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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits Neg
Permits Neg..................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Strategy Notes..............................................................................................................................................................................................7
** Topicality **...........................................................................................................................................................................................8
T – Incentives 1NC (1/2).............................................................................................................................................................................9
T – Incentives 1NC (2/2)...........................................................................................................................................................................10
2NC Overview (1/3)...................................................................................................................................................................................11
2NC Overview (2/3)..................................................................................................................................................................................12
2NC Overview (3/3)..................................................................................................................................................................................13
AT: “We Have Lots of Contextual Evidence”............................................................................................................................................14
AT: “We Have Lots of Contextual Evidence”............................................................................................................................................15
AT: “Cap and Trade Is Predictable”...........................................................................................................................................................16
AT: “Cap and Trade is Core Topic Ed”......................................................................................................................................................17
AT: “We Still Link to Your Offense”.........................................................................................................................................................18
Ext: Mandates Are Distinct From Incentives.............................................................................................................................................19
Impacts – Ground.......................................................................................................................................................................................20
Impacts – Ground.......................................................................................................................................................................................21
Ext: Their Authors Wrong/Interp Bad........................................................................................................................................................22
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................23
** Generic Solvency **.............................................................................................................................................................................23
Permits fail empirically..............................................................................................................................................................................24
Permits fail – empirically ..........................................................................................................................................................................25
Permits Fail................................................................................................................................................................................................26
Permits fail – Other countries....................................................................................................................................................................27
Permits fail – Offsets bad...........................................................................................................................................................................28
Permits fail – Offsets ................................................................................................................................................................................30
Permits fail – No Accountability................................................................................................................................................................31
AT SO2 means permits solve.....................................................................................................................................................................32
No Solvency – Carbon Caps fail................................................................................................................................................................33
No Solvency - Cap and trade doesn’t encourage AE.................................................................................................................................34
Upstream Good..........................................................................................................................................................................................35
Upstream good...........................................................................................................................................................................................36
Downstream fails.......................................................................................................................................................................................37
AT Banking adv.........................................................................................................................................................................................38
AT: Banking Adv.......................................................................................................................................................................................39
AT Bali ......................................................................................................................................................................................................40
AT Bali.......................................................................................................................................................................................................41
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Bali Conferences Not Working..................................................................................................................................................................41


Safety Valve block intl markets.................................................................................................................................................................42
Permits = market manipulation..................................................................................................................................................................43
Grandfathering bad....................................................................................................................................................................................44
Permits increase emissions........................................................................................................................................................................45
Permits increase emissions........................................................................................................................................................................46
Permits increase emissions........................................................................................................................................................................47
Permit  leakage /c tax solves..................................................................................................................................................................48
Permits  leakage.....................................................................................................................................................................................49
Permits = Rent seeking = wars..................................................................................................................................................................50
Permits = cheating and corruption (terrorism IL)......................................................................................................................................51
Permits = cheating.....................................................................................................................................................................................52
Permits hurt trade.......................................................................................................................................................................................53
Permits = Biz as Usual...............................................................................................................................................................................54
** Politics/Elections Links **...................................................................................................................................................................55
Cap/Trade helps Mccain............................................................................................................................................................................56
Cap/Trade hurts Mccain.............................................................................................................................................................................57
Cap/Trade hurts McCain coal states..........................................................................................................................................................58
Cap/Trade hurts Mccain base.....................................................................................................................................................................59
Middle Class Link .....................................................................................................................................................................................60
Cap/Trade hurts Obama.............................................................................................................................................................................61
Cap/Trade Unpopular.................................................................................................................................................................................62
Climate not key to election........................................................................................................................................................................63
Obama will do the plan..............................................................................................................................................................................64
McCain won’t do the plan..........................................................................................................................................................................65
Politics Link cap pop tax unpop.................................................................................................................................................................66
C tax popular..............................................................................................................................................................................................67
**** States CP ****..................................................................................................................................................................................68
1NC States CP............................................................................................................................................................................................69
States solve generic ..................................................................................................................................................................................70
States solve cap and trade..........................................................................................................................................................................71
States Solve Cap and Trade........................................................................................................................................................................72
States Solve Cap and Trade........................................................................................................................................................................73
States Solve GHG Emissions.....................................................................................................................................................................74
States Solve Carbon Tax............................................................................................................................................................................75
States  Fed policy...................................................................................................................................................................................76
States solve intl coop.................................................................................................................................................................................77

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States solve intl..........................................................................................................................................................................................78


States can link to intl markets....................................................................................................................................................................79
States can link to intl markets....................................................................................................................................................................80
States Go Global........................................................................................................................................................................................81
States cap trade now...................................................................................................................................................................................82
State cap/trade now....................................................................................................................................................................................83
States solve warming ...............................................................................................................................................................................84
SQ Solves...................................................................................................................................................................................................85
AT no state cooperation.............................................................................................................................................................................86
Federalism U..............................................................................................................................................................................................87
Perm links to federalism............................................................................................................................................................................88
Aff – Perm for States CP...........................................................................................................................................................................89
** Carbon Tax CP **.................................................................................................................................................................................90
Carbon Tax CP 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................................91
Carbon Tax CP 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................................92
C tax Generic solvo....................................................................................................................................................................................93
Pricing feasible...........................................................................................................................................................................................94
C tax solve over time.................................................................................................................................................................................95
C tax solve emissions best.........................................................................................................................................................................96
C tax solves innovation .............................................................................................................................................................................97
Carbon tax solves innovation.....................................................................................................................................................................98
C tax solve competitiveness.......................................................................................................................................................................99
C tax most equitable.................................................................................................................................................................................100
C tax upstream solves..............................................................................................................................................................................101
C Tax solvency - faster.............................................................................................................................................................................102
AT C tax doesn’t reduce CO2..................................................................................................................................................................103
US leadership on C tax solves.................................................................................................................................................................104
US leadership on C tax solves.................................................................................................................................................................105
US leadership on C tax solves.................................................................................................................................................................106
C tax solves global...................................................................................................................................................................................107
C tax solves Bali better............................................................................................................................................................................108
Tax more feasible intl...............................................................................................................................................................................109
Price stability solves trade........................................................................................................................................................................110
C tax solves Competitveness....................................................................................................................................................................111
Border adjustments solve.........................................................................................................................................................................112
Permits = rollback....................................................................................................................................................................................113
AT Biz con................................................................................................................................................................................................114
AT Biz Con...............................................................................................................................................................................................115
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AT: kills the economy..............................................................................................................................................................................116


Carbon tax  pay for Entitlements.........................................................................................................................................................117
Tax switching...........................................................................................................................................................................................118
AT Permits Raise Revenue.......................................................................................................................................................................119
AT Permits raise revenue.........................................................................................................................................................................120
Auctions don’t solve tax-switching.........................................................................................................................................................121
AT C tax hurts the Poor............................................................................................................................................................................122
Carbon tax solve cheating........................................................................................................................................................................123
C Tax solves cheating..............................................................................................................................................................................124
AT high gas prices didn’t reduce consumption........................................................................................................................................125
C Tax solves Environmental Justice........................................................................................................................................................126
Carbon Tax solve env Justice...................................................................................................................................................................127
Monitoring Net Benefit............................................................................................................................................................................128
Monitoring Extensions.............................................................................................................................................................................129
Accountability NB...................................................................................................................................................................................130
Ext: Accountability..................................................................................................................................................................................131
Perm fails.................................................................................................................................................................................................132
**Price Volatility Turn **........................................................................................................................................................................133
Price Volatility Turn 1NC........................................................................................................................................................................134
Permits  Price Volatility......................................................................................................................................................................135
Permits  Price volatility........................................................................................................................................................................136
Permits  Price Volatility kills economy................................................................................................................................................137
Price Volatility Turn – Stability key to investment..................................................................................................................................138
Predictability key to solve........................................................................................................................................................................139
Volatility kills the economy.....................................................................................................................................................................140
C tax = certainty.......................................................................................................................................................................................141
C tax solves price volatility. ....................................................................................................................................................................142
AT Safety Valve Solve volatility..............................................................................................................................................................143
AT “Fed” oversight of market solve volatility.........................................................................................................................................144
** Env. Justice DA **..............................................................................................................................................................................145
Environmental Injustice DA-Links..........................................................................................................................................................146
Env Just DA links – Hot spots.................................................................................................................................................................147
Environmental Injustice DA-Links..........................................................................................................................................................148
Environmental Injustice DA-Links..........................................................................................................................................................149
Environmental Injustice DA-Impact: Democracy...................................................................................................................................150
Environmental Injustice DA-Impact: Human Survival ..........................................................................................................................151
Environmental Injustice DA-CT Tradesoff CC.......................................................................................................................................152

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Aff Ans: Carbon Tax-Environmental Injustice Turn................................................................................................................................153


