You are on page 1of 48

AB

The International Marine Contractors Association

Guidelines for

The Issue of a Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document

www.imca-int.com

127 DPVOA
February 1995

The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is the international trade association representing offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies.
IMCA promotes improvements in quality, health, safety, environmental and technical standards through the publication of information notes, codes of practice and by other appropriate means. Members are self-regulating through the adoption of IMCA guidelines as appropriate. They commit to act as responsible members by following relevant guidelines and being willing to be audited against compliance with them by their clients. There are two core committees that relate to all members: Safety, Environment & Legislation Training, Certification & Personnel Competence The Association is organised through four distinct divisions, each covering a specific area of members interests: Diving, Marine, Offshore Survey, Remote Systems & ROV. There are also four regional sections which facilitate work on issues affecting members in their local geographic area Americas Deepwater, Asia-Pacific, Europe & Africa and Middle East & India.

AB

127 DPVOA
The Marine Division is concerned with all aspects of specialist vessel operations. Key aspects of its work include an annual seminar, in particular focusing on practical experience, annual reports on DP station keeping incidents, also incorporated in an electronic database available to members of the division, industry-leading guidelines for the design and operation of dynamically positioned vessels and a wealth of in-depth technical reports on a range of related issues. DPVOA merged with AODC to form IMCA in 1995.

www.imca-int.com/marine

The information contained herein is given for guidance only and endeavours to reflect best industry practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall attach to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

1 1.1

INTRODUCTION Background In response to the requirement by the flag states and the published IMO guidelines for vessels with Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems (Ref:1), the Dynamic Positioning Vessel Owners Association (DPVOA) required that a review of the Flag State Verification Acceptance Document (FSVAD) be carried out and a set of guidelines be produced, setting out the procedures and requirements that a flag state could expect, in order to issue a FSVAD to a vessel. Objective The overall objective of the Flag State Verification Acceptance Document is to: Provide a comprehensive and safe testing and checking programme for the DP system; Demonstrate that the DP system is maintained to fulfil the requirements of the vessel's capability and integrity; Reduce over testing of systems such that components are not unnecessarily stressed; To ensure that new problem areas are quickly incorporated into the system and resolved; To provide a continuous and structured record of events which are relevant to the DP operation of the vessel; Provide a stand alone document which can be easily audited by the flag state representative or by the organisation authorised by the flag state.

1.1.1

1.2 1.2.1

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 2

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

2 2.1

GUIDELINES FOR FSVAD General It is recommended that a technically competent person who is familiar with the overall DP system should be involved in organising the documentation. The documentation required for a FSVAD can be arranged as a register where it can be catalogued and kept up to date, thereby providing an easily auditable system for both vessel's staff and auditor. This can be incorporated within a quality management system, where the necessary documentation is indexed for ease of use. An example format has been included in the Appendix 2 for reference. On the assignment of the relevant equipment class, the successful completion of survey and testing in accordance with Appendix 2, and the compilation of the relevant documentation, a FSVAD will be issued. The documentation should include the main areas of interest listed below, which can be presented in a format appropriate to the management system onboard the vessel. This will expedite the appointed auditors task in assessing the vessel. Initial Survey 2.2.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis A systematic description of all systems and major components of the DP system (Ref:5) is required and this can be accommodated within a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). It is important to have a FMEA completed as soon as possible (Refs: 2 and 6) to describe the DP system and identify the relevant failure modes. 2.2.2 System Drawings A full list or index of drawings that are onboard the vessel should be available. The drawings listed should be adequate to describe the layout of all systems including any modifications that have been made to the DP system. The list should identify the location of the drawings, to make the identification of systems and major components easier for the appointed auditor. 2.2.3 Pre-Installation Documentation and Certification A systematic list of all pre-installation documents and certificates along with Factory Acceptance Test (FAT), installation tests, commissioning tests for each system and major component should be documented. Copies of the pre-installation documentation should be filed onboard the vessel when the vessel is new, or whenever a particular system is modified. The purpose of the pre-installation documentation list is to verify that all systems and major components have been tested and duly certificated.

2.1.1 2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

2.2

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 3

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

2.2.4

DP Proving Trials Results of the initial sea trials of the DP system after installation onboard the vessel should be documented. This should include the Harbour Acceptance Trials (HAT), Customer Acceptance Trials (CAT) and FMEA Proving Trials (Refs:2 and 3) as appropriate. It is important to document the programme of trials and completed results from the initial sea trials.

