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SPACE/EUROPE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE GOOD/BAD FILE....................................................................1
SPACE MILITARIZATION DESTROYS COOPERATION..................................................................................2
NMD BAD – U.S. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR....................................................................................................3
NMD BAD – U.S. RUSSIAN RELATIONS...........................................................................................................4
NMD BAD – ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH................................................................................................................5
NMD CAUSES MILITARIZED SPACE RACE ....................................................................................................6
NMD BAD – TACTICAL NUKES ........................................................................................................................7
NMD BAD – RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR............................................................................................................8
NMD BAD – IRANIAN PROLIF ..........................................................................................................................9
NMD BAD – PREEMPTIVE WARS....................................................................................................................10
NMD BAD – SPACE MIL ....................................................................................................................................11
NMD FAILS - IRAN.............................................................................................................................................12
NMD FAILS – U.S. – EUROPEAN RELATIONS ..............................................................................................13
NMD IS A LONG TIME AWAY ..........................................................................................................................14
NMD GOOD – NUCLEAR WAR.........................................................................................................................15
NMD GOOD – PROLIF........................................................................................................................................16
NMD GOOD – NUCLEAR TERROR..................................................................................................................17
NMD GOOD – IRAN............................................................................................................................................18
NMD GOOD – IRAN............................................................................................................................................19
NMD GOOD – STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION...................................................................................................20
NMD GOOD – STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION...................................................................................................21
NMD GOOD – NO WAR WITH RUSSIA...........................................................................................................22
NMD GOOD – SYSTEM WORKS .....................................................................................................................23
SPACE BASED NMD IS EASILY BEATABLE...................................................................................................24
SPACE BASED NMD CAN WORK....................................................................................................................25
SPACE BASED NMD FAILS...............................................................................................................................26
SPACE BASED NMD FAILS...............................................................................................................................27
SPACE BASED NMD FAILS...............................................................................................................................28
SPACE BASED NMD FAILS...............................................................................................................................29
NMD GOOD – IRAN............................................................................................................................................30

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U.S. Space militarization destroys any chance of co-operation in space.

One of the most important questions plaguing the current NASA Plan 1S the degree to which other nations will be invited to join the
United States as true partners and to participate in the early planning stages of future human exploration missions. President Bush, in
his speech of Januar) 14,2004, appeared to invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of his vision and the new era
of discovery. However, NASA leadership subsequently contradicted that promise when then NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe
stated that the new space initiative was “ very much going to be a U.S. led endeavor. That’s our intent. And, again, much of what we
had been directed and what the President envisions we do is to achieve this set of American, U.S. exploration objectives.”23 This is
not an invitation to partnership. Partnership, of course, does not exclude national objectives, but it does require a sharing of vision,
objectives, and commitments, at the earliest stages of planning. Otherwise, the United States cannot expect other nations to participate
enthusiastically and to provide the necessary staffing and funding. Based on the authors conversations, it is clear that scientists,
engineers, and policy makers around the world perceive that the United States has no interest in bringing other nations into the
planning process, though it expects them to take on the operation of the space station and to provide assistance for other U.5.-led space
efforts when asked. Given the present limited U.S. capability to undertake a major pro-gram such returning humans to the Moon and
sending them, eventually, to Mars, it is clear that international cooperation is necessary for these missions. Furthermore, even if the
United States had all the necessary resources, why would it make sense to go it alone in the scientific and human exploration of space?
For international cooperation to be a realistic possibility the United States will have to take a very different approach to prospective
partnerships, in tone and in substance.

Space militarization destroys cooperation in space


Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause for alarm throughout the world 4, in the context of the issues addressed in this
paper, would create a major obstacle to international cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more restrictive
u.s. export control policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the willingness of other
nations to join U.S-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The placement of weapons in
space would reinforce in the world community the feeling that the United states increasingly is basing its foreign policy on unilateral
initiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years towards multilateral international

Space co-operation and space militarization are zero-sum.


The choice between space assurance and space dominance is fundamentally important since it will shape the contours of international
security, global commerce, alliance ties, and relations between major powers. The United States cannot have it both ways: The pursuit
of space dominance will come at the expense of space assurance. And space assurance is undermined by the pursuit of space

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U.S. based NMD in Europe causes a full-scale U.S. Russian nuclear war.
Bronwen Maddox in Moscow London Times, June 4, 2007

President Putin has warned the US that its deployment of a new anti-missile network across Eastern Europe would prompt Russia to
point its own missiles at European targets and could trigger nuclear war. In an exclusive interview with The Times, the Russian leader
says: “It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will have
to respond. “This system of missile defence on one side and the absence of this system on the other ... increases the possibility of
unleashing a nuclear conflict.” Russia has been alarmed at America’s plans to install a network of defences in Eastern Europe to shoot
down incoming missiles it fears that Iran might launch. Mr Putin expressed scepticism of this motive, arguing that “There are no such
missiles – Iran does not have missiles with the range”. The US was insisting, he said, that the defence system was to be “installed for
the protection from something that does not exist. Is it not sort of funny? It would be funny if it were not so sad.” He speculated that
the US’s real motive was to provoke Russia’s retaliation and so “to avoid further closeness of Russia and Europe”. Mr Putin’s tough
warning comes days before the start of the G8 meeting of the world’s most powerful industrialised economies. His uncompromising
stand on America’s missile defence, Kosovo, Iran and climate change was partly blamed for the failure of last month’s summit
between Russia and the European Union. Mr Putin had warm words for the “cordial reception” that Tony Blair had given him, and for
Gordon Brown, “a high-class specialist”. But he offered little room for compromise on Britain’s request for the extradition of Andrei
Lugovoy, the former intelligence officer, wanted on charges of the murder of dissident former agent Alexander Litvinenko by
radioactive poisoning in London. “No matter from what angle we look at this problem, it’s all stupid, stupid nonsense”, he said of
Britain’s extradition request. “I will not see any single positive component. It’s complete nonsense.” Russian authorities were
investigating the case and if enough evidence were found, the case would “certainly be sent to court”, he said. In theory, he added,
“there are possible circumstances” in which Russia would comply with the extradition “but it would require an amendment to the
Constitution.” But Britain had not provided justification for such a dramatic move, he said. If heads of British law enforcement
agencies “did not know that the constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens to foreign states then their competence is
questionable” and “they should work for parliament or newspapers” because the request was at heart “only a political public relations
step”. He also gave no quarter on the cases of Shell and BP, the British oil giants, who have recently seen the terms of their
investments in Russia rewritten because of alleged breaches of their licences. Mr Putin insisted that he wants “cooperation not
confrontation”, repeatedly blaming the US for its intransigence. But of all the potential clashes at the G8 meeting, which begins on
Wednesday in Germany, it is his warnings on Russian retaliation to the US missile defence plans that are likely to cause the greatest
friction. He called on “our American friends to rethink their decision” and warned that ”We cannot be responsible for our reciprocal
steps because it is not us who are initiating an arms race in Europe”. He added: “We will need to establish such systems which would
be able to penetrate the [US] missile defence systems... What kind of means will be used to hit the targets that our military believe are
potential threats – ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, or some kind of new weapons system – this is a purely technical issue?

And, war with Russia isn’t so unlikely.

Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Russia seems to be going through a new period of nationalistic assertiveness, one expression of which is the display of military
accomplishments. For example, Russia has announced the successful development of new ICBMs, warned that its nuclear weapons
might have to be aimed at Europe, put its strategic bombers back in the air on training flights, and announced that Russia has
suspended its participation in the treaty restricting deployments of conventional forces in Europe. Some might say that these displays
are more to impress Russian voters than to impress America, as well as to secure Putin's future should he decide to run for president
again after sitting out for a term, as can be done under Russian law. Undoubtedly, Putin would not mind if he impressed Russian
voters, but we would argue that these developments are primarily aimed at the United States.

