VELAMMAL ENGINEERING COLLEGE

Velammal Nagar, Ambattur-Red Hills Road, Chennai - 600 066.

SIGNIFICANT FAILURES IN CIVIL ENGINEERING PRACTICES

L.Naveen Dsouza S.Kavin Raj

3rd year, Department of Civil Engineering

SIGNIFICANT FAILURES IN CIVIL ENGINEERING PRACTICES

ABSTRACT
The overlook of failures addresses uncertainty in civil engineering from design to construction. Failures do occur in practice. The uncertainties were caused either by design oversights, construction deficiencies, poor workmanship and Design Procedures which all eventually led to the catastrophe of the structure. A closer scrutiny of the design, the data and the soil-structure-interaction is required. The cause of the failures is generally due to Design Foundation Construction Natural catastrophes

Available information from experience, in situ measurements, laboratory tests, previous projects and expert assessments should be taken into account. The worst of all natural disasters, earthquake has become more pronounced and it is a growing concern among civil engineers and architects. Besides natural disasters, Foundation failures have lead to perceptible changes and effects.So first off, soil should be scoured thoroughly in order to improve the shear strength and bearing capacity of the soil. When it comes to design, a consistent design approach should comply with the desired performance, not only at the initial stage when the system is supposed to be in the intact state, but also during its expected life-cycle.

Failure By Design:

Hyatt Hotel Walkway Collapse Use your analytical and deductive skills to speculate about what caused a structural disaster Tacoma Narrows Bridge Collapse Examine different types of wave motion and how aerodynamic effects destroyed a structure Hyatt Walkway Collapse Kansas City Hyatt Regency hotel opened in 1980

40-story tower Function block Connecting atrium with three elevated walkways 117 ft (36 m) long.

Hyatt Walkway Collapse The Disaster

Atrium crowded with 1500-2000 people for a dance competition Second and fourth-floor walkways collapsed 114 people killed, over 200 injured 2nd-floor walkway designed to hang from 4th-floor walkway, which was hung from roof by three rods along each side of its 117 ft (36 m) length 3rd floor walkway was separate and survived

Design Change Original design used single rods to support both walkways, but they would have been awkward to install and thread. Each rod would have connected to 4th-floor walkway as shown.

As-built, the single long rods were replaced by a pair of shorter rods connecting to the 4th-floor walkway as shown. The 4th-floor box beams were separated at the ends, with the 2nd-floor hangers still in place.

The engineers at G.C.E. were found of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. Consequently, the engineers lost their licenses and many supporting firms went bankrupt.

Tacoma Narrows Bridge Collapse Design Third-longest in the world in 1940 Quite narrow (39 feet; two lanes) Bridge deck supported by vertical cables hung from two long cables strung from one shore, over two towers, to other shore (5000 ft; 2800 ft center span)

2800 ft center span

To reduce costs, sides constructed of solid 8-foot tall I-beams rather than typical open trusses

two-lane concrete roadway

Bridge nicknamed Galloping Gertie by drivers who would be startled as cars in front of them would bounce in and out of view. Engineers spent four months trying to reduce the vibrations The Disaster November 7, 1940 Midnight storm weakens bridge deck and cable stays Mid-morning wind reaches 40-45 mph Bridge closed at 10 am and bridge begins torsional wave motion

Why did this bridge oscillate so much? Solid I-beam girders, unlike trusses, did not allow wind to flow through Flexible bridge oscillated vertically (transverse waves) due to vertical forces from vortex shedding as wind flowed around side girders Torsional waves began when center cable stays on one side failed, allowing cable to slip back and forth. As bridge deck tilted, its angle into the wind changed and created new vortices that steadily increased its twisting until failure What design changes might have prevented this failure? Use open trusses instead of I-beams Increase depth/span & width/span ratios Increase bridge weight Install better dampeners Bridge rebuilt in 1950 with these changes; new bridge has lasted >50 years

1940 Bridge

1950 Bridge

Foundation Failures :

EVAPORATION Hot dry wind and intense heat will often cause the soil to shrink beneath the foundation. This settlement may cause cracks to appear throughout the structure. TRANSPIRATION Tree roots may desiccate the soul beneath a home causing the soil to shrink and the home to settle. PLUMBING LEAKS Water from plumbing leaks is often the cause of foundation problems. DRAINAGE Improper drainage is one of the leading causes of foundation failure. Excess moisture will erode or consolidate soils and cause settlement. INFERIOR FOUNDATION CONSTRUCTION Insufficient steel and inferior concrete will contribute to movement in the slab. INFERIOR GROUND PREPARATION Soft, low density soils and/or improperly compacted soil beneath a home is the leading cause of foundation failure. Cut and fill situations should be properly prepared before the soil is ready to support a structure. POOR SOIL CONDITIONS Poor soil and its expansive and/or contraction contribute to foundation failure.

