Philosophy, Aesthetics and Cultural Theory Series Editor: Hugh J. Silverman, Stony Brook University, USA The Philosophy, Aesthetics and Cultural Theory series examines the encounter between contemporary Continental philosophy and aesthetic and cultural theory. Each book in the series explores an exciting new direction in philosophical aesthetics or cultural theory, identifying the most important and pressing issues in Continental philosophy today. Derrida, Literature and War, Sean Gaston Foucault’s Philosophy of Art, Joseph J. Tanke Philosophy and the Book, Daniel Selcer


Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane 11 York Road Suite 704 London SE1 7NX New York, NY 10038 © William Watkin 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-8470-6452-3 PB: 978-0-8264-4324-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Watkin, William, 1970– The literary Agamben: adventures in logopoiesis / William Watkin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN-13: 978-1-84706-452-3 (hbk.) ISBN-10: 1-84706-452-3 (hbk.) ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-4324-3 (pbk.) ISBN-10: 0-8264-4324-9 (pbk.) 1. Agamben, Giorgio, 1942–Knowledge–Literature. 2. Literature–Philosophy. I. Title. B3611.A44W37 2010 2009030741 195–dc22

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a Emilia e Luca “Long have we laboured in miracle realms” .

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Thinking Thought Poetic Thinking Poetry and Philosophy Communicability.CONTENTS Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Exoteric Dossier: The Literary Agamben Projection: There is Language Infancy: Animals and Children Ineffability and Experience The Stanza The Sign Negating Negation Subjective Enunciation The Semiotic Poetic Dictation FIRST EPISODE: ON THE WAY TO LOGOPOIESIS Chapter 1 Logos. The Idea of Prose Poetic Gestures The Tablet. The Thing Itself The Idea of Language Communicability. Philosophical Gesturality Potentiality x xi 1 4 6 9 13 17 20 23 26 32 41 41 44 48 52 54 58 61 63 vii .

Productive Anti-poiesis Living As If or As Not Auratic Twilight Shock! Profaning Scission Taste and Terror How to Exit Art Modern Aesthetic Desubjectivization 69 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 87 88 92 94 97 99 103 107 SECOND EPISODE: ADVENTURES IN LOGOPOIESIS Chapter 4 Logopoiesis. Thinking through Making Poiesis Praxis Techne The Art Thing Finitude Morphe. The Messianic As Not ˉ Messianic Kairos Messianic Rhyme An Endless Falling Into Silence Tension: The One Line Chapter 6 Caesura. Modern Anti-Poiesis Chapter 3 Modernity. the Space of Thought The Caesura Apotropaics 117 119 122 124 129 135 135 139 144 149 153 155 162 166 166 174 viii . the Turn of Verse The Definition of Poetry Boustrophedonics Kle sis. Shape Entelechy Arche. Thinking Tautology The Logo-Poiesis Tautology The Exemplary Tautology of Logopoiesis Infinite Poetry The Habits of the Muse Chapter 5 Enjambement.Chapter 2 Poiesis.

Ease: The Proximate Space Corn: In The Corner of The Room Rhythm Recursion. the Turn of Thinking Notes Bibliography Index 180 186 189 194 203 218 229 ix .

but also for her many comments. on behalf of the author. not merely because of the incredible support she has given me over this past. x . the writing of this book coincided with the birth of my daughter . Reprint of the final stanza from “Down By the Station Early in the Morning” from A WAVE by John Ashbery. 1983. intense. The Man Without Content. that is truly living. and Sarah Campbell. Obvious it is that sharing a house with an Italian is useful when writing a book on Agamben. . Finally. 1984 by John Ashbery. Language and Death © 1991 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota. Permission to use “Warrant” granted by Charles Bernstein. suggestions. I greatly appreciate the questions and remarks that followed which encouraged but also challenged me. . Dearest Barbara. more unexpected it was that sharing a home with a theoretical physicist would open up for me the very structural basis of poetry and thinking.. University.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks are due to my editors Hugh Silverman. 1982. So it is that the last but also always the first expression of gratitude as ever goes to my wife. Barbara Montanari. Chapter Two was presented as a seminar at Brunel University in March 2009. miraculous year. whose careful stewardship of the book in its latter stages was much appreciated. Inc. and my son. and aids to translation. I must also thank Brunel University for granting me a year-long sabbatical to complete this work. living with someone so much more intelligent than I. the title of this book is his. granted by permission of Georges Borchardt. and Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy © 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. Excerpts from Giorgio Agamben. Excerpts from Giorgio Agamben. Copyright © 1981.

trans. 1998). William Watkin. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (1978). Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books. 3–24. trans. Martin Heidegger. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press. xi . Giorgio Agamben. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: SUNY Press. trans. 1996). 1993). Giorgio Agamben. trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Liz Heron (London: Verso. trans. Being and Time (1953). 2 (2000). 1993). PA: Bucknell University Press. trans. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (1981). Giorgio Agamben. Idea of Prose (1985). 2000). 2007). Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1999). Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995). Handbook of Inaesthetics (1998). “Agamben’s Potential. trans. Alain Badiou.” Diacritics 30. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press. Giorgio Agamben. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. The End of the Poem (1996). Giorgio Agamben. 2001). In the Process of Poetry: The New York School and the Avant-Garde (Lewisburg. trans. no. Alain Badiou. trans. 2005). Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity Press. The Century (2005). 1995).LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AP BT C CC EHP EP HI HS IH IP IPP Leland De La Durantaye. The Coming Community (1990).

trans.LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LAS Jean-François Lyotard. Politics. On Mourning: Theories of Loss in Modern Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. MWE Giorgio Agamben. trans. Peter D. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row. xii . Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press. MofP William Watkin. “The Materialization of Prose: Poiesis versus Dianoia in the Work of Godzich & Kittay. 1999). 2005). 2006). On the Way to Language (1959). trans. 2008). trans. trans. 2004). Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (1982). 1982). Means Without Ends (1996). Poetry. trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Para Paragraph 25. Multiple Arts. LPN Shane Weller. OWL Martin Heidegger. 1999). PA Catherine Mills. 3 (2008). Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Margins of Philosophy (1972). trans. 344–364. NC: Duke University Press. no. Karen E. The Open: Man and Animal (2002). Nihilism: The Uncanniest of Guests (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 1999). LD Giorgio Agamben. trans. 1971). MA Jean-Luc Nancy.. 2008). 2000). Literature. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: Acumen Press. MWC Giorgio Agamben.” Paragraph 31. Ninfe (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 2008). Georgia Albert (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Manifesto for Philosophy (1989). Metaphysics and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Durham. Norman Madarasz (Albany: SUNY. Alan Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Philosophy. Thought. PLT Martin Heidegger. N Giorgio Agamben. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Shklovsky. Language. Silliman and Agamben. Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (1991). The Man Without Content (1970). trans. ed. 1971). PMD Andrew Norris ed. OM William Watkin. 2004). trans. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins. P Potentialities (1999). M Jacques Derrida. 2 (2002). Muses II. O Giorgio Agamben. 1994). MP Alain Badiou. 1991). no.

trans. State of Exception (2003). Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Nicholas Heron. SAQ The South Atlantic Quarterly 2007). TP John Ashbery. 1 (2008). SL Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli eds. 1993). trans. trans.LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Prof Giorgio Agamben. 1993). ST Giorgio Agamben. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture (1977). 2008). RA Giorgio Agamben. Blanchot and Agamben (Albany: SUNY Press. http://williamwatkin. WGA Justin Clemens. QCT Martin Heidegger. 2008). William Watkin’s Blog. RP Thomas Carl Wall. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books. Radical Passivity: Lé 2007). trans. William Lovitt (London: Harper Perennial. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books. R Plato. Three Poems (New York: Penguin. Sovereignty and Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Republic. 1999). WWB William Watkin. trans. trans. 2005). 2002). Selected Poetry (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks. and Alex Murray eds. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ronald L. Life (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Profanations (2005). SE Giorgio Agamben. 2005). SP Alexander Pope.. xiii . trans. 2008). Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (1999). The Work of Giorgio Agamben: Law. Robin Winterfield (Oxford: Oxford World Classics. The Question Concerning Technology. blogspot. TTR The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (2000). Literature. 1977).

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the homo sacer and our current “state of exception.EXOTERIC DOSSIER: THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (b. 1 . In this work Agamben presents his critique of our political modernity as a permanent state of exception/emergency. In the complex and. That exception has become the norm is the basis of Agamben’s savage attack on our biopolitical modernity. typically. perhaps.” he presents a convincing cartography of the political in our age that is. 1942) first came to prominence in the field of political philosophy with the publication in 1995 of his explosive book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. This extended study of the categories of the political and modernity continues apace. Like the homo sacer. now stretched to six volumes or around a third of his total published output. our bare life can be taken from us at any point without the state having to answer to the very apparatus of law from which is gains legitimated power through its right of occasional exception from legal norms. through which he likens our advanced democracies to living in a camp. whose sacred life was the possession and legitimization of the sovereign ready to be forfeited at any point without fear of legal repercussion. bare life. the homo sacer. is overseen by sovereign power. This state of exception. confrontational studies that make up the ongoing Homo Sacer project Agamben proposes a radical. Living perpetually in this denuded zone of indistinction between biological existence as such (zoé) and our social life (bios). In particular through the consideration of sovereignty. The sovereign’s legitimacy extends from the power of the state to reduce our existence to bare life or life as mere survival. often unremittingly negative critique of our Western modernity in terms of the political and its relation to life. what Agamben calls the biopolitical. makes of us that most despised figure from Roman law.

through immersion in the work of philology and linguistic analysis. Numerous critics have noted a seemingly contradictory bifurcation in the Agamben methodology. the “literary” Agamben is not mere youthful promiscuousness but a serious and lifelong affair for his compatriot—to retain the propensity for plenitude to be found in dualistic metaphysics at the same time as he praises Agamben for finally putting an end to this tradition. by manipulating and constructing them). Away from the political/materialist Agamben there is another Agamben.3 Negri is far from alone in asserting that “Agamben” is a homonymic moniker referring to two thinkers of radical dissimilarity. These are the metaphysical and the political Agambens respectively. the literary Agamben. There is the one who lingers in the existential. This is the Agamben we are most familiar with. sometimes so marked it is suggestive of the possibility that there are more Agambens out there writing philosophy than was first assumed. so desperate to negate the third Agamben. Canny enough perhaps. he rediscovers pieces or elements of being. one of Agamben’s great productive antagonists.1 Antonio Negri.5 Thus Negri. unless under the auspices of dialectical resolution or archeunity. 111). who. the uncanny unwelcome guest at the intimate if troubled feast that rages still tête-à-tête between metaphysics and politics. 2 . one a philosopher of negative being and the other an etymo-philologer and habitué of material clues. where he is perpetually forced into a confrontation with the idea of death.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN the leading revolutionary political theory that we have.4 This enforced subjective scission is strategic. As is often the case with the dual structures of metaphysics the energy between two terms leaves little space for the imposition of a third. destining. And there is another Agamben. but no one can fully suppress the ability of the uncanny to undermine studiously erected structures of identity. ponders. Thus Negri is canny enough—well aware as he is that even though he dismisses the three books preceding Language and Death (1982) as a “literary apprenticeship” (SL. and terrifying shadows. attains the power of being (that is. and the one about whom I will have the least to say in the chapters that follow. instead opens the door to just such a possibility of tertiary ruination. for example. rather infamously:2 It seems there are two Agambens.

It is this voice. Effectively. absolved of the negativity of which it had been the bearer. the literary Agamben. to the tones of the tern.6 3 . intimidated by the sovereignty of metaphysical thought. if you will. an absolute voice. inasmuch as it endures as the only power of this dissolved universe” (SL. beyond the learnéd and almost overwhelming conversation between the two Agambens and his many critics. and yet always persistent and quietly insistent. Attend then. adventurer in poiesis. that the following pages wish to augment. it is now poiesis.EXOTERIC DOSSIER: THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Speaking of Agamben’s oft-cited application of the voice as such emptied of content as a solution for post-metaphysical negativity he concedes: “this nihilistic self-dissolution of being frees the voice— but another voice. 113–14). muted by the clamour of the bios.

however. over the years.” Such an experience. clearly. . his metaphysics and. to let language speak 4 . . Such a pure exteriority of an empty language which yet still speaks is both the basis of Agamben’s “metaphysics” and of my claim that the literary Agamben is an essential element of that mode of thinking. the centrality of literature to his work.)1 At the age of 36. unbelievably obdurate for it is undoubtedly true that the questioning of the presence of language remains at the heart of Agamben’s political thinking. is able to predict the guiding topic of all one’s books. Who. cannot think its chirping. requires that one “venture into a perfectly empty dimension . written and unwritten?3 Now.4 To see language as it is.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE (The cricket. most pertinent to our study here. in its full material yet voided exteriority. in the preface to his third book.” In this thin sheaf of pages he explains that he is undertaking an experiment with language “in the true meaning of the words. 30 years later one has to concede that the young thinker was either preternaturally prescient or. a characteristically confident Giorgio Agamben declares: “In both my written and unwritten books. This risk-bound declaration of intent occurs in the short piece that prefaces Infancy and History (1978) entitled “Experimentum Linguae. after all. in which what is experienced is language itself. past and future. what is the meaning of ‘I speak’?”2 This may seem like youthful exuberance and in the mouths of others at similarly early stages in their career might strike the seasoned observer as a touch hubristic. in which one can encounter the pure exteriority of language” (IH. he suggests. 5). to make language appear before us such as it is. I have stubbornly pursued only one train of thought: what is the meaning of ‘there is language’ [vi è il linguaggio].

The first of these is extrapolated from an. . 5 . and yet related responses when confronted with the empty plane of language or the sheerness of its suddenly uprearing edifice is our simple mode of conceptual transport here in this now-written work.5 It is the nexus wherein his great ontological question. This unusual rumination leads to a series of related questions such as. This theme. and if we do not find a human voice. is this what we humans mean by language. An adventure in the mind and in the word is how I would term such an experiment that can only commence through access to the singular nature of the relation between literature and linguistic exteriority that philosophy has traditionally termed poiesis. To understand the relation between thought and literature through their complex. In this incorporated and yet incorporeal work he asks: “Is there a human voice. unpublished fragment of another great work Agamben never wrote. The two interlocutions are. and Agamben has indeed not yet done so. 4).?” (IH. what is the meaning of “I speak”? or at the very least this demand will eventually lead Agamben to consider the political and anthropological implications of this assertion for the Western definition of human being in works such as Homo Sacer and The Open (2002). returns again and again in Agamben’s early work. one will take his word for it that this is also the case. what does it mean to live as a human being. a voice that is the voice of man as the chirp is the voice of the cricket . what does it mean to have language.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE itself without being exhausted through its enunciation is the experiment Agamben conducts on thought as such in all his written works thus far. La voce umana (the human voice). differential. 3). the possession of voice/language by the animal and the privation of voice in the human.6 not posed until many years later. up to this point. what is the relationship between voice and language in this regard. The projection of the “problem” of empty linguistic exteriority from the experiments with language the youthful Agamben had been performing in the laboratory of his mind allows him to address with great speed in the pages which follow some of the major problems of philosophy. where does this lead the classic philosophical definition of the human as zoon logon echon or “the living being which has ¯ ¯ language”? (IH. or better drama. As for the unwritten. if there is a human voice. . oversteps the threshold of his other great demand that primarily occupies the first two decades or so of his career. in effect. bundled together in what might be termed his interim request.

Aside from the obvious fact that literature is composed of language and constitutes a profound experience with language. they do not actually speak although they do possess language. or as-such-ness. enunciation. and second they are pre-possessed of their voice as soon as they come into being. what order of communication. and self-regarding entity? INFANCY: ANIMALS AND CHILDREN One of the earliest postings into the vast dossier of Agamben’s great experimentum primarily concerns what he calls human linguistic infancy or how we humans are expelled from language as such into linguistic and metaphysical scission. the role of language in subjective enunciation. Agamben uses the term infancy in his early work to describe an interim state between our pure state of grace in language. of language: communicability or a language that communicates itself without communicating any specific thing. is this solipsistic. negation. purely exterior landscape of language as such. (The difference between speech. the dependence of metaphysical definitions of language on division and negation. First. my contention is that in order to take up a position in relation to the literary in Agamben one must come to terms with language.) Infancy does not describe our actual early childhood. scission. and voice is therefore foundational. however. but is an ontological term for a state of being indicating a compound of questions pertaining to how humans have language and how this relates to their 6 . and language’s materiality. echoing that of the animal. and semiotic materiality therefore form the five arms of the guiding star of the Agambenian ontological constellation that shines above the empty and literally unwelcoming. Acquisition of voice. Infancy as a concept originates in the observable phenomenon that humans learn to speak whereas animals do not in two significant ways. and our acquisition of a voice.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Consistent with Negri’s remark and the critical community’s claims of the two Agambens. tautological.7 What kind of language. language. what if anything does the literary have to contribute to the arrival at the sheer face of the outcrop that is language’s exteriority? The answer resides in Agamben’s complex investigation of language as such through ideas pertaining to the acquisition of human voice. The cold light cast by this stelliform compound reveals for us linguistic exteriority defined as the very existence.

for example. they are always and totally language .10 In contrast to this. The historicity of the human being has its basis in this difference and discontinuity. Unlike the metaphysical tradition Agamben is not at ease with the Aristotelian definition of human being as zoon logon echon. or at least he is uncomfortable with the uncritical ¯ ¯ acceptance of this formulation within philosophy. has to constitute himself as the subject of language–he has to say I.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE apparently not having a voice of their own such as one finds in the cricket.8 In one basic sense infancy captures the process wherein human animals learn. or have speech foisted upon them. if language is truly man’s nature . Thus. by preceding speech. and chimpanzees. This could be taken to mean how we come to language but this is not how Agamben views infancy. in order to speak. are the only beings that are not born with a clearly identifiable voice then they must come to their voice or arrive at speech. as we saw. their being. . or a cricket’s chirping one also names the animal’s language and. regardless of our tireless encouragement. language and speech are indivisible and when one speaks of an animal voice. thus far have not. for infancy brings it discontinuity and the difference between language and discourse. on the contrary. then man’s nature is split at its source. . acquire. the human has no voice of its own.” Second. . . . they are already inside it. Animals do not enter language. for that matter. 59) Infancy in this instance names the fact that human animals are the only ones to emerge from language into the ambiguity of the unidentifiable sound of the human voice. of all animals. In this way the term infancy describes having language and privation of voice as fundamental conditions for human being establishing an important interplay between possession and privation that echoes throughout the whole of Agamben’s work. (IH. splits this single language and. instead. Man. as humans acquire 7 . For the animal. means they cannot be appropriated by “we who do” as a means of securing subjective self-definition:9 Animals are not in fact denied language. as indeed developmentally we seem to do. . by having an infancy. One can say the cricket chirps but not the human “. first. by implication. If humans. a dog’s bark. In disputation with the Aristotelian inheritance Agamben does not accept that animals are without language which.

in seeking to regain language we create the possibility of becoming something like a post-human. language-speech. and finally as negation. first silencing language and then. that forms the bedrock of Agamben’s attack on metaphysics and modern ontology upon which all the various edifices of the numerous Agamben’s are placed. the way we have language is first as bifurcation. Thus. This is effectively the argument of Language and Death. voice. Fourth. Infancy submits us to history expelling us from language as such and propelling us into a bifurcated sense of language as phone and logos. and infancy as that which we must recuperate. It would seem. 8 . as Agamben is at pains to show. the follow-up text to Infancy and History. Life. from this. it is not the fact that we have language that defines our humanity. In losing language we become a human being and alive. that there are two infancies: infancy as that which we have lost. or lack of it. language.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN their voice a clear division between speech and language in the human animal develops.12 Thus one could put together the three great questions of Agambenian ontology by exclaiming that what it means for human beings to live is the fact that they “have” language as a silenced potential embedded within the human voice. In reality these two nascent states are simply two elements of an overall infancy as an ongoing process of being. and this is a profoundly Heideggerian gesture. is infancy. and as a critique of the basis of modern thinking on negation. The only way out of this metaphysical dead end. a return to a pre-divided idea of a pure language.11 It is only because we have infancy that we have a history and it is only because we have a history that we are human and possess the potential to access the full meaning of this by a recuperation of our infancy. voice itself. a period wherein we acquire speech. eventually. but the way in which we come to have it—not the zoon or the logon but the generally ignored echon ¯ ¯ that matters. then as subordination. and voice are therefore separate yet inseparable terms within Agamben’s thought. and silence. this division and our awareness of it define human being as self-consciously different from all other beings. speech denies any experience of the nature of language as such comparable to the manner in which animals experience language. in a destinal and possibly liberationist historicization. forming the basis of the meaning of our possession of voice. Yet it also involves us. Third. Agamben argues. Our entrance into this philosophical cul-de-sac is the fact that we humans have infancy. speech over language.

This is our old friend the experimentum linguae which Agamben renames here infancy. the concept of infancy is then an attempt to think through these limits in a direction other than that of the vulgarly ineffable” (IH. 54–65).” a place where thought can go and language cannot. the ineffable in philosophy. Agamben goes on to read the experience of the ineffable in the work of Kant and German historian Carl Erdmann as an attempt to think a concept that can be known but which has no referent in the world. there must be reference to something that is not language that it signifies. Thought has become embroiled in thinking language in terms not of what it can say but of what it cannot. “If every thought can be classified according to the way in which it articulates the question of the limits of language. the unsayable being precisely what language must presuppose in order to signify” (IH. “in which the limits of language are to be found not outside language. It is a concept without a name and knowledge without an object. 4). instead “express its invincible power of presupposition. the unsaid and the ineffable. and second. 4). 4). namely that of the ineffable. defining being and thinking along the way as first. to identify the singularity of language as such. which seems to direct us towards pure thinking without language. Ironically. 4–6). based on language. Erdmann knowledge independent of sensibility (see IH. post-vocal divided language. In contrast to this tradition of negation Agamben involves himself in an experiment. Accepting this to be the case the ineffable can be said to come to presence in that it only exists as pure thought or what language cannot say. a thing or a truth to be known.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE INEFFABILITY AND EXPERIENCE Infancy solves another problem for Agamben beyond that of the relation of the human to the animal via the faculty of speech as a negation of language. For language to signify and thus become the human language we are all familiar with. actually comes to name language for this tradition. “far from indicating the limit of language. 9 . Kant calls this the “transcendental experience” of pure thought. presuppositionally negative (see LD. as “not something ineffable but something superlatively sayable: the thing of language” (IH. As Agamben says. after Benjamin. In Language and Death specifically Agamben identifies a metaphysical reliance on ineffable unsayability as modern thinking’s greatest weakness leading philosophy into a reification of the unsayable as the negative basis for being in language.

This great quest to move beyond modern philosophical ineffability isolates a third and final issue in relation to infancy. but in terms of what it can say if it does not refer to that which is outside of itself. in response to the problem that there is an object. rather it is language that is content-less speech. for if it is not named there can be no shortfall of plenitude. language that says nothing other than here I am. in its pure self-reference” (IH. or a typical conversation in a British pub towards closing time. only to find that the name for such an experience is the ineffable or un-named as such. that we need language to name it. even if all one is saying is that one can say something. but also testing. Finally. infancy names the problem of human experience. Infancy first names our coming away from being animal. a reification of the unspeakable.13 This problem has afflicted language for a good deal of time naming a clear division in philosophy between knowledge and experience. . forcing the thinker to seek for a concept that cannot be named. Important in this regard is the fact that the words “experiment” and “experience” share the same Latin root and consequently the meaning of experience for Agamben originates not only in the act of sustaining or going through something. but in an experience of language as such. 15–49). as a thinker. It then indicates our ability to conceive of a pure thinking not in terms of what cannot be said but what can. as the pure fact that one speaks. “But what can an experience of this kind be? How can there be an experience not of an object but of language itself . Language as the basis of thought should be considered not in terms of what it cannot say. The subtitle of Infancy and History is On the Destruction of Experience and a significant portion of the book is a response to the philosophical belief that in modernity one does not go through an experience but merely observes events as spectacle from the outside (see IH. that language exists” (IH. Agamben instead simply introjects the problem. 10 . thus concluding that language always remains insufficient to name objects. I am language. but in naming it we find that the name never entirely renders the object. Rather than. 6)? This then is a second issue: Can one testify in thought to the significance of the fact that one speaks or that language exists without recourse to referential exteriority and difference? Can there be an experience of language as speaking but saying nothing in particular? This is not language as the ineffable.referential language. . that which is outside of it (the referent). pre. a morass it has proven impossible to escape from.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN in the direction of its referent. 6). experience me.or ir.

and then imposing unworkable unities to heal this rift is a habitual failing of Western thought. Maintaining the false division. self-conscious subjectivity. 8). Infancy names this third possibility: to maintain experience as knowing and as undergoing. thinking. which he takes to be the experience of experience itself. namely as the imposition of scission as a means of creating human. defining human being as “neither Homo sapiens nor Homo loquens. Infancy reveals the confluence of language. and being human within the very faculty of language that says nothing specifically but merely enacts the experience of having language before one succumbs to the way in which our tradition has chosen to possess this faculty. To undergo an experience with language. or we observe events from the outside as judgemental critics. Human language. It is what Agamben means by thinking and what he takes to be the truth of the very existence of the possessed faculty of language as such. primordial being for whom the division between phone and logos has not yet come about. is to undergo a new form of experience as testing or thinking. but Homo sapiens loquendi” (IH. via that infancy that dwells in the margin between language and discourse. as Agamben sees it. cannot be undertaken exterior to language as he contends some philosophers have attempted. he concedes. it is an impossibility of speaking from the basis of a language. therefore. between experience as knowledge and as going through. Yet nor can it be experienced entirely from the inside as in some imagined. of the very faculty or power of speech” (IH. a form of thinking that does not look at language 11 . Either our experiences are so unique that they are one-off events that can hold no meaning for “the human experience” at large. is by definition bifurcated. As he says: “In this sense what is experienced in the experimentum linguae is not merely an impossibility of saying: rather. 8).PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE Thus Agamben’s expressed project or experimentum linguae suggests that to understand the fact that there is language one must conduct an experiment on and undergo an experience with language. To live as a human being means to live both from the outside of language as the being who knows but does not speak and from the inside as the being that speaks but does not know. evidenced by our endless pursuit of novel and new experiences. In the modern age the division between the two meanings of experience is most profoundly felt. it is an experience. denying that the event in question actually pertains to how we live.14 For Agamben the experience of language.

and what does it mean to experience something? Most specifically. In a way. said relation to language. Agamben’s rests in large part within the silence as regards how we have language and the assumption that the human ontological relation to language depends on the voice to such a degree that the truth of human being. Infancy. 39–62).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN from the outside. which we might call infant being. 54–5). or occupy language and seek for exterior referents. therefore. while Agamben is critical of both Heidegger and Derrida. zoological. One issue here is that the very choice of the name infancy is as confusing as it is illustrative. therefore. and the imposition of a voice through the agency of speech. what does language say. 24). If Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics resides in the tradition’s obfuscation of authentic Being. which is not only impossible to ascertain but also not what Agamben intends. our actual infancy is merely a useful developmental analogue for an ontological temporality of development that presupposes a pre-human. While infancy is observable in children it would be a mistake to suggest that infancy is a psychosomatic or neonatal stage of our development (see IH. suggesting a developmental. If anything. a human defined as life. and an in-between and constantly emergent human being. but which accepts the presence of language as such as exteriority as such. provokes our attention back to the quasi-mythological “moment” before the acquisition of speech when human beings had a more direct line of sight to language in that they did not possess language but were rather possessed or captivated by language (see O. This is not to be conceived of as a return to a pre-human animal stage but is rather a moment between our emergence from the animal in our realization that we have no voice to speak of. and Derrida’s on its privileging of speech over writing. 12 . it opens up a zone that exists for thought and being between language as such and discourse. yet refusing to succumb to the various aporias that have traditionally arrested the progression of thought on this matter. or psychosomatic empiricism behind our being with or having language. accepting their division as a fact of our ontological Geschichte or deep history (see QCT. Infancy allows Agamben to name this alternative mode of thinking in relation to three key metaphysical problems for conventional thought: what is the human animal.15 his own philosophy is partly a colloquium of his two great predecessors: an attack on the metaphysical occlusion of being (in language) that was actuated historically by the prioritization of speech in the form of the voice. is silenced.

collapses the last great frontier of metaphysics. 91).17 This difference is not simply the difference between different technical senses of being in the work of one philosopher however. the ontic. Agamben sometimes writes it like this. simply put. although the term “before” needs careful reconsideration within what might be termed an ontological rather than historiographic or teleological temporality. and knowing. is an ancient problem relating to how language names truth. to live our division. It cannot unify language and discourse into a single entity. Infancy has little. or the eradication of difference. is nonspeech (see LD. to do with babies. much as Agamben might wish. Nor can it choose language over discourse. Rather.18 He thus designates for himself an immensely difficult task and he sets about it by returning to the scission inherent in language through the theory of signification. the ontological. 13–16 & 21–2).PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE Nor should one suggest that Agamben is recounting an actual historical series: animal-infant-human. Human being is this ontological caesura (see O. THE STANZA In relation to Heidegger people often speak of the ontico-ontological difference between actual being-in-the-world. Certainly there are many forms of difference. 13 . in other words. endless deferral. for we are always in the world operating as already pre-divided beings. but the asymmetric difference between experience. Thus in-fancy. the only remnant of the tradition that Heidegger leaves standing. If infancy is to resolve this difference then its hands are tied to some degree. This is perhaps best illustrated by the etymological root of the word wherein fans originates from fari or to speak. and as such is an ontological state of speechlessness within language that precedes the potential human being’s emergence into actual humanity. We must stress this is not the intention of infancy. and being as such. In some way Agamben’s thought must enter into the scission of being and resolve the conflict therein without recourse to pre-human unity. Dasein. It is our existence in language before the primary scission of language into phone and logos. infancy is to be found within the human at all stages as both remnant of the animal and potential for the post-human. capitalized Being. but is the reliance of metaphysics on difference as such. or better there are myriad differentiations to be made. reconfigured as the term différance. To live as human means.16 In a sense Derrida’s critical investigation of this difference.

The space of the stanza. which he regularly cites along with that of the stil novists as the origin of all modern poetics. brackets this fascinating topic in major statements on language and philosophy. For the troubadour poets the stanza was not just a structural designation but the “nucleus” of their poetry. the 14 . The split is so fundamental to our cultural tradition that Plato could already declare it “an ancient enemy. xvi).and thirteenth-century troubadour tradition. in its capacity. By conflating a formal technique with a meta-thematic concern the troubadour stanza takes on the quality in poetry of a “receptive ‘womb’” (ST. xvi). dwelling-stability. defined as a “capacious dwelling. although taking as its main area of concern the art object.” According to a conception that is only implicitly contained in the Platonic critique of poetry. and his considerations of poetic space and rhyme. for the entire tradition. but in response to this ancient quest for the missing womb of art in our culture Agamben states that access to the destination of this labour is “barred by the forgetfulness of a scission” so ingrained in our culture that it goes without saying.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Agamben’s first major intervention on language concerns linguistic scission as the precondition for the later establishment of infancy. “when in fact it is the only thing truly worth interrogating” (ST. The majority of the book proceeds to investigate the object of love ever since in the arts and has little to say about the stanza as such. the troubadour concept of the stanza provides a model for discovering metaphysical truths within the very prosodic operations of the poem itself. Students of Heidegger will immediately recognize this structure of imposed forgetting of the most important thing due to its assumed obviousness as Being. between the poetic word and the word of thought. and open reception not only holds the words contained in the poem’s structural segmentation but also conveys the unique object of all the poetry of this period. receptacle” (ST. In a way this is true although Agamben prefers to call it scission: The scission in question is that between poetry and philosophy. but that has in modern times acquired a hegemonic character. namely the joi d’amor or unattainable joy of love. The 1977 volume Stanzas. xvi). caesura. In addition. a process Agamben emulates in his own work on the metaphysics of enjambement. Again in the preface—Agamben has a penchant for the exoteric as well as the esoteric statement—he considers the various significances of the term stanza for poets of the twelfth.

Within our tradition. “In the West. very early on in his career. therefore. locates his philosophy within this scission between poetic joy and philosophical knowing in the capacious dwelling of the stanza as opened up and yet closed off.19 Here he effectively substitutes poetry for a number of terms—language as such. therefore. as if fallen from the sky. holds the key to language’s capacious inner chamber. dissatisfied word is the immaterialized insensible word of Western philosophy. The poetic word. In contrast. poetry exists entirely in language on one side of the scission of the word. and enjoys the object of knowledge by representing it in beautiful form. infant form of language. stanza in Italian means room of course. as we saw earlier. prose. and philosophy entirely outside on the opposing side. the thing here being language as such whose forbears can be found in the troubadour quest for the joi d’amour represented by the stanza. while philosophy is able to test language it has no direct experience with language. the word is thus divided between a word that is unaware. alone. This grave.” We will take this word from now on to be the poetic word. Agamben clearly does not hypostatize poetry as an ideal. This is particularly because infancy resides between the poetic and philosophic word or. Having said this. Poetry does not know what it has. Agamben.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE scission of the word is construed to mean that poetry possesses its object without knowing it while philosophy knows its object without possessing it. “And a word that has all seriousness and consciousness for itself but does not enjoy its object because it does not know how to represent it” (ST. a direct experience of language as such within which resides the meaning of human being. xvi–xvii) These thoughts on the stanza in relation to unattainability and scission compose one of the first occasions that Agamben names the role of poetry within his overall experiment in language and is the open door for my own contention that the literary Agamben is essential to an understanding of Agamben’s work as a whole. experience—some of which we have already considered. Both are victims of the cruel scission at the heart of human language and neither. is now named as the closest we can get to an experience of language that speaks itself while not necessarily saying anything specific. Poetry’s tragedy is possession of the thing without knowledge of the thing. xvii). (ST. between language and discourse. by knowledge of what 15 . because it can only experience language as going through or sustaining. for example.

The stanza of criticism. and infancy are all manifestations of the tendency towards scission in Western thought imposed between two central modes of thinking language as such: philosophy and poetry. What he reveals for us in these early pages is the state of aesthetics in the modern age whether he likes it or not. both revealing it and rendering it inoperative. xvii). Agamben explains that criticism is marked by a formula “according to which it neither represents nor knows. xvii). Yet he also begins a complex journey out of the abyss of philosophical nihilism onto the plain of a Benjaminian messianic positive philosophy to come through his approach to language. one a modern quasi-philosophical discourse the other a historical prosodic-structural effect. so it is an ambiguous strength to say the least. and we will investigate it in detail in the chapters to come.20 We are presented with a model 16 . so modern criticism reveals the emptiness of the modern category of art by its imposition of a division between the artist as maker and the critic as she who judges creation. whether in philosophy or. He does not. in modern aesthetics. but he is also something of a fatalistic thinker.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN cannot be possessed and/or possession of that which can never be known. through its empty capaciousness. The stanza. a nothingness that protects art’s most precious object. Just as the ancient stanza manifests. To appropriation without consciousness and to consciousness without enjoyment criticism opposes the enjoyment of what cannot be possessed and the possession of what cannot be enjoyed” (ST. he states most openly that the assumed problem of metaphysics is to be revealed there in that room. metaphysical scission represented in the thirteenthcentury European culture by the poetic stanza reaches its apotheosis and crisis point within the epoch of modernity in the rather different form of criticism: “Criticism is born at the moment when the scission reaches its extreme point” (ST. The power of criticism emerges out of its collapsing and nihilization of the category of art. criticism. While criticism differs in kind to the stanza. contains nothing. and directs a large part of his energy to resolving what he sees as the false caesura at the founding of our philosophy and culture which effectively cuts the room in two. but knows the representation. For Agamben. the missing thing of poetry via scission. here. as Agamben calls it in relation to modern poetry and art. Agamben is widely critical of the modern nihilistic tradition of valorizing negation. Further. that which it cannot possess.

” namely the room as such and while to us this appears as an empty and. On the other is the philosophical word. art. because of this indistinction. one must valorize negation as such. which all amount to the same thing. Language as such. on language. leaving us with a dark legacy. that is disguised. and a possible solution. or at least everything in metaphysics since the Greeks. and third there never can be. or how we have language. On one side of the stanza is the poetic word. What language is is portrayed in this impossibly contracted history of everything. The division between the two “words” is not so much imposed by Plato as reified. The stanza is nothing other than a pure. reveal its ubiquity across our culture.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE of generic languages. Saussure’s development of the idea of the sign first divides the sign in a classic metaphysical gesture and then places the two components of the sign in an essential 17 . neutral medium. This word is pure. if disgruntled. This location contains nothing specifically and in our age we have made the error of assuming that. like being. language as scission. and finally indicate the role poetry has to play in any future comments on metaphysics. It exists as a containment space between opposing forces occupying the same zone of indifferent indistinction as infancy. currently withheld from view. Yet there is something “in the room. Because we see that the room is empty we assume that first there is nothing in the room. poetic and philosophic. in terms of the future. knowing: logos. because it is Being. Rather their generic subdivision courtesy first of Plato and then of Aristotle. second that there never was. but they are not genres at all. is an attempt to veil the truth of the basis of all thought. an error for which we suffer but which may also be a productive and generative errancy. almost. scission as stanza. this is pure. is. this is just the inheritance of negativity from the metaphysics of scission. hopeless space. Agamben uses the figure of the stanza to bring this complex logic into relief. Agamben’s great project. and being. as a philological consideration of the troubadours’ idea of the stanza. meaningless pleasure: phone. or that there is language. THE SIGN Agamben himself imposes a dividing caesura of over a hundred pages before he finally attends to the issue of linguistic scission in Stanzas through a consideration of the sign.

has been a source of metaphysical unease. and the relation of latent to sensible 18 . is there the need to philosophize” (ST. In this algorithm the phonic element of the word. rest in establishing one half of the division as more true than the other. not only does this scission produce the sign. temporarily or artificially impose a unity on the primacy of scission in metaphysics. In so doing it naturally foregrounds the imposition of false scission: “The symbolic.” meaning that “all that comes to presence comes there as to the place of a deferral and an exclusion. These strategies. it has been widely ignored by classic metaphysical strategies. Symbolic acts. completing his narrative. familiar to us now. In this way all signs can be said to be part-symbolic or. a lack” (ST.” In other words. . before access to materiality or intercourse between the two values is literally banned or barred. positive destiny.21 Agamben comes to this “original fracture of presence that is inseparable from the Western experience of being. in the model of paradigm and copy. Justifying this claim. our conception of language as a mode of signification reliant on the sign is not actually language at all but the historical solution to this primary scission of presence from absence. in the sense that its manifestation is simultaneously a concealment. 136). and ejecting us for now from the spacious medium of Stanzas Agamben explains that while said scission is foundational and its “resolution” our only possible. is located below the meaning of the word. yet the effect is not actual reconciliation but a painful reminder of this most destructive caesura. therefore. it also creates the discipline of thinking called philosophy: “only because there is at the origin not plenitude but deferral . Meaning is separated from. All three gestures are typical of the metaphysical scission represented by Plato’s banning of poetry from the republic. The symbol. primarily because the symbol brings together S/s into a single unified entity. . he argues.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN yet profoundly heterogeneous relation: S/s (with S representing meaning and s the material signifier). as he says: “Only because presence is divided and unglued is something like ‘signifying’ possible. and its being present. and the two are separated by a bar. especially for Hegel. through a consideration of the aesthetics of the symbolic emblem. is also the diabolic that continually transgresses and exposes the truth of this knowledge” (ST. For that matter. 136). the act of recognition that reunites what is divided. the signifier. 136). then placed above material noise.

it is the structuring of thought qua scission. however. insignificant. it contains within its own boundaries a sensuous representation of both unity and scission in the form of the bar.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE manifestation.” Our idea of language as signification is false. itself supposedly a symbol of unity. which has always been par excellence the plane on which the experience of the original fracture is represented. as in Derrida. “In the reflection on language. with that omission. is the very thing that is the source of its inauthenticity and possible rehabilitation. the very thing the philosophy of language does not see. 136). Stanzas is by far Agamben’s most sustained engagement with psychoanalysis. If the sign is a source of displeasure for Agamben. although the scission between presence and absence comes very close to being archetypal for Agamben. 156). and ultimately indifferent mediality. Aside from his regular use of the term semiotics. As Agamben presciently states: “In modern semiology. This scission is not specifically a division between one thing and another. Not only does it present a unity to mask the primary scission of language-thought. its own authentic intention” (ST. the bar (/) of the graphic S/s . Agamben believes one can overcome scission. . falsifies. but the barrier within the sign functions as metaphysic’s betrayer.22 19 . this interpretation is crystallized in the notion of the sign as the expressive unity of the signifier and signified” (ST. deferral. Unlike Derrida. Agamben is not an adherent to the science of signification. as Agamben believes contentiously that Derrida has (ST. the bar. it betrays through its symbol-status the division at the heart of metaphysical systems of unity. It exists in the form of a cancelled stanza more accurately represented as S [ / ] s than the Saussurian S/s. The bar is language as pure. in particular here “language. Every semiology that fails to ask why the barrier that establishes the possibility of signifying should itself be resistant to signification. that is. Again here we can see the quasi-symbolic nature of the sign. but rather. . or Derridean différance without succumbing to said division. The sign represents for him the ultimate in metaphysical amnesia and until we overcome signification we remain trapped in a failed project of thinking that imposes false unities to obscure the original scission at the heart of thought. In a Lacanian gesture. 137). within its graphicality in the figuration of the bar. It is therefore metaphysical structural scission that Agamben consistently takes to task. the forgetting of the original fracture of presence is manifested precisely in what ought to betray it.

23 For Heidegger it is the impossibility of Dasein to ever actually occupy the space of its own being (LD. I. this. Language and Death. continues the development of the idea of infancy through a radical critique of the dependence of modern thought on negativity. For Hegel this is the inability of the sensuous sign to render in full the material realm (LD. Deixis is a term used in linguistics to indicate the point of reference of a statement that relies absolutely on context. the jongleur or performer used a series of gestures known to his mime-literate audience to show that he was speaking as someone else. then.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN NEGATING NEGATION Agamben’s first sustained engagement with the metaphysical tradition. 1–5 & 59–60). Reading Hegel and Heidegger he strives to demonstrate how nihilism dominates their thought in three ways. or of something else. The third is the reliance of both thinkers on deixis when trying to express language’s necessary insufficiency in relation to knowledge. 4–5). Each of these three themes is of no small relevance to what we have already learnt of infancy. according to Godzich and Kittay. most surprising and technical part of this critique. These are most commonly personal pronouns. here. 13–14). an assumed quality of 20 . philosophy’s reliance on deixis or pronouns to manifest being and the concomitant dissatisfaction they draw from this procedure. wherein the possibility of having an intra-textual technique for referring to assumed extra linguistic material or presences was developed. or something was referred to over there. most famously in Heidegger’s being-towards-death (LD. The second is the retention of ineffability within thought.25 Up to this point the normative mode of literature was performed poetry and if someone other than the narrator spoke. but other pronouns indicative of space and time are also deictic: now. that. With the slow but inexorable rise of prose this bringing in of the outside into the text.24 Deixis as a form of indication can be described as exophoric in that it refers to extra-linguistic material. The first of these is a reliance on death as a means of defining being. there. The dependency of our concept of being on finitude or death is usually taken alongside our having language as the basis of the fundamental difference between humans and animals. you. As we have already dealt with the issue of the ineffable through an analysis of unsayability we are left with the third. This exophoric capability explains the rise of deixis as a literary device from the twelfth century onwards. it.

Hegel’s interest in the sensuous versus Heidegger’s in ontological topography. both writers find that while language is essential to access truth the insufficiencies of the signifier mean that something in language always remains unsaid of the thing expressed: the world and our being in it. “there” does little to convey. 19–26). In Language and Death Agamben foregrounds the importance of deixis for modern philosophy specifically in the use of the German words diese (this) in Hegel and da (there) in Heidegger (LD.” “that door. There-being or being-the-there as Agamben re-translates Dasein (LD. for Heidegger. 4).29 and cataphoric projective reference. Working at opposite ends of the rather colourless deictic spectrum. Finally. Venice. noun. and in its anaphoric/cataphoric mode it is indeed nothing other than a convenience of abbreviation. or indeed anything of use about the where or the there. the complexity of either the world being occupies or how it occupies that world. For both authors this referential shortfall is represented by the silent voice at the heart of being. and so on previously mentioned: “The gun. anaphoric recursive reference. It tells us where being is but says nothing of how or why it is. the very thing 21 . and then replace each with the reductive “this.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE prose that differentiates it from the so-called “univocality” of the poem. it can also function cataphorically such as in the opening of Paradise Lost wherein the subject of the opening sentence is not known until the very end of the long. They effectively use anaphoric/cataphoric deixis as shorthand for an already uttered or to be uttered authentic name of being. give it to me.27 Deixis is also regularly utilized as a form of anaphora or internal reference that refers back to a subject.” Similarly.26 was facilitated by simple phrases such as “he said. inaugural syntagm: “And justify the ways of God to man.”28 All three elements of deixis. exophoric context-dependent indication.” and so on. Naturally. Agamben is most interested in how both thinkers by definition place being in negation by utilizing deictic pronouns to indicate an absence at the heart of language. will come to hold a central importance in Agamben’s thought and its relation to poetry. Imagine Islamic art. the brevity and baldness of the pronominal will fail to convey the full complexity of a sensuous presence for Hegel. by definition disappoints. referring to the previously mentioned firearm (“firearm” in this sentence is anaphoric but not deictic). or the work of Lyn Hejinian.” The “it” in this sentence is both deictic and anaphoric.

however diligently Proust attended to it. and signified. They then. in reality a synecdochic anamorphism wherein one element of linguistic scission comes to stand in for language as a whole. The only solution to this problem. although Agamben does not write it like this. valorize and exteriorize the signified only to discover a profound asymmetry in signification. relies in each instance on an assault on the voice. The tripartite critique of modern thought enacted in Language and Death. If language as pure mediality has been artificially and with violence bifurcated in metaphysics into phone (voice) and logos (language as discourse). this or there. and then perhaps the Voice under negation. both Hegel and Heidegger succumb to a primary scission in the word between signifier. which results in the negation of philosophical negativity by the end of the final seminar (LD. is not to try and render experience through language but to render experience as language. In effect there are numerous voices in Language and Death. 106). a work every bit as important to the collapsing of metaphysics as Being and Time or Of Grammatology. While he blames the valorization of the voice for the dominance of negativity in metaphysics. through the idea of human infancy. and the failure of speech to evince knowledge. Deixis is always used to indicate something exterior to language and so is shorthand for all the failings of language’s referential shortfall. “This” may not capture Venice but nor will the prose of Ruskin. Agamben systematically attacks the idea that human voice emerges from the animal. he also seeks for solutions to negativity ostensibly through the voice. classically. There is the voice of the animal (especially in death).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN that enunciates being and yet leaves its truth unsaid. One might then ask the question why thinkers of such sophistication resort to deictic indicators at all. with the voice being set up as the failure to speak or the failure to mean within thought’s reliance on 22 . the world or being. which one could describe as the problem that a word does not totally contain its meaning or referent. that the voice is defined by what it cannot say (the ineffable). This returns us to the philosophical tendency to view language in terms of exterior objectivity due to the split assumed within the sign between language and discourse. the metaphysical capitalization of the Voice as a condition of being in withdrawal. Voice. Agamben believes. the human voice as lack. If one demands of language that it is a tool for reference one consigns language to inevitable failure as regards knowledge. To sum up in more familiar terms. Agamben’s relation to the voice is complex.

language. Yet it is central to his methodology to look for a productive projection out from the very heart of the source of negation and this is precisely the case with deixis as regards his theory of subjective enunciation. the second about the scission at the heart of metaphysics between language and discourse that will ultimately lead us to view what Agamben believes philosophy has occluded. To exit metaphysics. or having to. one must pass through the negative abyssal gullet of the voice.30 The first theory allows us to think again about subjectivity. mistakenly. SUBJECTIVE ENUNCIATION It might appear from Agamben’s critique of metaphysics that deixis is. One can see therefore that Benveniste allows Agamben to. instead he uses this very dependence to present a combined theory of referential ontology that he calls desubjectivization. synthesize his ideas on negation and scission in direct relation to language. language is seen in modern philosophy as essential to thinking and yet source of thinking’s deficiency. for Hegel and Heidegger. then the voice is always both the villain and victim of philosophy. “this” thing is always a privation of the plenitude of the actual thing. Agamben is inspired in particular by the ontological turn in the work of French structural linguist Emile Benveniste. I will deal with each idea in turn.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE language. but brings to presence truth or being as privation. this plangent insufficiency. in part. Language brings to presence. or it struggles to sum up our whole world and our place within it. specifically his theories of the subject of enunciation and the semiotic. The problem is that either language fails to convey the profound texturality and diversity of the sensuous. As we saw. Benveniste’s theory of subjectivity is based on the idea of linguistic enunciation and specifically how this relies on deixis. not being as such but language as such. albeit under negation. enunciate its own self through language. there-being. Rather than attempt to remove the reliance of objective and ontological referentiality on deixis. Benveniste defines the condition of the human subject by its being able to. in part. the Voice. therefore. means that we come to be human by 23 . culpable for modern negative metaphysics and this is correct. Agamben calls this exasperation. The possession of an articulated or bifurcated system of differential referentiality which we term.


our possession of self-consciousness and our ability to speak of this. Thus we can announce “I am” and in so doing we enunciate our subjectivity. Important in this regard is Benveniste’s conception that while the subject can enunciate its presence, speak its being, this act does not proceed from an already existent central being or subject. “I” in the phrase “I am” is a form of (de)subjectifying deixis. It appears to refer to an exterior presence, but, as Benveniste explains and indeed as my own work has investigated elsewhere (MofP, 347–9), deixis as a form of indicative reference does not refer to an actual exteriority but simply to the instance of reference as such. Accepting this to be the case, the “I” of “I am” only comes into existence in the act of enunciation via what Jacobson calls the power of pronominal shifting, or a movement from langue, the whole system and existence of language, to parole, a local instance of discourse. While in Saussure it is essential that langue and parole remain heterogeneous, deictic shifters present an opportunity to move from indication to signification, a journey that defines these two faculties, their complex interrelationship and, ultimately, undermines all our presuppositions about language and being. Agamben concludes from this: The sphere of utterance thus includes that which, in every speech act, refers exclusively to its taking place, to its instance, independently and prior to what is said and meant in it. Pronouns and the other indicators of the utterance, before they designate real objects, indicate precisely that language takes place. In this way, still prior to the word of meanings, they permit the reference to the very event of language . . . (LD, 25)31 Modern philosophy is already well aware of the ontological implications of the deictic phrase “I am.” It is, for example, central to one of Derrida’s most influential essays “Signature Event Context.” There we find that the subject’s capacity to enunciate itself reveals the subject’s ability to come into existence through the revelation of the division between presence and voice. That the subject can enunciate existence means they can step out of the experience of being, of being captivated like an animal,32 and self-consciously comment on said experience. This emergence from captivation to self-consciousness is the movement from language to speech in Agamben which is both the precondition for, and problem of, human being. The power of the


subject to enunciate itself is brought to the fore in Derrida’s work more piquantly by his work on the sister phrase to “I am,” “I am not.”33 Not only can the subject enunciate presence, therefore, in so doing they also precipitate their lasting absence. Enunciation marks the advent of being and, simultaneously, its finitude. For Derrida this enunciative advent of finite being ruins any transcendental sense of subjectivity in that the subject dies as self-presence at the very moment it enunciates its existence and thus comes to life;34 one way of reading Heidegger’s being-towards-death. However, for Agamben, as soon as the subject comes to presence it is desubjectified and this is, in fact, its subjectivity. Subjectivity is not negated by enunciation as Derrida seems to suggest but actually founded through this process of negation. This reformulation of the theory of the subject allows Agamben to state that “the transcendental subject is nothing other than the ‘enunciator’” (IH, 53). If one can say “I am” one has already entered into a productively alienating subjectivity in language (RP, 128–9). Yet if one cannot say “I am,” within metaphysics at least, one cannot exist as the human is emergent from the biological indeterminacy of the animal precisely because they have the dubious power of self-conscious enunciation. As a realist Agamben cannot deny the fact that subjectivity is founded on its negation, but as the declared enemy of metaphysical nihilism he is unable to simply accept this. If one could isolate the moment, ontologically speaking, before the subject speaks but after they acquire language, what Agamben calls infancy, then one could perhaps instigate an alternative mode of being that is based on language but not on the voice as negation. This is Agamben’s intention. Before we get to that, and we may never in our epoch, we must accept the fact that, for Agamben, the subject of enunciation, once spoken, is the result of a permanent desubjectivization. At the moment the subject says “I am,” subjectivity comes to presence as nothing other than an instance of empty, technical indication. As he says: Benveniste’s studies . . . show that it is in and through language that the individual is constituted as a subject. Subjectivity is nothing other than the speaker’s capacity to posit him or herself as an ego, and cannot in any way be defined through some wordless sense of being oneself, nor by deferral to some ineffable psychic experience of the ego, but only through a linguistic I transcending any possible experience. (IH, 52)


Mills’ interpretation of this is especially strong in the manner of how she first shows that “in taking the place of ‘I’ as speaking subject, the speaker must effectively alienate him/herself as a phenomenal or empirical individual” and her realization that “by entering into language as a mode of ‘communicative action,’ the speaker loses touch with the mute experience of language as such” (PA, 25). Thus enunciation denies the subject both its subjectivity and its infancy. However, because infancy is not a stage in a developmental teleology, no more is subjectivity or being human, none of these possibilities are lost for good when one says “I am.” In fact, they only come about because of enunciation, even if their happening takes place in an instant before, or due to, their negation. Agamben is treading a very treacherous and perhaps impossibly fine line here. Infancy is the precondition of subjectivity only in that it allows for desubjectivization through the act of losing or emerging out of infancy. It appears that Agamben’s childhood is potentially a troubled, but ultimately liberating time.

