DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

***WTO Disad***
***WTO Disad***.....................................................................................................................................................1 1nc 1/2.........................................................................................................................................................................2 1nc 2/2.........................................................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness***......................................................................................................................................................4 Uniqueness Counterplan.............................................................................................................................................5 Compliance Works......................................................................................................................................................6 Compliancy High- farm subsides................................................................................................................................7 ***Links***...............................................................................................................................................................8 Incentives....................................................................................................................................................................9 Renewable Subsidies................................................................................................................................................10 Efficiency Standards.................................................................................................................................................11 Competitiveness........................................................................................................................................................12 Café Standards..........................................................................................................................................................13 Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting...............................................................................................14 ***Compliance Good***.........................................................................................................................................15 Hege..........................................................................................................................................................................16 Trade Sanctions.........................................................................................................................................................17 ***WTO Collapse Bad***.......................................................................................................................................18 Compliance Key to WTO.........................................................................................................................................19 China.........................................................................................................................................................................20 Protectionism............................................................................................................................................................21 Trade Wars................................................................................................................................................................22 Warming....................................................................................................................................................................23 ***Free Trade Impacts***........................................................................................................................................24 Competitiveness........................................................................................................................................................25 Environment..............................................................................................................................................................26 Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming.........................................................................................................27 ***IPR Good***......................................................................................................................................................28 WTO Compliance Key to IPR..................................................................................................................................29 Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR..........................................................................................................................30 IPR Module: Econ.....................................................................................................................................................31 IPR Module: Econ.....................................................................................................................................................32 IPR Module: China...................................................................................................................................................33 IPR Module: China...................................................................................................................................................34 IPR Module: Medicines............................................................................................................................................35 ***Aff***.................................................................................................................................................................36 No Link—renewable incentives aren’t targeted ......................................................................................................37 Not Unique—No International Compliance.............................................................................................................38 Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now.....................................................................................................................39 Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now.....................................................................................................................40

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1nc 1/2
The WTO and its settlement system’s credibility are on the brink. Robert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, March 2007, “The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html

[Zavell]

The shift from bilateral to multilateral enforcement helps secure the legitimacy of the trading system and reduces the political costs associated with bilateral dispute settlement. It helps the United States itself keep protectionist impulses at bay. It is also particularly useful for dealing with disputes with America’s largest trading partners, such as the European Union, Japan, China, India, and Brazil, with which the United States has not signed free trade agreements. And yet, despite these considerable strengths, support for the WTO and its dispute settlement system remains fragile. This report describes how that system operates, considers the arguments of its critics, and finally provides some recommendations for improvement.

Targeting of domestic renewable industries with incentives will be successfully challenged at the WTO Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change
Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]

Most types of subsidies for climate-friendly investments are likely to be found "actionable" or even "prohibited" by the SCM Agreement. For example, the Senate version of H.R. 6 contains a provision for renewable fuel facilities loan guarantees (H.R. 6, Senate version, Section 124). Facilities may receive loans of up to $250 million, covering up to 80% of the total cost of the facility. This federal "financial contribution" is "specific to certain industries or enterprises" in the sense of Article 2 of the SCM, as it is intended for the biofuels industry. However, the loan guarantees provision is aimed at "a particular subsidized primary product or commodity" - ethanol and other biofuels - and affects another primary product, conventional fuels. If it is found to be empirically-provable that international trade in biofuels and/or conventional fuels is substantially affected by this loan guarantee program (alone or in conjunction with other similar provisions in H.R. 6), they may become a WTO dispute issue. In such circumstances, a dispute panel may determine that loan guarantees, besides providing domestic "technological and economic benefits" to renewable fuels facilities (which in itself does not mean that they have international trade consequences), also serve to increase the U.S. share of the world market in ethanol and other biofuels "as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years, and this increase follows a consistent trend over the period that subsidies have been granted." (SCM Article 6.3 (d)). In this case, the loan guarantees would constitute an "actionable" subsidy, which could be successfully challenged under WTO rules.

Fiat guarantees the US will not comply—this tanks the WTO Tara Gingerich, Senior Staff, American University Law Review; J.D. Candidate, October, 1998 The American University
Law Review, Comment: “Why The Wto Should Require The Application Of The Evidentiary Threshold Requirement In Antidumping Investigations” Lexis, [Zavell]

The WTO has obligations to the international community. While it must be flexible out of political necessity, it also must set standards for international trade. It needs to establish a clear requirement of an evidentiary threshold in antidumping investigations. The standard must be one by which all countries can, and will, abide. The organization must realize its limitations and accept that if it pushes its members too far, they will not comply and the organization will lose all credibility. Conversely, it must not shrink from its responsibility to promote fair and free trade, or the WTO will risk becoming meaningless. Antidumping measures may have met this balance in the past, but they no longer do; the initiation threshold must now be set clearly, and at a sufficiently high level, in order to accomplish the same goals.

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1nc 2/2
WTO key to solve Nuclear War Copley News Service, 99 (December 1)
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

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***Uniqueness***

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Uniqueness Counterplan
Text: The United States federal government should comply with all future WTO dispute settlement rulings. And, we have an advocate. National Association of Manufactures No Date Listed, Last updated Thursday, May 15, 2008 http://www.nam.org/policypositions/IEAP_intltrade.html “IEAP-01 International Trade Policy” [Zavell]
The WTO dispute settlement process is the key enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with multilateral trade obligations. The NAM believes all WTO member economies, including the United States, should comply with WTO agreements, including the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

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Compliance Works
Compliance rates high—nations values trade reputation Robert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, March 2007, “The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System” http://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html [Zavell]
The dispute settlement system has generally been successful in helping members resolve disputes and in obtaining compliance where violations have been found. Many cases have been settled in the consultation stage.12 While there are delays, particularly when legislative action is required, and a few cases in which compliance has been lacking, the evidence suggests that by and large the United States and other countries eventually come into compliance.13 Nations appear to comply less because of retaliation, which has rarely been used, but rather because they believe it is in their interest to do so.14 This is because on balance they benefit from the rules and care about their reputations in a system in which there are ongoing negotiations. They also care about their relationships with significant trading partners.15

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Compliancy High- farm subsides
US complying with WTO—recent subsidies reductions Doug Palmer, Reuters, July 16, 2008 “U.S. will make "enormous" cuts for WTO deal: Schwab”http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN1626797920080717?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandC hannel=0 [Zavell]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is prepared to make "enormous" cuts in farm subsidy spending limits and its barriers to foreign goods to reach a breakthrough next week in world trade talks, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Wednesday. "We have already signaled our willingness to put an enormous amount of market opening and subsidy discipline on the table in the context of an agreement," Schwab said in a speech to the Washington International Trade Association.

