, decided 10 June 1946 by vote of 4 to 3; Frankfurter for the Court, black in dissent, Jackson not participating (Stone's death left one vacancy). Qualified voters challenged the apportionment of congressional districts in Illinois as lacking appropriate compactness and equality. A three‐judge district court dismissed the case and Justices Felix Frankfurter, Stanley Reed, and Harold Burton affirmed that action. These justices branded apportionment a political question and reasoned that invalidation of Illinois districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that remedied. Such party contests should be resolved by the state legislature subject to congressional supervision. Justice Wiley B. Rutledge concurred in the result, convinced that the short time between a judicial judgment and the impending election made an equitable remedy difficult. Justice Hugo Black, joined by William Douglas and Frank Murphy, believed the failure to reapportion the Illinois districts since 1901 denied the equal protection of the laws and of the guarantee in Article I of the right to vote for congressional representatives. Weakened by the close division of the justices and by the continuing inaction of state legislatures, the Court declared in Baker v. Carr (1962) that apportionment issues were cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This action set the stage for later decisions requiring approximate equality of electoral districts. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that retreated from the Court's political question doctrine, deciding that reapportionment (attempts to change the way voting districts are delineated) issues present justiciable questions, thus enabling federal courts to intervene in and to decide reapportionment cases. The defendants unsuccessfully argued that reapportionment of legislative districts is a "political question," and hence not a question that may be resolved by federal courts.

Background Plaintiff Charles Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee, the county in which Memphis is located. His complaint was that though the Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts be redrawn every ten years according to the federal census, to provide for districts of substantially equal population, Tennessee had not in fact redistricted since the census of 1901. By the time of Baker's lawsuit, the population had shifted such that his district in Shelby County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts. Representationally, the votes of rural citizens were worth more than the votes of urban citizens. Baker's argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal protection of the laws" required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Secretary of State for Tennessee. Carr was not the person who set the district lines – the state legislature had done that – but was sued ex officio as the person who was ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and for the publication of district maps. The State of Tennessee argued that legislative districts were essentially political questions, not judicial ones, as had been held by a plurality opinion of the Court in Colegrove v. Green (1946), wherein Justice Felix Frankfurter declared that, "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for legislative malapportionment had to be attained through the political process. The Court's decision

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"The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. 369 U. had challenged the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature. The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962. This re-apportionment increased the political power of urban centers and limited the influence of more rural. Baker v. voiding the provision of the Arizona constitution which had provided for two state senators from each county and similar provisions elsewhere.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. 533 (1964) was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that state legislature districts had to be roughly equal in population. Among the more egregious pre-Reynolds disparities (compiled by Congressman Morris K. the court laid out a new test for evaluating such claims in Reynolds v.S. Justice Charles Evans Whittaker was so torn over the case that he eventually had to recuse himself. often several times. Sanders." 5. The case had to be put over for reargument because in conference no clear majority emerged for either side of the case. one-vote" was first applied as a standard for congressional districts in 1964's Wesberry v. The Alabama Constitution provided that there be at least one representative per county and as many senatorial districts as there were senators. and is justiciable by the federal courts." as an example of this. "One-person. The Court split 6 to 2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable. Before Reynolds. which would have enabled a majority which could have granted relief for Baker. urban counties were often drastically underrepresented. Holding: The reapportionment of state legislative districts is not a political question." 4. Brennan. The large majority in this case can in many ways be attributed to Justice Brennan. Carr. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Carr line of cases the most important in his tenure as Chief Justice. Carr and subsequent cases fundamentally altered the nature of political representation in America. 377 U. the Court formulated the famous "one-person. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made. Carr was one of the most wrenching in the Court's history.com The decision of Baker v. nearly a year after it was initially argued. (Even the Tennessee constitution. Reynolds v.S. arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political questions" 2. the Court went further in order to correct what seemed to it to be egregious examples of malapportionment which were serious enough to undermine the premises underlying republican government. proposing a six-part test for determining which questions were "political" in nature. and the arduous decisional process in Baker is often blamed for Whittaker's subsequent health problems.. one-vote" standard for legislative districting.) However. Brennan also talked down Justices Black and Douglas from their usual absolutist positions to achieve a compromise. Udall): 3 . who convinced Potter Stewart that the case was a narrow ruling dealing only with plaintiff power to challenge the statute. Ratio variances as great as 41 to 1 from one senatorial district to another existed in the Alabama Senate (i. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. The Court decided that in states with bicameral legislatures both houses had to be apportioned on this standard. producing. three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. dissented vigorously and at length. has a provision which prevented counties from being "split" and portions of a county being attached to other counties or parts of counties in the creation of a district which was overridden. 186 (1962). Clark switched his vote at the last minute to a concurrence on the substance of Baker's claims. Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers. Frankfurter. Sims. holding that each individual had to be weighted equally in legislative apportionment. conservative interests that had benefited from the Supreme Court ruling injusticiable such "political" questions as those of apportionment. arguing that the Court had shunted aside history and judicial restraint and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.S." 3. Chief Justice Earl Warren called the Baker v. Cases which are political in nature are marked by: 1. In Gray v. Alabama. the number of eligible voters voting for one senator was in one case 41 times the number of voters in another). requiring not just Tennessee but nearly every state to redistrict during the 1960s. Sims. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.e. 377 U. Voters from Jefferson County. enforcement of which was the original basis for the case. joined by John Marshall Harlan II.[2] After he left the Court.[1] Aftermath Having declared reapportionment issues justiciable in Baker. Sanders. 533 (1964). which forced him to resign from the Court. Having already overturned its ruling that redistricting was a purely political question in Baker v. but instead the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court." 6. and today counties are frequently split among districts in forming Tennessee State Senate districts." Justice Tom C. in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J.

In the Nevada Senate. In his majority decision. Chief Justice Earl Warren said "Legislators represent people. Holding: The Court struck down state senate inequality based their decision on the principle of "one person. with over two-thirds of the State's population. had one member in the California State Senate. the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires all districts to be substantially apportioned on a population bases. California could be dominated by Los Angeles and San Francisco.com        In the Connecticut General Assembly. Karcher v. not trees or acres. and was therefore unconstitutional. the smallest district had 165 people. a ratio of almost 1.000. as did the 14. regardless of population. the wholesale neglect of population considerations is unconstitutional. While noting that some deviation from strict population considerations may be permitted to offset minor underrepresentations of one group or another. Harlan further claimed that if Reynolds was correct. the smallest Senate district had 951 people. one vote". Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado Facts of the Case Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area. In the Idaho Legislature. Although the Constitution explicitly grants two senators per state. and conformity to historical divisions). Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois led a fight to pass a Constitutional amendment allowing unequal legislative districts. with 6 million people. one House district had 191 people.000 or as few as 568 people. one township with three people had a Representative in the lower house. 17 members represented as many as 127." In dissent. the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari. The eight justices who struck down state senate inequality based their decision on the principle of "one person.. not farms or cities or economic interests." "One person. another. Michigan by Detroit. 93. He warned that ". Los Angeles County. could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. the largest. In the Utah State Legislature.. Harlan claimed the Court was imposing its own idea of "good government" on the states.244. If they were. Under Colorado's apportionment plan. then the United States Constitution's own provision for two United States Senators from each state would then be Constitutionally suspect as the fifty states have anything but "substantially equal populations. the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography. this cannot override even a single individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote. In the Vermont General Assembly. this was the same representation given another district with a population of 3. Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under the Court's new decree. The apportionment of Colorado's Senate rendered population considerations virtually insignificant. the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3. Justice John Marshall Harlan II lambasted the Court for ignoring the original intention of the Equal Protection Clause. California.000 (424 times more).081 times more powerful at the Capitol. the smallest district had 36 people." Lucas v. Daggett 4 . one vote" was extended to Congressional (but not Senatorial) districts in 1964's Wesberry v.the forces of our national life are not brought to bear on public questions solely in proportion to the weight of numbers. In the New Hampshire General Court. the 6 million citizens of the Chicago area would hold sway in the Illinois Legislature without consideration of the problems of their 4 million fellows who are scattered in 100 other counties.000 people of one rural county (428 times more). Reynolds v. The vote of a resident of the first township was therefore 1. Consequently. the largest 32.380 (196 times the population of the other). When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan. compactness and contiguity. The Court added that although a majority of the Colorado electorate approved its apportionment scheme. counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate. Question Is a majority-approved state apportionment plan that permits one house of its congress to be largely apportioned on the basis of factors other than population distribution in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion Yes. stifling creativity and violating federalism.6-to-1. a ratio of 224 to 1. natural boundaries. the largest 35." Dirksen was ultimately unsuccessful.400 (97 times more). and the chief metropolitan areas. one vote. Sims set off a legislative firestorm in the country.000 to 1. Legislators are elected by voters. 81..Downloaded From OutlineDepot. Sanders. which he argued did not extend to voting rights. In a 6-to-3 opinion. stressing its recent approval by the electorate. accessibility.

The argument. 536 (1927).A. as we know." The Court then turned to the merits of the suit. Nixon. who were magistrates in charge of elections. sought to vote in the Democratic Party primary of 1924 in El Paso. and it is too clear for extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this case. L. It stated that it was unnecessary to discuss whether the statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment. they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power in the state. discriminating against them by the distinction of color alone.com Facts of the Case Democrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. was passed. .[1] The defendants. prevented him from doing so on the basis of a Texas statute which provided that "in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas.." his suit "allege[d] and s[ought] to recover for private damage.. Within four months the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party passed a resolution that "all white Democrats . as it was a political question.. rejected the argument that the political question doctrine barred the Court from deciding the case. Question Did the gerrymandering in the reapportionment plan violate Article I.. granting authority to political parties to determine who should vote in their primaries. the Democratic Party primary was the only competitive process and chance to choose among candidates. was "little more than a play upon words. Nixon v. Because Texas was a one-party state. Dissent None." Nixon sought an injunction against the statute in federal district court. was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court struck down a Texas law which forbade blacks from voting in the Texas Democratic primary. Texas." Justice Brennan upheld past Court decisions (Kirkpatrick v." While the injury which the plaintiff alleged "involved political action. This was one of four cases brought to challenge the Texas Democratic Party's allwhite primary. Even though the district populations differed by less than one percent from each other. 1973.. Preisler.S. Fact Dr. and Wesberry v. The statute of Texas . "because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth. Section 2 of the Constitution? Conclusion Even though the population differences in the districts were slight. Sanders. The district court dismissed the suit. States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational.. Issue Nixon argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. but there are limits. and Nixon appealed to the Supreme Court. Aftermath Texas quickly enacted a new provision to continue restrictions on voter participation. all of which were supported by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). [2] 5 . 273 U. Ruling The unanimous Court. ” The Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.. assumes to forbid negroes to take part in a primary election the importance of which we have indicated. Herndon. the Court held that they were unconstitutional because they "were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality. The defendants argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the issue. speaking through Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 1964) and argued that relying on a strict numerical standard of populations to assess district equality would be misguided. said the Court.. and none other" be allowed to participate in the approaching primary of 1927." The Court continued: “ The [Fourteenth Amendment] . a black physician in El Paso. with a special intent to protect the blacks from discrimination against them.