Environmental Injustice DA-Command and Control Solves..................................................................................................................154
Aff Ans: Command and Control CP-Fails Now......................................................................................................................................155
** Commodity K **.................................................................................................................................................................................156
Tradable permits commidify....................................................................................................................................................................157
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................158
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................159
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................160
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................161
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................162
Commodity K Links................................................................................................................................................................................163
Cap K – Links..........................................................................................................................................................................................164
Commodity K Impacts.............................................................................................................................................................................165
K turns the case........................................................................................................................................................................................166
Cap K – Capitalism causes warming.......................................................................................................................................................167
Cap K – Capitalism causes warming.......................................................................................................................................................168
Cap K – Capitalism is a crime against humanity.....................................................................................................................................169
Cap K – Alt (Reform economic systems)................................................................................................................................................170
Cap K - Alt Solves...................................................................................................................................................................................171
Cap K - Alt Solves...................................................................................................................................................................................172
Aff Ans: Political Approach Key.............................................................................................................................................................173
** Development K **..............................................................................................................................................................................174
Development 1NC (1/2)...........................................................................................................................................................................175
Development 1NC (2/2)...........................................................................................................................................................................176
AT: Perm..................................................................................................................................................................................................177
Development Links..................................................................................................................................................................................178
Development Links..................................................................................................................................................................................180
Development Links..................................................................................................................................................................................181
Development K – Emissions trading = colonialism................................................................................................................................182
Development K – They don’t consider development impacts.................................................................................................................183
Development Impacts..............................................................................................................................................................................184
Development Impacts..............................................................................................................................................................................185
Development Impacts..............................................................................................................................................................................186
Development K – Plan  exploitation....................................................................................................................................................187
Development K – Plan  exploitation....................................................................................................................................................188
Development K – Plan  underdevelopment.........................................................................................................................................189
Development K – Plan  structural violence.........................................................................................................................................190

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Development K – Plan  capitalism.......................................................................................................................................................191


Development K – Plan  infringes sovereignty.....................................................................................................................................192
Development K – Plan  diverts key funds...........................................................................................................................................193
Development K – Plan  substitutes real development.........................................................................................................................194
Development K – Plan  destroys protection from exploitation ...........................................................................................................195
Development K – Plan  diversion of polluting technology..................................................................................................................196
Dev. K C tax CP Solves...........................................................................................................................................................................197
Development K – Alternative..................................................................................................................................................................198
Framework...............................................................................................................................................................................................199
Framework...............................................................................................................................................................................................200
Framework/Alt Solves.............................................................................................................................................................................201
Development K – Key to analyzing impacts...........................................................................................................................................202
Development K – West always dominates...............................................................................................................................................203
Development K – West always dominates...............................................................................................................................................204
Development K – Emissions trading is worse than carbon tax...............................................................................................................205
Development K – Policymakers must consider consequences ..............................................................................................................206
Aff Ans – Development K is colonialist ................................................................................................................................................207
Aff Ans – Developing nations benefit.....................................................................................................................................................208
Aff Ans – Improve economy and infrastructure......................................................................................................................................209
Aff Ans – Alt can’t solve.........................................................................................................................................................................210
** Other **...............................................................................................................................................................................................211
Biopower link...........................................................................................................................................................................................212
Other – Tax Credits fail............................................................................................................................................................................213
Other – Carbon taxes fail.........................................................................................................................................................................214
Other – Economic incentives solve better than mandates.......................................................................................................................215
Other – Global Warming.........................................................................................................................................................................216
Other – Energy Policy Key to Solving Economy....................................................................................................................................217
Other – Stopping war solves the environment.........................................................................................................................................218

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Strategy Notes
First of all, take a stand. This aff isn’t topical. Use this to make the 1AR’s life harder. Pick and good strat,
implement it in the block along with a well-developed T arg and make the aff cry for thinking they were
cool to recycle old college backfiles.

Strategy 1: States and politics/Elections/whatever feds bad arg you want

This is pretty straight forward, the states can do the plan just as well now. Most of the other arguments
are not net benefits.

Use the “States do cap/trade now” to answer utopian/multiactor fiat args!

Strategy 2: Carbon Tax CP

Net benefits are most of the solvency arguments, Price Volatility, Development K, Environmental Justice.
Most of the sections have cards that are titled “Carbon tax solves ___”.

There’s a lot of technical terms in the debate over Cap and Trade and Carbon Tax, I would actually
recommend going to carbontax.org to do some basic reading on the subject and then using that as a
primer on the differences between the two. Carbon Tax is gaining steam Al Gore approves of it, so what
else could you ask for?

Strategy 3: Commodity K

This would be a good net benefit to a Command and Control CP or just a stand alone K.

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** Topicality **

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T – Incentives 1NC (1/2)

A. Interpretation and Violation: The affirmative team includes mandates in their plan which is not an
alternative energy incentive

David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998,
55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

This Part develops a theory of true economic incentives as an alternative to reliance upon repeated governmental decisions
concerning the scale of emission reductions. Emissions trading does not provide a meaningful alternative to traditional
programs, because it relies upon government decisions about the scale of reductions instead of decentralized responses to
continuous incentives to reduce pollution. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish true economic incentive programs, programs
that rely solely on positive and negative economic inducements to secure reductions, from mixed programs like emissions
trading and traditional regulation, that rely on a combination of negative economic inducements, in the form of monetary
penalties for non-compliance, and government commands. 223

B. Reasons to Prefer

1. Limits-

a.)The affirmative interpretation explodes the topic because they allow for any case that includes
mandates, thus giving aff double the ground than the resolution intended for.

b.) At best, they are extra topical – even if they win that they create a positive incentive to get below the
cap, that positive incentive is only financed by the negative incentive paid by producers above the cap –
the net effect is still a mandate

David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring,
1998, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289
Emissions trading, traditionally considered an "economic incentive" program, may provide a less potent economic
incentive to reduce pollution [*337] and innovate than a comparable traditional regulation. 221 An understanding of the
reasons for this may contribute to a theory that would help guide design of better environmental programs. Analyzing a
program's ability to provide economic incentives for pollution reduction requires an evaluation of all potentially relevant
monetary flows. In simpler terms, "follow the money." Emissions trading programs are often characterized as economic
incentives because they use positive economic inducements. The lower cost source can increase revenue by reducing
pollution below regulatory limits and selling credits to the higher cost source. The money to provide a positive inducement,
however, must come from somewhere. An emissions trading program produces no net incentive to do better than
traditional regulation in any way because emission increases finance emission decreases. High-cost sources decrease costs by
exceeding a regulatory limit. The savings the high-cost source realizes by exceeding a regulatory limit on pollution finance
the low-cost source's "additional" pollution reductions. The emissions trading example teaches that mimicking free market
features that do not coincide with desired policy outcomes proves counterproductive. Emissions trading programs, although they
create no special net incentives to reduce emissions, encourage trade in emission reduction credits. As mentioned above, one can
always motivate trading by allowing pollution sources to avoid real reduction obligations by purchasing paper credits or allowing
poorly monitored emissions reduction claims to become creditable. While this may create a robust market, it produces cost savings
through inferior performance. 222 A theory focusing on developing robust markets leads to investment of scarce public resources
in programs that fail to use economic incentives to motivate at least equivalent environmental achievement at lower cost.

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T – Incentives 1NC (2/2)

C. Our effects argument – their claim to be an incentive is effectual at best – multiple empirical studies of
permit regimes leaves the question of whether or not its an incentive open

David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring,
1998, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289
If "economic incentives" are good and "command and control" is bad, then it makes sense to apply emissions trading
widely and displace nearly all "command and control" regulation. 151 The simple dichotomy supports continuing application
of emissions trading regimes, even to poorly monitored pollutants. The dichotomy also supports writing rules that fail to prohibit
gaming. 152 This will stimulate the maximum expansion of the market by [*322] making cheap credits reflecting no real
improvement available, even though it will undermine environmental quality. 153 A recognition that emissions trading is a
tool that only works properly for well monitored pollutants and rules requiring sufficient actual emission reductions would
limit the scope of trading programs and require strict rules ensuring the integrity of the programs enacted. If proponents of
emissions trading are correct in asserting that emissions trading will succeed because of stimulated innovation or wide divergence
in compliance costs between sources, then a market can thrive with rules prohibiting all potential opportunities to claim
credits without undertaking fresh pollution reductions and only allowing trades where strict monitoring exists. Apparently,
emissions trading has not caused significant innovation. Even the lead phase-down owes the substantial changes it induced not to
emissions trading, but to the stringency of its underlying limitations. The failure of emissions trading to cause significant
innovation calls into question the adequacy of the command and control/economic incentive dichotomy. 154 If economic
incentive programs, in contrast to command and control regulation, provide superior incentives for innovation, then one
might have expected emissions trading to result in widespread innovation.
The lack of innovation in response to the emissions trading regime also raises the question whether emissions trading
programs really are economic incentive programs. A clear theory of economic incentives may help in designing programs that
will provide adequate incentives to motivate innovation and continuous reduction of pollution.

2. Predictability- They make the resolution bidirectional. Affirmative teams steal mandates, which are
core neg ground, for their plan and that makes it impossible for a neg team to be prepared because the
research burden would be impossible to meet.

