Bozin, Sunny

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Ostendorff, William Saturday, March 12, 2011 8:09 AM Franovich, Mike Nieh, Ho; Warnick, Greg; Kock, Andrea; Zorn, Jason Re: UPDATE from the telecon at 7:30

Thanks Mike. WCO

From: Franovich, Mike To: Ostendorff, William Cc: Nieh, Ho; Warnick, Greg; Kock, Andrea; Zorn, Jason Sent: Sat Mar 12 08:01:21 2011 Subject: UPDATE from the telecon at 7:30 Marty Virgilio didn't have much more to offer. The explosion may have been a steam explosion in secondary containment and not primary containment. He said the ET/RST were making that deduction by what they know of similar plants. If secondary containment is failed, then there is a pathway for spent fuel (in the pool) to be exposed to the environment (no filtering). NRC has a thermal hydraulic expert (Ulses) on his way to Japan part of the USAID contingent (DART (relief team)). As an aside, I believe the secondary containment scenario is plausible as the plant operator would have tried venting the primary containment to relieve pressure thru the secondary containment to allow for some filtering of rad gas. If this plant does not have a hardened vent (a retrofit many US BWRs Mark I containment did about 20 years ago), then the explosion scenario makes sense. Also, I understand that OIP has made attempts to get IAEA info but IAEA is not return calls at the moment. Next CA briefing at 15:30.