582. argued 16 Jan. S. Court of Appeals affirmed. a black man. blacks were excluded. 1944. reversed.. Dr. and ordered District Court to abstain until state courts had determined whether Hawaii's election laws in fact permitted write-in voting. the Jaybird Democratic Association. Smith. Thereafter. Condon (1932). The Supreme Court. club” thus was purposefully organized to disenfranchise blacks and circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment (p. (The Court's decision in this matter was amended on June 12. The District Court certified questions. These candidates entered the Democratic party primary and were invariably nominated and then elected in a usually uncontested general election. A state cannot "permit a private organization to practice racial discrimination" in elections. Allwright was a county election official. Eight justices seemed to agree that the Jaybird party was performing a public function and was therefore violating the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized the participation of state election officials in the discrimination. claiming that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting violated First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Nixon v. Justice Tom Clark maintained that the Jaybird party was an auxiliary of the state‐regulated Democratic party. Justice White. argued Justice Reed. 70 Haw. Burdick v. 494). the right to vote in the 1940 Texas Democratic primary. Allwright Facts of the Case A resolution of the Democratic Party of Texas. decided 4 May 1953 by vote of 8 to 1. The Court of Appeals. Allwright engaged in state action abridging Smith's right to vote because of his race. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Nixon reappeared before the Supreme Court in another suit against the all-white primary. the District Court. Question Did denying blacks the right to vote in primary elections violate the Fifteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Court overruled its decision in Grovey v. held that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting did not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens' rights under First and Fourteenth Amendments. Minton in dissent. voluntary. White voters automatically became members. Townsend (1935) and found the restrictions against blacks unconstitutional. 1953. and appeal was taken. the party conducted primary elections under state statutory authority. Even though the Democratic Party was a voluntary organization. 463). 461 (1953). and the Hawaii Supreme Court.2d 415. J. Only Justice Sherman Minton dissented. Fong. black announced the judgment for the Court.) Terry v. Beginning in 1889 in Fort Bend County. a group that the Texas Supreme Court had deemed a "voluntary association. 776 P. 846 F. Harold M. held an unofficial primary election to select candidates for county offices.S.2d 824.S.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. and voter petitioned for certiorari. Texas. Justice Kennedy filed dissenting opinion. This was the last of the so‐called white primary cases. 737 F.Supp. 937 F. in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. reversed. Takushi. Adams 345 U. Syllabus [FN*] 6 . this decision provided a precedent for congressional proscription of private racial discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment in later federal legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965. granted injunctive relief. or Jaybird party.2d 587. Besides marking the last hurrah of the southern white primary." allowed only whites to participate in Democratic primary elections. This “self‐governing. There was no majority opinion. he denied Lonnie E. saying that the Jaybird party constitutionally was nothing more than another “pressure group” (p. ruled that write-in voting was prohibited. Director Of Elections Of Hawaii Case Summary/Synopsis Registered voter brought action against Hawaii Director of Elections and related parties. Smith v. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii struck down prohibition and denied stay pending appeal. the fact that Texas statutes governed the selection of county-level party leaders. Justice Hugo Black said that the state could not countenance the exclusion of blacks from the only election that mattered.com Five years later. and state courts were given exclusive original jurisdiction over contested elections. guaranteed for blacks the right to vote in primaries. Holding: A Texas law prohibiting blacks from voting in the Texas Democratic Party primary violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 498.

filed a dissenting opinion. 116 L. SCALIA. Celebrezze.S.Ct. Norman v. 14. 1. a write-in voting prohibition will be presumptively valid. Const. Pp. 2068. in which REHNQUIST. 1.Ct. had only to further important regulatory interests to be upheld. 14. in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS. holding that the prohibition. U. 1564. 788-789. 12-2. at 788.J.Amends. p. JJ.Ct. 26 S. This Court's cases have applied a more flexible standard: A court considering a state election law challenge must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justification for the burden imposed by its rule.S. nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Detroit Lumber Co. at 1570.Ed.Amends. Not every law that imposes any burden upon right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.Ed. When state's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.. Const. If it imposes only "reasonable.C. taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. as good citizens. post. the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions..C.A.. Anderson v. right to vote is right to participate in electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain integrity of democratic system. 698. regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance state interest of compelling importance. 705. we must live. Cf. While no right is more precious in free country than that of having voice in election of those who make laws under which.C. 2064-2066. 415 U.. in light of adequate ballot access afforded under Hawaii's election code. affirmed. Const. 50 L. Pp. 2062-2068. prohibition against write-in voting will be presumptively valid. 75 L. Petitioner. 1281.S. U. J. filed suit against respondent state officials. 2062-2064.Ct. claiming that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting violated his rights of expression and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. since any burden on the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice will be light and normally will be counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme. 2067-2068. 289. 200 U.. 460 U. joined. Held: Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 460 U. joined. Hawaii's ban on write-in voting imposed only limited burden on voters' rights to make free choices and to associate politically through the vote and. 499. 12-31. 1. taken as part of the State's comprehensive election scheme. (c) Hawaii's asserted interests in avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election and in guarding against "party raiding" during the primaries are legitimate and are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting ban imposes upon voters. JJ. nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon those rights.. 282. U. supra.Ed.com FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.2d 714. 1274. since any burden on right to vote for candidate of one's choice will be light and normally will be counterbalanced by very state interests supporting ballot access scheme. 7 . 112 S..C.. WHITE. An interest in making a late rather than an early decision is entitled to little weight.S. as here. Const.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. When state election law subjects First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to "severe" restriction. rigorousness of inquiry into propriety of state election law depends upon extent to which challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Reed. 1569-1570.Amends. therefore. a State's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.S. 321. and O'CONNOR. a registered Honolulu voter. 14. 287. instead. 337. delivered the opinion of the Court. Because the State's election laws provide easy access to the primary ballot until the cutoff date for the filing of nominating petitions. Under this standard. U.5 to 12-7. the foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that where.S. 724. Hawaii's interests in avoiding possibility of unrestrained factionalism at general election and in guarding against "party raiding" outweighed voter's limited interest in waiting until 11th hour to choose his preferred candidate and provided adequate justification for Hawaii's ban on writein voting at general election.A. Pp.Ct. Brown. 11-62. J.A. Storer v. See United States v.S. SOUTER. state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify restrictions. 1. Pp. but the Court of Appeals reversed. C. (d) Indeed. Pp. a regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance only when it subjects the voters' rights to "severe" restrictions. Anderson. 736.2d 547.2d 415 (CA9 1991). The District Court ultimately granted his motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief.S.Amends. and THOMAS. 937 F.Ed. two months before the primary. 103 S. HRSA §§ 11-61. (a) Petitioner assumes erroneously that a law that imposes any burden on the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. 780. (b) Hawaii's write-in vote prohibition imposes a very limited burden upon voters' rights to associate politically through the vote and to have candidates of their choice placed on the ballot. 94 S. any burden on the voters' rights is borne only by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until shortly before the primary. 2066-2067.S. 39 L. 14.A. 279. does not impermissibly burden the right to vote. 103 S.2d 711. but when state election law imposes only "reasonable. KENNEDY. 502 U.

Circuit Judge. both of which are important parts of the democratic process. and were therefore barred from running. 28 U. C. emolument. Pp. BURGER. Pp. 1358. Defendants' motion to dismiss granted and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment denied. S. On cross motions for summary judgment and to dismiss. of certain voting and associational rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.Supp. (c) The apportionment of costs among candidates is not the only means available to finance primary elections. affirmed. 405 U.. S. and that Connecticut election laws governing primaries are not in violation of United States Constitution.A. Appellees claimed that they were unable to pay the required fees. Schaffer Case Summary/Synopsis Action was brought by registered voters to redress alleged deprivation. § 2281. 405 U. and not merely because it has some rational basis. which eliminates legitimate potential candidates. Appellants contend that the filing fees are necessary both to regulate the primary ballot and to finance elections. like those involved here.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. 8 . 321 F.com Bullock v. it falls with unequal weight on candidates and voters according to their ability to pay the fees. 405 U. and therefore it must be "closely scrutinized" and can be sustained only if it is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate state objective. Pp. Following a hearing. Pp. held that Connecticut statute providing that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party is reasonably related to accomplishment of legitimate state goals. Where complaint sought order restraining enforcement of Connecticut statute which provides that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party on grounds of its alleged unconstitutionality. in which all Members joined except POWELL and REHNQUIST. requires payment of fees ranging as high as $8. the Three-Judge District Court." The fees for local candidates tend appreciably to exceed those for state-wide candidates. 144-147. it cannot attain these objectives by arbitrary means such as those called for by the Texas statute. Under the Texas statute." in light of "the importance.J. JJ. under color of state law.900. and term of office.C. Anderson. S. S. Carter Appellees who sought to become candidates for local office in the Texas Democratic primary election challenged in the District Court the validity of the Texas statutory scheme which. 135 elections. (b) Although a State has an interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot and eliminating those who are spurious. delivered the opinion of the Court. 147-149.. 140-144. without write-in or other alternative provisions. the party committee estimates the total cost of the primary and apportions it among candidates according to its judgment of what is "just and equitable." three-judge court was convened. Held: The Texas primary election filing fee system contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. as it does general Page 405 U. (a) Since the Texas statute imposes filing fees of such magnitude that numerous qualified candidates are precluded from filing. who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 405 U. S. and the State can identify certain bodies as political parties entitled to sponsorship if the State itself finances the primaries. Robert P. Nader v. 140149. who cannot afford the filing fees. and constitutional question raised was not "insubstantial. the District Court declared the fee system invalid and enjoined its enforcement.S.