TYPES OF SETTLEMENT

Settlements lead to cracks such as shrinkage and swelling cracks. So before the construction of the structure,the soil is tested if it is a shrinking or swelling soil. Shrinking and Swelling Soils Some soils will change volume significantly depending upon their moisture content. This poses a special problem for pavement design because this volume change can cause overlying pavements to sink down or heave up unevenly potentially resulting in a cracked or uneven pavement. Jones and Holtz (1973) estimated that shrinking and swelling soils cause about $2.3 billion of damage annually in the U.S. alone. Affected Soils Shrinking and swelling are generally associated with fine-grained clay soils. Shrinking Soils Soil shrinkage is generally confined to the upper portions of a soil. Shrinkage and shrinkage cracks are caused by a reduction in soil moisture content through: 1. Evaporation from the soil surface in dry climates.

2. Lowering of the groundwater table. 3. Desiccation of soil by trees during temporary dry spells in otherwise humid climates. The following process is illustrated in Figure 1: As moisture content decreases, capillary stress in the void spaces increases due to the increased surface tension. This increased surface tension tends to pull adjacent soil particles closer together resulting in an overall soil volume decrease. As moisture content continues to decrease, capillary stress continues to increase, which continues to reduce overall volume. The point where no further volume reduction occurs but the degree of moisture saturation is still 100 percent is called the shrinkage limit (SL), which is an Atterberg limit, just as plasticity index (PI) is. At this point the capillary menisci just begin to retreat below the soil surface, which can be seen by a change in surface appearance from shiny to dull. The shrinkage limit is not commonly tested because of various difficulties. However, a soil near the shrinkage limit typically have lower void ratios that can be achieved by compaction because of the associated high capillary stress. When the climate changes and the shrunken soils again have access to water they tend to swell. Swelling (Expansive) Soils Swelling soils, also known as expansive soils, are ones that swell in volume when subjected to moisture. These swelling soils typically contain clay minerals that attract and absorb water. When water is introduced to expansive soils, the water molecules are pulled into gaps between the soil plates. As more water is absorbed, the plates are forced further apart, leading to an increase in soil pore pressure (Handy, 1995). If this increased pressure exceeds surcharge pressure (including the weight of the overlying pavement) the soil will expand in volume to a point where these pressures are once again in balance. Swelling pressures can be on the order of 100 - 200 kPa (14.5 - 29 psi) and have been measured as high as 1000 kPa (145 psi). Table 1 gives a general idea of the types of expansion that can be expected. So soil exploration is of great concern in shrinking and swelling soils.

FOUNDATION FAILURE OF THE TRANSCONA GRAIN ELEVATOR

The foundation failure in-1913 of a million-bushel grain elevator at Transcona, a few miles from Winnipeg, Manitoba, provides such an opportunity. It is the purposeof this paper to correlate the data on the founclation failure of the Transcona grain elevator with a recently coinpleted field and laboratory soil mechanics investigation using the latest analytical methods. General Description of the Structure : Development of Canada's vast wheat lands in the early part of this century resulted in serious congestion of the Winnipeg railroad yards during peak periods of grain movement. Construction was therefore started in 1911 on the Transcona elevator in conjunction with one of the world's largest railroad yards to facilitate rapid grain movement and to give relief to the Winnipeg railroad.

It consists of a dryer 18 by 30 by 60 feet high,work house 70 by 96 by 180 feet high and the bin house 77 by 195 by feet high, all constructed mainly of reinforced concrete. The foundation failure occurred under the bin house which was designed for storing one million bushels of grain. It consists of 65 circular bins arranged 13 in each of 5 rows running north and south. The 48 interstices between bins are also used for storing grain. A raft foundation, of reinforced concrete 2 feet thick, supports the bins and the conveyor tunnels under the bins. The depth to the bottom of the footings was 12 feet below the ground surface.The design bearing pressure was 6,600 Ib. per square foot based on load bearing tests for which the data are no longer available. Dead weight of the bin house was very nearly 20,000 tons. General Description of Soils : The top 10 feet or less consist of relatively recent deposits of organic soils, flood-deposites,silts and silty clays and outwash from higher ground, and modified lacustrine deposits. Under these are found 40 feet or less of glacial lake deposits forming two distinct layers of approximately equal thickness. Description of Failure: On October 18th, grain was being transferred into the Transcona Grain Elevator. As it was loaded, the bin house began to settle, going down 1 foot in the first hour. Over the next day, the structure settled further and came to rest at a 27 degree angle from the vertical to the west. The foundation of the building which otherwise sat on weak clay soil was supported by a line of bolders on its east side which then permitted the grain elevator to sink more so on the west side. (Remington, 1923) The pressure exerted on the soil beneath the elevator caused the failure. Clay,