The powerful malleability of the deictic pronoun “I”is well known allowing for any number of ontological compressions, of selfpresence “I am,” self negation “I am not,” and self-alienation “I is another.” The last of these is a famous promulgation by Rimbaud often analysed by philosophers, but initially it is to English poetry and Keats’ missives on deictic desubjectivization that Agamben turns to in his own work in the field. In the dense, remarkable, and troubling book Remnants of Auschwitz (1999), Agamben finds himself reading Keats’ letter to Richard Woodhouse on 27 October 1818. As he does so he isolates four themes of poetic, deictic desubjectivization. These are not unfamiliar, so I will merely summarize them here: (1) the poetic I is not an I nor is it identical to itself, (2) the poet is therefore the most unpoetical of things, (3) the statement “I am a poet” is not a statement but a contradiction in terms, and (4) poetic experience is that of desubjectivization. The third of these, “I am a poet,” is contradictory because, as Keats argues, “if he has no self, and I am a Poet, where is the wonder that I should say I would write no more?”35 Here Keats encounters the universal condition of enunciative desubjectivization but, significantly, he poses it as a poetically contingent experience. The poet is, by definition, always other to


himself, an experience confirmed by Rimbaud, Eliot, and the anticonfessionalism of poetry from the so-called New York, Language, and Cambridge schools. As Agamben says with misleading lucidity: “In the Western literary tradition, the act of poetic creation, and indeed every act of speech, implies something like a desubjectivization (poets have named this desubjectivization the ‘Muse’)” (RA, 113). Agamben will also go on in his work to regularly refer to this as poetic dictation, but before we get to that let us concentrate on that almost offhand remark “and indeed every act of speech.” While fascinated by poetic desubjectivization one can perceive from his comments here that he is most interested in it as a form of general ontology. Indeed it is true that all acts of enunciation utilizing the pronoun “I” in the moment of indicating subjective presence negate its ever coming to presence as we saw in his analysis of Benveniste. All speech acts are in this way “poetic.” The experience of the subject coming to being by negating its own subjectivity is, according to Agamben and innumerable poets, a poetic experience, justifying once again my claim that any analysis of the philosophy of Agamben, so centrally located on the movement beyond negative metaphysics through a theory of language and desubjectivization, is meaningless without recourse to the literary Agamben. However determined this study may be to prove the importance of poiesis to Agambenian ontology it would be disingenuous to ignore the most obvious question that comes to mind at this stage: How can Agamben begin to argue that every act of speech is an instance of poetic desubjectivization via the universal category of deictic desubjectivization? Rather the opposite must be seen to be the case: poetic desubjectivization ought to be simply an example of general, ontological enunciative desubjectivization. To justify Agamben’s and Keats’ claim on behalf of poetry, namely that the essence of modern ontology resides therein, we must now return briefly to Benveniste’s other great ontological development, the idea of the semiotic. In his work on the semiotic Benveniste, on the surface, does little more than refine the terminology of Saussure. The well-known terms langue and parole become semiotic and semantic, while the arbitrary nature of the sign becomes the semiotic definition of the sign. This definition has a familiar ontological ring to it in that it consists of two preconditions. Benveniste’s appropriation of the sign develops the law of the semiotic as first, existing, and second, not being any other sign. The sign as semiotic is defined as that it is,


and then that which it is by virtue of comparison with all that it is not which, admittedly by negation, matches precisely Heidegger’s ontological pairing of that there is something and how it is. Here how a sign comes to presence in the world (langue) is by not being any other sign replacing being-in-the-world with not-being-anywhere-elsein-the-world and opening up a space for linguistic being which, by its being uninsurable and subject to general negation, matches precisely the space of the stanzaic sign: S [/] s. The semiotic, therefore, is another name for language as a whole, as material presence (phone) and code (logos), before it means anything and yet always already available to mean. Its basic preconditions are presence and difference under the sign of a negation. It matters not how it exists, in terms of meaning or reference, or in which way specifically it is not other signs. Rather, for the semiotic, all that counts is that it can be identified as present and placed in a situation of quasi-singularity by one confirming it is what it is by its not being any other sign. This is structurally, at least, exactly the same as modern ontology. Being is proven by its existence and by its mode of being in the world but not being other beings. While Benveniste maintains his predecessor’s conviction that the semiotic and the semantic cannot meet one can see from his revisions that the semantic is seemingly dependent on a semiotic, quasi-presuppositional precondition. Discourse needs language as semiotic, material, yet neutral, presence to come into being. That said language only occurs to allow discourse to happen specifically as a mode of emergent human being through the process of desubjectivization which Agamben identifies as poetic. Further, it is only through discourse that language as such under negation courtesy of the voice of discourse becomes unconcealed for modern ontology. Language is the precondition for a discursive negation which precedes it. While the relation between poetry and desubjectivization becomes ever clearer, we still cannot be at peace with the assertion that modern ontological alienation is the result of contingent poetic alienation. To assist us in this regard we must return to Agamben’s consideration of poetic desubjectivization in Remnants of Auschwitz, which leads him into a wider philological consideration of “a fully desubjectivized experience in the act of speech” within the Western religious traditions, bringing poetic and ontological desubjectivization into more intimate proximity. Such a foray allows Agamben to make direct links between that other famous missive of modern poetic

it simply and materially is.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE desubjectivization. The modern term for this experience or event of language as such. the process of pushing discourse to its limit or the retention of a remnant of pre-discursive “pure” language. Agamben. and which is aggressively attacked by the work of Badiou. Nancy. If we now combine the theory of the semiotic with that of enunciative deixis we can see that enunciation also partakes of the two sides of the semiotic. and another more ancient missive. as we know. Thus glossolalia confirms the first condition of the semiotic.39 As Agamben explains: “The experience of glossolalia merely radicalizes a desubjectifying experience implicit in the simplest act of speech” (RA. Demeny (“for I is another”). while xenoglossia gives us an experience of the second condition. in some ways. 114). in effect. Yet at the same time such terms 29 . it hints at all post-Adorno poetics of responsibility that can be located in the work of Derrida. Rimbaud’s letter to P. thus establishing a tradition of civilization based on xenoglossia as a form of glossolalia. signs that we know are meaningful in a context but whose specific meaning we cannot glean. glossolalia has associations with the term barbarism on which our preciously held concept of civilization hangs. is glossolalia and it has risen to prominence in investigations of the outer limits of poetic experience and experimentation. It is. Glossolalia and xenoglossia are. In glossolalia we encounter the pure materiality of language away from any possible meaning.37 Additionally. is the phonetic transcription of languages the Greeks did not understand. devoid of meaning. “it” in poetry. which still has aesthetic and political repercussions for us today.38 Bar-bar. and Lacoue-Labarthe. before and as precondition for discourse.36 Due to its Greek provenance. “it” in philosophical discourse all have very different potential usages—indicative forms operate at the semantic level of discursive meaning. opposite and revelatory experiences of the nature of language as such. 115). In xenoglossia we do not understand an act of speech but we assume it has communicative and referential meaning for the barbarians which speak it within their context. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians where he speaks of “lalein glosse ” or speaking in tongues (wherein ¯ ¯ the speaker speaks with no understanding of what they say) (RA. “it” in narrative. Deixis and types of indicative linguistic technique such as anaphora work differently to all other forms of signification. In that they are entirely context dependent—“it” in conversation.

40 In one sense deixis is meaningless and empty reference. and stone the twenty-first. He then proceeds to bulldozer and flatten both sides of this impasse with a Calibanesque heavy-handedness: “On the one hand. Glossolalia. xenoglossia. to break this task down I will progress through the page-long summary step by step. Just as. which is what the later sections of Remnants of Auschwitz constitute. In another it is pure contextual differentiation in that it is potentially referential but is always awaiting a context to come to mean. they instead refer neutrally to the event of speech and language or what might be termed its passive taking place. Therefore deixis stages not a fixed meaning in language but language as such as medium for meaning’s transmission. in Heidegger. just choosing so. that he has gained access to being always already anticipated by a glossolalic 30 . loving not.” (The becoming impersonal is a central moment in Agamben’s theory of the roots of poetry in desubjectifying dictation from the mouth of the muse.”41 The conclusion of the updating of Infancy and History. once stripped of all extralinguistic meaning and constituted as a subject of enunciation. just choosing so. hating not. but infancy also allows us a possible route back to language. Agamben begins by expressing the contradiction at the heart of enunciation: “the passage from language to discourse appears as a paradoxical act that simultaneously implies both subjectification and desubjectivization” (RA. is so rich that it needs must be quoted in its entirety. / Loving not. However. rather. This language as such is ruined by our having infancy and the concomitant desubjectivization of differential scission.) “But. hating not. deictic desubjectivization. so for Agamben infancy operates in the same god-like way echoing almost the sentiments of Browning’s Caliban as regards his sovereign dominion over crabs: “Let twenty pass. and the semiotic are all examples of a possible experience of pure language or a language which speaks before voice and says nothing other than it exists as pure exterior presence. the subject discovers that he has gained access not so much to a possibility of speaking as to an impossibility of speaking—or. the historical “fall” of being is both the loss of being and its potential recuperation. Indicative forms of this order are not pure noise but nor are they meaningful. the psychosomatic individual must fully abolish himself and desubjectify himself as a real individual to become the subject of enunciation. poetic desubjectivization. 116).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN are devoid of specific meaning. for example “I” out of context means nothing and is basically glossolalic.

feedback. as Paul terms it. In the absolute present of the event of discourse. the final facet of his conclusion makes the radical step away from alterity and the philosophy of responsibility. which is the event of language as such. This being the case. instead finds not meaning but the very absence of meaning. an isle full of noises. this I-other stands in an impossibility of speaking—he has nothing to say. and potentially devastating conclusion. if not removed. and both the flesh and blood individual 31 . instead the subject finds himself “expropriated of all referential reality. 114). In appropriating the “formal instruments” of discourse. This rather terrifying observation is crucial in our adventures under the leadership of the literary Agamben. subjectification and desubjectivization coincide at every point.42 However. such as deixis. once he is inside of discourse he becomes expropriated.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE potentiality over which he has neither control nor mastery” (RA. In enunciating the I. The sound of language as such. profound. in seeming to access discourse (meaning) through the xenophora of deixis. which locates his work alongside Badiou as the only potential. This leads Agamben to a three-part. independent of every meaning. blurred or suspended as the subject uses deixis to access discourse only to find in place of discourse pure noise. for example. the subject becomes. and thus affirmative philosophy of our age. post-alterity. Setebos to the subject’s Caliban. he concedes that it makes no more sense to say “this I-other speaks”: For. 116). Here she tunes in to white noise. the subject. insofar as it is solely sustained in a pure event of language. and Agamben is well aware of the tradition he is potentially entering here. sounds.43 Explaining that “I speak” is as meaningless as “I am a poet. letting himself be defined solely through the pure and empty relation to the event of discourse” (RA. 116). Lévinas and Derrida. while as Agamben explains the subject of enunciation is composed entirely of discourse.” for what I hope now are clear reasons in that I is always other. “him that speaketh a barbarian” (cited in RA. Those well-versed in contemporary philosophy may recognize this speck of alterity at the heart of self-presence from. rather he is spoken in the glossolalic language of barbarians. wailing. He cannot speak. Here. This is the one and only moment that the radical difference between semiotic and semantic linguistic modes that Agamben locates at the root of Western metaphysics is. and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not.

when Love inspires me. Love. Agamben notes that while on the surface this tercet conforms to the scholastic definition of language as “notation and sign of a passion of the soul” (ST. an early theorization of poetic dictation can be found in the pages of Stanzas circulating about a tercet from Dante’s Purgatorio that goes as follows: “I am one who. is not a modality of intellection but the combinatory theory of language as such in the European tradition as an unattainable yet present generative space for intellection represented by the prosodic 32 . but language . poetry. takes note. 127). which also finds great utility in The End of the Poem (1996). Agamben proffers the touchstone to my whole study. and in the manner that he dictates within I go signifying” (cited in ST. . rather than speaking of the poeticization of thought. POETIC DICTATION At the end of this remarkable passage of Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben then brings us back to our main project here.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN and the subject of enunciation are perfectly silent. This relationship is marked by the experience of becoming impersonal that Agamben terms the poetic experience of ontological desubjectivization. 124). as we know. namely the relationship between discursive prose and poetry: logo-poiesis. in fact it radically calls into question the idea of language as a notation of intellection. 127). that poets need to be willing to “open to prose” the reasons for their poetry or face shame (his version of the troubadour razo de trobar or narrating of the inspiration for the composition of the work). This can also be expressed by saying that the one who speaks is not the individual. (RA. or what he often refers to simply as poetic dictation when. “Dante instead characterized poetic expression precisely as the dictation of an inspiring love” (ST. Staying with Dante. often called inspiration or the muse. . Agamben prefers the term poetic dictation. he instead commits himself to thoughts about poetry. when he mentions that it is not surprising “in the face of this intimate extraneousness implicit in the act of speech” that poets feel a sense of responsibility and shame. 117) This experience of the powerful depersonalization of being spoken by language is a profoundly literary one.44 Repeating a quote from Dante’s Vita nuova. I won’t speak of the complex theory of shame Agamben mounts here as this has been done very well elsewhere.

. which doesn’t pretend. [is] the language of poetry. to be there before being . as in a dream. what one might term a truly defining subjective event for which subjects habitually lack words. The language for which we have no words. Agamben says of this experience of an event that it is neither experience nor event in actual fact but matter nothing more than the point at which we touch the limits of language . Contrariwise there is another experience in which man remains absolutely without words in the face of language. Where language stops is not where the unsayable occurs. The theme of poetic dictation stays with Agamben coming to dominate the early pages of Idea of Prose (1985) through a series of considerations of the challenge of the poet’s intimate experience of their ability to speak of language as such. . Knowing already that philosophy has fallen into the trap of misconstruing language’s neutral inexpressiveness as ineffability. . (IP. matter or wildwood. (IP. in fact. the experience of language that forever presupposes words . . are prisoners of representation. which the ancients called silva (wildwood). even when they keep silent. Agamben reveals that the experience of language is always doubled: There is. therefore. The main body of the book commences with the essay “The idea of Matter.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE conception of the stanza.” where Agamben considers enigmatically what he calls decisive experience. but rather where the matter of words begins. is not a form of notation of thinking yet it is a form of notation and it does have a direct relation to thinking through its direct experience of language. this woody substance of language. . we now battle alongside the poet as she attempts to find a voice for her experience of the poetic word. 48) It can be deduced from this that within our tradition there are two types of language-experience/usage in accordance with the 33 . . Glossing on Celan’s assertion as to the uniqueness of poetic language.46 in the essay “The Idea of the Unique” Agamben then goes on to consider in greater depth a conception of speechlessness in the face of language that is not simply unsayability. Those who have not reached. 37) Having proposed a potentiality for a silent experience of materiality as such which is not unsayable but simply inexpressive and nonrepresentable presence.45 Poetry. like grammatical language.

THE LITERARY AGAMBEN traditional roles of philosophy and poetry respectively. to have forever . can experience the tree in terms of what it is made of. of what order is such a destiny in that. But at that point. uniqueness is the destiny of language. of course. He explains “the unique language is not one language” in that it is always already split between words without language (philosophy) and being wordless in front of language (poetry). as Celan argues. therefore. faced with the infancy of the world. so alone. . Faced with the impossibility of seeing either wood or tree. 49). Agamben’s great innovation here is to turn a dead end into a new clearing for thought: This vain promise of a meaning in language is its destiny. and decides to remember that emptiness and fill it. a false eschatology for in speaking of the uniqueness of language one proves its impossibility. language stands before him. “Destiny is concerned only with the language that. Poetry is always in the experience. it precedes words as vehicles for meaning and to whom can it occur if we are not yet speakers? Agamben. . The poet is the infant who piously receives this promise and who. its grammar and its tradition. (IP. . and if one has words to speak of language one no longer has language before one of which to speak. something to say of it” (IP. vows to be able to encounter it. which is to say. as we have repeatedly seen. Discursive grammatical prose does not concern itself with the semiotic and has. irrespective of the form it takes. and so lacks access to the language needed to express the nature of the matter of language as such. Such a destiny is. If. 49) The easiest summation of this is that the poet would like to testify to their experience of pure language as such but they cannot because 34 . it would seem. Agamben realizes immediately the aporia at the heart of any conception of a unique language accorded to poetic dictation. through avowing its emptiness. Only the poet. decides for truth. calls this state of speechlessness before a language that precedes words infancy. . Philosophy already has the words to convey the experience and thus can never undergo the experience. Having asserted this. so abandoned to itself that it can no longer in any way impose: “la poésie ne s’impose plus. Elle s’expose. no means of cutting a path through the wildwood of matter to an encounter of the forest as something composed of wood.” so Celan writes . and reflects that such a state knows nothing of destiny. as Agamben responds.

between the inability to remember in the perfect. it is always written after the fact and so is obviously dictated by the already existent presence of the poem. As Agamben notes more than once elsewhere. . This tradition still holds for Dante. means both an authoritative declaration intended for preserving transcription and a mode of poiesis. between the experience of dictation as inspiration courtesy of the muse. Reading Delfini and Campana Agamben summarizes dictation as the space or locale. while the razo of a poem (and a razo can often be internal to the poem such as one finds in works such as Wordsworth’s “Daffodils” and “The Solitary Reaper. but only occurs in the instance of its exposition. poetry is always divided. The essay begins with the tradition of the razo or ability to recount after the fact how the poet came to compose/dictate their work.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE their experience of pure language cannot translate beyond that experience.” A useful translator’s footnote in the English tradition explains that the Italian for dictation. finds significant examples in the modern tradition in works such as Coleridge’s famous narrative of the composition of “Kubla Khan. and the memory that arises precisely out of the impossibility of this love. Dictation. retains an element from late Latin culture wherein the term refers to writing a literary work. channelling the muse. This mediality of poetic dictation explains why “the lyric—which uniquely keeps to such dictation—is necessarily 35 . and a power of only thinking. and that of the subsequent declamation of the experience in discursive prose: “Between the impossibility of thinking . Dictation therefore names a midway point or tension between being as the intimacy of undergoing an experience of language. testing the experience through thoughtful prose. a sense also to be found in the German word Dichtung that Heidegger often prefers in reference to poetry. .” or works such as Frank O’Hara’s “Why I Am Not a Painter”)47 is presented as the ontico-experiential basis of a work of poiesis describing. amorous attachment to the present. dettato. cannot be narrated after the fact. the events that led to the dictation of a poem. stanza. The combination of ideas of pure linguistic matter and language as subsequent philosophical discourse combine in “The Idea of Dictation. and this intimate divergence is its dictation” (IP. therefore. 52). and the distanciation of a proceeding recollection of the experience.” and is analyzed here in relation to twentieth-century Italian poet Delfini. say. Such a poetic experience of language cannot impose itself in prose.

76). and love. for example the Gospel of John.” (IP. said experience cannot be recounted. What I hope becomes clear by virtue of this positioning of the lyric at a moment of linguistic twilight is that like infancy. inventive art was given the title argumentum because it was supposed that invention gave one access to the very place of speech as such. and once one is abandoned by the muse the only tale to tell is of said abandonment. withdraws from both the lived experience of the psychosomatic individual and the biological unsayability of the species” (EP. the source from which all arguments originate. This ancient rhetoric of topics however became watered down over centuries so that the place of speech 36 . the stanza. produces life. it is perhaps not surprising that Agamben more than once asks as to the direct relation between poetry and life going so far as to argue that: “The poet is he who. That said. but a discovery through the belatedness of the razo or recounting of experience that yes. While one is in the moment of inspiration one lacks the space to speak. Life. poetry is central to the work of Agamben. and as his main theme is of course the political determinations of the category life. As I have been arguing. it is always transfixed on the verge of a day that has always already set . Agamben notes that in ancient rhetoric ratio or ars invendiendi (inventive art/argument) was juxtaposed with ratio iudicandi or truthful. suggesting that while it makes sense that life is the product of language it is predominantly the case these days that the obverse is taken to be true. poetic dictation exposes for view the speechlessness of a direct experience of language that is itself not the result of the ineffability of that experience per se. Agamben supports his claim that language precedes life with citations from the theological tradition of the West. 93). or a waking dream? Fled is that music:—do I wake or sleep? This problem is reformulated in the essay “The Dictation of Poetry” in terms of the relationship between poetry and life. 52). correctly spoken discourse.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN empty. which the poet produces in the poem.48 In “The Dictation of Poetry” the relation of poetry to life is expressed in the more familiar and relevant question for us here: “What does it mean for a living being to speak?” (EP. . Was it a vision. before honing in on the specificity of the relation between poetry and the poet’s life in the development of the razo de trobar. in the word. . but in this failure to recollect one is exposed to the dictatorial truth of poetry: recount and recall what cannot be said or remembered.

ratio iveniendi. is therefore neither a biographical nor a linguistic event. 79). caught as it is between the wordless experience of language as such and the language-less process of language about language. but also that of philosophy.” (LD. That psychology and narrative have taken over the razo simply deflects attention from the fact that poetry presents for us the central ontological problematic of our age.PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE as arche-source simply became conventional arguments used as mnemonic techniques in oral cultures. This allows Agamben to now explain once and for all the role of the razo in poetry: “The razo. . the razo is a zone of indifference. can there be an experience of language as the basis of thinking being that retains language as a thing that can be said but which itself is not reduced to merely saying something? Poetic dictation. from the poetic experience of language as such. then fable. More interesting than the slippery nature of topics/razo perhaps is the relation between lived experience and the experience of language which typifies dictation. so to speak. what the troubadours called the stanza of love. between lived experience and what is poeticized . 79). The brilliance of the troubadours is that they return the idea of topos back to its fundamental fount: “the troubadours want not to recall arguments consigned to a topos but instead to experience the very event of language as original topos” (EP. as the tight unity of what is lived and what is poeticized—now becomes a giving of reasons for experience” (EP. Clearly there is something about the original place of language. an experience of the event of language as love. which we share in common with all life? How. ratio iudicandi. and finally the novel.49 Agamben notes that over centuries this has given birth to the art of biography. How can life emerge from language in such a way that it is neither the specificity of a life (biography) or the unsayable nature of biological life. Modern versions of the razo can be found in the work of Freud as much as in Joyce for example. not only dramatizes the problematic of the emergence of human life out of language. in other words. The impersonality of dictation becoming the personal element of biography. or the experience of inspiration becoming the tale of 37 . 80). which lies at the foundation of poetry and which constitutes what the poet calls its dictation (dictamen). and indeed our whole tradition. . that defies definition. for again over time the meaning of the razo was diluted in the same manner as was observed in topics so that “What for the troubadours was an experience of the razo—that is. Rather.

is precisely the zone of indistinction between language and life that Agamben repeatedly seeks to reveal as the very place of a speechless language as such: dictated. indifferent. which is the basis of human being as both divided and potentially redeemed. in-fancy.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN inspiration. 38 . poeticized. cannot be addressed unless one listens with care to the dictates of the many pages that comprise the work of the literary Agamben. This is why the fact that there is language. ontological.


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From the Latin gerere it is a type of bearing or carrying. not a person as such who has the capacity for thought. Accepting Foucault’s dictum that the author as creating subject is dead and replaced by the author-function. Agamben is however unable to concede that there is no author as such in the text. in a recent essay “The Author as Gesture” included in the collection Profanations (2005). the author is present in the text only as a gesture that makes expression possible precisely by establishing a central emptiness within this expression. THINKING THOUGHT POETIC THINKING Going against the grain of the Platonic tradition and accepting as a given that poetry thinks. Agamben wonders where precisely the thought of the poem occurs. Foraging for the place of poetic thinking Agamben reads a poem by the famous author-function César Vallejo. after all.”2 Naturally. Instead he retains a vestigial role for creative agency in defining the perished author as a gesture: “If we call ‘gesture’ what remains unexpressed in each expressive act. Yet if the author is merely a functional facilitation or a supporting inexpressive gesture then it makes little sense to suggest that the thoughts of a poem or indeed any work of literature take place in the “mind” of said gesture.CHAPTER 1 LOGOS. a place-holder for a subjective category convenience. a meaningless action. .1 a functionality that attenuates the presence of creative agency to a mere support for discursive distributions of power along lines of ownership rights and so on. Gesture is rather an unconscious occupancy of the hands in conversation. we can say that . . “Father dust who rises 41 . the location of poetic thinking would ordinarily be seen to take place in the mind of an author. The gesture in question is. empty.

” (Prof. The author is only the witness or guarantor of his own absence in the work in which he is put into play . . Influenced no doubt by his own views on dictation he refutes the possibility that they simply blew in to the poet who then wrote them down.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN from Spain” (Prof. 98 fn. in occupying the space vacated by the author becomes. . Nietzschean. 71). a reader-function. but desubjectivized ontology. Agamben is forced to conclude. its actual taking place as a mode of thinking-feeling. The only outstanding thinking subject involved in poetry. . thinking subject. The reader becomes. then thought occurs at the 42 . must be the reader who. “in the gesture through which the author and reader put themselves into play in the text and. creative. contrary to one’s assumptions. in effect. willing agency. as Foucault would have it. “Does this mean that the place of thought and feeling is in the poem itself . can be located neither in the poem nor the author/reader-function. This being the case the author-function does not facilitate ownership or authority. “will occupy the empty place in the poem left by the author. Author-functions play tag with the text. Aside from it being almost impossible to stipulate the exact moment that a poet “thought” what they wrote. if the thoughts of a poem are not in the mind of the author-function as they cannot be. a similarly evacuated subjectivity. then can they ever even be said to be the thoughts of the poet? It would seem not. therefore. in taking up the poem to read. . in effect. Agamben adroitly comes to realize that this is equally impossible for thoughts imply by definition a thinking subject. suggesting rather that they most probably only came to be known to the author as he was writing. 71). at this point. at the same time.3 The place of the poem. touching the text into being through an act of empty. 71). the author-function does not think but is a collaborating facilitator of social forces. nor can a poem as object be said to think either. he will repeat the same inexpressive gesture the author used to testify to his absence in the work” (Prof.4 Instead. poetic thinking must be. or indeed even later as he was rereading his work. 12). speculating as to the exact location of the thoughts and sentiments contained in the work.?” (Prof. gestural agency whose sole function is to come to presence as the “creator”’ of a poem through the marked presence of their absenting themselves from the work as subjective. If the poem “thinks” or presents thoughts and this thinking is not to be located in the mind of an actual. are infinitely withdrawn from it. Here Agamben realizes that the reader.

250–1). thought would effectively think nothing as such.5 Aristotle illustrates this rather abstract point with reference to the 43 . and thus thinking being. At this impossible point thought is reduced to being a presuppositional representation of the thing. If thought were simply the neutral potential to think something then. Reading Aristotle’s Metaphysics Agamben presents the aporia of what thought actually thinks in terms of issues of potentiality and actuality. Yet if thought instead comes to actuality and thinks something. THINKING THOUGHT moment that subject and object. bring each other into presence then immediately withdraw. the work becomes the place of thought without one personifying the poem in some absurd way by declaring that it is an autonomous. paternal. or On Contingency” Agamben is again attempting to think the place of thought through a consideration of literature. They are examples of ontological deixis. which for Agamben is a form of language. but nothing specific? Aristotle believes so and proves this by defining thought as the thinking of thinking which “is a kind of mean between thinking nothing and thinking something.LOGOS. In contrast. available medium “to think” something. The result is that the author and reader exist within the work as available subjects to facilitate thought not as actual present and thinking beings but gestures of being. between potentiality and actuality. The author can only come to being as the supporting gesture of the text. Does thought actually exist as such as a general. then paradoxically it ceases to be thought as such but a category subordinate to the thing. Through this Cimmerian light one is able to discern the topos of a poetic thinking. Aristotle contends. potential. Each time thought thinks some thing therefore. thought and its expression. They point to the presence of beings but they do not possess actual being. thought no longer thinks some thing in its advent of singularity but is effectively what must be thought about some already presupposed thing. 72). Thought that thinks itself neither thinks of an object nor thinks nothing. It thinks a pure potentiality (to think and not to think)” (P. In an earlier piece “Bartleby. From being the presupposition of a thing’s truth the thing becomes the presuppositional necessity of thinking. this time the more familiar discipline of philosophical thought or thinking as such. anything. Such a thought is obviously meaningless. but the text “has no other light than the opaque one that radiates from the testimony of his [the author’s] absence” (Prof. touch upon each other.

which convinces me that the way we were trying to found our community was along absolutely the right lines . That we flatly refused to admit representational poetry. Both seem to founder on an aporia between potentiality and actuality. surprising. The same is true for the philosopher. while to think of thought as a thing in the world and thus actualize it is to subordinate the process of thinking to an actual object and demote thinking to a form of representation or writing.”7 Thus began proceedings for what Agamben translates as the “divorce” between poetry and prose 44 . . hand-in-hand. the author as individual does not exist as such in a text. yet generally ignored problem shared by poetic and philosophical thinking. Yet to think thought as potentiality leaves thought with nothing to think. producing an ontological caress. and its presence as a coming to be a thing to be thought. They touch on being and. Yet if. a bolstering figuration that shares a clear equivalency to Agamben’s idea of gesture as an empty facilitation of thinking. Thus to think thought is to think both the absence of thought as a thing to be thought. coyly withdraw. seemingly accusing them of false mimesis and warning of their power to convince the citizenry that their creations are better than reality itself: “the issue of poetry is the main consideration .THE LITERARY AGAMBEN figure of a blank tablet upon which thought can be written but on which it has not yet been written. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY Yet one would be wrong if one then declared some kind of lasting amity between poetry and philosophy. In his treatise on how to establish the ideal totalitarian state Plato immortally excludes poets from the republic. .6 Let us dwell momentarily on a common. . which at the same time negates thinking as such. or at least Aristotle passes this belief on to Western metaphysics. of what potential is a poem the actualization of ? By definition potential must be the actualization of the potential to be and yet not be the author–reader of a thought expressed in the poem body. If the philosopher’s vocation is to think then naturally to think what thought is would be their highest calling. The poem and the philosopheme share powerful affiliation at this exact point in terms of their both coming to being at the moment of a productive negation. as we saw. . The author in a text is a potential to be while the realization of her thoughts in the text seems to be an actualization.

but for most it is not a form of thought. Poetry is a form of expression. The stated intention of the Provençal poets’ razo de trobar was “to experience the topos of all topoi. the place from which all places emerge. an attempt to experience the very taking place of the poetic word in the form of the joy of love seems a long way from nihilism. even radical disjuncture. this abyss weighs heavy upon our philosopher’s mind. that is. Love is not only the term for the very event and advent of the poetic word it also comes to stand for the unattainable. came to remove from poetry thinking as a form of authentic modality. So much so that today it seems strange perhaps to even argue a role for poetry as a mode of thinking. Although Troubadour love constitutes a promising avenue of inquiry. THINKING THOUGHT (MWC. “And if love is presented in the 45 . They named the experience of the very advent of the poetic word. primarily excluded from the philosophical canon. then what is the extreme experience of language within the poetic tradition?” (LD. of mimesis. he wonders. of material pleasure.. the very taking place of language as originary argument” (LD. 66). But on the whole poetry as a form of thinking. Not that philosophy then neglected poetry. . but has also introduced a disastrous aporia into Western metaphysics based around the presupposed difference between poetry and thinking which. Republic 607b–c) poetry . Agamben returns to the division imposed by Plato many times in his own work whenever he speaks of the abyss between language and thought or poetry and philosophy. . or even poetry’s role in thinking was. Agamben soon uncovers a dark truth at the heart of troubadour poetics. until Hegel.LOGOS. Agamben suspects as much when he presents just such a possibility at the foundation of modern poetics in the razo de trobar. 66). Perhaps it is in poetry that we find a concept of language that is not that of negation but rather a “reflection on the taking place of language” (LD. is there is another experience of language that does not depend on a foundation of unspeakability? “If philosophy is presented from the beginning as a ‘confrontation’ with (enantiosis) and a divergence from (diaphora. inevitably. in particular. 68) as we have already seen. 66). love. 52). for example. Aristotle was more than happy to begin the discipline of aesthetics or philosophical categorical thinking about the arts spawning a long and illustrious tradition. Defining philosophy as “the unspeakable experience of the Voice” (LD. that not only typifies our culture’s response to the arts. Plato. In Language and Death.

in as much as the roots of European poetics lie precisely in the empty loveless stanzas of the troubadour lyric they mark the origin of an experience of poetic negativity which echoes that of modern metaphysics. rather. and this experience. The two empty resonators. Agamben admits. to attain such an experience. but both rest originally in a common negative experience of the taking place of language. and thus. alone. while separating them. 74) There is encased in this citation the basic structure that explains Agamben’s repeated return to poetry as he tries to establish a post-nihilistic philosophy of negated scission. and the stanza S [/] s. modern metaphysics and Provençal poetics are. only from this common negative experience is it possible to understand the meaning of that scission in the status of language that we are accustomed to call poetry and philosophy. also holds them together and seems to point beyond their fracture. so much so that Agamben is willing to hand over ontology to the “poetic” experience of desubjectivization. unspeakability. These two traditions and experiences of the word as negativity. Thus while poetry comes very close to an originary experience of language as such. the subject of The Man Without Content (1970). philosophy and poetry. resorting always to negative constructions of language as unattainability. (LD. that is because the experience of the taking place of language is at stake here. and modern art and aesthetics as nihilism. Perhaps. 69). seems necessarily to be marked by negativity” (LD. I showed this in the previous chapter by drawing parallels between algorithms for the sign S/s. and so on.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Provençal lyric as a desperate adventure whose object is far away. as an ancient tradition of thought would have it. to understand that which. his philosophy of indifference. come together within the modern experience of metaphysics as negation detailed in Language and Death. he is forced to conclude: Even poetry seems here to experience the originary event of its own word as nothing. as such. nothingness. and yet accessible only in this distance. Neither is able. seemingly divergent yet. These issues come to full appearance for both disciplines during the period of 46 . unattainable. The poetic and philosophical experiences of language are thus not separated by an abyss. Both poetry and philosophy seek an indifferent experience of language as such before the moment of its division into language and voice.

. THINKING THOUGHT modernity. In Infancy and History.8 Agamben is moved to wonder in this regard: Are we capable today of no longer being philosophers of the letter . gesture. Tracing this articulation back to ancient Greek sources. politics. or On Gesture” he brings together poetry. In “Kommerell. in the “Project for a Review” he ends the volume by calling for a radicalization of the ancient science of philology which would. essentially. while in “Tradition of the Immemorial” he speaks of Hölderlin’s quest for an undivided being leading to his call for the abolishment of the “philosophy of the letter” in favour of a poetics of dictation. the idea of a tension that is both the articulation of a difference and a unity” (ST. Stanzas concludes with an attempt to relocate a post-nihilistic idea of presence located in the very fold or articulation between signified and signifier. He is not calling for a synthesis of poetry and philosophy here but a clear understanding of the actual conditions of their difference as opposed to those imposed upon them by Platonic exception. however. (He is referring here to Heidegger. without thereby becoming either philosophers of the voice or mere enthusiasts? Are we capable of reckoning with the poetic 47 . 157). 163). He cites Heraclitus in describing this harmonia as “invisible” harmony before exhorting that “the last Western philosopher recognized a hint of this harmony in a painting by Cézanne in the possible rediscovered community of thought and poetry” (ST. but rather the result of a mutual origin in thinking as such that. problematic experience rather than an embarrassed repression” (IH. . 85). poeticize philology so that the site of the division between poetry and philosophy “becomes a conscious. Again and again he returns to this theme.LOGOS. yet the roots of their failure to find language go back several centuries at least. he names this possibility harmonia or “the idea of a laceration that is also a suture. 157). for example.) The abyss between poetry and philosophy occupies the last of Agamben’s thoughts in Language and Death (LD. That poetry and philosophy share such commonalities is not a coincidence. 108) and forms the conclusion of two major essays in the collection Potentialities (1999). has been obscured by the Platonic tradition that Agamben habitually calls the “abyss” between poetry and philosophy. Ending books on a call for the healing of the fracture between poetry and philosophy then becomes something of a habitual gesture. and philosophy in a characteristically ambitious denouement (P.

. emerges where no voice calls us? Only then would tradition cease to be the remission and betrayal of an unsayable transmission . 115) I believe our point is well made. while Agamben seeks for a true experience of language in poetry he is regularly disappointed. The destination of many major works by Agamben is the revocation of the divorce between poetry and philosophy instigated formally by Plato in Republic. therefore.9 This usually takes the form of a summons to poeticize philosophy and expose philosophic prose to the semiotic presence of the poetic word. 115). Plato devised an apotropaic pedagogical methodology. COMMUNICABILITY. paraphrasing Wittgenstein. (P.” Agamben recounts a story told by Plato in one of his letters of how. rather. provides an opening up of the pathway towards a future for philosophy but alone it is not the destination of this track.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN presentation of the vocation that. as a nonpresupposed principle. Or. it resides somewhere in the division between poetry and philosophy. and surrounding the two contesting ideas of thinking within our tradition. but they also come together in Agamben’s idea of the communicability of language as such as the place between. citing the famous Wittgenstein declaration that philosophy should really only be poeticized. However. its resolution resting with neither party nor an idealized unity of the two but between them somehow. has always existed in the midst of the two fundamental experiences of language in our culture: language as sustaining (poetry) and as testing (philosophy). These two experiences form the basis of Agamben’s idea of the origin of all literature in dictation. pestered endlessly by the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius to once more attend his court. that poetry should really only be philosophised” (EP. . in the “last” essay of The End of the Poem. within. on the contrary. Poetry. one could say. in the fold or invisible harmony that. Agamben believes. One presents to the apparently eager student the whole thing of 48 . Rather. The answer to the problem of Western metaphysics can only be approached by the rehabilitation of poetry as a form of thinking but its solution does not simply emerge from poetry. Agamben argues: “As for poetry. Conceding this point. that it is threatened by an excess of tension and thought. THE THING ITSELF In the opening essay of Potentialities entitled “The Thing Itself.

an arche thing impossible to retrieve. the most difficult of all problems: the very thing of thought as such. 31). Agamben then performs one of his classic gestures by rediscovering through his remarkable and controversial philological method that translations of Plato have perhaps misrepresented his thoughts on this most essential thing. additional recondite element as the tradition has it. name (onama). Plato concedes. 32). but the very precondition of being: “no longer simply the being in its obscurity. 28) will realize the dolour of “the thing” and task their tutor no more. Agamben’s translation finds that the four bases of being which define the Platonic theory of ideas. This thing is not a thing in any ordinary sense of the term. all are dependent on the thing as such. Yet. If this thing is not a thing in the world nor is it.LOGOS. therefore. otherwise those merely “tanned” by philosophy (P. image (eidolon). If the student is sincere he or she will embrace this difficulty. Rather said thing is to be brought to light “in the very medium of its knowability. THINKING THOUGHT thought and all difficulties attendant on that. while language cannot say the thing as such. its own knowability and truth” (P. definition (logos). Knowledge presupposes something as already existing about which it has knowledge whose veracity it can vouchsafe through the idea truth as agreement. “that by which the object is known. Agamben reconstitutes the thing as such as the ground or support of knowability. but the basis of knowledge on this very obscurity. Having presented this reading of Plato. Modern science is the archetypal epistemology in 49 . and knowledge. The thing itself. This thing then is not a fifth. there but never to be made available to presence. in the pure light of its self-manifestation and announcement to consciousness” (P. the thing is “nevertheless possible only in language and by virtue of language: precisely the thing of language” (P. however. Rather than the thing as such being an unsayable and inaccessible part of being.” but.10 In accordance with the logic of apotropaicism it is precisely the thing’s unknowability and nonrepresentability in language that defines not simply the thing’s obscurity. the obscure nature of the presupposition of a thing. Much of this comes down to the problem of presupposition. is the apotropaic heart of philosophy. as an object presupposed by language and the epistemological process. The powerfully obscure nature of the thing dissuades the thinker but in so doing also attracts them to the very basis of philosophy’s being. a thing in the world or a thing than can be represented by language and thus known in this way. 33).

we always presuppose and forget . it would take the form 50 . The result is that the sayability of the thing said and the knowability of the thing known are both lost to presuppositional thinking. What is the very thing of thought itself ? this tradition seems to ask. The thing itself of thought. . nor a presupposition or hypothesis. declaring that the thing itself is not “something ineffable that must remain unsaid and hence sheltered” (P. without which. If the thing is not a thing in the world. . more typical of modern ontology. Agamben strongly refutes this history of the thing. cannot however be thought separately. the very open-ness at issue in language. 34). in language. Communicability divided from communication. unsayability. Yet communicability cannot be collapsed into communication in that in itself it cannot be communicated: “if communicability let itself be communicated.” Communication and communicability. Düttmann states: “Communicability always communicates itself. reveals that: “Language sup-poses and hides what it brings to light. and negation at the heart of epistemology. While language and knowledge presuppose the thing itself as already existing as a thing about which they can speak and have knowledge.11 their presupposition of the thing itself will always make said thing inaccessible. the thing could not come to presence.” (P. . 35).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN this regard operating as the very opposite structure to that of an apotropaic thinking that is. inscribing a myth of absence. it is nothing but communication itself. in the very act in which it brings it to light” (P. would not name the thing being communicated and so said thing would not be produced into presence and communicability never invoked and revealed. 35). what we are always saying and communicating . therefore. privation. what is the thing? “It is the very sayability. spends some considerable effort defining communicability through its source in Benjamin and establishing it as the heart of Agamben’s thought. why that which cannot be thought. which. is the communicability of the very language that cannot express the thing but. 33). nor is it “horribly or beautifully unreachable in its obscurity” (P. although not the same thing at all. Düttmann’s introduction to Idea of Prose. One of the earliest and most important essays on Agamben’s work. nor even an arche thing forever lost to which thought aspires. in using language as a means of accessing that about which one speaks. I would argue. . Such thinking. it is what we are always disclosing in speaking. an act of communication.

” one ought to note that the explicit history of this term in Plato is of no small water to our own study. merely that the means of encountering it are not provided by communication of something specific. While he has a great deal to say of poetry that is philological. lead it forward into the light).LOGOS. The means by which this occurs is apotropaic in a historical sense in that the thing’s unsayability in philosophical language gives birth to the tradition of negativity. but at the same time allows us access to a profound realization. which is also essential to Agamben’s ideas on poetry. a chattering mime of poets along the way. one presumes. is not precisely a comment on language. reducing itself to the simple communication of something. and technical. and we as critics of literature can and must learn from him in these areas. and the logic of the thing as not an object of presupposition but the very basis of objectivity and subjectivity is directly inherited from “the last philosopher. For example.” poetry is fundamentally important to thinking but not necessarily fundamentally important in itself. Plato’s development of the thing itself as a concept is in response to the entreaties of the tyrant of Ortygia where Plato first travelled with the idea of setting up his republic and expelling. In addition. a structure we recognize from our considerations of thinking as such. would erase itself immediately. Language cannot say the thing as such because the thing as such is the very sayability of language and knowability of knowledge (it cannot communicate communicability but it can pro-duce it. however far the thing as such is from Agamben’s ideas on enjambement or poetic rhythm. THINKING THOUGHT of a thing. and communication. and his interest in language is piqued only as a way of revealing the very basis of thinking and being as such. Like Heidegger. Agamben’s analysis of the thing as such should therefore act as a warning. historiographic. This does not mean communicability is unsayable or invisible. It would not be possible to produce an Agambenian linguistics from it for example.”12 Hence communicability is defined here as that which supports and facilitates communication but which itself is never communicated through an act of communication. 51 . one can see here that the communicability of language. Returning to “The Thing Itself. Agamben’s interest in poetry and the literary in general is only as a means of bringing him closer to language. Language is the very thing that allows thought to occur and it is thought that Agamben pursues.

humans see the world through language but do not see language. Instead it says the thing as such of language. can presuppose nothing.” he considers the influence of the concept of revelation on the Western metaphysical ideas of linguistic unsayability. The meaning of revelation is that humans can reveal beings through language but cannot reveal language itself . Agamben explains that the beginning word. . 40) This transparency of language within our tradition has come to be the very quality of god’s invisibility. Like the quasi-theology of the “big bang” theory of our universe. Revelation. This diversion through the tautegorical revelation. en arkhe e ho ¯ ¯n logos (“In the beginning was the word”). the very fact that language (and therefore knowledge) exists. Glossing on John. 41). as a statement on the ontology of language as such. nothing precedes the “big word” of God. (P. a knowable thing that we did not previously know. .” Agamben says making a point he often returns to. but is instead a truth that concerns language itself.14 is a strategy on Agamben’s part to suggest that modern metaphysics is similarly dominated by the impossible 52 . the first word of god. but more than that something that totally exceeds the process of human reason: this can only mean the following: the content of revelation is not a truth that can be expressed in the form of linguistic propositions about a being . “no word for the word” (P. This is elsewhere reformulated as there being no name for the name. The absolute presupposition is itself non-presuppositional. allowing Agamben to define that foundational theological declaration on language. must contain within it not merely content that human ingenuity has not yet conceived of. “There is. or what Lyotard defines as thinking-feeling of something happening as the very happening in question. . . meaning it also does not say some thing in the world.” or a heuristic tautegorical structure that says its essence through the act of saying but saying nothing as such.13 This word/name therefore cannot say something about something as there is no something that precedes it. Agamben calls this the movement of language’s “self-revelation. it is noted.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN THE IDEA OF LANGUAGE In the second essay Agamben has written under the title “The Idea of Language.

he wonders. The problem here is mapped out very succinctly. Agamben believes that the Idea of Greek thought is one possible way of escaping the philosophical double bind of language’s polysemantic homonymy and its anonymous finitude. “Can there be discourse that. without being a metalanguage or sinking into the unsayable. does not have a presence that can be named but nor is the Idea a nameless nothingness. which for human beings mediates all things and all knowledge. allow one to think language as such. as ever the quarry in Agamben’s sights here. Nothing immediate can be reached by speaking beings—nothing. does not. 53 . Or what Plato calls the thing itself. Such language is not presupposed. yet it provides no direct means of letting language speak itself. mediation itself ” (P. as immediate mediation “constitutes the sole possibility of reaching a principle freed of every presupposition” (P. and naturally enough he comes to call this the Idea of language. The Idea. if the presuppositional power of language knew no limits. Thus. for example. however.” but nor is an Idea some thing in the world outside: “it is a vision of language itself. Thus the conception of language as immediate mediation defines its communicability and reveals a possible way out of the nihilism of modern thought. 47). “this is an Idea. while locating one irrevocably within language and its endless deferrals and referrals (it must be remembered that the trace defers forward by simultaneously referring back to historical contextual usages that presage its deferrals to come). is itself immediate. THINKING THOUGHT logic of revelation. then there would truly be no possible experience of the limits of language. The Greek sense of the Idea is not a word so cannot be named meta-linguistically. As Agamben says. 47). says language itself and exposes its limits?” (P. except language itself. 46–7). A metalinguistic approach to language is able to think language in its finitude as a thing of some order but it must lift itself from out of language as semiotic medium to do so. Returning to Plato. 46). On the other hand.LOGOS. “If every human word presupposed another word. Yet the Derridean idea of language as subject to the logic of the trace. Agamben sees the modern presupposition of language as profoundly aporetic in that it posits language as the presupposition to thought. forcing it always to speak of something pertaining to the epochal closure of the metaphysical project. a perfect language purged of all homonymy and composed solely of univocal signs would be a language absolutely without Ideas” (P. Language. Agamben believes. that is.

via the mediation of Agamben’s text: “Its language is the idea of prose itself. even the most universal presupposition. For example. Silent on the problems it has solved and silent as it comprehends the problems that remain. THE IDEA OF PROSE While an essential element of Agamben’s thought critics have. suspended. like a number of thinkers since Heidegger. Such a mode of thinking is not lost in the mire of unspeakability as one might assume and is silent on the subject about which it must speak only because it.” As the text opens we encounter Walter Benjamin speaking in notes for “Theses on the Philosophy of History” of the messianic world to come which he famously defines as one of integral actuality. Confusingly. perhaps. Even Agamben’s own. for a second at least. He wishes. alone it tells us little. or moment in history when all division is. or thought that does not find presuppositional commonalities but eliminates all presupposition leaving merely the great single object of true thinking. to solve the problem of philosophy itself rather than use philosophy to solve problems. One name for this voluble silence in Agamben’s work is the Idea of Prose. 45). This object is the thing itself of thought defined by Agamben not by what it can know presuppositionally but what it cannot. self-avowed project is negated here in true philosophical thought. In the pursuit of thought nothing is sacred. the text Idea of Prose does not contain the source material of this intriguing construction that is to be found elsewhere in the third of our trinity of essays on communicability as such contained in Potentialities: “Language and History. not in song but in a pure language?16 He says. he reminds us that the original task of thought was not to discern the presuppositional bases for thinking problems but the elimination of presuppositions. does not understand what to say. which is expressed in the formula ‘that there is language’? Is philosophy not concerned precisely with comprehending the incomprehensible?” (P. “Was philosophy not perhaps the discourse that wanted to free itself of all presuppositions. True philosophy in this way ought to be doubly silent. in isolation poetry’s reserved role as the closest experience we can have of immediate mediation via dictation is not Agamben’s main point. made over much of linguistic communicability.15 Such a moment ought to be celebrated should it not.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN COMMUNICABILITY. as yet. which is understood by all humans 54 . Similarly.

I believe we now have an answer that we can retrieve from the mysticism of Benjamin’s wonderful prose. Benjamin. integrated. In the Idea of Prose we would not return. not by taking up one single language and rejecting all others. he writes. 52). but in the integration of all languages into one pure language that is not written or spoken but simply celebrated. This Benjamin famously calls “freed prose. prose would name nothing other than the fact that it can name: nominal potentiality. At this moment what is 55 . like many thinkers. naming the world. At the moment that history is redeemed from division into integral actuality.LOGOS. 48). simply to a universal system of nouns but to a totally transparent system of pure coincidence between sound and sense. language. as there would be no exteriority for such endless deferral. Discursive language is widely seen as a necessary evil to redeem the fall of language over time from a pure system of transparent signification. discourse presupposes names then a name cannot be anything that would ever need discourse again.” a language not tied down to communication but existing rather as pure communicability. accepts the scission at the heart of human language between pure signification. discourse. THINKING THOUGHT just as the language of birds is understood by those born on Sunday” (cited in P. “The status of this Adamic language is therefore of speech that does not communicate anything other than itself and in which spiritual essence and linguistic essence thus coincide. How can this be? Agamben himself poses this question. naming. instead it is perfectly transparent to itself ” (P.17 What would such prose consist of ? Primarily names. nor can it refer to other names within language. and communication. and actual presence of language as such. Language as communicability is the moment of integral actuality when the thing as such of thought touches the medium of thinking. as our tradition often has it. To put it succinctly. or communicability. as confusion can of course lead again to a diversity of names for such things. Such a language does not have a content and does not communicate objects through meanings. however. If. humanity will resolve the issue of the Babelian profusion of languages. Thus the Idea of Prose is a system of pure and transparent naming that names one thing: the universal. to an impure process of attempted communication or trying to render transparent once more the opacity of signs. Such a name cannot refer to things in the world.

language as semiotic mediality. It has to be this way. transmit it. so to speak. This vision of prose’s total invisibility in the face of semantic transmission is part of a tradition that I have analysed elsewhere and has come to form the very frontier of the future of 56 . languages would have to cease to mean it. ironically. is the thing of such of thought. language.18 choosing to stay within language rather than distance himself from the source of all thought. He is not a poet.”19 However. is to be totally comprehended. That said. A thought that precedes language simply reiterates the aporias of philosophy’s reliance on. The very meaning of language is its transmission of meaning as such. seems to be promoted by an observation by Valéry that states “the essence of prose is to perish” (cited in P. and difference. Language too requires immediate mediation as Agamben explains: “to say what they mean. Which is why. or to leave no excessive. answering the very pertinent question why he did not describe an Idea of Poetry. At this point it would cease to be a sustaining experience of language as transmission and would instead be a specific transmissible meaning.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN revealed is that the medium that allows one to produce or perceive the thing as such. In so doing it discovers this possibility through the very medium that momentarily facilitates this question. unity. Is his prose therefore close to the Idea of Prose? At the resolution of the essay Agamben returns to the citation that commenced the discussion and its proffering of the “Idea of Prose.” He finds precedents for this conception in Plato’s Idea of the thing as such that an uncited Aristotelian fragment describes as “a kind of mean between prose and poetry. Thought thinks how it is possible for thought to think away from presuppositionality. Benjamin’s choice of the confusing term prose. 54). philosophy. yet disregard for. A language that precedes thought places language in a position of presupposition immediately negating its true essence and making it a philosophical concept. but to say this it would have to cease transmitting immediately and choose a side. The destiny of perfect or pure prose. or material remnant. He does not take dictation. 60). Agamben opts for poetry. given the weak choice of poetry or philosophy in the interim while we await the arrival of the Idea of Prose. by actually trying to think it. the poet says. Agamben is a philosopher and purveyor of philosophical prose. But this is exactly what they cannot do without abolishing themselves” (P. that is. semiotic.

surely. like Badiou. are no longer in opposition but in a state of integral actuality. insofar as it now says and understands only itself. the Idea of Prose. and Heidegger. But remnants of it can be perceived first in the very communicability of language as such or as pure medium. Nancy. can pro-duce perfect prose. if we are ever to arrive at that point. This indifference is not the result of unity or dialectic synthesis. it is “pure history”—history without grammar or transmission. Agamben is reaching here. 57 . which knows neither past nor repetition. having eliminated all of its presuppositions and names and no longer having anything to say. THINKING THOUGHT poetry itself. it would seem. Only poetry.20 Accepting that there are certain presuppositional and aporetic elements to this view. Confusingly. in never having been. It is what is continually said and what continually takes place in every language not as an unsayable presupposition but as what. I will here concede however that at the very least it is the dream and beyond that also the Idea of Prose that its materiality should always finish in total immaterialization. and thus Agamben. It does not unify because it exists pre-divisively in a completely other order of thinking that has no conception of scission and opposition. sustains the life of language. now simply speaks. a poetry of materialized prose. in the collapse of philosophy into a linguistic presupposition of unsayability which ironically allows us to finally think of a silent language that speaks itself. naming and signifying.LOGOS. 60) A language of perfect transparency would accept no division and therefore can be described as totally indifferent. resting solely on its own never having been. speech restored to the Idea is immediately dispersed. Yet a pellucid language would not be reducible to dialectic either as the two elements. can no longer be pursued through philosophical prose. (P. for a messianic and impossible dream? Perhaps. The Idea of language is language that no longer presupposes any other language. Derrida. As Agamben says of such prose: Insofar as it has reached perfect transparency to itself. and finally in poetry and its complex presentation and experience of the materiality of language as such through dictation. it is the language that. but essentially. is forced to turn to poetry.