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And, deploying a NMD system in Europe would lower U.S. Russian relations below Cuban Missile Crisis
Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Moreover, the proposed missiles exacerbate U.S.-Russian relations to the point of creating a volatile situation that did not previously
exist. In October 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew the analogy between the current situation and the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, when the Soviet Union based missiles in Cuba that could easily reach the United States. "The situation is quite similar
technologically for us," said Putin. "We have withdrawn the remains of bases from Vietnam and Cuba, but such threats are being
created near our borders."7 Just as forty-six years ago America saw Russian missiles in Cuba as an alarming threat, Russia clearly
feels that the proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic are too close for comfort. True, the Soviet missiles in
Cuba were offensive, and the planned U.S. interceptors in Poland are to be defensive. Nevertheless, the U.S. proposal is in direct
violation of the joint declaration issued in conjunction with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty—also known as the Moscow
Treaty—signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002.8 The joint declaration calls for joint research and development on
missile defense technologies and U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense for Europe. The Bush proposal to establish U.S. missile
defenses in Europe was neither joint nor cooperative, and was initiated unilaterally almost before the ink had dried on the joint

NMD in Europe would draw the U.S. into a diplomatic conflict against Russia.
Eastern European Review, 12-11, 2007, “Poland, Iran, Russia, and the Polish Missile Shield Base,” online:,

History has shown that Poland cannot depend on Europe to defend it. And given the current military might of the countries in Europe,
future defense ability might be plausibly questioned. Germany - The Soft Underbelly of Europe But a base in Poland is a US asset that
will be defended by the US against any aggressor. It fixes Poland position as not under the Russian sphere of influence. That is if the
US Congress agrees to build it. So Tusk has to balance many evils before him. Is it better to have a foreign military base that is not
wanted by his countrymen or take his chances with a rogue missile and/or a resurgent Russia? What are his risks and rewards?
Tusk is in a difficult position. He will surely make a decision that he thinks best for Poland. And whatever that decision is, there will
be unhappy people and long term consequences for Poland. Its not just about Poland. Its about Poland, Europe, Iran and Russia with
the US waiting for a decision and having to make a decision of its own.

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NMD in Europe causes Russia to pull out of the Joint Data Exchange Center
Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Other bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia, such as the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), could also suffer
due to relations distressed by a U.S. missile defense site in Europe. This was to be a spin-off of the successful Y2K center created at
the turn of the century to ensure that there would not be any unexpected misunderstandings due to Y2K glitches. From Peterson Air
Force Base, Colorado, both Russian and U.S. officials monitored missile launches globally. The JDEC was to continue this effort at
cooperation with the aim of creating "an uninterrupted exchange of information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch
vehicles from the early warning systems of the United States of America and the Russian Federation."28 However, it has been stunted
in talks almost from its June 2000 inception, largely due to concerns about liability and tax issues, and the program currently is in
limbo. If missile defense negatively affects relations, it will not help the JDEC progress.

JDEC key to prevent accidental launch

Pavel Podvig, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, February 2005, “Reducing the risk of accidental
launch: Time for a new approach?,” online:,

Other projects that were discussed in the context of reducing risk of an accidental launch suggested providing Russia with independent
early-warning information, which was supposed to complement the data received by the Russian system. The most advanced of these
proposals called for establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), which would provide both sides with access to their
counterpart?s early-warning information. The logic of the project was that in a case of conflicting information from early-warning
satellites and radars, the United States and Russia could demonstrate to each other that no attack is underway. Cooperation like this
would probably have helped to determine what happened during the January 1995 incident, but it is not certain if it would be of any
help in a serious crisis, when each side would have reasons to doubt information provided by its counterpart.

Accidental launch causes global escalation and nuclear war, killing billions
PR Newswire, 4-29-98

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and
speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace
organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces
under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games"
it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of
casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an " accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine that
would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel
killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but
impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

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NMD systems places in Europe causes a militarized space race.
Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

A crack in relations between the United States and Russia could have longterm consequences for emerging national security issues,
such as space weaponization. Until China's ASAT test in January 2007 there had been only two countries that had tested space
weapons: the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the two adversaries tested ASATs fifty-three times.29 Right
now the official U.S. policy is to eschew weaponizing space, but the new U.S. national space policy released in October 2006
culminated several years of policy papers by the U.S. Air Force and indicated that it was becoming much more open to the idea.30
Furthermore, the U.S. military has seized upon China's ASAT test as all the more reason for the weaponization of space. USA-193, the
NRO satellite that was shot down by the United States in February 2008, had been launched in December 2006 and almost
immediately was unresponsive to ground control and began to deorbit outside the Pentagon's control. Pentagon officials claimed that
the satellite was shot down out of health concerns, in order to prevent its hydrazine-filled fuel tank from crashing into a populated area
(although these concerns appear to have been exaggerated). They have further alleged that it was a one-time event involving
modifications to the software and mode of the three SM-3 missiles that were pulled aside for the mission (only one was used), and that
the software and the other two SM-3 missiles were immediately changed back to their missile defense mode. However, one cannot be
certain which version of the SM-3 has been deployed from then on: is it the sort used for ballistic missile defense or is it the
antisatellite kind such as was used to shoot down USA-193? Russia and the United States are major space players, and both have
much to lose if the new international norm were to target satellites or to allow for the free creation of space debris that could damage
or destroy expensive space assets. There is a movement to create some sort of space "rules of the road," which would not be a treaty
but rather codes of conduct by which all space-faring nations could abide. If the United States and Russia have a rift in their
relationship due to missile defense, this cooperative effort will not succeed. China, as a growing space power, would have to be
included in these talks, and if the United States and Russia were not able to work together, we could see a repeat of the Cold War
dynamic whereby one country would try to pit other countries against each other.

This results in a nuclear war.

Marko Beljac, Professor at the University of Melbourne, 4-1, 2008, “Arms Race in Space,” Foreign Policy In Focus, online:,

Though the latest Russian and Chinese space arms control proposal is flawed, because of the clumsy definition of what constitutes a
“space weapon,” this doesn’t mean that space arms control is not possible in principle. A global space arms control regime would
protect U.S., Russian, Chinese, and even Australian space assets. An arms race in space will eventually lead other states to catch up
with the United States and thereby placing Washington's commercial satellites at risk. Space weaponization may well have
cataclysmic consequences given the link between space weapons and nuclear weapons strategy. This is because Russia, and the United
States, to a certain extent rely on satellites for early warning of nuclear attack. As other space nations with nuclear weapons develop
their space capacity it is expected that they will follow suit.The deployment of space weapons means that the first shot in a nuclear
war would be fired against these early warning satellites. Currently strategic planners in Moscow have about 10 minutes between
warning of an attack and the decision to launch nuclear weapons in response before they impact. Weapons in space would lower this in
certain scenarios down to seconds. This would also apply for weapons placed in space that would be considered to be defensive such
as say a space based BMD interceptor or a “counter-ASAT” weapon. On occasion, ground warning radars falsely show that a nuclear
attack has been launched. In the 1990s a false alarm went all the way up to President Boris Yeltsin and was terminated after
approximately eight minutes. We are still here, noted analysts believe, because warning satellites would have given Moscow real time
information showing the alarm to be false. Should such a false alarm coincide with an accident involving an early warning satellite
when space weapons are known to exist, an accidental nuclear exchange could result. The risk would increase if the false alarm
occurred during a crisis. Space weapons could lead to itchy fingers on nuclear triggers. They would therefore significantly increase the
importance nuclear weapon states place upon nuclear deterrence.

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NMD in Europe would cause Russia and the U.S. to deploy tactical nuclear weapons.
Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Also linked to the proposed U.S. missile defenses are Russia's vague threats over the past several years to pull out of the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This treaty banned a whole range of ballistic missiles (those with ranges of 500 to
5,500 kilometers, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles), and has held up even after the Soviet Union dissolved into its separate
republics. Again, this is an idea that has been floated by Russian officials for the past several years, but also again, they seem to be
latching on to the U.S. missile defense system in Europe as their primary motivating factor. The initial reason for the INF Treaty was
that intermediate-range missiles were considered highly destabilizing, as their short flight times meant they could wreak devastation
very quickly and made a retaliatory response almost automatic. Because of the specific dangers inherent in intermediate-range ballistic
missiles, there has even been talk about internationalizing the INF Treaty and trying to get other countries in unstable parts of the
world to sign it as a way of creating confidence-building measures. However, if Russia pulls out of the INF, it would be almost
impossible to convince other countries to sign onto the treaty, and the U.S. incentive to continue to follow its provisions would be
vastly reduced.

