INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 978–92 –0–107410–2
ISSN 1020–525X
“Governments, regulatory bodies and operators everywhere must
ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are used
beneficially, safely and ethically. The IAEA safety standards are
designed to facilitate this, and I encourage all Member States to
make use of them.”
Yukiya Amano
Director General
Safety through international standards
IAEA Safety Standards
Criteria for Use in
Preparedness and
Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency
Jointly sponsored by the
FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, WHO
1
for protecting people and the environment
No. GSG-2
General Safety Guide
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P1467_cover.indd 1 2011-05-04 07:35:32
IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish
or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life
and property, and to provide for the application of these standards.
The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in
the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety,
transport safety and waste safety. The publication categories in the series are Safety
Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.
Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme is available at the IAEA
Internet site
http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/
The site provides the texts in English of published and draft safety standards. The
texts of safety standards issued in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, the
IAEA Safety Glossary and a status report for safety standards under development are
also available. For further information, please contact the IAEA at PO Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria.
All users of IAEA safety standards are invited to inform the IAEA of experience
in their use (e.g. as a basis for national regulations, for safety reviews and for training
courses) for the purpose of ensuring that they continue to meet users’ needs.
Information may be provided via the IAEA Internet site or by post, as above, or by
email to Official.Mail@iaea.org.
OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS
The IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of
Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of
information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among
its Member States for this purpose.
Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued as Safety
Reports, which provide practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in
support of the safety standards.
Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Radiological Assessment
Reports, the International Nuclear Safety Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports
and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological accidents, training
manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety related publications. Security
related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
RELATED PUBLI CATI ONS
www.iaea.org/books
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2
STI/PUB/1133 (72 pp.; 2002)
ISBN 92–0–116702–4 Price: €20.50
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS FOR A NUCLEAR OR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1
STI/PUB/1265 (145 pp.; 2007)
ISBN 92–0–109306–3 Price: €31.00
PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO
TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3)
STI/PUB/1119 (125 pp.; 2002)
ISBN 92–0–111602–0 Price: €14.50
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1
STI/PUB/1273 (37 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–110706–4 Price: €25.00
CATEGORIZATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9
STI/PUB/1227 (70 pp.; 2005)
ISBN 92–0–103905–0 Price: €18.00
GOVERNMENTAL, LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
SAFETY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1
STI/PUB/1465 (63 pp.; 2010)
ISBN 978–92–0–106410–3 Price: €45.00
SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 4
STI/PUB/1375 (56 pp.; 2009)
ISBN 978–92–0–112808–9 Price: €48.00
PREDISPOSAL MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5
STI/PUB/1368 (38 pp.; 2009)
ISBN 978–92–0–111508–9 Price: €45.00
THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3
STI/PUB/1252 (39 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–106506–X Price: €25.00
P1467_cover.indd 2 2011-05-04 07:35:33
CRITERIA FOR USE IN
PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE FOR A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCY
The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The
Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
CRITERIA FOR USE IN
PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE FOR A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCY
GENERAL SAFETY GUIDE
JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2011
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. GSG-2
IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Criteria for use in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
emergency : general safety guide / jointly sponsored by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations … [et al.]. — Vienna :
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011.
p. ; 24 cm. — (IAEA safety standards series, ISSN 1020–525X ;
no. GSG-2)
STI/PUB/1467
ISBN 978–92–0–107410–2
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Nuclear facilities — Safety measures. 2. Nuclear accidents. 3. Assistance
in emergencies. 4. Emergency plans. 5. Safety standards. 6. Radiation
dosimetry. I. International Atomic Energy Agency. II. Series.
IAEAL 11–00669
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
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the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised in
1972 (Paris). The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual
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to royalty agreements. Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and
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should be addressed to the IAEA Publishing Section at:
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email: sales.publications@iaea.org
http://www.iaea.org/books
© IAEA, 2011
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
May 2011
STI/PUB/1467
FOREWORD
by Yukiya Amano
Director General
The IAEA’s Statute authorizes the Agency to “establish or adopt…
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and
property” — standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which
States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation
safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the
United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive
set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and
sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA’s assistance in their application.
The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The
emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has
led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety
Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which
represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of
protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety
Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its
standards.
Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The
IAEA’s safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety,
operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe
management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization,
regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist
Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience
and insights to be shared.
Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided
to adopt the IAEA’s standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to
the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a
consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations
under the conventions. The standards are also applied by regulatory bodies and
operators around the world to enhance safety in nuclear power generation and in
nuclear applications in medicine, industry, agriculture and research.
Safety is not an end in itself but a prerequisite for the purpose of the
protection of people in all States and of the environment — now and in the future.
The risks associated with ionizing radiation must be assessed and controlled
without unduly limiting the contribution of nuclear energy to equitable and
sustainable development. Governments, regulatory bodies and operators
everywhere must ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are used
beneficially, safely and ethically. The IAEA safety standards are designed to
facilitate this, and I encourage all Member States to make use of them.
DISCLAIMER
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what
constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from
harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The process of developing, reviewing and
establishing the IAEA standards involves the IAEA Secretariat and all Member
States, many of which are represented on the four IAEA safety standards
committees and the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards.
The IAEA standards, as a key element of the global safety regime, are kept
under regular review by the Secretariat, the safety standards committees and the
Commission on Safety Standards. The Secretariat gathers information on
experience in the application of the IAEA standards and information gained from
the follow-up of events for the purpose of ensuring that the standards continue to
meet users’ needs. The present publication reflects feedback and experience
accumulated until 2010 and it has been subject to the rigorous review process for
standards.
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan caused
by the disastrous earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 and the consequences
of the emergency for people and the environment have to be fully investigated.
They are already under study in Japan, at the IAEA and elsewhere. Lessons to be
learned for nuclear safety and radiation protection and for emergency
preparedness and response will be reflected in IAEA safety standards as they are
revised and issued in the future.
PREFACE
In March 2002, the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved a Safety
Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2), jointly
sponsored by seven international organizations, which establishes the
requirements for an adequate level of preparedness for and response to a nuclear
or radiological emergency in any State. The IAEA General Conference, in
resolution GC(46)/RES/9, encouraged Member States “to implement, if
necessary, instruments for improving their own preparedness and response
capabilities for nuclear and radiological incidents and accidents, including their
arrangements for responding to acts involving the malicious use of nuclear or
radioactive material and to threats of such acts”, and further encouraged them to
“implement the Safety Requirements for Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear
or Radiological Emergency”.
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (‘the Early
Notification Convention’) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (‘the Assistance Convention’)
(IAEA Legal Series No. 14), adopted in 1986, place specific obligations on the
Parties and on the IAEA. Under Article 5a(ii) of the Assistance Convention, one
function of the IAEA is to collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member
States information concerning methodologies, techniques and available results of
research relating to response to such emergencies.
This Safety Guide is intended to assist Member States in the application of
the Safety Requirements publication on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear
or Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2), and to
help in the fulfilment of the IAEA’s obligations under the Assistance Convention.
It provides generic criteria for protective actions and other response actions in the
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency, including numerical values of these
criteria. It also presents operational criteria derived from certain generic criteria.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the
International Labour Office (ILO), the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are joint sponsors of this
Safety Guide.
.
THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
BACKGROUND
Radioactivity is a natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation
are features of the environment. Radiation and radioactive substances have
many beneficial applications, ranging from power generation to uses in
medicine, industry and agriculture. The radiation risks to workers and the
public and to the environment that may arise from these applications have to
be assessed and, if necessary, controlled.
Activities such as the medical uses of radiation, the operation of nuclear
installations, the production, transport and use of radioactive material, and the
management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to standards of
safety.
Regulating safety is a national responsibility. However, radiation risks
may transcend national borders, and international cooperation serves to
promote and enhance safety globally by exchanging experience and by
improving capabilities to control hazards, to prevent accidents, to respond to
emergencies and to mitigate any harmful consequences.
States have an obligation of diligence and duty of care, and are expected
to fulfil their national and international undertakings and obligations.
International safety standards provide support for States in meeting their
obligations under general principles of international law, such as those relating
to environmental protection. International safety standards also promote and
assure confidence in safety and facilitate international commerce and trade.
A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously
improved. IAEA safety standards, which support the implementation of
binding international instruments and national safety infrastructures, are a
cornerstone of this global regime. The IAEA safety standards constitute
a useful tool for contracting parties to assess their performance under these
international conventions.
THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA’s Statute,
which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations
and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection
of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for
their application.
With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish
fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the
radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the
environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of
control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source
or any other source of radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of such
events if they were to occur. The standards apply to facilities and activities that
give rise to radiation risks, including nuclear installations, the use of radiation
and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the
management of radioactive waste.
Safety measures and security measures
1
have in common the aim of
protecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures and
security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner
so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not
compromise security.
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what
constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series, which has three categories (see Fig. 1).
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and
principles of protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety
requirements.
Safety Requirements
An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes the
requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the
environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by
the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements
are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of
safety. The format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the
establishment, in a harmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework.
Requirements, including numbered ‘overarching’ requirements, are expressed
as ‘shall’ statements. Many requirements are not addressed to a specific party,
1
See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
the implication being that the appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling
them.
Safety Guides
Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply
with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is
necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative
measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and
increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high
levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed
as ‘should’ statements.
APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are
regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety
standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations and by many
Part 1. Governmental, Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Safety
Part 2. Leadership and Management
for Safety
Part 3. Radiation Protection and the
Safety of Radiation Sources
Part 4. Safety Assessment for
Facilities and Activities
Part 5. Predisposal Management
of Radioactive Waste
Part 6. Decommissioning and
Termination of Activities
Part 7. Emergency Preparedness
and Response
1. Site Evaluation for
Nuclear Installations
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
2.1. Design and Construction
2.2. Commissioning and Operation
3. Safety of Research Reactors
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facilities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities
6. Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material
General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals
Fundamental Safety Principles
Collection of Safety Guides
FIG. 1. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series.
organizations that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as
organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.
The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the
entire lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for
peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks.
They can be used by States as a reference for their national regulations in
respect of facilities and activities.
The IAEA’s Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in
relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted
operations.
The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA’s safety
review services, and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence
building, including the development of educational curricula and training
courses.
International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the
IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties.
The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international conventions,
industry standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent
basis for protecting people and the environment. There will also be some
special aspects of safety that need to be assessed at the national level. For
example, many of the IAEA safety standards, in particular those addressing
aspects of safety in planning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new
facilities and activities. The requirements established in the IAEA safety
standards might not be fully met at some existing facilities that were built to
earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards are to be applied
to such facilities is a decision for individual States.
The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards
provide an objective basis for decisions concerning safety; however, decision
makers must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to
balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation
risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA
Secretariat and four safety standards committees, for nuclear safety (NUSSC),
radiation safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the
safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on
Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme
(see Fig. 2).
All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards
committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership of
the Commission on Safety Standards is appointed by the Director General and
includes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishing
national standards.
A management system has been established for the processes of planning,
developing, reviewing, revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards.
It articulates the mandate of the IAEA, the vision for the future application of
the safety standards, policies and strategies, and corresponding functions and
responsibilities.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international
Secretariat and
consultants:
drafting of new or revision
of existing safety standard
Draft
Endorsement
by the CSS
Final draft
Review by
safety standards
committee(s)
Member States
Comments
Draft
Outline and work plan
prepared by the Secretariat;
review by the safety standards
committees and the CSS
FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.
expert bodies, notably the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety
standards. Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other
bodies in the United Nations system or other specialized agencies, including
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United
Nations Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization, the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and
the World Health Organization.
INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety
Glossary (see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.htm). Otherwise,
words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest
edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. For Safety Guides, the English
version of the text is the authoritative version.
The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series and its objective, scope and structure are explained in
Section 1, Introduction, of each publication.
Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text
(e.g. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text, is included in
support of statements in the body text, or describes methods of calculation,
procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or
annexes.
An appendix, if included, is considered to form an integral part of the
safety standard. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text,
and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. Annexes and footnotes to the main
text, if included, are used to provide practical examples or additional
information or explanation. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the
main text. Annex material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued
under its authorship; material under other authorship may be presented in
annexes to the safety standards. Extraneous material presented in annexes is
excerpted and adapted as necessary to be generally useful.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background (1.1–1.5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Objective (1.6–1.7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope (1.8–1.15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Structure (1.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS (2.1–2.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE CRITERIA . . . . 5
System of protective actions and other response actions (3.1–3.12) . . . 5
Substantial risk as a basis for operational criteria (3.13–3.17) . . . . . . 12
Projected dose as a basis for operational criteria (3.18–3.25) . . . . . . . 13
Dose that has been received as a basis for operational criteria
(3.26–3.34). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS
(4.1–4.7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. OPERATIONAL CRITERIA (5.1–5.13). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
APPENDIX I: DOSE CONCEPTS AND DOSIMETRIC
QUANTITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
APPENDIX II: EXAMPLES OF DEFAULT OILs FOR DEPOSITION,
INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATION AND
CONTAMINATION OF FOOD, MILK AND WATER. . 29
APPENDIX III: DEVELOPMENT OF EALs AND EXAMPLES
OF EALs FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS . . . . . . . . 53
APPENDIX IV: OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OF
A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1
1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
1.1. Under Article 5a(ii) of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (‘the Assistance Convention’) [1],
one function of the IAEA is to “collect and disseminate to States Parties and
Member States information concerning … methodologies, techniques and available
results of research relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological
emergencies”.
1.2. In March 2002, the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved a Safety
Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency, which establishes the requirements for an adequate
level of preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency in
any State. This was jointly sponsored by seven international organizations and
was issued as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2 [2].
1.3. A rigorous assessment of experience in Member States has shown that there
is a need for additional consistent international guidance on taking protective
actions and other response actions
1
, and for placing this guidance in a context that
is comprehensive for decision makers and that can be explained to the public. In
2005, the IAEA issued a publication, jointly sponsored by the World Health
Organization (WHO) [3], that presents numerical values for generic criteria for
emergency response and provides additional guidance. The criteria are described
and needs for their development on the basis of lessons learned from experience
and related scientific knowledge are explained. The framework proposed in
Ref. [3] was used as the starting point for developing revised international
guidance on emergency preparedness and response.
1.4. Principle 9 of the Fundamental Safety Principles establishes that
arrangements for emergency preparedness and response include “[c]riteria set in
advance for use in determining when to take different protective actions”
(Ref. [4], para. 3.36). The present Safety Guide provides recommendations on
such criteria.
1
Examples of other response actions include the provision of public information,
medical treatment and long term health monitoring.
2
1.5. Safety related terms used in this Safety Guide are to be understood as
defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary [5].
OBJECTIVE
1.6. The primary objectives of this Safety Guide are:
—To present a coherent set of generic criteria (expressed numerically in terms
of radiation dose) that form a basis for developing the operational levels
needed for decision making concerning protective actions and other
response actions necessary to meet the emergency response objectives. The
set of generic criteria:
• Addresses the requirements of Ref. [2] for emergency preparedness and
response;
• Addresses lessons learned from responses to past emergencies;
• Provides an internally consistent foundation for the application of
principles of and insights into radiation protection for the conceivable
range of protective actions and other response actions, and emergency
conditions.
—To propose a basis for a plain language explanation of the criteria for the
public and for public officials that addresses the risks to human health of
radiation exposure and provides a basis for a response that is commensurate
with the risks.
1.7. This Safety Guide should be used in conjunction with Ref. [2], which it
supports. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements of Ref. [2]
by providing generic criteria, and numerical values for these criteria, for
protective actions and other response actions in the event of a nuclear or
radiological emergency. This Safety Guide also presents operational criteria
derived from certain generic criteria and as such represents the revision of
Ref. [6].
SCOPE
1.8. The recommendations presented in this Safety Guide concern the values of
the generic criteria needed to develop operational criteria for implementing
protective actions and other response actions to protect emergency workers and
the public in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
3
1.9. Examples of default operational criteria for implementing protective
actions and other response actions are also provided. The method used for the
development of operational criteria is described only in general terms.
2
1.10. This Safety Guide addresses the criteria for initiating protective actions and
other response actions and criteria to support decision making in an emergency.
1.11. This Safety Guide excludes recommendations for actions that might be
required in an existing exposure situation.
1.12. This Safety Guide does not provide detailed guidance on the arrangements
necessary for developing and maintaining an effective emergency response
capability. Detailed recommendations on developing and maintaining an
effective emergency response capability are provided in Refs [7–9].
1.13. This Safety Guide cannot take into account all factors that are site specific,
local, State specific or specific to a particular type of emergency. Emergency
planners should remain flexible in their use of the guidance and should work with
interested parties to adapt the recommendations so as to take account of local,
social, political, economic, environmental, demographic and other factors.
1.14. Protective actions and other response actions are not based on attributes
relating to radiation protection alone. Decision makers should consider various
social, economic, environmental and psychological factors before making any
final decision on actions to be taken in response to an emergency. However, the
recommendations on generic and operational criteria presented in this Safety
Guide relate solely to that input into the decision making process that is based on
considerations of radiation protection.
1.15. Decision makers in an emergency and the public may have only a limited or
no understanding of the principles of radiation protection, the risks associated
with radiation exposure and the appropriate actions that can be taken to reduce
these risks. This Safety Guide therefore also provides a plain language
explanation of the operational criteria, to assist in the communication of the
purpose of each of the criteria and the associated protective actions and other
response actions.
2
A manual for assessment of field data in a nuclear or radiological emergency is in
preparation.
4
STRUCTURE
1.16. This Safety Guide has five sections. Section 2 provides a discussion of the
basic considerations used in the development of the recommendations. Sections 3
and 4 provide recommendations on emergency response criteria for protective
actions and other response actions for protecting the public and on guidance
values for emergency workers, respectively. Section 5 discusses operational
criteria. The four appendices provide further elaboration on and clarification of
the recommendations provided in the main text.
2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
2.1. Experience has clearly shown that an internationally endorsed, fully
integrated system of guidance is necessary for taking consistent protective actions
and other response actions in an emergency that will best ensure public safety.
This system should build on existing international guidance and experience,
should be based on international consensus and should subsequently be
implemented at the national level. Implementing compatible systems at the
national level in different States will allow the objectives of emergency response
to be met and will contribute towards establishing a harmonized system for
emergency preparedness and response worldwide.
2.2. The framework of generic criteria for emergency response presented in this
Safety Guide was developed on the understanding that it should be simple and
consistent.
2.3. This Safety Guide was developed with due consideration of the relevant
international guidance that provides recommendations for the response to a
nuclear or radiological emergency [2, 6, 10–15].
2.4. The recommendations presented in the Safety Guide address health
consequences due to external exposure and internal exposure of specific target
organs, for which the generic criteria were developed. For the recommendations
on how to meet the requirements of Ref. [2], thresholds for severe deterministic
effects
3
for both external exposure and internal exposure were developed that
could be directly related to the full range of important radionuclides.
3
A deterministic effect is considered to be a severe deterministic effect if it is fatal or
life threatening or if it results in a permanent injury that reduces quality of life [2, 5].
5
2.5. Generic criteria are based on current knowledge of deterministic and
stochastic effects (see Ref. [3] for the basis for the numerical values of the criteria
addressing deterministic and stochastic effects).
3. FRAMEWORK FOR
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CRITERIA
SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS
3.1. The system of protective actions and other response actions in an
emergency (see Table 1) includes numerical values of generic criteria as well as
of the corresponding operational criteria that form the basis for decision making
in an emergency.
TABLE 1. SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE
ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY
Types of possible health
consequences of exposure
Basis for implementation of protective actions
and other response actions
Projected dose Dose received
Severe deterministic effects
a
Implementation of precautionary
urgent protective actions, even
under adverse conditions, to
prevent severe deterministic
effects
Other response actions
b
for
treatment and management
of severe deterministic
effects
Increase in stochastic effects Implementation of urgent
protective actions and initiation
of early protective actions
c
to
reduce the risk of stochastic
effects as far as reasonably
possible
Other response actions
d
for
early detection and
effective management of
stochastic effects
a
Generic criteria are established at levels of dose that are approaching the thresholds for severe
deterministic effects.
b
Such actions include immediate medical examination, consultation and treatment as
indicated, contamination control, decorporation where applicable, registration for long term
health monitoring, and comprehensive psychological counselling.
c
Such actions include relocation and long term restriction of consumption of contaminated
food.
d
Such actions include screening based on individual doses to specific organs, considering the
need for registration for medical follow-up and counselling to allow informed decisions to be
made in individual circumstances.
6
3.2. The following considerations form the basis of this system:
—The following possible outcomes should be considered during the planning
and implementation of protective actions and other response actions in an
emergency:
• Development of severe deterministic effects
4
;
• Increase in stochastic effects;
• Adverse effects on the environment and property;
• Other adverse effects (e.g. psychological effects, social disorder,
economic disruption).
—The following types of exposure should be taken into account in the
planning and implementation of protective actions and other response
actions in an emergency:
• The projected dose that could be prevented or reduced by means of
precautionary urgent protective actions;
• The dose that has been received, the detriment due to which may be
minimized by, for example, medical actions, as required, and may be
addressed by public reassurance or counselling.
—Precautionary urgent protective actions should be implemented before the
event (on the basis of a substantial risk of a release or exposure) under any
circumstances, in order to prevent the development of severe deterministic
effects for very high levels of dose (generic criteria are presented in
Table 2).
—If the risk of stochastic effects is the main concern and the risk of the
development of severe deterministic effects is negligible, urgent and early
protective actions and other response actions, all of which are justified and
optimized, should be implemented to reduce the risk of stochastic effects
(generic criteria are presented in Table 3).
—If the dose exceeds a particular generic criterion identified in Table 2 or 3,
individuals should be provided with appropriate medical attention,
including medical treatment
5
, long term health monitoring and
psychological counselling.
4
See Appendix I.
5
Medical actions should be initiated and performed on the basis of medical symptoms
and observations. However, dosimetric information (e.g. based on radiation survey data, dose
measurements or dose calculations) can provide a valuable input for determining the medical
treatment.
7
—For all levels of dose that may result in an emergency exposure situation, a
plain language explanation of the risks should be provided to decision
makers and the public to allow them to make informed decisions about what
actions they will take.
3.3. Table 1 summarizes, for different types of possible health consequences of
exposure, the basis for implementation of protective actions and other response
actions. A summary of the dose concepts and the dosimetric quantities is
provided in Appendix I.
3.4. The system of generic criteria and operational criteria is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Generic criteria are provided in terms of dose that can be projected or dose that
has already been received. The operational criteria
6
are values of measurable
quantities or observables that include operational intervention levels (OILs),
emergency action levels (EALs), specific observables and other indicators of
conditions on the scene that should be used in decision making during an
6
These operational criteria are used as ‘triggers’ at the early stage of an emergency, and
in some publications the term ‘trigger’ is used.
Operational
intervention
levels
(OILs)
Field and laboratory
measurements
Abnormal facility
conditions
Conditions
on the scene
Emergency
action levels
(EALs)
Observables/
indicators
For issues related to:
Generic criteria
FIG. 1. System of generic criteria and operational criteria.
8
emergency. The operational criteria can be used immediately and directly to
determine the need for appropriate protective actions and other response actions.
3.5. Generic criteria have been established on the basis of generic optimization
in consideration of the range of conditions that prevail in an emergency. Generic
criteria are established for urgent protective actions and early protective actions,
as well as for other response actions that may be required in an emergency.
Urgent protective actions (e.g. evacuation) should be taken promptly (e.g. within
hours) to be effective, because their effectiveness will be reduced by delay [6].
Early protective actions should be implemented within days or weeks to be
effective. They can be long lasting, even after the emergency (e.g. temporary
relocation). In no case should urgent protective actions and early protective
actions based on the generic criteria cause more detriment than they avert. Event
specific conditions may warrant modification of the generic criteria.
3.6. The generic criteria replace the system of generic intervention levels (GILs)
and generic action levels (GALs) that have been described in previous
standards [6, 10]. This use of generic criteria meets the need for a common term
for the system of values that would be used as the basis for the implementation of
protective actions (e.g. evacuation or food replacement) and other response
actions (e.g. medical follow-up).
3.7. A protection strategy, comprising specific protective actions and other
response actions, should be developed. It should include, but should not be
limited to, the following aspects:
—Generic criteria for implementing precautionary urgent protective actions to
prevent severe deterministic effects should be established (see Table 2).
—A reference level should be set, typically an effective dose of between 20
and 100 mSv, expressed in terms of residual dose, which includes dose
contributions via all exposure pathways. The protection strategy should be
optimized to reduce exposures below the reference level.
—On the basis of the outcome of the optimization of the protection strategy,
and by using the reference level, generic criteria for particular protective
actions and other response actions, expressed in terms of projected dose or
dose that has been received, should be developed. If the numerical values of
the generic criteria are expected to be exceeded, those actions, either
individually or in combination, should be implemented. Table 3 provides a
set of generic criteria for use in the protection strategy that are compatible
with reference levels within a range of 20–100 mSv, as well as further
details for specific actions in different time frames. The implementation of
9
protective actions and other response actions, given in Table 3, would
prevent a significant amount of dose.
—Once the protection strategy has been optimized and a set of generic criteria
has been developed, default triggers for initiating the different parts of an
emergency response plan, primarily for the early phase, should be derived
from the generic criteria. Default triggers, such as conditions on the scene,
OILs and EALs, should be expressed in terms of parameters or observable
conditions. Arrangements should be established in advance to revise these
triggers, as appropriate, in an emergency exposure situation, with account
taken of the prevailing conditions as they evolve.
3.8. Table 2 presents generic criteria (expressed in terms of the dose that is
projected or dose that has been received) for taking precautionary urgent
protective actions under any circumstances to prevent severe deterministic
effects.
3.9. Table 3 provides a set of generic criteria expressed in terms of the dose that
has been projected or the dose that has been received. The set of generic criteria
expressed in terms of the projected dose is compatible with reference levels
within a range of 20–100 mSv. Taking protective actions at this level of dose will
allow the occurrence of all deterministic effects to be avoided and the risk of
stochastic effects to be reduced to acceptable levels. If a protective action is
implemented effectively, the majority of the projected dose can be averted. The
concept of averted dose is therefore useful for the assessment of the efficiency of
individual protective actions or their combination. The concept of averted dose
represents an important component of the optimization of emergency response
planning [15]. In the application of generic criteria for individual protective
actions, the process of optimization of emergency response planning should be
applied.
3.10. The generic criterion provided in Table 3 for iodine thyroid blocking is
applied for an urgent protective action: (a) if exposure due to radioactive iodine is
involved, (b) before or shortly after a release of radioactive iodine, and (c) within
only a short period after the intake of radioactive iodine. Less disruptive
protective actions such as sheltering could be implemented for lower doses.
3.11. In the absence of national guidance, the generic criteria presented in
Tables 2 and 3 could be used as a basis for the development of criteria at the
national level. If a reference level different from 20–100 mSv is chosen,
appropriate scaling of the values of the generic criteria in Table 3 should be
carried out, with account taken of the time frame (acute or annual) of the
10
TABLE 2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ACUTE DOSES FOR WHICH
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE
EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID
OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS
Generic criteria
Examples of protective actions
and other response actions
External acute exposure (<10 hours) If the dose is projected:
—Take precautionary urgent protective
actions immediately (even under
difficult conditions) to keep doses below
the generic criteria
—Provide public information and
warnings
—Carry out urgent decontamination
AD
Red marrow
a
1 Gy
AD
Fetus
0.1 Gy
AD
Tissue
b
25 Gy at 0.5 cm
AD
Skin
c
10 Gy to 100 cm
2
Internal exposure from acute intake
(A = 30 days)
d
If the dose has been received:
—Perform immediate medical
examination, consultation and indicated
medical treatment
—Carry out contamination control
—Carry out immediate decorporation
f
(if applicable)
—Carry out registration for long term
health monitoring (medical follow-up)
—Provide comprehensive psychological
counselling
AD(A)
Red marrow
0.2 Gy for radionuclides
with Z > 90
e
2 Gy for radionuclides
with Z s 89
e
AD(A)
Thyroid
2 Gy
AD(A)
Lung
g
30 Gy
AD(A)
Colon
20 Gy
AD(A′)
Fetus
h
0.1 Gy
a
AD
Red marrow
represents the average RBE weighted absorbed dose to internal tissues or organs
(e.g. red marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid) and to the lens of the eye from
exposure in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation.
b
Dose delivered to 100 cm
2
at a depth of 0.5 cm under the body surface in tissue due to close
contact with a radioactive source (e.g. source carried in the hand or pocket).
c
The dose is to the 100 cm
2
dermis (skin structures at a depth of 40 mg/cm
2
(or 0.4 mm) below
the body surface).
d
AD(A) is the RBE weighted absorbed dose delivered over the period of time A by the
intake (I
05
) that will result in a severe deterministic effect in 5% of exposed individuals.
e
Different criteria are used to take account of the significant difference in the radionuclide
specific intake threshold values for the radionuclides in these groups [3].
f
The generic criterion for decorporation is based on the projected dose without decorporation.
Decorporation is the biological processes, facilitated by a chemical or biological agent, by
which incorporated radionuclides are removed from the human body.
g
For the purposes of these generic criteria, ‘lung’ means the alveolar-interstitial region of the
respiratory tract.
h
For this particular case, A′ means the period of in utero development.
11
reference level. In exceptional circumstances, higher values of the generic criteria
may be necessary.
3.12. Examples of when such higher values of generic criteria in exceptional
circumstances may be warranted include cases in which replacement food or
water is not available, cases of extreme weather conditions, natural disasters, the
rapid progression of a situation and cases of malicious acts. Generic criteria used
in such cases should not exceed those presented in Table 3 by a factor of more
than 2–3.
TABLE 3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND
OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY EXPOSURE SITUATIONS
TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
Generic criteria
Examples of protective actions
and other response actions
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take urgent protective actions
and other response actions
H
Thyroid
50 mSv in the first 7 days Iodine thyroid blocking
E 100 mSv in the first 7 days Sheltering; evacuation; decontamination;
restriction of consumption of food, milk and
water; contamination control; public
reassurance
H
Fetus
100 mSv in the first 7 days
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other
response actions early in the response
E 100 mSv per annum Temporary relocation; decontamination;
replacement of food, milk and water; public
reassurance
H
Fetus
100 mSv for the full period
of in utero development
Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take longer
term medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effects
E 100 mSv in a month Screening based on equivalent doses to
specific radiosensitive organs (as a basis
for medical follow-up); counselling
H
Fetus
100 mSv for the full period
of in utero development
Counselling to allow informed decisions to be
made in individual circumstances
Note: H
T
— equivalent dose in an organ or tissue T; E — effective dose.
12
SUBSTANTIAL RISK AS A BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL CRITERIA
3.13. The risk associated with a radioactive release or exposure is considered to
be a ‘substantial risk’ if the release or exposure could result in early deaths or
other severe deterministic effects.
3.14. The term ‘substantial risk’ is the basis for operational criteria for decision
makers to take actions to prevent severe deterministic effects by keeping doses
below those approaching the generic criteria set out in Table 2. These precautionary
urgent protective actions are warranted under any circumstances [2].
3.15. Emergencies can result in early deaths or other severe deterministic effects
unless urgent protective actions are taken. Examples include a nuclear emergency
in a facility in threat category I [2], such as severe core damage at a nuclear power
plant, a criticality accident or a radiological emergency in threat category IV
involving a lost or stolen source, or the malicious use of radioactive material [16].
For such emergencies, observed conditions indicating a substantial risk
associated with a release or exposure that could result in severe deterministic
effects should warrant precautionary urgent protective actions.
3.16. Reference [2] addresses this issue by stating that facilities in threat
categories I, II and III
7
shall have appropriate arrangements in place for promptly
detecting, classifying and responding to emergencies for which precautionary
urgent protective actions should be taken to protect workers and the public from
severe deterministic effects. Generic criteria, based on projected dose, for
precautionary urgent protective actions to prevent severe deterministic effects, as
provided in Table 2, should be used as the dosimetric criteria in defining those
emergencies that have the potential to result in such health effects.
3.17. For emergencies in threat category IV [2] involving dangerous sources
8
,
precautionary urgent protective actions should also be undertaken before or
shortly after the start of a release or exposure. These include transport and other
authorized activities involving dangerous sources such as industrial radiography
7
Threat categories I, II and III represent decreasing levels of threat at facilities and of
the corresponding stringency of requirements for emergency preparedness and response
arrangements. See para. 3.6 and table I of Ref. [2] for more details.
8
A dangerous source is a source that could, if not under control, give rise to exposure
sufficient to cause severe deterministic effects. This categorization is used for determining the
need for emergency response arrangements and is not to be confused with categorization of
sources for other purposes.
13
sources, nuclear powered satellites or radiothermal generators, as well as events
involving possible unauthorized activities. Reference [2] establishes that the
operator of a practice using a dangerous source shall make arrangements to
respond promptly to an emergency involving the source in order to mitigate any
consequences (Ref. [2], para. 4.37). The generic criteria in Table 2 are used as the
dosimetric criteria in defining those sources that are considered dangerous [8,
17]. In addition, local officials should develop predetermined criteria for
initiating precautionary urgent protective actions upon identifying a situation that
could result in severe deterministic effects if no action were taken [18].
PROJECTED DOSE AS A BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL CRITERIA
3.18. The projected dose is the basis for operational criteria for decision makers
to take actions that meet the following three objectives [2]:
—To prevent severe deterministic effects by keeping the dose below levels
approaching the generic criteria in Table 2 at which urgent protective
actions are warranted under any circumstances;
—To take effective protective actions and other response actions to reasonably
reduce the risk of stochastic effects by keeping the dose below levels
approaching the generic criteria in Table 3;
—To ensure the safety of emergency workers in the tasks being undertaken
through the use of the guidance values in Table 4.
3.19. Urgent protective actions should always be introduced to avoid doses
approaching levels at which, if received, severe deterministic effects could occur.
It should be recognized that the doses received before implementation of the
protective action could contribute to the induction of deterministic effects.
3.20. When assessing projected doses, the dose distribution should be considered
together with the uncertainty in the dose distribution in the population under
consideration. When exposure is being assessed for members of the public, the
possibility of the presence of children and pregnant women should be considered.
3.21. The generic criteria in Table 2 are given separately for intake of radioactive
material and for external exposure. For external exposure, the threshold for the
development of deterministic effects depends on the dose, the dose rate and the
relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of the radiation. For internal exposure, the
threshold depends on many factors, such as intake activity, half-life, route of
intake, the radionuclide emitted and the metabolism of the radionuclide. In order
14
to take all of these factors into account, the threshold for the development of
specific deterministic effects following intake is best established in terms of
intake activity [3]. However, the thresholds in terms of intake range over six
orders of magnitude [3]. Establishing threshold values in terms of the 30 day
committed RBE weighted dose relative to the intake thresholds leads to a
decrease in the range of threshold values from six orders of magnitude (for the
intake) down to a factor of three (for the dose). Therefore, in the case of
inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material, a value of the 30 day committed
RBE weighted absorbed dose is used to specify the threshold for the possible
onset of severe deterministic effects in the organ concerned.
3.22. The RBE weighted averaged absorbed dose in an organ or tissue (RBE
weighted absorbed dose) is defined as the product of the averaged absorbed dose
in an organ or tissue and the RBE. The unit used to express the RBE weighted
absorbed dose is the gray (Gy). For details see Appendix I.
3.23. In the case of combined internal and external exposure, the sum of the RBE
weighted absorbed doses for intake of radioactive material and for external
exposure may be used as a basis for calculation of OILs for decision making
purposes, as discussed in detail in para. II.5 of appendix II of Ref. [3].
3.24. The generic criteria in Table 2 should be used to derive OILs for taking
precautionary urgent protective actions and other response actions to prevent
severe deterministic effects. For the purpose of taking actions to reduce the risk of
stochastic effects, the principles of both justification and optimization require
consideration of the benefit that would be achieved by the protective actions and
other response actions and of the harm, in its broadest sense, that would result
from them. Actions to prevent doses approaching those in Table 2 are always
justified.
3.25. Table 3 provides the generic criteria that should be used to derive OILs for
taking urgent and early protective actions and other response actions. The
protection provided by applying these generic criteria has been optimized on a
generic basis for the general population, assuming that other hazardous
conditions do not prevail at the time the actions are implemented. The proposed
values do not need to be adjusted to take account of any particular members of the
population (e.g. children or pregnant women) because protective action taken to
avert these doses will satisfy the basic principle for the whole population.
15
DOSE THAT HAS BEEN RECEIVED AS A BASIS FOR
OPERATIONAL CRITERIA
3.26. In describing the dose that has been received, there is a need to distinguish
between the planning stage and an actual situation. In the planning stage, the
hypothetical dose that will be received falls under the definition of residual dose
(the dose expected to be incurred in the future after protective actions have been
terminated or a decision has been taken not to implement protective actions). In
an actual situation, the dose that has been received is the actual dose received via
all exposure pathways.
3.27. The dose that has been received is the basis for operational criteria to
support the following actions:
—To provide medical care, as required, when the dose received exceeds the
levels in Table 2 (see footnote 3 on page 4);
—To consider the need for medical follow-up for early detection and effective
treatment of radiation induced cancers if the dose received exceeds the
levels in Table 3;
—To provide counselling to those exposed, including pregnant women, so
that they can make informed decisions concerning the further course of
their treatment if the dose received exceeds the levels in Tables 2 and 3;
—To provide a basis for reassuring those who were not exposed above the
levels specified in Tables 2 and 3 that there is no need for concern.
3.28. The dose that has been received supports decisions for urgent and longer
term medical actions. Examples of urgent actions are medical triage on the scene
of an emergency and specialized treatment in hospital shortly after an emergency.
These actions are initiated and performed on the basis of medical symptoms and
observations. However, in the performance of medical triage on the scene,
observables (e.g. radiation signs and placards) and radiation survey data should
be taken into account when they become available. Decisions on the
implementation of medical actions in the hospital (e.g. the extent of exposed
tissue to be excised during surgical treatment for local radiation injury and the
efficiency of decorporation for internal contamination) are strongly supported by
the dosimetric information. Long term health monitoring of exposed persons
starts early during the response and continues for an extended period of time.
3.29. Medical records made during an emergency (especially on the site) should
be focused on clinical symptoms and other observed facts, without including
assumptions of causal association with radiation exposure. Such assumptions
16
might lead to anxiety and unjustified medical examination. Determining the
cause of the symptoms requires analysis by experts.
3.30. There are different reasons to perform long term health monitoring of the
persons affected, such as to provide advanced medical care, to reduce their
concern with regard to their health status and to advance scientific knowledge.
The reason for follow-up studies should be carefully explained to those involved.
3.31. Long term medical follow-up is justified to detect and treat late
deterministic effects and their complications as well as radiation induced cancers.
Long term health monitoring should be justified on the basis of one of the
following levels of exposure:
—Long term health monitoring is always justified at levels of dose above the
thresholds for deterministic effects [3].
—Justification of long term health monitoring at levels of dose below the
thresholds for deterministic effects requires proper identification of
populations at higher risk of developing radiation induced cancers. Medical
follow-up should always result in more benefit than harm in terms of public
health. One reason for establishing a registry and providing medical follow-
up is for the early detection of disease. This is on the basis of the
assumption that earlier diagnosis of cancer will result in more efficient
treatment and thus in reduced morbidity and mortality. The level of
exposure of radiosensitive organs expressed in equivalent dose and the
possibility of detecting cancer among the exposed population should be
taken into account when establishing the registry.
3.32. Current epidemiological data show that radiation induced cancers (the
excess number of cancer cases above background cancer cases) could be
statistically detected in large populations exposed at doses above 0.1 Sv delivered
at high dose rates. These data are based on epidemiological studies of well
defined populations (e.g. the survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan and
patients undergoing radiological medical procedures). Epidemiological studies
have not demonstrated such effects in individuals exposed at low doses (less than
0.1 Sv) delivered over a period of many years [19]. The inclusion in long term
health monitoring programmes of persons who have received very low doses may
cause unnecessary anxiety. Moreover, it is not cost effective in terms of public
health care.
3.33. Assessment of long term follow-up after the Chernobyl accident in 1986
revealed that medical follow-up of persons receiving doses below 1 Gy may not
17
be justified, except in the case of absorbed doses to the thyroid. As cited in the
WHO Report on Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health
Care Programmes [20], cancer screening tests for asymptomatic persons have not
been beneficial in terms of improving either survival or quality of life, except
screening for breast cancer and cervical cancer through mammography and Pap
9
tests, respectively. Thyroid cancer screening following emergencies involving the
release of radioactive isotopes of iodine has proved very effective for earlier
diagnosis and treatment of children exposed following the Chernobyl accident.
3.34. Exposed persons should be provided with adequate information about the
long term risk due to their radiation exposure, including assurance of no further
actions being required.
4. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS
4.1. An emergency worker is a person having specified duties as a worker in
response to an emergency, who might be exposed while taking actions in
response to the emergency. Emergency workers may include those employed by
registrants and licensees as well as personnel from response organizations, such
as police officers, firefighters, medical personnel, and drivers and crews of
evacuation vehicles.
4.2. Reference [2], para. 4.60, states that
“National guidance that is in accordance with international
standards…shall be adopted for managing, controlling and recording the
doses received by emergency workers. This guidance shall include default
operational levels of dose for emergency workers for different types of
response activities, which are set in quantities that can be directly
monitored during the performance of these activities (such as the integrated
dose from external penetrating radiation). In setting the default operational
levels of dose for emergency workers the contribution to doses via all
exposure pathways shall be taken into account.”
9
The Papanicolaou test.
18
4.3. Table 4 recommends guidance values to be used for the protection of
emergency workers responding to an emergency.
4.4. Life saving actions resulting in doses that approach or exceed the threshold
for severe deterministic effects should be considered only if (a) the expected
benefit to others would clearly outweigh the emergency worker’s own risk and
(b) the emergency worker volunteers to take the action, and understands and
accepts this risk.
4.5. Emergency workers who undertake actions in which the doses received
might exceed 50 mSv do so voluntarily and should have been clearly and
comprehensively informed in advance of the associated health risks, as well as of
available protective measures, and should be trained, to the extent possible, in the
actions that they may be required to take. The voluntary basis for response actions
by emergency workers is usually covered in the emergency response
arrangements.
4.6. Emergency workers should receive medical attention appropriate for the
dose they may have received (actions according to Tables 2 and 3). The doses
received and information concerning the consequent health risks should be
communicated to the workers. Female workers who are aware that they are
pregnant should be encouraged to notify the appropriate authority and would
typically be excluded from emergency duties.
4.7. In almost all emergencies, at best only the dose from external penetrating
radiation will be measured continuously. Consequently, the operational guidance
provided to emergency workers should be based on measurements of penetrating
radiation (e.g. as displayed on an active or self-reading dosimeter). The dose from
intake or skin contamination should be limited by means of the use of protective
equipment, the use of stable iodine prophylaxis and the provision of instructions
concerning operations in potentially hazardous radiological conditions
10
.
Available information about radiation conditions on the site should be used in
aiding decisions on the appropriate protection of emergency workers.
10
Instructions will cover the application of time, distance and shielding principles, the
prevention of ingestion of radioactive material and the use of respiratory protection.
19
5. OPERATIONAL CRITERIA
5.1. Projected dose and dose that has been received are not measurable
quantities and cannot be used as a basis for quick actions in an emergency. There
is a need to establish — in advance — operational criteria (values of measurable
default quantities or observables) as a surrogate for the generic criteria for
undertaking different protective actions and other response actions. Precautionary
urgent protective actions and, as applicable, urgent protective actions should be
taken on the basis of precalculated default operational criteria. The majority of
urgent protective actions and early protective actions are also implemented on the
basis of precalculated default operational criteria. However, if the characteristics
of an emergency differ from those assumed in the calculations of default
operational criteria, the criteria should be recalculated. Methods for the
recalculation to address prevailing conditions in an actual emergency should be
established during the planning phase.
TABLE 4. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF
EMERGENCY WORKERS
Tasks Guidance value
a
Life saving actions H
P
(10)
b
<500 mSv
This value may be exceeded under
circumstances in which the expected benefits
to others clearly outweigh the emergency
worker’s own health risks, and the emergency
worker volunteers to take the action and
understands and accepts this health risk
Actions to prevent severe deterministic
effects and actions to prevent the
development of catastrophic conditions that
could significantly affect people and the
environment
H
P
(10) <500 mSv
Actions to avert a large collective dose H
P
(10) <100 mSv
a
These values apply only for the dose from exposure to external penetrating radiation. Doses
from exposure to non-penetrating external radiation and from intake or skin contamination
need to be prevented by all possible means. If this is not feasible, the effective dose and the
equivalent dose to an organ that are received have to be limited to minimize the health risk to
the individual in line with the risk associated with the guidance values given here.
b
H
P
(10) is the personal dose equivalent H
P
(d) where d = 10 mm.
20
5.2. The operational criteria
11
are the EALs, OILs, observables and indicators of
conditions on the scene.
5.3. The EALs are the specific, predetermined, observable operational criteria
used to detect, recognize and determine the emergency class of an event at
facilities in threat categories I, II and III [2]. The EALs are used for classification
and for decisions on the implementation of precautionary urgent protective
actions corresponding to the emergency class. These criteria should be predefined
as stated in Ref. [2] and implemented as described in Refs [7, 8]. Appendix III
provides a discussion of the EAL development process and gives examples of
EALs for the classification of emergencies at a light water reactor nuclear power
plant.
5.4. For emergencies in threat category IV [2], the operational criteria for
implementing urgent protective actions should be predetermined on the basis of
information that will be observable on the scene. Usually observations that
indicate a radiation hazard will be made by first responders or operators on the
scene (e.g. upon seeing a placard on a vehicle that has been involved in an
accident). References [7, 8, 18] provide guidance on the approximate radius of
the inner cordoned area in which urgent protective actions would initially be
taken on the basis of information observable by responders upon their arrival on
the scene. The size of the cordoned area may be expanded on the basis of dose
rate OILs and other environmental measurement OILs (see Appendix II) when
these data become available. Reference [18] provides a list of observables that
can be used by responders to identify a dangerous source, together with the
actions to be taken to protect responders and the public. Reference [17] provides
guidance on the activity of a radionuclide that, if not controlled, should be
considered to constitute a dangerous source.
5.5. The OIL is a calculated quantity that corresponds to one of the generic
criteria. The OILs are used with the other operational criteria (EALs and
observables) to determine appropriate protective actions and other response
actions. If the OILs are exceeded, the appropriate protective action should be
promptly invoked. The OILs are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or
activity of radioactive material released, time integrated air concentrations,
ground or surface concentrations, or activity concentration of radionuclides in the
environment, in food, in water or in biological samples. OILs can be measured by
11
These operational criteria are used as triggers at the early stage of an emergency; in
some publications the term ‘trigger’ is used.
21
means of instruments in the field or can be determined by means of laboratory
analysis or assessment.
5.6. Reference [2], in para. 4.71, states that “arrangements shall be made for
promptly assessing the results of environmental monitoring and monitoring for
contamination on people in order to decide on or to adapt urgent protective
actions to protect workers and the public, including the application of operational
intervention levels (OILs) with arrangements to revise the OILs as appropriate to
take into account the conditions prevailing during the emergency.” In addition,
para. 4.89 of Ref. [2] states that default OILs shall be established together with
the means to revise the OILs for “environmental measurements (such as dose
rates due to deposition and deposition densities) and food concentrations; the means
to revise the OILs; timely monitoring...for ground contamination in the field; the
sampling and analysis of food and water; and the means to enforce agricultural
countermeasures.”
5.7. Every effort should be made to keep the system simple by keeping the
number of OILs to a minimum. In principle, the default OILs should be a
minimum set for each operational quantity (e.g. dose rate due to skin
contamination) that, with due consideration of the uncertainties, reasonably
encompasses the protective action (e.g. urgent decontamination), applicable
generic criteria and associated assumptions (e.g. the type of emergency or the
characteristics of the radiological hazard).
5.8. It is possible that, during an emergency, individuals might receive doses
that give rise to a high risk of incurring radiation induced cancers. Although it is
unlikely, there might be a detectable increase in the incidence of cancers among
the population group that has been exposed, owing to radiation induced cases of
cancer. Emergencies have occurred for which no criteria for long term health
monitoring and treatment had been pre-established. Criteria that have been
established after emergencies have occurred have often been set at too low a level
of dose received or have not been set on the basis of radiation dose criteria at all.
This has led to the designation of groups for follow-up for which it would have
been impossible, because of the inherent limitations of epidemiological studies,
to detect any increase in the incidence of cancers, owing to the relatively small
number of cases of radiation induced cancer to be expected. Default operational
criteria are therefore needed for determining whether a person should be
considered for long term health monitoring and treatment.
22
5.9. Reference [2] states a requirement for guidelines relating to the diagnosis
and treatment of radiation injuries. These guidelines should include operational
criteria used in the dosimetric support of medical management of the patient [21].
5.10. The dosimetric models for developing the OILs should be established
during the planning phase. These models should include a full set of parameters
important for the purposes of decision making for dose assessment. For internal
dose assessment and the development of corresponding OILs, the application of
computer codes is necessary.
5.11. The dosimetric models and data should provide reliable assurance that all
members of the public, including those that are most sensitive to radiation (e.g.
pregnant women), are considered. In the development of the default operational
criteria, the public needs to be assured that all groups (e.g. children playing
outdoors) have been considered. Consequently, the OILs must be accompanied
by a plain language explanation of the situation to which they apply (see
Appendix II), the way in which they address a safety or health concern, and what
their application means in terms of the risk to individuals.
5.12. These default OILs should be developed on the basis of assumptions
regarding the emergency, the affected population and the prevailing conditions;
these assumptions, however, may not accurately reflect the emergency in
question. Consequently, Ref. [2] requires that means be established to revise the
default OILs to take into account prevailing emergency conditions. However,
revising the OILs during an emergency may be disruptive, and they should
therefore only be revised if the situation is well understood and there are
compelling reasons to do so. The public should be informed of the reasons for any
change in the OILs applied in an actual emergency.
5.13. Appendix II provides selected examples of default OILs for deposition,
levels of individual contamination, and contamination levels for food, milk and
water, together with a plain language explanation of the OILs.
23
Appendix I
DOSE CONCEPTS AND DOSIMETRIC QUANTITIES
I.1. There are different dose concepts that are relevant to preparedness for and
response to an emergency: projected dose, residual dose and averted dose [5].
I.2. The dosimetric quantities of effective dose, equivalent dose and RBE
weighted absorbed dose are used in evaluating radiation induced consequences of
a nuclear or radiological emergency. They are listed in Table 5 and illustrated in
Fig. 2, and are discussed in the following.
I.3. The RBE weighted averaged absorbed dose in an organ or tissue (RBE
weighted absorbed dose, AD
T
) is defined as the product of averaged absorbed
dose (D
R,T
) of radiation (R) in an organ or tissue (T) and the relative biological
effectiveness (RBE
R,T
):
(1)
TABLE 5. DOSIMETRIC QUANTITIES USED IN EMERGENCY
EXPOSURE SITUATIONS
Dosimetric quantity Symbol Purpose
Radiation protection quantities
RBE weighted
absorbed dose
AD
T
For evaluating deterministic effects induced as a result
of exposure of an organ or tissue
Equivalent dose H
T
For evaluating stochastic effects induced as a result of
exposure of an organ or tissue
Effective dose E For evaluating detriment related to the occurrence of
stochastic effects in an exposed population
Operational quantities
Personal dose
equivalent
H
P
(d) For monitoring external exposure of an individual
Ambient dose
equivalent
H*(d) For monitoring a radiation field at the site of an
emergency
AD D RBE
R,T R,T R,T
R
= ¥
Â
24
I.4. The value of RBE should be selected with account taken of the type of
radiation, the dose and the health effects of concern, as shown in Table 6.
I.5. The International System of Units (SI) unit used to express the RBE
weighted absorbed dose is J·kg
–1
, which is called the gray (Gy) [14, 22, 23].