2.2.5

DP Operations Manual The DP Operations Manual should describe the DP operating system (Ref:2) specific to the vessel. A description of the procedures for operating the DP system and the DP set-up procedures should be detailed, along with the procedures for the start and termination of DP operations. Vessel DP operational limits should be included to incorporate weather working limits for DP operations within design and operational limitations. The DP system description can be augmented by one line diagrams of the system.

2.2.6

Responsibility and Organisation A description of the vessel's organisation and the responsibilities for DP operations should be included in the DP Operations Manual, and incorporated within the vessel's quality management system. It should include the responsibility for the revision of procedures to include when and how this should be carried out. Reference should be made to vessel training and familiarisation of key DP personnel (Ref:8).

2.2.7

Emergency Control and Response Emergency station keeping control and response procedures should be included in the DP Operations manual, in the event of loss of DP control or any situation where the DP status is degraded. A reporting system should be incorporated to detail any DP incidents and any changes to the vessel's safety policy.

2.2.8

DP Checklists and Control Procedures DP checklists and control procedure should be included within the DP Operations Manual and be specific to the vessel. These checks and controls should be set out in a clear and ordered method, to ensure that each action is carried out in the correct sequence, accommodates the nature and equipment class level of the vessel. The checks and controls should be used to ensure that the vessel is being operated within the requirements of the appropriate IMO equipment class. The DP checklists and control procedures should be designed so as to be filed and used to document each DP operation (Ref:9).

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 4

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

2.3

Annual DP Survey 2.3.1 Annual DP Trials The annual DP trials (Refs:4 and 5) should include all test and control procedures necessary to verify and document the DP system conforms to the requirements of design and operational limitations appropriate to the equipment class of the vessel. The annual DP trials control and procedures should be independently witnessed. The annual DP trials programme is not fixed and may be changed or be adapted to accommodate modifications to the system. 2.3.2 Planned Maintenance System A system for documenting and carrying out maintenance to company standard or manufacturers recommendations, as appropriate should be included within an accepted planned maintenance schedule (Refs:1 and 2). Records of all maintenance carried out on the DP system should be readily available.

2.4

Periodical DP Survey 2.4.1 5-Yearly DP Trials The five yearly DP trials (Refs:1 and 5) should be carried out in conjunction with the classification society's 5 yearly survey. The trials should be used to verify and document that the DP system is operating within design and operational limits appropriate to the equipment class of the vessel.

2.5

Modification and Non-Conformances 2.5.1 Test and Control Procedures Control and test procedures should be adopted (Ref:10) to ensure that any modifications to the DP system and/or the installation of any new equipment to the DP system is tested adequately and that DP system operates within the design and operational limitations appropriate to the equipment class of the vessel (Refs:2 and 5). This also applies to the rectification of any non-compliancies. Any modification to the software that may effect the DP system should be documented and tested thoroughly, with the results recorded and filed. The purpose of documenting and testing of any new equipment is to incorporate the documentation into the existing system of documentation. 2.5.2 DP System Records Records should be kept to document the continuing and historical condition of the vessel with respect to the DP system (Refs:2 and 5). This information should be systematic and be arranged to facilitate easy retrieval of individual reports.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 5

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

REFERENCES International Maritime Organization (IMO); Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems, draft MSC Circular DE 37/25/Add.1 Annex 7. DP Vessel Owner's Association (DPVOA); Review of DP Related Documentation on DP Vessels, Report No. GM-1219-0792-1448. DP Vessel Owner's Association (DPVOA); Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels, Report No. GM-510-0189-650. Global Maritime (GM); Example of a DP Vessel's Trials Programme, for DP Vessel Owner's Association, 6, November 1991. Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD); Guidelines and Notes No. 24, 15.6.93. Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD); Guidelines and Notes No. 28, 20.10.94. International Maritime Organization (IMO); Guidelines on Dynamic Positioning Systems for New MODUs and Vessels Engaged in Similar Operations, MSC 57/27 paragraph 24.34. DP Vessel Owner's Association (DPVOA); Training & Experience of Key DP personnel, Report No. GM-1418-0993-1809. DP Vessel Owner's Association (DPVOA); Example of a DP Vessel's Trials Programme, 6 November 1991. United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA); Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with Dynamically Positioned Systems

8 9 10

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 6

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

APPENDIX 1 IMO GUIDELINES FOR DYNAMICALLY POSITIONED VESSELS

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 7

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document


INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT LONDON SE1 7SR Telephone: Fax: Telex: 020 7735 7611 020 7587 3210 23588 IMOLDN G