This turns into full-fledged nuclear war.

Jan Lodal, Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, National Security Council, The Price of Dominance: The New
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership, 2001, p. 23

Many of the 12,000 US and 20,000 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. A
tactical nuclear war would have killed tens or perhaps hundreds of millions, even without escalating to an all-out strategic nuclear
exchange. But such a war probably would have escalated. Tactical nuclear weapons would not have led to a decisive outcome on the
battlefield, but their use would have broken the taboo against nuclear weapons. At some point, one side would begin to lose the
tactical nuclear war. With a large strategic nuclear force in reserve, the losing side would have a strong incentive to escalate the war
and use strategic forces in an attempt to regain the military initiative.

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U.S. deployment of NMD in Europe would cause Russia to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to
Sergei Blagov, Moscow-based correspondent for ISN Security Watch, 12-21, 2007, ISN Security Watch, “Another Assertive
Kremlin,” online:,

Against the backdrop of recent economic revival - and regardless of long-term economic growth prospects - Russian foreign policy
has become increasingly assertive, both domestically and internationally. Moscow's assertiveness, sometimes bordering the Cold War-
era style of confrontational thinking, will persist in 2008.Above all, the Kremlin is not expected to review its negative attitudes toward
US plans for a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, which is perceived by the Kremlin as specifically targeting Russia.In
response to these plans, Moscow has already introduced countermeasures and threatened further moves, including the resumption of
strategic bomber flights and the suspension of Russia's obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
Russian military officials, however, insist that the CFE treaty suspension, effective from 12 December, will not mean any immediate
troop redeployments on the country's western frontier, though some of the military elite have advocated such a move in the face of the
threats posed by an expanding NATO. The Kremlin has also indicated plans to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) treaty between the US and the former Soviet Union in order to deploy its own missiles in the country's western Kaliningrad
region, and in Belarus, to target US strategic missile defense sites in Europe. Russian experts concede that short-range tactical missile
deployments have little chance of convincing Washington to re-think its missile shield plans in Europe. However, threats to move
Russian missiles close to EU borders have been perceived as a stratagem to create division in the West as the threat level would be
obviously different for Europe and the US.

Russian TNW deployments to Kaliningrad cause escalation to full-scale nuclear war

Stanley Kober, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, February 11, 1998, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing #46,

When the Cold War ended, people around the world breathed a sigh of relief, believing that the danger of a nuclear catastrophe had
passed. Unfortunately, NATO expansion is raising that danger to new heights. In the first place, it is lowering the nuclear threshold on
both sides. "In the prevailing adverse conditions, Russia cannot ignore the overwhelming superiority of the potential adversary, even
taking all its CIS allies into account," writes a Russian general in the Independent Military Review. "Therefore, a stronger adversary
can be forced to cease his aggression on conditions acceptable to Russia only by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear
weapons. This is the logic of deterrence."(42) An article in a Polish newspaper has graphically outlined the danger: Thus, the Russians
speak of reinforcing their troops on the Western border, aiming nuclear missiles at the [future] new member countries of NATO,
deploying nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad Oblast, and breaking off talks on conventional and strategic disarmaments. It is hardly
conceivable that planning by the Russian military, who are mentally accustomed to treat NATO as the main enemy, does not provide
for carrying out some of these threats. I think that we should consider the possibility of becoming a target of Russian missiles with
nuclear warheads, owing not so much to our automatically becoming one of potential military enemies as to the current weakness of
the conventional armed forces of the Russian Federation. . . . The status of Kaliningrad still remains unclear. . . . But any plan for
turning Kaliningrad into a significant [conventional] military factor in Europe will remain unrealistic so long as military transports to
that enclave run across sovereign countries, which moreover aspire to membership in NATO (Lithuania). In this situation, the only
way of turning Kaliningrad into a territory that matters, given the prospects for extending NATO to Poland, is to deploy nuclear
weapons there. Such weapons had anyhow been deployed there during the cold war era (short- and medium-range missiles of the
Baltic Fleet, mounted on submarines and missile cruisers). It is noteworthy that such a measure does not entail substantial financial
outlays, in contrast with the attempts to deploy troops in the western military districts of the Russian Federation. Even worse, just as
NATO expansion would impel the Russians to lower the nuclear threshold, including the Baltic states would have the same effect on
NATO. "A representative of the Pentagon, with whom Rzecspospolita had a chance to talk, said bluntly that NATO would 'have
difficulties defending' the region of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia," the Polish newspaper reported last November.(44) A prominent
American expert is even more blunt. "If, for example, NATO is expanded to include the Baltic states, no conventional defense would
be possible," former defense secretary James Schlesinger told Congress in October 1997. "If we were to fulfill a commitment to
provide protection, we would be driven back to threatening a nuclear response to a conventional attack, a commitment from which we
have only recently escaped."(45) It is an indication of how bizarre the debate over NATO expansion has become that apparently
neither Schlesinger nor the Wall Street Journal, in which his testimony was excerpted, thought a return to the horrible situation from
which we had just recently escaped was something we should try to avoid.

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NMD in Europe destroys the co-operation necessary to prevent Iranian proliferation
Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

There are two serious nuclear proliferation issues facing the world today that require a united response, something that is unlikely if
hostilities are increased between the United States and Russia as a result of the U.S. missile defense plans. The first is Iran's nuclear
program. While the November 2007 NIE acknowledged that as far as the U.S. intelligence community knew, Iran had stopped work
on its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it still indicated that Iran's nuclear intentions are unknown. Furthermore, no one doubts that
Iran continues to enrich uranium, possibly to the point where it will become weapons-grade fissile material. Iran is a signatory to the
NPT, so in theory it admits there are limits to what it can do with its nuclear materials (although Iranian officials defiantly aver that
they are free to do what they wish). This is all to say that the international community can still work together to lessen the threat of an
Iranian nuclear weapons program. In fact, the NIE states that Iran's nuclear weapons work "probably was halted primarily in response
to international pressure."23 Russia in particular has a strong relationship with Iran and has been one of the holdouts against
strengthening international sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, Russia still indicates that it is holding fast to the option of finishing a
nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran.24 Clearly, Russia is a key component to any solution to the Iranian nuclear question. Given how
much Iran factors in the justification for extending the U.S. missile defense system to Europe, this cannot be ignored.

Iranian proliferation results in extinction.

Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, June 2007, Commentary, online:,

But there is, it has been reported, another consideration that is driving Bush. According to a recent news story in the New York Times,
for example, Bush has taken to heart what “[o]fficials from 21 governments in and around the Middle East warned at a meeting of
Arab leaders in March”—namely, “that Iran’s drive for atomic technology could result in the beginning of ‘a grave and destructive
nuclear arms race in the region.’” Which is to say that he fears that local resistance to Iran’s bid for hegemony in the greater Middle
East through the acquisition of nuclear weapons could have even more dangerous consequences than a passive capitulation to that bid
by the Arab countries. For resistance would spell the doom of all efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and it would vastly
increase the chances of their use.

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NMD in Europe allows the U.S. to engage in preemptive strikes
Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

The public debate which followed that announcement revealed divergent opinions on the issue within the Polish strategic community
– analysts and foreign policy experts. The critics pointed to the dangers of aligning Poland’s security policy too closely with the
United States in such a way. Development of the missile defence system was portrayed as a sign of the US willingness to secure
strategic domination against present and future opponents. It was argued that the system’s characteristics might be defensive, but its
presence would encourage the United States to try offensive strategies, possibly involving the use of force, in the confrontations with
states armed with ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities. Since the MD facilities is a logical target for an enemy’s first strike, Poland
would find itself in grave danger on account of the US deployment. Bilateral arrangements on the Missile Defence would also,
according to the critics, put into question Poland’s credentials as a member of NATO and the European Union, not to mention the
unavoidable deterioration of the relations with Russia. It was argued that any benefits obtained from the Americans could not
compensate for the overall worsening of the security of Poland.

Global Nuclear war.

