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Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions Author(s): Lisa L. Martin and Beth A.

Simmons Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), pp. 729-757 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: . Accessed: 08/03/2012 21:28
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Theoriesand EmpiricalStudies ofInternational Institutions

Lisa L. Martin BethA. Simmons and

Theroleofinternational institutions beencentral thestudy world has to of politics at of leastsincetheconclusion World WarII. Muchofthis research was,andcontinues to be, pioneered thepages of International in In we Organization. thisarticle take stock pastworkon international of institutions, theevolution majorthemes trace of in scholarship time, highlight over and areasfor productive research. cennew Our tral argument that is research should turn of increasingly tothequestion howinstituin the in tionsmatter shaping behavior important of New reactors worldpolitics. of searchefforts shouldemphasize observable of theories implications alternative institutions. advocate We approaching international institutionsboth objectof as the choiceanda constraint actors' to strategic on an is behavior, ideathat familiar scholin ars of domestic institutions has beenneglected muchof thedebatebetween but realist institutionalist and of scholars international relations. The article organized is intothree majorsections. The first section provides an of From analytical reviewof thedevelopment studies international of institutions. thebeginning, pagesofIO havebeenfilled the with of insightful studies institutions, in somecases askingquestions consistent theresearch with agendawe proposein thisessay.But thelack of a disciplinary in foundation theearlyyearsmeant that weresimply into manygood insights lost,notintegrated other scholars' research. Withtheprofessionalization thediscipline on of sincethelate 1950s,scholarship rehas international institutions becomemore theoretically informed, empirical and to of searchhas begunmoreoften conform social-scientific to standards evidence, bothcaution inspiration future for with results provide that and research. ofthe One mostconsequential for of institutions developments ourunderstandinginternational that camein theearly1970s,whena newgeneration scholars of developed insights that intellectual opened inquiry up beyond offormal organizations, providing bridgeof headstothestudy institutions generally. more

Our thanks comments previous for on versions to Marc Busch,PeterKatzenstein, Keohane, go Bob in SteveKrasner, participants theIO fiftieth and issue anniversary conference. International Organization 4, Autumn 52, 1998,pp.729-757 ? 1998byThe 10 Foundation theMassachusetts and Institute Technology of

730 Intemational Organization The secondsection explicitly addresses theme a thatarisesfrom reviewof the on scholarship institutions: whether international politics needsto be treated sui as with owntheories approaches are distinct its generis, and that from other fields of political science, whether fruitfully draw theories domestic or it can on of politics. As ourreview in shows, developments studies American of politics, suchas studies of voting and coalitional have often behavior, influenced way thatscholarsapthe proached intemational institutions. oftheseefforts notpay off Most did with major insights. functionalist The to approach institutions in adopted the1980sowedlittle to of theories domestic more economic on politics, drawing models. we Today, see the pendulum swinging back,as morescholars turn modern to theories initially developedtostudy domestic political phenomena HelenMilner's (see in article this issue). we Here, assesswhether these newattempts likely be anymore are to successful than previous efforts. The third section turns theproblem research to of agendas. Where does scholarshipon international institutions next?Our primary in go is argument thissection that attention needstofocuson how, justwhether, not international institutions matterforworldpolitics. Too often overthelastdecade and a halfthefocalpointof debate beencrudely has dichotomous: institutions or do matter, they not.Thisshaping of theagendahas obscured moreproductive interesting and about questions variation thetypes degree institutional in and of variations werein fact that effects, welldocumented theless theoretical well-researched studies the in but case of journal's earliest Of we years. course, do notsuggest return idiographic a to institutional we a of analysis. Rather, suggest number linesoftheoretically informed that analysis maylead toresearch both that asksbetter questions is moresubject empirical and to These pathsincludemoreseriousanalysisof thedistributional testing. of effects the institutions, relation between international institutions domestic and the politics, problem unanticipated of and consequences, a typology institutional of effects.

The Evolution an Idea: of in International Institutions Politics

EarlyStudies theInstitutionalization Postwar of World ofthe The "poles"ofrealism idealism-ofwhich and much madeingraduate is seminarshad little do with highly to the practical that organizational dominated the analysis decadesafter war. the The focus attention on howwell pagesofIO inthefirst of was thesenewlyestablished met institutions theproblems thattheyweredesigned to solve.On thisscore, fewscholarly accounts wereoverly Overwhelmed optimistic. of and economic by themagnitude thepolitical reconstruction few effort, judged postwar as organizations up to thetask.Central thisdebatewas a highly to realistic that wouldshapeand limit effectiveness understanding international the of politics no that postwar institutions; virtually one predicted thesewouldtriumph poliover

International Institutions 731 on and tics.The UN,' theGeneral Agreement Tariffs Trade(GATT),2theInternaFund3 -all werethesubject highly of critical review. tional Monetary of A number important of studies with institugrappled explicitly theimpact these for tionson thepoliciesof themajorpowersand theoutcomes thecentral political them. answers, The were from andmilitary between competition predictably, derived more but a to little than informed counterfactual reasoning, they displayed sensitivity that such thebroadrangeofpossibleimpacts institutions as theLeague andtheUN In of couldhaveon themajor examination theidealofcollective secupowers. their rity, HowardC. Johnson Gerhart and Niemeyer squarely inquired therolethat into behavior. norms, backedby organizations as theUN, playin affecting such states' Theyaskedwhether states were"prepared use force thethreat force the to or of for in sake ofpubliclaw and order rather thanforthesake of their national advantage of of beenaffected relation that other to states.... How has thebehavior states by more in in these standards?"4 than Though ultimately confident thebalanceofpower in norms embodied theruleoflaw,thesescholars werecorrect pushfora mechato nismthat might explain effects institutions behavior: the of on "We cannot claimto havelearned muchabouttheLeague experiment we knowhowithas affected until of of rolein the theproblem harnessing controlling factors force and the and their of relations power."'5 in A flurry studies theearly1950ssuggested of to possibleanswers. Pointing the U.S. rolein decolonization military forKorea,collective and aid institutions were of said to raise U.S. "consciousness broader issues" thatmight affect American interests thereby and maketheU.S. moreresponsive world to opinion.6 subjectBy ingpoliciesto globalscrutiny-amechanism unlike not thoseof transparency and in central theliterature the1980s-the UN was viewedas having to had reputation on an (admittedly effect someofthemostcentral issuesofworld marginal) politics. Though lacking elaborate the theoretical apparatus current of research, early studof ies ofpostwar organizations many thesameinsights haveinformed had that "modem" institutionalism. much on of Paralleling contemporary argument theform coopone in as was eration,7 study earlyas 1949 arguedthatmultilateralism precluded cases where there weresignificant and advanbargaining advantages discrimination more treattagesofproceeding bilaterally.8 Foreshadowing theoretically sophisticated ments informal of versusformal studiesof GATT as earlyas 1954 agreements,9 that their recognized some agreements strength gain through informal nature, and
1. See Goodrich1947, 18; Fox 1951; Hoffmann 1956; Claude 1963; and Malin 1947. But forthe optimistic view,see Bloomfield 1960. 2. Gorter 1954. 3. See Knorr 1948;andKindleberger la. 195 4. Johnson Niemeyer and 1954,27. 5. Niemeyer 1952,558 (italicsadded). 6. Cohen1951.Fora parallel analysis institutional of effects Sovietbehavior, Rudzinski on see 1951. 7. See Oye 1992;andMartin 1992b. 8. Little1949. 9. Lipson1991.

732 International Organization prescient theregimes of literature viewedthevalue of GATT as "a focalpointon 10 which many divergent viewson appropriate commercial policyconverge." Lacka inga theoretical on which hangthese hook to observations, withoutprofessionand alized critical mass of scholars developtheseinsights, to findings manyimportant and more wereonlyrediscovered advanced than decadeslater. two of between Nowhere thismoretruethanin therediscovery therelationship is institutions domestic and The idea that international instituinternational politics. state channels was tions influence behavior acting can by through domestic political in to recognized scholars by writing themid-1950s. Refeiring theexampleof the international organizaInternational FinanceCorporation, E. Matecki B. wrote that withtheability setin motion to national tionscouldbe "idea generating centers" II influence making national forces directly that the of on policy. Reflecting theefforts of theCouncilof Europeto gain acceptance its visionforEuropein national of of out capitals, earlystudy A. GlennMowerspointed theconsciousstrategy an by direct of national And in a lobbying national governments through parliaments.12 of Councilin influencing Dutchcolonial fascinating study theroleof theSecurity Perkins interaction between interto authoritative policy, Whitney pointed thecrucial of Councilthe national decisions democratic and politics: "By defiance theSecurity in Dutchalerted with forces powerful monitors alliedtheir who strength domestic 13 of requiring them liveup toprinciples decolonization]." "In thistype interto [of someof theessential actionbetween democratic and governments theUN emerge 14 of for elements a world political process." Anticipatingmechanism institutional a in he effects haverecently that resurfaced contemporary that studies, concluded "The roleoftheUN is toexert to pressures designed enabletheloserinpublicsentiment to 15 of reflected effort an to accepttheconsequences itsloss." Thisresearch approach flesh themechanisms whichthepoliciesand perspectives international out of by could institutions work national through politics. In short, earlypostwar the whilehighly literature international on institutions, on focused formal was morepolitically organizations, farless naiveand legalistic, than credit being. for included sensitive insightful itis often and given Earlyinsights therecognition thenature theinternational that of a political system provided context for effectivenessinternational the of that effectiveness should institutions, institutional elaborate structure is be subject empirical to and investigation, that organizational the international notalwaysthebestapproach achieving to Moreover, cooperation. not withwhether international best of thisearlyliterature concerned merely was think for had but abouta mechanism their institutions an impact, how one might effects. and as political presTransparency, reputation, legitimacy well as domestic in But sureswere suggested variousstrands thought. there of was no conceptual
10. Gorter 1954,1,8. 11. Matecki1956. 12. Mowers1964. 13. Perkins 1958,40. 14. Ibid.,26. 15. Ibid.,42

