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Europe Trade DA

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Europe Trade DA
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Uniqueness.................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Unique -EU-US Climate Relations............................................................................................................................................. 10
Unique -EU-US Climate Relations............................................................................................................................................. 11
Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade ..................................................................................................................................12
Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade...................................................................................................................................13
Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade...................................................................................................................................14
Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action................................................................................................................................... 15
Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action................................................................................................................................... 16
Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action................................................................................................................................... 17
Unique - EU Liberalizing Trade - Climate..................................................................................................................................18
Unique - EU Liberalizing Trade - Climate..................................................................................................................................19
Unique: AT: No Regulations ......................................................................................................................................................20
Unique: AT: Incentives Now...................................................................................................................................................... 21
Unique: AT: Incentives Now ..................................................................................................................................................... 22
Unique: AT: Incentives Now...................................................................................................................................................... 23
Unique - AT: BioFuel Subsides ................................................................................................................................................. 24
AT: Iraq killed US-EU trade....................................................................................................................................................... 25
Links............................................................................................................................................................................................26
Extension - Generic Link ........................................................................................................................................................... 27
Extension - general Links............................................................................................................................................................28
Extension - general Links............................................................................................................................................................29
Link-- environmental policy........................................................................................................................................................30
Link – environmental policy....................................................................................................................................................... 31
Link--environmental policy.........................................................................................................................................................32
Link --Incentives......................................................................................................................................................................... 33
Link -- Incentives........................................................................................................................................................................ 33
Link-- incentives......................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Link – incentives ........................................................................................................................................................................ 36
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Link - incentives..........................................................................................................................................................................37
Link Incentives............................................................................................................................................................................ 38
Link—Incentives......................................................................................................................................................................... 39
Link--Subsidies........................................................................................................................................................................... 40
Link—Domestic Policy...............................................................................................................................................................41
Link-must be 0 emissions............................................................................................................................................................42
Link—policy not Kyoto.............................................................................................................................................................. 43
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 44
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 45
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 46
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 48
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 49
Link – policy not Kyoto............................................................................................................................................................. 50
Link - technology....................................................................................................................................................................... 51
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 52
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 53
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 54
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 55
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 56
Internal Link - Voluntary Percieved As Shift From Cap............................................................................................................ 57
Internal Links - Carbon Tarrifs/Relations................................................................................................................................... 58
Carbon Tariffs = Trade War........................................................................................................................................................59
Carbon Tariffs= Trade War .......................................................................................................................................................60
Carbon Tariffs =Trade War ........................................................................................................................................................61
Trade Key to US-EU Relations .................................................................................................................................................. 62
Trade Key to US-Eu Relations ...................................................................................................................................................63
Trade Key to US-Eu Relations ...................................................................................................................................................64
Impacts ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 65
US-EU Free Trade - Extensions..................................................................................................................................................66
US-EU Trade Economy -Module ...............................................................................................................................................67
US-EU Trade Economy - Extensions .........................................................................................................................................68
US-EU Relations Democracy Module........................................................................................................................................ 69
US-EU Relations Democracy Extensions .................................................................................................................................. 70
US-EU Solves Iran Prolif Module.............................................................................................................................................. 71
US-EU Coop on Iran Prolif Now................................................................................................................................................ 72

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US-EU Cooperation on Prolif Now............................................................................................................................................ 73


US-Eu Key to Iran Prolif.............................................................................................................................................................74
US-EU Solves Peace Process Module ....................................................................................................................................... 75
US-EU Solves Peace Process - Extension..................................................................................................................................76
US-EU Relations - Heg Module..................................................................................................................................................77
US-EU Relations -Heg Extensions............................................................................................................................................. 78
US-EU Relations -Heg Extensions............................................................................................................................................. 79
US-EU Bioterror Module ........................................................................................................................................................... 80
US-EU Bioterror - Extensions.....................................................................................................................................................81
US-EU Relations Solves War - General .................................................................................................................................... 82
US-EU Relations Solves War - General..................................................................................................................................... 83
US-EU Trade Solves LL............................................................................................................................................................. 84
US-EU key to Indo-Pak...............................................................................................................................................................85
US-EU key to Central Asian stability......................................................................................................................................... 86
US-EU key to Disease.................................................................................................................................................................87
US-EU key to Bird Flu................................................................................................................................................................88
US-EU  NMD..........................................................................................................................................................................89
US-EU  NMD..........................................................................................................................................................................90
US-EU Relations - Turns Case - Climate....................................................................................................................................91
US-EU Relations - Turns Case - Climate....................................................................................................................................92
US-EU Relations - Turns Case - Climate....................................................................................................................................93
Neg Blocks.................................................................................................................................................................................. 94
2NC Overview.............................................................................................................................................................................95
AT: EU Pessimistic..................................................................................................................................................................... 96
AT: Long Timeframe ................................................................................................................................................................. 97
AT: Incentives Increasing Now...................................................................................................................................................98
AT: No Sanctions/Trade Conflict............................................................................................................................................... 99
AT: No Link ............................................................................................................................................................................. 100

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A. The EU is holding off on trade barriers because they believe the Us will increase c02 regulations
Stephen Boucher, Former Advisor on European Affairs for the Belgian Deputy PM - Prof. @ Science Po in Paris, 4/4/’8 [Clinton,
Obama, McCain - Europe’s Best Hope for Fighting Climate Change, http://www.notre-
europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper34-SBoucher-ClimateChange-en.pdf]

What EU governments and institutions can do in the forthcoming months in relation to US plans for climate change can only be
modest in the context of an electoral campaign. However, with the promising trends described above, an unprecedented opportunity
has arisen to form a transatlantic alliance to lead efforts to fight global warming. Climate change could now be seen as a common
cause for the EU and the USA, rather than an issue that pits both sides of the Atlantic against each other. There is the possibility to help
drive the world towards an international agreement that seriously tackles the issue of global warming. In light of these objectives, EU policy-makers
should, more specifically: •Maintain high standards; • Monitor closely US efforts and debates and engage in discussions over precise mechanisms in
order to address competitiveness concerns jointly; • Encourage common thinking on China and India.45 These tasks will fall primarily to the French
administration under its presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008, to European Commission officials, and to the Swedish presidency, in the
second half of 2009, as the Czech government has clearly indicated that climate change will not be a priority, unlike for the French and Swedish
governments. Despite Czech President Vaclav Klaus’ skepticism regarding climate change, the Czech government has nevertheless indicated
informally to its French partners that it will not hinder France’s efforts to conclude legislative negotiations on the Commission’s proposals by the end
of 2008. 3.2 Maintain high standards If the EU wishes to play an active role, it should not provide ammunition for those in the USA seeking to lower
long-term objectives nor weaken future US legislation. This could happen with the current dilution of goals indicated by the fact that the EU had
committed to a reduction by 25- 40% in Bali. The EU environment commissioner, as mentioned above, has talked of an insufficient goal of 50%
emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 2050. This goal was in fact endorsed at the June 2007 G8 meeting in Heiligendamm. This sends the wrong
signal. A weakening of EU resolve has also been noticed concerning auctioning rules. Emphatic talk about the EU’s leadership should not hide this.
At present, the best thing the EU can do in 2008 is therefore to put its own house in order. This would mean reaching a preliminary agreement
between the Council and the Parliament by the end of 2008 and sticking as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposal. This will require
resisting national industry lobbying on a number of dimensions. European policy makers should also consider enforcing the 30% emissions reduction
target by 2020 even before an international agreement is reached. If Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama is elected, this will help them stick to the more
demanding plans they have backed. If McCain is elected, this will help him go higher than the 65% reduction goal by 2050 he has announced,
considered insufficient, and at least not go lower. On the other hand, one should be wary of letting the current US administration’s recalcitrance push
Europe to make counter-proposals that are too bold. A careful balance needs to be found between proposing anything too radical, while keeping the
pressure on, and preparing for quick movement in January 2009. 3.3 Initiate discussion on mechanisms Two striking observations can be made
regarding the current situation. First, for the first time, legislative proposals seeking to address climate change happen to be under
discussion in parallel on both sides of the Atlantic and may come to fruition in 2009. Second, as seen above, while there are real
similarities between US and EU plans, the United States may possibly go further than the EU on a number of aspects, and vice versa.
The opportunity is thus ripe for Europe to engage the United States in climate policy deliberations and for EU discussions to benefit
from US plans. Whether with each campaign individually, or the US policy arena collectively, the most important thing is for Europe
to engage Americans actively on the climate issue. The American mainstream is fast becoming aware of the climate problem, and
could benefit from learning of Europe’s experience in tackling the issue. Also, it is crucial that both US and EU policies trend towards
harmonization and integration, especially for the functioning of carbon markets. Therefore, at this formative stage, the European
Union, the United States, and the world would benefit from a closer alignment of climate policies across the Atlantic. Efforts should
be focused on finding common legislative ground, so as to increase the likelihood that the US outcome can work with the EU regime,
and vice versa. Until the future tells us who becomes the next US President, EU policymakers would therefore be well advised to
follow closely discussions and legislative progress on climate change in the USA. They should continue carrying out negotiations with
the Bush administration while remembering that a more climate-ambitious administration will be coming soon. Pursuing informal channels of
diplomacy is also in order. Making contact with the staff of all three candidates would be wise. Informal diplomacy, with the help of relevant EU and
US think tanks and officials would not be time wasted. Engaging private sector stakeholders across the two sides of the Atlantic is also important, to
foster common thinking and support. 3.4 Encourage common thinking on China, India and other major emitters The critical issue moving forward is
treatment of BRICs and differentiated responsibility. This is the stated reason of the Byrd-Hagel resolution opposing the Kyoto treaty in 1997, and
could ultimately derail - or at least stymie and delay - US climate policy action. Therefore, addressing this issue is essential for ensuring US action,
no matter who the President-elect is. Europe has a vital and important role to play in facilitating these difficult discussions, as it did in Bali. Also, the
EU and the future US President will agree that the best way to tackle global warming while limiting the impact on their

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competitiveness is by involving as many countries as possible under the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. This requires bringing
in developing countries, if necessary starting from relatively limited emission cuts. There will be no Congress backing if the BRICs are not seriously
committed. However, the current bill moving through Senate requires “comparable” action from developing countries, indicating that it may become
more flexible on the issue. Considering the outcome of the December UNFCCC Bali meeting, it
would seem that China is ready to play a more constructive role. China and other emerging countries agreed for the first time in Bali to try to make
“measurable, reportable and verifiable” emissions cuts.46 However, they did not appear to be ready to agreeing to any mandatory restrictions in the
near future. Their priority remains economic development. Both the EU and the USA should therefore seek jointly to make use of these
positive signals for a global climate treaty, while engaging in discussions with all major emitters with an open mind. Most
importantly, they should not talk unwisely of “border adjustments”47 and tariffs on imported goods from countries without carbon
pricing. Rightly so, EU Commission President Barroso said that this issue would only be reviewed in 2010 in the light of
international negotiations. EU government should adhere to this discipline. This is true also for the USA, where import tariffs have
been requested by a number of business interest groups.
Conclusion
Europe should already start looking beyond the Bush Administration and begin to engage alternative and emerging policy leaders.
This is a crucial period in US climate policy formulation and Europe has a rare and fleeting opportunity to help inform US climate
policy development. For those in Europe who assume that a Democrat as President of the USA would be more inclined to join forces
with Europe to lead the global fight against climate change, this paper suggests that there is in fact a unique opportunity lying ahead to
join forces with the forthcoming US administration, no matter who wins the November election. However, it also argues that the
resolve of any of the three could be dampened if faced with resistance. Or, possibly, with Europe’s own lack of ambition EU policy
makers today should be governed by an exceptional sense of urgency. If Europe adopts clear legislation, it could bolster efforts by
those in the USA who have similar goals. They should also be governed by the notion that convergence is desirable, as opposed to a
form of beauty contest some seem to believe the EU is engaged in with the United States. This could lead to the creation before the
end of 2009 of a transatlantic consensus helping shape a successor treaty to the Kyoto treaty. As Europe wrestles with the difficulty of
being leader and worries about the impact on its economy, its best hope today is to prepare to join forces with the next US
administration, setting bold long term emissions targets and encouraging cooperation with developing countries.

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The Plan Will be Percieved as a Trojan Horse to Block US Cap and Trade -
Ensuring EU Backlash
Time Magazine, staff writer Andrew Purvis, 6-4-07, Europe vs. Bush on global warming,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1628024,00.html [Barber]

The targets require taking steps to ensure that average temperatures on the planet increase by no more than 2 degrees celsius by the
end of the century, and to slash greenhouse gas emissions to 50% of the 1990 level before 2050. But when the German draft was
circulated two weeks ago in Washington, U.S. negotiators declared, in a document leaked shortly afterwards, that the German draft
"crossed multiple 'red lines'" and that "there is only so far we can go, given our fundamental opposition to the German position." Then,
on May 31, President George W. Bush announced his own climate change inititiative, which calls on the leaders of the 15 leading
producers of the heat-trapping gases to develop long term voluntary emission-reduction goals. The proposal, notably short on
specfics, raised concern in Europe that Bush was trying to make an end-run around the existing United Nations process for
addressing climate change, which includes the Kyoto agreement. The German environment minister warned of a possible "trojan
horse" designed to sidestep an agreement in Heiligendamm and "torpedo the international climate protection process." Underlying
the increasingly testy exchange are fundamental differences over how the climate crisis is to be addressed. The biggest worry in
Europe is that the Bush Administration approach of stressing technology and voluntary targets will weaken the global effort under
U.N. auspices to set mandatory targets. "America increasingly wants to use new technologies and in this way test how much carbon
dioxide emissions can be decreased," Angela Merkel told the newsmagazine Der Spiegel. "We Europeans find it more compelling to
agree on goals on an international level, and direct our efforts accordingly." She added: "I encourage [President Bush] to be
courageous and lead the way with concrete climate protection goals." Sigmar Gabriel, the German Environment Minister, added:
"What we need now is a worldwide climate change regime. We need clear aims and we have to be able to check if the contracting
partners stick to the goals." Defenders of the Bush plan contend that it would actually help the U.N. process by bringing in countries
such as China and India, along with the U.S., that have been reluctant to sign on to a more top-down approach. And tempers appear to
be cooling as the G8 summit draws near. Merkel announced over the weekend that the U.S. President's proposals of May 31 were, in
fact, "very welcome ... if they are channeled into the framework of [U.N. treaty negotiations]." Blair, speaking afterward, agreed that
"it is good that the U.S. has made these commitments," while adding, "We need to make sure that we keep these targets within the
U.N. agreement." Still, the U.S. and the Europeans are unlikely to resolve differences when their leaders meet this week. Though
there's a chance the Europeans could water down the communique by agreeing to remove concrete targets, Merkel insisted last
weekend that she would not do so. No European leaders are going to suffer politically for standing up to the Bush Administration on
global warming. But they point to President Bush's recent acknowledgement that man-made global warming is a reality as a sign of
progress — and sufficient reason for avoiding a head-on collision, at least for now. Administration on global warming. But they point
to President Bush's recent acknowledgement that man-made global warming is a reality as a sign of progress — and sufficient reason
for avoiding a head-on collision, at least for now.

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EU Climate Trade Sanctions Spills Over to Collapse the WTO
Euractiv '8 [January 28, EU Warned of Trade War Over Climate Measures, http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?
type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjgyNjc]
The Commission's threat of climate-related trade sanctions aimed at putting EU and third country producers on a level
footing appears mainly targeted at convincing governments in Washington and Beijing to adhere to a global deal on
climate change. Indeed, the EU executive has confirmed that it will not decide on the introduction of any such measures
before 2011. However, the mere fact that the EU is considering such action has already caused outrage among its trade
partners. The United States has warned it would "vigorously" resist any move to introduce a tax on American products based
on its position in. Last week , US Trade Representative Susan Schwab accused the EU of using the climate as an excuse for
protectionism. Legal experts remain divided on whether the EU's proposed measures would be compatible with international
trade regulations, as the WTO has no clear provisions on the subject. On the one hand, border adjustment measures could be
considered to contravene WTO rules prohibiting discrimination between countries or between "like products". On the other,
WTO law also states that countries may deviate from these rules if it is for the protection of animal, plant or human health or
for the conservation of natural resources. Positions Commission President José Manuel Barroso said: "There would be no
point in pushing EU companies to cut emissions if the only result is that production, and indeed pollution, shifts to countries
with no carbon disciplines at all." A spokesman from the US Mission to the EU told EurActiv that while the US was
encouraged to see that the EU's new climate package does not introduce any trade-restrictive action on imports, the US would
be "vigorous in resisting calls for any form of trade protectionism as a response to climate change." Furthermore, the US
appears to have won British support. "We are against any measures which might look like trade barriers […] There is always
the danger that the protectionists in Europe - and they do exist - could use this as a kind of secret weapon to bring about
protectionism," British Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks told the BBC. France, however, is continuing to push for
protection against unfair international competition to avoid massive delocalisation of EU companies. The establishment
of a border adjustment mechanism is a "fundamental element" of the package and France will work "very closely" with the
European Commission between now and 2011 on proposals to set up the scheme, insisted French Minister of Ecology and
Sustainable Development Jean-Louis Borloo . According to the Financial Times, Ujal Singh Bhatia, India's ambassador to
the WTO , warned against the risk of retaliation and litigation from the EU's trade partners if it goes ahead with trade
restrictive measures. He said: "Unilateral measures at this stage would create contentiousness and lead to charges of
protectionism […] If the countries imposing such measures invoke Gatt provisions to justify them, the dispute settlement
mechanism in [the] WTO would face serious challenges and create divisions along North-South lines." However, British
Liberal MEP Chris Davies welcomed the idea of tariffs, saying they would create a level-playing field for business: "It makes
more likely an emissions trading scheme on a worldwide basis, if manufacturers in China know they are not going to gain
entry." But business leaders fear that imposing "climate tariffs" could provoke trade retaliation. Folker Franz, a senior
policy adviser at BusinessEurope, the European employers' organisation , said: "If you impose import measures on others,
the others might do the same." As an alternative, he said the EU should promote the clean development mechanism – a
scheme which allows European companies to invest in carbon-reduction projects in the developing world.

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Nuclear Extinction
Copley News ’99 [12/1, Commentary, ln]
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear
winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle
apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own
prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war
for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear
disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is
environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike
yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament
movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war
protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have
been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other
countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so
important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for
the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational
corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's
not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a
growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies
for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods
without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday
workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and
work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world
trade. They should be celebrating it.

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Uniqueness

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Unique -EU-US Climate Relations

US-EU relations are strong even in the areas of trade and climate change.
Colleen P. Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,
5/13/08, Gaffy, Trade, Climate Change and Soft Power--Does America Have Friends in
Europe?, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm [SD]
So, when I am posed the question: “Does America have friends in Europe with regard to trade and climate change?” I would say not
only does the U.S. have friends, the U.S. also has partners. Let’s remember that the transatlantic market today makes up nearly 55
percent of global GDP and about 40 percent of world trade. So there is a strong incentive to work together as friends and partners.
Both the United States and Europe believe in strong and effective regulation to protect our citizens and the environment. However, in
some cases, unnecessary differences in our regulatory approaches have made our companies less competitive, raised consumer costs,
reduced consumer choice and slowed job creation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and BusinessEurope believe that if we could align
our economies better, we could generate $10 billion in saved costs and potential growth for the transatlantic economy. And so,
working together, we are trying to do exactly that, by creating the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which met for the second
time today in Brussels. The TEC was created in April 2007, under the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration,
and was signed by President Bush, Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Barroso during the U.S.-EU Summit in
Washington, DC. The goal of the TEC is to promote regulatory cooperation, eliminate barriers to transatlantic trade, advance capital
market liberalization, and strengthen support for open investment regimes. In short, it is trying to reduce barriers to trade and
investment. In the area of the environment, the Transatlantic Economic Council is recommending that the June 2008 U.S.-EU Summit
consider joint efforts in clean energy technologies that will help us address our shared concerns about energy security and climate
change.

Bush implements many climate change policies to keep US-EU relations strong
Colleen P. Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,
5/13/08, Gaffy, Trade, Climate Change and Soft Power--Does America Have Friends in
Europe?, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm [SD]
Another example of our multilateral cooperation with the EU is the Methane to Markets Partnership, which is an international effort to
promote methane recovery and its use as a clean source of energy. Methane accounts for 16 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions
that come from human activities. It remains in the atmosphere for up to 15 years and is also a primary constituent of natural gas and an
important energy source. So if we can either prevent or use methane emissions, we can achieve significant energy, economic and
environmental benefits. This Partnership, which began in 2004, has the potential to deliver, by 2015, annual reductions in methane
emissions that would be the equivalent of removing 33 million cars from the roadways for one year, or planting 55 million acres of
trees. The Transatlantic Economic Council and the Methane to Markets Partnership are two examples of U.S.-EU cooperation. Before
I describe others, it might be helpful to know about the commitments the U.S. has made domestically on energy security, renewable
and alternative energy sources and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. As many of you know, President Bush signed the
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) in December 2007. EISA was in response to the President’s "Twenty in Ten" challenge
in last year's State of the Union Address to improve vehicle fuel economy and increase alternative fuels. The act includes some
significant measures, including a Renewable Fuels Mandate that will increase the use of renewable fuels by 500 percent, and a Vehicle
Fuel Economy Mandate, which specifies a national mandatory fuel economy standard of 35 miles per gallon by 2020. That mandate
alone would save billions of gallons of fuel and increase efficiency by 40 percent. EISA also phases out the use of incandescent light
bulbs by 2014, sets new mandatory efficiency standards for appliances, and requires all federal buildings to reduce their energy
consumption by 30 percent by 2015 and to be carbon-neutral by 2030.

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Unique -EU-US Climate Relations

US-EU relations promote multilateral cooperation


Colleen P. Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,
5/13/08, Gaffy, Trade, Climate Change and Soft Power--Does America Have Friends in
Europe?, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm [SD]
Not only do the U.S. and EU cooperate closely bilaterally, but we also work together multilaterally. Last September, the President
launched the Major Economies Process (MEP) as a way to support and accelerate the UN process. We believe that when you gather
around a single table the 17 economies that represent 80 percent of the world’s economy and 80 percent of the world’s emissions, you
can make a significant contribution to the UN talks. The EU and several European countries participate in the MEP, and France just
hosted the latest meeting in Paris in April. The result is that for the first time ever there will be a Major Economies Meeting (MEM) at
the time of the G-8 Summit where MEM countries will be represented at the leader level. European countries also played an important
role at the recent Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC), which brought together government officials,
civil society and private sector leaders from around the world to advance the development and commercialization of renewable energy
And let’s not forget the World Trade Organization (WTO). Last year, U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab announced that the
United States and the European Union had submitted a proposal—in the WTO—to increase global trade in environmental goods and
services. This initiative places priority on technologies that are directly linked to addressing climate change and energy security. The
U.S. and EU also proposed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental technologies and services in the Doha Round. In
addition, the U.S. is forming several other international partnerships to pursue clean and renewable energy, such as the Asia-Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP, which includes Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea and India,
has endorsed more than 25 new renewable energy projects. There are also other international partnerships and initiatives, including
working with Sweden to advance biofuel and clean vehicle technologies, and working with the private sector and the United
Kingdom's Wave Hub to harness the power of the ocean. And of course we have the agreement reached under the Montreal Protocol
to speed the phase-out of hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that deplete the ozone layer. If you leave today with only one message
from my remarks, I hope it is the message that the United States is actively engaged and working with other countries in a multilateral
way to find solutions to these energy issues that the whole world is facing.

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Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade

EU expects similar strategies from US presidential candidates to decrease emissions


Stephen Boucher, consultant in the energy policy field, 4/2008, Clinton, Obama, McCain - Europe’s Best Hope
for Fighting Climate Change, http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper34-SBoucher-
ClimateChange-en.pdf [SD]
How do US plans compare with the EU’s?

The short answer is: favorably.20 As summarized in Table 1 below, plans endorsed by US presidential candidates are on par with EU
plans on several key dimensions of emissions trading. A notable exception is the issue of flexibility, where US proposals allow for
overly generous use of reduction projects outside the USA.

First, the long-term targets in US legislative proposals (between 65% for McCain and 80% for Clinton and Obama) are at least as
ambitious as the EU’s, if not more. Official EU statements have suggested that “significant emission reductions of 60%-80%
compared to 1990 will be necessary by 2050, if we are to reach the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature
increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.”22 Yet, EU environment commissioner Stavros Dimas also recently spoke
of the need for global emissions to “be cut by at least 50% of 1990 levels by 2050.”

The percentage of auctioning is higher. And coverage, both in terms of industries and gases is also potentially greater. For the EU, it
represents about half its economy from 2013. For the US, about 80%.

U.S. presidential candidates are expected to fight climate change


Stephen Boucher, consultant in the energy policy field, 4/2008, Clinton, Obama, McCain - Europe’s Best Hope
for Fighting Climate Change, http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper34-SBoucher-
ClimateChange-en.pdf [SD]

One might consider Obama’s environmental record, Clinton’s precise plans, or McCain’s boldness in sponsoring legislation in Congress to
suggest that one or the other is a better candidate for fighting climate change. One can also find fault with each candidate. A crucial
assessment was made by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Recalling that a minimum of 80% below 2000 levels is required from the
United States to limit the global temperature increase to 2°C, UCS argues that the Sanders-Boxer Bill achieves that, but not the McCain-
Lieberman Bill.19 Notwithstanding this assessment, McCain has not sufficiently strengthened his proposals. In his defense, considering his
party’s stance, this would probably be politically suicide at this stage, and one should not exclude his willingness to agree to a higher target if
elected President.

Albeit with shades of green, it appears overall that all three current US presidential hopefuls have relatively good credentials to fight climate
change—especially if compared with former Republican candidates— and collaborate with the EU to negotiate a successor treaty to the
Kyoto Treaty. Another question is whether Europe’s plans will measure up with the United States’.

12
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade


Obama and McCain are committed to cap and trade.
The Irish Times, 7/11/08, G8 and climate change,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/0711/1215677267262.html [SD]
At the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali last December, delegates from more than 180 countries, rich and poor alike, committed
themselves to negotiate a comprehensive global agreement on global warming in Copenhagen at the end of next year. Crucial talks to
advance this goal will be held in the Polish city of Poznan this December, by which time George W Bush will be on the way out and
the US will have a new president-elect. Encouragingly, both Barack Obama and John McCain are committed to dealing with climate
change, including the introduction of a "cap and trade" regime aimed at cutting emissions in the US. Whether this commitment will
survive in an era of recession and rising oil prices is a moot point, but at least the fact that oil is now more realistically priced to reflect
its relative scarcity will spur the long-delayed advance of alternative energy technologies.

EU leaders expect McCain and Obama to participate in international cap and trade.
Patrick Wintour, political editor for The Guardian, 7/8/08, Clouds part slowly in climate change diplomacy,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/08/g8.climatechange [SD]
There is also an acceptance that there must be interim targets for emissions reductions, presumably for 2020, and an agreement that a
new body may be needed to guide this process through the UN. The EU has already unilaterally targeted a 20% interim cut by 2020.
This, in the sphere of international climate change diplomacy, represents progress, and sets the course for further talks through the UN
leading to an agreement at Copenhagen at the end of next year on a precise deal designed to replace the Kyoto agreement that expires
in 2012. Copenhagen has always been seen as the ultimate destination for these talks. But Gordon Brown, like every other European
leader, has been waiting politely for George Bush to leave the international stage and allow either John McCain or Barack Obama to
embrace deep carbon cuts by 2050, based on an international cap and trade scheme. In private he points out that he has spoken to both
McCain and Obama about climate change, and both are committed to changing US policy. Obama favours an 80% cut in emissions by
2050 using a baseline of 1990, and McCain favours a 60% cut. Both favour an international cap and trade mechanism to achieve this.
"Cap and trade is being implemented in Europe and they have stumbled and they've had problems but it is still the right thing to do,"
McCain has said. McCain is probably more pro-nuclear of the two, and Obama appears to have a more progressive view on biofuels,

13
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique - Both Candidates Cap and Trade

McCain will push for cap-and-trade regardless of political rewards


Stephen Boucher, consultant in the energy policy field, 4/2008, Clinton, Obama, McCain - Europe’s Best Hope
for Fighting Climate Change, http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper34-SBoucher-
ClimateChange-en.pdf [SD]
For John McCain, “The issue of climate change is one of the most important issues facing our nation and the world today.“2 On the
positive side, as previously mentioned, he can be credited for taking a bold step: co-authoring the first-ever Congress bill on climate
change. In 2003, he and Senator Joe Lieberman introduced the “Climate Stewardship Act”, which called for a cap-and-trade system
similar to Europe’s. It was defeated that same year, but the two congressmen reintroduced it in 2005, and again in 2007.