Absorbed dose
D (Gy)
at surface of
body
Quality
factors
Q
Personal dose
equivalent
a
H
P
(d) (Sv)
For issues
related to:
Individual
monitoring
Area
monitoring
Radiation
protection
Stochastic
effects
Deterministic
effects
Quality
factors
Q
Absorbed dose
D (Gy)
at a point
Ambient dose
equivalent
b
H*(d) (Sv)
Effective dose
E (Sv)
Tissue
weighting
factors
w
T
Radiation
weighting
factors
w
R
Fluence of
penetrating
radiation
(cm
–2
)
Activity
A (Bq)
inside body
Activity on the
body
(Bq/cm
2
)
Average
absorbed dose
D
R,T
(Gy)
of radiation
R to tissue or
organ T
Equivalent
dose
H
T
(Sv)
to tissue or
organ T
Notes:
a
At a depth of d mm in the ICRU slab phantom
b
At a depth of 10 mm in the ICRU spherical phantom
Relative
biological
effectiveness
RBE
RBE
weighted
absorbed dose
AD
T
(Gy)
to tissue or
organ T
FIG. 2. Dosimetric quantities and their application in emergency exposure situations.
25
TABLE 6. TISSUE SPECIFIC AND RADIATION SPECIFIC VALUES OF
RBE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED SEVERE
DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS [3, 17]
Health effect Critical organ Exposure
a
RBE
T,R
Haematopoietic syndrome Red bone
marrow
External and internal ¸ 1
External and internal n
3
Internal |
1
Internal o
2
Pneumonitis Lung
b
External and internal ¸ 1
External and internal n
3
Internal |
1
Internal o
7
Gastrointestinal syndrome Colon External and internal ¸ 1
External and internal n
3
Internal |
1
Internal o
0
c
Necrosis Soft tissue
d
External |, ¸ 1
External n
3
Moist desquamation Skin
e
External |, ¸ 1
External n
3
Hypothyroidism Thyroid Intake of iodine isotopes
f
0.2
Other thyroid seekers
1
a
External |, ¸ exposure includes exposure due to bremsstrahlung produced within the material
of the source.
b
Tissue of the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract.
c
For alpha emitters uniformly distributed in the contents of the colon, it is assumed that
irradiation of the walls of the intestine is negligible.
d
Tissue at a depth of 5 mm below the skin surface over an area of more than 100 cm
2
.
e
Tissue at a depth of 0.5 mm below the skin surface over an area of more than 100 cm
2
.
f
Uniform irradiation of the tissue of the thyroid gland is considered to be five times more likely
to produce deterministic effects than internal exposure due to low energy beta emitting
isotopes of iodine, such as
131
I,
129
I,
125
I,
124
I and
123
I. Thyroid seeking radionuclides have a
heterogeneous distribution in thyroid tissue. The isotope
131
I emits low energy beta particles,
which leads to a reduced effectiveness of irradiation of critical thyroid tissue owing to the
dissipation of the energy of the particles within other tissues.
26
I.6. The weighted averaged absorbed dose (equivalent dose, H
T
) is defined as
the product of the averaged absorbed dose in the organ or tissue (D) and the
radiation weighting factor w
R
[11, 24]:
(2)
I.7. The weighted averaged absorbed dose (equivalent dose, H
T
) is expressed in
sieverts (Sv) [22, 24]. It is an organ specific quantity that may be used for
assessment of the risk of incurring any radiation induced cancer in an organ.
I.8. The effective dose is widely used in justifying and optimizing protective
actions

[10]
.
Its unit is the sievert (Sv) [22]. The total effective dose (E) includes
the doses due to external penetrating radiation and due to intake:
(3)
I.9. The quantities used for radiation monitoring are:
—Ambient dose equivalent (H*(d)); that is, the dose equivalent that would be
produced by the corresponding aligned and expanded field in the
International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU)
sphere at a depth d on the radius opposing the direction of the aligned field;
—Personal dose equivalent (H
P
(d)); that is, the dose equivalent in soft tissue
below a specified point on the body at an appropriate depth d.
The SI unit for these quantities is J·kg
–1
, and they are expressed in Sv.
I.10. Ambient dose equivalent and personal dose equivalent are the operational
quantities based on the quantity of dose equivalent. The dose equivalent is the
product of the absorbed dose at a point in the tissue or organ and the appropriate
quality factor (Q
R
) for the type of radiation giving rise to the dose [25]:
(4)
H D w
T R,T R
R
= ¥
Â
E H w = ¥
 T T
T
H D Q = ¥
 R R
R
27
TABLE 7. CRITICAL RADIATION INDUCED HEALTH EFFECTS IN A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY [3]
Health effect Target organ or entity
Deterministic effects
Fatal
Haematopoietic syndrome Red marrow
a
Gastrointestinal syndrome Small intestine for external exposure
a
Colon for internal exposure
b
Pneumonitis Lung
a,c
Death of embryo/fetus Embryo/fetus in all periods of gestation
Non-fatal
Moist desquamation Skin
d
Necrosis Soft tissue
e
Cataract Lens of the eye
a,f
Acute radiation thyroiditis Thyroid
a
Hypothyroidism Thyroid
a
Permanently suppressed ovulation Ovaries
a
Permanently suppressed sperm count Testes
a
Severe mental retardation Embryo/fetus 8–25 weeks of gestation
Verifiable reduction in intelligence
quotient (IQ)
Embryo/fetus 8–25 weeks of gestation
Malformation Embryo/fetus 3–25 weeks of gestation [26]
Growth retardation Embryo/fetus 3–25 weeks of gestation [26]
Stochastic effects
Thyroid cancer Thyroid
All stochastic effects All organs taken into account in definition
of effective dose
a
External exposure to the red bone marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid and lens of the
eye as irradiation in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation is addressed by AD
Red marrow
.
b
Different targets for gastrointestinal syndrome are proposed because of the difference in the
dose formation in the small intestine and colon in the case of internal exposure. This is due to
differences in the kinetics of ingested material in the gastrointestinal tract, which lead to much
higher doses in the colon than in the small intestine after intake.
c
For the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory system.
d
Skin structures at a depth of 50 mg/cm
2
(or 0.5 mm) below the surface and over an area of
100 cm
2
.
e
To a depth of 5 mm in tissue.
f
Lens structures at a depth of 300 mg/cm
2
(or 3 mm) below the surface.
28
I.11. Table 7 presents a list of radiation induced health effects that would be
critical during an emergency. Experience and research indicate that evaluation of
the dose to the target organs as presented in the table should provide a basis for
selecting operational criteria for making decisions that will address the full range
of possible health effects.
29
Appendix II
EXAMPLES OF DEFAULT OILs FOR DEPOSITION,
INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATION AND CONTAMINATION OF
FOOD, MILK AND WATER
GENERAL
II.1. In this appendix, examples of default OILs are provided for use in
responding to an emergency that results in contamination, together with a plain
language explanation of these OILs and guidance on the use of the OILs (see
Tables 8–10). The following example default OILs are provided
12,13
:
(1) OIL1 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for:
—Urgent protective actions (e.g. evacuation) to keep the dose to any
person living in a contaminated area below the generic criteria for urgent
protective actions provided in Table 3;
—Medical actions, as required, because the dose received by evacuees may
be above the generic criteria for medical actions provided in Table 3.
(2) OIL2 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for early
protective actions to keep the dose for one year to any person living in the
area below the generic criteria for taking actions to reasonably reduce the
risk of stochastic effects provided in Table 3.
12
OILs for rates or air concentrations in a plume resulting from an ongoing release are
not provided because the example criteria are intended to be very general and practical. OILs
for air doses or air concentrations from a plume are not included because: (a) in many cases the
significant release will be over by the time results of environmental measurements are
available; (b) it is difficult to take and analyse air concentrations in a sample in a timely
manner; (c) there is a great variation in time and location of the plume concentrations at any
location during a release; and (d) OILs of these types are highly dependent on the nature of the
release, which makes it very difficult to develop OILs that apply to the full range of possible
releases. During the period of significant release, therefore, protective actions (e.g. evacuation
or sheltering, to a predetermined distance) are best taken on the basis of observable criteria.
Operating organizations of facilities at which there could be emergencies that result in airborne
releases of long duration should develop EALs and possibly facility specific OILs for
measurements taken in a plume, for possible airborne releases from the facilities. Examples of
OILs for dose rates in a release from a light water reactor resulting from core melt are provided
in Ref. [27].
13
OILs for air concentrations arising from resuspension are not provided because doses
arising from resuspension have been considered in the deposition OILs.
30
(3) OIL3 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for immediate
restrictions on the consumption of leaf vegetables, milk from animals
grazing in the area and rainwater collected for drinking to keep the dose to
any person below the generic criteria for taking the urgent protective
actions provided in Table 3.
(4) OIL4 is a measured value of skin contamination calling for performing
decontamination or providing instructions for self-decontamination and for
limiting inadvertent ingestion so as:
—To keep the dose due to skin contamination to any person below the
generic criteria for taking urgent protective action provided in Table 3;
—To initiate medical treatment or screening, as required, because the dose
received by any person may exceed the generic criteria for medical
actions provided in Table 3.
(5) OIL5 and OIL6 are measured values of concentrations in food, milk or
water that warrant the consideration of restrictions on consumption so as to
keep the effective dose to any person below 10 mSv per annum.
II.2. For the purposes of describing the use of the OILs, nuclear or radiological
emergencies resulting in contamination can be thought of as being of three types:
(1) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a large
area (hundreds of square kilometres) with the possible involvement of a
large number of people; that is, contamination of an area so large that, in
order to be effective, implementation of urgent protective actions and early
protective actions should be performed in two phases: first, urgent
protective actions (e.g. evacuation) are taken, followed by early protective
actions (e.g. relocation). An emergency of this type could occur at nuclear
facilities such as nuclear power plants that are in threat category I or II [2].
(2) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a
moderate area (tens of square kilometres) with the possible involvement of
a large number of people; that is, contamination of an area small enough
that urgent protective actions and early protective actions can be effectively
performed at the same time without the need for a phased response. An
emergency of this type could be the result of the explosion of a radiological
dispersal device or could be caused by a damaged dangerous radioactive
source [28].
(3) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of small
areas and/or with the possible involvement of a small number of people;
that is, contamination of small areas that can easily and quickly be isolated,
with the involvement of a small number of people who can all be
decontaminated and medically assessed by using available resources,
31
without causing any major disruptions. This type of emergency includes
those confined to a single room or a single spill. For this type of emergency,
the response involves isolating the potentially contaminated area and
decontaminating all those involved without necessarily using the OILs.
RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
THAT RESULTS IN CONTAMINATION OF A LARGE AREA
II.3. The process of assessing and responding to an emergency of this type
through the implementation of protective actions is shown in Fig. 3. First
protective actions should be taken on the basis of conditions observed on the
scene [7, 18] or on the basis of an emergency classification (see Appendix III, and
appendix IV of Ref. [7]) before data from radiological monitoring become
available.
II.4. Within hours, areas where ground deposition levels exceed or are likely to
exceed OIL1, the default OIL, should be identified and the appropriate urgent
protective actions should be taken, such as evacuation, stopping the consumption
of local produce, and medical evaluation of evacuees.
II.5. Within hours, actions should also be taken to reduce the consequences of
contamination for those people who were in the area where OIL1 was exceeded.
If OIL4 is exceeded, the evacuees should be monitored and decontaminated (if
these actions can be carried out promptly). If monitoring and decontamination are
not immediately possible, the evacuees should be released and instructed to take
actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and to shower and change their clothing
as soon as possible. OIL4 levels may be very difficult to detect under emergency
conditions. Therefore, any person who may have been contaminated, including
those who were monitored and had contamination levels below OIL4, should take
actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and should shower and change their
clothing as soon as possible. The dose to evacuees should also be evaluated and
the medical actions called for in Tables 2 and 3 should be taken, as appropriate.
II.6. Within a day, the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default
OIL2 should be identified and early protective actions should be taken, such as
stopping the consumption of locally produced vegetables and milk and
commencing the process of implementing temporary relocation. Relocation
should be accomplished within a week.
32
Take action based on
observations and
classification before
monitoring
Take OIL1
urgent response
actions
Yes
OIL1
exceeded
Immediate
decontamination
possible
Monitor and
decontaminate
evacuees using
OIL4
Release evacuees with
instruction to control ingestion
and to decontaminate
when possible
Take OIL2
early response
actions
OIL2
exceeded
Take OIL3
food, milk
and water
response actions
OIL3
exceeded
Sample food, milk and
water far beyond
where OIL3
is exceeded
OIL5 and 6
exceeded
Take OIL6
food and milk
response actions
Take longer term action
based on criteria developed
with stakeholders after
assessment of conditions
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
FIG. 3. Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in
contamination of a large area.
33
II.7. Within days, the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default
OIL3 should be identified and actions should be taken to stop consumption of
locally produced vegetables and milk, and of rainwater collected for drinking,
until they have been screened and analysed. Within a week, food, milk and water
should be screened and analysed, possibly out to a distance of more than 100 km,
and actions should be taken to restrict consumption of food, milk and water with
concentrations of radionuclides in excess of OIL5 and OIL6.
II.8. Within days, the mixture of the radionuclides over the affected area should
be determined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised, if
warranted.
II.9. Any recommendation to the public to take any protective actions should be
accompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria.
II.10. After the emergency is over, further actions should be taken on the basis of
criteria developed after careful assessment of conditions and in consultation with
interested parties.
RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION OF A MODERATE AREA
II.11. The process of assessing and responding to a nuclear or radiological
emergency resulting in contamination of a moderate area through the
implementation of protective actions is shown in Fig. 4. First protective actions
are taken on the basis of conditions observed on the scene [7, 18] or on the basis
of an emergency classification (see Appendix III, and appendix IV of Ref. [7])
before data from radiological monitoring become available.
II.12. Within hours, areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL2
should be identified, and the appropriate urgent protective actions and early
protective actions should be taken where OIL2 is exceeded. The dose to evacuees
should also be evaluated and the medical actions called for in Tables 2 and 3
should be taken.
II.13. Evacuees should be monitored and if OIL4 is exceeded, evacuees should
be decontaminated, if this can be done promptly. If monitoring and/or
decontamination are not immediately possible, the evacuees should be released
34
and should be instructed to take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and to
shower and change their clothing as soon as possible. OIL4 levels may be very
difficult to detect under emergency conditions. Any person who may have been
contaminated, including those who were monitored and had contamination levels
below OIL4, should therefore take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and
should shower and change their clothing as soon as possible.
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Take action based on
observations and
classification before
monitoring
OIL2
exceeded*
Take
OIL1 urgent
and OIL2 early
response actions
Immediate
decontamination
possible
Monitor and
decontaminate
evacuees using
OIL4
Release evacuees with
instruction to control ingestion
and to decontaminate
when possible
OIL3
exceeded
Take OIL3
food, milk and
water response
actions
Sample food, milk and
water far beyond
where OIL3
is exceeded
OIL5 and 6
exceeded
Take OIL6
food and milk
response actions
Take longer term action
based on criteria developed
with stakeholders after
assessment of conditions
Legend
May not be needed
* For this type of emergency, OIL1 urgent and
OIL2 early protective actions are taken at the
same time where OIL2 is exceeded
FIG. 4. Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination
of a moderate area.
35
II.14. Within days, areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL3
should be identified and actions should be taken to stop the consumption of
rainwater and locally produced vegetables and milk until they have been screened
and analysed. However, if only limited amounts of food (e.g. fruit and vegetables
from local gardens) and non-essential food could have been affected, this step
may be omitted, and instead restrictions should be placed on the consumption of
all the food that could be contaminated until it can be screened and analysed.
Finally, food, milk and rainwater should be screened and analysed, out to a
distance of several kilometres, and actions should be taken to restrict the
consumption of food, milk and rainwater having concentrations of radionuclides
in excess of OIL5 and OIL6.
II.15. Within days, the mixture of radionuclides over the affected area should be
determined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised, if
warranted.
II.16. Any recommendations to the public to take any protective actions should
be accompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria.
II.17. After the emergency is over, further actions should be taken on the basis of
criteria developed after careful assessment of the conditions and in consultation
with the interested parties.
DEFAULT OILs
II.18. Table 8 contains OILs for assessing the results of field monitoring of
contamination of the ground, skin and clothing. Three types of OIL are provided
in the units measured by field survey instruments: dose rate (OIL(¸)); beta counts
per second (counts/s) for beta radiation (OIL(|)); and alpha counts/s for alpha
radiation (OIL(o)). An OIL is exceeded if any of its types are exceeded. These
OILs apply for emergencies involving all radionuclides, including fission
products released by melting reactor fuel.
II.19. The OILs in Table 8 were established for implementing the protective
actions and other response actions in a way consistent with the generic criteria in
Tables 2 and 3. In the development of these OILs, all members of the population
(including children and pregnant women) as well as all usual activities (such as
children playing outdoors) were considered. The OILs were calculated to ensure
that the protective actions to be taken protect against the most radiotoxic
radionuclides. As a result, the OILs are overly conservative for many
36
TABLE 8. DEFAULT OILs FOR FIELD SURVEY MEASUREMENTS
OIL OIL value Response action (as appropriate) if the OIL is exceeded
Environmental measurements
OIL1 Gamma (γ) 1000 µSv/h at
1 m from surface or a
source
2000 counts/s direct beta
(|) surface contamination
measurement
e
50 counts/s direct alpha (o)
surface contamination
measurement
f
—Immediately evacuate or provide substantial shelter
a
—Provide for decontamination of evacuees
b

—Reduce inadvertent ingestion
c
—Stop consumption of local produce
d
, rainwater and milk
from animals grazing in the area
—Register and provide for a medical examination of
evacuees
—If a person has handled a source with a dose rate equal
to or exceeding 1000 µSv/h at 1 m
e
, provide an
immediate medical examination
OIL2 Gamma (γ) 100 µSv/h at
1 m from surface or a
source
200 counts/s direct beta (|)
surface contamination
measurement
f
10 counts/s direct alpha (o)
surface contamination
measurement
f
—Stop consumption of local produce
d
, rainwater and milk
from animals grazing in the area until they have been
screened and contamination levels have been assessed
using OIL5 and OIL6
—Temporarily relocate those living in the area; before
relocation, reduce inadvertent ingestion
c
; register and
estimate the dose to those who were in the area to
determine if medical screening is warranted; relocation
of people from the areas with the highest potential
exposure should begin within days
—If a person has handled a source with a dose rate equal
to or exceeding 100 µSv/h at 1 m
e
, provide medical
examination and evaluation; any pregnant women who
have handled such a source should receive immediate
medical evaluation and dose assessment
OIL3 Gamma (γ) 1 µSv/h at 1 m
from surface
20 counts/s direct beta (|)
surface contamination
measurement
f,i

