Department of Defense Trade Off

Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Index F-22 Trade Off 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................................................2 F-22 Trade Off 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................................................3 Budget Tight.................................................................................................................................................................................................4 F-22 Chopping Block...................................................................................................................................................................................5 F-22 Chopping Block...................................................................................................................................................................................6 F-22 Chopping Block...................................................................................................................................................................................7 Funding Trade Off........................................................................................................................................................................................8 Space Trades Off..........................................................................................................................................................................................9 Funding Key to F-22..................................................................................................................................................................................10 Funding Key To Air Force.........................................................................................................................................................................11 F-22 Good – Security.................................................................................................................................................................................12 F-22 Good – China ....................................................................................................................................................................................13 F-22 Good – Terror....................................................................................................................................................................................14 F-22 Good – Air Power..............................................................................................................................................................................15 F-22 Good – Air Power..............................................................................................................................................................................16 Air Power Good – Hegemony ...................................................................................................................................................................17 Air Power Good – Military........................................................................................................................................................................18 Air Power Good – Terror...........................................................................................................................................................................19 Air Power Good – Middle East..................................................................................................................................................................20 Air Power Good – Koreas..........................................................................................................................................................................21 Air Power Good – Deterrence ...................................................................................................................................................................22 F-22 Funding Low.....................................................................................................................................................................................23 Trade Off Now...........................................................................................................................................................................................24 Trade Off Inevitable...................................................................................................................................................................................25 Funding Irrelevant......................................................................................................................................................................................26 F-22 Fail – Air Power................................................................................................................................................................................27 F-22 Fail – Timeframe ..............................................................................................................................................................................28 F-22 Fail – Engineering ............................................................................................................................................................................29 F-22 Fail – Software..................................................................................................................................................................................30 AT: Air Power............................................................................................................................................................................................31 AT: Air Power............................................................................................................................................................................................32 AT: Overseas Threats.................................................................................................................................................................................33 AT: Middle East.........................................................................................................................................................................................34 AT: China...................................................................................................................................................................................................35 AT: Terror...................................................................................................................................................................................................36 F-22 Bad – Iraq War...................................................................................................................................................................................37 FCS Trade Off 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................................38 FCS Trade Off 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................................39 FCS Chopping Block.................................................................................................................................................................................40 FCS Funding High.....................................................................................................................................................................................41 Funding Key To FCS.................................................................................................................................................................................42 FCS Coming...............................................................................................................................................................................................43 FCS Coming...............................................................................................................................................................................................44 FCS Good – Heg........................................................................................................................................................................................45 FCS Good – Heg .......................................................................................................................................................................................46 FCS Good – Readiness .............................................................................................................................................................................47 FCS Funding Cut Now...............................................................................................................................................................................48 FCS Cuts Inevitable...................................................................................................................................................................................49 FCS Fails – Tech........................................................................................................................................................................................50 FCS Fails – Insufficient ............................................................................................................................................................................51 FCS Fails – Timeframe .............................................................................................................................................................................52 AT: Terror...................................................................................................................................................................................................53

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

1

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Trade Off 1NC
Lockheed’s F-22 jet will barely get funded – but it’s on the chopping block Bob Cox ‘8, Staff writer @ Star-Telegram
[“What’s up next for F-35, F-22?” 6/17/08, http://www.star-telegram.com/business/story/704902.html]

Clear air, politically speaking, appears to lie ahead for the F-35 joint strike fighter program in the wake of Lockheed Martin’s successful flight test last week of the first redesigned version of the aircraft. The same probably can’t be said for Lockheed’s F22 jet after its most vocal proponents in the U.S. Air Force leadership were sacked recently by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The successful test flight of the F-35B Lightning II short takeoff-vertical landing model on Wednesday prompted a vote of confidence from one senior civilian Pentagon official. John Young, undersecretary of defense for weapons development and acquisition, said in a statement that the flight “makes a strong statement” about the progress on the F-35 program despite well publicized delays and technical issues. Young said “the JSF program is ahead of similar programs in terms of quality, software, testing, and manufacturing readiness. The JSF program has many more steps ahead, but today’s flight demonstrates the maturity and progress being made on JSF.” The F-35B is the short takeoff-vertical landing, or “STOVL,” model of the three versions and is the most challenging technically. In April, Young had approved funds to produce six F-35A conventionaltakeoff-and-landing models, but withheld funds for six STOVL models until after the first flight. Young will receive a further briefing by program and Lockheed officials, probably within the next month, including a review of plans for resolving problems discovered in tests of F-35B engines. But barring any new technical issues with the engine, Young is expected to release funds for the other six aircraft approved in the 2008 budget. Politically, “the joint strike fighter is in very good shape,” said Loren Thompson, defense analyst with the Lexington Institute and a consultant to several aerospace and defense companies, including Lockheed. The same can’t be said for the F-22. The June 5 firings of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, Thompson said, were in large part due to the increasingly angry debate between the Air Force and senior Pentagon leaders over whether to buy more F-22s. The tone of the discussions between Moseley and, particularly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England over the F-22 had grown increasingly tense. “The absence of any strong advocates for the F-22, with Moseley and Wynne gone, will be detrimental for the program,” Thompson said. Both programs are important to Lockheed’s Fort Worth operation. About 1,800 workers assemble the mid-fuselage of the F-22, while about 4,000 are working on the F-35 with production work just beginning to have an impact on staffing. The F-22 still has strong supporters in Congress who will probably maintain some funding for additional planes beyond the 183 now on order in the 2009 budget, but the likelihood of long-term production is dim. Both Gates and England are firmly opposed to future orders. And Thompson said it is unlikely, given their past positions, that either Sen. John McCain or Sen. Barack Obama will be champion of the program if elected president. F-22 funding competes with other initiatives GAO ‘5, U.S. Government Accountability Office
[“TACTICAL AIRCRAFT Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities,” 3/1/05, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05304.pdf]

DOD has been pushing to transform its military operations and capabilities to acquire revolutionary weapon systems and meet evolving post-Cold War threats. Undertaking this transformational effort requires significant funding and competes with other DOD and national priorities. When DOD’s weapon systems, such as the F/A-22, require more time and money than originally anticipated, the extra investment needed to solve problems takes funding away from other priorities, slows DOD’s overall modernization effort, delays capabilities for the warfighter, and forces unplanned—and possibly unnecessary—trade-offs among DOD’s many priorities. Our past work has shown that problems, such as cost overruns, arise when weapon programs do not have a sound business case2 or capture the knowledge needed to efficiently and effectively manage program risks. The end result is a reduction in quantities and ultimately in DOD’s overall buying power.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

2

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Trade Off 1NC
F-22 planes key to US air superiority. Seth Weingberger, Prof. of Intl Rels and Political Philosophy at Univ. of Pudget Sound, “Here Comes The F-22”, 1/9/2008 Assuming the Air Force is not being extra-cautious with the F-15s to encourage the purchase of more F-22s (such an assumption shouldn't be seen as an indictment of the Air Force, but rather a recognition of the way in which bureaucratic incentives affect decision making), the structural problems emerging in the F-22 does seem to recommend increasing the complement of F-22s. The F-15s are now, on average, 25 years old, and the F-16s are even older. The F-22 will keep the US Air Force unchallenged in the skies and will serve as a deterrent against potential rivals attempting to challenge US air superiority. Air dominance is such a vital component of US military strategy; it would be unacceptable to let the gap between the US and other states' air forces shrink. Not all military systems are worth the investment. But the F-22 is. Hegemony is beautiful Zalmay Khalilizad, Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program @ RAND and current US Ambassador to Iraq, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, p. Lexis Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

3

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

Budget Tight
Military spending is expected to be tight despite the need for funding Thom Shanker ‘8, Staff Writer @ New York Times
[“Proposed Military Spending Is Highest Since WWII”, 2/4/08, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/washington/04military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin]

Pentagon and military officials acknowledge the considerable commitment of money that will be required for continuing the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as efforts to increase the size of the Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations forces, to replace weapons worn out in the desert and to assure “quality of life” for those in uniform so they will remain in the military. Yet those demands for money do not even include the price of refocusing the military’s attention beyond the current wars to prepare for other challenges. Senior Pentagon civilians and the top generals and admirals do not deny the challenge of sustaining military spending, and they acknowledge that Congress and the American people may turn inward after Iraq. “I believe that we need to have a broad public discussion about what we should spend on defense,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Friday. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Admiral Mullen have said military spending should not drop below 4 percent of the national economy. “I really do believe this 4 percent floor is important,” Admiral Mullen said. “It’s really important, given the world we’re living in, given the threats that we see out there, the risks that are, in fact, global, not just in the Middle East.” [continued] [continued] Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Mr. Gates and the senior Pentagon leadership were well aware that the large emergency spending bills for the war, over and above the Pentagon base budget, would at some point come to an end. “The secretary believes that whenever we transition away from war supplementals, the Congress should dedicate 4 percent of our G.D.P. to funding national security,” Mr. Morrell said. “That is what he believes to be a reasonable price to stay free and protect our interests around the world.” Air Force programs are on the chopping block JP ‘7, [“US budget request for increased defence spending masks squeeze on procurement and R&D,” 2/8/07, http://www.janes.com/news/defence/triservice/jdi/jdi070208_1_n.shtml] Army officials professed themselves pleased with their allotment. The budget, if fully implemented, "goes a long way toward addressing some of the issues we have with our department", said Lieutenant-General David Melcher, military deputy for budget in the office of the assistant secretary of the army (financial management and comptroller). Several programmes were cut, however. The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II missile, which is being developed by BAE Systems and General Dynamics as a cheaper, lighter substitute for the AGM-114 Hellfire missile, was cancelled. The Lockheed Martin Army Tactical Missile System was also axed. The US Air Force said its top-priority acquisition programmes and overall readiness are under threat in the proposed FY08 budget. "It's not fast enough and it's not enough," said Air Force Budget Director Major-General Frank Faykes of the money requested in 2008 for major procurement programmes.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

4

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Chopping Block
Lockheed’s F-22 Jets have been cut back because of spending restraints Elizabeth Becker, staff writer, 7/23/1999, New York Times, “Critics Catch up to a 21st – Century Jet”, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EFD9153EF930A15754C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all This picture of outsized industrial self-confidence survived years of questioning from Congress about cost overruns and delays in the $70 billion project intended to build the Air Force's state-of-the-art fighter jet. Throughout those years, the program enjoyed the powerful protection of Georgia politicians like Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House whose district included this Lockheed plant, and Sam Nunn, the former head of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Without them, Lockheed finds itself on the defensive with Congress, with the House yesterday approving the deletion of $1.8 billion earmarked to manufacture the first six jets to be used in combat as it went ahead and overwhelmingly approved the military spending bill for the next fiscal year. It was a defeat for the Pentagon and the manufacturer, which rarely had encountered a Congress opposed to a military program on the verge of production. Rifes within the DOD makes F-22’s a vulnerable target for cuts Bob Cox, staff writer, 6/17/08, Star-Telegram, “What’s up next for F-35, F-22?”, http://www.startelegram.com/business/story/704902.html Clear air, politically speaking, appears to lie ahead for the F-35 joint strike fighter program in the wake of Lockheed Martin’s successful flight test last week of the first redesigned version of the aircraft. The same probably can’t be said for Lockheed’s F-22 jet after its most vocal proponents in the U.S. Air Force leadership were sacked recently by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The successful test flight of the F-35B Lightning II short takeoff-vertical landing model on Wednesday prompted a vote of confidence from one senior civilian Pentagon official. John Young, undersecretary of defense for weapons development and acquisition, said in a statement that the flight “makes a strong statement” about the progress on the F-35 program despite well publicized delays and technical issues. Young said “the JSF program is ahead of similar programs in terms of quality, software, testing, and manufacturing readiness. The JSF program has many more steps ahead, but today’s flight demonstrates the maturity and progress being made on JSF.” The F-35B is the short takeoff-vertical landing, or “STOVL,” model of the three versions and is the most challenging technically. In April, Young had approved funds to produce six F-35A conventional-takeoff-and-landing models, but withheld funds for six STOVL models until after the first flight. Young will receive a further briefing by program and Lockheed officials, probably within the next month, including a review of plans for resolving problems discovered in tests of F-35B engines. But barring any new technical issues with the engine, Young is expected to release funds for the other six aircraft approved in the 2008 budget. Politically, “the joint strike fighter is in very good shape,” said Loren Thompson, defense analyst with the Lexington Institute and a consultant to several aerospace and defense companies, including Lockheed. The same can’t be said for the F-22. The June 5 firings of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, Thompson said, were in large part due to the increasingly angry debate between the Air Force and senior Pentagon leaders over whether to buy more F-22s. The tone of the discussions between Moseley and, particularly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England over the F-22 had grown increasingly tense. “The absence of any strong advocates for the F-22, with Moseley and Wynne gone, will be detrimental for the program,” Thompson said. Both programs are important to Lockheed’s Fort Worth operation. About 1,800 workers assemble the mid-fuselage of the F-22, while about 4,000 are working on the F-35 with production work just beginning to have an impact on staffing. The F-22 still has strong supporters in Congress who will probably maintain some funding for additional planes beyond the 183 now on order in the 2009 budget, but the likelihood of long-term production is dim. Both Gates and England are firmly opposed to future orders. And Thompson said it is unlikely, given their past positions, that either Sen. John McCain or Sen. Barack Obama will be champion of the program if elected president.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

