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ESAD Technology Benefits to ISD’s

ESAD Technology Benefits to ISD’s
ESAD Technology Benefits to ISD’s • Brief Personal Note, A Tragic Accident • MIL-STD-1901A Requirements

ESAD Technology Benefits to ISD’s

• Brief Personal Note, A Tragic Accident

• MIL-STD-1901A Requirements

• Typical ISD System, Safety Concern and Possible Remedy

• Traditional Out-of-Line ISD

• Out-of-Line Disadvantages

• New Component Requirements

• Inline ISD Architectures

• Conclusions

A Tragic Accident • Fire Aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS Forrestal (CV 59) – Date:

A Tragic Accident

• Fire Aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS Forrestal (CV 59)

– Date: 29 July 1967

– Time: 10:50 AM

– Cost: $72.1 M (1967),

– Lives Lost: 134

– Seriously Injured: 64

$350 M (2005)

Source: Naval Weapons Center Report, China Lake, CA, January 1975

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967 4

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967 4
USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967 5

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967 6

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967

7
USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967 8

USS Forrestal (CV-59) July 29, 1967

A GOOD DOCUMENTARY SAILORS TO THE END By GREGORY A. FREEMAN Harper Collins Publishers 9

A GOOD DOCUMENTARY

SAILORS TO THE END

By

GREGORY A. FREEMAN

Harper Collins Publishers

MIL-STD-1901A Requirements Revised June of ‘02 • Traditional Out-of-Line Still Acceptable • Slight Revisions to

MIL-STD-1901A Requirements Revised June of ‘02

• Traditional Out-of-Line Still Acceptable

• Slight Revisions to In-Line Requirements

• Range of Application is Most Significant Change (Par.

4.2.a)

– Safety Analysis is no longer a basis for non use of an ISD

• 1 Amp -1 Watt In-Line No Longer Acceptable

• An ISD is Now Mandatory for New Exploratory, Advanced Engineering, and Operational System Developments. Par. 1.2

Typical ISD System Launcher Control Intent to Launch: Target Recognition/ Identification Executive Decision Computer

Typical ISD System

Launcher Control

Intent to Launch:

Target Recognition/ Identification Executive Decision Computer Decision

Safety Interlocks Removed:

Multiple Key Locks Guarded Toggles/ PushButtons Safety Pins

Launch Command Issued

ISD

Ignition Safety Device

Safety Features:

Out-of-Line Energetics Safety Shorts Insensitive 1 A/1 W Squibs

Deflagrating Output
Deflagrating
Output
Electrical Interface
Electrical Interface
Typical Interface Details Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (+28 VDC) ISD Return SHIELD 12

Typical Interface Details

Launch

Control

Typical Interface Details Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (+28 VDC) ISD Return SHIELD 12

ARM (+28 VDC)

Typical Interface Details Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (+28 VDC) ISD Return SHIELD 12

Fire (+28 VDC)

ISD

Return

Typical Interface Details Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (+28 VDC) ISD Return SHIELD 12

SHIELD

Typical Interface Details Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (+28 VDC) ISD Return SHIELD 12
Improved Interface Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (Serial Interface) ISD Return SHIELD 13

Improved Interface

Launch

Control

Improved Interface Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (Serial Interface) ISD Return SHIELD 13

ARM (+28 VDC)

Improved Interface Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (Serial Interface) ISD Return SHIELD 13

Fire (Serial Interface)

ISD

Return

Improved Interface Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (Serial Interface) ISD Return SHIELD 13

SHIELD

Improved Interface Launch Control ARM (+28 VDC) Fire (Serial Interface) ISD Return SHIELD 13
Traditional Out-of-Line ISD • Simple Operation: – Arm Command (Solenoid Power) – Fire Command (Firing

Traditional Out-of-Line ISD

Simple Operation:

– Arm Command (Solenoid Power) – Fire Command (Firing Energy) – Status Feedback – Current
– Arm Command (Solenoid
Power)
– Fire Command (Firing
Energy)
– Status Feedback
– Current Limit Feature
Out-of Line Disadvantages • Minimal Safety (Arm-Fire Device) • Often Large and Heavy • Physical