2 counts/s direct alpha (o)
surface contamination
measurement
f,i
—Stop consumption of non-essential
g
local produce
d
,
rainwater and milk from animals
h
grazing in the area
until it has been screened and contamination levels have
been assessed using OIL5 and OIL6
—Screen local produce, rainwater and milk from animals
h

grazing in the area out to at least 10 times the distance
to which OIL3 is exceeded and assess samples using
OIL5 and OIL6
—Consider providing iodine thyroid blocking
j
for fresh
fission products
k
and for iodine contamination if
replacement for essential
g
local produce or milk is not
immediately available
—Estimate the dose of those who may have consumed
food, milk or rainwater from the area where restrictions
were implemented to determine if medical screening is
warranted
37
Skin contamination
OIL4 Gamma (γ) 1 µSv/h at
10 cm from the skin
1000 counts/s direct beta
(|) skin contamination
measurement
f
50 counts/s direct alpha (o)
skin contamination
measurement
f
—Provide for skin decontamination
b
and reduce
inadvertent ingestion
c

—Register and provide for a medical examination
Note: The OILs should be revised as soon as it is known which radionuclides are actually
involved. The OILs should also be revised, if necessary, as part of the preparedness
process, to be more consistent with the instruments to be used during the response.
However, the default OILs in this table can be used without revision to make a
conservative assessment immediately.
a
Inside closed halls of large multi-storey buildings or large masonry structures and away from
walls or windows.
b
If immediate decontamination is not practicable, advise evacuees to change their clothing and
to shower as soon as possible. Guidance on performing decontamination can be found in
Refs [18, 21].
c
Advise evacuees not to drink, eat or smoke and to keep hands away from the mouth until
hands are washed.
d
Local produce is food that is grown in open spaces that may be directly contaminated by the
release and that is consumed within weeks (e.g. vegetables).
e
This external dose rate criterion applies only to sealed dangerous sources and does not need
to be revised in an emergency.
f
Performed using good contamination monitoring practice.
g
Restricting essential foods could result in severe health effects (e.g. severe malnutrition), and
therefore essential foods should be restricted only if replacement food is available.
h
Use 10% of OIL3 for milk from small animals (e.g. goats) grazing in the area.
i
Deposition by rain of short lived naturally occurring radon progeny can result in count rates
of four or more times the background count rate. These rates should not be confused with the
deposition rates due to the emergency. Count rates due to radon progeny will decrease rapidly
after the rain stops and should be back to typical background levels within a few hours.
j
Only for several days and only if replacement food is not available.
k
Fission products that were produced within the last month, thus containing large amounts of
iodine.
TABLE 8. DEFAULT OILs FOR FIELD SURVEY MEASUREMENTS (cont.)
OIL OIL value Response action (as appropriate) if the OIL is exceeded
38
radionuclides and should be revised as soon as it is known which radionuclides
are involved.
II.20. As a minimum criterion, a contamination monitoring instrument is
considered suitable for applying the OIL if it will provide a response equal to or
more conservative than that assumed in development of the OILs. The following
procedure may be used for checking whether or not a particular instrument meets
the minimum criterion and can be used in applying the operational criteria for
OIL1, OIL2 and OIL4 in Table 8:
(1) Ensure that the instrument can display counts/s (or counts/min) over the
ranges of the OIL values in Table 8.
(2) For a beta monitor, ensure that it can detect both high (e.g.
32
P) and low
(e.g.
14
C) energy beta emitters. It is not required that very weak emitters
(e.g.
63
Ni) be detectable.
(3) Calculate the instrument coefficients (ICs) using measured (i.e. derived
from the calibration factor) or known 4π efficiencies (e.g. those provided by
the manufacturer) for high energy and low energy beta emitting
radionuclides and an alpha emitting radionuclide (as applicable) using the
formula:
(5)
where
IC is the instrument coefficient ((counts/s  cm
2
)/Bq);
W
monitor
is the effective area of the detector window (cm
2
);
θ
monitor
is the energy dependent efficiency for 4t geometry close to the surface
and under ideal conditions (counts/s  Bq
–1
).
(4) If the calculated IC values are greater than or equal to the following, the
instrument is suitable:
—For medium or high energy beta emitters (e.g.
36
Cl) — 1;
—For low energy beta emitters (e.g.
14
C) — 0.2;
—For alpha emitters — 0.5.
A beta monitor should meet both the high energy and the low energy beta criteria.
These criteria were established so that the majority of commonly available
contamination monitoring instruments will give a response that is equal to or
IC W = ¥
monitor monitor
q
39
higher (i.e. more conservative) than the response assumed in developing the
default OILs. However, the response of instruments that meet these minimum
criteria may vary by a factor of as much as 20, primarily owing to differences in
the effective area of the detector. Therefore, the OILs in Table 8 should be
revised, if necessary, to be more consistent with the characteristics of the
instruments to be used during the response. This should be done as part of the
preparedness process.
II.21. The process of assessing radionuclide concentrations in food, milk and
water is shown in Fig. 5. First the potentially contaminated food should be
screened over a wide area and analysed to determine the gross alpha and beta
concentrations if this can be done more promptly than assessing the concentration
of individual radionuclides. If the OIL5 (see Table 9) screening levels are not
exceeded, the food, milk and water are safe for consumption during the
emergency phase. If an OIL5 level is exceeded, the radionuclide specific
concentrations in the food, milk or water should be determined. If the OIL6 levels
in Table 10 are exceeded, consumption of non-essential food, milk or water
should be stopped, and essential food, milk and water should be replaced or the
people should be relocated if replacements are not available. Finally, as soon as
possible the guidance in Ref. [29] should be used to determine whether the food,
milk or water is suitable for international trade, and national criteria or WHO
guidance [30] should be used to determine whether the food, milk or water is
suitable for long term consumption after the emergency phase.
II.22. Tables 9 and 10 give OILs for assessing food, milk and water (see also
Table 11). These OILs apply to radionuclides in food, milk and water destined for
human consumption (they are not applicable for dried food or concentrated food).
The food, milk and water OILs in Tables 9 and 10 were calculated on the basis of
the following conservative assumptions:
• All of the food, milk and water are initially contaminated and are consumed
throughout a full year.
• The most restrictive age dependent dose conversion factors and ingestion
rates (i.e. those for infants) are used.
The generic criterion of 10 mSv per year (and not 100 mSv per year, as in Table 3,
at which early protective actions are to be taken) was used to ensure that those
people in areas from which they were not relocated will not receive a total dose
(including the dose from ingestion) greater than 100 mSv per year.
40
II.23. Radioactive
40
K is commonly found in food and water. It does not
accumulate in the body but is maintained at a constant level independent of
intake
14
[30]. The contribution of
40
K should therefore be subtracted, following a
separate determination of total potassium content. The beta activity of the
40
K
included in natural potassium is 27.6 Bq/g. This is the factor that should be used
to calculate the beta activity due to
40
K (Ref. [29], para. 9.4.2).
Text cont. on p. 49.
14
In the response to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, in some cases
40
K was confused
with
137
Cs and produce was discarded even though it contained virtually no radioactive
caesium [31].
Determine gross
D and E activity
OIL5
exceeded
Determine radionuclide
concentration
OIL6
exceeded
May not be suitable for
consumption except in
exceptional circumstances
Suitable for
consumption
Yes No
No Yes
FIG. 5. Process of assessing radionuclide concentrations in food, milk and water.
41
TABLE 9. DEFAULT SCREENING OILs FOR FOOD, MILK AND WATER
CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS
OIL OIL value Response action if the OIL is exceeded
OIL5 Gross beta (|): 100 Bq/kg
or
Gross alpha (o): 5 Bq/kg
Above OIL5: Assess using OIL6
Below OIL5: Safe for consumption during
the emergency phase
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
H-3 2 × 10
5
Sc-44 1 × 10
7
Be-7 7 × 10
5
Sc-46 8 × 10
3
Be-10 3 × 10
3
Sc-47 4 × 10
5
C-11 2 × 10
9
Sc-48 3 × 10
5
C-14 1 × 10
4
Ti-44 + 6 × 10
2
F-18 2 × 10
8
V-48 3 × 10
4
Na-22 2 × 10
3
V-49 2 × 10
5
Na-24 4 × 10
6
Cr-51 8 × 10
5
Mg-28 +
a
4 × 10
5
Mn-52 1 × 10
5
Al-26 1 × 10
3
Mn-53 9 × 10
4
Si-31 5 × 10
7
Mn-54 9 × 10
3
Si-32 + 9 × 10
2
Mn-56 3 × 10
7
P-32 2 × 10
4
Fe-52 + 2 × 10
6
P-33 1 × 10
5
Fe-55 1 × 10
4
S-35 1 × 10
4
Fe-59 9 × 10
3
Cl-36 3 × 10
3
Fe-60 7 × 10
1
Cl-38 3 × 10
8
Co-55 1 × 10
6
K-40 NA
b,c
Co-56 4 × 10
3
K-42 3 × 10
6
Co-57 2 × 10
4
a
‘+’ indicates radionuclides with progeny listed in Table 11 that are assumed to be in
equilibrium with the parent radionuclide and therefore do not need to be considered
independently when assessing compliance with OILs.
b
NA: not applicable.
c
The dose from ingestion of
40
K is considered not to be relevant because
40
K does not
accumulate in the body and is maintained at a constant level independent of intake [29].
42
K-43 4 × 10
6
Co-58 2 × 10
4
Ca-41 4 × 10
4
Co-58m 9 × 10
7
Ca-45 8 × 10
3
Co-60 8 × 10
2
Ca-47 + 5 × 10
4
Ni-59 6 × 10
4
Ni-63 2 × 10
4
Sr-89 6 × 10
3
Ni-65 4 × 10
7
Sr-90 + 2 × 10
2
Cu-64 1 × 10
7
Sr-91 3 × 10
6
Cu-67 8 × 10
5
Sr-92 2 × 10
7
Zn-65 2 × 10
3
Y-87 + 4 × 10
5
Zn-69 6 × 10
8
Y-88 9 × 10
3
Zn-69m + 3 × 10
6
Y-90 9 × 10
4
Ga-67 1 × 10
6
Y-91 5 × 10
3
Ga-68 2 × 10
8
Y-91m 2 × 10
9
Ga-72 1 × 10
6
Y-92 1 × 10
7
Ge-68 + 3 × 10
3
Y-93 1 × 10
6
Ge-71 5 × 10
6
Zr-88 3 × 10
4
Ge-77 6 × 10
6
Zr-93 2 × 10
4
As-72 4 × 10
5
Zr-95 + 6 × 10
3
As-73 3 × 10
4
Zr-97 + 5 × 10
5
As-74 3 × 10
4
Nb-93m 2 × 10
4
As-76 4 × 10
5
Nb-94 2 × 10
3
As-77 1 × 10
6
Nb-95 5 × 10
4
Se-75 4 × 10
3
Nb-97 2 × 10
8
Se-79 7 × 10
2
Mo-93 3 × 10
3
Br-76 3 × 10
6
Mo-99 + 5 × 10
5
Br-77 5 × 10
6
Tc-95m + 3 × 10
4
Br-82 1 × 10
6
Tc-96 2 × 10
5
Rb-81 8 × 10
7
Tc-96m 2 × 10
9
Rb-83 7 × 10
3
Tc-97 4 × 10
4
Rb-84 1 × 10
4
Tc-97m 2 × 10
4
Rb-86 1 × 10
4
Tc-98 2 × 10
3
Rb-87 2 × 10
3
Tc-99 4 × 10
3
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.)
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
43
Sr-82 + 5 × 10
3
Tc-99m 2 × 10
8
Sr-85 3 × 10
4
Ru-97 2 × 10
6
Sr-85m 3 × 10
9
Ru-103 + 3 × 10
4
Sr-87m 3 × 10
8
Ru-105 2 × 10
7
Ru-106 + 6 × 10
2
Sb-126 3 × 10
4
Rh-99 1 × 10
5
Te-121 1 × 10
5
Rh-101 8 × 10
3
Te-121m + 3 × 10
3
Rh-102 2 × 10
3
Te-123m 5 × 10
3
Rh-102m 5 × 10
3
Te-125m 1 × 10
4
Rh-103m 5 × 10
9
Te-127 1 × 10
7
Rh-105 1 × 10
6
Te-127m + 3 × 10
3
Pd-103 + 2 × 10
5
Te-129 2 × 10
8
Pd-107 7 × 10
4
Te-129m + 6 × 10
3
Pd-109 + 2 × 10
6
Te-131 4 × 10
8
Ag-105 5 × 10
4
Te-131m 3 × 10
5
Ag-108m + 2 × 10
3
Te-132 + 5 × 10
4
Ag-110m + 2 × 10
3
I-123 5 × 10
6
Ag-111 7 × 10
4
I-124 1 × 10
4
Cd-109 + 3 × 10
3
I-125 1 × 10
3
Cd-113m 4 × 10
2
I-126 2 × 10
3
Cd-115 + 2 × 10
5
I-129 NA
d
Cd-115m 6 × 10
3
I-131 3 × 10
3
In-111 1 × 10
6
I-132 2 × 10
7
In-113m 4 × 10
8
I-133 1 × 10
5
In-114m + 3 × 10
3
I-134 2 × 10
8
In-115m 5 × 10
7
I-135 2 × 10
6
Sn-113 + 1 × 10
4
Cs-129 1 × 10
7
Sn-117m 7 × 10
4
Cs-131 2 × 10
6
Sn-119m 1 × 10
4
Cs-132 4 × 10
5
Sn-121m + 5 × 10
3
Cs-134 1 × 10
3
Sn-123 3 × 10
3
Cs-134m 3 × 10
8
d
Not a significant source of radiation because of the low specific activity.
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.)
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
44
Sn-125 2 × 10
4
Cs-135 9 × 10
3
Sn-126 + 5 × 10
2
Cs-136 4 × 10
4
Sb-122 2 × 10
5
Cs-137 + 2 × 10
3
Sb-124 5 × 10
3
Ba-131 + 1 × 10
5
Sb-125 + 3 × 10
3
Ba-133 3 × 10
3
Ba-133m 9 × 10
5
Eu-156 2 × 10
4
Ba-140 + 1 × 10
4
Gd-146 + 8 × 10
3
La-137 4 × 10
4
Gd-148 1 × 10
2
La-140 2 × 10
5
Gd-153 2 × 10
4
Ce-139 3 × 10
4
Gd-159 2 × 10
6
Ce-141 3 × 10
4
Tb-157 9 × 10
4
Ce-143 5 × 10
5
Tb-158 3 × 10
3
Ce-144 + 8 × 10
2
Tb-160 7 × 10
3
Pr-142 6 × 10
5
Dy-159 7 × 10
4
Pr-143 4 × 10
4
Dy-165 7 × 10
7
Nd-147 6 × 10
4
Dy-166 + 6 × 10
4
Nd-149 8 × 10
7
Ho-166 5 × 10
5
Pm-143 3 × 10
4
Ho-166m 2 × 10
3
Pm-144 6 × 10
3
Er-169 2 × 10
5
Pm-145 3 × 10
4
Er-171 6 × 10
6
Pm-147 1 × 10
4
Tm-167 1 × 10
5
Pm-148m + 1 × 10
4
Tm-170 5 × 10
3
Pm-149 3 × 10
5
Tm-171 3 × 10
4
Pm-151 8 × 10
5
Yb-169 3 × 10
4
Sm-145 2 × 10
4
Yb-175 4 × 10
5
Sm-147 1 × 10
2
Lu-172 1 × 10
5
Sm-151 3 × 10
4
Lu-173 2 × 10
4
Sm-153 5 × 10
5
Lu-174 1 × 10
4
Eu-147 8 × 10
4
Lu-174m 1 × 10
4
Eu-148 2 × 10
4
Lu-177 2 × 10
5
Eu-149 9 × 10
4
Hf-172 + 2 × 10
3
Eu-150b 3 × 10
6
Hf-175 3 × 10
4
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.)
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
45
Eu-150a 4 × 10
3
Hf-181 2 × 10
4
Eu-152 3 × 10
3
Hf-182 + 1 × 10
3
Eu-152m 4 × 10
6
Ta-178a 1 × 10
8
Eu-154 2 × 10
3
Ta-179 6 × 10
4
Eu-155 1 × 10
4
Ta-182 5 × 10
3
W-178 + 2 × 10
5
Hg-194 + 2 × 10
2
W-181 1 × 10
5
Hg-195 2 × 10
7
W-185 2 × 10
4
Hg-195m 8 × 10
5
W-187 1 × 10
6
Hg-197 1 × 10
6
W-188 + 3 × 10
3
Hg-197m 2 × 10
6
Re-184 2 × 10
4
Hg-203 1 × 10
4
Re-184m + 3 × 10
3
Tl-200 5 × 10
6
Re-186 1 × 10
5
Tl-201 3 × 10
6
Re-187 5 × 10
5
Tl-202 2 × 10
5
Re-188 7 × 10
5
Tl-204 3 × 10
3
Re-189 8 × 10
5
Pb-201 2 × 10
7
Os-185 2 × 10
4
Pb-202 + 1 × 10
3
Os-191 8 × 10
4
Pb-203 2 × 10
6
Os-191m 1 × 10
7
Pb-205 2 × 10
4
Os-193 7 × 10
5
Pb-210 + 2.0
Os-194 + 8 × 10
2
Pb-212 + 2 × 10
5
Ir-189 2 × 10
5
Bi-205 7 × 10
4
Ir-190 6 × 10
4
Bi-206 8 × 10
4
Ir-192 8 × 10
3
Bi-207 3 × 10
3
Ir-194 6 × 10
5
Bi-210 1 × 10
5
Pt-188 + 6 × 10
4
Bi-210m 2 × 10
2
Pt-191 9 × 10
5
Bi-212 + 7 × 10
7
Pt-193 8 × 10
4
Po-210 5.0
Pt-193m 3 × 10
5
At-211 + 2 × 10
5
Pt-195m 3 × 10
5
Ra-223 + 4 × 10
2
Pt-197 2 × 10
6
Ra-224 + 2 × 10
3
Pt-197m 1 × 10
8
Ra-225 + 2 × 10
2
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.)
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
46
Au-193 8 × 10
6
Ra-226 + 2 × 10
1
Au-194 1 × 10
6
Ra-228 3.0
Au-195 2 × 10
4
Ac-225 3 × 10
3
Au-198 3 × 10
5
Ac-227 + 5.0
Au-199 5 × 10
5
Ac-228 7 × 10
6
Th-227 + 9 × 10
1
Pu-242 5 × 10
1
Th-228 + 2 × 10
1
Pu-244 + 5 × 10
1
Th-229 + 8.0 Am-241 5 × 10
1
Th-230 5 × 10
1
Am-242m + 5 × 10
1
Th-231 2 × 10
6
Am-243 + 5 × 10
1
Th-232 4.0 Am-244 4 × 10
6
Th-234 + 8 × 10
3
Am-241/Be-9 5 × 10
1
Pa-230 5 × 10
4
Cm-240 4 × 10
3
Pa-231 2 × 10
1
Cm-241 3 × 10
4
Pa-233 3 × 10
4
Cm-242 5 × 10
2
U-230 + 8 × 10
2
Cm-243 6 × 10
1
U-232 2 × 10
1
Cm-244 7 × 10
1
U-233 1 × 10
2
Cm-245 5 × 10
1
U-234 2 × 10
2
Cm-246 5 × 10
1
U-235 + 2 × 10
2
Cm-247 6 × 10
1
U-236 2 × 10
2
Cm-248 1 × 10
1
U-238 + 1 × 10
2
Bk-247 2 × 10
1
Np-235 7 × 10
4
Bk-249 1 × 10
4
Np-236l + 8 × 10
2
Cf-248 2 × 10
2
Np-236s 4 × 10
6
Cf-249 2 × 10
1
Np-237 + 9 × 10
1
Cf-250 4 × 10
1
Np-239 4 × 10
5
Cf-251 2 × 10
1
Pu-236 1 × 10
2
Cf-252 4 × 10
1
Pu-237 2 × 10
5
Cf-253 3 × 10
4
Pu-238 5 × 10
1
Cf-254 3 × 10
1
Pu-239 5 × 10
1
Es-253 5 × 10
3
Pu-240 5 × 10
1
Pu-239/Be-9 5 × 10
1
Pu-241 4 × 10
3
TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILK
AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.)
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/kg)
47
TABLE 11. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS
Parent radionuclide
Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being
in equilibrium with the parent
Mg-28 Al-28
Si-32 P-32
Ca-47 Sc-47 (3.8)
a
Ti-44 Sc-44
Fe-52 Mn-52m
Zn-69m Zn-69 (1.1)
Ge-68 Ga-68
Sr-90 Y-90
Y-87 Sr-87m
Zr-95 Nb-95 (2.2)
Zr-97 Nb-97m (0.95), Nb-97
Tc-95m Tc-95 (0.041)
Mo-99 Tc-99m (0.96)
Ru-103 Rh-103m
Ru-106 Rh-106
Pd-103 Rh-103m
Pd-109 Ag-109m
Ag-108m Ag-108 (0.09)
Ag-110m Ag-110 (0.013)
Cd-109 Ag-109m
Cd-115 In-115m (1.1)
In-114m In-114 (0.96)
Sn-113 In-113m
Sn-121m Sn-121 (0.78)
Sn-126 Sb-126m, Sb-126 (0.14)
Sb-125 Te-125m (0.24)
Te-121m Te-121
Te-127m Te-127
Te-129m Te-129 (0.65)
Te-132 I-132
a
The value inside the parentheses is the activity of the daughter radionuclide, per unit of the
parent, assumed to be present.
48
Cs-137 Ba-137m
Ba-131 Cs-131 (5.6)
Ba-140 La-140 (1.2)
Ce-144 Pr-144m (0.018), Pr-144
Pm-148m Pm-148 (0.053)
Gd-146 Eu-146
Dy-166 Ho-166 (1.5)
Hf-172 Lu-172
Hf-182 Ta-182
W-178 Ta-178a
W-188 Re-188
Re-184m Re-184 (0.97)
Os-194 Ir-194
Pt-188 Ir-188 (1.2)
Hg-194 Au-194
Pb-202 Tl-202
Pb-210 Bi-210, Po-210
Pb-212 Bi-212 , Tl-208 (0.40), Po-212 (0.71)
Bi-210m Ti-206
Bi-212 Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.65)
At-211 Po-211 (0.58)
Rn-222 Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214, Po-214
Ra-223 Rn-219, Po-215, Pb-211, Bi-211, Tl-207
Ra-224 Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212 , Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.65)
Ra-225 Ac-225 (3.0), Fr-221 (3.0), At-217 (3.0), Bi-213 (3.0), Po-213 (2.9),
Pb-209 (2.9), Tl-209 (0.067), Pb-209 (0.067)
Ra-226 Rn-222, Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214, Po-214
Ac-225 Fr-221, At-217, Bi-213, Po-213 (0.98), Pb-209, Tl-209 (0.022)
Ac-227 Th-227 (0.99), Ra-223 (0.99), Rn-219 (0.99), Po-215 (0.99),
Pb-211 (0.99), Bi-211 (0.99), Tl-207 (0.99), Fr-223 (0.014),
Ra-223 (0.014), Rn-219 (0.014), Po-215 (0.014), Pb-211 (0.014),
Bi-211 (0.014), Tl-207 (0.014)
TABLE 11. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS (cont.)
Parent radionuclide
Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being
in equilibrium with the parent
49
II.24. OIL6 is exceeded if the following condition is satisfied:
(6)
where
C
f,i
is the concentration of radionuclide i in the food, milk or water (Bq/kg);
OIL6
i
is the concentration of radionuclide i from Table 10 (Bq/kg).
II.25. If OIL6 is exceeded, the following actions should be taken:
—Stop consumption of non-essential
15
food, milk or water and conduct an
assessment on the basis of realistic consumption rates. Replace essential
Th-227 Ra-223 (2.6), Rn-219 (2.6), Po-215 (2.6), Pb-211 (2.6), Bi-211 (2.6),
Tl-207 (2.6)
Th-228 Ra-224, Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212, Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36),
Po-212 (0.64)
Th-229 Ra-225, Ac-225, Fr-221, At-217, Bi-213, Po-213 (0.98), Pb-209 (0.98),
Tl-209 (0.02), Pb-209 (0.02)
Th-234 Pa-234m
U-232 Th-226, Ra-222, Rn-218, Po-214
U-235 Th-231
U-238 Th-234, Pa-234m
Np-237 Pa-233
Pu-244 U-240, Np-240m
Am-242m Am-242, Cm-242 (0.83)
Am-243 Np-239
15
Restriction of the consumption of essential food could result in severe health effects
(e.g. severe malnutrition).
TABLE 11. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS (cont.)
Parent radionuclide
Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being
in equilibrium with the parent
C
f i
i
i
,
OIL6
1
Â
>
50
food, milk and water promptly, or relocate people if replacement of
essential food, milk and water is not possible.
—For fission products (e.g. containing iodine) and iodine contamination,
consider providing iodine thyroid blocking if replacement of essential food,
milk or water is not immediately possible.
—Estimate the dose to those

who may have consumed food, milk or rainwater
from the area where restrictions were implemented

to determine if medical
screening is warranted.
PLAIN LANGUAGE EXPLANATION
II.26. Experience has shown that decision makers take actions and the public
follow instructions best when they understand how the actions provide for the
safety of the public [32]. The default OILs are therefore supported by a plain
language explanation of how criteria and associated actions provide for the safety
of all members of the public. In addition, experience shows that use of overly
conservative criteria can result in the public taking actions that do more harm
than good. The default OILs are developed using realistically conservative
assumptions that provide reasonable assurance that all members of the public are
safe.
II.27. The development of plain language explanations for the default OILs
should be based on the assumption that members of the public living under
normal conditions, including those who are more vulnerable to radiation
exposure such as children and pregnant women, will achieve a level of protection
that meets international standards, provided that during the emergency phase
they:
—Do not receive a dose to any organ approaching that resulting in severe
deterministic effects. The thresholds for the onset of severe deterministic
effects are listed in Table 2.
—Do not receive a dose above which the risk of health effects (e.g. cancers) is
sufficiently high to justify taking protective actions during an emergency
(generic criterion of 100 mSv per annum, as presented in Table 3). Below
this generic criterion, protective actions are not always justified and will be
taken (if at all) on the basis of justified criteria developed, with interested
parties, after careful consideration of the conditions, including the impact of
any protective action.
51
II.28. The plain language communications below provide text that may be given
directly to those members of the public to whom the criterion applies.
OIL1 plain language explanation
II.29. Remaining in the area where OIL1 is exceeded may not be safe. Those
living in the area should [insert appropriate recommended actions for OIL1] to
reduce the risk of health effects due to radiation.
OIL2 plain language explanation
II.30. Remaining in the area where OIL2 is exceeded for a short time is possible
if the following recommended actions are taken, but staying for longer periods
may not be safe. Move out of the area (relocate) within a week and [insert
appropriated recommended actions for OIL2].
II.31. The recommended actions for OIL2 take into account those members of
the public most vulnerable to radiation exposure (e.g. infants and pregnant
women). They also consider all the ways a person can be exposed to radiation
from radioactive material deposited on the ground, including inhalation of dust
and inadvertent ingestion of dirt (e.g. from dirty hands). For some types of
radioactive material this advice may be overly cautious, but it is considered
prudent until further analysis is performed. The relocation is likely to be
temporary.
OIL3 plain language explanation
II.32. If other food is available in the territories where OIL3 is exceeded, stop
consuming local produce (e.g. vegetables), milk from grazing animals and
rainwater until they have been screened and declared safe. However, if restriction
of consumption is likely to result in severe malnutrition or dehydration because
replacement food, milk or water is not available, these items may be consumed
for a short time until replacements are available.
II.33. The recommended actions for OIL3 take into account the most vulnerable
members of the public (e.g. infants and pregnant women). The actions assume
that all the locally produced food and milk is contaminated with radioactive
material and that little is done (e.g. washing) to reduce the levels of
contamination in the food before consumption. Exceeding OIL3 does not mean
that the food or milk produced in the area is not safe; however, it is prudent not to
consume local non-essential food until further analysis has been performed.
52
OIL4 plain language explanation
II.34. Any person who may have radioactive material on the skin or clothing
should take actions to prevent inadvertent ingestion of the material (which may not
be visible). Appropriate actions include washing the hands before drinking, eating
or smoking, and keeping the hands away from the mouth until they have been
washed. Further actions include changing clothes as soon as possible and
showering before putting on clean clothes. The removed clothing should be put in a
bag until it can be dealt with. These recommendations also apply to those people
who may have been monitored. The recommended actions for OIL4 take into
account the most vulnerable members of the public (e.g. infants and pregnant
women). It is assumed that people might eat with contaminated hands and thereby
might ingest radioactive material. Timely monitoring and immediate
decontamination by experts may not be possible, and the contamination levels may
be very difficult to detect under emergency conditions, but potentially contaminated
persons can take the effective actions mentioned above to protect themselves.
OIL5 plain language explanation
II.35. Below OIL5: Locally produced food, milk and water have been screened,
and all members of the public, including infants, children and pregnant women,
can safely drink the milk and water and eat the food during the emergency phase.
OIL6 plain language explanation
II.36. Below OIL6: Locally produced food, milk and water have been screened,
and all members of the public, including infants, children and pregnant women,
can safely drink the milk and water and eat the food during the emergency phase.
II.37. Above OIL6: Locally produced food, milk and water have been screened
and the measurements indicate that further investigation is necessary before
unrestricted general consumption of these items is allowed. However, if
restriction of consumption is likely to result in severe malnutrition or
dehydration, because no replacement food, milk or water is available, then these
items may be consumed for a short time until replacements are available.
II.38. The analysis for OIL6 considers the most vulnerable members of the public
(e.g. infants and pregnant women), and it assumes that all of the food, milk and
water is contaminated. Exceeding the criteria therefore might not mean that the
food, water or milk is unsuitable for consumption but might indicate that further
investigation, including consideration of actual consumption rates and additional
screening, is needed.
53
Appendix III
DEVELOPMENT OF EALs AND EXAMPLES OF EALs
FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS
III.1. Reference [2], in para. 4.19, requires the operator of a facility or a
practice in threat category I, II, III or IV (which includes light water reactors) to
implement a system for classifying all potential nuclear and radiological
emergencies that would warrant an emergency intervention to protect workers
and the public.
III.2. The events considered in the classification system should not be
expanded to include all reportable events, but should be limited to alerts and
emergencies that require immediate on-site action
16
.
III.3. The following classes are defined for facilities in threat categories I and
II: general emergency, site area emergency, facility emergency and alert [2].
III.4. Declaration of an emergency in any of these emergency classes should
initiate a response that is considerably beyond normal operations. Four is the
minimum number of classes. Each class initiates a distinctly different level of
response, as shown in Fig. 6.
16
Examples of events that should not be included in the emergency classification system
are: technical deficiencies exceeding the limits of in-service inspection codes; equipment
failure beyond expected reliability limits; detection of major design deficiencies or of potential
accident sequences outside the plant’s design basis; symptoms of severe deficiencies in
operator training or behaviour; breaches of technical specifications or of transport regulations;
and deficiencies in safety culture.
Alert Facility emergency Site area emergency General emergency
Immediate actions to analyse the situation and mitigate the consequences