155). He first raises the issue in an essay called “Notes on Gesture” inserted into the appendices of Infancy and History. 155). that potential for the gesture to interrupt it in its very being-means and only thus does it display it. gesture breaks the false alternative between ends and means . He comes to define gesture. however tense this dual occupancy may be. are removed from the sphere of mediation without thereby becoming ends” (IH. “in a means. as such.” while owing much to Aristotle.21 This early work begins in characteristic fashion with the philosopher bemoaning the loss of gestures in modern life. the basis of Agamben’s presentation of form-of-life as a new mode of thinking in Means Without Ends (1996). 155). . via the neo-Platonist Varro’s reading of Aristotle. the making visible of a means as such” (IH. does it turn a res into a res gesta” (IH.23 This definition of a means without determinate ends. This is vintage Agamben. Astonishingly.24 is what Agamben calls gesture: “Gesture is the display of mediation. presents a new. combining Greek scholarship 58 . One solution to this problem resides in Agamben’s theory of the gesture with which we already have some familiarity from what is. 154–5). .22 He admits that Varro’s analysis of gesture as neither production nor enactment but “undertaking and supporting. but of a kind of mediation that is pure and devoid of any end” (IH. third kind of action: “if doing is a means in sight of an end and praxis is an end without a means. and we will need to wait before we can fully comprehend this final leap of his imagination. this rapidly leads him to the conclusion that it is gesture as pure medium that allows us finally to understand the Kantian definition of beauty as “finality without purpose” or “without end” which is. inbuilt scepticism. and presents means which. perhaps due to the Platonic inheritance. or simply the radical nature of Agamben’s claim. in fact. as that which resides between the two sides of Aristotle’s famous distinction between action (praxis) and production (poiesis).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN POETIC GESTURES Although Agamben consistently affirms a common history and destiny for poetry and philosophy. He feels confident at this stage to then immediately make the jump of almost two millennia from the Roman scholar Varro to the French poet Mallarmé and his concept of the milieu pur: “a sphere not of an end in itself. it remains difficult for us perhaps to see how poetry and philosophy could even begin to be said to share a common ground. Agamben’s third foray into the theory of gesture.

provides the potential for a silence to once more speak. 59 . These comments mark a fairly recognizable presaging of Agamben’s early thoughts on gesture here brought into the sphere of poiesis. The essay ends by explaining a relation the reader may already have discerned. The German defines gesture as closely tied but not reducible to. A presence in language more originary than conceptual expression. Undeniably this silence muzzles the truth of human being but it is a mere interruption of amnesia whose very presence reveals the thing it promoted us to forget: language as pure medium. 77). while a distraction from the truth of language. THINKING THOUGHT forays into the European avant-garde and radical re-readings of the foundations of modern philosophy all within a few sentences. because what it shows is the being-in-language of human beings as a pure potential for mediation” (IH. here becomes a positive gagging or “an exposition of the human being’s being-in-language: pure gesturality” (IH. however. it is “the stratum of language that is not exhausted in communication and that captures language. the linguistic. while yet another example of the mute voice within our tradition is. but in the aforementioned “Kommerell. presents Agamben with a double negation typified by the use of the term gag. much reviled in Language and Death for example.25 Agamben calls such positive silence a “gag” playing on the double meaning of a hindrance to speech and an ad lib inserted into a speech by an actor unsure of her lines. he reads Kommerell’s own comments on linguistic gesturality. in gesture. This nothing to say. is also a betrayal of its importance. Agamben describes philosophy’s gag as being akin to that of what he calls the gesturality of cinema. or On Gesture” he brings philosophy closer to an art form more central to our study. The insertion of speech into silence. a positive silence. in its solitary moments” (P. 156). namely that gesture is another name for the communicability of language as pure medium: “gesture is the communication of a potential to be communicated. Thus the muteness of philosophy. In itself it has nothing to say. Gesture’s muteness. therefore. Lamentably the gag silences but it also inserts language into a hiatus which.LOGOS. Defining the great twentiethcentury German critic as a “gestic” critic. 156). so to speak. language as such.26 It transpires that philosophy speaks of silence to fill in its memory lapse as regards its true subject for speech. poetry. which originates from the fact that pure mediality cannot be presented in the form of a proposition it being the unspoken base of all propositions. therefore.

Each word. before assuring us that prose is essentially the conceptual component of language. the other side of language. He says the more we have language the greater the weight of the unsayable. language as pure. the gestural is one of the means by which poetry and philosophy come together in Agamben’s work. the weight of language’s gestic muteness. the muteness inherent in humankind’s very capacity for language. Quite the opposite. Having said that there is one aspect of the philosophical tradition that echoes the pure mediality of gesturality in poiesis. He defines language as primarily conceptual and mimetic. It speaks not of the pre. the actor’s improvisation to make up for an impossibility of speaking” (P. If this is the case.but sublinguistic support of the semiotic as such in language. Aside from the common history and destiny shared by poetry and philosophy. bears a quantum of gestic mass.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Kommerell. Thus for those possessed of the most words. Gesture is one name Agamben gives for the very mediality of language’s communicability. A proposition that allows one to draw the conclusion that in-fancy is also gestural. Agamben calls this the tablet and our second encounter with it. 78). graphicality. remember we have already considered Aristotle’s blank tablet. inexpressive materiality. requires that we leave Kommerell in Germany and travel 60 . This remaining mimetic element is its gesturality or what we can also call the semiotic. Not that philosophy as such is gestural. compares gestural loneliness as akin to that found in lyric poetry. then. 78). noise. Kommerell proposes a decidedly odd equation of diminishing returns in this regard. its unspeakability as pure medium that Hegel identified in the inadequacy of the deictic diese. therefore. it tends ever to the conceptual. to better illustrate his point. then what is at issue in gesture is not so much a prelinguistic content as. . and a common if divergent response to their being “gagged” by language’s tendency towards muteness within our culture. there must always be something in the poem not exhausted by a reading of it in terms of meaning. already heightened for them by their semiotic rather than semantic use of language. poets. . according to Kommerell poetry is subject to the gestic gag or as Agamben says: “something put in someone’s mouth to keep him from speaking and. Kommerell defines speech as originary gesture leading Agamben to conclude: “If this is true . it would seem. so to speak. and poetry the mimetic. becomes almost unbearable. its speechless dwelling in language” (P. Like philosophy.

not a place or thing. “not an image. the pure potentiality of representation itself: the writing tablet! . with many interruptions. .27 From this charming story of ancient times. the Syrian city where he was born many years before. the ageing philosopher Damascius decided to devote his last years to an impossible work entitled Aporias and Solutions Concerning First Principles. .LOGOS. (IP. . or word might eventually take place . but something like the perfectly empty space in which only image. breath. The entire. . 33). Agamben too finds the instigation of what he had been looking for since the inauguration of his great experimentum linguae. in a flash the old philosopher realized the truth of thought: The uttermost limit thought can reach is not a being. he narrates how. but the site of a place” (IP. THE TABLET. PHILOSOPHICAL GESTURALITY In the sixth century AD. its own absolute potentiality. . how can one comprehend the incomprehensible” (IP. in exile. itself unthinkable and unspeakable. . one night. no matter how free of any quality. After three hundred days and three hundred nights of consideration. 33). but rather. 34) 61 . Then. 32). THINKING THOUGHT back in time many hundreds of years to the court of Koshrau I of Persia where a respected and aged philosopher once set himself the task of finally resolving the remaining problems of philosophy . he was in despair “because how can thought pose the question of the beginning of thought . not the origin of first principles but the place where language can be thought without reducing it to mere discourse and named without tying it down to a fixed. “Wasn’t what he was searching for exactly like the threshing floor. lengthy volume that the hand of the scribe had crammed with characters was nothing other than the attempt to represent the perfectly bare writing tablet on which nothing had yet been written. . an image occurred to him that would guide him towards the completion of this impossible task. where the winnowing fans of thought and language separated the grain and chaff of everything?” (IP. it was not even a space. . Describing Damascius setting about writing down the idea of the threshing floor. taking his hand from the writing tablet for a moment. This site of a place reminded him of nothing so much as the threshing floors of Damascus. particular referent.

preferring the German translation “mitte” or midst. rather medio must signify being in the midst of a milieu and being a milieu of the midst. Being a thinker not a poet he thus has no option but to break the tablet of material language and abandon his philosophical ambitions. Agamben has no such intentions towards a narrative of sour disavowal told by some future thinker fifteen hundred years hence and so alights with relish upon Benjamin’s Idea of Prose as a way out of perennial philosophical failure. remains surrounded by the milieu that characterizes such an intermediary state” (IP. here represented by the medium of an as yet un-inscribed set of thoughts. The term does not. This allegorical provocation is the threshold of Agamben’s first attempt to bring together the millennial project of poetry and philosophy and heal their painful divorce in Idea of Prose. né poesia né prosa. per lui. Düttmann’s analysis of the translation of the key phrase from “The Idea of Prose” is important here. and the medium created by the bringing together of these two terms. with its double sense of midst and milieu or “what takes place in the middle. namely mean. as Düttmann correctly asserts. ma il loro medio” (“was for him neither poetry nor prose. Medio in this way would mean to be both in the midst of something. what. That said Düttmann’s version seems to miss the most obvious translation of the term medio. means he is unable to reconcile the conflict between writing that does not think (poetry) and thinking that cannot be written (philosophy). in the midst of poetry and philosophy. One can see why the rather bland and non-suggestive “middle term” then is not to his or indeed my own liking. The closing words of the essay speak again of the enigmatic statement of Aristotle that Plato’s “idea del linguaggio” (“idea of language”). the precondition of all thought on the materiality of a non-expressive language. therefore. The tablet is. Mean here retains the sense of middleness and of sharing a common ground but 62 .28 Düttmann is somewhat dissatisfied with the translation of medio as “middle term” by Sullivan and Whitsitt. As Damascius discerned. no doubt with great bitterness (although the text of this great work was in fact written). “non era. 5). but their middle term”). refer to an already presupposed medium waiting to be occupied. a version of a kind of gestural or poeticized thinking.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Courtesy of this epiphany Damascius understood that his work would be finished only at the moment he ceased writing and accordingly he broke the tablet in two. not giving way to the extremes.

but their mean. this time the tale of different form of tablet named “Bartleby the Scrivener. This second volume. Excited by this formulation he goes on to name this the quodlibet or whatever character of being in relation to that complex philosophical term potential originating in the work of Aristotle and finding radical reinvention in Heidegger under the terms of possibility. but indifferent being in that it is “such as it is. For that matter he is also speaking of language. It commences with prophesy: “The coming being is whatever being” (CC.” It is a story Agamben has. 1). specifically its ability to communicate nothing but its potential to communicate: whatever name. is also a delineation of potentiality in terms of ontology as the opening essay “Whatever” reveals. I believe that without the concomitant implication of averaging out.”29 The tablet. stillness. Average is a most common meaning for medio in Italian. being French or being Muslim. midst and milieu do not quite capture what is the essential experience of the Idea of Prose. while a consideration of ethics and community.32 63 .LOGOS. This portentous rhetorical portal opens up a debate on the meaning of “whatever” in terms of identity and being.30 and again in the lapidarianally entitled “Bartleby. Singularity is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal” (CC. aptly.” in The Coming Community (1990). or On Contingency” for Potentialities. or the mean of communicability between poetry and prose. told twice over first as part of a co-authored book with Deleuze translated as “Bartleby.31 with Agamben explaining he does not mean an indifferent being in relation to a common property. While Agamben is talking about being and ethics here we can now clearly see that he is also discoursing on the traditionally assumed qualities of poetry (ineffability) and philosophy (intelligibility). tension. is an example of a potential medium for thinking the thing of thought as such dependent on precisely this (re)translation of Aristotle’s definition of said thing as pure mediality: “neither poetry nor prose. middleness (Wall’s aforementioned radical passivity). namely balance.” POTENTIALITY To draw together the diverse strands of Agamben’s theory of the medio. suspension: “dialectic at a standstill. THINKING THOUGHT importantly it adds a third sense: the average of two terms. therefore. 1). it is time to tell another story.

To have a faculty to write a poem. 179). Akhmatova is a poet at the moment of her not-yet-having-written and. all potentiality is based on a choice not to do. 179). but rather the existence of non-Being. 64 . is defined in terms of being through negation or desubjectivization. or whatever being. so that potentiality is not simply actuality to be but also the refusal to actuate one’s potential. Agamben uses here the example of Akhmatova’s avowal that she had the faculty to express the horror of the Russian purges before she had written a word. in-creation. non-invention. in an odd way she is less of a poet when she is fulfilling her potential and writing poems. . . “‘in this sense. Thus. the poet the potential to not-write poems” (P. means that you can write a poem but not that you are writing one or even that you ever will. the presence of an absence . which comes to define being as the presence of the not to be. as indeed all makers are.” (P. we say of the architect that he or she has the potential to build. The presence of an absence for Agamben is the true definition of potentiality. tabularity. not the assumed movement from potentiality to actuality which we might call “creation” or “invention. and communicability all come together here in a sustained consideration of potential as the desubjectivizing presence of absence in being.” the actual and surprising definition of poetic being is the possession of a faculty and not using it. Agamben concludes.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Agamben has said a number of times that the Western metaphysical tradition was part founded on the now generally ignored opposition between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle’s work. “What is essential is that potentiality is not simply non-Being. Being is defined in its singularity by precisely this ontological condition of neutrality and passivity. The poet here. “Thus the architect is potential insofar as he has the potential to not-build. simple privation.33 He notes that in Aristotle potentiality. is developed from the debate over what it means to have a faculty to do something and yet not be doing it. the simultaneous existence of not being within the very identity of one’s being. It ought now to be becoming increasingly clear how Agamben’s early ideas pertaining to authorial gesturality. for the sake of argument let us say the poet’s potential to make a poem. Thus when Agamben goes on to define the artist.” but the chance that potential will remain solely potential—potential inaction. of the poet that he or she has the potential to write poems. at every moment that the poet is not writing a poem they are in a state of potential privation: they could write but they choose not to. Indeed.

he celebrates Gould’s artistic power through a consideration of his potential to not not-play. Noting that true power comes from the capability for power and impotence. Gesture is the touch and withdrawal of being. retains the element of blankness. The tablet is the medium of this touch or what is touched. being in its potentiality. Here gesture and tablet find a common medium in what I envisage as a tensile pairing that forms the communicability of language or the thing itself of thought. so to speak. he is able to consider his potential being beyond simply occupying this named position. must retain a remnant in each of its two manifestations. having been. nor is it simply incapable . with his potential to not-play” (CC. Such a being is located in the mean or medial position between potentiality.LOGOS. the potential not to be a poet as the very actualization of the poetic subjective state. or to turn his potential into actuality. “I would prefer not to. Clearly Gould is a thinker in his playing potential for rather than simply being a pianist. it should now be clear that the reluctant scribe is the manifestation of potentiality embedded in his apparently self-destructive and nihilistic riposte to any request for action. modern “poetic” thinking. Returning to Bartleby. Being. . for those who are familiar with this remarkably prescient work by Melville. Stating that any pianist can play or not play. Before being comes to be it already possess the remnant of a true being in that such a being is not full actualization but the retention of not-being even in the act of full coming to being. it is equally certain that it is not capable of only this or that specific act. a blankness that is never entirely blank and that. Gould’s power is that “he plays. THINKING THOUGHT Akhmatova is a poet because she can write poems but she only has this faculty because she can also not write poems. the being that is properly whatever is able to not-be. not yet being. 35). there must be retained a part of potential being that is never fully realized. Once potential passes over into actualization however. and actuality. even when written upon. 36).”34 Agamben calls this supreme power using the figure of Glenn Gould to better illustrate the power of whatever being. therefore. 65 . “For if it is true that whatever being always has a potential character. it is capable of its own impotence” (CC. . As such he is an exemplar of Aristotelian thought as potential and his controversial and apparently unhinged performance choices are recognizable examples of masterful. the simultaneous coming to being and desubjectivization of identity that Agamben describes as the essence of the author-function.

. it would always already have passed through to the act and it would remain necessarily inferior to its own object. Thought is neither presence.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Reading De Anima.35 Just as Gould can think his own potentiality by playing with its negation. 37). stepping away from to play or not to play in favour of a position of playing to play and playing not to play. but is the presence of absence within presence that both affirms and negates being. But thought. but being as presence becomes unthinkable. therefore. this time more centrally to its relation to potentiality: “If thought were in fact only the potentiality to think this or that intelligibility . as such. action and passion coincide and the writing tablet writes by itself or. Aristotle compares it to a writing tablet on which nothing is written” (CC. neither an object nor its negation. “but that layer of wax. The perfect act of writing comes not from a power to write. but is not yet and may never be. writes its own passivity. that rasum tabulae that is nothing but its own passivity” (CC. 37). or On Contingency”: “In its deepest intention. but from an impotence that turns back on itself and in this way comes to itself as pure act . nor some negative theological absence. is pure potentiality. Agamben glosses again on Aristotle’s definition of thought. so thought can think itself as a pure medium. in other words. rather. This waxen screen allows thought to turn back on itself and think itself as the thought of thought. it is also the potentiality to not think. as Agamben states midway through “Bartleby. the construction of an experience of the possible as such. written.” (CC. simply put. is the archetype of pure potentiality as the passive writing medium upon which thought could. Or. thought is no longer thought as such. This complex yet necessary logic not only dictates the potentiality of thought and willed creation but their interrelation through writing: “In the potentiality that thinks itself. we can now reveal that it is the famous tabula rasa. but not in actuality think it for as soon as it is thought. Being as pure absence remains nonbeing. And Bartleby. Thought must have something to think. Having met with this tablet once before. and. “a scribe who does not simply cease writing but ‘prefers not to’” (CC. not writing but the white sheet is what philosophy 66 . . 37). Not thought but the potential to think. in its essence. philosophy is a firm assertion of potentiality. . as possible or material intellect. not thought considered as an object. 37). although Agamben notes that the correct term should be rasum tabulae or the layer of wax covering the tablet which the stylus engraves. .

then opts not to . Poets are called by the muse to write. Going on to describe the essence of the poetic as the tension between the demands of ego and genius. withdraws the pen. Duchamp.36 Potentiality in the writer is precisely this tension between genius and character. yet each act of writing. what do they see? Dressed in second-clothes. Then there are the great works that were written purely through genius: “Kubla Khan. a certain special pen.: “The ink. a certain dim light shining from the left. Looking in the mirror of their art. however. they have become someone they are not. commences writing. and the works never created: Mallarmé’s Livre. 14). Writer’s block is a phenomenon best explained by the ontology of potentiality. Each person’s character is engendered by the way he attempts to turn away from Genius. changes her mind. The impersonal is negated in the personal act of writing something specific. THINKING THOUGHT refuses at all costs to forget” (P. . Without being facetious. 244). Agamben’s whole philosophical system of thinking as such could be reduced to the thoughtless doodling of ontology upon a blank sheet with an inkless pen. the late Rimbaud. the drop of darkness with which the pen writes. Or better a dot. There are the great books that were never written.” The Magnetic Fields. 67 . as we saw. a series of dots. with what resides in us but does not belong to us. Agamben’s La voce umana. it is useless to tell yourself that just any pen will do. The experience of the poet can be defined in precisely these terms as poetic dictation direct from the muse or the greatest experience of potential impotentiality. as is the writing of pure inspiration. as the poet sets pen to paper. 10). On the Road. but as they write they murder the muse and assume her garb. Agamben concludes: “To some extent we all come to terms with Genius.LOGOS. changes her mind. is thought itself ” (P. 17). that any paper and any light will suffice” (Prof. not to write and to write. As I Lay Dying. This white sheet is yet another version of the tablet of philosophy and the empty inscriptions imprinted upon it the gesturality that is at the basis of poetry’s experience of language as such. Or is it to be unearthed in his description of the capricious diffidence found at the desk of every writer of genius? “If in order to write you need—he needs!—a certain yellow paper. DeChirico. to flee from him” (Prof. the personal and impersonal (Prof. The author attempted to merely will them into existence. 249). They are the art of pure character. . depersonalizes and desubjectivizes the writer. These works did not come into being because they were not possessed of genius.

THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Kenneth Koch’s When the Sun Tries to Go On. A blank tablet acting as mere reproach to the woman of genius. or to write as not writing. 68 . inspired flow are two sides of an imbalance of writerly potentiality. the great writers of genius. when genius has abandoned them? “It is the late and final stage when the old artist lays down his pen—and contemplates. for Agamben. They are happy with their lot and it would never occur to them not to write. Their destiny is otherwise. . and that is the only way. . Their brilliance does not reside in what they write or what they excise or refute. Does one fulfil one’s potential in the work? Never. Gesturality signs the long and chequered history of one’s being with language. Writer’s block and pure. but in their ongoing and self-conscious game with writing: to write. the powerful unfulfilment of true potential being. devoid of every charm . only now does the very long unlearning of the self begin . the brush as it is lifted from the canvas not when it is applied. fulfil.” (Prof. 18). The gesture alone is meaningless and sad. . Some do not write and could never do so. that determine one’s subjective desubjectivity as a writer of potential. And what of when a writer simply ceases to write. all one’s written and unwritten works as Agamben phrases it. There are those who can write and do so with facility and alacrity. and so on. . Then there are the few. Here the author seemingly had little or nothing to do with writing. too much character in one and overabundance of genius in the other. or not to not write. The pen that grazes the page. or not to write. What does he contemplate? Gestures: for the first time truly his own.

poetry has come to be the archetype of all the arts.”2 Within the period of aesthetic modernity extending from Romanticism to our contemporary moment it has been common to interpret this dictum in such a way that poiesis could be taken to mean simply the willed making of something: creation. of filmic presentations of creation such as the various versions of Frankenstein. but is not limited to it. Plato famously says in the Symposium: “any cause that brings into existence something that was not there before is poiesis. Finally. A sweating. This includes willed creative agency therefore. This view of creativity finds its culmination in Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to Power as Art or maker as creative genius. for the modern philosophical tradition. dark-browed genius does not necessarily have to work in the intermittent flashes of lightning accompanied by Wagnerian thunder and a rattling gurney to simply “bring something into presence. Such a view confirms the ontotheological and masculine activity of god-like invention as creation ex nihilo that has dominated modern ideas of the artist-creator. the process of actually making is rather less glamorous than that. poiesis is “any cause” that results in creation. Yet if we pay careful attention to Plato’s words here. but could just as easily be a truth or observation. At the same time creation does not simply indicate the god-like making of a new object in the world. say.CHAPTER 2 POIESIS. but the bringing into existence something that was not there before which could be an object.” Bringing something into presence could just as easily 69 . but its wider meaning is in fact creation. THINKING THROUGH MAKING POIESIS The Greek word poiesis1 is the origin of our term poetry explaining why.

The chalice is to hand or possesses Heideggerian equipmentality. It may be timorous. Rather. respecting the Greek provenance. form.” (QCT. The statue makes one think of the materialization of a god within a temple. and efficient cause (QCT 6–7)—he considers poiesis in terms of that which brings all these elements together into his chosen art object example: a silver chalice. making the chalice is really an afterthought following on from deep consideration on the part of the maker as to how material. Presence need not be awful. Beauty may be a part of poiesis but it is not necessarily the purpose of poiesis. the relationship between gods. The chalice makes one think of certain things in relation to ceremony and sacrifice. soil. and so on.. each of them must be made of matter that is formed to an end by a causality. Relying on the ancient Aristotelian four causes theory of philosophy—matter. 21). The same would be true of the statue. form. poiesis makes something manifest to appearance that was not manifest before. purpose. . at least not in the way in which they make the chalice. and utility. reliability. 70 . the temple. guiding. 35). that he presents as poiesis. and their causality in such a way as they will bring to presence a truth or being that was not available for view before. These four causes share the responsibility for “the silver chalice’s lying ready before us as a sacrificial vessel” (QCT. purpose. unveiling values such as equipmentality. toil. rather than the beauty of the chalice. For Heidegger. or accompanying. Heidegger specifically defines the bringing-forth of poiesis as that which “lets what presences come forth into unconcealment. but the causality that combines all the other elements together into the coming to presence of a truth is not someone deciding to make something but someone. It is what the chalice can produce for us as sacrificial vessel and all that entails.g.” a process he defines as “producing that brings forth—e.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN mean coaxing. 9). form. the erecting of a statue in the temple precinct . and the people through a precinct where earth and sky are gathered and composed together into a world where the gods seem to dwell among us. . through making. Heidegger is careful to stipulate that the silversmith who makes the chalice is not the final and efficient cause of the chalice. The temple. and purpose will all fit together causally. thinking deeply about the “that” and the “how” of material. Note the emphasis on the object’s availability for use here. Van Gogh’s peasant shoes “let us know what shoes are in truth” (PLT.

We ought not to feel excessive culpability or remorse in this regard. Over vast tracts of time within our culture creation has emerged from the original Greek sense of pro-duction as passive experience of something coming to presence (to pro-duce literally means to lead forward) to a definition resulting in a god-like act of will on the part of man to make something or bring about something in the world that was not there before. by making something new and wonderful in the world. in contrast. poiesis was. an experience of the production of something absent into presence and from concealment into the light.” is god-like fiat and lacks the sense of passivity and modesty inherent in the term’s original definition. to praxis which meant to do something or to act in accordance with one’s will (MWC. that of work. Poiesis as pro-duction. As Agamben explains: “The essential character of poiesis was not its aspect as a practical and voluntary process but its being a mode of truth as unveiling” (MWC.POIESIS. therefore yet today we often speak of creative production as practice and artists as practitioners. That said the difference between the two terms could not be clearer. lacks the subjective agency of an artist as a maker. Poiesis does not share with praxis the element of practical. for the Greeks. poiesis. If praxis meant doing something through one’s will to do that thing. a doer. was a concept at one remove from their 71 . a person able to bend their will to create themselves into being as The Artist. in that both seem to fulfil Plato’s stipulation that creation is bringing something new into existence. THINKING THROUGH MAKING PRAXIS According to Agamben poiesis was opposed. due to the reliance on that culture on the sustaining activities of slaves. Poiesis of this second. inaccurate order. It is an easy mistake to make. praxis. essentially guide or facilitator of truth. 69). what one might call modern “Romantic poiesis. un-concealment). wilful action. 68). that for many thinkers constitutes the opposite of what creation actually is. voluntary. Poiesis has in the modern age been mistaken therefore for praxis. One of the reasons for this confusion between poiesis and praxis in the modern age relates to a third category. was directly tied into the biological processes of the human as animal and. for the Greeks.3 Work. which is the Greek sense of experiencing truth as unveiling or a-letheia (un-forgetting. to confuse poiesis with praxis. This slip of the tongue unfortunately confines creation to the very process.

Over the centuries the clear differentiation between poiesis. most notably in the work of Nietzsche. pro-duction into presence. At the same time a significant shift occurred typified by the modern period wherein “will” comes to overtake the unveiling of truth as the essence of artistic creation: The central experience of poiesis. eventually. of life understood as energy and creative impulse” (MWC. . Smith. . thus opening the space of truth (ά-λήθεια) and building a world for man’s dwelling on earth—and to the operari of the artist . Nietzsche’s definition of Will to Power as Art. 70) As Agamben goes on to show through brief readings of Locke. biological existence” in contrast to the way in which poiesis “constructs the space where man finds his certitude and where he ensures the freedom and duration of his action” (MWC. of the process through which the object has been produced . . 69). “the point of arrival of Western aesthetics is a metaphysics of the will. . the highest. Instead. praxis. the original productive state of the work of art is all but forgotten except by certain poets and.”4 However different they are. As this theme develops through materialism and then through philosophy. is replaced by the question of the “how. (MWC. the lowest of the three categories for the Greeks to. this means that the emphasis shifts away from what the Greeks considered the essence of the work—the fact that in it something passed from nonbeing into being. is completely opposed to the Greek sense of poiesis and is perhaps best summarized in the shift from the subjective statement “this happened to me. That said. that is.” to simply “I made this. 72). For example. the shift away from truth to genius facilitated the elevation of work. it is much easier to find common ground between praxis and work understood as the basic production of all material life. and the materialists. and work has been lost. For we “moderns” it would seem that making is something a subject does to 72 . eventually. Marx. they were able to realize that work was “bare.” that is. than between praxis as will and poiesis as almost passive experience. Greek and modern poiesis are both similarly ontological in basis in that both bring something into being and also operate as an act pertaining to one’s own being. The predominance of will over creation taken as a value of will.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN lives. although the Greeks did not indulge habitually in work. Heidegger.

The first is active participant. “Every occasion for whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poiesis. For the Greeks making is something that can happen to being or the subject to produce an authentic experience of truth. THINKING THROUGH MAKING being. Modern making defines being as making something. 59). as Heidegger suspects. Art was not a sector of cultural activity” (QCT.POIESIS. Most especially poiesis does not make what we would term “art. the Being of beings. 10). and this confirms the artist’s being as god-like maker. meant that. it makes a new being. These stipulations allow Heidegger to re-translate Plato’s definition of poiesis so that “any cause that brings into existence something that was not there before is poiesis. “The arts were not derived from the artistic. This astounding declaration is partly founded on an earlier observation by Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art” that there is a good deal of evidence that the Greeks would not have used the term art in the context of making but would prefer techne or skill. poiesis does not make anything new.” during the halcyon days of Greek culture in its ascendancy the task granted to poiesis. Greek making defines being as the experience of making. For them. or as Heidegger interprets the Greek sense of truth as aletheia. This retranslation in effect negates the possibility that creation as poiesis can be Nietzschean.” As Heidegger exudes in the closing sections of his influential essay “The Question Concerning Technology. 34). and looks for technical and theoretical means of producing a thing which belongs to the category of possibility and the cause of which lies in the producer not in what is produced. 1 flags up this problematic synonymity between poiesis and technics citing Aristotle as claiming: “Every art [tekhne] is concerned with bringing something into being. a premature seizing of the seat of the gods by presumptuous man. the second passive recipient.5 TECHNE Staying with the Greeks a little longer one can see that the Nietzschean interpretation of poiesis as active. which is precisely the point. Art works were not enjoyed aesthetically.” becomes. it merely lifts the curtain to reveal what is behind. willed creation ex nihilo. is bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen]” (QCT. making the artist a technites (PLT. willed making into being is. Bernard Stiegler in his influential study of Technics and Time Vol.”6 73 . the bringing to presence of the gods.

First. a form of artistic production. appearance. 159). we must come to terms with the making element of the term as well as the truth revealing or presencing element. techne. Finally 74 . he explains. All of this hinges on a double sense of what it means to produce an art work with work referring both to the thing made and the process of its production.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN If there was no term for art as we conceive of it. Heidegger is helpful in this regard by asserting that there can be no poiesis without techne. and techne as skilled knowing through doing. but for the Greeks a specific type of knowing through creative making or as he says: “to make something appear. if fleeting. praxis as simply doing. The work’s becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens” (PLT. there is no poiesis without making something. therefore. as this or that. Yet surely. the unveiling of truth. In this way poiesis is not making in the form of simple techne or skilful productivity—although the terms are necessarily linked and for Heidegger as for Stiegler ostensibly synonymous (chair makers for Heidegger have easily as much techne as Damien Hirst or Booker prize winning novelists)—but the activity of bringing to presence something that was not in a state of presence before: the truth of Being as such. “the making of making as such” as Jean-Luc Nancy translates poiesis in its modern manifestation as poetry as the archetype of all arts. is not simply craft or skill. poiesis as production of presence. makes art make being come to full. instead of art. direct relation between poiesis and art as such? Heidegger believes so in that for him pure poiesis. Therefore while one cannot assume that poiesis is definable as simply making something. Second. is this not a definition of art but of philosophy? For poiesis to make any sense as creative act. I believe we must accept two things at this stage. within what is present. our modern sense of creation is a muddle of these three Greek ideas. in this way or that way. although alone making cannot simply will truth. Praxis is the physical activity and will necessary to bring this about. Poiesis is the experience of the production or facilitation of the coming into the light of a truth. can one trace any actual. The Greeks conceive of techne. while it does not always make art. and the Greeks used instead the word skill. Techne. in terms of letting appear” (PLT. that for the Greeks the three terms were all elements of a process of what they called bringing something into presence or aletheia. As Heidegger states: “to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. 60). producing.

What is poietic about the shoes and the chalice is how they allow objects to become things through the process of making something. The art thing as one must now call it rather than the more common art object seems to negate one of the primary aesthetic aims 75 . equipmentality. rather its thingly status depends on the truths it makes manifest for human beings on earth: sacrifice.8 Heidegger is careful to state that art is not simply a delimited made object in the world. the gods. and so poiesis and techne must function together for praxis in general to become artistic practice. from a thing. Thus Van Gogh’s shoes are not an object. transmissible traditions. There is no guarantee that techne will result in poiesis or the flashing bloom of truth. Here Heidegger attentively distinguishes an object or something with clear limits that the subject can observe and indeed make. the art object in this context. Knowing through skilled making prepares for the possibility of presencing in that it is a process of coming to know things about the world through skilful and directed making. One might. THINKING THROUGH MAKING techne is an intermediary state dependent on real skill in pursuit of the truth. is not poietic as such but resultant from poiesis. if only briefly and partially. or mechanical production. indeed they are not they are a mere image. THE ART THING Taking all of this to be the case. but certainly for a work of art to happen there needs to be work as process and work as thing. then it can be termed poietic and as such art. the work of art. or that poiesis will result in art. after Heidegger makes this simple distinction: if an act of making produces being or truth by bringing it into the light. but again a gathering of ancient ideas of sacrifice. It makes a small world effectively. A thing is something in the world that composes and gathers together truths in the world. instrumental. or gathers a continuum around itself made up of all the elements of its truthpresencing. and so on. If not then such a process is merely making something and is artisanal. etc. Even the chalice is not on object as such. therefore. but they are a thing: a point of gathering of truths about what it means to be on this earth and work this earth using equipment. the religious world. ceremony.7 Yet this bringing forth of truth cannot occur without making something so that the idea of the work of art must be taken simultaneously as an activity and an object or better thing.POIESIS.

to be entirely at home in something.” a form of “knowing in the widest sense . representational bronze. If poiesis is dependent on techne. . 13). Conceptual art is as thingly as Westminster Abbey. Other philosophical themes are regularly addressed 76 . realistic. As an opening up it is a revealing” (QCT. Such knowing provides an opening up. In “Back” four bronze reliefs of a back are displayed side by side. 3). colour. even Turner. 89–96). Mondrian. each showing increasing levels of abstraction from the first. Poiesis must be hands-on. what Heidegger calls “Denken. For critics this would be truth-revealing enough but it must be conceded that for thinkers of poiesis such as Heidegger and Agamben these quasi-truths would only be granted full truth status if they move the artist and observer towards greater truths such as the Being of beings for Heidegger or artistic desubjectivization for Agamben. Its object-status is to some degree irrelevant. simplification. compression. Both forms of thinking can often think the same things. the poietic art thing is not art for art’s sake but art for the sake of truth and world composition. abstraction. effectively negating subjectivity and defining so-called desubjectivization as the modern experience of the poeticization of being. techne is itself “something poietic. to understand and be expert in it. Agamben notes how modern art has thought about being and subjectivity. from poiesis. Pollock. . Similar gradations of abstraction are observable in the art of Picasso. and so on.” which is the bringing to presence of truth. One of the most transparent examples of the interdependence of poiesis and techne is the move over time towards abstraction in a work such as “Back” by Matisse.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN of modern art: that the object made comes to stand in the world in a delimited and self-sufficient manner akin to that of rocks and flowers. composition. which is the bringing to presence of truth through making. Kandinsky. to be revealed as if for the first time through their ongoing skill and thoughtful experimentation. stuff. Alain Badiou speaks in a similar vein of poetry’s ability to negate the category of the object (MP. representation. That said the art thing must subsist in matter. In each instance the artist’s technical virtuosity does not simply allow them to make beautiful things but provides an opportunity for profound artistic truths pertaining to dimensionality. We are now at the point where we can differentiate thinking. Nancy speaks of poetry as the very moment of meta-making or thinking about making through making (MA. and the sensuous realm. Certainly.

according to Heidegger. propriety. not through pedestrian description or disciplined argumentation but through a form of thinking that occurs courtesy of the activity of making. and complexity of the term poiesis the artist can now be described as a “maker-thinker.” Due to the provenance. Thus a flower’s finitude is not its actual perfection but the perfection of flowers as such. Kant’s famous definition of the art work as that which has finitude without purpose is. It seems obvious. and Being as such. growing. singularity. this used to be. and Agamben. Issues such as part and whole. The finitude of a work of art in a totally transmissible. One could judge their completion against communally held values pertaining to what perfect and thus finished work was. the human. the case with works of art as well. after all. I want to concentrate instead on the more complicated issue of its finitude. nature. flowers are in possession of poiesis. The maker-thinker. in itself ” (QCT. makes a thing in the world in a way which provides a powerful point of difference between thinking as such and poietic thinking. in part.9 or what I will go on to name “logopoiesis. A non-purposive finitude allows for the work of art to partake of the perfection of a completion that is not directed towards any ends other than finitude as such and the pleasure we habitually and inexplicably gain from perceiving perfectly finished. which cannot be considered in terms of art even if. not least because a flower is a living. Heidegger. happiness. Rather than dwell here on the much-vaunted Wildean uselessness of modern art. traditional Greek culture such as that imagined by Hölderlin. intuitive even. Such a procedure of thinking through making defines “poetic thinking” as Heidegger and Badiou have termed it. death. and decaying thing. causality. poised. 10). ostensibly. being in the world. and balanced made things. THINKING THROUGH MAKING by the arts. mobile. that a flower is complete but its completion is not of the order of its physical borders. infinity. a means by which to differentiate beauty made by human hands and the beauty of flowers and so on. 77 . His chosen example of poiesis in nature is “the bursting of a blossom into bloom. are all thought by poietic activity. law. If we are to believe the philosophers.” FINITUDE A central element of the activity of poiesis is the complex issue of finitude or formal completion. subtlety. contested status. finitude.POIESIS.

We are also more than ever attuned to the material problems of delineating the work of art in that the parerga.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN was not to be found around the borders of the work but the means by which the work matched the transmissible model of what art. Taking all this into consideration one has to conclude we live in an age of very Greek art. virtuality. for our ability to retain the term art at all is surely testimony to the means by which we consider art not as located within a carefully crafted. unique object. Further.10 78 . For Agamben such a view is meaningless to modern. critical sensibility. and truth was. but in the endless process of the coming into presence of the being of art in a manner entirely separate from the simple activity of making something lovely. had always been. material innovations in the performativity. not how it conforms to the model but how it is an original work that confounds modelling as a cultural process of imposed convention and cliché. objective. and conceptuality of art works mean it is now often impossible to determine the actual. value. or marginalia that surround the art object may indeed now constitute the art object. frames. Here is the first stanza of a poem by Charles Bernstein entitled “Warrant”: I warrant that this poem is entirely my own work and that the underlying ideas concepts. or material (even temporal) limits of a work of art. In our epoch the value of a work of art is precisely the opposite. There is no communally held view as to what a Work of Art in general should be. and make-up of the poem have not been taken from any other source or any other poem but rather originate with this poem. Finally. we value art for not conforming to any such model if it did indeed exist which. The frame may become the work or its faming in the museum its poiesis. It was an act of mapping a perfect gestalt. and would unquestionably always remain. It would be true to say that the modern art work lacks finitude in almost direct proportion to its attainment of ever new levels of non-purposiveness. with delicious paradox. it does not.

law. therefore. . in fact. SHAPE Agamben sides initially with Heidegger in calling for a return to and development of the original Greek sense of poiesis as production into presence.” the one we are actually reading. in that the poem being described and warranted does not exist except as something indicated within another “poem. 60). Thus he declares: “Poiesis. and ontology.” (MWC. lineated legal prose and not “poetic” at all in any sense of profound techne. no actual delimited poem body here. aesthetically. and ontologically warranted absence. if this is a work of art where does its artistic being emanate from? I would argue first that the poem is art and second that its art status comes from its poiesis. As there is no poem object as such to view. Agamben is able to admit that even nature could come under the term poiesis if it were not for a careful stipulation of Aristotle between a natural act of creation that “contains in itself its own άρχή [arche]. poetry. but returns back to the Greek and applies his own philological skills in trying to resolve the complex problem of the exact relation of poiesis to human doing essential to his later formulations of potentiality as having the ability to do something. the process of a coming into being of an idea about art as object within the market place. THINKING THROUGH MAKING This is one of several examples of self-annihilating meta-poiesis in the work of the greatest conceptual poet writing today. of that productive action of which artistic doing is only a privileged example . That said he does not simply accede to Heidegger’s reading of the term. either also called “Warrant” or perhaps nameless.” then we need poiesis if only to keep hold of art. that is. does not designate here an art among others. There is. but is the very name of man’s doing. the principle and origin of its entry into presence” (MWC. If modern and future art criticism and creation is based on a process of aesthetic judgement on nonpurposive non-objectal.POIESIS. . and as the poetry on view is. and that which finds its principle through 79 . 59). But what is the status of the ancient Greek term poiesis in a contemporary modern art environment? This is a question that Agamben in his work on poiesis has tried to answer. The deixis of “this poem” immediately reveals pure indication. illimited art things such as “Warrant. MORPHE. aesthetic convention. beyond the deictic “this” as an indication of the presence of a poem in its legally.


human productive activity instead. This second category enters into presence by virtue of techne or skill, especially at shaping, forming before our eyes the crux of the difference between nature and poiesis, and finally dispatching the idea to be found in Heidegger that nature is also poietic. Nature contains within itself the principle by which it enters into presence, what Kant terms purposiveness, while poiesis has the character of a hylomorphic and Aristotelian “installation into shape” (MWC, 60) by which Agamben explains it must take on a shape or form in order to make the transition from nonbeing into being—for example Bernstein’s ideas about the enframing of art by capital taking the shape of a poem. Poiesis then produces a shape or form but poiesis is not the creation of an object. If an art object is presented then this object is the result of poiesis. All art is, in this light, post-poietic waste product. The interrelationship between shape and poiesis production into presence is problematic for a theory of modern creation. The Greek word for shape, morphe, was associated with idea and image, as well as appearance, all essential components of the presencing or bringing forward of poiesis. What does it mean that coming to presence takes a shape in poiesis? For a Greek audience au fait with the concept of Ideal Forms perhaps such a question might never be raised. It is simply too obvious. The Form of nature which is outside of space and time comes to human perception, it appears, in particular instances of form all of which are representations, examples or manifestations of Form as such, but none of which constitute Form as such. Form, therefore, while appearing in many forms, is irreducible to its forms. Hence the question of shape/form, morphe, was easily resolved by reference back, up or out to a set of Ideal Forms for comparison. Yet within the epoch of modernity shape is not something one can have any confidence in as an unquestionable presence. Within English, for example, the many varied definitions of the term shape might lead one to conclude the term “shape” is itself rather baggy, a tad shapeless. It can mean creation and/or form, outline, the created universe as such, imaginary or ghostly forms, an indistinct person or form, the outward appearance of something, to mould, and to frame. There is as much definition in the term relating to framing and indistinctness as to moulding and forming, perhaps indicating a slow dissolution of Greek ideas of Ideal form over time resulting in a


notable indistinctness surrounding the activity of formation. Spiralling out from this word are multiple possibilities that all indicate the problematic of taking on a Greek definition of poiesis without the concomitant intellectual architecture of a theory of Ideal Forms. If one believes in Forms then it is clear how poiesis can be said to produce presence through making without actually creating or making anything new in the world. The form one’s thing takes gives revelatory access to the Ideal Form which is at the root of the Being of all beings and this determines its shape. Yet without a sustained and secure theory of Form as the foundation or lit projection of formed shape as frame any modern theory of poiesis stutters to a degree however essential it is. How can production be the conferring of form onto a presence if the very conception of form undermines itself and thus provides nothing but a leaky container for the already slippery and dissolute matter of one’s making? If poiesis is making as such dependent on an idea of shape as truthful agreement with an already existent Ideal form, what is making for us today in a postFormal world?

The question casts us back to and indeed brings together two key issues in Agamben’s philosophy: poetry and potentiality. Summarizing Aristotle, Agamben delineates how every act of pro-duction into presence, natural or man-made, has the character of what is usually translated as actual reality defined in contrast to potentiality. Agamben then explains that actual reality is a rather poor translation in that Aristotle also employs the term entelechy in relation to actuality. While entelechy is usually reserved for the very process wherein potentiality comes to actuality, Agamben philologically opens up the definition of entelechy as follows: “That which enters into presence and remains in presence, gathering itself, in an end-directed way, into a shape in which it finds its fullness, its completeness; that which, then, έν τέλι έχι, possesses itself in its own end, has the character of ενέργεια . . . means being-at-work, since the work, έργον, is precisely entelechy . . .” (MWC, 64–5). In contrast to entelechyactuality, Aristotle defines potential as that which, not (yet) being at work, doesn’t “possess itself in its own shape as its own end” but is merely available (MWC, 65). If this is the case, work as a result of poiesis cannot be simply potential because “it is precisely production


into and station in a shape that possesses itself in its own end” (MWC, 65). Entelechy is the final element that allows us to recuperate poiesis as a term for creation. Poiesis is a work but, according to the passages just cited, it is also the result of work. Even so, apart from modern art it cannot actually be “at work.” Poiesis as creation is made up therefore of three elements. The first is potential, the availability-for of a material and a skill that, however, without techne, cannot come into actuality. The second is actuality, which is potentiality realized in the form of being-at-work. We must define this as not being continually at work, in process, never coming to an end, but that actuality is being at and in the form and station of a work. Thus work in which there is no being is not a real work and is represented by Agamben by the industrial object. In that all objects result from potential and end up in actuality, the third term in play here, entelechy, is that which differentiates making from creation-making. Agamben’s extended definition of entelechy is complex and remains without full development in his own work, presumably because the terms are all already in play in Aristotle, but it seems essential to fully understand poiesis that we spend some time explaining these issues. As becomes increasingly apparent, poiesis is the direct product of entelechy or that which negotiates between potential and actuality. Indeed poiesis is definable as the messianic formula: potential— (entelechy)—actuality.11 Entelechy determines something that both enters into and remains in presence. Thus entelechy must emanate from nonpresence and remain in a state of presence. The Heideggerian term “gathering” is instructive in this regard in that it suggests the nature of nonpresence as disseminated or dispersed and the coming to presence of poiesis as not so much the revelation of a form hiding in a substance but the attraction of things towards and composition around a substance. The way, for example, a jug attracts issues of containment, shoes in Van Gogh concepts of equipmentality, or a statue in the precinct of a Greek temple makes manifest an ideal of the gods. All this leads up to the crucial element of entelechy as that which allows a work to find absolute finitude. Being-at-work therefore means the total coincidence of being and form, the total realization of eidos that is, as Agamben says, both full and complete. Complete indeed because the moulded shape is replete with being. The shape of the work of art, then, is all important, as the only differentiation


between potentiality and actuality is that potentiality does not possess a shape. Entelechy is the process of shape-making and shapefilling forcing upon us an unusual sense of creation. Making or poiesis consists of marshalling the energy of presence as potential work into presence-at-work or actuality. This is not the making of anything as such. Rather poiesis makes an outline or contour for being. One must presume that until entelechy is complete, and Agamben gives no definite time for this as clearly entelechy does not take a period of time but takes one from the atemporal zone of Forms to the temporality of work via his own conception of messianic temporality, this contour is not yet shaped. Until the impossible point of completion it remains shape in potential, an elasticity of an already closed but not yet finished line. As being makes its way into this lasso of work it comes to simultaneously fill and make the shape. When being touches every point internal to the line then the work is complete, full, and finished. Here we see a shift away from the definition of the work of art as the total coincidence of form and theme as is often stated, to that of an elastic and tensile coincidence of form and shape. Agamben names this “content” allowing him to define the modern artist, after Musil, as the man without content or creator away from form; shaper of shape as such; instigator of a pocket or gap within the tensile balloon of the work. Like Ulrich, such an artist is brimming over with abilities, but has no actual quality or content as he cannot apply his qualities to any one task and convert his potential into actual, subjective value and identity.12 His potential remains shapeless in other words, lacking in entelechy.

Speaking of the period of aesthetic modernity Agamben notes that during our epoch the conception of the shaping of a unitary set of objects which do not come from nature but which possess finitude through agreement between shape and form has been split by the rise of modern technology and capitalism. With the infamous division of labour came also the division of making, leading to a differentiation or scission between things “that enter into presence according to the statute of aesthetics and those that arise purely by way of τέχυη [techne]” (MWC, 60–1). This downgrading of techne to mere making without poiesis promotes Agamben to reconsider poiesis in terms of


the modern doctrine of art being that which is original or authentic. He purports that within modern aesthetics any made thing that does not contain its own arche or origin within itself has been called original, the term meaning not so much unique but of proximity to an origin. During the modern period therefore: “The work of art is original because it maintains a particular relationship to its origin, to its formal άρχή, in the sense that it not only derives from the latter and conforms to it, but also remains in a relationship of permanent proximity to it” (MWC, 61). What this means in real terms is that poiesis refutes reproducibility through its claim to an originality that “maintains with its formal principle such a relation of proximity as excludes the possibility that its entry into presence may be in some way reproducible, almost as though the shape pro-duced itself into presence in the unrepeatable act of aesthetic creation” (MWC, 61). In other words, an original art work is pro-duced into the light from a proximate and preceding source. As soon as one reproduces the art work, one places it an extra remove from the source and indeed cancels out poiesis as pro-duction, for now it is re-pro-duction. And, for Agamben at least, that is not good at all. Agamben concludes that reproducibility is the essence of techne and originality the essence of the modern work of art. Yet, on the other hand, outside of Greek culture what does this modern quest for the origin actually consist of ? Agamben defines the arche as “the image, which governs and determines the entry into presence” (MWC, 61). In contrast, objects made simply according to techne do not have proximity to this image but rather the image preexists as an already pre-pro-duced mould with which the product must conform. Again, this issue depends on the presumption of an eidos or arche-image. In a transmissible culture, this eidos is the already existent content of any work of art that will be reproduced. In the Greek epoch of transmission, originality therefore is simply inconceivable in relation to creation. One does not create something new as in something novel but rather one creates a new body for an already existent idea which allows one to see this idea as if for the first time. Surprisingly, according to Agamben in the modern world, there is also no new work of art because there is no work or object that can be made that conforms both to the idea and the form of poiesis. Thus Agamben argues that originality totally destroyed the idea of the artist wherein “everything that in some way constituted the common space in which the personalities of different artists met

63–4) Modern art. With pop art the situation is reversed in that an art object is made utilizing techne then reproduced using industrial processes. they are. leaving poiesis as such as a place-holder of negation somewhere in between the two options: In both cases—except for the instant of the alienation effect—the passage from the one to the other status is impossible: that which is reproducible cannot become original. suspended in a kind of disquieting limbo between being and nonbeing. the only two movements available at present for modern acts of creation. yet at the same time it is a comment on its rampant reproducibility. The curtain is grasped but never raised. These hybrid forms of poiesis are not simply two movements in modern art. THINKING THROUGH MAKING in a living unity” (MWC. and that which is irreproducible cannot be reproduced. now the artist is defined as the person who makes things that don’t fit the mould but which break with moulding. is poiesis in suspension. Pop art is all form with no proximity to the concept. The object cannot attain presence and remains enveloped in shadow. is modern art’s first and most lasting poiesis: artistic desubjectivization or creative self-alienation. It is pure eidos for its form and shape are irrelevant. (MWC. Agamben demonstrates the paradox of modern originality brilliantly with reference to what he sees as the two most significant modern artistic investigations of the very presence of the art object. While in the past traditional values and lack of originality determined greatness as being proximate to the source of poiesis. On the one hand “Warrant” deals directly with the archepresence of the poem. Thus the artist brings to being the very end of the lasting concept of the artist as subject and this. Ideas held in common. The brilliance of Bernstein’s poem now becomes even more apparent in that he is able to demonstrate both situations in one single work. the ready-made and pop art. therefore. 62). became during our age simply the commonplace.POIESIS. With the ready-made an industrial object is alienated from its context and thus raised up into the sphere of art. for Agamben. testifying as it does to its singular originality. What need is there of a warrant if the work were not in danger of unwarranted reproducibility away from and damaging of the archepresence of the poem as such? The final brilliant twist being that 85 . in a sense.