3. Ground- Affirmative interpretation steals all negative counterplan ground. Our interpretation gives
each side a fair amount of ground and sets a clear division.

C. Voter for fairness, education and jurisdiction

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2NC Overview (1/3)

Our interpretation is that an alternative energy incentive is not a mandate, extend our Dreisen 98
evidence, a mandate is not an alternative energy incentive.

Prefer our interpretation:

1. Even if they win that they are an incentive-

A.)That just proves they are extra-topical because the plan creates a negative incentive and the net effect
will always be a mandate-that’s our second piece of driesen evidence. Extra-topicality destroys all neg
ground and destrpys predictability. This is an independent voter for fairness

B.)They are effects topical, extend our third piece of driesen 98 evidence, the question of whether
emissions trading is an incentive is effectual because they don’t directly cause innovation or any
motivation to use alternative energy, rather.

C. They still explode the topic – they would allow literally any regulation that included a financial penalty
for non-compliance
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring,
1998, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Many scholars advocate increased reliance upon economic incentives to achieve environmental goals. But what precisely is an
economic incentive? [*323] What distinguishes reliance upon economic incentives from reliance upon traditional
regulation to meet environmental goals? An economic incentive program can be defined as any program that provides an
economic benefit for pollution reductions or an economic penalty for pollution. Defining economic incentives to include
both positive and negative incentives includes pollution taxes in the definition. 155 Does command and control regulation
qualify as an economic incentive program under this definition? Imagine a pure command and control law. The law
commands polluters to perform specific pollution reducing acts, but provides no penalties for non-compliance. This law would
probably motivate little or no pollution reduction, because polluters could violate the commands without consequence. 156
Command and control regulation only works when an enforcement mechanism exists. 157 Traditional regulation relies
upon a negative economic incentive a monetary penalty for non-compliance as the principle inducement to comply with
regulatory requirements, true command and control requirements, such as work practice standards, and the more common
performance standards. 158 Indeed, a traditional regulation's success depends heavily upon the adequacy of these monetary
penalties. 159 A formal definition of an economic incentive program as any program relying on positive or negative
economic inducements to secure pollution reductions plausibly applies to just about any regulatory program. To evaluate
possible explanations for the dichotomy's assumption that emissions trading relies on economic incentives, but traditional
regulation does not, a functional analysis is helpful. Parties to this debate need to analyze whether emissions trading overcomes
traditional regulation's weaknesses in spurring innovation and providing continuous incentives. This will require examination of
the sources of economic inducements, the financing mechanisms, the likely responses of regulated polluters (both strategic and
desired), and the governmental [*324] role in emissions trading. These questions provide the tools to develop a functional theory
of economic incentives

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2NC Overview (2/3)

2. We provide the best bright line: price effects vs. quantity effects – the aff has conflated the fact that
their plan creates an incentive with the idea of being an incentive – here’s contextual evidence that
distinguishes caps from price instruments

European Union Legislative Summary “Market-based instruments for the environment” - 6/11/07
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l28191.htm

Two main types of market-based instrument are used at Community level: * instruments influencing prices, thus altering
them: this applies principally to taxes (which increase the price of a product or service) and financial or fiscal incentives
(which reduce the price); * instruments influencing quantities, by which a maximum quantity is set (in absolute terms or per
unit of output): this is the case with tradable permit schemes such as the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme , under
which a maximum quantity of a particular pollutant that may be emitted is set, the quantity being divided up between
economic operators and traded by them on a market specifically set up for that purpose, according to their ability to comply with
the emissions limits (those who emit fewer pollutants than they are allowed can sell their unused quotas while those who emit
more can buy quotas to make up the shortfall). Instruments influencing quantities offer greater certainty and visibility in terms of
achieving specific objectives (emission limits, for example), while instruments influencing prices offer certainty as regards the cost
of achieving the objective (taxes, for example) but are as a rule easier to implement. In addition, taxes are a source of revenue
while tradable permit schemes only generate revenue where the quotas traded are first granted by public tender. Charges do not
generate any revenue for public budgets because they only represent payment for services rendered.

3. There’s a topical version of the aff - trades with no cap – even their solvency author thinks so

Stavins in 03 (Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University; Joseph E. Aldy, Harvard University; Scott Barrett, Johns Hopkins
University; LBS; July 2003, “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=385000)

3.2.4 International Emissions Trading Without a Cap (Bradford, 2002)

This proposal is the equivalent of an international emissions trading program without a fixed cap on emissions. All nations,
including developing countries, are allocated permits equivalent to their anticipated business-as-usual time path of emissions.
Periodically, an international authority offers to purchase (and retire) emissions allowances. Distributional issues are
handled through the financing of the international authority, with differential funding responsibilities being established on
the basis of per capita income levels and other criteria. The environmental effectiveness of Bradford’s proposal would depend on the magnitude
of countries’ contributions to the central authority responsible for purchasing emissions allowances. While countries have incentives to sell emissions reductions (so
long as the bidding price exceeds marginal costs), the proposal may not adequately induce participation in the financing scheme. This approach reveals the costs of
participation in a much more transparent manner than other policies, such as straight quantity-based systems that allow for devolution to the private sector. It has
the advantage of letting countries know how much they would be spending — in total — on climate change mitigation. However, it also has the disadvantage,
because of its transparency, of possibly becoming a lightning rod for political opponents. Subject to this financing participation constraint, the central authority
could purchase emissions allowances from countries over time consistent with a dynamically efficient emissions path. The process of soliciting bids for emissions
allowances would result in cost-effective emissions abatement. This policy reflects several equity principles. Bradford recommends that a country’s financial
contribution to the central authority depend on its per capita income (ability to pay) and the benefits it will incur from climate change mitigation (distribution of
benefits). As new information becomes available, the central authority could adjust its plans to purchase emissions allowances accordingly, allowing for substantial
policy flexibility, so long as countries adequately finance this authority. There is no suggestion how the agreement would enforce either contributions to the
international authority or the emissions limits associated with the purchase scheme.

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2NC Overview (3/3)

4. Our interpretation should be preferred - scholarship interpreting tradable permits as an incentive


incorrectly defines incentives and posits a false dichotomy –
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring,
1998, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Is an emissions trading program 1 an economic incentive program? Emissions trading programs allow polluters to avoid pollution reductions
at a regulated pollution source, if they provide an equivalent reduction elsewhere. 2 Most scholars, government officials, and practitioners
equate emissions trading with economic incentives, but they do not define "economic incentives." This failure to define
economic incentives leaves unsupported the suggestion that emissions trading realizes environmental goals through
economic incentives, but that traditional regulations (rules that limit discharges of pollutants into the environment without allowing trading) do
not. Both traditional regulation and emissions trading rely upon the threat of a monetary penalty to secure compliance
with government commands setting emission limitations. 3 Perhaps neither traditional regulation nor emissions trading
should be considered economic incentive programs, because both rely upon government commands. 4 Or perhaps both
should be considered economic incentive programs, because monetary penalties provide a crucial economic incentive in
both systems. Rather than define economic incentives, scholars employ a conventional dichotomy that contrasts
"command and control" regulations (rules that dictate [*291] precisely how a polluter must clean-up) with economic incentives. 5 They claim
that command and control regulations work inefficiently, discourage innovation, and fail to provide continuous incentives to reduce pollution, but that emissions
trading and other economic incentive programs overcome these problems. 6 The dichotomy between command and control regulations and economic incentives
has had a powerful influence upon policy. 7 On October 22, 1997, President Clinton outlined his plans to address global climate change, an increase in global mean
surface temperatures that emissions of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse gases" cause. 8 The President's speech stressed the issue's importance by referring to
some possible consequences of climate change including "disruptive weather events" (such as droughts and floods), the spread of "disease bearing insects," and
receding glaciers (which might cause inundation of coastal areas). 9 President Clinton did not mention a single new traditional regulatory program or propose any
specific cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, such as carbon dioxide, below 1990 levels to combat this potential menace. Instead, he announced a "package of strong
market incentives, [*292] tax cuts and cooperative efforts with industry." 10 The President's package included emissions trading, which is the "economic incentive
program" most often implemented. His proposal would allow polluters in one country to avoid greenhouse gas reductions at home in exchange for pollution
reductions abroad. 11 Not surprisingly, emissions trading became an important element of the subsequently negotiated Kyoto Protocol on climate change, in which
the developed countries apparently agreed to modest cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. 12 A few days prior to Clinton's speech on climate change, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released its proposal to address interstate pollution, an important impediment to delivering healthful air under the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act. 13 The EPA, predictably, called for an interstate emissions trading program. 14 [*293] This Article develops a theory of
economic incentives. Any program to regulate or to deregulate creates economic incentives. 15 The programs referred to as
"economic incentive" programs all envision a substantial governmental role of some kind. That is why lawyers, experts in law, write
about them. 16 Moreover, traditional environmental law creates free markets. Law performs a fundamental role in creating
markets generally, 17 and environmental law is no different. For example, laws requiring businesses to keep promises to customers and
suppliers (contract) make commercial transactions possible. 18 Laws allowing owners to forbid nonowners from using "their" property create a need for nonowners
to buy or rent property from owners. 19 Traditional environmental law creates markets, just as surely as contract and property law create markets. 20 It
establishes obligations that cause a polluter to hire people (or pay contractors) to clean-up dirty facilities. 21 This creates
markets in pollution control technology, techniques, and cleaner processes, just as obligations to fulfill contractual promises
and refrain from appropriating private property create markets in goods consumers wish to have. Any meaningful
theory of economic incentives must address several key questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide
incentives to do? Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions helps analyze claims that emissions trading
offers free market-like dynamic advantages inducement of innovation and continuous environmental improvement central to its attractiveness. 22 It clarifies the
advantages and [*294] disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things can be done with the concept of
economic incentives than trade emission reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more dynamic and effective
environmental law.