voters.S. State statute must impose more than minimal infringement on rights to vote and of association before strict judicial review of statute is warranted. State has legitimate interest in protecting overall integrity of historic electoral process. in a broad sense. which interest includes preserving parties as viable and identifiable interest groups and insuring that results of primary elections.S. unless deterrent aspect of criminal law were totally effective. § 1983.Const. Although criminal sanctions might be effective to punish ringleaders of any primary election raiding episode. In action by registered voters challenging Connecticut statute which provides that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party.A. Improper state support for Democratic and Republican parties could not be inferred from fact that their primary elections were closely regulated by statute. had been successful in attracting bulk of electorate so that they now had substantial followings. §§ 9-56. enrollment requirements of Connecticut statute providing that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party constitutes constitutionally acceptable surrogate. 1. Connecticut would not be required to utilize criminal sanctions against perpetrators of raiding and other distorting and deceptive conduct rather than requiring persons to enroll in party in order to vote in party primary. in order to support claim that public nature of enrollment violated their rights to privacy and of association by potentially subjecting them to harassment because of required affiliation with a party.S.C. C. Attempt to interfere with political party's ability to maintain itself is simultaneously interference with associational rights of its members. had to make detailed factual showing of actual threats or incidents of harassment and could not merely raise spectre of harassment.Const.C. which is voluntary association instituted for political purposes with goal of effectuating will of its members.S. In view of fact that registered voters who were not enrolled in political party and thus could not vote in party primaries were not interested in primary elections in crucial.A.A.431. 42 U. § 9-431. Constitutionally protected associational rights of members of political party. C. §§ 9. In order to protect party members from intrusion by those with adverse political principles and to preserve integrity of electoral process. State has legitimate interest in protecting political party members' associational rights by legislating to protect party from intrusion by those with adverse political principles. Since state cannot conduct test on each voter to determine his political ideas before allowing him to vote in primary election. are vitally essential to candidate selection process. Amend.A. Connecticut could condition participation in primary election upon party loyalty oath that was not particularly burdensome but required minimal demonstration by voter that he had some "commitment" to party in primary of which he wished to participate and that did not prevent elector in subsequent general election from voting for any party's candidate or for independent candidate as he chose.A. and since.S.S. Any dominant position enjoyed by Democratic and Republican parties in Connecticut was not result of improper support or discrimination in their favor by Connecticut but rather because parties.G.A. C. 9-431. C.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. U. 14. state legitimately may condition one's participation in party's nominating process on some showing of loyalty to that party.G. 9-431. § 9. Connecticut statute providing that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party is reasonably related to accomplishment of legitimate state goals of protecting associational rights of political party members and protecting overall integrity of historic electoral process and thus did not violate voting and associational rights of registered voters who were not enrolled party members. such a law would apply only after damage had been done to electoral process. Secretary of State's actions in enforcing Connecticut statute which provides that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party were taken under color of state law for purposes of federal civil rights statute providing redress for deprivation of rights under color of state law.A.S. § 9-431.C. since it would be very difficult to detect and punish all individual voters who engaged in proscribed conduct. State action or policy must cause more than minimal infringement of First Amendment rights before state is called upon to provide "compelling interest" justification.56.G.S.com Constitutional standards must be satisfied in primary as well as in general elections.G. accurately reflect voting of party members. Amend. C. distinguishing way that party members were interested. over period of time. Connecticut statute which provides that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party did not deprive voters of equal protection by denying them right to participate in election in which they were interested and by which they were affected to same extent as those persons who could vote in primary elections. 9 .A. U.G. 9-59.

C. injunction gave group more relief than it was entitled to.S.S.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.2d 932. concurred and filed an opinion.C. Affirmed. Bills of rights are often included as part of Constitution and are intended to protect citizens from governmental transgressions of certain fundamental rights. 1:92-CV-116. After granting stay. Action was dismissed by the District Court. 5 F.RCF. Senior District Judge. rather. J. Supreme Court relies heavily on its literal text and gives effect to its plain language. Plaintiffs appealed.Supp.Texas Const. (2) actions of political party in denying booth and program advertising space at state convention to group attempting to change party's internal platform was not "state action" subject to bill of rights. § 29. Vernon's Ann. When interpreting state Constitution. general supervision of operations of government. § 29. Richard C.A. Dismissed as moot. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Texas Bill of Rights generally applies only against the government.Const. 1. Massey Case Summary/Synopsis Candidate for Republican nomination for President and voters brought action against Georgia's Secretary of State and Georgia Republican Party candidate selection committee challenging constitutionality of his exclusion from primary ballot. and is appropriate only to correct clear abuse of discretion or violation of duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law. and the Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge. J.C. U.Texas Const. John K. issued temporary injunction requiring party to provide convention booth and program advertisement space to group supporting equal civil rights for gay and lesbian individuals.G. 1. 9-431. state action subject to bill of rights is only present for otherwise private conduct when conduct can be fairly attributed to government.A. Dietz Case Summary/Synopsis Political party sought writ of mandamus after the 345th District Court. Court's prior decisions.A. which provide that no person may vote in party primary unless he is on last completed enrollment list of such party and which are not invidiously discriminatory but apply to all alike. Art. § 9-431. held that: (1) Texas Bill of Rights generally applies only against the government. historical context in which it was written.S.W. denied plaintiffs' motion and granted summary judgment to defendants. parties filed motions for summary judgment. 9-56. Spector.3d 1399. J. Vernon's Ann. Travis County. 511. Although in some cases disputed facts regarding extent of government's involvement in challenged action must be resolved by trier of fact. Dietz. it also may consider such things as purpose of provision. 1. and constitutional theory..G. Amend. vacated and remanded.. collective intent of framers and people who adopted it. § 29. Art. ultimate determination of whether facts are sufficient to constitute state action subject to bill of rights is a question of law.com C. Vernon's Ann. 9-59. §§ 9-20.S. § 1983. but are not designed to protect from the invasion of such rights by individuals. are not in violation of United States Constitution but provide for legitimate goals through constitutionally permissible means. Hatchett. Federal courts should not use power to change law in suit raising federal constitutional question for purpose of exercising some amorphous. the Supreme Court.. Duke v. such power should be used only to redress violation of basic human rights to which federal constitutional protections have been extended or to correct governmental action which otherwise conflicts with express provisions of Constitution. Art. The Court of Appeals. Generally. On remand.A. Mandamus is extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances. Freeman.Texas Const. 1. Abbott. 42 U. held that: (1) decision of party's candidate selection committee to exclude candidate from ballot constituted state action potentially allowing recovery under federal civil rights statute. Vernon's Ann. and (3) even if group could prevail on some contract claims. interpretations of analogous constitutional provisions by other jurisdictions. No. Republican Party of Texas v. and candidate and voters appealed. but (2) exclusion did not violate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidate and his supporters. Connecticut election laws which govern primaries.Texas 10 . and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Constitution is compact between government and the people in which the people delegate powers to government and in which powers of government are prescribed. 9-21. 884 F. 924 S.

Ct. which presupposes the freedom to identify those who constitute the association. but the processes by which political parties select their nominees are not wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely. 214. *567. 97 L. 1. 109 S. Allwright. Political party is state actor for purposes of bill of rights in some instances. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 321 U. 337.. (a) States play a major role in structuring and monitoring the primary election process. Democratic Party of United States v. (Cite as: 530 U.3d 646.Ct. and Terry v. 73 S. that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment rights of association. They filed suit against respondent state official. Justice Kennedy filed concurring opinion. 200 U.S. 499. In no area is the political association's right to exclude more important than in its candidate- 11 . even if group could prevail on other contract claims. 461. e. 479 U. 757.Texas Const. 1. Pp.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.2d 514. 2406-2414.Ct. Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined in part.2d 271.Ct. 489 U.Ed. J. 1152. California Democratic Party v. id. inter alia.Ct. Each of petitioner political parties prohibits nonmembers from voting in the party's primary. See United States v.S. 2402. but private organization in other instances. 1." party retained contractual right to restrict booth and approve advertisement so that. Actions of political party in denying booth and program advertising space at state convention to group attempting to change party's internal platform was not "state action" subject to bill of rights. This Nation has a tradition of political associations in which citizens band together to promote candidates who espouse their political views. 544.S. 282. 1013. Art.Ed. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm. Respondent Californians for an Open Primary intervened. see. 120 S. e.Ed. 208.Ct.. Respondents misplace their reliance on Smith v. The District Court held that the primary's burden on petitioners' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. 122. held that California's blanket primary violated political parties' First Amendment right of association. Justice Scalia. 101 S. in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees. 1010. and to limit the association to those people. Art. **2404) Syllabus [FN*] FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Fact that political party agreed to abide by State Constitution when "applicable" did not make its denial of program advertising and booth space to group at state convention "state action" subject to bill of rights. Republican Party of Conn. States must act within limits imposed by the Constitution when regulating parties' internal processes. the parties' discriminatory action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amendment.. when a State prescribes an election process that gives a special role to political parties. 567.Texas Const. The Supreme Court. 450 U. 107. 544. free of First Amendment protections. 987. 567. Vernon's Ann.S. § 29. In 1996. 67 L.Texas Const. Wisconsin ex rel. 50 L.. Tashjian v. alleging. 120 S.g. the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 107 S. injunction requiring party to provide booth and program advertising space gave group more relief than it was entitled to.Ed. Art. Levi.Ed. 169 F. 88 L. which held not that party affairs are public affairs.S. 26 S. 93 L. 103 L. such as when it is conducting certain of its internal affairs.Ct. David F. To the contrary. Held: California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. The First Amendment protects the freedom to join together to further common political beliefs. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election..S.2d 82..S.Supp.g. affirmed. One way that candidates for public office in California gain access to the general ballot is by winning a qualified political party's primary. 2402. See. 321. 984 F. 107 S. Proposition 198 changed the State's partisan primary from a closed primary. Where group seeking booth and program advertising space at political party's convention was aware that advertisements had to be approved and correspondence accompanying its proffered advertisement stated that "if for some reason the ad is not accepted for publication in the program.Ed.Ct.com Const. 1. Vernon's Ann. La Follette. Reversed. such as when it is conducting elections. 1288. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Vernon's Ann. 649. to a blanket primary. upheld proposition. Adams. **2404) (Cite as: 530 U. in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. § 29. Certiorari was granted. § 29. On appeal. 345 U. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. Eu v. 64 S. Jones Case Summary/Synopsis Action was brought challenging constitutionality of California proposition which converted State's primary election from closed to blanket primary in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation. at 214-215.S. § 29.Ct. please return the check to the above address. Art. but only that. 809..