If it comes to find a shape it must allow that form to succumb to the techne of modern reproducibility carrying it permanently away from its originary presence.” and thus there can be no reproduction of the work precisely because the warrant controlling this process is the work itself. Like most of his peers. categorical amnesia. to an epochal apostrophe: “how is it possible to attain a new poiesis in an original way?” (MWC. the question shifts from the Greek inheritance of creation as the coming to presence of a being to the issue of being and nonbeing within coming to being. in some fashion. within the dark defiles of modern art itself. which is perhaps why shape bears close proximity to indistinctness. meaning he accedes to the Greek world of Ideal Forms.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN arche-presence is undermined by there being no poem other than that indicated by the empty deixis of “this poem. Leading him. is problematized because it is bifurcated. as ever. If it remains proximate to arche-presence it can take on no physical form and instead has to parasitically occupy an already existent. unlike Plato and Aristotle. in contrast to the poet. in splitting poiesis. Modern art is either poiesis without techne or techne without poiesis. He is forced to take on the act of making as the transition from nonbeing into being and all that entails. As Agamben says in reference to his chosen examples. philosophical understanding of poiesis. and so on). The answer to this question must lodge. industrial form (urinals. the form in which privation itself comes into presence” (MWC. including the subjective nonbeing of the artist. While this is a lamentable state of affairs for a full. Agamben’s conception of creation depends on the Greek concept of poiesis. Furthermore. its taking shape. arche-mimesis. modern art works such as these “constitute the most alienated (and thus most extreme) form of poiesis. its becoming something. In modern aesthetic theory since Kant. he seems locked here into a set of almost impossible aporias. 64). wheels. he is writing in an age where the shape of the work. at the very least. 86 . The very shape of a work of modern art is permanently split. modernity has turned poiesis into a problem and thus made it visible for us after many centuries of easeful. 64). and eidos. Perhaps Agamben should have consulted with Bernstein for.

historically. Agamben is one of the most aggressive and suggestive critics of modernism that we have or ever will encounter. a time that is both out of time in that it is beyond everyday linear time. and then. Being. the very epoch of the epoch. potentially productive. Heidegger argues. The Homo Sacer project and the metaphysical considerations of works such as Language and Death construct critical theories of political and philosophical modernity that are proving impossible to ignore. he argues. nihilistic. modernity. and indeed one of Agamben’s aims is the bringing of modernity 87 . being is also profoundly historical in a deep destinal way he calls Geschichte. This duality of temporality as regards being is the basis of what one might call ontological temporality. and “out of time” in that it sounds the death knell of the metaphysical project and dispatches being into hiding for an indefinite period of time.CHAPTER 3 MODERNITY. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS Since Heidegger questions pertaining to being are traditionally posed through two temporalities. He too sees the temporality of human being as both immemorial ecstasy and contingent historicity and. Agamben’s work on time is indebted to but not uncritical of this model of ontological time. The coming to presence of being in aletheia or manifestation of truth as unveiling and bringing to light typical of poiesis is a type of sempiternal event. He calls this epoch. like his great forebear. is currently withheld from view in the modern age of instrumental technology because. This was not always the case and our dire situation will. he has a name for the coming together of the two elements of ontological time in a moment of crisis that is first. that is its destiny.1 Under pressure from such attacks modernity can barely be said to remain intact. at some juncture. change. Yet.

while modernity is a temporal epoch it demands a reconsideration of temporality in terms of ontological epochality that must replace a simple linear representation of modern time as moving towards the eschaton of completion. 5–6).” When called by ¯ ¯. This time that remains. Rather. That modernity allows us access to time as a remnant that will radically undermine the eschatological and chronological categories of modern time is both the tragedy of the modern and its lasting hope. But more relevant to debates on modernity is the way in which the call to 88 . LIVING AS IF OR AS NOT In the early pages of The Time That Remains (2000) Agamben considers the Pauline call to a Messianic vocation through a philological reconsideration of the term kle (call or vocation). 62–3). the issue of modern time is so central to Agamben’s work from his very earliest pronouncements to his most recent. indeed cannot abandon the dark and divided epochality of our modern age of aesthetic modernity. desubjectivization. and dictation.3 and his complex revision of historiography. il tempo che resta. temporality. Rather. along with his mid-career investigations of the gesturality and the pure mediality of thought as potential. Agamben will never allow a movement from temporal modernity to ontological or subjective modernity. The messianic kle emulates many elements of ¯sis Agamben’s earlier work on language. Agamben will not. some might call it fatalism. his is a project that reoccupies the nihilised spaces of modernity through a productive negation of modern categories with the aim of moving beyond the modern by dividing it from itself internally. which is a common representation of time within modernity (TTR. takes the form of a messianic contracted time of remnants (TTR.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN to a form of non-eschatological resolution. 23). and ending. or the condition of the hos me “as not. the messianic the subject is called out of its current position and then required to occupy the process of its desubjectivization as its new subjective existence. subjective modernization is the realization of the radical change in the conception of time followed by the occupation of that site of transmutation as the only time left to us on this earth. For this reason.2 Yet Agamben’s realism. In this way. This ¯sis call to vocation he defines as the “revocation of every vocation” (TTR. disallow him the simple act of finishing with the modern. for example deixis.

the archetypal example of living as if. This alerts Agamben’s interest. as Agamben shows.4 This.6 This then is a rare mention 89 . PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS negation is not conceived by Agamben as just another form of modern nihilism but something potentially productive. Rather. aesthetics. Finally. 35–40). therefore. but rather the now familiar suspension of actualization that exemplifies potentiality at its most powerful and creative. The “as not” is not negation as such.MODERNITY. rather than aspiring towards actual redemption. a number of thinkers of modernity have come to see “as if ” as the great failing of thought in the modern era expressly as regards its role in aestheticization (TTR. If “as not” is a negation of being that presages a positive coming of being to presence “after” negation (the messianic time that remains). which considers fiction. not least because he finds it hard to accept that Adorno advocates an aestheticization of thought after he famously designates aesthetic beauty as “a spell over spells.” typical of modern thought about aesthetics. to live “as if ” sounds initially like a creative potentiality for being. The phrases “as not” and “as if ” both play games with the idea of negation and creation. while messianic kle would seem to occupy a temporality of ending.5 This has no small importance for while Agamben regularly resorts to telling stories as an alternative philosophical method he rarely speaks of the fictive and narrative as such. however.” ending with Gaultier’s work Bovarysm. as an ontological condition. So when Agamben posits the “as not” as a positive alternative to what he calls the “as if. and the arts in the most unexpected places. has not been seen to be the case by the critical heritage.” All the same Agamben presents a full analysis of the twentieth-century tradition of thinking the “as if. The call does not negate subjectivity but calls subjectivity into presence through desubjectivity. 61–78). one can begin to see how messianic time can be of great utility to ideas about modern art. Agamben details a history of the philosophy of “as if ” which need not concern us except that it originates in a critique by Taubes of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory which Taubes believes advocates thinking through the despair of the modern age only as if it could be redeemed. the time that ¯sis remains within temporal contraction. This may seem less that auspicious terrain to seek out ideas pertaining either to literature or modernity but it is typical of Agamben’s work that one encounters comments about poetics. this is patently not the case as Agamben is at pains to demonstrate (TTR.

Yet. subjective agency value? In an age when god is dead. so to speak. Aesthetic beauty is the chastisement. so too fiction might be a credible category of thinking about being. he argues. This maudlin yet typically modern stance leads Agamben to conclude: “The fact of having missed the moment of its realization is what obliges philosophy to indefinitely contemplate the appearance of redemption. . thinkers of the “as if ” live on the earth as if they were gods. . ontology is reduced to pretending-to-be as a form of double ontological negation. This being man’s essence. and second. This ontological condition does not stand up to the test of modern ontological thinking perhaps. First. he must now really live in a world without God” (TTR. That is why aesthetic beauty cannot be anything more than a spell over spells” (TTR. of philosophy’s having missed its moment . What is the Will to Power as Art except turning as-if-ness into creative. in doing so one of course is pretending to be something other than what one is in that one is nothing.” Yet it is significant. All of these considerations return Agamben’s attention back to Adorno. specifically his contention that “philosophy lives on because the moment to realize it was missed” (cited in TTR. but we will come to see it as the specifically epochal manifestation of desubjectivization in general. at the same time this impotent turning to the aesthetic at the point of thought’s failure is more than acceptable to him as a definition of the modern era. bringing to mind Heidegger’s definition of poets as demi-gods. . 37).” in this instance “as not” rather than “as if. but pretends to be something. . According to his 90 . and Gaultier himself suggests that Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome nihilism was little more than an attempt to live the “as if ” of absent being through wilful and creative appropriation.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN of the possibility that just as poetry and linguistics can be seen to enter the field of ontology.” Such a subject “no longer has similitudes at his disposal . 37). 42). one pretends to be someone else because one is no one. Gaultier defines the essence of human being as believing one is different to whom one is.7 while it takes a truly brave thinker to live as one “who no longer knows the as if. Agamben is strongly critical of this stance rejecting immediately Adorno’s negative dialectics as typifying a defeatist “impotential” that is unable to find power in weakness that he feels the Pauline messianic tradition of potential excels in. Agamben’s consideration of “as if ” is a side issue in his attempt to present a credible messianic condition of living “as.

One lives as if one is a character in a great. living as such. proving destructive and nihilistic in each instance. aestheticization of politics. The most familiar is the “as if. is: How does one travel from “as if ” to “as not”? To do this. aestheticization of life. In each of these very modern formulations an assumed impropriety. one needs to traverse the problems of aestheticization and replace them with a radical poeticization. To get to a “new” poiesis. or so the argument of aestheticization goes.8 Nor can one live life itself for that has been reduced to horror and bareness. modern aesthetics has two potentialities available to it.” while seemingly creative and thus an act of poiesis. considering the failure of modern thought and the horrendous nature of modern history how else can one live except “as if ?” One cannot live the truth for the truth is nothingness. For not only does the spell over spells cast a false veil over thinking it also misrepresents the poetic as well. as indeed it does.” Aesthetics becomes. therefore. Thus one lives as if one lives. and this is what Agamben’s early tome The Man Without Content ventures as he makes the first of several attempts to negate negation. the State. If “as not” involves negation. The great question for modern thought. one first has to travel through the dread landscapes of aesthetic modernism. as if the philosophical pursuits of truth and happiness could be realized. to live the “as not” is far from being nihilistic. If “as if ” is a belated and blinded decadence. as if one has being. creativity. Yet. 91 . is added to the realm of the proper. the aesthetic. under the spell of living “as if. In contrast to this. the “as not” depicts an alternate futural moment of authentic being. turns out to be self-defeating both for thought and art. I would argue. a living through thought as if thought could still redeem itself but also accepting that we will always miss it if it does (a subtle swipe at Badiou perhaps?). therefore. it is itself the negation of modern negativity in the form of a messianic moment to come which is the true state of modern now-time. of art even. the empty violence of The Real. This as-if-ness requires that one ontologize the spell over spells that Agamben later says “may even aptly describe poetry” (TTR. thought.MODERNITY. The second option is to live “as not. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS reading.” Living “as if.” that dreaded term aestheticization: aestheticization of philosophy. The life of the “as if ” is the modern condition of the handing over of the failure of thinking to the debilitating yet distracting pleasures of the text. but potentially redeeming modern novel. tragic. 39).

due to two modern statements by the masters of modern thought. for modern life is replete with new and exciting experiences. what we miss is a common experience that the modern subject can undergo. Experience. What is lacking in modernity is not the element of testing. 15). In a post-transmission. indeed criticism is in essence all that modernity has become. and totally possess: “Thus experience is now definitively something one can only undergo but never have. one must 92 . In the closing pages of The Man Without Content Agamben turns. This consideration of the negation of experience in the modern is a development of what Agamben calls the end of the transmissibility of common values and experiences within our culture. the Nietzschean idea that god is dead.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN AURATIC TWILIGHT As we saw.9 The arrest of transmissibility is. an idea also taken from Benjamin. . reproductive age—note here how reproduction does not aid transmission of cultural value but eliminates it—what dictates the exact rate of the fading of a work’s aura? Does aura dim in direct proportion to the numerical potentiality of a work’s reproducibility. or the possibility of sustaining an experience. 38). The essays that make up this remarkable study then primarily investigate the implications of the thesis of the end of cultural transmission. specifically here highlighting a profound aporia in Benjamin’s work on the fading of the aura in modern art and culture. to the work of Walter Benjamin. and the Heideggerian adage that art no longer dwells among us.” (IH. test. a gradual decline that rapidly accelerates as the industrial process and consumer demand increases? Or would it be more accurate to state that a work is divested of its aura at the moment of its first reproduction. another way of expressing the end of experience in post-transmissible cultures. to go through and to test. perhaps an engraving commissioned at some expense from a Parisian atelier or a detailed description in a traveller’s journal first handed round by close friends then published and a runaway success? In other words. has two meanings for Agamben. . you will recall. as he so often does. Rather. he argues. in the debate presented in Infancy and History on experience Agamben is quick to agree with Benjamin that one of the preconditions of modernity is the negation of experience (IH. Experience is never accessible as a totality and never complete except in the infinite approximation of the total social process .

Duchamp questioning the authority of the creator. comments on aura.MODERNITY. (MWC. probably Benjamin’s most astute and generous reader. It becomes. like so many of the German thinker’s eclectic projects. becomes the very cipher of elusiveness. a consumer item rather than a work of art. Warhol the singularity of the work. Agamben asserts. . its technical reproducibility . every text. a urinal is signed into being singular and thus art. The more an art object is reproduced. The best comparison here is made by Agamben himself elsewhere in this volume when he places together the two key examples of modern art. seemingly. incomplete. This is to say: the work of art loses the authority and the guarantees it derived from belonging to a tradition for which it built the places and objects that incessantly weld past and present together. 106) It remains hard to tell if Agamben is glossing Benjamin here or totally dismissing his most influential theory. This problem is not lost on Agamben. states the opposite. in effect. perhaps the most central theory in the canon of cultural studies. besmirching them in the profanity of repetition and excess did not. one might presume. when he argues that Benjamin’s discovery of the loss of the auratic value of art is. Pop art instead takes the process of industrial reproduction and applies it to the art object. Not until a work is reproducible can the question of authenticity be raised for the first time by the distance introduced between original and copy by the industrial process. remove the aura from the work of art: Far from freeing the object from its authenticity. Both are. Properly speaking this is not at odds with Benjamin but is in accord with what Agamben defines as his great forbear’s messianic hermeneutic principle: “every work. by way of the multiplication of the original. As we saw the ready-made confers aura to an industrial object. The technical expertise that allowed for an industrial-scale reproducibility of art works thus removing from them their sacred quality. the ready-made and pop art. Benjamin argues. contains a historical 93 . Agamben. however. With each copy. it moves one more step away. . carries authenticity to extremes: technical reproducibility is the moment when authenticity. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS determine if the auratic twilight of the modern is a historical process taking place over time or an a-chronological event. the further away from the source of its authority it is carried.

as well as its only coming forth to full legibility at a determinate historical moment” (TTR. reproducibility along with communicability. and deface them (think of Magritte’s infamous vandalization of a reproduction of the Mona Lisa). the religious icon say. What Agamben cannily reveals in reading Benjamin’s ideas on art under the heading of his ideas on history is that reproducibility is meaningless unless thought of in tandem with transmissibility. occur together technically as the result of the same forces initially on these very islands from which I am transmitting my code to the world. does not inhere solely in the work’s unique singularity. both actual in terms of rail travel and virtual in terms of the mass media and new technologies such as the telegraph. 145). god is dead and an art no longer dwells among us. it also depends on the transmissibility of this quality (by transmissibility here read unquestioned status). If aura exists it only exists for us at the moment that we see it in accordance with Benjaminian hermeneutics. works of auratic art.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN index which indicates both its belonging to a determinate epoch. Indeed. The two great dicta of modern art’s destruction of tradition. that there is only one or that it has the quality of a magical relic. Myopically peering through the murk. Modernists have often been called iconoclasts but according to Agamben this is literally true in that they take religious relics. Reproducibility contributes to this malaise only by weakening the points wherein past and present meet. SHOCK! Reproducibility as mass phenomenon occurs simultaneous to the end of cultural transmissibility within Western societies in the form of the negation of common experience by the end of the nineteenth century. the lights lowered to dissuade further fading. blinding anti-poiesis. are both comments on cultural intransmissibility. we strain to see what is left of the concept of an authentic and singular work of art and in not being able to see authenticity it comes to view for the first time in a moment of tenebrous. an activity that 94 . The authenticity and authority of the icon. the defacement of the icon simply adds aura to it within a transitional culture of transmissible intransmissibility wherein the potentiality or perhaps simply desire for authenticity still exists. What Agamben realizes is that within the modern moment.

Baudelaire’s comments on modernity here. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS replaces the communal places of common art. is the missing element of Benjamin’s great theory of aura. Agamben realizes. the fleeting. Baudelaire was confronted with the very collapse of art as a means for the transmissibility of common cultural values and thus the end of art as it had been conceived through the whole of transmissible Western culture. modern experience. Baudelaire’s conception of shock. common experience. Baudelaire demonstrates the powerful forces at play in modernity’s embracing of reproducibility at the moment of intransmissibility by his creation of two impossible paradoxes. 106). The paradox of the eternal transient is the more well known and its oxymoronic nature obvious. The end of experience experienced as shocking is. in other words. Baudelaire was tasked with inventing a new source of authority for the art work. our new. what Baudelaire attempts is to take the very value that ends tradition.MODERNITY.” Baudelaire “fulfilled this task by making the very intransmissibility of culture a new value and putting the experience of shock at the center of his artistic labour” (MWC. with the famous Baudelaire lieu commun. Face to face with the dissolution of aura within a society where the authority of tradition was daily under attack. 106). In order to bring this mammoth prophylaxis/invention into play “the artist had to attempt to reproduce in his work that very destruction of transmissibility 95 . along with his rumination that the modern is “the transient. the contingent. As regards the proposal of shock as the “common place” of a post-transmissible culture however. In effect. Having to “invent a new authority. or commonplace wherein modern shock can become what we hold in common. At this juncture Agamben then begins to tinker ever so slightly with the terms in play when referring to the means by which Baudelaire saved art and created modernity. In both formulations. the lieu commun and the eternal transient. the ability of modern life and art to shock (for shock is the result of a happening for which a culture is not preprepared) and make shock the new locale of a common. Shock is defined here as the “jolt power acquired by things when they lose their transmissibility and their comprehensibility within a given cultural order” (MWC. it is the one half of art. the other being the eternal and the immutable.”10 easily confer upon him the honour of being the great precursor to contemporary reappraisals of modernity and aesthetics. temple or festival.

It becomes. The work of art must therefore cease to be an objectal work and become instead praxis or being at work whose materiality is reduced to the vehicular transportation of that which cannot be transported. that dissolves the finitude of the art object as a delimited and valued thing through its reproducibility and conversion into praxis. expunging. it forms the basis of the whole of the epoch of aesthetic modernity and modern aestheticization. in the final analysis. With the rise of reproducibility the work of art becomes severed from this community and ceases to transmit so that reproducibility is not the cause of the diminishment of aura but merely facilitates what is in fact the revelation. and this alienation is in its turn nothing other 96 . 106). The work becomes a moment of shock. in this light. in effect. The alienation experienced within art serves as nothing else but the dissolution of the borders of said work through the revelation of the finitude of the work at the moment of its collapse. absolutely and significantly finite. The new work of art. and relighting of aura’s eternal flame through the epochal hiatus between transmissibility and the transmission of a communal intransmissible experience of culture. must be defined as a process of transmitting the very quality of intransmissibility. This event alone produces what we now call modern art. Previous to the moment or epoch of shock there was in effect no “work of art” as art was environed seamlessly within the very culture it was able to transmit through time.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN that was at the origin of the experience of shock: in this way he would succeed in turning the work into the very vehicle of the intransmissible” (MWC. Art did not act as a vehicle for transmission. More than that. Attend here to the means by which Agamben repositions the meaning of the terms reproducibility and transmissibility. the alienation effected by the work of art. art was transmission. Instead of a work of art being a thing in itself whose reproduction undermines its sacral singularity effectively profaning the work. At the same moment it brings the work of art into contact with history for the very first time: “The survival of the past in the imponderable instant of aesthetic epiphany is. linking tradition with the present age. unrecognizable from the work of art which precedes it but at the same time it operates as the lens through which that work can be called art. Shock becomes not the collapse of meaning in art but the meaning of art as the collapse of meaning. reproduction is instead reserved for the praxis of the creator.

MODERNITY. Indeed one could go one step further here and propose that aesthetic modernity not only reveals tradition through negation but in fact invents it for the first time. Agamben’s contention here is that the work of art in space and time is experienced for the first time in the moment of shock at the realization that the work no longer exists in a time-space continuum but is expropriated from both. 97 . PROFANING SCISSION Both transmission and reproduction are dependent on metaphysical conceptions of scission and separation. In contrast. a recursiveprojective interplay that we will later come to term poetic structure. At this point. each in violent contradiction—art is defined as the singular instance of the held in common—are seen critically for the first time. temporal and spatial. of both the premodern and modern epochs of transmissibility and intransmissibility respectively. Transmissibility. effectively eradicates separation. turning back to gaze over one’s fleeing shoulder. singularity and transmissibility. Thus the end of art is a recursive glance back to the transmission of art through time that only comes into full view at the moment of its cessation. of tradition” (MWC. retrospectively. 107). ¯. creating a continuum between tradition and the present that all but eradicates their difference. It would seem alienating shock is not the legacy of modern art but of self-satisfied traditional values. When the transmissible act of making something singular comes to replace the singularity of the work of transmissibility one is both exiting art and seeing it for the first time as art. it fulfils the double meaning of epoch to be found in its etymology: epoche a point in time and a delimited period of time. This experience of aesthetic epoche ¯ is Agamben’s definition of that epoch of epochs we call modernity. The “now” ceases to be a moment in time but rather is the endless extension of tradition into the future. that is. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS that the measure of the destruction of its transmissibility. for example. Aesthetic modernity is the point in time when the epoch of the modern period of art is seen for the first time through its retrospective revelation via negation of the epoch of transmissibility which precedes it. Epoch of epochs for. occupying both the position of an event of major transition and the creation. the arche-epoch of art’s very first coming into being or the conditions for art.


reproducibility removes the art object from its original authenticity establishing an impossible to traverse abyss between the idea of authenticity as origin and the work itself as literally present. Reproducibility, therefore, introduces an intransmissible space between poiesis and praxis working effectively as the destructive locum for anti-entelechy. Reproducibility is necessary for intransmissibility as such or the making permanently profane the sacred work which is the genius of modern art and its most valuable anti-poietic legacy. Yet, as we now know separation within Agamben is never straightforward and always to be questioned. In the essay “In Praise of Profanation,” for example, Agamben boldly declares that religion can be defined as “that which removes things, places, animals, or people from common use and transfers them to a separate sphere. Not only is there no religion without separation, but every separation also contains or preserves within itself a genuinely religious core” (Prof, 74). While Agamben, reading the founders of modern anthropology, defines the sacred as this passage across the zone of separation, he concedes that the differentiation profane/sacred is less important than “the caesura that divides the two spheres, the threshold that the victim must cross . . .” (Prof, 74). One of the simplest forms of such a crossing is contagion, he notes, the transmission of a disease that threatens to reproduce out of control. The “contagious” nature of separation, whose etymology is to be found in the word contact, allows us to understand the very roots of our transmissible culture in religion. Later, in the same essay Agamben is again reading a Benjamin fragment, this time “Capitalism as Religion,” wherein he finds Benjamin’s suggestion that capitalism appropriates the separating ability that defines religion and generalizes it in all domains: Where sacrifice once marked the passage from the profane to the sacred and from the sacred to the profane, there is now a single, multiform, ceaseless process of separation that assails every thing, every place, every human activity in order to divide it from itself . . . In its extreme form, the capitalist religion realizes the pure form of separation, to the point that there is nothing left to separate. An absolute profanation without remainder . . . (Prof, 81)11 This is naturally a description of commodity culture or the paradox of the separation of separation where the object becomes so profaned that it becomes impossible to profane as separation as such


is negated.12 In such a culture all objects are equally transmissible and therefore, in theory, equally sacred resulting in a sacralization of the profane. The consumer object is transmission’s evil doppelganger wherein the object no longer operates within transmissible, historically located cultural values, but instead all values become ahistorical products of the object defined purely as transmissible or exchangeable.

In an age of artistic singularity and transmissibility, which is not an age per se but the precursor to the age of art as art, taste and terror are not qualities that the spectator ought to admit to. Inclination and repulsion, although naturally qualities that are unavoidable when observing any phenomenon, could not, during the time of tradition, be admitted into the role of the spectator of particular art works. Certainly, one could love art and one could fear it, especially from the position of actual or aspirational sovereignty such as one finds in Plato, but always as a whole or single entity. Judging art in totality was possible and common in the form of censorship for example, however such sovereign decrees would not depend on personal inclination on what we call today taste. One could not, in a truly transmissible culture, judge a work of art or even perhaps identify it. Art would be, during such an age, extensible with culture as a whole and culture synonymous with the polis. To judge art as bad would be to judge bios as bad. Only a sovereign can do that. Like Nancy, I am uncertain if a totally transmissible culture is anything more than the nostalgic yearning of certain poets and philosophers.13 Yet, irrespective of whether a truly and totally transmissible culture ever existed without remainder, the transmissibility of art was an assumed characteristic up until the moment that the nexus between tradition and the present came under critical consideration in France in the eighteenth century with the debate between the ancients and the moderns. Kant’s third critique on judgement, of course, along with Hegel’s assertion that in the modern period art was at an end, contributed to the development of the category of taste which enters into common usage in English round about the eighteenth century. Agamben however traces its origins back to the middle of the previous century with the rise of the figure of the man of taste who was reputed to have a sixth sense for art which allowed


him to identify the “point de perfection that is characteristic of every work of art” (MWC, 13). As taste develops as a concept Agamben notes how the roles of and relationship between the artist and spectator change accordingly: As the idea of taste increases in precision . . . the work of art (at least so long as it is not finished) starts to be regarded as the exclusive competence of the artist, whose creative imagination tolerates neither limits nor impositions. The non-artist, however, can only spectare, that is, transform himself into a less and less necessary and more and more passive partner, for whom the work of art is merely an occasion to practice his good taste. (MWC, 15) The resultant downgrading of the role of spectator in relation to transmissible art cultures is more than apparent here. From active participant in communal culture, of the same subjective value effectively as the artist, the spectator now becomes the one who sees, gazes, gawps from a distance and then, at the end, passes judgement. I like it/I don’t like it. In contrast, the artist’s role becomes far more pronounced for art made by such a creator cannot in effect be judged it being the very dismissal of all such strictures. It comes into being much as a Kantian flower might, and can no more be judged than a flower can or its creator, god. Finally, the relation between the creator and the spectator is now one of irrevocable disjunction. They are not participants in communal culture but two entirely different subjects in relation to a new, alien form. The artist invents so as to live, to attain subjectivity of a kind. The spectator merely observes with the aim of practising or perhaps better honing their new sixth sense: taste. While the rise of taste seems to provide the creator with a god-like power which Nietzsche comes to formulate as the Will to Power as Art, like all humans who attempt to emulate the gods the results are fearful and dangerous: “The artist, faced with a spectator who becomes more similar to an evanescent ghost the more refined his taste becomes, moves in an increasingly free and rarefied atmosphere and begins the voyage that will take him from the live tissue of society to the hyperborean no-man’s-land of aesthetics . . .” (MWC, 16). Taste and invention then seem to be bound together tragically by a rule of inverse proportions: “For, while the balanced figure of the man of taste becomes wide-spread in European society, the artist


enters a dimension of imbalance and eccentricity” (MWC, 16). The critic, in other words, becomes a stabilized subject by his increasingly professionalized and technically refined inclinations. The poet is gripped by holy terror. While the spectator becomes spectral through a process of endless refinement, his corporeal presence is literally attenuated into a tissue-thin membrane of exquisite judgements, it is the freedom afforded to the artist by the rise of judgement over mutuality that really opens up an uncanny landscape of diaphanous presences and gloomy open plains. The origins of this differentiation lie, according to Agamben, initially with Plato and then more recently with Nietzsche. Indeed, while we may assume that the fear of art is a contemporary issue manifested in people’s suspicious dismissal of art not as bad or even not art but as rubbish, the Greeks too felt the terror of art. The Man Without Content begins with a large tranche of Genealogy of Morals wherein Nietzsche makes his famous attack on the conception of Kantian disinterestedness before making his own case for an interested art. After this greedy bite of Nietzsche, Agamben goes on to note that Nietzsche’s attack on disinterestedness was not designed to bring about an alternative aesthetics but to purify the concept of beauty by decanting it from the sensory involvement of the spectator, so as to serve it up entirely to the pleasure of the creator. In a prophesy of modern art which Agamben goes on to debate throughout the rest of the essays in the book, modern art comes to be defined in terms of the experience of creation rather than the sensible apprehension of the spectator, as had been the case for Kant and Hegel of course. Art becomes, at this point, invention; art becomes modernism; art becomes shock. As ever with Nietzsche this is all very thrilling but there were good reasons for an ideology of aesthetic disinterestedness.14 As Agamben notes, there is a long history of repulsion as regards the rich dish of an interested and interesting art from the decree to raze the Roman theatres, the attacks of Saint Augustine on scenic games, to what Agamben calls “the first time that something similar to an autonomous examination of the aesthetic phenomenon in European medieval society” (MWC, 3) occurred (it was primarily concerned with the dangers of ars nova distracting the laity). Agamben goes further noting the infamous section of Plato’s Republic and Sophocles’ Antigone as contributors to a decidedly Greek fear/awe of art as a form of profound and politically threatening interest.


An art of interest is, primarily, an art of involvement, complicity, often an art of seduction. The distance of the spectator is devoured by the interest they share in the performance in front of them. They are no longer spectators but participants in the very act of pure creation. Possessed by art’s contagion they begin to live as if they were heroes, queens, gods, and monsters. While some remnant of the Greek idea of an art of interest remains in such concepts as, say, catharsis, which is the archetype of an interested experience of art, and modern debates on censorship, it is perhaps hard for us to conceive of a work by John Ashbery as capable of the literal magic, as Artaud expresses it, of an interested art. The term Plato uses to describe the inspired imagination is “divine terror” (MWC, 4), and Agamben concedes this is a rather tasteless overplaying of the effects of art on the modern spectator. That said, returning to Nietzsche and the various exponents of an interested art, terror was very much on the minds of the modern artist. Fatuous explanations for the prevalence of early death, tragedy, suicide, murder, madness, and renunciation among artists usually look to modern psychological models of manic depression and perhaps a disturbed childhood for good measure. Lautréamont, Woolf, Baudelaire, Proust, Mayakovsky, Khlebnikov, Eliot, Pound; why did they lose their life, their health, their socialization, their minds? Agamben’s insight into the madness of modern art takes up an entirely different, unexpected and, for our understanding of the arts, profound recipe than that of simple psychology. At the same time as, in modern aesthetics, the spectator is able place art at one remove by virtue of disinterest: “For the one who creates it, art becomes an increasingly uncanny experience, with respect to which speaking of interest is at the very least a euphemism, because what is at stake seems to be not in any way the production of a beautiful work but instead the life and death of the author, or at least his spiritual health” (MWC, 5). This statement results in another equation wherein the increasing innocence of the spectator’s experience in front of the art work corresponds to the degree of danger central to the creator’s experience. Agamben backs this up with many now well-known expressions of the risk of art— Baudelaire, Hölderlin, Van Gogh, Rilke—suggesting an alternative messianism in his work, that of the self-sacrifice of the modern artist at the altar of an interested anti-aesthetics of creation as subjective state.

not least literary criticism. pit man against Terror?” (MWC. Such mad artists do not want to move to a fresh plain. an art for artists. museums. commissions. 7). whistling about our ears. In this once rich land of cultural transmissibility a mismanagement of the environment has lead to barrenness and conflagrations on hill-sides once renowned for their fertility and festivals. how can modern art subsist on the ambiguous fare of taste based on universal disinterest.16 a nihilistic art that seeks not so much innovation as is sometimes assumed (make it new).15 but also easily identified in the statements of the artists themselves. Nietzsche. or perhaps more pungently. then perhaps we are today in a privileged position to understand the authentic significance of the Western aesthetic project” (MWC. . lay out foundations. and artistic scandals. for artists only” (MWC. with a senate. to return art to life. but a devastation of the distanciation between art and life imposed by the presence of the spectator and the institutions that have arisen to support this concept. Here Agamben merely hints at the now classic definition of the avant-garde to be found in the work of Burger and others. a destruction perhaps already in place: “If it is true that the fundamental problem becomes visible only in the house ravaged by fire. Yes. statuary. calling for “another kind of art . HOW TO EXIT ART “How can art. Having taken us across a ghostly plain we are now confronted with a burnt-out homestead. . and terror which is the result of interest? Taste seems to attract the spectator to participate in precisely 103 . but not so as to make art transmissible in life again but rather to make life subject to the very alienation the artist feels when faced with the uncanny presence of pure poiesis. These artists wish to make artists of us all. The landscapes of Agamben’s thinking are always appealing and slightly appalling.MODERNITY. The essay then ends by jettisoning us out onto this calcified outcrop with the words of a mad prophet. 8) the philosopher asks. 6). This instigates a movement from the misty nostalgia of a Heideggerian art that dwells among us to a truly modern conception of art that immolates its very dwelling on this earth. and build a new home that perhaps over time could become a city. this most innocent of occupations. Rather they want to burn the very dwelling of art to the ground. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS The death of poets leads Agamben to a typically messianic conclusion which calls for the destruction of aesthetics.

rhetoricians and terrorists. 9).” Yet in reality the woman he has painted is reduced to mere colours and abstract forms: “a chaos of colors. through a reading of the character of the artist Frenhofer in Balzac’s The Unknown Masterpiece that the dream of the terrorist is to create a work that exists in the world in the same manner as objects do: block of stone or drop of water. a “living reality. while terrorists “refuse to bend to this law and pursue the opposite dream of a language that would be nothing but meaning. a kind of shapeless fog” leading the young Poussin to exclaim “but sooner or later he will have to realize there is nothing on the canvas!” (MWC. the distinction is clearly reflective of a tendency within modern Western (anti)aesthetics or at the very least the two extremes of that most extreme epoch aesthetic modernity. In direct contradistinction. silence. As Agamben rightly indicates. “It is the dream of a product that exists according to the statute of the thing” (MWC. allows Agamben to begin to undermine not only the quest for the absolute in terror. of a thought in whose flame the sign would be fully consumed. Agamben calls the terrorist a misologist. the artist is allowed to be totally consumed by the desire to create and yet this same desire leads to the pure intoxicating terror of madness. The rhetorician wishes to “dissolve all meaning into form” (MWC. like the Pygmalion myth. Loath as I am to succumb to the simple binary oppositions displayed in this. Agamben traces the relation between poiesis and terror to the distinction to be found in the mid-century French writer and critic Jean Paulhan between two types of writers. putting the writer face to face with the absolute” (MWC. 8). in trying to create art that competes with. His is an art of abstraction which repulses 104 . and death. 9). an art which exits art through the door marked “To Art.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN what they cannot have. of course. Frenhofer labours at his masterpiece for ten years to create a work of art that negates art and becomes.” Frenhofer invents a modern art. but also to commence with breaking down the differentiation between rhetoric and terrorism. Agamben’s earliest work. a kind of aesthetic wine-tasting where they can sample Picasso but cannot become drunk on Joyce. indeed becomes transmissible with life. hesitating nuances. 9). This remainder. tones. He notes. who “does not recognize in the drop of water that remains on his fingertips the sea in which he thought he had immersed himself ” (MWC. an art which is auto-anthropophaganous or self-devouring. the dark face of his own beloved philology. kitsch. 8).

isn’t the unknown masterpiece instead the masterpiece of Rhetoric? Has the meaning erased the sign. Speaking of Frenhofer’s ever-collapsing. unpalatable masterpiece he says: “The quest for absolute meaning has devoured all meaning. Returning to Rimbaud for a moment. in the very apotropaic hall of mirrors that is modern art. and Duchamp’s silence. The terrorist is left. 10). But in the attempt. to survive. and the appetite for signs becomes a cause of disgust. allowing only signs. Such confusion over the source of the conflagration of art’s dwelling place. But. agitated and enflamed. “In order to leave the evanescent world of forms. a mere representation of the artist in art). 10). Gogol’s disappointment that Dead Souls did not liberate the peasants is matched by Mallarmé’s inability to complete Le Livre. or thought leads Agamben to posit the very paradox of the artist’s terror. which is the archetypal gesture of the modern artist: “But the paradox of the Terror is still present even in this extreme move. Fleeing from rhetoric leads him to terror. meaningless forms. between ‘the poems that he wrote and those he did not deign to write?’” Agamben then 105 . convert poiesis into fiat lux.” (MWC. Yet. namely. the repulsion from signs becomes an impossible attraction. or has the sign abolished the meaning?” (MWC. Rimbaud’s flight from art.MODERNITY. he ends up with nothing in his hands but signs . the ultimate paradox is that the act of greatest terror is precisely that of aestheticoamputation. De Chirico’s self-parody. the more he has to concentrate on it to render it permeable to the inexpressible content he wants to express. There are many famous examples of terrorism in modern art. as Blanchot rightly observed. To truly exit literature one cannot make literature into a thing. silence? Isn’t Rimbaud’s fame divided. form. rhetoric and terror. Instead one can only escape the matter of art by removing it from oneself entirely. set up by aesthetics. Agamben mentions Mallarmé’s statement that the only gesture available to this terrorist of poetry was to have poetry surgically removed from himself while he was alive. he has no other means than form itself. . Roussel’s collapse when La Doublure did not change the world. and the more he wants to erase it. Agamben’s conclusion to the tale is a devastating and much overdue total foundering of the differentiation between form and thought. . Misology becomes philology. For what is the mystery we call Rimbaud if not the point where literature annexes its opposite. then. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS the disinterested spectre of Poussin (literally spectral here. terror flings him back into rhetoric.

over time. ignored by his “friend” Brod. This is the ultimate desubjectivization of the poet.17 does not the material depiction of silence. There is no resisting dictation in the modern age. destroyed but. Rimbaud and Duchamp do not merely make and then choose not to make. Consider the gesture we call author-function Rimbaud and Duchamp against those we call Malevich or Beckett. I mention this rhetorical flourish because it touches on the importance of the potential not to write that is the heart of the act of poiesis. His decision to have all his works destroyed at his death.” As soon as one speaks of the creation of art one enters subjective negation. the final version of Le Livre. surely. at the very nexus between the terrorist become rhetorician and the rhetorician facing up to the terror of the absolute void. Even silence succumbs to speech it would seem. for what else have we been debating here? Not the loss of being through the semiotic necessity of its enunciation but through the enunciative necessity of the semiotic.18 He sits. but surely the greatest works of modernism are those which were never created: Lautréamont’s third book. most potently. becoming even kitsch? To paint absence is one thing. 11). never made. Which is the greatest artist. Will there ever be an end to art that is itself not a work of art but a pure experience of the poetic? 106 . risk accusations of the obvious. This is why Kafka casts such a shadow over Agamben’s work and the modern age as a whole. manifest the very condition of acsesis as both testament to the lack of events and precursive preparation for the event to come. decomposed. the most eloquent rhetorician? Who has the most fiendish savour for violence and fear? While Malevich and (late) Beckett. In their choice not to make they make their greatest masterpieces: the pure rhetoric of the semiotics of the absent sign which is the sign under which all modern art is composed. makes him the most pathetic and powerful of all modern artists: the man who sought silence and was thus then forced to speak. as Badiou shows.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN finally and fatally enquires: “isn’t this the masterpiece of rhetoric?” (MWC. Bruno Schultz’s first novel. As soon as one actively pursues the negation of art one creates anew an art of negation as such. Nietzsche’s Will to Power? What confers true genius on the modern artist is the very failure of terror in the pure silence of an absolute and thus truly terrifying rhetoric: the work of pure silence. The way out of art into language is permanently barred by the very sign that indicates “Exit from Art.

at each level of Hegelian aesthetics modern art is denigrated. These are that art is the sensible presentation of the idea. and negation. to accept its tripartite collapse or to turn these failings around and form from them a new lieu commun.19 and that this age is marked by its being the epoch of the end of art. Second it is a mere prosaic remnant of the poetic art that once dwelled among us. the prosaic. Enlightenment democracy. the power of art over the spectator collapsed into profane secularization only to rise again in the form of shock rather than awe. courtesy of philosophy. This means that. art. aesthetic double-desubjectivization which may be the only means by which art under negation during modernity might result in some form of pro-ductive poiesis after modernity. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS MODERN AESTHETIC DESUBJECTIVIZATION The Man Without Content is effectively a conversation between Agamben and the three fathers of modern aesthetics: Kant. A choice lies before modern poiesis therefore. The modern art work becomes a means of presenting that there was once art but now such work is at an end. through four central tenets to Hegel’s overall aesthetic theory. First it is subordinate to the idea. poiesis arrives. As Agamben shows in an extensive analysis of the history of the development of the museum from the ancient cabinet of wonder. As we have seen at some point or over time in Western culture. at the presentation of its own dissolution: the collapse of poetry into prose. Hegel’s work is perhaps most central to Agamben’s reading of art under negation. democratic. at the moment that poiesis becomes available for full view to us for the first time since the Platonic occlusion. Kant’s theory of aesthetic disinterested judgement and Nietzsche’s conception of an interested art emanating from a god-like creator bracket the work of Hegel together forming a theory of modern. that we currently live in the age of prose. as it were. Third its critical definition is also its negation. For Hegel modern art is a valorization of the sensible presentation of the idea.20 The final element here is of greatest importance to aesthetic desubjectivization but this thesis makes little sense without all four elements of Hegelian proto-post-aesthetics.MODERNITY. or an art that celebrates subordination. and Nietzsche. Hegel. It arrives precisely at the moment that prose as bios or social ethics has inundated all during the period of Western. once the space of 107 . that poetry is the archetypal art in that it exists between language (the sensible) and image (idea). As one can see.

Previous to that she had no direct selfconsciousness of material or making. the poem. prosaic objectivity goes to one side. The definition of modern art at the point of its cessation in Hegel comes from the moment when the material of the work of art is seen by the artist as material as such and as art as such. That Hegel placed art at the lowest level of the journey of the spirit from exteriority. any content. substantially. At this moment works of modern art are produced through the profanation of the relic into an art object already suffering auratic aphasia. and to the other the free subjectivity of the artistic principle. as it were. In a very basic way this idealized act of creation was neither making something nor creating art as we moderns understand these terms. This is the very essence of art as transmissibility. autonomous. is revelatory in this regard. contagiously through the art work. or when the creator becomes critical spectator of their own work. 35) Contained in the vaunting rhetoric here of Agamben’s reading of Hegel are the various stages of his complex ideas on poetry and 108 . At the moment that the creator steps out of the transmissibility of cultural traditions her relation to her material changes. Art is now the absolute freedom that seeks its end and its foundation in itself.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN display of a valued object changes and the object is placed under glass the relation of the spectator to the object also changes. (MWC. For Hegel this scission within the subjectivity of the spectator is first enacted within that of the creator and transmitted. because it can only measure itself against the vertigo caused by its own abyss. At this moment the work of poiesis enters the world of prose: The artist then experiences a radical tearing or split. Art got one ready for god who in his turn prepared one for Geist. by which the inert world of contents in their indifferent. religion. secular shock. rather the subject-artist simply presented in sensible form the idea of her communally held spirit within an exterior form as a necessary step towards a final interiorization. and does not need.21 They no longer pause in front of the object in religious awe but are as if rooted to the spot or transfixed by pure. which soars above the contents as over an immense repository of materials that it can evoke or reject at will. through exterior interiority. All of her acts were the result of her consciousness so that when she made something she made herself as a subject within a unified culture.

confounding common denominator. Central to the definitions of the object of aesthetic judgement as disinterested satisfaction. namely that of Kant. 42). . universality apart from concepts. Modern art. or the moment at which the artist becomes her own spectator or the spectator becomes the judge of art. is thus definable by a conglomeration of the following quasi-events. Incommensurability: the much touted incommensurability of postmodernity hounded by Habermas in particular23 is surely simply an overstatement of the spatio-philosophical paradox of sublating negation that Agamben sets up here through his reading of Hegel. it holds in its hands not the beautiful but its shadow. floating in the sense that it both soars above and is endlessly falling away. that every time aesthetic judgement attempts to determine what the beautiful is. At this point perhaps the greatest paradox of modern art comes into view as we float or plunge above the void of self-founding self-negation.MODERNITY. Agamben then turns to the very aesthetic system from which Hegel’s work emanates but also seeks to depart from. This shadow of art is the modern experience of 109 . purposiveness without purpose. Materiality: the work becomes a commodity fetish or non-utilitarian choice of the object purely for the sake of exchange. The work of art is moved from being encased in a continuum to floating within the void. and normality without a norm “it seems . Art is no longer measurable against culture as either being of the same standard or co-extensive. which is art as such defined by Agamben as art under erasure. Having set up Hegelian aesthetics as permanently under negation. Height: the subjectivity of the artist is now defined as that of being above the territory of art’s dwelling on earth.22 Contentless-ness: what the work of art now contains as content is the work of art as such. the only measure of art on earth is art itself. Freedom: defined here in a Nancyian manner as a nonfoundational self-founding. Summarizing the four characteristics of aesthetic judgement as Kant delineates them he finds a single. as though its true object were not so much what art is but what it is not” (MWC. Scission: art is no longer defined through its place in the continuum but through its being excerpted from the continuum. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS modern art. Art becomes incommensurable in the moment that measuring art becomes possible through the Kantian discipline of criticism. Prose: at this juncture the meaning of the work becomes subject to the prose of the world. so that the semantic is handed over to prose and meaning becomes the absence of meaning. Therefore. .

. Considering Kant’s famous paradox that the judgement of taste is not based on concepts as it could be subject to proofs and yet that it must be based on concepts otherwise we would not quarrel about it (it would not in fact be taste). put simply. from which . The moment that we engage the faculty of judgement we are negating the very object we are judging. This led to a widespread acceptance of the term judgement as finding the universal in the particular based on the regulative idea of the finality of nature. therefore. or as Lyotard says: “The strength of reflective weakness can be explained by the heuristic function of reflection. In Lyotard’s remarkably detailed reading of the third critique he begins by telling the traditional story of Kant’s theory of judgement as the bridge between theoretical and practical knowledge. 44). 43). the only experience of art and also the first experience of art as a thing in itself. or of discovering natural beauty defined as finality without purpose (objective perfection without teleology). Agamben. which is the indication to thought that it is taking place. The tautegorical nature of reflective judgement is to be found in the relation of judgement to the sensation which.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN inexperiencible art which is. so to speak. The act of judgement produces the feeling of the activity of judgement. is that judgement is the affect of the sensation of thinking. This reading undermines the assumed legislative power of judgement and leaves it instead as a reflective faculty whose strength resides precisely in its legislative debilitation: because judgement cannot legislate it can supplement the contesting legislations. . for us. Reflective thinking 110 . . He thus concludes that “our appreciation of art begins necessarily with the forgetting of art” (MWC. . presents a critical synthesis of Kant and Hegel here to provide a model for creation (Hegel) and judgement (Kant) that is based on the commencement of the art object from the moment of its selfnegation. the tautegorical aesthetic shares in the weakness of this strength” (LAS. nothing can be known” (MWC. which is the quintessence of taste. of understanding and reason. Agamben then moves to Kant’s dictum that judgement is “a concept . In finding the universal in the particular. judgement merely operates between practical reason and understanding which is judgement’s famous heuristic capacity. 6). We can recognize in this concentration by Agamben on the paradox of judgement as a non-knowing concept parallels with Lyotard’s reading of reflective judgement as tautegorical.

not on thinking something.MODERNITY. Yet while judgement seems almost to blame for the end of art thesis. the content he perceives. In contrast. Judgments of taste are based. the scission between genius and taste which defines aesthetic judgement and gives birth to modern criticism. therefore. appears to him no longer as a truth that finds its necessary expression in the work. The very self-presence of the spectator is the pre-condition of the work of 111 . 47). that is. . “one can never return to it from a state posterior to its creation”.’ But this state is nothing other than the feeling that signals it . Having established this fundamental quality of the tautegorical nature of critical judgement Agamben then differentiates judgements of taste from those of natural beauty in Kant. it is in fact the content-less nature of the modern work of art that results in perhaps the ultimate. namely. concepts that could be known. The person whose job it is to shed light on modern art. At this juncture. we do need a concept of what the work of artistic beauty should be “because the foundation of the work of art is something other than us. . Natural beauty does not require a regulative concept. Pure reflection is first and foremost the ability of thought to be immediately informed of its state by this state and without other means of measure than feeling itself ” (LAS. 46). most powerful irony of modern aesthetics wherein the critic sees in the work of art the very contentless-ness that defines the subjectivity of the modern man without content. thought’s thinking of itself as thinking through sensation: “Any act of thinking is thus accompanied by a feeling that signals to thought its ‘state. the spectator-critic. Agamben identifies the central point of his thesis on modern art. he brings with him nonbeing and shadow” (MWC. “What he sees of himself in the work. or “once the work of art has been produced. This scission submits all art to the law of the “degradation of artistic energy” which states that once one has passed judgement on a work of art. 11). 46). is the very person who commits art to the realm of dark non-art: “whenever he exercises his reflection. there is no way to return to it by way of the reverse path of taste” (MWC. but on the sensation of thinking thinking. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS is. indeed for Kant nature is the regulative concept for aesthetic beauty—the very thing Hegel takes issue with. the free creative-formal principle of the artist” (MWC. therefore. but rather as something of which he is already perfectly aware as a thinking subject. and which therefore he can legitimately believe himself capable of expressing” (MWC. 45).

The subject of judgement finds itself both subject and predicate of their judgement. it belongs with them. What they see in the work of art is what they already know. the critic cannot. Yet. it is the pure split and lack of foundation that endlessly drifts on the ocean of form without ever reaching dry land” (MWC. but the critic does not make modern art placing them/us in a doubly untenable position. The critic identifies her being in the alienation of the work which rejects or. he has no other way of finding himself again than wholly to assume his contradiction. the critic knows all. The presence of the critic makes possible modern art. but there is one simple fact separating the two. existing in both positions without any means of bringing the two together again. to use Hegel’s term. at the same time the spectator is by definition not the artist. The pure creative principle results in the alienation of art and the critic not only recognizes this theme-less theme. leaves behind all support. and agrees to enter the circle of absolute perversion. 48). perverts any relationship between the genius of creation and the communality of culture. but as something absolutely Other. The genius makes art. being-for-itself has as its object its own being-for-itself. The annihilation of content may be familiar. Thus the alienation of art is their subject. Agamben’s explanation of this double negation. they are of course part of what makes it possible. but the critic cannot share in it. he must split 112 . and at the same time immediately as itself. is the very basis of his theory of the potentially productive nature of the historically contingent. What we can conclude from aesthetic modern contentlessness is that the moment the spectator and the artist become two separate entities (the archetypal event of modern aesthetic metaphysical scission) ironically the artist no longer has anything new to say to the spectator for the spectator was party to the very scission that facilitated the shift from art to nonart that the artist thought they had created ex nihilo. and yet what they know is what they can never be. as Agamben says both absolutely Other and immediately itself. There is nothing the artist can teach the spectator. desubjectivized being of the critic/spectator : If the spectator consents to the radical alienation of this experience. being-as-nonnart but not being art. That is.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN art without content. The result of this on all of us is devastating: “In the aesthetic judgement.

Which annihilates and dissolves every content in its continuous effort to transcend and actualize itself. “outside of this split. . and Agamben here names Rimbaud and Artaud as exemplary in this regard. however. . negate his own negation . . (MWC. Nietzschean genius he says: What the artist experiences in the work of art is. can attempt to totally inhabit the split and try to live this violence. (MWC. for which all subject matter is indifferent. 55). 54). Yet here Agamben takes on critical desubjectivization and proposes at least a desire to convert ontological negation into a productive category. the pure creative-formal principle. for Agamben at least. Yet even if one chooses to live the split. if she then embraces pure subjectivity and ceases to seek for content she finds herself embracing her subjective inessence: “content in what is mere form” (MWC. Of the creative. PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS asunder his own split. there is no escaping the fact that. Yet. . is the absolute abstract inessence. and in owning himself he alienates himself. Thus the modern artistic subject can be defined as a radical split. In this alienation he owns himself. to live the epoch or to live outside of it. everything is a lie” (MWC. If she places her faith in a specific content she realizes she is lying as her own pure subjectivity is everything. Hence Agamben’s conclusion: “The artist is the 113 . 54). Having dealt with one half of modern aesthetic desubjectivization. 54) Such a dire conundrum strands the artistic subject in a doubly desubjectivizing quandary. Faced with this alternative. he cannot neglect the other half: artist as god-like creator. without content. which is the subjective position all but of a few of us occupy in front of the art work (perhaps indeed all as in modernity even the artist becomes spectator to their own poiesis) is akin to that described by Hegel as the selfannihilating nothing of Romantic Irony. in fact. beside his reality” (MWC. 55). however. split from any content. “trying to make of the split that inhabits him the fundamental experience starting from which a new human station becomes possible” (MWC. the heroic modern artist.MODERNITY. that artistic subjectivity is absolute essence. 48) The position of the modern spectator. the artist is always living on what he calls “this side of his essence .

for the very first time. modern art. Here one can see the importance of aesthetic modernity to Agamben’s wider philosophical project.can result in a productive category hinted at in the terms of such a double negative: modern nonart as the potential for an exit from art into a futural and sustainable poiesis. Modern art is art that is under negation through the act of coming to view. . how negation as such. And finally third. 55). as if for the first time. critically.24 The end of art as art results in a double desubjectivization. or all form without content.” (MWC. are as pure subjective inessence. who has no other identity than a perpetual emerging out of the nothingness of expression . in accordance with Benjamin’s hermeneutic principle. perhaps predictably. Either art is pure content without form.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN man without content. modern art presents us with the most credible and challenging model of “poetic” desubjectivization as a solution to the failings of nihilistic ontology. Modern aesthetic double desubjectivization provides us with a prototype for the following three propositions in Agamben’s overall system. Second in revealing the structural interdependence of philosophy and poetry in this process: formless thought or contentless form. thoughts about art. . Yet. The critic possesses knowledge of an entity they have no experience of and the artist experiences a process of which they can have no knowledge. the critic/spectator and the artist are both examples of self-annihilating nothings. as is indeed. First as an example of poeticized desubjectivization. For Agamben. and certainly there is no greater negation than self-annihilating nothingness. It opens up to us the importance of tradition and transmissibility which we now see. 114 . most significantly in a manner only hinted at in the pages of The Man Without Content but which comes to full fruition over the intervening decades. This has various benefits of course.


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CHAPTER 4 LOGOPOIESIS. an ancient by-way thicketed by prejudice. THINKING TAUTOLOGY The title of this volume proposes a compound construction or double thesis. my suggestion that no understanding of Agamben’s indifferent ontology is possible without recourse to the literary might even seem frivolous. For reasons which I believe now are more than apparent it is not possible to overview the work of Agamben without accepting that his project will always resist being reducible to one side of the ancient division philosophy–poetry. expropriating appropriative methodology. Neither a thinker of philosophy nor poetry alone and unable to succumb to any of the traditional modes of thinking division. however. they must accept and actively live through. This cannot be helped. At the same time. or as we will come to see him comparative. that Agamben is “literary” and that the literary Agamben opens up a clearing around thinking through poetry/ poiesis that I am calling logopoiesis. while at the same time striving to reveal how both traditions first fail to lift thinking out of negation by virtue of their being subsumed by scission. novels. And so I present for general perusal and 117 . the happy few who have come to understand that Agamben is one of the greatest thinkers of the arts in our tradition may be dismayed at the suggestion that all his talk of poetry. and by their occlusion of the fact that their inter-division is a false divide which. the compound. thinker requires a compound and demonstrative term to present these tonal issues. and the visual arts is merely as a means of approaching a post-nihilistic metaphysics. more pointedly. The tension between the philosophical and the literary in Agamben is the central animator of his whole intra-metaphysical. a political philosopher. Such a di-thetic approach runs the risk of being doubly unpopular in that for those who believe Agamben to be a philosopher or.

or not solely. Other contemporary logopoietic thinkers therefore. for Agamben at least thought is or must be poeticized and poiesis is a mode of material thinking. I will not here present a history of logopoiesis. Badiou is also a great logopoietic thinker of course and he. One would not want to neglect Blanchot in this regard also. Jacques Derrida. Poetic thinking is not thinking about poetry. as is now apparent. one which thinks the very basis of thinking as such in the pure mediality of language the most 118 . uses the term “poetic thinking” to describe the centrality of poiesis to a new form of thinking that exceeds that of Heidegger in some fashion (HI. beyond stating that it was the later work of Heidegger and its emphasis on poetry and poetic thinking that commenced the tradition that was able “to hand philosophy over to poetry” as Badiou states it (MP. 20). As we have seen. Agamben proposes various names for this alternate or “new” form of thinking. like Heidegger before him. perhaps more contentiously. we are now in a position to propose logopoiesis as not merely a viable compound term but more significantly as a complementary coupling or comparative tonality. convenient possibility. would include Jean-Luc Nancy. A fully worked out vision of logopoiesis would require detailed reading of all their work in conjunction with that of Agamben. While. indeed the inserts into such a narrative are sparse and inconclusive. Having now dealt in some detail with logos. While this gesture is important and marks the roots of the term in the work of Heidegger. it does not accurately reflect the sophistication and tensile balance I intend to convey in the term logopoiesis. and some comments would be reserved for the work of Deleuze. or thinking thought as such. or not entirely. The simplest definition of such poetic thinking is a turn to poetry to assist thinking to overcome the aporias of modern thought. thinkers who accept the centrality of Heidegger but also look to poetry as a way beyond his ontology.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN perhaps initial scepticism or even weary derision my theory of logo-poiesis. I do not intend here to establish a strict canon as logopoiesis is still in its nascent stages and presented here as little more than a provocative. any designation of thought that hands over thinking either to philosophy or poetry is not properly “poetic” thinking but is in fact metaphysical thinking about poetry. and poiesis. or thinking through making. There may be others. as we saw. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and. 74). nor is it a type of poetry that thinks. which is why logos and poiesis alone are not sufficient designations even if.