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AT: “We Have Lots of Contextual Evidence”

Contextual evidence doesn’t make you topical, it just means lots of other people make the same mistake
you do –

1. Your literature is wrong – cross apply our Driesen in 98 evidence from the overview - scholarship
interpreting tradable permits as an incentive incorrectly defines incentives and posits a false dichotomy –
this means even if it looks like an incentive and smells like an incentive, it isn’t a TRUE incentive – we’re
the only team capable of delineating a bright line – the aff doesn’t get mandates

2. The aff interpretation completely nullifies the meaning of the word incentive – our interp should be
preferred for it’s precision
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring,
1998, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

The emissions trading example reveals that the term "economic incentive" has very little meaning if defined to include
everything that relies on some kind of monetary penalty or benefit. Indeed, to the extent the term "economic incentive"
should not apply to traditional regulation, it also should not apply to emissions trading. Both types of programs rely on
monetary penalties to induce compliance with government set limits. Neither creates incentives for sources to continuously
realize net reductions substantially surpassing the specifically mandated reductions. The emissions trading example shows
that one must carefully analyze programs to see which free market-like advantages they might offer. While emissions trading may
have the capacity to use private sector compliance resources efficiently, it may use government resources for program design and
enforcement inefficiently. Emissions trading may provide no more incentive for continual improvement or innovation than
traditional regulation. Emissions trading does not stimulate competition to maximize environmental performance. It
simply authorizes some trading around of obligations the government has created. A theory of economic incentives aimed
at continuous environmental improvement and innovation needs more specificity than the command and control/economic
incentive dichotomy offers. The theory might aim to approximate more carefully the dynamics that stimulate innovation in
a free market.

3. Non Responsive to the Limits Standard: Their interpretation creates extra topical plan advantages,
such as banking or sanctions, obtained through effects topical mechanisms. This allows for virtually any
form of incentive to eventually lead to alternative energy, exploding the topic and crushing neg ground.
Their evidence is irrelevant if the neg doesn’t have ground.

4. Their Evidence Isn’t Contextual to Debate: All of their evidence that articulates incentives is
comparative to CURRENT INCENTIVE LEVELS; it has nothing to do with the key distinction between
a trade affirmative and a cap and trade affirmative. They have no evidence that is directly responsive to
the T violation.

5. There’s a topical version of the aff – they have no evidence defending the cap or offensive reasons why
it’s crucial to their ground – we have offense why it kills ours

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AT: “We Have Lots of Contextual Evidence”

6. Effects Answers This: Even if they win that a cap and trade system is an incentive, the plan is still
effectually topical; the affirmative must BE an alternative energy incentive, not LEAD to one through a
step, i.e. a cap. Effects topicality is completely unlimiting, as explained above. It also steals neg. ground;
the affirmative has the resolution, the neg. has everything else; thus, every effects topical plank they use
hijacks our ground. We can’t prepare for these steps; killing education and fairness. Finally, the
affirmative’s conceptualization of the resolution is grammatically inaccurate. If the resolution said “the
united states should enact a policy for the purpose of increasing alternative energy development” they
would be topical. Too bad the resolution MANDATES THE INCENTIVE.

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AT: “Cap and Trade Is Predictable”

1. This Isn’t the 04-05 College Topic: Back files don’t make your case predictable.

2. The Resolution Doesn’t Say Global Warming: Our topic is about ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, not
carbon reduction. Carbon reduction may be a byproduct of a topical affirmative, but a topical plan can’t
mandate solvency while skipping over alternative energy.

3. Its What They Justify: Even if Cap and Trade is predictable, all of the other mandates that their
interpretation allows aren’t, that’s in the overview.

4. Bidirectionality Explodes Prep Burden: The affirmative’s interpretation would allow affs to mandate alternative energy,
and the negative to counterplan with incentives, and vice versa. This crushes neg prep; teams would have to prep both sides of every
argument to be negative. Added to the structural advantages of the affirmative, this makes debate near impossible for the neg.

5. Core Controversy: The main focus of the CP debate on this topic is mandates v. incentives. The Aff
prematurely silences this debate by allowing hybrid versions of incentives and mandates that sever out of
ALL of our offense.

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AT: “Cap and Trade is Core Topic Ed”

1. Trickle Down College Backfiles Aren’t Education: You may have some sweet Harvard friends, but
every debate topic should have a life of its own; all of your reasons why your education is good were
SOLVED ALREADY by multiple past debate topics.

2. Its Neg Ground: Even if they win that its core topic ground; it belongs to the negative. They steal our
counter plan ground by taking mandates and quantity regulations into aff ground. We can have the
debate they want, but the neg should be the one to start the story. This avoids the infinite regression
argument; the negative has no defense against hybrid mandate incentive plans, but the affirmative
always has the game winning permutation. Seeing as the negative already has everything outside of the
resolution, comparatively, there is only a risk of abuse voting affirmative.

3. Our Limits Are The Key Internal Link: Limiting down the topic is crucial to in depth education and
debate; under the affirmative’s interpretation: we would be debating about hamsters on treadmills more
often than anything meaningful. We control the impact to all of their standards.

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AT: “We Still Link to Your Offense”

1. Extra Topicality Kills our Offense: Even if we manage a link to the affirmative, they have massive
extra topical plan planks that they can use to solve the impact.

2. No Solvency Debate: The affirmative steals our answers to their solvency contention, as they FIAT
OUT of it. Solvency presses are key neg ground and a basic aff burden; defense of incentives is crucial to
test it.

3. Hybrids Solve All Of Our Links: Even if part of the plan links through incentives, the mandate plank
crushes links to disads like spending. This is crucial to neg ground; the affirmative can literally claim to
MAKE MONEY as an advantage based on the action of fiat.

4. Star This Argument: they can’t go for both this and link takeouts on the disads.

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Ext: Mandates Are Distinct From Incentives

( _ ) Incentives are distinct from mandates – solar water heater cases prove
Laura Thomas Gebert, J.D. candidate, Barry University School of Law, Barry Law Review, Spring, 2007, 8 Barry L. Rev. 149

Building codes requiring solar water heaters in residential buildings have increased the deployment of such systems. 119 Starting in
1999, Barcelona and other Spanish municipalities passed solar water heating requirements, leading to a ten-fold increase in solar water
heating in Spain. 120 Similarly Israel has required the use of solar water heaters in most domestic buildings for over twenty years. 121
As a result of this requirement, Israel has the highest collector area per capita in the world. 122 Over eighty percent of the hot water
systems in Israel use solar water heaters, which represents approximately three percent of Israel's total primary energy. 123

Government incentive programs which encourage -- as opposed to mandate -- the use of solar water heaters have been less successful
than the Israeli program. 124 Greece has the second highest per capita use of solar water heaters (ranked only behind Israel), yet only
twenty-five percent of all Greek households own a solar hot water system. 125 Greek law does not require the use of solar water
heaters. 126 Instead, [*162] during the 1980s tax incentives were introduced which allowed individual homeowners to deduct the
cost of a solar system from their income tax. 127 At the same time the tax incentives were implemented, the Greek solar industry
began heavily promoting solar-powered water heaters through a publicity campaign backed by financial support from the government.
128 The marketing campaign targeted both consumers and construction professionals such as builders, architects, and engineers. 129
Recently, the tax exemption for solar water heaters was abolished and the effect on the solar industry is expected to be negative. 130

( _ ) Mandates d/n = incentives


David B. Spence, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, May, 2008, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 765

Regulators and system operators have tried a variety of different approaches to the problem of ensuring that there is a sufficient supply
of energy and network capacity to serve demand. With respect to energy capacity, regulators in the United States and Europe employ a
mixture of mandates and incentives to try to ensure that energy is not too scarce. Because of the limited ability to store gas and
electricity, 194 regulators mandate that retail sellers of energy in competitive markets maintain adequate reserves to satisfy peak
demand. However, this is easier to mandate than to do. This is particularly difficult in European gas markets, where the supply of gas
entering Europe is limited and mostly committed to a few incumbent gas firms under long-term contracts. 195 As mentioned
previously, the European Commission and national regulators approach this problem in two ways: by encouraging the development of
new supply routes into Europe (pipelines and LNG facilities) 196 and by forcing long-term contracts open. 197 In both American and
European electricity markets, however, regulators are working hard to create incentives for construction of new capacity. For example,
the New England Independent System Operator, a network management organization serving the northeastern United States electricity
grid, uses a "locational installed capacity" pricing system to encourage investment in new capacity. 198 The New York Independent
System Operator specifies that retail sellers acquire their reserve margin capacity at above-market prices that decline as the amount of
capacity purchased approaches the target of 118 percent of projected needs. 199 The European Commission is also trying to encourage
the use of such reserve margin acquisition programs, [*807] particularly capacity auctions, to promote investment in energy
production. 200 This is essentially the approach used by the PJM system, where market concentration continues to worry regulators.
201