733 International Institutions comparaframework couldtiethese that insights together; was there systematic nor a replete tiveenterprise checkfortheir to regularity. Rather, another research agenda, withfancy from American methodological toolsimported politics, was to demote polithese questions favor an onlypartially in of fruitful examination theinternal of ticsofinternational organizations. TheInfluence Behavioralism: of PoliticsWithin International Institutions If fewthought politics, it international organization wouldliberate worldfrom the becameimportant understand has powerin these to who and arguably organizations howthat power was beingexercised. Especially sincetheuse ofthevetohadapparconcern on rendered Security the Council ently toothless, begantofocus thedevelopin The of ment rulesand norms theGeneral of Assembly. supposed"specter" bloc in of to scholars policymakand voting that forum-increasingly concern American its concern.16 ersas theCold Warextended gelidreach-becamea central Perhaps to due Thisdebatetookwhatappears today be an odd early to direction. the quickly new and exciting workin U.S. legislative behavior, research program in becamefocusedon how to describe of Assembly, patterns voting theGeneral to of behavior without systematic a apattempt sortouttheusefulness thevoting different proach. Despitewarnings theinternational that system fundamentally was that from domestic political systems,17 research this program easilyaccepted voting in theUN was a proxy powerin that wereskeptics: for institution. Certainly there in Rupert Emerson InisL. Claude,for and example, cautioned voting an internathat electedparliationalbodydoes nothave thesamefunction in a democratically as conference a negotiating rather thana legislative body. ment;an international is in was to role, Voting sucha situation, noted, unlikely playa deliberative since they suchvoteswereno morethan efforts.18 of thesestudies Few explicitly propaganda somehow mattered to defended their that resolutions assumption General Assembly for of But thefascination withthemethod analyzing theconduct worldpolitics. the behavior the that domestic-international overcame voting fairly readily caution the an be to logicshould subject close scrutiny. Moreover, hopeofproviding explicmodelinspired American itly political (legislative) by politics mayhavebeena reacthe of tionagainst overly "anarchic" systems analysis thelate1950s.19 in of Muchofthis work be traced can to directly developments thestudy American in Alker BruceRussett's International Politics theGenand politics. Hayward study
focusing primarily the on of see 16. Forone oftheearliest studies bloc voting, Ball 1951.Fora study with influence theCommonthe of countries, Carter see 1950.Concern behavior theCommonwealth of in coloniesgainedindependence membership theearly1960s. See and wealthgrewas former British Millar1962. 17. Hoffmann 1960,1-4. 1952. 18. Emerson Claude 1952.See also Jebb and "[i]t that refer 19. Alker Russett and 1965,145,explicitly toLiska 1957andKaplan1957.Theyargue chaotic, and utterly unlikenational of politicsas anarchic, is simply erroneous think international to politics." Alker Russett and 1965,147.

734 International Organization eral Assembly, example, for acknowledged "thatstudies theAmerican of political process Robert by Dahl,DuncanMacrae,20 DavidTruman and weretheoretically and of methodologically suggestive waysinwhich roll-call datacouldbe usedtotest for theexistence a pluralistic of in political process a quasi-legislative international organization."'21 Influenced James by March22 Robert and Dahl, thisstudysought to understand various on influences UN voting behavior acrossissueareasinwhich the dimensions powerandinfluence of werelikely differ. to one influCertainly, factor thisresearch encing agendawas thepriority givento reproducible "objective" and of forms socialscience;thefocuson General was Assembly voting acknowledged to be an artifact theavailability fairly of of complete voting records.23 Largely related theferment American to in voting studies, politics within UN the dominated research the the agendaformostofthedecadefrom mid-1960s. Central was theconcern explain to countries a tendency votetogether, had to to whycertain voteinblocs,ortoform coalitions."24 obviously Also "legislative inspired Ameriby of of on can politics, another branch inquiry focused thedeterminants successfully running elective office.25 for Muchofthis literature methodologically was UN rather thanconceptually driven and highly inductive withrespect its majorempirical to the to the of findings.26 effort madetoexplore extent which concept repreLittle was or of in sentation thewinning elections thedomestic couldtravel setting meaningto The fire institution. research lost under fully an intemational program steam heavy from who demanded stronger for on scholars a justification focusing theGeneral as for Assembly a microcosm world politics.27 in Partially response thecritique to thattheGeneral the Assembly was hardly of center world and influenced another in politics, partially by trend American poliof ticsgrowing of thestudy bureaucratic out politics political and another systems, research was taken Robert path by Cox andHarold Jacobson's of study eight specialized agencies within UN.28 their the In edited volume, focuswas on thestructure the and processof influence associated withtheseinstitutions their and rather outputs, thanon their formal character. Reflecting once again a majorthread American in the was could be politics, underlying assumption thatinternational organizations as in one out fruitfully analyzed distinct political systems which couldtrace patterns ofinfluence: of "The legalandformal character thecontent thedecision less and is important thebalanceofforces itexpresses theinclination itgives than that and that tothefurther of direction events."29
20. MacRae 1958. 21. Alker Russett and 1965,vii. 22. March1955. and 23. On objectivity, Alker Russett see 1965,2-3; on availability datasee p. 19. of and 24. See Riggs 1958;Hovet1958;Keohane1967,1969;Weigert Riggs 1969;Gareau1970;Alker 1970;Volgy1973;andHarbert 1976. 25. See Volgy Quistgard and and 1974;andSinger Sensenig 1963. 26. See, for example, Rieselbach 1960. 27. Fortwosystematic of on reviews thequantitative research theUN andinternational organizations, see Riggsetal. 1970;andAlger1970. 28. Cox andJacobson 1973. 29. Ibid.

Institutions 735 International The work Cox andJacobson encouraged study international of also the of organiinfluences. Whereas zationsto consider moretransgovernmental of their a model modelof state other research inspired behavioralism by typically assumed unified a interests actors, and thisworkfocusedon transgovernmental coalitions involving of and of One parts governments parts international organizations. ofthemost important insights generated highly was consonant developments transgovemmenwith in talrelations had come on theintellectual scenein the1970s:30 observation the that one that channel which state through international organizations couldaffect policies the bureaucrawas through potential alliances that couldform between international cies anddomestic this pressure groups thenational at level.31 Although was an interand esting insight, case studies tended confirm importance such "transnato the of tional coalitions" policy for formulation remains implementation, effect policy their on unclear.32 the the Meanwhile, issuesfacing international community changed drastiof to callyin theearly1970s,giving to a newapproach thestudy international rise institutions, discussed thefollowing in section. of Finally, strand research a stimulated Ernst by Haas's "neofunctional approach" of tointegration left telling also a on of effects international mark thestudy empirical in role institutions the 1970s.Neofunctionalism ascribed dynamic to individuals a of andinterest in of communities.33 virtue groups theprocess integrating pluralist By their in of interest participation thepolicymaking process an integrating community, of groupsand other participants werehypothesized "learn" abouttherewards to suchinvolvement undergo and attitudinal changes them toward inclining favorably the integrative system. According Haas, "political to integration process is the whereby actors shift their and activities toward newcenter, a loyalties, expectations, political 34 whoseinstitutions possessordemand jurisdiction preexisting over national states." The implications empirical for on research such institutions readily were drawn: thosewho participate international in organizations shouldexhibit altered attitudes toward their usefulness effectiveness. and American instrument dovetailed that politics provided another yet methodological to testable of nicelywithwhatwas thought be an empirically proposition Haas's Fromthe late 1950s intotheearly1980s,a plethora research! of theory: survey studies toestablish whether international could to tlied organizations contribute"learnor The of ing,"whether cognitive affective.35 attitudes civilservants,36 political apwere for and that pointees, evennational legislators37 scrutinized evidence thelength or nature their of association withvarious kindsof intemational organizations had The of induced attitudinal from American change. impact methods was politics obvi30. KeohaneandNye 1974. 1973,214. 31. See Cox 1969,225; andCox andJacobson 32. See, for example, Russell1973;andKeohane1978. 33. See Haas 1958;andPentland 1973. 34. Haas 1958,10. 35. See Kelman1962; Alger1965; and Jacobson 1967. See also Wolf1974,352-53; and Volgyand Quistgard 1975. 36. See Ernst 1978;andPeck 1979. 37. See Bonham1970;Kerr1973;Riggs1977;andKarns1977.