2d 589. J. Proposition 198 is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.Elec. 1. The Court of Appeals. 351. promoting fairness.A.Amend. California's blanket primary violates these principles. Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-selection process--a political party's basic function--by opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party. 520 U. Affirmed. West's Ann. and hence to political power. Pp. California's "blanket primary. and party's federal officeholders brought action challenging validity of Connecticut's closed primary law. Pp. J.C.Cal. and protecting privacy. in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. State may require party registration a reasonable period of time before primary election. promoting fairness. filed a concurring opinion. U. at best. post.C.Amend. 117 S. Twin Cities Area New Party. KENNEDY.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.C.C.Ed. 107 S. District of Connecticut. were illegitimate or not sufficiently compelling to justify California's intrusion into parties' associational rights. 1. Tashjian. 2412-2414. 2151. C. 599 F. U. had refused to affiliate with the party. violated political parties' First Amendment right of association. blanket primary was not narrowly tailored means of furthering them. and O'CONNOR. supra. 544..Cal.Cal. expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns. at 224. in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation. That process often determines the party's positions on significant public policy issues. filed a dissenting opinion. in which REHNQUIST.S. The First Amendment reserves a special place. SCALIA." a process in which dedicated members of one party formally switch to another party to alter outcome of that party's primary.Ct. 2151. 1013. expanding candidate debate beyond scope of partisan concerns. increasing voter participation. reversed. and (2) party rule that permitted unaffiliated voters to participate in primary elections did not violate Qualifications Clause or Seventeenth Amendment. See Timmons v. Const. J. because the moment of choosing the party's nominee is the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action. held that: (1) Connecticut closed primary statute impermissibly interfered with political party's First Amendment right to define its associational boundaries. delivered the opinion of the Court. could not be justified by state's interests in producing elected officials who better represented electorate and expanding candidate debate beyond scope of partisan concerns. KENNEDY. In order to avoid burdening general election ballot with frivolous candidacies. and. and state appealed. Tashjian v. Const. at worst. Justice Scalia dissented and filed opinion. in which Justice Scalia joined.S. Eu. who may have different views from the party.Amend. for that process. West's Ann. 208 (1986) Case Summary/Synopsis Political party. West's Ann. in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation. Justice Stevens dissented and filed opinion. Cabranes." in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation. West's Ann. 1364. José A. (b) None of respondents' seven proffered state interests--producing elected officials who better represent the electorate.Supp. 1. and BREYER.S. and accords a special protection. J. affirmed. Const. The Supreme Court. and state petitioned for certiorari. and protecting privacy--is a compelling interest justifying California's intrusion into the parties' associational rights. California's blanket primary. affording voters greater choice. at 216. post.Ct.Amend. had expressly affiliated with a rival. 109 S.com selection process. p. State interests in promoting fairness.Cal. 358. 137 L.. 479 U. Syllabus [FN*] 12 . California's blanket primary. Such forced association has the likely outcome--indeed. SOUTER. ensuring that disenfranchised persons enjoy the right to an effective vote. 2151. supra. ensuring that disenfranchised persons enjoyed right to effective vote.. and it is the nominee who is the party's ambassador charged with winning the general electorate over to its views. J.J. Justice Marshall.. Const. In order to prevent "party raiding. U. 169 F. p. Because there is no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom.. 1. joined as to Part I.A. JJ. 2406-2412. and even if interests were compelling. increasing voter participation. increasing voter participation. Republican Party.Elec. state chairman of party. State may require parties to demonstrate significant modicum of support before allowing their candidates a place on that ballot.Code §§ 2150. and state interests in producing elected officials who better represented electorate. such "interests" reduced to nothing more than stark repudiation of freedom of association.Code §§ 2150.3d 646. affording voters greater choice.A. could not be justified by state's interests in ensuring that disenfranchised persons enjoyed right to effective vote.Code §§ 2150.Ct. 2414. 1228.S. in which GINSBURG.Elec..Code §§ 2150.Elec. 2416. THOMAS.S. affording voters greater choice. 770 F. STEVENS. The United States District Court. and protecting privacy were not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into political parties' associational rights through California's blanket primary.S. nonmember's desire to participate in party's affairs was overborne by countervailing and legitimate associational right of party to determine its own membership qualifications.A.. in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation. U. 2151. it is Proposition 198's intended outcome--of changing the parties' message. joined. blanket primary forced political parties to associate with those who. granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.2d 265.

. U. J. (b) The interests asserted by appellant Secretary of State of Connecticut as justification for the statute--that it ensures the administrability of the primary.S.. filed a dissenting opinion. 550-54.S.Amend.Amend.A. U. 200 U. Section 9-431 impermissibly burdens the rights of the Party and its members protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. State of Connecticut's interest in preventing raiding was not sufficient basis for statute mandating closed primaries.Ct. 2. and POWELL. without more.com FN* Note: The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. The District Court granted summary judgment in appellees' favor.J. and protects the integrity of the two-party system and the responsibility of party government--are insubstantial.Amend. See United States v. The Clause and the Amendment are not violated by the fact that the Party rule establishes qualifications for voting in congressional elections that differ from the qualifications in elections for the state legislature. has made the primary an integral part of the election procedure. 14. Detroit Lumber Co. Const.S. J. and manner of elections does not justify. The Party and the Party's federal officeholders and state chairman (also appellees) brought an action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of § 9-431 on the ground that it deprives the Party of its right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to enter into political association with individuals of its own choosing. Where state law. abridgement of fundamental rights such as right to vote or to enter into political associations. 26 S. joined. where political party wished 13 . and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. prevents voter raiding. where political party wished to open its primary elections to unaffiliated voters. MARSHALL. Held: 1. 548-50. independent raiders need only register as Republicans and vote in the primary.S.S. without more. such as the right to vote or.G. p. the abridgment of fundamental rights. in which BRENNAN.A. post. Section 9-431 places limits upon the group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the "basic function" of selecting the Party's candidates. Political organization has constitutional right to protect privacy of its membership rolls. delivered the opinion of the Court. 1. C.. 554-56. filed a dissenting opinion. Pp. U. State of Connecticut's interest in economic administrative of election system was not sufficient basis for statute mandating closed primaries..S. 50 L. 770 F. SCALIA..A. Const. affirmed.Amends.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. and O'CONNOR.C. Pp. Connecticut closed primary statute impermissibly interfered with political party's First Amendment right to define its associational boundaries.C. The implementation of the Party rule will not violate the Qualifications Clause of the Constitution--which provides that the House of Representatives "shall be composed of Members chosen . as here.C. 14. 499. Freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization. since § 9-431 does not impede a raid on the Republican Party by independent voters. J. in which REHNQUIST.A.. Const. and the Court of Appeals affirmed. And even if the State were correct in arguing that § 9-431 in providing for a closed primary system is designed to save the Party from undertaking conduct destructive of its own interests.2d 265 (CA2 1985). and hence to political power in the community. the requirements of the Clause and the Amendment apply to primaries as well as to general elections. STEVENS.. WHITE. 1. (a) The freedom of association protected by those Amendments includes partisan political organization. joined. The achievement of the goal of the Clause to prevent the mischief that would arise if state voters found themselves disqualified from participating in federal elections does not require that qualifications for exercise of the federal franchise be precisely equivalent to the qualifications for exercising the franchise in a given State.S. ---. 1. C. The possibility of increases in the cost of administering the election system is not a sufficient basis for infringing appellees' First Amendment rights. U.G. requires voters in any political party primary to be registered members of that party. BLACKMUN. whose determination of the boundaries of its own association and of the structure that best allows it to pursue its political goals is protected by the Constitution.Ed. § 9-431. § 9-431.A. joined.. The fact that the State has the power to regulate the time. 282. A Connecticut statute (§ 9-431). where members affiliation with organization might subject members to public hostility or discrimination. by the People of the several States. J. The interest in curtailing raiding is not implicated. The interest in preventing voter confusion does not make it necessary to burden the Party's associational rights.Amends. as here. place. JJ. appellee Republican Party of Connecticut (Party) adopted a Party rule that permits independent voters--registered voters not affiliated with any party--to vote in Republican primaries for federal and statewide offices. p. The State thus limits the Party's associational opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action. J. in which SCALIA. because it does not disenfranchise any voter in a federal election who was qualified to vote in a primary or general election for the more numerous house of the state legislature. 1. Power to regulate time. 1.. 548-54. Pp.S. Const. 321.A. post. In 1984. avoids voter confusion.C. Const. 337. enacted in 1955. place and manner of elections does not justify. and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature"--and the parallel provision of the Seventeenth Amendment. the State may not constitutionally substitute its judgment for that of the Party. ---.. the freedom of political association. 287.C. Pp.A. U. C. though unaffiliated voters could register as members of party as late as noon of last business day preceding primary.

The Court of Appeals. since they burden the First Amendment rights of political parties and their members without serving a compelling state interest. Amend.S.S. inter alia. Const.Ct. Section 11702 of the California Elections Code (Code) forbids the official governing bodies of political parties to endorse or oppose candidates in primary elections. Amend. § 2. where rule did not disenfranchise any voter in federal election who was qualified to vote in primary or general election for most numerous branch of state legislature.A.C. U.. limit the term of office for a party's state central committee chair. 17. The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to the provisions in question. Neither state nor court may constitutionally substitute its judgment for that of political party as to boundaries of its own association and structure that best allows it to pursue its political goals.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. 1. § 2. Circuit Judge. 17. U. 864. U. and the Court of Appeals affirmed.S. See United States v.G. Affirmed. 1.S. Justice Stevens filed concurring opinion. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee Case Summary/Synopsis Party central committees brought action challenging sections of California Election Code banning primary endorsements and imposing restrictions on internal policy governance of political parties. Const.C. § 2. Art. entered judgment for committees.C. 826 F. 50 L. cl. J.A. U.A. and require that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California.C. Held: The challenged California election laws are invalid. Art. v..com to open its primary elections only to unaffiliated voters and not to members of other political parties. 17. 337.S.S.S. 1. Art. claiming.S. Other Code sections dictate the organization and composition of parties' governing bodies. 479 U. Const. that these Code provisions deprived parties and their members of the rights of free speech and free association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.Ed. Const. 200 U. By preventing a party's governing body from stating whether a candidate adheres to the party's tenets or whether party officials believe that the candidate is qualified for the position sought.G. 1. members of such bodies.Ed. the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall held that: (1) ban on primary endorsements violated First and Fourteenth Amendments. 93 L. Norris. § 9-431. Amend. and other politically active groups and individuals brought suit in the District Court. and requirement that such chairs rotate between residents of Northern and Southern California could not be upheld. § 2. and (2) restrictions on organization and composition of official governing bodies of political parties. On appeal. Art. vacated and remanded. 321. cl. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California. U.C. 1. Marilyn H. Qualifications Clauses require only that all those qualified to participate in selection of members of most numerous branch of state legislature be qualified to participate in federal legislative elections. Const.Ct. Various party governing bodies. C.Amend. Eu. 1. the ban directly hampers the party's ability to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves about the 14 .A. Const. §§ 9-56.Amend. On remand. Qualifications Clauses do not require perfect symmetry of voter qualifications in state and federal legislative elections. 287. 282.A. cl. cl. the Court of Appeals. limits on term of office for state central committee chairs. 26 S.S.C. 1.2d 802. Party rule opening political party's primary elections to unaffiliated voters did not violate Qualifications Clauses or Seventeenth Amendment.A.A.A. C. 9-431. 1. U. State of Connecticut's interest in avoiding voter confusion was insufficient basis for statute mandating closed primaries. 792 F. Patel. and appeal was taken. 1.Amend. U.2d 814. Qualifications Clauses are applicable to primary elections in precisely same fashion that they apply to general congressional elections. On appeal. and election statute provided that unaffiliated voter could register as party member as late as noon on last business day preceding primary. 1.S. 17. (a) The ban on primary endorsements in §§ 11702 and 29430 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.C.A.2d 820. 1019-1025. 1.S. Pp. again affirmed. 499. where political party had elected to open its primaries to unaffiliated voters. while § 29430 makes it a misdemeanor for any candidate in a primary to claim official party endorsement. Amend. 1024. 107 S. Detroit Lumber Co. Syllabus [FN*] FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in consideration or decision of case. affirmed. the United States Supreme Court. Const.