He has also voted against drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, contrary to President George Bush’s desire and despite party
pressure. As suggested by political commentator and senior staff writer at Grist.org David Roberts, “These aren’t chopped liver. All
were acts of courage undertaken in a time of Republican majority, when they offered little political reward.”

Relative to other Republican candidates, McCain is definitely good news for Europe and climate change. Other Republican hopefuls,
such as Mitt Romney, only grudgingly acknowledged human influence on the climate and were very critical of McCain’s stance.

14
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action

Europe is withholding boarder taxes because they expect that the United
States will cap emission- new climate proposals will be used as an excuse for
protectionism
James Kanter and Stephen Castle, January 22, 2008, International Herald Tribune,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2008/01/22/us_warns_eu_on_using_climate_change_as_pretext/

BRUSSELS - The United States warned the European Union yesterday against using climate change as a pretext for
protectionism, setting the stage for trans-Atlantic tension over a new package of EU measures to combat global warming. 'We
have been dismayed . . . where we have seen the climate and the environment being used.' The pointed comments by the US trade
representative, Susan Schwab, after talks in Brussels, came just two days before the European Commission introduced its proposals
for cutting EU emissions at least 20 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. "We have been dismayed at a variety of suggestions where
we have seen the climate and the environment being used as an excuse to close markets," Schwab said after discussions with
Peter Mandelson, her European counterpart. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has called for a carbon tax on imports to ensure that
European companies that need to comply with tough environmental rules are not undercut by foreign competitors whose governments
are not capping carbon emissions. EU officials were not expected to propose such a measure tomorrow but were expected to
keep alive the possibility of a so-called border tax to keep European industries competitive. The EU pledge to protect
European industry by 2011 at the latest will be aimed at assuaging powerful lobby groups from sectors like steel and
aluminum manufacturing, which say they are facing higher costs than their overseas competitors because of the EU's
determination to lead the world in climate protection. Even so, EU officials hope to be able to avoid the issue, not least because
any European border tax could be challenged at the World Trade Organization. Instead, EU officials hope that other developed
countries like the United States, which did not sign the Kyoto climate treaty, will join an international treaty by the end of the
decade, making protectionist measures unnecessary.

G-8 Predicts Bush to advocate climate control


Associated Press, 7/8/08, Bush, G-8 make progress on climate change,
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5iDhfdxlthyulzNbmR8KGjPKvNzaAD91PO3D00 [SD]

TOYAKO, Japan (AP) — President Bush and other world leaders made gradual progress Tuesday on climate change, but finalizing a
long-term global agreement on what to do about the fevered planet remains elusive. Climate change, the focus of this year's meeting of
industrialized nations, is just one on a long list of global issues — from Iran's nuclear weapons program to missile defense — that
Bush is trying to push forward at the Group of Eight summit. With his popularity low at home and fewer than 200 days left in office,
Bush is methodically promoting his issues, seemingly ready to accept incremental progress rather than pursuing eye-catching
breakthroughs. The G-8 endorsed cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases by 50 percent by 2050 and called for emitters to set
midterm reduction targets. The White House quickly hailed the G-8 declaration as a validation of Bush's approach. "This represents
substantial progress from last year," said Dan Price, the president's deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs.
Price said the G-8 acknowledged that it alone cannot effectively address climate change — that contributions from all major
economies are required — a position Bush has argued repeatedly. Price also said the declaration struck here Tuesday reflects the sense
the development and deployment of clean technologies in developing nations is crucial — another thing that Bush has been pushing.
The president long has insisted that major emerging economies like China and India be included in any global plan to cut emissions.
Bush scored a small victory in getting the other big-polluting major economy nations to agree to attend a meeting Wednesday on the
sidelines of a summit. It's unclear, however, whether the heads of state at Wednesday's session will "finalize" a long-term goal for
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, as Bush predicted back in September.

15
Europe Trade DA
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Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action

EU wants the US to curb emissions regardless of other country’s policies.


James Kanter and Stephen Castle, staff writers, International Herald Tribune, 1/22/08, US warns EU on using
climate change as pretext,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2008/01/22/us_warns_eu_on_using_climate_change_as_pre
text/ [SD]
EU officials say they are optimistic about a global climate accord after the recent meeting of nearly 200 nations in Bali, Indonesia,
where agreement was reached on laying out a plan for negotiations that could produce a climate treaty by 2009. But the Bali Action
Plan faces high hurdles, including the persistently thorny problem of convincing the United States to take action even if fast-
developing countries like China, which insists on developments getting higher priority than emissions curbs, fail to make similar
pledges.

Europe wants countries to curb emissions AND shift financial focus


Jennifer L Morgan, Director at Climate and Energy Security for Third Generation Environmentalism, 5/20/08,
Clinton, Obama, McCain – Europe’s opportunity to shape a presidency,
http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Reaction_E3G_Notre_Europe_Policy_Paper_34_US___EU_Climate_Chan
ge.pdf [SD]
In order to assess “What Europe should do now”, we must have the ongoing international climate negotiations on a post-2012
agreement in mind. As Boucher notes, at the Bali meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (and its Kyoto
Protocol), ministers launched a new round of negotiations scheduled to be completed in Copenhagen in December 2009. The core
elements of these negotiations include what actions developed and developing countries will take to curb their emissions, advance
technology innovation and cooperation, strengthen carbon markets, scale up adaptation and address the cross-cutting issue of
finance.

Europe needs an engaged US government in order to be successful


Jennifer L Morgan, Director at Climate and Energy Security for Third Generation Environmentalism, 5/20/08,
Clinton, Obama, McCain – Europe’s opportunity to shape a presidency,
http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Reaction_E3G_Notre_Europe_Policy_Paper_34_US___EU_Climate_Chan
ge.pdf

The Bali Action Plan has, in a sense, left open a space for the US’ level of ambition to be negotiated under the UNFCCC to which it is
a party, and noted that the commitment of the United States should be “comparable” with other industrialised countries. This question
of comparability is nicely treated in Boucher’s analysis as it is quite clear that current US legislative proposals, while quite ambitious
in the longer-term, are far away from the 25 to 40% range currently under negotiation. Europe must therefore engage the US Senate
and the three candidates sooner rather than later to begin defining what a comparable effort might be. As Boucher notes, Europe will
be in a far stronger position for this negotiation if it is able to complete its own legislative process on its target of 20% below 1990 by
2020 by the end of 2008 under the French Presidency.

16
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique - EU Expects US Climate Action

Europe wants countries to cap emissions or they will permit energy incentive exports.
Jennifer L Morgan, Director at Climate and Energy Security for Third Generation Environmentalism, 5/20/08,
Clinton, Obama, McCain – Europe’s opportunity to shape a presidency,
http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Reaction_E3G_Notre_Europe_Policy_Paper_34_US___EU_Climate_Chan
ge.pdf [SD]

Recently, voices on both sides of the Atlantic have increasingly started to call for the use of trade sanctions as a tool to protect energy-
intensive industries and/or workers. There is still however a distinct difference in approach. While Europe is waiting to see the
outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations before implementing any protective measures for energy-intensive industries, the
Lieberman/Warner bill poses a more explicit threat to emerging economies (i.e. China). The bill sets out that these countries should
take on a national cap by a certain date or accept an emissions permit levy on energy-intensive exports to the US. This provision
ignores the responsibility of the US and other developed countries to cut their emissions further and faster than developing countries.
It would antagonise developing countries, make it harder to get a deal at Copenhagen and help only a handful of industries (energy
intensive goods account for just 3% of US imports from China). Far more effective would be for Europe to continue its more positive
engagement with China to bring together the world’s largest single market with the world’s most dynamic economy in the pursuit of a
combined transition to a low carbon economy. For example, next year the European Commission should decide to remove high tariffs
on Chinese compact fluorescent lightbulbs so that European consumers can purchase cheap low carbon goods, and Chinese producers
can see the benefit of producing them. Really making such low carbon markets function would create massive first-mover benefits for
both economies, and would signal the way forward for a more positive and proactive engagement from US business interests.

Climate Progress Preserving US-EU Co-operation

Plain Dealer 6/17/’8 [Bush's farewell tour, ln]


Even the protesters mostly stayed away - but not for the reason the president claimed: that they've lost interest because Iraq is going so
well. Bush also ascribed his smooth sailing through the capitals of Europe to America's progress on climate change policy. That, his
aides suggested, has led to a new amity between his administration and old Europe. Such amity is important. It preserves the all-
important united front between Europe and the United States on the tricky question of how much pressure to put on Tehran to give up
its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Bush is Percieved as Moving Towards Europe on Climate

Chicago Tribune 6/15/’8 [With Bush near exit, Europe's ire softens, ln]
Even the tone has changed. In an interview with the Times of London, the president was applauded for adopting language "much less
jarring, more conciliatory than it once was." "His humor is self-deprecating," the paper said. This is a marked change from the
characterizations that had become so familiar. The "Toxic Texan" with his "cowboy diplomacy" seems to many over here a distant
memory. And on his last trip to Europe, Bush might just have achieved something that had hitherto eluded him. With his newfound
support for climate-change policy, his emphasis on a multilateral approach to Iran and his commitment, however belated, to
engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bush comes across as being constructive: a man to do business with. He looks like a
statesman.

17
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique - EU Liberalizing Trade - Climate


The EU Is Support Trade Relations By Liberalizing Climate Barriers
Meena Raman and Charly Poppe, Secretary General, Friends of the Earth Malaysia & Chair - Friends of the
Earth International, and Trade Programme Coordinator, Friends of the Earth Europe, 1/2008 Climate Change
and International Trade: The Need for a Paradigm Shift,"
http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2008/trade_climate_jan08_en.pdf [SD]
The “trade & climate change” debate started in Europe in 2006 when some very different stakeholders argued for the establishment of
a “Kyoto tariff” at the EU border, both on competitiveness and moral grounds. Since then, the EU Trade Commissioner ruled out the
proposal as “bad politics” and much of the climate & trade debate has been focussed on the “mutual supportiveness” of the trade and
climate regimes. It has been emphasized how the liberalisation of “environmental goods and services” and “green technologies” could
play a role in climate mitigation and adaptation. It has also been argued that the liberalisation of energy resources will bring more
energy security more efficiency, and the necessary stimulus for the development of the renewable energy market. Strong pressures
have also been made for the liberalisation of agrofuels as a means for cutting carbon emissions from transport (although this idea has
suffered from major setbacks in the last months). In the same vein, the old theory that trade liberalisation leads to growth which leads
to increased welfare and in turn, to more environmental consciousness and, ultimately, to environmental policies, is making its come-
back, although it has proven to be fallacious and factually wrong3. So let us leave theory and the good thoughts about “mutual
supportiveness” aside for a moment, and talk about the real crunching issues. Let us face it: policy-making is rarely coherent, and
there are a number of potential or existing tensions and conflicts between climate and trade policies. Trade and Climate: Tensions and
Conflicts To begin with, we would like to emphasize that in Friends of the Earth’s view, the current trading system and the push for
liberalisation is a “driver” of climate change. The dominant trading system, and its emphasis on the ‘free market’, promotes a model
of development based on unsustainable patterns of production and consumption dependent on a fossil fuel-based economy. The model
is premised on unfettered growth and consumption, including growth of exports and imports, and the deregulation of markets, where
nature has no limits and pollution costs are externalised. While scarce resources are used to feed the greed of a few rich, the poor
majority is denied a decent standard of living. By the same token, the rich have emitted so much of greenhouse gases (GHG) already
to feed their irrational wants that the poor who are least responsible for climate change have to pay the price in terms of climate
catastrophes. The EU is a frontrunner in global climate negotiations; this should be acknowledged. In the last few years, the EU
(comparing to other governments) has committed itself to strong and binding GHG reductions targets, setting a positive trend for other
nations and giving positive market signals. Yet many other EU policies are undermining these efforts. What are these contradictions?
“Global Europe” is the new framework for the EU’s trade policy. The Global Europe strategy is placing “competitiveness” and market
access above all other concerns. Global Europe is fundamentally a pro-deregulation and market-opening approach. With its push for
eliminating ‘non-tariff barriers’ and particularly export taxes, the EU is threatening to undermine or chill any domestic
legislation, measure or standard that intends to mitigate or prevent climate change (for instance: subsidies to renewable energy
programmes, energy efficiency standards, export restrictions on ‘climate-sensitive’ products such as illegal timber, etc.). This is not
only jeopardizing climate policies but also undermining the ‘development space’ of poor countries.

18
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Unique - EU Liberalizing Trade - Climate

EU is considering carbon taxes now

Business Week, 1/8/08, EU Ponders Carbon Tariff on Imports,


http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2008/gb2008018_121679.htm?
chan=search [SD]
Brussels considers a policy to charge companies that import goods into Europe for the CO2 they emitted during production
European Union leaders strive to portray themselves as being on the front line of global efforts to combat climate change. They boast
that the EU has agreed to cut emissions 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, well beyond the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.
And both the United Kingdom and Germany recently announced plans to expand their commitment to renewable energy. Their
strategy, it seemed, was to lead by example. But they appear to be considering less subtle tactics. The European Commission is
considering a carbon tariff on goods from countries where greenhouse gas emission policies do not match European standards. The
tariff system would force companies that import products into Europe to buy EU carbon emissions permits through the Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS) -- the ETS already obliges European firms to buy and sell excess carbon dioxide emissions, thereby creating a
continental cap on carbon dioxide emissions. Some EU officials have publicly opposed the proposed tariff. European Trade
Commissioner Peter Mandelson told Reuters that such a scheme would be hard to implement and could lead to trade disputes.
A spokesperson for the European Commission's secretary of environment, reached by SPIEGEL ONLINE, confirmed that
the tariff is under discussion but declined to comment further. The proposed tariff is one facet of a larger debate on emissions control
policies that will govern Europe after current regulations expire in 2012. A package of climate policy proposals is due to be published
by the commission later this month. France, in particular, is a supporter of the potential tariff. Both former president Jacques Chirac
and current president Nicolas Sarkozy have warned that overly strict emissions regulations could hobble the competitiveness of
European countries. In October, Sarkozy urged European leaders to "examine the option of taxing products imported from countries
that do not respect the Kyoto Protocol."

19
Europe Trade DA
DDI 2008

Unique: AT: No Regulations

We Control the Uniqueness Trend - Bush’s Moves Have been Towards Regulation
MSNBC ‘7 [Oct 4, U.S. official: CO2 regulation likely, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21135556/]
The United States is moving toward the regulation of carbon emissions, a U.S. energy official said Thursday, even though the Bush
administration adheres to a voluntary approach to controlling the primary gas blamed for climate change. "There will be carbon
regulation of some sort," said Dan Arvizu, director of the National Renewable Energy Lab, speaking a week after he briefed President
Bush's global warming conference in Washington. "I am neutral as to which kind of carbon management regulation there will be. It is
very clear to me that there will be carbon management, whether it will be a direct tax, carbon cap-and-trade or some other instrument,"
Arvizu told an international conference on the next generation of biofuels. Arvizu did not say he was speaking for the administration.
But some of his listeners thought it was significant that he spoke after the Washington meeting that brought the United States together
with leading industrial nations which have embraced stringent mandatory controls and with developing countries like India, China and
Brazil which are totally unregulated. "He's picking up the vibe" in Washington, said Patrick Mazza, chairman of the biofuel
conference and research director of Climate Solutions based in Seattle. Arvizu later told The Associated Press the United States "is
headed in a different direction than we were a few years ago." He said executives of utility companies and U.S. oil giants — two
lobbies that had resisted regulation — now want predictable and transparent carbon policies. "Certainly my reference point has
changed dramatically," he said. "The position of this administration is beginning to evolve." In his speech to the Washington
conference, Bush reiterated his view that each nation should set targets for itself and decide how it will combat global warming
without hindering economic growth. But Arvizu said that, while Bush remained in favor of voluntary targets, his position is not as
rigid as it once was, and he made a point of telling the Washington meeting that he has accepted a mandatory renewable fuel standard
for vehicles.

U.S. is Determening its Approach to C02 Regulations - 2008 Will be the Determening Year
Fox News 5/14/’7 [Bush Orders Regulations to Cut Carbon Emissions in Response to High Court Ruling,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,272078,00.html]
President Bush on Monday ordered his cabinet members to begin drafting rules that will comply with recent a Supreme Court decision
combating greenhouse gases as well as meet his call to begin replacing gasoline with alternative fuels. "We're taking action by taking
the first step towards rules that will make our economy stronger, our environment cleaner and our nation more secure for generations
to come," Bush said, addressing reporters in the Rose Garden. Bush said he ordered his cabinet members to finish the process by the
end of 2008. While the regulations he called for can be implemented by the executive branch, Bush added that Congress could make even more of a
difference. "With good legislation, we could save up to 8.5 billion gallons of gasoline per year by 2017 and further reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from cars and trucks," Bush said. Bush said he signed an executive order Monday directing the EPA and the Energy, Transportation and Agriculture
departments to work with White House staff and Congress to develop regulations that will meet the needs of the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA by
using Bush's "20 in 10" plan to reduce gasoline consumption by 20 percent by 2017 as a starting point. The 20 in 10 plan focuses on reducing
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards — the average fuel economy standards for autos and light trucks — as well as reducing
gasoline consumption by boosting alternative fuel consumption to 35 billion gallons by 2017. The White House is hoping for a bipartisan accord to
make way for broader, more effective changes. "This is a proposal that seems to give both parties what they say they want in terms of pursuing
energy independence and at the same time pursuing a cleaner environment," White House press secretary Tony Snow said earlier Monday. "So there
ought to be a pretty good bipartisan basis for passing such legislation. We'll continue to work it." Last month in a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court
ruled carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases qualify as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act and can be regulated by the EPA, which the
administration had fought. The court also said the reasons the administration had given for declining to regulate greenhouse gases are insufficient,
and that the agency must regulate carbon dioxide, the leading gas linked to global warming, if it finds that it endangers public health. Bush has said
that he recognized the serious environmental problems created by such emissions and other so-called greenhouse gases. But he has
urged against anything other than a voluntary approach to curbing emissions, saying regulations could undercut economic activity.
The president also says he will accept no global deal on greenhouse gases without the participation of China, India and other high-
polluting, developing nations. Since taking control of Congress in January, Democrats have held a number of hearings exploring the
consequences of climate change and have been pressuring the administration to say when it will comply with the high court's ruling
and decide whether to regulate carbon dioxide. The environmental group Environmental Defense said the effort "will fall far short of
fixing the climate problem" without mandatory caps on carbon emissions. "Whether EPA will lead the fight against global warming
or lead us to a hotter planet remains to be seen," said Environmental Defense President Fred Krupp. "It's time for this administration to
join with the mainstream of American businesses and support a cap on carbon."

20
Europe Trade DA
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Unique: AT: Incentives Now

New “Funding Alternatives” to Carbon Regulations Will Be Blocked


EnergyWashington Week 6/18/’8 [Environmentalists Blast Pending Bush Request For Clean-Energy Fund, ln]
Environmentalists are criticizing a Bush administration proposal to create a $10 billion international "Clean Technology Fund" to be
administered by the World Bank, arguing the fund would subsidize the construction of coal plants and other projects in the developing
world that could undermine efforts to mitigate climate change. The criticisms might deal a heavy blow to what could be one of the
Bush administration's final initiatives for a technology-based response to climate change as an alternative to emission-reduction
mandates. Announced by President Bush last September, the proposed technology fund seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the developing
world by retrofitting existing energy infrastructure, promoting efficiency improvements, and financing new, "clean" power generation. The Bush
administration has pledged $2 billion over the first three years of the fund and is currently requesting that Congress appropriate $400 million for
fiscal year 2009. Another $8 billion is expected to be contributed by other developed nations, including Britain and Japan. But a "fact sheet" released
by Friends of the Earth and the environmental group Oil Change International charges that the fund could actually fuel global warming rather than
mitigate it. In fact, the groups argue "The 'Slightly Less Dirty' Technology Fund" could "potentially be used to fund massive coal projects that are
only somewhat less polluting than the dirtiest existing projects," including funds "to prepare for 'carbon capture and storage,' a technology which
doesn't even exist yet." At a June 5 hearing on the fund held by the House Financial Services Committee's monetary policy and
technology subcommittee, which is required to authorize World Bank-related funding, Friends of the Earth President Brent
Blackwelder criticized the lack of clarity regarding what technologies would qualify as either "clean" or "lowcarbon" under the fund.
Blackwelder also singled out the World Bank's willingness to fund projects aimed at promoting carbon capture and storage (CCS) "readiness,"
arguing that, "Using public money for coal and CCS may boost companies that make coal plant equipment, but it cannot be considered part of the
solution for the climate crisis." In his written testimony, Blackwelder suggested "there should be a certification requirement to ensure that none of the
funds have been used for coal, oil, gas or nuclear projects." A senior official with the World Bank's environmental department says the technology
fund will likely include significant investments in coal as part of a "diverse and balanced portfolio" that meets the energy needs of developing
countries. "Obviously, there will be a strong preference for the most cost-effective interventions," the official notes, though all projects would need to
be desired by the host countries and lead to "significant greenhouse gas reductions." "Yes, there might be greater [emissions] savings if you went to
wind or solar, but at what cost?" the source asks. The World Bank would also consider funding integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) coal
plants that have the capacity to add CCS "at a future time," as well as commercial-scale demonstration projects of CCS technology. Most analysts
estimate that CCS is, at best, more than a decade away from commercial availability, with officials for some electric utilities suggesting it could be as
much 40 years away. A World Bank document from April laying out the scope of the fund states, "Recognizing that coal is forecast to remain an
important component of global energy use for the next 30-50 years, the coal-fired projects would be supported where they are least cost." That
language is absent from the final, June 9 "scoping" document, though that document nonetheless endorses "adopting best available coal technologies
with substantial improvements in energy efficiency and readiness for implementation of carbon capture and storage." In contrast, a statement of
principles for a prospective clean technology fund distributed by Friends of the Earth calls for investing in "the full range of existing solar, wind,
hydropower below ten megawatts, and geothermal energy supply technologies," while funds "should not be used to make conventional high emission
projects marginally or incrementally cleaner." The money should also be distributed through the United Nations and not the World Bank so as to
provide developing countries more say in how funds are dispersed, the group argues. At the June 5 hearing, Financial Services Chairman Barney
Frank (D-MA) noted that "historically, the World Bank has not been seen as an institution friendly to environmental concerns." In March, the
Institute for Policy Studies issued a report, World Bank: Climate Profiteer, charging that the Bank's climate change programs, such as the "Clean
Development Mechanism," frequently benefited corporate interests through projects of dubious environmental merit.
Frank said concerns about the World Bank's environmental record were "well grounded in history" and "not paranoia." He suggested
that he would likely support authorizing the clean technology fund for no more than a one year "trial period," before adding that, if
faced with a "budget crunch," he would recommend the fund be the first program to be axed. The fund requires approval from both
the Financial Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee's foreign operations subcommittee. Meanwhile, Rep. Ron Paul
(R-TX) questioned where Congress would find the money for a $2 billion technology fund amid rising deficits, as well as the wisdom of
expecting the World Bank, rather than market forces, to determine how to best invest money in carbon-reducing technologies. "It's sort of like
politicians deciding, well, the very best way to develop ethanol is to subsidize farmers and prohibit people from raising hemp, and, you know, hemp
is so much better" from an environmental perspective, said Paul, the subcommittee's ranking Republican. Subcommittee Chairman Luis
Gutierrez (D-IL), in questioning State Department Under Secretary for International Affairs David McCormick, also noted the
concerns of some environmentalists regarding the lack of a "clean technology" definition, and inquired as to whether the fund would end
up financing "super-critical coal plants." In response, McCormick said coal projects "would be considered," but that he didn't expect them to make up
a "significant portion" of the fund's investments. However, he then argued that certain countries were going to go ahead with coal plants "with or
without our support, and we think there may be cases that do in fact justify the deployment of the cleanest available coal technology possible." Later
in the hearing, McCormick maintained that the fund was "not meant to finance the development of new technologies, but rather the deployment of
existing technologies."

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Unique: AT: Incentives Now

Reduction in R&D subsidies


Andreas Tjernshaugen , @ Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, ‘5 [CICERO Policy Note 2005:01, United
States participation in future climate agreements, http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/3312.pdf]
Fifth, the Kyoto parties should consider in which climate-relevant fields other than actual emissions regulation they might usefully
cooperate with the Americans on the short term. The obvious answer is science and technology. The knowledge and shared
understanding built through cooperation in scientific research, monitoring and assessment of climate change is a crucial foundation for
climate policy and should be given a high priority. As discussed in section 1 above, technology research, development and
demonstration is the area of climate policy where the potential for cooperation with the United States currently looks best. Both the
United States and European countries could usefully increase their efforts in this field. Given the discrepancy between projected
energy supply and demand and what would be needed to keep global warming in check, governments worldwide spend remarkably
little money on energy research and development. From the mid 1980s to the late 1990s – the very period that the global warming
problem was taken up by political bodies – spending on energy R&D was in fact considerably reduced (Dooley et al. 1998; Dooley
and Runci 1999). One proposed remedy is to negotiate a “R&D protocol” to the UNFCCC, where countries commit to specific levels
of funding for collaborative research and development on cleaner energy technologies (Barret 2003). It is, however, not clear that such
a formal agreement is necessary to promote R&D spending. Since just nine OECD countries account for 95 percent of the world’s
investments in energy research and development (Dooley et al. 1998), negotiations involving all UN members may not be the most
effective approach.

Congress Pushing to Cut Climate Tech


CRS ‘7 [February 8, Congressional Research Service, Climate change and Environmental policy,
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Global_Climate_Change:_Major_Scientific_and_Policy_Issues]
Two issues of concern to Congress are the extent to which spending for the CCRI and CCTP represents new money, versus how much
is attributable to the reclassification of ongoing research and technology programs, and whether reduced funding in some cases, or
virtually level funding in most other cases, might be deemed necessary or sufficient to accomplish the work of the CCSP and the
CCTP. Five reports currently serve as guidance documents for CCSP and CCTP activities. The Administration released a Climate
Change Science Program Strategic Plan on July 24, 2003. The plan included five major research goals and dozens of specific research
targets as well as 23 written synthesis and assessment products with deadlines. The National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences conducted an independent review of the CCSP Strategic Plan and in April 2004 published its overall assessment
in a 51-page report, Implementing Climate and Global Change Research: A Review of the Final U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic
Plan. To complement the CCSP Strategic Plan, the Department of Energy has released four guidance documents for Climate Change Technology
Program activities: Results of a Technical Review of the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program’s R&D Portfolio (May 2006), Climate Change
Technology Program Strategic Plan Public Review Draft (January 2006), U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: Technology Options for the
Near and Long Term (September 2005), and U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: Vision and Framework for Strategy and Planning (August
2005). Release by the CCTP of the completed final Strategic Plan on Climate Change Technology is expected late in 2006.