MSC/Circ.645 6 June 1994

IMO

Ref. T4/3.03

GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS

The Maritime Safety Committee at its sixty-third session (16 to 25 May 1994), approved the Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems, set out at annex to the present circular, as prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment at its thirty-seventh session. Member Governments are invited to bring the Guidelines to the attention of all bodies concerned, and apply the Guidelines to new vessels with dynamic positioning systems constructed on or after 1 July 1994, in conjunction with implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4.12 of the 1989 MODU Code as amended by resolution MSC.38(63). Member Governments are also invited to use the proposed model form of flag State verification and acceptance document set out in the appendix to the Guidelines. ***

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 8

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

ANNEX Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems

CONTENTS PREAMBLE...................................................................................................................10 1 GENERAL .........................................................................................................11


1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Purpose and responsibility ................................................................................ 11 Application........................................................................................................ 11 Definitions......................................................................................................... 11 Exemptions........................................................................................................ 12 Equivalents........................................................................................................ 12

2 3

EQUIPMENT CLASSES..................................................................................14 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................16


3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 General .............................................................................................................. 16 Power system .................................................................................................... 16 Thruster system ................................................................................................. 17 DP-control system............................................................................................. 17 Cables and piping systems ................................................................................ 20 Requirements for essential non-DP systems ..................................................... 20

4 5

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................21 SURVEYS, TESTING AND THE FLAG STATE VERIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT (FSVAD) ..............................................22
5.1 5.2 Surveys and testing ........................................................................................... 22 Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD).......................... 23

APPENDIX - MODEL FORM OF FLAG STATE VERIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT.........................................................................24

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 9

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

PREAMBLE 1 These Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems have been developed to provide an international standard for dynamic positioning systems on all types of new vessel. Taking into account that dynamically positioned vessels are moved and operated internationally and recognizing that the design and operating criteria require special consideration, the Guidelines have been developed to facilitate international operation without having to document the dynamic positioning system in detail for every new area of operation. The Guidelines are not intended to prohibit the use of any existing vessel because its dynamic positioning system does not comply with these Guidelines. Many existing units have operated successfully and safely for extended periods of time and their operating history should be considered in evaluating their suitability to conduct dynamically positioned operations. Compliance with the Guidelines will be documented by a Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) for the dynamic positioning system. The purpose of a FSVAD is to ensure that the vessel is operated, surveyed and tested according to vessel specific procedures and that the results are properly recorded. A coastal State may permit any vessel whose dynamic positioning system is designed to a different standard than that of these Guidelines to engage in operations.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 10

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

1 1.1

GENERAL Purpose and responsibility The purpose of these Guidelines is to recommend design criteria, necessary equipment, operating requirements, and a test and documentation system for dynamic positioning systems to reduce the risk to personnel, the vessel, other vessels or structures, sub-sea installations and the environment while performing operations under dynamic positioning control. The responsibility for ensuring that the provisions of the Guidelines are complied with rests with the owner of the DP-vessel.

1.2

Application

The Guidelines apply to dynamically positioned units or vessels, the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 July 1994. 1.3 Definitions

In addition to the definitions in the MODU Code 1989 the following definitions are necessary for the guidelines: Dynamically positioned vessel (DP-vessel) means a unit or a vessel which automatically maintains its position (fixed location or predetermined track) by means of thruster force. Dynamic positioning systems (DP-system) means the complete installation necessary for dynamically positioning a vessel comprising the following sub-systems: .1 .2 .3 power system, thruster system, and DP-control system.

Position keeping means maintaining a desired position within the normal excursions of the control system and the environmental conditions. Power system means all components and systems necessary to supply the DP-system with power. The power system includes: .1 .2 .3 .4 prime movers with necessary auxiliary systems including piping, generators, switchboards, and distributing system (cabling and cable routeing).

Thruster system means all components and systems necessary to supply the DP-system with thrust force and direction. The thruster system includes: .1
IMCA 127 DPVOA

thrusters with drive units and necessary auxiliary systems including piping,
Page 11

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

.2 .3 .4 .5

main propellers and rudders if these are under the control of the DP-system, thruster control electronics, manual thruster controls, and associated cabling and cable routeing.

DP-control system means all control components and systems, hardware and software necessary to dynamically position the vessel. The DP-control system consists of the following: .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 computer system/joystick system, sensor system, display system (operator panels), position reference system, and associated cabling and cable routeing.