5

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Chopping Block
Lockheed’s F-22 Jets have been empirically under spending restraints Elizabeth Becker, staff writer, 7/23/1999, New York Times, “Critics Catch up to a 21st – Century Jet”, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EFD9153EF930A15754C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all This picture of outsized industrial self-confidence survived years of questioning from Congress about cost overruns and delays in the $70 billion project intended to build the Air Force's state-of-the-art fighter jet. Throughout those years, the program enjoyed the powerful protection of Georgia politicians like Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House whose district included this Lockheed plant, and Sam Nunn, the former head of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Without them, Lockheed finds itself on the defensive with Congress, with the House yesterday approving the deletion of $1.8 billion earmarked to manufacture the first six jets to be used in combat as it went ahead and overwhelmingly approved the military spending bill for the next fiscal year. It was a defeat for the Pentagon and the manufacturer, which rarely had encountered a Congress opposed to a military program on the verge of production.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

6

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Chopping Block
Congress has been willing in the past to scrape F-22 funding
Jack Shanahan, journalist, 5/22/2000, Baltimore Sun, With the budget clamp squeezing hard, will House Republicans determine that the F-22 is indeed justified this year, when last year it was not? PERHAPS THE most unexpected - and intelligent - act by last year's Congress was the vote by the House to cut one of the largest single items in the federal budget: Construction funds for the Pentagon's F-22 fighter jet. The vote was overwhelming, 379 to 45. After the House vote, a highly unusual scenario unfolded as President Clinton joined Senate Republicans in calling for the full restoration of F-22 funds. The White House threatened to veto the defense appropriations bill over this issue. In the end, a House-Senate conference committee restored most of the funds for the F-22, with significant restrictions attached. But fiscally conservative House leaders, led by Jerry Lewis, R-Calif., continued to express their displeasure with the F-22 program. Faced with unprecedented budget pressures, what will the House do this year? The case for funding the F-22 has not improved since last year's vote. The jet was sold to Congress in 1990 as a replacement for the F-15 fighter because U.S. military experts believed the Soviet Union was designing new, superior fighter jets. But the Soviet planes never were built. The plans for them collapsed with the Soviet Union. Thus, the existing 750 active F-15s remain, undeniably, the world's most advanced tactical fighters. And they will remain so, reports the General Accounting Office, through 2015 or later. With at least a 50-1 advantage in modern fighter aircraft over Iraq, Iran, China, and other potential adversaries, U.S. air superiority is not in jeopardy. Yet, the Air Force wants to replace the F-15s (which cost $33 million each) with 339 F-22s at a cost of $63 billion, about $187 million per plane. It would be by far the most expensive fighter plane ever. And, astonishingly, the F-22 is only one of three new-generation fighter jets that the Pentagon wants to build in the coming decades, costing a total of $350 billion. In addition to serious questions about the need for the F-22, there is evidence that it will not work as advertised - and anyone in their right mind would expect Congress to pay close attention to these problems in the wake of the recent tilt-rotor Osprey crash, which killed 19 Marines. The Osprey was needlessly rushed through Congress by pork-barreling politicians. Fewer than five percent of planned F-22 flight tests have been completed. The GAO, the investigative arm of Congress - which also objected to the Opsrey - has reported that the F-22 faces design deficiencies, including faulty brakes, leaky fuel lines and problems connecting the plane's wings to its body. And questions remain about the F-22's ambitious design, such as its ability to cruise at supersonic speed with unmatched maneuverability. Despite these problems, lobbying pressure on behalf of the F-22 has been intense, as it was for the Osprey. After the plane's near-death experience last year, Lockheed Martin - the prime manufacturer of the jet - went on afterburner into a lobbying frenzy. Undoubtedly buoyed by the knowledge that parts for the F-22 are made in 46 states, Lockheed lobbyists visited key lawmakers in their home districts during the congressional recess immediately following the House vote. Lockheed warned that hundreds of jobs would be lost if Congress did not allocate sufficient tax dollars to build the F-22. In four key cities, Lockheed set up a dazzling computer simulation of the plane's cockpit. The display - basically a video game promised gee-whiz performance This year, lobbying pressure will continue to be intense, but so will budget pressure. The Clinton administration has raised its request for the F-22 from the $2.2 billion allocated last year to an eye-popping $4 billion - enough to build more than 250 secondary schools across America. Th F-22 request comes as congressional Republicans are grappling with how to justify their proposal to increase funding for the Pentagon and education, legislate a tax cut, and - with inflation added - to cut nearly everything else in the discretionary portion of the budget. And they must deal with this in an election year. With the budget clamp squeezing hard, will House Republicans determine that the F-22 is indeed justified this year, when last year it was not? Or will we see an encore to last year's act, in which brave House Republicans - joined this time by the Clinton administration and a Senate concerned about a repeat of the Osprey disaster - withstand the lobbying pressure and recognize that America has much more pressing budget v priorities than the expensive and unnecessary F-22?

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

7

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

Funding Trade Off
The Plan will tradeoff with other DOD programs Kristine E. Blackwell ‘7, National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
[“The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on Fossil-Based Aviation Fuel- Issues for Congress,” June 15th 2007, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf]

There are several ways in which DOD can reduce its use of fossil-based aviation fuel. Each has advantages and disadvantages and no single option provides the perfect solution. Advanced technologies, such as synthetic fuels, offer potential alternatives but further development and study are required before DOD can employ them on a large scale. DOD can also take measures to decrease its use of fuel. Possible options include upgrading aircraft engines and modifying operational procedures. Many of these measures, however, are costly and must compete for funding with other operational priorities.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

8

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

Space Trades Off
Air force funding trades off with space funding. John Hazlehurst ‘8, writer for Colorado Springs Business Journal [“Air Force's request for more money at center of debate over country's needs,” 2/29/08, l/n] However, Selva's concerns about aging aircraft were confirmed by last November's midair disintegration of a 27 year-old F-15 fighter, which literally came apart during a high-G maneuver. Despite injuries, the pilot managed to safely eject. As a result, the entire fleet of F-15s was grounded. The cause of the accident was found to be a cracked longeron (a longitudinal support member). Nine other aircraft were found to have similar fatigue cracks. But the service's perceived needs could encounter multiple obstacles. During the next few years, fears about recession, the winding down of the Iraq conflict and rising federal deficits might substantially affect the overall military budget. Any substantial decrease in the Air Force's budget, or any diminution or dilution of its role in America's Armed Forces, might be bad news for Colorado Springs. With multiple Air Force installations, as well as the service's crown jewel, the U.S. Air Force Academy, the city's economy is intimately linked to the fortunes of the junior service. But Mike Kazmierski, a retired Army colonel who now heads the Colorado Springs Economic Development Corp., said that prospective budget changes might conceivably benefit the Springs. "If it's budget shifting, for example, with more funding to space and cyberspace operations, that could be beneficial," he said. "But if the overall budget decreases, and we see downsizing, that could dramatically affect us, and our local economy. "

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

9

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

Funding Key to F-22
F-22’s will end without appropriate funding Aviation Week ‘8, Space and aviation magazine
[“F-35B First Flight Boosts JSF as F-22 Loses Supporters,” 6/15/08, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw061608p2.xml&headline=F35B%20First%20Flight%20Boosts%20JSF%20as%20F-22%20Loses%20Supporters]

The timeline for Boeing, which makes the wing and aft fuselage, is even tighter. "Advanced procurement for Lot 10 must be added to the FY [Fiscal Year] 2009 defense budget this fall to avoid the initiation of shutdown in October 2008," says Bob Jenkins, Boeing's F-22 business strategy director. Although Lockheed and Boeing are funded to produce aircraft until 2011, the long-lead suppliers will deliver their last parts as early as mid-2009. The termination threat comes as the program is stabilizing, says Larry Lawson, Lockheed Martin vice president and F-22 program manager. Aircraft are being delivered with zero defects, a month ahead of schedule, and the mission-capable rate of the fleet is running at a "pretty good" 70%, he says. The F-22 has faced termination since February, when the Defense Dept.'s Fiscal 2009 budget request omitted funding for the fighter, leaving its fate to the next administration. Both defense authorization committees proposed plus-ups in order to procure some long-lead items, but a final decision awaits a negotiation between the House and Senate. The U.S. Air Force added to the pressure for funding by sending a letter to the Senate on June 3 "outlining the potential impact to the F-22 if the decision is not made by Oct. 31," says Jenkins. Although exact figures are not being disclosed, Jenkins says "a gap of a year and you're talking close to a $1-billion impact." Restarting production, and covering supply-chain expenditures, would raise the unit cost of future aircraft. Funding is key to development and implementation of F-22 GAO ‘8, Government Accountability Office
[“DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,” 3/1/08, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf]

The F-22A modernization program has experienced numerous budget decreases and program restructurings that have resulted in delaying the planned implementation of the development increments by 3 years. Since fiscal year 2002, the F- 22A’s modernization budget has been decreased by nearly $330 million. Some of these decreases were the result of congressional budget cuts. However, more than 50 percent of the decreases can be attributed to program restructuring by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In its fiscal year 2008 budget submission to Congress, the Air Force requested $743 million in development funding for F-22A modernization. The conference reports accompanying the 2008 National Department of Defense Authorization Act, and Defense Appropriations Act both recommended providing the F-22A modernization program with $611 million, about $132 million less than requested. Program officials indicated that this decrease in funding required changes to minimize the impact on the planned modernization program.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

10

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

Funding Key To Air Force
Budget cuts severely weaken air force AP ‘8, Associated Press
[“Service wants more money — a lot more — for coveted planes,” 2/18/08, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23223286/]

Air Force officials are warning that unless their budget is increased dramatically, and soon, the military's high-flying branch won't dominate the skies as it has for decades. After more than seven years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Air Force's aging jet fighters, bombers, cargo aircraft and gunships are at the breaking point, they say, and expensive, ultramodern replacements are needed fast. "What we've done is put the requirement on the table that says, 'If we're going to do the missions you're going to ask us to do, it will require this kind of investment,'" Maj. Gen. Paul Selva, the Air Force's director of strategic planning, said in an interview "Failing that, we take what is already a geriatric Air Force," Selva said, "and we drive it for another 20 years into an area of uncertainty." An extra $20 billion each year over the next five — beginning with an Air Force budget of about $137 billion in 2009 instead of the $117 billion proposed by the Bush administration — would solve that problem, according to Selva and other senior Air Force officers. Yet the prospects for huge infusions of cash seem dim. Congress is expected to boost the 2009 budget, but not to the level urged by the Air Force. In the years that follow, a possible recession, a rising federal deficit and a distaste for higher taxes all portend a decline in defense spending regardless of which party wins the White House in November. "The Air Force is going to be confronting a major procurement crisis because it can't buy all the things that it absolutely needs," said Dov Zakheim, a former Pentagon comptroller. "It's going to force us to rethink, yet again, what is the strategy we want? What can we give up?" Decrease in funding critically weakens the air force. Mackenzie Eaglen ‘7, Senior Policy Analyst for National Security
[“Airmen vs. Modernization: The Air Force Budget Dilemma,” 5/18/07, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2037.cfm]

Choosing between aircraft modernization and force sizing is not occurring in a vacuum as airframes are wearing out quicker than anticipated. Declining readiness combined with an aging fleet and reduced buying power is causing a tradeoff in long-term modernization programs. If the Air Force continues modernization at the expense of its personnel under the current budgetary constraints, both will continue to suffer. Replacing older aircraft with new ones is yet another challenge facing the Air Force today. The Air Force has approximately 6,000 aircraft and is buying about 60 new airplanes per year--a 100-year rate of recapitalization. The Air Force is "now the oldest of all the services."[31]The Air Force also needs to purchase next-generation aircraft because the next war will not look like the last war. General Moseley remarked that U.S. aircraft "will face threats" from "increasingly lethal anti-access systems, weapons, sophisticated integrated air defense systems, enhanced surface-to-air missiles, advanced fighters, avionics, and air-to-air missiles." He offered a stark assessment of the future if procurement does not occur in greater numbers, noting that the U.S. air fleet is "at a point of obsolescence vis-à-vis these emerging threats."