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Congress Cutting Renewable Incentives


Rob Varon, @ Connecticut Post Online, 6/18/’8 [GE seeks renewable energy support, ln]
General Electric Co. executives and spokespeople said Wednesday another congressional failure to extend a tax credit for
renewable energy projects could put billions of dollars worth of future wind farms in jeopardy. Steve Taub, a senior vice
president of GE Energy Financial Services, said in a report Wednesday Congress' failure to create a stable
tax policy for renewable energy has resulted in a pogo-stick-like pattern of capacity expansion and
retraction. The federal production tax credit (PTC) for solar, wind and other renewable power projects is
set to expire on Dec. 31. It is indexed to inflation, so owners of wind farms receive a tax credit of 2.1 cents
per kilowatt hour for the first 10 years of operation. The PTC was first instituted in 1992 to help encourage
renewable energy sources and reduce pollution. Taub's report showed when the production tax credit
granted to wind projects was in effect capacity climbed in 1999 before dropping 90 percent in 2000, when
it was unclear if Congress would renew it. The PTC has lapsed three times since its inception: 1999, 2001
and 2003. But it has been available every year since 2005. A concern among some in Congress is the need to
generate revenue, but Taub said in his report there is a net revenue gain from taxes on the projects' income
and suppliers to the projects and payroll taxes that makes up for the tax credit. Despite making billions on
wind turbine and wind farm deals, GE executives and spokespeople said the technology still needs subsidies to compete
against established energy technologies, like natural gas and coal.

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Unique - AT: BioFuel Subsides

Biofuel Subsides Irrelevent - Cutting Them

Inside U.S. Trade 5/13/’8 [EU Decides To Launch Investigation Into U.S. Biodiesel Subsidies, ln]
The U.S. grants income tax and excise tax credits for biodiesel used in the U.S. and exported to the EU. The EU grants tax
credits to all biodiesel used in the EU but does not grant credits to exports. As a result, U.S. biodiesel used
in the EU can receive credits from the U.S. as well as the EU, putting European manufacturers at a
disadvantage. The biodiesel tax credits are in place until the end of 2008. An early version of the newly enacted farm bill included
an extension of this sunset, but the extension was removed in the final version.

Congress Will Cut the Biofuel Subsidies in Question

William LaJeunesse, @ Fox News, 6/13/8 ['Splash and Dash' Biofuel Scam Costs Americans Millions, Lawmakers Say,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,369495,00.html]
A lawmaker says U.S. taxpayers are being bilked to the tune of millions of dollars by a biofuel subsidy that helps to lower gas prices
in Europe, and he's leading the charge to close the apparent loophole. “In 2007 this subsidy cost the American taxpayer $300 million,
and it’s projected to cost the American taxpayers $600 million next year,” said Rep. John Shadegg, R-Ariz. • Click here to view
video. The scam — as Shadegg and others call it — is known as “splash and dash.” It stems from an existing $1 subsidy for every
gallon of biodiesel fuel blended with regular diesel in the United States. Here’s how it works: Biodiesel is produced abroad using
South American sugar cane or Asian palm oil and shipped to the United States, where it’s blended with just a “splash” of regular
diesel. A typical tanker-load of about 9 million gallons of biodiesel requires just 9,000 gallons of American diesel to make it qualify
for the subsidy. But every gallon in the shipment garners a buck. The ship then makes a “dash” for Europe, where its fuel is sold
below market rates. That means each tanker-load that makes the dash nets importers about $9 million dollars in tax credits from the
IRS. Lawmakers have estimated its cost to Americans at tens — or even hundreds — of millions each year. And while Congress and
the National Biodiesel Board say they know the loophole is being exploited — as America is exporting much more biofuel than it's
producing — they’ve been unable to identify the guilty companies. “Ultimately when you dig down it gets to the point that you would
have to have access to IRS information,” said Manning Feraci, vice president of federal affairs at the National Biodiesel Board.
“Taxpayer information is confidential, so we can’t have access to it.” “We really haven’t found out the names of the companies who
are profiting from it,” Shadegg told FOX News. “I think the bad actors are the members of Congress who are allowing this to happen.”
Shadegg wants to end “splash and dash” by eliminating the subsidy for any biodiesel exported from the United States, which he says
harms energy independence. Shadegg is pushing his bill in the House, which has already passed measures

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AT: Iraq killed US-EU trade


Political problems like Iraq haven’t affected trade
Gregory Shaffer, the Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law at Loyola University Chicago, and Mark Pollack, 2006, The
Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, Introduction: The Future of Transatlantic Economic
Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID953958_code347008.pdf?
abstractid=953958&mirid=5
We highlight three primary findings that emerge from the chapters. First, despite the concerns, transatlantic foreign policy
rifts did not spill over into the economic realm or trigger economic backlash of any significance. Rather, the bulk of the
evidence presented in this volume points to the continuity in the transatlantic economic relationship and the resilience of
the transatlantic economic marketplace in a period of political turmoil. As Joseph Quinlan and Daniel Hamilton show in
chapter 2, transatlantic trade and foreign direct investment have actually flourished in recent years, notwithstanding the
bitter conflict over Iraq. As they conclude, “No other commercial artery in the world is as integrated and fused together
by foreign investment, a fact lost on many pundits, parliamentarians and policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic.”

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Links

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Extension - Generic Link

The Affs Perception That the US is Moving From Cap and Trade Collapse
Relations
William A. Nitze President, Gemstar Group, summer 2001, Beyond Kyoto: a Plan to Bridge the U.S.-EU Gap, European affairs, [adit]

A U.S. alternative to Kyoto should be built around a domestic "cap and trade" proposal that combines a more realistic and politically
acceptable short-term emissions reduction target with a commitment to achieve more far-reaching reductions in the longer term.
The proposed system should include all greenhouse gases so as to reduce its overall cost, be supplemented by other market friendly
policies and mechanisms, and maintain a level playing field among established and new energy supply technologies and investments
in energy efficiency.
If Mr. Bush were to propose such an alternative, the United States and Europe could close the gap between them by agreeing on a
combination of more far-reaching environmental goals, market-based policies for achieving these goals, and a common approach for
encouraging deployment of environmentally friendly technologies.
Agreement on more far-reaching environmental goals is the element that poses the greatest challenge to the Bush administration. By
rejecting the Kyoto Protocol without proposing an alternative, Mr. Bush has left open the possibility that he does not support any
binding target for U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and proposes to rely solely on business-as-usual technological change and voluntary
programs.
If the administration did formally adopt such a position, it would isolate the United States in the climate change issue and place a
significant strain on its overall relationship with the European Union.

Failure to make enormous emission cuts now guarantees sanctions to protect industry
Seattle pi, 3/14/08, EU leaders urge trade sanctions on U.S., China
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/355174_eusummit15.html [adit]
European Union leaders threatened the United States and China with trade sanctions Friday if the world's two biggest polluters don't
commit to ambitious cuts in greenhouse gases by next year.
The warning came as the economic downturn focused European leaders on the impact on industry of their groundbreaking agreement
last year to cut carbon emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels by 2020.
EU leaders want similar commitments from other major economies by next year, when a conference on global warming will take
place in Copenhagen, Denmark. Otherwise, they say European companies will need protection from unfair competition from heavily
polluting rivals in China and the United States -- the world's biggest emitters of carbon dioxide.
In a declaration issued after a two-day summit, the 27 EU leaders warned: "If international negotiations fail, appropriate measures can
be taken" to protect European industry.

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Extension - general Links

The Aff Creates The Perception that the US is Shifting Towards Voluntary Incentives, Ensuring European Tarrifs on the US
Thomas L. Brewer, Associate Professor at Georgetown University, Washington, DC and Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS), June '8 [The Trade and Climate Change Joint Agenda CEPS Working Document No. 295/June
2008, http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1673.]
Issues have arisen about whether provisions in the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 2007 are compatible with the WTO plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA), to which the US is a signatory (NFTC, 2007, pp. 14-17). A key issue is whether provisions such as those requiring US
government agencies to purchase ‘low greenhouse gas emitting’ vehicles and to take into account energy efficiency standards in their
purchasing decisions could violate WTO non-discrimination principles or constitute disguised protectionism. There are several reasons to
believe there would not be such problems. In particular Article XXIII of the GPA, like Article XX of the GATT, allows exceptions to national treatment on the grounds
of protection of “human, animal, or plant life….” The conclusion of the NFTC was that the provisions of the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Act “do not
appear to be in violation” of the GPA. However, it also noted that “government procurement program specifications are more likely to qualify for GPA exceptions if
governments demonstrate their intent to engage multilaterally” (NFTC, 2007, p. 17). As for other countries, since only 12 countries plus the EU are signatories to the
GPA, its provisions are irrelevant to most countries. Yet, since the signatories do include for instance major trading countries - China, the EU and Japan, in particular -
there could be GPA-related issues that arise. An extensive analysis by Van Asselt, van der Grijp and Oosterhuis (2006) examines a variety of issues about the
intersection of climate-trade issues in relation to the GPA. 3. Sectoral Issues: International Aviation and Maritime Shipping The international aviation and
maritime shipping industries present quite different kinds of issues for the joint climate-trade agenda – for two reasons. First, there are already disputes involving both
industries because of their greenhouse gas emissions – an international aviation dispute that has entered onto the agenda of US-EU relations and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and domestic legal actions within the US that target both the international aviation and maritime shipping industries. Second, the two
industries have always been outside the multilateral climate regime and the multilateral trade regime. Among the key issues, therefore, are whether, when, and how they
can be or should be brought into either or both of the two multilateral regimes. These two sets of issues – concerning disputes and concerning their positions outside the
multilateral regimes – are considered in turn. 3.1 International and Domestic Disputes The first international trade-climate dispute has already begun, at least
informally - namely the US government’s objections to the EU plan to cover aviation in its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). It is important to note that this is not a
formal dispute brought within the context of the WTO dispute settlement process. Rather, the basis of the US objection is the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of
1944, which established the system of bi-lateral agreements that regulate airline services and which is administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). At issue, in part, is Article 15 which includes the following provision: “No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect
solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon” (Chicago Convention, 1944).
8 US, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, and Switzerland. THE TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE JOINT
AGENDA | 7 While the Office of the US Trade Representative has not made a formal public statement on the issue, the US Federal Aviation Administration, the US
Ambassador to the EU, and a representative of the US airline industry association have been vocal about the issue. An unnamed US government representative said the
EU had decided to go ahead with the plan “despite strong objections raised by the US” (Financial Times, 2006d; also see ICTSD Bridges, 2007). A statement by the US
Ambassador to the EU, Boyden Gray, in September 2007, was particularly direct: “We don’t think Europe has the authority to do it….The Europeans are confident of
their legal authority and people on the other side are equally confident of their position. It sounds like a lawsuit to me. I don’t see how it’s going to get resolved
politically” (International Herald Tribune, 2007). A representative of the Air Transport Association of America similarly observed “If [the Europeans] persist, there will
no doubt be a legal battle” (ICTSD Bridges, 2007); this comment followed a meeting of the ICAO in October 2007. The meeting reversed a 2004 resolution that had
supported regional emissions trading schemes. As a result, at the 2007 meeting 42 countries represented by the EU and the European Civil Aviation Conference
formally stated a ‘reservation’ to indicate that they would go ahead with the plan to include aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Whether it can be resolved
politically remains to be seen. Importantly, the application of the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme to the aviation industry would not come into force until 2010, 2011 or
possibly even later, with international flights into and out of the EU possibly not included until a year after the initiation of the system for flights within the EU. This
would mean transatlantic flights involving the US would not be included until 2011 or 2012, long after a new US administration is in office. (For more on the case, see
Council on Foreign Relations, 2007; Eurarchiv, 2007; Financial Times, 2006a, 2006b, 2006, 2006d, 2007a, 2007b; US Mission to the EU, 2007). There have also been
legal cases within the US concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of both the international aviation industry and maritime shipping industry. Two separate but
closelyrelated petitions were filed with the US national government’s EPA in October 2007. One concerning aviation was filed by the states of California, Connecticut,
New Mexico, and Pennsylvania, the cities of New York and Washington, DC, a regional air quality district in California, and several environmental organisations. On
the basis of a Supreme Court decision that requires the EPA to consider carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air pollutants, the petition asks the EPA to apply

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Extension - general Links

regulations to all planes, including those of foreign airlines, that land or take off from airports in the US - regulations that would reduce emissions through greater fuel efficiency,
improved aircraft designs, and cleaner fuels. A similar petition concerning international maritime shipping was filed at the same time (ICTSD, Bridges BioRes, 2007c, 2007d). 3.2
Coverage of the Multilateral Climate and Trade Regimes Perhaps most importantly for the place of the international aviation and maritime shipping industries in the
future climate change regime is the decision by the government of Norway to take a leadership role in an effort to include both industries in a the post-2012 climate regime. That
effort has included an international workshop on the issue just prior to the Bali conference (IISD, 2007; Norway, 2007). Since before the UNFCCC entered into force, there has
been concern about the increasing contributions of GHGs of the two industries, and in fact in recent years the emissions of the two industries have been increasing as fast as or
faster than any other sectors. From 1990 to 2004, international aviation emissions increased by 34% and international maritime emissions increased by 43%. In recent years,
aviation emissions have accounted for about 2% of total world GHG emissions and international maritime shipping has accounted for about 3%. The 5% 8 | THOMAS L.
BREWER of the world total for the combination of the two industries places them ahead of all but 5 national economies.9 However, technical problems with measuring their
emissions and allocating them between domestic and international trips, together with political obstacles, prevented the industries’ emissions from being included in Kyoto
Protocol targets. Further, in the national government and thus UNFCCC greenhouse gas reporting systems, the bunker fuels used for aviation and shipping are not included as
national emissions, but rather are reported separately as international emissions that are not associated with any particular country. Efforts to address the technical problems and
formulate industry emission targets were referred to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Many of the
technical problems have since been solved. For instance, the government of Switzerland has reported that it has a “database with information on 16,000 individual aircraft and 400
different types of engines” and “knows the exact split between domestic and international aviation emissions” (IISD, 2007, p. 4). As the perception has grown that efforts to
establish industry emission targets and other tangible evidence of progress in the addressing the problem have not materialised, efforts outside the UNFCCC framework and
outside the two industry-based international organisations have been gaining momentum (IISD, 2007; Norway, 2007). The increasing interest in global sector-specific agreements
as part of the post-2012 multilateral climate regime could facilitate inclusion of both industries in the new climate regime. The two industries have not only been outside the
multilateral climate regime; they have also been outside the multilateral trade regime. Government trade policies and industry practices have been considered within the context of
the ICAO and IMO. International trade in both of their services has been subject to a combination of national subsidies, national protectionist policies such as those that prevent
‘cabotage’ within countries by foreign firms, and international agreements that have limited competition among carriers. Although the privatisation and deregulation policies of
many governments and the renegotiation of international agreements, especially in the airline industry, have reduced the subsidy and protection programmes, international
competition in both industries is still relatively constrained by national and international trade policies (again outside the WTO in both industries).10 4. Offsetting Border Measures
that Address Free Rider, Carbon Leakage, and International Competitiveness Concerns Among the climate-trade issues that have emerged to date, one of the most
contentious concerns the possible use of offsetting border measures to reduce free rider, carbon leakage and international
competitiveness problems. The underlying problem in the terminology of political economy is that there can be ‘free riders’ on
international agreements, in this case multilateral climate change agreements. The problem, in short, is that any given country can
benefit from uch an agreement without incurring the costs of participating in it. Moreover, the regime can be undermined by the
‘leakage’ of emissions, as production increases in countries that are not party to the climate regime. Further, firms may fear that their
international competitive position is being undermined by lower energy prices in non-participating countries. In the US, these
issues have become salient in regard to emerging economy countries (especially Brazil, China, and India). In the EU, the issues have
arisen from time to time during the past several years in regard to US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol. The emphasis in the
public discussions within the EU was initially on the possible imposition of offsetting tariffs, though the European Parliament’s
resolution (2005/2049) uses the generic term “border adjustment measures.” 12 The European Commission’s reaction to these
measures was initially to oppose them on the grounds that they risked exacerbating trade relations with the US, particularly at a time
when trade relations were already strained and when transatlantic relations more generally were unusually conflicted over a broad
range of issues. In addition, there have been concerns that such a measure would undermine support in the US among those political
and business circles that have been hoping for increased EU-US cooperation on climate change issues. There have also been concerns that such a
tariff might be challenged in a WTO dispute settlement case, and the outcome of such a case would inevitably be uncertain. However, before leaving office in 2007,
French President Chirac and Prime Minister de Villepin suggested again that such measures be undertaken, and President Sarkozy subsequently expressed interest in the
idea soon after his election. In November 2007 – in advance of the Bali climate change conference – the issue was again the subject of attention within the Commission
and Parliament, and among industry and environmental groups. EU Enterprise Commissioner Günter Verheugen suggested that the Commission was more favourably
inclined to address the issue through sectoral agreements, including perhaps voluntary global industry agreements - a position that has been supported by at least some
industry and environmental organisations (see especially, Financial Times, 2007; and EurActiv, 2007b). However, just before and after the release of the Commission’s
proposals for the extension of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on 23 January 2008, there was a specific and salient resurgence of interest. Commission President
Jose Manuel Barroso explicitly mentioned the possibility in a speech (European Commission, 2008a). The possibility of such action is left open for
future consideration, as is the possibility of granting all allowances free to energy- intensive industries (ICTSD, 2008a). The focus of
discussion, however, has shifted away from tariffs to importers’ purchases of emission credits.

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Link-- environmental policy

Adaptation of new environmental policy causes Europe to raise tariffs


Joseph E. Aldy et al. (John Ashton, Richard Baron, Daniel Bodansky, Steve Charnovitz, Elliot Diringer, Thomas C. Heller, Jonathan
Pershing, P.R. Shukla, Laurence Tubiana, Fernando Tudela, Xueman Wang), 02, Beyond Kyoto, advancing the international effort
against climate change, PEW center for global climate change, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Trade%20and%20Climate.pdf
[Barber]

Just as trade policy will have climate effects, climate policy will have significant implications for trade relations and for the
trade regime (Gibbs 2003, pp. 16–17). By raising the cost of energy and energy-intensive goods, climate policies will affect
economic competitiveness—both among countries undertaking climate efforts, due to different mitigation costs, and between
those countries that undertake significant action and those that do not. To protect vulnerable sectors, governments may seek to
compensate Trade and climate Potential conflicts and synergies Trade and climate Potential conflicts and synergies for the
costs of domestic climate action by imposing comparable costs on imported products or by reducing costs on exported
products. Either approach is likely to invite challenge in the WTO. Apart from efforts to address competitiveness, national
policies to reduce GHG emissions may also come into conflict with trade rules to the extent they affect domestic and imported
products differently. In an acknowledgement of these possibilities, Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the parties shall
strive to implement policies and measures in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including effects on
internationaltrade.1Moreover, the Protocol authorizes the parties to take further action to promote implementation of this
provision.2Another potential source of tension would be the use of trade measures to induce other countries to participate in a
climate regime or to enforce compliance among those that do participate. The idea that governments participating in the Kyoto
Protocol should act together to impose trade measures against the United States (in view of its decision not to join the Protocol)
is a recurrent image in writings about the climate regime, particularly by Europeans (e.g., Legrain 2002, p. 253). Some analysts
have also suggested that the evolving climate regime employ trade sanctions to hold parties to their commitments. Both uses of
trade measures could be challenged in the WTO. Although no climate-related dispute has yet reached the WTO, potential
conflicts appear on the horizon. Following the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Parliament called for new
initiatives “within supranational structures (in particular the World Trade Organisation)… designed to prevent
countries which do not ratify the Kyoto Protocol from obtaining unfair competitive advantages, particularly where
energy products are concerned.”3Venezuela has told a WTO committee that measures taken to implement the Protocol could
run afoul of trade rules and raise trade concerns (WTO 2002,para. 198). Saudi Arabia has cited “a number of areas in which
countries pursuing environmental objectives (such as climate change policy) may contravene their WTO obligations and seek
to protect their domestic interests” (Saudi Arabia 2002, par a. 57). That no dispute has bubbled up may suggest that trade action
—either unilateral or within the WTO—is more easily threatened, perhaps for political advantage, than actually launched. But
it may also be a sign of a constriction underneath the surface. Worries about infringing trade rules, reportedly, have led to a
“chilling effect” in some environmental negotiations in which prospective treaty measures are taken off the table because of
concerns that such measures might violate the WTO. The claim that prospective climate measures are a WTO violation may
also inhibit consideration of policies and measures at the national level. The good news is that opportunities exist for making
the trade and climate regimes more comple-mentary and, potentially, synergistic. The two regimes could, at a minimum, work
independently andtogether to anticipate and avoid conflicts between their mandates. The climate regime, for instance,could
facilitate a uniform approach to energy/GHG taxation, and particularly, the application of taxes toAdvancing the international
effort 142

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Link – environmental policy

Alternative energy policies lead to economic consequences from the EU


William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University., 3-27-06, After Kyoto: Alternative mechanisms to control
global warming, Foreign policy in focus think tank, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3167 [Barber]

After more than a decade of negotiations and planning under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the first
binding international agreement to control the emissions of greenhouse gases has come into effect in the Kyoto Protocol. The
first budget period of 2008-2012 is at hand. Moreover, the scientific evidence on greenhouse warming strengthens steadily as
observational evidence of warming accumulates. The institutional framework of the Protocol has taken hold solidly in the EU's
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which covers almost half of Europe's CO2 emissions.
Notwithstanding this apparent success, the Kyoto Protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and terminal. Early
troubles came with the failure to include the major developing countries along with lack of an agreed-upon mechanism to
include new countries and extend the agreement to new periods. The major blow came when the United States withdrew from
the Treaty in 2001. By 2002, the Protocol covered only 30% of global emissions, while the hard enforcement mechanism in the
ETS accounts for about 8% of global emissions. Even if the current Protocol is extended, models indicate that it will have little
impact on global temperature change. Unless there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design, the Protocol threatens to be
seen as a monument to institutional overreach.
Nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate-change policies for the period after 2008-2012. Some countries,
states, cities, companies, and even universities are adopting their own climate-change policies. Are there in fact alternatives to
the scheme of tradable emissions permit embodied in the Protocol? The fact is that alterative approaches have not had a serious
hearing among natural scientists or among policymakers. What are some alternatives? 1
For global public goods, there are three potential approaches: command-and-control regulation, quantity-oriented market
approaches, and tax- or price-based regimes. Of these, only the tradable-quantity and the price-like regimes have any hope of
being reasonably efficient.
Under a tradable quantity approach, an agreement proceeds by setting limits on emissions by different countries. The limits are
partially or wholly transferable among countries. This is the approach taken under the Kyoto Protocol. This approach has very
limited international experience under existing protocols such as the CFC mechanisms and somewhat broader experience under
national trading regimes, such as the U.S. SO2 regime.
A radically different approach is to use harmonized prices, fees, or taxes as a method of coordinating policies among countries.
This approach has no international experience in the environmental area, although it has modest experience nationally in such
areas as the U.S. tax on ozone-depleting chemicals. On the other hand, the use of harmonized price-type measures has
extensive international experience in fiscal and trade policies, such as with the harmonization of taxes in the EU and
harmonized tariffs in international trade.

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Link--environmental policy

EU wont compromise on alternative energy policy


New York Times, 4/20/03, Europe Gets Tougher On U.S. Companies, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9900E0D9143AF933A15757C0A9659C8B63 [adit]
The European Union, which includes 15 member countries from Portugal to Finland and Ireland to Greece, is adopting environmental
and consumer protection legislation that will go further in regulating corporate behavior than almost anything the United States
government has enacted in decades. For American companies that are accustomed to getting their way in Washington, it has come as a
shock.
"They are big powerful companies in the U.S., but just because they are big powerful companies in the U.S. doesn't mean they are
going to be treated better in Brussels," said Michelle O'Neill, who lobbies on behalf of Hewlett-Packard here.
If anything, being an American company in Europe is a liability these days. Some American business practices are regarded with deep
suspicion here, in light of the corporate accounting scandals and what many Europeans see as the Bush administration's high-handed
and unilateralist policies on the environment and Iraq.
"I don't think that Europeans are in the mood — or will be in the mood for some time to come — to swallow what the Americans tell
them about the way things are going to go," said Giles Merritt, who runs Friends of Europe, a research group that receives money
from the European Union.

Defiance of EU emissions policy kills relations


New York Times, 4/20/03, Europe Gets Tougher On U.S. Companies, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9900E0D9143AF933A15757C0A9659C8B63 [adit]

In Washington, corporate lobbying has weakened or killed legislation aimed at regulating tobacco, pharmaceuticals and pollutants that
contribute to global warming. In all three cases, the affected industries spent tens of millions of dollars on lobbying and advertising, all
to persuade lawmakers that regulation restricted the free market and would hurt American business.
Such tactics would not play well in Europe, where there is a long history of state intervention in the economy and where senior
government officials are usually more highly regarded than are corporate executives.
"If you go on the offensive in Europe it backfires and you lose on all fronts," said Erik Jonnaert, the chief lobbyist here for Procter &
Gamble.
American companies can ill afford such losses in a big market that is about to become bigger: after 10 nations join the European
Union next year, the rule makers here will represent more than a half-billion consumers

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Link --Incentives
Unfair advantages lead to EU imposition of tariffs on the US
Pew Center Global Climate Chainge, independent research group, 02 January, Implications for US Companies of Kyoto's Entry into
Force With the United States," http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Kyoto-USBusiness.pdf [Barber]
Kyoto will create an international market in GHG emission reductions from which private firms could potentially profit.
Emissions trading - In general, emissions trading would allow regulated companies to reduce their costs of compliance, but
would
not produce economic gains for regulated entities (unless the required emission reductions could be achieved through no
regrets
measures). The emissions trading rules adopted in Marrakech would not prevent U.S. companies from acting as financial
intermedi-
aries or brokers in facilitating emissions trades.
CDM - The Kyoto Protocol allows private entities to participate in CDM projects and thereby earn an additional return on
projects
that reduce GHG emissions or enhance sinks through the generation of certified emission reduction (CER) credits.
Under the Marrakech Accords, U.S. companies will be able to participate in the CDM despite U.S. non-participation in
Kyoto, since the rules allow developing countries to undertake unilateral CDM projects – that is, CDM projects that do
not involve the participation of an Annex B party. As a result, a U.S. company could undertake a CDM project in con-
junction with a host developing country.
In addition, the CDM rules adopted in Marrakech do not specifically require that “operating entities” (firms or other
entities that provide services such as review of baselines and verification of emissions reductions) be entities of Kyoto
Protocol parties. Thus, U.S. firms could potentially serve as operating entities under the CDM.
Joint implementation - Despite U.S. non-participation in Kyoto, U.S. firms could compete for emission reduction projects in
other
developed countries. Although the U.S. firms could not directly receive the emission reduction credits generated from such
projects,
they could receive their monetary equivalent.
Measures against U.S. Exporters
Trade sanctions - Conceivably Kyoto parties could try to use the Kyoto Protocol as a justification for imposing trade measures
against non-parties. However, such measures would be problematic under the GATT and would not address the fact that non-
Annex B parties and large seller nations such as Russia would all enjoy similar advantages.

A Kyoto party that imposed a carbon tax as part of its domestic implementation might argue that a border tax adjust-
ment was needed to compensate for the fact that non-parties such as the United States do not have a similar tax. In
general, the GATT allows countries to impose border tax adjustments. However, such a tax adjustment would need to
apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all countries that don’t impose similar taxes.
Annex B parties might argue that trade restrictions on goods from countries without comparable emission targets are
necessary in order to make their own climate policies effective by preventing leakage (that is, the migration of produc-
tion, and emissions, from Annex B parties to countries without targets). This paper does not address in detail whether
a World Trade Oranization panel would be likely to uphold attempts to use Kyoto as a basis to justify trade measures
against countries without comparable emission targets. However, the existing WTO jurisprudence makes it quite diffi-
cult for a country to impose trade restrictions against goods on the grounds that those goods are produced in a man-
ner that harms the environment.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

Link -- Incentives

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(PEW) CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

Moreover, any restrictions would arguably need to be applied against all countries
without emission targets (including developing countries), not just non-parties such as the United States.
The European Parliament has already stated its view that the EU should launch an initiative in the WTO to prevent
non-parties from gaining unfair competitive advantages, so the threat of trade measures against the United States is
more than merely hypothetical.