Michel Chossudovsky, frequent contributor to the Centre for Research on Globalization, February 17, 2006, “The Dangers of a Middle
East Nuclear War,” online:,

The Bush administration's new nuclear doctrine contains specific "guidelines" which allow for "preemptive" nuclear strikes against
"rogue enemies" which "possess" or are "developing" weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
and Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (DJNO)). The preemptive nuclear doctrine (DJNO), which applies to Iran and North Korea
calls for "offensive and defensive integration". It explicitly allows the preemptive use of thermonuclear weapons in conventional war
theaters. In the showdown with Tehran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, these Pentagon "guidelines" would allow, subject to
presidential approval, for the launching of punitive bombings using "mini-nukes" or tactical thermonuclear weapons. While the
"guidelines" do not exclude other (more deadly) categories of nukes in the US and/or Israeli nuclear arsenal, Pentagon "scenarios" in
the Middle East are currently limited to the use of tactical nuclear weapons including the B61-11 bunker buster bomb. This particular
version of the bunker buster is a thermonuclear bomb, a so-called Nuclear Earth Penetrator or NEP. It is a Weapon of Mass
Destruction in the real sense of the word. Its utilization by the US or Israel in the Middle East war theater would trigger a nuclear

TURNSTEIN 2K8 11 / 30
NMD leads to space militarization.
Gordon R. Mitchell, et al (David Cram Helwich, , and Kevin J. Ayotte, Professor of Communications at Cal State-Fresno), July 2001,
ISIS Briefing on BMD, No. 6, online:,

As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry '� may well be a determined effort
to develop a national ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the ABM Treaty or to
abrogate the treaty entirely. Until then, it is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested and
fielded'. Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive political opposition both
home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which the placement of space-based weapons will likely
occur is under a second US space policy directive � that of ballistic missile defense� This could preempt any political umbrage from
most of the world's influential nations while positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In
this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US military
domination of the heavens. A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but
this rationale glosses over the tendency that '� the presence of space weapons� will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33
This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-
ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.

Space militarization and war results in extinction.

Gordon R. Mitchell, et al (David Cram Helwich, , and Kevin J. Ayotte, Professor of Communications at Cal State-Fresno), July 2001,
ISIS Briefing on BMD, No. 6, online:,

It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny
projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage � even more than would be
done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence
analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of
microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space
weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war
sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 12 / 30
NMD fails to contain Iran – they can just strike outside its protection zone.
Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

The fact that something is useful for the United States, does not make it equally useful for its partners. For Europe, even assuming that
Iran would eventually have ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons, the strategic utility of some part of the continent being in the range
of the American interceptors is close to zero. First of all, since command and control of the system stays with the United States, there
can only be a certain level of confidence, never a certainty, that the interceptors will be launched upon Iranian attack. It is sufficient to
think of a future Iranian arsenal of, lets say, about 10 ICBMs to reach the US and 30-40 missiles capable of reaching Paris, London,
Berlin or Warsaw. With multiple launch of only part of those missile at different targets, the question of intercept priorities could
become rather disturbing. Secondly, the Iranians may be willing to strike (or threaten to strike) a target outside the perimeter covered
by the MD base. The perspective of destruction of Athens, Ankara or Sophia is as unacceptable to the European leaders as any city of
Central or Western Europe. Thirdly, regardless of the technical advances of the MD, there cannot be a 100% guarantee that the system
would work in the combat conditions. Taken all this into account, even with the complete system in place, it would be prudent for
European countries not to count on the Missile Defence cover when drafting their Iranian policy. Which may actually be a good thing,
since it would quash any temptations of military adventurism vis-à-vis Iran.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 13 / 30
Stationing BMD in Europe won’t overcome other sources of anti-Americanism
Taylor Dinerman, writer for The Space Review, March 26, 2007, “European missile defense: why bother?,” online:,

The tidal wave of anti-Americanism that is washing over Europe will not recede any time soon. Iraq and Bush are simply excuses for
it. Before Iraq and before Bush they were complaining about America as a “hyperpower” and were trying to find ways to bring it to
heel. Keeping up any sort of “special relationship” or friendship, especially in the missile defense field with a continent so full of
hostility, seems a bit illogical.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 14 / 30
NMD would take years to be completed and effective.
Eastern European Review, 12-11, 2007, “Poland, Iran, Russia, and the Polish Missile Shield Base,” online:,

The missile shield, announced as a system to protect Europe from rogue missile attacks from countries such as, but not limited to, Iran,
is years from completion. Not only does the base not exist, the interceptor missiles don't work yet. In the mean time, Iran is moving
forward on its missile development program. It has recently announced that it has a new missile. The billed missile range would,if the
missile works as claimed, give Iran the possibility of hitting Europe, including the chance that it might hit both Warsaw and Moscow.
Polish Missile Defense - Is Poland Now In Range Of Iran's Missiles?

TURNSTEIN 2K8 15 / 30
NMD is critical to avoid nuclear war.
Investor’s Business Daily, 11-7, 2007

Is it possible that Democrats are still skeptical that a missile shield will actually work? If so, evidence that it will has reached the point
that it can no longer be denied. Or is their lack of support simply due to a reflexive opposition to the military and toward symbols of
what they perceive to be projections of U.S. power? Either way, their actions could leave us vulnerable to nuclear attack from a rogue
nation such as Iran (see editorial at left) or North Korea, which is supposedly backing down on its nuclear weapons program but will
remain a threat as long as its communist regime stays in place. The risk doesn't end, however, with those two legs of the Axis of Evil,
both of which are on the State Department's list of terrorist states. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now an ally, yet it could become an
enemy depending on how its internal turmoil is resolved. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban have powerful bases in the region. What if the
Musharraf government one day falls and one of those terrorist groups suddenly has the keys to a nuclear arsenal? It's just as plausible
that the threat could come from any of the Mideast nations that want to keep up with Iran's nuclear program. With Egypt making its
announcement last week, there are now 13 countries in the region that have in the last year said they want nuclear power. They can
claim, as Iran has, that they want it merely for energy. But the step from nuclear power to nuclear weapons is not that far. Given the
volatility of the region, it would be wise to make sure that all precautions — and that includes a missile defense — are taken. Even
Russia, with its extensive nuclear weaponry, could be a threat. President Vladimir Putin has raised objections to America's allying with
former Soviet satellites to place U.S. missile defense components in their countries. This, warns Putin in language reminiscent of the
Cold War, will turn Europe into a "powder keg." For his part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has declared: "The arms race is
starting again." Are congressional Democrats prepared to leave us only partly protected in a world where nuclear arms might soon
begin to spread like a Southern California wildfire? Some have looked at the Democrats' actions and said, emphatically, yes. "Their
aim," Heritage Foundation defense analyst Baker Spring said earlier this year, "is to force the U.S. to adopt a position that prohibits it
from developing — much less deploying — missile defense interceptors in space under any circumstance and for all time."

TURNSTEIN 2K8 16 / 30
NMD key to check proliferation
Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage
Foundation, 11-8, 2007, online:

If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing effect on the security
environment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missile
defense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against it. To make
America and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to incur further proliferation. As President
Bush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool for

TURNSTEIN 2K8 17 / 30
NMD in Europe is key to deter and prevent nuclear terror strikes on the U.S. and allies
Joe Pitts, U.S. Representative (R-PA), 11-2, 2007, online:,

The strange irony is that in the first decade of the 21st century the United States and its allies may be more vulnerable to the threat of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles today than we were during the Cold War. Though there were certainly serious times of raised
tensions, the dry logic of mutually assured destruction kept the major actors in the Cold War from ever actually using nuclear armed
ballistic missiles. Today, rogue nations and non-state terror organizations operate outside the realm of mutually assured destruction. A
terrorist organization has no territory or population it must protect. Pariah nations that chronically operate outside the realm of the
international community, like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, under the rule of Saddam Hussein, may not follow the same rational logic
that prevented the U.S. and the Soviet Union from launching nuclear missiles. The United States continues to work on non-
proliferation measures to keep nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of countries or groups that might use them against the
United States and its allies. However, the global nuclear arms sales network of A.Q. Khan, of Pakistan, was evidence that nuclear
weapons can and have been proliferated into the hands of enemies of the United States. It would take just one nuclear warhead to
destroy an entire city. The toll in human lives would be massive and catastrophic. It is an issue that we should not take lightly. It is a
threat that we must address. The U.S. Department of Defense began deploying long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and
California in 2004. These interceptors would protect the United States from a long-range missile threat from rogue nations in Asia,
such as a launch from North Korea. The United States has ground-mobile and sea-based systems as well that would combat short-
range ballistic missiles. What is currently missing from a global ballistic missile defense is a system that would protect our strategic
interests and allies in Europe. The threat from a potentially nuclear armed Iran cannot be ignored. I believe we should continue
working toward a diplomatic resolution with Iran over the issue of nuclear weapons. However, we cannot assume such a resolution
will take place, and need to move forward in tandem with a plan to provide defense against a nuclear armed.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 18 / 30
NMD key to avoid Iranian proliferation.
Charlie Szrom, research assistant in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute,
12-21, 2007, The Weekly Standard, online:,