As should be the effect on both terms when placed in a zone of bound proximity. Heidegger tells us.” which would be the translation of logopoiesis. THE LOGO-POIESIS TAUTOLOGY The creation of a compound term out of two ancient. logopoiesis has not come to be a developed rhetorical or critical term. Certainly he does not use the term logopoiesis.LOGOPOIESIS. 119 . and neglects the possibility of a poetry that thinks. One term will naturally seek dominance over the other. as its novelty resides in the manner in which something original has been totally forgotten and then rediscovered centuries later).1 While sporadically mentioned by critics. much debated and contested terms is unwise. In contrast “poetic thinking. Yet logopoiesis is not a neologism. Poetic thinking it could be logopoiesis it is. The dangers are heightened further when it comes to the combination of two terms such as logos and poiesis which. The definition of the terms in play. and the fact that poetic thinking really names a form of philosophy that considers poetry. however. has found significant currency within philosophy. I have opted for the more obscure but also productively suggestive term. and how indeed two terms can be placed in relation to each other simply by spatio-linguistic proximity are all issues to be taken rather seriously. THINKING TAUTOLOGY authentic experience of which is the poetic word (I hesitate to call it new. especially considering the dangers of duality inherent within our tradition. witness Halliburton’s book on Heidegger of the same name. a full understanding of categorical thinking and the problems of naming. Poetic thinking ultimately stresses a form of thinking that relies on and appropriates poetry. For this reason. essentially name the same process of bringing to appearance.2 As such “poetic thinking” is destined to be a problematic and misleading designation whereas logopoiesis presents a balance between the philosophical and poetic elements of such modes of thinking even if the harmony is an uneasy one. balanced proximity giving way to a hierarchical topography and so on. One cannot blithely produce neologisms and not expect certain repercussions. he does not hone in on one particular name or ever actually advocate a “poetic thinking” at all. Thus logopoiesis is essentially tautological in essence. None of the thinkers I have mentioned do so. It first came to the fore as a term for a thinking poetry in Pound’s ABC of Reading in contrast to melopoiesis or the poetry of pure semiosis.

29). Like logos. rely on the mediation of speech: making something appear which is hidden and remains so. concept. If we now return briefly to Heidegger’s foundational work on the term poiesis. 25) must be interpreted effectively as a symptom. the manifest” (BT. rather it means that something makes itself known which does not show itself. judgement. judgement. The knowledge generating powers of logos as reason. makes logos and poiesis appear as synonymous and thus the term logopoiesis as tautological. therefore. meaning something that shows itself to indicate something else that does not show itself. can speech be speech and also mean all of these other things that effectively form the very basis of discursive. Yet the means by which poiesis does this differ from those of logos. bringing forth. definition. Appearance. which effectively means speech. presuppositional philosophical thought? The answer he gives is that logos really means deloun or to make manifest what is being talked about in speech. has come to be translated/interpreted variously as reason.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Heidegger explains that for the Greeks the term logos. It makes itself known through something that does show itself ” (BT. Logos means speech as a means of bringing something out of concealment and making it appear not as the thing as such but as the concealed thing. Logos makes appear something in precisely this way: “to take things that are being talked about in legein as apophainethai out of their concealment. poiesis makes something manifest to appearance that was not manifest before. Therefore the fact that logos can simultaneously mean mediation and knowledge is revealed not as a possibility but in fact a necessity (it also negates once and for all the misconception that Heidegger is a thinker of revelation. concept. “does not mean that something shows itself. the self-showing. This is facilitated by the root of logos being Legein or the making present of something: “the simple apprehension of something objectively present in its pure objective presence” (BT. ground. and so on. 26). he ponders. quite the contrary he is a thinker of obfuscation). its definition as presencing. 120 . but what does it mean to make something appear and how is this affected by mediation through language? Heidegger believes that the term appearance in the context of “what shows itself. relation. to discover them” (BT. How. 22). Heidegger specifically defines the bringing-forth of poiesis as producing something into presence. to let them be seen as something unconcealed (alēthes). Thus logos is definable as making something appear in speech. and relation.

Gestell is instrumental and pre-ordained production. Techne is the active process of bringing something to presence through making. making. apportions itself into the revealing that brings forth and that also challenges . while in poiesis they are produced through making. one makes is not the thing produced by poiesis. . logo-poiesis is primarily tautological as both logos and poiesis are mediating modes of producing truth. Perhaps it is more illuminating to write the tautology out thus: (logos) the truth of production—(poiesis) the production of truth. while poiesis is that form of revealing that “ever so suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking. Yet in later Heidegger the emphasis has changed. Thus logos means making something manifest through the mediation of speech. he differentiates two forms of producing forth. is that in philosophy truths are produced through the support of linguistic mediation. . Here language is merely symptomatic of truth. The difference between philosophical and poetic thinking. but ultimately logopoiesis says the same thing twice: the production of truth—the production of truth. When one makes something the actual thing. As Heidegger’s work progresses and he becomes convinced of the restrictions of producing based around enframing (Gestell) or a predisposition within production that forces techne to serve pre-ordained dictates rather than facilitate free appearing. What is important here in early Heidegger is simply that the mediation indicates that the production of truth is not the production of a thing as such but of truth’s appearance as something concealed. production as instrumentality which he terms challenging-forth. rather in making something poiesis brings something that was hidden to presence. This difference becomes clearer if we re-consider the role of production or techne in relation to presencing. 121 . Yet to do so runs the risk of obfuscating the truth that logopoiesis is essentially a form of tautological circular thinking. and could indeed use another form of mediation. Enframed techne produces something to the dictates of the age in which it is produced. which he also translates as presencing. while free techne or poiesis exceeds the frame and produces freed thinking. while poiesis means producing something into presence through the act of making.LOGOPOIESIS. Yet logos merely utilizes speech as a mediation. 29). Most certainly thinking and poetry produce truth in a different manner. To sum up. therefore. Truth is now produced into presence by virtue of techne. It could also be accused of using speech instrumentally as a form of Gestell.” (QCT. THINKING TAUTOLOGY whereas logos mediates presencing.

Damascius’ consciousness of the tablet. “Bartleby. is inimical to philosophical thought. to recognize the Being of something as something” (P. models for logopoiesis. tautology names the specificity. with the poets. 190 and OWL. it disallows philosophy or poetry to totally appropriate the term. 122 . 174 respectively) and indeed the centrality of the hermeneutic circle. Glenn Gould’s playing with not-playing. Second. the most profound experience of which belongs. tautology is true to the Heideggerian roots of the conception. or On Contingency. THE EXEMPLARY TAUTOLOGY OF LOGOPOIESIS We have already seen some examples of logopoietic thinking. First. before or beyond its determination as true or false. . Such a truth resides in the fact that there is language as pure medium. Agamben declares that this ought to be the “paradigm for literary writing. 260). for truth is what is at issue in them” (P. emulating as it does Heidegger’s own late tautological style in such formulations as the “language itself is language” and a thing’s thinging (See PLT.” He then proceeds to explain: “Not only science but also poetry and thinking conduct experiments. it touches on the debate as regards the tautegorical nature of logopoiesis. 260). rather. we are repeatedly assured. Perhaps it would be useful here to adumbrate a few more examples provided by Agamben in that central essay in the canon of logopoiesis.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN The tautology of the term is relevant for several reasons and thus must be retained. . perhaps indeed singularity of the projectiverecursive circular mode of thinking that is the quintessence of logopoietic thinking—itself a tautology we can now dispense with as logopoiesis names a modality of thought—and which. These experiences are without truth. Finally. at the same time. in their way. as I said. These experiments do not simply concern the truth or falsity of hypotheses . they call into question Being itself. Akhmatova’s ability not to write and Benjamin’s Idea of Prose are all. but which produces truth as the very precondition for thinking. as we shall now go on to see. Third. it cannot be proved right or wrong by testing it for agreement in relation to concepts or things in the world.” Here he speaks of the prose of Robert Walser which the critic Walter Lüssi called “pure poetry” because it “refuses in the widest sense. I would also call this an archetypal definition of logopoiesis: a form of thinking that is without truthfulness.

for the reptile. power. the only experiment to be conducted by logo-poets. the moment when the subject “withdraws from both the lived experience of the psychosomatic individual and the biological unsayability of the species” (EP.3 Agamben stresses that Bartleby’s experiment with being and potential is of this kind.” Here he experiments with issues of will. this is his form of life. Of course he then recounts Rimbaud’s declaration “I is another” alongside Kleist’s use of the marionette as paradigm for the absolute. but when asked to copy or write by his boss he replies that he would “prefer not to. and potential. effectively. and most significantly. but as we saw desubjectivization is a central tenet in Agamben’s conception of the relevancy of poetry to philosophy and being. 94) indicates how integral in actuality is his vision of thinking and poetry. It is not that he cannot copy.LOGOPOIESIS. being. the father of logopoiesis. THINKING TAUTOLOGY Agamben then goes on to list a history. He mentions Avicenna’s imagining of an eviscerated and dismembered being that can still state “I am. 260). That Agamben uses precisely the same phrase when explaining that the importance of poetry is that it produces life (EP. 93). as we saw. This is not. Each of these thinkers conducts an experiment in being which we should now recognize as that of desubjectivization. He is a scrivener. all logopoiesis produces life out of desubjectivization or. of remarkable logopoietic thinkers. but a scrivener whose potential never arrives at actualization. He describes Condillac’s introduction of a statue to the sense of smell and Dante’s desubjectification of the “I” of the poet into the third person. 260). if I may but temporarily coin that rather horrendous-sounding neologism. the transformation of limbs that changed it into a bird” (P. Finally. This is what Agamben calls the “irreducibility of his ‘I would 123 . Speaking of these notable poietic experiments with existence he says: “Whoever submits himself to these experiments jeopardizes not so much the truth of his own statements as the very mode of his existence. he undergoes an anthropological change that is just as decisive in the context of the individual’s natural history as the liberation of the hand by the erect position was for the primate or as was. He is a scrivener. All poetic thinking. who “replaces the physical ‘I’ with an empty and inessential being that is only its own ways of Being and has possibility only in the impossible” (P.” He speaks of Cavalcanti’s description of the poetic experience of being like an automaton. He remains a scrivener with the potential to write mimetically. Rather he does not want to. he ends with Heidegger. I believe.

“Emancipating itself from Being and non-Being alike. form-of-life (HS. between potential absoluta and potential ordinate. Potential shares with tautology the same truth-testing aporetic base in that its truth cannot be appraised not because it is always true but because it constitutes the very experiment or test of truth. Agamben goes on to describe how the green screen (another version of the tablet perhaps) that isolates Bartleby’s desk “traces the borders of an experimental laboratory” wherein the scrivener who can copy but chooses not to frees himself from the principle of reason: either one is a scrivener and one copies or one is not and does not.” poetry thrives on it. In the end there is little difference between this presentation of truth 124 . The ontology of potentiality can also be termed that of logopoiesis confirmed by Agamben’s subsequent comments on the relation of the Bartleby’s formula to tautology “a proposition that is impenetrable to truth conditions on account of always being true” (P. For a start Melville’s story seems to merely recount the conditions of potential in an allegorical or analogous form. or better. Philosophy cannot abide the tautology. 261). Logopoiesis is a truth-testing tautology that can only occur outside the realms of philosophy. 188). 259). A tautology is a form of thinking whose truth cannot be tested because it is always true. he would simply prefer not to.” It is not that he does not want to copy. another name Agamben gives to this ontology is life. In that this ontology withdraws subjectivity from actual identity and biological indistinction. Bartleby’s ontology of unfulfilled potential can not be submitted to truth conditions not because it is always true but because it is simultaneously true and not true. but. as Keats demonstrates in the final line of “Ode on a Grecian Urn.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN prefer not to’. Logopoiesis therefore must be a construction dependent on the logic of potentiality as Agamben finesses it. he argues. potentiality thus creates its own ontology” (P. “The formula that he so obstinately repeats destroys all possibility of constructing a relation between being able and being willing. as all illustrations are. It is the formula of potentiality” (P. Similarly. are somewhat dissatisfying.4 INFINITE POETRY While illustrative these examples. Such a process is in effect heuristically tautegorical in that one can only attest to the truth of its taking place through the sense of its taking place or not taking place. 255).

specificity to generality. most specifically the circular tautological nature of thinking under the auspices of logopoiesis. absolute silence and “the living presence and its sound” the poet is overwhelmed: “And so / in this immensity my thought is drowned: / and in this sea is foundering sweet to me. that moves beyond what we have already learnt of deixis from other sources. is this specific use of deixis singular to the poem when innumerable poems use the same technique? Agamben believes that Leopardi. This is best illustrated by the centrality he gives to poetry in Language and Death. While the use of deixis is fascinating Agamben rightly asks what we can learn of the poem’s reliance on deixis as indicating the instance of discourse. And how. He notes the deictic “this” is repeated six times in the poem’s fifteen lines. Narrative. always conceives of the sense-certainty assumed by the “this” as always already “universal and negative. faced with the “immensity” of both infinite space and infinite time. in particular his reading of Leopardi’s poem “L’infinito” proceeding directly out of the analysis of the troubadours’ noble if failed attempt to think the place of language as such—the ultimate logopoietic adventure for Agamben I would suspect. of merely allegorizing literature in the service of philosophy.” Naturally. the impersonal genius of the wind interjects and “I find myself comparing to this voice / that infinite silence: and I recall eternity.LOGOPOIESIS. and back again. / and this hedgerow that hides from view / so large a part of the remote horizon. and dialogue have all been used by philosophy to make a point. along with an interesting interchange between “this” and “that. like Hegel. THINKING TAUTOLOGY and that found in Plato’s dialogues or the fabulous Nietzsche.” Author-function Leopardi is then struck by a sense of “interminable spaces” in the distant beyond. indeed. marked by “supernatural silences. poetry.”6 Agamben’s analysis begins in technicalities which indicate the sincere philologer within him. This is logopoiesis in its weakest state.” so that while we may assume that Leopardi did 125 . which it undoubtedly does in the poem.5 His is a truly engaged logopoiesis that gives as much attention to the operations of poetic thinking as to philosophical thought processes.” moving one from proximity to distance.” with “this hedgerow” becoming converted later into “that. as some have of Heidegger and Badiou. Yet Agamben is not to be accused. “L’infinito” begins: “This lonely knoll was ever dear to me.” At this point.

The place of poetry is therefore always a place of memory and repetition. first as regards the now fully fleshed-out conception of dictation.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN once perceive a knoll in his home town of Recanati. 76) Although a consideration of one short lyric this is also an observation of great significance.7 He is reading a poem by Leopardi but. like the poet himself. Previously. Agamben’s use of prose was illustrative. that the memorable is the very ungraspability of the instance of discourse as such (and not simply an instance of discourse determined historically and spatially). and third how poetic thinking differs totally from that of philosophy. second as to how poetic structure. already referentially deficient but still intimate. however. converting with haste Leopardi the existent-being into Leopardi the author-function gesture. and the wind in the poem have immediately moved beyond referentiality to an existential fact. This. is modified to become the more vague and distant “that. in such a way. Poetic language takes place in such a way that its advent always already escapes both toward the future and toward the past. a That). toward an infinity of events of language. is indicated for example by how soon the “this” in the poem.” and then “this” for “that” suggests that. the “this” points always already beyond the hedgerow. I believe. (LD. In the Leopardian idyll. serving as the basis for the possibility of its infinite repetition. More precisely the instance of discourse is assigned to memory from the very beginning. he believes. also converts the ontic object of the text as such into mere text-function. beyond the last horizon. and into other realms of generality. reference. the hedgerow. that the procedure of author-function becoming reader-function. he is immediately transforming the sense-certainty of the poem into a set of universal qualities revealing. referentiality in poetry is always already moving away from reference to an actual thing towards 126 .” The rapidity and alacrity with which the poet abandons a noun for “this. in other words where and how poetry thinks? First. What are these qualities that typify the place of poetry. reducing both subjectivities to mere gesturality. as in the Hegelian analysis of sense-certainty. and rhythm work. here his analysis of poetry is exemplary and paradigmatic. the knoll. here the This is always already a Not-this (a universal. in the instance of discourse that the habitual use of deixis indicates.

the poietic poem. 69). there was a Grecian urn but in the poem there is no Grecian urn. universal. therefore. namely. The poem deals with a truth that is always already in place before the poet ever even wanders lonely as a cloud. they have already entered into a field of repetition. This invention of an encounter or happening is in fact an act of false memory. to a universal precondition of experience as such. Its advent is both pre-cursive and reflective. this allows Agamben to make a truly profound revelation as to the nature of poetic structure. there was a solitary reaper but in the poem she has already fled.” There was a knoll but in the poem there is no knoll. as the object referred to in the poem is the very ungraspability of existential reality the poem is quickly transferred from a specific description of a lived reality. poetic referentiality is always marked by a belatedness transferring all poetic temporality into memorialization. fourth. and thus available for perpetual repetition. and yet as soon as the poet encounters daffodils. Finally. This is a point he also makes in reference to the razo de trobar. that the taking place of language is unspeakable and ungraspable.” located as it is beyond the knoll in 127 . Reference in poetry therefore is always an indication of the taking place of language either in actuality through use of heightened semiotic devices. Second. is truly an event in that it negates the very possibility of its ever occupying this space and being termed as such. He says that the poem “expresses the same experience which we saw as constitutive of philosophy itself.LOGOPOIESIS. The event as such is either always already prepared for. something singular to the poet. or has always already been converted from singular event to universal quality. Although the lived experience always precedes the act of mimesis in our tradition. The poem. A poem can never be an event. THINKING TAUTOLOGY the thing first standing for something else and then finally an indication of the thing of language as such. the fiction of the razo creates lived experience simply to support the event of writing a poem that is long past. a poem is therefore always profoundly evental. a gesture conjured up to support to presence of the poem as such (LD. the uncertainties of memory down by the station early in the morning. At this point the poem shifts from being a specific instance of discourse to the truth of discursive ungraspability ceasing to be singular in becoming general. Agamben’s first conclusion from this astonishing reading is itself somewhat predictable but essential all the same. Third. or conceptually through such considerations of space and time that we find in “L’infinito. frog-spawn.

Well. This element is what he calls here poetry’s “super-shifter . Agamben’s definition of language’s sayability as pure medium being perpetually silenced by the instance of the Voice. weaving a complex planar and tabular matrix of anaphoric and cataphoric elements that are the essence of its form. . of course. in all poetry even contemporary mainstream free verse and experimental poetics. as in prose) signals for a reader that these words have always already come to be. However the true significance of poetry is not that of winning a metaphysical race but lies elsewhere in the semiotic element of verse that philosophy simply cannot match. and that the instance of the word that takes place in a poem is. There are blessings and curses to be gleaned from this analysis. He adds: “The word. although in later studies he refers to it as the semiotic. thus. Thus he is able to conclude in a phrase of some significance to my own theory of logopoiesis: “The poetic experience of dictation seems.8 As Agamben says in response to this obvious yet seemingly invisible fact: The metrical-musical element demonstrates first of all the verse as a place of memory and repetition. Poetry and philosophy are most certainly linked in terms of how they think language. 77). the act of turning. as opposed to prorsus.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN interminable silence (LD. 77). The utilization of metrical forms in poetry. 77). is an essential part of poetry. to return. not quite. Its role as a functioning meta-deixis although not often enough remarked upon is central to the literary experience as a whole. 128 . comes about in such as way that its advent necessarily remains unsaid in that which is said” (LD. to proceed directly. taking place in time. This is no more the case than in the poem which demands to be read then re-read. from verto. . that they will return again. This is. Literature points to itself as an instance of discourse not merely when it plays games with reference and deixis but as soon as it takes place as a work. For a start Agamben excitedly notes in relation to Bartleby that Melville’s observations on will precede those of Nietzsche by three decades. 77). The verse (versus. In addition. Thus literature can get there first. to coincide perfectly with the philosophical experience of language” (LD. That said if philosophy is marked by language as negation then poetry too cannot escape this metaphysical nihilism. if philosophy has already indicated this surely all that is left for poetry is to back philosophy up. the metrical-musical element” (LD. for this reason.

reference and. indeed. philosophical discourse cannot.LOGOPOIESIS. and has always already taken place and then begun again before you even get to the end. (LD. where poetry thinks. structure. While philosophy is able to speak of the unspeakable giving us insight into negativity but no means of overcoming it. is by definition a placeless one. Through the musical element. he believes. poetry seems to prepare a portal through which one could emerge into a post-nihilistic world or word that philosophy does not have at its disposal. lineation. Does it not. philosophy and poetry. modern poetic dictation is just as marked by negation as modern philosophical thinking. which is something philosophical language can never do unless it becomes poeticized. but the commencement of a possible shift away from the aporias of both logos and poiesis. This is prosody as such or poetry’s reliance on repetition in terms of stress. remain unclear in the detail as to why poetry’s reliance on semiotic repetition is able to potentially save the whole of Western metaphysics? I would suggest so. There is. sound. Philosophy’s prose proceeds but poetry’s verse returns and this constitutes their essential difference. finally. and while my formulation of logopoiesis advocates 129 . You will recall that although poetry and philosophy both share as their object the unattainability of language as such. THINKING TAUTOLOGY ungraspable. THE HABITS OF THE MUSE Agamben’s conclusion to his reading of Leopardi is complex and subtle. As the poem is always already in place before you even come upon it. in what I have called logopoiesis. But this placelessness has a place to be found in prosody itself. it performs or at least demonstrates that the very place of poetry. the unattainable). This is not the solution to our metaphysical problems. This allows poetry to take possession of language’s unattainability in a way. counting as one of the most profound reflections on the literary ever penned in any language at any time. that is. poetic language commemorates its own inaccessible originary place and it says the unspeakability of the event of language (it attains. 78) This is the essence of the nature of poetry for Agamben. no quick solution to this problem. Thus the poem is able to take possession of the unattainable as the positive basis for its own self-generation. in poetry the unattainable is its very essence. however.

This is not unique to this poem. an adventure indeed. For now we must satisfy ourselves with Agamben’s final point in relation to “L’infinito” as regards what might be called poetic habit. “was ever dear to me” and “sweet to me. This is the place of poetic thinking. so many lyrics. Just as the poem never ends always returning our attention back to that first line. novels.” and the emphasis on dearness/sweetness. Every couplet is in miniature the ontological potential of the poem to save thought. The first rhyme already recalls the second. placed at the head of the poem composing the poem’s advent word from which the verse is launched as always already being in place.” a common enough construction of the experience of the always. sempre. progressing only to refer back.” Two elements at the poem’s end recall. When is one ever in the poem spatially or temporally. Thus he defines the roots of always as meaning “once and for all. is also referred to directly by the first line of the poem which in Italian reads: “Sempre caro mi fu quest’ermo colle. of which he finds the sem. The poem proceeds through verse. the second harks back to the first. He then suggests: “The sempre that opens the idyll thus points 130 . symphonies.” “This lonely knoll” and “this sea. its advent. Consider rhyme as a simple example of this. for Agamben. the poem form is dominated by the advent-finitude tabular matrix.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN this productive position for literature I cannot say at this point that call it anything more than a projection on my part. the habit of its reversal. sem-per.” Agamben traces the etymology of sempre to the Latin semper which he first fractures into two elements. the use of “this. combined with a positive potential. its restless habitus. if one is always proceeding and returning? One never is. All that Agamben is really looking for is an honest experience of linguistic/ontological unattainability or the definition of poeticphilosophical being as by definition the unattainable. going backwards to go forwards. First.” Here always. it never begins either commencing always on “ the Indo-European word for single. unlike in the English translation. and films recall their commencement in their ending. Second. In “L’infinito” the habitual. is. although always there in the metricalmusical element. turning.” This in fact is not a remarkable observation. He thinks he finds this at the end of the poem where the poet admits his thought is drowned in the immensity of the unattainable before adding the proviso: “and in this sea is foundering sweet to me.

LOGOPOIESIS. yet the process of being named is the very thing that robs any event of singularity for the name allows the event to be reiterated and transmitted through space and time. “Il pensiero dominante” he seems to embrace thinking which. Yet we know that in trying to have the knoll the poet is instead cast into the interminable space that dismays his heart. a having (habitus) that unifies (once) a multiplicity (all times): the having ever dear this knoll” (LD. 80). cedes to thought its sovereign power in affairs of the mind but is wrong to do so. Agamben now rereads the whole poem as an attempt to seize the habitual. This is in a way a restatement of the logic of the name in Heidegger. The singular cannot be attained except through its being named in language. Agamben believes this change in situation as regards thought is dramatized in “L’infinito” through the figure of drowning: “Thought drowns in that about which it thinks: the unattainable taking place of language. Poetry. the that of the knoll or its endless repetition through its prophylactic and transmissible encounter in poetic language. and the event in Badiou. . to hold this unattainability in suspense. as is ever the case at least since Plato’s time. 80). to measure its dimensions” (LD. 79).” the poet instead founders in the multiplicity of potential experiences of the knoll. the perpetual place of always. fully experiencing the unattainable of the place of language. invention in Derrida. although dominating is also sweet. 131 . by the poet’s trying to haveever-dear the experience of the knoll. THINKING TAUTOLOGY toward a habit. It departs from a habit and returns to the same habit” (LD. it represents the initial sempre as an interminable multiplicity . This is perhaps why in an early letter Leopardi writes of the way in which thought makes him unhappy. . 80–1). . . seeks to think. because it leads into the heart of the Same. Agamben’s second conclusion on the poem therefore is as follows: “The experience at stake in the idyll is thus the breaking apart of a habit. The thought is a movement that. to occupy its singular once-ness for all time indicated in the “this. Habit cedes to a thought that ‘feigns’. But the drowning of thought in ‘this’ sea now permits a return to the ‘ever dear’ of the first line. This “voyage” taken in the poem is “truly more brief than any time or measure. will even kill him if he is unable to change his situation. In trying to inhabit the experience of the knoll. here. Yet in a later poem. the habitual dwelling with which the idyll began” (LD.9 that is. the rupturing of a habitual dwelling into a ‘surprise’ .

radically productive uselessness. a project of which I think we can say Heidegger is the greatest master. Plato. that it says nothing of worth. thus. The circular journey to nowhere brings to the fore the darkness of the poem. Agamben believes philosophy was born out of the very need to 132 . 78). Muse. Previous to this analysis Agamben draws ancient parallels between poetry and philosophy through the figure of the muse which as we know he also terms dictation. one encounters Plato’s problem with poetry as identified by Lacoue-Labarthe in his recent response to Badiou’s critique of his work on poiesis: competition. that it takes us nowhere. he sees a rival to his claim for thought’s sovereignty. is the name the Greeks gave to the “ungraspability of the originary place of the poetic word” (LD. Use of the poetic word in fact is an expropriated appropriation in that one is possessed by the muse. amity. The name of this technique in poetry is the periplus. Both seek to grasp that original. philo-poiesis. nothing that can be tested as being true in terms of agreement or reasoning. “so that it necessarily escapes whoever tries to speak it” (LD. is responsible for giving the poetic word the character of being an eurema Moisan or invention of the muses. much more than a simple rivalry. in the Ion. For Plato the meaning of the most beautiful song is “to demonstrate that poetic words do no originally belong to the people nor are they created by them” (LD. for speaking man. therefore. the habit. 78). nothing new. Periplus as a term marks the structural pointlessness or meaninglessness of art. and instead of appreciating filiation. here thought cannot measure trapped as it is in the tautology of the same. 78). inaccessible place of the word. 78). Agamben believes Plato is correct in his calling philosophy supreme music and its muse the true muse. 78). is the highest stake” (LD. anti-poiesis. In that “philosophy too experiences the place of language as its supreme problem (the problem of being)” (LD. its utter.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN In contrast to our previous definition of thought as that which takes measure of the dimensions of the unattainable. Wildean. Here. the circular structural basis of all logopoiesis. he claims. the circular journey immortalized by The Odyssey becoming a foundational recursive and tautological structure of so much Western art to follow. in a nutshell. which. Agamben’s reading goes even further than this however: “The ‘confrontation’ that has always been under way between poetry and philosophy is.10 Plato sees the community between poetry and philosophy. he explains. Periplus describes. just sails around. spoken by it.

the trans-planar and tabular experience of the anaphoriccataphoric matrix of poetic recursiveness. It does this. Thought now experiences. once and for all time. (LD. and thus freed. vocal silence at the very heart of being. Thought in the poem. tautological logopoiesis. . neither verse not prose. to Leopardi Agamben ends what is surely one of the great additions to the science of aesthetics in considering a logopoietic thinking that finds no measure of the infinite but is captured instead. Yet. will ever be able to accomplish their millennial enterprise by themselves. Perhaps only language in which the pure prose of philosophy would intervene at a certain point to break apart the verse of the poetic word. would be the true human language). perhaps neither poetry nor philosophy. sets out from only to return back to the same. Yet. in the periplus logic of tautological habitudes.” Thought has been truly poeticized by being sucked into the vortex of poetic periplus. lost at sea as we say. Plato argues in Phaedrus. Agamben inserts the following: (For this reason. Who will save us: poetry or philosophy? The answer is neither and both. he argues. The second the establishment of negative. and in which the verse of poetry would intervene to bend the prose of philosophy into a ring. that is. Yet. along the way. The first is the scission of poetry from philosophy echoed by the bifurcation of language in the theory of the sign and dramatized in poetics through the development of the stanza. no sooner launched the logopoietic bark is inundated by the cruel seas of the infinite and drowns.”’ At sea. you recall. by transforming muse into spirit or Geist. once and for all. as is often the case in such salty tales of the sea. thought has many adventures during which thought’s silence and interminable nature miraculously ceases to be “a negative experience. Returning one last time. . thought “in its drowning” is “now truly lost forever .LOGOPOIESIS. the most beautiful voice of the muse is voice without sound marking the origins of two essential and ultimately destructive events in Western thought. 78) With this parenthetical wondering Agamben gives birth to the new discipline of logopoiesis. In parentheses as if an after thought which in fact is the advent of this whole impossible yet unavoidable enterprise. THINKING TAUTOLOGY liberate poetry from inspiration or to retrieve language from mystical music-making and return it to statements of truth. 133 .

its having-been and its coming to be . For now. negativity as the breaking and making of the habit or of a poetic. for different yet related reasons. and reflect on how far we have come.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN in the poem. in the exhaustion of the dimension of being. 134 . the figure of humanity’s having emerges for the first time in its simple clarity: to have always dear as one’s habitual dwelling place. the truth of a statement cannot be tested. its habit and its versus. 81). its having been. and the very turn of poetry as a formidable alternative to the traditional modes of thinking which renounce the circular in every instance in favour of moving ever forward towards the truth. it suffices to pull ourselves from the ocean and back onto the shore. Logopoiesis in its tautology names a certain experience of truth that emulates that of potential. as the ethos of humanity” (LD. literary singularity born out of structures of repetition. and eschatological futural time. In both tautology and potentiality. its versification of language. Yet the circularity of logopoiesis goes even further than this. Logopoiesis is the turn of verse in all senses of the word. Both the ability of poetic language to turn (projective-recursion) as a potential for a pro-ductive philosophy to come. Everything hangs on the temporal-spatial essence of poetry. . The result of this is a form of radical desubjectivization. This logic is the tautological logic of poetic thinking. . time between times or between chronological time. Through the projectiverecursive nature of poetic structure we are gifted with a model for a truly tautological mode of thought that draws together all the strands of Agamben’s attempt to think beyond the metaphysics of scission and negation. however. Later when we return to poetic structure we will see how Agamben’s recent work has come to name this in-between time messianic time. dry off. and yet how much further we still have to travel. The result is the “extinguishing of thought. At this point the metaphysical and poetic Agamben will once more come together and take the measure of each other.” its drowning and its tautological negation so that “in the negative dimensions of the event of language. the very testing of truth through its own alienation. without resorting to arche-presence of the false imposition of unity. a truly original idea of language and thought that exceeds all the traditions of thinking from Plato as far as Heidegger by simply escaping the craft of thinking through drowning in equivalence and pointlessness. its coming to be.

interests him only in as much as it provides singular and privileged access to thinking the thing of thought as such: language. THE TURN OF VERSE THE DEFINITION OF POETRY Bare space is still veiled. the end of the poem.CHAPTER 5 ENJAMBEMENT. language. Never more powerfully apparent than here is it that Agamben is both negligent of the singularity of literature and yet entirely dependent on it.” Having spent several pages defining poetry in terms of lineation. Like all other identities in Agamben. and the arts. All of which gives a certain piquancy to his avowed project here. the poem must die through a process of self-alienation to become what it is destined to be. 115). 96) If it were not already apparent that there is a profound interdependence in Agamben between thinking. recurrence. From this we are now in a position to ascertain that the prosodic element of poetry which concerns so much of Agamben’s work on literature. (BT. 135 . he concludes on material seemingly at one removed from the technical concerns of prosody: “The poem thus reveals the goal of its proud strategy: to let language finally communicate itself. interruption. without remaining unsaid in what is said” (EP. In Agamben’s hands the poem may be reborn into the service of a profound shift in metaphysics but at a certain cost to its own self-identity. consider the conclusion of the short essay on poetics entitled “The End of the Poem. and finitude.

is to define a poetic institution that has until now remained unidentified: the end of the poem. not the case. negative metaphysics. And so it becomes possible to see how this tension which occurs in the technicalities of prosody will open up for Agamben a possible route out of negation into pro-duction. To do this. (EP. by definition. namely that such a scission demands separation and relation. must also be those for thought. If this tension were easy to maintain. not least because the non-relational relation between two terms in a zone of indistinction that typifies the Agambenian method is best described as a tension. which was originally a paper presented in French. Thus we can see that differential opposition. but also that the specific tension of the poetic. The fact that the poem comes to an end both allows 136 . begins in a rather pedestrian vein that gives little indication of the direction it will eventually take: My plan.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN The essay. as you can see summarized in the title of this lecture. 109) This deceptively simple definition of poetry as reducible to the prosodic technique of enjambement that does not even belong with Agamben1 establishes a set of preconditions for poetry which. strikes me as obvious—namely that poetry lives only in the tension and difference (and hence also the virtual interference) between sound and sense. between the semiotic and the semantic sphere. happens to emulate precisely the tension at the heart of modern. here in the scission between phone and logos. that between the semiotic and the semantic. without being trivial. This may indeed be a truism for all entities the result of the metaphysical tradition. yet as we saw poetry has a special place in this tradition. I will have to begin with a claim that. source of the tension he mentions here. perhaps Agamben might rapidly find what he is looking for in poetry but. this is. we now realize. Rather the definition of poetry exists precisely in the ambivalence to be found at the heart of all structures of differential scission. although widely attacked by Agamben cannot simply be eradicated. This is not merely due to the repulsive attitude of first philosophy to poetry. like all tension. and poetry is the archetypal tensile linguistic form. It is notable that the essay title and Agamben’s initial declaration both refer not to the internal tension of the poem but its cessation: the end of the poem is the true definition of poetry.

ongoing poetry of an impossible or virtual nature. it follows that the last verse of a poem is not a verse. For if poetry is defined precisely by the possibility of enjambement. No wonder it is “as if for poetry the end implied a catastrophe and loss of identity” (EP. 115). because at this point the whole texture of poetry. Agamben wonders: what happens at the point which the poem ends? Clearly. a gap which words can pause before and then overleap as in enjambement. here there can be no enjambement in the final verse of a poem. it is inevitable that if the sequence cannot recommence then the thing in question at that point no longer exists. THE TURN OF VERSE one to define the potential of its internal tensions and to understand how. If poetry subsists in the tensions it calls up between semiotic and semantic forces. only pure. starts to unravel. This fact is certainly trivial. not least because without finitude there can be no poem. The poem is tense because it must end. then. not a preference for the semiotic over the semantic but the balancing of one precariously against the other. if poetry is indeed this tension. yet it implies consequences that are as perplexing as they are necessary.2 Yet there would be no tension without this probable eventuality. most marked at the end of the line where semiotic demands of metrical counting and rhyme undermine the semantic expectations set up within the progress of the serial syntax previous to this point of transition from one line to the next. Verse is verse because it will at some point cease to be verse defining a structure of identity based on self-alienation we are now more than familiar with under the wider ontological heading of desubjectivization. and instead becomes a true abyss of philosophical proportions. 137 . Does this mean that the last verse trespasses into prose? (EP. Thus the final “verse” of any poem cannot be poetry for the tension is asymmetrically poised above a permanent rather than transitory space. ceases to be a facilitator of poetic tension. the abyssal presence of absence edging all poetry into being. 112) If something is defined by a tensile dynamic between arrest and sequential recommencement. poetry alone cannot be thought’s substitute.ENJAMBEMENT. teetering on a ledge above an abyss of pure space or universal prose. This space. carefully woven according to Agamben from the tensile interchange of semiotics and semantics. while a potential for thought.

indeed all creation precisely in the terms of Heidegger’s beingtowards-death. dissolving. the beginning of the poem. or is it merely the period when there is no poetic tension? Where does this space end into. but rather the already inscribed future failure of poetry. Just as being-in-the-world can only be disclosed through an admission of finitude so too the poem in the world is only a poem by virtue of its eventual negation by the Hegelian “prose of the world” of the everyday. its mood or attunement. outside the collection or book? Is it actual space. by its ending. if it indeed ever does begin as such and not simply strike up again on its guitar or lute. but rather is the experience of projective and imminent finitude as such. losing its footing on a slippery way it must follow to its death. This other tension is the tension of philosophical finitude. Is the space before the poem the space between poems. composed of alinear but sequential marks. vacancy is just as present before the poem begins. in other words. Is prose. the famous Agamben tablet of potential? The end of the poem raises more questions than it answers but what is certain is that it is not precisely the tension between semiotics and semantics that allows the poem to come to presence. before the title. implied before the poem has even begun. inevitable at the poem’s final footing on the edge before the abyss. which is also a being-away-from-birth. questions begin to be asked of being. between the title and the poem body. If space looms at the end of the poem. and finitude. Poetry is not marked by finitude. foreshadowed in the worrying gaps between stanzas. not space at all but un-inscribed or zero-marked matter. For poetry is perpetually fading. from this obvious if not trivial definition. or the fake space of the blank page.” because Agamben is speaking here of deathly negativity. one might also wonder what happens at the point of incipit or the very birth of the poem. to be perpetually born to presence. tension. He comes to define poetry. but also disseminated or contaminated across the stretch of the line in the gaps between the words and the fading of certain syllables in the service of others. Surely the essay would be better named “The Death of the Poem. meaning that poetry is the natural or normative state of language and prose merely its interim interruption? Such an argument is historically supportable in the work of Godzich and Kittay. This is the source of poetry’s Stimmung. and hence poiesis. Poetry is tense because it is permanently buffeted by recollected 138 . its uncanny angst. certainly suggested at the end of each line whether it runs on or not.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN If.

and Agamben’s plan for the institution of the end of the poem is born out of his obvious yet remarkable observation that: No definition of verse is perfectly satisfying unless it asserts an identity for poetry against prose through the possibility of enjambement. however obvious it may seem to be. Quantity. is a geometric term pertaining to the point where any two lines meet one’s line of sight at the perpendicular and form a twodimensional flat surface or plane diminishing in accordance with perspective. and the intervening ten years between Agamben’s initial. 39) This is taken from Idea of Prose. A plane occurs whenever there are three points or where there are two lines which are not parallel for. A plan. simply listing actions. will meet at a third and mutual point (in perspective the vanishing point). BOUSTROPHEDONICS I will take Agamben at his word and read “The End of the Poem” as a plan for a poetic institution of foundational instability. None of which is at all trivial. quasi-scientific formulation and the more complex rhetoric of “The End of the Poem” allows Agamben to add 139 . for example. THE TURN OF VERSE premonitions and intimations of mortality.ENJAMBEMENT. Prose is the discourse in which this is impossible. maps out a planar surface. A plan. (IP. after all. from this standpoint. Any line therefore at a slant—tell the truth but tell it slant—holds within it an invitation to some future assignation wherein its linearity will become planar. Such plans always implicate the formation of a plane. rhythm. But we shall call poetry the discourse in which it is possible to set a metrical limit against a syntactic one (verse in which enjambement is not actually present is to be seen as verse with zero enjambement). provide sufficient criteria. at some point of extension. and the number of syllables—all elements that can equally well occur in prose—do not. those two lines each made of two points. among other things.

The first of these observations is. The grammatological difference cannot contain the phonematic. There is.” There are two clear levels of segmentation. and leaves the world to darkness and to me.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN one additional element to this formula. which is a grammatological differentiation. are all composed of successive series. although free verse has made the potential for this differentiation available in principle to all syntax with Agamben’s theory backing this up to some degree. resulting in the perfectly sensible and violently contested idea that the voice precedes writing. although of all of these mathematics also has a tabular potential. which is phonematic. words in any real sense. in that speaking the words does not reproduce textual spacing or planar dimensionality.4 So in grammatology one cannot “see” stress. and the regular. rather obvious. by which I mean the simple appearance of the words does not reproduce stress.3 Let us scientifically and geometrically proceed with this for a moment. of course. and in phonology one cannot hear “words. and articulation charted here: the space between the words. alphabetic languages which are written although not necessarily spoken. This third difference is enjambement. however. The brain that cuts up this continual stream into single units identified as “words. The second is less so and is based on scientific work on phonemes which establishes that when one speaks a stream of syntax. as you may have recognized when you 140 . notice how hard is the conception of the phonetic as a line and the grammatological as a stream. and mathematics.” They are not. Let us take a random and innocent syntagm in English to better illustrate the issue: “The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. at least until one pauses for breath. for. a designation which includes Italian. difference. the adoption of the terms semantic and semiotic to place atop of the initial bare skeleton of prose and poetry. a third level of segmentation available to only a very limited number of syntagms.” These two realms rely on very different modes of sensation resulting in cognition of a language which remains permanently bifurcated and at odds with itself. undifferentiated utterance. English. the lowing heard winds slowly o’er the lea. metrical iambic rhythm. rather they are electrical impulses giving an impression of words. There is a fundamental disjuncture in such successive series between words as they are heard and how they are written. the ploughman homeward plods his weary way. Latin. dare I say it. Western. while the phonematic difference cannot contain the grammatological. one utters a single.

The ploughman homeward plods his weary way. The lowing herd winds slowly o’er the lea. Agamben summarizes this ancient ontological counterpositioning in terms of the bar (/) that we found articulated the ban and articulation of the sign. as proven by my example that until those breaks are spatially imposed the sentence in question holds off from become a verse. And leaves the world to darkness and to me. enjambement is neither purely grammatological nor phonological. but in the fold of the presence on which they are established: the logos . This leads to Agamben’s contention that gramma (writing) rather than destabilizing the pre-eminence of phone (voice) as full presence is actually the pre-condition or reverse face of such a pre-eminence: “the originary nucleus of signification is neither in the signifier or the signified. Is such a break a grammatological or phonematic occurrence? The way Agamben presents it remains permanently unclear.” There are two levels of analysis to present here. The second takes us into a much more complex question as to what is actually meant by a line-break. While attestation suggests Agamben conceives of enjambement grammatologically. THE TURN OF VERSE saw my example or felt when you read it. And the human is precisely this fracture of presence” (ST. there are a number of reasons why this cannot be the case.ENJAMBEMENT. . so I have to extrapolate from his evidence the possibility that it is both and neither.5 So goes famously the first stanza of Gray’s exemplary “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard. neither in writing nor in the voice. the extract in question is more traditionally inscribed thus: The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. As one can see from my little experiment in linguistic presentation. . True one needs in 141 . is the fold that gathers and divides all things in the ‘putting together’ of presence. The first pertains to Agamben’s more general work on language and in particular his radical critique of Derrida’s theory of the trace conducted through Agamben’s own problematization of the idea of the gramma. 156). 156). The remaining evidence is much more empirical. The first is the line taken by Agamben that without the line-breaks after every ten syllables this sentence is prose. revealing not simply Derridean différance but also the “topological game of putting things together and articulating” (ST.

and its recommencement. This is due to the perfection of the metrics here widely recognized as one of the most superlative and thus static examples of traditional English prosody. one still finds oneself pausing every ten syllables. until one has one’s suspicions confirmed by the graphical plan of the poem before one. which can be presented graphically as follows: Geometrically speaking. While prose fills a planar page space. more intangibly. In fact you do not need to read the poem to visually apprehend it is a poem nor do you need to see the poem when you are reading it to know or feel it is a poem. entente. .here page the of side hand left the at line the up takes then It This maps out three points: the beginning of the line.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN some sense the spatial presentation of the break for the poem to be immediately perceptible as the visual entity called poem.6 this is not essential but merely a contingency of 142 . but its full force comes through the combination of the two. All of which brings us back to the poetic plane. this time not between poetry and prose (philosophy) but between speech and writing. Certainly you can see a line-break or feel it. poetry is the becoming planar of an endlessly extendable two-dimensional field we call prose. the almost genetic inclination of English speakers to allow their speech to fall into iambs organized into groups of ten syllables or so. for indeed one cannot understand enjambement unless one understands the semantic content of the lines in view. Enjambement artificially breaks the sequential line of language at the right hand side of the page here. and perhaps finally. Enjambement therefore not only establishes a tension between semantics and semiotics but it simultaneously eases or even eradicates another ancient antagonism. Enjambement in this manner demonstrates perhaps the only instance in language where the rivalry between the immediacy of speech and the mediation of writing is transformed into a constructive. But if one reads the four lines as one line. while at the same time one can feel enjambement but it remains as discarnate as a feeling or uncanny sensation. its ending. the use of zero enjambement facilitated by terminal caesurae at the end of every subsection of ten syllables. if strained.

as it were. The paragraph. Paradoxically Agamben terms this accommodating recuperation a “dive into the abyss of meaning” for in recovering a state of stable continuity through the renunciation of the cut for the hinge. Here voice shouts down writing. In this way. and transportation of prose writing. . of poetry . interrupted by the paragraph certainly but never for anything other than stabilizing semantic dictates within this line. Most avowedly the paragraph is not a stanza. distribution. and reclaims that which it had the temerity to eject. namely sense. the purely sonic unit of verse transgresses its own identity as it does its own measure. I would argue. The cut folded back on itself always becomes a hinge except for the very last verse which remains severed not bent. It hints at a passage of prose with the very gesture that attests its own versatility. referring to the rhetorical term echoing the passage of an oxen along and between the furrows it ploughs wherein you write first from right to left and then from left to right. (IP. and it is a point. 40) Agamben’s phrasing itself constructs something of a boustrophedonic folding logic. As Agamben argues: In the very moment that the verse affirms its own identity by breaking a syntactic link. In abstract terms the line of prose is always one single line. it is irresistibly drawn into bending over into the next line to lay hold of what it has thrown out of itself. Poetry affirms its identity at the very moment that it breaks the line indicating a preference for semiotic metrics and rhyme over semantic clarity and continuity.ENJAMBEMENT.7 the verse finds that its very identity as verse is lost at the precise point of its being 143 . By this headlong dive into the abyss of meaning. neither poetic nor prosaic. Yet at the very point. THE TURN OF VERSE the development of the book as a technology for the preservation. Poetry is the moment in which the plane of writing is opened through the addition of an extra point to the bi-punctal line of prose. spatial absence (the jagged abyss that looms at the right-hand edge of all poetry) the break is softened into a bend. organization. but boustrophedonic. Writing scribbles down voice. enjambement brings to light the original gait. although the closest entity in prose graphematically to the property of enjambement does not interrupt the dimensionality of the prose line into a poetic planar surface. . that it abandons sense for the abyss of grammatical.

and finally excision of an opening for suprasensuous thinking within the sensible body of a “work” of art. What poetry makes happen in the birth to plane is nothing other than thinking. What poetry “makes happen” geometrically is that it adds a third point.9 Students of poetry will be more than aware of how considerations of space. has suffered a ban. or something that the poetic makes happen or brings into presence. This experience of space produced by the boustrophedonic transition from line to plane. If we take the structural shift of the metricalmusical element of the anaphora-cataphora projective recursive tabular matrix of poetic structure. – KLE SIS. poetry is continually and permanently born to presence and withheld from view. something that writing does.8 opening up a planar space in writing that is the very basis of the grammatological. THE MESSIANIC AS NOT The space of thought within the poem. an essential logopoietic opening up of space for thought in a medium that. to poetry as the tensile effect of this activity. allows the poetic to become poetry. “Poetic” remains therefore at the level of praxis.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN founded. one can see a dramatization of this dynamic in the grammatological presentation of the work while partially occluded in the phonematic in which voice unfolds in time. as a threshold. This plane of language first and foremost introduces writing to a fundamental experience of space as opposed to the simple activity of differential spacing: space as a second dimension. the way it always refers both forwards and backwards. cannot be cleared until the issue of time in poetry is resolved. since Plato certainly. while poetry as such is poiesis. More importantly we find here in the becoming planar of the line of sense an internal bifurcation in the category poetry as Agamben shifts from the adjective poetic. colonization. One of 144 . Students of metaphysics will be more than aware of how considerations of time become those of space. to refer to the activity of enjambement. immediately closed down again by the cut becoming in an instant a fold. At the point in the line when the line becomes a part of a plane the poiesis of poetry is revealed. revealed and concealed or vice versa. such as the becoming planar of the cut/turn at the end of the poetic line. as a surround or framing device. rely on temporality. and vice versa. and abyss. therefore. indeed poetry as such is based on the fundamental number three. Between the cut and the fold.

Yet its essential combination with the theory of potentiality is. space becoming time. In our considerations of Agamben’s interventions on art in general we saw how in his critique of aesthetic modernism he was committed to a rather different temporality of epochal ending. we must pass through the distorting hall of temporal mirrors that is the complex and brilliant theory of messianic time to be found in this volume. the medium or supportive gesturality of language as such makes little reference to temporality. the epoch of modernity. To move from boustrophedonics to a logopoietic philosophy of indifference that finds its clearing in the very space of thought within the poem requires a considerable and remarkable diversion of the way through these entangled and ancient defiles.10 The combination of these two terms not only involves an even more ontological radicalization of enjambement as the obvious definition of the poem. silence. temporal. in part. and progress in our task of a logopoiesis in which poetry is an essential partner in the indifferential thought to come. as regards Agamben’s own philosophy of indifference. poetic temporality. If we are to move from lineation to the space of poetry. There are two central epochal moments in Agamben’s messianic The Time That Remains which we are already. Finally. The first of these is kle ¯sis or calling as a surrogate to epoch as event. and the messianic strand of potential. of course. negation. and the quest for a post-nihilistic theory of productive thought about art that did not succumb to the metaphysical-epochal designations of ending. 145 . Indeed the whole project of the early formulation of the Idea of Prose depends upon complex interactions with temporality such as Benjaminian now-time and messianic redemption. Yet such is the nature of the adventure. and so on. The second is kairos as an alternative time to chronos presenting to us a possible historical existence that is neither chronological nor eschatological but between and incisive of both. Map-less but with guidance we will commence with the call of the messianic vocation. familiar with. Agamben has only been able to resolve these issues. resolve the aporias of modernity. but also the possible solution as to how a future for thought can be found in the technicalities of prosody.ENJAMBEMENT. THE TURN OF VERSE the prime reasons for the retention of the gramma within the phone of the poem is to allow access to the spatiality within poetic temporality and resist poiesis becoming simply an apparent privileging of some arche-vocal presence. in one of his recent and most important works The Time That Remains.

Here the “he” is an anaphoric designation of the previous kle ¯sei. 22). 7:17: 17–22. is that the commencement and completion of the vocation of the messianic all occur within the temporality of the act of calling. is one which commentators have struggled for centuries to render in their respective languages. therefore. or the call of the previous calling. “Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Agamben argues the problem is that the phrase is not tautological.11 In terms of it being the logic of “as not” it is a modification of the sceptical “no more than” that Agamben places at the heart of poetic potentiality and epochality (P. Indeed. repeating the same logic we found in play with aesthetic judgement. 257). or to remain within the dynamic of calling indicated by the logical and linguistic operations of anaphoric deixis. The Time That Remains is a sustained philological analysis of the Pauline canon of messianic texts. but a “peculiar tautegorical movement that comes from the call and returns back to it” (TTR. deixis. therefore. While the tautology of this phrasing. messianic calling is first presented in the “Second Day” of The Time That Remains bracketing the debate of modern. This occurs through a technical application of that. 19). What deixis indicates here. now. the messianic “calling. Such a use of anaphoric deixis is peculiarly tautegorical because not until the call is recalled. the calling of being called.” can be read intertextually in relation to three areas of concern for logopoiesis. Finally. The call. 198 & 209). is instigated and completed only after the fact of when it is called to call. one might redefine this form of anaphora as tautegorical cataphoric anaphora. fictive subjective as-if-ness that we have already delineated. wherein the repeated term can only be presented as a term to be repeated 146 . and establishing an impossible to ignore parallel between negative modern criticism and a possible positive outcome of this vocation through the act of messianic calling to the call. most familiar linguistic operator. and thus it is from Paul that Agamben extricates the idea of kle as the calling to the messianic vocation. To be called to the messianic vocation is to be called to the call. Clearly it presents a modification of Heidegger’s idea of the poetic as the calling of calling (PLT.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN Kle ¯sis. usually translated as “the ¯ ¯sei ¯the same calling wherein he was called” (TTR. Reading specifically a ¯sis sentence from 1 Cor.” Agamben focuses on the seemingly tautological phrase en te kle he ekle ¯. can the referent or call can be said to call at all. until the deictic indicator refers back to its previous referent.

a form of indication that “may apply to any condition. but of change. Jew. . 23). of having a condition as not having a condition.ENJAMBEMENT. The messianic vocation is the revocation of every vocation . . referring to the first half of the Pauline formulation. the classic definition of deixis. negatively heuristic kle is the first part of the mes¯sis sianic which structurally and technically emulates the process of deictic desubjectivization we saw in Agamben’s appropriation of Benveniste. One is called away from one’s vocation. but instead are called into the nullification of one’s vocation as one’s vocation. As Agamben says with more admirable clarity than I can muster: “Kle indicates the particular transformation that every juridical ¯sis status and worldly condition undergoes because of. . THE TURN OF VERSE after it has first been repeated. and only because of. “calls for nothing and to no place . “Why remain then in this nothing?” Agamben asks. the “Ho s me ” of the Pauline text. its being essentially and foremost a calling of the calling” (TTR. We are faced here therefore not with a matter of eschatological indifference. Agamben calls ¯ ¯ this the “ultimate meaning of kle ¯sis” (TTR. Tautegorical.12 Calling or kle is first of all an empty ¯sis revocation of every vocation. and indeed there is increasing room for Benveniste here and in other later works. but not called to a new vocation. Thus one is called to remain in the negation of vocation as a form of vocation. Citing Paul when he says that kle involves ¯sis operating “as not having” a condition. yet cannot be repeated until it has occurred. as though it were an urgency that works it from within and hollows it 147 . apostle. almost an internal shifting between each and every single condition by virtue of being called” (TTR. . . You are not called from one vocation. it revokes a condition . Think of this if you will as anaphoric deixis that refers to no particular thing but merely refers to its own operations.” he says. its relation to the messianic event. 23)— immobilized by the confounding circular logic of the tautegorical. but for this same reason. .” (TTR. 23). “Vocation. for example called to criticism as the critical tautegorical nullification of criticism. This being the case the messianic vocation has no specific content. Precisely because such a remaining “signifies the immobile anaphoric gesture of the messianic calling. Instead one is called into the subjective state of vocational desubjectivization (whatever vocation) as Agamben confirms in his follow-up analysis of the “as not” of the messianic vocation. 22). to another. the vocation calls the vocation itself.