736 International Organization ous: in some cases, indicators wereused thatprecisely paralleled "thermomthe eters" usedbytheNational Opinion Survey Research project. Threeproblems bedeviled research this for approach years. First, failed proit to duceconsensus theeffect international on of on institutions attitudes.38 Second,attitudeswerenever reconnected outcomes, with or policies, actions.39 Third, researchers were neverable to overcomethe problemof recruitment whichitself bias, accounted mostofthepositive for attitudes bypersonnel held associated with international institutions. neofunctionalisma theoretical As as orientation favor lost over thecourseofthe1970sandintegrative international organizations as theEurosuch peanCommunity theUN seemedto stagnate thefaceofgrowing and in world problemsbeyond their this purview, research program a declined, though is today version in pursued primarily studiesthatattempt document to mass attitudes the toward European Union. Politics Beyond FormalOrganizations: TheRiseofInternational Regimes As the study international of institutions over thepost-World progressed War II the years, gulfbetween international and politics formal organization arrangements beganto openin waysthat werenoteasyto reconcile. majorinternational The conflict a rising for generation scholars-the of Vietnam War-ragedbeyond formal the declarations theUN. Two decadesof predictable of relations under the monetary Bretton Woods institutions shattered a unilateral were by decisionby the United in States 1971to close thegoldwindow later float dollar. and to the The riseofthe of Organization Petroleum Countries their and Exporting apparent powerto upset previously understood arrangements respect oil pricing availability with to and took place outside structure traditional the of international as organizations, didconsumin ers'response later thedecade.Forsome,theproper normative seemed to response be to strengthen international to of organizations deal with rising problems interdeOthers more familiar the with public pendence.40 choiceliterature that argued a proper of extension property in rights, largely underway areassuchas environmental protecrather a formal than extension supranational of tion, authority se,was theanswer per tosolving of problems collective action.41 few that life Overall, doubted international was "organized," increasingly, itbecameapparent much theearlier but, that of focus

38. Studies failed confirm that to expectations attitudinal of change include Siverson 1973;andBonham 1970.A fewstudies evenfound negative impacts attitudes toassociation on due with international organizations: Smith 1973;andPendergast 1976. 39. To theextent suchassociations that affected outcomes, results the weregenerally innocuous. See, for example, Mathiason 1972. 40. Brownand Fabian,forexample, call modestly for"a comprehensive ocean authority, outer an spaceprojects a agency, globalweather climate and organization, an international and scientific commissiononglobalresources technologies." Brown Fabian1975.See also Ruggie1972,890,891; and See and andGosovicandRuggie1976. 41. Conybeare 1980.

737 Institutions International on formal structures multilateral and treaty-based agreements, especially UN, the hadbeenoverdrawn.42 The events theearly1970sgave riseto thestudy "international of of regimes," that defined rules, as norms, principles, procedures focus and expectations regarding an to intemational behavior. Clearly, regimes the movement represented effort substian tute understandinginternational of with of organization an understandinginternamorebroadly.43also demoted study international of tional governance It the organiinto zations actors: as to of an prior thestudy international regimes inquiry theeffects into ofinternational institutions meant a particular inquiring howeffectively agency the Health its the with performed job, for example, efficiency which World Organizathe Whenregimes lookedforeftionvaccinated world'sneedychildren.44 analysts of thesewereunderstood be outcomes to influenced a constellation rules fects, by rather tasks than performed a collective by international agency. Butjust whateffects to has as regimes analysis sought uncover changed thereA first to search has collective effort thescholarly program unfolded.45 by community of effects primarily interested thedistributive in address was regime consequences the food that to thenorms theinternational regime, of arguing itis important consider the affects wealth, commu... "waysinwhich globalfoodregime power, autonomy, . nity, nutritional well-being, . . and sometimes physical survival."46In thisview, of weretobe reckoned terms thedistributive in of regime "effects" consequences the of of behavior a myriad producers, distributors, consumers, in a minor and and, way, and there was in this by international organizations statebureaucracies. Certainly, thatregimeswere somehowefficient efficiencyor earlyvolumelittlethought wouldimply; the improving outcomes, latertheorizing as rather, foodregime was characterized "broadandendemic which theresult national are of by inadequacies," that and ... policies are"internationally bargained coordinated bymultilateral agreeor ment unilateral dictate."47 Further research international on in moved direcregimes thinking three important tions. First, distributive consequences soon fellfrom center consideration the of as research on are and in begantofocus howinternational regimes created transformed thefirst of than placeas wellas thebehavioral consequences norms rules,48 or rather thedistributive of itself. to consequences behavior (We arguelaterthatattention to in distlibutive issuesought be restored.) not strand Second, one(though dominant)

42. On skepticism regarding centrality theGATT regime, Strange the see of 1988. On thedeclining importance "publicinternational of agencies"ingeneral theFAO inparticular, McLin 1979. and see 43. See, for example, Hopkins Puchala1978,especially and 598. 44. Hoole 1977.The focuson international organizations actors as providing collective redistribuor tivegoodshas a longhistory. Kindleberger See 1951a;Ascher1952;Wood 1952; Loveday1953; Sharp 1953;andGregg1966. 45. We focushereon effects intemational of regimes because,as arguedlater, think is the we this on research shouldconcentrate. a reviewof theories purport explain For question whichfuture that to and international regimes, Haggard Simmons see 1987. 46. Hopkins Puchala1978,598. and 47. Ibid.,615-16. and 48. Krasner introduction conclusion. 1983b,

738 International Organization ofresearch, attention thenormative to aspects international of regimes naturally led of of toconsideration thesubjective meaning suchnorms toa research and paradigm that was in sympathy developments constructivist with in schoolsofthought.49 (See Finnemore Kathryn and in issueofIO.) theessaybyMartha Sikkink this of Third, themidby 1980sexplanations international regimes becameintertwined with explanations international of cooperation moregenerally. workof Robert The drewfrom thatemphasized effithe Keohaneespecially functionalist approaches for Based reasons rulesand agreements ciency amongregime participants.50 on rain shared a growing literature political this tionality assumptions by economy, researchsought show thatinternational to a institutions provided way forstatesto of and overcome problems collective action, high transaction costs, information defiof we citsorasymmetries. approach produced number insights, This has a which will later. itsanalytical bite-derivedfrom focuson states as discussandextend But its unified rational actors-was purchased theexpenseof earlier at to insights relating transnational coalitions domestic the and,especially, politics. Furthermore, strength ofthisapproach largely has beenitsability explain creation maintenance to the and their of international institutions.has been weaker delineating It in effects state on behavior other and an we significant outcomes, issuetowhich willreturn. This weakness in the openedtheway foran important realist counterthrust late in 1980s: thechallenge showthat to international institutions affect state behavior raised anysignificant Somerealists, way. particularly neorealists, logicalandempirical objections theinstitutionalist to research agenda.On thelogical side,Joseph states Grieco5I John and Mearsheimer that concerns argued relative-gains prevent from The intensive cooperation. essenceoftheir argument that was sincethebenefits of cooperation couldbe translated military into states wouldbe fearful advantages, woulddisproportionately to potential and that suchbenefits flow adversaries therein forewouldbe reluctant cooperate substantial, to sustained ways.Responsesby Powell showedthat, Duncan Snidal and Robert even if statesdid put substantial weight suchrelative-gains on concerns, circumstances the under which they would in inhibit werequitelimited. chalgreatly cooperation Mearsheimer, his extensive that also that evidence lengeto institutionalism, argued theempirical showing instiof in tutions behavior weak,especially theareaofsecurity was changed patterns state Whilewe might we affairs. the conclusions drawn Mearsheimer, dispute extreme by his to In sectakeseriously challenge provide evidence. thethird stronger empirical we linesofinstitutionalist that lendthemtionofthisarticle suggest analysis should selvestorigorous someoftheinferential andfallaempirical testing, avoiding traps cies that Mearsheimer other and realists haveidentified.52

49. 50. 51. 52.

See Haas 1983;andRuggie1972. Keohane1984. See Grieco1988;andMearsheimer 1994. See Snidal 1991;andPowell 1991.See also Baldwin1993.

International Institutions 739

Institutions AcrosstheLevel-of-Analysis Divide: Insights from DomesticPolitics

were Earlystudiesof international institutions often motivated theattempt to by of applynewmethods usedin thestudy domestic politics. justreviewed, As studies of voting behavior theGeneral in electoral Assembly, successin theUN governing and structure, surveys regarding attitudinal change a result international as of organizationexperience all primeexamples.Similarstudiescontinue are today, exfor in of ample, calculations powerindexes member for states theEuropean of Union.53 Theseapproaches havenot, however, beenwidely influential and recently havebeen In spite this subject trenchant to criticisms.54 of less-than-promising experience, scholarstoday turning againtomodelsofdomestic are once to newquespolitics suggest tionsand approaches thestudy international of In to institutions. thissection, we whether these consider newapproaches more are to briefly likely bearfruit. We find reasonsto be relatively to optimistic abouttoday'sattempts transport modelsacrosslevelsofanalysis, longas suchattempts undertaken some as are with In caution. particular, see substantial we in at of potential looking theories domestic institutions are rootedin noncooperative that Rationalist of game theory. theories of institutions fallintothecategory the"newinstitutionalism" applicabilthat have and ityat boththedomestic international levels.Virtually theearlyattempts all to and from to domestic applytechniques research strategies politics theinternational level wereimplicitly based on theassumption agreements that amongactorsare this enforceable. under which madesenseto look it Indeed, was theonly assumption at thepolitics underlay that and in institutions voting decision making international at all. Modelsthat assumethat will third agreements be enforced a neutral by party areespecially for inappropriate theinternational setting; calculating voting powerin in theGeneral of than a Assembly a world unenforceable agreements havemore may to on resemblance arranging chairs theTitanic. deck it passing Thus, is notsurprising that these modelshavenothadgreat influence whentransported theinternational to level. of recent models domestic institutionsa ruledraw, as on However, often explicitly, The of noncooperative gametheory. basic assumptions noncooperative gametheory arethat actors rational, are and no will and actor strategic, opportunistic, that outside that stepin to enforce agreements. Therefore, agreements will makea difference must self-enforcing. conditions remarkably be These are similar theusualcharacto terization international of as of and As politics a situation anarchy self-help.55 longas models thesamebasic assumptions use aboutthenature actors their of and environfor the ment, potential learning acrossthelevel-of-analysis dividecould be enormous.
53. Hosli 1993. 54. Garrett Tsebelis1996. and 55. Waltz1979.