Government incentives have international trade implications with the EU

Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward, Kevin A. Hassett, 6-1-07, Environmental policy outlook, AIE
(American Enterprise institute for public policy research) online publications, Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26286/pub_detail.asp [Barber]

Establishing allowances and accounting systems for GHG emissions across industries is going to be vastly more difficult and
highly politicized. The forest products industry, for example, will reasonably want credits for creating carbon sinks in the trees
it plants and harvests, but the manufacturing sector that uses these wood products as a raw material will want credit for
sequestering carbon. The difference will have to be split in some arbitrary manner that will surely introduce economic
distortions in the marketplace. The auto industry will want credits for GHG innovations, while industries and businesses of all
kinds will lobby for credits for reducing mobile source emissions from changes to their auto and truck fleets. There are going to
be winners and losers in this allocation process. Multiply this problem across sectors and industries and it becomes evident that
a GHG emissions-trading system is going to be highly complex and unwieldy, and too susceptible to rent-seeking influence in
Washington. The problem of politically adjusting competing interests will be compounded on the international scale. The long-
running diplomatic conflicts that can be observed over purported subsidies for aircraft (i.e., Boeing versus Airbus) and the
European Union's agricultural subsidies and trade barriers are examples of the kinds of conflicts that will be endemic to any
international emissions-trading scheme.

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Link-- incentives
U.S. not complying with warming standards leads to sanctions and tariffs
which leads to global trade wars
Aldy, Joseph E., Peter R. Orszag, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2001. Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action,
Paper Prepared for the Conference on “The Timing of Climate Change Policies,” Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, October http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:COMuvbVKm-8J:www.sbgo.com/Papers/Aldy-Orszag-
Stiglitz_5.pdf+climate+change:+an+agenda+for+global+collective+action&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us [Barber]

The major economic sanctions are associated with trade, and although trade
sanctions are often ineffective when imposed by a single country against another, they can be effective in some limited
situations.
Trade sanctions were part of the backdrop
to the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric ozone layer, although compliance has been achieved without resorting to
them.
A question remains about how such trade sanctions can be squared with World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. In
particular, it is unclear what happens when two international treaties come into conflict. In the following paragraphs, we
describe how a sanction system could potentially work, and how it could respond to a situation in which WTO obligations were
found to be inconsistent with climate treaty obligations.
The easiest context for seeing how an international compliance regime would work is if the global agreement involved
common measures (e.g., a carbon tax). If one country refused to comply with that approach, the rest of the world could simply
impose a compensating tax on the relevant nation’s exports. Indeed, the other nations could impose a punitive carbon tax -- i.e.,
a tax against the rogue nation’s exports equal to, say, three times the carbon tax that would have had to have been paid in the
first place.
The tax could even vary with the ratio of exports to domestic production, so that the total carbon tax collections collected from
the country by foreign governments would be a fixed multiple of what the country would have collected itself, had it imposed
the carbon tax.
Such a system could change the political economy of the underlying agreement,
since the interests who previously opposed the imposition of a carbon tax domestically
would have less incentive to continue such opposition.
The hardest questions are posed by potential WTO restrictions. The traditional
interpretation of WTO rules is that they do not allow discrimination on the basis of
process and production methods. This interpretation would preclude taxes based on
energy or greenhouse gas inputs. The recent shrimp-turtle case, however, raises
interesting questions about the traditional interpretation of WTO rules. In the shrimp-
turtle case,
the appellate body found that Article XX of the GATT 1994 in principle
allowed countries to impose trade sanctions on the basis of environmental concerns
outside their borders (in this case, shrimp caught outside the United States in a manner
that incidentally killed sea turtles).
The logic of the appellate body’s argument could
easily be extended to allowing nations to impose trade sanctions on rogue countries that
do not obey international climate norms.
Regardless of whether WTO regulations allow such trade sanctions, they do not
forbid them: they only allow retaliation against countries that impose sanctions outside
the WTO rules. Thus, the countries of the world could impose sanctions against a rogue
nation, knowing that the rogue nation may be entitled under the WTO rules to retaliate.
Such retaliation may not be undertaken in any case, since it would only serve to reinforce
opposition to the rogue nation. Indeed, any such “trade war” could increase public
sentiment for compliance with global norms. The danger with this approach, however, is
that excessive reliance on trade sanctions may undermine the general WTO framework and threaten global trade.

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Link – incentives
If the U.S. Turns to voluntary climate measures, the EU will compensate with
trade barriers.
Richard B. Stewart and Johnathan B. Wiener, December 03’, Practical climate change policy, http://209.85.215.104/search?
q=cache:79sojU_DGWwJ:www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/7/9/Climate_paris_1.pdf+United+States+and+Kyoto+and+voluntary+and+climate+and+regulation+and+europ
e&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=30&gl=us [Barber]

The extensive literature on climate science and policy shows that climate change is a serious risk that warrants sensible global
regulatory action despite its many uncertainties. Indeed, some uncertainties, such as the risk of abrupt climate shifts, favor
more, not less, action. But climate change calls for prudent preventive approaches, not costly crash measures.
Under the international law of treaty adoption by consent, a climate policy regime must yield net benefits not only to the world
as a whole, but also to each country that participates. Because the damages from climate change and the
costs and benefits of climate protection will vary significantly across countries, designing a regime to attract participation by
all major emitters will be quite a feat.
Several studies suggest that the Kyoto Protocol, as currently structured, would probably yield expected benefits less than its
expected costs, particularly for the United States. Perhaps for this reason, the Bush administration has rejected the protocol
and proposed voluntary measures aimed at reducing U.S. GHG emissions intensity (emissions per unit of economic output),
but not necessarily reducing total emissions.
Limiting the growth of GHG emissions can, however, be prudent insurance against the risks of climate change if appropriate
regulatory policies are followed. A National Academy of Sciences report requested by the White House in 2001concluded that
rising GHG emissions from human activities are already causing Earth's atmosphere to warm and that the rate and extent of
warming will increase significantly during this century. Recent studies indicate that some initial warming and carbon
fertilization may help agriculture in some areas, including
Russia, China, and member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), but will likely have adverse effects in poorer areas. These studies also show that the
impact of greater or more rapid warming will worsen worldwide over time, including losses of 1 to 2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) in the United States and other OECD countries and 4 to 9 percent in Russia and most developing countries,
except China, which is forecast to gain about 2 percent of GDP. These estimates do not include the possibility of abrupt
changes in ocean currents or other earth systems.
But the Kyoto Protocol would reduce global emissions only enough to avoid a fraction of these future losses, perhaps 10
percent, amounting to a benefit of 0.1
to 0.2 percent of GDP in the United States and other industrialized countries and
0.4 to 0.9 percent of GDP elsewhere. Several economic models put the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets through wholly
domestic measures to reduce CO emissions at 1 to 3 percent of GDP in the United States and other industrialized countries,
clearly exceeding the benefits.
Smart regulatory design, however, can substantially reduce these costs. As detailed below, a comprehensive approach covering
all GHGs and sinks and full international emissions trading could in concert reduce the costs by 90 percent or more, to 0.1 to
0.3 percent of GDP, about equal to the estimated benefits.
Adding the risk of abrupt climate change and the ancillary benefits of reduction of other pollutants might make the benefits
slightly greater than the costs for the United States and would make the benefits significantly greater than the costs
globally.

STEWART AND WIENER CONTINUED ON NEXT PAAGE

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Link - incentives
STEWART AND WIENER CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

Although staying out of Kyoto could give U.S. industry a competitive advantage over companies in other industrialized
countries that are subject to Kyoto's regulatory burdens, U.S. nonparticipation in any climate regime would also deprive U.S.
businesses of valuable commercial opportunities and impose significant business risks. If the United States joined a well-
designed climate regime, many U.S. companies could become allowance sellers by achieving low-cost GHG emission
reductions and enhancing sinks, and many U.S. firms in the financial, consulting, accounting, legal, and insurance industries
could help run emissions trading markets. These opportunities for U.S. business are likely to be foreclosed or sharply restricted
if the United States remains on the sidelines.
London, not New York, will become the center of global emissions trading; indeed, this is already starting to happen.
Ironically, the United States championed international emissions trading and the comprehensive approach for the past 12
years, but is now standing aside while others move first. Britain,
Denmark, and Norway are already launching their own domestic CO emissions trading systems, and the EU is creating a
Europe-wide trading system, also limited to CO emissions. These European CO2 emissions trading systems may become the
models for the global trading system, restricting the coverage of other gases and sinks and leaving the United States at a
disadvantage if it decides to join later.

If the United States stays out of international climate policy, U.S. businesses subject to eventual U.S. domestic emissions
limitations, as well as those with operations abroad in industrialized countries that ratify Kyoto, will be unable to enjoy the
compliance cost savings provided by international emissions trading. Worse, parties to the Kyoto Protocol, particularly in
Europe, may attempt to impose countervailing duties against imports of U.S. goods to compensate for the lower cost of
embedded GHG emissions in U.S. production; such "carbon trade wars" could seriously damage global prosperity.

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Link Incentives
Voluntary non target based Kyoto alternatives will be bashed by Europe
The Washington Post, 2/16/02 Bush Climate Plan Gets Cold Shoulder; Alternative to Kyoto Protocol Bashed on Eve of Asia Tour,
lexis [adit]

President Bush's plan for combating global warming received a frosty response around the world today, with Belgium questioning the
morality of a plan that would allow U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to continue to rise.
Bush offered incentives to companies that voluntarily slow the rise in heat-trapping gas emissions blamed for global warming, the rise
in the atmosphere's temperature. The Bush administration withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which set mandatory reductions in
greenhouse gases, arguing it would harm the U.S. economy.
"It's really shocking. . . . It's a bit like saying: 'Wealth is for us today in 2002 and we will leave the problems for our children or for
people in Africa or Asia,' " said Belgium's energy minister, Olivier Deleuze, of the Green party.
Deleuze led the European Union delegation at talks last year that secured support from most of the rest of the world to push on with
the Kyoto treaty without the United States.
"It's a policy that's not very moral, I feel," Deleuze told Belgian television channel RTBF of Bush's plan, which was announced
Thursday.
Many scientists say gas emissions -- particularly carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels -- are trapping heat in the Earth's
atmosphere, risking massive climate changes that could lead to disastrous floods and droughts. The United States generates roughly
one quarter of the world's man-made greenhouse gases.
Germany's environment minister, Juergen Trittin, said Bush's plan was "disappointing" because it was voluntary and failed to set
targets for cuts by the world's biggest polluter.
"We must not slam the door for a return of the United States under the Kyoto Protocol's regime," he said. "We must not let the
country with the biggest emissions of greenhouse gases worldwide escape responsibility for protecting the global climate."
The European Union's environment commissioner, Margot Wallstrom, said Bush's policy could lead the United States to break a
long-standing commitment to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions.
"It seems that President Bush's proposals will not lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions but allow a significant increase," she
said. "This raises the question whether the U.S. will be able to meet its commitments under the [1992] U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change."
The United States remains a party to the 1992 climate change pact that President Bush's father signed at the Rio Earth Summit. The
convention commits developed countries to try to stabilize their greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.
Japan, host of the Kyoto talks, said it was not "extremely happy" with the Bush plan. "It's obvious that this plan won't achieve the 7
percent reduction target which the United States had agreed to in Kyoto," Environment Minister Hiroshi Oki said.

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Link—Incentives
Incentive based reductions jacks U.S-E.U relations--they are perceived as isolationist
Francine Kiefer and Peter Spotts Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, 2/15/02 Bush opts for incentive-based CO2 cuts,
Christian Science Monitor p.3 lexis [adit]
"The White House spent a year criticizing the Kyoto Protocol, saying it didn't do anything to solve the problem in the long term," says
Dr. Kete. "This plan doesn't solve anything either."
The White House does, however, propose mandatory cuts on another emissions issue largely
unrelated to climate: a 70 percent reduction in nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury by 2018. These are the three worst air
pollutants, and contribute to smog, acid rain, regional haze, and particle pollution. Nitrogen oxides also contribute to global warming,
but Kete says, the administration's impact on nitrogen oxides is expected to have a negligible effect in the battle against climate
change.
Even before the administration released its proposal, some of which would require congressional approval, environmental groups
were emailing reporters with blistering appraisals. It's a sign that, four months after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the administration
is now open to domestic criticism.
Europeans unhappy, again
Internationally, the response to the Bush plan may not be enthusiastic either, observers say, since it still disregards past US
commitments to reduce greenhouse emissions. Nor do observers expect developed countries in Europe or Asia to see this as a viable
alternative to the Kyoto accords. "This is clearly going to be seen as more of the go-it-alone approach by the US," says Donald
Goldberg of the Center for International Environmental Law.
The timing of Bush's announcement is thought to have been influenced by the president's departure tomorrow on a five-day trip to
Asia. His first stop will be Tokyo, where the government has been anxious to see the US take some steps on greenhouse emissions.

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Link--Subsidies
Increased Subsidies ensure EU sanctions
Christian science monitor, Biofuel boondoggle: US subsidy aids Europe's drivers, 6/8/08,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0608/p02s01-usec.htm [adit]
The US importer of the load applies to the Internal Revenue Service for the credit – a dollar for each of the 9 million biodiesel gallons,
Mr. Baize calculates. The next day the tanker can set sail – dash – for Europe. There, the US importer resells the biodiesel, taking
advantage of European fuel-tax credits that, in effect, keep biodiesel prices above US prices.
"Splash-and-dash is something Congress never intended," says Baize. "It's bad for taxpayers and it ought to be fixed now."
Signs of splash-and-dash began to show up last fall. But efforts to fix the problem only began taking shape in Congress this spring
after European biodiesel manufacturers complained in March about the subsidized imports and the US biodiesel industry also
complained a month later.
"This [splash-and-dash] is something our people are aware of and that's on their radar screen," says a staff aide on the House Ways
and Means Committee, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press. "It's one of the issues that's
driving closer scrutiny."
European officials are also unhappy about the practice. Such "touch and go" maneuvers could quickly become a much larger problem,
warned Raffaello Garofalo, secretary general of the European Biodiesel Board, in a March 19 letter to the European Trade
Commissioner.
European manufacturers are worried about all US biodiesel imports – not just the splash-and-dash variety – because the subsidized
fuel is flooding their markets, cutting into their domestic biodiesel business and lowering prices.
"We want really to get a fair trade and want this unfair subsidy to stop," says Mr. Garofalo in a phone interview. "The US products get
subsidies in the US, and in Europe, a double subsidy."
The industry is calling for trade sanctions against the US.

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Link—Domestic Policy
Domestic initiatives kill EU relations
BBC, 6/28/05 EU pushes binding climate deal, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4724877.stm [adit]
The European Commission's environment spokeswoman Barbara Helferrich told the BBC News website that Europe remained
committed to further legally binding reductions in emissions.
"We welcome any initiative that can combat climate change, but this has to be seen in a global context," she said.
"If it is simply technology and clean coal, it is no substitute for agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and we do not expect it to have a
real impact on climate change.
"There will have to be binding global agreements, but on what scale and what basis is yet to be decided."
The designated forum for making those decisions is the next round of United Nations climate negotiations, which opens in Montreal in
November - shortly after the Asia-Pacific grouping holds its first meeting in Adelaide.
There is concern in environmental circles that the United States and Australia will present the new pact as evidence that a "son-of-
Kyoto"-style treaty is not needed.
Europe, which for many years has been the leading pro-Kyoto force, is unlikely to agree.

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Link-must be 0 emissions
Zero-emission alternatives are the only way to maintain U.S-E.U relations
New York Times, SUZANNE DALEY, 2/15/02, Europeans Give Bush Plan on Climate Change a Tepid Reception, lexis, [adit]
Saying that any action taken to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases was at least a step in the right direction, the European Union
gave a tepid welcome today to President Bush's new proposals to tackle climate change. The Bush proposals, which are strictly
voluntary, would rely on tax credits to coax big business to pollute less. As word of the proposals began to filter out, many
environmentalists and political commentators in Europe said that Mr. Bush's plan was far too little, too late, and would not improve
his image abroad as a servant of the oil industry. The most outspoken reaction came from France, where the head of an
intergovernmental task force on global warming calling the proposals "window dressing." The expert, Philippe Meunier, said that
although it was hard to judge the new plan before knowing its details, "the total volunteerism approach makes us worry." "It lacks
credibility," Mr. Meunier added. "We worry that without sanctions it just won't work." He asserted that while the plan was a step in
the right direction, it showed that the United States sought change "at no cost and in a way that would not in any way challenge the
American lifestyle and especially its consumption." Echoing the concerns of most other specialists reacting today, Mr. Meunier
evoked the Kyoto Protocol, the widely accepted treaty that would require emissions cuts by 2010 to well below their 1990 levels. The
Bush plan might "destabilize" support for the Kyoto pact, which is awaiting ratification. As Mr. Meunier put it, "You may have
countries that say, why should we who are poorer do anything?" The Bush administration's rejection of the protocol last March caused
an outcry in Europe and came to be seen here as another example of America's refusal to limit its options in almost any sphere. When
he rejected the treaty, Mr. Bush called its targets arbitrary, its schedule too costly to meet and its terms unfair. Nonetheless, no other
country has chosen to abandon it. The voluntary measures in the plan Mr. Bush unveiled today would, if followed, slow but not halt
the growth in emissions of heat-trapping gases linked to global warming. It would use $4.6 billion in tax credits over the next five
years to encourage companies and individuals to limit those emissions. In Brussels, a European Commission spokeswoman, Pia
Ahrenkilde-Hansen, said, "We feel that the multilateral approach is the best way to face up to this tremendous challenge." She said
that the European Union still hoped the United States would return to the Kyoto pact. In Britain, Chris Hewett of the Institute for
Public Policy Research, added his voice to criticism of the plan as not enough. He said Britain had proved "that you can cut emissions
and still have a healthy economy," adding that there was no "inextricable link" between carbon dioxide emissions and economic
growth. Some green groups said they were suspicious of the timing of the White House announcement, just days before Mr. Bush is
scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Japan. Japan has so far remained committed to the Kyoto pact, but it has
made no secret of the fact that it will have difficulty meeting its targets. Hiroshi Oki, the new Japanese environment minister, said it
would be best for the United States to return to the the protocol. But, he said that "our joint efforts" must not be halted by
disagreement on that point. The only real praise for the Bush administration had nothing to do with the environmental proposal. In
Germany, Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and a member of the
government's advisory council, made a point of citing a second American plan announced today, one that affects emissions but not
global warming. He hailed Mr. Bush's call for mandatory restrictions on three power plant pollutants -- mercury, sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides -- as "a great air pollution policy." "A wonderful policy," Mr. Schellnhuber added. "But the wrong target

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Deviation from Kyoto sets Bush on a collision course with Europe
Irish Times, PATRICK SMYTH, Washington Correspondent, Bush abandons pledge on carbon dioxide, 3/15/01, lexis [adit]

In a dramatic about-face that reflects the important influence of the energy industry in the White House, President Bush has
abandoned an explicit campaign pledge to set limits to CO2 emissions. The decision, against the advice of his director of the
Environmental Protection Agency, Ms Christine Todd-Whitman, sets the new administration on a collision course with Europe in the
Kyoto climate-change talks. Only days ago Ms Todd-Whitman was assuring the country that Mr Bush would keep his election
promise. "George Bush was very clear during the course of the campaign that he believes in a multi-pollutant strategy, and that
includes CO 2", she told CNN's Crossfire. "He has also been very clear that the science is good on global warming." During the
election Mr Bush even criticised his opponent, Mr Al Gore, for proposing voluntary emission curbs. "In Texas we have done better
with mandatory reductions and I believe the nation can do better," he claimed. But on Tuesday, in a letter to four Republican senators,
Mr Bush claimed that "new" evidence from the Energy Department showed that curbs on CO2 emissions would lead to a move away
from coal to gas and result in higher energy costs. "I do not believe . . . that the government should impose on power plants mandatory
emission reductions for carbon dioxide," he told them. The decision was a bitter disappointment to environmentalists who believe that
CO2 is a major factor in global warming and was described by one Democratic member of the House, Mr Henry Waxman, as a
"breathtaking betrayal". And Mr Waxman pointed the finger firmly at the influence of coal and oil lobbies on a White House. Mr Bush
and Vice-President Bill Cheney are both former oil executives as are several senior members of the Cabinet, and Mr Bush will have
been reminded that he owes the coal producers of West Virginia, won by him on promises that coal would be made a priority by his
Administration. Mr Bush has made repeated play of the need for the US to become more self-sufficient in energy production by such
controversial means as drilling in the Alaskan National Wilderness Park. For energy interests the policy on CO 2 jarred with that. Mr
David Doniger, senior lawyer for the Natural Re sources Defence Council, said: "Bush has turned his back on the consensus of the
science which shows that global warming is an alarming problem. "You just can't deal with global warming unless you deal with
power plants. He's snuffed out the spark of what we had hoped would be a progressive environmental policy. He's caved in to the coal
industry's medieval view of the science," he said. Internationally Mr Bush's decision will be viewed with dismay. Talks on
implementation of the Kyoto protocol on emission limits were postponed last month at US request after its negotiators said they
needed more time to prepare. That had given rise to hope that the US, the main obstacle to binding commitments to greenhouse gas
emission reductions, would be more forthcoming. The Kyoto Protocol has been signed by more than 100 countries but has not been
ratified by any industrialised nation. Its final adoption would require the US and three dozen other industrialised countries to cut
combined emissions by 2012 to 5 per cent below their 1990 levels. The US produces a fourth of the world's emissions with 5 per cent
of the world's population. Bargaining broke down in November at The Hague, where the EU rejected a US compromise position.

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Incentives violate the Kyoto protocol leads to European sanctions on the U.S.

Timothy E. Deal, senior VP for the US council for international business, Jan 08, WTO rules sand procedures and their implication for
the Kyoto Protocol, http://209.85.215.104/search?
q=cache:mr_7GUxZIywJ:www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf+The+World+Trade+Organization%27s+view:
+emissions+reduction+in+a+free+trade+world+Arthur+Appleton&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us [Barber]

“In order to meet their Kyoto emission targets with minimum adverse effects on their economy, it is highly likely that Annex 1
governments with differentiated legal and political systems might pursue these policies in such a way as to unfairly favor
domestic producers over foreign ones.
Such differential treatment could occur in governing eligibility for, and the amount of, the subsidy, in establishing energy
efficiency standards, in the determination of the category of ecolabled products and the procedures of establishing ecolabels, in
the specifications in tenders, and in specifying condition(s) for participating in government procurement bids. In (the) case
where a country unilaterally imposes a carbon tax, it may adjust taxes at the border to mitigate (the) competitiveness effects of
cheaper imports not subject to a similar level of the carbon in the country of origin.
Measure(s) of this sort may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO consistency and the conditions under which
border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of international competitiveness.”
2
The possibility of a clash over climate change commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and WTO rules arises because of the
U.S. decision to abandon Kyoto. Strong resentment over this action, particularly in Europe, could lead the EU, and perhaps
others, to undertake actions to penalize American and other non-Annex 1 firms for alleged competitive advantages resulting
from their non-adherence to Kyoto, although the probability of such action is low at the present time.

In 2002, the United States Council for International Business (USCIB) produced an earlier version of this paper. At the time,
the notion of trade action in the form of a carbon tax against non-Kyoto compliant countries was highly speculative in nature
and supported mainly by NGOs such as Greenpeace International and Friends of the Earth
Europe. Since then, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have talked more openly about carbon taxes.
At the time, the official EU position was outlined in a policy statement posted on its website:
“The EU also wants to clarify that measures taken to tackle environmental problems under Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs), such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate change, are not contrary to WTO rules.
For example, problems could arise if a country imposed a trade measure for environmental purposes on another WTO Member
that had not signed the MEA. Could the country affected use WTO rules to overrule the trade measures? The EU wants WTO
Members to agree that this should not be allowed to happen.”
3
But some European politicians have suggested more aggressive action. In November 2006, then French Prime Minister
Dominque de Ville pin stated, “Europe has to use all its weight to stand up to environmental dumping”, adding that France
would urge its European partners to study “the principle of a carbon tax on the import of industrial products from countries
which refuse to commit themselves to the Kyoto Protocol after 2012.” That same year, in a letter to EU Commission President
Barroso, EU Enterprise and Industry Commissioner Günter Verhheugen backed de Villepin’s proposal, saying that if Europe
remained alone in cutting emissions, there was a risk that companies could shift their production to countries where standards
were more lax. He added that border tax adjustments for developed countries that have not implemented Kyoto could balance
out such effects

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Increased disagreement on environment policy leads to increased tension
between the U.S. and the E.U.
David L. Aaron and C. Boyden Gray, co- chairmen of the Atlantic Council. 2002. Risk and Reward: U.S.–EU Regulatory Cooperation
on Food Safety and the Environment, November, http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:3FHUXrIZMIAJ:www.acus.org/docs/0211-
Risk_Reward_U.S._EU_Regulatory_Cooperation_Food_Safety_Environment.pdf+Risk+and+reward+U.S.+E.U.
+regulatory+cooperation+on+food+safety+and+environment&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us#35 [Barber]

Both the United States and the European Union (including the member states) have adopted many laws and regulations designed to
protect their environments. Indeed, they have been in the forefront internationally in developing such rules. However, the different
regulatory approaches behind these rules have led to disputes. Although disagreements to date have been limited in both number and
scope, some have been especially persistent. Given the importance of environmental protection to both the European and U.S. publics,
the political sensitivity of these disagreements is likely to increase, leading to greater transatlantic tensions in the future. Moreover,
these regulatory issues have a significant international dimension, as the standards and practices that develop out of the two dominant
markets will inevitably affect those adopted by multilateral standard-setting bodies and international corporations.
The disagreement over the Kyoto Protocol on climate change is only the most visible example of transatlantic conflict over the
environment. Other, lower profile cases — over hushkits for airplanes, electronic waste recycling, persistent organic pollutants, and
ozone-depleting substances — have also generated serious tensions. These cases proved to be particularly complex because of the
multitude of actors involved, most with primarily domestic orientations and agendas, and because of the impact of continually
changing technologies. Finally, while the United States and the EU often agree in their assessment of the risk, they sometimes use
incompatible mechanisms to manage that risk and approach implementation and enforcement very differently

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Taxation penalities on U.S. don’t exist in S.Q. Incentives continue to violate
the Kyoto Protocol Europe will target the US
Biermann, Frank and Rainer Brohm. Institute for Environmental policies, 2003. Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without the
United States. The Strategic role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, Global Governance Working Paper, No. 5, January.
http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:SAXsYzk0-
bUJ:www.glogov.org/images/doc/BiermannReplaceWP5.pdf+Implementing+the+Kyoto+Protocol+Without+the+United+States.
+The+Strategic+Role+of+Energy+Tax+Adjustments&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us [Barber]

The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change on 16 February 2005 has highlighted the political divide between the coalition of industrialized countries that support
the Kyoto treaty and plan to implement stringent climate policies, and the few industrialized countries that are unwilling to do
so.
This situation has a likely consequence: energy prices, in particular between the USA and Europe, will continue to develop in
different directions.
Current trends in European energy and climate policies are expected to result in further increases in the price of energy, while
US prices will remain unaffected by the current climate policies of the Bush administration.
Price increases in Europe may be brought about, in particular, by environmental taxation.
Up until now, different schemes of energy or carbon taxes have been introduced in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and the
UK.
Energy prices in the USA are already substantially lower than in most countries with sizeable energy taxes. For instance, the
price of heavy fuel oil for industry in the USA is about one-fifth lower than the average price in a sample of nine other OECD
countries, all of which have some form of energy taxation (see Table 1). Regarding electricity prices for industry, prices in the
USA are lower by as much as one-third. This price gap between the USA and other industrialized countries is more remarkable
given that countries with energy tax regimes already grant numerous exemptions for energy-intensive industries. Without such
exemptions, price effects of domestic
energy taxation would be higher. Some countries, such as Germany, are also planning to significantly reduce the number of
exemptions

Such price differentials created or reinforced by environmental taxation have triggered strong political pressure against
European governments and the European Commission in the past, and they are likely to continue to do so. Such political
pressure, in particular from industry, may obstruct European environmental policies and become a threat for climate protection
strategies and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This in turn might jeopardize, or at least complicate, the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in those countries that have ratified it.
A number of different options are available for European governments to offset real or perceived impacts of energy taxes on
competition.
Most prominent is the partial or full exemption from the tax and the granting of reduced tax rates. Although such tax
exemptions for energy-intensive or export-oriented industries can eliminate competitive disadvantages or reduce the burden
below a threshold of concern, exemptions also give rise to significant problems.