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***Links***

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Incentives
Positive incentives targeted at a specific industry violate WTO Law Lucas Assunção, Research Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 11-20-2000 http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2000-11-20/20-11-00-Assuncao.pdf [Zavell]
In introducing subsidy incentives to domestic firms, governments will obviously attempt to foster industrial development and, at the same time, achieve reductions in present or future greenhouse gas emissions. However, if the sector where such subsidies are introduced is significantly open to foreign trade, such subsidies could potentially be challenged under WTO rules. Under Art.5 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, they could be actionable as being discriminatory subsidies and tax incentives causing “adverse effects to the (trade) interests of other members.” Subsidies might be qualified as WTO-illegal if they are: (1) granted specifically to a particular firm or industry within a country, (2) linked to exports of the subsidised good, (3) contingent upon the use of domestic over imported inputs, or (4) found to cause "adverse effects" to foreign competitors. Most subsidy schemes aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be considered “specific” under the WTO Subsidies Agreement and fall under criteria (1) above. On the other hand, defining “adverse effects” can be rather complicated, but it would not prevent a country home to competitor producers from initiating a WTO dispute if they estimate the subsidy impairs their market share or discriminates against their exports. It is indeed conceivable that in key economic sectors several of the subsidy schemes currently envisaged to reduce specific industries's emissions would run against WTO rules. Potential conflict with trade rules could then become a reality -- and a real obstacle to climate change policy. This risk for conflict will be higher depending on how relevant a certain sector is for Annex I Party emission reductions and how significant trade flows are in that specific sector.

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Renewable Subsidies
Renewable Subsidies will be prohibited by WTO rules Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Subsidies for renewable energy are very likely to violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For example, loan guarantees for renewable fuels facilities in H.R. 6 are financial contributions targeting specific industries and commodity products; they may act to increase the U.S. world market share in biofuels while decreasing foreign countries’ U.S. market share in conventional fuels. Any subsidy that affects the export performance of a U.S.-produced climate-friendly good is likely to be prohibited under WTO rules .

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Efficiency Standards
Energy efficiency standards will be challenged in WTO Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Because energy efficiency standards may limit U.S. imports of energy-inefficient products, exporting countries may contend that the regulations constitute a protectionist measure. PPM-based measures, distinguishing between otherwise-like products exclusively on the basis of the way in which they were produced, may be particularly difficult to defend under WTO rules. On the other hand, PPM-based energy efficiency standards may also face domestic opposition because higher standards imposed on U.S. manufacturers may cause them to raise prices, undermining the international competitiveness of U.S.-manufactured products Eco-labels are complementary to energy efficiency standards and regulations. They inform consumers about the environmental characteristics of products and the environmental impact of their performance over time. Eco-labels may change consumer preferences and behavior. The wholesale purchasing decisions of large retailers may shift in response to changing consumer demand, significantly affecting patterns of international trade. All producers will need to adapt to these changes, but producers in developing countries may have disproportionate difficulties in adjusting their production methods to the new requirements and in qualifying for eco-labeling schemes. Thus, eco-labeling is a potential source of dispute at the WTO.

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Competitiveness
Policies that favor US markets over others even if primarily aimed at helping the environment will be struck down absent attempts to co-operate with other countries Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Renewable fuel standards employed in the United States. have already been challenged at the WTO. In 1996, a landmark WTO dispute found the Gasoline Rule in the U.S. Clean Air Act to violate GATT 1994 Article III on National Treatment. In many ways similar to the RFS provided for in H.R. 6, the Gasoline Rule allowed only gasoline of a specified “cleanliness” to be sold to consumers in the most polluted parts of the United States, and applied to all refiners, blenders, and importers of gasoline. Brazil and Venezuela argued that the Gasoline Rule discriminated against their products in U.S. markets. The United States appealed the panel’s findings, arguing that, even if it discriminated against foreign products, the Gasoline Rule was a permissible exception under Article XX (g) on General Exceptions, because it was intended to “preserve an exhaustible resource” – clean air. The Appellate Body subsequently agreed that the primary aim of the Gasoline Rule was to conserve clean air, and that clean air is an “exhaustible resource” that can potentially qualify a domestic measure as a GATT Article XX General Exception. Ultimately, however, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to be WTOincompatible due to the manner in which it had been applied. Because the United States had not sought to cooperate with Brazil and Venezuela in passing the Gasoline Rule, the measure did not pass the Chapeau of Article XX on General Exceptions. In effect, the measure was found to constitute “arbitrary [and] unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.” Pursuing the Chapeau of Article XX further, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to constitute a “disguised restriction on international trade” because the United States failed to eliminate costs for foreign producers that it had eliminated for domestic refiners. This particular argument may be extended to the RFS in H.R. 6, and in particular the provision to exclude small refineries, if it is found to impose greater costs on foreign producers than on domestic producers.

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Café Standards
Café Standards will be voted down by WTO – empirically proven Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Several comprehensive energy and climate change bills include CAFE standards for automobiles, including H.R. 1506, the “Fuel Economy Reform Act.” In a 1994 GATT dispute, U.S.-Automobiles, similar U.S. CAFE regulations were struck down by a Panel decision for violating GATT Article III on National Treatment. Although never adopted, this ruling has often been cited by international lawyers and provides insights into future WTO treatment of CAFE standards. Specifically, according to U.S.-Automobiles, CAFE regulations like the ones employed in the United States in 1994 risk violating Article III.4 of the GATT.

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Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting
Targeting renewables is a specific subsidy Andrew Green assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Oct 2006 World Trade Review
University Press http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=524032 [Zavell] Cambridge

A further concern relates to subsidies that focus on research and development in particular industries or that promote the development of renewable energy. Renewable energy subsidies, for example, could be viewed as specific as they apply not to the energy industry as a whole but to a sub-sector. An argument that there are many types of renewable energy such that the subsidy is spread across a range of industries seems unlikely to prevail (although the potential for co-generation sources to use such subsidies attenuates this conclusion somewhat). However, the obiter comment set out above by the Panel in US–Final Determination Softwood on natural resources makes the likely interpretation somewhat less clear. If governments can provide oil without it being held to be specific because oil benefits many industries, the research and development subsidies to renewable energy could possibly be viewed as non-specific.

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***Compliance Good***

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Hege
Using the WTO to resolve the IPR issues is critical to US trade leadership and hegemony Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George Washington University, 2005 “The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,”
Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis In addition to Professor Oman's arguments, a more contemporary rationale also exists. In relation to the global political climate in which the United States operates, disassociation from the WTO would produce overwhelming negative sentiment throughout the world. In the last several years, the United States has embarked on a quasi-unilateral course of action regarding global trade and the war on terrorism. This platform has alienated long-standing allies and has established a virtually non-existent coalition. Consequently, the United States is walking on eggshells, and, therefore, can ill-afford to further isolate itself from the global community. It is conceivable that any decision of disassociation would irreversible alienate the United States. The United States would be perceived as incapable of working on a global scale. Its status as the world's economic leader would be diminished significantly and would provide sufficient incentive for our trading partners to seek new markets, thereby negatively affecting American businessmen and consumers.