Computer system means a system consisting of one or several computers including software and their interfaces. Redundancy means ability of a component or system to mantain or restore its function, when a single failure has occurred. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components, systems or alternative means of performing a function. Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) means the document issued by the Administration to a DP-vessel complying with these Guidelines. (See Appendix for model form.) 1.4 Exemptions

An Administration may exempt any vessel which embodies features of a novel kind from any provisions of the guidelines the application of which might impede research into the development of such features. Any such vessels should, however, comply with safety requirements which, in the opinion of the Administration, are adequate for the service intended and are such as to ensure the overall safety of the vessel. The Administration which allows any such exemptions should list the exemptions on the Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) and communicate to the Organization the particulars, together with the reason therefor, so that the Organization may circulate the same to other Governments for the information of their officers. 1.5 Equivalents Where the Guidelines require that a particular fitting, material, appliance, apparatus, item of equipment or type thereof should be fitted or carried out in a vessel, or that any particular provision should be made, or any procedure or arrangement should be complied with, the Administration may allow other fitting, material, appliance, apparatus, item of equipment or type thereof to be fitted or carried, or any other provision, procedure or arrangement to be made in
IMCA 127 DPVOA Page 12

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

that vessel, if it is satisfied by trial thereof or otherwise that such fitting, material, appliance, apparatus, item of equipment or type thereof or that any particular provision, procedure or arrangement is at least as effective as that required by the Guidelines. When an Administration so allows any fitting, material, appliance, apparatus, item of equipment or type thereof, or provision, procedure, arrangement, novel design or application to be substituted, it should communicate to the Organization the particulars thereof, together with a report on the evidence submitted, so that the Organization may circulate the same to other Governments for information of their officers.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 13

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

2 2.1

EQUIPMENT CLASSES A DP-system consists of components and systems acting together to achieve sufficiently reliable position keeping capability. The necessary reliability is determined by the consequence of a loss of position keeping capability. The larger the consequence, the more reliable the DP-system should be. To achieve this philosophy the requirements have been grouped into three equipment classes. For each equipment class the associated worst case failure should be defined as in 2.2 below. The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based on a risk analysis of the consequence of a loss of position. Else, the Administration or coastal State may decide the equipment class for the particular operation.

2.2

The equipment classes are defined by their worst case failure modes as follows: .1 .2 For equipment class 1, loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault For equipment class 2, a loss of position is not to occur in the event of a single fault in any active component or system. Normally static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated, and reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include: .1 .2 Any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards, remote controlled valves, etc.). Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) which is not properly documented with respect to protection and reliability.

.3

For equipment class 3, a single failure includes: .1 .2 .3 Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static component is assumed to fail. All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire or flooding. All components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or flooding (for cables, see also 3.5.1).

2.3 2.4 2.5

For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be considered as a single fault if such an act is reasonably probable. Based on the single failure definitions in 2.2 the worst case failure should be determined and used as the criterion for the consequence analysis (see 3.4.2.4). The Administration should assign the relevant equipment class to a DP-vessel based on the criteria in 2.2 and state it in the Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) (see 5.2).

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 14

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

2.6

When a DP-vessel is assigned an equipment class this means that the DP-vessel is suitable for all types of DP-operations within the assigned and lower equipment classes. It is a provision of the guidelines that the DP-vessel is operated in such a way that the worst case failure, as determined in 2.2, can occur at any time without causing a significant loss of position.

2.7

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 15

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

3 3.1

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS General In so far as is practicable all components in a DP-system should be designed, constructed and tested in accordance with international standards recognized by the Administration. In order to meet the single failure criteria given in 2.2, redundancy of components will normally be necessary as follows: .1 .2 for equipment class 2, redundancy of all active components; for equipment class 3, redundancy of all components and physical separation of the components.

For equipment class 3, full redundancy may not always be possible (e.g., there may be a need for a single change-over system from the main computer system to the back-up computer system). Non-redundant connections between otherwise redundant and separated systems may be accepted provided it is documented to give clear safety advantages, and that their reliability can be demonstrated and documented to the satisfaction of the Administration. Such connections should be kept to the absolute minimum and made to fail to the safest condition. Failure in one system should in no case be transferred to the other redundant system. Redundant components and systems should be immediately available and with such capacity that the DP-operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated safely. The transfer to redundant component or system should be automatic as far as possible, and operator intervention should be kept to a minimum. The transfer should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the operation. 3.2 Power system The power system should have an adequate response time to power demand changes. For equipment class 1 the power system need not be redundant. For equipment class 2, the power system should be divisible into two or more systems such that in the event of failure of one system at least one other system will remain in operation. The power system may be run as one system during operation, but should be arranged by bus-tie breakers to separate automatically upon failures which could be transferred from one system to another, including overloading and short-circuits. For equipment class 3, the power system should be divisible into two or more systems such that in the event of failure of one system, at least one other system will remain in operation. The divided power system should be located in different spaces separated by A.60 class division. Where the power systems are located below the operational waterline, the separation should also be watertight.
IMCA 127 DPVOA Page 16