While apparent that Agamben here is speaking of the mediality of language in another register. 24–5). . if it exists at all. that of the messianism of a temporality to come. if I may refer to such a thing. but of the duality of language itself imposed upon it by human speech. In the messianic parable signum and res significa approximate each other because language itself is what is signified. is that of a thing with itself in the form of non-self-identity. 23–4). Instead. but are placed alongside children.” Like the comparison the parable. rejoicing pushed towards not rejoicing. . as the operation of language as such to such a degree that in many languages the word for language originates from the parable. it prepares its end” (TTR. they do not resemble children. As he says: “In the parable. noting how in the Bible the parable comes to stand for the word of god itself or logos. Speaking specifically of the parable of the sower where seed represents logos of course. Agamben identifies how a whole tradition of the parable develops that takes paraballisation. 24). In Paul’s comparative explanation of the subjective effect of kle weeping ¯sis is pushed towards itself as not weeping. it sets itself up against itself in the form of the as not: weeping as not weeping” (TTR. but makes it pass.” and how this form of comparison was analysed by Medieval grammarians in a particular fashion as not a form of identity or resemblance. the difference between the signum and res significa thus tends to annul itself without completely disappearing. from the Greek 148 . “unless you become as children. seed meaning seed and logos.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN out. the messianic does not simply cancel out this figure. If this is true then for Paul men are not as children. “but rather they interpreted the comparative as an (intensive or remissive) tension that sets one concept against another” (TTR. Traditionally a parable is assumed to have a double meaning but Agamben views this not as a signifier having two signifieds. At the end of this section Agamben speaks of the process “as not” in terms of another classic form of rhetoric. for it does ¯ ¯ not push a concept’s semantic field toward that of another concept. the parable. “The Pauline hos me seems to be a special type of tensor. Agamben concludes from this form of comparison: “In pushing each thing towards itself through the as not. . The comparison. nullifying it in the very gesture of maintaining and dwelling in it” (TTR. He first uses the example of the technique of comparison within Paul. 24). not until he starts to speak of figurality is one able to see how these comments pertain to modern aesthetics.

works in a manner which places figuration alongside itself. when the division of time is itself divided . The messianic condition of “as not” is the movement of scission within language from being within the sign to being between the sign and itself. He explains that while Paul regularly uses eschatological time when speaking of the two Jewish time traditions. eschaton. kairos. the “as if. Language does not refer to the world but to language as such. To negotiate this subtle and complex difference will take the rest of my study here on the conception of poiesis. . and to take us from negative modernity to productive poiesis we must turn to the second Pauline term. This shift from comparison to parable brackets.” (TTR. . indicates a process of internal division (as well as creating tabular space). chronos. messianic time is neither of these epochal designations. The sign is not a system of difference and similarity but of a non-selfcoincidence as identity. Language operates does it not as if it referred to the world at large when we discovered in fact that such deictic acts merely reveal is a temporal belatedness in terms of referentiality? “As not. 62).” The historical conflict he maps out between “as if ” and “as not” can now be situated around familiar territory pertaining to language and figuration. but so as to put “each being and each term in tension with itself ” (TTR. “it is a remnant. comparison. how does that differ from the messianic figurality of anaphora. Glossing on the traditional representation of time as a line along 149 .ENJAMBEMENT. Rather. THE TURN OF VERSE para-ballo to place one thing next to another. signifier and signified. the time that remains between these two times. 43). in relation to what he sees as a common misrepresentation of apostolic messianic time as eschatological. and the atemporal eternity that extends after the end of time. “As if ” would seem to be figuration as such.” however. as I said. and parable? These constructions are also self-regarding but in a manner that Agamben believes is truly redemptive. a consideration of a third form of figuration. MESSIANIC KAIROS Agamben first addresses the term kairos. Agamben’s argument in The Man Without Content. The question therefore remains if modern “as if ” aesthetics finds its archetype in art for art’s sake. occasion or now. In the language of messianic time comparisons and parables exist not in terms of linguistic comparison. that which stretches from creation to the end of time.

Agamben hones in on this gap between representable and thinkable time by adopting the linguistic concept of operational time. for example A—B—C wherein A is creation. Kairos adds futurity to the past and pastness to the future but it is not the moment or instant. as ever. stratifications. reiterations. either we are confronted with a model that is representable but unthinkable as actual experience of time. he explains that this linear model is. in regard of linear time. is not a dot on the line of time but a segment or stanza within the divisions of epochs along this line. Thus he reconstitutes the time line by adding a segmentation which removes position B from the line and instead locates it as a caesuric interruption of the line: A C Of this model and its reappraisal of messianic time he suggests that we take “messianic time as a caesura which. Be not afraid. nor a synthesis of all three tenses in a manner that emulates Bergson’s influential theory of modern time. but accept such a time is unrepresentable. therefore. As such it operates with precisely the same logic as the term epoch. the classic representation of time since Aristotle. insufficient to capture the complexity of time. 64). although the time of the now. being neither point nor extension but the precondition and deconstruction of both.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN which one situates epochs. Kairos. The result is a caesuric division between an epoch’s cessation and the resumption of the new epoch. here represented as between the two vertical dotted lines. B the messianic event. and C apocalypse. Such caesuric time operates as part of the epoch of chronos while exceeding it. interruptions. in its dividing the division between two times. in this instance messianic time. 150 . As Agamben says. Of the time line consisting of assumed strings of points. and as part of the eschaton while exceeding that. extends epochal time into the postepochal and post-epochal time back into epochal time. introduces a remainder [resto] into it that exceeds the division” (TTR. Agamben is aware that this messianic time presents a powerful challenge to our human consciousness of time and indeed the general difficulty of thinking time. he notes that such a line has never accorded with the human experience of time. Messianic time. or we concede the thinkable nature of time and all its complexities. and dimensionalities.

Guillaume ingeniously explains that the time line past—present—future is naturally too perfect and operates as if such a time line were always already constructed for the subject. the time we take to bring time to an end. 67). (TTR. tautegorical calling and self-constructing temporal representation. are both examples of the figural nature of the messianic for Agamben. 68). to achieve our representation of time” (TTR. This process of temporal construction takes a period of time. another time is implied that is not entirely consumed by representation. Instead. By this we do not mean they are simply rhetorical forms. It is as though man. THE TURN OF VERSE Operational time originates from the work of French linguist Gustave Guillaume. . This time that remains is the messianic kairos. Kle ¯sis and kairos. the subject’s experience of time is constructed by the subject in accordance with this ideal representation. Agamben concludes that In every representation we make of time and in every discourse by means of which we define and represent time. This interior time is what Agamben means by messianic time: “the time that time takes to come to an end. 67). formation. and having been constructed. The benefit of operational time is that it adds “a projection in which the process of forming the time-image is cast back onto the time image itself ” (TTR. or. that prevented him from perfectly coinciding with the time out of which he could make images and representations. converts time from a linear to “three-dimensional” entity by which he means it conveys the three moments of temporality: potentiality. for Agamben figuration is a structural 151 . 66) which. and Guillaume calls this operational time or “the time the mind takes to realize a time-image” (TTR. more precisely. Rather.ENJAMBEMENT. Whatever experience of time they undergo they are able to come to represent it as this idealized model in their minds subsequently. insofar as he is a thinking and speaking being. perhaps only an instant but a period all the same. as we know.13 He then adds a modification to this defining messianic time as “the time we need to make time end: the time that is left us” (TTR. Agamben argues. 67) Such an “ulterior time” as he initially calls it is not a supplemental time added onto the exterior of chronological time but a “time within time—not ulterior but interior” (TTR. 66). produced an additional time . .

such a correspondence existed prominently throughout the medieval period. The calling of the “as not” places one’s subjectivity alongside its negation. what concerns us is “a tension that clasps together and transforms past and future. is not important as a “biunivocal correspondence” (TTR. typos. 74). the most famous example of which is that between zoe and bios in Homo Sacer. Agamben is now able to add a third figural term. all things are recapitu¯ro ¯ lated in the messiah. Paul explains that at the messianic moment of total fulfilment of time. although. it is the relation itself” (TTR. while kairatic time places time’s constructed nature against its representation of non-constructed and proper perfection. This means that each instant of messianic 152 . the two elements are heterogeneous. Without getting too lost in the theology of this suffice it to say that if in the messianic kairos there is in the typos a prefigurement of the antitypos. as Agamben says. so too in the antitypos there is a compacted summation of the typos or. To this typological caesuric figuration. the antitypos. Agamben argues. We have already considered comparison and parable in this regard. This results in what might be called the relational tension of the nonrelational. Rather. and yet in a manner in which their proximity naturally calls up some attempt at relation in the form of tension. in an inseparable constellation. that of recapitulation. not a third epoch following the past (typos) and future (antitypos) but the way in which these two epochs are brought face to face with each other by means of their caesura or “zone of indiscernibility. as he considers Paul’s explanation of how all that is past will come to be taken into account at the end of time. he tells us. typos and antitypos. in which the past is dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past” (TTR. This tendency to think of time as a past prefigurement of a future yet to arrive. 76). 74). 74). At this stage then our extended debate on the epochal time of the messianic and our technical considerations of prosody also start to turn to face each other at long last. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this typological relation. This is the epoch of the messianic. ple ¯ ma ton kairon. A good example of this is Adam whose sin acts as a typos or prefiguration of the coming of the messiah and the negation of sin.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN process wherein two conditions are placed alongside each other in a nonrelational fashion. Paul adds one more final figural notion. “messianic ple ¯ ma is therefore an abridgement and anticipation of eschatologi¯ro cal fulfilment” (TTR. typosantitypos.

the temporality of poetry.ENJAMBEMENT. anaphora and cataphora that is the basis of any poem structure and which we have already defined. and even he concedes this may be surprising. The same goes for eschatological time. or an act that demands the called subject “seize hold of his own being seized” (TTR. and the structure of the poem. and eschaton or temporal finitude. One is. able to restate this fairly logically away from the theological philology of Agamben’s text. Any theory of temporal extended linearity must contain some idea of completion and any theory of temporal completion must complete on something. 78). as the very location of poetic thinking: logopoiesis. As soon as Agamben 153 . a kind of small-scale model of messianic time” (TTR. the greatest of which is surely modernity itself. “The tension toward what lies ahead is produced on and out of what lies behind” prompting Agamben to call this the “double tension” of messianic calling. something that is now past. Everything about messianic time recalls the figurality of the poetic. In the kairos of operational time two incommensurable epochs or conceptions of epoch lie alongside each other. each moment of chronological time is prefigured by its completion. A structure such as the kairatic kle depends ¯sis on the precise mix of occurrence and reiteration. is the poetic convention of rhyme. At this point Agamben wisely decides to give “something like a concrete example. This situation is expressed by Agamben as Pauline messianic tension conveyed in the complex term epekteinomenos or straining forward in tension towards something which Paul uses to describe the effect on the subject of kairos due to kle ¯sis. 78). The law of figuration means that because messianic kairatic time extends the eschaton into the chronos. in fact. MESSIANIC RHYME Perhaps now it does not surprise us. As messianic time extends chronos into the eschaton all narratives of completion. by virtue of the metrical-musical element. must first consist of a summation of all that went before. If we step back now from theology entirely we can first explain this more generally in terms of our experience of operational time. chronos or temporal extension. This example. THE TURN OF VERSE kairos effectively fulfils the eschatological moment of immediacy with god rather than conforming to this as a one-off event that occurs at the end of time. and then in relation to poetry.

I have argued in my own study of this phenomena in modern experimental poetry. The final stanza or tornada is then only three lines long but repeats all six end-words placing two per line and always ending on at least one of these. But for the more or less brief time that the poem lasts. Thus in the sestina. A kind of eschatology occurs within the poem itself. The first six stanzas are each six lines long and the six end words are always the same in each stanza. At the same “hermeneutic” time one also picks up on the interplay. it has a specific and unmistakable temporality. one can begin to see how wonderfully this analogy works. effectively. or model is. for example the sonnet. This reading back however comes most to the fore in the tornada where. Agamben’s example is taken from the twelfth-century poet Arnaut Daniel but I have also written some years ago about the use of sestina in John Ashbery. strains towards its end. That said every poem is also a recursive or reiterative structure. every poem unfolds in linear time semiotically marking this out with great clarity by using artificially ended lines which graphically demonstrate chronos much more adeptly than in any other art form. A sestina is made up of seven stanzas. he argues. Thus he says of the closed rhyming lyric form. Put simply. a foundational quality of all poetic structure. all usages of the words thus far are 154 . repetition. You begin to recognize the pattern. Agamben’s analysis of the rhythm of the sestina while most apparent in this poem form is. look to how the next stanza will recombine the six fixed elements and thus one is always reading both forwards and backwards. which necessarily will come to an end as determined by the rule of the form: “The poem is therefore an organism or a temporal machine that. and variance of the use of homologous rhyming end words. example. it has its own time” (TTR. 79).14 The form still operates on occasion in modern poetry in other words. in the case of rhyme.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN describes the poem. in each case. For example. from the very start. although to describe it as analogy. and he is truly gifted in his appreciation of the technicalities of prosody along with the implications of poetic ontology. This is especially true. as one moves towards the predictability of the end. in the penultimate stanza one can predict the distribution of the final end words without reading the stanza simply by looking back at their distribution in the previous six stanzas. the closed form means that in every line the end is prefigured. a fact made most apparent in that rather rare stanzaic form the sestina. only organized in different combinations. insufficient.

poetic structure is far from a mystery. Such a tabular-planar structure. Agamben’s insights take the tabularity of poetic structure far beyond anything anyone else could have imagined. This is the time of the messiah. and. AN ENDLESS FALLING INTO SILENCE Agamben’s insights into the relation between poetic structural tabularity and a post-nihilistic modality of indifferent thinking depend. Poetry is not an example here or not solely exemplary. First he notes how the poem produces an internal disruption of linear time that is not an alternative “poetic time” to replace chronological time.16 This aside. on a shifting interrelational tensile comparative combination between temporal-structural projection and recursion. model or not. in any case the eschaton already fulfils that role. every poem—is a soteriological device which. . as we saw. “on the contrary. While Agamben calls the sestina a “model” of messianic time this same process is observable in the reiterations of symbols in Joyce’s work of novelistic epiphany. The poem does not create a new. through the sophisticated mechane of the announcement and retrieval of rhyming end words (which correspond to typological relations between past and present). but it does have its own time. Nor is the philosophy of time handed over to poetic time.ENJAMBEMENT. The same process is discernible in the rhythmic distribution of lines and colours in Pollock. While I have worked for some years on this project. which I have already posed as the 155 . in order to make place for the time of the poem” or what he also calls its “cruciform retrogradation” (TTR. of course. 83). post-chronological time. in this sense. what we have is the same time that organizes itself through its own somewhat hidden internal pulsation. . 82). or indeed leitmotifs in Wagner. THE TURN OF VERSE recalled in their final combination. especially his most recent work Inland Empire whose very title expresses the reliance on his work on precisely this anaphoric-cataphoric internal matrix of developmental reiteration. and the narrative structures of the films of David Lynch. This matrix I have called the anaphoric-cataphoric matrix of every poem. converting the poem from a linear-horizontal entity to a tabular planar form. Agamben explains: “The sestina—and. the time that the poem takes to come to an end” (TTR. transforms chronological time into messianic time . the time of the end.15 In miniature therefore we have the whole basis of Agamben’s logopoiesis.

lodged within the trans-psychological definition of hesitation such as it is or ontological hesitation. Rather this felt hesitation moves one into another realm of hesitation as such. Then one must dismiss hesitation as sensation without entirely dispensing with it. one is likely to have recourse to a line-break and an example. recursive. a philosophical hesitation. and return to our original debate on poetic. you do not need to experience a linebreak every time you wish to think about prolonged hesitation.17 This difficulty pertaining to the actual nature of the experience of hesitation. 156 . evental element. betimes. categorical hesitation. for a time. if only to confirm that enjambement is a recursive rather than unique. and when one wants philosophically to speak of hesitation as such. advental finitude. stems for the most part from the well-documented and complex relation one finds in poetry between the sensuous and the suprasensuous which differentiates it from philosophy and other arts that share with poetry the emphasis on semiotics. but you do need to have experienced a line-break to think this way and to be sure of experiencing it at least more than once. It leaves.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN way in which poetry thinks. Agamben immediately asks the question: What is a hesitation if one ceases to think of it psychologically? A hesitation of such an order. most notably music. affective or intellectual. in a phenomenological reading. For an unveiling of philosophical. When one does experience a line-break one is likely to experience the opening up of the truth of hesitation. and tabular structure. but also structurally at the two extremes of the poem body. tension. We must now remove ourselves from messianic time. a trace of psychological pause. cannot be separated from the original experience of hesitation that one undergoes every time one reads poetry. in particular through a consideration of the ends or limits of the poem and their dependence on certain ideas of silence. one must first experience hesitation as sensation. must surely be beyond an actually felt hesitation such as one experiences at the end of a line of poetry. is dependent on the permanent tension within the poetic line certainly. what is hesitation in thought without the knowledge of an experience of hesitation in the world? Or to pose the issue in different terms. Yet philosophical. quasi-universal. for hesitation as theme and/or category. hesitation true for all time as it were. and propositional hesitation. Hesitation is not the localized emotional experience of hesitating yet. as a thinker. Having assured us that poetry is a “prolonged hesitation” between sound and sense.

Poetry has nothing to do directly with the object.19 This is an unadmitted but now quite familiar aporia in modern philosophical work on poetry. is laid out through precisely the reading of specific poets and their singularly inventive effects. because after all sounds as such do not interest Agamben but voiced sounds. and that aesthetics. but the Voice as such. Derrida. and poiesis is not necessarily poetry. the two hesitations of verse. at which point he behaves almost like a literary critic. This is an issue that occurs repeatedly in Heidegger. not literally from a voice. A prolonged hesitation between sound and sense.18 Certainly truth precedes. definable at the very least as a thing. He applies truth to poetic sensation so as to be able. are not separated by a caesura or clear-edged cut but are two strands of a single folded line whose essence resides not in the event of a hesitation as such but in its prolongation. and Nancy and their use of what one can term epistemological exemplarity in relation to their reading of certain poems by certain poets as exemplary of the general conditions of poiesis. The conceptualization of poetry in philosophy is never tied either to a particular poem or any one of its singular effects manifested in a clear set of differentiations: poetry is not in the poem per se. sensation. sensation. such a delay between voice and meaning which Agamben likens to a katechon 157 . say as an inventive mode of bringing truth to presence. the poem. Although Agamben denies it. between the dying away of a voiced vibration. yet truth always proceeds from the sensible at the same time. the science of sensation. in this way. to clear a future pathway for truth in what is a high-risk yet now essential intellectual strategy. while simultaneously sailing the ship of truth most perilously proximate to the ruining rocks of sensation. truth. Yet the pathway to poetry. yet it always proceeds from a poem in Heidegger and all his students. is not dependent on aiesthesis. a word heard and its meaning. Of all the philosophers in this rowdy school of logopoiesis Agamben carries the burden of post-Heideggerian tragic philosophy closest to the truth-freedoms of verse. and then by using these techniques to mount a post-nihilistic metaphysics of indifference. not a physiological voice imprinted on a psychological capability. THE TURN OF VERSE Heidegger clearly states that aletheia. from sensation. First by applying a philosophical category to the technical specifics of prosody. a project so vast it all but overwhelms his slight work on prosody. psychologically-actual and philosophical-conceptual.ENJAMBEMENT. is not the name to be given to twentieth-century work on poiesis. Badiou.

If this is. Such an abyss is not to be mistaken for silence either for. as poets teach us. as I contend. Thus a poem. a kind of silence.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN or “something which slows and delays the advent of the Messiah. This would require here a differentiation between what the poem is as ergon partaking of an impossible. nothing is said therein. as they pause on the precipice of their own self-conscious. having stated that “all poetic institutions participate in this noncoincidence” of which we speak here. semiotic and semantic. Yet the poem is also an ergon. that is. namely the opposition between metric and semantic pauses. is silence. 158 . and between actual opposition and possible or potential opposition. self-dissolution. Poetry partakes of a local. Agamben progresses towards the point of silence that is the end of the poem. The poem is. self-willed. self-negating finitude. singular and impossible to repeat. between sound and sense. that is rendered mute. differentiations between the poetic. Through such careful distinctions between orders of silence. unlike poetry or at least its tension. fulfilling the time of poetry and uniting its two eons. Instead poetry can be defined as the prolonged hesitation. repeatable. for poetry cannot survive its own finitude. a perception of the tension of poetry. of him who. poetry. 114). 110). would destroy the poetic machine by hurling it into silence” (EP. a single body of work which means that it must and indeed already has come to an end. between two units. general but not universal silence. the poem of a silence which is not local but over there. universal but not generalizable. then there must be at least two orders of silence. Even as the poem is falling into a profound silence at its material and generic limits. according to this. and the poem. For example. is defined by a silence brought about by its finitude meaning that poetry is never silenced. the sounding cataract is any thing but mute. Poetry is not silence per se but instead consists of the abyss into which poetry is thrown by the very possibility of its own being. he points out that the poem is “grounded in the perception of the limits and endings that define— without ever fully coinciding with. it remains in full as the hesitant voice within these impossible limits. and almost in intermittent dispute with—sonorous (or graphic) units and semantic units” (EP. This being the case poetry is not precisely the opposition between sound and sense but the possibility of the opposition between two types of hesitation. and what poetry is as that which goes on in the poem but which is not susceptible to or reducible to the poem.

The body as such of poetry does not exist without that body suffering a moment of cutting or caesura. hesitantly. like the poet. that the poem body is constructed from the accumulation of poetry’s delaying of the arrival of silence at its limits from which the ergon is born. but this space is of the order of a boundary condition: the line exits on the right and always enters to the left. then the ergon could not continually come to 159 .ENJAMBEMENT. It may be useful analogously to think of this in relation to what physicists call a “boundary condition” when studying planes. surfaces were invented by the devil. I am always delaying its arrival. As the physicist Pauli was fond of saying: “God made the bulk. Poetry must be ceaselessly. First that ergon is brought to its limitation and finitude by the infinite presence of the parergonal space-place which is also the time of its completion. this can only be an illustrative analogy. and locally cutting off. as I said. as if one has to somehow hack off a limb for the human body to be complete. or a tail. A boundary condition of a hexagonal crystal. Although. A plane only becomes a surface when an actual cut is made in the infinitely extendable plane. A plane is always defined as being imaginary because it is infinitely extendable in every two-dimensional direction. a space which is inarticulate. for the poem to know of its finitude and be complete. This means that the second sense of ergon is continually born to presence from the already existent presence of the par-ergon. it simultaneously exists through the bottom line á la Pacman. some remnant of our animalistic past. This is another way in which one could read Agamben. that jagged chasm to the right of the poem. for example. Without the internal space. Space must be present for enjambement to occur for example. The poem must be cut-off in order to be complete.” A plane becomes a surface when the boundary condition is suspended and the edge of a structure bounded by a vacuum occurs. THE TURN OF VERSE I must speak of silence but. a silent space that is not silence. The ergon is nothing other than the production of delaying time-space within a space opened up and delimited by the imposition of an exterior to the poem in the form of the parergon of silent space. We can deduce from this line of reasoning that the ergon of the poem is defined by two concepts uncomfortable in each other’s presence and yet not contradictory. all the same a space of a similar structural order can be said to exist in some form internal to the poem. states that if something enters through the top line of the structure. a part of the body of the poem on the page or in the book but not a part of the poem body as such.

THE LITERARY AGAMBEN being. while differentiating the semiotic and semantic unit does not make a clear distinction between sonorous or graphic semiotics unearthing a rare moment of indistinction in his meticulous work. constructions of the representability of an idealized construction of a concept that. the final moment of finitude that is singular and plunges the ergon of poetry into infinite. the body puts off by its extension and yet invites by the structural necessity of its completion. Second. silent sense. is either thinkable and unrepresentable. Is there any actual silence within the body of the text? I would argue not. enjambement as boundary condition. like time. either a profound error on the part of the philosopher or we are still considering silence psychologically and not philosophically. alinear prose? Agamben. In speaking of silence. relies on two competing convocations with its borders. merely perceptions of silence. the potentially endless and thus infinite fake silence between one line and the next. however. Surely the silence of sound is an actual silence while the silence of the grapheme. is not silent at all but simply unpronounced. The ergon of the poem body. the unpronounced and the uninscribed. What is silence? Was that it? Is it after the question mark or between these lines? Is it even possible to encounter silence within a text such as this so clearly an example of discursive quasi-philosophical. this consonance which was previously forgivable is harder to support. Agamben suggests that true silence only occurs once one has exited the text and entered the abyss of sense which has no requirement of 160 . First. it would seem. then. This is the moment of the plane becoming a surface. or represented in unthinkable fashion. utilizing messianic time. A finitude which. There are pauses. There is. gestural support. The perception of this double deconstructive presence of absence within the ergon of poetry is what the poem as such is reducible to. but no silence as such. Nor is it even space as such but simply the uninscribed medium. by which one can only mean space. which the poem invites into its body so as to expel it and thus allow itself to endlessly be born into being. or as-yet blank tablet.

Only the human knows of the quietude of the caesura. without finding in this its own name. While nature and animals are forever caught up in a language. sensibly. the name of poetry. in a Heideggerian gesture. Only the human animal can establish the quality of exteriority as regards language. This silence is the silence of philosophy of which Agamben says. only man succeeds in interrupting. not in other words as the cessation of speaking (surely what he means by a psychological hesitation).20 This being the case one must engage with the profound and complex conception of the idea of word in Agamben. which is anything but a sign. philosophy’s word leaves unsaid its own silence” (IP. the infinite language of nature and placing himself for a moment in front of mute things. once the following essay. The word as such. This complex negotiation with a silence which exposes philosophy to a period without name which is not. “but silence of the word itself.” has engaged with the silence of philosophy. absolutely without identity. is the conclusion of the essay “The Idea of Silence. or an utterance. We now know that this encounter most powerfully occurs at the end of the poem. exists only for man. “The Idea of Language. Here then we finally understand what Agamben means when he states that animals are always within language. however. to me at least. in the word. The inviolate rose. because man is the sole animal who learns language through infancy. (IP. it endures the without-name. an exteriority of the word that Agamben. 113). rather. of interrupting words with the as-suchness of the word of language whose defining quality. Silence is not its secret word—but rather. is silence. the becoming visible of the word: the idea of language” (IP. the idea of the rose.” an essay which only speaks. incessantly speaking and responding to signs even while keeping silent. 113) Paradoxically. 111). Here Agamben defines silence not as the suspension of discourse. human living being as such through the faculty of language: Only the word puts us in contact with mute things. THE TURN OF VERSE textuality to exist at all. describes as silence. 161 . the becoming visible but remaining silent word is. he is the only creature capable of not having language. by which I mean the quality which allows it definition and availability to our apprehension. an entity beyond the trivial differentiations of sonorous versus graphic.ENJAMBEMENT. philosophy stands exposed. in what is almost a cryptogram: “In silence.

one is struck by how singularity is always immediately ruined by its repeatability. pure impurity as indicated first by the way he structurally treats the semantic and the semiotic as ostensibly of the same order. Prose literally overwhelms poetry in the following line. There is. for at the end of the poem. If one were to think back to the Derridean conception of invention.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN As Agamben says. which is also always the final line. but it is an unavoidable reality however unpleasant. in the final verse. the end of the poem is marked by a change in the tension between the units of semiotics and semantics which is poetry. Yet Agamben is a thinker of another order of perfect. one condition always simultaneously the pre-condition and impossibility of the other. but which is often termed deconstruction as a form of intellectual short-hand in quasitranscendental self-critical thought. after a prolonged hesitation.” While clear that the semiotic and the semantic are both radically heterogeneous and of differing 162 . Left to its own devices the poetry machine. there is no enjambement. to resume the semantic stream. and literally collapses back into this alterity as the next line commences. as I have termed it elsewhere. no pure poetry. Certainly Derrida is the thinker of a certain type of pure impurity. One could almost argue that the concept of enjambement in Agamben’s work is a graphic and thus grammatological presentation of what is unpresentable in Derrida’s work as a whole. thus granting us finally access to the realm of pure poetry.21 will continue its demonstration of deconstructive energies almost as an illustrative tool for Derrida’s work. semiotics and semantics. Poetry. and Agamben’s work seems similar in the way he establishes two oppositional concepts. and leaves them suspended in an almost endless dynamic of supersession and negation. is itself an impurity between poetic techniques and prose. ironically pure semiotics does not hold sway. only to be literally interrupted and superseded at the line’s outermost point. in fact. rather. TENSION: THE ONE LINE The impurity of poetry surely seems an untenable position within a post-Heideggerian theorization of poetic singularity as a mode of thinking such as I am proposing here. At this point where the semiotics of the poetic line are unable. They are both units within an “almost intermittent dispute. Poetry is literally elevated above its dyadic other at the end of the line.

Agamben naturally frames the issues with greater facility when he eloquently states: Everything is complicated by the fact that in the poem there are not. Without quibbling over an extra dimension here and there. at the moment of deus ex machina. the machine 163 .ENJAMBEMENT. there is but one line that is simultaneously traversed by the semantic current and the semiotic current. The metaphor of flow is a well established one in reference to prosody and is essential to sustain the interruptive power of enjambement’s “sharp interval” in the form of mechane. what we can be certain of is Agamben seems to take the geometric presence of poetry backwards away from two (three) dimensions. Interestingly. (Sound and sense are not two substances but two intensities. strictly speaking. favouring instead a one dimensional and yet also trans-dimensional single line. repetitious mechanistic element of prosody with which we are all familiar. the caesura for the semantic) constantly. Rather. and finally a tension or tone. issues that would be strongly foregrounded by Derrida. but also the ancient Greek origin of the term in relation to the end of a play. dianoia and poiesis. two tonoi of the same linguistic substance). a model which echoes Agamben’s own description of operational time. And between these two currents lies the sharp interval obstinately maintained by poetic mechane. two series or lines in parallel flight. for example. rescinded. which in reality means very uneasily. suggesting that Agamben does not so much ignore the radical incommensurability between sense and matter. as commit an act of violence to both so as to make them enter into the prison of the line with the promise of parole (enjambement for the semiotic. THE TURN OF VERSE orders of magnitude. for Agamben they can both be fitted to a pattern of similar units. Both are equally out of their element in the line. a line which metamorphoses first into a current. The machine of poetry referred to here is not simply the technical. potentialityformation-having been constructed. but intermittently. (EP. The semantic can just as easily occupy the unit of the line as the semiotic. then a machine. incipit-interruption-continuation. 114) Here Agamben gives supporting evidence to my earlier claim that the planar essence of poetry means that it must always be thought of as a two-dimensional plane consisting of the three points of the poetic line. which somewhat misleadingly he calls three-dimensional.

Keep up the tension in the line. enmeshed as it is into the very lines of prosody. We will plunge to our death unless the tension in the lines is maintained. Am I flying through the second act or being carried beyond the play entirely and into the realm of the gods at the end of the third? I look across and I see you also suspended by the bodiless limb of a crane. and metre of verse. and its obviation in the recommencement of the line within the planar territory I am calling the poem. Second that it is a theory of the obvious and its obviation. the tonoi of poetry. and a figuration of the literal implied transcendence at the end of every Greek work of art. Its complexities lie first in the apparent proximity of this theory and the work of Derrida. that way they can never become truly entangled. Like invention. flying. especially in relation to invention and the trace. first that it marks out an axiom for poetics which we scholars of poetry can recognize. thus it allows a literalization of a kind of localized transcendence. The semiotic and the semantic are not differential terms but two tones within one single linguistic substance. I have forgotten everything. my lines and cues. tension. I need a gag. I feel the tension of the tonoi of the line of poetry as it suspends me above the plane of the stage below. and like the trace it is a theory of intermittent and almost interminable spacing. Don’t come too close. enjambement puts forward a theory of necessarily betrayed purity. In addition.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN of art was regularly used both to end the work and also to allow characters to fly. but what does Agamben mean by suggesting that the semiotic and the semantic are not radically heterogeneous and different also in magnitude. No wait. the lines with get entangled. unlike the deconstructive mechane.22 Yet unlike Derrida the impurity of the line is permanently under question. they may form knots. I am giddy. the zone wherein language can communicate itself “without remaining unsaid in what is said?” Is this a certain philosophical silence as linguistic substance as such? Agamben’s theory of enjambement is as complex as it is obvious. that instead they are two tones/tensions/stresses within the same linguistic substance? What linguistic substance can this be? Is this the language of which he speaks at the end of the poem. or the moment when the material copy of essence is abandoned and essence alone remains: Deus. Tono in Latin is the tone. which are separate strands but not different from each 164 . Obvious in two ways. of the obstacle to sense that the premature line-ending constructs.

and the recursive cataphora that the poem experiences at the very moment of its negation through finitude. At which point. but the occupation of the time it takes time to end. For time to come to an end it must find within itself the interval between prefigurement and recursiveness brought about by the impossibility and yet necessity of a local and structurally final relationship with silence. in the endless falling into silence that defines the end of the poem. and silence at the end of the poem. presents us with a messianic event of events. in enacting an endlessly falling into silence rather than a structural point of cessation. we experience messianic silence as the prefigured anaphora of absolute finitude of each local ending. something will happen. and of which we have a local example at the end of each line that is a psychological hesitation different in kind from silence as such but somehow its key. eschatological silence. unlike perhaps in the work of Derrida. therefore. Instead in each instance of time the time of the end. the time it takes for finitude to come to a point of tension or dissolution. chronological silence. for example at the end of the line. not the end of time or even the very last event. This is not to be conceived of eschatologically as one last event of course. a messianic event. for Agamben this event will be the final event. for Agamben poetry is in preparation for the event to come. Unlike Badiou. The poem excels in messianic temporality. Its unique combinatory structure of prefigured recursiveness is meaningless without a direct and complex relation with an absolute point of finitude: the end of the poem. This end. who himself admits to a sparse number of events. In a form of agreement with Badiou. 165 . will come to an end as the poem must also come to an end. however. is inserted into time as such or everyday vulgar temporality as Heidegger calls it. Rather the messianic temporality of the interval is the interruptive event of the cessation of the temporal succession chronos-eschaton. THE TURN OF VERSE other.ENJAMBEMENT. Between silence in the line.

As he says in caesuric cadence: “The rhythmic transport that gives the verse its impetus is empty. the caesura of verse. Voice here is not the transport 166 . This allows Agamben to note that “For the poet. He takes Penna’s horse to be the voice or the word as utterance whose measured equine progress can only be arrested by the logos. 43) represented by the couplet from Penna “I go towards the river on a horse / which when I think a little a little stops. while for an instant the horse of poetry is stopped” (IP. 43). the caesura—for a little—thinks. Agamben declares this couplet to be a treatise on the subject of the caesura before composing one of his many allegories. Yet thought within the context of the poetic line is not of equal measure to that of the thinking of philosophy one finds at the line’s limits as the semiotic steed of haltered poetics gives way to the license of discourse. holds in suspense. The place of thought in the poem is the caesura. Agamben remarks on the “breaking action of the caesura” (IP. Rather. is thought” (IP.CHAPTER 6 CAESURA. namely thinking as such. this thought is another. 44). the element that arrests the metrical impetus of the voice. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT THE CAESURA The essay proceeding directly from “The Idea of Prose.” Agamben’s first attempt to define poetry in terms of enjambement is entitled “The Idea of Caesura.”1 Invoking an ancient European exegetical tradition which takes the horse to represent the “sound and vocal element of language” (IP. And it is this emptiness which. more fundamental or alternate mode of thinking.” Speaking specifically of the Italian poet Sandro Penna. 43). is only the transport of itself. as pure word. We now have a clear answer to a question I posed earlier.

and the end of the poem.” Agamben is able to conclude thus on thinking: “Where the voice drops. thought is not semantic discourse. the only venues within a line of poetry inhospitable to the caesura are at the beginning of the line. considering that the Latin origins of the term caesura inculcate it into the violent rites of cutting and separation. Similarly. including the poem’s incipit. This congeniality within prosodic flow to its own negation except at poetic 167 . here asleep on his horse. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT of expression nor the silent Voice of metaphysical nihilism. and that it effects the ultimate violence to prosody by its interruption of linear flow. thought ventures forth” (IP. where breath is lacking. arrest. and ecstatic thinking is presented in such a way that later in the book. 44). but the infantile voice of language as such. in the essay “The Idea of Thought. This pause most commonly occurs at the medial position. However its most common usage is of course the imposition of an audible pause within a line often but not always indicated by punctuation (in the Penna verse not for reasons peculiar to Italian prosody). Surprisingly.CAESURA. As we are well aware this is all Agamben craves and we might now name this as the essential precondition of all logopoiesis. One such little sign in prosody is the comma. Poetry is presented here as the sleep of thought and yet not until the poet is lulled by the cadence of hooves on grass and road can they be woken into thinking as such and that only when the horse of verse is arrested. is any word ending that did not coincide with the cessation of a metrical foot. for example. Thus the interplay between flow. hesitantly. awakens and contemplates for an instant the inspiration that carries him—he thinks nothing else but his voice”’ (IP. If the voice in the poem is gestic transport as such the interruption of pure transport by thought is simply a moment wherein thinking is able to think the pure word without the imposed differentiation of word and world that so troubles the end of the line. a little sign remains suspended. Thus caesura was originally any displaced footing within the seamlessness of prosodic flow. but a much more “poeticized” idea of thinking. The classical definition of a caesura. 104). Yet the comma is not a necessary element of caesura. the most common representation of caesuric pausing itself often reproduced in prosody by the so-called double pipes ||. prose as we might name it. On nothing other than that. “The poet. not a pause for thought so much as a slight stumble. but there are also initial caesura that are imposed close to the beginning of the line and terminal caesura which occur close to or at the end of the line. mid-line.

In the ideal antithetical couplet a line is divided exactly in two by a caesura. In enjambement flow overtakes meaning and the space at the right hand side of the poem is negated by linear. Men. By contrast in the caesura the steady and irresistible progress of verse is suspended by the merest hint of a sign. quiet and strife. The presupposed flow of the poetic line is interrupted by the imposition internally of semantics so that stress is cut across by meaning through regularized and predictable caesurae. Here is a particularly misogynistic and yet prosodically perfect example from Pope’s “Epistle to a Lady on the Characters of Women”: Men. then bound together by rhyme to a second line which may echo the antithesis of the first or. operate as antithesis to the antithesis. But ev’ry Lady would be Queen for life.” each “odd” line eradicates harmony in terms of balance by making demonstrative an excess of one quality (pleasure) or unrealistic demands for which there can be no compromise: all women would be sovereign over a kingdom devoid of subjects. demonstrating prosodic femininity here as “Matter too soft a lasting mark to bear. some to Pleasure take.2 The first “male” line uses caesura to emulate the poise of the couplet unit within the line balancing the oppositions of eighteenth-century bios: business and pleasure.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN advent and total formal finitude suggests that caesura is an internal concern of the poem body. Yet. transversal exuberance. Thus the place for thinking is a space within verse that works directly in opposition to enjambement. Over the many thousands of years of European prosody the caesura has been used to various effects. in effect. here. to allow time for thought to think the conditions of its own transport and its dependence on arrest. Indeed the lack of caesura at the line’s incipit is simply a form of conventional display for. Then semiotics 168 . In a sense this is the most perfect example of the tonos of poetry. but its greatest application is surely the double duality of the classical couplet revived in the English tradition by Dryden and Pope as the Heroic and eventually antithetical couplet. some to public Strife. some to Quiet. terminal caesura can also be taken for true initial caesura. some to Bus’ness. and in this momentary. enough to open a gap in flow. ecstatic space. But ev’ry Woman is at heart a Rake.

Meanwhile. . at the same juncture prosody. of course. As he says of the problematic of life as a definition of being in The Open: For anyone undertaking a genealogical study of the concept of “life” in our culture. terminal enjambement of the perfectly balanced Heroic couplet designed to halt and formalize the profligacy of the endlessly over-running Miltonic couplet. with rhyme introducing a projective recursion that. is indicative of messianic time but also the tabular trans-linear dimensionality not just of poetic structure but of poetic thinking as a whole. The most fully developed and perhaps important of these caesurae is that to be found internal to the very definition of human ontology. Then. a three-way tension indeed. The verse unit is born of a tension first between flow and interruption. . the implied separation between lines that occurs due to enjambement. At the same time. a temporal-spatial self-consciousness is mapped across the neutrality of these two terms. even the zero. If flow is the presupposition of the poem then the first caesura negates the semiotic in favour of the semantic. yet immediately in the second line flow inundates sense. everything happens as if. arrest and flow. is undermined by the coincidence of sound across two syllables and/or words located each time at the final point of the line. the next line is ready to burst its stops and race ahead. as we now know. And yet. The resumption of the line would then seem to be a victory for thinking. in our culture. its transport.CAESURA. When with the second cut discourse is able to impose a damn on flow and pause for thought. and its temporal-spatial matrix is the ultimate tonos of poetry in the service of the transport and arrest of thinking. This tension. life. Yet at the instance of the cut we now know that meaning is interrupted not prosody. this thing that remains indeterminate gets articulated and divided time and again through a series of caesurae and oppositions . one of the first and most instructive observations to be made is that the concept never gets defined as such. takes hold of the line and refers meaning back against the current to the preceding end word. between thought. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT is reinstated as flow commences and the artificiality of the line ending reminds one that the poem is more horse than waking. Agamben uses the term caesura regularly in his essays when speaking of the numerous and problematic acts of scission performed by negative metaphysics. then between interruption and flow. life were what 169 . through the agency of rhyme.

13) The caesura Agamben is considering here is that between the human and the animal. as he more commonly terms it. yet at the same time no caesura is momentous either. resumption suspension. imposes upon it a permanent indistinction. the cut and the cut of the cut. The interruption of thinking. something we observed in relation to the (/) or barred caesura in the sign between gramma and phone. (O. in this manner. the first division. namely in-definition or. The caesura initially performs a negative function directly at odds with his earlier valorization of the term as the basis for thinking thought. Rather the caesura in separating a term off with the desire of imposing definitional distinction instead inculcates said term into a mechanism of division and articulation which. is meaningless and indeed inoperative until that division is divided from itself and cast back into linear flow. must be ceaselessly articulated and divided. then it articulates lineation as the transport of thinking. Human life for Agamben. for example. rather than defining the term life here. The same indeed is true of the end of the line and its relation to enjambement. Life ceases to be a definition of something and instead. it comes to be the very definition of the problem of definition as such. This more developed definition of caesura as a mode of thinking division in terms of relation now allows us to return to prosodic caesura and see that when Agamben uses the term caesura in metaphysics he is being more than simply metaphorical. In the poem body suspension always results in resumption. and yet as his comments show the essence of the caesura is not simply scission. does not define human life per se but the idea of human life as both separate from and intrinsically linked to the animal.3 First the caesura divides the line. In terms of the act of caesura within the poem we perceive that there are always two cuts. through the operations of the caesura as that which both divides and conjoins. The caesura is not possessed of finitude any more than of inventiveness or evental 170 . precisely for this reason. except at the moments of poetic advent and finitude. No caesura is. Yet. and rather stands for its own inability to take on definition as the energetic source of its ongoing productive presence in ontology as the basis of that which both divides and articulates. if we look again at the definition of life in terms of caesura we find a productive negation. yet. indistinction. Life then comes to stand not so much for something like biological existence. permanent.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN cannot be defined.

Aside from being a masterclass in the extendibility and power of caesuric prosody. should be like in fame. the woodland and the plain. (line b) caesura. Here earth and water. One is always already in the midst of poetry. harmonious whole.” This last is perhaps the best prosodic-graphematic demonstration of the stanza of messianic time in that the antithesis is embedded within an extended caesuric zone between the first and second comma. enjambement. Live in description. vanish’d now so long. all agree. (SP. seem to strive again. the caesura always cuts in the midst. the cut and the cut of the cut. all agree.CAESURA. The tone of balance resides in the perfect tension of the four combined and yet separate units. 20) Here we can observe basic antithesis across a caesura. enjambement. and look green in song: These. Unexpectedly perhaps. “And where. Rather. “Here hills and vales.” While Pope conjures for us a world of balance encased in the harmony of the bi-linear couplet. harmoniously confus’d: Where order in variety we see. seem to strive again”. and finally the caesuric cut of the cut internalized in the space of one line. This world of harmonious tension is both described and performed in the opening lines of Pope’s “Windsor Forest”: The groves of Eden. should be like in fame”. the woodland and the plain. Here hills and vales. were my breast inspir’d with equal flame. these two acts of violence. Like them in beauty. Not Chaos like together crush’d and bruis’d. and the same is true of life. result in classical poetics in a perfectly balanced. harmonious oxymoronic implied semantic caesura “harmoniously confus’d: / Where order in variety we see”. the section in question also provides the perfect razo de trobar of prosody summarized by the phrase “harmoniously confused. all reliant on the counting and positioning of stress: (line a) caesura. / Here earth and water. tho’ all things differ. the medio or mean point. And where. tho’ all things differ. “like them in beauty. double caesuric antithesis. This is both true of poetic caesurae and the general logic of the caesura such as one finds in The Open or indeed between zoe and bios in Homo Sacer and State of Exception (2003). THE SPACE OF THOUGHT status. at the same time every two lines 171 . But as the world.

gathers within itself the recursion of that which went before. at the moment of reading on into meaning development one always lags behind in some manner in sonic. semiotic consonance. For rhyme. concomitantly the first caesura is always a touch weakened in that one is already thinking ahead to its rhyme and also the strong sense of local completion the couplet always provides. while powerfully semiotic. Although Agamben does not consider it in these terms. or enjambement where the obverse is true. however. unless one ends the poetic line with the first sy/Llable and commences the next with the second. but 172 . and yet also recursive. sura cannot occur is within the word (as I have just demonstrated). and thus the shifting of the metrical–musical element between semiotics (langue) and semantics (parole) becomes the metrical–musical–semantic element. it provides the semiotic rules to sense what the next rhyme might be. in rhyme thought and language combine to produce a word-based semiotics that is both predictive. while enjambement is equal to chronos in that at the point of the line’s eschaton it overleaps finitude and imposes a retrograde return to sense. Unlike the caesura where thought interrupts poetry. The caesura represents the eschaton. and indeed that is all they are gestic and meaningless prosodic devices. before the push and pull of lineation can continue. in French Alexandrines. The only place internal to the poem that a cae. Yet the inclusion of rhyme suggests instead a messianic moment that does not rise out of this stuttering continuum but uncovers a solution to the metaphysical logic of the caesura internal to the poem itself. but in most sophisticated prosody there is a wide use of initial and terminal caesurae. is dependent on semantics to perform. say. The caesura of classical prosody tends to what is called the medial but this is not compulsory as. Left to their own devices. The caesura of English tends also to the medial rising to a degree of compulsarity in Old and Middle English verse. If every second caesura is more forceful in that it cataphorically holds back flow.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN there is a moment of cataphoric recursion as the second rhyme is tabulated backwards to its previous rhyme partner. in that it interrupts the linear progression of the line. the couplet contains the very basis of poetry’s capability to think through the tabular-planar metrical agency of a continuation that contains within it the projection of its ending and a cut or completion that. interruption and flow retain poetic tonos. What is significant here is the means by which rhyme provides the potential solution to the tensile cut of the cut of the caesura– enjambement matrix.

a frame at all for it has no continuity. or a meta-linear version of its localized prosodic effects of flow and interruption. is not a pause but an endless falling into the silence of philosophy on the part of poetry. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT even this is that peculiar form of terminal caesura called enjambement. poems are not of the same order as flowers. Similarly the end of the poem. therefore. similarly voice. What does the terminally or edge-restricted mobility of the caesura tell us? Certainly that the poem’s advent is not a continuation or a type of universal poetic flow. The spacesilence made parergonal frame around the poem is not. a cyclical loop. Also of some significance is the fact that all caesuric cuts occur “after” flow. these at the moment of advent and finitude. If they are in possession of finitude then not of this order. the presence of messianic time within the poem is dependent on a traditional and to some degree problematic designation of the poem as a strictly delimited body. Poems are not rocks. In this way. two forms of exterior space to the poem body. Where the poem begins is of another order to where it ends and the two edges of its finitude will never meet. For those of us well versed in prosody this is highly satisfying as it is true that an enjambement 173 . Just as the end of the line has no commonality to the incipit due to the ban on the caesura at the point of the line’s inception. There are. contrary to its internal structure.CAESURA. The poem as a whole or thing is not. even if the poem is part of a sequence. therefore. The caesura is the essential complement to enjambement. even if they are poems in a sequence. The two edges of a poem’s frame will never meet. so that the point of the end of the line is radically dissimilar to its incipit. and two forms of silence cocooning the voice. or the line. a miniaturized rule of some value when one comes to consider the very limits of the ergon. the parergon will always slice open the finitude of the ergon. in this light. never before it. so too the beginning of a poem does not take up the line from the end of the last poem. only two operative interdictions on caesuric scission. There are. Therefore. as we have seen. This is in contradistinction to the end of one line and the commencement of the next which are always in communion with each other. If enjambement instigates the event of the poetic by interrupting discourse with voice and semiotic material rhythm. perpetually meeting and departing from their assignation. Logopoiesis is an internal affair that occurs inside verse but which does not delimit verse. is interrupted by thought or by the silence that is apparently endemic to contemporary thinking.

the next. As is regularly commented on. intermittent and hesitant silence. for example. This simple consonance of oppositions is now clearer to us being typical.4 Agamben’s reasoning for this symbiotic relation between interruption and overflowing would be that both caesura and enjambement stem from different pathways to the same. APOTROPAICS Lurking in the final words of Stanzas is Agamben’s early summation of his appreciation of the necessity to turn to poetry to resolve certain issues pertaining to negativity that had scuppered the great hulk of metaphysics in its journey towards the thing as such of thought. The line arrested in the centre is the reversal of this flood of semiotics. A control of this rhythmic effect is an additional prosody still relatively mysterious to literary criticism which I have termed “line measure” or the metrical counting of the line as a rhythmic unit rather than solely the syllable. either to thought or to poetry.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN more likely than not either follows from or is followed by a caesura. Enjambement only occurs at moments when the thought is too big for the line pushing the caesura into the middle of the next line. Concomitantly. a caesura midline leaves few syllables in the line to commence a new thought making another enjambement very probable. The line broken at the end then is the influx of the voice inundating thought and for a moment erasing it. of the parallelism of the comparison. its ripples spreading out through the lines and the calm surface of the poem taking some time/ lines to settle down once more. It also conveys the messianic moment of a stilled 174 . or even in the case of real thinkers such as Milton and Wordsworth. This hesitation is two-fold because the manner in which language has been lost to us is double. stopping the flow and for a second eradicating the voice entirely with a momentary. the ideal of the poetic line is the exact match between syllables and thought so that all caesurae occur at the end of the line. leading Agamben to look to the Greek sense of harmonia as “a laceration that is also a suture. You will recall he is speaking here of the tensile harmony to be located in the work of Heraclitus. the idea of a tension that is both the articulation of a difference and unitary” (ST. event: the prolonged hesitation between sound and sense that constitutes poetry. Thus enjambement works like a stone cast into a still pool. momentarily held. or the next. 157).

“Faithful to this apotropaic project. I am speculating. speaking of Heidegger’s rediscovery of the harmony of harmonies between philosophy and poetry. then silenced by philosophy—there was the harmony between interruption and flow. whose signification had appeared to the dawning of Greek thought 175 . should then be transferred to the numericalacoustic sphere. a double harmony. While within the acoustical realm—the originary voice of poetry before it was split. There was.CAESURA. if I read this compacted section correctly. where it is still possible to discern the solidarity between signification and metaphysical articulation. 157) There was a time. Then there was the harmony between the monstrative and acoustical harmonies with. Of this Agamben says. Thus there was philosophical harmony mirrored by poetic harmony and then a harmony between the two. were not placed on either side of a false bar or division as is articulated in the theory of the sign. philosophy playing the role of visibility/interruption. Harmony names. but also the rule of poetry which is defined by the tension between interruption and flow. and remember harmony here means just as much division as it does unification. Speaking of the term harmony in Heraclitus Agamben notes that for the Greek the idea of harmony pertained precisely to its invisibility. not the eradication of division and unity but the tensile suspension of the metaphysical foundational categories of difference and identity. He then adds: That this articulation. the cut that is cut. still belongs to the tactile-visible sphere. for Heraclitus. is the Idea of Prose that is manifest in the early work and reconstituted first as potentiality and then as messianic time in the later. which. locating harmony as a basis for being in concealment within the visible realm. testifies to a decisive turn in Western thought. therefore. appropriated. and poetry invisibility/flow. This harmony of harmonies. One can now also see that harmony not merely names an ideal state of being in the universe as it did for the Greeks. in the passage from the visible to the acoustic aspect of language. the harmonious confusion of caesura as a division that combines. the visible and the acoustic. it transpires. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT dialectic. (ST. “back” then. when thought and poetry. Within the visible realm of being—being has always been confined in our tradition to a monstrative and (in)visible entity—there was the harmony between being as concealed and its momentarily appearing.