Immediate actions to protect those on the site


Preparations to take protective action off the site

Immediate actions to protect
the public off the site
FIG. 6. Relationship of response actions under the classification system. (Note: The actions are
not presented in a sequence for implementation.)
54
III.5. Reference [2], in para. 4.20, states that “The criteria for classification shall
be predefined emergency action levels (EALs) that relate to abnormal conditions for
the facility or practice concerned, security related concerns, releases of radioactive
material, environmental measurements and other observable indications”.
III.6. The following are examples of situations that could lead to a general
emergency:
—Actual or projected
17
damage to the reactor core or large amounts of recently
discharged fuel in combination with actual damage to barriers or critical
safety systems such that a radioactive release becomes highly probable;
—Detection of radiation levels off the site that warrant urgent protective
measures;
—A malicious act resulting in an inability to monitor or control critical safety
systems that are needed to prevent a release, or in exposures off the site that
could result in doses that warrant urgent protective actions.
III.7. The following are examples of situations that could lead to a site area
emergency:
—A major decrease in the level of defence in depth provided for the reactor
core or actively cooled fuel;
—A major decrease in protection against an accidental criticality;
—Conditions such that any additional failures could result in a general emergency;
—Doses off the site approaching the intervention levels for urgent protective
actions;
—A malicious act with the potential to disrupt the performance of critical
safety functions or to result in a major release or severe exposures.
III.8. The following are examples of situations that could lead to a facility
emergency:
—A fuel handling emergency including the dropping of a fuel transport
container
18
;
17
‘Projected damage’ is indicated by a loss of critical safety functions necessary to
protect the core or large amounts of recently discharged fuel.
18
The dropping of a fuel transport container and a fuel handling accident are considered
facility emergencies because they cannot give rise to doses that warrant protective actions off
the site.
55
—An in-facility fire or other emergency not affecting safety systems;
—A malicious or criminal activity (e.g. extortion or blackmail) leading to
hazardous on-site conditions but with no potential to result in a criticality or
a release off the site that would warrant urgent protective actions;
—Loss of shielding or control for a large gamma emitter or for spent fuel;
—Rupture of a dangerous source;
—High doses on the site approaching intervention levels for urgent protective
actions;
—Doses exceeding established limits for occupationally exposed staff,
including workers in transport or handling activities, and including cases of
confirmed high values measured by area or process radiation monitors or
from contamination measurements;
—Spills of oil or chemicals that constitute a hazard to the environment;
—Civil disturbance (e.g. demonstrations in the vicinity of a nuclear power
plant).
III.9. Alerts are events that do not represent an emergency but that warrant
prompt activation of parts of the on-site response organization in support of the
operating staff.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS
III.10. This classification was developed to be as independent as possible of
light water reactor designs. The aim is to develop a classification that can be
considered a useful reference for the various designs of light water reactors used
throughout the world. When it is applied, the specific reactor design features
available have to be considered.
III.11. The foundation of the classification system is the fact that core damage
and failure of confinement are both necessary for a severe release and high on-
site doses to occur.
III.12. The classes are associated with increasing probability or confidence that
conditions exist that will lead to core damage or to high doses on or off the site.
Such a classification system provides the on-site staff with the greatest
opportunity to mitigate the consequences of the event and the off-site responders
with the greatest opportunity to take effective protective actions for the public.
56
APPLICATION OF THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
III.13. The criteria used for classifying the events are called emergency action
levels (EALs). An EAL is a predetermined threshold for an observable that places
the plant and off-site response organizations in preparedness for an emergency in
a given emergency class. There are two fundamentally different types of EAL:
symptom based and event based. Symptom based EALs are site specific
instrument readings (e.g. reactor coolant system pressure higher than a certain
level) or other observable or quantifiable thresholds (e.g. failure of emergency
power supply systems as indicated by a specific parameter). Event based EALs
are more subjective criteria requiring the judgement of the operating staff. An
example of an event based EAL would be ‘fire detected in an area containing
vital safety systems’.
III.14. When possible, symptom based EALs should be used because they make
the classification process more timely and less subject to error. For facilities
where safety significant systems are monitored by means of instruments and
alarms, a large fraction of the EALs may be symptom based in nature, whereas
classification procedures for simple facilities with few instruments will consist
almost exclusively of event based EALs.
III.15. This appendix has two tables providing examples of EALs for classifying
events
19
. Table 12 is for a reactor in operating, standby or hot shutdown mode. In
these modes, all the fission product barriers, instruments and safety systems are in
place and operational. Table 13 is for reactors in cold shutdown mode (reactor
coolant system closed and reactor coolant system coolant temperature less than
100°C) or in refuelling mode. In these modes the amount of energy in the reactor
coolant system, decay heat generation and short lived fission products are greatly
reduced. In addition, in these modes the reactor coolant system and containment
may not be in place (e.g. the reactor pressure vessel head may have been
removed) and fewer safety systems and instruments are required to be
operational. The scopes of these two tables, as described, conservatively bound
the essential criterion, which is whether the reactor coolant system is sealed or not
sealed (i.e. open to the atmosphere).
19
Examples of EALs for a facility emergency are not included because research and
generic studies have not been done to identify the range of possible facility emergencies that
could be used as a firm basis for developing such examples. Events that are classified as a
facility emergency and EALs for their classification should therefore be based on site specific
analysis.
57
III.16. The criteria in the tables are organized to provide for the earliest possible
classification of an event that could result in a severe release. The criteria are
provided in the following order: (1) impairment of a critical safety function;
(2) loss of fission product barriers; (3) increased radiation levels on the site;
(4) increased radiation levels off the site; (5) security events, fires, explosions,
releases of toxic gas, natural events and other events; and (6) spent fuel pool
events.
III.17. Tables 12 and 13 contain examples of EALs that address the elements of
the classification system. The EALs provided in the tables should therefore be
replaced with site specific EALs. The following guidance applies for this process:
—It is crucial that the site specific classification procedure be designed for
fast (to be completed in a few minutes) and easy use in an event.
—Care should be taken to ensure that the classification procedures are usable
under accident conditions, when the workload and stress are very high.
—The performance of instruments in an emergency should also be considered
in developing the EALs. Tables 12 and 13 include notes about facts that
should be considered when using various instruments in an emergency. Not
all instruments are qualified for reliable operation in harsh accident
conditions.
—The site specific EALs should use the units of the instruments and the
terminology used in the plant.
—Once the site specific EAL system has been developed, it should be tested
and/or validated in drills and walk-through sessions to ensure that it is
usable by the assigned control room staff in emergency conditions.
—The final step in implementation is to review the classification system with
off-site officials. The off-site officials who would be tasked with the
implementation of any protective action or other response action called for
by a classification should be in agreement with the classification system.
—The EALs and corresponding procedures should be revised on the basis of
operating experience and feedback from exercises.
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
III.18. The main objectives of accident management are to prevent the
escalation of an event to a severe accident, to mitigate the consequences of a
severe accident once it has happened and to achieve a long term safe stable state.
58
III.19. Emergency operating procedures aimed at preventing a severe accident
are used by the main control room staff in events not involving a severe accident.
Severe accident management guidelines are developed to deal with a severe
accident, should one occur; severe accident management guidelines are used
primarily by the operating organization’s technical support centre or emergency
control centre to advise the main control room staff and off-site emergency
groups on mitigatory measures.
III.20. Paragraph 4.19 of Ref. [2] requires that the operator “shall make
arrangements for the prompt identification of an actual or potential nuclear or
radiological emergency and determination of the appropriate level of response”.
III.21. Any conditions that would warrant the use of emergency operating
procedures would be classified as constituting an emergency and would trigger a
predetermined emergency response on the site. Once conditions of actual or
imminent core damage exist, a transition from the domain of emergency
operating procedures to the domain of severe accident management guidelines
should take place.
III.22. The emergency operating procedures and severe accident management
guidelines should be integrated into the organizational structure defined in the
plant emergency plan and should be coordinated with the plan to ensure a
consistent and coordinated response to severe accident conditions. Plant
conditions in the emergency operating procedures and severe accident
management guidelines should provide clear inputs for accident entry conditions
in the accident classification for declaring appropriate EALs on the site.
III.23. As part of the implementation of the plant specific emergency operating
procedures and severe accident management guidelines, the emergency plan
should be reviewed with respect to the actions that should be taken following the
emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines, to
ensure that there are no conflicts. It should be ensured that there are no conflicts
with the arrangements made for security, firefighting and support from off the
site, such as off-site firefighters or off-site security services.
III.24. Paragraph 4.7 of Ref. [2] requires that it be ensured “that the transition to
the emergency response and the performance of initial response actions do not
impair the ability of the operational staff (such as the control room staff) to follow
the procedures needed for safe operations and for taking mitigatory actions”.
59
TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS
III.25. The examples of EALs in Tables 12 and 13 are based on the considerable
amount of severe accident research conducted for light water reactors (such as
pressurized water reactors, boiling water reactors and water moderated, water
cooled reactors). The EALs should cover all possible events at a light water
reactor that could result in high doses on the site or in a severe release. However,
they should be compared with the results of any available site specific
probabilistic safety assessment to ensure that all severe accidents are addressed.
III.26. The three possible levels of emergency in Tables 12 and 13 are defined as
follows [27]:
General emergency. Events resulting in an actual release or a substantial risk of a
release requiring the implementation of urgent protective actions off the site. This
includes (a) actual severe damage
20
or projected severe damage to the core or to
large amounts of spent fuel, or (b) releases off the site resulting in a dose
exceeding the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. Urgent protective
actions should be taken immediately for the public near the plant when this level
of emergency is declared.
Site area emergency. Events resulting in a major decrease in the level of
protection for on-site personnel or for the public. This includes: (i) a major
decrease in the level of protection provided for the core or for large amounts of
spent fuel; (ii) conditions in which any additional failures could result in damage
to the core or to spent fuel; or (iii) high doses on the site or doses off the site
approaching the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. For this class of
emergency, actions should be taken to control the dose to on-site personnel and
preparations should be made to take protective actions off the site.
Alert. Events involving an unknown or significant decrease in the level of
protection for on-site personnel or for the public. For this class of emergency, the
state of readiness of the on-site and off-site response organizations is increased
and additional assessments are made.

20
Severe damage resulting in a release of greater than 20% of the gap inventory.
60
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81
EXAMPLE EALs
III.27. When using Tables 12 and 13, all the abnormal entry conditions in the
first column should be reviewed. For each entry condition that applies to a
specific case, the class is selected by matching the EAL criteria to the left. The
accident is classified at the highest class indicated, the highest class being
‘general emergency’ and the lowest class being ‘alert’.
III.28. These example EALs are based on an example system from Ref. [27].
Changes in the original guidance of Ref. [27] are accompanied by footnotes to
explain and distinguish them from the technical comments included in the
original guidance in Ref. [33]. This was done to help users of the previous
guidance to better understand how to apply the changes. Some of the EALs from
the original guidance were removed (this is not noted in the tables).
COOLING MARGIN–SATURATION CURVE
III.29. A primary system temperature equal to or greater than the saturation
temperature indicates that the water in the core is boiling. The cooling margin can
be approximated (neglecting instrument inaccuracies) by subtracting the coolant
temperature from the saturation temperature for the given primary system
pressure. For a pressurized water reactor a negative cooling margin indicates that
water is boiling in the reactor pressure vessel and that the reactor core may be
uncovered [33].
390
370
350
330
310
290
270
250
5 10 15 20 25
0 1 2 3 4 5
Absolute pressure (MPa) Absolute pressure (MPa)
S
a
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(
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C
)
FIG. 7. Cooling margin–saturation curve [27].
82
How to use Fig. 7:
III.30. Determine the absolute pressure and temperature in the primary system T
ps
;
then use the graphs to determine the saturation temperature T
sat
, and thus the
cooling margin, by using the equation below:
Cooling margin = T
sat
− T
ps
where
T
ps
is the temperature in the primary system;
T
sat
is the saturation temperature from Fig. 7.
WATER LOST BY BOILING DUE TO DECAY HEAT IN A 3000 MW(th)
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
III.31. The curve in Fig. 8 shows the amount of water that must be injected into
the reactor pressure vessel to replace water lost by boiling due to decay heat. This
curve is based on a 3000 MW(th) reactor operated at a constant power for a
nominally infinite period and then shut down instantaneously. This is the
minimum water flow rate that must be injected into a reactor core to cool it once
it is shut down [33].
Step 1: Determine the amount of water injection required, from:
where
W
i
is the water injection required (m
3
/h);
W
i
3000
is the water injection required for a 3000 MW(th) plant (m
3
/h), from Fig. 8;
P
plant
is the power output of the plant in MW(th) (MW(th) = 3 × MW(e)).
Step 2: If the core has been uncovered for more than 15 min, increase the
injection rate by a factor of three to accommodate the heat from the Zr–H
2
O
reaction and built-up (stored) energy.
W W
P
i i
3000
plant
(MW(th))
(MW(th))
=
3000
83
Hours after shutdown
Days after shutdown
m
3
/
h
m
3
/
h
FIG. 8. Rate of injection of water required to replace water lost by boiling due to decay heat in
a 3000 MW(th) nuclear power plant [27].
84
Appendix IV
OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OF
A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
IV.1. In a radiological emergency, the inner cordoned area is where protective
action is implemented to protect responders and the public. Initially the size of the
area is determined on the basis of information that can be directly observed (e.g.
markings). The size of the area may be expanded on the basis of dose rates and
environmental measurement OILs (see Appendix II) when these data become
available. Table 14 [7, 17] provides suggestions for the approximate radius of the
inner cordoned area. Instruction 1 in Ref. [17] provides a list of observables that
can be used by first responders to identify a dangerous source. The actual
boundaries of the safety and security perimeters should be defined in such a way
that they are easily recognizable (e.g. by roads) and should be secured. However,
the safety perimeter should be established at least as far from the source as is
indicated in the table until the radiological assessor has assessed the situation.
TABLE 14. SUGGESTED RADIUS OF THE INNER CORDONED AREA
(SAFETY PERIMETER) IN A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Situation
Initial inner cordoned area
(safety perimeter)
Initial determination — Outside
Unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source 30 m radius around the source
Major spill from a potentially dangerous source 100 m radius around the source
Fire, explosion or fumes involving a dangerous source 300 m radius
Suspected bomb (possible radiological dispersal
device), exploded or unexploded
400 m radius or more to protect
against an explosion
Conventional (non-nuclear) explosion or a fire
involving a nuclear weapon (no nuclear yield)
1000 m radius
Initial determination — Inside a building
Damage, loss of shielding or spill involving a
potentially dangerous source
Affected and adjacent areas
(including floors above and below)
Fire or other event involving a potentially dangerous
source that can spread radioactive material throughout
the building (e.g. through the ventilation system)
Entire building and appropriate
outside distance as indicated above
Expansion based on radiological monitoring
OIL1 and OIL2 from Table 8 Wherever these levels are measured
85
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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Aeberli, W. Beznau Nuclear Power Plant, Switzerland
Ahmad, S. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Pakistan
Barabanova, A. State Research Centre, Institute of Biophysics,
Russian Federation
Boecker, B. Consultant, United States of America
Buglova, E. International Atomic Energy Agency
Carr, Z. World Health Organization
Crick, M. International Atomic Energy Agency
Ford, J. Health Canada, Canada
Hedemann Jensen, P. Risø National Laboratory, Denmark
Homma, T. Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan
Hončarenko, R. Temelin Nuclear Power Plant, Czech Republic
Janko, K. Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic,
Slovakia
Jaworska, A. Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Norway
Kenigsberg, J. National Commission on Radiation Protection, Belarus
Kocheyev, V. World Association for Disaster and Emergency
Medicine, United States of America
Kostadinov, V. Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, Slovenia
Kutkov, V. Russian Research Centre ‘Kurchatov Institute’,
Russian Federation
Lafortune, J. International Safety Research, Canada
Lee, S. International Atomic Energy Agency
90
Lim, S. Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences
(KIRAMS), Republic of Korea
Martinčič, R. International Atomic Energy Agency
McClelland, V. United States Department of Energy,
United States of America
McKenna, T. International Atomic Energy Agency
Miller, C. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
United States of America
Nagataki, S. Japan Radioisotope Association, Japan
Paile, W. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland
Pellet, S. OSSKI National Research Institute for Radiobiology
and Radiohygiene, Hungary
Perez, M. World Health Organization
Ricks, R. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site,
United States of America
Robinson, J. Nuclear Safety Directorate, United Kingdom
Rochedo, E. National Nuclear Energy Commission, Brazil
Scott, B. Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute,
United States of America
Sjöblom, K. Fortum Power and Heat Oy, Loviisa Power Plant,
Finland
Sládek, V. Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic,
Slovakia
Smith, J. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
United States of America
Solomon, S. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
Agency, Australia
91
Sundnes, K. World Association for Disaster and Emergency
Medicine, Norway
Turai, I. OSSKI National Research Institute for Radiobiology
and Radiohygiene, Hungary
Weiss, W. Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Germany
Whitcomb, R. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
United States of America
.
93
BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT
OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
An asterisk denotes a corresponding member. Corresponding members receive
drafts for comment and other documentation but they do not generally participate
in meetings. Two asterisks denote an alternate.
Commission on Safety Standards
Argentina: González, A.J.; Australia: Loy, J.; Belgium: Samain, J.-P.; Brazil:
Vinhas, L.A.; Canada: Jammal, R.; China: Liu Hua; Egypt: Barakat, M.; Finland:
Laaksonen, J.; France: Lacoste, A.-C. (Chairperson); Germany: Majer, D.; India:
Sharma, S.K.; Israel: Levanon, I.; Japan: Fukushima, A.; Korea, Republic of:
Choul-Ho Yun; Lithuania: Maksimovas, G.; Pakistan: Rahman, M.S.; Russian
Federation: Adamchik, S.; South Africa: Magugumela, M.T.; Spain: Barceló
Vernet, J.; Sweden: Larsson, C.M.; Ukraine: Mykolaichuk, O.; United Kingdom:
Weightman, M.; United States of America: Virgilio, M.; Vietnam: Le-chi Dung;
IAEA: Delattre, D. (Coordinator); Advisory Group on Nuclear Security:
Hashmi, J.A.; European Commission: Faross, P.; International Nuclear Safety
Group: Meserve, R.; International Commission on Radiological Protection:
Holm, L.-E.; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Yoshimura, U.; Safety Standards
Committee Chairpersons: Brach, E.W. (TRANSSC); Magnusson, S. (RASSC);
Pather, T. (WASSC); Vaughan, G.J. (NUSSC).
Nuclear Safety Standards Committee
Algeria: Merrouche, D.; Argentina: Waldman, R.; Australia: Le Cann, G.; Austria:
Sholly, S.; Belgium: De Boeck, B.; Brazil: Gromann, A.; *Bulgaria:
Gledachev, Y.; Canada: Rzentkowski, G.; China: Jingxi Li; Croatia: Valčić, I.;
*Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech Republic: Šváb, M.; Egypt: Ibrahim, M.;
Finland: Järvinen, M.-L.; France: Feron, F.; Germany: Wassilew, C.; Ghana:
Emi-Reynolds, G.; *Greece: Camarinopoulos, L.; Hungary: Adorján, F.; India:
Vaze, K.; Indonesia: Antariksawan, A.; Iran, Islamic Republic of:
Asgharizadeh, F.; Israel: Hirshfeld, H.; Italy: Bava, G.; Japan: Kanda, T.; Korea,
Republic of: Hyun-Koon Kim; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Abuzid, O.; Lithuania:
Demčenko, M.; Malaysia: Azlina Mohammed Jais; Mexico: Carrera, A.; Morocco:
Soufi, I.; Netherlands: van der Wiel, L.; Pakistan: Habib, M.A.; Poland:
Jurkowski, M.; Romania: Biro, L.; Russian Federation: Baranaev, Y.; Slovakia:
Uhrik, P.; Slovenia: Vojnovič, D.; South Africa: Leotwane, W.; Spain:
Zarzuela, J.; Sweden: Hallman, A.; Switzerland: Flury, P.; Tunisia: Baccouche, S.;
94
Turkey: Bezdegumeli, U.; Ukraine: Shumkova, N.; United Kingdom:
Vaughan, G.J. (Chairperson); United States of America: Mayfield, M.; Uruguay:
Nader, A.; European Commission: Vigne, S.; FORATOM: Fourest, B.;
IAEA: Feige, G. (Coordinator); International Electrotechnical Commission:
Bouard, J.-P.; International Organization for Standardization: Sevestre, B.;
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Reig, J.; *World Nuclear Association:
Borysova, I.
Radiation Safety Standards Committee
*Algeria: Chelbani, S.; Argentina: Massera, G.; Australia: Melbourne, A.;
*Austria: Karg, V.; Belgium: van Bladel, L.; Brazil: Rodriguez Rochedo, E.R.;
*Bulgaria: Katzarska, L.; Canada: Clement, C.; China: Huating Yang; Croatia:
Kralik, I.; *Cuba: Betancourt Hernandez, L.; *Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech
Republic: Petrova, K.; Denmark: Øhlenschlæger, M.; Egypt: Hassib, G.M.;
Estonia: Lust, M.; Finland: Markkanen, M.; France: Godet, J.-L.; Germany:
Helming, M.; Ghana: Amoako, J.; *Greece: Kamenopoulou, V.; Hungary:
Koblinger, L.; Iceland: Magnusson, S. (Chairperson); India: Sharma, D.N.;
Indonesia: Widodo, S.; Iran, Islamic Republic of: Kardan, M.R.; Ireland:
Colgan, T.; Israel: Koch, J.; Italy: Bologna, L.; Japan: Kiryu, Y.; Korea, Republic
of: Byung-Soo Lee; *Latvia: Salmins, A.; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Busitta, M.;
Lithuania: Mastauskas, A.; Malaysia: Hamrah, M.A.; Mexico: Delgado
Guardado, J.; Morocco: Tazi, S.; Netherlands: Zuur, C.; Norway: Saxebol, G.;
Pakistan: Ali, M.; Paraguay: Romero de Gonzalez, V.; Philippines: Valdezco, E.;
Poland: Merta, A.; Portugal: Dias de Oliveira, A.M.; Romania: Rodna, A.;
Russian Federation: Savkin, M.; Slovakia: Jurina, V.; Slovenia: Sutej, T.; South
Africa: Olivier, J.H.I.; Spain: Amor Calvo, I.; Sweden: Almen, A.; Switzerland:
Piller, G.; *Thailand: Suntarapai, P.; Tunisia: Chékir, Z.; Turkey: Okyar, H.B.;
Ukraine: Pavlenko, T.; United Kingdom: Robinson, I.; United States of America:
Lewis, R.; *Uruguay: Nader, A.; European Commission: Janssens, A.; Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Byron, D.; IAEA: Boal, T.
(Coordinator); International Commission on Radiological Protection: Valentin, J.;
International Electrotechnical Commission: Thompson, I.; International Labour
Office: Niu, S.; International Organization for Standardization: Rannou, A.;
International Source Suppliers and Producers Association: Fasten, W.; OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency: Lazo, T.E.; Pan American Health Organization:
Jiménez, P.; United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation: Crick, M.; World Health Organization: Carr, Z.; World Nuclear
Association: Saint-Pierre, S.
95
Transport Safety Standards Committee
Argentina: López Vietri, J.; **Capadona, N.M.; Australia: Sarkar, S.; Austria:
Kirchnawy, F.; Belgium: Cottens, E.; Brazil: Xavier, A.M.; Bulgaria:
Bakalova, A.; Canada: Régimbald, A.; China: Xiaoqing Li; Croatia:
Belamarić, N.; *Cuba: Quevedo Garcia, J.R.; *Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech
Republic: Ducháček, V.; Denmark: Breddam, K.; Egypt: El-Shinawy, R.M.K.;
Finland: Lahkola, A.; France: Landier, D.; Germany: Rein, H.; *Nitsche, F.;
**Alter, U.; Ghana: Emi-Reynolds, G.; *Greece: Vogiatzi, S.; Hungary: Sáfár, J.;
India: Agarwal, S.P.; Indonesia: Wisnubroto, D.; Iran, Islamic Republic of:
Eshraghi, A.; *Emamjomeh, A.; Ireland: Duffy, J.; Israel: Koch, J.; Italy:
Trivelloni, S.; **Orsini, A.; Japan: Hanaki, I.; Korea, Republic of: Dae-Hyung
Cho; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Kekli, A.T.; Lithuania: Statkus, V.; Malaysia:
Sobari, M.P.M.; **Husain, Z.A.; Mexico: Bautista Arteaga, D.M.; **Delgado
Guardado, J.L.; *Morocco: Allach, A.; Netherlands: Ter Morshuizen, M.; *New
Zealand: Ardouin, C.; Norway: Hornkjøl, S.; Pakistan: Rashid, M.; *Paraguay:
More Torres, L.E.; Poland: Dziubiak, T.; Portugal: Buxo da Trindade, R.; Russian
Federation: Buchelnikov, A.E.; South Africa: Hinrichsen, P.; Spain: Zamora
Martin, F.; Sweden: Häggblom, E.; **Svahn, B.; Switzerland: Krietsch, T.;
Thailand: Jerachanchai, S.; Turkey: Ertürk, K.; Ukraine: Lopatin, S.; United
Kingdom: Sallit, G.; United States of America: Boyle, R.W.; Brach, E.W.
(Chairperson); Uruguay: Nader, A.; *Cabral, W.; European Commission: Binet, J.;
IAEA: Stewart, J.T. (Coordinator); International Air Transport Association:
Brennan, D.; International Civil Aviation Organization: Rooney, K.; International
Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations: Tisdall, A.; **Gessl, M.; International
Maritime Organization: Rahim, I.; International Organization for
Standardization: Malesys, P.; International Source Supplies and Producers
Association: Miller, J.J.; **Roughan, K.; United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe: Kervella, O.; Universal Postal Union: Bowers, D.G.; World Nuclear
Association: Gorlin, S.; World Nuclear Transport Institute: Green, L.
Waste Safety Standards Committee
Algeria: Abdenacer, G.; Argentina: Biaggio, A.; Australia: Williams, G.; *Austria:
Fischer, H.; Belgium: Blommaert, W.; Brazil: Tostes, M.; *Bulgaria:
Simeonov, G.; Canada: Howard, D.; China: Zhimin Qu; Croatia: Trifunovic, D.;
Cuba: Fernandez, A.; Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech Republic: Lietava, P.;
Denmark: Nielsen, C.; Egypt: Mohamed, Y.; Estonia: Lust, M.; Finland: Hutri, K.;
France: Rieu, J.; Germany: Götz, C.; Ghana: Faanu, A.; Greece: Tzika, F.;
Hungary: Czoch, I.; India: Rana, D.; Indonesia: Wisnubroto, D.; Iran, Islamic
96
Republic of: Assadi, M.; *Zarghami, R.; Iraq: Abbas, H.; Israel: Dody, A.; Italy:
Dionisi, M.; Japan: Matsuo, H.; Korea, Republic of: Won-Jae Park; *Latvia:
Salmins, A.; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Elfawares, A.; Lithuania: Paulikas, V.;
Malaysia: Sudin, M.; Mexico: Aguirre Gómez, J.; *Morocco: Barkouch, R.;
Netherlands: van der Shaaf, M.; Pakistan: Mannan, A.; *Paraguay: Idoyaga
Navarro, M.; Poland: Wlodarski, J.; Portugal: Flausino de Paiva, M.; Slovakia:
Homola, J.; Slovenia: Mele, I.; South Africa: Pather, T. (Chairperson); Spain: Sanz
Aludan, M.; Sweden: Frise, L.; Switzerland: Wanner, H.; *Thailand: Supaokit, P.;
Tunisia: Bousselmi, M.; Turkey: Özdemir, T.; Ukraine: Makarovska, O.; United
Kingdom: Chandler, S.; United States of America: Camper, L.; *Uruguay:
Nader, A.; European Commission: Necheva, C.; European Nuclear Installations
Safety Standards: Lorenz, B.; *European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards:
Zaiss, W.; IAEA: Siraky, G. (Coordinator); International Organization for
Standardization: Hutson, G.; International Source Suppliers and Producers
Association: Fasten, W.; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Riotte, H.; World
Nuclear Association: Saint-Pierre, S.
@
No. 22
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IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish
or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life
and property, and to provide for the application of these standards.
The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in
the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety,
transport safety and waste safety. The publication categories in the series are Safety
Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.
Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme is available at the IAEA
Internet site
http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/
The site provides the texts in English of published and draft safety standards. The
texts of safety standards issued in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, the
IAEA Safety Glossary and a status report for safety standards under development are
also available. For further information, please contact the IAEA at PO Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria.
All users of IAEA safety standards are invited to inform the IAEA of experience
in their use (e.g. as a basis for national regulations, for safety reviews and for training
courses) for the purpose of ensuring that they continue to meet users’ needs.
Information may be provided via the IAEA Internet site or by post, as above, or by
email to Official.Mail@iaea.org.
OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS
The IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of
Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of
information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among
its Member States for this purpose.
Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued as Safety
Reports, which provide practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in
support of the safety standards.
Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Radiological Assessment
Reports, the International Nuclear Safety Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports
and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological accidents, training
manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety related publications. Security
related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
RELATED PUBLI CATI ONS
www.iaea.org/books
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2
STI/PUB/1133 (72 pp.; 2002)
ISBN 92–0–116702–4 Price: €20.50
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS FOR A NUCLEAR OR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1
STI/PUB/1265 (145 pp.; 2007)
ISBN 92–0–109306–3 Price: €31.00
PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO
TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3)
STI/PUB/1119 (125 pp.; 2002)
ISBN 92–0–111602–0 Price: €14.50
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1
STI/PUB/1273 (37 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–110706–4 Price: €25.00
CATEGORIZATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9
STI/PUB/1227 (70 pp.; 2005)
ISBN 92–0–103905–0 Price: €18.00
GOVERNMENTAL, LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
SAFETY
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1
STI/PUB/1465 (63 pp.; 2010)
ISBN 978–92–0–106410–3 Price: €45.00
SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 4
STI/PUB/1375 (56 pp.; 2009)
ISBN 978–92–0–112808–9 Price: €48.00
PREDISPOSAL MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5
STI/PUB/1368 (38 pp.; 2009)
ISBN 978–92–0–111508–9 Price: €45.00
THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3
STI/PUB/1252 (39 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–106506–X Price: €25.00
P1467_cover.indd 2 2011-05-04 07:35:33
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA
ISBN 978–92 –0–107410–2
ISSN 1020–525X
“Governments, regulatory bodies and operators everywhere must
ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are used
beneficially, safely and ethically. The IAEA safety standards are
designed to facilitate this, and I encourage all Member States to
make use of them.”
Yukiya Amano
Director General
Safety through international standards
IAEA Safety Standards
Criteria for Use in
Preparedness and
Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency
Jointly sponsored by the
FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, WHO
1
for protecting people and the environment
No. GSG-2
General Safety Guide
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P1467_cover.indd 1 2011-05-04 07:35:32

IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for the application of these standards. The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety. The publication categories in the series are Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme is available at the IAEA Internet site http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ The site provides the texts in English of published and draft safety standards. The texts of safety standards issued in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, the IAEA Safety Glossary and a status report for safety standards under development are also available. For further information, please contact the IAEA at PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, Austria. All users of IAEA safety standards are invited to inform the IAEA of experience in their use (e.g. as a basis for national regulations, for safety reviews and for training courses) for the purpose of ensuring that they continue to meet users’ needs. Information may be provided via the IAEA Internet site or by post, as above, or by email to Official.Mail@iaea.org.

OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS The IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among its Member States for this purpose. Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued as Safety Reports, which provide practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in support of the safety standards. Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Radiological Assessment Reports, the International Nuclear Safety Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological accidents, training manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety related publications. Security related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

CRITERIA FOR USE IN PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. GSG-2

CRITERIA FOR USE IN PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
GENERAL SAFETY GUIDE
JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 2011

COPYRIGHT NOTICE
All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised in 1972 (Paris). The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual Property Organization (Geneva) to include electronic and virtual intellectual property. Permission to use whole or parts of texts contained in IAEA publications in printed or electronic form must be obtained and is usually subject to royalty agreements. Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and translations are welcomed and considered on a case-by-case basis. Enquiries should be addressed to the IAEA Publishing Section at: Marketing and Sales Unit, Publishing Section International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna International Centre PO Box 100 1400 Vienna, Austria fax: +43 1 2600 29302 tel.: +43 1 2600 22417 email: sales.publications@iaea.org http://www.iaea.org/books

© IAEA, 2011 Printed by the IAEA in Austria May 2011 STI/PUB/1467

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Criteria for use in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency : general safety guide / jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations … [et al.]. — Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011. p. ; 24 cm. — (IAEA safety standards series, ISSN 1020–525X ; no. GSG-2) STI/PUB/1467 ISBN 978–92–0–107410–2 Includes bibliographical references. 1. Nuclear facilities — Safety measures. 2. Nuclear accidents. 3. Assistance in emergencies. 4. Emergency plans. 5. Safety standards. 6. Radiation dosimetry. I. International Atomic Energy Agency. II. Series. IAEAL 11–00669

and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste. The standards are also applied by regulatory bodies and operators around the world to enhance safety in nuclear power generation and in nuclear applications in medicine. regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime. as well as governmental organization. as is the IAEA’s assistance in their application. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles. which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. Regulating safety is a national responsibility. The emphasis placed on quality. siting and engineering safety. The risks associated with ionizing radiation must be assessed and controlled without unduly limiting the contribution of nuclear energy to equitable and sustainable development. operational safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. .FOREWORD by Yukiya Amano Director General The IAEA’s Statute authorizes the Agency to “establish or adopt… standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property” — standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. agriculture and research. radiation safety. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The IAEA safety standards are designed to facilitate this. safely and ethically. and I encourage all Member States to make use of them. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Safety is not an end in itself but a prerequisite for the purpose of the protection of people in all States and of the environment — now and in the future. reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions. For parties to the various international safety conventions. Governments. regulatory bodies and operators everywhere must ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are used beneficially. industry. and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA’s standards for use in their national regulations. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards. The IAEA’s safety services encompass design. the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. IAEA standards provide a consistent.

at the IAEA and elsewhere. the safety standards committees and the Commission on Safety Standards. reviewing and establishing the IAEA standards involves the IAEA Secretariat and all Member States. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan caused by the disastrous earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 and the consequences of the emergency for people and the environment have to be fully investigated. Lessons to be learned for nuclear safety and radiation protection and for emergency preparedness and response will be reflected in IAEA safety standards as they are revised and issued in the future. . They are already under study in Japan. are kept under regular review by the Secretariat. as a key element of the global safety regime. The present publication reflects feedback and experience accumulated until 2010 and it has been subject to the rigorous review process for standards. The process of developing.DISCLAIMER The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The IAEA standards. many of which are represented on the four IAEA safety standards committees and the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards. The Secretariat gathers information on experience in the application of the IAEA standards and information gained from the follow-up of events for the purpose of ensuring that the standards continue to meet users’ needs.

14). Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. Under Article 5a(ii) of the Assistance Convention. GS-R-2). adopted in 1986. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). one function of the IAEA is to collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information concerning methodologies. the International Labour Office (ILO). jointly sponsored by seven international organizations. if necessary. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (‘the Early Notification Convention’) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (‘the Assistance Convention’) (IAEA Legal Series No. It also presents operational criteria derived from certain generic criteria. techniques and available results of research relating to response to such emergencies. place specific obligations on the Parties and on the IAEA.PREFACE In March 2002. which establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. and further encouraged them to “implement the Safety Requirements for Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency”. including numerical values of these criteria. in resolution GC(46)/RES/9. This Safety Guide is intended to assist Member States in the application of the Safety Requirements publication on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. including their arrangements for responding to acts involving the malicious use of nuclear or radioactive material and to threats of such acts”. It provides generic criteria for protective actions and other response actions in the case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. GS-R-2). . instruments for improving their own preparedness and response capabilities for nuclear and radiological incidents and accidents. encouraged Member States “to implement. and to help in the fulfilment of the IAEA’s obligations under the Assistance Convention. the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are joint sponsors of this Safety Guide. the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved a Safety Requirements publication. The IAEA General Conference.

..

are a cornerstone of this global regime. States have an obligation of diligence and duty of care. where appropriate. THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA’s Statute. in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. International safety standards also promote and assure confidence in safety and facilitate international commerce and trade. IAEA safety standards. which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt. The IAEA safety standards constitute a useful tool for contracting parties to assess their performance under these international conventions. radiation risks may transcend national borders. and are expected to fulfil their national and international undertakings and obligations. and international cooperation serves to promote and enhance safety globally by exchanging experience and by improving capabilities to control hazards. Regulating safety is a national responsibility. which support the implementation of binding international instruments and national safety infrastructures. ranging from power generation to uses in medicine. However. transport and use of radioactive material. Activities such as the medical uses of radiation. the production. A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously improved. and the management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to standards of safety. such as those relating to environmental protection. to respond to emergencies and to mitigate any harmful consequences. if necessary. industry and agriculture. The radiation risks to workers and the public and to the environment that may arise from these applications have to be assessed and. standards of safety for protection . controlled. in consultation and. International safety standards provide support for States in meeting their obligations under general principles of international law.THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS BACKGROUND Radioactivity is a natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation are features of the environment. to prevent accidents. the operation of nuclear installations. Radiation and radioactive substances have many beneficial applications.

Requirements. .of health and minimization of danger to life and property. and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur. the IAEA safety standards establish fundamental safety principles. Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security. including nuclear installations. both now and in the future. nuclear chain reaction. With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. 1). the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste. and provide the basis for the safety requirements. Safety Fundamentals Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles of protection and safety. radioactive source or any other source of radiation. and to provide for their application. The format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment. the use of radiation and radioactive sources. including numbered ‘overarching’ requirements. Safety Requirements An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment. measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The requirements are governed by the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. They are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. requirements and measures to control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment. in a harmonized manner. If the requirements are not met. to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core. The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks. of a national regulatory framework. Many requirements are not addressed to a specific party. which has three categories (see Fig. Safety measures and security measures1 have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment. are expressed as ‘shall’ statements. 1 See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

Governmental. APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. Emergency Preparedness and Response Specific Safety Requirements 1. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed as ‘should’ statements. Decommissioning and Termination of Activities Part 7. Commissioning and Operation 3. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities 6.2. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities Part 5. Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety Part 2.Safety Fundamentals Fundamental Safety Principles General Safety Requirements Part 1. 1. The IAEA safety standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations and by many . and increasingly they reflect best practices. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Collection of Safety Guides FIG. the implication being that the appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 5. Design and Construction 2. to help users striving to achieve high levels of safety.1. Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources Part 4. Safety of Research Reactors 4. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series. Leadership and Management for Safety Part 3. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste Part 6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2. Safety Guides Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the safety requirements. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations 2. The Safety Guides present international good practices. indicating an international consensus that it is necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative measures).