THE NEW NATIONAL Intelligence Estimate has led many to call for a new policy towards Iran. Sen. Hillary Clinton "vehemently
disagree[s]" that "nothing in American policy has to change." Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the report confirmed the
Russian view that "there is no military element in [Iran's] nuclear program." Doesn't all this mean we should drop support for missile
defense? No. The threat has not changed significantly and missile defense remains one of the few options still available to lessen the
power of potential Iranian nukes. The program can also turn positive relationships with Central European states into long-term,
mutually-dependent alliances. Iran tested a new missile, called the 'Ashura,' as recently as late last month. This 2000-kilometer-range
weapon could potentially reach U.S bases in the Middle East and parts of Eastern Europe, including such U.S. allies as Romania,
Georgia, or Ukraine. The announcement may just be bluster, but the unveiling alone shows that Iran has no intention of backing down
militarily. A careful reading of the NIE makes an even stronger case for a continued menace. The report admits that Iran continues to
enrich uranium, that Iran "probably would be technically capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame," and that it "will be difficult" to convince the Iranian leadership to abandon eventual
development of a nuclear capability. The basic facts remain the same; perhaps the only revelation is that Iran, if anything, has made a
tactical decision to delay warhead production so it can buy enough time for the more difficult task of enriching uranium. After the
marathon of amassing sufficient fuel, Tehran just has to sprint through the relatively simple process of developing warheads. Our
missile defense partners recognize the enduring danger. The Czech foreign ministry stated that, "'According to the report, Iran will
probably be capable of producing a sufficient quantity of nuclear material for the production of a nuclear bomb between 2010 and
2015. This corresponds with the previous estimates. By this date the European pillar of anti-missile defense should be in place.'" The
threat still exists. How can we continue to pressure Iran? The report dashed hopes for any broad UN sanctions against Iran, as Russia
and China, reluctant beforehand to impose serious punitive measures on Iran, now have a ready excuse. Military strikes now also seem
highly unlikely, given the lack of urgency precipitated by the NIE. Those opposed to an Iranian nuclear program might still enact
smart sanctions--targeting, for example, the participation of Iranian regime elements in the international financial system--in
coordination with a few hardy European allies. One such ally, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, said through a spokesman that
"the report confirms we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons." But such action will not be enough.
The United States needs a response that will directly address the physical threat of Iranian nukes. Missile defense development avoids
the problem of UN-based obstruction by Russia or China, and it remains one of the few remaining pressure points we can use against

TURNSTEIN 2K8 19 / 30
NMD is key to counter Iranian proliferation and nuclear capabilities.
Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage
Foundation, 11-8, 2007, online:

In fact, the emerging Iranian threat is nothing less than a race against the clock. Iran is involved in both a long-range missile program
and a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Both programs could reach initial operating capability in the 2013-2015 timeframe or
even earlier. Pending immediate approval, current projections forecast completion of the Polish and Czech "third site" installations
within five years, which is only marginally ahead of Iran's estimated long-range ballistic missile capability and nuclear capability.[3]
Moreover, with the possibility of a Manhattan Project-like effort by Iran, supported by countries such as North Korea, Iran's capability
may well be realized even earlier than currently expected. With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad saber-rattling and
threatening to "wipe Israel off the face of the earth,"[4] it is incumbent upon the United States to take the growing Iranian threat
seriously by taking steps to protect itself, its forward-deployed troops, and its friends and allies.

NMD is critical to avoid Iranian proliferation.

Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

To put it simple, the Americans feel they need to have an MD system and are able to build it. The decision to field a European MD
component comes directly from this logic, and it appears futile to look for some hidden motives (for example, an attempt to divide the
European Union). The radar is meant to provide better tracking of Iranian missiles, and the interceptor base would give the US
additional interception opportunities of an ICBM aimed at the US, plus some rudimentary level of protection for their bases in Europe
and parts of European territory (excluding south-eastern part of the continent). On this last point, it is worth to point out that spending
lots of money and efforts on protecting someone else’s territory makes in this case perfect strategic sense. After all, if the US is
protected by the anti-missile shield, what would be the ‘next best thing’ for Iranian planners wishing to deter the West from interfering
in Iran’s affairs?

NMD is critical to prevent Iran from proliferating – it sends a clear signal.

Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

Arguments pointing to the slow pace of the Iranian missile developments, lack of strategic rationale for Iran to build an arsenal for
striking Europe or the United States when better targets are available in the neighbourhood (e.g. American bases across the Gulf), or
the availability of other means of transporting WMD to the target, will have no impact on the United States. Scrapping the system
would be equal with admitting the fundamental flaws of the ‘undeterrable rogue states’ doctrine. Neither this, nor any next
administration seems prepared to make such a move. Of course, as with every major armaments programme, there is also the self-
perpetuating internal logic of ‘we have advanced so far, and cannot stop here…’.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 20 / 30
NMD is critical to prevent Russian expansion.
Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage
Foundation, 11-8, 2007, online:

If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing effect on the security
environment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missile
defense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against it. To make
America and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to incur further proliferation. As President
Bush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool for
counterproliferation."[8] However, the failure of third site negotiations would embolden those in Russia who believe that the United
States is negotiating from a position of diplomatic and military weakness. Putin would claim--with some credibility--to have scored a
diplomatic victory over the United States. Failure would also increase Russian boldness in intimidating former satellite states, adding
to instability in Eastern Europe.

Russian military expansionism gets modeled by India and Pakistan

Business Week Online , September 30, 2002

But heightened activity in the Caucasus presents risks for the U.S., too. One is the danger that U.S. advisers in Georgia get targeted in
a new flare-up of violence. America's global image could also suffer through a closer identification with aggressive Russian war
methods. And a dangerous precedent could be set. If Putin mounts a larger military effort with the tacit approval of Washington,
countries in other hot spots could follow his example. Analysts fear India, for example, could invoke the same argument Putin is using
to launch a major strike against the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. ''This has got to be very carefully controlled'' by U.S.
policymakers, says Fiona Hill, an expert on the Caucasus region at the Brookings Institution. Even as Putin cooperates with the war on
terror, he's posing yet another dilemma for Bush's hard-pressed anti-terrorism team.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 21 / 30
NMD is key to stop Russian expansion.
Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

Which threat is so potent that it requires the US base as an ‘insurance policy’ against aggression? Most of the supporters of Poland’s
involvement in the Missile Defence project point unanimously at Russia and the possible future course of its policy. With the new
strength coming from gas and oil revenues, Russia looks determined to increase its influence not only in the ‘near abroad’ (i.e. former
USSR), but also globally. At home, the Kremlin-devised concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ provides a basis for a stable system
political which has most of the attributes of a democracy (e.g. periodic elections), but little of its spirit (no real choices for the voters).
According to some commentators, the new over-confident Russia may, in the medium to long-term perspective, try to use not only the
energy weapon, but also the threat of military force as a foreign policy tool.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 22 / 30
The U.S. will never go to war with Russia over NMD.
Alexander Golts, St. Petersburg Times, 11-6, 2007