silt, and glacial deposits sit beneath the structure. The clays were of the stratified type, meaning that pockets of silt sat between thin sheets of actual clay. (Baracos, 1957) The present clay types lack the unconfined compressive strength of other soil types. The foundation pressed downward with a force of 3.06 tsf (tons per square foot) while the clay beneath it could only support approximately 1.13 tsf based on samples. Soil strength calculations done at the time of construction approximated that it should be able to withstand loads of 4 to 5 tsf. Based on these calculations, the grain elevators weight was well within the acceptable range. Basic errors in soil strength computations were the cause for this failure. (Delatte, 2009) Soon after it came to rest, the elevator was righted using jacks and an elaborate system of piers. It had tilted over without incurring any damage, and as a result, it was structurally sound after being pushed back up though it sat 14 feet below grade. (Skatfeld, 1998) The stiff blue clay of the Red River Valley has been responsible for various other structural failures one of which was the Fargo Grain Elevator in 1955. The weakness in these failures is due to an overbearing amount of pressure on soil which cannot hold the structure. The soil then gives way and essentially swallows the structures into the ground. All the samples below the 10-foot depth showed complete or near complete saturation. Twelve undrained tri axial tests on samples from hole 2 confirmed a negligible angle of internal friction for this type of loading. The consolidation test results (for samples from hole 4) indicate a decrease in compressibility with increased depth. Swelling pressures determined by permitting undisturbed samples to swell under a small load adl determining the pressure required to return the sample to its original volume, range from 560 to 2050 lb. per square foot and are typical of the Greater Winnipeg clays which contain about 30 percent of the more active clay minerals that they are somewhat in excess of overburden pressures probably due to desiccation. Lab tests : Figure 1 shows the location of seven test holes used to obtain samples for the laboratory tests. Holes 4 and 7 were sufficiently removed from the structure to avoid disturbances caused by the failure and the righting operations.The remaining holes were located nearer the structure, some 60 feet from the bin house, in an effort to ascertain the effects of failure. It was realized, however, that these holes would show the effects of almost 40 years of continued pumping that has tatken place since the bin house was righted. Pumping has been necessary to keep the bottom of the bin house dry. After righting, the bin house was ,approximately 34 feet below the prairie grade. It was not considered practical to place the test holes any closer to the structure as the entire area nearer the building was disturbed by tunnelling, excavation.etc, during the righting operations. To keep the bins dry, a 12-foot-deeptrench had. in addition. been excavated around the bin house on all but the south side, further discouraging test holes any closer to the structure than those indicated.

Lessons Learned from this Failure Incidents like the bearing capacity failure of the Transcona Grain Elevator are mysterious in nature, but do allow for geotechnical theories to be tested. Decades after the actual failure a theory arose among geotechnical theorists that the internal friction of saturated clay is equal to zero. This theory had been circulating since the 1920s and many advances towards its proof were made, but there were no actual failures used in testing this theory until Robert Peck in the 1943. He used the data collected from the soil before and after this failure and through a series of Terzaghis equations about ultimate bearing capacity developed in the 1930s to prove that this theory was actually true. The proof of this theory allows for a variety of new assumptions and theories to be made about the tricky ways in which soil moves. (Morley, 1996) More accurate soil tests and calculations could have prevented the failure of the Transcona Elevator. Advances in technology since 1913 have enabled more precise studies. However, the true maximum mass that soil can hold is difficult to predict exactly. The true number is often not known until the building actually collapses. Reports documenting the failure of the elevator have aided engineers in buildings since its collapse. (Delatte, 2009) Also located in the Red River Valley, the Fargo Grain Elevator collapsed in 1955 due to a similar building failure. Apparently the geological engineers had not learned their lesson, as the Fargo elevator also failed due to unstable foundation soils.

Collapse in Shanghai: Building Collapsed In Shanghai :(06/27/2009) (Daqi) At around 5:30am on June 27, an unoccupied building still under construction at Lianhuanan Road in the Minhang district of Shanghai city toppled over. One worker was killed. According to information, a 70 meter section of the flood prevention wall in nearby Dianpu River and that may have something to do with this building collapse.

(1) An underground garage was being dug on the south side, to a depth of 4.6 meters (2) The excavated dirt was being piled up on the north side, to a height of 10 meters (3) The building experienced uneven lateral pressure from south and north (4) This resulted in a lateral pressure of 3,000 tonnes, which was greater than why the pilings could tolerate. Thus the building toppled over in the southerly direction.

First, the apartment building was constructed.

Then the plan called for an underground garage to be dug out. The excavated soil was piled up on the other side of the building.

Heavy rains resulted in water seeping into the ground. The building began to shift and the concrete pilings were snapped due to the uneven lateral pressures.

The building began to tilt.

The collapse of a Shanghai high-rise last Saturday was not due to cost-cutting on the part of its builders - as some rumors have suggested, local authorities announced. The experts scornfully said that No company having common sense would do such a thing.