The requirements established in the IAEA safety standards might not be fully met at some existing facilities that were built to earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards are to be applied to such facilities is a decision for individual States. 2). are intended to apply primarily to new facilities and activities. construct and operate nuclear facilities. The IAEA safety standards. in particular those addressing aspects of safety in planning or design. They can be used by States as a reference for their national regulations in respect of facilities and activities. many of the IAEA safety standards. For example. The IAEA safety standards are applicable. The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA’s safety review services. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA Secretariat and four safety standards committees. however. and a Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme (see Fig. .organizations that design. and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence building. supplemented by international conventions. International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties. decision makers must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise. The IAEA’s Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted operations. establish a consistent basis for protecting people and the environment. radiation safety (RASSC). There will also be some special aspects of safety that need to be assessed at the national level. as relevant. including the development of educational curricula and training courses. the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC). industry standards and detailed national requirements. The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards provide an objective basis for decisions concerning safety. as well as organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources. throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. for nuclear safety (NUSSC).

review by the safety standards committees and the CSS Secretariat and consultants: drafting of new or revision of existing safety standard Draft Review by safety standards committee(s) Draft Member States Comments Final draft Endorsement by the CSS FIG. A management system has been established for the processes of planning. It articulates the mandate of the IAEA. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard. developing. the vision for the future application of the safety standards. revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards. All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards committees and may provide comments on draft standards.Outline and work plan prepared by the Secretariat. policies and strategies. The membership of the Commission on Safety Standards is appointed by the Director General and includes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishing national standards. and corresponding functions and responsibilities. reviewing. INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international . 2.

iaea. the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization. are used to provide practical examples or additional information or explanation. of each publication. scope and structure are explained in Section 1. if included.expert bodies.htm). Introduction.org/standards/safety-glossary. Extraneous material presented in annexes is excerpted and adapted as necessary to be generally useful. . Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other bodies in the United Nations system or other specialized agencies. Otherwise. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the main text. the United Nations Environment Programme. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text. including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. notably the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). An appendix. the English version of the text is the authoritative version. are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety standards. is considered to form an integral part of the safety standard. procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or annexes. and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Annexes and footnotes to the main text. For Safety Guides. the International Labour Organization. or describes methods of calculation. the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary (see http://www-ns. Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text (e. material under other authorship may be presented in annexes to the safety standards. The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety Standards Series and its objective. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text. is included in support of statements in the body text.g. if included. Annex material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued under its authorship.

. . .1–1. 2. . . . .26–3. . . . . .12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8–1. . . . . . . . MILK AND WATER. INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATION AND CONTAMINATION OF FOOD. . . . . . . . . . . . OPERATIONAL CRITERIA (5.15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Structure (1.13–3. . . . . . .34). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18–3. . . . CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . .1–5. . 4.1–2. . Substantial risk as a basis for operational criteria (3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BASIC CONSIDERATIONS (2. . . . .13). . . . . . 53 84 85 89 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objective (1. . GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS (4. .16) . . . . . . . . . . FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE CRITERIA .5). Scope (1. System of protective actions and other response actions (3. . . . . . . . . . . APPENDIX IV: OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OF A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY . . .1–3. . . . . . . . .6–1. Projected dose as a basis for operational criteria (3. . . . . . .5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REFERENCES . . . . . . DOSE CONCEPTS AND DOSIMETRIC QUANTITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPENDIX I: 23 APPENDIX II: 29 APPENDIX III: DEVELOPMENT OF EALs AND EXAMPLES OF EALs FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS . .1–4. . . . . EXAMPLES OF DEFAULT OILs FOR DEPOSITION. . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION . . . .CONTENTS 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 2 4 4 5 5 12 13 15 17 19 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background (1. .7) . . . . . .17) . . . . . . 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . Dose that has been received as a basis for operational criteria (3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1. INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND 1. jointly sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) [3]. para. one function of the IAEA is to “collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information concerning … methodologies.1.4. medical treatment and long term health monitoring. which establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Under Article 5a(ii) of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (‘the Assistance Convention’) [1]. the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved a Safety Requirements publication. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. [3] was used as the starting point for developing revised international guidance on emergency preparedness and response. The framework proposed in Ref. In 2005. that presents numerical values for generic criteria for emergency response and provides additional guidance. 3. Examples of other response actions include the provision of public information.36). 1. In March 2002. The criteria are described and needs for their development on the basis of lessons learned from experience and related scientific knowledge are explained. the IAEA issued a publication. [4]. The present Safety Guide provides recommendations on such criteria.2. A rigorous assessment of experience in Member States has shown that there is a need for additional consistent international guidance on taking protective actions and other response actions1.3. This was jointly sponsored by seven international organizations and was issued as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. and for placing this guidance in a context that is comprehensive for decision makers and that can be explained to the public. techniques and available results of research relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies”. GS-R-2 [2]. 1. 1 1 . Principle 9 of the Fundamental Safety Principles establishes that arrangements for emergency preparedness and response include “[c]riteria set in advance for use in determining when to take different protective actions” (Ref.1.

and emergency conditions. Safety related terms used in this Safety Guide are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary [5]. • Addresses lessons learned from responses to past emergencies. and numerical values for these criteria. 2 . [2] for emergency preparedness and response. The recommendations presented in this Safety Guide concern the values of the generic criteria needed to develop operational criteria for implementing protective actions and other response actions to protect emergency workers and the public in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. • Provides an internally consistent foundation for the application of principles of and insights into radiation protection for the conceivable range of protective actions and other response actions. The primary objectives of this Safety Guide are: — To present a coherent set of generic criteria (expressed numerically in terms of radiation dose) that form a basis for developing the operational levels needed for decision making concerning protective actions and other response actions necessary to meet the emergency response objectives. [6]. The set of generic criteria: • Addresses the requirements of Ref.8.6. SCOPE 1. 1. This Safety Guide should be used in conjunction with Ref.7. OBJECTIVE 1. [2]. [2] by providing generic criteria. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements of Ref. — To propose a basis for a plain language explanation of the criteria for the public and for public officials that addresses the risks to human health of radiation exposure and provides a basis for a response that is commensurate with the risks.5. for protective actions and other response actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. This Safety Guide also presents operational criteria derived from certain generic criteria and as such represents the revision of Ref.1. which it supports.

1. This Safety Guide does not provide detailed guidance on the arrangements necessary for developing and maintaining an effective emergency response capability.13. This Safety Guide cannot take into account all factors that are site specific. Detailed recommendations on developing and maintaining an effective emergency response capability are provided in Refs [7–9]. local. However. social. The method used for the development of operational criteria is described only in general terms. Decision makers in an emergency and the public may have only a limited or no understanding of the principles of radiation protection. 1. economic. political. 2 3 .11. Examples of default operational criteria for implementing protective actions and other response actions are also provided. 1. A manual for assessment of field data in a nuclear or radiological emergency is in preparation.1. Protective actions and other response actions are not based on attributes relating to radiation protection alone. to assist in the communication of the purpose of each of the criteria and the associated protective actions and other response actions. This Safety Guide addresses the criteria for initiating protective actions and other response actions and criteria to support decision making in an emergency. economic. This Safety Guide therefore also provides a plain language explanation of the operational criteria.10.14. Emergency planners should remain flexible in their use of the guidance and should work with interested parties to adapt the recommendations so as to take account of local.9. environmental. demographic and other factors. the risks associated with radiation exposure and the appropriate actions that can be taken to reduce these risks.2 1.12. environmental and psychological factors before making any final decision on actions to be taken in response to an emergency.15. State specific or specific to a particular type of emergency. 1. Decision makers should consider various social. This Safety Guide excludes recommendations for actions that might be required in an existing exposure situation. 1. the recommendations on generic and operational criteria presented in this Safety Guide relate solely to that input into the decision making process that is based on considerations of radiation protection.

2. Implementing compatible systems at the national level in different States will allow the objectives of emergency response to be met and will contribute towards establishing a harmonized system for emergency preparedness and response worldwide. The four appendices provide further elaboration on and clarification of the recommendations provided in the main text. Section 5 discusses operational criteria. This Safety Guide was developed with due consideration of the relevant international guidance that provides recommendations for the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency [2. 2.3. for which the generic criteria were developed. Sections 3 and 4 provide recommendations on emergency response criteria for protective actions and other response actions for protecting the public and on guidance values for emergency workers. 2. respectively. The framework of generic criteria for emergency response presented in this Safety Guide was developed on the understanding that it should be simple and consistent. Experience has clearly shown that an internationally endorsed. fully integrated system of guidance is necessary for taking consistent protective actions and other response actions in an emergency that will best ensure public safety.4. A deterministic effect is considered to be a severe deterministic effect if it is fatal or life threatening or if it results in a permanent injury that reduces quality of life [2. 10–15]. 3 4 . This system should build on existing international guidance and experience. 2. [2]. 2. This Safety Guide has five sections. 5].1. Section 2 provides a discussion of the basic considerations used in the development of the recommendations. thresholds for severe deterministic effects3 for both external exposure and internal exposure were developed that could be directly related to the full range of important radionuclides. 6. The recommendations presented in the Safety Guide address health consequences due to external exposure and internal exposure of specific target organs. should be based on international consensus and should subsequently be implemented at the national level. For the recommendations on how to meet the requirements of Ref. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS 2.STRUCTURE 1.16.

registration for long term health monitoring. 5 . Such actions include screening based on individual doses to specific organs. SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY Types of possible health consequences of exposure Severe deterministic effects a Basis for implementation of protective actions and other response actions Projected dose Implementation of precautionary urgent protective actions. to prevent severe deterministic effects Implementation of urgent protective actions and initiation of early protective actionsc to reduce the risk of stochastic effects as far as reasonably possible Dose received Other response actionsb for treatment and management of severe deterministic effects Other response actionsd for early detection and effective management of stochastic effects Increase in stochastic effects a b c d Generic criteria are established at levels of dose that are approaching the thresholds for severe deterministic effects. considering the need for registration for medical follow-up and counselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances. [3] for the basis for the numerical values of the criteria addressing deterministic and stochastic effects).1.2. Such actions include relocation and long term restriction of consumption of contaminated food. and comprehensive psychological counselling. Such actions include immediate medical examination. The system of protective actions and other response actions in an emergency (see Table 1) includes numerical values of generic criteria as well as of the corresponding operational criteria that form the basis for decision making in an emergency. Generic criteria are based on current knowledge of deterministic and stochastic effects (see Ref. decorporation where applicable. contamination control. 3.5. consultation and treatment as indicated. TABLE 1. FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE CRITERIA SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS 3. even under adverse conditions.

should be implemented to reduce the risk of stochastic effects (generic criteria are presented in Table 3). based on radiation survey data. — If the dose exceeds a particular generic criterion identified in Table 2 or 3. the detriment due to which may be minimized by. as required. dose measurements or dose calculations) can provide a valuable input for determining the medical treatment. • Increase in stochastic effects.g. However. including medical treatment5. all of which are justified and optimized. — The following types of exposure should be taken into account in the planning and implementation of protective actions and other response actions in an emergency: • The projected dose that could be prevented or reduced by means of precautionary urgent protective actions. 5 4 6 . individuals should be provided with appropriate medical attention. medical actions. See Appendix I.2. — Precautionary urgent protective actions should be implemented before the event (on the basis of a substantial risk of a release or exposure) under any circumstances. Medical actions should be initiated and performed on the basis of medical symptoms and observations.g. psychological effects. • The dose that has been received. in order to prevent the development of severe deterministic effects for very high levels of dose (generic criteria are presented in Table 2). long term health monitoring and psychological counselling. • Adverse effects on the environment and property. for example.3. dosimetric information (e. The following considerations form the basis of this system: — The following possible outcomes should be considered during the planning and implementation of protective actions and other response actions in an emergency: • Development of severe deterministic effects4. urgent and early protective actions and other response actions. — If the risk of stochastic effects is the main concern and the risk of the development of severe deterministic effects is negligible. and may be addressed by public reassurance or counselling. • Other adverse effects (e. economic disruption). social disorder.

A summary of the dose concepts and the dosimetric quantities is provided in Appendix I. for different types of possible health consequences of exposure. System of generic criteria and operational criteria. Table 1 summarizes. 6 7 .3. specific observables and other indicators of conditions on the scene that should be used in decision making during an These operational criteria are used as ‘triggers’ at the early stage of an emergency. — For all levels of dose that may result in an emergency exposure situation. a plain language explanation of the risks should be provided to decision makers and the public to allow them to make informed decisions about what actions they will take. and in some publications the term ‘trigger’ is used. emergency action levels (EALs). 1. 3. 1.For issues related to: Operational intervention levels (OILs) Field and laboratory measurements Generic criteria Emergency action levels (EALs) Abnormal facility conditions Observables/ indicators Conditions on the scene FIG. The operational criteria6 are values of measurable quantities or observables that include operational intervention levels (OILs).4. Generic criteria are provided in terms of dose that can be projected or dose that has already been received. 3. the basis for implementation of protective actions and other response actions. The system of generic criteria and operational criteria is illustrated in Fig.

even after the emergency (e. Table 3 provides a set of generic criteria for use in the protection strategy that are compatible with reference levels within a range of 20–100 mSv. It should include.5. The protection strategy should be optimized to reduce exposures below the reference level.g. 3. should be developed.6. as well as further details for specific actions in different time frames. but should not be limited to. comprising specific protective actions and other response actions. A protection strategy. evacuation or food replacement) and other response actions (e. — A reference level should be set. The implementation of 8 . either individually or in combination. If the numerical values of the generic criteria are expected to be exceeded. Urgent protective actions (e.g. should be developed.g.g. — On the basis of the outcome of the optimization of the protection strategy. evacuation) should be taken promptly (e. 10]. should be implemented. because their effectiveness will be reduced by delay [6]. 3. Generic criteria have been established on the basis of generic optimization in consideration of the range of conditions that prevail in an emergency. In no case should urgent protective actions and early protective actions based on the generic criteria cause more detriment than they avert. 3. temporary relocation). expressed in terms of residual dose. expressed in terms of projected dose or dose that has been received.g. Generic criteria are established for urgent protective actions and early protective actions. the following aspects: — Generic criteria for implementing precautionary urgent protective actions to prevent severe deterministic effects should be established (see Table 2). generic criteria for particular protective actions and other response actions. within hours) to be effective. those actions.emergency. and by using the reference level. as well as for other response actions that may be required in an emergency. Event specific conditions may warrant modification of the generic criteria. typically an effective dose of between 20 and 100 mSv. which includes dose contributions via all exposure pathways. They can be long lasting. The generic criteria replace the system of generic intervention levels (GILs) and generic action levels (GALs) that have been described in previous standards [6. medical follow-up). The operational criteria can be used immediately and directly to determine the need for appropriate protective actions and other response actions.7. Early protective actions should be implemented within days or weeks to be effective. This use of generic criteria meets the need for a common term for the system of values that would be used as the basis for the implementation of protective actions (e.

default triggers for initiating the different parts of an emergency response plan. the process of optimization of emergency response planning should be applied. should be expressed in terms of parameters or observable conditions. with account taken of the prevailing conditions as they evolve. Default triggers. the generic criteria presented in Tables 2 and 3 could be used as a basis for the development of criteria at the national level.protective actions and other response actions. with account taken of the time frame (acute or annual) of the 9 . OILs and EALs. as appropriate. (b) before or shortly after a release of radioactive iodine. — Once the protection strategy has been optimized and a set of generic criteria has been developed. If a protective action is implemented effectively.8. and (c) within only a short period after the intake of radioactive iodine. primarily for the early phase. In the absence of national guidance. 3. The generic criterion provided in Table 3 for iodine thyroid blocking is applied for an urgent protective action: (a) if exposure due to radioactive iodine is involved. such as conditions on the scene. The concept of averted dose represents an important component of the optimization of emergency response planning [15]. 3. Taking protective actions at this level of dose will allow the occurrence of all deterministic effects to be avoided and the risk of stochastic effects to be reduced to acceptable levels. in an emergency exposure situation.11. If a reference level different from 20–100 mSv is chosen. Table 2 presents generic criteria (expressed in terms of the dose that is projected or dose that has been received) for taking precautionary urgent protective actions under any circumstances to prevent severe deterministic effects. The concept of averted dose is therefore useful for the assessment of the efficiency of individual protective actions or their combination. Less disruptive protective actions such as sheltering could be implemented for lower doses. would prevent a significant amount of dose. the majority of the projected dose can be averted. 3. Arrangements should be established in advance to revise these triggers. Table 3 provides a set of generic criteria expressed in terms of the dose that has been projected or the dose that has been received.9. 3.10. In the application of generic criteria for individual protective actions. given in Table 3. The set of generic criteria expressed in terms of the projected dose is compatible with reference levels within a range of 20–100 mSv. appropriate scaling of the values of the generic criteria in Table 3 should be carried out. should be derived from the generic criteria.

‘lung’ means the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract. AD() is the RBE weighted absorbed dose delivered over the period of time  by the intake (I05) that will result in a severe deterministic effect in 5% of exposed individuals. 10 . For the purposes of these generic criteria.4 mm) below the body surface). thyroid) and to the lens of the eye from exposure in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation. For this particular case. The generic criterion for decorporation is based on the projected dose without decorporation. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ACUTE DOSES FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS Generic criteria External acute exposure (<10 hours) ADRed marrowa ADFetus ADTissue ADSkinc b Examples of protective actions and other response actions If the dose is projected: — Take precautionary urgent protective actions immediately (even under difficult conditions) to keep doses below the generic criteria — Provide public information and warnings — Carry out urgent decontamination If the dose has been received: — Perform immediate medical examination.g.2 Gy for radionuclides with Z  90e 2 Gy for radionuclides with Z  89e 2 Gy 30 Gy 20 Gy 0.1 Gy 25 Gy at 0. by which incorporated radionuclides are removed from the human body. red marrow. Decorporation is the biological processes. source carried in the hand or pocket).g. Different criteria are used to take account of the significant difference in the radionuclide specific intake threshold values for the radionuclides in these groups [3]. consultation and indicated medical treatment — Carry out contamination control — Carry out immediate decorporationf (if applicable) — Carry out registration for long term health monitoring (medical follow-up) — Provide comprehensive psychological counselling 1 Gy 0. Dose delivered to 100 cm2 at a depth of 0.TABLE 2. ′ means the period of in utero development. lung. gonads.5 cm 10 Gy to 100 cm2 Internal exposure from acute intake ( = 30 days)d AD()Red marrow 0.5 cm under the body surface in tissue due to close contact with a radioactive source (e. facilitated by a chemical or biological agent.1 Gy AD()Thyroid AD()Lung g AD()Colon AD(′)Fetush a b c d e f g h ADRed marrow represents the average RBE weighted absorbed dose to internal tissues or organs (e. The dose is to the 100 cm2 dermis (skin structures at a depth of 40 mg/cm2 (or 0. small intestine.

counselling Counselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances HFetus 100 mSv for the full period of in utero development Note: HT — equivalent dose in an organ or tissue T. evacuation. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY EXPOSURE SITUATIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS Generic criteria Examples of protective actions and other response actions Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take urgent protective actions and other response actions HThyroid E HFetus 50 mSv in the first 7 days 100 mSv in the first 7 days 100 mSv in the first 7 days Iodine thyroid blocking Sheltering. higher values of the generic criteria may be necessary. Generic criteria used in such cases should not exceed those presented in Table 3 by a factor of more than 2–3. the rapid progression of a situation and cases of malicious acts. Examples of when such higher values of generic criteria in exceptional circumstances may be warranted include cases in which replacement food or water is not available. 3. milk and water. milk and water. In exceptional circumstances. natural disasters. decontamination.12. decontamination. public reassurance Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take longer term medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effects E 100 mSv in a month Screening based on equivalent doses to specific radiosensitive organs (as a basis for medical follow-up). cases of extreme weather conditions. E — effective dose. restriction of consumption of food. public reassurance Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other response actions early in the response E HFetus 100 mSv per annum 100 mSv for the full period of in utero development Temporary relocation. 11 . contamination control.TABLE 3. reference level. replacement of food.

6 and table I of Ref. See para. 7 12 . if not under control.16. precautionary urgent protective actions should also be undertaken before or shortly after the start of a release or exposure.SUBSTANTIAL RISK AS A BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL CRITERIA 3. for precautionary urgent protective actions to prevent severe deterministic effects. These precautionary urgent protective actions are warranted under any circumstances [2].13. should be used as the dosimetric criteria in defining those emergencies that have the potential to result in such health effects. classifying and responding to emergencies for which precautionary urgent protective actions should be taken to protect workers and the public from severe deterministic effects. observed conditions indicating a substantial risk associated with a release or exposure that could result in severe deterministic effects should warrant precautionary urgent protective actions. a criticality accident or a radiological emergency in threat category IV involving a lost or stolen source. 3. as provided in Table 2. 3. 8 A dangerous source is a source that could. such as severe core damage at a nuclear power plant. II and III represent decreasing levels of threat at facilities and of the corresponding stringency of requirements for emergency preparedness and response arrangements.17. give rise to exposure sufficient to cause severe deterministic effects. For such emergencies. or the malicious use of radioactive material [16]. Examples include a nuclear emergency in a facility in threat category I [2]. Emergencies can result in early deaths or other severe deterministic effects unless urgent protective actions are taken. 3. 3.15. Generic criteria. These include transport and other authorized activities involving dangerous sources such as industrial radiography Threat categories I. The term ‘substantial risk’ is the basis for operational criteria for decision makers to take actions to prevent severe deterministic effects by keeping doses below those approaching the generic criteria set out in Table 2. Reference [2] addresses this issue by stating that facilities in threat categories I. For emergencies in threat category IV [2] involving dangerous sources8. This categorization is used for determining the need for emergency response arrangements and is not to be confused with categorization of sources for other purposes. [2] for more details. based on projected dose. The risk associated with a radioactive release or exposure is considered to be a ‘substantial risk’ if the release or exposure could result in early deaths or other severe deterministic effects. II and III7 shall have appropriate arrangements in place for promptly detecting.14. 3.

sources. the threshold depends on many factors. as well as events involving possible unauthorized activities. 17].20. In order 13 . the possibility of the presence of children and pregnant women should be considered. para. [2]. such as intake activity. When exposure is being assessed for members of the public. For external exposure. In addition. The projected dose is the basis for operational criteria for decision makers to take actions that meet the following three objectives [2]: — To prevent severe deterministic effects by keeping the dose below levels approaching the generic criteria in Table 2 at which urgent protective actions are warranted under any circumstances. It should be recognized that the doses received before implementation of the protective action could contribute to the induction of deterministic effects. severe deterministic effects could occur. — To take effective protective actions and other response actions to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects by keeping the dose below levels approaching the generic criteria in Table 3.19. half-life. The generic criteria in Table 2 are used as the dosimetric criteria in defining those sources that are considered dangerous [8. PROJECTED DOSE AS A BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL CRITERIA 3. When assessing projected doses.37). 4.21. route of intake. the dose distribution should be considered together with the uncertainty in the dose distribution in the population under consideration. Urgent protective actions should always be introduced to avoid doses approaching levels at which. 3. 3. local officials should develop predetermined criteria for initiating precautionary urgent protective actions upon identifying a situation that could result in severe deterministic effects if no action were taken [18]. Reference [2] establishes that the operator of a practice using a dangerous source shall make arrangements to respond promptly to an emergency involving the source in order to mitigate any consequences (Ref. For internal exposure. The generic criteria in Table 2 are given separately for intake of radioactive material and for external exposure. — To ensure the safety of emergency workers in the tasks being undertaken through the use of the guidance values in Table 4. the dose rate and the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of the radiation. if received.18. nuclear powered satellites or radiothermal generators. the radionuclide emitted and the metabolism of the radionuclide. the threshold for the development of deterministic effects depends on the dose. 3.

the principles of both justification and optimization require consideration of the benefit that would be achieved by the protective actions and other response actions and of the harm.22. in its broadest sense. 14 .24. The RBE weighted averaged absorbed dose in an organ or tissue (RBE weighted absorbed dose) is defined as the product of the averaged absorbed dose in an organ or tissue and the RBE. that would result from them.23. 3. The generic criteria in Table 2 should be used to derive OILs for taking precautionary urgent protective actions and other response actions to prevent severe deterministic effects.g. Therefore. Actions to prevent doses approaching those in Table 2 are always justified. 3.to take all of these factors into account. Table 3 provides the generic criteria that should be used to derive OILs for taking urgent and early protective actions and other response actions. However. For details see Appendix I. The protection provided by applying these generic criteria has been optimized on a generic basis for the general population. as discussed in detail in para.25. Establishing threshold values in terms of the 30 day committed RBE weighted dose relative to the intake thresholds leads to a decrease in the range of threshold values from six orders of magnitude (for the intake) down to a factor of three (for the dose). children or pregnant women) because protective action taken to avert these doses will satisfy the basic principle for the whole population. The unit used to express the RBE weighted absorbed dose is the gray (Gy). the thresholds in terms of intake range over six orders of magnitude [3].5 of appendix II of Ref. assuming that other hazardous conditions do not prevail at the time the actions are implemented. [3]. 3. In the case of combined internal and external exposure. in the case of inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material. 3. the sum of the RBE weighted absorbed doses for intake of radioactive material and for external exposure may be used as a basis for calculation of OILs for decision making purposes. II. the threshold for the development of specific deterministic effects following intake is best established in terms of intake activity [3]. The proposed values do not need to be adjusted to take account of any particular members of the population (e. a value of the 30 day committed RBE weighted absorbed dose is used to specify the threshold for the possible onset of severe deterministic effects in the organ concerned. For the purpose of taking actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.

radiation signs and placards) and radiation survey data should be taken into account when they become available. the dose that has been received is the actual dose received via all exposure pathways. the hypothetical dose that will be received falls under the definition of residual dose (the dose expected to be incurred in the future after protective actions have been terminated or a decision has been taken not to implement protective actions). 3.DOSE THAT HAS BEEN RECEIVED AS A BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL CRITERIA 3. when the dose received exceeds the levels in Table 2 (see footnote 3 on page 4). Examples of urgent actions are medical triage on the scene of an emergency and specialized treatment in hospital shortly after an emergency. 3. Decisions on the implementation of medical actions in the hospital (e. — To provide counselling to those exposed. as required. in the performance of medical triage on the scene. including pregnant women.26. the extent of exposed tissue to be excised during surgical treatment for local radiation injury and the efficiency of decorporation for internal contamination) are strongly supported by the dosimetric information.28.29. However. In describing the dose that has been received. without including assumptions of causal association with radiation exposure. there is a need to distinguish between the planning stage and an actual situation. Medical records made during an emergency (especially on the site) should be focused on clinical symptoms and other observed facts. 3. These actions are initiated and performed on the basis of medical symptoms and observations. In an actual situation. The dose that has been received supports decisions for urgent and longer term medical actions. In the planning stage. The dose that has been received is the basis for operational criteria to support the following actions: — To provide medical care. — To consider the need for medical follow-up for early detection and effective treatment of radiation induced cancers if the dose received exceeds the levels in Table 3. — To provide a basis for reassuring those who were not exposed above the levels specified in Tables 2 and 3 that there is no need for concern. Long term health monitoring of exposed persons starts early during the response and continues for an extended period of time. Such assumptions 15 .g.27. so that they can make informed decisions concerning the further course of their treatment if the dose received exceeds the levels in Tables 2 and 3.g. observables (e.

might lead to anxiety and unjustified medical examination. Determining the cause of the symptoms requires analysis by experts. 3.30. There are different reasons to perform long term health monitoring of the persons affected, such as to provide advanced medical care, to reduce their concern with regard to their health status and to advance scientific knowledge. The reason for follow-up studies should be carefully explained to those involved. 3.31. Long term medical follow-up is justified to detect and treat late deterministic effects and their complications as well as radiation induced cancers. Long term health monitoring should be justified on the basis of one of the following levels of exposure: — Long term health monitoring is always justified at levels of dose above the thresholds for deterministic effects [3]. — Justification of long term health monitoring at levels of dose below the thresholds for deterministic effects requires proper identification of populations at higher risk of developing radiation induced cancers. Medical follow-up should always result in more benefit than harm in terms of public health. One reason for establishing a registry and providing medical followup is for the early detection of disease. This is on the basis of the assumption that earlier diagnosis of cancer will result in more efficient treatment and thus in reduced morbidity and mortality. The level of exposure of radiosensitive organs expressed in equivalent dose and the possibility of detecting cancer among the exposed population should be taken into account when establishing the registry. 3.32. Current epidemiological data show that radiation induced cancers (the excess number of cancer cases above background cancer cases) could be statistically detected in large populations exposed at doses above 0.1 Sv delivered at high dose rates. These data are based on epidemiological studies of well defined populations (e.g. the survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan and patients undergoing radiological medical procedures). Epidemiological studies have not demonstrated such effects in individuals exposed at low doses (less than 0.1 Sv) delivered over a period of many years [19]. The inclusion in long term health monitoring programmes of persons who have received very low doses may cause unnecessary anxiety. Moreover, it is not cost effective in terms of public health care. 3.33. Assessment of long term follow-up after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 revealed that medical follow-up of persons receiving doses below 1 Gy may not

16

be justified, except in the case of absorbed doses to the thyroid. As cited in the WHO Report on Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes [20], cancer screening tests for asymptomatic persons have not been beneficial in terms of improving either survival or quality of life, except screening for breast cancer and cervical cancer through mammography and Pap9 tests, respectively. Thyroid cancer screening following emergencies involving the release of radioactive isotopes of iodine has proved very effective for earlier diagnosis and treatment of children exposed following the Chernobyl accident. 3.34. Exposed persons should be provided with adequate information about the long term risk due to their radiation exposure, including assurance of no further actions being required.

4. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS
4.1. An emergency worker is a person having specified duties as a worker in response to an emergency, who might be exposed while taking actions in response to the emergency. Emergency workers may include those employed by registrants and licensees as well as personnel from response organizations, such as police officers, firefighters, medical personnel, and drivers and crews of evacuation vehicles. 4.2. Reference [2], para. 4.60, states that “National guidance that is in accordance with international standards…shall be adopted for managing, controlling and recording the doses received by emergency workers. This guidance shall include default operational levels of dose for emergency workers for different types of response activities, which are set in quantities that can be directly monitored during the performance of these activities (such as the integrated dose from external penetrating radiation). In setting the default operational levels of dose for emergency workers the contribution to doses via all exposure pathways shall be taken into account.”

9

The Papanicolaou test.

17

4.3. Table 4 recommends guidance values to be used for the protection of emergency workers responding to an emergency. 4.4. Life saving actions resulting in doses that approach or exceed the threshold for severe deterministic effects should be considered only if (a) the expected benefit to others would clearly outweigh the emergency worker’s own risk and (b) the emergency worker volunteers to take the action, and understands and accepts this risk. 4.5. Emergency workers who undertake actions in which the doses received might exceed 50 mSv do so voluntarily and should have been clearly and comprehensively informed in advance of the associated health risks, as well as of available protective measures, and should be trained, to the extent possible, in the actions that they may be required to take. The voluntary basis for response actions by emergency workers is usually covered in the emergency response arrangements. 4.6. Emergency workers should receive medical attention appropriate for the dose they may have received (actions according to Tables 2 and 3). The doses received and information concerning the consequent health risks should be communicated to the workers. Female workers who are aware that they are pregnant should be encouraged to notify the appropriate authority and would typically be excluded from emergency duties. 4.7. In almost all emergencies, at best only the dose from external penetrating radiation will be measured continuously. Consequently, the operational guidance provided to emergency workers should be based on measurements of penetrating radiation (e.g. as displayed on an active or self-reading dosimeter). The dose from intake or skin contamination should be limited by means of the use of protective equipment, the use of stable iodine prophylaxis and the provision of instructions concerning operations in potentially hazardous radiological conditions10. Available information about radiation conditions on the site should be used in aiding decisions on the appropriate protection of emergency workers.

Instructions will cover the application of time, distance and shielding principles, the prevention of ingestion of radioactive material and the use of respiratory protection.

10

18

urgent protective actions should be taken on the basis of precalculated default operational criteria. If this is not feasible. the effective dose and the equivalent dose to an organ that are received have to be limited to minimize the health risk to the individual in line with the risk associated with the guidance values given here. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS Tasks Life saving actions Guidance valuea HP(10)b <500 mSv This value may be exceeded under circumstances in which the expected benefits to others clearly outweigh the emergency worker’s own health risks. There is a need to establish — in advance — operational criteria (values of measurable default quantities or observables) as a surrogate for the generic criteria for undertaking different protective actions and other response actions.1. Methods for the recalculation to address prevailing conditions in an actual emergency should be established during the planning phase.TABLE 4. Precautionary urgent protective actions and. 19 . if the characteristics of an emergency differ from those assumed in the calculations of default operational criteria. Projected dose and dose that has been received are not measurable quantities and cannot be used as a basis for quick actions in an emergency. However. OPERATIONAL CRITERIA 5. HP(10) is the personal dose equivalent HP(d) where d = 10 mm. 5. the criteria should be recalculated. as applicable. and the emergency worker volunteers to take the action and understands and accepts this health risk HP(10) <500 mSv Actions to prevent severe deterministic effects and actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect people and the environment Actions to avert a large collective dose a HP(10) <100 mSv b These values apply only for the dose from exposure to external penetrating radiation. Doses from exposure to non-penetrating external radiation and from intake or skin contamination need to be prevented by all possible means. The majority of urgent protective actions and early protective actions are also implemented on the basis of precalculated default operational criteria.

if not controlled. 5. 11 20 . OILs can be measured by These operational criteria are used as triggers at the early stage of an emergency.3. These criteria should be predefined as stated in Ref.4. ground or surface concentrations. 5. time integrated air concentrations. The size of the cordoned area may be expanded on the basis of dose rate OILs and other environmental measurement OILs (see Appendix II) when these data become available.g. observable operational criteria used to detect. Reference [17] provides guidance on the activity of a radionuclide that.2. The operational criteria11 are the EALs. The OIL is a calculated quantity that corresponds to one of the generic criteria. 8]. the appropriate protective action should be promptly invoked. observables and indicators of conditions on the scene. OILs.5. 5. The EALs are used for classification and for decisions on the implementation of precautionary urgent protective actions corresponding to the emergency class. [2] and implemented as described in Refs [7. in some publications the term ‘trigger’ is used. The OILs are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or activity of radioactive material released. together with the actions to be taken to protect responders and the public. II and III [2]. Appendix III provides a discussion of the EAL development process and gives examples of EALs for the classification of emergencies at a light water reactor nuclear power plant. upon seeing a placard on a vehicle that has been involved in an accident). Reference [18] provides a list of observables that can be used by responders to identify a dangerous source. should be considered to constitute a dangerous source. the operational criteria for implementing urgent protective actions should be predetermined on the basis of information that will be observable on the scene. References [7. or activity concentration of radionuclides in the environment. The EALs are the specific.5. If the OILs are exceeded. predetermined. in food. in water or in biological samples. Usually observations that indicate a radiation hazard will be made by first responders or operators on the scene (e. recognize and determine the emergency class of an event at facilities in threat categories I. The OILs are used with the other operational criteria (EALs and observables) to determine appropriate protective actions and other response actions. For emergencies in threat category IV [2]. 8. 18] provide guidance on the approximate radius of the inner cordoned area in which urgent protective actions would initially be taken on the basis of information observable by responders upon their arrival on the scene.

owing to radiation induced cases of cancer. Every effort should be made to keep the system simple by keeping the number of OILs to a minimum.” 5. In principle. with due consideration of the uncertainties. to detect any increase in the incidence of cancers. 21 . applicable generic criteria and associated assumptions (e. in para. the means to revise the OILs. timely monitoring. It is possible that. reasonably encompasses the protective action (e. and the means to enforce agricultural countermeasures. because of the inherent limitations of epidemiological studies. dose rate due to skin contamination) that. during an emergency.g. 5. owing to the relatively small number of cases of radiation induced cancer to be expected. 5.for ground contamination in the field.. 4. the type of emergency or the characteristics of the radiological hazard).means of instruments in the field or can be determined by means of laboratory analysis or assessment. the sampling and analysis of food and water.g. states that “arrangements shall be made for promptly assessing the results of environmental monitoring and monitoring for contamination on people in order to decide on or to adapt urgent protective actions to protect workers and the public.6.7. This has led to the designation of groups for follow-up for which it would have been impossible. Although it is unlikely. Default operational criteria are therefore needed for determining whether a person should be considered for long term health monitoring and treatment.g. individuals might receive doses that give rise to a high risk of incurring radiation induced cancers.71.. [2] states that default OILs shall be established together with the means to revise the OILs for “environmental measurements (such as dose rates due to deposition and deposition densities) and food concentrations. there might be a detectable increase in the incidence of cancers among the population group that has been exposed. 4. the default OILs should be a minimum set for each operational quantity (e. including the application of operational intervention levels (OILs) with arrangements to revise the OILs as appropriate to take into account the conditions prevailing during the emergency. Criteria that have been established after emergencies have occurred have often been set at too low a level of dose received or have not been set on the basis of radiation dose criteria at all.” In addition. Emergencies have occurred for which no criteria for long term health monitoring and treatment had been pre-established. para.89 of Ref. urgent decontamination).8. Reference [2].

and contamination levels for food. pregnant women). The dosimetric models and data should provide reliable assurance that all members of the public. these assumptions. These default OILs should be developed on the basis of assumptions regarding the emergency. the OILs must be accompanied by a plain language explanation of the situation to which they apply (see Appendix II).12. 5. 22 . Consequently.5. These guidelines should include operational criteria used in the dosimetric support of medical management of the patient [21]. Reference [2] states a requirement for guidelines relating to the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injuries. the public needs to be assured that all groups (e. and they should therefore only be revised if the situation is well understood and there are compelling reasons to do so.13. In the development of the default operational criteria. however. Appendix II provides selected examples of default OILs for deposition. are considered. [2] requires that means be established to revise the default OILs to take into account prevailing emergency conditions. For internal dose assessment and the development of corresponding OILs. the way in which they address a safety or health concern. may not accurately reflect the emergency in question. the application of computer codes is necessary. revising the OILs during an emergency may be disruptive. Ref.11. including those that are most sensitive to radiation (e.10. The dosimetric models for developing the OILs should be established during the planning phase. 5.9. children playing outdoors) have been considered. levels of individual contamination.g. milk and water. However. 5. together with a plain language explanation of the OILs. 5. and what their application means in terms of the risk to individuals.g. the affected population and the prevailing conditions. These models should include a full set of parameters important for the purposes of decision making for dose assessment. Consequently. The public should be informed of the reasons for any change in the OILs applied in an actual emergency.