It is clear that Moscow has no desire to reach a compromise on the missile defense issue. On the contrary, the Kremlin has a vested
interest in preserving an ongoing, smoldering conflict with the United States over nuclear weapons and missile defense. Putin and his
inner circle are convinced that this is the only way Russia can regain its status as a superpower and stand on equal footing with the
United States -- at least in the nuclear sphere. This is why Moscow is always pushing for negotiations on nuclear weapons, such as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I. And in order to underscore the importance of
such talks, the Kremlin periodically threatens to pull out of a treaty or to deploy a mysterious, miracle warhead capable of overcoming
U.S. missile defense systems. In reality, however, the nuclear factor plays an increasingly minor role in U.S.-Russian relations. And,
paradoxically, its importance began to diminish after the Cuban missile crisis, when it became clear that neither side was willing to use
its nuclear weapons against the other. Despite having 20 times more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, the United States rejected
any plan involving a first strike against Moscow. In the late 1950s, Robert McNamara calculated the probable losses in the event of a
Soviet first nuclear strike against the United States. After becoming defense secretary in the early 1960s, however, McNamara
acknowledged that Soviet nuclear weapons were not capable of inflicting the level of damage that he had earlier estimated, and he thus
ruled out any plan for a U.S. first strike. For nuclear weapons to be an important factor in politics, there must be a real fear that the
leader possessing the weapons is crazy enough to actually use them. That is why the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea have
generated such heightened concern around the world. Putin, however, has shown — whether he intended to or not — that he is a
rational leader. And even drawing unfounded, exaggerated historical parallels with the Cuban missile crisis can’t ruin that reputation
— at least not yet.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 23 / 30
Current NMD technology works and can stop nuclear attacks.
Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish
Perspective,” online:,

For many countries, the perspective of having a shield protecting its territory against long-range ballistic missiles may be attractive
(the Russians only have a system protecting Moscow, using nuclear warheads), but only for the United States that option has become
both technically achievable and affordable. An impressive work has been done on the development and integration of the MD system
of sensors (including space assets and radars), weapons (maritime and ground component) and command & control architecture – all
thanks to the US technological potential and industrial prowess. Technical problems and failed tests notwithstanding, it seems now
that the system will indeed offer high chances of intercepting a simple, non-decoys-included, ballistic missile. And in the gargantuan
US military budget, the money spend on Missile Defence (almost 100 billion USD so far) is just a fraction of the overall expenses.

Recent, demanding tests show that NMD system works.

Investor’s Business Daily, 11-7, 2007

While the rest of the country went about its business Tuesday night, the Missile Defense Agency conducted another successful test,
this time hitting not one but two missiles. It was the first time multiple targets had been used. Shortly after 8 p.m. Pacific time, two
short-range ballistic missiles were launched from Hawaii. Within minutes, interceptors fired from the USS Lake Erie's weapon system
struck and destroyed the missiles more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The hits were the 10th and 11th for the Aegis sea-
based part of the missile shield program. Adding to their significance is the fact that the Lake Erie crew was not informed of the time
of the launch, though it was on alert.

Successful dual-warhead tests are a significant improvement for NMD

Brendon Nicholson The Melbourne Age, 11-9, 2007

THE US Navy has tracked and destroyed two ballistic missiles in space within seconds of each other in a test that will have
implications for Australia's next government. The successful destruction of two missiles almost simultaneously is a significant step in
the development of the controversial US anti-ballistic missile system in which Australia will play a part. Previously single missiles
have been destroyed in space by US warships armed with the Aegis anti-ballistic missile system.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 24 / 30
Nuclear missile defense systems can be easily fooled by unsophisticated countermeasures.
Rand.Org Accessed 2008 - no date found.

Chapter Five asserted that unsophisticated countermeasures could readily saturate terminal and midcourse missile defenses based in
the continental United States. In discussing the urgency of boost-phase missile defenses, Chapter Three introduced the
countermeasures. This appendix contains a thought-experiment to illustrate the possibility of an unconventional, unsophisticated
countermeasure against terminal-area ballistic-missile defenses. The appendix also illustrates a possible unconventional, space-based
deterrent weapon. The straightforward approach to defeating midcourse and terminal missile defenses is to saturate them with multiple
aim points. One way to saturate defenses during the midcourse portion of a missile’s trajectory outside the atmosphere is to deploy
relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated decoys (such as balloons or fragments of the booster) in large numbers and to alter the
appearance of real targets to help confuse sensors trying to sort the real and false targets, for example, by deploying the real targets in
what amounts to another decoy (APS, 1987; Lewis and Postol, 1997). By the time the decoys and a typical nuclear reentry vehicle
reach the atmosphere, the lower ballistic coefficient of the decoys will cause them to fall behind and allow terminal-area defenses to
concentrate on the reentry vehicles in the time remaining before the weapon detonates (Bethe, Boutwell, and Garwin, 1986, pp. 64–68;
Flax, 1986, pp. 43–46; Garwin and Bethe, 1968).

Space based NMD systems can be fooled by unsophisticated

Rand.Org Accessed 2008 - no date found.

Because making a decoy’s ballistic coefficient and other observable signatures match that of a reentry vehicle carrying a weapon is
roughly equivalent to making another reentry vehicle, the conventional approach to defeating the remaining terminal-area defenses is
normally not to saturate them with false targets but to try to outmaneuver them. This technique originally involved faster reentry
(higher ballistic coefficients) and, as the technology evolved, maneuverable reentry vehicles. Alternatively, the attacker can saturate
the terminal defenses with real targets. Either of these two approaches, maneuvering or multiple reentry vehicles, requires some degree
of technical sophistication and more resources than we might associate with an unsophisticated opponent. However, an
unsophisticated opponent may not follow the same development paths the United States or the Soviet Union took in developing their
own strategic deterrent arsenals. Launching a nuclear weapon in a reentry vehicle on a ballistic missile is not the only way to pose an
unacceptable threat to the United States. Other possible weapons of terror or deterrence (depending on perspective and purpose)
include chemical and biological weapons, and these may be more readily available to what might be called rogue states. Their
proliferation is more difficult to detect or interdict than nuclear weapons. Their development signatures are identical to those of
pharmaceutical research and production. Chemical weapons and agricultural chemicals need the same production infrastructure. The
infrastructure for producing biological weapons is practically undetectable. Among these “poor man’s nuclear weapons,” the spores of
anthrax bacteria have been described vividly in the open literature and in official information (DoD, 1998a; DoD, 1998b; OTA,
1993a; OTA, 1993b; Taylor, 1996). A few kilograms of the spores delivered in an inhalable form can cause extremely large numbers of
fatalities in areas of high population density. Against that kind of a target area with that kind of lethality, precision delivery is not
required, just widespread dispersal and rough timing relative to time of day and weather. Defending against the means of delivering
chemical and biological weapons for terrorist purposes (suitcases, shipping containers, car bombs, subway releases) is generally the
realm of police, customs, coast guard, and intelligence agencies, rather than of the military. Some opponents of missile defenses are
quick to point these means of delivery out as evidence of the futility of military missile defenses. However, if the weapons are
intended as a military deterrent, their utility would be better served by more visible delivery means, such as aircraft or missiles. These
delivery platforms still provide the opportunity for effective, unsophisticated counters to terminal-area missile defenses. With shorter-
range missiles, the acknowledged approach for saturating terminal defenses is to fractionate a unitary warhead into multiple
submunitions and deploy them early in the trajectory (Lewis and Postol, 1997, p. 62). Some might think this approach applies only to
short-range, theater missiles because the submunitions would not survive the heat of reentry associated with longer-range missiles
unless their reentry vehicles were of the expense and complexity suitable for a nuclear weapon. However, that assumes an opponent
would adopt a design philosophy that mirrors historical practice for nuclear reentry vehicles.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 25 / 30
Space based NMD can work – empirically the nay-sayers have been the ones living in a fantasy.
Mona Charen February 22, 2008 12:00 AM On Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet Missile-defense naysayers were the ones peddling