29430. the ban does not serve a compelling governmental interest.Amends. U. 14. individual legislator may be acting on her understanding of public good or her interest in reelection rather than as representative of party interests.Cal.C. since the ban restricts the flow of information to the citizenry without any evidence of the existence of fraud or corruption that would justify such a restriction.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. U. 1019-1023. since the goal of protecting the party against itself would not justify a State's substituting its judgment for that of the party. Freedom of association guaranteed under First Amendment means not only that individual voter has right to associate with political party of her choice. 1. delivered the opinion of the Court. ban prevents party governing bodies from stating whether candidate adheres to tenets of party or whether party officials believe that candidate is qualified for position sought. Parties and political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments.J.Amend.Amend. In constitutional challenge to California's ban on primary endorsements.Code §§ 11702. Const.Code §§ 11702. and honest. 1. not all parties have significant representation in legislature. (b) The restrictions on the organization and composition of the official governing bodies of political parties. and California has made no such showing.S. filed a concurring opinion. and thereby burdens the core right to free political speech of the party and its members. 1023-1025. The State's claim that it has a compelling interest in the democratic management of internal party affairs is without merit.A. since a State may enact laws to prevent disruption of political parties from without but not from within.. endorsement ban prevented parties from promoting candidates at crucial juncture at which appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action and hence to political power in community. 1025. Moreover. and fact that parties continued to participate in state-run primary process did not indicate that they favored such regulation imposed upon that process. who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Moreover.Cal. and select its leaders.C.S. Const. the laws do not serve a compelling state interest. The explanation that the State's compelling interest in stable government embraces a similar interest in party stability is untenable. Const.Elec. California's ban on primary endorsements constituted violation of First Amendment right to free speech. affirmed. 1. in supporting endorsement ban. West's Ann.S. U. Const. Nor are the restrictions justified by the State's claim that limiting the term of the state central committee chair and requiring that the chair rotate between northern and southern California help to prevent regional friction from reaching a critical mass. West's Ann. California statute which deprived political party of power to endorse candidates violated right of freedom of association as guaranteed under First Amendment. Const.S. U.Amends. and the requirement that such chairs rotate between residents of northern and southern California cannot be upheld.Code §§ 11702. 826 F. State may not enact election laws to mitigate intraparty factionalism during primary campaign. statute burdening rights to free speech and free association could survive constitutional scrutiny only if it served compelling governmental interest.Elec. primary is not hostile to intraparty feuds but rather 15 . and since the State has no interest in protecting the party's integrity against the party itself. since a State cannot substitute its judgment for that of the party as to the desirability of a particular party structure. the limits on the term of office for state central committee chairs.C. post. it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if state shows that it advances compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 29430. These laws directly burden the associational rights of a party and its members by limiting the party's discretion in how to organize itself. Pp. West's Ann. since this is not a case where intervention is necessary to prevent the derogation of party adherents' civil rights. Pp. that bylaws of some parties prohibited primary endorsements.Code §§ 11702.Cal. p. in which all other Members joined. The State has not adequately explained how the ban advances its claimed interest in a stable political system or what makes California so peculiar that it is virtually the only State to determine that such a ban is necessary.Amend.. Const..A. STEVENS. The ban also infringes a party's protected freedom of association rights to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard-bearer who best represents the party's ideology and preferences. U.S.Cal.Elec.A. state was not relieved from showing endorsement ban served compelling state interest on basis that legislatures who could repeal ban belonged to political parties. 29430. by preventing the party from promoting candidates at the crucial primary election juncture. Supreme Court first examines whether it burdens rights protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments.A. and that parties continued to participate in state-run primaries. 1. In constitutional challenge to California statute banning primary endorsements. U.A. fair. if challenged law burdens rights of political parties and their members. The claim that a party that issues primary endorsements risks intraparty friction which may endanger its general election prospects is insufficient. 14.A.2d 814 (CA9 1987). which directly hampers ability of party to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves about candidates and campaign issues. but also that political party has right to identify people who constitute association and to select standard bearer who best represents party's ideologies and preferences. C. 1. To assess constitutionality of state election law. J.C.Elec. conduct its affairs.C.C.Amend. 29430. except REHNQUIST. The State's claim that the ban is necessary to protect primary voters from confusion and undue influence must be viewed with skepticism.S. J. West's Ann.com candidates and issues. A State cannot justify regulating a party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is necessary to ensure that elections are orderly. 1. MARSHALL.

Const. 14. The Supreme Court opined that these powers could properly be exercised by an "Officer of the United States" (validly appointed under Article II.Cal.Elec. may enact laws interfering with party's internal affairs when necessary to ensure that elections are fair and honest. The petitioners sought for the district court to overturn the key provisions outlined above. Buckley v.Amends. even if ban on endorsements saves political party from pursuing self-destructive acts. U. U.Amend.S. 424 U. In addition there was a requirement that each of the three appointing authorities was forbidden to choose both of their appointees from the same political party.C. 1. The scheme by which the eight members of the commission were chosen was that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives were ex officio members of the Commission without a right to vote. the Secretary of the Senate and ex officio member of the FEC who represented the U. California's statutory restrictions on internal policy governance of political parties which infringed upon First Amendment rights did not serve compelling state interest and thus could not be upheld. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals.S.S. limited independent expenditures to $1000 (formerly 18 U.C.Code §§ 11702. U. 16 .Amend.Elec. Const.Code §§ 11702. 29430.A.Amends. but ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally protected free speech.S. the limitations on campaign expenditures. State has compelling interest in preserving integrity of its election process and toward that end.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. by Senator James L. 1 (1976). the court sustained the Act's limits on individual contributions. California's ban on party primary endorsements did not serve state's legitimate interest in fostering informed electorate. Valeo. West's Ann. §608e). restrictions limited political party's discretion in how to organize itself. The court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. former Senator. 1.S.C. §437c(a) (1)(A-C)). §608a).C. federal government.A. yet lacked any compelling countervailing government interest necessary to sustain them.C. and two would be appointed by the President.Code § 1 et seq.Cal. two would be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives upon recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the House.. except for presidential candidates who accepted public funding (formerly 18 U. History In 1974. conduct it affairs. 1.A. and others.Elec.com is ideal forum in which to resolve them. West's Ann. and created and fixed the method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (formerly 2 U. state made no showing that voters were unduly influenced by party endorsements or that endorsement issued by official party organization carried more weight than one issued by newspaper or labor union. and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds were found to be constitutionally infirm in that they placed severe restrictions on protected expression and association. two members would be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. and struck down portions of the law. A lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the D.C.Cal. 29430. U. The six voting members would then need to be confirmed by the majority of both Houses of Congress.A.C. Const. Const. as well as the disclosure and reporting provisions and the public financing scheme.S.S. 1. §608(c) (1)(C-F)).A. West's Ann. Ford. However. Statutory restrictions on internal policy governance of political parties infringes upon party's right to free association. respectively.Code § 1 et seq.C. 1976.S. Valeo. and select its officers. Freedom of association as protected by First Amendment encompasses political party's decisions about identity of and process for electing its leaders. 14. U. Preserving party unity during primary is not compelling state interest so as to justify infringement on First Amendment rights by statutory ban on primary endorsements.C. Buckley of New York. on January 2. such does not justify state's substitution of its judgment for that of party.Elec. creating the first comprehensive effort by the federal government to regulate campaign contributions and spending. provided for the public financing of presidential elections (IRC Subtitle H). 1. The suit was filed against Francis R.Amend. West's Ann. limited candidate expenditures from personal funds (formerly 18 U. state failed to demonstrate that such regulation was necessary to ensure election that was orderly and fair. the Congress passed significant amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 1975. limited expenditures by candidates and associated committees. Const. was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a federal law which set limits on campaign contributions. The key parts of the amended law limited contributions to candidates for federal office (2 USC §441a). over the veto of President Gerald R.S. The court also stated candidates can give unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns.C. Decision In a lengthy per curiam decision issued on January 30. The Court also held that the method for appointments to the Federal Election Commission was an unconstitutional violation of Separation of Powers. on independent expenditures by individuals and groups.S. They argued that the legislation was in violation of the 1st and 5th Amendment rights to freedom of expression and due process. 1968 presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.S.Cal. required the disclosure of political contributions (2 USC §434).