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

11

Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Good – Security
The F-22 Jets are designed from cutting edge technology necessary for US security in the skies Elizabeth Becker, staff writer, 7/23/1999, New York Times, “Critics Catch up to a 21st – Century Jet”, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EFD9153EF930A15754C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all On the outside, the flat, almost blunt silhouette of the F-22 has little of the futuristic look of the B-2 stealth bomber. Inside, in the cockpit, however, it has the feel of a video game in which approaching enemy aircraft are tracked on a computer screen as red triangles, easily distinguishable from the green squares representing the ''friendlies'' and the pale yellow oblongs indicating planes with unknown loyalties. ''Use the cursor like a mouse and see who he is,'' said C. L. Buzze, a former Air Force pilot and now the F-22 advanced product representative, as he manipulated the levers of a facsimile of an F-22 cockpit. The cursor slid over the triangle and immediately identified the enemy plane as a fighter jet from the Russian fleet. When the plane came in range, the command ''Shoot'' appeared on the screen, and with a flick of a switch, a white tail slithered across the screen hitting a dot that exploded into a small fiery ball. But if the plane passes all of its tests during the next three to four years, officials say that the expensive stealth features built into nearly every part of the plane will insure that the F-22 image on an enemy radar is so reduced that it is unlikely to be detected before the it attacks. And according to Lockheed officials, the F-22's supersonic cruising speed, and technical advances will enable the F-22 pilot to take the first shot in an aerial duel. The aviation electronic system in the cockpit, where data are collected, integrated and instantly compiled on the screen, is one of fighter jet's biggest selling points. Many modern fighter jets have the F22's capabilities but none compile it and integrate it on one single screen.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Good – China
F-22 contains Chinese military threat Reuters ‘8, International News Agency
[“Air Force shakeup may spur spending shifts,” 6/9/08, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN0832331720080609]

Gates has argued that the F-22, the top U.S. dogfighter, is "principally for use against a near peer," Pentagon code words for China and Russia, potential threats he deems years away. Gates' spending priorities have not always matched those of the Air Force, which had pushed for an average of $20 billion a year more than was budgeted over the next five years. Air Force Gen. Bruce Carlson, who heads a command responsible for developing and testing new systems, said in February the Air Force would go on pushing for the coveted F-22s, optimized for knocking out advanced air defenses. "Most people say in the future there will be a Chinese element to whatever we do," he told reporters on February 13. In Carlson's remarks, "Gates correctly detected a lack of willingness among Air Force leaders to follow his policies on F-22 fighters," said Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute, noted for his close ties to the Pentagon and industry. Adding to the friction was a perception the Air Force was quietly lobbying Congress to extend the F-22 production line, a decision Gates has left to the next U.S. president who will be elected on November 4. The Pentagon, in its last major strategy review, in 2006, said China had the greatest potential "to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies."

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DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Good – Terror
THE F-22'S SUPERIOR CAPABILITIES ARE KEY TO WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR Al Gibbs ‘4, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 3-30-04, Federal Document Clearing House, p. L/N As indicated earlier, joint warfighting success in the Global War on Terrorism has been possible in part due to superior weapons capabilities. New weapon systems are the tools of combat capability that enable our combatant commanders to respond quickly to conflicts in support of national security objectives. The FY 2005 Total Force new mission military construction program consists of 45 projects, totaling more than $403 million. These projects support a number of weapons systems; two of special significance are the F/A-22 Raptor and the C-17 Globemaster III. The F/A 22 Raptor is the Air Force's next generation air superiority and ground attack fighter. F/A-22 flight training and maintenance training will be conducted at Tyndall AFB, Florida, and Sheppard AFB, Texas, respectively. Our FY 2005 military construction request includes two F/A-22 projects at Tyndall AFB for $19 million, and one F/A-22 project at Sheppard AFB totaling $21 million.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Good – Air Power
THE F-22 IS KEY TO AIR POWER General Ryan ‘99, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, 10-5-99, Omaha World Herald, p. L/N That's why it was such a surprise when the House Appropriations subcommittee summarily removed production funding for the F-22. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen has called the F-22 "the cornerstone of our nation's air power in the 21st century." In our nation's conflicts, we will be asked to lead the fight into the heart of the enemy's air defenses, to ensure air superiority for our soldiers, sailors, Marines and Air Force personnel. We will be asked to own the sky; we should not ask our aviators to do it with anything but first-rate equipment. That's the F-22 Raptor. NO PLANE IS NEARLY AS ESSENTIAL TO US AIRPOWER AS THE F-22 Major General Bolton 2k, Program Executive Officer for Fighter and Bomber Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 2-22-00, Federal Document Clearing House, p. L/N Those aircraft threats, coupled with increasingly more sophisticated and lethal surface-to-air missiles, have dramatically increased the importance of the F-22's capabilities. The new fighter will bring together in a single package four capabilities no other fighter system in the world possesses: the ability to fly supersonically without the use of afterburners, or what is called supercruise; stealth design; greater maneuverability at supersonic speeds; and an integrated avionics package designed to present better and clearer information to the pilot. THE F-22 IS KEY TO U.S AIR POWER – THE ONE THING THAT MAINTAINS US MILITARY SUPREMACY Washington Times, 8-8-99, p. L/N Scanning the troops and materiel stretched across the Normandy beaches in 1944, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, according to Air Force historian Richard Hallion, remarked, "If I didn't have air supremacy, I wouldn't be here." Lexington Institute analyst Loren Thompson, who teaches in Georgetown's National Security Studies Program, recently observed, "Not a single U.S. soldier has been killed by enemy aircraft since the Korean War." The reason? The United States has always maintained air superiority. Whether such air dominance will continue well into the next century is now an open question. The House of Representatives recently diverted $1.8 billion in production funds from the Air Force's F-22 fighter program to other areas in the defense budget, some of which, coincidentally, would benefit the districts of several representatives who led the charge against the F-22. The funds would have financed the first six F-22 Raptor aircraft. Secretary of Defense William Cohen objected to the diversion, noting, "This decision, if enacted, would for all practical purposes kill the F-22 program, the cornerstone of our nation's air power in the 21st century."

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DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Good – Air Power
F-22s KEY TO AIRPOWER Virginian-Pilot ‘2, 5-31-02, p. L/N But in remarks to reporters at Langley Thursday, Air Force Brig. Gen. William J. Jabour stood in the shadow of a test Raptor and defended the jet, lauding its "ability to penetrate enemy airspace unheard of before." The F-22 should be all but invisible to enemy radars and operate at supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners, according to Air Force officials. Jabour, who is responsible for the purchase of the F-22, said he remains convinced that the Air Force still needs at least 339 of the planes. <It Continues> And whatever their air power, officials say, those countries will be able to buy advanced surface-to-air missiles that only a stealthy plane like the F- 22 will be able to avoid. Michael E. O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, agrees in part, saying the F-22 is now "the only candidate for next-generation air-to-air combat." F-22’S ARE KEY TO DETERRENCE AND US AIR SUPREMACY Jack Kelly ‘4, Staff Writer, 7-13-04, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. L/N Loren Thompson, an analyst for the Lexington Institute, a think tank funded chiefly by defense contractors, said the results of the Cope India exercise make it plain that the Air Force needs a new fighter. And Rep. Randy Cunningham, R-Calif., a former naval aviator, is a big fan of the F-22 Raptor. "I had the opportunity to fly against the F-22," he said. "The only way I could catch it in my F15, even in full afterburner, was in a turn. The F-22 is an amazingly capable fighter that is going to insure America's air superiority in the years ahead." Thompson figures that "without air superiority, we can't do anything else." But he conceded that "you can probably do without hundreds of lower-end fighters." Krepinovich, on the other side of the argument, made a concession, as well. He acknowledged that the Air Force probably should develop a small, "silver bullet" force of F-22s. "It has an intimidation effect," he said. "It tells the rest of the word: don't even bother challenging the U.S. in air superiority." The F-22 Jets necessary for US security in the skies Elizabeth Becker, staff writer, 7/23/1999, New York Times, “Critics Catch up to a 21st – Century Jet”, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EFD9153EF930A15754C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all On the outside, the flat, almost blunt silhouette of the F-22 has little of the futuristic look of the B-2 stealth bomber. Inside, in the cockpit, however, it has the feel of a video game in which approaching enemy aircraft are tracked on a computer screen as red triangles, easily distinguishable from the green squares representing the ''friendlies'' and the pale yellow oblongs indicating planes with unknown loyalties. ''Use the cursor like a mouse and see who he is,'' said C. L. Buzze, a former Air Force pilot and now the F-22 advanced product representative, as he manipulated the levers of a facsimile of an F-22 cockpit. The cursor slid over the triangle and immediately identified the enemy plane as a fighter jet from the Russian fleet. When the plane came in range, the command ''Shoot'' appeared on the screen, and with a flick of a switch, a white tail slithered across the screen hitting a dot that exploded into a small fiery ball. But if the plane passes all of its tests during the next three to four years, officials say that the expensive stealth features built into nearly every part of the plane will insure that the F-22 image on an enemy radar is so reduced that it is unlikely to be detected before the it attacks. And according to Lockheed officials, the F-22's supersonic cruising speed, and technical advances will enable the F-22 pilot to take the first shot in an aerial duel. The aviation electronic system in the cockpit, where data are collected, integrated and instantly compiled on the screen, is one of fighter jet's biggest selling points. Many modern fighter jets have the F22's capabilities but none compile it and integrate it on one single screen.