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Impacts – Ground

( _ ) Here’s more evidence that even traditional and performance based regulations CREATE an
incentive –
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998, 55
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Polluters have substantial economic incentives to use the flexibility that performance standards offer to employ innovative
means of meeting emission limitations that are less costly than traditional compliance methods. Such use of innovations saves
polluters money. This incentive exists even for technology-based performance standards that did not contemplate the innovative
compliance mechanism a polluter discovers. 62 Professor Stewart has stated that polluters have "strong incentives to adopt the
particular technology underlying" a technology-based performance standard because "its use will readily persuade regulators
of compliance." 63 It seems unlikely that this countervailing persuasiveness incentive would overcome the economic incentive to
realize savings through an effective and cheaper innovation, even if the persuasiveness incentive were powerful. Moreover, polluters
have a number of means of persuading regulators that their innovations perform adequately if they in fact do so. First, polluters may
monitor their pollution directly to demonstrate compliance. Second, in some cases polluters may eliminate regulated chemicals, which
certainly demonstrates compliance. 64 While polluters have an equally powerful economic incentive to use cheaper alternative
compliance methods for true command and control regulations, the polluter may have more difficulty persuading a regulator
that an alternative is viable if she cannot measure emissions directly. Nevertheless, the polluter can deploy her substantial
expertise to estimate the effectiveness of alternative techniques and may persuade regulators to accept alternatives. Indeed, she may
persuade a regulator that a less effective technique is equally effective, because the regulator may feel insecure in second-guessing a
company's judgment. In any case, empirical studies of actual responses to regulation do not support the idea that technology-based
performance standards frequently discourage innovation by dissuading companies with innovative compliant technologies from using
them to meet the standards.

( _ ) Traditional regulation creates incentives – proving the likelihood of regression


David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998, 55
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Critics also advance the claim that "command and control" regulation provides no incentive to go beyond complying with current
regulatory requirements and fails to provide continuous incentives for environmental improvement. 75 This charge that traditional
regulation provides no incentive to reduce pollution below required levels does not completely survive rigorous analysis.
Polluters subject to performance standards usually emit much less than their permits allow in order to make sure that they
consistently comply with regulatory standards. 76 Hence, the enforceability of traditional standards can provide an incentive to
surpass them to some degree. Moreover, polluters have an incentive to reduce pollution substantially below regulated levels
when meeting a more stringent level costs less than meeting the level regulation requires.

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Impacts – Ground

( _ ) The incentives in their plan are indistinct from the incentives created by traditional regulations
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998, 55
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

A pure emissions trading model may help clarify the relationship between emissions trading, emission limitations, and incentives for
continuous pollution reductions. Imagine a law that allows any firm that reduces pollution to trade with any firm that increases
pollution but fails to mandate emission reductions from particular pollution sources. This law would accomplish little. Without
regulatory limits, firms would have no obligation to make further reductions and no incentives to reduce emissions at all (or to
trade). An emissions trading program necessarily includes requirements for specific reductions from pollution sources within
the trading program and allows sources to avoid the limits by trading with sources of credits. 161 This means that some
governmental body must set quantitative limits for specific pollution sources. 162 Once a pollution source has complied with the
underlying limits, no further incentive exists to make additional reductions. The incentive to provide reductions, either by making
them at the source or purchasing credits from elsewhere, continues throughout the compliance period defined by the
underlying regulations. The incentive's duration precisely matches that of a traditional regulation with the same compliance
period. Once the polluters regulated by a trading program have reached an equilibrium providing the reductions that the governmental
body required, no incentive for further reductions exists.

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Ext: Their Authors Wrong/Interp Bad

( _ ) Their attempt to distinguish themselves from traditional regulation is a false one – the command and
control/market based distinction is a false one
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998, 55
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Because traditional regulation consists primarily of performance standards, scholars and policy-makers should abandon the
command and control/economic incentive dichotomy. The term "traditional regulation," rather than the misleading command and
control epithet, could be used to describe regulatory categories that include performance standards. Lobbyists for regulated
industries may use the term "command and control" without regard to accuracy, because it helps undermine the political
legitimacy of traditional regulation. Scholarly proponents recognize that emissions trading cannot wholly supplant traditional
regulation95 and should therefore avoid terminology that unfairly undermines traditional regulation. 9

( _ ) Their incentives evidence is an exaggeration on the part of cap and trade proponents
David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Washington & Lee Law Review, Spring, 1998, 55
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289

Proponents of emissions trading generally claim that economic incentive programs will remedy the defects that they attribute
to traditional regulation [*312] by promoting efficiency, 105 stimulating innovation, 106 and providing continuous incentives to go
beyond regulatory requirements. 107 They invoke the image of a free market system producing better environmental quality through
unleashed innovative energy with little need for slow ponderous government decision making. 108 These advocates claim that
emissions trading constitutes an economic incentive program with the features mentioned above. 109 Emissions trading
theoretically offers some efficiency advantages over traditional regulation to the extent that significant differences in the marginal
cost of pollution control exist between pollution sources. 110 For example, if a regulator wishes to obtain eighty tons of total
reductions from two pollution sources each emitting one hundred tons she could require each source to make a forty ton reduction. If
one source, Seller, has control costs of $ 1,000 per ton and another, Buyer, has control costs of $ 3,000 per ton, then this eighty ton
reduction will cost $ 160,000 ($ 40,000 spent at Seller and $ 120,000 at Buyer). Suppose, however, that the regulator allows Seller and
Buyer to trade as long as they produce eighty tons of total reductions. Buyer may choose to pay Seller to produce forty tons of
additional reductions (beyond the forty Seller already will produce) and forego making any reductions at Buyer. Buyer need only pay
Seller a little more than $ 40,000 to realize an economic benefit. Thus, in this example, pollution trading allows the same reduction for
less money, $ 80,000 111 rather than $ 160,000. 112 Since the end of the 1970s, EPA has encouraged states to authorize various
forms of emissions trading, usually between units within a plant, under the Clean Air Act. 113 These programs allowed pollution
sources to [*313] escape spatially specific construction bans, strict pollution controls for new pollution sources, and existing source
emission regulations in exchange for claimed reductions elsewhere. 114 Scholars often assert that these programs, sometimes
collectively referred to as "bubbles," 115 greatly reduce compliance costs. 116 Generally, these assertions rely on econometric
models rather than empirical studies comparing the actual costs of traditional programs to comparable trading regimes after
implementation. 117 The literature often fails to address adequately the question of whether emissions trading, now almost
two decades old, has, in fact, stimulated innovation or even produced the emission reductions that comparable traditional
regulation would generate. 118 Unfortunately, the history of emissions trading reveals no evidence that emissions trading and
its precursors have stimulated innovation or environmental performance superior to comparable traditional regulation. 119

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** Generic Solvency **

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Permits fail empirically

Emissions trading schemes empirically fail, no verification means that there is no net emissions reduction.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

As predicted, the ETS also appears vulnerable to favoritism and evasion. Most ETS members ignored EU directives to
conduct two rounds of open, public consultations to develop their national allocation plans, and instead worked with
industry groups behind closed doors.59 Climate Action Network Europe (CAN-Europe), the region’s leading umbrella group for environmental
organizations, also has found tzhat many ETS members have little capacity to monitor or verify the energy use or emissions of
those who hold the permits.60 Without strict monitoring and verification, companies have powerful incentives to
underreport their energy and emissions and so profit from trading “excess” allowances. As a result of all of these factors and
deficiencies, the ETS is failing to reduce European CO2 emissions. In 2005, total CO2 emissions across the EU-25 actually
increased by 0.4 percent, and by 0.6 percent among the EU-15.61 Nor are the signs more encouraging for Phase-2 of the ETS. The EU
reports that 11 of the EU-25 have failed to submit their completed NAPs for Phase-2,62 and those which did comply consistently project much higher
emissions that most independent analyses.63 Finally, the European Environmental Agency has projected that the EU is likely to
achieve no more than onequarter of its Kyoto-targeted reductions by 2012,64 and much of those “reductions” will
simply reflect credits purchased from Russia or non-Annex-I countries, with no net environmental benefits.