Out-of Line Disadvantages

• Minimal Safety (Arm-Fire Device)

• Often Large and Heavy

• Physical Location Restricted to Near Ignition Point

• High Current Requirements

• Spring or Motor Driven Return to Safe Condition

• Relatively Expensive

New Component Requirements EFDI (Exploding Foil Deflagrating Initiator) • LEEFI with HNS-4 to BKNO3 Transition

New Component Requirements

EFDI (Exploding Foil Deflagrating Initiator)

Requirements EFDI (Exploding Foil Deflagrating Initiator) • LEEFI with HNS-4 to BKNO3 Transition • Based on

LEEFI with HNS-4 to BKNO3 Transition

Based on Slapper Detonator Technology for Warheads

Now Under Development and Qualification

for Warheads • Now Under Development and Qualification HNS-IV Pellet BKNO 3 Flyer High Voltage Pulse
HNS-IV Pellet BKNO 3
HNS-IV Pellet
BKNO 3
Flyer
Flyer

High Voltage

Pulse

Slapper

Deflagration

Bridge

Now Under Development and Qualification HNS-IV Pellet BKNO 3 Flyer High Voltage Pulse Slapper Deflagration Bridge
New Component Requirements EFDI In Standard LEEFI Package MODELLI7010 LIgniter™™ Patent Pending P.O. Box 1229,

New Component Requirements

EFDI In Standard LEEFI Package

MODELLI7010 LIgniter™™ Patent Pending
MODELLI7010
LIgniter™™
Patent Pending
LEEFI Package MODELLI7010 LIgniter™™ Patent Pending P.O. Box 1229, Middletown, CA 95461 Phone: (707) 928-5244

P.O. Box 1229, Middletown, CA 95461

Phone: (707) 928-5244

E-mail: office@reynoldssystems.com

Fax: (707) 928-5033

Igniter for

Rocket Motors Gas Generators

PressureCartridge

Pyrotechnic Actuators, Ejectors,PinPullers,Valves and other piston driven devices.

PressureCartridge Pyrotechnic Actuators, Ejectors,PinPullers,Valves and other piston driven devices. 3 X actual size 17

3 X actual size

New Component Requirements IPS (Integrated Planar Switch) • Part of Slapper Geometry – Zero Size

New Component Requirements IPS (Integrated Planar Switch)

• Part of Slapper Geometry

– Zero Size

– Near Zero Cost

• ARDEC Funded Development

• Now in Advanced Development

• Low Risk for Qualification

– Passed Engineering Env. Testing

– Based on Fully Qualified LEEFI

• Enhances Safety

MIL-DTL-23659

Env. Testing – Based on Fully Qualified LEEFI • Enhances Safety – MIL-DTL-23659 • Requires a

• Requires a Hermetic Seal

New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of

New Component Requirements

IPS Operation

New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap
New Component Requirements IPS Operation • Electrical – +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap

• Electrical

– +V increased to exceed breakdown voltage of gap

– Breakdown voltage set by gap size

– Other characteristics set by surrounding circuitry

Gap LEEFI Bridge
Gap
LEEFI
Bridge
gap – Breakdown voltage set by gap size – Other characteristics set by surrounding circuitry Gap
New Component Requirements IPS (Integrated Planar Switch) V V max V min High Voltage Jitter

New Component Requirements IPS (Integrated Planar Switch)

V

Vmax

Vmin

High Voltage

New Component Requirements IPS (Integrated Planar Switch) V V max V min High Voltage Jitter t

Jitter

t

IPS Threshold Jitter

IPS ENVIRONMENTAL TEST • Tested to LEEFI Levels Cold – -65 F – +160 F

IPS ENVIRONMENTAL TEST

Tested to LEEFI Levels

Cold

-65 F

+160 F

Hot

Shock

2000g .5 ms

Vibe

F15 Buffet MIL-

STD-810

Test Results

60 for 60 (30 hot, 30 cold)

+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
+160 F Hot Shock – 2000g .5 ms – Vibe F15 Buffet MIL- STD-810 • Test
Self-Contained ISD • Single Unit • Possible Drop-in Replacement • Location Restricted • All components