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Bus-tie breakers should be open during equipment class 3 operations unless equivalent integrity of power operation can be accepted according to 3.1.3. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the power available for position keeping should be sufficient to maintain the vessel in position after worst case failure according to 2.2. If a power management system is installed, adequate redundancy or reliability to the satisfaction of the Administration should be demonstrated. 3.3 Thruster system The thruster system should provide adequate thrust in longitudinal and lateral directions, and provide yawing moment for heading control. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the thruster system should be connected to the power system in such a way that 3.3.1 can be complied with even after failure of one of the constituent power systems and the thrusters connected to that system. The values of thruster force used in the consequence analysis (see 3.4.2.4) should be corrected for interference between thrusters and other effects which would reduce the effective force. Failure of thruster system including pitch, azimuth or speed control, should not make the thruster rotate or go to uncontrolled full pitch and speed. 3.4 DP-control system General .1 In general the DP-control system should be arranged in a DP-control station where the operator has a good view of the vessels exterior limits and the surrounding area. The DP-control station should display information from the power system, thruster system and DP-control system to ensure that these systems are functioning correctly. Information necessary to operate the DP-system safely should be visible at all times. Other information should be available upon operator request. Display systems and the DP-control station in particular should be based on sound ergonometric principles. The DP-control system should provide for easy selection of control mode, i.e. manual, joystick, or computer control of thrusters, and the active mode should be clearly displayed. For equipment classes 2 and 3, operator controls should be designed so that no single inadvertent act on the operators panel can lead to a critical condition. Alarms and warnings for failures in systems interfaced to and/or controlled by the DP-control system are to be audible and visual.
Page 17

.2

.3

.4

.5
IMCA 127 DPVOA

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

A permanent record of their occurrence and of status changes should be provided together with any necessary explanations. .6 The DP-control system should prevent failures being transferred from one system to another. The redundant components should be so arranged that a failure of one component should be isolated, and the other component activated. It should be possible to control the thrusters manually, by individual joysticks and by a common joystick, in the event of failure of the DP-control system. The software should be produced in accordance with an appropriate international quality standard recognized by the Administration.

.7

.8

Computers .1 .2 For equipment class 1, the DP-control system need not be redundant. For equipment class 2, the DP-control system should consist of at least two independent computer systems. Common facilities such as selfchecking routines, data transfer arrangements, and plant interfaces should not be capable of causing the failure of both/all systems. For equipment class 3, the DP-control system should consist of at least two independent computer systems with self-checking and alignment facilities. Common facilities such as self-checking routines, data transfer arrangements and plant interfaces should not be capable of causing failure at both/all systems. In addition, one back-up DP control system should be arranged, see 3.4.2.6. An alarm should be initiated if any computer fails or is not ready to take control. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the DP-control system should include a software function, normally known as consequence analysis, which continuously verifies that the vessel will remain in position even if the worst case failure occurs. This analysis should verify that the thrusters remaining in operation after the worst case failure can generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the failure. The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst case failure would lead to a loss of position due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing environmental conditions. For operations which will take a long time to safely terminate, the consequence analysis should include a function which simulates the thrust and power remaining after the worse case failure, based on manual input of weather trend. Redundant computer systems should be arranged with automatic transfer of control after a detected failure in one of the computer systems. The automatic transfer of control from one computer system to another should be smooth, and within the acceptable limitations of the operation. For equipment class 3, the back-up DP-control system should be in a room separated by A.60 class division from the main DP-control station. During DP-operation this back-up control system should be continuously
Page 18

.3

.4

.5

.6

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

updated by input from the sensors, position reference system, thruster feedback, etc., and be ready to take over control. The switch-over of control to the back-up system should be manual, situated on the back-up computer and should not be affected by failure of the main DP-control system. .7 An uninterruptable power supply (UPS) should be provided for each DPcomputer system to ensure that any power failure will not affect more than one computer. UPS battery capacity should provide a minimum of 30 minutes operation following a mains supply failure.

Position reference system .1 Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements, both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situation. For equipment classes 2 and 3, at least three position reference systems should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP-control system during operation. When two or more position reference systems are required, they should not all be of the same type, but based on different principles and suitable for the operating conditions. The position reference systems should produce data with adequate accuracy for the intended DP-operation. The performance of position reference systems should be monitored and warnings provided when the signals from the position reference systems are either incorrect or substantially degraded. For equipment class 3, at least one of the position reference systems should be connected directly to the back-up control system and separated by A.60 class division from the other position reference systems.