740 International Organization As one example, consider whatinternational relations scholars might learnfrom looking current at debateson thenature legislative of institutions.56 Analogously to howrealist theory portrays states with mixture common conflicting a of and interests but without these models treatlegislators selfas supranational enforcement, in interested, individualistic actors a situation where they must cooperate with one another achieve to mutual benefits.57 askhowlegislators They under these conditions as might construct institutions-such committees parties-that allowthem or will to reachgoals suchas reelection.58 Similarly, international relations scholars interare or estedin howstates other entities forms design institutional (organizations, proceinformal dures, cooperative arrangements, arrangements) assistin theretreaty that alization their of The is of objectives. point not,as much theearlier literature assumed, that "legislative activity" theinternational is interesting se. Thepower at level per of theanalogy rests on choosestrategies cope with to similar solely howactors strategic In environments.general, suggest more we that can out progress be madebydrawing are theaspectsof domestic that characterized attempts cooperate to politics by by who cannotturn and actorswithmixedmotives, easilyto external enforcement, of them to relations. applying selectively thestudy international The debateaboutlegislative organization, whichwe arguemayprovide insights into international has institutions generally, beenroughly more into organized a contrast between informational distributional and Informational models models. concentrate thewaysin which on allow legislators learnaboutthe structures to legislative are thusavoiding inefficient outcomes.59 Researchers have policiesthey adopting, that can structured committees efficiently informaargued properly legislative signal of tionabouttheeffects proposed informational conpoliciesto thefloor, that and of cernscan explainboththepattern appointment legislators committees of to and thedecision All rulesunder which committees claimshave making operate. ofthese stimulated intense which beenchallenged thedistrihas empirical investigation, by butional Informational models be usedtoextend discussed later. can and perspective in in literature stress roleof institutions that the clarify arguments theinternational of as and as theprovision information,Keohanehas argued, in thelearning process, Ernst Peter and Haas haveemphasized. about condithe Theycanleadtopredictions tionsunder whichinternational institutions effectively can provide policy-relevant of that inforinformation states, to credible aboutthekinds institutions can provide of on of behavand the mation, about effects suchinformation provision patterns state of these is ior.An example an issueareawhere effects be might prominent environ56. The work legislative on institutions is justone example theapplication noncooperative of of game to But we on theory domestic institutions. sinceitis a particularly well-developed literature, concentrate it here, without wishing imply thisis theonlybranch research domestic to that of on institutions may that haveinteresting analogies international to institutions. 57. ShepsleandWeingast 1995. on in 58. Although muchof theworkon legislative organization concentrates theAmerican context, recent yearscreative efforts have been made to developsuchmodelsin non-U.S.settings. Huber See and and 1996b;Tsebelis Money1995;Ramseyer Rosenbluth 1993; G. Cox 1987;andShugart Carey and 1992. 59. See Gilligan Krehbiel and 1990;andKrehbiel 1991.

741 Institutions International to likely theability organizations provide that of mental institutions, itis highly where on abouttheeffects human of activities theenvironreliable, credible information on ment a keyfactor explaining successor failure negotiations environis in the of of might thecreation international be mental treaties. Another possibleapplication an funcInternational Settlements, original financial institutions, as theBankfor such on creditwortionofwhich was toprovide credible informationmarkets German to indepenUnion, Commission's as a relatively the role thiness.60 Within European the for explanation itsability dent collector policy-relevant of informationa plausible is over outcomes.61 toexercise considerable influence policy is hand,assumethat informationnotall that Distributional models, theother on are on that legislators heterogeneous problematic. Instead, they concentrate thefact in mutual gains, intheir differentially various about issues.62 Achieving tastes, caring issues. Since deals thatwill stickacrossdifferent thisframework, meanscutting have of strucalwaysbe simultaneous, legislators developed exchanges votescannot and allow them puttogether to tures suchas committees agenda-setting that rules to Thisstructure on intense particularistic interest them. majorities theissuesofmost legislators. Distrithe of to provides predictions about distributionbenefits individual Like flow to committees. butional benefits through appointment powerful legislative have thosein thedistributional tradition tradition, researchers theinformational in used suchmodelsto explain predict and various organization. aspectsoflegislative will of outliersForexample, that committees be composed preference they argue those who about issues-and that suchcomintensely particular legislators caremost will is to mittees be granted power, which necessary keepcross-issue agenda-setting in dealsfrom on models maybe especially useful Distributional unraveling thefloor. or in in fashion roleofinternational the institutionsfacilitating exploring a rigorous issue linkages that havebeen an important research hampering mutually beneficial relations.63 agendaininternational models legislative of organiThedebate between informational distributional and It in and terms. has zationhas been highly productive, boththeoretical empirical the into confronted legislators, types by new of provided insights thetypes problems in On and of solutions availableto them, therole of institutions democracies. the for a observable of implications, empirical side,ithas generated plethora alternative under of committees theconditions or the about composition congressional example, research both on whichactorsgain gatekeeping amendment or power.Empirical of such abouthowthestructure institutions, as legislasideshas led todeepinsights overcome collectivetheir to tivecommittees, influences ability help individuals to individuals be willing delwill and under which action problems, theconditions Both typesof to decision-making authority such institutions. egate substantial to of are and relevant essential an understandingtheroleofinstituquestions highly the modelsuggests tions international in as politics well.Forexample, informational
60. 61. 62. 63. Simmons 1993. See Haas 1989;andBemauer1995. Weingast Marshall1988. and 1992c. see On issuelinkage, Stein1980;andMartin

742 International Organization that institutions should mostinfluential promoting be in cooperation whenthey are relatively independent, "expert" sources information whensuchinformation of and is scarceand valuableto states. shouldexpectthismodelto be mostuseful We in issue international areascharacterized information by or asymmetries inthedevelopment expert of knowledge (suchas financial banking and regulation). distribuThe tional modelpredicts institutions be most that will successful allowing credible in for deals between cross-issue stateswhenthosewiththemostintense interest any in particular issue dominate on policymaking thatdimension wheninstitutional and mechanisms inhibit states from on reneging cross-issue deals,evenifperformance ondifferent is dimensions notsimultaneous. Institutions try copewith that to environmental protection development and needsinthesamepackage(suchas UNCED and theAgenda21 program) providea plausibleexample.For our interests, another striking analogy between international andthelegislative the arena literature the is to degree which terms thedebate-information the of versus the distribution-reflect emerging debate aboutthesignificance international of institutions. In manyessential the respects problems facedby individual legislators mirror thosefacedby individual states theinternational in Individual actorsface system. in situations whichtheymustcooperate order achievebenefits also face in to but to temptationsdefect from cooperative arrangements. external No authority exists to enforce cooperative be agreements; must self-enforcing. they Self-enforcement takes theform exclusion of from benefits cooperation, coercive the of a measure. Given theseanalogies, there every is reasonto expectthat someof themethods, insights, andresults thesenew studies legislators of of couldusefully inform studies new of international in institutions, spiteof the fact thatlegislators (usually)operatein a more densely institutionalized environment.64 Moregenerally, rationalist modelsof institutions have beendeveloped domestic that in have thepotential be settings to translated theinternational to level.As long as we are considering mixed-motive situations whichactorsmustcooperate orderto pursuetheir in in the objectives, to incentives construct institutions structure encouragecooperation to and are similar. How InstitutionsMatter on Sincethe1980s,work international institutions beendefined themost has for part thatscholars to by thedemand institutions respond a realist agenda:to provethat on havea significant effect state behavior. Whilestructuring debatein thismanthe nermayhavestimulated direct theoretical ithas some confrontation, also obscured and to research realism settheresearch important tractable paths. Allowing agenda has meant modelsof international that institutions rarely have taken domestic poli64. One could make a similarargument of about domestictheories delegation. See Epsteinand O'Halloran1997;Lohmann O'Halloran1994;andLupiaandMcCubbins and 1994.The analogy between to to politicians deciding delegate authority bureaucrats committees states and or delegating authority to intermational institutionsstrong. is