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In this article, we therefore analyze an alternative measure that could offset competitive burdens on the global marketplace
without watering down the environmental objective of reducing carbon dioxide emissions: the adjustment of energy taxes at
the border. There are at present no such border adjustment schemes on energy taxes in place, nor do we expect such
adjustments to be enacted soon. Instead, we are interested in the question of whether such border tax adjustments would be
allowable under world trade law if, at some time in the future, European decision- makers would deem such measures as being
necessary to protect (possibly more stringent) European climate policies from competition by non-European industrialized
countries. This information about a hypothetical future situation is highly relevant for the present development of policies, and
it might prove to be important information for climate negotiators in both Europe and the USA.
It is important to note that we draw a distinction between border tax adjustments vis-à-vis non- European industrialized countries, on the one hand,
and developing countries, on the other. We draw this distinction on both fairness and legal grounds. On fairness grounds, certain advantages for
developing countries through the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are probably justified given the historic overuse of the atmosphere in the
course of Northern industrialization and the persistent higher per-capita emissions in the North. On legal grounds, such advantages seem justified, if
not required, by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities as enshrined in Article 3:1 of the 1992 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, as well as in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. These legal documents influence the
interpretation of world trade law, since its interpretation must take into account widely ratified multilateral treaties concluded by WTO parties in
related domains (see Biermann,2001, on this question).
In addition, possible environmental leakage effects to developing countries can be addressed through existing mechanisms, such as the Global
Environment Facility that has been created to reimburse the agreed incremental costs of developing countries in implementing the climate
convention and a few other agreements.
Thus, border tax adjustments might be implemented – if justifiable under world trade law, as will be analysed in the remainder
of this article – against industrialized countries that gain trade advantages through persistently lower energy prices owing to
insufficient implementation of climate policies. Border tax adjustments should be avoided, however, against developing
countries, while other policies to address carbon leakage, such as financial and technological

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EU already perceives U.S. as economically advantaged, incentives force tariffs
and trade barriers.
ICTSD (International centre for trade and sustainable development), Dec.07, Climate, equity, and Global trade, International The
E.U. and the U.S. http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:ib7dSBKtwx8J:www.trade-
environment.org/page/ictsd/projects/Bali_Climate_Equity_and_Global_Trade_Dec07.pdf+Committee+on+Trade+and+Environment+
Special+Session,+Energy+Taxation,
+Subsidies+and+Incentives+in+OECD+Countries+and+their+Economic+and+Trade+Implications+on+Developing+Countries,
+in+particular+developing+oil+producing+and+exporting+countries&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us [Barber]

European UnionThe European Parliament has passed resolutions calling upon the European Commission to consider the
possibility of imposing offsetting tariffs on imports from countries that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol.The Commission’s
reaction has been to oppose such measures on the grounds that they risked exacerbating tensions in trade relations with the US,
particularly at a time when trade relations were already strained and trans-Atlantic relations more generally were unusually
conflicted over a broad range of issues. In addition, there were concerns that such measures would undermine support in the
US for increased EU-US cooperation on climate change issues. Finally, there were concerns that such a tariff might be
challenged in a WTO dispute settlement case, and the outcome of such a case would inevitably be uncertain. However, before
leaving office in 2007, French President Chirac and Prime Minister deVillepin suggested again that such measures be
undertaken. European Trade Commissioner Mandelson responded, however, that this would not be helpful. For now, the issue
is quiescent at least in public. However, since it is of continuing concern to the European cement industry and other greenhouse
gas-intensive industries, the issue is not likely to go away. United States Similar issues appeared in 2007 on the agenda in the
US in the context of the introduction of climate change bills in the Congress. As in the EU, it is a combination of international
competitiveness and climate change free-rider concerns that have put the issue on the active agenda in the US Congress. As of
the beginning of September 2007, the prospects for the many climate bills under consideration in the House and Senate were
uncertain. However, whatever the outcome of votes in the two houses on these bills and any Presidential action that might
ensue, it is clear that there is much political support for some kind of border measure provision in climate legislation that
includes a mandatory cap-and-trade system. There is a key difference in the form of the measure that is on the agenda in the
US, as compared with the tariff proposal in Europe. In particular, the proposal in the US is to require US importers in some
circumstances to purchase GHG emission allowances. Such a measure could be less vulnerable than a tariff to challenge in the
WTO, because it could more clearly be considered an environmental measure that would qualify as an exception under GATT
Article XX(g), which allows measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”1One US legislative
proposal of special interest that was under consideration in September 2007 was Senate Bill S. 17 , which is commonly know
as the Bingaman Bill or Bingaman-Specter bill after its sponsors. It includes Title V, “Periodic Review and International
Leadership,” which requires reviews every five years of “whether each of the five largest trading partners”2of the US has taken
“comparable action” to limit GHG emissions (section 501(2)(B)(i)). “Comparable action” is definedas “greenhouse gas
regulatory programs, requirements, and other measures adopted by a foreign country that are determined by the President to be,
in combination, comparable in effect to the action taken by the United States to limit greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to this
Act, after taking into account the level of economic development of the foreign country” (section 502(a)(2)). US importers of
“covered” GHG-intensive goods from countries that have been found not to have taken comparable actions must purchase
“international reserve allowances” (i.e. GHG emission credits) to be issued by the US government. A “covered good” is one
“that the President identifies, by rule, as a greenhouse gas intensive good that is closely related to goods, the cost of production
of which in the United States is affected by this Act” (section 502(a)(5)).3These and many other technicalities of the bill are of
course subject to revision in Congressional deliberations and in any negotiations that may occur between members of Congress
and the President

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However, it is significant that quite specific and extensive language already has been formulated and is under active
consideration in the Congress. It is also noteworthy that there would be much flexibility in how the provisions of the bill would
be applied to particular circumstances. Further, the bill would require negotiations with countries before the import measures
were implemented.Perhaps more important than the legal technicalities or procedural issues at this point, is the political support
already expressed for the concept of border measures on imports from countries deemed by the US government to be deficient
in terms of actions to mitigate climate change in the future. Indeed, the proposal was first vetted jointly by one of the country’s
largest electricity producers, American Electric Power, and one of the largest labor unions, The International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers. It has subsequently been endorsed by other major business and labour organisations. In short, the issue is
now a significant item on the climate policy agenda in the US, and with much domestic political appeal.Scenarios for the
Future As this article was being finalised in early September 2007, the US Congress was returning from a late summer recess,
with a widespread expectation that at least some of the proposed climate legislation would progress to votes by the end of the
year. Though not entirely out of question, the prospects were not promising for passage of such measures and acceptance by
the President by the end of 2007. A more likely scenario is that there will be such legislation passed, signed and entering into
effect in 2009 or 2010.It is also likely that pressures to put in place some kind of import measures in the EU will grow as the
debate and legislative process in the US progress. Ironically, the debate in the US will tend to legitimise any similar measures
by the EU. Furthermore, the international competitiveness concerns in the EU are more advanced than in the US because the
EU’s Emission Trading Scheme is already in operation, while any US national cap-and-trade system is still years from being
operational if at all. The precise form that such a measure would take in the EU, however, is uncertain. On the one hand, as
noted above, there has already been movement towards the establishment of offsetting tariffs; on the other hand, certain
features of the possible US measures, particularly in regard to challenges in the WTO, may make it more appealing to require
GHG allowance purchases rather than to impose a tariff. A third possibility that could emerge from present circumstances is
that the EU and US would join together in an effort to develop border-measure provisions to be included in the post-2012
climate regime. Now that the concept has become part of the climate change dialogue in Washington as well as in Brussels, it
would be natural for a trans-Atlantic dialogue, whether explicitly and officially endorsed or not, to expand as ideas for the post-
2012 agenda become increasingly tangible and detailed

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Link - technology
U.S. Focus to technology p/o Europe
EurActiv.com, 5-27-05, Heroes or Villains EU and US policy on climate change, http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/heroes-vs-
villains-eu-us-policies-climate-change/article-140082 [Barber]

America's focus on technology has gone down badly in Europe, explains CEPS's Christian Egenhofer because it was seen as
trying to postpone the issue for the long term and wait for another 50 years.
Egenhofer agrees this could partly explain the US attitude but he believes there is merit in developing technologies. "If you
look at the targets that need to be achieved under the UNFCCC, then you will need breakthrough technologies by 2050. And
you don't get these without putting money into research and collaboration projects. They do not develop on their own."
In the EU, the approach has been to "push" new technologies by putting a cap on industry's CO2 emissions and setting up a
market for individual plants to buy or sell the CO2 emission allowances they were granted. The Commission says the scheme
also has a "market pull" component in the sense that it makes low carbon technologies more competitive compared to the more
polluting ones.
"You get a lot of improvement of existing technologies the EU way by increasing the price of carbon which pushes technology
improvements, but you do not get the breakthrough technologies in this way," comments Egenhofer. With their long-term
research programme and massive investments, Egenhofer believes the US "has got something right there".
In the EU, the CO2 constraint placed on individual industrial plants have so far been too low to give enough incentives for
breakthrough technologies, because they come at a too high a cost, Egenhofer continues. "In that sense, it does not get you
there, you really need breakthrough technologies," he says.
There are of course renewable sources of energy which are being pushed by the EU with the aim of increasing its share of
electricity production to 22.1% by 2010. But they will not play a big role, even in 20 to 30 years, Egenhofer points out.
Renewables are of course important, but their cost needs to be brought down and "the only way of doing this is by getting them
onto the market" thanks to appropriate support. "But obviously, if you put subsidies into coal, the renewables will become
competitive later, he adds, saying EU countries are still subsidising coal to the tune of 20 billion euros a year. "In the US, this
is not an issue, they are exporting."

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U.S. voluntary measures are perceived by European countries as moving away
from Global Climate change policy
Pamela S. Chasek, Manhattan College, 9-19-07, “U.S. policy in the U.N environmental arena: powerful laggard or constructive
leader?” International environmental agreements, politics, law, and economics,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/24vp586k31766450/fulltext.html [Barber]

The U.S. was also adamantly opposed to language on targets and timetables for reducing fossil fuel consumption. In the end,
the U.S. was successful in thwarting European attempts to set a goal of having 15% of countries’ energy provided by
renewable sources by 2015 (Speth 2003). The U.S. was also wary of expansion of scope of two principles contained in the Rio
Declaration—the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Principle 7) and the precautionary ‘approach’
(Principle 15). The U.S. had been reluctant to include these principles in the Rio Declaration and worked hard to limit their
scope. Since Rio, the U.S. has worked hard to contain the influence of these two principles and has constantly denied their
status as customary international law (Brunnée 2004, p. 629). The long-standing U.S. resistance to the precautionary principle
is rooted in the concern that it might serve as the pretext for other countries to restrict the import of U.S. goods. Reluctance to
embrace the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is derived from concern that this could imply that the U.S.
bears the legal responsibility for global environmental problems, such as climate change, and that any action taken by
developing countries must be financially and technically supported by developed countries (Brunnée 2004, pp. 629–630).
Finally, the U.S. made concerted efforts to promote the Type II outcomes—voluntary public-private partnerships—in
Johannesburg. Rather than relying on negotiated agreements, the U.S. argued forcefully that private sector engagement was the
best way to promote implementation of sustainable development agreements. Critics of this approach, including Norway and
members of the G–77 (see Rosendal and Najam, this volume), felt that the partnerships initiative was a way of masking the
failure of governments to agree on meaningful action and enable governments to abdicate responsibility to sustainable
development. Others argued that the lack of any international review process for the Type II outcomes (this was resisted by the
U.S.), meant that there was no accountability and that these partnerships may result in all talk and no action. The U.S., on the
other hand, felt that these partnerships could harness the billions of private dollars that circulate the globe and far outweigh
public development assistance (Brunnée 2004, p. 635).

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Europe perceives Voluntary Incentives as a continuation of rejection of the


Kyoto protocol
Suzanne Daley, 2-25-02, New York times, Europeans give Bush plan on climate change a tepid reception,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07EFD6153FF936A25751C0A9649C8B63&n=Top/Reference/Times
%20Topics/People/D/Daley,%20Suzanne [Barber]

The Bush proposals, which are strictly voluntary, would rely on tax credits to coax big business to pollute less. As word of the
proposals began to filter out, many environmentalists and political commentators in Europe said that Mr. Bush's plan was far too little,
too late, and would not improve his image abroad as a servant of the oil industry.
The most outspoken reaction came from France, where the head of an intergovernmental task force on global warming calling the
proposals ''window dressing.''
The expert, Philippe Meunier, said that although it was hard to judge the new plan before knowing its details, ''the total volunteerism
approach makes us worry.''
''It lacks credibility,'' Mr. Meunier added. ''We worry that without sanctions it just won't work.''
He asserted that while the plan was a step in the right direction, it showed that the United States sought change ''at no cost and in a
way that would not in any way challenge the American lifestyle and especially its consumption.''
Echoing the concerns of most other specialists reacting today, Mr. Meunier evoked the Kyoto Protocol, the widely accepted treaty that
would require emissions cuts by 2010 to well below their 1990 levels.
The Bush plan might ''destabilize'' support for the Kyoto pact, which is awaiting ratification.
As Mr. Meunier put it, ''You may have countries that say, why should we who are poorer do anything?''
The Bush administration's rejection of the protocol last March caused an outcry in Europe and came to be seen here as another
example of America's refusal to limit its options in almost any sphere.
When he rejected the treaty, Mr. Bush called its targets arbitrary, its schedule too costly to meet and its terms unfair.

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Bush’s environmental policies are perceived by Europe and further movement


against the Kyoto protocol
Ben Fenton in Washington and Charles Clover, Environment Editor, 2/15/02,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1384984/Bush-puts-US-on-'new-path'-
after-no-to-Kyoto.html [Barber]

PRESIDENT BUSH announced last night a "new environmental path for America", his alternative to the Kyoto protocol he
summarily rejected last year, to the dismay and anger of European nations and other allies.
Mr Bush outlined a voluntary scheme for reducing the rate of growth in America's greenhouse gas emissions that "will benefit the
entire world".
His proposals, which involved encouraging American companies to comply with regulations to slow the increase in pollution of the
skies, were condemned by his critics.
Environmentalists in Britain said the Bush plan would mean a rise in emissions over the next decade, instead of the cut required by the
Kyoto treaty.
The plan is aimed at cutting greenhouse gas "intensity" - emissions per unit of gross domestic product - by 18 per cent over 10 years.
But the Bush administration's forecast rate of growth in GDP over the next decade is 38 per cent, meaning that emissions will rise by
14 per cent.

The treaty signed by Mr Bush's father in 1992, the Climate Change Convention, to which America remains a party, requires
signatories to put in place policies and measures with the aim of returning to their 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

John Lanchbery, head of climate change policy at the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, said: "This is not an alternative to
Kyoto but a travesty of it. It is aptly named the 'global warming plan' because that is precisely what it will lead to."

But the European Union gave a cautious welcome. "It is positive that the US administration is realising that there needs to be
something done about climate change, but we feel that the multilateral approach is the best way to face up to this tremendous
challenge."

The 1997 Kyoto protocol, which Britain and 178 other countries have signed, but not ratified, calls for countries to return to 1990
levels by 2010.

The protocol was endorsed by Bill Clinton when he was president, but not ratified by the Senate. The Bush White House rejected it on
two grounds, both linked to American jobs.

First, the administration objected that the protocol did not apply to such major polluting nations as China and India and would give
them an unfair competitive advantage.

Second, Mr Bush expressed scepticism about the science that linked greenhouse gases to climate change and refused to risk thousands
of American jobs by imposing restrictions costing companies hundreds of millions of pounds.

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Voluntary targets are perceived as undermining Kyoto


The Gazette, SHELDON ALBERTS, CanWest Washington Correspondent, 9/29/07, Bush warms up to climate change, sort of; 'We
take this issue seriously'. President seeks goals for slashing carbon emissions, but rejects mandatory cuts, lexis [adit]
U.S. President George W. Bush urged the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitters yesterday to agree on goals for slashing carbon
emissions, but rejected mandatory cuts as potentially devastating to global economic growth. Addressing a White House-sponsored
conference on energy and climate change, Bush said the U.S. agrees "there is a problem" with global warming but said each country
must decide on its own how best to meet reduction targets. The U.S. will press rich countries to contribute to a new "international
clean technology fund" aimed at help developing nations pay for cleaner technologies key to reducing emissions. "Our guiding
principle is clear: We must lead the world to produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions, and we must do it in a way that does not
undermine economic growth or prevent nations from delivering greater prosperity for their people," Bush told delegates to the two-
day conference, which attracted officials from 16 countries, including Canada. "Each nation must decide for itself the right mix of
tools and technology to achieve results that are measurable and environmentally effective." In the past, Bush has questioned the
science linking human activity to global warming. But in his speech, he cited a report this year by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change that concluded global temperatures are rising and that they are caused largely by human activities. "Our
understanding of climate change has come a long way," Bush said. "The United States will do our part. We take this issue seriously."
The U.S., though, has come under fire from European countries for continuing to resist mandatory greenhouse gas limits. The Bush
administration refused to participate in the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012, partly because major developing countries like
China and India were not required to cut emissions. Any new international consensus for voluntary emissions cuts must include both
China and India, he said. "By setting this goal, we acknowledge there is a problem, and by setting this goal, we commit ourselves to
doing something about it," Bush said. Bush's insistence on voluntary targets has been viewed by some environmentalists as an attempt
to undermine the United Nations efforts to negotiate new mandatory standards after Kyoto. But the Bush denies the U.S. is charting its
own course. He said his government will convene its own meeting of major polluters by the summer of 2008 to "finalize" emission
targets and methods for measuring progress.

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Voluntary incentives are criticized by European leaders as ineffective and
unilateral
Peter N. Spotts and Mariah Blake, starr writer and contributor to the Christian Science Monitor, President , 6-4-07, Bush’s new global
warming plan greeted with skepticism at this week’s world summit in Germany. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0604/p02s01-
wogi.htm [Barber]

Under Mr. Bush's plan, the United States would gather leaders of 15 developed and developing nations that are the leading
emitters of heat-trapping gases and the largest consumers of energy. Their objective: Develop a long-term emissions-reduction
goal that, according to administration officials, is "aspirational" rather than binding. Countries would then develop their own
sets of internal programs to achieve the overall goal.
Bush unveiled the plan on the eve of this year's Group of 8 summit, set to start Wednesday in Heiligendamm, Germany.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who will chair the meeting, has put out drafts of a final communiqué that commit G-8
members to doing their "fair share" to reach specific emissions goals by 2050.
Her effort is driven in no small part by three recent reports on global warming, its effects, and strategies for reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases – mainly carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuel. The reports, which aim to inform policymakers as they
craft ways to reduce human influence on climate, were issued earlier this year by the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC).
During the run-up to the G-8 meeting, the Bush administration has come under intense criticism from environmental groups
and some European officials. The White House rejected the wording of large sections of the draft's climate provisions. It
argued that the offending elements run counter to Bush's policy on dealing with global warming.
For example, Washington's proposed changes to the draft G-8 document virtually wipe out any reference to various emissions-
reduction goals by 2050 or an objective of trying to hold global average temperature increases to about 2 degrees C. These are
based on IPCC projections of possible emissions trends and approaches that could avoid what the UN agreements refer to as
"dangerous human-made influence on climate."
It would now appear that the White House may have been trying to adjust the draft communiqué text in ways that brought it
into closer conformity with the plan Washington was preparing to announce. The White House has long rejected mandatory
targets and timetables.
Fewer friends in US's corner
Either way, some analysts say, the Bush plan is merely trying to defuse the barrage of criticism aimed its way.
"This is a transparent effort to divert attention from the president's refusal to accept any emissions-reductions proposals at [the]
G-8 summit," says Philip Clapp, head of the National Environmental Trust in Washington. "The White House is just trying to
hide the fact that the president is completely isolated among the G-8 leaders by calling vaguely for some agreement next year,
right before he leaves office."
As if to underscore that isolation, long-time Bush ally on climate, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, announced over the
weekend that his country would set an emissions target next year and set up a carbon-trading system by 2012 to help achieve it.
Both approaches have been anathema to the White House.
Others suggest the White House is attempting an end-run around any United Nations-based process for dealing with climate.
Sigmar Gabriel, the German environment minister, said Friday that the G-8 should not allow the Bush plan to become "a
Trojan horse to get past Heiligendamm and basically torpedo the international climate-protection process."
Some, though, say Washington's approach in the end may help prod a ponderous UN process. While setting an "aspirational"
goal might seem out of touch with calls for binding commitments, environmental treaties often set a broad goal, which is
turned into action through each country's process of ratification and enacting enabling legislation, said James Connaughton,
head of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, at a May 31 press briefing. Citing fisheries agreements as an
example, he noted that, "You agree on goals in the international process [and] you implement them through national strategies
that include binding measures."

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Internal Links - Carbon Tarrifs/Relations

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Climate Tarrifs Ensure Retaliation and Trade wars

Euractiv, January 28 2008, EU warned of trade war over climate measures,


http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-warned-trade-war-climate-measures/article-169878
The Commission's threat of climate-related trade sanctions aimed at putting EU and third country producers on a level footing
appears mainly targeted at convincing governments in Washington and Beijing to adhere to a global deal on climate change.
Indeed, the EU executive has confirmed that it will not decide on the introduction of any such measures before 2011. However,
the mere fact that the EU is considering such action has already caused outrage among its trade partners. The United States has
warned it would "vigorously" resist any move to introduce a tax on American products based on its position in climate change
negotiations. Last week, US Trade Representative Susan Schwab accused the EU of using the climate as an excuse for
protectionism.

Sanctions risk global trade wars between major powers

Financial Post March 25 2008, Carbon Tariff War? http://www.nationalpost.com/related/links/story.html?


id=397658
A European Union summit agreement two weeks ago to slash carbon emissions by 2020 ended with a veiled threat. If the rest
of the world doesn't match Europe's carbon tax and control regimes, "appropriate measures" can be taken by the EU, the final
summit statement said. The phrase "appropriate measures" hasn't been defined yet, but French President Nicolas Sarkozy
thinks Europe should impose a carbon tariff on goods imported into Europe. If steel arrives from China or America, countries
that have no carbon taxes in place, then Europe should tax the steel. European governments love a good excuse to build trade
barriers. Carl B. Hamilton, a Swedish MP and economics professor, warns in a letter to the Financial Times that EU-initiated
carbon trade barriers "could provoke a global trade war between the EU on the one hand and countries such as the United
States, China, India and Brazil on the other."

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EU sanctions cause trade wars

New Energy News, June 01, 2008, EU – U.S. BIOFUEL TRADE WAR?,
http://newenergynews.blogspot.com/2008/06/eu-us-biofuel-trade-war.html
The EC is threatening to put a duty on U.S. biodiesel imports if “splash and dash” is not discontinued, although public
statements remain muted. Unnamed EU diplomat: "The Commission is in contact with the United States to clarify certain
details regarding U.S. production…" The U.S. Congress looked into closing down this abominable practice in the 2007 energy
bill but “somehow” the loophole in the biodiesel subsidy left it in place. If Congress doesn’t close the loophole soon, it risks
starting a trade war with the EU. The situation is urgent for the European biodiesel industry. Linda McAvan, Labour MP,
UK:"My fear is that by the time we get something done, the European industry will be out of business."

Threats to trade risk relations collapse; it’s the NUCLEAR BOMB of climate
negotiations

Roger Harrabin, Environment analyst and write for BBC News, January 22, 2008, Barroso trade threat
on climate, BBC news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7201835.stm
He said foreign firms should be forced to purchase the same EU carbon allowances European firms would have to buy, thereby
leveling the industrial playing field. The threat of trade measures is the nuclear bomb of climate negotiations - and the
commission president said he very much hoped it would not be used. He said his preferred option was for a comprehensive
global treaty on emissions.

EU has been supporting sanctions on the US for awhile, they wont hesitate

Roger Harrabin, Environment analyst and write for BBC News, January 22, 2008, Barroso trade threat
on climate, BBC news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7201835.stm
The idea of climate trade sanctions against nations such as the United States has long been promoted by the French. They say it
is unfair for Europe's firms to bear a financial risk because of the EU's leadership on a global issue. They believe the right
measures would be acceptable to the WTO, which in some cases allows countries to impose charges on environmental grounds

Trade sanctions threaten major trade wars

Robert Collier, May 2, 2008, Can Green Trade Tariffs Combat Climate Change?
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000051
After the inconclusive end of the UN led Bali talks on the global environment, worry has grown among U.S. and European
industries—especially iron, steel, cement, glass, chemicals, and pulp and paper—that any new climate treaty would put them at
a big disadvantage against their fast-growing competitors in China. In response, the U.S. Congress is moving to create a system
of trade sanctions that would levy heavy taxes on imports from other major greenhouse gas emitters. Ironically, the American
plan is taking shape even before the United States takes any action to reduce its own emissions, inviting charges of hypocrisy,
violation of international law, and threatening a major trade war.

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Trade disputes between the U.S. and E.U. could easily escalate to trade wars.
Toronto Star, November 13th, ‘3
(World trade wars are on the horizon and it's a time for Canadian leadership; If the global trading system fails, the world faces the risk
of a major recession, p. Factiva)

The world is closer to trade wars than it has been for many years. This is bad news because trade wars are highly destructive to
jobs and growth. Once launched, they inevitably escalate, generating a vicious cycle of retaliation and response.This is what
happened during the 1930s, making the Great Depression much worse. It was why, after The Second World War, that many nations,
including Canada, worked to create a new trade regime to lower trade barriers and establish a procedure for dealing with trade
disputes. This was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, which in 1994 became the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The trigger for such a trade war this time could come from an increasingly protectionist United States and a European Union
that finds itself at odds with the United States on many issues, from the war in Iraq to the Kyoto agreement on climate change.

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EU and US trade key to relations. – Trade relations heavily influence political relations.

European Policy Center 26 July 2002 “EU-US Economic Disputes: There is More to Trade than Goods
and Services” http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-economic-disputes-trade-goods-services/article-
116971)

Regardless of which path is pursued, the key to regaining stability in transatlantic trade relations is an increased understanding
between the two societies. Stu Eizenstat and Hugo Paemen in their piece in the Financial Times London, of July 25th, 2002
suggested several steps to reach this objective, including a one-year suspension of the filing of new WTO cases and the
drafting of a common economic goal and work programme to achieve it. This alone, however, is not enough. Congress and the
European Parliament, as respective legislative bodies, should intensify information sharing and try to achieve a further
harmonization of legal standards and trade laws. At the same time Europeans must double their efforts to explain the
precautionary principle to the US so that the deep concerns at the heart of the new philosophical trade disputes are recognized
and taken seriously by their transatlantic partner. Finally, both powers must realize that trade and politics no longer are easily
separated. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Trade today is the only area in which the EU and the US deal as equals. But if
Americans and Europeans can keep in mind the benefits reaped from multilateral economic cooperation and transfer the
lessons learned here into the political sphere, the basis for a new transatlantic relationship might well be laid.

[ ] US-EU trade relations lead to political partnership and relations.

European Policy Center 26 July 2002 ( “EU-US Economic Disputes: There is More to Trade than Goods and
Services” http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-economic-disputes-trade-goods-services/article-116971)
The EU-US trade relationship is of great importance in today's global economic system. Not only do bilateral economic
relations between these two economic giants make up over 40% of world trade, but their trade relationship also greatly
influences political cooperation between the two unions. As Leon Brittan, former EU commissioner for trade recently wrote,
there is a loose linkage between economic and political cooperation and partnership. If serious strains arise on one side of the
relationship, there is always a risk that the other will suffer. The US-EU trade relationship draws wider circles, however, and
also serves an important signalling effect to the world trading system as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to move the global trade
agenda forward when the EU and US pull on opposite strands.There is currently a long list of US-EU trade disputes ranging
from unresolved issues, such as the EU refusal to allow imports of hormone treated beef (despite a contrary WTO ruling), to
those disputes that are only just about to erupt, such as the potential row over the imposition of tariffs on US steel imports.
Most recently, the EU has won a case against the US for its Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Law, which bestows special tax
breaks on US companies in the exporting business. The EU was granted the right to impose sanctions worth up to $4 billion -
the largest award in WTO history. For the status and a brief summary of the 11 currently active bilateral US-EU cases in the
WTO please refer to the Annex below. Even though EU-US trade accounts for less than 22% of EU trade, it comprises over
47% of the EU's WTO disputes. By contrast, the EU currently has not a single WTO dispute with its preferential partners in
Europe and Africa, although 32% of its trade takes place with these countries. These numbers point out that, even though the
EU and US try to settle their trade disagreements in various informal and formal bilateral settings, they still depend heavily on
the WTO dispute resolution mechanism to solve their most contentious problems.