We don’t talk to the poh-lice.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Hegemony
High level air power key to United States hegemony. Thomas Donelly, Research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses”, 2000 http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf) The reconstitution of the stateside Air Force as a large-scale, warfighting force will complicate the service’s plans to reconfigure itself for the purposes of expeditionary operations. But the proliferation of overseas bases should reduce many, if not all, of the burdens of rotational contingency operations. Because of its inherent mobility and flexibility, the Air Force will be the first U.S. military force to arrive in a theater during times of crisis; as such, the Air Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain sufficient numbers of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its earliest stages. Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with the Army, that remains the core of America’s ability to apply decisive military power when its pleases. To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is to lose the key component of American military preeminence. F-22s ARE KEY TO HEGEMONY Frank Dudney ‘4, Editor in Chief of Air Force Magazine, 3-31-04, U.S. Newswire, p. L/N Some critics say the Raptor should be de-emphasized in favor of future unmanned combat air vehicles, other fighters, or space- based systems. That position is not favored by most defense professionals. In a July 22, 1999, pro-F/A-22 letter to Congress, seven former Secretaries of Defense argued thus: "It is not enough to say that something better may be available in the future. Something better is always available in the future. Serious threats to American air superiority may arise sooner, and the nation's security cannot tolerate a loss of command of the air. Congress and the Administration must focus on this fundamental reality and fully fund the nation's only truly stealthy air superiority fighter." One of the seven signatories was Donald Rumsfeld. OUR AIR POWER IS THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE US MILITARY Frank Record, Senior Fellow @ Georgia Tech Center for International Strategy, 5-6-96, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Aerospace power has been a and will continue to be a the single most important component of U.S. military strength in the postindustrial age. It is essential that the United States preserve as large a margin of superiority as possible in areospace technology. The F22 program embodies that imperative.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Military
Air superiority is key to military superiority Gen. Ryan ‘99, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, 10-5-99, Omaha World Herald, p. L/N NATO and the United States completed a victorious air campaign in Yugoslavia. As in Desert Storm, almost a decade earlier, the conditions for victory were set because we owned the sky: We had air superiority. Air superiority is not just control of an enemy's aircraft; it is domination of all of an enemy's air capabilities - command and control, communications, radar, surface-to-air missiles, airfields, munitions and infrastructure. Air superiority is the state of military air affairs that provides freedom from attack and freedom to attack, not just for air forces, but for land and naval forces as well. In Desert Storm, the conditions were set by air superiority for land forces to succeed in fewer than 100 hours. In Kosovo, conditions were set for victory without having to use land forces in battle. Not since early World War II have American fighting forces been subjected to intense aerial attack. In the early 1970s, we began producing the F-15 aircraft to ensure air superiority for all our forces. That was more than a quarter of a century ago, and the F-15 is wearing out - both physically and technologically. AIR POWER IS KEY TO OVERALL MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS Maj. Gen. Bolton, Program Executive Officer for Fighter and Bomber Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 2-22-00, Federal Document Clearing House, p. L/N "Maintaining our air superiority and air dominance is No. 1 for us because it is the enabler for everything else we do," said Bolton. "It allows us to prosecute our war plans and allows our Army and Navy colleagues to do what they need to do without worrying about who is flying over them."

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Terror
AIR POWER IS KEY TO U.S. MILITARY DOMINANCE AND ENDING TERRORISM Chris Lundy, Research Associate at the Council of Foreign Relations, 1-13-02, Los Angeles Times, p. L/N U.S. air power is flying high for its role in the war against terrorism. And it should be. The combat performance of U.S. aircraft was largely responsible for our quick and decisive victory in Afghanistan. It can even be said that air power, as an instrument of military power, has turned a corner, at long last realizing the dreams of some strategic thinkers who regarded air war as a civilizing force because it could shorten conflicts. Yet, all this success shouldn't rush to the heads of policymakers, who may be tempted to use air power to pursue ambitious--and risky--goals abroad. Some analysts, policymakers and politicians already believe that air power can fight and win our conflicts. In the Dec. 3 issue of Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria wrote that many in the Pentagon remain trapped in landpower nostalgia. He urged them to face the facts that bombing works. Similarly, Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) has complained that we "underestimate the impact that air power can have." Lawrence J. Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, notes there is "a tendency among our political leaders to view air power as a cheap and easy military solution to all our foreign policy problems." Air power is necessary to effective counter-terrorism RAND, Project Air Force Annual Report, 2003, http://www.rand.org/pubs/annual_reports/2005/AR7089.pdf The war on terrorism is more likely to be a long-term effort in which the use of force, at least by U.S. military personnel, is only sporadic and successful military operations will resemble counterinsurgency operations. The primary role of U.S. military forces will often be indirect and supportive. U.S. forces will be called upon to train, equip, advise, and assist host-country forces in rooting out terrorist groups; forge strong relationships with host-country personnel; show great discretion in their conduct of operations; and maintain a low pro- file in the host country. They will be able to react swiftly and effectively when promising targets arise. The Air Force, then, should expect sustained heavy demand to provide important capabilities, assets, and skill sets to support counterterrorism operations abroad. Chief contributions will include surveillance platforms, operators, and analysts; language-qualified personnel to help train and advise host-country forces and to analyze human intelligence; security police and other force-protection assets; base operating support personnel and equipment to provide communications, housing, and transportation; heliborne insertion and extraction capabilities; and humanitarian relief assets. In some cases, U.S. airpower may be called upon to strike terrorists in base camps, hideouts, vehicles, and other locations.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Middle East
Air force essential to progress in the Middle East Mackenzie Eaglen ‘7, Senior Policy Analyst for National Security
[“Airmen vs. Modernization: The Air Force Budget Dilemma,” 5/18/07, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2037.cfm]

In this tightening fiscal environment, the Air Force continues to reduce various programs while the other services are increasingly relying on additional airlift capacity. Demands for airlift include helping to remove convoys from dangerous routes in Iraq, providing forces with extended logistics reach, and penetrating deeper into terrorist havens in Afghanistan. General Norton Schwartz, commander of U.S. Transportation Command, recently highlighted the importance of airlift, stating that a "distributed fight," such as in Afghanistan, requires airlift because missions often "cannot be effectively prosecuted from main operating bases."[8] General Moseley recently said that the need for strategic airlift is expected to increase, which means that the C-5 modernization program "makes more sense now than ever."[9]The demand for airlift goes well beyond current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Admiral William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Pacific Command from February 2005 to March 2007, noted that the command's posture is affected by the "shortage of responsive strategic air and ship lift to support force sustainment and deployment to operating areas."[10]While the airlift requirements continue unabated, the Air Force is dramatically cutting endstrength to free funding for competing priorities. Secretary Wynne said that the 2008 budget is "so delicately balanced" that there is no room to free an extra $2 billion for strategic airlift even as senior Air Force officials acknowledge that current plans for airlift will not meet the needs of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.[11]

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Koreas
Air Power is vital for continued stability in the Korea peninsula Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. ‘5, Air & Space Power Journal
[“The Future of U.S. Airpower on the Korean Peninsula,” Fall, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/bechtol.html]

Transformation has come to the Korean Peninsula. The Global Posture Review has prompted a major reduction in the number of ground forces in Korea, and plans call for a withdrawal of 12,500 American troops from Korea (mostly ground forces) by the end of 2008. In addition, Headquarters Command for United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command is scheduled to move most of its infrastructure and personnel south, to Camp Humphries (near the city of Pyongtaek) during the same time period.25 The primary American ground forces in Korea, the 2d Infantry Division, should transform into a next-generation combat unit during the summer of 2005, becoming a “unit of employment X” two years ahead of schedule.26 Furthermore, numerous command and funding issues in the ROK-US alliance will remain in flux during completion of the ongoing moves, but a discussion of those matters lies beyond the scope of this article. One must then consider the question of how all of this affects the role of airpower on the Korean Peninsula. The answer is obvious. The ROK-US alliance will now rely more than ever on the unique capabilities of US airpower to deter the North Korean threat. In fact, with all of the effort under way to reorganize US Army forces on the peninsula and move ground-combat units, headquarters facilities, and personnel south, the disposition of US Air Force units has remained relatively unchanged. Gen Leon LaPorte, commander of US Forces Korea, recently stated that the mission of our forces in Korea remains clear (despite taking on a regional role): to defend South Korea against an attack from the North. He also discussed US plans to improve combat capabilities by spending $11 billion over the next three years and to establish five or six Stryker brigades focused on the Pacific region that could deploy to Korea quickly.27 But US forces—especially airpower—remain the best way of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, in 2003 former Georgetown University professor (and current senior member of the National Security Council) Victor Cha observed that the most reasonable arrangement for the alliance would entail an increased emphasis on US naval and airpower presence with a reduction in ground forces. We are now seeing this happen.28 The threat from North Korea has evolved but remains no less ominous either to US interests or to those of Washington’s important allies South Korea and Japan. Because the threat and geopolitical situation in Asia have changed and, perhaps just as important, because the US military is now transforming, traditional paradigms regarding how we face threats throughout the world no longer apply in many cases—such as Korea. Although a large, forwarddeployed ground presence on the Korean Peninsula may no -longer be necessary, providing military support to the ROK-US alliance remains as important as ever. In fact, the deterrence provided by a strong airpower presence continues to have an effect on our enemies, as evidenced by a manual published by the North Korean People’s Army in 2004, which warns that the United States will target North Korea’s military leadership during a time of war.29 The types of US forces that support freedom in South Korea have changed, but Washington’s commitment to the security of that country has not. For the foreseeable future, airpower will continue to play a major (and now a more prominent) role on the Korean Peninsula.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Air Power Good – Deterrence
Air Power has an amazing deterrence effect due to its capabilities of quick mission accomplishment and minimal casualties Martin Anderburg ‘2k, Captain of the 2nd Division of F-10 Skane Wing in the Swedish Air Force, [“Air Power,” Baltic Link 2000, 8-4-00, http://www.mil.se/pfp/baltlink/exairp.html] Among military instruments is air power. Air power is inherently flexible and today's multi-role aircraft may be used for a variety of tasks. Indeed, a swing-role capability facilitates a change of role during a sortie. Air power is also responsive in nature, which derives from its characteristics of versatility, speed, range and ubiquity. In international operations this means that air power can be deployed rapidly from its home base and undertake operations almost immediately. This characteristic also facilitates fast withdrawal from an area if it is decided at the political level that the military operation no longer promotes the national/international objectives. This possibility is also very valuable as a mean to avoid escalation. Air power assets may be based at long distance from the area of conflict because of their great reach. The capability of every unit is such that only a limited number is required to present a significant military force. These characteristics put together implies a reduction in the number of own combatants at risk and in lower operational costs. Precise navigation equipment and precision weapons result in minimum collateral damage, including enemy civilians and armed forces. Such considerations are of increasing concern to democratic governments in military operations. Furthermore, air power does not give the belligerents the possibility to take international military forces hostage. In psychological terms, air power has what is usually referred to as a secondary effect through deterrence. Air power is, because of its characteristics, very good at projecting military power fast. It might thus be a valuable resource for deterring belligerents from continued fighting.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

F-22 Funding Low
The DoD is about to cut funding for the F-22. Reuters, International News Agency, 6/9/08, “Air Force shakeup may spur spending shifts” http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN0832331720080609 The ouster of the Air Force's top two officials may spur even more Pentagon spending on equipment for current wars and end production of pricey F-22 jets designed for potential conflicts with countries such as China. Defense Secretary Robert Gates forced the resignations of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley on Thursday after gaffes involving nuclear and missile security. The Air Force's accidental shipping of ballistic-missile fuses to Taiwan may have been the last straw amid strains over acquisition priorities, remotely piloted vehicles and other friction about post-Iraq needs, experts on the military said. Starting months ago, Gates had singled out the Air Force's top-of-the-line Lockheed Martin Corp F-22 Raptor fighter jet as a prime example of what he deemed misplaced military priorities. "The reality is we are fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a single mission in either theater," Gates told a Senate committee in February. He later urged all the services to send more remotely piloted planes, such as General Atomics' Predator, to the battlefield, a step that feeds surveillance video to troops in real time. Under Wynne and Moseley, the Air Force had sought to buy 381 radar-evading F-22s -- more than twice as many as the 183 budgeted by the Defense Department. The F-22 costs more than $132 million apiece. Dov Zakheim, who retired as the Pentagon's chief financial officer in 2004, said the Air Force shake-up would prompt the Army, Navy and Marine Corps to rethink their big-ticket acquisition plans as well to make sure they met Gates' goals. "What just happened underscores the secretary's concern that the (Defense) department pursue programs that are most relevant to the kinds of wars that he expects the United States to continue to fight," Zakheim said in a telephone interview.