Nuclear War Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the UN, 1995 "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Trade Sanctions
Unilateral refusal to comply causes trade sanctioning Carol J. Miller Professor of Business @ SMSU Law and Jennifer L. Croston M.B.A @ SMSU “WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act” 1999 The American Business Law Association, Lexis,
[Zavell] These Tuna-Dolphin I and II decisions became bellwether cases for assessment of unilateral ETMs. The United States was placed in the awkward position of having to decide whether to abide by the panel's interpretation of GATT principles or to do what prevailing U.S. public domestic opinion and U.S. law deemed to be environmentally correct. 208 If the United States followed the panels' decisions, the United States would be forced to permit importation of tuna caught by methods it does not sanction and which violate its conservation policy. By refusing to follow the GATT panel decision, however, the United States would draw into question its allegiance to free trade policies and risk countervailing sanctions from affected nations. Failure to follow WTO rulings will have more significant consequences under the new dispute settlement procedures because an individual nation can no longer block a panel decision. A unanimous vote of the WTO Dispute Settlement Board is necessary to reject the WTO panel decision or Appellate Body Report. Consequently, the WTO procedure poses greater risks for implementation of U.S. environmental law. 209 A WTO panel already has ruled that certain provisions of the U.S. Clean Air Act related to reformulated gasoline violated GATT principles, 210 compelling the United States to amend those sections of its domestic legislation related to oil refineries. The 1998 Shrimp-Sea Turtle Ruling by the WTO Appellate Body against the U.S. embargo of shrimp from nations that had not adopted U.S. "comparable" standards to safeguard endangered sea turtle species 211 further draws into [*108] question how a nation can effectively enforce environmental policy when some, but not all, affected nations are parties to MEAs that recognize the standards.

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***WTO Collapse Bad***

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Compliance Key to WTO
US Disregard of rulings kills WTO cred John Gero, Director of the Trade Remedies Division @ the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Kathleen Lannan , Member of the Bar of Ontario and New York, Trade Policy Officer @ the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, 1995, Canada-United States Law Journal, “Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, Lexis) [Zavell]
The effectiveness of the WTO will be severely undermined if the disputed issues are covered by the WTO and the United States does not comply with the WTO dispute settlement procedures. This could happen if, for example, the United States issued a section 301 determination before the WTO mechanism has run its course; if it retaliated after losing a case; if it used threats and pressure to convince members to drop complaints against the United States or to meet its demands; or if it did not comply with a ruling after it had lost a case.

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China
The WTO agreement is at a critical cross-roads - collapse of the WTO leads to conflict-ridden bilateral agreements that make U.S.-China trade conflict inevitable G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, jan/feb 2008, Foreign Affairs "The Rise of China and
the Future of the West" www.ituassu.com.br/china_ikenberry_fa.pdf The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would include building on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks, which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basic standard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there are growing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developing countries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universal rules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements -- on global warming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership. The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does not fragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states in various regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateral and all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.

Unrestrained U.S.-China Trade Conflict Escalates To A Shooting War That Would Destroy The U.S.
Henry C K Liu, Chairman of a New York-based private investment group, 2005 (Asia Times, Online: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/global_economy/GH20Dj01.html) The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn heighten further mutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a redirection of Chinese growth momentum inward, increasing Chinese power, including military power, while further encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. This in turn will validate US apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict. A war between the US and China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarily through its technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently exists would not be recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, are mere minor scrimmages compared with a war with China.

China US War goes Nuclear Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2001, The Nation, p 20
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious U.S. militarists know that china’s miniscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the Unites States, deeply divided Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

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Protectionism
Withdrawal of US multilateral trade leadership causes the deterioration of global trade and economic growth, in favor of hostile regional blocs and protectionism C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics, 2001 Foreign Affairs, April, Lexis
A MORE SUBTLE CAUSE of the present crisis is the decline of effective U.S. leadership in the global economic system. This in turn stems from a domestic popular backlash against globalization and the resulting political stalemate in Washington. During the postwar period, the pervasive tension between regionalism and multilateralism (mainly as a result of increasing European integration) was generally resolved in favor of multilateralism due to steady American leadership in that direction. The United States insisted on a new round of global trade liberalization after each major step in the European integration process, which otherwise would have created additional trade discrimination and likely emulation around the world. Thus the primacy of GATT was maintained. Indeed, a positive dynamic between regional and global trade liberalization remained consistent for more than four decades. Even when the United States itself began to embrace regionalism -- from bilateral free trade with Canada to the North American Free Trade Agreement to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) -- it was careful to simultaneously pursue new multilateral initiatives to ensure an umbrella of global trade liberalization. Washington's ability to maintain such leadership has been severely curtailed over the past five years, however. Despite the strength of America's economy and the reduction of its unemployment rate to a 30-year low, the popular backlash against globalization has
produced a political stalemate on most international economic issues. As a result, the president has had no effective authority to negotiate new trade agreements since 1994. Legislation to replenish the IMF languished for a year in the midst of the Asian crisis, until it was rescued fortuitously by the farm community's interest in restoring its exports to Asia. Even relatively straightforward issues -- such as extending permanent normal trade relations to China or offering enhanced market access to Africa and the Caribbean -- required lengthy, all-out presidential and business campaigns to persuade Congress. Largely as a result of this domestic standstill, America's international economic posture has been compromised. The United States' initial refusal in 1997 to contribute to the IMF support package for Thailand for fear of further riling Congress, for example, earned lasting enmity throughout Asia. The main reason for the debacle at Seattle was the United States' inability to propose a new round of trade negotiations that would meet the legitimate interests of other major players. Lacking the domestic authority to lower its own trade barriers, Washington was forced to offer an agenda that sought to reduce protection only in other countries -- a prospect that was understandably unappealing to the rest of the world. Similarly, in 1997 -- 98 APEC negotiations, the United States unsuccessfully pushed a program of sector-specific liberalization that focused almost wholly on U.S. export interests. And six years after the idea of the FTAA was launched in Miami, little progress has been made toward hemispheric trade liberalization. This international leadership vacuum has

had two subtle but profound effects on the world economy. Like a bicycle on a hill, the global trading system tends to slip backwards in the absence of continual progress forward. Now, with no serious multilateral trade negotiations taking place anywhere in the world, the backsliding has come in the form of intensified regionalism (which is inherently discriminatory), as well as mercantilist and protectionist disputes across the Atlantic. An East Asian free trade area -- and along with it, a three-bloc world -- will likely emerge if the United States remains on the sidelines of international trade for another five years. Such U.S. impotence would also mean that the traditionally positive impact of regional liberalization on the multilateral process would give way to increasing antagonism and even hostility between the regional blocs. The other chief effect of the leadership vacuum is increased international disregard of, or even hostility toward, the United States on the economic front. Because of its weight in the world economy, its dynamic growth, and its traditional leadership role, the
United States remains the most important player in the global economic system. The other economic powers generally seek to avoid confronting it directly. The EU, for example, has tried to avoid overt battles, despite its escalating range of disputes with the United States. East Asian governments are careful to assure Washington that their new regional initiatives are fully consistent with existing global norms and institutions -- a conciliatory stance that is in sharp contrast to Mahathir's shrill rhetoric of a decade ago and Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara's aggressive 1997 promotion of the AMF. In reality, however, the United States is perceived as wanting to call the shots without putting up much of its own money or making changes in its own laws and practices. These specific economic complaints fuse with and feed on more general anti-American sentiments throughout the world. Hence, the two other economic superpowers are proceeding on their own. The EU has launched the euro, a new association agreement with Mexico, and negotiations with Mercosur (the trade bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay); East Asia is pursuing the AMF and the East Asian free trade area. The result is a clear and steady erosion of both the United States' position on the global

economic scene and the multilateral rules and institutions that it has traditionally championed. If not checked soon, this erosion could deteriorate into severe international conflicts and the disintegration of global economic links.