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Transatlantic trade disputes spillover


Jan Bohanes, Associate Attorney at the International Trade and Dispute Resolution Group, 2005 Review: Transatlantic
Economic Disputes: The EU, the US, and the WTO, Journal of Economic Law,
The United States (US) and the European Communities (EC) are among the world’s most developed economic entities and
together account for some 40 percent of both global GDP and trade. Indeed, it is almost trite to refer to the importance
the US and the EC – and their bilateral relationship – have within the World Trade Organization (WTO). From the
perspective of the global economic and trading system, the significance of the economic relations between these two economic
giants, and of the economic disputes arising between them, can hardly be overestimated. It may be true that only two percent of
EC–US trade and investments are affected by allegedly WTOinconsistent trade restrictions; nevertheless, EC–US economic
disputes often surpass disputes between other nations by virtue of the sheer trade volume at stake or their political
dimensions. Furthermore, these disputes often reflect some of the thorniest questions of trade policy – taxation policy and
health measures (hormones, genetically modified organisms), to name only two. Moreover, the EC and US have, over the past
ten years, been the two most frequent litigators before the WTO, such that disputes pitting the EC and the US against each
other have led to the clarification of significant aspects, in terms of substance and volume, of both procedural and substantive
WTO law. In sum, EC–US economic relations and economic disputes represent an area of study of great importance in
international economic affairs. And this important area of study has been enriched by an edited volume whose quality is on a
par with the importance of the subject matter it addresses.

[ ] Free trade without barriers key to EU US relations.


U.S. Department of State April 30, 2007 ( “U.S., EU Agree To Reduce Regulatory and Trade Barriers”
http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=74174DC1-203C-48EA-87F6-C58557DEB56A)

The United States and the European Union (EU) have agreed to expand economic ties by cutting barriers to trade and investment and
liberalizing restrictions on air travel. Joint commitments on a broad range of economic and security issues were signed April 30 during
the annual U.S.-EU summit in Washington.President Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President
Jose Manuel Barroso signed the trans-Atlantic economic partnership plan under which the two trading partners will establish a
framework for business integration by streamlining regulatory standards that are often different between the trans-Atlantic partners. “It
is a commitment to eliminating barriers to trade. It is recognition that the closer that the United States and the EU become, the better
off our people become,” Bush said at a joint press conference with the European leaders after their meeting. As part of the framework,
the United States and EU will set up the "Trans-Atlantic Economic Council" to push regulatory convergence in nearly 40 areas,
including intellectual property, financial services and the automotive industry. Merkel, whose country holds the rotating EU and G8
presidency, said the agreement is a “significant step forward” for trade partners that exchange more than $2 billion in goods and
services across the Atlantic every day. In addition to the United States and Germany, the G8 includes the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Japan, Canada and Russia. Barroso said the agreement will help fight protectionism and isolationism by getting rid of “artificial
barriers to trade and investment” through the “harmonization of standards.” In addition, all three leaders stressed their commitment to
bringing the long-stalled Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations to a successful outcome. "I'm under no
illusions as to how hard it will be to achieve the objective, but the first thing is there must be a firm commitment by the leadership to
get a deal," Bush said.

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Trans-atlantic economic relations are key to US-European relations

Lee Hamilton, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director
of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, 6/30/08, Treading carefully in trans-
Atlantic, relationshttp://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20080630/OPINION12/806300312/1002/opinion [SD]
It's the world's largest economic bloc with a GDP of $16 trillion, and its once-lethargic economies are growing faster than America's
with lower budget deficits. The Euro continues to appreciate against the dollar, unemployment is falling, and the EU is reducing its
dependence on foreign energy.
Despite longtime U.S. support for European integration, there are real differences over: Iraq, the broader Middle East, the death
penalty, and climate change, among others. But keeping trans-Atlantic relations in good order is a strategic interest of the highest
importance for both partners.
Germany and France are among Iran's four largest import-partners. While the U.S. should engage Iran directly for diplomatic non-
proliferation efforts to succeed, transatlantic coordination is essential.

US-European relations are based on interests and trade.

Lee Hamilton, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director
of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, 6/30/08, Treading carefully in trans-
Atlantic, relationshttp://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20080630/OPINION12/806300312/1002/opinion [SD]
Turkey's increasingly dynamic economy, its vibrant democracy, and its growing clout in foreign affairs illustrate its tremendous value
as an ally. The U.S. would welcome Turkey's further integration into the EU, but many Europeans express reluctance or outright
opposition.
Despite these challenges, the future of U.S.-European relations is not bleak. Our alliance is rooted in common values, interests, and
strong economic ties, including the world's largest bilateral trade relationship, measuring roughly $3 trillion in goods and services.
The foundations of our alliance are unshakeable, and the opportunities for its leaders are great.

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Impacts

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US-EU Free Trade - Extensions


US-EU relations are key to trade and the world economy
WILLIAM DROZDIAK, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Jan/Feb2005, The
North Atlantic Drift. By: Drozdiak, William, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 1, EBSCO, Business Source
Complete

These transatlantic investments have proved very profitable. In 2003, while the media reported that Americans were pouring Bordeaux
wine down the drain to protest Paris' position on the war in Iraq, corporate America saw its investment inflows and profits from
France surge to the highest levels in nearly a decade: $2.4 billion and $l.7 billion, respectively. Profits earned by U.S. affiliates in
Europe soared to a record $77 billion, and U.S. investments in Europe jumped by 30 percent to $87 billion. Large U.S. technology
firms, such as Microsoft and Intel, predict that half of their global revenues will come from Europe in 2005. Thus, U.S. business
leaders say that the EU's 450 million affluent consumers still form the largest pool of purchasing power in the world. They also
say that economic self-interest should be enough to persuade both Democrats and Republicans in the United States to want to
protect the Atlantic partnership--all the more so because the combined Economic power of the United States and Europe would
give them enormous leverage to deal with major global challenges. Despite the billions of dollars already invested on both sides,
the full potential of the U.S.-European economic relationship is not yet realized. Four big challenges remain. The first is
managing the Western world's worsening jobs crisis (which is partly caused by outsourcing to cheap-wage places such as China and
India) without resorting to the kind of draconian protectionist measures that provoked the Great Depression. Second, as the world's
major oil, coal, and gas consumers, the United States and Europe urgently need to consider joint energy and environmental strategies
to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels and curtail greenhouse gas emissions. Third, they must promptly conclude the Doha Round
of global trade negotiations by agreeing to cut much of their $300 billion in farm export subsidies, which harm producers in
developing countries and exacerbate the disparity between rich and poor nations. Finally, they must

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US-EU Trade Economy -Module

European- US trade disputes collapse the global economy


European Commission, 11-07, The EU and the US are each other's main trading partners and account for the largest bilateral
trade relationship in the world. They are also the largest players in global trade.,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/index_en.htm
In 2006 the EU and the US combined economies accounted for nearly 60 % of global GDP, 33 % of world trade in goods and
42 % of world trade in services. The EU and the US are each other's main trading partners. Trade flows across the Atlantic
amount to around €1.7 billion every day. The two economies are interdependent to a high degree. Close to a quarter of all
EU-US trade consists of transactions within firms based on their investments on either side of the Atlantic. The
transatlantic relationship also defines the shape of the global economy as a whole as either the EU or the US is also the
largest trade and investment partner for almost all other countries in the global economy. Total FDI stocks held in each
others countries reach approximately €1.89 trillion. The overall "transatlantic workforce" is estimated at 12 to 14 million
people, of which roughly half are Americans who owe their jobs directly or indirectly to EU companies.

Nuclear War
Walter Russell Mead, 1992, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer, p. 30.
The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes
to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market
economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that
our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we
will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries
with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and
Japan did in the 1930's.

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Collapse of relations destroys the global economy


(Gareth Harding, Europe Correspondent for United Press International, 9/7/2002 (United Press International))
Despite their differences, EU and U.S. leaders know that a breakdown in relations between the two sides would be disastrous for
the international economy and global stability. Together, Europe and America have the biggest trade and investment
relationship in the world -- amounting to over $1 billion a day -- accounting for half the planet's wealth and forming the
cornerstone of the world's most powerful military alliance, NATO.

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US-EU Relations Democracy Module


EU - US trade relations key - relations promote peace and democracy.
European Union February 2005 ("EU / US Relations" http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?
option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=7&id=29&Itemid=59)
Bilateral trade between the EU and US amounts to over $1 billion a day; investment links are even more substantial,
totaling over $1.8 trillion a year. Each partner creates jobs for about 6 million workers on each side of the Atlantic, and
EU-US trade accounts for almost 40% of world trade. But the EU-US economic partnership goes way beyond pure trade
matters: it is supported by a number of institutionalized dialogues and regulatory cooperation between the partners. Through
continued dialogue and cooperation the EU and US also work together to promote global peace, stability and
democracy. On a global level, the EU and US are major powers and as such have a global responsibility. Exercising that
power and responsibility effectively inevitably means working together. In that respect the EU and US are jointly
promoting democracy, freedom, stability and prosperity throughout the world. Whether it is in the Middle East, Afghanistan or
the Balkans, Europe and the US can only succeed in advancing these values if they act together. Together the EU and US
are committed to the challenge of alleviating poverty and disease and provide almost 80% of global development
assistance.

The impact is human survival and global war


Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1995, [December, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly
powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life
on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty, and openness.
LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies
do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another.
Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable
climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to
protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and
because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they
respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new
world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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US-EU relations key to democracy promotion
Colin Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State, 2003
Thanks in great measure to the concerted efforts of Americans and Europeans, efforts that have gone on for the past half
century, we are much closer to that vision, much closer that world we dream of today. The spread of democratic and
economic freedoms that together we have done so much to secure and engender, have opened unprecedented
opportunities to help better the lives of millions on every continent. And the hope for realizing that great potential still
rests to a great degree on strong and enduring partnerships between Europe and the United States.

US-EU cooperation key to democratic reforms in the Middle East


Richard Youngs, senior researcher at the 'Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior' (FRIDE) in
Madrid, and lecturer at the University of Warwick, 2004, Trans-Atlantic Cooperation on Middle East Reform: A European Mis-
judgment?, http://www.fpc.org.uk/fsblob/352.pdf
At the very least, tighter trans-Atlantic cooperation would make it more difficult for Middle Eastern regimes to play the
EU and US off against each other. This has on occasions worked to the detriment of both the EU and US: when the EU
started to raise reform issues with the Egyptian government in the mid-1990s, Mubarak’s regime could confidently rebuff
these efforts by pointing to continued unconditional US support; conversely, when the US moved to push the Algerian
regime towards reform, the latter was able to cite continued French backing. One trans-Atlantic group of experts has
advocated a ‘common trans-Atlantic benchmark’ for offering solidarity to democracy activists, that could be brought
about through the US and EU pressing regimes to sit down with a range of opposition and civil society organisations to design
national reform projects. 13 Certainly, given the extreme lack of coherence between different donors’ projects, the US
proposal to pool and commonly plan political aid initiatives was not without merit. For all the EU’s defensiveness over being
emasculated by intensified US involvement, American policy-makers have frequently acknowledged that the US ‘carries
more baggage’ in the Middle East and consequently has greater need of a more multilateral effort. This gives the EU leverage
to negotiate forms of cooperation that boost its own aims and approaches to reform. As within the EU itself, cooperation need
not completely suppress areas of particular national expertise; it can be readily acknowledged that some things may be
better done by the Europeans, others by the US. A common trans-Atlantic reform agenda should be able to combine
the benefits of a united front with space for diversity in European and US priorities on the ground.
consider global financial reforms to avert a dollar crisis and take account of the growing importance of the euro.

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US-EU Cooperation key to stop Iranian prolif
WILLIAM DROZDIAK, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Jan/Feb2005, The
North Atlantic Drift. By: Drozdiak, William, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 1, EBSCO, Business Source
Complete
U.S. and European assets are complementary. Europe's penchant for offering diplomatic incentives should be combined
with America's tendency to threaten military force. Concerted diplomacy would help fulfill Europe's ambitions of playing a
more assertive role in world affairs while encouraging it to work more closely in partnership with the United States. At the
same time, presenting a unified front would restore to U.S. action the international legitimacy that the Bush
administration's strong-arm unilateralism has tarnished. Washington should allow its allies in Europe to take the lead in
exploring new policy initiatives in regions where they enjoy greater influence or historical connections. Consider Iran, for
example. The Bush administration was skeptical about Iran's proclamation that its nuclear activities were only peaceful,
but it encouraged Europe to make a last-ditch effort to persuade Tehran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities
and reassure the world that it is not trying to build nuclear weapons. European diplomats say Iran's refusal to accept
Europe's best offer, including enhanced trade possibilities and assured nuclear fuel supplies, would almost certainly
trigger EU support for the UN sanctions that the United States is advocating. Indeed, the combination of European
diplomacy and U.S. threats for wider sanctions has raised hopes that Iran will finally abide by its latest agreement to
suspend all uranium-enrichment activities.

iranian nuclearization causes nuclear war by a regional nuclear arms race


Joseph Cirincione (Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress), April
4, 2006, Interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10331/
They want to deter a United States or possibly Israeli attack, and they want the prestige that such a weapon would give them for their
regional ambitions. And it's exactly for those reasons that other countries in the region would react. Saudi Arabia could not tolerate the
political, military, and diplomatic power that a nuclear weapon would give Iran. And that's the great danger—that other countries in
the region would start exploring their nuclear options.
There are already stories that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with the Pakistanis on nuclear research. We don't know if this is true, but we
do know that the Saudis bankrolled the Pakistani nuclear program. My great fear is that the Saudis might take a nuclear shortcut, and
invite Pakistan to station some of its nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. This, in fact, would actually be legal under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which Saudi Arabia is a member of, just the way the United States stations nuclear weapons in Europe. Egypt
might also react. They used to have a nuclear program in the 1960s; they might decide that they have to beat the Iranian challenge in
their own way. So might Turkey.
In fact, if there's a unified government of Iraq within five years, Iraq—long-term foe of Iran—might consider that it needs to balance
Iranian power. So that's really the great threat, is that you would go from a Middle East with one nuclear weapons state, Israel, to one
with three, four, or five nuclear weapons states with the remaining political, economic, and ethnic conflicts unresolved. That's a recipe
for nuclear war.

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US and EU cooperating on Iranian Prolif now
Robert J. Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, 2004, Washington Quarterly, A Transatlantic
Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wash.2004.27.4.21
Although views may differ across the Atlantic on whether Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons or only a nuclear
weapons option, they appear to have converged on two crucial matters. First, the consensus seems to be that Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons would be disastrous for the stability of the Middle East and for the future of the global
nonproliferation regime. Both President George W. Bush and Democratic presiden- tial candidate Senator John Kerry (Mass.)
have called such a development “unacceptable.” Although Europeans avoid such categorical formulations, they have
repeatedly expressed strong opposition to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, transatlantic agreement seems
to have formed that persuading Iran to give up its own fissile material production capability, regardless of Iran’s true
motivation for seeking it—whether to produce reactor fuel indigenously, to give itself a future nuclear option, or to build
nuclear weapons as soon as possible—is essential. Both the Americans and Europeans fully appreciate that a country has gone
most of the distance toward nuclear weapons once it has the ability to enrich uranium or produce plutonium. Because a
determined proliferator could at any time withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), kick out inspectors, and
proceed to turn previously safeguarded nuclear material into bombs, they further recognize that putting Iran’s capability under
the IAEA’s verification is not an adequate solution.

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US-EU cooperation currently solving prolif
Dalia Dassa Kaye, political scientist and a member of the research staff in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND,
Winter 03/04, Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East, Washington Quarterly,
Although Europeans may not be as inclined to conflate the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with that of terrorism, as is
the tendency in current U.S. policy circles, European concern about the proliferation of unconventional weapons and the missile
systems able to deliver them is growing. Even prior to the war in Iraq, common concerns about proliferation partly explain the initial
U.S.-European agreement on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 calling for the disarmament of Iraq in the fall of 2002.
Since the Iraq war, WMD is creeping toward the top of the European agenda. The war in Iraq and the diplomatic dispute
prior to it provided a catalyst for Europe to place proliferation higher on its agenda and reexamine its policies to combat this
threat. This shift reflected a general, pragmatic reaction to align Europe’s policies more closely with the United States to help repair
transatlantic relations as well as relations within Europe after the Iraq rupture. Europeans did not want to be marginalized and divided
as they were in Iraq, and major European states such as France and Germany recognized that a united Europe was necessary for the
projection of European power externally. Moreover, European governments were confronted with substantial evidence of significant
Iranian efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Consequently, the EU issued a new policy to confront WMD at the European
Council meeting in Thessaloniki in late June 2003 that included considering coercive measures if diplomatic efforts to stem
proliferation in certain problem states failed, marking a dramatic departure from the previous European, particularly German, aversion
to the use of force in such scenarios. 5 As a result, the EU is now pursuing an approach to proliferation that more actively addresses
countries of concern (e.g., Iran, North Korea, and Libya) rather than relying solely on existing international agreements to do the job.
Although Europeans are still strong believers in international regimes, they increasingly recognize the implementation and
compliance problems of accords such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, like the United States, Europe is
now focusing less on broadening international arms control regimes and more on improving the implementation of existing
treaties, particularly those regarding nuclear weapons. Perhaps the best example of growing convergence on the threat of proliferation
is the case of Iran. Traditionally, the United States and Europe have taken very different approaches. While the United States has
preferred policies of containment, economic sanctions, and the threat of force, European states have favored policies of engagement
and have been reluctant to link their economic and political relations with Tehran’s proliferation activity. Now, however, the
European position is shifting toward that of Washington. In mid-June 2003, the foreign ministers of the EU’s member states
released a statement critical of Iran’s nuclear program and demanded that Iran accept more aggressive inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 6 Most critical, the EU for the first time specifically linked the trade and
cooperation agreement it is negotiating with Tehran to the nuclear issue, signaling that Europe is willing to employ economic
levers to address the proliferation problem. The French, in contrast to their stance on Iraq, have actively supported this tougher
position toward Iran. Their motivations for doing so are unclear, whether a desire to mend fences with the United States and within
Europe, a desire to maintain its nuclear status by limiting the number of nuclear powers, or in reaction to increasingly unambiguous
intelligence suggesting that Iran is actively seeking a nuclear weapons program. Clearly, however, the resultant EU policy toward Iran
is closer to the U.S. position than was previously the case. The tougher EU stance appears, for now, to have paid off as the foreign
ministers of Great Britain, France, and Germany brokered a deal in late October 2003 whereby Iran agreed to cooperate with the
IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities.

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US-EU cooperation to stop Iranian prolif


Robert J. Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, 2004, Washington Quarterly, A Transatlantic
Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wash.2004.27.4.21
Both the United States and Europe have critical roles to play in framing the choice for Iran. Thus far, the Bush
administration has played the bad cop and the Europeans have played the good cop. The United States has branded Iran a
member of the “axis of evil”; urged the IAEA board to find Iran in noncompliance with the NPT and to send the matter
to the Security Council; opposed all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including Russia’s construction of a power reactor at
Bushehr; and broken off even limited bilateral contacts with Iran. The EU 3, on the other hand, have preferred carrots to
sticks. They promised to enhance high-technology trade with Iran, including in the civil nuclear area, and opposed
efforts to take the issue to New York if Tehran abides by the October 2003 deal. European sticks have usually taken the form
of deferred carrots, such as the EU’s postponement of further talks with Iran on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement until the
nuclear issue is resolved. Such actions do not hurt Iran; they simply threaten to take away future gains.

US-EU cooperation to stop Iranian prolif


Roberto Aliboni, Vice-President at the International Affairs Institute-IAI in Rome, 11-26-2005, EUROPE ’ S ROLE IN THE
GULF: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0532.pdf
On the other hand, the EU-3 initiative towards Iran shows that Europe can play a security role based on its own principles and
objectives. True, the EU-3 initiative did not succeed. However this was due less to weaknesses in the European diplomatic
platform than to the changes that cropped up in Iran’s international and domestic conditions. If European diplomacy proved
unable to come to terms with the radicals now in power at Teheran, the United States cannot hope to coerce Iran either,
for a number of evident reasons: Iraq is overstretching American forces; Iraq ’ s weakness and the role the Shiites play in the
country are objectively reinforcing Teheran; and the UN Security Council ’ s constellation is not necessarily in favour of the
West. While these conditions have brought about – as tactical as it may be – a transatlantic rapprochement tilting
towards European “ dialogue ” rather than US coercion, what is worth noting here is that the EU cooperative approach
makes sense and may well evolve into a platform for joint transatlantic action. If this mixed picture is taken into
consideration, what it seems to suggest is that Europe can play a security role in the Gulf precisely by developing and
strengthening its own initiative. In a transatlantic perspective, autonomous reinforcement of the European and EU role in the
region will be more helpful than participation in the inherently limited ICI operations. At the same time, a more autonomous
European role is what the GCC countries, in particular, expect and desire. These countries are rather disappointed and
concerned by the US' performance in the Gulf and its consequences. They see the reinforcement of the European
presence in the GCC and the Gulf in general as a reassurance and a necessary balancing. Thus the EU is called upon to
play a security role, beneficial to both the United States and the regional countries, in terms of more and bolder initiatives in
the region. At the end of the day, all it has to do is to be more assertive and confident in renewing and enhancing its links with
the GCC, setting out a substantive and consistent strategy towards the region, and developing – wherever possible – its political
initiative in the same way it did with the EU-3 negotiations with Iran. Finally, Europe should take note that a new regime is
emerging in Iraq which deserves support. It is, in fact, high time for the Europeans to set out a policy towards Iraq,
independently of transatlantic rifts.

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US-EU Solves Peace Process Module

US-EU relations key to Middle-East Peace Process


WILLIAM DROZDIAK, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Jan/Feb2005, The
North Atlantic Drift. By: Drozdiak, William, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 1, EBSCO, Business Source
Complete
A more activist role for Europe could also have beneficial effects on efforts to broker peace between Israel and the
Palestinians. The United States has long been seen as the only outside power capable of extracting key concessions from
Israel--including the dismantling of settlements in Gaza and the West Bank--while Europe has been relegated to giving
humanitarian aid and financial support to the Palestinians. Yet a more activist EU role that offered trade and aid
incentives to Israel could help bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. After all, despite close security ties to the
United States, Israel still regards the EU as its most important economic partner.

Peace Process Necessary to Solve Largest War Ever


Charles K. Rowley, Prof. of Econ @ GMU, Michael J. Webb, @ Regulatory Economics Group, ‘7 [Public Choice 132, “Israel and
Palestine: the slow road to peace or the fast track to mutual annihilation?” p. 8]
Since May 14, 1948, when the British Mandate expired and David Ben Gurion declared the establishment of a Jewish State in
Palestine, Jews and Arabs have engaged in continuous low-level conflict punctuated by seven major wars (Rowley and Taylor 2006a,
2006b). Indeed, Shughart suggests that much of the instability can be attributed to the haphazard way in which boundaries were drawn
after the end of the FirstWorldWar (Shughart 2006, p. 34). This seemingly intractable conflict between Israelis and Arabs over the
future of the Holy Land lies at the root of instability throughout the Middle East. In a world where weapons of mass destruction are
becoming ever more accessible, the probability that this continuing friction may culminate in the elimination of the entire Middle
East as a habitable region for generations to come cannot be ignored.
In this commentary, we outline alternative scenarios for the Israel–Palestine land settlement problem as they have played themselves
out during three time-periods, employing game theory within a public choice perspective.We attempt to identify the key determinants
of the ultimate outcome of the current conflict, specifically, whether the Holy Land is on the slow road to peace or the fast track to
mutual annihilation. Our basic hypothesis is that the Israel–Palestine game is not necessarily zero-sum, nor is it necessarily a
prisoners’ dilemma. Rather it takes the form of a hawk–dove game in which peace-peace solutions are feasible, given the proper
incentives. Of course, the hawk–dove game may also result in war–war, perhaps of the most destructive kind that the world so far
has ever experienced.

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The US and EU are cooperating on the Middle East Peace Process now
Dalia Dassa Kaye, political scientist and a member of the research staff in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND,
Winter 03/04, Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East, Washington Quarterly,
Despite continued policy differences on the Arab-Israeli peace process, mutual concern about the negative effects of continued
bloodshed on the wider Middle East provides another basis for transatlantic agreement. Even before the Iraq war, the
deteriorating situation on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian territories in the aftermath of the outbreak of the second
Intifada in September 2000 and the unwillingness of the United States fully to engage in the peacemaking process
between Arabs and Israelis at the start of the Bush administration led to the formation of the Middle East Quartet
(comprising the United States, the EU, the UN, and Russia) in the summer of 2002 and its subsequent road map for Middle
East peace. The United States and Europe have never before coordinated so closely on the Middle East peace process,
even if the United States is still the pivotal player. Considering the historical rifts across the Atlantic on peace process issues,
the development of the Quartet is notable. The Europeans have finally obtained a political, not just economic, place at the
peace process table while the gap appears to be narrowing between the two sides’ visions of a final settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Both sides have moved closer to the other’s positions: the United States now supports a peace outcome (a two-
state solution), not just a peace process (although many Europeans would like the United States to specify the contours of a
final-status agreement, as occurred in the Clinton administration), while Europe has actively moved toward U.S. positions on
Palestinian reform. The United States and Europe continue to disagree on the question of engaging Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat (agreement among EU member states on this question is unanimous), but the EU supported U.S. efforts to promote
reform of thePalestinian Authority (PA) and to establish a Palestinian prime minister to counterbalance Arafat’s
authority. Despite growing frustration that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have implemented the road map—and
European concern that the United States did not invest heavily enough in the effort—the road map constitutes the first joint
U.S.-European effort to produce a peace plan. The Quartet has also served to coordinate European positions, helping to
avoid the inclination for unilateral initiatives from major European powers that have tended to erode Washington’s confidence
in a European partner in the past. Thus, even while regional developments (most notably continued terrorism and settlement
activity) undermine the Quartet’s road map, the common U.S. and European fear of continued violence and its potential to
destabilize the broader region provides a strong incentive for transatlantic cooperation in this ongoing conflict.

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US-EU Relations - Heg Module


US-EU relations key to heg – interdependence
Robert E. Hunter, a senior fellow at RAND, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, 2003, Washington Quarterly, “Europe’s Leverage”
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366003322596945?cookieSet=1
The destinies of the United States and Europe are now intertwined in such critical ways as to be inseparable. Policies,
programs, and practices of states on each side of the Atlantic must be measured against this reality. Some Europeans believe
that Europe, Russia, and China can create a bloc to balance U.S. power, and some Americans believe the United States
can divide European states from one another or simply ignore them. These attitudes and actions, however, are and will
continue to be based more on fantasy than analysis or understanding. The United States in particular, with all of its power
and potential, ambitions and aspirations, must grasp this notion and act according to its logic. Nothing has happened to
lessen the importance of the continent of Europe as the most important landmass—economically and politically—to be
kept free of a hegemonic power at odds with U.S. interests, values, and objectives (the stuff of three world wars in the
twentieth century). Europe still depends on U.S. power, influence, engagement, and leadership to be fully assured of its own
independence, security, long-term prosperity, and in some places even domestic tranquility. Meanwhile, the U.S. and European
economies, especially those of the European Union, are now so intermingled that both sides would suffer grievous injury if
either tried to lessen their level of entanglement with one another significantly. The panoply of economic interaction
between the United States and the EU, including trade in goods and services, investment, cross-ownership, travel, and
finance, must now be valued in the trillions of dollars, with the power to control and influence rarely having a clear locus on
one side of the Atlantic or the other; certainly neither side is able to claim decisive predominance. Indeed, transatlantic
[End Page 91] economic interdependence is now so much a fact of life that the concept is no longer even questioned. At the
same time, a broad array of relatively common values and institutions of incalculable worth bind the United States and Europe
together, creating an interpenetration of influence unrivaled among any other set of major powers. Much of what the United
States seeks to do elsewhere in the world will depend on its ability to gain the support and active engagement of
European power—and European powers—politically, economically, and militarily.