T) of radiation (R) in an organ or tissue (T) and the relative biological effectiveness (RBER. There are different dose concepts that are relevant to preparedness for and response to an emergency: projected dose.T (1) TABLE 5. The RBE weighted averaged absorbed dose in an organ or tissue (RBE weighted absorbed dose.T ¥ RBE R. equivalent dose and RBE weighted absorbed dose are used in evaluating radiation induced consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency. residual dose and averted dose [5].2.T): AD R. 2. The dosimetric quantities of effective dose.Appendix I DOSE CONCEPTS AND DOSIMETRIC QUANTITIES I. DOSIMETRIC EXPOSURE SITUATIONS Dosimetric quantity Symbol QUANTITIES USED IN EMERGENCY Purpose Radiation protection quantities RBE weighted absorbed dose Equivalent dose Effective dose ADT HT E For evaluating deterministic effects induced as a result of exposure of an organ or tissue For evaluating stochastic effects induced as a result of exposure of an organ or tissue For evaluating detriment related to the occurrence of stochastic effects in an exposed population Operational quantities Personal dose equivalent Ambient dose equivalent HP(d) H*(d) For monitoring external exposure of an individual For monitoring a radiation field at the site of an emergency 23 . I. and are discussed in the following.3.T = ÂD R R. They are listed in Table 5 and illustrated in Fig. I.1. ADT) is defined as the product of averaged absorbed dose (DR.

I. I. 22. The International System of Units (SI) unit used to express the RBE weighted absorbed dose is J·kg–1. 2.4. the dose and the health effects of concern. Dosimetric quantities and their application in emergency exposure situations. 23].5. 24 . The value of RBE should be selected with account taken of the type of radiation. as shown in Table 6. which is called the gray (Gy) [14.T (Gy) of radiation R to tissue or organ T Radiation weighting factors wR Tissue weighting factors wT Equivalent dose HT (Sv) to tissue or organ T Stochastic effects Activity on the body (Bq/cm 2) Relative biological effectiveness RBE Notes: a At a depth of d mm in the ICRU slab phantom b At a depth of 10 mm in the ICRU spherical phantom RBE weighted absorbed dose AD T (Gy) to tissue or organ T Deterministic effects FIG.Absorbed dose D (Gy) at surface of body Quality factors Q Personal dose equivalent a HP(d) (Sv) For issues related to: Individual monitoring Absorbed dose D (Gy) at a point Quality factors Q Ambient dose equivalentb H*(d) (Sv) Area monitoring Effective dose E (Sv) Fluence of penetrating radiation (cm –2) Radiation protection Activity A (Bq) inside body Average absorbed dose D R.

TABLE 6. TISSUE SPECIFIC AND RADIATION SPECIFIC VALUES OF RBE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS [3, 17]
Health effect Haematopoietic syndrome Critical organ Red bone marrow Exposurea External and internal  External and internal n Internal  Internal  Pneumonitis Lungb External and internal  External and internal n Internal  Internal  Gastrointestinal syndrome Colon External and internal  External and internal n Internal  Internal  Necrosis Soft tissued External ,  External n Moist desquamation Skine External ,  External n Hypothyroidism
a

RBET,R 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 7 1 3 1 0c 1 3 1 3
f

Thyroid

Intake of iodine isotopes Other thyroid seekers

0.2 1

b c

d e f

External ,  exposure includes exposure due to bremsstrahlung produced within the material of the source. Tissue of the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract. For alpha emitters uniformly distributed in the contents of the colon, it is assumed that irradiation of the walls of the intestine is negligible. Tissue at a depth of 5 mm below the skin surface over an area of more than 100 cm2. Tissue at a depth of 0.5 mm below the skin surface over an area of more than 100 cm2. Uniform irradiation of the tissue of the thyroid gland is considered to be five times more likely to produce deterministic effects than internal exposure due to low energy beta emitting isotopes of iodine, such as 131I, 129I, 125I, 124I and 123I. Thyroid seeking radionuclides have a heterogeneous distribution in thyroid tissue. The isotope 131I emits low energy beta particles, which leads to a reduced effectiveness of irradiation of critical thyroid tissue owing to the dissipation of the energy of the particles within other tissues.

25

I.6. The weighted averaged absorbed dose (equivalent dose, HT) is defined as the product of the averaged absorbed dose in the organ or tissue (D) and the radiation weighting factor wR [11, 24]:

HT =

ÂD
R

R,T

¥ wR

(2)

I.7. The weighted averaged absorbed dose (equivalent dose, HT) is expressed in sieverts (Sv) [22, 24]. It is an organ specific quantity that may be used for assessment of the risk of incurring any radiation induced cancer in an organ. I.8. The effective dose is widely used in justifying and optimizing protective actions [10]. Its unit is the sievert (Sv) [22]. The total effective dose (E) includes the doses due to external penetrating radiation and due to intake:

E=

ÂH
T

T

¥ wT

(3)

I.9. The quantities used for radiation monitoring are: — Ambient dose equivalent (H*(d)); that is, the dose equivalent that would be produced by the corresponding aligned and expanded field in the International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) sphere at a depth d on the radius opposing the direction of the aligned field; — Personal dose equivalent (HP(d)); that is, the dose equivalent in soft tissue below a specified point on the body at an appropriate depth d. The SI unit for these quantities is J·kg–1, and they are expressed in Sv. I.10. Ambient dose equivalent and personal dose equivalent are the operational quantities based on the quantity of dose equivalent. The dose equivalent is the product of the absorbed dose at a point in the tissue or organ and the appropriate quality factor (QR) for the type of radiation giving rise to the dose [25]:

H=

ÂD
R

R

¥ QR

(4)

26

TABLE 7. CRITICAL RADIATION INDUCED HEALTH EFFECTS IN A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY [3]
Health effect Deterministic effects Fatal Haematopoietic syndrome Gastrointestinal syndrome Pneumonitis Death of embryo/fetus Non-fatal Moist desquamation Necrosis Cataract Acute radiation thyroiditis Hypothyroidism Permanently suppressed ovulation Permanently suppressed sperm count Severe mental retardation Verifiable reduction in intelligence quotient (IQ) Malformation Growth retardation Thyroid cancer All stochastic effects
a

Target organ or entity

Red marrowa Small intestine for external exposurea Colon for internal exposureb Lunga,c Embryo/fetus in all periods of gestation Skind Soft tissuee Lens of the eyea,f Thyroida Thyroida Ovariesa Testesa Embryo/fetus 8–25 weeks of gestation Embryo/fetus 8–25 weeks of gestation Embryo/fetus 3–25 weeks of gestation [26] Embryo/fetus 3–25 weeks of gestation [26] Stochastic effects Thyroid All organs taken into account in definition of effective dose

b

c d

e f

External exposure to the red bone marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid and lens of the eye as irradiation in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation is addressed by ADRed marrow. Different targets for gastrointestinal syndrome are proposed because of the difference in the dose formation in the small intestine and colon in the case of internal exposure. This is due to differences in the kinetics of ingested material in the gastrointestinal tract, which lead to much higher doses in the colon than in the small intestine after intake. For the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory system. Skin structures at a depth of 50 mg/cm2 (or 0.5 mm) below the surface and over an area of 100 cm2. To a depth of 5 mm in tissue. Lens structures at a depth of 300 mg/cm2 (or 3 mm) below the surface.

27

Experience and research indicate that evaluation of the dose to the target organs as presented in the table should provide a basis for selecting operational criteria for making decisions that will address the full range of possible health effects. Table 7 presents a list of radiation induced health effects that would be critical during an emergency.11. 28 .I.

13: (1) OIL1 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for: — Urgent protective actions (e. OILs for air doses or air concentrations from a plume are not included because: (a) in many cases the significant release will be over by the time results of environmental measurements are available. because the dose received by evacuees may be above the generic criteria for medical actions provided in Table 3. examples of default OILs are provided for use in responding to an emergency that results in contamination.g. 29 . as required. (c) there is a great variation in time and location of the plume concentrations at any location during a release. together with a plain language explanation of these OILs and guidance on the use of the OILs (see Tables 8–10). and (d) OILs of these types are highly dependent on the nature of the release. INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATION AND CONTAMINATION OF FOOD. evacuation or sheltering. The following example default OILs are provided12.g. Operating organizations of facilities at which there could be emergencies that result in airborne releases of long duration should develop EALs and possibly facility specific OILs for measurements taken in a plume. OIL2 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for early protective actions to keep the dose for one year to any person living in the area below the generic criteria for taking actions to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects provided in Table 3. MILK AND WATER GENERAL II. protective actions (e. therefore. Examples of OILs for dose rates in a release from a light water reactor resulting from core melt are provided in Ref. — Medical actions. evacuation) to keep the dose to any person living in a contaminated area below the generic criteria for urgent protective actions provided in Table 3. for possible airborne releases from the facilities.1.Appendix II EXAMPLES OF DEFAULT OILs FOR DEPOSITION. 13 OILs for air concentrations arising from resuspension are not provided because doses arising from resuspension have been considered in the deposition OILs. to a predetermined distance) are best taken on the basis of observable criteria. which makes it very difficult to develop OILs that apply to the full range of possible releases. (b) it is difficult to take and analyse air concentrations in a sample in a timely manner. [27]. During the period of significant release. In this appendix. 12 (2) OILs for rates or air concentrations in a plume resulting from an ongoing release are not provided because the example criteria are intended to be very general and practical.

g. contamination of an area small enough that urgent protective actions and early protective actions can be effectively performed at the same time without the need for a phased response. because the dose received by any person may exceed the generic criteria for medical actions provided in Table 3. A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of small areas and/or with the possible involvement of a small number of people. For the purposes of describing the use of the OILs. that is. evacuation) are taken. milk from animals grazing in the area and rainwater collected for drinking to keep the dose to any person below the generic criteria for taking the urgent protective actions provided in Table 3. A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a moderate area (tens of square kilometres) with the possible involvement of a large number of people. nuclear or radiological emergencies resulting in contamination can be thought of as being of three types: (1) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a large area (hundreds of square kilometres) with the possible involvement of a large number of people. urgent protective actions (e. II. followed by early protective actions (e. milk or water that warrant the consideration of restrictions on consumption so as to keep the effective dose to any person below 10 mSv per annum. that is.(3) (4) (5) OIL3 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for immediate restrictions on the consumption of leaf vegetables. OIL4 is a measured value of skin contamination calling for performing decontamination or providing instructions for self-decontamination and for limiting inadvertent ingestion so as: — To keep the dose due to skin contamination to any person below the generic criteria for taking urgent protective action provided in Table 3. (2) (3) 30 . implementation of urgent protective actions and early protective actions should be performed in two phases: first. OIL5 and OIL6 are measured values of concentrations in food. with the involvement of a small number of people who can all be decontaminated and medically assessed by using available resources. contamination of small areas that can easily and quickly be isolated. An emergency of this type could occur at nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants that are in threat category I or II [2]. as required. — To initiate medical treatment or screening. An emergency of this type could be the result of the explosion of a radiological dispersal device or could be caused by a damaged dangerous radioactive source [28]. contamination of an area so large that.2. relocation). that is. in order to be effective.g.

and appendix IV of Ref. For this type of emergency. as appropriate. II. Within a day. OIL4 levels may be very difficult to detect under emergency conditions. Within hours. The process of assessing and responding to an emergency of this type through the implementation of protective actions is shown in Fig.5. any person who may have been contaminated. RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY THAT RESULTS IN CONTAMINATION OF A LARGE AREA II. and to shower and change their clothing as soon as possible. Therefore. the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL2 should be identified and early protective actions should be taken. areas where ground deposition levels exceed or are likely to exceed OIL1. If monitoring and decontamination are not immediately possible. First protective actions should be taken on the basis of conditions observed on the scene [7.3. II. actions should also be taken to reduce the consequences of contamination for those people who were in the area where OIL1 was exceeded. 31 . should be identified and the appropriate urgent protective actions should be taken. Relocation should be accomplished within a week. II. the evacuees should be released and instructed to take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion. The dose to evacuees should also be evaluated and the medical actions called for in Tables 2 and 3 should be taken. and medical evaluation of evacuees.without causing any major disruptions. such as evacuation. should take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion.4. the default OIL. stopping the consumption of local produce. 3.6. and should shower and change their clothing as soon as possible. This type of emergency includes those confined to a single room or a single spill. the evacuees should be monitored and decontaminated (if these actions can be carried out promptly). such as stopping the consumption of locally produced vegetables and milk and commencing the process of implementing temporary relocation. including those who were monitored and had contamination levels below OIL4. the response involves isolating the potentially contaminated area and decontaminating all those involved without necessarily using the OILs. Within hours. If OIL4 is exceeded. [7]) before data from radiological monitoring become available. 18] or on the basis of an emergency classification (see Appendix III.

milk and water response actions No Sample food. 32 .Take action based on observations and classification before monitoring OIL1 exceeded Yes Take OIL1 urgent response actions Immediate Yes decontamination possible Monitor and decontaminate evacuees using OIL4 No No Release evacuees with instruction to control ingestion and to decontaminate when possible OIL2 exceeded Yes Take OIL2 early response actions No OIL3 exceeded Yes Take OIL3 food. milk and water far beyond where OIL3 is exceeded OIL5 and 6 exceeded Yes Take OIL6 food and milk response actions Take longer term action based on criteria developed with stakeholders after assessment of conditions FIG. Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a large area. 3.

and appendix IV of Ref.13. if warranted. possibly out to a distance of more than 100 km. Within days. 18] or on the basis of an emergency classification (see Appendix III. After the emergency is over.8. and of rainwater collected for drinking. Within days.9. the mixture of the radionuclides over the affected area should be determined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised. and the appropriate urgent protective actions and early protective actions should be taken where OIL2 is exceeded. evacuees should be decontaminated. the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL3 should be identified and actions should be taken to stop consumption of locally produced vegetables and milk. if this can be done promptly. If monitoring and/or decontamination are not immediately possible. The process of assessing and responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a moderate area through the implementation of protective actions is shown in Fig. Within a week. II. II.7.12. II. Evacuees should be monitored and if OIL4 is exceeded. further actions should be taken on the basis of criteria developed after careful assessment of conditions and in consultation with interested parties. and actions should be taken to restrict consumption of food. Within hours. milk and water with concentrations of radionuclides in excess of OIL5 and OIL6. 4. areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL2 should be identified. Any recommendation to the public to take any protective actions should be accompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria. until they have been screened and analysed. II. food. the evacuees should be released 33 . First protective actions are taken on the basis of conditions observed on the scene [7.10. RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION OF A MODERATE AREA II. [7]) before data from radiological monitoring become available. milk and water should be screened and analysed.11.II. II. The dose to evacuees should also be evaluated and the medical actions called for in Tables 2 and 3 should be taken.

4. 34 . milk and water far beyond where OIL3 is exceeded May not be needed * For this type of emergency. should therefore take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion. including those who were monitored and had contamination levels below OIL4. OIL4 levels may be very difficult to detect under emergency conditions. OIL1 urgent and OIL2 early protective actions are taken at the same time where OIL2 is exceeded OIL5 and 6 exceeded No Yes Take OIL6 food and milk response actions Take longer term action based on criteria developed with stakeholders after assessment of conditions FIG. and should shower and change their clothing as soon as possible. milk and water response actions No Legend Sample food. Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of a moderate area. and to shower and change their clothing as soon as possible.Take action based on observations and classification before monitoring OIL2 exceeded* Yes Take OIL1 urgent and OIL2 early response actions Immediate Yes decontamination possible Monitor and decontaminate evacuees using OIL4 No No Release evacuees with instruction to control ingestion and to decontaminate when possible OIL3 exceeded Yes Take OIL3 food. and should be instructed to take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion. Any person who may have been contaminated.

II. areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL3 should be identified and actions should be taken to stop the consumption of rainwater and locally produced vegetables and milk until they have been screened and analysed.14.18. As a result. if only limited amounts of food (e. further actions should be taken on the basis of criteria developed after careful assessment of the conditions and in consultation with the interested parties. The OILs were calculated to ensure that the protective actions to be taken protect against the most radiotoxic radionuclides. and alpha counts/s for alpha radiation (OIL()). all members of the population (including children and pregnant women) as well as all usual activities (such as children playing outdoors) were considered. if warranted. DEFAULT OILs II. II. food. the OILs are overly conservative for many 35 . beta counts per second (counts/s) for beta radiation (OIL()).g. and actions should be taken to restrict the consumption of food. skin and clothing. this step may be omitted.17. Any recommendations to the public to take any protective actions should be accompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria. milk and rainwater should be screened and analysed. II.II. out to a distance of several kilometres. II. Within days. The OILs in Table 8 were established for implementing the protective actions and other response actions in a way consistent with the generic criteria in Tables 2 and 3.19. These OILs apply for emergencies involving all radionuclides. After the emergency is over. and instead restrictions should be placed on the consumption of all the food that could be contaminated until it can be screened and analysed. Table 8 contains OILs for assessing the results of field monitoring of contamination of the ground. fruit and vegetables from local gardens) and non-essential food could have been affected. milk and rainwater having concentrations of radionuclides in excess of OIL5 and OIL6. Within days. An OIL is exceeded if any of its types are exceeded. Finally. In the development of these OILs.15. Three types of OIL are provided in the units measured by field survey instruments: dose rate (OIL()). However. the mixture of radionuclides over the affected area should be determined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised. including fission products released by melting reactor fuel.16.

provide an surface contamination f immediate medical examination measurement — Stop consumption of local produced. register and measurementf estimate the dose to those who were in the area to determine if medical screening is warranted.i measurement grazing in the area out to at least 10 times the distance to which OIL3 is exceeded and assess samples using 2 counts/s direct alpha () OIL5 and OIL6 surface contamination — Consider providing iodine thyroid blockingj for fresh measurementf. DEFAULT OILs FOR FIELD SURVEY MEASUREMENTS OIL OIL value Response action (as appropriate) if the OIL is exceeded Environmental measurements OIL1 Gamma (γ) 1000 Sv/h at 1 m from surface or a source — Immediately evacuate or provide substantial sheltera — Provide for decontamination of evacueesb — Reduce inadvertent ingestionc — Stop consumption of local produced. from surface rainwater and milk from animalsh grazing in the area until it has been screened and contamination levels have 20 counts/s direct beta () been assessed using OIL5 and OIL6 surface contamination — Screen local produce. rainwater and milk from animals grazing in the area until they have been screened and contamination levels have been assessed using OIL5 and OIL6 200 counts/s direct beta () — Temporarily relocate those living in the area. relocation 10 counts/s direct alpha () of people from the areas with the highest potential surface contamination exposure should begin within days measurementf — If a person has handled a source with a dose rate equal to or exceeding 100 Sv/h at 1 me.TABLE 8.i fission productsk and for iodine contamination if replacement for essentialg local produce or milk is not immediately available — Estimate the dose of those who may have consumed food. before surface contamination relocation. provide medical examination and evaluation. milk or rainwater from the area where restrictions were implemented to determine if medical screening is warranted 36 . rainwater and milk 2000 counts/s direct beta from animals grazing in the area () surface contamination — Register and provide for a medical examination of e measurement evacuees 50 counts/s direct alpha () — If a person has handled a source with a dose rate equal to or exceeding 1000 Sv/h at 1 me. rainwater and milk from animalsh f. any pregnant women who have handled such a source should receive immediate medical evaluation and dose assessment OIL2 Gamma (γ) 100 Sv/h at 1 m from surface or a source OIL3 Gamma (γ) 1 Sv/h at 1 m — Stop consumption of non-essentialg local produced. reduce inadvertent ingestionc.

the default OILs in this table can be used without revision to make a conservative assessment immediately. The OILs should also be revised. a — Provide for skin decontaminationb and reduce inadvertent ingestionc — Register and provide for a medical examination b c d e f g h i j k Inside closed halls of large multi-storey buildings or large masonry structures and away from walls or windows. If immediate decontamination is not practicable. Performed using good contamination monitoring practice. as part of the preparedness process.TABLE 8. Use 10% of OIL3 for milk from small animals (e. severe malnutrition). vegetables). Restricting essential foods could result in severe health effects (e. This external dose rate criterion applies only to sealed dangerous sources and does not need to be revised in an emergency. Advise evacuees not to drink.g. Fission products that were produced within the last month. Deposition by rain of short lived naturally occurring radon progeny can result in count rates of four or more times the background count rate. goats) grazing in the area.) OIL OIL value Response action (as appropriate) if the OIL is exceeded Skin contamination OIL4 Gamma (γ) 1 Sv/h at 10 cm from the skin 1000 counts/s direct beta () skin contamination measurementf 50 counts/s direct alpha () skin contamination measurementf Note: The OILs should be revised as soon as it is known which radionuclides are actually involved. to be more consistent with the instruments to be used during the response. Only for several days and only if replacement food is not available. 21]. These rates should not be confused with the deposition rates due to the emergency. Count rates due to radon progeny will decrease rapidly after the rain stops and should be back to typical background levels within a few hours.g. Local produce is food that is grown in open spaces that may be directly contaminated by the release and that is consumed within weeks (e. thus containing large amounts of iodine.g. Guidance on performing decontamination can be found in Refs [18. and therefore essential foods should be restricted only if replacement food is available. However. if necessary. 37 . advise evacuees to change their clothing and to shower as soon as possible. eat or smoke and to keep hands away from the mouth until hands are washed. DEFAULT OILs FOR FIELD SURVEY MEASUREMENTS (cont.

2. As a minimum criterion. It is not required that very weak emitters (e. ensure that it can detect both high (e.g.g. those provided by the manufacturer) for high energy and low energy beta emitting radionuclides and an alpha emitting radionuclide (as applicable) using the formula: (3) IC = W monitor ¥ q monitor where (5) IC is the instrument coefficient ((counts/s  cm2)/Bq). These criteria were established so that the majority of commonly available contamination monitoring instruments will give a response that is equal to or 38 . 14C) — 0. 63Ni) be detectable. 14C) energy beta emitters. The following procedure may be used for checking whether or not a particular instrument meets the minimum criterion and can be used in applying the operational criteria for OIL1. the instrument is suitable: — For medium or high energy beta emitters (e. (4) If the calculated IC values are greater than or equal to the following.g. A beta monitor should meet both the high energy and the low energy beta criteria.g. a contamination monitoring instrument is considered suitable for applying the OIL if it will provide a response equal to or more conservative than that assumed in development of the OILs. Calculate the instrument coefficients (ICs) using measured (i. II.20.5. — For low energy beta emitters (e. 32P) and low (e.g. — For alpha emitters — 0.g. θmonitor is the energy dependent efficiency for 4 geometry close to the surface and under ideal conditions (counts/s  Bq–1). 36Cl) — 1. derived from the calibration factor) or known 4π efficiencies (e.e. OIL2 and OIL4 in Table 8: (1) (2) Ensure that the instrument can display counts/s (or counts/min) over the ranges of the OIL values in Table 8. Wmonitor is the effective area of the detector window (cm2). For a beta monitor.radionuclides and should be revised as soon as it is known which radionuclides are involved.

Finally. consumption of non-essential food. if necessary. and essential food. as soon as possible the guidance in Ref.e. milk and water is shown in Fig. milk and water destined for human consumption (they are not applicable for dried food or concentrated food).higher (i. These OILs apply to radionuclides in food. • The most restrictive age dependent dose conversion factors and ingestion rates (i. If an OIL5 level is exceeded. This should be done as part of the preparedness process. [29] should be used to determine whether the food.e. II. and national criteria or WHO guidance [30] should be used to determine whether the food. If the OIL6 levels in Table 10 are exceeded. First the potentially contaminated food should be screened over a wide area and analysed to determine the gross alpha and beta concentrations if this can be done more promptly than assessing the concentration of individual radionuclides. milk and water (see also Table 11). milk and water should be replaced or the people should be relocated if replacements are not available. at which early protective actions are to be taken) was used to ensure that those people in areas from which they were not relocated will not receive a total dose (including the dose from ingestion) greater than 100 mSv per year. The process of assessing radionuclide concentrations in food. If the OIL5 (see Table 9) screening levels are not exceeded. the radionuclide specific concentrations in the food. milk or water should be stopped. 5. 39 . The food. Tables 9 and 10 give OILs for assessing food. Therefore. more conservative) than the response assumed in developing the default OILs. to be more consistent with the characteristics of the instruments to be used during the response. the OILs in Table 8 should be revised. those for infants) are used. milk and water are safe for consumption during the emergency phase. However. milk or water should be determined. milk or water is suitable for long term consumption after the emergency phase. milk and water are initially contaminated and are consumed throughout a full year. the response of instruments that meet these minimum criteria may vary by a factor of as much as 20. milk or water is suitable for international trade. milk and water OILs in Tables 9 and 10 were calculated on the basis of the following conservative assumptions: • All of the food. the food.21. The generic criterion of 10 mSv per year (and not 100 mSv per year. as in Table 3.22. II. primarily owing to differences in the effective area of the detector.

5. 14 In the response to the Chernobyl accident in 1986.4. 49.6 Bq/g. following a separate determination of total potassium content. in some cases 40K was confused with 137Cs and produce was discarded even though it contained virtually no radioactive caesium [31]. 9. It does not accumulate in the body but is maintained at a constant level independent of intake14 [30].23. Text cont. Process of assessing radionuclide concentrations in food.Determine gross D and E activity No OIL5 exceeded Yes Determine radionuclide concentration No OIL6 exceeded Yes Suitable for consumption May not be suitable for consumption except in exceptional circumstances FIG. Radioactive 40K is commonly found in food and water. This is the factor that should be used to calculate the beta activity due to 40K (Ref. The contribution of 40K should therefore be subtracted. II. on p. [29]. 40 . The beta activity of the 40K included in natural potassium is 27.2). para. milk and water.

The dose from ingestion of 40K is considered not to be relevant because 40K does not accumulate in the body and is maintained at a constant level independent of intake [29]. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD. DEFAULT SCREENING OILs FOR FOOD. NA: not applicable. 41 . MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS Radionuclide H-3 Be-7 Be-10 C-11 C-14 F-18 Na-22 Na-24 Mg-28 Al-26 Si-31 Si-32 P-32 P-33 S-35 Cl-36 Cl-38 K-40 K-42 a OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 105 7 × 105 3 × 10 3 Radionuclide Sc-44 Sc-46 Sc-47 Sc-48 Ti-44 V-48 V-49 Cr-51 Mn-52 Mn-53 Mn-54 Mn-56 Fe-52 Fe-55 Fe-59 Fe-60 Co-55 Co-56 Co-57 + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 1 × 107 8 × 103 4 × 105 3 × 105 6 × 102 3 × 104 2 × 105 8 × 105 1 × 105 9 × 104 9 × 103 3 × 107 2 × 106 1 × 104 9 × 103 7 × 101 1 × 106 4 × 103 2 × 104 2 × 109 1 × 104 2 × 108 2 × 10 +a 3 4 × 106 4 × 105 1 × 103 5 × 10 + 7 9 × 102 2 × 104 1 × 105 1 × 10 4 3 × 103 3 × 108 NAb. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS OIL OIL5 OIL value Gross beta (): 100 Bq/kg or Gross alpha (): 5 Bq/kg Response action if the OIL is exceeded Above OIL5: Assess using OIL6 Below OIL5: Safe for consumption during the emergency phase TABLE 10.c 3 × 10 6 b c ‘+’ indicates radionuclides with progeny listed in Table 11 that are assumed to be in equilibrium with the parent radionuclide and therefore do not need to be considered independently when assessing compliance with OILs.TABLE 9.

TABLE 10. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.) Radionuclide K-43 Ca-41 Ca-45 Ca-47 Ni-63 Ni-65 Cu-64 Cu-67 Zn-65 Zn-69 Zn-69m Ga-67 Ga-68 Ga-72 Ge-68 Ge-71 Ge-77 As-72 As-73 As-74 As-76 As-77 Se-75 Se-79 Br-76 Br-77 Br-82 Rb-81 Rb-83 Rb-84 Rb-86 Rb-87 + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 4 × 106 4 × 10 4 Radionuclide Co-58 Co-58m Co-60 Ni-59 Sr-89 Sr-90 Sr-91 Sr-92 Y-87 Y-88 Y-90 Y-91 Y-91m Y-92 Y-93 Zr-88 Zr-93 Zr-95 Zr-97 Nb-93m Nb-94 Nb-95 Nb-97 Mo-93 Mo-99 Tc-95m Tc-96 Tc-96m Tc-97 Tc-97m Tc-98 Tc-99 + + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 104 9 × 107 8 × 102 6 × 104 6 × 103 2 × 102 3 × 106 2 × 107 4 × 105 9 × 103 9 × 104 5 × 103 2 × 109 1 × 107 1 × 106 3 × 104 2 × 104 6 × 103 5 × 105 2 × 104 2 × 103 5 × 104 2 × 108 3 × 103 5 × 105 3 × 104 2 × 105 2 × 109 4 × 104 2 × 104 2 × 103 4 × 103 8 × 103 5 × 104 2 × 104 4 × 10 7 1 × 107 8 × 105 2 × 103 6 × 10 8 3 × 106 1 × 106 2 × 108 1 × 10 6 3 × 103 5 × 106 6 × 106 4 × 10 5 3 × 104 3 × 104 4 × 105 1 × 10 6 4 × 103 7 × 102 3 × 106 5 × 10 6 1 × 106 8 × 107 7 × 103 1 × 10 4 1 × 104 2 × 103 42 .

DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.TABLE 10. 43 .) Radionuclide Sr-82 Sr-85 Sr-85m Sr-87m Ru-106 Rh-99 Rh-101 Rh-102 Rh-102m Rh-103m Rh-105 Pd-103 Pd-107 Pd-109 Ag-105 Ag-108m Ag-110m Ag-111 Cd-109 Cd-113m Cd-115 Cd-115m In-111 In-113m In-114m In-115m Sn-113 Sn-117m Sn-119m Sn-121m Sn-123 d OIL6 (Bq/kg) + 5 × 103 3 × 10 4 Radionuclide Tc-99m Ru-97 Ru-103 Ru-105 Sb-126 Te-121 Te-121m Te-123m Te-125m Te-127 Te-127m Te-129 Te-129m Te-131 Te-131m Te-132 I-123 I-124 I-125 I-126 I-129 I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Cs-129 Cs-131 Cs-132 Cs-134 Cs-134m + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 108 2 × 106 3 × 104 2 × 107 3 × 104 1 × 105 3 × 103 5 × 103 1 × 104 1 × 107 3 × 103 2 × 108 6 × 103 4 × 108 3 × 105 5 × 104 5 × 106 1 × 104 1 × 103 2 × 103 NAd 3 × 103 2 × 107 1 × 105 2 × 108 2 × 106 1 × 107 2 × 106 4 × 105 1 × 103 3 × 108 3 × 109 3 × 108 + 6 × 102 1 × 10 5 8 × 103 2 × 103 5 × 103 5 × 10 + + + + + + 9 1 × 106 2 × 105 7 × 104 2 × 10 6 5 × 104 2 × 103 2 × 103 7 × 10 4 3 × 103 4 × 102 2 × 105 6 × 10 3 1 × 106 4 × 108 + + 3 × 103 5 × 10 7 1 × 104 7 × 104 1 × 104 + 5 × 10 3 3 × 103 Not a significant source of radiation because of the low specific activity.

) Radionuclide Sn-125 Sn-126 Sb-122 Sb-124 Sb-125 Ba-133m Ba-140 La-137 La-140 Ce-139 Ce-141 Ce-143 Ce-144 Pr-142 Pr-143 Nd-147 Nd-149 Pm-143 Pm-144 Pm-145 Pm-147 Pm-148m Pm-149 Pm-151 Sm-145 Sm-147 Sm-151 Sm-153 Eu-147 Eu-148 Eu-149 Eu-150b + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 104 5 × 10 2 Radionuclide Cs-135 Cs-136 Cs-137 Ba-131 Ba-133 Eu-156 Gd-146 Gd-148 Gd-153 Gd-159 Tb-157 Tb-158 Tb-160 Dy-159 Dy-165 Dy-166 Ho-166 Ho-166m Er-169 Er-171 Tm-167 Tm-170 Tm-171 Yb-169 Yb-175 Lu-172 Lu-173 Lu-174 Lu-174m Lu-177 Hf-172 Hf-175 + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 9 × 103 4 × 104 2 × 103 1 × 105 3 × 103 2 × 104 8 × 103 1 × 102 2 × 104 2 × 106 9 × 104 3 × 103 7 × 103 7 × 104 7 × 107 6 × 104 5 × 105 2 × 103 2 × 105 6 × 106 1 × 105 5 × 103 3 × 104 3 × 104 4 × 105 1 × 105 2 × 104 1 × 104 1 × 104 2 × 105 2 × 103 3 × 104 2 × 105 5 × 103 3 × 103 9 × 10 5 1 × 104 4 × 104 2 × 105 3 × 10 4 3 × 104 5 × 105 8 × 102 6 × 10 5 4 × 104 6 × 104 8 × 107 3 × 10 4 6 × 103 3 × 104 1 × 104 1 × 10 4 3 × 105 8 × 105 2 × 104 1 × 10 2 3 × 104 5 × 105 8 × 104 2 × 10 4 9 × 104 3 × 106 44 .TABLE 10. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD.