743 Institutions International the treating stateas a unit.The debatehas also been reducedto a tics seriously, has attention been do matter they not.Insufficient or either institutions dichotomy: effects work. to institutional we expect through which might given themechanisms to as largely indepenhavetreated institutions in response realism, to Institutionalists, are institutions that insights international whileplaying downearlier dentvariables, as institutions dependent the statechoice.Treating themselves objectsof strategic as admission thattheyare been understood an implicit has mistakenly variables on of with effect patterns behavior.65 epiphenomenal, no independent the of explaining existence to merely it Although has beenimportant go beyond if emerge we acceptthat productive linesofresearch new institutions, international are is, are institutions simultaneouslycauses and effects;that institutions boththe framework, equilibrium In objectsof statechoiceand consequential. a rationalist, institutions. states chooseanddesign is thisstatement obviousandunexceptionable: instituthat through do facecertain problems can be resolved States so becausethey intended effects. Once becauseoftheir tional mechanisms. Theychooseinstitutions will even as theyare conand institutions constrain shapebehavior, constructed, In we a member states. thissection, outline by challenged reformed their and stantly matter the to that number linesofresearch showpromise takeus beyond "do they of on of institutions. ordon'tthey" structure research international this Although in tradition. agendais firmly therationalist research The following in of over variation patterns preferences outcomes, allowsforsubstantial approach in change such aboutoutcomes basedon exogenous andindeed provides predictions with to leverage respect thesources itprovides relatively explanatory little preferences, to A of changein suchpreferences. fewwordson how thisagendais related the To constructivist research be constructivist program-may in order. thedegreethat in fundamental goals endogat changes actors' provepowerful making approaches the for refutable hypotheses abouttheconditions suchchange, conenous, providing rationalist will be complementary. Although approaches structivist rationalist and how policypreferences for change are powerful explaining approaches generally alternative or conditions approaches, change, whenexternal constraints information internal are for morefundamental, such as constructivism, necessary explaining has the research program muchto changesin actors'goals. However, rationalist in for theories aboutthereasons change actors'goals. even strong contribute without of is of of interaction that, regardless One of thecore insights theories strategic of to probtypes cooperation actors' they preferences, willtend facegeneric specific on to give lemsoverandoveragain.Manysituations riseto incentives renege deals run makeactors happyin theshort but or to behavein time-inconsistent that ways of interaction rise in situations strategic give many Likewise, regretful thelongrun. will overhow to divideup thissurplus and to benefits from cooperation, conflicts of and cheating how efforts. Thus,considerations howtoprevent plaguecooperative are to to to resolvedistributional examples, central conflict, give two prominent of of aptheories cooperation goals of actors.Rationalist regardless the specific
1994. 65. Mearsheimer

744 International Organization proaches powerful are becausethey suggest observable implications aboutpatterns in evenabsent kind precise the of ofcooperation thefaceofsuchdilemmas, informaIt tionaboutpreferences scholars that desire. is to suchdilemmas we nowturn that ourattention.
Collaboration VersusCoordinationProblems

The mostproductive institutionalist research relaagendathusfarin international with tions beentherationalist-functionalist originating Keohane's has agenda, After on edited volume international This HegemonyandSteveKrasner's regimes.66 work was informed a fundamentally of by important insight, inspired themetaphor the by rational action states couldimpede mutuPrisoners'Dilemma (PD). Individually by to Institutions wouldbe effective thedegreethatthey allybeneficial cooperation. to thusrealizing allowedstatesto avoid short-term available temptations renege, mutual benefits. that Some authors, recognizing PD was onlyone typeof collective-action proba and Collabolem,drew distinction between collaboration coordination problems.67 to incentives defect the and ration problems, PD, arecharacterized individual like by of that states facein existence equilibria arenotPareto optimal. Thus,theproblem in and thissituation finding is to waysto bindthemselves others order reachthe In Pareto frontier. contrast, coordination gamesarecharacterized theexistence by of The states facein thissituation notto is multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria. problem these avoidtemptations defect, to chooseamong to but Suchchoicemay equilibria. of be relatively if simpleandresolved identificationa focalpoint, theequilibria by in of are notsharply differentiated one another terms thedistribution benfrom of Battleof theSexes,inefits.68 somecoordination But games,liketheparadigmatic volvemultiple the overwhich actors havestrongly equilibria divergent preferences. Initially, mostauthors argued institutions that wouldhavelittle effect patterns on of state behavior coordination in substantial institutional effects games, predicting only these led in collaboration situations. Interestingly, arguments bothto expectations to aboutinstitutional effects state on behavior tostate and incentives delegate authorwiththekindof equilibrium ityto institutions, consistent analysiswe findmost for research. promising future into has As thelogic of modern game theory becomemoredeeplyintegrated the international relations and haverecognized limitations the of theory, as authors to the we that collaboration-coordination distinction, havebegun see work integrates and asconcerns associated with collaboration thedistributional concerns efficiency to line sociated with coordination. Krasner madea seminal contributionthis ofanalyto sis.69 argued when He that states attemptingcooperate oneanother, are with achievone the frontier-is ingefficiency gains-reaching Pareto only ofthechallenges they
66. 67. 68. 69. 1983b. See Keohane1984;andKrasner 1992b. See Snidal1985a;Stein1983;andMartin Garrett Weingast and 1993. 1991. Krasner

745 International Institutions mayexistalongthePareto one. not difficult Manyequilibria faceandoften themost bargaining through as one and frontier, specifying ofthese thelocusofcooperation, coopof empirical examples international of power, dominates andtheexercise state of with theorems noncoopis compatible thefolk insight perfectly eration. Krasner's gamegivesriseto play of a PD-type repeated that gametheory showthat erative probcollaboration transforms Thus,repetition infinite-equilibria. many-in fact, states In problems. mostcircumstances, havesimultaneously lemsintocoordination conflict. and distributional efficient outcomes resolving reaching toworry about becomes to institutions our this Once we recognize fact, approach international relations to international bothmorecomplexand morecloselyrelated traditional institutions cannotmerely To concerns aboutpowerand bargaining. be effective, funcinformational and through monitoring other problems resolvecollaboration For conflict. for distributional also provide mechanism resolving a Theymust tions. identifying possibleequilibone focalpoints, may institutions construct example, about bargaining state-to-state or rium thedefault "obvious"one,thusreducing as of The role of theEuropean Courtof thechoiceof a particular pattern outcomes. in of in is elsewhere thisarticle, captured part thistype by Justice (ECJ),discussed role The Basle Banking Committee's in devising constructed analysis. focal-point helpedto coordisimilarly practices banking for standards prudential international wereavailable.70 of wherea number plausiblesolutions regulations natenational to are flowing of fearthat benefits cooperation disproportionately the Wherestates and the aboutstatebehavior can institutions providereliableinformation others, perform many Tradeinstitutions of to benefits cooperation allaysuchfears. realized of moreanalytical is scrutiny theprovision one that functions; function couldstand Another way of amongmembers. aboutthedistribution benefits suchinformation of is conflict to "keepaccount" dealsstruck, distributional could institutions mitigate in institumulti-issue particularly complex made,andgainsachieved, compromises institutions theEuropean of within supranational the created tions.The networks and for the scope forissue-linkage institutional provide necessary Union, example, over achievea of that to the memory perform function assuring all members, time, of of Unlesstheproblem equilibfair of reasonably share thebenefits cooperation.71 willnotallow in monitoring theworld is all rium selection resolved, thethird-party for international cooperation. stable distributional issuesback will line bringing Thus,a promising ofresearch involve the issuesthat werein fact focusofsome institutions, intothestudy international of with Institutions interact distridiscussed earlier. may oftheearly literature regimes settleand in of they butional conflict a number ways.Mostsimply, reflect solidify moretraditional through that conflict havebeenestablished ments distributional of Krasner of which emphasizes, Thesemeansinclude exercise state the power, means. trades of such as making methods bargaining and market dominance, alternative if lockina can In institutions makea differencethey acrossissues.72 this perspective,
70. Simmons 1998. 71. Pollack1997. 72. Fearon1994a.

746 International Organization in reflecting power particular equilibrium, providing stability. rather merely But than as in an epiphenomenal fashion, realists wouldhaveit,institutions thisformulation of exprevent potential challengers from undermining existing patterns cooperation, these rather than plaining powerful why states maychoosetoinstitutionalize patterns relying solelyon ad hoc cooperation. therefore miniInstitutions also servea less controversial may signaling function, construct points focal mizing bargaining costs.Thiswouldbe thecase ifinstitutions or if they of of overtime, discussed as primarily account thepattern benefits keep In Once a particular earlier. either case, they effectively increase pathdependence. is institutions itin. Researching waysin which the instituequilibrium chosen, lock tions this-how do they do what conditions?enhance path dependence, under and wouldbe intriguing. Normative questions riseto thetopoftheagendaoncewe also of If a recognize lock-inrole of institutions. theydo in factsolidify pattern the of we the status cooperation preferred themost by powerful, should question ethical as questions. institutions, turning attention equity, wellas efficiency, our to In themosttraditional, reflect enhancestate and state-centric terms, institutions power;in TonyEvans and PeterWilson'swords, theyare "arenasforactingout On we end of thespectrum, maywantto ask about powerrelations."73 theother in distributional situations whichinstitutions a moreactiverole in resolving play institutions sometimes more do than lockinequilibria chosen conflict. through Perhaps of theexercise state of power, having independent intheselection equilibria. an part in Suchan argument beenmademost has clearly thecase oftheECJ.Here,Geoffrey of Garrett Barry Weingast that and R. find there a number waysin whichthe are marthe European Community couldhaverealizeditsgoal of completing internal in ket.74 ECJmadea bigdifference thecourse European The of becauseit integration was able to construct focalpointby choosing a that one of thesemechanisms, of mutual This implications was acbut recognition. choicehad cleardistributional over states becauseit was a Paretoimprovement thereversion ceptedby member of to the market. distinct A research tradition emphapoint failing complete internal selecsizesthelegitimizing that role international institutions playinfocal-point can out tion.Some scholars and focalpoints point that institutionally legallyenshrined This can gain a highdegreeof legitimacy bothinternationally domestically.75 and in has legitimacy, turn, important political consequences.6 To developa research resolveproblems multiple of agendaon how institutions to we and equilibria distribution, wouldhave to buildon theseinsights ask condithe to the tional Whenarestates, willing turn probquestions. particularly powerful, are lem of equilibrium Whatkindsof institutions selection overto an institution? most this or that to that likely perform function effectively-those arestrategic those
73. EvansandWilson1992. the werenotsharply distinequilibria 74. Garrett Weingast and 1993. Theyalso arguethat multiple on conflict among guished from another terms efficiency do notconcentrate distributional one in of and See and 1993. equilibria. Theyhavebeencriticized these on points. Burley Mattli 75. See Franck 1990;andPeck 1996,237. 76. Claude 1966,367.