Protectionism causes nuclear war Michael Spicer, Economist; member of the British Parliament, 1996 The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121
A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

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Trade Wars
WTO collapse causes future trade tensions to escalate into shooting wars Raymond Waldmann, Vice Prez for International Relations at Boeing, 1999 Seattle PI, 5-11, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/wtoop.shtml
Trade is not a panacea for the political, economic and social problems of the world. But it is a force for peace and cross-cultural contact. Countries are less likely to go to war against their trading partners than they are against strangers. The WTO furthers the process of protecting against commercial skirmishes and potential trade wars by forging agreement among nations on trade protocols. Without the WTO, trade would be too dangerous a proposition for countries to leave to their trade ministries, and eventually trade disputes could become national security issues. A non-WTO world would more closely resemble the international economy before World War II, where countries used trade as tools of foreign policy, and international commerce was a pawn of aggressor states. As Franklin D. Roosevelt's former secretary of state Cordell Hull said, "When goods do not cross borders, armies do." Fortunately we do not live in that world. Indeed, if the WTO didn't exist, we would have to create it. And that is precisely what the United States and 22 other countries did in 1948. Today, 134 members of the WTO are dedicated to preventing trade conflicts from getting out of hand. By nature, the wheels of international law move slowly, but the WTO patiently and continuously improves its rules and institutions in order to make the world a better place. Through successive rounds of trade talks going back to 1949, the GATT and its successor the WTO have reduced tariffs on goods from industrial countries from an average of more than 40 percent in 1948 to today's 3.9 percent. As a result, trade has exploded; today it is 26 times the volume of 1949. Through GATT and WTO, countries have tackled and solved some of the thorniest problems of trade, and have settled hundreds of trade disputes. The WTO has already: Dramatically reduced tariffs and other barriers to trade, so that today's exporters and consumers are able to shop for the best deals almost anywhere in the world; Solved more than 100 trade disputes in the past four years between countries before they got out of hand and turned into bitter trade wars;

WTO destruction leads to trade wars Kevin Watkins, director of the UN's Human Development Report Office, 2003 “Essay,” Prospect, July 24, Lexis
Some anti-globalisers will view any proposal to reform the WTO as ill-conceived. But what are the alternatives? If you want a glimpse into the future of a world with a weakened multilateral system take a look at the content of regional and bilateral trade pacts. Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative, now arrives at international meetings waving the US-Singapore free trade agreement and holding it up as a model for all countries. Its provisions include duty free market access for US exports, a legal provision prohibiting future import taxes, unrestricted rights of entry and profit repatriation for US investors, and intellectual property rules that make the Trips agreement look tame. The US would probably be happy to see the end of the WTO and is busy building a trade empire that projects the realities of its unrivalled power. Witness the creation of a middle east free trade zone-and the refusal to allow Egypt entry as punishment for its refusal to support the US case against the EU over genetically modified food. The WTO's rules are rigged in favour of the strong. Yet abolition is not an option. Apart from removing a source of pressure on the US and the EU to open markets, cut farm subsidies, and halt protectionist abuses, it would risk a ruinous spiral of conflict. Rich countries would bulldoze poor ones into deeply unequal trade treaties. The multilateralism of convenience and bilateral power politics that the Bush administration is promoting in other international institutions would prevail. Ultimately, that is in nobody's interest-Cancun is the place to draw a line in the Mexican sand.

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Warming
WTO key to solve warming Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador, United States Trade Representative, December 9, 2007
“Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change” http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/96703.htm [Zavell] The potential benefits of a WTO climate initiative and EGSA are compelling. A recent World Bank study shows that trade in climatefriendly technologies would likely to grow 7-14% as result of a WTO deal. WTO Members have the opportunity to take bold, ambitious action now to use trade tools, such as tariff reductions on clean technologies, to advance clean energy and climate change mitigation objectives. There is no time to waste arguing over approaches; we need immediate results that benefit all: producers, consumers, exporters, importers. Trade liberalization in the WTO can make a real difference in accelerating the spread of new, cutting edge clean technologies – ones that can make concrete contributions to global efforts to mitigate climate change. According to the World Bank study, “while FDI is the most important means of transferring technology, weak intellectual property rights regimes (or regimes perceived to be weak) in developing countries often inhibit diffusion of specific technologies beyond the project level.”

WTO is key to carbon restriction legitimacy—solves warming Peter Franklin, staff writer, April 25, 2006 “Only the WTO can stop global warming”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/25/onlythewtocanstopglobalw Good stuff all round, the problem is none of it brings us any closer towards changing one rather important fact: As a result of human activity, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are now higher than at any point at human history and are still climbing. To stabilise those concentrations the nations of the world have to make deep cuts in their emissions. So far progress is not encouraging, which has brought great cheer to the opponents of the Kyoto treaty. Targets don't work, they say. What we need instead is new technology. This is a position that Tony Blair has been flirting with for some time. But new technology costs money, so who will pay? The obvious answer is the polluter. And so how should the costs be fairly apportioned between different countries? According to how much they pollute, of course. Which takes us back to targets. The reason why they haven't worked so far is because they're not enforced. Thus any successor to the Kyoto treaty, which expires in 2012, needs to be underpinned by an effective enforcement mechanism.So far, dear readers, I sense I am carrying most of you with me - but here's where I throw it all away. Look around the world and there are only two enforcement mechanisms that can operate on a truly global level. The first of these is the US military, but that's not looking so effective of late. The second is the World Trade Organisation. The anti-globalisation movement may hate it - but one of the reasons why they do is that it is ready and able to enforce free trade agreements. If the WTO were more like the Kyoto treaty then signatory nations could agree to tariff reductions and then fail to implement them in the sure knowledge that there'd be no come back. As it is, however, protectionism is punished through trade sanctions and so cheating is kept to a minimum. That's why the negotiation of further free trade agreements are so fraught, signatory nations know that they will be held to their commitments. The anti-globalisers will argue that the WTO enforces agreements that cheat the poor, but that is not the issue here. Indeed, the poorest nations of the world have very little to fear from a global agreement to limit carbon emissions because their emissions are so low. From a different angle, the climate change sceptics will argue that enforced targets would represent an attack on national sovereignty. But strangely that doesn't seem to bother them when it comes to enforcing free trade. So my modest proposition is this: negotiate a successor to Kyoto and then let the WTO enforce it. Nations that failed to meet their carbon targets would have a proportionate tariff slapped on their imports. Such a system could even be used to deal with countries that refused to sign up to the new agreement. The WTO would unilaterally impose a target on each non-signatory nation, with their excess carbon emissions and consequent penalties being assessed in absentia. The export-led economies of China, India and other key Kyoto absentees would be particularly susceptible to such pressure.