Global nuclear exchange


Zalmay Khalilzad ’95 (Washington Quarterly, ln)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not
as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.
Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude
the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the
attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a
bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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US-EU Relations -Heg Extensions

US-EU cooperation key to heg – burdensharing and support


Ivo H. Daalder, former director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, and James M. Goldgeier, former director
of Russian affairs in the National Security Council, 2001, Survival, “Putting Europe First”
There are also fundamental political problems with such an approach. The unilateralism implied by assigning primary
responsibility for global security and stability to the United States without support from or regard for the perspective of
regional allies and other countries is hardly consistent with the desire, repeatedly emphasised by the incoming team, to
exercise American power ‘without arrogance and to pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster’.4 At a time when the
United States is already regarded by much of the world as an overbearing ‘hyperpower’, insisting on a division of
labour that assigns Washington the main international security role to the exclusion of others is unlikely to be popular
among its allies. Such a posture is also unlikely to be popular at home. In recent years, it has become very clear that the
American public will support the use of US military forces overseas only if other countries share the burden. This is not
only in the case of so-called humanitarian interventions, but also when it involves the defence of such vital national interests as
the world’s supply of crude oil. In either case, international legitimacy of action and a commitment by other nations to share
the costs will be a political prerequisite for gaining public support.
Despite Europe’s internal weaknesses and divisions, no part of the world offers the United States a better prospect for
becoming a strong partner in taking on global challenges and opportunities. Europe combines actual economic strength
with potential military and diplomatic capacity to be America’s strategic partner, if not today, then tomorrow. And rather
than assigning Europe a limited, albeit still important role, of handling its own affairs in ways that do not require US
participation, as the new division of labour suggests, American interests are best served by developing a genuine
partnership with a Europe that is both capable and willing to share the burdens of maintaining and strengthening
international security.

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US-EU Relations -Heg Extensions

US-EU cooperation allows for burden-sharing, and reducing overstretch


WILLIAM DROZDIAK, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Jan/Feb2005, The
North Atlantic Drift. By: Drozdiak, William, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 1, EBSCO, Business Source
Complete
U.S. and European assets are complementary. Europe's penchant for offering diplomatic incentives should be combined with
America's tendency to threaten military force. Concerted diplomacy would help fulfill Europe's ambitions of playing a more
assertive role in world affairs while encouraging it to work more closely in partnership with the United States. At the same
time, presenting a unified front would restore to U.S. action the international legitimacy that the Bush administration's
strong-arm unilateralism has tarnished. Washington should allow its allies in Europe to take the lead in exploring new policy
initiatives in regions where they enjoy greater influence or historical connections. Consider Iran, for example. The Bush
administration was skeptical about Iran's proclamation that its nuclear activities were only peaceful, but it encouraged Europe
to make a last-ditch effort to persuade Tehran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and reassure the world that it is not
trying to build nuclear weapons. European diplomats say Iran's refusal to accept Europe's best offer, including enhanced trade
possibilities and assured nuclear fuel supplies, would almost certainly trigger EU support for the UN sanctions that the United
States is advocating. Indeed, the combination of European diplomacy and U.S. threats for wider sanctions has raised hopes that
Iran will finally abide by its latest agreement to suspend all uranium-enrichment activities. A more activist role for Europe
could also have beneficial effects on efforts to broker peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States has long
been seen as the only outside power capable of extracting key concessions from Israel--including the dismantling of
settlements in Gaza and the West Bank--while Europe has been relegated to giving humanitarian aid and financial support to
the Palestinians. Yet a more activist EU role that offered trade and aid incentives to Israel could help bring the two sides back
to the negotiating table. After all, despite close security ties to the United States, Israel still regards the EU as its most
important economic partner. Diplomatic burden-sharing would relieve the United States of carrying the lion's share of
responsibilities for regional peacekeeping. It would also help disprove the reputation for "free riding" that Europeans
have earned, critics say, by sometimes shirking difficult military missions knowing that the United States would pick up the
slack. In the Balkans, where the EU will soon take control of all international peacekeeping, this kind of recalibration is
already underway. And there could be more shifting of duties. Indeed, the European allies have adapted their military forces
to the post-Cold War environment better than American critics usually admit. The United States has about 1.4 million men and
women in its armed forces, with about 400,000 troops available for foreign deployment. The 25 EU states have 1.9 million in
their armed forces, and although today only about 50,000 can be sent abroad, that figure is expected to reach 200,000 over the
next decade. The $175 billion combined annual defense budget of EU members may seem paltry against the United States'
nearly $500 billion budget for the current fiscal year, but it exceeds the military budgets of China, Japan, and Russia
combined. Moreover, several key projects have been launched to rectify Europe's military shortcomings and equip it with a
long-range air transport fleet, an autonomous satellite reconnaissance system, new precision-guided weapons, and hundreds of
light transport helicopters. There are now 19,000 troops from 15 European NATO countries in Iraq and 7,000 European
soldiers in the NATO peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan. In the Balkans, American troops are outnumbered by the
30,000 European forces who have assumed command of peacekeeping contingents in nearly all of the region's hot spots,
including Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Anticipating that future missions will require street patrols rather than
blazing firepower, a new 5,000-strong EU police force has been established for peacekeeping duties abroad. Three such
missions were conducted under the EU flag in 2003, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

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US-EU Bioterror Module

Transatlantic efforts key to contain bioterrorism and epidemics


Richard A. Chilcoat, Commandant of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Joseph R. Cerami, Retired U.S. Army
Colonel and Director of the Public Service Leadership Program for the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas
A&M University, and Patrick B Baetjer Research Assistant to the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 5-12-2006, The Future
of Transatlantic Security Relations
Atlantic Storm showed that even experienced international leaders, when faced with an unfolding epidemic and
the resulting uncertainty, would have limited options and stark choices, given the conditions that exist today.
Preparation is essential: international leaders cannot be expected to develop the requisite response systems in the midst of a
crisis. The exercise made clear that there is much that can be done to improve overall biosecurity for both intentional and
natural epidemics—a critical lesson given the growing possibility of an avian infuenza pandemic. Transatlantic
and international initiatives to enhance biosecurity—the Global Health Security Action Group, the European
Commission’s Heath Security Committee, the recently announced International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Infuenza—are beginning to gain prominence, but much more work is needed. The nations of the Atlantic Community
should lead this effort and include as many partners as possible. What is needed is a multilayered, comprehensive
effort that seeks to render nations essentially immune to mass lethality and other destabilizing effects of the
epidemics that would be caused by the most serious biosecurity threats. While no single tool holds the key to success, a
variety of approaches could complement and reinforce each other. The core challenge in addressing bioterrorism (as
also is true for naturally occurring epidemics) is to control and minimize the devastation of disease, thereby
diminishing any reward that could result from pursuit of an intentional attack and the incentive for staging one.

Use Means Extinction - Outweigh Nux


Michael Horowitz, PhD in Poli Sci @ Harvard,‘5 [Prepared for the Midlwest Political Sciene Association Annual Meeting, “Does
Proliferation Matter? Assessing the Empirical Impact of Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons on International Security,” p.19]

Though biological weapons are difficult to deliver, Steinbrunner (1997) argues the consequences of their use are almost unlimited.
Given the new possibilities for genetic manipulations made possible by modern science, biological weapons could threaten the
future of human civilization. The Office of Technology Assessment, while cautioning that the probability of effective use is much
lower than for nuclear weapons, concluded in 1993 that, pound for pound, biological weapons might be more devastating for
human populations than nuclear weapons (OTA 1993, 52). Even though the probability of effective use is low, the enormous
magnitude may instantly make the use of biological weapons a credible threat. United States policy makers certainly take the threat
seriously. In an oft-repeated statement on the risk of biological warfare, the Office of Technology Assessment also noted that the
distribution of 100kg of anthrax in the air over a city could kill up to three million people (BBC 1998). As with chemical weapons,
while defensive measures can mitigate the terminal impact of use, in cases of asymmetric capabilities, the threat to use biological
weapons could be especially credible. Also similarly to chemical weapons, it is the fear of the impact of biological weapons, even
more than a rational cost-benefit analysis that makes them important for international politics. The possibility of mass disease in the
homeland or among troops deployed abroad, is frightening (Mauroni 2003, XV). This alternative view of chemical and biological
weapons leads to the following hypothesis.

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US-EU Bioterror - Extensions

International cooperation solves bioterrrorism


Marc L. Ostfield , Senior Advisor on Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security September 14, 2005 Remarks at NATO
Conference on Elements of Combating WMD Terrorism Warsaw, Poland, “Intersectoral and International Cooperation on
Combating Bioterrorism” http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/56614.htm
Combating Bioterrorism Benefits Global Health Even if nations do not see completely eye to eye on the importance of
combating bioterrorism, there is an additional and very compelling argument for sustained and enhanced international
collaboration on these efforts. The essential pillars I have described hreat awareness, prevention and protection,
surveillance and detection, response and recovery, have the added benefit of simultaneously strengthening global health
protection overall. Virtually everything we do to defend against bioterrorism improving disease surveillance and
detection systems, enhancing cross-border communication, facilitating international laboratory cooperation, and developing
mechanisms for international sharing of medical countermeasures, for example benefit all of us in the event of a
naturally-occurring outbreak or a bioterror attack. As the growing concerns about avian and pandemic influenza make
clear, international cooperation is absolutely critical to any effective strategy for national and global preparedness,
prevention, containment, and response. Awareness of this fortunate synergy of efforts is not new. After the SARS outbreak in
2003, for example, a CIA-sponsored panel of experts concluded that "the early containment of SARS in the U.S. was greatly
facilitated by existing bioterrorism preparedness measures." Both naturally-occurring outbreaks and bioterrorism point the
way toward a clear recognition of the complexity of the health, economic, political, and security threats posed by disease and
the need for strong links between health, agriculture, and security sectors, and between domestic and international actions. A
great challenge of the 21st century is to prevent the deliberate use of disease as a weapon from killing millions, destabilizing
economies and disrupting societies. The great security opportunity of this new century is to eliminate massively lethal
epidemics of infectious disease by ensuring that biodefense humanity’s timeless struggle to prevent and defeat disease is far
more potent than the inevitable attempts to create and use bioweapons.

Coordination on terrorism now


Dalia Dassa Kaye, political scientist and a member of the research staff in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND,
Winter 03/04, Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East, Washington Quarterly,
The common threat of international terrorism, particularly after September 11, 2001, has produced some robust
transatlantic cooperation. According to a 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund poll as well as
the Transatlantic Trends 2003 poll, Americans and Europeans rank international terrorism as the most serious threat to
national security. This opinion helps explain the widespread European support for the U.S. operation to remove the
Taliban in Afghanistan as well as strengthened intelligence gathering and sharing in the transatlantic community. Bilateral
U.S.-European working groups now meet regularly to coordinate and improve law enforcement measures to contain the
movement of terrorists and limit their sources of funding. After September 11, 2001, the member nations of the
European Union moved uncharacteristically quickly to harmonize their extradition procedures, and Europe is currently
in the process of drafting a treaty on extradition with the United States despite ongoing concerns about the U.S. death
penalty. The common threat, particularly the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack, is likely to bind the United States and
Europe in common cause for many years to come, even if approaches to the threat are likely to differ.4

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US-EU Relations Solves War - General


US/EU relations prevent global conflict.
Asmus 2003 (Ronald D.; Senior Fellow - Council on Foreign Relations) Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance" Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct
l/n
Meeting in Washington in the spring of 1999, NATO leaders pledged to recast the transatlantic relationship to make sure it is
as good at dealing with the problems of the next 50 years as it was in dealing with those of the last. September 11 has opened
eyes in both the United States and Europe to those problems and may have heralded the beginning of a dangerous century. It
is clearly desirable for both sides of the Atlantic to coalesce in meeting the challenges of this new era. If major instability
erupts in either the region lying between Europe and Russia or in the greater Middle East, both the United States and
Europe are likely to be drawn in to deal with it. Their ability to do so successfully will be much greater if they find a way
to rebuild their alliance around a common framework and strategy. There is little doubt that if leaders of the caliber of
Truman and his European counterparts existed today, they would be setting a new strategic direction and rebuilding the
alliance to meet precisely these challenges. Whether President Bush, Jacques Chirac, and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder are up to the task remains to be seen. Progress may very well require regime change on one or both sides of the
Atlantic. One thing, however, is clear: if today's leaders fail to achieve such progress, both the United States and Europe
will be worse off. Transatlantic strategic cooperation is one reason why the second half of the twentieth century was so
much better than the first. If the United States and Europe can agree on a common strategy to meet the challenges of the
new era, the world will be much the better for it.

US-EU relations prevents war


John O'Sullivan, editor of The National Interest, March 2004,
The report's starting point -- that U.S.-European relations are extremely important -- is undeniable. A united Western alliance
would shape world institutions in line with values and practices rooted in liberty and democracy and coax rising powers
such as India and China into going along with this international status quo for the foreseeable future. Indeed, this is
already happening as China accepts liberal economic rules at home in order to enter institutions such as the G7 and the
World Trade Organization. By contrast, a disunited West would tempt such powers to play off Europe and America
against each other and foster a global jockeying for power not unlike the maneuvering between a half-dozen great powers
that led to 1914.

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US-EU Relations Solves War - General


Relations solve European balancing and nuclear war
Mearsheimer 2001 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of
Chicago, "The Future of the American Pacifier", Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct., Ebsco)
Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition among
the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would go from benign bipolarity to
unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany
would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In effect, they would all become
great powers, making Europe multipolar and raising the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves. And
Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of worry. Looking at Europe today, such a
forecast might appear far-fetched, but that is because few are prepared to consider how radically the European security
environment will be transformed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Once the major European powers are forced to provide for
their awn defense, suspicions among them are certain to grow, thereby triggering the familiar dynamics of great-power
competition. The kind of trouble that might lie ahead for Europe can be illustrated by considering how particular German
measures aimed at enhancing its security might nevertheless lead to instability. If the United States removed its security
umbrella from over western Europe, Germany would likely move to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. This would be the
case both because nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent, as Germany's governing elites recognized during the Cold
War, but also because it would be the best way to escape potential coercion by its three nuclear-armed neighbors. During the
proliferation process, however, these neighbors would probably contemplate using force to prevent Germany from going
nuclear, and the result could be a major crisis. Without the American military on its territory, furthermore, Germany
would probably increase the size of its army and certainly would be more inclined to try to dominate central Europe.
Why? Because Germany would fear Russian control of that critically important buffer zone between them. Of course,
Russia would have the same fear in reverse, which would likely lead to a serious security competition between them for
control of central Europe. France, meanwhile, would undoubtedly view such behavior by Germany with alarm and take
measures to protect itself—for example, by increasing its defense spending and establishing closer relations with Russia.
Germany, of course, would perceive these actions as hostile and respond with measures of its own.

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US-EU Trade Solves LL


US-EU trade relations are crucial to prevent terrorism, environmental
destruction, disease and economic collapse
Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, 2003,
"Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," Foreign Affairs, July-August 2003, lexis
DECENT DIPLOMACY The easiest way to overcome the recent troubles would be for the United States and Europe to
manage controversial high-stakes issues delicately while continuing to work together on other subjects that matter to
both sides. This is how the Western alliance has functioned for most of its history -- protecting core cooperation in European
and nonmilitary matters, while disagreeing about "out of area" intervention and, sometimes, nuclear strategy. Today this
lowest-common-denominator policy should still unite nearly all Western leaders. The transatlantic partnership remains the
most important diplomatic relationship in the world, and so the allies have much to protect. Together, the United States
and Europe account for 70 percent of world trade. The success of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations -- which
promises much for the developing world -- could contribute greatly to long-term global security. Ongoing cooperation on
intelligence and law enforcement is indispensable to successful counterterrorism. An expanded NATO is now widely
recognized as a force for democracy and stability. Western governments have unanimously authorized a dozen
humanitarian interventions over the last ten years. They work together on many other issues, including human rights,
environmental policy, disease control, and financial regulation. Failure to cauterize and contain disputes such as that
over Iraq threatens all of this cooperation, as would any deliberate U.S. strategy of trying to weaken or divide international
organizations like the UN, the EU, or NATO.

US-EU relations solve terrorism, prolif, trade, and democracy


Doug Bereuter, president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and John Lis, former director of the assembly's Defense and
Security Committee in Brussels, Winter 03/04, Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship, Washington Quarterly,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366003322596972
On both sides, some have concluded from the recent dispute that Europe should define itself in opposition to the United
States to constrain U.S. power, only bolstering the case of a few who advocate that the United States obstruct efforts to form a
united Europe. Yet, the reality is that ors NATO have a future in out of area missions? Will the European Union's plans for an
independent military force be a threat to the transatlantic relationship? Should the EU have a planning cell within NATO or
not? Will the American space program collide with Europe's evolving space policy? Will China be able to buy arms from the
Europeans over the objections of the U.S. government? All of these are relevant and important questions, to be sure. But with
the backdrop of the global war on terror, it does indeed feel — as one participant noted after the session "The Global War
on Terror: Transatlantic Challenges and Transatlantic Cooperation" — as though we are rearranging the deckchairs on the
Titanic. The existential question is whether we are engaged in a clash of civilizations, as historian Samuel Huntington
famously has described it, or in a war against a particularly vicious and potent form of terrorism. What emerged from the
Wilton Park discussions is that while terrorists on one level operate in a highly globalized environment in cyberspace, we
do have the power to pre-empt that capacity. We can fight a high-tech war against them, using all the means of modern
technology, from satellites to track cell phones to cyberspace policing to shut down Web sites. If we in the West are not to
hang separately, if we are in a war, surely we should cooperate. The question is how far are we prepared — if at all — to
impinge on the civil liberties that make our civilization what it is in order to save it.

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US-EU key to Indo-Pak


US-EU cooperation solves conflicts over Kashmir
News Network International, 10-9-2003, US, EU Urged To Facilitate Negotiations On Kashmir, http://www.jammu-
kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20031009a.html
Executive Director of Kashmiri American Council, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai has urged the United States and European
Union to help resolve the lingering Kashmir issue. He was addressing the Kashmir Conference organized by the International
Council of Human Rights in Brussels, KMS reported. He said, Kashmir issue involves the life and future of 13 million
people of the land. Because of its impact on relations between India and Pakistan, it directly effects the peace and stability of
the South Asian sub-continent, he said. He maintained that due to Indian obduracy and world apathy, the issue remained
unresolved so far, otherwise, the dispute was not insoluble. He said, Kashmir issue can be resolved only in accordance with
the will of the people, which can be ascertained through free and impartial plebiscite, guaranteed by United Nations
Security Council resolutions and prominently championed by the United States, Britain and other democratic states. He
urged the United States and the European Union to support Kashmiris get their birth right. He also urged them to facilitate
negotiations on Kashmir because bilateral talks in past have failed to produce any results.

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US-EU key to Central Asian stability


US-EU cooperation key to Central Asian stability
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2-17-2005, U.S.-EU Cooperation on Reform in Eurasia,
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/42562.htm
The United States and the European Union (EU) share a common goal of promoting successful transitions to democracy
and market-based economies in Eurasia. We share a common goal in combating threats to regional stability and the
transition process: crime and corruption; illicit narcotics; weapons of mass destruction; and trafficking of persons. We
coordinate our policy messages and our assistance programs in order to maximize their impact. Recent successful examples of
U.S.-EU cooperation in promoting democratization, free media, respect for human rights and key economic reforms include:
* In Georgia, the U.S. and EU have worked closely together to support a smooth transition for that country's new leadership in
the wake of the "Revolution of the Roses." We continue to work together to support the aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia to further integrate into the Euro-Atlantic family. The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy and NATO’s
Partnership for Peace promote the values we share in common with Europe, and build deeper connections between the nations
of the South Caucasus and the more established democracies of the West; * In Ukraine, we joined forces to promote free
and fair local and presidential elections in 2004, which contributed to the Ukrainian people’s rejection of electoral fraud and to
the historic repeat vote on December 26. In Belarus, the EU and United States have coordinated at an unprecedented level,
including by conducting a joint diplomatic mission to Minsk in the Spring of 2004 to send a clear and united message on
democratization, and by enacting travel restrictions on those officials implicated in election malfeasance and human rights
violations. In Moldova, we also coordinated travel restrictions against the leadership of the Transnistrian separatists, and are
promoting a free and fair campaign and parliamentary election on March 6; * The U.S. and EU recognize the challenge to
security and stability of the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions posed by the unresolved conflicts in the area of Eurasia. We
support the territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan and cooperate to facilitate international efforts to achieve
peaceful political settlements to the conflicts over Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh; * In
Central Asia, the United States and European Union work together to support democratic and economic transition,
protection of human rights, promoting good governance/rule of law, increased regional trade, and humanitarian and human
development. We also cooperate in the effort to combat trade in opium and heroin from Afghanistan—a serious threat
to peace and stability and a growing public health concern in the region. The U.S., European Commission, and EU member
states, working with the United Nations agencies, closely coordinate our assistance programs to boost Central Asian
states’ capabilities to meet this threat. U.S. and EU assistance efforts have provided much-needed training, equipment,
physical infrastructure, and more effective government institutions.

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US-EU key to Disease


US-EU cooperation key to solve disease pandemics
Robert E. Hunter, a senior fellow at RAND, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, 2003, Washington Quarterly, “Europe’s Leverage”
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366003322596945?cookieSet=1
More generally, Western security, as broadly understood, faces a wide range of actual and potential challenges where
nonmilitary instruments are important. Preventing communicable diseases from coming to a nation’s shores, especially in a
world of easy and frequent travel, is one such case; less well understood is the value of promoting health in countries where its
absence can help produce conflict, support for terrorism, and social and economic breakdown—potential security as well as
humanitarian concerns that can operate beyond the borders of the immediately affected country or region. Health is not
alone; the full range of issues that cluster under the rubrics of development and environment, broadly understood, are part of
this canon. Strategic Partnership to Shape the Future These points may seem far afield from the original discussion of what
power and influence Europe can wield, how Europe relates to the United States, and how seriously the United States should
take Europe, but they are not. Indeed, the greatest potential for agreement and reinforcement of action in the transatlantic
world falls in the area of advance effort, of trying to prevent the emergence of threats in common to the United States
and Europe. The United States and the European states should be looking for means to augment traditional political-
military security cooperation, that is, the mutual harnessing and rationalizing to common ends of the military power on the
two sides of the Atlantic, primarily through NATO. Even though that cooperation continues to be important to both sides, they
should also be looking for ways to build on the obvious and ineluctable intertwining of their respective economies, shared
leadership of the global economy, and interests and capabilities in a wide range of third areas, especially health, education,
development, promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as other aspects of society, nation, and
institution building.

Lack of cooperation makes diseases inevitable


James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, 2005 “New directions for transatlantic security
cooperation” Survival Global Politics and Strategy, Ingenta Connect
Yet, if the immediate prospects for transatlantic defence cooperation are bleak, the arguments in favour of a common
approach remain compelling. America's failure to stabilise Iraq, when contrasted with the Alliance's greater successes in the
Balkans, and even Afghanistan, has underscored the limits of unilateralism. Across much of the globe, the continued
fragmentation of nation states, the increase in ungoverned space, and the unwanted immigration, disease, crime and terrorism that
these conditions breed continue to compel attention. If the United States cannot count on European support to defend South Korea
or Taiwan, neither is that support essential. In confronting the challenges of stabilisation, reconstruction and nation-building, however,
there is no alternative to collective action.

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US-EU key to Bird Flu


Multilateral efforts are key to solve bird flu
UN.org, 6-2006, U.S.-EU Summit Declaration: Promoting Peace, Human Rights and Democracy Worldwide,
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/EU-US_Summit_Delcaration_June2006.pdf
We reiterate our support for multilateral efforts to improve prevention and combat global health threats such as the spread of
pandemics, including HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, and other communicable diseases like SARS and Hepatitis. We
agree that priority should be given to promoting effective control measures in animal health as a means to reduce
outbreaks of H5N1 in birds. We will further increase regional and global cooperation between states, international
organizations and civil society in mitigating and preparing for a pandemic, to which input by the International
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza is welcome. We will further improve coordination of our response to natural
disasters that have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

US-EU cooperation key to contain bird flu pandemics


EuropeanInstitute.org, 2-1-2006, European Health and Consumer Protection Policies: Toward Cooperation with the U.S. on
Nutrition and the Avian Flu, http://www.europeaninstitute.org/content.php?section=biotech
Europe and the U.S. now face many of the same public health challenges, including issues related to nutrition and physical
activity, and the threat of infectious diseases such as avian influenza. Public health officials on both sides of the Atlantic
could benefit from increased communication as they work to respond to these challenges. As part of its Forum on
Biotechnology, Health and Consumer Protection, The European Institute conducted a special discussion with Robert
Madelin, Director-General for Health and Consumer Protection of the European Commission, who addressed health problems
caused by obesity, the need for coordinated public responses to the spread of avian influenza, and the emerging risks and
promises of nanotechnology. Each issue, Mr. Madelin stated, offers a platform on which transatlantic cooperation can be
strengthened. With obesity rates in Europe approaching those in the U.S., both could do more to share best practices to
promote appropriate life skills in populations where obesity can be a greater health risk than cigarette smoking. On the avian
flu and the threat of a pandemic flu, Mr. Madelin noted that the leadership and processes established at the recent Beijing
conference will maximize the chances that when the pandemic happens, vaccines will be produced in critical mass as fast as
possible, and its impact both on lives and on livelihoods minimized. He also stressed the importance of regulation in the
emerging field of nanotechnology, and the need for government regulators in this area to keep pace with scientific advances, to
"talk to each other before we know what we think." John B. Reynolds, Senior Manager for Government and Trade Affairs of
The Iams Company/P&G Pet Health and Nutrition, served as Chair of the Forum.

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US-EU  NMD
NMDs are inevitable, but won’t work without US-EU cooperation
Philip H. Gordon, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, 2-2001, Bush, Missile Defence and
the Atlantic Alliance, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2001/02defense_gordon/2001survival.pdf
Intensive allied discussions of the missile defence issue over the past year have helped to narrow some of the big gaps that
have divided the alliance on this issue. As a result of these discussions, Europeans have a better understanding of the
reality of the growing ballistic-missile threat (and the options for dealing with it), and Americans have a better appreciation
of the need to move deliberately and fully consider the potential international implications of a deployment. As the previous
sections make clear, however, the transatlantic gaps remain large. While it is possible that a set of external developments —
the emergence of a clear and realistic missile and WMD threat that would persuade Europeans of the need for active defences,
or alternatively very positive developments in Iran, Iraq and North Korea that would persuade Americans that they are not
needed — the more likely scenario is that Europeans and Americans continue to disagree on the net assessment of the
need for national missile defence over the next several years. In this context, how should they proceed? Most essential is for
all allies — and in particular the Americans — to realise that it is highly desirable, if not imperative, that Americans and
Europeans act in concert. At the most basic level, given the current US need for radars in the UK and Greenland, NMD
may simply fail to work if the United States does not get cooperation from Europe. This is also true for any eventual
boost-phase systems, which would also need Europeans to supply bases, ports, or airfields.

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US-EU  NMD
Concessions to EU will exchange with full-scale NMDs
David Malone, president of the International Peace Academy in New York, and Ramesh Thakur, vice rector of the United
Nations University in Tokyo, 2-11-2001, Trade NMD for the CTBT, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20010311a2.html
There can be little doubt that the Bush administration does not incline naturally toward multilateral diplomacy and a treaty-
based international security system. Nevertheless, it will not wish to alienate close allies on more than one or two issues at a
time and may soon find itself engaged in give-and-take with them. Its top priority appears to be the further development
and eventual deployment of a national missile defense system, a U.S. idea that has long unsettled not only Russia and
China, but also key European allies and Canada. It could well decide, among other measures, that ratification of the CTBT
had become useful to reassure allies and foes alike. Regardless of their views on NMD, U.S. allies and foes now need to
consider their own strategies. Indefinitely stamping their feet on an issue that may be nonnegotiable in essence but negotiable
in specifics and at the margins, would be self-defeating. NMD is not something the allies, Moscow or Beijing can stop.
However, they could well influence the context within which NMD will be developed, its ultimate scope and its detailed
aims. Their eventual consent can also be exchanged against concessions from Washington on related or different issues.