International Institutions 747 or on are naive;thosethat relyon political decisionmaking thosethat relyheavily relatively independent experts and/or judicialprocesses; those broadly that reflect the membership theinstitution thosethat dominated thepowerful? of or are by Under whatconditions constructed points are focal likely gaininternational to recognition relations and acceptance? the international focuson Overall,bringing traditional distributional conflict into study international back the of institutions the holds potenin tial forgenerating researchable questions thatare bothpositiveand normative nature. International Institutions Domestic and Politics In allowing their agendatobe defined responding therealist by to challenge, institutionalists have generally neglected role of domestic the politics. Stateshave been and This frametreated rational as unitary actors and assigned preferences beliefs. work beenproductive allowing to outline broadwaysin which in us the instituhas tions change can of But as we patterns behavior. inprivileging state an actor, have the neglected waysin which the other actors international in politics might instituuse tions(a central and insight earlier of studies transgovernmental of organization) the or waysinwhich nature interests thestate the of itself potentially are changed the by actions institutions implication theearlyneofunctionalist of of Here (an literature). for we outline fewlinesof analysis a thatshouldbe fruitful integrating domestic in thantreating politicsand international institutions a systematic manner, rather domestic politics a residual as category explanation. of Becausethelinesofanalysis herehavefoundations specific in analytical frameworks explicit with assumptions, applying them theproblem international to of institutions should result productive in research paths, rather thanmerely proliferation possible"explanatory the of varihas ables" that characterized to and many attempts integrate domestic politics international relations. should We notethat bringing domestic politics backinto study the of international institutions an agendathatshouldbe understood analytically is as in setdistinct from of applying that institutionalist modelsdeveloped thedomestic in to elsewhere thisarticle. ting theinternational an agendaaddressed level, As we willargue, ofthemore international instione fundamental in which ways If tutions change can state behavior bysubstituting domestic is for practices. policies made institutions nowmadeon theinternational itis are formerly bydomestic level, to in of Threerereasonable expectsubstantial changes thepatterns world politics. latedquestions central understanding relations to the between domestic interand are to national institutions. under what conditions domestic actors willing be First, might domestic substitute international domestic for institutions? Second,are particular to actors to regularly advantaged theability transfer by policymaking authority the to and international Third, what level? extent international can institutional decisions are for rulesbe enforced domestic by institutions, what theimplications compliand are that intenance?Thesequestions tiedtogether theassumption domestic actors by to tionally delegate policymaking authority theinternational whenthisaction level furthers of interests. pursuit their

748 International Organization Domesticinstitutions at timesbe a barrier therealization benefits can to of for society a whole.Failures domestic as of institutions arisethrough number can a of mechanisms. Perhaps most obviously, domestic institutions be captured prefcan by erence outliers whoholdpolicyhostage their to research demands. Recent suggests that maybe thecase with this respect thesettlement territorial to of disputes between in in bordering states someregions: repeated failure ratify to border agreements the legislature oneofthemost is important domestic political conditions associated with thewillingness states submit of to their disputes international to arbitration.77 More this for generally, situation likely arisewhensomeactors, is to suchas those looking with find do concerned particularistic benefits, iteasierto organize than actors more thewelfare theaveragecitizen. of Such is thestory often toldabouttrade policy. Import-competing producers others and with interest protectionist an in policiesmay find easiertoorganize it of and than those whofavor trade, coalition exporters free a in of consumers. differential This ability organize biaspolicy favor protection, to will decreasing overallwelfare. Transferring policymaking the processto theinternain to tional in level,where exporters see that can they havea stake organization order of can a evenhanded gaintheopening foreign markets, facilitatemore representation welfareofinterests. Thoseactors whohavethemost gainfrom to of pursuit general in suchas executives interest elected a national by constituency-will showthemost Goldstein to institutions suchcircumstances. turning international under Judith providesan analysis alongtheselineswhensheexplains paradox theU.S. presithe of dentagreeing bilateral to dispute-resolution panelsin theU.S.-Canada FreeTrade Act(FTA),in spite thefact these of that panelspredictably decidecases ina waythat tends deny to to protection U.S. producers.78 We can identify to other incentives domestic for actors transfer to policymaking theinternational level. One common problem withinstitutions are under that the control political of actors that time-inconsistent is of preferences. Although running an unexpectedly levelofinflation to immediate benefits politihigh today maybring ciansup for for reelection, example, allowing monetary policytobe madebypoliticianswill introduce welfare-decreasing a inflationary to theeconomy. bias Putting additional on constraints policy, example, joining system fixed for a of by exchange this ratesor a common a to currency area,can provide mechanism overcome timeIn as of inconsistency problem, argued proponents a singleEuropean by currency. if of to involves short-term general, pursuit gainsovertime sacrifices, turning international institutions be an attractive can for option domestic policymakers. A secondandrelated kinds aboutdomestic is question politics whether particular ofactors regularly an advantage turning theinternational At the will in level. see to that"internationalist" actors-thoseheavily simplest level,itseemslikely engaged in international transactions,79 who sharethenorms international those of society,80

77. 78. 79. 80.

Simmons 1998. See Goldstein 1996;andGilligan1997. Frieden 1991. Sikkink 1993a.

International Institutions 749 or thosewho have a stakein a transnational globalresource81 or -will have an in interest turning theinternational to level.This mayespecially thecase when be suchgroups parties consistently a minority or in are in position domestic politics. Drawing theseideas,we couldbeginto develophypotheses on aboutthekindsof domestic interest groups willmost that favor transferring authority theintersome to national level. Certain domestic institutional actorsmay also have a tendency benefit to from international-level policymaking. suchactor, One whichis just beginning enter to political of scientists'analysisinternational is the institutions, judiciary. Increasingly, international agreements legalinform. are Thismeans that often interpreted are they bydomestic courts, that and judgescan use international as a basis on which law to makejudgments.82 Because international provides particular law this actorwithan additional resource which pursue by to whether agendas, bureaucratic ideological, or we might that judiciary general in expect the tends be sympatheticinternational to to institutions. as toward Overall, we work moresophisticated of specification thecausalmechanisms through which institutions influence can we behavior, willhaveto paymuch more attention domestic to politics than of studies international institutions thus have far. development general The of of theories domestic an politics provides opening for systematic of development propositions aboutdomestic actors. no longer We needto treat domestic the level as merely sourceof state the preferences, as a residual nor to category explainanomalies patterns variation cannot explained or of that be by international factors. we Instead, can movetoward genuinely interactive theories of domestic and politics international institutions, the specifying conditions under which certain actors likely prefer policy madeon theinternational This are to that be level. focusallowsus tospecify conditions to likely lead tothedelegation policymaking of to authority theinternational someofwhich haveoutlined we level, here. Unanticipated Consequences In a rationalist framework, institutions both objectofstate are the choiceandconseThe quential. linkthat thesetwoaspectsofinstitutions ties together, allowsthe and to analyst developrefutable propositions aboutinstitutions within equilibrium an is framework,theability actors anticipate consequences particular of to the of types of institutions. example, thepreceding For in discussion domestic of we politics, assumed that actors consistently domestic wereable to gaugewithsomedegreeof the accuracy waysin whichworking within international institutions wouldaffect their to their material ideational or ability pursue goals. The rationalist in stands distinction a historical sociologicalapapproach to or to proach institutions.83 approaches institutionsmore These see as deeply rooted and
81. Young1979. 82. See Alter 1996;andConforti 1993. 83. See Steinmo, Thelen, Longstreth and 1992;andPierson 1996b.Historical institutionalism stresses thepath-dependent of nature institutions, explaining apparently why inefficient institutions persist. Socio-

750 International Organization to draw attentiontheir unanticipated consequences. Although may we question whether manyinternational institutions reachthesame degreeof "taken-for-grantedness" it that see indomestic we or socialrelations, seemsundeniable politics smaller-scale that they sometimes haveeffects surprise that their member states. is important It to Effects differentiate between unintended unanticipated and effects. maybe anticiFor it thatarrangements to patedbutunintended. example, is generally expected lowertherateof inflation lead to somewhat will higher levels of unemployment. is Thus,higher unemploymentan anticipated, although unintended, consequence of stringent monetary policies.It is bestunderstood a priceactorsare sometimes as to of Such willing bearto gainthebenefits low inflation. unintended anticipated but of consequences institutions present little challenge a rationalist to approach, since fit intoa typical they neatly cost-benefit analysis. Genuinely unanticipated effects, however, present larger a challenge. of of instiSpecific examples apparently unanticipated consequences international to tutions notdifficult find. are Statesthat believedthat accordswere human-rights but of themselves of nothing meaningless scraps paperfound surprised theability by actors use thesecommitmentsforce to to to their transnational governments change In that few policies.84 theEuropean Community, anticipated theECJwouldhavethe on influence policythat has.85 it Prime Minister Thatcher was widespread Margaret at of to ruleswithin the apparently surprised theresults agreeing change quite voting such of which she European Community, as theadoption qualified-majority voting, in accepted theSingleEuropean Act.86 a How might rationalist approach deal withtheseevents?One productive apbe to which the under conproach might to attempt specify conditions unanticipated are Thisspecification sequences most likely. wouldatleastallowus to suggest when a simple rationalist modelwillprovide substantial and explanatory leverage whenit becomenecessary integrate insights otherschoolsof thought. to of If might the dominate we unanticipated consequences political outcomes, wouldhavetodrawon alternatives rationalist to modelsin a waythat as goes farbeyond usingthem a way tospecify and when conpreferences goals.Here,we beginspecifying unanticipated to are of sequences most likely confound patterns international cooperation. it that in rules-that rules about rulesInductively,appears changes secondary is, in voting rules are thechangesmostlikelyto workin unexpected ways.Changes within institution, example, an for can give riseto new coalitions previously and of to suppressed expressions interest, leading unpredicted policyoutcomes. Changes in decision-making and efcan procedures haveevenmorewidespread unexpected fectsif they from new actors. of open thepolicyprocessto input Manyexamples arisefrom that acunanticipated consequences decision-making procedures provide and Sikcess to nongovernmental transnational actors, forexample,Kathryn as,
logicalinstitutionalism emphasizes social nature institutions, the of stressing their rolein defining individuals'identities thefact many and that important institutions tobe taken granted therefore come for and notseenas susceptible reform. to 84. Sikkink 1993a. 85. Burley Mattli and 1993. 86. Moravcsik 1991.