.2

.3

.4 .5

.6

Vessel sensors .1 .2 Vessel sensors should at least measure vessel heading, vessel motions, and wind speed and direction. When an equipment class 2 or 3 DP-control system is fully dependent on correct signals from vessel sensors, then these signals should be based on three systems serving the same purpose (i.e. this will result in at least three gyro compasses being installed). Sensors for the same purpose, connected to redundant systems should be arranged independently so that failure of one will not affect the others. For equipment class 3, one of each type of sensors should be connected directly to the back-up control system and separated by A.60 class division from the other sensors.

.3 .4

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 19

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

3.5

Cables and piping systems For equipment class 3, cables for redundant equipment or systems should not be routed together through the same compartments. Where this is unavoidable such cables could run together in cable ducts of A-60 class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards, except that represented by the cables themselves. Cable connection boxes are not allowed in such ducts. For equipment class 2, piping systems for fuel, lubrication, hydraulic oil, cooling water and cables should be located with due regard to fire hazards and mechanical damage. For equipment class 3, redundant piping system (i.e. piping for fuel, cooling water, lubrication oil, hydraulic oil, etc.) should not be routed together through the same compartments. Where this is unavoidable, such pipes could run together in ducts of A-60 class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards, except that represented by the pipes themselves.

3.6

Requirements for essential non-DP systems For equipment classes 2 and 3, systems not directly part of the DP-system but which in the event of failure could cause failure of the DP-system, (e.g., common fire supression systems, engine ventilation systems, shut-down systems, etc.), should also comply with relevant requirements of these Guidelines.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 20

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

4 4.1

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Before every DP-operation, the DP-system should be checked according to a vessel specific location check list to make sure that the DP-system is functioning correctly and that the system has been set up for the appropriate equipment class. During DP-operations, the system should be checked at regular intervals according to a vessel specific watchkeeping checklist. DP operations necessitating equipment class 2 or 3 should be terminated when the environmental conditions are such that the DP-vessel will no longer be able to keep position if the single failure criterion applicable to the equipment class should occur. In this context deterioration of environmental conditions and the necessary time to safely terminate the operation should also be taken into consideration. This should be checked by way of environmental envelopes if operating in equipment class 1 and by way of an automatic consequence analysis if operating in equipment class 2 or 3. The necessary operating instructions, etc., should be on board. The following checklists, test procedures and instructions should be incorporated into the DP operating manuals for the vessel: .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 Location checklist (see 4.1). Watchkeeping checklist (see 4.2). DP-operation instructions (see 4.3). Annual tests and procedures (see 5.1.1.3). Initial and periodical (5-year) tests and procedures (See 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2). Example of tests and procedures after modifications and nonconformities (see 5.1.1.4).

4.2 4.3

4.4

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 21

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

SURVEYS, TESTING AND THE FLAG STATE VERIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT (FSVAD) Surveys and testing Each DP-vessel which is required to comply with the Guidelines is subject to the surveys and testing specified below: .1 Initial survey which should include a complete survey of the DP-system to ensure full compliance with the applicable parts of the guidelines. Further it includes a complete test of all systems and components and the ability to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class. The type of test carried out and results should be documented in the Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD), see 5.2. Periodical survey at intervals not exceeding five years to ensure full compliance with the applicable parts of the guidelines. A complete test should be carried out as required in 5.1.1.1. The type of test carried out and the results should be documented in the FSVAD, see 5.2. Annual survey should be carried out within three months before or after each anniversary date of the initial survey. The annual survey should ensure that the DP-system has been maintained in accordance with applicable parts of the guidelines and is in good working order. Further an annual test of all important systems and components should be carried out to document the ability of the DP-vessel to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class. The type of test carried out and results should be documented in the FSVAD, see 5.2. A survey either general or partial according to circumstances should be made every time a defect is discovered and corrected or an accident occurs which affects the safety of the DP-vessel, or whenever any significant repairs or alterations are made. After such a survey, necessary tests should be carried out to demonstrate full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Guidelines. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board.

5.1

.2

.3

.4

These surveys and tests should be witnessed by officers of the Administration. The Administration may, however, entrust the surveys and testing either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organizations recognized by it. In every case the Administration concerned should fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the surveys and testing. The Administration may entrust the owner of the vessel to carry out annual and minor repair surveys according to a test programme accepted by the Administration. After any survey and testing has been completed, no significant change should be made to the DP-system without the sanction of the Administration, except the direct replacement of equipment and fittings for the purpose of repair or maintenance.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 22