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Trade Off Now
Defense budget already capped F-22’s at 183 Baker Spring ‘8, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
[“The FY 2009 Defense Budget Request: The Growing Gap in Defense Spending,” 2/25/08, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2110.cfm]

In the 1980s, procurement consumed more than 70 percent of the modernization budget. The core defense budget for FY 2009 would still leave procurement at only slightly more than 60 percent. (See Chart 6.) As a result, essential new weapons programs must be stretched out, which increases unit costs, reduces the numbers of new weapons available to the military, and prevents their timely delivery. For example: Although Congress is seeking to remedy this problem, the Navy has been forced to reduce construction of Virginia-class submarines to one per year even though constructing two per year would reduce the unit cost to $2 billion per boat.[13] The Air Force has been forced to scale back its purchasing of F-22 Raptor tactical fighters dramatically. It is now slated to obtain just 183 F-22s despite its requirement for 381.[14] The Army has been forced to extend the production time for its Future Combat System by four years.[15]

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Trade Off Inevitable
Oil price fluctuations cause trade offs in established budgets for force modernization Lawerence Spinetta ‘6, “Fuel hedging: lessons from the airlines”, Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_30/ai_n27099563 The Air Force is not concerned with profitability, but it is concerned with managing shocks to its budget from price volatility. Fluctuations in the price of oil adversely affect the Air Force's ability to ensure the necessary funds are available to finance force modernization and fund operations. The timeline of the federal government budget cycle requires the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (the Comptroller) to estimate and establish a stabilized price for fuel and other fuel-related commodities 18 months in advance of budget execution. Figure 1 diagrams the Defense Department's budget process as related to fuel. Not surprisingly, prices set by the Comptroller often prove wildly inaccurate. For example, last year the Pentagon's forecast was so inaccurate that it had to set a revised oil price that was 50 percent higher than the original price. (16) The problem is that the Services' budgets use inaccurate forecasts and make budgeting decisions based on prices that are not representative of actual costs (see Figure 2). Trade off’s are occurring now Ivan Eland ‘8, Director of Center of Peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute
[“Can the Air Force be Reformed?” 6/28/08, http://www.antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=13059]

The one thing that could be done to at least loosen the grip of the military-industrial-congressional complex is to require the Air Force to drop excessively unique military specifications for components of weapon systems and instead use commercial components or slight variations thereof. Letting commercial non-defense companies – which are not part of the dedicated defense industry dependent on government largesse – compete for defense subcontracts would lessen the pressure to buy unneeded weapon systems. If subcontractors had commercial business to fall back on when defense procurement was slow, there would be less pressure for the Air Force and Congress to buy unneeded systems to keep the welfare queens of the dedicated defense subcontracting industry aloft. However, this reform, even if adopted, would have an effect only over the long-term. Thus, despite the secretary's dramatic personnel changes, don't expect to see a different Air Force soon.

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DDI ’08 [SS]

Funding Irrelevant
Air force wastes majority of money that would tradeoff John Hazlehurst ‘8, writer for Colorado Springs Business Journal
[“Air Force's request for more money at center of debate over country's needs,” 2/29/08, l/n]

With the release of the proposed 2009 defense budget, the three branches of the armed services are already clamoring for more money. But of the three, the Air Force's list is particularly long - and particularly pricey. President George W. Bush's proposed budget calls for $144 billion in funding for the Air Force, but that's not enough, say Air Force planners. They're asking for an additional $18.75 billion, more than double the combined unfunded requests of the Army and the Marines. The bulk of the requests are driven by the Air Force's fleet - what Maj. Gen Paul Selva, the Air Force's director of strategic planning, calls "a geriatric air force. " The Air Force Association, an independent nonprofit organization that promotes "public understanding of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation," has called for allocating an extra $20 billion annually to the Air Force during the next 20 years. But critics argue that the Air Force squanders vast amounts of money on advanced weapons systems of limited utility. They say that new weapons systems such as the F-22 and the F-35 are built to combat a threat that no longer exists in a post-Cold War world. Funding not critical to air force operations AP ‘8, Associated Press
[“Service wants more money — a lot more — for coveted planes,” 2/19/08, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23223286/]

The Air Force's distress is partly self-inflicted, says Steve Kosiak of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. The F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning, the new jet fighters that will supplant the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Falcon, have drastically higher price tags than their predecessors and require a bigger chunk of the defense budget. "One of the reasons their equipment has aged so much is because they continue to move ahead with the development and presumed acquisition of new weapon systems that cost two to three times as much as the systems they are replacing," Kosiak said. "It's like replacing a Toyota with a Mercedes."It's not as if the Air Force has gone without any new airplanes. The B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, the C17 Globemaster airlifter and the CV-22 tilt-rotor, which flies like a helicopter or an airplane, have all been added since the mid1990s.The Air Force also is planning to spend between $30 billion and $40 billion over the next 15 years for new refueling tankers. A contract is expected to be awarded soon. Those new tankers, however, won't be flying until 2013.The Air Force isn't alone in wanting more money, but its appetite is far greater than the other military branches. Shortly after President Bush submitted his defense plan for the 2009 budget year, which begins Oct. 1, each service outlined for Congress what it felt was left out. The Air Force's "wish list" totaled $18.8 billion, almost twice as much as the other three services combined."There's no justification for it. Period. End of story," said Gordon Adams, a former Clinton administration budget official who specializes in defense issues. "Until someone constrains these budget requests, the hunger for more will charge ahead unchecked."

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F-22 Fail – Air Power
F-22 unnecessary – US has air superiority. Lawrence J. Korb ‘5, Senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information
[“The Best Weapons Money Can Buy,” 8/13/05, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/08/b837247_ct1327177.html]

There is no doubt that even with the defense budget at historical highs, the Pentagon cannot afford the $1.5 trillion worth of weapons that the military services would like to purchase. However, although the Defense Department is correct in trying to slash the F/A-22, it is dead wrong in trying to save money by canceling the Joint Strike Fighter. The F/A-22 Raptor is the most unnecessary weapon system being built by the Pentagon. In fact, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld tried to do away with it in the summer of 2002 but backed off when his Air Force secretary threatened to resign over the issue. It was originally designed to achieve air superiority over Soviet fighter jets, which will never be built. In 1985, the Air Force claimed that it could build about 750 of these stealth fighters for $26 billion. Over the last 20 years, the cost of the total program has continued to grow even as the number of planes to be purchased has declined. Just a year ago, the Air Force said it could purchase 275 Raptors for $72 billion. Now, the Pentagon says it can buy 179 planes for about $64 billion, raising the price per plane by about $100 million — for an unnecessary aircraft. The performance of the current generation of Air Force fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq makes it clear that the Air Force already has the capability to achieve air superiority against all enemies. The Taliban, Al Qaeda and Iraqi insurgents do not have jet fighters for the Raptor to conquer. The Air Force has recognized this and has added a ground attack — or bombing — mission to the Raptor. But using the world's most expensive fighter, which travels at twice the speed of sound, for attacking ground targets is neither cost-effective nor technically practical.

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F-22 Fail – Timeframe
F-22 will not be ready until 2013. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 3/1/08, “DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf The Air Force originally planned to field the enhanced F-22A capabilities in three development increments to be completed in 2010. However, due to numerous funding decreases, schedule slips, and changes in requirements and work content in each increment, the last increment will not be integrated on the F-22A until 2013, 3 years later than planned. The program has achieved less than 30 percent design maturity for its first major increment. The Air Force also plans to integrate additional capabilities beyond the current three planned increments in a separate Acquisition Category I program.

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F-22 Fail – Engineering
F-22s faces initial engineering issues John A. Tirpak, executive editor of Airforce Magazine, 9/2002, Airforce Magazine, “F-22 on the Line”, http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2002/0902raptor.asp Other F-22 problems that have made headlines--a brake overheating issue and wing vortex that threatened to damage the vertical stabilizers--have been largely resolved, Jabour said. "We are gathering more data" on the stabilizer issue, but a fix involving a beefed up rudder actuator and some strengthening of some of the ribs in the rudder should do the trick, he said. The change will not affect the mold line of the airplane--its external shape--nor will it affect the F-22's stealthiness. The brake issue has been looked at, and the aircraft has been cleared for hot-pit refueling--meaning that ground crews are allowed to refuel the airplane when the brakes are still hot, and this is not considered especially dangerous. An F-22 a few months ago showed its mettle when it absorbed a bird strike, Jabour noted. On takeoff from Lockheed Martin's Marietta, Ga., plant, he said, the aircraft collided with a "nine-pound bird," but the pilot reported that he could feel "no change in engine performance" and landed merely as a precaution.

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F-22 Fail – Software
Software issues threaten to hurt F-22 jet efficiency and production John A. Tirpak, executive editor of Airforce Magazine, 9/2002, Airforce Magazine, “F-22 on the Line”, http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2002/0902raptor.asp In another example, Rearden noted that all the power cables, hydraulics, cooling hoses, and other umbilicals that usually have to be connected to an airplane in assembly will now flow from a single "vault" in the floor beneath each station, reducing accidents and disconnections and saving time as the line moves. The F-22's software problems coincided with a brain drain that hit the aerospace industry in the late 1990s, when the dot-com fever lured away many talented software engineers with stock options and other compensation, Rearden noted. In the wake of the dot-com crash, he now has all the software engineers he needs, but the effect of the turbulence is still felt. A 44-day production strike at Lockheed Martin also affected the program. The reduced time resulted in slowing the numbers of aircraft available for test, thus slowing the rate at which the Air Force can burn down the required flight test points, Jabour said.

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AT: Air Power
The F-22 is ineffective and expensive. Ethan Heitner, Staff writer for Tom Paine Common Sense. 7/27/06 “The Other F-22 Problem” http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/07/27/the_f22s_other_problem.php What do you do when you've got the world's most expensive fighter jet and its canopy won't open correctly so you have to chainsaw free the hapless pilot? If you're the U.S. government, you sign up for an extended three-year contract to ensure you get even more of them than you originally wanted Retired Vice Admiral Jack Shanahan elucidates the cost of the Pentagon's outdated thinking about defense spending today in an article on TomPaine.com about the bloated and unloved F-22 Raptor fighter jet: Political leaders in Washington are so scared of being labeled “weak on defense” that they rarely object at all to defense expenditures, even ones like the F-22 that are widely regarded as wasteful. In fact, it’s an open secret in Washington that tens of billions of dollars are going down the drain at the Pentagon. At the same time, it’s also an open secret that millions of American kids lack health insurance, public schools around the country are falling down, and our nation continues to rely on petroleum—a national vulnerability that could set us up for a serious economic collapse. And how much is the federal government spending on renewable energy research? About as much as we’re spending on the F-22 fighter jet. And less than a third as much as we spend on national missile defense. F-22s unnecessary for US security Victoria Samson, staff writer, 2/26/08, Asheville Citizen-Times, “How many guns are enough?”, http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=4223&IssueID=214&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Or derby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=37&issueID=214 One case in point is the F-22 Raptor plane. Originally intended for air-to-air combat, this aircraft now has a questionable role in determining U.S. security. Whom exactly this fighter would be fighting is unclear. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently pointed out, “The reality is, we are fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a single mission in either theater.” Even so, the Pentagon wishes to limit its purchases of the F-22 to “just” 183 of them, at a cost of $140 million…each. This is still not enough for the Air Force, which vehemently insists that 381 are still needed as initially planned. The Air Force as a service is trying to find direction in a time when the chance of aerial dogfights is slim to none, and it is understandable that some old procurement inclinations reassert themselves from time to time. But it is inexcusable to put this sort of funding into a program that does little to strengthen U.S. security when so many other more pressing needs for the military go unmet. Military purchases must be made in light of longevity of the weapons, F-22s are not strategic buys Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., staff writer, 3/20/2008, National Journal, “On the sea and in the air, military bills come due”, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0308/032008nj1.htm The air and sea services certainly make the case for their own relevance. Besides an increasing number of air strikes since the beginning of the 2007 "surge" of troops into Iraq, "what you see is Air Force airplanes providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in direct support of ground forces," said Maj. Gen. Paul Selva, the service's director of strategic planning. With land vehicles vulnerable to roadside bombs, Selva added, Air Force transports shuttle an average of 2,000 troops a day around Iraq and Afghanistan. But even Selva puts the case for high-tech, high-cost systems in terms of future conflicts, not the current low-tech war."The question with the F-22 is the long-term strategic horizon," Selva said, "because whatever number we end up [buying] with the F-22, that's the number we're going to have for the next 20 years." The Navy, likewise, emphasizes that the ships it builds today must last for decades in a world where lethal technologies are proliferating rapidly. Whether these long-term arguments will shake an extra $40 billion out of Congress is an open question. And whether the services' planned purchases are the right investments for the future is another question altogether."My main concern is readiness for the unexpected, for what's around the corner," said Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "You do your best to have high-technology systems to deter and prevail in the unexpected [future] -- but the need to bolster the ground forces is highly important today. We have to do our very best to balance them out."