000. This legislation included a prohibition on soft money as well as limits on independent expenditures by private groups.) On a somewhat different note." have argued for overturning Buckley on these grounds. a political action committee. are protected by the First Amendment as free speech. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1. "Even without the authority of Buckley. ranging from $250 to $1. in dissent. in deference to Congress's greater knowledge and expertise on the issue. clause 2 of the Constitution) but held that the Commissioners could not exercise this significant authority because they were not "appointed". In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. with or without adjustment for inflation. and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC. Zev David Fredman. do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. who were not on the Court at the time of "Buckley. without the limitation.075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. From the other side. filed suit. See e. Valeo established a $1. In reversing. the Court further restricted attempts to minimize the effects of private money on races for the U. FEC). who wrote that the Court's decision "runs the risk of endorsing the view that fair representation is representation according to the amount of influence effectively exerted." (See: wealth primary. Justice Byron White. upheld the statute. The statute allows for periodic adjustments.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley. This position was advanced by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his dissent. The PAC had contributed $1. Buckley v. some disagree vigorously with Buckley on the grounds that it sustained some limits on campaign contributions which.000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. FEC.075 to Fredman and argued. argued the entire law should have been upheld. but their position has not been adopted by the court. it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. FEC Facts of the Case Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate. In 2008. McConnell v. define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional? Conclusion Yes. wrote Justice Souter for the Court. there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed. the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and. Valeo. Shrink Missouri Government PAC Facts of the Case In 1976. its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal District Court. Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented. Holding: The Court upheld federal limits on campaign contributions and ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally protected free speech. Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. at 137. Among those criticizing the decision on this line was philosopher John Rawls. who claimed that individual contributions and expenditures are protected speech acts. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits.000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1. with or without adjustment for inflation. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment.075 for candidates for statewide office. Id.S. applying Buckley v. Nixon v. voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights." Justices Anthony Kennedy.com Section 2. House and Senate when it struck down the "Millionaires Amendment" in the case of FEC v Davis (originally Davis v. Question Does Buckley v. "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. they argue. the case remains the starting point for judicial analysis of the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions. upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("McCain-Feingold Bill"). alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. and no. to candidates for state office. which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1. the Court of Appeals. but that the federal limits approved in Buckley. because it struck down limits on expenditures some argue that this precedent allows those with great wealth to effectively drown out the speech of average citizens. no. Colorado Rep Fed Campaign Comm v.g. which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate. Souter. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia." The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First 17 . a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor. Criticism Although the decision upheld restrictions on the size of campaign contributions. Additionally. In 1998. Despite criticism of Buckley from both sides. including state auditor. found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.

for a common-law writ of certiorari. or concert. Albritton et al. §§ 17. Tit. Tit. 13. interferes with the party-candidate relationship. a candidate. consultation. and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption. justices are limited in their power to supervise persons and bodies clothed with judicial power in the exercise thereof. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Under statute granting Supreme Court authority to issue writs of injunction and other remedial and original writs as necessary to give to it a general superintendence and control of inferior jurisdiction.'" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy. unlike expenditures truly independent. that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. 17. or their agents.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. Case Summary/Synopsis Original application of the State of Alabama against Robert B. Kennedy. joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. executive or ministerial rather than judicial." Justice Thomas concluded that the Provision is unconstitutional not only as applied to the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee. Subsequently.S. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed. the Committee's broader claim remained. as presidential electors of the State of Alabama. § 140. § 235. Therefore. Code 1940. Facts of the Case The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of "contribution" includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. concluded that. in Buckley v. 13. Question Are congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate? Conclusion No. Supreme Court. may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. Justice Stephen G. with. Certiorari will lie to review only those acts which are judicial or quasi-judicial in their nature. 18. consultation. which was joined by Chief Justice William H. held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional. Dissenting. FEC. but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. Justice Thomas argued that the spending limit "sweeps too broadly. In a plurality decision. Albritton and others. or at the request or suggestion of." Justice Souter noted that "'there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates. Code 1940. violate First Amendment rights when applied to expenditures a political party has made independently of any candidate's campaign? Conclusion Yes. or in the alternative for an injunction or other extraordinary writ to review or control the performance of respondents' official duties. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte. Tit. Souter. and it does not lie to review or annul any judgment or proceeding which is legislative. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. without coordination with any candidate. the court ordered judgment for the FEC. Const. FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a "contribution" a political party's spending "in cooperation. without coordination with any candidate. his authorized political committees. as established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. in which the Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently." State v. the Court held that "a party's coordinated expenditures. Question Do the federal campaign-financing limits on the amount of money political parties may spend on congressional races. the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to "an expenditure that the political party has made independently. with_a candidate. FEC v." The U. Valeo. but also on its face. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer.1901. § 17.com Amendment as applied to its advertisements. Petition dismissed." In the wake of this decision. on its face. Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion. 18 . or concert. nor to review action of an inferior tribunal or board in the exercise of purely legislative functions nor to review or control issues of purely political nature.

dismissed action.C. U. The right to vote in presidential elections inheres not in citizens but in states. to vote in a presidential election.A.. cls. Art. even though not residents of a state. v. cls. COUNCIL OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES ("CAPP"). U.. 2. art. Tit. Code 1940. Const. 3 U. but the action of the electors in casting their votes by ballot is governed by the federal Constitution. et al. 18. Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to enjoin presidential electors elected by Democratic Party of Alabama from casting their votes for a candidate other than the Democratic national nominee after the 1948 general election to fill the office of President of the United States. 3 U. 3.S.S. 3 U. Tit. 2. §§ 17. and appeal was taken. U. and in determining the individuals for whom they cast the electoral votes of the states. § 235. cls. Tit. 13. Cristobal C.C. Code 1940. 3.Const. 12. Amend. 399 Federal constitution manifests intent that presidential and vice presidential electors chosen for the several states are to exercise their judgment and discretion in performance of their duty in election of President and Vice President. 2.A. State of Alabama in its corporate capacity was without interest to maintain application for issuance of writ of certiorari to review announcement made by respondents while running as candidates for presidential electors in primary held by state Democratic Party that if elected they would not cast their ballots for stated person as President if nominated by the National Democratic Convention on a civil rights platform. Const. 18. as amended.C. 2. Citizens Residing in Guam Qualified to Vote Pursuant to Organic Act v. art. § 235.S. Case Summary/Synopsis Attorney General of Guam and four individuals brought action against the United States on behalf of American citizens who are residents of Guam registered to vote in territorial elections seeking a judgment declaring right of citizens to vote in the United States presidential and vicepresidential elections. § 17. Duenas.S. violates provisions of the federal Constitution showing intention that electors should exercise their judgment and discretion in performance of their duty in the election of the President and Vice President.C. Code 1940. 2. 17. Congress has not authorized all American citizens. cl. New Jersey Libertarian Party. art. Affirmed. Amend. 17. UNITED STATES of America. thus. Guam is not a state. § 202. Inc. The ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the TERRITORY OF GUAM on Behalf of ALL U.S. Schroeder. § 1. Defendant-Appellee.A.C. 13. and John Paff. § 1. held that constitutional rights of American citizens on Guam were not violated by prohibiting their voting in the United States presidential and vice-presidential elections.C. §§ 17. CITIZENS RESIDING IN GUAM QUALIFIED TO VOTE PURSUANT TO the ORGANIC ACT. their constitutional rights were not violated by prohibiting their voting in the election of the president and vice-president of the United States. Const. 12.S.S. The United States District Court for the Territory of Guam. cl.A.C.1901. § 1973aa-1. 3. and in determining the individuals for whom they will cast the electoral votes of the states. 2. Tit. Voting Right Act of 1965. 18.. Circuit Judge. 2. 17. 2. Attorney General of Territory of Guam on Behalf of All U. U. § 1. 2. J.C. or in the alternative for a writ of injunction restraining such electors from casting their votes for a candidate other than the party named after his nomination by the National Convention.S.S.A.S.S.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. Const. 250 Ala. Amendatory act providing that presidential and vice presidential electors shall cast their ballots for the nominee of the national convention of the party by which they were elected. § 226. Reform Party of New Jersey.A.C.A. § 17. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Territory of Guam.com Certiorari would not issue to review announcement made by state presidential electors while running as candidates for that office in Democratic primary that if nominated and elected they would not cast their ballot for the Democratic national nominee if he were nominated on a civil rights platform. citizens vote indirectly for the president by voting for state electors.A. § 17. Plaintiffs- 19 . Tit.A. Tit. § 1. The Court of Appeals. it can have no electors for the presidential election. 12.S. U. Const. Plaintiffs-Appellants. §§ 17. 42 U. George Guzdek. Amend. The appointment and mode of appointment of presidential and vice presidential electors belong exclusively to the state under the federal Constitution. U. Art. 3. Code 1940. § 1. 13. § 140. and American citizens who are residents of Guam and who are registered to vote in territorial elections cannot exercise individual votes in a presidential election.

J.S.Amend. If the burden imposed on plaintiffs' First Amendment rights is severe. or Independent and statute governing dissemination of voter affiliation information.C.A. The Superior Court. harmony and honesty. Statutes establishing voter affiliation declaration scheme and procedure for maintaining and disseminating this information created impermissible burden on voters' and alternative political parties' First Amendment rights to express political ideas and to associate to exchange these ideas to further their political goals and denied to them the equal protection of the laws.J.A. and ballots to reduce election and campaign disorder and to advance fair and honest elections. STATE of New Jersey. 1. v. 19:5-- 20 . DefendantsAppellants.S. Jr. Const. Democrat. U. Appellate Division. 19:31-18. Const. The STATE COMMITTEE OF the REPUBLICAN PARTY of the State of New Jersey. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. The independent expression of a political party or organization's views is a "core" First Amendment activity and this includes the right to create and advance new parties which enhances the constitutional interests of like-minded voters to gather to pursue common ends. 14.S. State.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. U.C. and his successor. 1.. U. a state may not impose severe burdens on those rights absent a weightier state interest. close scrutiny is in order. The Superior Court.A.S. 1.C. N. Gold.Amend.1.C.Amends. and Norman P. Parrillo. declared voter affiliation scheme unconstitutional.A. Richard J. When the restrictions imposed on plaintiffs' First Amendment rights are severe. J. Susy ROGERS. Rosen.S. 19:23-45. 19:5--4 and The State Committee of the Democratic Party.S. Page.Amend. however. DIVISION OF ELECTIONS and John J. 1. in his capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey.S.S. Const. If the burden imposed on plaintiffs' First Amendment rights is considered minimal. Jr. U. and New Jersey Republican State Committee and New Jersey Democratic State Committee. 19:23-45.D. held that statutes establishing voter affiliation declaration scheme and procedure for maintaining and disseminating this information created impermissible burden on voters' and alternative parties' First Amendment rights and denied to them the equal protection of the laws.S.A.A. they must be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling state interest. 1. statutes failed to recognize that alternative parties were entitled to same opportunity to have their followers declare their affiliation and to have county registrars maintain and disseminate this information to alternative parties on the same terms as major political parties. Plaintiffs. James Streeter.A. State and major political parties appealed. 1. Intervenors-Appellants. West Codenotes Held Unconstitutional N. Farmer.Amend. U. A state restriction which creates access barriers to the ballot thereby restricting the candidate field does not compel close scrutiny. J.A. Mercer County. Div.J.. a political body organized pursuant to N. Chancery Division. U. U. in the name of order.S. however. Charles E. The First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment protect the rights of citizens to associate and form political parties. the State's valid regulatory interests are generally considered sufficient to justify the burden.A. elections. Const.Amends.A.A.1.C. The state has a role in enacting reasonable regulations of political parties. Cuff. v. of Elections Case Summary/Synopsis Alternative political parties brought action challenging constitutionality of statute precluding registered voters from declaring a party affiliation other than Republican. Const. when these state restrictions severely burden First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Const..Amends.A. 14.J. a political body organized pursuant to N. the restrictions will be subjected to close scrutiny and the State's interests justifying the burden must be compelling. 14. Affirmed. 19:31-18.C..C. 1.S. Const.com Respondents.