Cap-and-trade are programs will fail to be effective because they are not developed
Solomon and Gorman 2002
(Dr. Hugh S. Gorman is assistant professor of environmental history and policy at Michigan Technological University, Professor of
Geography and Environmental Policy Ph.D., Indiana University, 1983-Professor of Geography. Department of Social Sciences.
Michigan Technological University, Project Muse, “The Origins and Practice of Emissions Trading”
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_policy_history/v014/14.3gorman.html, Accessed July 16, 2008)

Emissions trading programs, of course, are still in their youth. Most industrial facilities currently do not participate in any emissions or
(effluent trading) program and probably will not for some time to come. Furthermore, individual programs require significant effort to
develop. Numerous design concerns must be considered. For example, emissions trading programs that do not place explicit caps on
the pollutants being managed are less likely to be effective. Neither are programs that fail to establish clear rules for allocating
allowances, monitoring emissions, retiring and banking allowances, generating credits, and demonstrating compliance—all in a way
that is appropriate for that pollutant. The size of the region associated with a trading program also matters, with a higher geographic
scale of administration being better; any pollutants able to drift in from outside the trading zone clearly complicate matters.65 Finally,
trading programs cannot be expected to cover all emissions sources for a pollutant. Natural, nonpoint, and mobile sources often
require different strategies. Good program design, proponents argue, can address such concerns. Some issues are more problematic.
Although some critics have attacked the practice of allocating allowances based on a firm’s history of emissions, the challenge has not
been significant. By precedent, the assumption is that the status quo should be used as a baseline, with facilities initially having the
right to emit whatever they have been emitting in the past. This assumption is generally consistent with the allocation of water rights
in western states. In effect, the policy implies that firms have been putting a resource— whether it is water or the right to emit a
contaminant—to productive purposes, and therefore deserved to inherit those rights. However, on equity grounds, economists and
others have criticized trading programs for this “free” distribution of emissions allowances to existing facilities, while new facilities
must purchase all their allowances from the market.66

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Permits fail – empirically

Cap-and-trade is empirically proven to fail, it increases greenhouse gas emissions- EU proves and it hurts
the economy
Lieberman 2007(Ben, Ben Lieberman is a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy
Studies, The Heritage Foundation, “Beware of Cap and Trade Climate Bills”, December 6, 2007,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/wm1723.cfm, Accessed July 16, 2008)

These measures would set a limit, or cap, on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use. The effect of such a cap would be to
impose rationing of coal, oil, and natural gas on the American economy. Each covered utility,oil company, and manufacturing facility
would be given allowances based on past emissions or some other formula. Those companies that emit less carbon dioxide than
permitted by their allowances could sell the excess to those that do not; this is the trade part of cap and trade. Over time, the cap would
be ratcheted down, requiring greater cuts in emissions. Each proposal differs from the others on specifics: the stringency of the cap,
the number and type of companies covered, the ground rules for allocating and trading allowances, and other details. S. 2191 is, in
several respects, more stringent than other cap and trade bills. Its requirement that emissions decline to 15 percent below 2005 levels
by 2020--even in the face of a growing population and rising energy demand--sets a very difficult target.[1] Measures like S. 2191
that target carbon emissions aggressively will be costlier than those that give the economy more time to adjust to the energy
constraints. For example, over the long term, energy companies may find ways to capture and store carbon dioxide emissions
underground, rather than emit them into the air, or switch to lower-emitting alternative energy sources as they are developed. But most
experts see these advances as taking decades--much longer than the initial targets in S. 2191 allow. In fact, these targets may actually
complicate the development of longer-term innovations, as they will divert resources to near-term fixes. Carbon dioxide is the
unavoidable byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, which currently provides 85 percent of America's energy. Thus, it will be very costly
to move away from this preferred energy source, and especially doing so as expeditiously as S. 2191 requires. A study by Charles
River Associates puts the cost (in terms of reduced household spending per year) of S. 2191 at $800 to $1,300 per household by 2015,
rising to $1,500 to $2,500 by 2050.[2] Electricity prices could jump by 36 to 65 percent by 2015 and 80 to 125 percent by 2050.[3] No
analysis has been done on the impact of S. 2191 on gasoline prices, but an Environmental Protection Agency study of a less stringent
cap and trade bill estimates impacts of 26 cents per gallon by 2030 and 68 cents by 2050.[4] Even these cost projections may
underestimate the true costs, because they assume no unpleasant surprises. But the world has already witnessed many unpleasant
surprises with Europe's ongoing efforts to impose a cap and trade program under the Kyoto Protocol, the international climate treaty to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, European efforts have racked up significant costs while failing to reduce emissions.[5]
Nearly every European country participating has higher emissions today than when the treaty was first signed in 1997. Further, despite
ongoing criticism of the United States from Kyoto parties for failing to ratify the treaty, emissions in many of these nations are
actually rising faster than in the United States. The European experience also shows the problem of cap and trade fraud.[6] None
other than Enron's Ken Lay was a strong supporter of carbon cap and trade when the idea was first floated in the 1990s, saying that it
could "do more to promote Enron's business than almost any other regulatory initiative." These carbon allowances that will be bought
and sold have a value estimated at $50 billion to $300 billion annually, and the trade in them would be a huge new business.[7] Enron
may be gone, but others ready to take advantage of cap and trade--often at public expense--are not. The actual cost of S. 2191 is
difficult to estimate--as America has never had to deal with such severe energy constraints--but would likely be very high.

Empirically proven: Cap-and-trade fails, countries with cap-and-trade policies emit more than countries
w/o cap-and-trade
Lieberman 2008
(Ben, Ben Lieberman is a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage
Foundation, “Five Myths About the Lieberman-Warner Global Warming Legislation”, May 30, 2008,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/energyandenvironment/wm1940.cfm, Accessed July 16, 2008)

Myth #5: LW's cap-and-trade approach is a proven success. Fact: Critics of the cap-and-trade approach in LW, in which emissions are
capped and regulated entities may trade their rights to emit, point to the European Union's substantial difficulties since initiating its
own cap-and-trade program in 2005. Most E.U. nations are not on track to meet their targets, and many are seeing their emissions rise
faster than those in the U.S. The program is furthermore plagued by accusations of fraud and unfairness. LW essentially adopts the
European approach wholesale.

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Permits Fail
Emission trading allows nations to escape their responsibility of emission reduction and allows them to
continually exploit the environment
Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse, 1998
(David, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)
International law traditionally involves law governing relationships between sovereign states. n362 The idea of sovereignty has a
territorial basis. Nations have the right and responsibility to control activities within their borders. n363 These general principles of
international law give rise to specific principles of national responsibility in the international [*69] environmental area. International
environmental law establishes a general national duty to make sure that private sector activities on a nation's soil do not cause serious
environmental harms to neighboring countries, a territorial responsibility principle. n364 The assignment of specific national emission
reduction targets is consistent with the territorial responsibility principle. Nations assume responsibility for reducing harmful
emissions from their territory. Trading relaxes this territorial principle. Nations may allow harmful emissions to emanate from their
territory, if they earn credits somewhere else. This may represent a fairly serious departure from a norm of national responsibility for
consequences of actions taking place within a nation's territory. n365 Perhaps greater global integration invites a broader ethic of
responsibility. For example, countries could be held responsible for all of the environmentally destructive activities their nationals
participate in or finance regardless of location under a "financial responsibility principle." But allowing a country to claim credits for
reductions the country or its nationals finance abroad, without requiring it to assume responsibility for emission increases the country
or its nationals finance abroad, does not advance a "financial responsibility principle," or any other discernible ethic of national
responsibility. Since the Climate Change Convention does not require countries to assume debits for emission increases or rainforest
destruction that they finance, it does not advance any competing ethic. n366 The Convention's embrace of emissions trading departs
from the principle of national responsibility for emissions within the national territory. Countries' willingness to hold their nationals
accountable to the international community rests in no small measure upon their acceptance of the national responsibility principle. If
international emissions trading becomes widespread and undermines this principle, it will [*70] make it very difficult to hold nations
accountable for pollution emitted in their countries, most of which comes from private activity. Weakening the national responsibility
principle would make it very difficult to negotiate and implement international agreements effectively addressing international
environmental problems.

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Permits fail – Other countries


Cap-and-trade measures would be offset by global greenhouse emissions by China and India, plan alone
couldn’t solve.
Lieberman 2008
(Ben, Ben Lieberman is a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage
Foundation, “Five Myths About the Lieberman-Warner Global Warming Legislation”, May 30, 2008,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/energyandenvironment/wm1940.cfm, Accessed July 16, 2008)

Myth #4: LW effectively addresses the threat of climate change. Fact: Even assuming the worst of global warming, LW reduces the
threat by a minuscule amount. The bill reduces emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the United States only.
China has overtaken America as the world's largest emitter, and its emissions growth is several times greater than that of the U.S. India
and other fast-developing nations are on a similar trajectory. Thus, the unilateral impact of the bill on global emissions would be
inconsequential. At most, it would reduce the earth's future temperature by one or two tenths of a degree Celsius--too small to even
verify. In other words, LW is all economic pain for no environmental gain.