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***Free Trade Impacts***

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Competitiveness
Free Trade Key to Competitiveness (Kenneth Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration in Department of Commerce, December 10th, 2001, “Globalization, National Security and Export Controls”, http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/archive2001/GlobalizationNScarsdaleNY.htm)
One of the simple and clear points, in my view, is the continued importance of international trade. Indeed, the promotion of free trade is -- and remains – a fundamental pillar of the Administration’s economic and foreign policy. In our view, free and open trade sustains economic growth and contributes to economic prosperity. The benefits of free trade are undeniable. Open markets allow for increased export sales, which lead to more jobs, higher revenues, more profits, and overall economic growth. Department of Commerce statistics show that exports have accounted for almost one quarter of U.S. economic growth during the past decade. While the United States negotiated and implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round trade agreements, the U.S. economy grew at its fastest rate in a generation. Similar statistics show that free trade also benefits American workers. Jobs supported by international trade pay 13 to 18 percent more than the national average. Free trade also benefits U.S. consumers. Global competition results in more choices and lower prices in the marketplace. Finally, free trade enhances U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace. Imports stimulate competition, which leads to technological innovation and quality enhancement.

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Environment
Protectionism Kills The Environment (Richard Katz, Co-Editor, Oriental Economist Report And TOE Alert, 22-JUN-2007, The International Economy, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)
First, protectionism is bad for the environment. World Bank data shows that, while global warming gases per dollar of GDP initially rise as poor countries industrialize to the per capita income of a country like South Africa or Chile, they tend to fall back again as countries grow richer. How about organic wastes that factories emit into the water supply? As measured by pollution per worker, factories in middle-income countries tend to be cleaner than in poor ones, and cleaner still in rich countries. Not only does environmental awareness grow once people have a full belly and a solid roof, but rich countries can better afford environmental safeguards. And it is trade that helps transform poor countries into rich ones. Globalization underpinned the economic miracles that have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians from hunger, infant mortality, and illiteracy. Not coincidentally, China's rapid development has also engendered a public outcry within China about the sinking water table, and the air pollution that kills hundreds of thousands each year.

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Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming
Environmental Trade Barriers Turn Case- They Destroy Adoption Of New Alternative Energies And Undermine Effiency (Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Former German Federal Minister Of Economics, 22-Jun-2007, The International Economy, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)
Beyond doubt, environmentalism is gaining momentum-not only in politics, but also in business. Customers are increasingly willing to pay extra for environment-friendly goods in the light of noticeable climate change. Of course, companies want to take advantage of the market's readiness to pay higher prices. In this context, protectionism is a promising tool for domestic producers to safeguard high margins by excluding international rivals. For instance, instead of competing for cheaper and better products, European manufacturers of electronics achieved in 2002 surcharges on imports of energy-efficient bulbs from China. The 66 percent duty is more than dubious as Europe's leaders are at the same time urging households to make use of exactly these energy-efficient light bulbs. If the duty ended, market prices of energy-efficient bulbs would equal those of conventional ones. The consequences of this kind of protectionism are twofold: first, domestic manufacturers are not forced to produce more cost-efficiently; and second, many customers who cannot afford the artificial high prices continue to purchase conventional bulbs. The European Commission acts Janus-faced: While defending unnecessary high prices for energy-efficient bulbs due to successful lobbying, it is striving for a significant reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Obviously, the attractive international market for environment-friendly goods must stay free of protectionism for our planet's sake. Only if premium energy-efficient products become affordable for the majority can a pivotal contribution to environmental protection be made. By the way, Australia has just decided to ban incandescent bulbs. Instead of intervening, governments should more often trust and release market forces to boost environmentalism. The promotion of free trade would be a sufficient first step toward lowering the energy-efficient bulbs' pricing and as a consequence changing consumer habits. If the Chinese can offer eco-friendly products under more favorable conditions, let them do the business.

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***IPR Good***

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WTO Compliance Key to IPR
Non-compliance with WTO leads to collapse of US IPR protection and international isolationism Donald P. Harris, Associate Professor of Law, Spring, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 185, “The International Intellectual Property Regime Complex: Trips And Treaties Of Adhesion Part Ii: Back To The Past Or A Small Step Forward?”, Lexis, [Zavell]
The United States has already demonstrated a willingness to ignore adverse WTO decisions. 92 The United States' refusal to abide by WTO decisions can have serious negative implications. For example, the United States could jeopardize its leadership role in intellectual property, ruin its credibility and weaken its position in future bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and put United States' intellectual property rights holders at risk, for other countries would have little incentive to continue protecting United States holders' works. 93 In addition, the United States risks being perceived as isolationist and protectionist, which could harm it not only as respects intellectual property but also with respect to other areas, including the war on terror. 94

***Insert module***

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Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR
Lack of WTO observance tanks US IPR Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George Washington University, 2005 “The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,”
Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis [Zavell] [*257] As Professor Ralph Oman observed, the United States has several broader reasons for continued adherence to international IP agreements. 165 First, observance would help the U.S. "secure dynamic leadership in international copyright relations". 166 As previously discussed, the United States is the largest exporter of copyrighted work. Therefore, an international IP platform is the only viable method to protect its economic interests abroad. The United States has already seen the DSU's advantages both in effective enforcement and in the establishment of bright line protection obligations. Second, continued observance "will enhance the United States' political credibility and strengthen its position for negotiating multilateral and bilateral trade agreements involving intellectual property." 167 If the United States were to walk away from the WTO, other States could interpret the move as protectionist and isolationist in nature. These "trading partners" would have little incentive to continue the domestic protection of U.S.-originating IP works. 168 The move would render the United States' negotiating position null and void. On the other hand, the DSU procedure provides a platform on which the U.S. can work with its trading partners in resolving disputes amicably. 169 Third, continued membership in the WTO will provide a sense of security for U.S. authors. 170 TRIPs provide these authors effective judicial intervention unavailable under Berne. It creates the "stronger copyright laws and better universal copyright [*258] enforcement" that Professor Oman envisioned with Berne, not only through its provisions but through eventual dispositive caselaw interpreting the agreement. 171