0 2 × 105 4 × 102 2 × 103 2 × 102 4 × 106 2 × 103 1 × 104 2 × 10 5 1 × 105 2 × 104 1 × 106 3 × 10 3 2 × 104 3 × 103 1 × 105 5 × 10 5 7 × 105 8 × 105 2 × 104 8 × 10 4 1 × 107 7 × 105 8 × 102 2 × 105 6 × 104 8 × 103 6 × 105 6 × 10 4 9 × 105 8 × 104 3 × 105 3 × 105 2 × 106 1 × 108 45 .) Radionuclide Eu-150a Eu-152 Eu-152m Eu-154 Eu-155 W-178 W-181 W-185 W-187 W-188 Re-184 Re-184m Re-186 Re-187 Re-188 Re-189 Os-185 Os-191 Os-191m Os-193 Os-194 Ir-189 Ir-190 Ir-192 Ir-194 Pt-188 Pt-191 Pt-193 Pt-193m Pt-195m Pt-197 Pt-197m + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 4 × 103 3 × 10 3 Radionuclide Hf-181 Hf-182 Ta-178a Ta-179 Ta-182 Hg-194 Hg-195 Hg-195m Hg-197 Hg-197m Hg-203 Tl-200 Tl-201 Tl-202 Tl-204 Pb-201 Pb-202 Pb-203 Pb-205 Pb-210 Pb-212 Bi-205 Bi-206 Bi-207 Bi-210 Bi-210m Bi-212 Po-210 At-211 Ra-223 Ra-224 Ra-225 + + + + + + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 104 1 × 103 1 × 108 6 × 104 5 × 103 2 × 102 2 × 107 8 × 105 1 × 106 2 × 106 1 × 104 5 × 106 3 × 106 2 × 105 3 × 103 2 × 107 1 × 103 2 × 106 2 × 104 2.TABLE 10. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont. DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD.0 2 × 105 7 × 104 8 × 104 3 × 103 1 × 105 2 × 102 7 × 107 5.

0 7 × 106 5 × 101 5 × 101 5 × 101 5 × 101 5 × 101 4 × 106 5 × 101 4 × 103 3 × 104 5 × 102 6 × 101 7 × 101 5 × 101 5 × 101 6 × 101 1 × 101 2 × 101 1 × 104 2 × 102 2 × 101 4 × 101 2 × 101 4 × 101 3 × 104 3 × 101 5 × 103 5 × 101 3 × 105 5 × 105 9 × 101 2 × 101 8.) Radionuclide Au-193 Au-194 Au-195 Au-198 Au-199 Th-227 Th-228 Th-229 Th-230 Th-231 Th-232 Th-234 Pa-230 Pa-231 Pa-233 U-230 U-232 U-233 U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238 Np-235 Np-236l Np-236s Np-237 Np-239 Pu-236 Pu-237 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 + + + + + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 8 × 106 1 × 10 2 × 10 6 4 Radionuclide Ra-226 Ra-228 Ac-225 Ac-227 Ac-228 Pu-242 Pu-244 Am-241 Am-242m Am-243 Am-244 Am-241/Be-9 Cm-240 Cm-241 Cm-242 Cm-243 Cm-244 Cm-245 Cm-246 Cm-247 Cm-248 Bk-247 Bk-249 Cf-248 Cf-249 Cf-250 Cf-251 Cf-252 Cf-253 Cf-254 Es-253 Pu-239/Be-9 + + + + + OIL6 (Bq/kg) 2 × 101 3. MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY ANALYSIS (cont.0 8 × 103 5 × 104 2 × 10 1 1 2 × 106 3 × 104 8 × 102 2 × 10 2 × 10 1 1 × 102 2 2 × 102 2 × 102 1 × 10 2 7 × 104 8 × 102 4 × 10 6 9 × 101 4 × 10 5 1 × 102 2 × 105 5 × 10 1 5 × 101 5 × 101 4 × 10 3 46 . DEFAULT RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD.0 3 × 103 5.0 5 × 10 4.TABLE 10.

013) Ag-109m In-115m (1.09) Ag-110 (0.2) Nb-97m (0. assumed to be present.14) Te-125m (0. Nb-97 Tc-95 (0.TABLE 11.65) I-132 The value inside the parentheses is the activity of the daughter radionuclide. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS Parent radionuclide Mg-28 Si-32 Ca-47 Ti-44 Fe-52 Zn-69m Ge-68 Sr-90 Y-87 Zr-95 Zr-97 Tc-95m Mo-99 Ru-103 Ru-106 Pd-103 Pd-109 Ag-108m Ag-110m Cd-109 Cd-115 In-114m Sn-113 Sn-121m Sn-126 Sb-125 Te-121m Te-127m Te-129m Te-132 a Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being in equilibrium with the parent Al-28 P-32 Sc-47 (3.24) Te-121 Te-127 Te-129 (0.1) Ga-68 Y-90 Sr-87m Nb-95 (2.96) Rh-103m Rh-106 Rh-103m Ag-109m Ag-108 (0. Sb-126 (0. 47 .95).96) In-113m Sn-121 (0.78) Sb-126m. per unit of the parent.8)a Sc-44 Mn-52m Zn-69 (1.041) Tc-99m (0.1) In-114 (0.

99).40). Bi-213. Po-212 (0.067).  Bi-211 (0. Rn-219 (0. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS (cont. Bi-212. Po-214 Rn-219. Po-215 (0.TABLE 11.  Pb-211 (0.6) La-140 (1.018). Tl-207 (0.9). Bi-214.36).98). Pr-144 Pm-148 (0.36). Pb-211 (0. Pb-212 .0). Ra-223 (0. At-217 (3. Bi-213 (3. Fr-223 (0. Tl-207 Rn-220.014).97) Ir-194 Ir-188 (1.022) Th-227 (0.99).0). Po-212 (0. Bi-214.0). Tl-208 (0. Pb-209 (0.58) Po-218.65) Po-211 (0. At-217. Po-213 (0. Tl-208 (0. Tl-209 (0.2) Pr-144m (0.014) 48 . Pb-209. Po-215.99).014). Pb-214. Pb-211.9).99).99). Po-210 Bi-212 .99).014). Tl-207 (0.  Ra-223 (0.014). Bi-211 (0. Rn-219 (0. Po-216.0).014).014).71) Ti-206 Tl-208 (0. Po-214 Fr-221. Tl-209 (0.5) Lu-172 Ta-182 Ta-178a Re-188 Re-184 (0. Po-212 (0. Pb-214.) Parent radionuclide Cs-137 Ba-131 Ba-140 Ce-144 Pm-148m Gd-146 Dy-166 Hf-172 Hf-182 W-178 W-188 Re-184m Os-194 Pt-188 Hg-194 Pb-202 Pb-210 Pb-212 Bi-210m Bi-212 At-211 Rn-222 Ra-223 Ra-224 Ra-225 Ra-226 Ac-225 Ac-227 Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being in equilibrium with the parent Ba-137m Cs-131 (5.067) Rn-222.99).2) Au-194 Tl-202 Bi-210. Po-213 (2. Po-218.65) Ac-225 (3. Bi-211. Pb-209 (2. Fr-221 (3. Po-215 (0.053) Eu-146 Ho-166 (1.

Bi-213. the following actions should be taken: — Stop consumption of non-essential15 food.g. Rn-218. Pb-211 (2. Rn-220.i is the concentration of radionuclide i in the food. OIL6i is the concentration of radionuclide i from Table 10 (Bq/kg).6).64) Ra-225. Ac-225.6) Ra-224.6).83) Np-239 II. EQUILIBRIUM RADIOACTIVE CHAINS (cont. milk or water (Bq/kg). Bi-211 (2.98). Po-212 (0. If OIL6 is exceeded. Pb-209 (0.6). II. Cm-242 (0.  Tl-207 (2. Bi-212. At-217.24. OIL6 is exceeded if the following condition is satisfied: Â OIL6 i C f .25.98). Tl-209 (0. Pb-212.TABLE 11.i >1 i (6) where Cf. milk or water and conduct an assessment on the basis of realistic consumption rates. Fr-221. Po-215 (2. Po-213 (0. Np-240m Am-242. Tl-208 (0.36). Po-214 Th-231 Th-234.02).02) Pa-234m Th-226. Pa-234m Pa-233 U-240.6). Rn-219 (2. Ra-222. severe malnutrition). Po-216.) Parent radionuclide Th-227 Th-228 Th-229 Th-234 U-232 U-235 U-238 Np-237 Pu-244 Am-242m Am-243 Progeny radionuclides considered in OIL6 assessment as being in equilibrium with the parent Ra-223 (2. Replace essential Restriction of the consumption of essential food could result in severe health effects (e. Pb-209 (0.6). 15 49 .

containing iodine) and iodine contamination. — Estimate the dose to those who may have consumed food. The default OILs are therefore supported by a plain language explanation of how criteria and associated actions provide for the safety of all members of the public. The development of plain language explanations for the default OILs should be based on the assumption that members of the public living under normal conditions. In addition. 50 . consider providing iodine thyroid blocking if replacement of essential food. will achieve a level of protection that meets international standards. including the impact of any protective action. as presented in Table 3). protective actions are not always justified and will be taken (if at all) on the basis of justified criteria developed.g. milk or water is not immediately possible. The default OILs are developed using realistically conservative assumptions that provide reasonable assurance that all members of the public are safe. — Do not receive a dose above which the risk of health effects (e. after careful consideration of the conditions. The thresholds for the onset of severe deterministic effects are listed in Table 2. Below this generic criterion. experience shows that use of overly conservative criteria can result in the public taking actions that do more harm than good. cancers) is sufficiently high to justify taking protective actions during an emergency (generic criterion of 100 mSv per annum.g. provided that during the emergency phase they: — Do not receive a dose to any organ approaching that resulting in severe deterministic effects. Experience has shown that decision makers take actions and the public follow instructions best when they understand how the actions provide for the safety of the public [32].food. PLAIN LANGUAGE EXPLANATION II. or relocate people if replacement of essential food. milk or rainwater from the area where restrictions were implemented to determine if medical screening is warranted. including those who are more vulnerable to radiation exposure such as children and pregnant women. — For fission products (e. milk and water is not possible. milk and water promptly.26. with interested parties. II.27.

OIL1 plain language explanation II.33. from dirty hands).29. OIL2 plain language explanation II.31. The plain language communications below provide text that may be given directly to those members of the public to whom the criterion applies. The actions assume that all the locally produced food and milk is contaminated with radioactive material and that little is done (e.g. Move out of the area (relocate) within a week and [insert appropriated recommended actions for OIL2]. infants and pregnant women). milk or water is not available. milk from grazing animals and rainwater until they have been screened and declared safe.g. washing) to reduce the levels of contamination in the food before consumption. it is prudent not to consume local non-essential food until further analysis has been performed. stop consuming local produce (e. If other food is available in the territories where OIL3 is exceeded. Those living in the area should [insert appropriate recommended actions for OIL1] to reduce the risk of health effects due to radiation. OIL3 plain language explanation II.32. The recommended actions for OIL2 take into account those members of the public most vulnerable to radiation exposure (e. II. Remaining in the area where OIL2 is exceeded for a short time is possible if the following recommended actions are taken. For some types of radioactive material this advice may be overly cautious. However. The recommended actions for OIL3 take into account the most vulnerable members of the public (e.g. but it is considered prudent until further analysis is performed. II. but staying for longer periods may not be safe.g. 51 . however. Remaining in the area where OIL1 is exceeded may not be safe.II. these items may be consumed for a short time until replacements are available. Exceeding OIL3 does not mean that the food or milk produced in the area is not safe.g. vegetables).30. including inhalation of dust and inadvertent ingestion of dirt (e. They also consider all the ways a person can be exposed to radiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground. The relocation is likely to be temporary. infants and pregnant women). if restriction of consumption is likely to result in severe malnutrition or dehydration because replacement food.28.

g. children and pregnant women. and keeping the hands away from the mouth until they have been washed. Below OIL5: Locally produced food. then these items may be consumed for a short time until replacements are available. II. can safely drink the milk and water and eat the food during the emergency phase. Further actions include changing clothes as soon as possible and showering before putting on clean clothes. The analysis for OIL6 considers the most vulnerable members of the public (e.36. The removed clothing should be put in a bag until it can be dealt with. However. milk or water is available. but potentially contaminated persons can take the effective actions mentioned above to protect themselves. can safely drink the milk and water and eat the food during the emergency phase. and the contamination levels may be very difficult to detect under emergency conditions. because no replacement food. milk and water is contaminated. eating or smoking.g. 52 . Above OIL6: Locally produced food. infants and pregnant women).38. water or milk is unsuitable for consumption but might indicate that further investigation. including infants. if restriction of consumption is likely to result in severe malnutrition or dehydration. children and pregnant women.34. Timely monitoring and immediate decontamination by experts may not be possible.35. II. milk and water have been screened. Any person who may have radioactive material on the skin or clothing should take actions to prevent inadvertent ingestion of the material (which may not be visible). OIL5 plain language explanation II. including consideration of actual consumption rates and additional screening. and all members of the public. milk and water have been screened and the measurements indicate that further investigation is necessary before unrestricted general consumption of these items is allowed. These recommendations also apply to those people who may have been monitored. and all members of the public. is needed. Below OIL6: Locally produced food.OIL4 plain language explanation II. milk and water have been screened. infants and pregnant women). including infants. It is assumed that people might eat with contaminated hands and thereby might ingest radioactive material. OIL6 plain language explanation II. Exceeding the criteria therefore might not mean that the food. and it assumes that all of the food.37. Appropriate actions include washing the hands before drinking. The recommended actions for OIL4 take into account the most vulnerable members of the public (e.

detection of major design deficiencies or of potential accident sequences outside the plant’s design basis. facility emergency and alert [2].4. symptoms of severe deficiencies in operator training or behaviour. Each class initiates a distinctly different level of response.2. as shown in Fig. Four is the minimum number of classes. in para. Declaration of an emergency in any of these emergency classes should initiate a response that is considerably beyond normal operations. breaches of technical specifications or of transport regulations. Alert Facility emergency Site area emergency Immediate actions to analyse the situation and mitigate the consequences Immediate actions to protect those on the site Preparations to take protective action off the site Immediate actions to protect the public off the site General emergency FIG. and deficiencies in safety culture. II. 6. III. requires the operator of a facility or a practice in threat category I. Reference [2]. site area emergency.19.) Examples of events that should not be included in the emergency classification system are: technical deficiencies exceeding the limits of in-service inspection codes. (Note: The actions are not presented in a sequence for implementation. 4. III.1. III. 6. 16 53 . equipment failure beyond expected reliability limits. III or IV (which includes light water reactors) to implement a system for classifying all potential nuclear and radiological emergencies that would warrant an emergency intervention to protect workers and the public. The following classes are defined for facilities in threat categories I and II: general emergency.Appendix III DEVELOPMENT OF EALs AND EXAMPLES OF EALs FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS III. but should be limited to alerts and emergencies that require immediate on-site action16.3. Relationship of response actions under the classification system. The events considered in the classification system should not be expanded to include all reportable events.

The following are examples of situations that could lead to a general emergency: — Actual or projected17 damage to the reactor core or large amounts of recently discharged fuel in combination with actual damage to barriers or critical safety systems such that a radioactive release becomes highly probable.III.5. — A malicious act with the potential to disrupt the performance of critical safety functions or to result in a major release or severe exposures.20.7. The following are examples of situations that could lead to a site area emergency: — A major decrease in the level of defence in depth provided for the reactor core or actively cooled fuel. — Conditions such that any additional failures could result in a general emergency. Reference [2]. — A major decrease in protection against an accidental criticality. or in exposures off the site that could result in doses that warrant urgent protective actions. 4. environmental measurements and other observable indications”. states that “The criteria for classification shall be predefined emergency action levels (EALs) that relate to abnormal conditions for the facility or practice concerned. security related concerns. — A malicious act resulting in an inability to monitor or control critical safety systems that are needed to prevent a release. III. III. 17 54 .8. 18 The dropping of a fuel transport container and a fuel handling accident are considered facility emergencies because they cannot give rise to doses that warrant protective actions off the site. The following are examples of situations that could lead to a facility emergency: — A fuel handling emergency including the dropping of a fuel transport container18. — Doses off the site approaching the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. releases of radioactive material. in para. — Detection of radiation levels off the site that warrant urgent protective measures.6. III. ‘Projected damage’ is indicated by a loss of critical safety functions necessary to protect the core or large amounts of recently discharged fuel.

11. — Doses exceeding established limits for occupationally exposed staff. — High doses on the site approaching intervention levels for urgent protective actions. — Civil disturbance (e. 55 . — Spills of oil or chemicals that constitute a hazard to the environment. III. the specific reactor design features available have to be considered.g. — Rupture of a dangerous source. Alerts are events that do not represent an emergency but that warrant prompt activation of parts of the on-site response organization in support of the operating staff. III. The aim is to develop a classification that can be considered a useful reference for the various designs of light water reactors used throughout the world. including workers in transport or handling activities.9. — A malicious or criminal activity (e.10. This classification was developed to be as independent as possible of light water reactor designs.g. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS III. III. The classes are associated with increasing probability or confidence that conditions exist that will lead to core damage or to high doses on or off the site. When it is applied. demonstrations in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant). The foundation of the classification system is the fact that core damage and failure of confinement are both necessary for a severe release and high onsite doses to occur.12. Such a classification system provides the on-site staff with the greatest opportunity to mitigate the consequences of the event and the off-site responders with the greatest opportunity to take effective protective actions for the public. and including cases of confirmed high values measured by area or process radiation monitors or from contamination measurements. — Loss of shielding or control for a large gamma emitter or for spent fuel.— An in-facility fire or other emergency not affecting safety systems. extortion or blackmail) leading to hazardous on-site conditions but with no potential to result in a criticality or a release off the site that would warrant urgent protective actions.

standby or hot shutdown mode. Table 12 is for a reactor in operating. III. in these modes the reactor coolant system and containment may not be in place (e.g.g. whereas classification procedures for simple facilities with few instruments will consist almost exclusively of event based EALs. An EAL is a predetermined threshold for an observable that places the plant and off-site response organizations in preparedness for an emergency in a given emergency class. decay heat generation and short lived fission products are greatly reduced. In these modes. III. The criteria used for classifying the events are called emergency action levels (EALs). as described. 19 56 . reactor coolant system pressure higher than a certain level) or other observable or quantifiable thresholds (e. instruments and safety systems are in place and operational. The scopes of these two tables. all the fission product barriers. An example of an event based EAL would be ‘fire detected in an area containing vital safety systems’.APPLICATION OF THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION III. which is whether the reactor coolant system is sealed or not sealed (i. symptom based EALs should be used because they make the classification process more timely and less subject to error.15. Table 13 is for reactors in cold shutdown mode (reactor coolant system closed and reactor coolant system coolant temperature less than 100°C) or in refuelling mode. failure of emergency power supply systems as indicated by a specific parameter). Examples of EALs for a facility emergency are not included because research and generic studies have not been done to identify the range of possible facility emergencies that could be used as a firm basis for developing such examples. In these modes the amount of energy in the reactor coolant system. Event based EALs are more subjective criteria requiring the judgement of the operating staff.14. In addition. For facilities where safety significant systems are monitored by means of instruments and alarms. open to the atmosphere). When possible. Events that are classified as a facility emergency and EALs for their classification should therefore be based on site specific analysis. Symptom based EALs are site specific instrument readings (e.g. a large fraction of the EALs may be symptom based in nature.13. the reactor pressure vessel head may have been removed) and fewer safety systems and instruments are required to be operational.e. This appendix has two tables providing examples of EALs for classifying events19. There are two fundamentally different types of EAL: symptom based and event based. conservatively bound the essential criterion.

ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION III. — The site specific EALs should use the units of the instruments and the terminology used in the plant. releases of toxic gas. fires. The following guidance applies for this process: — It is crucial that the site specific classification procedure be designed for fast (to be completed in a few minutes) and easy use in an event. — The performance of instruments in an emergency should also be considered in developing the EALs.16. 57 . natural events and other events. explosions.III. The main objectives of accident management are to prevent the escalation of an event to a severe accident. III. The criteria are provided in the following order: (1) impairment of a critical safety function. — The EALs and corresponding procedures should be revised on the basis of operating experience and feedback from exercises. (2) loss of fission product barriers. — Once the site specific EAL system has been developed. it should be tested and/or validated in drills and walk-through sessions to ensure that it is usable by the assigned control room staff in emergency conditions. and (6) spent fuel pool events.18. The off-site officials who would be tasked with the implementation of any protective action or other response action called for by a classification should be in agreement with the classification system. (3) increased radiation levels on the site.17. (5) security events. — Care should be taken to ensure that the classification procedures are usable under accident conditions. to mitigate the consequences of a severe accident once it has happened and to achieve a long term safe stable state. The criteria in the tables are organized to provide for the earliest possible classification of an event that could result in a severe release. Tables 12 and 13 include notes about facts that should be considered when using various instruments in an emergency. Not all instruments are qualified for reliable operation in harsh accident conditions. Tables 12 and 13 contain examples of EALs that address the elements of the classification system. The EALs provided in the tables should therefore be replaced with site specific EALs. when the workload and stress are very high. — The final step in implementation is to review the classification system with off-site officials. (4) increased radiation levels off the site.

20. III. Paragraph 4. such as off-site firefighters or off-site security services.III. should one occur. III. Any conditions that would warrant the use of emergency operating procedures would be classified as constituting an emergency and would trigger a predetermined emergency response on the site.21. firefighting and support from off the site. severe accident management guidelines are used primarily by the operating organization’s technical support centre or emergency control centre to advise the main control room staff and off-site emergency groups on mitigatory measures. Severe accident management guidelines are developed to deal with a severe accident.7 of Ref. III. Plant conditions in the emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines should provide clear inputs for accident entry conditions in the accident classification for declaring appropriate EALs on the site.19 of Ref. [2] requires that the operator “shall make arrangements for the prompt identification of an actual or potential nuclear or radiological emergency and determination of the appropriate level of response”. As part of the implementation of the plant specific emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines. Emergency operating procedures aimed at preventing a severe accident are used by the main control room staff in events not involving a severe accident. It should be ensured that there are no conflicts with the arrangements made for security. [2] requires that it be ensured “that the transition to the emergency response and the performance of initial response actions do not impair the ability of the operational staff (such as the control room staff) to follow the procedures needed for safe operations and for taking mitigatory actions”. 58 . III. The emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines should be integrated into the organizational structure defined in the plant emergency plan and should be coordinated with the plan to ensure a consistent and coordinated response to severe accident conditions.22. Paragraph 4.19. the emergency plan should be reviewed with respect to the actions that should be taken following the emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines.23. to ensure that there are no conflicts.24. III. Once conditions of actual or imminent core damage exist. a transition from the domain of emergency operating procedures to the domain of severe accident management guidelines should take place.

For this class of emergency. boiling water reactors and water moderated. (ii) conditions in which any additional failures could result in damage to the core or to spent fuel. Alert. water cooled reactors). Events involving an unknown or significant decrease in the level of protection for on-site personnel or for the public. This includes (a) actual severe damage20 or projected severe damage to the core or to large amounts of spent fuel. or (b) releases off the site resulting in a dose exceeding the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. or (iii) high doses on the site or doses off the site approaching the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. actions should be taken to control the dose to on-site personnel and preparations should be made to take protective actions off the site. 59 . For this class of emergency. the state of readiness of the on-site and off-site response organizations is increased and additional assessments are made.TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS III. However. Site area emergency. III. This includes: (i) a major decrease in the level of protection provided for the core or for large amounts of spent fuel. Events resulting in an actual release or a substantial risk of a release requiring the implementation of urgent protective actions off the site. 20 Severe damage resulting in a release of greater than 20% of the gap inventory. The three possible levels of emergency in Tables 12 and 13 are defined as follows [27]: General emergency. The examples of EALs in Tables 12 and 13 are based on the considerable amount of severe accident research conducted for light water reactors (such as pressurized water reactors.25. Events resulting in a major decrease in the level of protection for on-site personnel or for the public. they should be compared with the results of any available site specific probabilistic safety assessment to ensure that all severe accidents are addressed.26. Urgent protective actions should be taken immediately for the public near the plant when this level of emergency is declared. The EALs should cover all possible events at a light water reactor that could result in high doses on the site or in a severe release.

For some plants. below top of active fuel for more than 15 min 1 2 3 4 ‘Stop nuclear reaction’ is a general term that includes ‘reactor scram’. Increasing neutron flux is an explicit symptom that the reactor is not fully shut down. plant specific values should be used. Failure to scram the reactor is usually evaluated if reactor power is greater than 5% and conditions indicate that scram is necessary (safety systems are usually capable of removing heat for the heating rate at less than 5% of nominal power). These conditions are valid for both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors. different. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. which is used only for the insertion of control rods into the reactor. 7 or — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indication of actual or imminent core damage Inadequate core cooling — vessel level4 Vessel water level is. or is projected to be. which is relevant for pressurized water reactors only. core temperature and decay heat removal capability. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE For the following entry conditions: Critical safety function impairment Failure to stop nuclear reaction1 Failure to scram when above 5% power Failure to scram when above 5% power [or insert site specific power level] and [or insert site specific power level]2 abnormal conditions indicate that an and any of the following: automatic or manual scram is necessary — Pressurized water reactor negative cooling margin on the basis of Fig.60 Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Failure to fully shut down (increasing neutron flux)3 as part of normal shutdown with sufficient heat removal available (ultimate heat sink available and sufficient) Vessel water level is or is projected to be below top of active fuel Vessel water level decreasing over a longer time period than expected while systems are responding as designed TABLE 12. Inadequate core cooling is characterized by three kinds of entry condition: vessel level. and are put before the primary system temperature. .

auxiliary fluid) 5 6 7 In the event of core damage. 61 . Elevated core exit temperature is a direct symptom of core cooling degradation. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. 8 and capacity versus pressure curves of operating pumps] or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of imminent or actual core damage Note: Imminent reactor coolant system or containment boundary failure might be considered as additional criteria.TABLE 12. Therefore. 650°C is a value usually used for inadequate core cooling in emergency procedures and indicates that steam–Zr reaction will start to produce hydrogen. the status of the reactor containment system and the containment barriers will greatly affect the magnitude of the release of fission products. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING.5 Core exit thermocouple reading greater than 370oC Unavailability of the normal feedwater system for decay heat removal7 Inadequate core cooling — core temperature6 Core exit thermocouple reading greater than 800oC Inadequate core cooling — decay heat removal (considering the operations of pumps. The critical water temperature above which liquid water cannot exist irrespective of system pressure is 370°C.g. this symptom is used as an entry condition for inadequate core cooling. potentially affecting the ability to protect the core — Vessel injection rate less than [use Fig.) Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: For the following entry conditions: Notes about level measurement: Vessel water level is or is projected to be below top of active fuel and any of the following: — Pressurized water reactor pressurizer levels may not be valid indicators of vessel water level under accident conditions — Pressurized water reactor water levels measured in the vessel can have considerable uncertainties (30%) and should only be used for trend assessment — Boiling water reactor high dry well temperature and low pressure accidents (e. the alternate water sources should be used for steam generator feeding. piping. heat sinks. power supply. LOCAs) can cause the water level to read erroneously high Core exit thermocouple reading greater than 650oC Actual failure or projected long term failure of the ability to remove decay heat to the environment. 800°C indicates core damage that starts at a core temperature of about 1200°C. Normal feedwater is used for heat removal in these modes. heat exchangers. If normal feedwater is not available.

If there is water flow. In the event of core damage. .62 Declare a general emergency if: Pressurized water reactor — negative cooling margin on the basis of Fig.10 8 9 10 11 Thot provides a backup for the core temperature since the flow through the core cannot readily be confirmed and Thot changes are delayed relative to the core exit temperature. This provides a more accurate description of the phenomena inside the reactor vessel. the reactor coolant system liquid starts to become saturated. 7 for more than 5 min Note: Negative cooling margin is read as soon as the system temperature is higher than the saturation temperature at the set pressure of the reactor coolant system safety valves.) For the following entry conditions: Pressurized water reactor — abnormal primary system temperature (inadequate core cooling) Note: Temperature should be measured in the vessel. 7 for more than 15 min [or insert site specific time that core damage is possible following a loss of coolant accident] Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Pressurized water reactor — primary system pressure and temperature indicate negative cooling margin on the basis of Fig. If adequate coolant injection flow cannot be established to restore core heat removal. the hot leg temperature (Thot) could be used if core exit thermocouples are not available. Most pressurized water reactors have core exit thermocouples to measure temperatures in the vessel. 8 and capacity versus pressure curves of operating pumps]9 or — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of actual or imminent core damage Note: Imminent reactor coolant system or containment boundary failure might be considered as additional criteria. If the system temperature is higher than the saturation temperature at the set pressure of the reactor coolant system safety valves. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. 7 or primary system temperature exceeds scale for more than 15 min [or insert site specific time for core damage following a loss of coolant accident] and any of the following: — Vessel injection rate less than water loss due to decay heat boil-off [use Fig. although this indication is less prompt.8 For boiling water reactors there are no instruments that provide a valid reading of core temperature. Use the average of the highest four core exit thermocouple readings. this prevents further pressurization of the reactor coolant system. the status of the reactor coolant system and containment barriers will greatly affect the magnitude of the release of fission products. Pressurized water reactor — negative cooling margin on the basis of Fig. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont.11 TABLE 12.

TABLE 12.) Declare a general emergency if: Actual or projected loss of AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systems for more than 30 min [or insert site specific time required to uncover the core] Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systems is lost or reduced to a single source For the following entry conditions: Loss of AC or DC power sources Actual or projected loss of all AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systems is likely for more than 45 min [or insert site specific time required to uncover core for more than 15 min] Loss of all AC or DC power needed for safety systems operation and any of the following: — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indication of actual or imminent core damage Conditions which are not understood and which could potentially affect safety systems Conditions of an unknown cause affecting safety systems 63 . STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING.

64 Declare a general emergency if: Unavailability of safety system instruments or controls in the control room for more than 15 min and major transient in progress potentially affecting the ability to protect the core Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Unreliable functioning of several safety system instruments or controls in the control room for more than 15 min Failure of an additional safety system component will result in uncovering of the core or spent fuel Actual or predicted failures leaving only one train to prevent core damage. Loss for more than 45 min of all the systems required to protect the core or spent fuel [or insert site specific time required to uncover core for more than 15 min] 12 Safety system control capability can be either degraded or completely lost. both cases are reflected. . Post-accident instrumentation provides the essential information to support safety system operation and control and is included. Unreliable functioning of several safety system instruments or alarms and unavailability of safety system instruments or controls are considered. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING.) For the following entry conditions: Loss of or degraded control of safety systems including post-accident instrumentation12 Unavailability of safety system instruments or controls in the control room and remote control locations and any of the following: — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of imminent or actual core damage Loss of fission product barriers Major increased risk of damage to the core or spent fuel Note: Core damage can occur if the core is uncovered for more than 15 min. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. spent fuel damage or a major release TABLE 12.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. I concentration is greater than [insert site specific values for release of 10% of core inventory] — Use only concentrations from samples taken after the start of the event — Coolant concentrations may not be representative — Assumes the core may not be coolable after 10% melt [Insert site specific readings from postaccident sampling system indicating release of 1% of gap inventory] Confirmed core damage [Insert site specific readings from postaccident sampling system13indicating release of 20% of gap inventory14] 13 14 Reference to a failed fuel monitor in a pressurized water reactor and off-gas monitor in a boiling water reactor is replaced by reference to a post-accident sampling system.TABLE 12. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont.) Declare a general emergency if: 131 For the following entry conditions: Declare a site area emergency if: I concentration is greater than [insert site specific value indicating release of 20% of the gap inventory] 131 Declare an alert if: I concentration is greater than [insert site specific value 100 times the technical specifications or other operational limits] High 131I concentration in the primary coolant 131 Note: Coolant samples should not be taken if they will result in high individual doses. 65 . The gap inventory is the amount of fission products in the fuel pin gap during normal operations.

. 15 16 17 The criterion was replaced by the same requirement used for site area emergency to refer to the leak rate instead of the (previously misleading) operational core cooling system. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING.e.66 Declare a general emergency if: Primary system leak for more than 15 min requiring all normal and high pressure emergency core coolant systems to maintain primary system water level [insert site specific indicators] Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Primary system leak rate for more than 15 min greater than 2% of normal full power feedwater flow17 (for boiling water reactor refer to the reactor coolant inventory control system) [insert site specific indicators — as an alternative. reference to normal charging flow might be made] TABLE 12. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. to ensure sufficient core cooling). In the case of a loss of coolant accident and core damage. 8 or — Vessel water level below top of active fuel and decreasing or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of imminent or actual core damage Note: Imminent containment boundary failure might be considered as an additional criterion16. Such leak rate specification better covers the concern during a loss of coolant accident (i. Leak rate with respect to normal feedwater flow for normal full power operation is used instead of leak rate with respect to the number of operating pumps. For some plants. the leak rate should also be determined on the basis of the normal charging flow rate.) For the following entry conditions: Primary system leak Primary system leak requiring all normal and high pressure emergency core coolant systems to maintain primary system water level15 and any of the following: — Injection into the vessel less than the rate found from Fig. the status of the containment barrier will directly affect the magnitude of the fission product release.

such as: — Pressurized water reactor: steam generator tube rupture — Boiling water reactor: main steam isolation valve failure outside of containment — A leak with a failure of the containment to achieve isolation — A plant with no containment — Primary system leak directly to atmosphere18 or — Projected or confirmed vessel water — Pressurized water reactor: significant level below top of active fuel leak from the primary to the secondary or system19 — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indication of actual or imminent core damage Primary system leak directly to the atmosphere and any of the following: Radiation levels Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating that in 4 hours the off-site doses will be greater than 0. assuming average meteorological conditions] 18 19 20 21 Any significant primary leak directly to the atmosphere will cause releases of fission products to the environment. For boiling water reactors. failure of the main steam isolation valve without loss of integrity of steam piping to the turbine and/or condenser could cause early releases of fission products to the environment. For pressurized water reactors.10 of the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. and it is necessary to take appropriate actions to stop the leak. and it is necessary to take appropriate actions to stop the leak. assuming average meteorological conditions] Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating 100 times the release limits] Effluent release rates greater than 100 times the release limits Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating that in 1 hour the off-site doses will be greater than the intervention levels for urgent protective actions.TABLE 12. a primary system to secondary system leak at a rate above the normal charging system capability can quickly cause releases of fission products to the environment. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. and it is necessary to take immediate actions to stop the leak. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. 67 . a significant primary system to secondary system leak could cause releases of fission products to the environment. For pressurized water reactors. and it is necessary to take immediate actions to stop the leak.) Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Pressurized water reactor: primary system leak to the secondary system requiring continuous operation of more than the usually operating20charging pumps to maintain primary system water level Boiling water reactor: main steam isolation valve failure without loss of integrity of steam piping to turbine and/or condenser21 For the following entry conditions: Primary system leak directly to atmosphere.