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Permits fail – Offsets bad


Permits require offsetting mechanisms which build in warming for decades and are easily manipulated to
not reduce emissions.
Sylvester Johnson, 7-14-2007 Ph.D. Applied Physics “Carbon Trading and Offsets Counterproductive Compared to Politically
Possible Carbon Tax” http://www.climatehealth.net/ArticleCarbonTax.html

Carbon offsets can create perverse incentives, motivating the establishment of sources of heat-trapping emissions in
order to reap the reward of payments to reduce those emissions. Such abuses have already occurred in factories producing refrigerants that
have over 10,000 times the Global Warming Potential of carbon dioxide. Potent waste gasses were being released during production of refrigerants. As an
offset, companies from the European Union paid excessively large amounts for the installation of low cost incinerators
to destroy the gasses before release, motivating the construction of further factories to produce refrigerants with the
expectation of getting additional excessive windfall payments for destroying waste gasses (Nature). In general, some product
refrigerants also eventually escape from leaking coolers after they’re eventually discarded. Since extra factories were built to produce
refrigerants that may eventually escape, net warming may occur due to this supposed offset project. In another example of an
unwarranted windfall payment, a broker invited consumers to offset carbon emissions by investing in enhanced oil recovery,
which pumps carbon dioxide into depleted oil wells to force the remaining oil upward. However, this process was
profitable in itself, meaning operators were making extra revenues from selling redundant and unnecessary “carbon
credits” for burying the carbon. The carbon sequestration would have occurred anyway, without extra payments that
could have been invested in efficiencies to reduce consumers’ own fossil fuel usage. In addition oil fields are not reliable for long
term sequestration, since poorly plugged wells may act as conduits for escaping gas. The bureaucracy to investigate abuses and recommend
remedies such as delisting the abusers would have to be enormous. Even so the investigations would likely be
substantially less than 100% effective, so that new abuses would continue to proliferate. In addition, a shortage of
verification may make it difficult for buyers to assess the true value of carbon offsets, and allow instances of people
buying worthless offsets that do not yield any reductions in carbon emissions. Carbon offsets can also create
counterproductive subsidies. For example, dairy farms produce the greenhouse gas methane from both decomposition of
manure and from digestion by cattle, with the substantial majority of methane produced by bacterial digestion of
cellulose in the rumen-portion of the stomach and emitted in eructation or belching. Farms may capture the minority
portion of methane produced on the farms, the methane from decomposition of manure processed in “digesters” and
sell or burn it as fuel, so that the methane becomes a source of income, or reduction of fuel expense. In addition, such
capture of methane may qualify for sale as an offset if the verifying bureaucracy does not take into account the
likelihood that the methane-capture project would occur anyway without the investment raised by selling redundant
carbon offsets. Purchasing such offsets, moreover, subsidizes the entire farm and the production of methane by
digestion as well, a larger source of methane than decomposition of manure. This subsidy increases the average
economic viability of dairy farms with the consequence that all other aspects being equal more farms will function and
more methane get emitted overall by digestion than if the offset had not been sold. If the capture of the methane from decomposition
of manure would have occurred anyway because of its profitability, this result of more methane emitted overall by digestion is counterproductive to the goal of
reducing heat-trapping emissions. Certainly investing in manure digesters needs to be done in any case to capture the methane. A carbon tax raises the
price of fossil-fuel based energy, but not digester-based, motivating such investments in renewables, and without
unwarranted windfall payments from selling offsets. Many offsets build in warming: A fossil fuel consumer may seek an
offset that involves planting trees to sequester carbon equal to the amount of the consumer’s emissions being offset,
emissions from a car trip for example. One reason for the low price of the offset is that its cumulative effects over its entire lifetime are counted against the
consumer’s emissions. Solar power gets employed in photosynthesis over the decades required for the tree to mature enough to store an amount of carbon
equal to the carbon released during to the trip. However, warming occurs due to the trip emissions acting to trap heat during that growth period. By the time the
tree is mature, warming will have occurred for decades, ultimately contributing to the melting of ice and consequent increased absorption of solar radiation.
Although the intention is to reduce net warming to zero, instead the effect is to build in warming for decades. Therefore
planting trees as an offset is counterproductive for reducing net warming. While donations to tree-planting need to get made anyway,
offsets cannot substitute for critical reduction in emissions from fossil fuels as soon as possible to reduce their warming
effect from that which would occur if usage of fossil fuels continued unabated. Many offsets create similar counterproductive effects.
Near-term reduction of emissions at the source is much more beneficial than offsets. A well-managed woodlot has trees of all ages to maintain the health of the
forest continuously when a mature tree gets felled. When that tree gets burned to heat a home, the canopies of the trees around it expand rapidly into the
vacancy in the woodlot cover, rapidly sequestering a part of the carbon released in burning. Since many less mature trees around it grow more rapidly with
larger canopies, the rest of the carbon released may get sequestered in say a matter of five or ten years, rather than the several decades it takes an individual
tree or a newly planted forest to mature. However, the presence of trees of all ages growing up around it does not mean that zero warming occurs. The biomass
still takes the five or ten years to get sequestered, during which the emissions from burning cause warming. Therefore culling trees from a woodlot for heating
a home by wood burning does build in atmospheric warming, although far less than burning fossil fuels or planting new forests as offsets. Unfortunately, when
trees get planted on vacant land, eventually the dark leaves from the growing trees may absorb more heat annually than the plants that had been established
previously. In the tropics, the growth rate is usually sufficient to absorb enough CO2 to reduce net warming. In the temperate zone, growth is slower, so that
net warming by a woodlot may actually be greater than that of vacant land due to the dark leaves absorbing heat. However, in the larger context of species
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preservation and aesthetic appreciation, the variation provided by woodlots may well be preferable to vacant land.
Clearly application of any offset
for annual emissions of heat-trapping gasses has to be made based on the offset’s annual effects on heat-trapping gasses,
not the offset project’s cumulative effects over its entire extended lifetime. Otherwise the offset builds in warming.

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Permits fail – Offsets


Offsets means cap and trade can require no reduction in actual emissions.
Sylvester Johnson, Ph.D. Applied Physics Federal Carbon Tax.org No Date “Debate”
http://www.federalcarbontax.org/Debate.html

Persistent problems arise in quantification and verification of claims made for the effectiveness of offsets. A well-known but
flawed example of an offset is trying to compensate for the heat-trapping emissions from personal travel by funding the planting of trees. The value is often
overestimated by applying the offset project’s cumulative effects over its entire extended lifetime against present-day emissions. Certainly it is desirable
to donate money for tree planting. However the application of any offset against annual emissions of heat-trapping gasses has to be made based on the offset’s
annual effects on heat-trapping gasses, not over its entire lifetime. Otherwise the present-day emissions supposedly compensated by the
offset actually build in warming during the lifetime of the project, over decades of growth in the case of tree farming. In
other words, the extra blanket from the present-day emissions remains over the Earth for decades causing warming
during the growth of the trees. In a different twist, owners of existing woodlots are looking forward to being paid for an offset in order not to
cut down the trees and burn them. The company purchasing the offset would get to continue business as usual such as coal-burning. Based on this transaction
and countless others, the questionable claim would be made that society is reducing emissions. The European experiment with cap-trade
has shown that letting brokers find and promote offsets produces seriously flawed results in a process replete with
opportunities for deception. Offsets are analyzed further on this website at ArticleCarbonTax. The key to reducing emissions is to
motivate transformation of “business as usual” to a reduced-carbon economy using tax-and-refund. Because of the
increase in cost with the tax, less fossil fuel gets used and investments in renewable energy sources become more
attractive. In contrast, even “justifiable” offsets such as funding renewables excuse business as usual. Finally, the Carbon
Cycle argument against offsets: Put briefly, in the Carbon Cycle emissions from decomposing organic matter get absorbed during
photosynthesis and by other means. Burning fossil fuels adds human-induced carbon to the natural Cycle. No known
financially feasible offset removes carbon from the Cycle.