Self-Contained ISD

Single Unit

Possible Drop-in Replacement

Location Restricted

All components at Ignition Point

EFDI

Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch

ISD Module

Control

Point EFDI Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch ISD Module Control Power Deflagrating Output

Power

Point EFDI Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch ISD Module Control Power Deflagrating Output

Deflagrating

Output

Remote Ignition Module • Simplest Remote Configuration • Low Cost Ignition Module • Requires Stripline

Remote Ignition Module

Simplest Remote Configuration

Low Cost Ignition Module

Requires Stripline Connection

Limited Separation Distance

Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch

ISD M odule

Control

Distance Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch ISD M odule Control Stripline EFDI Power

Stripline

EFDI
EFDI

Power

Distance Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage HV Switch ISD M odule Control Stripline EFDI Power

Ignition M odule

Remote Ignition Module with IPS • Low Cost Switch Located in Ignition Module • Stripline

Remote Ignition Module with IPS

Low Cost Switch Located in Ignition Module

Stripline Required

Safety Enhanced by IPS

High EFDI / IPS Voltage IPS Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage Stripline EFDI Return
High
EFDI / IPS
Voltage
IPS
Safety Logic
HV Converter
Energy Storage
Stripline
EFDI
Return
Ignition Module
ISD Module

Control

Power

IPS Safety Logic HV Converter Energy Storage Stripline EFDI Return Ignition Module ISD Module Control Power
Ignition Module with IPS and Energy Storage • No Strip-line Requirement • Can Remote to

Ignition Module with IPS and Energy Storage

• No Strip-line Requirement

• Can Remote to Long Distance

EFDI / IPS High Voltage IPS Safety Logic HV Converter High voltage EFDI Capacitor Return
EFDI / IPS
High
Voltage
IPS
Safety Logic
HV Converter
High voltage
EFDI
Capacitor
Return
ISD Module
Ignition Module

Control Voltage IPS Safety Logic HV Converter High voltage EFDI Capacitor Return ISD Module Ignition Module Power

Power

IPS Safety Logic HV Converter High voltage EFDI Capacitor Return ISD Module Ignition Module Control Power
ISD /ESAD Combination SAFETY ENVIRONMENTS ELECTRONIC SAFE ARM DEVICE (ESAD) DETONATION OUTPUT (MIL-STD-1316) ARM

ISD /ESAD Combination

SAFETY ENVIRONMENTS
SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTS
ELECTRONIC SAFE ARM DEVICE (ESAD) DETONATION OUTPUT (MIL-STD-1316) ARM FIRE FEEDBACK POWER (DYNAMIC DRIVE)
ELECTRONIC SAFE ARM
DEVICE
(ESAD)
DETONATION
OUTPUT
(MIL-STD-1316)
ARM
FIRE
FEEDBACK
POWER
(DYNAMIC DRIVE)
(OPTIONAL)
IN-LINE
IGNITION SAFETY DEVICE
(ISD)
(MIL-STD-1901)

WARHEAD

WARHEAD

INITIATION

TRIGGER

MISSILE

COMMUNICATION

WARHEAD WARHEAD INITIATION TRIGGER MISSILE COMMUNICATION POWER POWER RETURN High Voltage to Ignition Module 26

POWER

POWER

RETURN

WARHEAD WARHEAD INITIATION TRIGGER MISSILE COMMUNICATION POWER POWER RETURN High Voltage to Ignition Module 26
WARHEAD WARHEAD INITIATION TRIGGER MISSILE COMMUNICATION POWER POWER RETURN High Voltage to Ignition Module 26
WARHEAD WARHEAD INITIATION TRIGGER MISSILE COMMUNICATION POWER POWER RETURN High Voltage to Ignition Module 26

High Voltage to Ignition Module

Conclusions • ISD Safety Evolution Has Been Slow • New Devices and Warhead ESAD Technology

Conclusions

• ISD Safety Evolution Has Been Slow

• New Devices and Warhead ESAD Technology Is Ready to Offer Improvements in:

– Safety

– Reliability

– Design Flexibility

– Weight

– Cost