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AT: Air Power
F-22 unnecessary – pilot skill determines air superiority. Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, Pierre Sprey, one of three designers who conceived and shaped the F-16, and James Stevenson, former editor of the Navy Fighter Weapons School's Topgun Journal, 2/7/08, “Fighter Mafia Alumns on the Defense Budget” http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003992.html?wh=wh Unfortunately, we can expect that same tiny F-22 force to attrite all too rapidly in combat for the simple reason that the Air Force no longer adequately supports pilot training. F-22 pilots get only ten to twelve hours of flight training per month. When we provided 20 to 25 hours per month to train pilots for Vietnam, our pilots complained - rightly - it was inadequate. At the height of their prowess in the 1960s and '70s, the Israelis gave their fighter pilots 40 to 50 hours of flight training per month. The history of air warfare shows all too clearly that the most important determinant of who wins and who dies in an aerial dogfight is pilot skill, not aircraft performance. Because they have raided pilot training accounts to feed increasingly voracious procurement programs (such as the F-22), Congress and the Air Force have virtually guaranteed high pilot losses for us in any hypothesized, large scale air war. If the advocates of more air power for the U.S. were serious about winning and saving American pilots lives, they would double, then triple, the amount of money available for pilot flight training before spending a single penny on new aircraft. Revealing its real priorities, in help pay for the pork it added to the 2008 DOD appropriations act, Congress cut air force training by $400 million.

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AT: Overseas Threats
F-22 unnecessary – the threats aren’t substantial enough to pursue. Sharon Weinberger, senior reporter for Wired’s national security blog, DANGER ROOM, and the coauthor of A Nuclear Family Vacation: Travels in the World of Atomic Weaponry, 7/1/08, Foreign Policy Magazine “The Pentagon’s Doomsday Men” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4382&print=1 In what may long be remembered as a turning point in the Pentagon’s approach to investing in technology, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates earlier this year publicly questioned the Air Force’s commitment to its F-22 Raptor, a stealthy fighter that was built to win dogfights against a Soviet adversary. “The reality is we are fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a single mission in either theater. So it is principally for use against a near peer in a conflict, and I think we all know who that is,” Gates told a congressional committee. “And looking at what I regard as the level of risk of conflict with one of those near peers over the next four or five years until the Joint Strike Fighter comes along, I think that something along the lines of 183 [planes] is a reasonable buy.” Although Gates’s comments constituted a rare public rebuke from the Pentagon’s civilian leadership, he was simply stating the obvious: The Air Force was betting billions on a future risk while simultaneously underinvesting in technologies necessary to combat a current threat. Equally remarkable, it was perhaps the first time in memory that a senior Pentagon official had uttered the phrase “level of risk” with respect to the department’s research and development portfolio. The Pentagon in years past has suffered from a form of compulsive gambling, making bets on long-shot odds, without regard to risk. Indeed, military planners dream up all kinds of doomsday scenarios: a high-altitude nuclear detonation’s wiping out our low-Earth satellites; a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile destroying an entire city; or more frighteningly, an asteroid that ends life as we know it. To counter these threats, they come up with all sorts of high-risk technologies (one of my current favorites is a proposal to beam radio waves into the atmosphere to clean out radiation from a high-altitude nuclear blast). Herein lies the dilemma. All of these scenarios are theoretically possible, so shouldn’t the Pentagon invest in mitigating all of these potential threats? The Pentagon, for its part, frequently speaks about investing in “high-risk, high-payoff” efforts—research that might well fail, but could lead to significant breakthroughs if it pays off. The Pentagon counts stealth aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and the Internet as successful examples of this strategy. Defense officials often employ a similar justification when addressing threats that may have a low probability of occurring, but pose a devastating consequence if they occur. The problem with this approach to risk is not the underlying philosophy, but the frequent lack of willingness to either qualitatively or quantitatively address the actual risks. At the extreme, we know an attack by aliens from outer space is theoretically possible, but improbable. On the more conventional side, we know that a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland is more likely than another country’s sudden development of a fighter that can match the F-22.

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AT: Middle East
F-22 is useless and counterproductive in Iraq and Afghanistan Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, Pierre Sprey, one of three designers who conceived and shaped the F-16, and James Stevenson, former editor of the Navy Fighter Weapons School's Topgun Journal, 2/7/08, “Fighter Mafia Alumns on the Defense Budget” http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003992.html?wh=wh Consider just one example; the Air Force's F-22 fighter aircraft. It began in the early 1980s as the Air Force's solution to maintaining air superiority over the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, a lot of history unfolded between the "Raptor's" conception back then and the Air Force's announcement on December 12, 2007 that after more than two decades of development the F-22 had finally reached "full operational capability," meaning that it was ready to go to war. There is, however, no war for it to go to. While there are, of course, two very real ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, the F-22 is yet to fly a single sortie over the skies of either country. Nor has the Air Force announced any intention to send the F-22 to either theater. The Air Force is quite right to keep the F-22 far away from those conflicts. The airplane is irrelevant to both, since its primary mission - to shoot down enemy aircraft - is useless against our opponents - al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgents - who have no air force and don't want one. Worse, if the F-22 were it to appear in those theaters, it would almost certainly harm our war efforts. It is not just that its huge logistics tail would strain our already overstretched support forces in both theaters. But also, the F-22 has operating limitations. While it can carry two medium sized bombs to attack ground targets, it is a capability so modest our opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan might not even notice. It would also be ungracious to compare the F-22 to the ridiculously cheap, simple A-10 close air support aircraft that is built specifically for the ground support role and that has been indispensable for supporting soldiers in combat in both wars. It would be even more bad-mannered to point out that each A-10 can deliver per day eight times, or more, the payload that an F-22 can. More to the point, the F-22 would be counterproductive. Data from Afghanistan indicate that U.S. and allied forces may have killed more innocent civilians than the enemy has in the past year, and from Iraq we read report after report of civilians killed as a result of US action. A major part of those "collateral" civilian casualties come from aircraft flying too fast and too high to positively identify exactly what they are guiding their munitions to. As such, the F-22 is too "thin-skinned" to endure ground fire, even from assault rifles, and it is too expensive to risk flying close enough to the ground to identify targets. In a form of conflict where winning over the civilian population is key to success, F-22 participation - along with that of other high flying, high speed aircraft - may help the enemy more than us. By keeping the F-22 at its US bases, the Air Force is doing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan a great favor.

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AT: China
China isn’t a threat – F-22’s are useless Fred Kaplan ‘8, Slate's "War Stories" columnist and Author
[“China Canard: The Air Force doesn't need any more F-22s,” 2/14/08, http://www.slate.com/id/2184481/pagenum/all/#page_start]

On Feb. 13, according to today's issue of Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Gen. Bruce Carlson, chief of the Air Force's materiel command, told a group of reporters, "We think that [187 planes] is the wrong number" and that the Air Force would find some way to build 380 before the program's done. He joked that 380 is a "compromise," since the original plan calls for 381. Gen. Carlson's rationale for this expansion: "Most people say in the future there will be a China element to whatever we do." In plainer words: He says we need more than twice as many F-22s than the secretary of defense says we need because of the future military threat from China. Two things should be noted about this claim. First, by the Pentagon's own measure, the Chinese military has a long way to go before it constitutes a threat to U.S. forces. Second, even if it does become a threat, it's not at all clear that the F-22 would be the best weapon to deal with it. China isn’t an air power threat Fred Kaplan ‘8, Slate's "War Stories" columnist and Author
[“China Canard: The Air Force doesn't need any more F-22s,” 2/14/08, http://www.slate.com/id/2184481/pagenum/all/#page_start]

And so, the China threat is dragged out of the cellar once again, as it has been to justify troubled weapons systems for 40 years now. (For an example from, yes, as far back as the mid-1960s, click here.) Is this threat real, though? In each of the last five years, Congress has required the Defense Department to issue a report titled "Military Power of the People's Republic of China." The latest edition, released last spring—like the one released in the spring of 2006—provides little basis for losing sleep (or building more F-22s). China's military is actively building up its strength. In March 2007, it announced a 17.8 percent increase in its military budget—larger than the increase of the country's gross domestic product. The Pentagon report notes that China is "pursuing long-term comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities for power projection." It's learning lessons about information warfare from our battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's building more short-range ballistic missiles across from the Taiwan Strait. And its leaders are expressing interest in building an aircraft carrier. This last point tells the tale, though: they're expressing interest in building an aircraft carrier—they're not building one. China did buy two used aircraft carriers from Russia, the Minsk in 1998 and the Kiev in 2000. But, in the words of the Pentagon report, "Neither carrier was made operational; instead, they were used as floating military theme parks." No Chinese air power threat in 7 years Fred Kaplan ‘8, Slate's "War Stories" columnist and Author
[“China Canard: The Air Force doesn't need any more F-22s,” 2/14/08, http://www.slate.com/id/2184481/pagenum/all/#page_start]

They're "indispensable" to "protect" China's maritime interests, much less to project China's power outside its peripheries. Yet China has no aircraft carriers. Wang is quoted as saying it can't build any "within three or five years." The Pentagon report notes that some U.S. intelligence analysts think China might have an aircraft carrier by 2011-15, while others don't think that day will come until "2020 or later." As for China's attempts to modernize its military, the Pentagon report notes that it is "untested in modern warfare" and that its senior officers "lack direct military experience" while also facing "deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint operations." The U.S. intelligence community "estimates that China will take until the end of this decade or later to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-sized adversary."

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AT: Terror
F-22’s don’t effect the War on Terror Russ Feingold ‘8, U.S. Senator
[“Remarks of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold: Confronting Foreign Intelligence and Information Gaps,” 6/23/08, l/n]

It is well past time to shift our strategic thinking - and our corresponding expenditures and actions - beyond outdated military tools and solutions. Let me quote Secretary Gates' budgetary views from his Kansas State University speech: "We need," he said, "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security - diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development." One way to increase this much- needed investment in the civilian instruments of national security is to cut wasteful spending on weapons programs that will not help us address our most pressing national security concerns. These include, for example, the F-22 Raptor, which Secretary Gates has specifically identified as a weapons system with limited relevance in counterterrorism operations. It has never flown in Iraq or Afghanistan yet the Air Force continues to ask for more.

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F-22 Bad – Iraq War
F-22 deployment to Iraq would spark a war with Iran. DoD Buzz, defense and acquisition journal, 6/30/08, “Gates Opposed AF Plans to Deploy F-22 to Iraq” http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/06/30/gates-opposed-af-plans-to-deploy-f-22-to-iraq/ The Air Force wanted to send the F-22 to the Middle East and Defense Secretary Robert Gates nixed the plans, citing the strategic danger from the deployment if it were misread by Iran, among other factors. This comes from a single usually reliable source with knowledge of Air Force policy and operations. Then-Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne sent a memo to Gates last December in which he made the recommendation, as well as laying out several major arguments for Air Force budget requests for the F-22 and bomber research and development, according to our source. Central Command had approved the deployment request and we understand several Arab governments were also supportive of the Air Force effort. The main opposition to the request, we hear, came from Ryan Henry, principal deputy to the undersecretary of Defense for policy, who worried that Iran would interpret the deployment of the country’s most capable fighter as a regional escalation at a time when rumors were sweeping the region that the US was planning strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. F-22 deployment of Iraq would increase US-Iran tensions. The Economist, global newspaper, 7/3/08, “Iran’s confrontation with the West” http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11670939 Mr Jafari’s remarks came in response to a string of what were seen in Tehran as provocative developments. These have included reports of massive Israeli long-distance aerial manoeuvres and revelations of a boost in covert American funding to Iranian opposition groups. There were also statements attributed to senior Israelis and Americans suggesting that the window for military action could close within a year, because by then Iran might already have developed a bomb, or improved its air defences sufficiently to deter any attack. Yet both the Israeli and American governments distanced themselves from these provocative statements. Asked about an unnamed Pentagon official who hinted at an imminent Israeli attack in a television interview, a State Department spokesman said that if such talk were credible, the source should not remain unnamed. In fact, American diplomats are talking about resuming direct talks with Iran over Iraq, and even of sending the first American diplomats to Tehran since the 1979-81 hostage crisis. It was also reported this week that the Pentagon stopped the air force from deploying its newest fighter to the Gulf, the F22, for fear of causing “strategic dislocation” with Iran.