General rejoicing? Not exactly. The Washington Post reports that “Scientists, arms-control advocates and others said the shoot-down
was based on questionable modeling by the government of the risks to human health and was a danger to the future peaceful use of
space.” Questionable modeling? Aren’t these the same people who argue that we must all abandon our passenger cars because
computer modeling suggests the world may be getting a bit warmer? As for arms-control advocates, where were they back in January
2007 when China blew up a satellite that was orbiting the Earth? The Chinese were obviously testing military technology as the
weather satellite they destroyed was in no danger of plunging to earth. Further, that satellite was orbiting at an altitude of 537 miles.
Its destruction therefore spread debris through space, complicating the orbits of other satellites. But the arms control advocates were
quiet. They’ve been dreading a U.S. anti-missile capability since Ronald Reagan first proposed it in the 1980s. Then congresswoman
(now senator) Barbara Boxer called the Strategic Defense Initiative “the president’s astrological dream . . . a dream of laser weapons
powered by nuclear explosions, particle beam weapons, chemical rockets and space based interceptors parked in ‘garages’ in orbit.”
Then-senator Al Gore called SDI “not feasible.” Journalist Ted Koppel summed up the conventional wisdom among liberals when he
declared “I think that what is being proposed for expenditure on Star Wars [sic] . . . is absolute nonsense. Anything like an SDI
program is going to put us in a position where, naturally, the Russians are going to feel threatened.” Besides, he continued, reciting the
then prevalent “It’s Dangerous and it Won’t Work” mantra, “There is no way it is going to work within the next twenty years and it is
going to cost not billions, not tens of billions, not hundreds of billions, but trillions of dollars.” The New York Times labeled the idea
“a pipe dream, a projection of fantasy into policy.” Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis was equally dismissive. He
called SDI “a fantasy — a technological illusion which most scientists say cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. The defenses
they envision won’t make the United States more secure. . . .” As recently as 1999, when Congress was considering funding for
missile defense, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., OR) once again invoked the old George Lucas imagery to debunk the idea. “Like the movie,
this is a phantom solution — hitting a bullet with a bullet in outer space.” But hitting a bullet with a bullet has become almost routine.
On September 28, 2007, also high above the Pacific Ocean (75 miles), another “Star Wars fantasy” vehicle successfully destroyed the
mock warhead of a long-range missile. Many other recent tests have shown similar success. In fact, the U.S. is joined by 30 other
nations who are working on missile-defense systems. For those whose delicate constitutions forbid them to take comfort in military
strength, they may consider that this same technology may one day save Earth from a catastrophic meteor strike. Contra Ted Koppel,
our capability to shoot hurtling satellites —and more dangerous flying objects — out of the sky did not cost trillions of dollars. Since
1983, we’ve spent approximately $100 billion on missile defense, a small percentage of overall defense spending during that period.
And in the end, it worked. American ingenuity can hit a bullet with a bullet. But there is still no cure for liberal short-sightedness

TURNSTEIN 2K8 26 / 30
Space based missile defense systems are the biggest, most expensive failure in American history – there is
no need to continue.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan shocked the national security establishment by calling upon the nation's scientific
community, "who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means
of rendering these weapons impotent and obsolete." Seventeen years have passed since that speech, and the United States has spent
more than $60 billion trying to develop a defense against ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") and
its successors have cost more than twice as much as the Manhattan Project (in constant dollars), but these programs have yet to
produce a single workable weapon. This "achievement" is probably a record in the annals of defense procurement: never has so much
been spent for so long with so little to show for it.

The idea of a space based nuclear missile defense system is out of touch with reality.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Explaining how this happened--and why--is the main aim of Frances Fitzgerald's Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and
the End of the Cold War. The "Star Wars" saga, according to Fitzgerald, is the story of how the United States came to chase a chimera.
For Fitzgerald, "Star Wars" illustrates "the extent to which our national discourse about foreign and defense policy is not about
reality--or the best intelligence estimates about it--but instead a matter of domestic politics, history, and mythology. Not surprisingly,
Fitzgerald's account begins with Ronald Reagan himself. Her portrait is a familiar one: an amiable but detached chief executive who
was poorly informed on most policy issues and unwilling to rein in his constantly warring subordinates. At the same time, she
confirms that Reagan was a skilled public performer with a remarkable ability to adapt his message to the American people's pulse.
Fitzgerald suggests that some of his political magic was the result of his early exposure to evangelical religion: themes of salvation
and redemption, good and evil, and so on are deeply woven into the fabric of American political culture, and they were also key
elements of Reagan's political rhetoric. The "Star Wars" speech was itself an example of Reagan's ability to invoke religious themes:
by calling for the "scientific community" to render nuclear weapons obsolete, Reagan was providing them with an opportunity to
atone for having created them in the first place.

Space based missile defense fails – no true, internal support because its simply unrealistic.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

The bulk of the book--nearly 500 densely footnoted pages--is a detailed narrative of the Reagan administration's defense and arms-
control policy and its handling of U.S.-Soviet relations. Fitzgerald's research is extensive and for the most part convincing, and her
effort to untangle the conflicting accounts of this period is especially impressive. The result is a comprehensive and often damning
account of Reagan-era defense policy. What are her most interesting discoveries? First, Fitzgerald shows that the early attempts to
launch a major missile-defense program failed to garner much support within the government, simply because the various schemes
could not pass the most rudimentary feasibility study. When a retired general, Daniel Graham, persuaded the Pentagon to evaluate a
missile-defense plan known as "High Frontier," for example, both the army and the air force concluded that the proposal was
"unrealistic regarding state of technology, cost, and schedule...[it] has no technical merit and should be rejected." Thus, even though
Reagan liked the basic idea of missile defense and several White House aides were strong supporters, the program's enthusiasts made
little progress in the first two years of his presidency.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 27 / 30
Space based NMD is only a political ruse.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Second, Fitzgerald argues that the decision to embrace strategic defense was primarily a political gesture designed to defuse
opposition at home. Specifically, the real catalyst for the 1983 speech was the nuclear-freeze movement, a grassroots antinuclear
campaign that Reagan's aides feared would undermine public support for his entire defense buildup. The idea of issuing a sweeping
call to eliminate the nuclear threat also appealed to Reagan's own misgivings about the policy of nuclear deterrence--forestalling a
Soviet attack solely by threatening devastating nuclear retaliation. Moreover, he recognized that a pledge to protect the American
people from nuclear destruction would be politically popular.

Space based NMD fails – not even remotely possible.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

At the same time, most experts recognized that an effective defense was not even remotely feasible. These doubts arose not because
skeptics liked nuclear deterrence, of course, but because the physical realities of nuclear weaponry make it very difficult to build a
meaningful defense. Nuclear weapons are small, comparatively light, and enormously destructive, and it would take but a handful to
wreak devastation on any advanced society. Because it takes less than 30 minutes to send an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
around the world, a defensive system has to respond almost instantly to an attack. It has to be able to distinguish real warheads from
decoys and other penetration aids, track them at thousands of miles per hour, and eventually guide a missile (or conceivably a laser or
particle beam) to destroy them. And such a system has to work with nearly 100 percent reliability the very first time it is needed. A
defense that stopped 90 warheads but missed 10 would be a technological marvel, but it would hardly be regarded as "effective," even
by those who survived. As McGeorge Bundy once noted, a mere 10 bombs landing on U.S. cities would be a "disaster beyond

Far to difficult to construct a working NMD.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Moreover, a strategic defense system has to be invulnerable, or an opponent can simply destroy the defense first and then fire the main
attack. Nor does missile defense make sense if it can be overcome more cheaply than it can be built, because opponents could always
retain their lead at less cost. And even if one could devise a cost-effective defense against ballistic missiles, the threat of nuclear
weapons would hardly be defused without additional defenses against aircraft, cruise missiles, or even clandestine smuggling.
Given these obstacles, it soon became clear that Reagan's vision of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" was beyond
our reach. The exotic "Star Wars" technologies touted by proponents turned out to be less effective than originally believed, and
congressional investigators soon discovered that many of the alleged technical advances were, as one scientist admitted, little more
than a "series of sleazy stunts." Administration officials began to concede that SDI would not be able to defend the U.S. population,
but argued that the technology might complicate an attacker's plans and provide a good way to defend the U.S. ICBM force.
Hardliners tried to get permission to begin a limited deployment before Reagan left office, but their efforts failed because there was in
reality no system to deploy.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 28 / 30
Space based NMD’s accomplish nothing
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Fitzgerald concludes with a final puzzle: if the costly pursuit of a national missile defense has accomplished so little, why does it
continue? She suggests that the support is largely a matter of ideological conviction, but several other factors are at work as well.
To begin with, the missile-defense program is now well entrenched within the defense establishment, and government programs rarely
go out of business without a fight. Moreover, given President Clinton's shaky relationship with the U.S. military, his support for this
project has been an obvious way to counter right-wing complaints that he was soft on defense.