10 mGy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 10% coolant inventory] TABLE 12. the dry well instead of the containment is more appropriate. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. low or centre range if they fail. Monitors may show high. Readings can be confirmed using hand held monitors outside the containment. Readings can be confirmed using hand held monitors outside the area.) For the following entry conditions: High radiation levels in the control room or other areas requiring continuous access for safety system operation and maintenance Radiation levels greater than 10 mSv/h Note: Inconsistent monitor readings could result from incomplete mixing. High radiation levels in areas requiring occasional occupancy to maintain or control safety systems Radiation levels greater than 100 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Elevated containment (for boiling water reactors. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. a failed monitor or irradiation from a contaminated system nearby. . Containment radiation levels greater than 5 Gy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 20% gap inventory] 22 23 For boiling water reactors. low or centre range if they fail. dry well)22 radiation levels Note: Inconsistent monitor readings could result from incomplete mixing or a failed monitor or irradiation from a contaminated system nearby23.68 Declare a general emergency if: Radiation levels greater than 1 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Radiation levels greater than 0. Radiation from a contaminated system nearby could also affect the radiation monitors inside the containment. Monitors may show high.10 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Radiation levels greater than 10 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Containment radiation levels greater than 1 Gy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 1% gap inventory] Radiation levels greater than 1 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Containment radiation levels increase more than 0.

see Procedure B1 in Ref.1 mSv/h [or insert one tenth of the site specific operational intervention level for evacuation. it can be used for the purpose of this EAL. [27]] Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more For the following entry conditions: Unplanned increase in plant radiation levels Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more and any other indication of actual core damage High ambient dose rates at or beyond24 the site boundary Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 1 mSv/h [or insert the site specific operational intervention level for evacuation. However. fires. which can cause significant damage in the event of ignition. natural and other events Security event resulting in damage or impaired25 access to safety systems Security event with potential to affect safety system operation. For boiling water reactors.) Declare a general emergency if: Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more and a major transient is in progress potentially affecting the ability to protect the core Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 0. [27]] Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 10 Sv/h [or insert site specific reading indicating 100 times the background] Security events. Wording change to better reflect the intent of the criterion. hydrogen in the dry well26 24 25 26 Ambient dose rate is usually measured at the site boundary. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. 69 . for boiling water reactors. if any measurement of ambient dose rate beyond the site boundary is available. see Procedure B1 in Ref. hydrogen concentration in the dry well could increase. toxic gas releases. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. explosions.TABLE 12. or uncertain security conditions Fire or explosion potentially affecting areas containing safety systems Flammable gas concentrations that prevent control or maintenance of safety systems Toxic or flammable gases in the plant Security event (intruder or malicious act) Security event resulting in loss of the ability to monitor and control safety functions needed to protect the core Fire or explosion (including turbine failure) Toxic or flammable gases including.

if both the main control room and the emergency control room are affected and the plant has to be controlled by alternative means. an alert is the appropriate EAL. This EAL is new and reflects the items that were deleted from the previous line. . STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont. a site area emergency is the appropriate EAL.70 Declare a general emergency if: Neither the main control room nor the emergency control room is habitable Major natural events resulting in damage or impaired30 access to safety systems and/or decay heat removal systems or affecting their long term operation Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Plant can be controlled from emergency control room Major natural events that threaten the plant such as: — Events beyond the design basis of the plant — Events resulting in actual or potential loss of access to the site for a long period of time Events resulting in actual or potential loss of communications to the site for a long period of time TABLE 12. Lightning strikes could also cause severe damage to the plant and reduce plant safety. An aircraft crash could also cause severe damage to the plant and reduce plant safety.) For the following entry conditions: Evacuation of the main control room27 Major natural disaster such as: — Earthquake — Tornado — Flood — High winds — Vehicle or aircraft28 crash — Hurricane — Tsunami — Storm surge — Low water level — Lightning strike29 Loss of communications31 27 28 29 30 31 New EAL: In the case of the need to evacuate the main control room. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. Wording changed to better reflect the intent of the criterion. the ability to control the plant is affected (the severity of the situation depends on the plant design). If the emergency control room is used for plant control.

TABLE 12. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN OPERATING. 71 . and this temperature should also be used as an additional symptom of abnormal refuelling conditions or spent fuel conditions.) Declare a general emergency if: Conditions that warrant preparing the public to implement urgent protective actions or Conditions that warrant taking protective actions on the site Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Abnormal conditions that warrant obtaining immediate additional assistance for the on-site operations staff or Abnormal conditions that warrant increased preparedness on the part of off-site officials For the following entry conditions: Plant shift supervisor’s opinion Conditions that warrant taking urgent protective actions off the site Spent fuel pool events Water level below top of irradiated fuel or Radiation level in pool area greater than 30 mGy/h Loss of ability to maintain water level above spent fuel or Damage to spent fuel or Loss of ability to maintain pool water temperature below 80°C32 Abnormal refuelling or spent fuel conditions Fully drained pool containing more than one third of a core removed from the reactor within the past 3 years or Radiation level in pool area greater than 3 Gy/h 32 High temperature in the spent fuel pool is a result of the degradation of heat removal from the spent fuel. STANDBY OR HOT SHUTDOWN MODE (cont.

or in the hot standby or the hot shutdown mode. This would cause the temperature of the reactor coolant system to increase and. . 8 or — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of actual or imminent core damage or spent fuel damage a Inability to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown (subcritical) state is also a concern in the cold shutdown mode and the refuelling mode. Since all control rods are inserted into the core and there is no means for immediate insertion of negative reactivity into the core. This process is partly self-controlled. However. the boron dilution in the reactor coolant system could return the reactor to criticality. it is necessary to take immediate action to return the reactor to a subcritical condition. Alert and site area emergency are appropriate EALs in this case. negative reactivity would be inserted into the core. since this process is not so time critical as during power operation. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE For the following entry conditions: Critical safety function impairment Inability to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown (subcritical) state a Failure to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition and any of the following: — Vessel injection rate less than shown in Fig. in the event of failure to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition. because of the negative thermal reactivity coefficient.72 Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Failure to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition TABLE 13.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. The reactor coolant system temperature increase is a symptom of inadequate core cooling.e Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Pressurized water reactor primary system temperature greater than 80oC For the following entry conditions: Pressurized water reactor inadequate core cooling — abnormal primary system temperatureb Pressurized water reactor primary system temperature greater than 90oC and any of the following: Note: Temperature should be measured in the vessel. however. For temperatures above 80°C. Use the average of the highest four core exit thermocouple readings. If the reactor coolant system temperature continues to increase. if the reactor coolant system is sealed and the reactor coolant system temperature can increase without loss of subcooling. for cold shutdown mode it has to be replaced by temperature corresponding to the relieving pressure of the cold overpressure mitigating system. although this indication is less prompt. Most pressurized water reactors have core exit thermocouples to measure temperatures in the vessel.TABLE 13. The hot leg temperature (Thot) could also be used if no core exit thermocouples are available. 73 . 8 and capacity versus pressure curves of operating pumps]d or — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of imminent core damage or spent fuel damage b c d e Different temperatures that characterize inadequate core cooling for pressurized water reactors should be used for the cold shutdown and refuelling modes. and immediate action to restore core cooling should be taken. The reactor coolant system temperature is maintained at a low level. it is a more severe situation and a site area emergency is the appropriate EAL. If the reactor coolant system is unsealed. This is a more accurate description of the phenomena inside the reactor vessel. During refuelling the reactor upper head is removed and the reactor coolant system can only be at atmospheric pressure. Thot provides a backup for core temperature.) Declare a general emergency if: Pressurized water reactor primary system temperature greater than 90oC for more than 30 min Note: 90°C limit applies to refuelling mode.c — Vessel injection rate less than water loss due to decay heat boil-off [use Fig. the temperature corresponding to saturation temperature at the relieving pressure of the cold overpressure mitigating system is the appropriate value. water flow through the core cannot be readily confirmed and changes in Thot occur after the core exit temperature changes. alert is the appropriate EAL. 90°C is the appropriate temperature value for this EAL. However.

For this water level. top of active fuel for more than 30 min below top of active fuel Water level is. Operation of the supporting systems for the safety systems is a necessary condition for operation of the safety systems. or is projected to be.) For the following entry conditions: Abnormal water level in the pressure vessel or in the refuelling area (inadequate core or spent fuel cooling)f Water level is. alert is the appropriate EAL. or is projected to be. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. 8 and capacity versus pressure curves of operating pumps]g or — Major (100–1000 times) increases in areas or process radiation monitors or — Other indications of imminent core damage Loss of AC or DC power sources Actual or projected loss of all AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systemsh is likely for more than 90 min [or insert site specific time required to uncover core or spent fuel for more than 30 min] f g h Actual or projected abnormal water level in the pressure vessel or the refuelling area is a symptom of inadequate core cooling or spent fuel cooling. or is projected to be.74 Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Water level is. immediate action to restore core cooling should be taken. below top of active fuel and any of the following: — Vessel injection rate less than [use Fig. below the mid-loop elevation and residual heat removal is interrupted for more than 15 min Actual or projected loss of all AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systems for more than 60 min [or insert site specific time required to uncover the core or spent fuel] AC or DC power needed for operation of safety systems and their supporting systems reduced to a single source TABLE 13. below Water level is. or is projected to be. This is a more accurate description of the phenomena inside the reactor vessel. The severity of the event increases as the water level decreases. If the water level is lower than is necessary for residual heat removal and cannot be restored. .

TABLE 13. both are reflected. 75 .) Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: For the following entry conditions: Loss of all AC or DC power needed for the operation of safety systems and any of the following: — Vessel water level below top of active fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increase in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indication of actual or imminent core damage Conditions which are not understood and which could potentially affect safety systems Unavailability of safety system instruments or controls in the control room for more than 30 min and major transient in progress potentially affecting the ability to protect irradiated fuel Unreliable functioning of some safety system instruments or controls in the control room for more than 30 min Conditions of an unknown cause affecting safety systems Loss or degraded control of safety systems including post-accident instrumentationi Unavailability of safety system instruments or controls in the control room and remote control locations and any of the following: — Projected or confirmed vessel water level below top of irradiated fuel or — Major (100–1000 times) increase in multiple radiation monitors or — Other indications of actual or imminent core damage i The control capability for safety systems could be either degraded or lost completely. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont.

In such a case.g. by ventilation. In the cold shutdown and refuelling modes. immediate action should be taken to mitigate or prevent the release. hot standby and hot shutdown modes. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. there still exists a possibility of primary system coolant leak. reactor heat removal system. etc. the containment could be the only intact barrier to a release. If a leak affecting core cooling occurs. alert is the appropriate emergency class. Even if a leak is less probable in the cold shutdown and refuelling modes than in the power operation.) TABLE 13. . locks) Actual or predicted safety system failures which increase the risk of core damage or spent fuel damage Fuel handling accident and containment isolation (e.) For the following entry conditions: Loss of fission product barriers Major increased risk of core damage or spent fuel damage Loss for more than 90 min of all systems required to protect the core [or insert site specific time required to uncover core for more than 30 min] Confirmed or projected core or spent fuel damagej Confirmed release greater than 20% of gap inventory in the reactor core Primary system coolant fluid leakk j k A fuel handling accident or confirmed release of a significant amount of the gap inventory can cause release of fission products to the environment. and site area emergency may be appropriate in the event that the containment is not completely isolated. immediate action to stop the leak and to prevent the loss of core cooling should be taken. In the event that the containment is isolated.g. The alert EAL is appropriate in such cases. by ventilation. locks) Major leak from piping carrying primary system coolant fluid outside the containment (in purification systems.76 Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Failure of one or more safety system components will result in uncovering of the core or spent fuel (loss of redundancy in safety systems) Fuel handling accident or confirmed release greater than 1% of gap inventory and incomplete containment isolation (e.

Radiation levels greater than 10 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Radiation levels greater than 1 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours High radiation levels in areas requiring occasional occupancy to maintain or inspect safety systems Radiation levels greater than 100 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours 77 .TABLE 13. a failed monitor or irradiation from a contaminated system nearby. Monitors may show high. assuming average meteorological conditions] Radiation levels greater than 1 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating 100 times the release limits] Effluent release rates greater than 100 times the release limits Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating that in 1 hour the off-site doses will be greater than the intervention levels for urgent protective actions. assuming average meteorological conditions] High radiation levels in areas requiring continuous access for operation and maintenance of safety systems Radiation levels greater than 10 mSv/h Radiation levels greater than 0.10 of the intervention levels for urgent protective actions.10 mSv/h potentially lasting several hours Note: Inconsistent monitor readings could result from incomplete mixing.) Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: For the following entry conditions: Radiation levels Effluent monitor readings for more than 15 min greater than [insert site specific list of effluent monitors and readings indicating that in 4 hours the off-site doses will be greater than 0. Readings can be confirmed using hand held monitors outside the area. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. low or centre range if they fail.

[27]] Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 10 Sv/h [or insert site specific reading indicating 100 times the dose rate due to background radiation levels] TABLE 13. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. Monitors may show high.10 mGy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 10% of coolant] Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more and a major transient in progress potentially affecting the ability to protect the core Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 0.) For the following entry conditions: Evaluated containment radiation levels Note: Inconsistent monitor readings could result from incomplete mixing. . a failed monitor or irradiation from a contaminated system nearby.78 Declare a general emergency if: Containment radiation levels greater than 1 Gy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 1% of gap inventory] Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Containment radiation levels increasing faster than 0. Containment radiation levels greater than 5 Gy/h [or insert site specific reading indicating release of greater than 20% of gap inventory] Unplanned increase in plant radiation levels as indicated by monitors Multiple plant radiation monitors show an unplanned or unpredicted increase by a factor of 100 or more and any other indication of actual core damage High ambient dose rates at or beyondl the site boundary Ambient dose rates at or beyond the site boundary greater than 1 mSv/h [or insert the site specific operational intervention level for evacuation. see Procedure B1 in Ref. Readings can be confirmed using hand held monitors outside the containment.1 mSv/h [or insert one tenth of the site specific operational intervention level for evacuation. However. if any measurement of ambient dose rate beyond the site boundary is available. low or centre range if they fail. see Procedure B1 in Ref. it can be used for the purpose of this EAL. [27]] l Ambient dose rate is usually measured at the site boundary.

or uncertain security conditions Fire or explosion potentially affecting areas containing safety systems Toxic or flammable gases in plant Major natural events resulting in damage or impaired access to safety and/or decay heat removal systems or affecting their long term operationq Major natural events that threaten the plant such as: — Events beyond the design basis of the plant — Events resulting in actual or potential loss of access to the site for a long period of time Security event (intruder or malicious act) Security event resulting in loss of the ability to monitor and control safety functions needed to protect the core Fire or explosionn Toxic or flammable gases A major natural disaster such as: — Earthquake — Tornado — Floods — High winds — Vehicle or aircraft crasho — Hurricane — Tsunami — Storm surge — Low water — Lightning strikep m n o p q Formal wording change to better convey the intent of the criterion. Wording changed to better convey the intent of the criterion. Lightning strikes can cause severe damage to the plant and reduce plant safety. Turbine is not in operation in the cold shutdown and refuelling modes. natural and other events Security event resulting in damage or impaired access to safety systems that are required to be operablem Security event with potential to affect safety system operation. Aircraft crash can also cause severe damage to the plant and reduce plant safety.TABLE 13. toxic gas releases. fires. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. explosions.) Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: For the following entry conditions: Security events. 79 . Only safety systems that are required to be operable are referenced in this EAL.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS IN COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELLING MODE (cont. High temperature in the spent fuel pool is a result of a degradation in heat removal from the spent fuel. .) For the following entry conditions: Loss of communications r Plant shift supervisor’s opinion Conditions that warrant taking urgent protective actions off the site Spent fuel pool events Abnormal refuelling or spent fuel conditions Fully drained pool containing fuel removed from the reactor core within the past 6 months or Radiation level in pool area greater than 3 Gy/h r s This EAL is new and reflects items deleted from the previous line.80 Declare a general emergency if: Declare a site area emergency if: Declare an alert if: Events resulting in actual or potential loss of communications to the site for a long period of time Conditions that warrant preparing the public to implement urgent protective actions or taking protective actions on the site Abnormal conditions that warrant immediate additional assistance for the on-site operations staff or increased preparedness of off-site officials Water level below top of irradiated fuel or Radiation level in pool area greater than 30 mGy/h Loss of ability to maintain water level in pool containing irradiated fuel or Damage to irradiated fuel or Loss of ability to maintain pool water temperature below 80°C s TABLE 13. and this temperature should also be used as an additional symptom of abnormal refuelling or abnormal spent fuel conditions.

7. This was done to help users of the previous guidance to better understand how to apply the changes. A primary system temperature equal to or greater than the saturation temperature indicates that the water in the core is boiling.29. For a pressurized water reactor a negative cooling margin indicates that water is boiling in the reactor pressure vessel and that the reactor core may be uncovered [33].28. Some of the EALs from the original guidance were removed (this is not noted in the tables). The accident is classified at the highest class indicated. the highest class being ‘general emergency’ and the lowest class being ‘alert’. all the abnormal entry conditions in the first column should be reviewed.EXAMPLE EALs III. Cooling margin–saturation curve [27]. These example EALs are based on an example system from Ref. [27] are accompanied by footnotes to explain and distinguish them from the technical comments included in the original guidance in Ref. Changes in the original guidance of Ref. When using Tables 12 and 13. COOLING MARGIN–SATURATION CURVE III. 81 . [27]. [33]. III.27. 280 390 Saturation temperature (°C) 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Saturation temperature (°C) 260 370 350 330 310 290 270 250 5 10 15 20 25 Absolute pressure (MPa) Absolute pressure (MPa) FIG. For each entry condition that applies to a specific case. The cooling margin can be approximated (neglecting instrument inaccuracies) by subtracting the coolant temperature from the saturation temperature for the given primary system pressure. the class is selected by matching the EAL criteria to the left.

WATER LOST BY BOILING DUE TO DECAY HEAT IN A 3000 MW(th) NUCLEAR POWER PLANT III. This curve is based on a 3000 MW(th) reactor operated at a constant power for a nominally infinite period and then shut down instantaneously.31. 82 . Step 2: If the core has been uncovered for more than 15 min. Wi3000 is the water injection required for a 3000 MW(th) plant (m3/h). 8 shows the amount of water that must be injected into the reactor pressure vessel to replace water lost by boiling due to decay heat. then use the graphs to determine the saturation temperature Tsat.30. This is the minimum water flow rate that must be injected into a reactor core to cool it once it is shut down [33]. 7: III. The curve in Fig. and thus the cooling margin. 7. Determine the absolute pressure and temperature in the primary system Tps. increase the injection rate by a factor of three to accommodate the heat from the Zr–H2O reaction and built-up (stored) energy. from Fig. from: Wi = Wi3000 where Pplant (MW(th)) 3000 (MW(th)) Wi is the water injection required (m3/h).How to use Fig. 8. Tsat is the saturation temperature from Fig. by using the equation below: Cooling margin = Tsat − Tps where Tps is the temperature in the primary system. Step 1: Determine the amount of water injection required. Pplant is the power output of the plant in MW(th) (MW(th) = 3 × MW(e)).

m3/h m3/h Hours after shutdown Days after shutdown FIG. 83 . 8. Rate of injection of water required to replace water lost by boiling due to decay heat in a 3000 MW(th) nuclear power plant [27].

explosion or fumes involving a dangerous source Suspected bomb (possible radiological dispersal device). Instruction 1 in Ref. The actual boundaries of the safety and security perimeters should be defined in such a way that they are easily recognizable (e. markings). SUGGESTED RADIUS OF THE INNER CORDONED AREA (SAFETY PERIMETER) IN A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY Situation Initial inner cordoned area (safety perimeter) Initial determination — Outside Unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source Major spill from a potentially dangerous source Fire. Table 14 [7. In a radiological emergency.g.g. the inner cordoned area is where protective action is implemented to protect responders and the public.Appendix IV OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OF A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY IV. by roads) and should be secured. However. TABLE 14. loss of shielding or spill involving a potentially dangerous source Fire or other event involving a potentially dangerous source that can spread radioactive material throughout the building (e.g.1. The size of the area may be expanded on the basis of dose rates and environmental measurement OILs (see Appendix II) when these data become available. exploded or unexploded Conventional (non-nuclear) explosion or a fire involving a nuclear weapon (no nuclear yield) Damage. [17] provides a list of observables that can be used by first responders to identify a dangerous source. Initially the size of the area is determined on the basis of information that can be directly observed (e. the safety perimeter should be established at least as far from the source as is indicated in the table until the radiological assessor has assessed the situation. 17] provides suggestions for the approximate radius of the inner cordoned area. through the ventilation system) OIL1 and OIL2 from Table 8 30 m radius around the source 100 m radius around the source 300 m radius 400 m radius or more to protect against an explosion 1000 m radius Initial determination — Inside a building Affected and adjacent areas (including floors above and below) Entire building and appropriate outside distance as indicated above Expansion based on radiological monitoring Wherever these levels are measured 84 .

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J. V. Ahmad. Kostadinov. United States of America International Atomic Energy Agency World Health Organization International Atomic Energy Agency Health Canada. Slovenia Russian Research Centre ‘Kurchatov Institute’. J. S. Hončarenko. E. S. Slovakia Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority. Kutkov. Belarus World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine. Z. M. R. Russian Federation Consultant. Buglova. Canada Risø National Laboratory. Kenigsberg. Pakistan State Research Centre. W. A. Lee. A. Switzerland Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Carr. Beznau Nuclear Power Plant. Barabanova. Ford. T. Czech Republic Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. Homma. Institute of Biophysics. Lafortune. K. 89 . Crick. P. Janko. J. Jaworska. Russian Federation International Safety Research. Canada International Atomic Energy Agency Boecker. Norway National Commission on Radiation Protection. V. V. B.CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW Aeberli. Kocheyev. Japan Temelin Nuclear Power Plant. Denmark Japan Atomic Energy Agency. Hedemann Jensen. United States of America Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration.

Miller. Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences (KIRAMS). Solomon. United States of America Fortum Power and Heat Oy. Slovakia Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. United States of America Nuclear Safety Directorate. S. R. J. E. J. K. United States of America International Atomic Energy Agency Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Perez. McKenna.Lim. Loviisa Power Plant. 90 . Sjöblom. Nagataki. McClelland. S. Rochedo. Australia Martinčič. United Kingdom National Nuclear Energy Commission. Republic of Korea International Atomic Energy Agency United States Department of Energy. Sládek. Scott. V. C. T. W. Ricks. Finland OSSKI National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene. United States of America Japan Radioisotope Association. Hungary World Health Organization Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. Pellet. S. United States of America Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. Japan Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. V. Brazil Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute. Smith. Finland Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. Paile. R. B. M. S. Robinson.

Germany Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. R. World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine. United States of America Turai. W. Weiss.Sundnes. Whitcomb. Norway OSSKI National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene. K. 91 . Hungary Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz. I.

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Y. Republic of: Choul-Ho Yun. C.. Corresponding members receive drafts for comment and other documentation but they do not generally participate in meetings. A.. S.. C. Finland: Järvinen.. Sweden: Larsson.A..S... H. International Nuclear Safety Group: Meserve. Iran. Islamic Republic of: Asgharizadeh. J.. South Africa: Leotwane. M.M. D. Republic of: Hyun-Koon Kim. D. L.. S.. (RASSC).. Japan: Fukushima.A.K.... W. India: Sharma.. B. P. Malaysia: Azlina Mohammed Jais.J. Nuclear Safety Standards Committee Algeria: Merrouche.-C. Czech Republic: Šváb. Morocco: Soufi.. A. *Cyprus: Demetriades. Switzerland: Flury.. Lithuania: Demčenko. M. Korea. R.. United States of America: Virgilio.. I... M... Canada: Jammal. L. D.. D. Poland: Jurkowski. Australia: Loy.. Russian Federation: Adamchik.. Korea. Tunisia: Baccouche. Brazil: Vinhas. South Africa: Magugumela. A.. O.-P. G. Magnusson. F... L. Netherlands: van der Wiel. (Coordinator). *Bulgaria: Gledachev. S. J. A. United Kingdom: Weightman. Lithuania: Maksimovas.. Australia: Le Cann. (TRANSSC). F. O.. Russian Federation: Baranaev. China: Jingxi Li. Ukraine: Mykolaichuk.. Safety Standards Committee Chairpersons: Brach... M. Germany: Majer. G. A. India: Vaze. M. Belgium: Samain. S. R.. M. Vietnam: Le-chi Dung. Brazil: Gromann.. Austria: Sholly... J. R. France: Lacoste. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Yoshimura. K. Mexico: Carrera... Pakistan: Rahman. L. Slovenia: Vojnovič. International Commission on Radiological Protection: Holm. G... Pakistan: Habib. E.. Italy: Bava. Germany: Wassilew. Pather.. I. Ghana: Emi-Reynolds. M. S. Spain: Zarzuela. Hungary: Adorján. Sweden: Hallman. L... (Chairperson). T. G. (NUSSC). (WASSC).T. France: Feron. Croatia: Valčić.. Slovakia: Uhrik. A. P. Y.. P.. Egypt: Barakat.. Japan: Kanda..BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS An asterisk denotes a corresponding member. Romania: Biro..W.. Israel: Levanon. Two asterisks denote an alternate. A. European Commission: Faross.. J. M. Egypt: Ibrahim... I. Vaughan. G.-L. Spain: Barceló Vernet. China: Liu Hua.. J. IAEA: Delattre. Finland: Laaksonen. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Abuzid. Argentina: Waldman.. Advisory Group on Nuclear Security: Hashmi.J..A. Belgium: De Boeck. *Greece: Camarinopoulos...... 93 . Canada: Rzentkowski.-E. M. M.. T. P. U. Commission on Safety Standards Argentina: González. Israel: Hirshfeld. F. G. Indonesia: Antariksawan. M. J.

Canada: Clement. C. D. Portugal: Dias de Oliveira. U. J. J. J. C... G. United States of America: Mayfield.. Ukraine: Pavlenko.R. South Africa: Olivier. R.I. World Nuclear Association: Saint-Pierre. United Kingdom: Robinson.J.. Germany: Helming. Paraguay: Romero de Gonzalez. J. Romania: Rodna. Mexico: Delgado Guardado.. Morocco: Tazi.... S. United Kingdom: Vaughan. Croatia: Kralik.. United States of America: Lewis. Israel: Koch. France: Godet. T. Tunisia: Chékir. E. A. International Labour Office: Niu.. G... G... V. International Organization for Standardization: Sevestre. Z... Ukraine: Shumkova..... Pakistan: Ali. S. FORATOM: Fourest.. P. A. M. (Coordinator). V..... Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Byron. *Thailand: Suntarapai. L.. (Chairperson). G. S. L. Sweden: Almen. Japan: Kiryu. IAEA: Boal. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Reig.. I. Turkey: Okyar. IAEA: Feige. Ghana: Amoako. Uruguay: Nader. China: Huating Yang. Argentina: Massera. J. Norway: Saxebol. T.-P.R.. A. Ireland: Colgan. Poland: Merta.. B. J.E.-L. G. Indonesia: Widodo. M. Pan American Health Organization: Jiménez. *Cyprus: Demetriades.. Korea. European Commission: Vigne. Iceland: Magnusson... I.. M.. *Uruguay: Nader. A. A. Y.... Islamic Republic of: Kardan. S. World Health Organization: Carr. M.. A.. P. Australia: Melbourne. Philippines: Valdezco... J. S.N.. M. P. *Latvia: Salmins.. Denmark: Øhlenschlæger... *Bulgaria: Katzarska. *Cuba: Betancourt Hernandez. I.. K.A. Slovenia: Sutej. Z.. Netherlands: Zuur. B.... L... *Greece: Kamenopoulou. M... Brazil: Rodriguez Rochedo. International Electrotechnical Commission: Bouard. *World Nuclear Association: Borysova. H. A. S.. *Austria: Karg. Hungary: Koblinger. Switzerland: Piller.. Malaysia: Hamrah. A. Radiation Safety Standards Committee *Algeria: Chelbani.. Belgium: van Bladel.. Estonia: Lust.. Slovakia: Jurina.... Iran..H. Russian Federation: Savkin.M. International Organization for Standardization: Rannou. M. M... Egypt: Hassib. India: Sharma. International Commission on Radiological Protection: Valentin. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Busitta.Turkey: Bezdegumeli. (Chairperson). A.. Finland: Markkanen.. I. J. L.. N. (Coordinator). European Commission: Janssens. Italy: Bologna. V. A. M. Czech Republic: Petrova.. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Lazo.. T.. M. E. T. Republic of: Byung-Soo Lee. M. International Source Suppliers and Producers Association: Fasten. 94 . Spain: Amor Calvo. G.. S.B. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: Crick..M. L. W. D.... A. V. I. Lithuania: Mastauskas. T. International Electrotechnical Commission: Thompson.

J. Finland: Lahkola.. Finland: Hutri. C. Ghana: Faanu. Islamic Republic of: Eshraghi. A. Hungary: Czoch. C. P... *Morocco: Allach. France: Landier. H. **Capadona. A. Thailand: Jerachanchai. United States of America: Boyle..W. K.. Iran. J.. *Austria: Fischer. World Nuclear Transport Institute: Green. T.. *Cuba: Quevedo Garcia. *New Zealand: Ardouin. V. Denmark: Nielsen. (Coordinator). Croatia: Belamarić.. W. U. N... Brach.. **Orsini. India: Agarwal. D. Pakistan: Rashid. M. International Maritime Organization: Rahim..J.E. International Air Transport Association: Brennan.. Australia: Williams. Portugal: Buxo da Trindade. O. South Africa: Hinrichsen. G. **Delgado Guardado. Estonia: Lust. R. K. A.. Switzerland: Krietsch. (Chairperson). United Kingdom: Sallit. Russian Federation: Buchelnikov.. Spain: Zamora Martin.. J..... Japan: Hanaki.. Germany: Götz. Argentina: Biaggio.. E. Netherlands: Ter Morshuizen. Croatia: Trifunovic.G. International Civil Aviation Organization: Rooney. A. IAEA: Stewart.. W.. Cyprus: Demetriades. S. V. G. P. M.. J.. K.. P.. Korea. K. M. **Gessl... A. E... Czech Republic: Ducháček... Republic of: Dae-Hyung Cho. P. European Commission: Binet. Belgium: Blommaert. H.. S. Norway: Hornkjøl.. S. *Cyprus: Demetriades. Lithuania: Statkus. S. Poland: Dziubiak...... Canada: Howard. M. Uruguay: Nader...... Ghana: Emi-Reynolds. A. G.M.R.. Israel: Koch. G. S. France: Rieu.M.. D. B... **Svahn..P. D.. S. D. R. *Nitsche.. Mexico: Bautista Arteaga. International Source Supplies and Producers Association: Miller. Iran.T. **Husain. E. M.... I. Brazil: Xavier. F..M.W. G. Egypt: Mohamed. J. Australia: Sarkar. R. China: Zhimin Qu. Ukraine: Lopatin. Turkey: Ertürk. L.L.P. A... D. Germany: Rein. India: Rana.. M. D. Malaysia: Sobari. Greece: Tzika. Czech Republic: Lietava... I. Italy: Trivelloni.. *Bulgaria: Simeonov.K. Indonesia: Wisnubroto..... Z. S... D.. International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations: Tisdall. World Nuclear Association: Gorlin.. Brazil: Tostes.. Ireland: Duffy. Austria: Kirchnawy.T.. A. A.Transport Safety Standards Committee Argentina: López Vietri... F.E. J. A. L. Hungary: Sáfár. Cuba: Fernandez. *Emamjomeh. Indonesia: Wisnubroto. Sweden: Häggblom. Canada: Régimbald. F. C. *Paraguay: More Torres. **Roughan. K.. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: Kervella. J. Denmark: Breddam. A. P. J. *Greece: Vogiatzi. A.. Belgium: Cottens. **Alter..... Waste Safety Standards Committee Algeria: Abdenacer. Bulgaria: Bakalova.. D.. A. Y... J. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Kekli.M... N. International Organization for Standardization: Malesys. J. Islamic 95 . A. F.A.M. D... China: Xiaoqing Li.. S. A.. T. *Cabral. Universal Postal Union: Bowers. Egypt: El-Shinawy.. I..

O. M.. *Zarghami... Poland: Wlodarski. Netherlands: van der Shaaf. Switzerland: Wanner. P. (Chairperson). I.. International Source Suppliers and Producers Association: Fasten. S... R. Italy: Dionisi. Mexico: Aguirre Gómez. Pakistan: Mannan. M. Slovakia: Homola. Japan: Matsuo... European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards: Lorenz.... T. M. Sweden: Frise.. H.. W. *Latvia: Salmins. M.. M. 96 . *Thailand: Supaokit. Malaysia: Sudin... Spain: Sanz Aludan. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Riotte. Ukraine: Makarovska. S. C... J.. *Morocco: Barkouch. (Coordinator). *European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards: Zaiss. South Africa: Pather. *Paraguay: Idoyaga Navarro.. International Organization for Standardization: Hutson. Portugal: Flausino de Paiva. H. T. Republic of: Won-Jae Park... Lithuania: Paulikas. A. Slovenia: Mele. World Nuclear Association: Saint-Pierre.... M.. A.. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Elfawares.. *Uruguay: Nader. Turkey: Özdemir. R. United Kingdom: Chandler. United States of America: Camper.. G. A. Israel: Dody... Tunisia: Bousselmi. H. L.Republic of: Assadi. M. G. J.. J. A. V. W. Korea. L. European Commission: Necheva... Iraq: Abbas. B.. M. IAEA: Siraky. A. H.

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.2 (ST-3) STI/PUB/1119 (125 pp. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY IAEA Safety Standards Series No.1 STI/PUB/1265 (145 pp.00 SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES IAEA Safety Standards Series No.. GS-G-2.00 THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES IAEA Safety Standards Series No. 2009) ISBN 978–92–0–112808–9 Price: €48. 2006) ISBN 92–0–106506–X Price: €25.. 2009) ISBN 978–92–0–111508–9 Price: €45.00 PREDISPOSAL MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IAEA Safety Standards Series No.9 STI/PUB/1227 (70 pp. 2007) ISBN 92–0–109306–3 Price: €31. GS-R-2 STI/PUB/1133 (72 pp..00 www..org/books .R ELATED PUBLICATIONS PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY IAEA Safety Standards Series No. 2002) ISBN 92–0–111602–0 Price: €14. TS-G-1.. GSR Part 4 STI/PUB/1375 (56 pp.iaea.00 CATEGORIZATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IAEA Safety Standards Series No. 2006) ISBN 92–0–110706–4 Price: €25. 2005) ISBN 92–0–103905–0 Price: €18. 2010) ISBN 978–92–0–106410–3 Price: €45. RS-G-1. GSR Part 1 STI/PUB/1465 (63 pp. GS-R-3 STI/PUB/1252 (39 pp. SF-1 STI/PUB/1273 (37 pp.50 ARRANGEMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY IAEA Safety Standards Series No..50 FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES IAEA Safety Standards Series No..00 GOVERNMENTAL.00 PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5 STI/PUB/1368 (38 pp. 2002) ISBN 92–0–116702–4 Price: €20..

regulatory bodies and operators everywhere must ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are used beneficially.Safety through international standards “Governments. The IAEA safety standards are designed to facilitate this. and I encourage all Member States to make use of them.” Yukiya Amano Director General INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA ISBN 978–92–0–107410–2 ISSN 1020–525X . safely and ethically.

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