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FCS Trade Off 1NC
Future Combat System is on the chopping block Gordon Lubold ‘8, Staff writer for The Christian Science Monitor
[“Congress eyes defense cuts,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/11/08, l/n]

Congress will have a greater impact on the massive defense budget this year, looking afresh at many programs long thought to be a sure thing. This includes the Army's multibillion-dollar modernization program, the controversial Future Combat System (FCS). A high-tech series of air and ground vehices linked by a wireless network, FCS has faced criticism before for being expensive and complicated. Lawmakers have previously been quick to cut funding from the program. But senior defense officials acknowledge that this year the system is facing real trouble. "The program is really in jeopardy, and I think it's on the ropes," says one senior officer, who wished to speak anonymously and only on background because of how sensitive the issue has become. FCS funding will trade off with competing budget priorities Paul L. Francis ‘8, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office
[“2009 Review of Future Combat System Is Critical to Program's Direction,” 4/10/08, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08638t.pdf]

The Army’s $160.9 billion cost estimate for the FCS program is largely unchanged from last year’s estimate despite a program adjustment that reduced the number of systems from 18 to 14. This may mean a reduction in capabilities of the FCS program and thus represents a reduction in the Army’s buying power on FCS. Further, two independent cost estimates—from DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) and the other from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a federally funded research and development center—are significantly higher than the Army’s estimate. Both assessments estimate higher costs for software development, to which a recent increase in lines of code adds credence. The Army has not accepted either of the independent estimates on the grounds that they each include additional work scope, particularly in the later years of the development phase. Also, the CAIG and IDA both use historical growth factors in their estimates, based on the results of previous programs. It is reasonable to include such growth factors, based on our own analysis of weapon systems and the low level of knowledge attained on the FCS program at this time. Given the program’s relative immaturity in terms of technology and requirements definition and demonstrations of capabilities to date, there is not a firm foundation for a confident cost estimate. The Army has not calculated confidence levels on its estimates, though this is a best practice and could reduce the probability of unbudgeted cost growth. Under its current structure, the Army will make substantial investments in the FCS program before key knowledge is gained on requirements, technologies, system designs, and system performance, leaving less than half its development budget to complete significantly expensive work, such as building and testing prototypes, after its preliminary design review. The Army maintains that if it becomes necessary, FCS content will be further reduced, by trading away requirements or changing the concept of operations, to keep development costs within available funding levels. As the Army begins a steep ramp-up of FCS production, FCS costs will compete with other Army funding priorities, such as the transition to modular organizations and recapitalizing the weapons and other assets that return from current operations. Together, the program’s uncertain cost estimate and competing Army priorities make additional reductions in FCS scope and increases in cost likely. Trade Offs terminate competing programs GAO ‘8, Government Accountability Office
[“DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes,” 7/2/08, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08619.pdf]

DOD often does not commit full funding to its major weapon system acquisitions when they are initiated, despite the department’s policy to do so. For a majority of the programs we reviewed, costs exceeded the funding levels initially planned for and reflected in the FYDP. To make up for these funding shortfalls, DOD often shifts funds from one program to pay for another, reduces system capabilities, cuts procurement quantities, extends development and procurement schedules, or in rare cases terminates programs. Such actions not only create instability in DOD’s weapon system portfolio, they also obscure the true future costs of current commitments, making it difficult to make informed investment decisions.

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FCS Trade Off 1NC
FCS is key to the War on Terror

Future terrorist attacks will cause extinction Yonah Alexander 03, Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies
[Washington Times, August 28, LN]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the

international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for
decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Chopping Block
FCS funding is on the chopping block San-Diego Union Tribune ‘8, San Diego Newspaper
[“The revolution of warfare,” 6/29/08, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20080629-9999-lz1b29warfare.html]

Rep. Duncan Hunter of Alpine, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, has pushed the Army in the past to accelerate its plans to get equipment to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. He welcomed plans to outfit infantry brigades first. “I think the Army is refocusing on FCS in terms of being able to get a capability to the field, to the troops, as quickly as possible,” Hunter said. The Army also faces the task of persuading Congress to provide sufficient funding, a job that takes on added urgency with the possible changeover to an administration that may be inclined to cut the program. Gregg J. Martin, FCS program manager and a Boeing vice president, said maintaining stable funding is his greatest challenge. In the past three years, Congress has cut the program by almost $800 million. Whenever funds are cut, the program has to be reorganized, Martin said. Congress has yet to finalize funding for next year. Although the Senate authorized the full $3.6 billion requested by the Bush administration, the House refused to go along, slicing $200 million from that sum.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Funding High
Funding for FCS is increasing Paul L. Francis ‘8, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management @ Government Accountability Office
[“2009 Review of Future Combat System Is Critical to Program's Direction,” 4/10/08, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08638t.pdf]

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), a networked family of weapons and other integrated systems. FCS is in the forefront of efforts to help the Army transform itself into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force by using a new concept of operations, new technologies, and a new information network linking whole brigades together in a system of systems. In 2009, FCS faces a congressionally mandated go/no-go decision review to determine the program’s future. This review is crucial, as production funding and commitments will build rapidly after that point, limiting the government’s ability to alter course.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

Funding Key To FCS
FCS funding cuts kill capability Reuters ‘8, International News Agency
[“U.S. Army lauds relevance of future weapons for today,” 6/11/08, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2008/06/11/us_army_lauds_relevance_of_future_weapons_for_today/]

FCS program officials say splitting up the program could lead to disconnects between the FCS communications network, the various new ground- and air-based weapons that would use it, and current weapons that also need to be linked in. Gregg Martin, Boeing vice president and FCS program manager, said the program was working to provide details about the separate weapons systems that make up FCS for Young ahead of a Defense Acquisition Board review at the end of July. He said the program was carefully watching congressional action on the FCS budget, warning that any cuts would result in schedule delays and revamped contracts with suppliers. The House of Representatives cut the FCS budget by $233 million, while the Senate fully funded it. Additional House and Senate committees must still act on the funding for the program.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Coming
Parts of FCS will be implemented Wired ‘8, technology magazine
[“Army's Drones of the 'Future' Head to Iraq, Now,”6/17/08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/06/the-defense-sec.html]

The Defense Secretary and Congress have been pounding on the Army, to start showing some results from its massive modernization project, Future Combat Systems. The Army is getting the message, sending a platoon of Future Combat's flying robots to Iraq, immediately. 30 of the Micro Air Vehicles, or MAVs, "are on their way to Baghdad two weeks from now," Future Combat Systems program manager Maj. Gen. Charles Cartwright tells Defense News. Unlike other small drones -- which fly like miniature airplanes -the MAVs use ducted fans to float in the air. Hovering in one place, they can stare down with "electrooptical and infrared cameras, and soon will have a gimbal-mounted camera and a laser designator," Defense News notes.

FCS coming out this year
Mackenzie Eaglen, Senior Defense and Homeland Security Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation and Oliver Horn, Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allisan Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, Future Combat Systems: Dispelling Widespread Myths of the US Army's Primary Modernization Program, 2/12/08 Although the Army will not equip the first FCS Brigade Combat Team until 2015, FCS forerunners are already playing important roles on the battlefield. The Army has already installed a stripped-down FCS-like network in some combat vehicles, which improves on the Army's Blue Force Tracker (BFT). In 2003, the Army equipped units heading into Iraq with BFT, enabling soldiers to track friendly "blue" units on screen. According to Captain Sam Donnelly, a battalion command staff officer during the invasion, before BTF, the "primary means of command-and-control was an FM radio, a map, and thumbtacks." By the end of the campaign, "the only real contact we had with [other units] was through [network] text messaging."[17] In addition, small unmanned ground vehicles (SUGV) such as the PACBOT have discovered over 1,000 IEDs in Iraq since 2003. The Army has recently outfitted the 25th Infantry Division with micro air vehicles--precursors to the FCS Class I UAV--to perform reconnaissance at the platoon level.[18] Finally, the latest armor upgrade kits for light vehicles, such as the Humvee, are based on FCS armor technology. Yet, despite their utility, these technologies were developed without the overall network integration that FCS will provide. Over the next decade, FCS technologies will spin out as the Army procures and equips the systems for soldiers in the field. The first spin-out is scheduled to begin in FY 2008 and will include an early part of the network operating system; joint tactical radio system; ground sensors; and the computer-integrated-system B-kits for ABRAMs, BRADLEYs, and Humvees. In FY 2008, the B-kits will enable soldiers in these vehicles to obtain data directly from UAVs. FCS will also provide the first MGV prototype, the non-line-of-sight launch system. Two additional spin-outs are scheduled to begin in FY 2010 (active protection system, vehicle sensors, SUGV, and Class 1 UAV) and FY 2012 (FCS Battle Command, MULE, and Class IV UAV) before the first FCS combat brigade arrives in 2015. FCS is coming this year and deserves support. Reuters, international news agency, 6/26/08, “U.S. Army speeds high-tech arms to infantry” http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUSN2643973820080627?sp=true The U.S. Army said on Thursday it is speeding up delivery of advanced rockets, robots and ultra-light drones to infantry units in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a reshaped $160 billion modernization program. The move brings forward by three years, from fiscal 2014 to 2011, the high-technology spin-out to light infantry and represents, "a very important shift in our priorities," said Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes, the army's deputy chief of staff for programs. The army said the shift would not change the overall cost of the so-called Future Combat Systems program, or FCS, co-managed by Boeing Co and Science Applications International Corp. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hailed the changes, which dovetailed with a recent push of his for more focus on equipping to fight irregulars and less on preparing for a possible fight against a potential foe such as China. "I was impressed" by the revised plan to speed systems to the infantry combat brigades in the near term, he told a Pentagon briefing, "and frankly, I think FCS, as they've restructured it, deserves support." The move turns the $160 billion project's initial focus to the operational needs and survivability of infantry, or foot soldiers, rather than armored brigades with heavy vehicles. Until now, heavy brigades were to have been the first to be equipped with some of the FCS's 14 new component technologies.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Coming
The first part of FCS is coming this year. Army News Service, news agency for the US Army, 6/12/08, “NLOS-C Unveiled on Capitol Hill” http://www.military.com/news/article/army-news/nlosc-unveiled-on-capitol-hill.html?col=1186032369115 The very first of many Future Combat System vehicles was unveiled June 11 on Capitol Hill for viewing by lawmakers, members of the press and taxpayers alike. Prototype 1 of the Non-Line of Sight Cannon, one of the eight manned ground vehicles within Future Combat Systems, was displayed on the National Mall in front of the U.S. Capitol Building. A total of eight such prototypes will eventually be delivered to Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., by 2010. The first five of those will be delivered by December 2008, the remaining three in early 2009. Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr. said the arrival of the vehicle was a significant milestone in the FCS timeline. "We've been talking and briefing and telling people about the FCS for a long time," the general said. "Right here today, it is real. After a decade of hard work, planning and effort, the FCS is real." The FCS is also relevant to Army operations today, the general said. The NLOS-C is manned by only two Soldiers, half the number required for the M109A6 Paladin, the system it replaces. And the cannon is capable of precision targeting, at a greater range than the Paladin, and from a more protected position. "That gives it relevance in both irregular and regular warfare," he said.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Good – Heg
FCS key to maintaining dominance on the battle field