US abiding by WTO rulings key to IPR credibility Christopher Costigan, President, Gambling911.com April 8, 2007 http://www.gambling911.com/US-OnlineGambling-WTO-Decision-040807.html [Zavell]
Should the US fail to abide by the ruling, the global implications could be immense. That's because the United States plans to file a complaint with the WTO against China as early as this week. The US complaint involves allegations that China has been engaging in piracy of copyrighted movies and books. Officials have prepared two cases, one saying China sets too high a value on pirated movie or music disks before prosecuting violators, and another objecting to restrictions on the sale of foreign books and movies in the nation, they said. The people, three industry officials and one lawyer, spoke on condition they not be identified. China's illegal copying of movies, music and software cost companies $2.2 billion in 2006 sales, according to an estimate by lobby groups representing Microsoft Corp., Walt Disney Co., and Vivendi SA. The WTO complaints are the first by the U.S. against China for breaching intellectual property rights, in a country where copying has extended to bags, golf clubs and even shampoo. ``The U.S. believes that now it's time to put more pressure'' on China, five years after the country became a WTO member, said Standard Chartered Plc's economist Stephen Green in Shanghai. ``The U.S. believes that China has clearly infringed rules that it agreed to play by,'' prompting the action, he said. But China will have every opportunity to point towards the US unwillingness to abide by the recent WTO decision should a complaint be filed. "Hypocrisy" charges will be easy to come by. While the United State can file an appeal in the Antigua vs USA matter, this just opens the
door for China to continue profiting from piracy for the next five years. In a letter to President George W. Bush in October, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers said that ``no country in the world has done more to undermine American intellectual property than China.'' U.S. complaints were imminent, Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Feb. 22. ``We're all going to run out of patience at some point, and that's going to be sooner rather than later,'' she said. Under WTO procedures, the U.S. will formally ask for consultations with China when it files its complaints. Only after 60 days can the U.S. ask for an independent panel to adjudicate the dispute. The U.S. plan may not escalate into a formal complaint, said Li Yushi, deputy director of the Chinese commerce ministry's research institute. ``This is just another turn of focus by the U.S. government in dealing with its widening trade deficit with China,'' Li said today in Beijing. ``The administration understands that China has made efforts in IPR protection, as well as our limitations in enforcing the effort.'' China is also one-upping the US in regard to its explosive gambling industry based primarily in Macao. While the United States government continues to demonize online gambling, Las Vegas and river boat gaming continues to thrive Stateside. But many fear the Vegas market could soon dry up with high rollers choosing Macao over Sin City. This year, Macao became the biggest gambling center in the world and continues to grow. Indications were that Vegas had intended to supplement losses by jumping into the billion dollar online gambling industry. Those plans were shot down with the passing of this new law, a law that does not exempt Las Vegas casinos. As for the US government's complaint against China, they may have even bigger worries to contend with on the counterfeiting front. Tiny Antigua may decide to follow China's lead, and what's to stop them? Should the

United States elect to ignore the WTO decision, the price they'll be paying could be astronomical. More astute policymakers in Washington appear to realize this. Chairmanship of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Franks, has already announced he will draft legislation to repeal the anti-online gambling measure.

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IPR Module: Econ
Additionally, IP is key to overall US competitiveness and growth James Mendenhall, General Counsel for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Federal News Service, July 15 2005, Lexis, [Zavell]
The services sector now accounts for about 60 to 80 percent of the U.S. economy. It's one area where the United States actually has a trade surplus. Protection of intellectual property has come to play a central role in U.S. economic growth. The value of innovation, creativity and branding, covering everything from movies and music to software and pharmaceuticals to basic trademarks, it's the key driver of U.S. competitiveness

Economic decline causes a nuclear war Mead, 1992(Walter Russell, NPQ’S Board of advisors, New perspectives quarterly, summer 1992, page 30 )
Hundreds of millions - billions - of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles -- and drawn closer to the west – because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - These countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.

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IPR Module: Econ
Growth can't exist without property right enforcement Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 2/27/2004, "Intellectual Property Rights", Statement at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/default.htm [Zavell]

Of particular current relevance to our economy overall is the application of property right protection to information technology. A noticeable component of the surge in the trend growth of the economy in recent years arguably reflects the benefits that we have derived from the synergy of laser and fiber optic technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. This synergy has produced very little that is tangible in information technology. Yet the information flow that it facilitates has fostered the creation of vast amounts of wealth. The dramatic gains in information technology have markedly improved the ability of businesses to identify and address incipient economic imbalances before they inflict significant damage. These gains reflect new advances in both the physical and the conceptual realms. It is imperative to find the appropriate intellectual property regime for each.

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IPR Module: China
Market Access Generated By IPR Protection Prevents Chinese Military Tech Progress Segal - Senior Fellow Council On Foreign Relations - 2004 Washington Quarterly, Summer http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v027/27.3segal.html
Many of the risks of the commercialization and globalization of R&D are uncontrollable, but the United States should be ready to try to exploit the possible security gains of exporting high-technology commercial products to China. U.S. sales to China promote dependence on U.S. technology—something the Chinese worry about—and give U.S. intelligence agencies knowledge of the potential weaknesses in the technologies the Chinese have purchased from abroad, as well as how they might be exploited in a conflict or for more routine information collection. U.S. technology firms located in or exporting to China may also crowd out Chinese producers. The presence of foreign firms offering high salaries to the best Chinese scientists and engineers makes it more difficult for the PRC to attract technical talent to its own defense R&D programs, which hampers Chinese efforts to develop a spin-on system and thus maintains the technological gap between U.S. forces and the PLA. Chinese officials have complained, for example, about Intel's recruitment of some of the country's top engineering graduates.33 In addition to fostering domestic policies focused on expanding private and public R&D, improving mathematics and science education, and increasing investment in technology infrastructure, the U.S. strategy must be built on fair access to international markets, particularly China. U.S. trade officials should continue to push China to live up to its WTO commitments. Chinese technology producers are finding new ways to exclude foreign penetration of their markets through the use of rebates of value-added taxes; the failure to provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR); and the definition of new standards in digital video disks, cellular phones, and wireless technologies. A March 2004 letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick protesting regulations requiring all wireless imports to contain data-encryption technology now produced only in China is an example of the type of pressure that the United States should be prepared to use.34 U.S. technology trade with China will need to be predicated on the country's adherence to the commitments defining its WTO membership: [End Page 168] transparency, nondiscrimination, elimination of trade barriers, and IPR protection.

Chinese Tech progression Causes US-China War Christensen - Associate Prof Poly Sci @ Mit 2001 International Security, Vol 25 No 4, Posing Problems Without
Catching Up, Pp. 5-40
China does not appear poised to become a peer competitor of the United States. If it were to do so, China's economic growth and increasing technological sophistication must allow China to close the gap with the American military, create power projection capabilities that would threaten the American position in East Asia, and replace the former Soviet Union as a global security threat.
Given the great leaps in economic and military power that this would entail, it seems incredible to many, including this author, that China might achieve such an outcome anytime in the next few decades. Of course, it is possible that China might accelerate its progress greatly by enjoying the "advantage of backwardness" in a quickly changing world of high technology: That is, by being more innovative than the United States

by necessity, China might then skip levels of technological development in the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) and quickly close the gap with a United States that is perceived as too self-confident and too bureaucratically hidebound to maintain a healthy lead against such a newcomer. Those who reject this scenario point to the low starting point for China's military modernization; China's own
impressive institutional and bureaucratic obstacles to innovation; and its continuing reliance on outsiders to develop new defense technologies that, themselves, are of late-Cold War vintage. In fact, the common argument among this group is not only that China is not likely to close the gap quickly between itself and the United States, but that the American technological lead will likely expand in the next few decades. As Robert Ross puts it persuasively, it appears so far that if there is going to be a revolution in military affairs in East Asia, "it will be a largely American revolution." 6 Such conclusions should not be cause for excessive optimism, however. Chinese strategists seem to recognize the reality of China's persistent relative [End Page 8] weakness, but they do not therefore throw up their hands in defeat, considering great power conflict unthinkable. No matter how much Beijing might wish it could develop capabilities that could match or defeat American military power,