1. 19:5-4 to 6.C. 19:6-18.. opposed by the Superintendent of Elections. N. Statute setting up State Committees of political parties and providing for election of one male and one female member of each county as committee member at primary election did not violate equal protection on ground that there was no provision for a one man. art. in view of facts that the State Committee neither makes nor enforces any laws and that its permissible activites cannot be classified as truly governmental. as from person convicted of crime. Rogers v. par. In determining its public policy with regard to withholding right of suffrage. A construction which would nullify constitutional clause and render its words mere surplusage cannot be adopted if any other construction is reasonably open. 19:32-18.S. One sovereign cannot impose punishment within territory of another. § 2. was to preserve purity of elections. but also in a federal court sitting in the state. The constitutional clause withholding right of suffrage from person convicted of a crime which "now" excludes him from being a witness refers to time of adoption of constitution on September 2. insane person.C. art. art.A.com 4. 1844. nor can one sovereign be compelled to impose punishment within its own territory on behalf of another.Const. U. 19:32-16.Const. p. the state may adopt such standard 21 . Courts are reluctant to interfere in intraparty controversies in absence of a violation of controlling statute or infringement of clear legal right. 1.J. N. and hence takes as a standard of reference the statute of 1799. Paterson's Laws.S. The Superior Court. Act June 7. held that the statute providing for election of one male and one female member of each county as committee member at primary election.A.C.S. but. 2. art. 14.S. Case Summary/Synopsis Proceeding in lieu of prerogative writs challenging constitutionality of statute setting up state committees of political parties. Application denied. Defendants. Statutes concerning the State committees of political parties manifest no intention to create a pervasive regulation of intraparty operations and procedures. A political party makes its own rules and regulations and determines its own policies.1. 2.S.Const. N. shall be admitted as a witness unless first pardoned.J. temporarily assigned. 401. APPLICATION OF MARINO Case Summary/Synopsis Proceeding in the matter of the application of Angelo Marino for an order permitting him to vote. 1. par. N. Ordinarily. providing that no person convicted of any of enumerated crimes. 19:4-1. J. and not to invoke a punishment or penalty.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.Const.J. 1. Schneider. in view of facts that the Committee neither makes nor enforces any laws and that its permissible activities cannot be classified as truly governmental. The clause of state Constitution withholding right of suffrage from person "convicted of a crime" which excludes him from being a witness includes the crime of conspiracy for which a defendant is convicted not only in state court. par.C.S. 19:27-10. 2. 1799.A.A. did not violate equal protection on ground that there was no provision for a one man-one vote basis. U. N.A. Amend. including conspiracy. or person convicted of a crime which excludes him from being a witness. one vote basis. 19:5-4.A. 19:13-2.J. N.J.S.S. Law Division. State Committee of Republican Party.A. where the people of a state deem it to their advantage to aid in effectuation of penal policy of sister state. Judgment for defendants A "political party" is an association of persons sponsoring ideas of government or maintaining certain political principles or beliefs in public policies of government. idiot.J. one sovereign will not lend its aid to imposition of punishment within its own territory on behalf of another. they may do so. The purpose of constitutional clause withholding right of suffrage from every pauper.Const. and its purpose is to urge adoption and execution of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like beliefs.A. No crime committed in New Jersey for which a defendant is convicted in state court now excludes him from being a witness.

Art. 19:31-2. Case Summary/Synopsis County elections board referred case to court for decision on ballots cast by patients of psychiatric hospital. 2. Convicted criminal was entitled to vote in election where. 1.S.. 6. A showing that a voter resides at a psychiatric hospital by itself is insufficient to sustain a challenge to the right to vote. segregated the ballots. N. on date of election. 6. v. Jr. 30:4-24. 19:41.A. pars. Cumberland County. Art. subd.J. (2) the challenger has the burden to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.S.J.A.S.S. c. N. 19:4-1. 19:57-24.A. a. par. 14. 19:4-1. Art.S.J.S. 30:4-24. § 1. N.S. The Superior Court. he was free on his own recognizance pending future surrender date to penitentiary. § 1.2. N. par. Rodriguez. Laws 1964. Hitchner v. N. c. C. N. 3. Involuntarily committed residents of a psychiatric hospital are presumed competent to vote. HITCHNER. Order accordingly. II. J. 19:4-1: N.A. U. held that: (1) a showing that a voter resides at a psychiatric hospital by itself is insufficient to sustain a challenge to the right to vote. c. 30:4-24. Cumberland County Bd. and can therefore adopt a penal standard set by the federal government. unless a compelling state interest to justify the restriction is shown. 3. N. Voting is a fundamental right. Advocacy group appealed. 3. 7. subd..A. Mercer County.2.A. pars. Const.J. pars.S. it was not a "determination" within the meaning of statute requiring disputes as to voter qualification to be referred to the superior court for determination. Segregating the ballots of patients at psychiatric hospital for a possible future disposition was improper. of Elections Case Summary/Synopsis Petitioner sought an order allowing him to vote in an election even though he had been convicted of a criminal offense. 30:4-24. subd. 30:4-24. and (3) segregating the patients' ballots was improper. The Superior Court. art.2. Law Division.A.J. Reversed. 19:32-39.A. N. As with all fundamental rights. Const.S.J. Amend. there can be no interference with an individual's right to vote.1947. 6. Convicted criminal could not be barred from voting in election where superintendent of elections failed to provide any notice to him of such disqualification and voter learned of it only when he was refused right to vote at polling place.D.J.A. Art. The burden of demonstrating that an individual is incompetent requires proof that is clear and convincing. All challenges to an individual's right to vote must be carefully scrutinized.Const.A. subject to federal Constitution. 7.J. N. 19:57-24. The challengers to ballots cast by patients of psychiatric hospital had the burden to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. I/M/O ABSENTEE BALLOTS CAST BY FIVE RESIDENTS OF TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL.A..2. 2. J. Appellate Division.J.J. N. 19:32-39. subd. held that petitioner was entitled to vote where he was free on his own recognizance pending a future surrender date to the penitentiary.2. Petitioner. N.2. The County Court.A. Const.S.S.A. c.1(8). 19:4-1(2-5). 41.S. 2. Miller.com as it desires. C.Const. Respondent.A.S. subd.A. 22 . 30:4-24.J. § 1. a.S. In re Absentee Ballots Cast by Five Residents of Trenton Psychiatric Hosp. subd.J. Const. N.J. 19:4. Marvin K. a. Those who seek to deprive an individual of a fundamental right must meet a clear and convincing burden of proof.C. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. The word "determination" in statute requiring disputes as to voter qualification to be referred to the superior court for determination means that the court has a duty to decide the validity or invalidity of the ballots based on statutes or case law authority. 2.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.

U. State of Utah v. Higginbotham. precluded state legislature from drawing new congressional district lines in the middle of a decade after a court had drawn district lines when the legislature initially failed to draw new lines after the decennial census. the Census Clause. Judgment for defendants.S.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. § 704. Law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. in order to satisfy requirements under free exercise of religion clause of First Amendment. A three-judge panel of the District Court held that: (1) recommendation that seat be apportioned to North Carolina was not agency action.Amend. denied in part. Ward. filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Donald L. Const. cl. and Rosenthal. rather than six. and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.A. held that: (1) neither the Elections Clause.S. J. subject to Administrative Procedure Act (APA). J.S. and the vote dilution provision of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). and interest groups brought action alleging that state's congressional redistricting plan violated the Elections.A.4% of the voters in the district.C. keeping in mind constitutional purpose of census. North Carolina cross moved for summary judgment. and its Congressional delegation. § 2. et al Session v. or of a group of seven congressional districts that at most were minority influence districts. Secretary and Director moved for dismissal or alternatively for summary judgment.. challenging apportionment of seat in House of Representatives to State of North Carolina. voters.S. 1. et al v. even if law has incidental effect of burdening particular religious practice.. but it does not authorize the segregation of absentee ballots prior to counting them. Census. (4) vote dilution provision of the VRA did not require state to preserve the boundaries of a congressional district in which Black and Hispanic voters constituted 46. Amend. Rick PERRY. nor statute requiring creation of congressional districts in each state entitled to more than one congressional representative.J. Census Bureau's decision. State of Utah moved for summary judgment. and (4) exclusion of missionaries did not mandate exclusion of federal employees.A. 5 U. Holdings: A three-judge panel. Walter SESSION. (3) inclusion in census of federal government employees stationed abroad did not mandate inclusion of religious denomination's missionaries serving abroad. to count no Americans living abroad other than federal government employees in establishing populations of states for 23 .A. 1. Art. Const. precluding challenge to report as arbitrary and capricious under Administrative Procedure Act (APA). recommending that seat in House of Representatives be apportioned to North Carolina rather than Utah. § 2. 19:29-1 to 19:29-14.C. Circuit Judge.C. (2) decision did not violate free exercise of religion clause of First Amendment or Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Secretary of Commerce did not take final agency action in transmitting report of 2000 census to President. (7) redistricting plan did not use racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. who was not covered by APA. Perry Case Summary/Synopsis Background: City. (6) VRA vote dilution provision did not preclude state's congressional redistricting plan from dividing previous Latino majority citizen voting age district for political purpose of favoring incumbent's reelection. 14. sued Secretary of Commerce and Director of Census Bureau. (2) fact that the state did not have a history or tradition of drawing new congressional district lines in the middle of a decade did not preclude the legislature from doing so. 3. U. Motions granted in part. (3) prior three-judge panel decision drawing new congressional district lines within the state after the state legislature failed to create new district lines after the decennial census did not have collateral estoppel effect on the state in the present action. Commerce Secretary's conduct of decennial census must bear only reasonable relationship to accomplishment of actual enumeration of population. and (8) changes of two percent or less in each of two African-American majority congressional districts' Black citizen voting age populations under the redistricting plan did not violate VRA vote dilution provision. (5) VRA vote dilution provision did not require congressional redistricting plan to include seven. districts in which Latinos were a majority of the citizen voting age population. N. 19:57-24. final apportionment decision was made by President. Evans Case Summary/Synopsis State of Utah.com The statutory scheme for challenging voter qualification and elections permits challenge to votes cast by absentee ballots. North Carolina and its Congressional delegation intervened.