Continuing space based NMD programs is worthless and exacerbates conflicts.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

The end of the Cold War has also made the objective seem somewhat more feasible (although it is still a long way off). Instead of
trying to counter thousands of Soviet warheads, current plans focus on the more realistic goal of stopping accidental launches or small
attacks from rogue states. Although it is not clear whether even this modest capability can be achieved, the revised rationale is not as
far-fetched as Reagan's original dream. Finally, the spread of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to states like Iraq and North
Korea has increased support for the program. In particular, missile defenses are seen as a way to keep a state like North Korea from
trying to deter the use of U.S. conventional forces by threatening nuclear escalation. Instead of being a means for eliminating nuclear
weapons, in short, missile defense is now seen as a way for the United States to retain the upper hand at any level of conflict.

Continuing space based NMD is bad – the current program is a rush to failure with no benefits.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

So does it now make sense to go forward with some type of national missile defense? I think not. After all, it is still unclear whether
such a system could actually work. A Department of Defense review panel recently described the current development program as a
"rush to failure," and we are still billions of dollars and many years away from an operational system. Moreover, the systems we are
presently developing would be incapable of dealing with rather primitive countermeasures, which means that even a minor power like
North Korea could probably overcome them easily. Thus, the alleged benefits may be wholly imaginary.

Space based NMD’s are costly and worthless.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Even if missile defenses were capable of protecting us from rogue states such as Iraq or North Korea, is this really a serious danger?
Do we really think that these regimes would invite national suicide by launching a handful of missiles at the United States, knowing
that we had thousands of warheads with which to respond? Advocates argue that such assailants are inherently irrational and cannot be
trusted, but similar arguments were made about Mao Zedong's China and Stalin's Russia--and both states behaved as sensibly as we
did when dealing with nuclear weapons. If we could deter the "evil empire" for four decades without a strategic defense, we can
almost certainly deter today's rogue states.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 29 / 30
Space based NMD’s are worthless – to many other alternative delivery methods.
Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Furthermore, if we were able to build an effective defense against ballistic missiles, hostile regimes could simply devise other ways to
deliver such weapons to U.S. soil. The U.S. border is notoriously permeable (as illegal immigrants and drug smugglers demonstrate
daily), and a clandestine attack would be harder to deter because we might not know who was responsible. Ballistic missiles, by
contrast, have unmistakable "return addresses."

Space based NMD leads to war with Russia and China.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

So much for the alleged benefits. Let us now consider some of the costs. First, creating a missile defense will discourage Russia from
further reducing its existing arsenal and encourage states like China to increase theirs. Russia and China are unlikely to accept U.S.
assurances that our missile defense is not directed at them; nor will they believe that a limited defense today might not be expanded in
the future. And their real fear is that the combination of large offensive forces and a limited missile-defense capability might enable
the United States to launch a first strike, counting on the defense to handle the opponent's surviving forces. If this concern seems far-
fetched, imagine how U.S. hardliners would react if Russia or China were modernizing their own arsenals and moving to develop their
own defenses. U.S. leaders would find this deeply worrying, even if Moscow or Beijing assured us that their defensive systems were
only intended to deal with an accidental launch or "limited" threat from North Korea or India.

Space based NMD jeopardizes controlling loose nukes.

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Second, building missile defenses jeopardizes the current campaign to control "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union. Russia is
clearly willing to cooperate with us in dismantling obsolete warheads, reducing the size of its weapons complex, and getting rid of its
huge plutonium stockpile. Moscow has also made it clear, however, that unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (which would be necessary if the U.S. were to deploy a defense), would derail these cooperative efforts. There is an obvious
irony here: the United States is spending billions of dollars trying to protect itself from a handful of (non-existent) weapons in the
hands of Iraq or North Korea, thereby undermining the successful effort to dismantle thousands of real weapons in the former Soviet

Space based NMD fails and costs billions

Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense” Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor of
international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Third, developing, building, and deploying a system will not be cheap. The General Accounting Office estimates that a single-site,
bare-bones defense would cost at least $18 billion; the cost of a somewhat more capable system might run over $28 billion. The U.S.
defense budget will face increasing fiscal pressures in the next decade. Given the dubious benefits of missile defense, this hardly looks
like the right place to invest scarce defense dollars. On all counts, the case for national missile defense is nearly as weak as it was
when "Star Wars" began. Unfortunately, logic and reason play little role in the present debate, so it is increasingly likely that some sort
of defense will eventually be deployed. Great powers like the United States are strongly inclined to seek unilateral advantages
wherever they can find them; it requires wisdom and foresight to recognize when seizing some alleged "advantage" might be wasteful
or counterproductive. Fitzgerald's account shows that such wisdom was absent when "Star Wars" was launched, and nothing in the
present debate suggests that much has been learned. During the next decade, the United States will spend further billions of dollars on
missile defense, even though we are likely to be disappointed by the results. But after reading Way Out There in the Blue, we certainly
shouldn't be surprised.

TURNSTEIN 2K8 30 / 30
NMD is critical to minimize the Iranian threat.
Peter R. Huessy is currently the president of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense and national security consulting business. In addition to
writing for, he is also a guest lecturer, appearing at such fine institutions as the School of Advanced
International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, The Institute of World Politics, and The National War College. Mr. Huessy has spent
his career working in government organizations and committees, such as the United Nations, The Environmental Fund, Department of
the Interior, and the National Defense University Foundation, August 01, 2008 -

In a few short weeks, the Czech Republic will vote on whether to accept the deployment of a NATO approved missile defense radar as
part of overall missile defense architecture to defend Europe and the United States from Iranian ballistic missiles that may soon be
armed with nuclear weapons. The vote may hinge on whether Prague thinks the next American President will follow-through and
support such a deployment or abandon it. This decision is also critically important to the extent to which NATO can defend itself
against Iranian missile threats. The drive-by media are telling the American people that Senator Obama is a better choice for President
than Senator McCain because the former is more popular around the world. A recent Pew Center poll of a number of European and
Asian countries confirmed this view. As the Illinois Senator traveled to the Middle East and Europe, we were buried in an avalanche of
news stories about how popular Obama is and of the hopes he can build “partnerships” with our allies and bridge the gap that divides
the US and her adversaries, presumably including Iran. Well, what about our adversaries? What bridge is there to straighten out our
differences with Iran, North Korea, the emerging fascism in Russia and the growing military power of China? As far as I know,
Senator Obama says only he is going to engage in tough diplomacy, whatever that means. He says he wants to offer Iran carrots,
although to date the US and its European partners have offered the Tehran mullahs an entire super market of such enticements to no
avail. He has criticized missile defense, calling for $10 billion in annual cuts in a $9 billion a year program. Senator McCain, on the
other hand, strongly supports the European based deployments. What does Iran want? It wants a compliant US foreign policy that will
accommodate its nuclear weapons program and ignore its state sponsorship of terrorism. It wants a “nuanced” American
administration that will “engage” Iran, expand trade and commerce, build cars like Hyundai and help with oil and gas developments
like the Norwegians. On the United States side, many of our foreign and defense policy elites hold the same view. Iran and its 66
million people “can’t be ignored”, so we have to “engage” them. Boiled down to the bumper sticker slogan, we have to “talk with
Iran” as if they were a normal nation among the nearly 200 around the globe. Senator Obama has called for just such talks, while it is
unclear what it is that he will say to the mullahs in Tehran that will magically change their minds about terrorism, missiles and nuclear
weapons. Iran welcomes such talks, however, because they can play rope a dope for years without ever having to make any real
concessions. They can always say talks in the future “could” or “might” yield results, as long as the United States or its European
partners, or the United Nations makes the necessary “adjustments”. Iran also wants an American President who will undo the progress
to date the US has achieved in building a missile defense deployment in the heart of Europe. Last week, a former NATO national
security official and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staffer warned that Iranian ballistic missile developments are, in
part, designed to coerce Europe into opposing more severe UN sanctions against the regime in Tehran. The missile defense in Europe
is thus connected to our economic and military security in the most serious way. As the Prime Minister of Japan said recently the
building of cooperative missile defenses is not being “done for fun”. This is serious business. As Mike Ledeen says, “Faster, please.”