Thus every truth is a form of enigma facilitated by the double 176 . Speaking of the foundation of philosophy Agamben notes that the Western experience of being. If the labyrinth is as an open plane then the thread of its solution and dissolution need not be painstakingly unspooled in the terror of darkness. For the truth to be unveiled it must first be transmitted through a sheet or material barrier. 138). For truth to be unveiled it must first have been obscured by a sheet or material barrier. is based on an impossible filiation therein to the fact that presence comes to philosophical thought as already divided. is the apotropaic structure of all logopoiesis. The apotropaic. Logopoiesis names little more than this at this stage in its development: an apotropaic harmony between poetic flow and philosophical interruption.5 We are now more than familiar with the fracture of presence alluded to here. the enigma of the order of a sign. It makes perfect sense. for the moment. that which attracts and repels. The sign is of the order of an enigma. Agamben is unhappy with the way that the enigma of the Sphinx has been placed beneath the transparent sign of the Oedipal interpretation: “What the Sphinx proposed was not simply something whose signified is hidden and veiled under an ‘enigmatic’ signifier. Considering the story of Oedipus and the Sphinx in Stanzas. ratified in the discipline of philosophy. called up at the moment that presence as such is split in two. remain at a distance” (ST. In this instant full presence becomes unavailable to view and the Greek activity of aletheia commences the strange affiliation called philosophy. The relation between poetry and thinking in Agamben. crucial to his overall overcoming of metaphysics as I hope I have now shown. but a mode of speech in which the original fracture of presence was alluded to in the paradox of a word that approaches its object while keeping it indefinitely at a distance” (ST. as Agamben concedes. If there were no secret then there needs must be no solution. we cannot but approach that which must. The presence of the sign is. Aletheia’s unveiling of truth moves one to the very heart of the almost awkward formulation of truth as unconcealedness which so dominates Heidegger’s work. which also explains why poetry matters to Agamben and also helps clarify his many valuable comments on the technicalities of prosody. 157). shares a good deal in common with the more familiar rhetorical designation of the enigma.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN as a mode of speaking that was neither a gathering nor a concealment.

and Western thought since then. The dancing path of the labyrinth. and an extraneous babble from the street Confirming the new value the hollow core has again. the enigma belongs to the sphere of the apotropaic. by attracting it and assuming it within itself. a philosophy dependent on an idea of language has totally missed the glaring fact that the power of the enigma lies elsewhere in the presence of the semiotic within the enigma of the sign. prosodic. The name of both these obstructions is rather obvious: the sign. is a poetics of the enigma as that which is not available for solution. structural. As the wrecking ball bursts through the wall with the book shelves Scattering the works of famous authors as well as those Of more obscure ones. Oedipus’ sin was not incest but “hubris toward the power of the symbolic in general . letting in Space. fable) of the ainigma is not only obscurity. like the Gorgon. Like the labyrinth. to a protective power that repels the uncanny. but a more original mode of speaking. 138) If this is the case. An apotropaic verse. 138). and conceptual even-ness: And so each day Culminates in merriment as well as a deep shock like an electric one. Agamben suggests. is the model of this relation with the uncanny that is expressed in the enigma. . therefore.” that ends with a shocking apocalypse for such a poet of tonal. has valorized the very quality of interpretation over the fact of the enigma as such. that is.6 177 . and like the Sphinx that utters it. and books with no author. (ST. which leads to the heart of that which is held at a distance. . THE SPACE OF THOUGHT hindrance of matter. which he has misinterpreted by interpreting its apotropaic intention as the relation of an oblique signifier and a hidden signified” (ST. Oedipus. Presupposing the enigma as a sign that needs to be made to signify.CAESURA. or a maze which has no centre point or any point of exit/entrance. Returning to the enigma now. the light From the lighthouse that protects as it pushes us away. Early in the Morning. Agamben goes on to state: The ainos (story. One of the great contemporary works of logopoietic apotropaicism is John Ashbery’s much-admired “Down by the Station.

ontology. That the resumption of the semantic in the next line should comment directly on the semiotic “space” is typical of the profound boustrophedonic verse only rare writers can perform. and more specifically in classrooms around the globe the enigma of the poem “Down by the station early in the morning. and the enigma of naming. a deliberation on impermanence. as in all eidos it literally calls your attention to it and by implication suggests that it is a metaphor for the hollow core of the decimated. Indeed are not all enigmas thus doubled-up? The image draws you in. The line break after “letting in” admits the essential material presence of space foundational to poetic tension. always leads my students and myself interminably across two verses which. for years. and the almost enjambed terminal caesura in the penultimate line suggests precisely this. is a comment on the tension between the semiotic (enjambement. and yet the poem’s final image seems to resist an endless falling into silence. labyrinthine structure of the wrecked library. 14). and even then / It may not have existed” (W. Indeed. If the hollow core is as the lighthouse. babble) and the semantic which typifies Agamben’s axiom. Ashbery admits into the work the essence of the poetic: the semiotic. As the wrecking ball demolishes the walls of a book-lined labyrinth of enigmas one presumes is a library. / And nothing does. I have laboured over both the enigma that is Ashbery. Or is Ashbery merely revealing the enigma of the very fact of the warning or the apotropaic nature of 178 .” an extraneous pure semiotic noise the result of the collapse of the single. memory. to the sudden collapse of all pedagogic certainty in the final stanza cited here. “a dull crinkled leather that no longer exists. as the line folds back on itself.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN As can be seen here Ashbery’s verse has always been marked by that which Agamben terms the apotropaic order of the enigma. and nonsense. then one is drawn towards the core and simultaneously repelled. In some senses Ashbery has found the only solution to the paradox of the end of the poem. it would appear. space. Following on from space comes the loaded term “babble. in a moment of supreme post-modern self-consciousness. space. Here it takes the form of enjambement. like Oedipus and Ariadne trapped in some terrible union neither dares to seek annulment for. form and theme merge into harmony precisely through their being manifestly at odds. The poem.” This work. while dense. Babelian tower of language. until you name it. remembering. I feel I can guide a passage through. The manifestation of the lighthouse is a double enigma. Here.

of which Ashbery is the master. The poem neither concludes nor. In an enigma one encounters the mystery of the uncanny in the form of a rebus to which not only is there no solution but whose very puzzlement is its truth. which protects us and seems almost to gather us to its bosom. the light of the lighthouse. as many works do such as “L’infinito. As regards the apotropaic structure of the enigma the elegance of Agamben’s formulation remains a thing of beauty. . remembering . until you name it. Ashbery’s comments on ontological inexistence are “instructive” in this regard in the way they maintain the impossible to resolve caesura between phone and logos to be found in the sign and emulated in prosody. gathers us by actually rejecting us. The third and final point is that by ending with an apotropaic Ashbery is able to endlessly defer the end of the verse while simultaneously suspending the poem within the very tension that Agamben suggests it is impossible to be suspended within. Certainly the bar divides poetry from thinking in a manner Agamben finds repulsive. but it also gathers them together in the same parallel space of stanzaic comparison revealing what may have already been suspected that the bar of the sign (/) and the double pipes of the caesura || are in fact of the same grammatological order. nor that there is a solution. Rather. but that there can be an unresolved relation between the two. the bar within the sign between phone and logos. is indeed as Agamben suggests not there to be solved but persists so as to retain within itself the presence of the problem as such. within the enigma one finds the only instance within signification wherein the semiotic and the semantic are suspended without falling into silence all due to the presence of the semiotic. . the possibility 179 .” combining the impossibility of logos preceding phone (nothing exists until you name it). The enigmatic in verse.CAESURA. Just as the issue of the suspense of the endless deferral of signification occurs within the poetic line expressly at the moment of its finitude. I would attempt to say three things about this blinding moment of logopoiesis. . and yet also the enigma of how phone can precede logos if it is a recursive act of memory: naming something as a prophylaxis against the inexistence we are all moving towards. This leads to my second comment on the sign as fundamentally apotropaic in structure or.” cyclically resumes at the poetic incipit. He says in relation to that which no longer exists “And nothing does. to be more precise. What the uncanny unearths is not that there is no solution. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT the enigma? In drawing attention to itself. The first is of the order of the enigma.

however. In The Coming Community the short essay “Ease” speaks of the Talmudic tradition of the reservation of two places for each person in Eden and Gehenna (Hell). Citing specifically the “Hericlitean project of an utterance that neither ‘hides’ nor ‘reveals’ but rather ‘signifies’ the unsignifiable conjunction (synapsis) between presence and absence” (ST. semiotics and semantics are post-Oedipal thinkers. that which exists between the signifier and the signified within the sign. a fourth order of space in Agamben’s work located to the side of the poem in a space that does not quite mark the limit of the text nor quite exist interior to the line either. This enigmatic. refusing the model of Oedipus. Speaking of the inheritance of Oedipus Agamben divides our epoch into two tendencies. 139). in the full sense of the term. focuses its attention above all on the barrier between signifier and signified that constitutes the original problem of signification” (ST. This glimpse first opened up by the enigma is the very harmony between poetry and philosophy essential to prosodic harmony and the wider apotropaic comparison of logopoiesis as such. that which can be found internal to the poem and of course Derridean spacing as such in the form of the trace. its being in 180 . 138–9). They seek to exit the maze into which they wished they had never been entered by their masters. signifier and signified. Those who seek to define signification as that which occurs as a relation between code and solution. Agamben notes that the topology of interest here resides not between Eden and Gehenna but within “the adjacent place that each person inevitably receives. Meanwhile: “under the sign of the Sphinx must be placed every theory of the symbol that. The first is more than familiar to we Oedipal decoders of poetic and literary Sphinxes. What is most proper to every creature is thus its substitutability. EASE: THE PROXIMATE SPACE Thus far we have spoken of space in terms of that which surrounds borders the poem. At the point when one reaches one’s final state and fulfils one’s own destiny. There is. Agamben in this early treatise provides a “glimpse of what a semiology freed from the mark of Oedipus and faithful to the Saussurian paradox would finally bring to the ‘barrier resistant to signification’” (ST. one finds oneself for that very reason in the place of the neighbour. space is what he describes as the space of ease. 139).THE LITERARY AGAMBEN of this proposition rests upon a second line.

common space of singularity. its being whatever—in other words. 25). but describing a complex. the topography of kle or the vocation of ¯sis subjective revocation. Forgive this digression into the biopolitical realm of the ethics of alterity. This semantico-etymological constellation excavates for us the relation of the opportune to the location of the harbour in favourable winds to which one moves. Ease is the proper name of this unrepresentable space” (CC. Further useful consonance between prosodic space and considerations of desubjectivization and language arrives in the mode in which Agamben goes on to describe the origins of the word ease: “The term ‘ease’ in fact designates. in a semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on opportune time (ad-agio. “the coming to itself of each singularity. such as it is. This leads to the potentiality of a new ethical topography no longer delineated around oppositions and individuals. therefore. but rather on the universal substitutability of singularity as non-representable (lacking in individuality). according to its etymology. adjacentia). at one’s ease (slowly). the subject as individual is alienated from identity without succumbing to biological indetermination. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT any case in the place of the other” (CC. The ostensible purpose of this essay is clear within a collection on community that takes up dialogue with Nancy’s work on the coming community and being-with. The space of ease delineates. 181 . They move to one side of who they are to a space of singular self-negation. the empty place where each can move freely.7 In the space of ease.CAESURA. under sail or beneath the effects of music. One crucial factor is that the space of ease brings together the technical aspects of prosodic space as we have been analysing with earlier debates on poetic desubjectivization. He then traces this idea in reference to a Christian community founded in the last century by Arabist Louis Massignon called Badaliya whose name was derived from the Arabic for substitution. for good measure. as well as Derrida’s post-Lévinasian ethics of alterity and hospitality and. which soon enough we will locate within the poem. An avenue of enquiry that moves Agamben to a conclusion that Badaliya and the Talmud allow for a possibility of a community based not on non-substitutable individuality. the space adjacent (ad-jacens. the work of Blanchot. 23). although I am sure these issues are not unfamiliar. moving at ease) and convenience borders on the correct relation” (CC. 25). but it is necessary to allow one to comprehend the centrality of space in Agamben’s ideas on poetry.


It also presents the original meaning of convenience as coming together or natural fittedness of things with other things. Thus ease is a temporal, spatial space to the side that gives one time/space to come to things, to step to one side, gain time, make space and so on. This sense of ease as a proximation and facilitation, opening up, making space for space, taking time to experience time, explains the centrality of the term for the origins of European prosody. Agamben therefore goes on to explain: “The provençal poets (whose songs first introduce the term into Romance languages in the form aizi, aizimen) make ease a terminus technicus in their poetics, designating the very place of love…not so much the place of love, but rather love as the experience of taking-place in whatever singularity” (CC, 25). Now we can begin to see that ease is supportive facilitation in the manner in which we have come to see love for the troubadour tradition. Love here is unattainable precisely because it is the medium, support, or space to the side that facilitates attainment as such but which itself, therefore, can never be possessed. Agamben speaks of a similar experience when he considers stil novist poetics, in particular Dante’s famous pursuit of the subjectposition called Beatrice. Beatrice is the name of the amorous experience of the event of language at play in the poetic text itself. She is thus the name and the love of language, but of language understood not in its grammaticality but, rather, in its radical primordiality, as the emergence of verse from the pure Nothing . . . It is because of its absolute originality that speech is the supreme cause and object of love and, at the same time, necessarily transient and perishable. (EP, 58) Such an understanding of speech as primordial, transient, and perishable relates, in Agamben’s work, to Dante’s reformulation of a central Humanist debate over the vernacular and grammar “that is, between the experience of the originary and secondary status of the event of language (or again between love of language and knowledge of language)” (EP, 54).8 Moving backwards through the arguments of the essay “The Dream of Language” where these quotes are couched we find ourselves gazing on an obscure fifteenth-century text, the Hypnerotomachia Polifili (1499), an image from which adorns the English translation of The End of the Poem. Agamben



focuses our attention on the later debate around the language of this text which seems to be made up from a fusion of grammar (Latin) and the vernacular (what was to become modern Italian). The result, he assures us, is an awkward mismatch of Latin grammar and vernacular lexicon of which Agamben comments that the singularity of this text “is a matter not of agrammatical discourse but rather of a language in which the resistance of names and words is not immediately dissolved and rendered transparent by the comprehension of the global meaning; hence the lexical element remains isolated and suspended for a few seconds, as dead material, before being articulated and dissolved in the fluid discourse of sense” (EP, 46). Agamben usefully likens this effect to the use of the word in Mallarmé before going on to note the qualities of the vernacular that make it so central to the role of the space of ease as love in all poetry. Glossing on Dante’s Convivio he remarks that “the vernacular can only follow ‘use’ not ‘art’; and it is, therefore, necessarily transient and subject to continual death. To speak in the vernacular is to precisely experience this incessant death and rebirth of words, which no grammar can fully treat” (EP, 54). What Agamben is tracing here along admittedly obscure defiles, aside from the complex simultaneous development of the idea of language and poetry within European culture from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, is the double stream of language which we have already become familiar with, only this time reconfigured away from the becoming-planar of the line towards the point of the word. The vernacular in the Hypnerotomachia Polifili resembles Mallarmé’s verse as I said in that “words stand out in isolation while their semantic values are suspended” (EP, 46), precisely because the vernacular lexicon has not yet been assimilated into a vernacular grammar. This will not happen until Latin truly becomes a dead language and the vernacular becomes a grammar at which point one gazes on two senses of what it means for a language to die. For Latin it means that it becomes a kind of pure langue or a complete grammar that has no actual usage. In contrast, the vernacular is pure parole in that words are used for the love of language, the words themselves, before they are reformulated in relation to definition and syntax. Love, therefore, is to experience the imminent vernacular in all language, a primordiality of pure usage before grammar died wherein words rise up and then die away again. This is an atactic language freed of grammar, for



what is grammar but an obviation of the need for syntax? Grammar is pure structure in which the specificity of the sign is totally irrelevant. The development of the vernacular into grammar by the death of grammar in the form of Latin allows us to see, as if for the first time, words for their own sake as purely vernacular. All of which forces us to now reconsider Agamben’s definition of the stanza as the “capacious dwelling, receptacle,” or womb of art. The stanza like a room is gifted with a certain set of spatial co-ordinates it being an enclosed space within a wider enclosure of space, the house, which is itself an enclosure of space surrounded by an illimitable space, the world, founded on the earth. The stanza, therefore, is a ventricle within the very conception of interiority and just as lineation rehearses the abyssal event of the end of the poem, so the stanza seems to act out the irresolvable aporetic relationship between interiority and exteriority which is, of course, modern philosophy. The stanza contains within its walls a double paradox. It is the material marking of an enclosure of space and also occupies the inside of the inside providing us now with a third messianic structure, not that of time as such, nor poetic time, but the interiority of space between space as enclosure (“eschatological” space) and space as endless extension and continuum (“chronological” space). While Agamben calls this the womb, he could, of course, have designated it with the Greek name chora.9 Now we are at our ease, our work here nearly done. Primed as we are to exit art and finally crack the puzzle of the maze of thought, let us pause for a moment on the complex entity that is called, in our tradition, the poem. What is a poem? A poem is made up of poetry that exists within the tension between the semiotic and semantic that occurs at the premature interjection of space as both temporal pause and spatial presence creating the line. This gesture of interruption is then reversed in boustrophedonic mode so that the seamless flow of metre is interrupted by the caesuric pause of thought. Thus a poem consists of the movement between two syntaxes, ignoring for now which take precedence: prose—poetry—prose and poetry—prose— poetry. Also overlooking the further complexity that spacing is a precondition for all writing and exists in equal measure between each sign and within each sign, we now advance propositionally to the centrality of the end of the poem, wherein the micro tensile oscillation of poetry is writ large and catastrophic. Agamben is clear that



the end of the poem is the end of verse which means also always the end of a verse or stanza. The end of the poem is, therefore, triply the end of poetry, the end of lineation, and the end of stanzation. As can be seen by this definition the end of the poem cannot come to an end as a propositional statement without a full understanding of the stanza. The first thing to note in this regard is that the end of the poem occurs, paradoxically, in a medial position by virtue of the stanza (as I said the end is central). The end of each line is different from the end of the last line, Agamben assures us, and so too must it be the case that the end of the stanza is an ending of a different order. It would be tempting to ascribe the end of the stanza as a miniature disaster and in a semiotic sense it can seem as such, but in fact the stanza is not a vertical form. The space at the end of the stanza is only one quarter of the relevant space for a stanza must have four walls revealing that the spatiality between stanzas is not one of finality but proximity. A stanza, in fact, is not a unit of poetry at all but a unit of sense, part of the syllogistic globalization of meaning promised by the poem and ruined by its finitude.10 As such there is a different relation to space in the stanza to that of the poem as verse or line. The stanza is known, therefore, for what it can contain, for its jug-like capaciousness, and as a receptacle it transcends or somehow avoids the temporal-spatial linearity of versification providing an internal, fractal, Chinese-box nested form of spatiality that endlessly defers ending by the act of turning in on itself in a process of almost endless reduction and insertion. The stanza provides the space of ease but where does this spatiality reside within the receptacle or around it? Is its spatiality that of the page/tablet, the parergonal forces of title, frame, and so on; or is it literally over there, to the side, located in the semi-mythical righthand margin of the Western poetic tradition?11 Thus far I have summarized the relation of poetry to space around four spatialities: frame space, the pause at the end of the line, spacing as such, and the space into which the poem is endlessly falling that Agamben terms silence. There is, however, a fifth space here located in no one location within the poem but which cuts across and is inserted into all spacing. This space is what I am terming the space of ease as facilitated by the technicus terminus of the poem as such as determined by the pure love of the word as such, as mere matter, pure signification, dead stuff . . .




In the essay “‘Corn’: from Anatomy to Poetics” Agamben traces the philology of an obscure term used in troubadour poetry: corn, or arse (specifically a woman’s). Agamben, alive to the rather suspect humour here, also shows that how, over time, a term referring to the female anatomy, corn, comes also, as cors, to represent the metrical unit of poetry as such. This odd transformation, although no odder than many similar semantic shifts, possibly stems from the tradition of equating the woman’s body to that of the poem, which we have already commented on in relation to the stanza as a kind of womb. Over time the term corn has come to stand for what is called the unrelated rhyme wherein an apparently unrhymed word in one stanza is later found to rhyme with a word in a subsequent stanza. This may seem obscure, indeed it is for Agamben the philologist who works hard to recuperate the meaning of this term, but as the essay progresses we come to realize that corn is an essential companion to the verse which, in relation to enjambement, has become so crucial to us in this discussion. If the etymological meanings of verse in the Latin versus explain so much about poetry, so too the potential meanings for corn as “tip,” “extremity,” “corner,” and “angle” open up a whole new aspect like an interior wall removed to flood a dull space with light. Now we can freely state that verse is the folding back of the line on itself, while corn is the retention of the line break as a break or exteriorized caesura. Corn allows one to see the extremity of the line at the same time as one sees it folding over to become, at least momentarily, prose. So what is corn? It is both verse and not verse, resembling something more like a remnant of verse at the moment of verse’s collapse into sense. Corn as a term retains the cut or tear in the fabric of meaning from which poetry attains its lasting power and significance but it is not verse as such. Corn is the corner of the room, what is left over as the line breaks. Undoubtedly it presents risk for the poem as it interrupts the semiotic precedence with that which is neither semantic nor apparently semiotic, which is why Agamben asserts that for the corn to function meta-strophically it must find its rhyme later in the poem. If corn did not find its rhyme it would cataphorically be revealed to be, after the end of the poem, in some sense a premature end resulting in the tension of verse dissipating prematurely and yet also, belatedly in its retrospective realization.

between orality and writing. Then again. As the corn delays rhyme until a later stanza it. in a wider sense referring to any larger structural unity within a work. if not a disjunction between semiotic event (the repetition of sounds) and semantic event. that between sound and sense” (EP. opening up a level of harmony. as Agamben goes on to concede an understanding of corn as a rupture of the poetic body based on disjuncture between first harmonic and melodic textures and then. weakens the rhyme. 31). In addition. Of Arnaut’s sestina Agamben asserts “he is the poet who treats all verses as ‘corns’ and who. The rhyme is still there but located at what has traditionally been called the harmonic rather than melodic level. with a wider understanding of what poetry is. because of this. and graphematics. transforms the unrelated rhyme into the principle of a higher relation” (EP. the importance of corn is not merely related to the means by which we can bring structure into the work for it also ushers in the predominance of writing into poetry. of course. structure. namely. it can find only a formal correspondence?” (EP. The greater the distance between the first instance of the rhyme and its second. One thing this observation allows is a more prominent place for rhyme within Agamben’s linear definition of poetry: “What is rhyme. cannot be heard and therefore must ultimately be read. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT Corn is the poetic term for what can otherwise be termed structure. by thus rupturing the closed unity of the strophe. Corn distributes the tension of the poem across two different spatialities that accord. I am calling this higher relation structure here because it cuts across the localized effects of the semiotic/semantic tension. and allows us to move through the poem at a point between local and apocalyptic. Structure is the trans-tensile containment of the obviousness of the poetic definition Agamben furnishes us with. of course. It takes us away from the localized issue of the line break versus the abyssal logic of the end of the poem. Agamben proceeds to look at the work of Arnaut in this regard. Taken within this context corn becomes an essential point of transition not only for poetry but also Agamben’s overall philosophy. disenchanted. 35). the harder it becomes to hear the rhyme. “cannot be understood if it is not situated in the context of a different formal register. every rhyme is delayed. by definition. such that the mind searches for an analogy of sense in the very place where.CAESURA. a writer who elevated corn to a metastrophic dominance in the development of the stanzaic form of the sestina in which. No poem can 187 . 34). The harmonic effects of corn.

intellectual and aesthetic rooms within rooms. and with corn we have the word. along with the impact of lineation. Overviewing Dante’s remarkably prescient comments Agamben. global unit and essentially metrical. . sequential level into the tabular.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN be complete unless. With enjambement we have lineation. Aside from the obvious observation that all poetry is embodied it leads one to a realization that there is a particular spatiality within the poem that simultaneously allows one to see the poem and to see language as such. we are informed. Ease is also a superlative example of logopoiesis. 188 . is likened in traditional poetics to the spatiality of the womb or semiotic chora. almost in astonishment. yet at the same time it requires that one consider the poem as consisting of lines within stanzas. the unrelated rhyme (the corn!) constitutes a threshold of passage between the metrical unity of ars and the higher semantic unity of sententia” (EP. Agamben is finally able to conclude that “Insofar as it opens . vertical space of the poem as a global entity. asserts: “Dante thus conceives of the structure of the canzone as founded on the relation between an essentially semantic. This is most readily found in poetry specifically in the material presence of an articulate space at the right hand of every lineated poem. At this juncture we must return one more time to Dante and his discussion of the structure of the canzone cited by Agamben. where he opposes cantio as a unit of sense (sententia) to stanza as a purely metrical unit (ars). This space. which of course calls to mind the womb. The unrelated rhyme forces one to concede that the poem exists in space and time beyond the power of its voicing. with the caesura we have discourse. the closed formal womb of the stanza. Based on two metaphors Dante utilizes. the bodily metaphor of the lap “For just as the canzone is in the lap of its subject-matter so the stanza enlaps its whole technique” (EP. and his later choice to call the unrelated rhyme or corn the clavis or key. . multi-dimensional. we can say that the space of ease opens the subject to the potentiality of their own singularity shared in common with all other self-alienated and thus singular beings. Ease requires the thinking of proximate space as precondition for singularity. To sum up this long and complex series of arguments. 35). 36). 35). one does not take into consideration the means by which words are distributed through the poem based on alternative patterns. partial units” (EP. This is the space of ease or that space into which the poem moves at the local. the fifth trans-poetic tabular space.

but rather we are able now to look back on that essay and see in it the basis of all that is to come. Both positions are problematic.CAESURA. and his most recent work on temporality harks back to his earliest work on the poem which itself presages the more sophisticated work to come. stanzas a poem. Aristotle asks in The Metaphysics what causes a collection of elements to be more than a mere aggregate. and so on? Structure is always a gestalt in that the parts cohere into something that is in excess of the particulate and yet which gives the particulate a single quantum: such and such a thing. The first thing to accept here is that these contesting views of structure are either based on an internal. The two traditional answers to this question are either that structure is an essential and irreducible element of the thing or it is what causes the “ensemble to be what it is” (MWC. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT RHYTHM Agamben is a sporadic and yet profoundly consistent writer. 96). The essay is a fairly unreconstructed Heideggerian reading of poetic rhythm. Yet the second view proposes that structure is something that is external to the ensemble in question which means first that one must go in search of it. or an external gestalt-based view that structure is something outside of the ensemble that is added to it to make it what it is. however having come so far we can leave aside the Heideggerian terminology and concentrate instead on what this essay reveals in terms of a harmony of all the different elements pertaining to prosody and logopoiesis lodged within that most difficult yet essential poetic term: rhythm. synecdochic view of a certain part of a collection of elements being the supra-elemental part. in other words how do parts cohere into a unified structure: lines become a stanza.” I am unable to assert that all the matters pertaining to poetic structure as a mode of thinking come together in this essay. second explain its essential role to the very collection it is radically exterior and other too. they cannot as it precedes all such work. I am speaking here of the dense chapter in The Man Without Content entitled “The Original Structure of the Work of Art. Agamben begins his treatise on rhythm by considering the age-old problem as to what constitutes structure. Internalized structure assumes structure to be something more than its elements and yet at the same time reduces this additional thing to the prime element “the ultimate quantum beyond which the object loses its reality” (MWC. and third (a point central to the work of Badiou) explain how this element exterior to one’s set can be 189 . 97).

inaugurates and announces the very existence of rhythm: “The word ‘rhythm’ comes from the Greek . This debate is promoted by a comment by a momentarily lucid. Rhythm. . for the sake of argument syllables. .THE LITERARY AGAMBEN a set-defining element and yet itself escape the problems of infinite regression and bad infinity intrinsic to set theory. every work of art is one rhythm. . to flow. 98). 99). and everything swings from the poeticizing lips of the god” (Cited in MWC. as in the case of water. now feels after Aristotle that he can define rhythm as that which negotiates between the very principle of presence. This centrality is further perpetuated when Agamben attempts to define the essential and original definition of rhythm by explaining how the interruption of flow in art is an ecstatic arrest of rhythm which. “element and minimal quantum. One can already see here the value of such a definition of structure as rhythm at least for the art work. 94). . Agamben. in other words. words. This second element. How can this “additional thing” exceed the very structure of aggregation it defines? After Aristotle. outside the work of art into the place of ecstasy and are gifted with a view of what art is before falling back into the incessant procession of the rhythm of the work below. the one preferred by Aristotle. . This. Yet this rhythm—as we commonly understand it—appears to introduce into this eternal flow a split and a stop” (MWC. and measure as such as a calculable number. that which is outside of a work and makes it what it is (Form). supra-spatial ecstatic moment that he 190 . initially struggling to comprehend this statement. and lines in the poem. is a double measure. measure as the coming to presence of being on the earth (Heideggerian Measure) and measure as a countable number of units or quanta. for a moment. Rhythm is the unquantifiable “extra” element that makes a thing a work of art. is the tantalizing gift and reserve of art. decrepit Hölderlin: “Everything is rhythm . That which flows does so in a temporal dimension: it flows in time . .” and rhythm “that which causes something to be what it is” (MWC. the very structure of art “that is at once as Gestalt and number” (MWC. yet at the same time rhythm is directly dependent on the elements that make up the work of art. He gives examples here of music and painting. the Greek philosopher renames Form. how in both cases the elements that function in harmony to create the work’s rhythm also provide us with an atemporal. at the same time. 100). Agamben argues. At the point that the rhythm stops we are launched. Agamben defines these two positions as number.

Clearly rhythm conceived in this way is the basis for Agamben’s later construction of messianic time. centring in on issues of Measure. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT describes thus: “we perceive a stop in time .CAESURA. . This then explains a final. coming from the future. because it is poiesis that founds for him the original space of his world” (MWC. to present. he argues. day-to-day vulgar time. Man has on earth a poetic status. . Thus Agamben concludes: “rhythm holds. an interruption in the incessant flow in instants that. . sinks into the past” (MWC. Through the act of pro-duction via entelechy. being-in-the-world. Agamben’s main argumentative thrust here is Heideggerian. 100) before attempting a somewhat “violent” retranslation of the term as rhythm. Yet rhythm is spoken of here in the very earliest work in terms of the Greek word epoch. Both epoch and rhythm therefore are the making of a unity through a radical act of disjunctive ecstasy which. The same is true of epoch in relation to the definition of a period. While it certainly takes time and is composed of three stages 191 . as well as providing an early prototype for the Idea of Prose and its subsequent reformulation as potential. however. as soon it is raised up out of the structured continuum. to suspend. Agamben translates epoch as meaning “both to hold back. . but the ongoing process of the evental interruption of flow. human being is able to exist in the transition from presence as origin to presence as thing in the world. falls back into said continuum. Yet this process of pro-duction is not entirely processual. as we saw. “In his authentic temporal dimension. that is. and to hand over. both the cut in time and the definition of a period in time. rhythm in defining art also defines the basis of being’s temporal existence in the world. rhythm grants men both the ecstatic dwelling in a more original dimension and the fall into the flight of measurable time” (MWC. to offer” (MWC. Even if epoch and rhythm are not actually synonymous they hold clear structural synonymity in that both speak of a moment outside of something which confers on that something its unified thing-status. 99). for example modernity. third meaning for epochal rhythm in the Greek. This being the case rhythm is not a single event. not on ongoing flow. and as flow. ecstasy. As I mentioned. What matters for us at this late hour however is how he relates rhythm to poiesis for. the poetic status of man on earth finds its proper meaning. 101). 100). namely “to be” in the sense of to dominate or to hold on to a place. namely the perpetual movement between time as origin. Being’s destiny and authenticity. gives and holds back .

THE LITERARY AGAMBEN (poiesis–entelechy–praxis). Said architectonics is a structure now extremely familiar to us across all that we have perused here. In one final report from the great Aristotle. therefore. any more than the continuum permanently disallows the epoch. flowarrest-flow-arrest. It dictates how human being exists in the essentiality of chronological time and space as a continuum. a process wherein “in the work of art the continuum of linear time is broken. So that when Agamben concludes. does not commence or cease but is perpetually in operation giving and holding back in a space or medial zone interior to the work of art. still very much in a Heideggerian strain at this early phase in his career. interruption (caesura). is pro-duction (τίκτω) of origin (άρχή). “In the experience of the work of art. poetic 192 .the term process does not convey the complexity of its operations. As we now know in terms of the spatiotemporality of the poem there is flow (enjambement). wherein the human sees its origins. in the origin that has revealed itself to him in the poietic act” (MWC. etymologically: art. does not dispense with the continuum below. This interplay. As he says: “That art is architectonic means. 102). rhythm is the perpetual interplay between flow and its arrest. between past and future his present space” (MWC. is not however simply an erratic or intermittent. is revealing. often by willed skilled acts of artistic making or artistic experience of the made thing. Poiesis is rhythmical structure. art’s architectonic basis. Agamben names this overall combination of elements into the rhythmical structure of the work of art that also determines human being through the means by which they make a space for themselves on the earth as productive beings in and out of time. being breaks with the continual and enters into the ecstatic. Poiesis. and perhaps this is the truly original and poetic part of Agamben’s thinking. which would simply carve time up into the traditional aporia of moments along a single line. Rather. at various points. Rather. art is the gift of the original space of man. Yet this epochal moment. itself simply archetypal of innumerable such structures across all the arts and beyond. and man recovers. Here is where poetic structure. and there is the architectural organization of these two elements into a third element which is the projective-recursive spatiotemporality of structure (what Agamben terms the metrical–musical element). It determines how. man stands in the truth that is. 101). 102). we can now reread this in a more Agambenian fashion. stuttering singular dimensionality. architectonics par excellence” (MWC. poiesis.

particularly the tabular-planar element of anaphoric– cataphoric projection–recursion that one finds. is a tabular-planar dimensional way of being always already projected towards a finitude that in turn always casts us back to an origin. we fall. the name we now give to the whole structural process of logopoietic thinking. If. which is the name for this process. This. and so on. recursive. is why poetry matters to Giorgio Agamben. in the modern epoch. and temporality–. Rather rhythm–. This projective-recursive. association. recurrence with modification (torquing). we progress. spatiality. and suddenly surprising. for example. defines poiesis as ongoing. we return and in doing so. productive mode of tabular thinking is logopoiesis. being. we make.CAESURA. under pro-duction also. due to the very logic of the epoch. simply put. through poiesis. THE SPACE OF THOUGHT structure. Poiesis as the ultimate architectonic of our being on this earth as potentially productive beings within the supportive medium of language as such. projective. We rise. in rhyme but also in numerous other elements of poetry such as referentiality. Poetry is able to save metaphysics from itself by providing another way of thinking. negates simple processional temporality. patternation. 193 . being and thinking are under negation they are also.

. Within our culture. every book demands a title: The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis. like so many titles. commenced with the adventure of reinstating the literary in the form of 194 . he has made it his life’s work to overcome difference through the creation of a productive philosophy of indifference. In my unwritten book I see that until the various strands of Agamben’s thought are presented as a whole. as most assuredly I have. (it would be premature and presumptuous to reduce his work to just three categorizations). Therefore as to the actual existence of a clearly definable “literary” Agamben. literary . This must now stand as my written book on Agamben. The literary Agamben is simply a device to get the critical fraternity to take their eyes off the Homo Sacer project and its impressive extension. for entirely mysterious and conventional reasons. And while he concedes the omnipresence of division. His is a philosophy that resists identity in favour of neutral singularity. our understanding of this most remarkable thinker is incomplete. Yet here at least I have made a start.RECURSION. self-defeating. As would the designation the “political” or “metaphysical” Agamben or even a composite of the three. particularly metaphysical differential scission. it is for this reason alone. To propose a certain identity or division within Agambenian philosophy is ill-advised and. The inaccurate entitlement of this book. THE TURN OF THINKING At the end of a great adventure the intrepid in repose often set down their encounters and observations in the form of a book. political. it goes against the very spirit of his work. . The enforcement of a “literary” Agamben is not simply reductive. I must attest to being unhappy with such a designation even if it is my own. metaphysical. is as strategic as it is descriptive. If I have neglected the political elements of Agamben’s work.

THE TURN OF THINKING a sustained analysis of poetry into the heart of Agamben’s indifferent thought. experience. connections to make. or inexpressive medium for expression. The predominance of semiotics in the poem is felt at the level of the syllable. providing an archetype for a mode of thinking dominated by naming that does not name anything specifically. why poetry in particular is of such importance to the work of Agamben. and structure that make it the essential complement to philosophy in the quest for the meaning of the existence of language as such as indifferent medium for thinking. word. discursive structures. Or in taking your leave. but also across the whole of the rhythm of poetic structure. that exists within our tradition. extrapolated out across larger. and line. The fundamental experience of ontology via language being that of desubjectivization. a process of depersonalization at the hands of language. historical relation between poetry and philosophy. That must suffice. neglect to say the very thing that is most on your mind to your loved ones. For Agamben there are five conditions of poetic language. 195 . has for centuries being attributed to the poetic experience of inspiration. Poetry produces the closest experience of language as such. or the press. the funding committee. desubjectivization due to linguistic depersonalization. intimacy with the semiotic. Similarly I feel now that I never at any point clearly expressed why literature. Sometimes when you set out on an adventure and you have a tight deadline. The rift may indeed be part cause of the modern philosophical collapse into negativity. This being the case the fact that poetry and philosophy suffered a powerful separation at the hands of first philosophy means that philosophy’s attempt to think the very basis of its continuing existence through an investigation of language cannot be completed until this rift is once more bridged. proximity to language as such. combine together to establish poetry’s role as one half of a mode of post-nihilistic productive thought such as I have repeatedly presented in Agamben’s work. At the same time. and rhythmical structure as an alternative model for thinking. These five conditions of poeticized ontology. I am fortunate enough to have the time and perspicacity to correct this.RECURSION. you forget to take the one thing you need most of all. As our departure is delayed here a few more pages due to an oversight in some paperwork. visas to apply for. the semiotic basis of depersonalizing desubjectivization is most readily presented and investigated by poetry’s emphasis on the material effects of language at the expense of rational discursive meaning.

His recourse to literary examples in this regard. and the relation between the larynx and the syrinx. the stanza and poetic dictation specifically.” now forever unwritten. and a character who at the beginning seemed one part of a great ensemble took over the story all but negating the early narrative. Badiou. Derrida. I dropped it.1 196 . All great adventures work this way. Logopoiesis. As this happened the previous disorder of the chapters froze into a pattern that came to seem as almost predestined. thousands of words on the category life. However aesthetic modernity provides a strong example of anti-poiesis that has two key effects. That book. This is not the book I set out to write. I admit that. suprasensuous and sensuous. The initial interest I had in Agamben’s ideas on linguistic materiality faded from view until finally I understood what it was I was writing about: thinking as such through poetry. An analysis so profound. and unexpectedly normal that when the niece and her new beau reappear back on screen at the film’s end you have all but forgotten who they are. Nancy. The history of modern metaphysical nihilism is matched by the history of aesthetic modernity dissuading us from looking for solutions in poiesis alone. as well as revealing a potential way out of this great abyss through the alternative modes of poietic thinking. museums. Language as such as neutral medium and support for thought and being allows Agamben to rethink the very thing of thought and move beyond productive metaphysical negation. real. is not illustrative but a fundamental part of his thinking. The actual book was lost along the way. saw Agamben as a supporting figure in a grand narrative of the turn to poiesis in the work of Heidegger. The ancient antagonism established between poetry and philosophy is first revealed and then in part resolved by the rehabilitation of the category of poiesis. dictation in poetry. In my case the usual: chapters which were central were removed entirely. “The Invention of Literary Singularity. The Agamben chapter got out of hand. It brings to presence the predominance of negation in all elements of metaphysics.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN It is inevitable that one will lose one’s way and in losing it find one’s true way. Mine has been no different. I am certain many books are like this. I am reminded of Ozu’s great film Flavour of Green Tea Over Rice where the story of the rebellious niece is supplanted by the consideration of her actions on the relationship between her aunt and uncle. and ultimately Agamben. The order of the remaining chapters was endlessly changed.

aside from its myriad other merits. and teleological thought is weakened as it progresses to its conclusions. a turn or kehre he denies and 197 . However a powerful example of the presentation of thinking before thought exists in Heidegger’s unfinished work Being and Time. The tensile rhythmic interchange between enjambement and caesura provides the medium for logopoiesis. That Heidegger then turns away entirely from the categories of this book in the later work on poetry. This is not simply thinking through the appropriation of the arts but the very structure of poiesis as an alternate and complimentary mode of thinking to that of the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger of course casts an ambiguous shadow over the work of Agamben. revealed by Agamben to be that of poetry as such. syllogistic. is a combination of the premature cessation of the flow of meaning through the imposition of a semiotic beak and the interruption of semiotic flow by the interjection of the space of thought. threatening a storm that in the midst of such a swashbuckling tale might indeed be welcomed even if it poses real danger. We have arrived at the quintessence of the logopoietic thought process. The structure of this thinking. Rhythm is the very ground upon which all future work on logopoiesis must be based. This conclusion voyages far from my original intention. Indeed. like the dark and yellowing illumination of the sky above you as you set out. Being and Time therefore. deductive. Mostly writers recount their thoughts but not their thinking. THE TURN OF THINKING Bringing together thought and poetry I was able to propose the tautological compound logopoiesis. Such a situation is.RECURSION. culminating. narrativizing. it has been observed that the second division takes up the issues of the first and in reconsidering them undermines them so that the powerful forward thrust of Heidegger’s propositional. but as a mode of thought it is meaningless without the combination of these elements into a trans-linear anaphoric–cataphoric tabular-planar projective–recursive structure which Agamben names rhythm as such. There are certain elements of Being and Time as a work of written thinking that tell us a good deal about thinking as such. is a powerful lesson in self-deconstruction in part obviating many of the critical studies of the work to come. as common as marriage when seen through the thinking lens of Ozu. summarizing. I suspect. People have called it thinking. The book essentially remains unfinished as the “third division” was never written and the second division was not all it could have been as Heidegger was forced to add it in haste.

198 . A turn from dispute into stasis and stillness. feeling. “the primal dimension within which man’s essence is first able to correspond at all to Being . Being turns about into the oblivion of its coming to presence.” Although Heideggerian negativity is the destinal ontology Agamben wants expressly to turn away from. . he defines this coming to presence of being as enframing as danger. and in that way simultaneously turns counter to the truth of its coming to presence. 41). The influence is neither negative nor positive. is thinking” (QCT. particularly his study of the hymn “The Ister” and the periplus logic of the river developed there. objectivizing. the verb used here to express the activity of the “turn in” of thought. an interiorization of thinking. with this turning. . .THE LITERARY AGAMBEN yet which is all too apparent. Speaking of the contemporary destiny of being in terms of instrumental. In the 1949 essay “The Turning” Heidegger comes to define thinking precisely in terms of recursion. turns away from this coming to presence. . therefore. einkehren. one can recognize here the basis of Agamben’s methodology. ever his method of thought and that the second division is not a failure but a triumph of recursive thought. and framing technology. and willing. the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that. means both to turn in and to put up at an inn. and we can see the profound influence Heideggerian thinking has had on Agambenian thinking.2 A similarity further confirmed when Heidegger adds: “In the coming to presence of the danger there conceals itself . Add into this Heidegger’s claim that language “is never primarily the expression of thinking. This primal corresponding . or stay. the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in—turn homeward—into whatever is” (QCT. As the translator’s footnote informs the English edition of Heidegger’s text.” but. Thus the act of turning is not simply turning back or away from the present but a turning in. suggests that turning away from and towards was. He then adds: “As the danger. . It recalls always the source. . In the text Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” Heidegger establishes an ontological rhythm of cruciform retrogradation that we found was central to Agamben’s theory of the relation of poetic rhythm to thinking as such. As the river departs from the source one can describe is as both homely and unhomely. 41). to alight. but the process of the turning from the negative to the positive by virtue of the negative. As they rightfully go on to explain this is of no small importance to Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin.

through philosophy to language. allegorical. In contrast Heidegger’s reading of “The Ister” concentrates on the meaning of the river as expressed by the semantic base of Hölderlin’s great hymn. This is an essential development in logopoietic thought from its origins in the later. the river drains into the ocean whose amorphous nature recalls the installation into shape of the source. the reason why so many great cities are on the banks of rivers. THE TURN OF THINKING the homely. From poetry. archetypal. While finally expression of the river as both flowing out into the uncanny and always being called back to the familiar source combines all these elements into an internalized poetic structural rhythmic periplus: Agambenian rhythm. In attaching the river to the ancient sea-bound periplus. First because of Agamben’s powerful critique of Heideggerian Being as based on mute negation. Similarly as the river journeys it also provides the essential natural elements for settlement. The ocean works very well as the endless falling into silence of poetic finitude. My contention here is not that Heidegger had already said what Agamben goes on to say. And second because Agamben is able to draw out the turn of thinking in poetics through detailed analysis of prosody as such. Indeed much of Agamben’s work on poetry is prefigured in this text. but only in departing from it. to a degree. illustrative.RECURSION. which is also essential to Agamben’s theory of messianic time. In contrast Agamben demonstrates that the very definition of poetry in terms of semiotic rhythm is the quintessence of turning as a form of thinking in the form of the verse. Thus the poem remains. This is not the case. Thinking as rhythmical turning by virtue of poetry is my first thesis in relation to logopoiesis. great work of the last philosopher. It exemplifies thought but it is not thought as such in my opinion. The manner in which the river flows and yet is also arrested by locality echoes the stop–start interplay of caesura and enjambement in Agamben. rhythm. The river therefore is both a locality or founding of a place and an endless journeying. and specifically singular in relation to thought. This rhythm is the essence of thought as a form of turning embedded in my choice of the tautological term logopoiesis to express this mode of poetic thinking. Heidegger brings another interiorization into poetic ontology and thinking. Agamben’s main concern is the definition of human being in terms of desubjectivization brought about by the profound depersonalization of the human being in the face of language as neutral medial support for thinking 199 .

I have understood it as the following: a modality of thinking through making and all that this entails. and full development of what literature is through its definition as a means of thinking through intimate experience with the semiotic materiality of language as such. Written on the back in Italian is the following enigma that I have translated the best I can: As to your delightful tale of logopoiesis. and the sensuous. objectal-instrumental. as the poemthought commences due to the presence of semiotic conventional rule-based constraint (I enjoyed very much your article on this by the way). Logopoiesis names the rehabilitation. rummaging through my capacious pockets for some gizmo for gouging stones out of the hooves of horses. by flowing and interrupting said flow. The first instalment of which is a consonance between the very structure of poetry and that of thinking. our aims are more modest. What I summarize as thinking through making. desolated by modernity and yet still eternally wonderful. Certainly thought about being in terms of the subject. In such a model. prosaic. logopoiesis. exhaustive.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN as such. That is: a self-consciously self-indicative anaphoric-cataphoric tabularplanar field or linguistic medium for thinking that is a projective recursion. Such a thought is definable by precisely the same structure as that of the poem for which read all works of art. I can now understand why you coin the term logopoiesis to indicate this complex compound of ideas although initially I was unconvinced. I find a postcard from Giorgio. temporality. On one side is a sepia image of the Rome of his childhood. is a way-station along the obscured tracks of a greater mission. This is not our concern. Thus if Agamben wishes to access the linguistic basis for all being. Rather than a syllogistic. teleological. Later. my own sensibly founded modesty forbids me from venturing any further than a total reappraisal of all the arts in terms of their being a form of thought. If for Agamben poetic thinking. by submitting thought to 200 . but also thought about other categories that I have yet to address such as objectivity. progressive. as far as I can tell. redefinition.3 it already prefigures its development and cessation. As it progresses it does so by always simultaneously going on and looking back. and eventually conclusive mode of progression through logical cumulative analysis. logopoiesis is the tautological turn of thought. deductive.

Very interesting. Finally. Rather than defining a problem and then seeking to solve it conclusively.RECURSION. part and whole. but which we cannot take hold of. Philosophy has now passed. It is for this reason that we call poetry. It must end. subject and object. Some ideas seem out of place. Finally then in the tensile interchange between having to end and being unable to end you have the perpetually adventurous finitude of poetic thought as such. mono-dimensional space but also architectonic. Beware the sloughs of negative despond by the 201 . You are not quite there yet but you are certainly moving towards very provocative territory. verse. in on itself. The last philosopher has spoken his final words. trans-linear space. language. thought and language. it is the turn of verse. and perpetually ends (did I get this right?). Not everything is as it should be. I will need time to think more about it. Just as human life can only come to life by ending the category of life and the tension therein. it must at the same time be turning back on itself and away from summation. as the poem ends it both comes to an end. As in thought so in art. are suspended in every sense of this word. By the same gesture as it seems to move towards its conclusions. In being dispossessed of the very thing which takes hold of us we turn from thinking about being to the turn of being as thinking. As ever. philosophy and poetry. as indeed must all logopoietic thinking. A poetic thinking shares this structure. a moment wherein categories such as beginning and end. poetic thought turns. indeed all the arts. THE TURN OF THINKING a constraining linearity and exploding linearity through a translinear tabular-planar rhythmic structure. For now at least. The linear extension of the semiotic and its interruption are both temporal. to come into existence. inside and outside. Such a thought exists both in space and time you suggested at one point. Quite so. structural. our habitual place. space and time. never comes to an end. That said the poem never comes to an end because the cataphoric-recursive element always folds the poem back on itself. but not for all time. This rhythmical space is also the rhythmical temporality of thought. we are held by that which possesses us. let’s say the problem of being. Yet the grammatological space required to actuate the caesura in the line reveals the dependence of linearity on not merely interruptive. it is always already within the problem. In the same manner the poem never commences. If traditional thought advances. put on hold.

upon an empty plateau about which they say great danger finds its dwelling. ignore the example of Orpheus. You will find his conversation and company very stimulating even if at first he seems obscure. There are always benefits to be accrued from looking back along the way you have come. I have finished what I have to say. Remember to take the right turn there. By the way. Giorgio 202 . He is a close associate of mine although we do not always see eye to eye. It’s your turn now.THE LITERARY AGAMBEN way. Hope we meet again some time in the future but I believe we may not as my destiny is beyond those cliffs which are treacherous. There. Good luck with your next guide.

henceforth cited as SL. Benjamin Noys. trans. “The Saturday of Messianic Time. Georgia Albert (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Dominick LaCapra.” in Sovereignty & Life. trans. Jean-Philipe Deranty. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press. “The Ripe Fruit of Redemption. “Time of Death. no.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 107. “The Enigma of Giorgio 203 . 27. 11. Nicholas Heron. 135. Andrew Norris (Durham. Siting Agamben. NC: Duke University Press. and Eleanor Kaufman. “Playing with Law: Agamben and Derrida on Postjuridical Justice. Negri’s provocation has been picked up by Jenny Edkins. 38. SAQ. “Seeing the Impossibility of Seeing or the Visibility of the Undead: Giorgio Agamben’s Gorgon. ‘Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?’ SL.generation-online. and Alex Murray. 2005). 2003). 117–18. “Giorgio Agamben: The Discreet Taste of the Dialectic. 44. henceforth cited as SAQ. Agamben’s Critique of Derrida.” The Germanic Review 82. Henceforth cited as MWC. 1999). 254.’ Kritikos 2 (2005). 190. Metaphysics and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer. Negri reiterates this critique in Antonio Negri. no. 175. “Witnessing the Inhuman: Agamben or Merleau-Ponty. 2 (2002). ed.” PMD. Arianna Bove. Rainer Maria Kiesow. and Time for Revolution.” trans. 70. See Giorgio Agamben. 173. unpaginated. see Erik Vogt.” PMD.NOTES EXOTERIC DOSSIER: THE LITERARY AGAMBEN 1 2 3 4 5 6 For various criticisms of Agamben’s supposedly dual methodology. Antonio Negri. 112–13.” SL. Colin McQuillan.” Angelaki 7. 2 (2007). Agamben’s first published work begins with a consideration of the uncanny as the ability of literature to produce desubjectivization. “Whatever Politics. 2007).” SAQ. The first critical concession of the three Agambens can be found in Justin Clemens.html. and Robert Buch. Matteo Mandarini (New York: Continuum. 1–7. 1 (2008). The Man Without Content. “S/Citing the Camp. www. and Ernesto Laclau. “Approaching Limit Events. See Adam Thurschwell. Catherine Mills. henceforth cited as PMD. negriagamben. 92. ‘The Political Life in Giorgio Agamben. 57. “Cutting the Branches for Akiba.” SL. no. No study of the uncanny is complete without reference to Nicholas Royle’s magisterial and unsettling The Uncanny: An Introduction (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2003). ed.” SAQ.” in Politics. “Law and Life.

social life. See for example Giorgio Agamben. ed. See “The Question Concerning Technology. trans. 204 . Giorgio Agamben. xxviii–xxxvi. Henceforth cited as IH. and Alex Murray.” and “The Turning. “Introduction: The Interim. 3. See Giorgio Agamben. “Jamming the Anthropological Machine.” William Watkin’s Blog.” in QCT. the inhuman. “Article: Syrinx / Larynx: A Full-Throated Ease. essentially. 109. trans. Mills defines as a crucial element of Agamben’s thought the faculty of having or capacity to do something. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Henceforth cited as WWB. the question behind the “political” texts comprising the Homo Sacer project in terms of the relation of the human to the animal.” in The Work of Giorgio Agamben: Law. 2 (2002). Henceforth cited as Para. 3–52. The Open: Man and Animal. 107. and ontology. no. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. 119. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Liz Heron (London: Verso. 43. Henceforth cited as QCT. William Lovitt (London: Harper Perennial. 10. Literature. trans. For more see Matthew Calarco. 59. 33–8. 29–30. http://williamwatkin. and again in LD. This is. The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: Acumen Press. bare life. Daniel HellerRoazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 62–75. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Henceforth cited as PA. The End of the Poem. 3.” Paragraph 25. See Giorgio Agamben. 140. 2004). Means Without Ends. Life. Language and Death: The Place of Negativity. Henceforth cited as MWE. Henceforth cited as HS. 1999). Henceforth cited as EP. see William Lovitt. trans. Giorgio Agamben. 2008). 2008). 90. For example.NOTES Agamben. 163–79. For a consideration of the status of the unwritten in Agamben see Andrew Dillon. IH. Henceforth cited as O. trans. This is the function of the “anthropological machine” that Agamben describes in The Open. “Introduction. 1991). Karen E. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1977).” in the collection Martin Heidegger. Henceforth cited as For more on the role of animal voice to poetry see William Watkin. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lovitt’s introduction is also useful. The importance of the literary has finally been conceded by some critics. & 187–8. 6. trans. 1–11.” SL. later in the main body of the book. trans. 84–5.” WGA. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Henceforth cited as LD. “The Role of the Shifter and the Problem of Reference in Giorgio Agamben. The Question Concerning Technology. See for example Justin Clemens. biological life. 1993). PROJECTION: THERE IS LANGUAGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Giorgio Agamben. Nicholas Heron. blogspot. 1998). See Catherine Mills. 2000). Justin Clemens. It also forms the basis of a whole chapter in The End of the Poem.