751 Institutions International actors and of Bothas sources newinformation as strategic has kink's work shown.87 of able to use new points access to gain are suchgroups often in their own right, rules Changesin decision-making willhavewideleverage overpolicy. unexpected rulesand are thusmorelikelyto have of on spreadeffects a variety substantive If rulesthemselves. thanchangesin substantive effects outcomes on unanticipated in consequences situaunanticipated we see is this observation correct, should more suchas legalized secondary rules, and complex permutable tions haverelatively that witha unitveto,whichhas little bargaining Traditional state-to-state institutions. or actors coalifor should less provide opportunity nonstate rule secondary structure, unexpectedly. outcomes tions theweakto influence of in is governarena, why arises, especially theinternational that Onequestion often in After participation all, outcomes. ments willingto live withunanticipated are outcomes freand is If institutions voluntary. unpleasant unexpected international to retain right pull outof institutions. the actors occur,states sovereign as quently of in? answer that benefits remainis the they Why might choosetoremain Thetrivial nonthis intosomething thanthecosts.But we can turn answer ingin are greater to is wheninstitutional abouttheconditions membership likely trivial thinking by the benefits. Some of thesehave been spelledout in functionalist provide greatest will institutions be greatest for Keohaneargues thedemand international that theory. of facea densenetwork relations of when under conditions interdependence, states is scarce.88 couldgeneralize We and informationsomewhat with another where one in from institutionthefaceof an to to that states leastlikely be willing withdraw are increasing with issuesthat exhibit when they dealing are consequences unanticipated Consider the in of create conditions pathdependence. returns scale,which, turn, to in provide of trading arrangementsthe1990s.Thesearrangements creation regional of and their members economic with benefits, thoseon theoutside thearrangements see and We opportunities. therefore eastfind losinginvestment trading themselves of members the to and otherstatesclamoring become ernEuropean, Caribbean, how increasing This arrangements. is a good exampleof relevant regional trading Under these condemand institutional for membership. to a returns scalecreate high a high levelof willbe willing putup with to it that ditions, seemslikely thesestates from an consider withdrawing before theywould seriously outcomes unexpected are ofwhether trade agreements begsthequestion However, example this institution. to effects. Theyare onlylikely do so in the unanticipated to likely have substantial suchas economic or largeinternational shocks, change case of rapidtechnological 1970s. of theoil shocks the
of Tvpology Institutional Effects

international instito of As we turn attention theproblem how,not our justwhether, alternative mechanisms it to through tutions matter, becomesessential understand in we To direction, their effects. prodourthinking this which institutions exert might
1993a. 87. Sikkink 88. Keohane1983a.

752 International Organization introduce preliminary a typology institutional of effects. reasoning The behind this typology that is different institutions,perhaps or similar in setinstitutionsdifferent tings, havedifferent ofeffects. will types Specifying these effects notonlyallow will us to developbetter insights thecausal mechanisms into underlying interaction the between institutions statesor societies. will also provide moretestable and It for propositions abouthow and whenwe should expect institutionsexert to substantial effects behavior. on The typology suggest analytically we is informed aimsfirst provide lanbut to a guagefor describing patterns change state of in behavior after creation an internaof tionalinstitution. we spell outthetypology present Here and someillustrative examples. next The stepwillbe tolink typology causalprocesses, we suggest the to and somepreliminary alongthese ideas lines.We begin suggesting types instiof by two tutional effects: Of convergence divergence and effects. course, nullhypothesis the is that institutions no effect. have Development a clearer of analytical framework may force to consider us in situations whichwe combine effects: example, for perhaps some typesof statesare subjectto convergence effects others divergence and to effects. We beginwith sincethelogicofmostrationalist, economisconvergence effects, leads us to expectsuch tic,and functionalist theories international of institutions effects. Thesemodelspositgoalsthat states find difficult achieveon their it to own, whether reasons time-inconsistent for of collective-action oldpreferences, problems, In fashioned domestic political or failures unilateral of state action. stalemate, other thisfunctionalist to turn international institutions resolvesuchprobto logic,states allow them achievebenefits lems;institutions to unavailable unilateral acthrough tionofexisting state structures. Functionalist analysis sees international institutions as important becausethey to help states solve problems. Manyof theseproblems in havetheir roots thefailures domestic of and institutions, their resolution involves turning sometypes authority to theinternational of over level.Once policyis delstate will converge: members will egatedto an international institution, behavior to or tend adoptsimilar monetary, trade, defense policies. Whathas beenmissing of from functionalist accounts institutionalization is the conditions incentives conconnection between domestic and to systematic political But struct comply and with international institutions. oncewe recognize internathat tional for institutions makea difference becausethey substitute domay effectively mesticpractices(makingpolicy decisions,setting policy goals, or undertaking our turns thedomestic monitoring to conditions that activities), attention political If makesuchsubstitutionreasonable a institutions are policyalternative. domestic if thesourceof persistent of the policyfailure, theysomehow prevent realization societal or interfere thepursuit mutual with of with benefits other preferences, ifthey functions level national overto theinternational can enhance welstates, turning fare.89 Monetary policyis a primeexampleof thislogic. Otherexamplesmight
89. Some wouldarguethat processis antidemocratic. Vaubel1986.However, this See suchan argument rests weakfoundations. on First, assumesthat it domestic institutions necessarily are to responsive

International Institutions 753 include trade policy, domestic if trade policy institutions captured protectionare by ists;or environmental policy, domestic if institutions encourage short-term a rather than long-term a perspective theproblem. on Thinking about logicofsubstitution the muchmoreattention inefficient requires to domestic politics thanmostfunctional theories haveprovided date. to A classicexampleof international institutions acting substitutes domestic as for institutions therefore and havingconvergence effects in arguments lies aboutwhy high-inflation suchas Italy states might choosetoenter European the Monetary Union (EMU).90Highinflation a publicbad,leadingto loweroverallwelfare is thanlow inflation. However, short-term the benefits politicians to from allowingspurts of unanticipated inflation makeitdifficult achievelow rates inflation to of unlessinstitutions setmonetary that policyareindependent political of influence.91 transThus, to from ferring authority an institution is relatively that insulated political influence, for benefits andthat itself a preference low inflation, provide has can overall welfare for country. is thelogicthat This the leads a state likeItalyto taketheunusual step a a core of of (for relatively developed rich, country) transfen-ing aspect sovereigntycontrol thecurrency-to European over a Central Bank. of Giventhis that see logicofdelegation, states becomemembers theEMU should in a convergence their of econorates inflation.92 the Although debateragesamong mists in aboutwhether European the Monetary System infact has worked this manfor union for is there doubt one ofthemajor that motivations monetary ner,93 is little high-inflation to "import" states low German ratesof inflation, leadingto similar If in inflation ratesin all member states. we lookedat thevariation inflation rates into union(or intoa monetary prior entry monetary to system moregenerally), and it ratesafter we compared to inflation entry, shouldsee a declinein thelevel of variation. Although monetary unionis a prominent intriguing and example convergence of in we a issueareasas well.Environmental effects, canimagine similar dynamic other institutions should such lead to convergence environmental of indicators, as carbon dioxide emissions.94 leadmeminstitutions as should Human-rights acting substitutes Even iffullconvergence bersto adoptincreasingly similar human-rights practices. as will doesnotoccur, major the of that effect aninstitution is acting a substitute be to in one state more bring practices closely linewith another. in A convergence and variation effect couldbe measured identified decreased by or indicators statepractices, of whether inflation relevant rates, pollution, humanor suchas time-inconsistent preferences, just discussed, national preferences. thekindsof reasons For instiassumes that international is false.Second,theargument institutional capture, assumption often this Alto and than institutions. constrain, influence domestic tutions necessarily are moredifficult monitor, it and somestates, is not assumption somekindsof societalactors for though maybe a reasonable this true. universally 1996. on 90. Fora contrasting argument thelogicofEMU, see Gruber 91. Rogoff 1985. 92. Fratianni vonHagen1992. and 93. See GiavazziandGiovannini 1991. 1989;andWeber 94. Levy 1993.