US and EU are diverging over issues like climate change, preventing NMDs
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, May 2001, The False
Crisis Over the Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, Lexis
This distaste for American values is matched by concern that the United States acts like a bull in the global china shop,
causing a strategic split with Europe over matters such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and national missile
defense (NMD). To these Europeans, America's reluctance to join the global land-mines ban, the International Criminal
Court (ICC), and the Kyoto Protocol on global warming evidences selfish unilateralism. Its fixation with "states of concern"
(formerly known as "rogues") is at best naive, at worst -- in the case of sanctions against Iraq -- "genocidal." Europeans are
skeptical of American support for European integration, especially in defense. And they fear that the United States and
Europe are fated to economic warfare as trade disputes spiral out of control. Together, the "values gap" and the "strategic
split" form the core of a newly fashionable argument advanced by European elites -- and reflected by their American
counterparts -- that the United States and Europe are growing apart. But a closer look shows that, far from diverging, the
United States and Europe are converging culturally, economically, and with some effort, strategically. This false crisis makes it
more difficult to deal with those differences that do exist and reap the potential of a partnership that can benefit Americans and
Europeans far into the future.

US-EU cooperation allows for NMDs


Ivo H. Daalder, former director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, and James M. Goldgeier, former director
of Russian affairs in the National Security Council, 2001, Survival, “Putting Europe First”
Never comfortable with the idea of deploying defences against ballistic missile attacks, and given the state of the existing
technology, President Clinton deferred a decision on deploying NMD to his successor.’° But even if the technology remains
uncertain, the Bush administration will have to decide the issue early in its tenure in order to be in a position to deploy even a
limited system by 2006—07, by which time a state like North Korea or Iraq could possess the capability to conduct a small-
scale missile attack. Top officials have suggested that the administration will decide to proceed with deployment, but that still
leaves the president to decide what kind of system to deploy and how to deal with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which bars the deployment of any system he might favour. Rice has called the ABM Treaty a ‘relic’ of the Cold War and
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has dismissed it as ‘ancient history’.” Much of Europe, meanwhile, has been nervous
about being left out of a deployment decision, about Russia’s adverse reaction, about the consequences for multilateral
efforts to stem weapons proliferation, and about a scenario in which America can defend itself but not its allies from
missile attacks.’2 In addition to avoiding a serious rift in the alliance, there is also a more practical need to garner some
European support for an American missile defence programme: a serious system will require upgrading radars in
Greenland and the United Kingdom, which means that, at the very least, officials in Copenhagen and London will have to
back the effort.

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US-EU Relations - Turns Case - Climate

US-EU cooperation is key to successful climate change policies – now is the key
time
Julianne Smith, director of the CSIS Europe Program, 2008, “The Transatlantic Climate Change Challenge” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2007-2008, l/n
Both sides of the Atlantic appear to be moving away from their disparate steadfast convictions on the best means to
address climate change. Political elites are increasingly promoting a hybrid approach that will draw on technological
advances and some international regulation. Despite such achievements, Europe and the United States have much more
to do in and out of government to tackle the problem, especially if they have hopes of launching a major effort for an effective
successor to the Kyoto Protocol in any form. First and foremost, Europeans will need to accept that the most viable post-Kyoto
Protocol regime in the eyes of Americans will probably be the one that resembles the protocol the least. Americans might be
warming up to the idea of caps, but binding international limits are unlikely to attract the support of the U.S. government,
regardless of which presidential candidate wins the next election. William Pizer, a senior fellow at Resources for the Future,
outlines five characteristics of a future climate regime that would win the support of a wide variety of policymakers, especially
those in the United States: it must defer to domestic interests, need not focus on all countries, must include technology
development, must engage the developing countries, and must stress evaluating action after the fact. 30 On the other side of
the Atlantic, Americans need to find ways to capitalize on the momentum that is starting to build on this issue. One of the
unique ways to do this is to pull non-climate change communities into the debate to make this challenge a key component of
U.S. foreign policy. To date, a handful of studies have worked to bridge the gap between the national security and climate
change communities so that global warming receives the same attention that other global challenges receive. Climate change
will have major ramifications for migration, force posturing, failed states, and federal resource allocation. The sooner national
governments treat climate change as a national security issue, the faster it will receive the intellectual and financial resources it
merits. The two sides of the Atlantic must also jointly examine the economic implications of a failure to act. Most American
skeptics argue that the United States will risk economic damage by cutting its carbon emissions, particularly if others do not
follow suit. Others, such as Sir Nicholas Stern, author of the infamous "Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,"
make the exact opposite point, that the economic costs of acting on global warming are far lower than the cost of inaction. 31
Although Stern's report has been criticized for its methodology (using an incorrect discount rate in its calculations), its
overarching thesis merits more discussion and research, particularly if Europeans have hopes of shrinking the pool of U.S.
skeptics. Any viable solution to the challenge of climate change rests on the ability of Europe and the United States to
combine their strengths, experiences, and positions into a post--Kyoto Protocol framework. Ultimately, the United States
will eventually need to agree to some form of emissions caps. Because that appears unlikely in the remaining months of the
Bush administration, Europeans will need to focus on short- and medium-term strategies. In the coming months, Europeans
and Americans should work to increase the tempo of their dialogue, bring in new communities, continue to dissuade the
skeptics, and capitalize on the fact that public opinion is primed for action. In the medium term, Europeans should be
preparing to engage the next U.S. president on this issue, with the hope of putting it at the top of the transatlantic agenda within
the first 100 days in office.

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US-EU Relations - Turns Case - Climate


Turns Case- destroys cooperation which is key to solve
Atlantic Council '7 [Feb 5-6, Transatlantic Cooperation for Clean Air: Summary of a Conference,
http://www.acus.org/docs/0702-Transatlantic_Cooperation_for_Clean_Air.pdf]
Despite differences in the focus of past policies, the development and commercialization of new technology is central for
both the U.S. and the EU. It is agreed that the U.S. and the EU have much to gain from cooperation. This collaboration could
be based upon a set of principles created by analysts during this dialogue. Recognizing that climate change and air quality must
be dealt with as part of a larger set of issues will allow for more collaboration. Two important areas of cooperation could be
the research and development of necessary technologies and outreach to the developing world. The U.S. and EU should
coordinate efforts to engage developing energy consuming nations.

Turns Case
IHT 3/26/'8 [UN climate change scientist: Tariffs on goods from big polluters spell trouble,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/26/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Climate-Change.php]
BRUSSELS, Belgium: Unilateral sanctions against major polluters by countries applying stricter environmental standards
would create serious political problems, the chief U.N. climate scientist warned Wednesday. Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the U.N.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which shared last year's Nobel Peace Prize with former U.S. Vice President Al Gore,
said applying import tariffs on goods from countries that do not comply with low carbon technologies needs to be avoided. "This issue
would be politically very divisive, you'd create a lot of political problems if certain groups of countries were to take these
actions," Pachauri told journalists at the European Parliament, where he met members of the assembly's group on climate change.
Pachauri responded to a warning by the European Union that the United States, China and other major polluters could face
consequences if they do not sign up to an international agreement on fighting global warming by next year.

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US-EU relations are key to prevent climate change


Robert Lempert, Senior Scientist at RAND, june, 2001, THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR VOLUME XXXVI, No. 2,
Finding Transatlantic Common Ground on Climate Change?
Whether to retain, modify or replace the Kyoto framework looms as a central diplomatic problem because the Protocol has
become a focus of opposition for many and a symbol of hard won progress for others. The Framework Conventional and
Protocol have achieved a number of important successes to date, including an international consensus on long-term goals and
on an initial process for modifying climate policy over time, an acceptance of the principles of binding emissions reduction
targets and the use of market-based mechanisms for meeting them, and an initial infrastructure for the monitoring necessary to
support any action on cli- mate change. Thus, building on the current structures may be less disruptive than attempting to begin
again with a clean slate. The existing treaty language is cer- tainly sufficiently broad to accommodate a wide range of possible
interpretations and revisions. Given US opposition, any conceivable climate change agreement will include significant
modifications to the emissions caps, through some combi- nation of weakening or delaying the target, expanding the definition
of what counts as emission reductions, or some variant of the safety valve. But the substance of the differences between the
EU, US and others can be reduced if negotiators com- bine changes in the emission caps with new commitments to other
actions directly tied to the other key milestones. There are certainly entrenched ideologies and economic interests on all
sides of the issue, but any necessary, serious economic dislocations due to cli- mate change policy remain largely in the
future. Thus, by retaining emissions con- trols, but balancing them as only one component of a well-balanced, robust climate
policy, the EU and US may be able to create a framework that will allow them, and the rest of the world, to agree on the
key near-term actions needed to prepare effectively for a wide range of plausible climate-change futures.

Lack of US-EU cooperation undermines climate change prevention efforts


Robert Lempert, Senior Scientist at RAND, june, 2001, THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR VOLUME XXXVI, No. 2,
Finding Transatlantic Common Ground on Climate Change?
At present, there appears to be little consensus on climate change policy. Most Europeans favour the Kyoto framework.
The Bush administration’s emerging cli- mate action plan will not. Failure to converge on climate policy could put an
endur- ing strain on US-EU relations, derail much of the progress made to date in responding to climate change, and
make it more difficult to fashion an effective re- sponse in the future.

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Neg Blocks

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2NC Overview
Disad outweighs –

A. Probability – loss of institutional ties like the WTO means countries have less restraint on nuclear triggers – means other
tensions could escalate easier – that’s Copley

B. Turns case – trade wars kill American competitiveness and access to other markets – killing our hegemony and cooperation
on warming

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AT: EU Pessimistic
1. The EU is currently discussing mutual climate changes policies that would benefit the common interest and is optimistic that these
will occur under the new president
And 2. they predict Bush to advocate climate control.
Associated Press, 7/8/08, Bush, G-8 make progress on climate change,
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5iDhfdxlthyulzNbmR8KGjPKvNzaAD91PO3D00 [SD]

TOYAKO, Japan (AP) — President Bush and other world leaders made gradual progress Tuesday on climate change, but finalizing a
long-term global agreement on what to do about the fevered planet remains elusive. Climate change, the focus of this year's meeting of
industrialized nations, is just one on a long list of global issues — from Iran's nuclear weapons program to missile defense — that
Bush is trying to push forward at the Group of Eight summit. With his popularity low at home and fewer than 200 days left in office,
Bush is methodically promoting his issues, seemingly ready to accept incremental progress rather than pursuing eye-catching
breakthroughs. The G-8 endorsed cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases by 50 percent by 2050 and called for emitters to set
midterm reduction targets. The White House quickly hailed the G-8 declaration as a validation of Bush's approach. "This represents
substantial progress from last year," said Dan Price, the president's deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs.
Price said the G-8 acknowledged that it alone cannot effectively address climate change — that contributions from all major
economies are required — a position Bush has argued repeatedly. Price also said the declaration struck here Tuesday reflects the sense
the development and deployment of clean technologies in developing nations is crucial — another thing that Bush has been pushing.
The president long has insisted that major emerging economies like China and India be included in any global plan to cut emissions.
Bush scored a small victory in getting the other big-polluting major economy nations to agree to attend a meeting Wednesday on the
sidelines of a summit. It's unclear, however, whether the heads of state at Wednesday's session will "finalize" a long-term goal for
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, as Bush predicted back in September.

3. Bush is perceived as moving towards Europe on climate.


Chicago Tribune 6/15/’8 [With Bush near exit, Europe's ire softens, ln]
Even the tone has changed. In an interview with the Times of London, the president was applauded for adopting language "much less
jarring, more conciliatory than it once was." "His humor is self-deprecating," the paper said. This is a marked change from the
characterizations that had become so familiar. The "Toxic Texan" with his "cowboy diplomacy" seems to many over here a distant
memory. And on his last trip to Europe, Bush might just have achieved something that had hitherto eluded him. With his newfound
support for climate-change policy, his emphasis on a multilateral approach to Iran and his commitment, however belated, to
engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bush comes across as being constructive: a man to do business with. He looks like a
statesman.

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AT: Long Timeframe


1. the aff’s cuts on carbon emissions and implementation won’t be fully developed before 2010 – link timeframe is irrelevant
2. European leaders will all stand up to the US Trojan horse immediately because there’s no political support for the Bush
administration - means sanctions would happen – that’s Time Magazine
And, they say new president solves the link – this is our argument and a direct contradiction with their non-unique’s – it proves that
the EU is optimistic about US Co2 regulations – the upcoming election is the warrant – means Bush’s indirect support of US cap and
trade revitalizes the link to EU backlash

Now their #3 – they say our uniqueness isn’t predictive – that’s not true – Boucher evidence clearly indicates EU perceptions that the
US will engage the EU with proposals for carbon regulations – this is answered above

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AT: Incentives Increasing Now


1. Our uniqueness evidence postdates and assumes increases in incentives – the EU is now optimistic that future presidential
candidates will move past Bush cap and trade – that’s Boucher
2. The aff is a voluntary incentive – insures European tariffs.
Thomas L. Brewer, Associate Professor at Georgetown University, Washington, DC and Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS), June '8 [The Trade and Climate Change Joint Agenda CEPS Working Document No. 295/June
2008, http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1673.]
Issues have arisen about whether provisions in the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 2007 are compatible with the WTO plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA), to which the US is a signatory (NFTC, 2007, pp. 14-17). A key issue is whether provisions such as those requiring US
government agencies to purchase ‘low greenhouse gas emitting’ vehicles and to take into account energy efficiency standards in their
purchasing decisions could violate WTO non-discrimination principles or constitute disguised protectionism. There are several reasons to believe there would not be
such problems. In particular Article XXIII of the GPA, like Article XX of the GATT, allows exceptions to national treatment on the grounds of protection of “human, animal, or plant life….” The conclusion of the NFTC was that the provisions of the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Act “do not appear to be in violation” of
the GPA. However, it also noted that “government procurement program specifications are more likely to qualify for GPA exceptions if governments demonstrate their intent to engage multilaterally” (NFTC, 2007, p. 17). As for other countries, since only 12 countries plus the EU are signatories to the GPA, its provisions are irrelevant
to most countries. Yet, since the signatories do include for instance major trading countries - China, the EU and Japan, in particular - there could be GPA-related issues that arise. An extensive analysis by Van Asselt, van der Grijp and Oosterhuis (2006) examines a variety of issues about the intersection of climate-trade issues in relation
to the GPA. 3. Sectoral Issues: International Aviation and Maritime Shipping The international aviation and maritime shipping industries present quite different kinds of issues for the joint climate-trade agenda – for two reasons. First, there are already disputes involving both industries because of their greenhouse gas
emissions – an international aviation dispute that has entered onto the agenda of US-EU relations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and domestic legal actions within the US that target both the international aviation and maritime shipping industries. Second, the two industries have always been outside the
multilateral climate regime and the multilateral trade regime. Among the key issues, therefore, are whether, when, and how they can be or should be brought into either or both of the two multilateral regimes. These two sets of issues – concerning disputes and concerning their positions outside the multilateral regimes – are considered in
turn. 3.1 International and Domestic Disputes The first international trade-climate dispute has already begun, at least informally - namely the US government’s objections to the EU plan to cover aviation in its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). It is important to note that this is not a formal dispute brought within the context of
the WTO dispute settlement process. Rather, the basis of the US objection is the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944, which established the system of bi-lateral agreements that regulate airline services and which is administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). At issue, in part, is Article 15 which
includes the following provision: “No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon” (Chicago Convention, 1944). 8 US, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel,
Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, and Switzerland. THE TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE JOINT AGENDA | 7 While the Office of the US Trade Representative has not made a formal public statement on the issue, the US Federal Aviation Administration, the US Ambassador to the EU, and a representative of the
US airline industry association have been vocal about the issue. An unnamed US government representative said the EU had decided to go ahead with the plan “despite strong objections raised by the US” (Financial Times, 2006d; also see ICTSD Bridges, 2007). A statement by the US Ambassador to the EU, Boyden Gray, in
September 2007, was particularly direct: “We don’t think Europe has the authority to do it….The Europeans are confident of their legal authority and people on the other side are equally confident of their position. It sounds like a lawsuit to me. I don’t see how it’s going to get resolved politically” (International Herald Tribune, 2007). A
representative of the Air Transport Association of America similarly observed “If [the Europeans] persist, there will no doubt be a legal battle” (ICTSD Bridges, 2007); this comment followed a meeting of the ICAO in October 2007. The meeting reversed a 2004 resolution that had supported regional emissions trading schemes. As a
result, at the 2007 meeting 42 countries represented by the EU and the European Civil Aviation Conference formally stated a ‘reservation’ to indicate that they would go ahead with the plan to include aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Whether it can be resolved politically remains to be seen. Importantly, the application of
the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme to the aviation industry would not come into force until 2010, 2011 or possibly even later, with international flights into and out of the EU possibly not included until a year after the initiation of the system for flights within the EU. This would mean transatlantic flights involving the US would not be
included until 2011 or 2012, long after a new US administration is in office. (For more on the case, see Council on Foreign Relations, 2007; Eurarchiv, 2007; Financial Times, 2006a, 2006b, 2006, 2006d, 2007a, 2007b; US Mission to the EU, 2007). There have also been legal cases within the US concerning the greenhouse gas
emissions of both the international aviation industry and maritime shipping industry. Two separate but closelyrelated petitions were filed with the US national government’s EPA in October 2007. One concerning aviation was filed by the states of California, Connecticut, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania, the cities of New York and
Washington, DC, a regional air quality district in California, and several environmental organisations. On the basis of a Supreme Court decision that requires the EPA to consider carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air pollutants, the petition asks the EPA to apply regulations to all planes, including those of foreign airlines,
that land or take off from airports in the US - regulations that would reduce emissions through greater fuel efficiency, improved aircraft designs, and cleaner fuels. A similar petition concerning international maritime shipping was filed at the same time (ICTSD, Bridges BioRes, 2007c, 2007d). 3.2 Coverage of the Multilateral
Climate and Trade Regimes Perhaps most importantly for the place of the international aviation and maritime shipping industries in the future climate change regime is the decision by the government of Norway to take a leadership role in an effort to include both industries in a the post-2012 climate regime. That effort has included
an international workshop on the issue just prior to the Bali conference (IISD, 2007; Norway, 2007). Since before the UNFCCC entered into force, there has been concern about the increasing contributions of GHGs of the two industries, and in fact in recent years the emissions of the two industries have been increasing as
fast as or faster than any other sectors. From 1990 to 2004, international aviation emissions increased by 34% and international maritime emissions increased by 43%. In recent years, aviation emissions have accounted for about 2% of total world GHG emissions and
international maritime shipping has accounted for about 3%. The 5% 8 | THOMAS L. BREWER of the world total for the combination of the two industries places them ahead of all but 5 national economies.9 However, technical problems with measuring their
emissions and allocating them between domestic and international trips, together with political obstacles, prevented the industries’ emissions from being included in Kyoto Protocol targets. Further, in the national government and thus UNFCCC greenhouse gas reporting
systems, the bunker fuels used for aviation and shipping are not included as national emissions, but rather are reported separately as international emissions that are not associated with any particular country. Efforts to address the technical problems and formulate
industry emission targets were referred to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Many of the technical problems have since been solved. For instance, the government of Switzerland has reported that it
has a “database with information on 16,000 individual aircraft and 400 different types of engines” and “knows the exact split between domestic and international aviation emissions” (IISD, 2007, p. 4). As the perception has grown that efforts to establish industry
emission targets and other tangible evidence of progress in the addressing the problem have not materialised, efforts outside the UNFCCC framework and outside the two industry-based international organisations have been gaining momentum (IISD, 2007; Norway,
2007). The increasing interest in global sector-specific agreements as part of the post-2012 multilateral climate regime could facilitate inclusion of both industries in the new climate regime. The two industries have not only been outside the multilateral climate regime;
they have also been outside the multilateral trade regime. Government trade policies and industry practices have been considered within the context of the ICAO and IMO. International trade in both of their services has been subject to a combination of national
subsidies, national protectionist policies such as those that prevent ‘cabotage’ within countries by foreign firms, and international agreements that have limited competition among carriers. Although the privatisation and deregulation policies of many governments and
the renegotiation of international agreements, especially in the airline industry, have reduced the subsidy and protection programmes, international competition in both industries is still relatively constrained by national and international trade policies (again outside the
WTO in both industries).10 4. Offsetting Border Measures that Address Free Rider, Carbon Leakage, and International Competitiveness Concerns Among the climate-trade issues that have emerged to date, one of the most contentious concerns the possible use of
offsetting border measures to reduce free rider, carbon leakage and international competitiveness problems. The underlying problem in the terminology of political economy is that there can be ‘free riders’ on international agreements, in this case multilateral climate
change agreements. The problem, in short, is that any given country can benefit from uch an agreement without incurring the costs of participating in it. Moreover, the regime can be undermined by the ‘leakage’ of emissions, as production increases in countries that are

firms may fear that their international competitive position is being undermined by lower energy prices in non-
not party to the climate regime. Further,

participating countries. In the US, these issues have become salient in regard to emerging economy countries (especially Brazil,
China, and India). In the EU, the issues have arisen from time to time during the past several years in regard to US non-participation in
the Kyoto Protocol. The emphasis in the public discussions within the EU was initially on the possible imposition of offsetting tariffs,
though the European Parliament’s resolution (2005/2049) uses the generic term “border adjustment measures.” 12 The European
Commission’s reaction to these measures was initially to oppose them on the grounds that they risked exacerbating trade relations
with the US, particularly at a time when trade relations were already strained and when transatlantic relations more generally were
unusually conflicted over a broad range of issues. In addition, there have been concerns that such a measure would undermine support
in the US among those political and business circles that have been hoping for increased EU-US cooperation on climate change issues.
There have also been concerns that such a tariff might be challenged in a WTO dispute settlement case, and the outcome of such a case would inevitably be uncertain.
However, before leaving office in 2007, French President Chirac and Prime Minister de Villepin suggested again that such measures be undertaken, and President
Sarkozy subsequently expressed interest in the idea soon after his election. In November 2007 – in advance of the Bali climate change conference – the issue was again
the subject of attention within the Commission and Parliament, and among industry and environmental groups. EU Enterprise Commissioner Günter Verheugen
suggested that the Commission was more favourably inclined to address the issue through sectoral agreements, including perhaps voluntary global industry agreements
- a position that has been supported by at least some industry and environmental organisations (see especially, Financial Times, 2007; and EurActiv, 2007b). However,
just before and after the release of the Commission’s proposals for the extension of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on 23 January 2008, there was a specific and
salient resurgence of interest. Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso explicitly mentioned the possibility in a speech (European Commission, 2008a). The
possibility of such action is left open for future consideration, as is the possibility of granting all allowances free to energy-
intensive industries (ICTSD, 2008a). The focus of discussion, however, has shifted away from tariffs to importers’ purchases of
emission credits.

And, 3. their evidence assumes incentives for research and development – not implementation of widespread cap and trade that would
benefit US big business

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AT: No Sanctions/Trade Conflict


1. European leaders aren’t constrained by political biases – the Bush administration is extremely unpopular, meaning they would
definitely sanction climate trade – that’s Boucher

2. Sanctions risk global trade wars between major powers

Financial Post March 25 2008, Carbon Tariff War? http://www.nationalpost.com/related/links/story.html?


id=397658
A European Union summit agreement two weeks ago to slash carbon emissions by 2020 ended with a veiled threat. If the rest
of the world doesn't match Europe's carbon tax and control regimes, "appropriate measures" can be taken by the EU, the final
summit statement said. The phrase "appropriate measures" hasn't been defined yet, but French President Nicolas Sarkozy
thinks Europe should impose a carbon tariff on goods imported into Europe. If steel arrives from China or America, countries
that have no carbon taxes in place, then Europe should tax the steel. European governments love a good excuse to build trade
barriers. Carl B. Hamilton, a Swedish MP and economics professor, warns in a letter to the Financial Times that EU-initiated
carbon trade barriers "could provoke a global trade war between the EU on the one hand and countries such as the United
States, China, India and Brazil on the other."

3. Businesses have little influence over climate trade – their evidence speaks to generic economic cooperation between the US and
Europeans, but EU leaders have specifically underscored their non-tolerance of the US stance on carbon cuts – that’s Boucher

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AT: No Link
First – Plan’s accommodation of business interests and tradability of permits means the EU perceives it as a soft, self-serving
approach on warming – meaning they’ll be skeptical of it – that’s Time Magazine.
Second – the plan would be perceived as unilateral US action on warming outside of the EU’s structure and international treaties – the
self-serving nature of not specifically mandating a cut in fossil fuels uniquely exacerbates the link
Third - Zero-emission policies are the only way to appease the EU.
New York Times, SUZANNE DALEY, 2/15/02, Europeans Give Bush Plan on Climate Change a Tepid Reception, lexis, [adit]
Saying that any action taken to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases was at least a step in the right direction, the European Union
gave a tepid welcome today to President Bush's new proposals to tackle climate change. The Bush proposals, which are strictly
voluntary, would rely on tax credits to coax big business to pollute less. As word of the proposals began to filter out, many
environmentalists and political commentators in Europe said that Mr. Bush's plan was far too little, too late, and would not improve
his image abroad as a servant of the oil industry. The most outspoken reaction came from France, where the head of an
intergovernmental task force on global warming calling the proposals "window dressing." The expert, Philippe Meunier, said that
although it was hard to judge the new plan before knowing its details, "the total volunteerism approach makes us worry." "It lacks
credibility," Mr. Meunier added. "We worry that without sanctions it just won't work." He asserted that while the plan was a step
in the right direction, it showed that the United States sought change "at no cost and in a way that would not in any way challenge the
American lifestyle and especially its consumption." Echoing the concerns of most other specialists reacting today, Mr. Meunier
evoked the Kyoto Protocol, the widely accepted treaty that would require emissions cuts by 2010 to well below their 1990 levels. The
Bush plan might "destabilize" support for the Kyoto pact, which is awaiting ratification. As Mr. Meunier put it, "You may have
countries that say, why should we who are poorer do anything?" The Bush administration's rejection of the protocol last March caused
an outcry in Europe and came to be seen here as another example of America's refusal to limit its options in almost any sphere. When
he rejected the treaty, Mr. Bush called its targets arbitrary, its schedule too costly to meet and its terms unfair. Nonetheless, no other
country has chosen to abandon it. The voluntary measures in the plan Mr. Bush unveiled today would, if followed, slow but not halt
the growth in emissions of heat-trapping gases linked to global warming. It would use $4.6 billion in tax credits over the next five
years to encourage companies and individuals to limit those emissions. In Brussels, a European Commission spokeswoman, Pia
Ahrenkilde-Hansen, said, "We feel that the multilateral approach is the best way to face up to this tremendous challenge." She said
that the European Union still hoped the United States would return to the Kyoto pact. In Britain, Chris Hewett of the Institute for
Public Policy Research, added his voice to criticism of the plan as not enough. He said Britain had proved "that you can cut emissions
and still have a healthy economy," adding that there was no "inextricable link" between carbon dioxide emissions and economic
growth. Some green groups said they were suspicious of the timing of the White House announcement, just days before Mr. Bush is
scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Japan. Japan has so far remained committed to the Kyoto pact, but it has
made no secret of the fact that it will have difficulty meeting its targets. Hiroshi Oki, the new Japanese environment minister, said it
would be best for the United States to return to the the protocol. But, he said that "our joint efforts" must not be halted by
disagreement on that point. The only real praise for the Bush administration had nothing to do with the environmental proposal. In
Germany, Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and a member of the
government's advisory council, made a point of citing a second American plan announced today, one that affects emissions but not
global warming. He hailed Mr. Bush's call for mandatory restrictions on three power plant pollutants -- mercury, sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides -- as "a great air pollution policy." "A wonderful policy," Mr. Schellnhuber added. "But the wrong target

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