China's strategy for the next twenty to thirty years appears more realistic: to develop the capabilities to dominate most regional actors, to become a regional peer competitor or near peer competitor of the other great powers in the region (including Russia, Japan, and perhaps a future unified Korea), and to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of great interest to China. As leading military officers argue in one recent internally circulated Chinese military education book (which is
analyzed in detail below): "Our weaponry has improved greatly in comparison to the past, but in comparison to the militaries of the advanced countries [fada guojia], there will still be a large gap not only now but long into the future. Therefore we not only must accelerate our development of advanced weapons, thus shrinking the gap to the fullest extent possible, but also [we must] use our current weapons to defeat enemies. . . . [We must] explore the art of the inferior defeating the superior under high-tech conditions." 7 In the near term, China seems devoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan's diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment of any third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf, including both the United States and Japan. 8

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IPR Module: China
Continued No Break
[End Page 9] If Beijing elites become convinced that relatively limited military capabilities and coercive tactics might allow for the

politically effective use of force against Taiwan and, if necessary, American forces, then war between the United States and China becomes a very real possibility. This is true regardless of whether China's military force is generally backward compared with those of the
United States and its allies, whether China still would be defeated in a toe-to-toe full-scale war with the United States, or whether the overall balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has changed enough to allow a successful amphibious invasion by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

US becomes immersed in a war with china, flashpoints around the world also escalate to nuclear conflagration, culminating in extinction. Strait Times 2k (No one gains in war over Taiwan; June 25, lexis)
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

IPR Module: Medicines
Strong patent protection is crucial for drug companies to create new, better medicines for AIDS, innovation is key to ending aids. Bate and Tren resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of Africa Fighting Malaria- 2001
(Roger and Richard, International Policy Network, “TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate-Malaria and Patents,” July 2001, http://www.policynetwork.net/uploaded/pdf/rethinking_the_debate_0701_batetren.pdf ) [Zavell]

This is great news for basic research and is certainly welcome, but breakthroughs in basic science will not lead to innovative new products that are thoroughly tested without the right incentives being in place for the companies that specialize in that part of the drug development process. Governments have shown themselves to be largely incapable of bringing new drugs to market. Although as the public private partnership involved in Mefloquine discovery discussed above demonstrates, they can play a critical role in the early stages. But in addition to this role, governments can change incentives for those better placed to transform relatively untested chemicals into viable pharmaceuticals. In addition to strong product patent protection, such incentives include tax breaks, guaranteed markets and prizes (see Morris 2001 for a discussion of these possibilities). Speeding up the process for approval of medicines also encourages are withdrawing drug trials from South Africa largely because of the inordinately long time that the South African Medicines Control Council (MCC) takes to approve the trials (Kirkman, 2001). Also removal of taxation on drugs would substantially lower prices and increase effective demand. Governments can in principle provide the right institutional environment for research and development. That includes strong product patent protection and swift regulatory approval procedures. Even though AIDS is a major disaster, and solutions must be found (although prevention may be the only solution for the foreseeable future), it would be a greater disaster to remove the incentive for drug companies to develop new drugs for AIDS and other diseases that primarily affect people in poor countries. In short, patent protection is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition to drive drug development.

AIDs leads to extinction Muchiri Kibaara Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi 2000 Michael “Will Annan finally put out Africa’s fires?”
Jakarta Post, March 6, Lexis The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn lamented that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that AIDS was now more effective than war in destabilizing African countries. Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in sub-Saharan Africa, surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998, 200,000 people died from armed conflicts compared to 2.2 million from AIDS. Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world, 70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive members and decimating entire villages. About 13 million of the 16 million people who have died of AIDS are in Africa, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a holocaust if this number is not a sure measure? There is no doubt that AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than hurricanes, earthquakes, economic crises, capital crashes or floods. It has no cure yet. We are watching a whole continent degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally succumb to a most excruciating, dehumanizing death. Gore said that his new initiative, if approved by the U.S. Congress, would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does this mean that the UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, AIDS was seen as threat to world peace, and Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to make political capital out of this by painting the usually disagreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck stops on the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salvage in Africa after all and this talk is about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve all African problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out man. The challenge is not one of a single continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in the AIDS challenge. Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before another continent is on the brink of extinction. Sure as death, Africa's time has run out, signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race. (we disagree with the gendered language used)

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

***Aff***

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

No Link—renewable incentives aren’t targeted
Plan makes all eligible who meet a certain requirement, doesn’t violate WTO law Lucas Assunção, Research Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 11-20-2000 http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2000-11-20/20-11-00-Assuncao.pdf [Zavell]
In addition to the exception just mentioned, a close look into the Subsidies Agreement may allow for some additional flexibility regarding its stern specificity rule. A subsidy is considered not “specific”, hence not actionable, if there are objective and legally enforceable criteria governing eligibility for, and the amount of, the subsidy and if eligibility is automatic for any company meeting the criteria. These criteria or conditions will need to be neutral, meaning they would not favour certain firms over others, and be economic in nature and horizontal in application. It could be argued that if eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy were linked directly to concrete criteria -- for example energy efficiency or intensity -- the subsidy might not be considered “specific” even if it only applied to one firm and industry, and therefore be perfectly consistent with WTO rules and climate change policies.

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

Not Unique—No International Compliance
International Non-Compliance rampant Gary Horlick Senior Partner in the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr, specializing in matters of international trade in goods AND Judith Coleman Attorney in the Washington, DC of WilmerHale 2007Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law “The Compliance Problems Of The WTO” http://www.law.arizona.edu/journals/ajicl/AJICL2007/vol241/Horlick%20article.pdf [Zavell]
To judge just from the very limited sample offered by cases brought to WTO dispute settlement, virtually every major trading Member of the WTO has taken action knowing it was inconsistent with the WTO, apparently on the basis that at worst it would be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement process, and then dragged out in litigation for three to four years before having to comply with the rules to which it had agreed. This is done not just by the big players—the United States, the EU, Japan, Canada, Brazil, India—but also Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, Egypt, and so on (for the sake of politeness, individual cases are not named here, but a quick look at the list of requests for consultations will identify them for the reader). In effect, the WTO has been re-written by those Members to claim that none of the obligations applies for a three- to four-year period. And these are only the most blatant cases. The same phenomena are probably reflected in the very leisurely way in which WTO Members adapt to fairly definitive rulings by the Appellate Body in cases involving other Members. The most obvious example is the case of India against the EC on “zeroing,” decided in India’s favor by the Appellate Body in 2001. 1 The ruling was sufficiently clear to guide other Members. But very few complied (in the sense of adapting their own national systems) with any speed, and some have made it clear they will not comply until fully stretching out (for six years and counting) dispute resolution in additional cases brought directly against them. It will be interesting to observe over time whether empirical data confirms the suspicion that this could become discriminatory, as countries better able to afford the internal or external cost of defending themselves in WTO dispute resolution cases are in a better position to undertake this behavior than poorer countries.