1 (2001). 12. 53–7. Peter D. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1971). especially in the later texts on poetry. His most veiled but sustained critique is to be found in the essay “Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality. 34–53. messianic conception of post-humanism: O.” WGA. 205–19. For a consideration of this argument see Thomas Docherty. 1993). 86–7. “Can the Dead Speak to Us? De Man. 129–30. trans. For a useful analysis of the relation of Agamben’s thought to that of Debord’s concept of the spectacle. Poetry. Lévinas and Agamben. The ontico-ontological difference refers to the division in Being and Time between Dasein or everyday being in the world and Being as such which he sees as epochally in withdrawal in the modern age. For largely negative comments on Agamben’s critique of Derrida see Thurschwell. 155–6. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books. 2002). Key moments come in the following texts Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture.” Culture. “Absence as Pure Possibility.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 106. trans. no. 1995).” in PMD. 15–88. 2005). Ronald L. 39–77). “As If the Time Were Now: Deconstructing Agamben. 1971). no. and is inevitably itself criticized by others. henceforth cited as TTR. See also Lee Spinks. trans. “Beyond Spectacle and the Image: the Poetics of Guy Debord and Agamben.” in Derrida. 187–210. Johnson. Subjectivation.” SAQ. see Alex Murray.” P. It is widely assumed that Heidegger’s interest in Dasein wanes as. and The Open (O. “Thinking the Post-human: Literature. Mills. henceforth cited as P. On the Way to Language. for example Krzysztof Ziarek. 90–2. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press. RA. see for example Martin Heidegger. 2009). 110–14. his commitment to Being as such waxes. Agamben’s critique of Heidegger spans the volumes Language and Death (LD. henceforth cited as OWL. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Thought. henceforth cited as IP. Henceforth cited as PLT. 173–97.” Textual Practice 15. 266–90. 54–64). David E. Potentialities. PMD. and Colin Davis. Language. “Linguistic Survival and Ethicality: Biopolitics. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row. For more on this topic see Catherine Mills. trans. trans. 164–9. henceforth cited as ST. Heidegger disputes this easy division. 2 (2007). 103–4. Henceforth cited as RA. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: SUNY Press. trans. Theory & Critique 45. and Sean Gaston. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 44–5. 44–6. 87–135. 200–2 and again Mills in PA. and Testimony in Remnants of Auschwitz. 1999). Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins. 23–46. and The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. “After Humanism: Agamben and Heidegger.NOTES 13 14 15 16 Also Giorgio Agamben. Affect and the Politics of Style. 102–4. no.” Para. His critique of Derrida is more sporadic yet insistent. HS. Literature and War: Absence and the Chance of Meeting (London: Continuum. “Potential European Democracy. PA. 61–2. post-kehre.” in Martin Heidegger. The conclusion to The Open sets out a more positive. 205 . 1 (2004). Idea of Prose. trans. but it is certainly true that analysis of the world gives way to considerations of earth in later texts such as “The Origin of the Work of Art.

trans. . Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press. See Shane Weller. and Barbara Formis. The relationship between the banning of poets from the republic and the figure if the homo sacer as desubjectivization under the ban of the sovereign. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: Chicago University Press. Silliman and Agamben. See ST. ed. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 137 & 159–62. Agamben later speculates on various grammatological punctuation marks in relation to his theory of nonrelational harmonic articulation that is neither “hypotactic nor paratactic but. Agamben.NOTES 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 See Derrida’s two remarkable assaults on Heideggerian difference. 2008). The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press. “Except for Law: Raymond Chandler. Vol.1 (2006). no. See M. no. Henceforth cited as LPN. 4.” American Anthropologist 108. and Rachel Blau DuPlessis. Weller is somewhat scathing of this narrative of overcoming nihilism which he says typifies our tradition in relation to nihilism since Nietzsche.” Paragraph 31. Literature. Shklovsky. “Coetzee. M. and William Watkin. John Milton. II. Jacques Derrida. 7–26. Ontological Difference. “‘Draft 33: Deixis’ / Notes on ‘Deixis’: a Midrashic Chain an exchange of thoughts. Bakhtin. com/36/watkin-duplessis. “Dismantling Theatricality: Aesthetics of Bare Life. 2004). For a full consideration of all these issues see William Watkin. Henceforth cited as MofP. 344–64. is implied but never fully developed in Agamben’s work. 1987). 1981).” in Jacques Derrida. 1977). 152–8. “The Materialization of Prose: Poiesis versus Dianoia in the work of Godzich & Kittay. Paradise Lost (Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Emergence of Prose: An Essay in Prosaics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 50. 3 (2008). 181–92. so to speak. Three essays which are not germane to my argument here in that they attempt to apply the ideas of Homo Sacer to literary analysis but still worth considering are Lee Spinks. James Ellroy. See also Wall’s ground-breaking analysis Radical Passivity: Lévinas.” SAQ 121–44. and the Passion of Abu Ghraib. the colon.” WGA. 206 .” Jacket 36 (2008). see John Lyons. 1989). 2008). For an analysis of deixis. http://jacketmagazine.shtml. 129–30. Psyche: Inventions of the Other. For a remarkable history of this process see Wlad Godzich and Jeffrey Kittay. and the Politics of Exception. Semantics Vol. Caton. . 636–7. atactic. Nihilism: The Uncanniest of Guests (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. and ellipsis dots in the title of the Deleuze essay “Immanence: A Life . Henceforth cited as RP. Blanchot and Agamben (New York: SUNY. Philosophy. 271–3. This is Agamben’s specific criticism of Derrida in Stanzas. 114–23. 221–3).” in relation to the hyphen. ” (P. Steven C. See for example HS. 1999). and “Geschlecht I: Sexual Difference. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question.

but the first serious study of the issue was Thomas Wall’s Radical Passivity. therefore they are alive without being human. 63–70 where Agamben considers Heidegger’s ideas pertaining to animal captivated being as fundamentally at odds with human privative. 307–30.” in Margins of Philosophy.” PMD. 32–5. This admits into sovereign domination a double weakness. 137–8. 1935). 1989). 53. See O. 1993). Norman Madarasz (Albany: SUNY. 198–226. Cecile Lindsay. On Mourning: Theories of Loss in Modern Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. is surely the basis of much cultural chauvinism and imperialism through the ages. Henceforth cited as CC. trans. Memoires for Paul de Man. Henceforth cited as MP. 92–4. “Vocal Utopias: Glossolalias. The importance of passivity and neutrality for Agamben’s post-metaphysical ontology has been noted by a number of critics. Henceforth cited as IPP. ed. In contrast glossolalia suggests a reductive animalism and a position of epistemological dominance based on an ontological certitude: they speak like animals and I can designate the significance of this as their being “as animals” confirming my status as civilized and thus human. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Manifesto for Philosophy. What barbarians utter is mere noise. “Au Hasard. trans. as glossolalic. 1999). Jonathan Culler. 2004). 2001). Second Edition. The Letters of John Keats. 1982). PA: Bucknell University Press. 29–47. trans. 227. trans. In the Process of Poetry: The New York School and the Avant-Garde (Lewisburg. Maurice Buxton Forman (Oxford: Oxford University Press. See Emile Benveniste. Xenoglossia implies both a culture as developed as one’s own and a lack of facility within the dominant culture: I know they are making sense but I do not have the capability to understand it.NOTES 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 For the relation of anaphora to deixis in Agamben see Giorgio Agamben. self-conscious being. and my own analysis of these issues in relation to poetry in William Watkin. The Coming Community. See also RA. John Keats. in other words. 217–30 & 35–40 respectively. I am thinking most specifically of the arguments put forward in Jacques Derrida. Alan Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 28–32. 207 .” Representations 56 (1996). See Jacques Derrida. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press. The English translation incorrectly names John Woodhouse as Keats’ addressee. and Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press. Henceforth cited as M. Problems in General Linguistics. a language equal to our own in every way except the specificity of its material signification. In Agambenian terms much cultural imperialism is based on the false division between xenoglossia (bios) and glossolalia (zoe). trans. a meaningless noise. The wilful treatment of xenoglossic alterity. and the subsequent denuding of xenoglossia under the sign of glossolalia. 1971). See for example Wall. “Signature Event Context. See Michel De Certeau. For more on this see William Watkin. Eduardo Cadava. See Alain Badiou.

See Zaraloudis. “Soulblind. 144.NOTES 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 Robert Browning.” Para. For further readings of the razo in Romantic and contemporary poetics see William Watkin. Josh Cohen. Agamben approaches the issue of the collusive nature of creation from a different angle. In fact Plato does not simply “exclude poets” in a single gesture but whittles away at the representational and mimetic bases of the arts within 208 . just as every author is always a coauthor. “Article: Poetic Dictation. Thurschwell. and Mills. PMD. 167.” Giorgio Agamben. De La Durantaye goes so far as to claim they are the same. 85. Vogt. Selected Poems (London: Penguin.” WWB. 2007). 186. here Heller-Roazen opts for “mean. 5–8. 2008). Pertinent to a later debate on the actual translation of the key term medio. 64.” SAQ. “Particularity and Exceptions: On Jews and Animals. 2 (2000). Andrew Benjamin. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books. PMD. Henceforth cited as SE. 2005). trans. Henceforth cited as Prof. State of Exception. 141–2. 76. “Spacing as Shared: Heraclitus. trans. “Agamben’s Potential.” WGA. trans. For an interesting consideration of love in Agamben see Julian Wolfreys. Henceforth cited as R. Robin Winterfield (Oxford: Oxford World Classics. 149–63. AP. THINKING THOUGHT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 See earlier comments on Foucault and desubjectivization in RA. and Robert Eaglestone. 131–2. 36–51. PMD. Badiou’s manifesto for “affirmative thinking” is mapped out in MP. Pindar. See Mills. 344. Agamben. the Other in Love. 13. PMD. For a consideration of this term and its relation to the semiotic in Agamben. Debating the origin of the inter-relation between the ancient legal terms auctoritas and potestas. 90–1. 2004).” in WGA. 113–38. 188. 203. For a consideration of the relation of life to poetry see WWB. concluding: “Every creation is always a cocreation. “On Giorgio Agamben’s Holocaust. “Face to Face with Agamben. no.” Para. 211. What Agamben defines as the pseudonymical nature of written selfenunciation. Plato. Profanations. RA. see Leland De La Durantaye.” PMD. or.” also my preference. 66. “‘A Different Insignificance’: The Poet and Witness in Agamben. Giorgio Agamben. CHAPTER 1 LOGOS. Mills. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Henceforth cited as AP. PA. “Philosophy of the letter” is the term used here for philosophers who use language merely as a transparent instrument without any regard for its presence as semiotic materiality or its mediality. a consonance I would be hesitant to endorse. 86. Republic. For criticism of Agamben in relation to otherness see Andrew Benjamin.” Diacritics 30.

107.NOTES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Greek culture. IP. See Bruno Gulli. 209 . 11–13. Idea of Prose. 193–211. “Idea of Poetry. and “Homonym. For more on pure. 60–1. 105. see RA. which in turn defines the concept of the pure medium of mediality in SE.” in Walter Benjamin: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory.” WGA. For an insightful consideration of the origins of the Idea of Prose in the work of Benjamin. For a consideration of knowability and sayability in relation to desubjectivization. This relentless degradation and attenuation of poiesis occurs in the fourth book of Republic. The political implications of this occupy Means Without Ends (MWE. 11–12). For a sustained reading of this essay see Deborah Levitt.” WGA. 97–107. “Article: Ontological Whisperings. 1994). post-juridical politics in final page of State of Exception: “To a word that does not bind . 1–28. but says only itself. 117).” in IP. ed. this definition of the Idea of Prose comes together with Agamben’s liberationist. 88). P. Alexander García Düttmann. “Notes on Media and Biopolitics: ‘Notes on Gesture’. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press. see R. unfortunately. Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime. 123. 84–8. . revealing a parity between the political and literary Agamben that. “Pseudonym. which shows itself. . see Nicholas Heron. politics. 70–102. See also Wall’s analysis RP. and the three main strands of Agamben’s work. 41 and again does not provide the citation. In a rare but central moment for Agamben scholarship. without any relation to an end. See MofP. primarily in an attempt to reject tragedy from the republic. “Politics and Poetics of Divine Violence: On a Figure in Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin. 2004).” WGA. An excellent consideration of the messianic and the term integral actuality can be found in Irving Wohlfarth. would correspond an action as pure means. 59–62. He also mentions this fragment in IP. For a consideration of pseudonym and homonym in literature see William Watkin. “The Ontology and Politics of Exception: Reflections on the Work of Giorgio Agamben. Jean-François Lyotard. 169–231. and metaphysics come together. 131.” (SE. Add into this Agamben’s definition of living in the category form-of-life as thinking as such (MWE. 107. For more on Agamben’s consideration of the logical aporia that “Discourse cannot say what is named by the name. poetry.” IP. 4–6. See also Düttmann. see also “The Idea of the Name. trans. divine violence see Anne De Boever.” P. 71–8.” WWB. where this argument is developed. “Integral Actuality. Peter Osborne (London: Taylor and Francis. Benjamin’s idea of a pure language finds an analogue in his conception of pure violence. 241–2.” SL.” CC.” CC. I do not have space to develop here. The Aristotelian saying something about something. “On the Messianic Structures of Walter Benjamin’s Last Reflections. Henceforth cited as LAS.

Conceding the “to” refers to some act that preceded to which Bartleby refers. Henceforth cited as BT. spinning on itself . 3 (2005). P. 79. 26–43. 248–1 & 309–10. 210 . I have decided not to italicize the term and so in effect neologise the very term for the formation of neologisms. the ultimate statement of potentiality. 35–8.NOTES 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 In Means Without Ends Agamben defines “form of life” as the ontic prefigurement of the specific life you will lead in a self-consciously critical manner. The archetypal activity of authentic being. and because I am arguing for poiesis as a contemporary term covering issues around making as pro-duction into presence. liberating future destiny. Thought is not just another form of life but form-of-life as such: MWE. back toward the phrase itself— absolute anaphora. . see Thanos Zartaloudis. The Parallax View (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 45–7 & TTR. See O. 2008). 2006). See also P. The gag comes to relate to later considerations of the use of the mask in drama which Agamben also defines as a gesture. 231. 72–3. Potentiality and Law: Deleuze and Agamben on ‘Bartleby’. Alexander Cooke. See Martin Heidegger. The final word however rests with Agamben and the relation of this. MWE. 134–8. to anaphora. This being the case.” Angelaki 10. Idea della prosa (Macerata: Quodlibet. See Gulli. 9. has also entered into English via the OED which defines it as creative production as well as being a technical term in psychology for the formation of neologisms. 116–8. no. is thought. SL. “A Sense of Loss: Whatever it May Be. 85. 140–44. 1996). Henceforth cited as N. THINKING THROUGH MAKING 1 Poiesis. Giorgio Agamben. See Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze. smooth glowing in which no point can be distinguished from any other” (P. 27–32. For further deliberations on this conception of Genius. or On Profanation. 110. 1993). and Marc Froment-Meurice. 112). HS. while a Greek word. 83.” (P. 223. MWE. CHAPTER 2 POIESIS. See also his comments on the Hegelian grund or ground in this regard in P. Being and Time. “Resistance. now turning. Bartleby: La Formula della creazione (Macerata: Quodlibet. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press. 375–85. 177–271. “Soulblind. It is indeed the origin of the political and its potential. and Slavoj Zizek. which he calls formof-life. . Ninfe (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. so to speak. and Giorgio Agamben. 76. trans. See Edkins SL.” in WGA.” Para. 2002). He speaks of potentiality in most of his major texts with major statements in CC. he notes: “But here it is as if this anaphora were absolutized to the point of losing all reference. 255). 21. as well as his description of the threshing floor of the ineffable as “a light.

ed. We will find exactly the same structural model in terms of messianic temporality later on so that Potentiality = projective chronos. 19–20. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press.php?articleID=216. Cited in Bernard Stiegler. 62–3. The Man Without Qualities. and Alain Badiou. 9. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper One. in Plato. See Derek H. accessed 17 September 2008. Nietzsche. 205b. See TTR. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University 1991). 165–86. 2006). 1998). trans. Henceforth cited as HI. 105–6. Ostensibly the modern epoch commences in the eighteenth century with the rise of Enlightenment rationalism and continues up to our present moment. refuting a criticism often 211 . from Nothing. See Claire Colebrook. The key term here is “letting. 57. be” (P. 557. Girly Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.” www. I consistently use the term modern here in the manner in which Agamben takes the term. trans. See the essay “The Thing” in PLT. especially the phenomenological thick description of jug-ness as thing. See PLT. 110 & 115. trans. As Agamben says most clearly in relation to the theological tradition of creation ex nihilo out of the void of the abyss: “the hardest thing in this experience is not the Nothing or its darkness . PRODUCTIVE ANTI-POIESIS 1 2 A solid overview of Agamben’s anti-modernity can be found in William Rasch. therefore. CHAPTER 3 MODERNITY. Potentiality. encompass Romanticism and contemporary “postmodernity. 172–3. 253). Michael Joyce. . 95.NOTES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Plato. .” SAQ. 2005). Whitehead. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press. Modern art would. “Poiesis and Art-Making: A Way of Letting-Be.” SL. trans. 1961). and indeed many others. and Life. Robert Musil. Heidegger famously and importantly differentiates an object which can be the party to subjective statements of knowledge and truth agreement from a thing which composes a phenomenological world around is being. where Agamben makes clear that his messianic temporality and overall method is not eschatological. and entelechy = chairatic interiorization. One and Two. The Collected Dialogues. Vols.” as opposed to praxis or a willed doing. Actuality = recursive eschaton. trans. “Agamben: Aesthetics. 1997). Synposium. Handbook of Inaesthetics. Charles Bernstein. 44.” Thus Colebrook’s critique of Agamben’s theory of poiesis as both masculinist and theological is incorrect. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike (London: Picador. “From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty. Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus. the hardest thing is being capable of annihilating this Nothing and letting something.contempaesthetics. This is the basis of the thesis of Martin Heidegger.

40). Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity Press. 110–12. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. In Potentialities cultural traditional transmissibility is founded first on linguistic transmissibility (communicability). trans. I turn to the critical material around the Kafka story presently.NOTES 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 and misguidedly levelled at his work. For considerations of Agamben’s use of Levi. See for example Andreas Kalyvas. tautological indication of the anaphoric act of indication as such. “The Sovereign Weaver: Beyond the Camp. While in The Time That Remains it is asserted as the defining feature of tradition: “That which makes each history historical and each tradition transmissible is the unforgettable nucleus that both bear within themselves at their core” (TTR. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. 2000). 74–106. Mills.. Such a process negates the age-old consideration of language as primarily metaphoric-symbolic. 31. Clearly a development of the idea of sacrifice in HS. Transmissibility is one of Agamben’s earliest. they pertain more directly to the work around the Homo Sacer project which I have chosen not to dwell on in this study. PMD. but of saying the suchness of as itself (CC. 73–83. 36–51. 198–221. 222–47. Two of the most infamous analyses of literature in Agamben are his consideration of Kafka’s “Before the Law” in Homo Sacer and his reading of the work of Primo Levi in Remnants of Auschwitz. Henceforth cited as C. 120–4. “Dead Man Walking: Law and Ethics After Giorgio Agamben’s Auschwitz. saying something as something. 212 . trans. of Voice: Bataille. to my mind. 97–100). and Esther Norma Marion. This I believe is Negri’s final criticism of Agamben in SL. Charles Baudelaire.” PMD.” MLN 121. where he takes Agamben’s commitment to productive thought and declares it effectively fatalistic and unproductive. 19–20. centrally important and. 4 (2006). trans. While both are important. Para. 397–417.” PMD. 104. 139 & 156. Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister. no. “The Painter of Modern Life. And Martin Heidegger. 403.” in Selected Writings on Art & Artists. “Supposing the Impossibility of Silence of Sound. “The Nazi Genocide and the Writing of the Holocaust Aporia: Ethics and Remnants of Auschwitz. Badiou defines the century as defined by the violence of The Real in Alain Badiou. P. “As such” here names the relation itself of relation between denotation (semiotics) and meaning with such-ness being the exposition of as-ness as tensile relation. Agamben and the Holocaust. Cohen. Charvet (Cambridge: Cambridge UP. See Wall. 2007). 4 (1999). 1996). Paul Hegarty. “Linguistic Survival and Ethicality. 64. PMD. Henceforth cited as EHP. P.’ trans. see Vogt. 1009–22.” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 12.” PMD. Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books. no. 1972). This debate can only be fully appreciated with reference to Agamben’s earlier consideration of “as” in the ontological mainstay “as such” as a form of anaphoric. most troublesome categories. See Marin Heidegger. The Century.E. David Fraser.

see Simon Morgan Wortham. 31–5). 43–70.” SAQ. Michael Shaw (Manchester: Manchester University Press. For Weller’s argument in this regard see LPN. Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 62 (2007). “Article: Under Glass. PMD. 19–34. no. Andrew Benjamin. 1992). 1984). 213 . Culture and Politics 15. Agamben’s most recent posting into this dossier is Giorgio Agamben. and my own consideration of these issues in William Watkin. 1993). and Mills. having fulfilled its past. CHAPTER 4 LOGOPOIESIS. trans. For a detailed analysis of Agamben’s theory of the museum. The Experience of Freedom. is now truly prose (that is pro-versa. “The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices. trans. 98. See David Halliburton. pro-verted.” Strategies: Journal of Theory. ed. C. “Playing with Law. 181–220. ed. For an excellent recent study of this classic theme. 2 (2002). 2005). THINKING TAUTOLOGY 1 2 Ezra Pound. trans. See Peter Burger. HS. 49–62 Agamben pits his reading against Derrida’s influential interpretation. 1991). “Law of Friendship: Derrida and Agamben. See my own analysis of avant-garde manifestoes in IPP. 1992). 13–27. Peter Connor in The Inoperative Community. turned forward” (P.” trans. 1992). “Myth Interrupted. “K. trans. see Sean Gaston. 89–105. See Jean-Luc Nancy. In this second reading. Derrida’s reading of the same text is to be found in Jacques Derrida. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge. Theory of the Avant-Garde. 146. Up until this point the most sustained engagement with the “literary” Agamben concerns his reading of Levi in Remnants and his of Kafka’s “Before the Law” in Homo Sacer. See Jürgen Habermas. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 55–7 for his comments on Malevich. Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.” PMD. 1982). 19–31 See Badiou.” WWB. 156. 1951). 36. For considerations of the relationship between the two texts. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: Polity Press. ABC of Reading (London: Faber.” New Formations. “Friendly Little Communities: Derrida’s Politics of Death. See my own consideration of this issue in IPP.” Postmetaphysical Thinking. 84–5. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Polity Press.NOTES 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 An early related analysis of the consumer object can be found in Stanzas where Agamben speaks of fetishism (ST. Glossing Hegel on philosophy after its end he speculates on “a humanity that. See Jean-Luc Nancy. 115–48. “Spacing as Shared. and The Decline of Modernism. HS 40–4. Acts of Literature. 219–37. 135). see William Watkin. Derrida and Disinterest (London: Continuum.” in WGA. 18. See Vogt.

1960).” which really means tricks me or feigns for me. “The Role of the Shifter. 637). by Froment-Meurice. as “The poem—this prolonged lingering between sound and sense” (EHP. trans. CHAPTER 5 ENJAMBEMENT. Jean-Pierre Barricelli (Boston: 1986). Jeff Fort (Urbana: University of Illinois Press.147–8. 1969). “Beauty is truth. lingers even longer than the poem itself. John Keats. Para. see Clemens. such lingering has its own lofty resoluteness. truth beauty”. Idea of Prose. thoughtless hanging around. 111 & 117. For a consideration of Agamben’s contentious use of the paradigmatic example. 176).11–134. SAQ. of course.” is misleading in relation to the Italian.NOTES 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 See Colebrook. For an introduction to some of these concepts see Heron. 114).” Lingering. “Introduction. which in part refutes the criticism of Agamben’s use of “extreme examples” such as one finds in Alison Ross. it is no mere vacillation. Signatura rerum: Sul metodo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.”’ WGA. unfairly I believe. cited in LD. 274–6.” SAQ. The English here. trans.” WGA. Para. Giacomo Leopardi. All English quotes taken from Giacomo Leopardi. 2008). See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. “The Exemplary Exception. 2007). Lingering in comparison calls to mind an almost passive. Oeuvres II. 17–37. 2008). “mi fingo. 109. see the first chapter of Signatura Rerum entitled “Che cos’è un paradigma?. “thought conceives. “Idea of Poetry. 75. Norris. This is a criticism levelled. 214 . is a significant change to prolongation which suggests stretching as an act of willed extension. 177. I first came across the idea of the tabularity of poetic structure in Julia Kristeva.” allowing him to conclude: “the listening to the poem. Σηµειωτιχη [Semiotike]: Recherches pour une Sémanalyse (Paris: Éditions du Seuil.” in Giorgio Agamben. The self-same formula is also placed in a position of some prominence in Heidegger’s essay ‘Hölderlin’s Earth and Heaven’ where Heidegger’s translator has him translating the Valéry dictum defining the poem: “Le poème: cette hésitation prolongée entre le sens et le son” (Paul Valéry. and even the thinking which prepares such listening. Jean Hytier (Paris. After all. 85–6. not due to indecisiveness (vacillation) but an authentic desire to listen to poetry’s call. THE TURN OF VERSE 1 2 3 Agamben’s elegant formula for poetry is borrowed from Valéry via Jacobson and attributed by Heller-Roazen to Milner (Heller-Roazen. 108–10. For a summary of the arguments. Selected Poems (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks. 3–4 and clarifies such issues as Norris’s exemplary examples. Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. Here “Heidegger” retains the caesuric and thetic nature of Valéry’s prose by translating prolongée in terms of the more suggestive “lingering.” PMD. ed. 50–1.

21 This useful term for the material space of the poem usually juxtaposed to e-space or virtual textual space is most often utilized in the work on contemporary poetics in the work of Johanna Drucker. [Every instant. 83–117. 26. See TTR. “Poetry Machines: Repetition in the Early Poetry of Kenneth Koch. See Johnson. Celan. For an indication as to how this technical prosodic effect could be interpolated into Agamben’s wider political analysis see his consideration of the hinge in “K. Hölderlin. Il sacramento del linguaggio: Archeologia del giuramento (Roma: GLF. 29–69. 203–6. PMD. “Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time. 158–91. 1981). while Agamben gives an example of the caesura he never provides examples of enjambement as such. “The Virtual Codex from Page Space to e-space. This logic resembles in miniature the logic of the epoch and of messianic time in a quite remarkable and universal fashion. For his initial conception of calling see BT. It is typical of all logopoietic thinkers that their analysis of poetry depends on a core of significant examples covering a canon of logopoietic poets. 1994). 2000). 222–47. Rilke.” he calls it Greetings. every image anticipates virtually its future unwinding and recalls its preceding gestures] Interestingly.” M. 9–10). It was the poets themselves who called this “retrogradatio cruciata . does not come to view as double until a third element occurs to confirm this duality. stress-unstress. The Language Instinct (London: Penguin. Selected Poems (Manchester: Carcanet. enjambement. however. 81–2). 117. 231. an alternation between inversion and progression” (TTR. See Jacques Derrida. . the essence of poetic structure which is also the basis of our being able to claim that poetry “thinks” has been known for many centuries but had simply dropped out of common usage. Agamben uses the example of Bill Viola’s 1995 work “The therefore. 53–4 & 74–5. As one can see. no. and rhyme are all dependent on an idea of duality which. IPP.NOTES 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 See Stephen Pinker. 35–6.philobiblon. SAQ.” http:// www. See for example Johanna Drucker. The essential bases of poetry.” EnterText 1. 119 & 132. 1 (Dec. 215 . 266. 17–19. See William Watkin. A useful consideration of silence can be found in Hegarty. 269–80. caesura. See Gulli. Mallarmé. yet in each case said reading works to develop what is effectively a quasi-universal or transcendental truth about poiesis as such. . 29 for the commencement of a career-long attack on aesthetics in Heidegger. SL. See BT.” WGA. and Giorgio Agamben. ogni immagine anticipa virtualmente il suo svolgimento futuro e ricorda i suoi gesti precedenti” (N. 2008). Thomas Gray. of which he says: “Ogni istante.

even if this is not marked grammatologically. trans. While I do not have space to deal with the trace in detail it should be obvious from my comments here and earlier in the text that the trace is not reducible either to time or space. WGA. no. 90–1. What he names “a paraexistence or a paratranscendence that dwells beside the thing. Henceforth cited as SP. of course. trans. For a brilliant attack on the omnipresence of end-directed syllogism as an unquestioned and damaging convention of poetic and prosaic structural coherence. 7–9. 38–59. 69–70. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press. before and after thought (penso). Selected Poetry (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks. see Ron Silliman.” Diacritics 33. For more on the gender implications of the appropriation of terms such as womb/khora. 1996). THE SPACE OF THOUGHT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 The original Italian is as follows: ‘Io vado verso il fiume su un cavallo / che quando io penso un poco un poco egli si ferma’ (IP. 101. ‘Khōra. CC. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press. On the relation of this to the Benjaminian concept of the division of the division and the caesura. For more on Italian versification. 122–4. see Sean Gaston. 2008). 53–8. 14. 1984).” the presence of being to the side. see Watkin. see Leland De La Durantaye. which he also terms the halo. See IPP. A History of European Versification. OM.106. Henceforth cited as W.NOTES 22 For by far the best and most penetrating explanation of spacing and the trace in Derrida. For my own analysis see MofP. Similarly. although for Agamben at least. Starting with Derrida (London: Continuum. Julia Kristeva. 1995). 216 . “The Suspended Substantive: On Animals and Men in Giorgio Agamben’s The Open. 1987). the trace is not synonymous with language. 25–30 and 239n11 (for her critique of Derrida). Alexander Pope. see Mikhail Leonovich Gasparov. 1984). Gerald Stanton Smith and Marina Tarlinskaja (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 84–119. A Wave (Manchester: Carcanet. see Jacques Derrida. and. CC. 200–6. CHAPTER 6 CAESURA.’ On the Name. Derrida’s conception of language is problematically ensconced within the differing and deferring logic of the trace. but is the endless collapsing of the traditional metaphysical distinction between the two. 2007). 89–130. 43). See De Boever. Revolution in Poetic Language. Here the hemistich in the second line breaks it into two clearly separate entities. John Ashbery. 2 (2003). See also MWE. 355–8. For more on the right-hand margin in poetry. The New Sentence (New York: Roof Books. ed.

to my piece “‘Systematic rule-governed violations of convention’: The Poetics of Procedural Constraint in Ron Silliman’s BART and The Chinese Notebook. no. 499–529. SAQ.NOTES RECURSION. Weller is in agreement. Could it be he knew of my work even before we met? It seems unlikely.” Contemporary Literature 48. 142. 217 . 108. I believe. although I do not remember ever mentioning it. 4 (2007). He refers. THE TURN OF THINKING 1 2 3 For an analysis of poiesis in relation to modernity see Colebrook. see LPN.

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133. 141. 98. 209n.25. 205n. 208n. 36–7.11 integral actuality 54–7. 209n. 209n.33.5 Means Without Ends 58. 204n. 206n. 157. 100– Agamben. 123. 123.19 Profanations 41–3. 89–90 aesthetics 16. 206n. 47–9. 208n. 152.32. 187–8.8 Ninfe 210n. 61–2.9. 209n.29 The Open 5. 47. 210n. 122–4. 113. 158. 205n.1. 100–14. 212n. 204n.6.12. 143. 20–2.7. 182–3.33. 54–64.21. 213n. 212n.33. 87. 163. 204n.27. 72. 92. 216n. 208n. 166– 204n. 212n.15. 211n. 209n. 207n.5 Homo Sacer 1.12 State of Exception 171. 111. 67. 210n.12.12.26. 204n. 210n. 67–8.18. 209n. 47. 204n.28 Idea of Prose 33–6.15 Adorno. 213n.5. 146. 209n.23.6 The Man Without Content 45–6.15. 32. 12–13. 209n. 91. 209n. 148–9.5.4. 213n. 8–9. 24.12.22. 209n. 204n. 7–12. 206n. 30. 216n. 59. 208n. 54. 212n. 64–6. 206n. 149. 215n. 203n. 205n. 89. 143–4. 124. 79–86. 169–71.34. 207n. 215n. 18. 205n.1 Il sacramento del linguaggio 215n.12 Infancy and History 4–5.31. 83–4. 25. 206n.18 .13. 45. 58–9.6. 196 as poetic spacing 137–8. 212n. 91–7. 174–80. 139.19.10. 212n.n. 211n. 45–7.15. 158 actuality 43–4.1.18 Signatura rerum 213n. 204n. 213n.4. 13.2 Remnants of Auschwitz 26–32. 212n. 81–3. 229 “K” 213. 210n. 209n. 135–9. 210n.2. 209n. 206n.INDEX abyss between poetry philosophy 45–7.18. 189–92. 48. 171.13. 5. 204n.4. 210n. 206n. 37.19. 216n. 205n. 95.7 Stanzas 14–19. 210n. 89. 205n.29 Potentialities 43.9.15. 210n.7 Language and Death 2. 71–2.10.13. 161.24. Theodor 29.22 Idea della prosa 210n. Giorgio Bartleby 210n. 209n.29.3.7 The End of the Poem 32.30 The Coming Community 63–6 180–2.15. 125. 213n. 205n. 204n. 126–34.

79. 150. 83–6 arche-presence 86. 86.17 Benveniste.4 anaphora/cataphora matrix 21. 211n.17 Bakhtin. 118. 163.9. M.INDEX Agamben. 212n.4 criticism 16. 128.39 boustrophedonic 139–45. 207n.6.34 corn (tip/corner) 186–8 couplet 130.8. 69. 175. 100–14 as if 88–94. 149.41 Buch. 206n. 156–7. Robert 30. Claire 211n. 197 arche (authentic origin) 49–50. 59–60.32. 92. 213n. 207n. 65–6. 153. 206n. 181 bios 1. 92–3. 63. 64.6 Colebrook.3 Calarco. 150. 215n. 98. 134. 197.2. Matthew 204n. 197. 79–91. 161. Derek 213n. 215n. 128. 145 Aristotle 17.15 caesura 13–14. 63–5. Alexander 210n. Daniel 154.1. 83–6. 210n. 122–4. 159. 138. 147.10 biopolitical 1. 215n. 168–72 creation 16. 146–54. 149 as not 68. 60. 97. 189–92 Arnaut.44. 105. 146. 95. 204n. 146–7 . Charles 78–9. 70–4. 137. 187 artist 16. 48–51.8. 29. 133. 152. Justin 204n. 64. 144. 125.6 Attridge. 211n. 62–6. 99.9 Caton. 68–9. 70–4.10. 106.20. 204n. 144–9.4 Burger.4. 146. 207n. 3.17.38. 211n.3. 20–5. 57. 210n. 108 Badiou. 122 aletheia (truth as unveiled or unconcealed) 28. 16. Charles 95. 207n. 98. 106. 107. 95 Benjamin. 76. 165. 152 ¯ ¯ Ashbery. 199. 31. Walter 9.42. 184 bringing forth 70. 90. 58.30 Bernstein.34 Baudelaire. Peter 103. 210n. 216n. 216n.15. 77. 159. 215n. 41–4. 212n. 164. 131.18 aura 92–7. 111. 211n. 165. 210n. 54–5. 110–13.1 communicability 6. 212n. Andrew 207n. 103. 200 animal 5–8.43. John 102. 196. 12–13.19 Clemens.9 Cooke. 155.2 Cohen. 206n. 215n. 122.26 230 Balzac.15 Akhmatova. 213n. 201. 209n. 66. 16. 31.3. 216n.24. 102. 117.18 Benjamin. 53–7. 79. 98. 27–8. 196 apotropaic 48–51. 212n. 168. 152. 101–2. M.10 lieu commun 85. 82 Hos me 88–94. 161.9. 94. 98. 10. 176 anaphora 21. Giorgio (Cont’d) The Time That Remains 88–94. 73.39 anti-poiesis 83–114. 108. 120–1 Browning. Josh 208n. Émile 23. 157. 71. 43–5. 205n. 212n. 120. 18.29. 189. 119. 209n. 132. 109. 132. 214n. Steven 206n.19 Celan 33–4. 102. 171. 193.33. 210n. 95.15. 178. 170. 146–7. 208n. 71–6. 211n. 87.4.12. 50. 154. 213n. 166–93. Robert 203n. 27. 86. 73–5. 212n. 178–9. Alain 29. 142. 174–80 appropriation 7. 135. Anna 64–5. 207n. 91. Honoré de 104 Bartleby 43. 206n. 132. 81–2. 157.

73.2. 134. 205n. 105. 185.6 DuPlessis.24. 181.31 enigma 176–80 enjambement 14. 87–8.22. 127. 186 Davis. 149. 191 ex nihilo (creation) 69. gestell) 78. Leland 208n. 178.1 Gaston. 210n.4 experience 4. 42. Jean-Philippe 203n. 112. 144. 96.12 De Boever. 6.3 deixis 20–3. 85.36 gesture 20. Marcel 67. 168–75. 198 Fraser. 123. 80–1. 60. 156. 106. 33. 27. 8–13. 128. 180–1. Michel 41. 137.14.26 Gasparov. Alexander García 50. 192. 209n.26 . 54. 86. 23–5.16. 205n. 203n. 147. Mikhail Leonovich 216n. 97. 192. 32–8. 209n. 168. 195. Rachel Blau 206n. 212n. 106–13. 129. 196. 53. 208n.24 Düttmann. 35. 208n. 25. 121. 130.29 Deranty. 199. 170.17. 213n. 160. 215n. 197. 88–90. 164 finitude 20. Johanna 214n. 212n. 165. 164–5. 96–7.15. 210n. 107.42 ease 180–5. 31. 135. 98. 41–3. 208n. 134.8 event 24. 24–5. 182.3 disinterest 101–3. 118. 47.18. 213n. 158–60. 128–9. 43. 106.8. 72. 15. 113.9 desubjectivization 23–32. 210n.34.21. Marc 210n. 199.6. 157. 170. 131. 22. 147. 57. 106.10 dictation 28.4. 58–65. 179. 62. David 212n. Colin 205n. 150. 172–3. 145–6. 47–8. 141. 46. 67. 196 différance 13. 210n. 199.31.19 Foucault. 37.33. 79. 88. Barbara 206n. 192.9. 67–8.14 Duchamp. 152–3.46. 123. 206n. 105.12.5 De La Durantaye. 125. 215n. 106. 132 fiction 89–90. 29–31. 209n. 109. Robert 207n.4 epoch 53. 206n. 205n. 31.11 231 enunciation 6. 77–9. 182–3. 191. 173–4.5 gag 59–60. 29. 165. 208n.15. 57. 186.17 entelechy 81–3. Anne 209n. 122 Dante 32. 159. Thomas 205n. 195 expropriation 31. 26–7.4 Derrida. 146. 42. 216n. 208n.1. 173. 206n.18. 117. 42. 215n. 106 Drucker. 209n. 67–8. 187. 145. 64–5. 130. 215n. 46.1 framing (parergon. 67.32 genius 67–9. 45–8. 135–66. 56–7. 82–3. 149–50. 153. 137–8. 126. 145.6 Froment-Meurice. 146 figural 148–53. 208n. 111–13. 203n. 215n.16. 141 Dillon. 53–4. 106. 19. 88. 216n. Andrew 204n. 126–7. 94–7. 216n. 29.5. 93. 124.15 Eaglestone. 109. 13. Sean 205n. 76. 123. 162. 125–6. 51.24 Formis. 126. 191–2. 188. 24–37. 132. 131. 127–8.18. 92. 201 form-of-life 58. 30. 88. Jenny 203n. 211n. 53. 94.14 Docherty.INDEX Damascius 61–2. 185. 215n. 207n. 29–32. 193. Jacques 12. 207n. 188 Edkins. 19. 107. 156. 182. 211n.

98.39 Ideal Form (eidos) 80–6. 125–6. 165. 30. 212n. G. 205n.16. 120. David E. 215n. Language. 45.8 Halliburton. 155. 58. 216n. 161 inspiration 32.16 Poetry. 35–8. 50. 198–9.32 Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ 198–9. 16.9 Hölderlin 47. Eleanor 203n. 99. 213n. 57. 120. 207n. Glenn 65–6. 147. 178. Andreas 211n. 148. 161. 113. 54.15. 107–12.36.9 .27 Gould.6.32. 124. 94.18 Being and Time 22. 75. 174–5 Heron. 211n. 20. Wlad and Jeffrey Kittay 20.9 The Question Concerning Technology 12.15 Johnson. 197.1 history 8. 87. 216n.1 kle sis 88–9. 210n. 28. 133. 204n. 136. 52–4.25. 204n. 170. Paul 212n. 121. 214n. 59–60 Kristeva. 70. 99. 67.11 Heraclitus 47. 47. 107–13. 79. 141. 122 gramma (grammatology) 140–1. 215n. 206n. 22. 152. 108. 59–60. 90. 70–9. 71. Julia 214n. 37–8. 118–25. 35. 143–5.13 Habermas.6.17. 73. Immanuel 9. 134. 12.4 Keats. Rainer Maria 203n. 214n.7 On the Way to Language 122. 209n.19 Heidegger.7. 117.22. 190 impersonality 30. 170 see also indifference ineffable 9–13. 211n. Bruno 209n.32. 205n. 207n.17. 138. 198. 100.16. Gustave 151 Gulli. 145–8. 153. 211n. 20–3. 145. 174 having see habit and appropriation Hegarty.10 judgement 11. 212n.1. 80. 161–2. 19. 205n. 191–2. 169–70. 57.1. 36.15. David 119 harmonia 47. 211n. 210n. 102. 213n. 124 Kiesow. 25–6. 179. 210n. 138. 151. 63. 38.INDEX glossolalia (babble.18 Kalyvas.3 232 hesitation 156–8. 190. 215n. 77. 178.11. 46. 205n.4.6. 214n. Jürgen 109 habit 129–34. 17.8. 205n. 131–2. 38. 60. W. 174. 63. 37. 37. 22. 55. 54–7. 34. 67. 77. Babel) 29–31. John 26–7. 215n. 207n. 159. 36. 146. Franz 106. Martin 12–14.16. 194–5 indistinction 1. 32. 203n. 73. 18. 63. 206n. 76. 214n.34. 157.2 Kant. 33. 210n.19 human 5–15.1 Gray.8. 165. 107–11 Kaufman. 122. 77. 146 Kafka. 157.8. 22–6. 77. 20.1. 100–1. F. 20. 215n. 113. 101. 212n. 199. 20–3. 162. Nicholas 209n.20 Hegel. 204n. 207n. 212n. 196–9. 210n. 57. 167. 86. 25. 181 ¯ Kommerell. Max 47. Thomas 141 Guillaume. 30. 205n. 195 integral actuality 54–5. 99–101. 135. 201.27 infancy 6–17.27. 206n. 133–4. 87. 205n. 204n.22. 96. 77. 201. 125 see also desubjectivization and dictation indifference 17. Thought 70. 51. 74.39 Godzich.

19 Marion. 45–7. 129. 113. 108–9.6. 211n. Esther Norma 212n. 9. 63.18 Milton. 209n.48.6 Matisse. 28. 179 love 14. 191. 204n.INDEX LaCapra. 204n. 118–21.24 logopoiesis 77. 32. 166. 132. 88. Friedrich 42. 67. 211n. 167. 107. 123–4.2. 195–6.6. Giacomo “L’infinito” 124–34. 215n. 184. 103.13. 203n. 45–6. Ernesto 203n. 88–93. 204n. 193. 15. 129–34 museum 78. 179–80. 160. 6 as medium 53. 145. 193. 203n. 215n. 13. 8. 197. 16–17. 136. 72–3. 11. 107–14.22 negation/negativity 2–3. 174 modern art 46. 8. 188–9. 110 Malevich 106. 87–91. 102–3. 169–70. 196. 89. 208n.20 . 211n. 30.19 logos 8. 67. 171–5. 191. 165. 80. 122 thing of thought as such 49–50. 92. 209n. 82. 131. 144–56. William 204n. 214n. 57–8. 133–4. Jean-Luc 29.15. 210n. 212n. 128.24 Lyotard. 32. 63. 141. 167.2 measure 97. 96–8. 49–52. Phillipe 29. 99. 157. 99. 196. 55. John 169. 103. 92–4. 33. 195 experimentum linguae 4.20. 135. Colin 203n. 200. 145. Deborah 209n. 169–71.8. Catherine 26. 83–116.12. 54. 125. 36–8. 22. 212n. 174 233 messianism 16. Jean-François 52. 128–9. 199–201.1 Laclau. 203n. 167. 48. 196. Alex 205n. 211n. 16. 199.8 Mills. 74. 173. 47.3. 196. Antonio 2. 101–14.10 language experience of 10–11.5 nihilism 3. Robert 83 name 9–10. 25. 35–7. 206n. 157. 89. 160. 55–66.21 life 1–2. 91. 6. 117–34. 117.3. 209n. 65. 10. 90.13 Muse 27. 213n. 105. 136.17 Mallarmé.42.18. 106–7.3 Nietzsche. 143. 198–9 and modernity 85. 166. 128. 35–7. 155.2. 69.3 modernity 1. 204n. 213n. 76. 69. 57. 195 Negri.16 that there is 4–40. 176–7. 72. Dominick 203n.11 Lyons. 179. Stéphane 58. 160. 195–7. 54. 206n. 208n. 131–4. 153. 6. 118. 11.1 Morgan Wortham. 21. 196. and subjectivity 25–8. 76. 20.21 Musil. 103–4. 149. Henri “Back” 76 McQuillan. 12. 182–5. 144–6. 148.11. 144. 26.15.1 Lacoue-Labarthe. 16. 169.45 Lovitt. 20–3. John 206n.12.44. 157. 215n. 117. 183. 122.18 morphe 79–81 Murray. 155.1. 57. 76–9. 216n. 213n. 145. 50–1. 44–6. 25. 106. 90. 64–7. 179 Levitt. 196 Leopardi. 100–3. 41–68. 210n. 53. 89. 91. 45. 201.1. 209n. 118. 129.13 Nancy. 158. 17. 56. 204n. 153. 82–3. 209n. 147. 35–6. 114. 85–6. 207n. 128. 208n. Simon 213n. 67. 211n. 213n.

17. 34–5. 178–9.40. 62. 195. 173 poetry and philosophy 14. 208n.9. 126. 210n. 98. 137–46. 197. 96. 132–4. 191. 138.7 Noys. 88. 178. 213n. 60. 184. 113–14. 204n.1 ontology 5–6. 144. 94. 170. 195–7. 58. 186–8.6.11 Pound. 169 production 58. 168–9. 135. 120.27. 160. 53. 162. 210n. 140–1. 125. 137–40. 17. 122. 69. 211n. 129. 35–7.1. 155. 129. 87–90. 195.47 ready-made 85. 35. Benjamin 203n. 29. 156. 17. 144–5.87–116 pop art 85. 175. 138. 51. 86. 206n. 81–3. 55. 171. 184–7. 143. 208n. 173 end of 135–9.34. 47. 159–60. 79–81. 142–4. 20–1. 48–9. 117–18. 154. 24. Andrew 214n.39. 90. 49–57. 214n. 71–3. 201 metrical-musical element (poetry) 128. 151. line 79.1 razo de trobar 32. 211n. 207n. 63–8. 74–5. 154–74. 139.40. 170. 93 Pope. 192 poem body 44. 112. 133. 209n. 186. 173. 44–5. 71–5. 106. 211n.4 Pacman 159 parable 148–9. 92–8 revelation 52–3 rhetorician 104–6 rhyme 14. 88–92. 175. 192–3. 214n. 114. 79. 145. 205n. 127. 146. 195–6 planar 128. 17. 72.8 Rimbaud. 152–3 periplus 132–3. 215n. 188. 197. 79. 167. 209n. 200.4. 193. 99. 79. 134. 198–9. 13. 30–1. 206n.19. 130. 128–9. 12–13. 44–8. 22. 166.25. 8.1. 42–6. 172. 210n.33. 83. 61. 79. Stephen 214n. 156. 181.11 234 poiesis 3.3 Idea of 54–7. 49. 124. 197. 155–62. 31. 27. 141. 191. 105–6. 67. 144–5. 48. 71–2. 153. 146–9. 58–9. 97. 43. 100.INDEX Norris. 52. 50. 211n. 113 . 130. 63–6. 208n. 44.16. 101–2. 186 phone 8. 63–4. 172. 60. 51. 23–8. 93 reproducibility 84–6. 91. 211n. 200–1 recursive-projection 21. 192. 136. 88. 164–5. 145–6. 193. 32.1 prose 15. Ezra 102. 157. 179 Pinker. 122. Arthur 26–7. 62–3. 120–1. 144.1 praxis 58. 210n. 183. 123–4. 163. 21. 134. 104–5. 170.27. 81. 172. 137. 213n. 163–4. 214n. William 211n. 206n. 180. 207n.4 Plato 14.9 poetry advent 126–33.18 Rasch. 33. 117–18. 140. 198–9 philology 2. 144. 11. 183–92. 45. 169. 216n. 37. 132. 32. Alexander 168–72 potential 13. 167. 153–5.4 presupposition 9.1 Paul 29. 129–31. 107–9. 137. 121. 5. 207n. 69–87. 103–8. 113. 163. 178–9. 86. 102. 43–4. 28. 153. 215n. 167. 132. 145. 137–43. 191–3.1 anti. 58–60. 149.19. 169–70. 152 passivity 30. 133. 28. 128–9. 67. 28.

47.4 techne 73–86. 108–9. 26–32. 117–34. 80. 192 operational time 150–3. 125–8. 170. 181–3. 184–8. 211n.4 terror 99–106 thing. 133. 63–4.6 Spinks. 21. 31. 172–4. 94–104. 97–8. 105–6. 157–8. 162. 149. 160. 150. 83. 173–5. 122. 56–7. 145. 127.10 singularity 5. 65. 12. 131. 214n. 192. 141. 184–9. 150. 149. 174–5. 200. 160. Ferdinand de 17.3. 54. 211n. 206n. 212n.27. 138. 134–5. 133–4. 122. 72. 85. 194 semantic 27–9. 174 Thurschwell.11 ergon 158–60. 43. 169. 167. 32. 199. 125. 30.21. 20. 27–8. 188. 199. Adam 203n. 214n. 83.15. 110–11. 207n. 199 semiotic 6. 125. 185. 158–64. 192.4. 77. 133. 136. 187 shock 94–7. 59. 60. 23. 34.6 stil novist 14. 197. 201 tone/tonos 163–4 transmissibility 30. 60.39 space 14. 97–9. 149–50. 165. 35–7.42 time/temporality chronos 145. 167. 46. 117–18. 212n. 131. 133. 179. 156. 6. 84. 71. 201. 158. 150. 32. 155. 109.11 kairos 145. 171–2. 28. 125. 131. 127. 184. 135. 173 eschaton 88. 140. 99. 169. 24. 45–6. 159–60. 48. 110–11 tautegorical 52. 149–53 linear time 87. 178–9. 216n. 133.19 stanza 13–17. 17. 149. 93–7.8 taste 99–103. 122. 28. 114. 184 silence 8. 163 and space 20.12. 149. 55–6.46. 57. 151 tautology 6. 47–8. 99. 80. 212n. 22–3. 144–5. 205n. 11. 37. 144. 172. 143. 188. 131. Ron 206n. 142. 186 turn see enjambment and verse . 128. 154. 32. 195. art 75–7 thing as such of thought 49. 144. 161. 169. 117. 56. 136–9. 146–7. 154. 197. 97. 172. 70.4 sestina 154–5. 182 tablet 44. 178–9. Bernard 211n. 215n. 186–7. 175–9. 107–8 sign 17–22. 206n. 216n. 142. 182. 155–62. 140. 30. 197. 165. 124. 51–2. 84. 153. 131–2. 108. 130. 105–6. 154. 208n. 211n. 150–4. 178–88. 48. 194. 111–12. 27 scission 2. 77–8. 121 tension 35. 164–5. 75. 188. 127. 207n. 53. 197. 19. 46. 60–8.20 Silliman. 199 sovereignty 1–2. 137–8. 32. 201. 57.5 Saussure. 28. 167–72. 177–80. 193.INDEX Romanticism 69. 171. 146. 120–1. 152–65. 136–43. 67. 149. 199–201. 136–44. 185 tabular 64. 173. Lee 205n. 32–3. 106. 56. 197. 199–201. 127–9. 124. 196 235 state of exception 1 Stiegler. 55. 196. 208n. 166–93. 92. 210n. 155–6. 46. 63.9 Troubador 14–17. 160–9. 113.3 Royle. 35. 61. 13–19. 149. 19. Nicholas 203n. 9. 172.

102 Varro 58 verse as versus 128–34. 216n.20 voice 3–8. Julian 208n.6.39 Zartaloudis.44. 177.21. 207n.34 zoe 1.5 Walser. 213n.13. 128. 215n. 199. Shane 206n.37. 207n. 186. 208n. 133. 30. 199.15 Wolfreys. 212n. 152. 140–4. 179.5 Valéry. 207n.1. 212n. 216n. 21–5.7 Wohlfarth.45 work see praxis and entelechy writer’s block 67–8 xenoglossia 29–30. 204n.21. 213n.20. 201 Vogt. 8 236 . 168.24. 45–8. 173–5. 12. Erik 203n. 59. Thanos 210n. 208n. 206n. 157–8. 178. 166–7. 214n.1 van Gogh. 125. 28. William 204n.11 Weller. Derek H. 206n.15 Zizek. 211n. 103. 135–65. 171. 205n.36.27.INDEX uncanny 2. 75. Robert 122 Warhol.39 zoon logon echon 5.47. 82. Slavoj 210n. Paul 56.2 whatever (quodlibet) 63–5 Whitehead.33. 207n. Krzysztof 205n.10 Wall. Irving 209n. 33. Andy 93 Watkin.36 Ziarek. Thomas Carl 207n. 209n. Vincent 70.10. 7.

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