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Good – Heg

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Good – Readiness
FCS would modernize the army and maintain readiness San-Diego Union Tribune ‘8, San Diego Newspaper
[“The revolution of warfare,” 6/29/08, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20080629-9999-lz1b29warfare.html]

Imagine a battlefield where soldiers, sensors, robots, vehicles and weapons are all linked in a high-speed wireless network, allowing the enemy to be seen, monitored and, if necessary, attacked from afar. Such is the promise of Future Combat Systems, a $160 billion Army modernization effort in which San Diego-based SAIC is a key contractor. FCS is the largest, most costly and complex modernization program in Army history. Proponents say it will revolutionize warfare, increasing the lethal force of U.S. troops while providing them with additional protection. It's also a big deal for SAIC, which serves as co-manager of the program in its capacity as co-lead systems integrator with the much larger Boeing Corp. SAIC will earn about $2.7 billion from its contract with the Army, marking the largest contract ever won by the company. “FCS is the most relevant program in the Army, and many would suggest the most relevant program in the Department of Defense,” said Dan Zanini, an SAIC senior vice president who serves as deputy program manager of Future Combat Systems. Winning the contract to help integrate the program was a leap forward for SAIC, a company that prides itself on providing scientific, engineering and technical solutions to defense and intelligence agencies, analysts said. “Here they are on the same level as a Boeing,” said Alex Hamilton, who follows SAIC for Jesup & Lamont. “Psychologically, it just catapults SAIC into a whole new level.” Under current plans, FCS will consist of 14 pieces of equipment – including portable sensors, unmanned air and ground vehicles and guided rockets – connected by a network that will transmit photos, video and other data, and allow soldiers to talk with one another. Some of the more unusual devices in the system include a keg-sized, unmanned aerial vehicle – essentially a flying robot – that can “perch and stare,” sending back photos, video and other information. An unmanned ground vehicle that fits into a backpack can be sent into buildings by remote control to search for explosives. Another weapon, popularly called “Rockets in a Box,” resembles a refrigerator. Dropped into the field by parachute, it can be placed on a vehicle or the ground. Rockets can be fired from the box by a soldier using remote control from a distant location and guided to targets identified by unmanned vehicles Although the system was conceived before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Army officials insist it is also suited to battling insurgents and terrorists in the 21st century. FCS will provide technological superiority to our force AP ‘8, Associated Press
[“Army alters $160B modernization program schedule,” 6/26/08, http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/apwire/c959feafbc1a16b510fee755eb2e4d8c.htm]

The Army will deliver some key technologies to ground forces in war zones three years ahead of schedule as part of its $160 billion combat modernization program led by Boeing Co. and SAIC Inc. Senior Army officials on Thursday said changes to the "Future Combat Systems" program will expedite the use of high-tech equipment, including unmanned sensors and robotics, to infantry brigades fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2011. Portions of FCS were expected to be used by armored units by 2014, but Army officials say the technology being developed is needed for the current war effort. Lt. Gen. Michael A. Vane, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, said accelerating FCS and other complementary programs will help "filling the gaps" created by huge demands on the infantry brigades, while increasing the effectiveness and safety of U.S. soldiers.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Funding Cut Now
The 09 budget is already set – FCS funding was already cut Reuters ‘8, international news agency
[“U.S. Army to announce reshaped modernization plan,” 6/26/08, http://uk.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUKN2648567620080626]

The Army will hold a briefing later in the day to detail acceleration of "some of the technologies going to soldiers fighting right now in Iraq and Afghanistan," said Lindy Kyzer, an Army spokeswoman. Future Combat Systems, or FCS, is the centerpiece of Army modernization. It consists of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by communications and information links. The plan is to replace systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle among other weapons. The Army is seeking about $3.6 billion in fiscal 2009 for the Future Combat Systems program, or about 10 percent of its combined research and procurement request for the year. The House of Representatives Armed Services Committee voted to cut about $200 million from the request for fiscal 2009, which starts Oct. 1.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
Montavius Choy

DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Cuts Inevitable
FCS funding will be cut – new presidents Bloomberg News ‘8, New York News Agency
[“Boeing, Lockheed May Lose as Obama, McCain Reject Big Weapons,” 6/29/08, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=adXiGrYSU5PA&refer=home]

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. warned its clients last month that Barack Obama would be ``a negative for defense stocks'' if he became president, because he will cut weapons programs that generate the companies' biggest profits. Boeing Co., Lockheed Martin Corp. and other military contractors may not fare any better under John McCain. While the two presidential candidates are hammering each other over their differences on Iraq, they share a skepticism over big Pentagon programs such as Lockheed Martin's F-22 fighter and the Army's $159 billion Future Combat Systems, a modernization plan jointly managed by Boeing and SAIC Inc. ``When you get beyond the issue of the war in Iraq, Senator McCain and Senator Obama sound remarkably similar on many defense issues,'' says Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia. Both have signaled they will increase overall defense spending. Still, they say the military should invest in technologies bestsuited to fighting the unconventional wars of the post-Sept. 11 world -- and rethink those designed for the Cold War.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Fails – Tech
FCS tech is immature – can’t deliver Paul L. Francis ‘8, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office
[“2009 Review of Future Combat System Is Critical to Program's Direction,” 4/10/08, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08638t.pdf]

FCS’s critical technologies remain at low maturity levels. According to the Army’s latest technology assessment, only two of FCS’s 44 critical technologies have reached a level of maturity that, based on best practice standards, should have been demonstrated at program start. Even applying the Army’s less rigorous standards, only 73 percent can be considered mature enough to begin system development today. The technological immaturity, coupled with incomplete requirements, is a mismatch that has prevented the Army from reaching the first critical knowledge point for this program—a precursor for cost growth. Many of these immature technologies may have an adverse cumulative impact on key FCS capabilities such as survivability. In addition, the Army is struggling to synchronize the schedules and capabilities of numerous essential complementary programs with the overall FCS program. The Army has identified problems that raise concerns about the likelihood that many complementary systems will deliver the required capabilities when needed. In some cases, complementary programs have been adversely affected by FCS demands, and in others, lack of coordination between FCS and complementary program officials has stalled efforts aimed at synchronizing programs and resolving cost, schedule, and technical issues. Only two FCS technologies are mature Government Accountability Office (GAO), 3/1/08, “DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf Only 2 of the program’s 44 technologies are fully mature and 30 are nearing full maturity. Based on the Army’s assessment, 6 technologies have demonstrated higher maturity since last year, but 3 are now assessed as less mature. All critical technologies may not be fully mature until the Army’s production decision in February 2013. The next independent verification of FCS critical technologies should be available in early 2009 for the preliminary design review.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Fails – Insufficient
FCS fails – new capabilities are used now and it doesn’t affect close-combat Valerie Reed, Straus Military Reform Project Research Assistant, and Jessica Guiney, CDI Research Assistant, 5/30/08,
[“Future Combat System: Is It Worth It?” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FCS.pdf]

Beyond this current need for armor, experience in Iraq and Afghanistan also suggests that to win wars where the population is the center of gravity, the use of air power and “precision” weapons must be carefully considered. One questions whether the “just in time” FCS response to threats will be able to consider the strategic implications of strikes in a nonlinear environment without risking the survivability of soldiers in FCS vehicles. In urban areas, complex structures and battle spaces mean enemies can surround themselves with civilians or valuable infrastructure. The ability of even precision air power to engage enemy forces in a way supporting the overall strategic objective will be difficult in urban terrain. For example, many key components of FCS promoted as break-through capabilities are already present on current battlefields: UAVs, global communication networks, linked sensor-to-shooter capabilities (both from UAV and ground-launched platforms), and distributed operations facilitated by satellite communications.32 While these technologies have aided operations in important ways, the types of capabilities they provide have proven completely insufficient to eliminate the “close” fight. Furthermore, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, relying on air power resulted in numerable civilian casualties, which worked against the strategic goals of the United States and NATO. Furthermore, mechanizing conflict, particularly in stability operations and population-centric warfare, has the potential to remove soldiers even farther from the situation on the ground.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

FCS Fails – Timeframe
FCS is massively expensive and will not be done until 2020.
Valerie Reed, Straus Military Reform Project Research Assistant, and Jessica Guiney, CDI Research Assistant, 5/30/08, “Future Combat System: Is It Worth It?” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FCS.pdf Additionally, there is the question of present versus future priorities and capabilities. The Army has preferred to idealize about what technology it can build in 20 years that should hold its own against current threats, instead of considering rapid prototyping of commercial products in order to integrate technologies quickly into the force structure. There is always merit in looking ahead to the future, but in the case of FCS, the Army seems to have overshot, ensuring that brigades in the 2020s will be prepared to counter more diverse threats, at the expense of solving current force problems in the present. An example is that because procurement funds will be tied up with FCS development, it is uncertain if there will be funds available for recapitalization of armored vehicles in the coming decades, some with technology from the 1960s. It will not be until the 2020s that FCS vehicles can completely substitute for the current aging fleet. Until then, many of the vehicles used will be past their programmed shelf life. It is estimated that $2 billion is needed annually 2010-2016 to maintain and upgrade the aging ground combat systems, and it is uncertain this can be afforded, even assuming no further FCS cost overruns – which is extremely optimistic, even unrealistic.25

FCS network won’t be operational until 2013.
Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 4/10/08, “2009 Review of Future Combat System Is Critical to Program's Direction” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08638t.pdf It is unclear when or how it can be demonstrated that the FCS network will work as needed, especially at key program junctures. For example, in 2009, network requirements, including software, may not be well defined nor designs completed at the preliminary design review; and at the FCS milestone review later that year, network demonstration is expected to be very limited. The Army and LSI have identified and need to address numerous areas of high risk such as network performance and scalability. The first large scale FCS network demonstration—the limited user test in 2012—will take place at least a year after the critical design review and only a year before the start of FCS production. That test will seek to identify the impact of the contributions and limitations of the network on the ability to conduct missions. This test will be conducted after the designs have been set for the FCS ground vehicles, a situation that poses risks because the designs depend on the network’s performance. A full demonstration of the network with all of its software components will not be demonstrated until at least 2013 when the fully automated battle command system is expected to be ready.

Infantry brigades will get FCS in 2011 at earliest.
Bloomberg News, an international news agency, 6/26/08, “Boeing Future Combat Systems Goes to Infantry First” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ay8hzUi19g8U&refer=us The U.S. Army, seeking to demonstrate the relevance of its most expensive weapons program, Boeing Co.'s Future Combat Systems, will give some of the new equipment first to infantry rather than armored units. The armored units haven't been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan as often as infantry brigades. The Army is under pressure from Congress and the Bush administration to show that the $159 billion system of radios, ground sensors, manned vehicles and missile launch systems can be effective in current conflicts. Some Army infantry brigades will get the equipment starting in 2011 instead of 2014, said Lieutenant General Michael Vane, director of the Army's capabilities integration center. Heavy, mechanized units of M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles that were scheduled to get the equipment in 2011 will now have to wait. Vane didn't say how long.

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Department of Defense Trade Off
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DDI ’08 [SS]

AT: Terror
FCS is not suited to the war on terror.
Valerie Reed, Straus Military Reform Project Research Assistant, and Jessica Guiney, CDI Research Assistant, 5/30/08, “Future Combat System: Is It Worth It?” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FCS.pdf Given the realities of these future missions, the basic assumptions upon which FCS is built are cause for concern. The most fundamental assumption FCS is predicated upon is the idea of “dominant battlefield knowledge.” Instead of equipping soldiers with heavy armor to protect them from direct fire, FCS integrates a massive amount of information to show soldiers where an enemy is before they are surprised. This light armor means the “survivability” of FCS depends upon soldiers using FCS getting the first shot. In an open battlefield, the premise is that a lighter, faster and more aware brigade could prevail over enemy vehicles. However, in Operation Iraqi Freedom the preferred method of engaging enemy forces was precision air strikes.27 Retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor has emphasized that FCS incorrectly assumes technology has eliminated the “close fight,” – something that is not readily apparent considering insurgent tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan.28 These wars suggest asymmetric tactics utilizing surprise and deception will continue to be challenges.

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