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

5.2

Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) A Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document (FSVAD) should be issued, after survey and testing in accordance with these Guidelines, either by officers of the Administration or by an organization duly authorized by it. In every case the Administration assumes full responsibility for the FSVAD. The FSVAD should be drawn up in the official language of the issuing country and be that of the model given in the appendix to the Guidelines. If the language used is neither English nor French, the text should include a translation into one of these languages. The FSVAD is issued for an unlimited period, or for a period specified by the Administration. An FSVAD should cease to be valid if significant alterations have been made in the DP-system equipment, fittings, arrangements, etc., specified in the Guidelines without the sanction of the Administration, except the direct replacement of such equipment or fittings for the purpose of repair or maintenance. An FSVAD issued to a DP-vessel should cease to be valid upon transfer of such a vessel to the flag of another country. The privileges of the FSVAD may not be claimed in favour of any DP-vessel unless the FSVAD is valid. Control of a DP-vessel holding a valid FSVAD should be carried out according to the principles of 1.7 in the MODU Code 1989. Results of the FSVAD tests should be readily available on board for reference.

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 23

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

APPENDIX 2 EXAMPLE FORMAT FOR FLAG STATE VERIFICATION ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 24

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

APPENDIX -

MODEL FORM OF FLAG STATE VERIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT

Appendix to IMO MSC Circular 645 FLAG STATE VERIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT (Official seal) (State) Issued under the provisions of the GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS (MSC/Circ.645) under the authority of the Government of _________________________________________
(full designation of the State)

by ______________________________________________________________
(full official designation of the competent person or organization authorised by the Administration) Distinctive identification (Name or number) Type Port of registry Official IMO-number

Date on which keel was laid or vessel was at similar stage of construction or on which major conversion was commenced ................................................................ THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above-mentioned vessel has been duly documented, surveyed and tested in accordance with the Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems (MSC/Circ.645) and found to comply with the Guidelines. The vessel is allowed to operate in DP Equipment Class ......................................... and in lower equipment classes. This document remains valid until ............................................................................ unless terminated by the Administration, provided that the vessel is operated, tested and surveyed according to the requirements in the guidelines and the results are properly recorded. Issued at ...................................................................................................................
(Place of issue of document)

......................
(Date of issue)

.......................................................................................................
(Signature of authorized official issuing the certificate)

...................................................................................................................................
(Seal or stamp of the issuing authority, as appropriate)
IMCA 127 DPVOA Page 25

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

LIST OF EXEMPTIONS AND EQUIVALENTS (ref. items 1.4 and 1.5 of the Guidelines -

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 26

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

LIST OF MAIN SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS COVERED BY FSVAD* -

All main systems and components included in the dynamic positioning system are to be listed in a systematic way. As an alternative reference can be made to drawings, etc. It is important that it is possible by this list to identify all systems and components covered by FSVAD. Software versions should also be identified. Equipment installed after date of issuing FSVAD should only be included in the list after control and testing has been completed and modifications and non-conformities report signed.
Page 27

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

RECORD OF ANNUAL SURVEY REPORTS, AND SPECIAL (5 YEARS) SURVEY REPORTS


Date Test type Remarks Report Reference * Date/Number Sign. of appointed surveyor (IR) Sign. of Master/ Platform Manager

All reports should be filed together with this FSVAD for use during later testing and inspections by nominated surveyors, flag State surveyors, etc.

IR = if required, ref. item 5.1.2


IMCA 127 DPVOA Page 28

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Cover Sheet

Flag State Verification Acceptance Document


SAMPLESHIP 1 Document SH/01/DP doc/01/Rev 1/

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 29

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 1 DP SYSTEM AND MAIN COMPONENTS