two sets of plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the legality and constitutionality of the plan. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case Summary/Synopsis Various United States residents brought action against federal agencies and officials. The suit in No. The Constitution's Census Clause authorizes Congress to direct an "actual Enumeration" of the American public every 10 years to provide a basis for apportioning congressional representation among the States. 1..C.A. 282. that federal government employees living abroad would be counted as residents of their home states for purposes of apportioning seats in House of Representatives. Affirmed. See United States v. and there were severe administrative problems involved in broadening count of Americans living abroad. or that they were even aware they would not be counted. § 2. in form of loss of state representative and dilution of voting strength.Ed.A. § 2000bb et seq.C. Art. Hilton.Amend. did not violate rights of church missionaries not counted as residents of Utah because of their presence overseas at time of census. and in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in part. Amend.. Justice Scalia concurred in part and filed opinion. Exclusion from population of state. and as employees were from all fifty states in roughly same proportion as population of each state compared to national population. in which Justice Souter. U. for purposes of apportioning seats in House of Representatives pursuant to decennial census.Amend. J.S. Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion.A. 337.C. On direct appeal. 98-404 was filed by the United States House of Representatives in the District Court for the District of Columbia.C.Ct. challenging planned use of statistical sampling during the next decennial census.. and (2) Census Act prohibited proposed use of statistical sampling in connection with decennial census. Justice Stevens dissented and filed opinion.A. 3.Supp.. goal of population apportionment was furthered. 1. on grounds that they were similarly situated. in which Justice Thomas joined.. U. 19 F. 13 U. § 1 et seq.S. Congress has enacted the Census Act.S. § 2 et seq. Each of the courts held that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for Article III standing. this Court consolidated the cases for oral argument. 26 S. Defendants and various intervenors filed motion to dismiss. Syllabus [FN*] FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.A. Consolidating appeal with appeal from decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.2d 76.C.S. 200 U.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.A.A. granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.A.C. in which court also upheld challenge to census plan. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.S.2d 543. 1. Pursuant to this authority. the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor.com purposes of apportioning seats in House of Representatives. their inclusion would be contrary to requirement that census achieve fair apportionment for entire country.S. and renters. including certain minorities. Defendants appealed. announced a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a chronic and apparently growing problem of "undercounting" of some identifiable groups. Lamberth. 321. of missionaries of particular religious denomination stationed abroad did not mandate that federal government employees living abroad not be counted as residents of their home states. Const. 499.C. delegating the authority to conduct the decennial census to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined proposed use of statistical sampling. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v.C. 24 . 13 U.Supp.C. In early 1998. children.. § 2 et seq.S. for the District of Virginia. 13 U.. 42 U. 98564 was filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by four counties and residents of 13 States. held that: (1) state residents challenging decision of Department of Commerce to use statistical sampling in upcoming decennial census sufficiently showed that they would suffer requisite personal injury. Const. The Census Bureau (Bureau). 11 F. and plaintiffs filed motion for summary judgment. there was no showing that Census Bureau's decision tended to burden or coerce missionaries in exercise of their religious beliefs. 13 U. The suit in No. federal government employees were required to be outside country. § 2 et seq. A threejudge panel of the District Court. § 2000bb et seq. § 141(a).S. and Justice Breyer joined in part. ruled that the Bureau's plan for the 2000 census violated the Census Act. § 141(a). 42 U. 1. § 141(a).. since disproportionate number of missionaries were from state of Utah. and permanently enjoined the planned use of statistical sampling to determine the population for congressional apportionment purposes.A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. to have Article III standing.S. § 2000bb et seq. U. Const.S.C. under either free exercise of religion clause of First Amendment or Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Chief Judge. which is part of the Department of Commerce. Census Bureau's determination.S.. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. Justice Ginsburg. did not trigger requirement that missionaries from particular denomination working abroad be similarly counted. 50 L. 42 U. cl. whether as substitute or as supplement to traditional enumeration methods for calculating the population for apportionment purposes.

468 U. in which REHNQUIST.Ed. 98-404. 82 L. Carr.S.Ed. See. Art. in such form and content as he may determine. p.S. e. § 1 et seq.C. Georgia. 91 S. In order to establish such standing.. A plaintiff must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability or the merits in order to prevail on a summary judgment motion.2d 556. Challenge to decision of Department of Commerce to use statistical sampling to determine the population of the various states. joined. JJ. 323 U. filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. and SCALIA.. Inc. this interpretation of the Census Act until 1994.2d 543. for apportionment purposes. affirmed. 144. In 1976.. and in which REHNQUIST. Allen v.A... Bock Laundry Machine Co. statistical . Appellees have also established standing on the basis of the expected effects of the use of sampling in the 2000 census on intrastate redistricting. causation. C. 89 L.." Section 195 requires the Secretary to use sampling in assembling the myriad demographic data that are collected in connection with the decennial census. in form of loss of state representative and dilution of voting strength. 101. § 195 provides: "Except for the determination of population for purposes of [congressional] apportionment .. and which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. joined. joined as to Part II..S. p. Const. 3. was fairly traceable to use of statistical sampling.J. 782.779.Supp. e. Congress revised 13 U. See. 871.. will lose a House seat under the proposed census 2000 plan. Cf. 497 U.A. Several of the States in which the counties are located require use of federal decennial census population numbers for their state legislative redistricting. post.2d 76. 779.J. e..Ct. McLaughlin.Downloaded From OutlineDepot. State residents challenging decision of Department of Commerce to use statistical sampling in upcoming decennial census sufficiently showed that they would suffer requisite personal injury. 104 S. 3177. 3315. 3. but it maintains the longstanding prohibition on the use of such sampling in calculating the population for congressional apportionment. Appellees in No.C. J..C. That loss undoubtedly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. appellees submitted an affidavit that demonstrates that it is a virtual certainty that Indiana. E. C. and States use the population numbers generated by the federal decennial census for federal congressional redistricting. which authorizes the Secretary to "take a decennial census . However. Art. that context is provided by over 200 years during which federal census statutes have uniformly prohibited using statistical sampling for congressional apportionment. post. 524. 593. joined. 3. Spector Motor Service.Ct. delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I. SCALIA. 104 L. and SCALIA. in which REHNQUIST. v.J. joined as to Parts I and II. 779. National Wildlife Federation..S. 775. 110 S. Appellees have demonstrated that voters in nine counties.. joined. since Indiana residents' votes will be diluted by the loss of a Representative.com Held: 1.Ed. 490 U. Baker v.Ct. and redressibility requirements. if he considers it feasible.2d 557. and KENNEDY. KENNEDY. 186. including several of the appellees.Ed.J. The Census Act prohibits the proposed uses of statistical sampling to determine the population for congressional apportionment purposes.. 145. 2.." This broad grant of authority is informed. 737. Here.. rather.. where appellee Hofmeister resides.Ct. and KENNEDY. filed a dissenting opinion. 751.. Pp. therefore that case no longer presents a substantial federal question and the appeal therein is dismissed. J.g. the Secretary shall.2d 741.S. 884. 98-564 also resolves the substantive issues presented in No. and would be redressed by grant of requested injunctive relief. The Court's affirmance of the judgment in No. Lujan v.C.2d 695.. J. threat of vote dilution from use of sampling methods was actual or imminent. 152. Hofmeister also meets the second and third standing requirements: There is undoubtedly a "traceable" connection between the use of sampling in the decennial census and Indiana's expected loss of a Representative.S. 11 F.S.S.g. See. Const. 789.Ed. however.. § 1 et seq... plaintiff must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability or the merits.S. by the narrower and more specific § 195. filed an opinion concurring in part. See Green v. 1981. O'CONNOR. a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.Supp. The present controversy is justiciable because several of the appellees have met their burden of proof regarding their standing to bring this suit. On motion for summary judgment. 105. 3. § 1 et seq. post. U. plaintiff must allege personal injury which is fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct. joined as to Parts II and III. and an opinion with respect to Part III-B. J. in which THOMAS.Ct. U. the "except/shall" sentence structure in the amended § 195 might reasonably be read as either permissive or prohibitive. To establish Article III standing... p. in which SOUTER. The expected intrastate vote dilution satisfies the injury-in-fact. 369 U. to have Article III standing. in which SOUTER and GINSBURG. J. in which REHNQUIST. 111 L. and in which BREYER. p. KENNEDY. the provisions here at issue took their present form. STEVENS.C. post. U.. Appellees living in the nine counties therefore have a strong claim that they will be injured because their votes will be diluted vis-à-vis residents of counties with larger undercount rates. unlike motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Sanks v. 772-775.S. 65 S. Wright. filed a dissenting opinion. 109 S. C. 786. GINSBURG. 3. and IV. 504. 82 S. during next decennial census was sufficiently ripe to permit judicial determination thereon. Art. 7 L. the Court need not reach the constitutional question presented.Ed. Pp. THOMAS. § 1 et seq. BREYER. U. and there is a substantial likelihood that the requested relief--a permanent injunction against the proposed uses of sampling in the census--will redress the alleged injury. Art. and BREYER. and even advocated. J. 208. 25 . and THOMAS.A. plaintiff cannot prevail merely by alleging injury. Const. In support of their summary judgment motion. J. J.2d 663. 27 L.g.g. authorize the use of .... J. P. As amended in 1976.A. JJ. Because the Court concludes that the Census Act prohibits the proposed uses of statistical sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment.. The Executive Branch accepted. appeal dismissed. joined. including the use of sampling procedures. JJ. 19 F.Ct. C. are substantially likely to suffer intrastate vote dilution as a result of the Bureau's plan. III-A. 101. Absent any historical context. 691.. 'sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this title. Const.. the section's interpretation depends primarily on the broader context in which that structure appears. 401 U. the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II.S. 98-564 satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. § 141(a). J.

C. § 195. Kourlis. 13 U. So ordered.J. held that: (1) Supreme Court would exercise its discretion to decide cases. the Census Act prohibited proposed use of statistical sampling in connection with decennial census.A. § 195. where challenge could be resolved on ground that proposed use of statistical sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment violated the Census Act. Mullarkey.S..C..C... which was second redistricting plan after 2000 census.Downloaded From OutlineDepot.S. 13 U. SALAZAR v.sampling. if he considers it feasible." did not alter statutory prohibition against use of sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment. the Secretary [of Commerce] shall. joined. The Supreme Court. and (3) General Assembly's congressional redistricting bill. Secretary of State brought separate original action challenging the Attorney General's authority to bring the first case. providing that "[e]xcept for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress. J. violated provision of state Constitution prohibiting congressional redistricting more than once per decade.. rather.A. DAVIDSON Case Summary/Synopsis Attorney General brought original action challenging constitutionality of the General Assembly's congressional redistricting bill. 26 ..com Amendment to the Census Act. J. Supreme Court would not reach constitutional questions raised by residents' challenge to decision of Department of Commerce to use statistical sampling during next decennial census. dissented in part and filed an opinion in which Coats.. whether as substitute or as supplement to traditional enumeration methods for calculating the population for apportionment purposes.. authorize the use of. (2) Attorney General had authority to petition the Supreme Court to enjoin the Secretary of State from conducting elections under bill.

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