754 International Organization Inflation prior entry monetary rates to into union Inflation after rates with effect entry a convergence Inflation after rates entry a divergence with effect








1. International institutions withconvergenceor divergenceeffects

rights abuses.Theexistence a convergence of effect couldalso be identified through 1 in graphical means. Figure givesanexample. the On x-axis, states arrayed order are oftheir on rates. Theseratesare performance theoutcome dimension, inflation say indicated they-axis.The solid line indicates on inflation ratesprior entry to into union. steepslopeindicates thestates Its variation monetary that exhibit substantial ininflation rates. dotted represents outcome monetary The line the of union as acting in The moreshallowslopeindicates substitute, causing convergence inflation rates. less variation observed than before entry monetary into union. Thenotion international that institutions substitute domestic might for onesunderlies functionalist theories institutions. of However, someempirical workon theeffects institutions found pattern of has a from of quitedifferent theconvergence outcomespredicted sucha mechanism. by Instead, some authors have found that the of is For primary effect institutionsto exaggerate preexisting patterns behavior. of has in Andrew Moravcsik found, a regional of example, comparison human-rights in that in institutions, theseinstitutions led to an improvement practices those only for states that exhibited highlevel of respect human a already rights.95 Thus,West in their have European states, through participation institutions, improved already to whereas LatinAmerican verygood human-rights records, states, according his showlittle of evidence, impact institutional participation. Thispattern that institutions sometimes to divergence suggests international lead in of statepractices, effect and tendencies complementing magnifying preexisting thanoverriding In will effect. rather them. thiscase, institutions have a divergence Thiseffect results when whoseinitial falls from institutional states practice far guidelineswillshowlittle change from behavior, whereas thoseneartheguidelines move
95. Moravcsik 1995.

Institutions 755 International In a effect wheninstitutions exert appears evenclosertothem. contrast,convergence deviates substanthosestates whosebehavior their influence precisely on greatest wheninstitutions exis to norms. Divergence likely emerge tially from institutional or they primarily of behavior when domestically generated tendencies state aggerate something alongthese Slaughter argued has Anne-Marie mimic domestic institutions. to and likely create abideby liberal states theonesmost are linesinpointing that out instituAccording thislogic,liberal to international institutions.96 relatively liberal willchange behavior liberal of but ones,leading diverto states notilliberal tions the behavior. genceofstate that comeclose toinstitutional A divergence means that thosestates already effect of whereas behavior thosethatdeviate the will movefurther toward them, norms of willremain If unchanged. we wereto developa measure state from suchnorms in variation state of behavior effect increased we behavior, wouldsee a divergence effects graphically, in as divergence after institutional creation. can also illustrate We in greater diverline,indicating effects result a steeper Figure1. Here,institutional we to gencein therelevant variable. ease ofcomparison, continue use For outcome in suchan outcome seemsunlikely practice, theEMU-inflation example. Although we thatmonetary unionthatallowedfor forthesake of argument could imagine reunconstrained fiscalpolicymaking while providing additional decentralized, outcome. Another, debtscould lead to such a perverse sourcesto covernational moreplausible, effect in thearea of overseas is exampleof a divergence perhaps to a of aid. agreed devote setpercentage development In the1970s,OECD countries some countries have to assistance. their Although GDP, 0.7 percent, development as comeclosetoproviding levelofaid anduse thetarget this figure a toolindomestic the havewholly this and decreased percentothers neglected target instead debates, aid. national income they that devote foreign to age oftheir Ifthistypology institutional effects, wayto describe alternative provides useful a is of thenextchallenge to beginto linkup thesepatterns behavior alternative to This ideas and causalmechanisms. project preliminary promising, we outline appears link that here. suggested As institutions leadtoconvergence state of behavior earlier, has studies international that dominated of approach up nicelyto thefunctionalist over years.In thissituation, and institutions, regimes, organizations thelastfifteen to of institutions of unilateral or stateaction creates incentives thefailure domestic mechanisms. kinds problems wouldprompt states to of that on The rely international well that of are use international institutions lead toconvergence behavior relatively for that incentives states understood. include time-inconsistency problems create They or within to bindthemselves collective-action and polities. problems amongstates institutions theresult suchproblems, of Whenstatesturn international to as and as we whentheseinstitutions operating intended, wouldexpectto see converare behavior. genceofstate Theconditions wouldprompt that states use institutions lead todivergence to that are We thatstates of behavior notas well understood. can beginby noting facing
1995. 96. Slaughter

756 International Organization collective-action suchas a PD or a coordination game,wouldbe unlikely problems, torely an institution exaggerated on that differencesstate in behavior. fundamenThe in incentives states adoptsimilar for tal problem suchcases is to create to policies: an free stringent fiscal armscontrol, so on.97 sucha situation, and In policies, trade, institution led to increased that of divergence state practice wouldquickly become is irrelevant states as ignored constraints. oneinitial its instituexpectation that Thus, in tionsshouldnot lead to divergence situations whereincentives existto adopt similar to or as externalities divergent unilateral behavior state policies, whenstrong to exist. Perhaps helpsus understand we appear see somedivergence this why effects inthehuman-rights area.Although issue human of rights a matter concern are around theglobe,human-rights practices usuallydo notinvolvethekindsof externalities andincentives strategic for that interaction existin issueareassuchas theenvironor ment monetary policy.98 lack does a answer why to divergence However, ofexternalities notprovide direct To it wouldoccur. understand effect, is likely we needtoconsider this that domestic madeearlier thisarticle. in us International returning to an argument agreepolitics, eventhosewithout ments, enforcement mechanisms suchas theOECD aid target, can provide "hooks"bywhich interest that the groups favor international agreement can increase their influence thedomestic on in agenda.For example, Scandinavian countries OECD target becomea potent the has dearguing pointin parliamentary a bates.In states without well-organized groupto grabontothishook,or in those witha moreclosedpolitical agreements without enforcement mechanisms process, to or substantial from other states comply unlikely have anyeffect. are to pressure Thesecontrasting domestic are to of political dynamics likely giverisetodivergence state of behavior members theinstitution. among A rationalist research is of institutionsrichand agendaforthestudy international This promising. agendabeginsby recognizing in equilibrium, that, institutions are bothcauses and effects, that and researchers the empirical mustbeginto consider of in not question howinstitutions matter, justwhether do. Thinking these they terms to turns attention theproblem how institutions our of might resolvebargaining and conflict wellas themore as of distributional It recognized problems cheating. forces us to differentiate from of anticipated effects institutions to ask and unanticipated whichunanticipated abouttheconditions under effects mostlikely. are Rationalist theories a for provide mechanism bringing domestic politicsmoresystematically intothestudy international of an that institutions, areaofresearch has beenslighted of thusfar. bythedevelopment thefield Finally, rationalist a approach allowsus to
97. Theremaybe somecoordination for somediscussed Simmons, which by in situations, example, thesolution thecoordination to problem doesnotinvolve adoption similar of policies all states clear by but division responsibilities of amongstates. Simmons See 1994.The Bretton Woodssystems, example, for coordinated behavior creating state by expectations theUnited that Stateswouldbehavedifferently from other members thesystem. of 98. Donnelly the surveys landscape human of 1986.There rights regimes. Donnelly See maybe exceptions thegeneralization international to that strategic interaction human on rights minimal, example, is for whensevere human-rights abuseslead to massive refugee Thiskindoflogiccouldlead totestable flows. propositions within issue area,forexample, the thatinstitutions shouldfunction differently such when externalities than exist "normal" under circumstances.

Institutions 757 International between effects developing and begindifferentiating different of institutional types to refutable propositions abouttheconditions under whichwe are mostlikely observe sucheffects.

in of institutions varied their have theoretical and Studies international sophistication a over relations research frequency timebuthave remained stapleof international and thepages of 10 overthelastfifty we the years.In thisarticle have examined of somepromising directions future for reand development thesestudies outlined were searchon international institutions. Earlystudiesof institutions verymuch worldthatsome hoped problem-driven, focusing theproblems thepostwar on of couldsolve.Although balancerealistic insightful, on and international organizations of failed cumulate, theresults these studies to due likely tothelackofa disciplinary in or theoretical framework which situate studies. morescientific to the A approach in on and showeditself a newerwave of workon institutions, drawing methods wereingeneral of But models suited poorly models American politics. becausethese to therealities international of failedto generate substantial innew politics, they It the of sights. was notuntil 1980s,withthedevelopment workon international and on program instiregimes functionalist theories, a more that progressive research tutions arose. has Onefailing thecurrent of focus on research program, however, beenitsintense without sufficient thatinstitutions attention constructing to wellproving matter, or in effects. We delineated causal mechanisms explaining variation institutional moveresearch thisimpasse.First, we consider approaches might two that beyond be recent might moresuccessful ask whether applying modelsof domestic politics havepastattempts. find We sincemodern of than theories scopeforoptimism here, domestic institutions drawon similar of agreetypically assumptions unenforceable that ments opportunistic and behavior individuals characterize work intermost in by to research national relations. we directions are that Finally, turn somemorespecific to and Theseinclude more careful likely giverisetoimportant testable propositions. consideration distributional of politics, unanticipated issues,therole of domestic and of effects. consequences, a typology institutional As we consider international institutions bothobjectsof strategic as choiceand to and variables consequential, allowing them serveas bothdependent independent in ourmodels, potential increasing understanding institutions of for our and the of in generalis substantial, preliminary workhas international as empirical politics to work international on that The earliest institutions produced insights begun show. in failed add up tomuch to framework which to becauseofthelackofan analytical of situate the of had thebenefit sucha frametheseinsights; nextgeneration work to we was poorly suited thetaskat hand.In thisarticle, hopeto but work, one that theoretilinesofresearch willcombine bestofbothworlds: the haveidentified that on that on that research institutions draws assumptions areappropricallygrounded of relations. atefor persistent the problems international