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 30

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document


DESCRIPTION
MAIN GENERATOR NO. 3

MANUFACTURER
NISHIBA ELECTRIC

LOCATION
MAIN ENG. RM PORT

MODEL
NT AKL-VC

SERIAL
505000 A1A-3

ADDITIONAL DATA
KVA.4600 KW/4160V

CERTIFICATE
84-K026086-X

ISSUED BY
A.B.S

MAIN GENERATOR NO. 4

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

MAIN ENG. RM STBD

NT AKL-VC

505000 A1A-4

KVA.4600 KW/4160V

84-K026086-X

A.B.S

MAIN GENERATOR NO. 5

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

MAIN ENG. RM PORT

NT AKL-VC

505000 A1A-5

KVA.4600 KW/4160V

84-K026069-X

A.B.S

MAIN GENERATOR NO. 6

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

MAIN ENG. RM STBD

NT AKL-VC

505000 A1A-6

4160V

84-K026069-X

A.B.S

MAIN SWITCH BOARD PORT

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

MSB ROOM PORT

12000 X 2990 X 2540

505000-CS10A

4160V

85-K026905

A.B.S

MAIN SWITCH BOARD STBD

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

MSB ROOM STBD

12000 X 2990 X 2540

505000-CS10B

130 KW/ 1170 RPM

85-K026905

A.B.S

PUMP, MAIN SEAWATER COOL #1

NANIWA

AUX.MACH.RM.C.P

FBWV-450.2

PUMP, MAIN SEAWATER COOL #1 E.MOTOR PUMP, MAIN SEAWATER COOL #2

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

AUX.MACH.RM.C.P

NTI KK RCT5

505001 M3-2

130 KW/ 1170 RPM

85-K025102-X

A.B.S

NANIWA

AUX.MACH.RM.C.P

FBWV-450.2

PUMP, MAIN SEAWATER COOL #2 E.MOTOR PUMP, SEAWATER SUPPLY PORT #1

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

AUX.MACH.RM.C.P

NTI KK RCT5

505001 M7-1

130 KW/ 1170 RPM

85-K025102-X

A.B.S

NANIWA

FWD PORT PUMPR

FBWV-450.2

PUMP, SEAWATER SUPPLY PORT #1 E.MOTOR PUMP, SEAWATER SUPPLY PORT #2

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

FWD PORT PUMPR

NTI KK RCT5

505001 M7-2

130 KW/ 1170 RPM

85-K25099-X

A.B.S

NANIWA

FWD PORT PUMPR

FBWV-450.2

PUMP, SEAWATER SUPPLY PORT #2 E.MOTOR PUMP, SEAWATER SUPPLY STBD #1

NISHIBA ELECTRIC

FWD PORT PUMPR

NTI KK RCT5

505001 M7-3

130 KW/ 1170 RPM

85-K25099-X

A.B.S

NANIWA

STDB PORT PUMPR

FBWV-450.2

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 31

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 2 SEA TRIALS REPORT

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 32

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Harbour Acceptance Trials (HAT) Customer Acceptance Trial (CAT) to be provided

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 33

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

FMEA Proving Trials 1997 Sampleship 1 for Sample Ship Industries Report No:

Document Details and Issue Record


Title: Issue:

FMEA Proving Trials 1997 Sampleship 1


Rev. No: Date Reason Author Checked Approved

28.2.97

Original issue

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 34

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 3 DP OPERATIONS MANUAL

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 35

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Copy of DP Operations Manual including Checklists to be provided

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 36

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 4 ANNUAL DP TRIALS PROCEDURES

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 37

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Annual DP Trials 1998 Sampleship 1 for Sample Ship Industries Report No:

Document Details and Issue Record


Title: Issue:

Annual Trials 1998 Sampleship 1


Rev. No: Date Reason Author Checked Approved

28.2.98

Original issue

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 38

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Annual DP Trials 1999 Sampleship 1 for Sample Ship Industries Report No:

Document Details and Issue Record


Title: Issue:

Annual Trials 1999 Sampleship 1


Rev. No: Date Reason Author Checked Approved

28.2.99

Original issue

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 39

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 5 FIVE-YEARLY DP TRIALS PROCEDURE

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 40

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Interim 5-Yearly DP Trials 2001 Sampleship 1 for Sample Ship Industries Report No:

Document Details and Issue Record


Title: Issue:

Interim 5-Yearly DP Trials 2001 Sampleship 1


Rev. No: Date Reason Author Checked Approved

28.2.01

Original issue

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 41

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 6 PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 42

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

STATEMENT 6 January 1995

On the DSV Sampleship a DnV approved planned maintenance system is run on AMOS-D computer programme. It is based on equipment run hours and on periodical intervals. The run hours and intervals are in compliance with manufacturers recommendations and according to on-board experience. All planned maintenance is kept up to date under the responsibility of the Chief Engineer

Head Operations Department

Head Equipment Management Section

AN Other

UT Cobbly

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 43

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 7 SYSTEM MODIFICATION

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 44

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Extract of QA Management Procedure for DP System Modifications and Documentation

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 45

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

Part 8 RECORDS

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 46

Guidelines to the Issue of a Flag State Verification Acceptance Document

SAMPLESHIP RECORD OF DP TESTS AND SURVEYS

6 January 1995

Date January 1995 May 1997 Sept 1999 July 2001 Aug 2003 Feb 2005 June 2007

Test Type Test prior to job Suitability test Annual Trials Annual Trials Trials for NMD Cl.3 Trials for NMD Cl.3 Annual Trials

Location North Sea Morecambe Bay North Sea North Sea North Sea Stavanger Bergen

Report GM-666-0110-123 DP Trials GM Sept. 1999 GM-999-1111-5252 August 2003 Feb 2005 GM-1111-5555-66565

Signature of Approval

IMCA 127 DPVOA

Page 47