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now
No international compliancy European Union Factsheet No Date“U.S. Non-Compliance With Wto Rulings” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/sum06_03/wto.pdf. [Zavell]
There is an increasing number of decisions where Members have openly decided not to comply and instead risk retaliation, starting with the 1998 EC – Hormones case 2 (where even full retaliation did not lead to compliance, and where the retaliation did not and could not compensate the exporters injured by the measure found to be WTO-inconsistent). Other non-compliance may not be so open. For example, the WTO website lists the case of U.S. – Lead and Bismuth II 3 as a success—the Appellate Body ruled and the defending country complied. It nowhere records that obtaining the compliance required a side payment to a competing company of many millions of dollars. Perhaps the losing Member would have eventually complied without the side payments, but the apparent lack of restrospectivity in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) means that exporters would continue to pay duty deposits after the duties were found WTO-inconsistent without those duties being refunded—so the DSU seems to encourage non-transparent side payments. B. The Data We have made a preliminary attempt to categorize how member countries have responded to WTO decisions, in the hope that people will be able to correct or amend these findings on the basis of better information that is perhaps not readily available to the public. We have attached our list, based on our quick survey. Here are some quick statistics: • Of the 98 final decisions since 1996, the panel or appellate body found violations in 85 cases (85.8%). That is to say, there was no violation found in 13 of the cases. • Of those 85 cases where violations were found, the compliance period is still running on 6 of them, and the compliance status of 2 is unclear, leaving 77 cases for our analysis. • Of those 77 cases, 53 (68.8%) ended in what we have (catchily) called Apparent More-or-Less Full Compliance, which includes compliance after threats of retaliation, compliance after decisions handed down by Article 21.5 panels, and especially long drawn-out compliance. • In 19 cases (24.6%), the violating country has made gestures at compliance: Partial Compliance in 8 cases (where some but not all measures are revised), Debatable Compliance in 6 cases (where one country claims to have complied but other countries raise an eyebrow), Sleazy Settlements in 5 cases (of which 4 are related to the pending U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber dispute). • Six of the cases (6.1%) have resulted in Unabashed Non- Compliance. That noncompliance has been tolerated, however grudgingly, by the complainants—except in one case, EC – Hormones. C. Why Worry? A 6.1% rate of open non-compliance does not seem very bad. But because it is mostly cumulative (most of the cases do not disappear), that means an increasing stack of embarrassingly overt non-compliance. It is worth noting that Bob Hudec calculated that the GATT dispute settlement system “worked” 88% of the time, but it was the 12% of cases where GATT did not “work” that reduced the system’s credibility enough to require the major changes in the Uruguay Round. In that context, the 25% of less-than-full compliance, and the delays in reaching full compliance in other cases, suggests the need for DSU reforms such as some of those suggested by Mexico (repayment of illegally collected duties, disincentives for delay).  

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DDI ‘08 Trade Generic Alex Zavell

Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now
US not compliant—6 examples European Union Factsheet No Date“U.S. Non-Compliance With Wto Rulings” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/sum06_03/wto.pdf. [Zavell]
1. The FSC legislation provides that, certain income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation would not be subject to U.S.  tax. The purpose was to encourage the export of U.S. manufactured goods. Subsidies such as these, which are contingent upon export  performance are prohibited under the WTO. In February 2000, the WTO ruled that FSC tax exemptions amount to a prohibited  export subsidy. Page 2 ­ 2 ­ Subsequently the U.S. replaced the original FSC legislation with the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial  Income Exclusion Act (ETI). However this Act still provides U.S. firms with prohibited export subsidies and on 14 January 2002 the  WTO appellate body ruled that the U.S. had not complied with the original WTO ruling from 2000. Subsequent to this finding, on  7 May 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has authorised the EU to impose countermeasures against the U.S. to the tune of  US$4 billion. However, in view of the assertions by the U.S. that it intends to comply with the WTO’s rulings, including a personal  pledge to this effect from President Bush, the EC has declined to implement these countermeasures so far. The European Commission  has agreed a time horizon within which the U.S. should comply with the latest WTO rulings regarding its FSC legislation. In particular,  the Commission will review the situation in the Autumn. In addition to the U.S. FSC legislation, there are a number of other cases  where U.S. compliance with WTO rulings has yet to materialise. 2. The U.S. Anti­Dumping Act of 1916 prohibiting the importation  and sale of goods “at a price substantially less than the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of their production”  was judged to be in breach of WTO rules in September 2000. There are currently three bills pending in Congress to repeal the 1916  Anti­Dumping Act, however two of these bills would leave on­going litigation unaffected. The EC has made it clear that repealing this  law without also terminating cases pending under it would not be an acceptable solution to the dispute. 3. In October 1998, Section 211  of the Omnibus Appropriations Act was adopted. It prohibits, under certain conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark  previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity and sets forth that no U.S. Court shall recognise or enforce any assertion of such rights.  The WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that this legislation breached WTO rules. The EU agreed to extend the initial deadline for  compliance (31 December 2002) to 30 June 2003. So far, however, there is little sign that this deadline will be met. 4. The Continued  Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (or ‘CDSOA’ ­ also known as the Byrd Amendment ­ signed into law in October 2000)  provides that proceeds from anti­dumping and countervailing duties shall be paid to the U.S. companies responsible for bringing the  cases. The payments redistributed to U.S. producers are substantial and have tended to benefit a very limited number of recipients,  mainly in the steel sector (cf. facts and figures below), thus increasing their distorting effects on competition. This provision is  incompatible with several WTO provisions. On 22 December 2000, the EC, together with eight other WTO partners (Australia, Brazil,  Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand), requested formal WTO consultations with the U.S. The position defended by the  EC and ten others (Canada and Mexico having joined the consultations in May 2001) was upheld in the WTO reports adopted on 27  January 2003: namely that the CDSOA is an illegal response to dumping or subsidisation and therefore WTO incompatible. A WTO  arbitrator set the deadline by which the U.S. has to comply with this ruling for 27 December 2003. 5. On 27 July 2001, the Dispute  Settlement Body found that Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was incompatible with WTO rules. So far, there have been no  legislative initiatives to bring the Act into compliance with this ruling. The U.S. and the EU are discussing on the implementation of  a temporary arrangement, pending full U.S. compliance with the WTO ruling. 6. In the British Steel case the methodology used by the  U.S. Department of Commerce on countervailing duties on privatised exporters was considered as WTO incompatible. The U.S.  consequently repealed the measure. However, due to a mis­interpretation of the WTO’s original Page 3 ­ 3 ­ ruling, the "new"  methodology which it was then replaced with was just as WTO incompatible, remaining prejudiced against EC exporters. The EC, in  order to defend its legitimate interest, was therefore forced to open another case at the WTO (the so­called Privatisation Case), on the  same issue, covering all 14 privatisation cases affected by the U.S. methodology. In this "new" case, the WTO has again ruled in favour  of the EC, and stipulated the 8 November 2003 as the date by which the U.S. should comply with this ruling. 

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