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Permits fail – No Accountability

Emission trading reduces accountability, ultimately preventing a country from reaching reduction goals-
Kyoto proves
Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse, 1998
(David, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

Trading may make it difficult to hold any given national government accountable for meeting treaty commitments. The degree of the
undermining of accountability, however, depends upon the particulars of the trading program.
The Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries, rather than private parties, to transfer "emission reduction" units amongst themselves.
n340 This comports with the Protocol's overall structure. The Protocol does not create obligations for any particular private party. It
only creates obligations for countries. Individual nations choose how to translate these national obligations into programs aimed at
particular sources of emissions. Hence, the treaty relies upon national government officials taking responsibility for inducing
appropriate private actions to reach an aggregate national target.
[*63] The Kyoto Protocol also requires developed country parties to subtract or add transferred units to their "assigned amount."
n341 Suppose that the country of "Small" emitted 100 million metric tons of emissions in 1990 and must make a five percent cut
under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, a five million ton reduction. If that country purchases a million tons of carbon credits abroad,
this accounting provision would allow Small to substract the one million tons of credits from its five million ton assigned reduction,
yielding a requirement to reduce domestic emissions by only four million tons. Conversely, if Small sold one million tons of credits, it
would have to add a million tons to its five million ton assigned reduction and make a six million ton domestic reduction.
If the COP interprets this provision to require this adjustment prior to carrying out joint implementation activities, this would help
preserve national accountability. n342 Each developed country would have to meet a target adjusted to account for expected trades and
could be held accountable for physically meeting the adjusted target, whether the trades occur or not. As long as an international body
does the math necessary to adjust the targets properly, this may not greatly complicate national accountability.
Trading may, however, proceed in a way that would make national accountability very difficult. For example, the COP could plausibly
interpret the Kyoto Protocol not to require specific a priori national decisions about the amount of credits to purchase or sell, since
most of the provisions for adjusting accounts do not explicitly state when the accounting should occur (or who should monitor it). n

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AT SO2 means permits solve


SO2 permits created substantial price volatility and are not comparable to CO2 emissions.
Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward and, Kevin A. Hassett 2007 Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes Friday, June 1, 2007
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OUTLOOK AEI Online Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K.
Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. June 1, 2007

There are a number of emissions-trading success stories that, upon inspection, suggest significant limitations to the applicability of emissions trading for GHG
emissions. Enthusiasts for cap-and-trade point first to our sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading experience under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. It is claimed that the costs of SO2 abatement through trading turned out to be dramatically lower than economists had forecast for a prescriptive
regime, wherein the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have mandated control technologies on individual coal-fired power plants. But a closer look shows
this success to have been uneven. There has been significant volatility in emission permit prices, ranging from a low of $66 per
ton in 1997 to $860 per ton in 2006, as the overall emissions cap has been tightened, with the price moving up and down as
much as 43 percent in a year.[1] Over the last three years, SO2 permit prices have risen 80 percent a year, despite the EPA's authority to auction additional
permits as a "safety valve" to smooth out this severe price volatility. Several other aspects of the SO2-trading program are of doubtful
applicability to GHGs. First, SO2 trading was only applied to a single sector: initially, only 110 coal-fired power plants were
included in the system, but it subsequently expanded to 445 plants. While coal-fired power plants account for roughly one third of U.S. carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions and will therefore be central to a GHG cap-and-trade program, a comprehensive GHG emissions-trading program will
have to apply across many sectors beyond electric utilities, vastly complicating a trading system. Second, SO2 and CO2 are not
comparable targets for emissions reduction. Reducing SO2 emissions did not require any constraint on end-use energy
production or consumption. Coal-fired power plants had many low-cost options to reduce SO2 emissions without reducing
electricity production. Some switched to low-sulfur coal (abetted in large part by railroad deregulation in the 1980s, which made transport of Western low-sulfur
coal more economical than previously). The cost of "scrubbers"--industrial devices which capture SO2 and sequester it--turned out to
be lower than predicted. Other utilities emphasized more use of natural gas. The impact on ratepayers and consumers was modest. CO2 is different: it is the
product of complete fuel combustion. There is no "low-CO2 coal," and the equivalent of SO2 scrubbers does not yet exist in economical
form.[2] At the margin there is some opportunity for GHG emissions reductions through substitution--increased use of natural gas (which emits less CO2 per unit of
energy than coal) and possibly nuclear power--but the inescapable fact is that any serious reduction in CO2 emissions will require a
suppression of fuel combustion. This is going to mean lower energy consumption and higher prices, at least in the intermediate term. Even though confined
to a segment of a single sector of energy use, the SO2 emissions-trading regime was far from simple. There were complicated allocation formulas to distribute the initial
emissions permits. Despite the best efforts to create objective criteria, at the end of the day, the allocation of emission permits involves some arbitrary discretion. For
political reasons there were special subsidies and extra allowances for the benefit of high-sulfur coal interests. Most trading in the early years took place between power
plants within the same company.

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No Solvency – Carbon Caps fail

Caps on carbon fail because credits are only distributed on the amount a company emitted.
Lewis - chairman and chief executive officer of Bank of America – 6/27/2008
(Kenneth, “Market alone can't take us to a more sustainable economy,” Mercury News.com,
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_9716296)

A significant test for this new approach to the Commons may come as we develop strategies to combat global warming. Europe and, several American
states, are
beginning to embrace a cap on carbon emissions, ratcheting the cap down over time to eventually reach a point where no further
global warming from human activities would occur. Such a cap creates an environmental market value for carbon. How should this
new value be distributed? Europe distributed carbon emission credits in proportion to the amount of pollution a company emitted! The
result? Billions of dollars in increased corporate income with little or no reduction in pollution. The new Governor of New York, Eliot Spitzer,
has suggested that 100 percent of the credits created by a New York carbon cap on electricity generation should be auctioned off.

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No Solvency - Cap and trade doesn’t encourage AE

Tax credit programs fail because the measurement in emission reduction is arbitrary.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

Even a credible long-run cap-and-trade system may provide insufficient incentives for investment in technology development if it does not address certain well-known
market failures, in particular those associated with investments that create knowledge with a public good nature (Jaffe et al. 2005, Newell 2007). A cap-and-trade
system alone will not encourage the socially desirable level of investment in research, development, and deployment of new
technologies that could reduce future emissions reduction costs. Additional policies may be necessary to increase government funding
or incentives for private funding of such research.10

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Upstream Good

Upstream cap-and-trade is a good option to increase alternative energy


Joseph Romm (Writer of Grist, Environmental News and Commentary) 2007 (“Repetto argues for upstream cap-and-
trade,” Aug 7 2007,http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/8/6/16134/64885http://gristmill.
grist.org/ story/2007/8/6/16134/64885) Assessed July 15 2008

An upstream cap-and-trade system along the lines outlined above is a good policy architecture. It will be effective, ensuring
comprehensive control of carbon emissions. It will be cost-effective, allowing maximum flexibility for market responses and
providing continuing incentives for development of alternative energy and energy efficiency technologies. It will be relatively easy to administer
and enforce. It will provide ample opportunities to ensure fairness. It is politically viable. It links readily to domestic and international offset programs.
It deals effectively with the problem of energy subsidies.

Upstream system reduces the amount of participates in air pollution


Matthew E. Kahn (Professor of Economics at UCLA) 2007 (“The Boston Globe Publishes Gib Metcalf’s Opionion
Piece,” Environmental and Urban Economics, Jan 27 2007, http://greeneconomics.
blogspot.com/2007/01/boston-globe-publishes-gib-metcalfs.html) Assessed July 15 2008

At the national level, an upstream plan is better. Production of carbon-based energy is concentrated, and relatively few
producers would have to be part of the system -- especially if we exempt small producers. For example, a plan with an
exemption for mines with annual production levels below 225,000 short tons would capture 95 percent of domestically
produced coal but require less than 30 percent of mines to be part of the system. Downstream implementation in
contrast would require thousands of firms to participate. When a system is too complex, policymakers are likely to
throw up their hands and leave crucial sectors out.

Only upstream cap and trade systems can encourage renewables.


Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

The environmental effectiveness of a domestic cap-and-trade system for climate change can be maximized and its costs and risks minimized
by inclusion of several specific features. The system should target all fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions through an economy-wide cap on those emissions. The cap
should be imposed “upstream,” that is, on fossil fuels at the point of extraction, processing, or distribution, not at the point of
combustion. The system should set a trajectory of caps over time that begin modestly and gradually become more stringent,
establishing a long-run price signal to encourage investment in emission-reducing technology. It should adopt mechanisms to protect against cost
uncertainty. And it should include linkages with the climate policy actions of other countries. Importantly, by providing politicians with the option
to mitigate economic impacts through the distribution of emissions allowances, this approach can establish consensus for a policy that achieves
meaningful reductions. It is for these reasons and others that cap-and-trade systems have been used increasingly in the United States to address an array of
environmental problems, for example to phase out the use of lead in gasoline, limit emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxides (NOX), and phase out
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs; Stavins 2003; see also the online appendix at www.hamiltonproject.org).

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Upstream good

Only upstream cap and trade systems solve best.


Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

The United States can launch a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically feasible approach to reducing its greenhouse
gas emissions by adopting an upstream, economy wide CO2 cap-and-trade system that implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions
over time. The approach proposed here also includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty, such as multiyear compliance periods,
provisions for banking and borrowing, and possibly a cost containment mechanism to protect against extreme price volatility. 15

Only upstream cap and trade systems can solve all CO2 emissions.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

Any cap-and-trade system for CO2 must define the set of emissions sources that are capped (the scope of coverage) and the point in the fossil
fuel supply chain at which that cap is enforced (the point of regulation). To achieve economy-wide coverage, the point of regulation should be
upstream, collecting allowances according to the carbon content of fuels at the point of their extraction, import, processing, or
distribution.21 The first sellers of extracted fossil fuels would be required to hold allowances: for coal, at the mine shipping terminus; for petroleum, at the refinery
gate; for natural gas, at the first distribution point; and for imports, at the point of importation. Such a cap would effectively cover all sources of CO2
emissions throughout the economy

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Downstream fails

Downstream cap and trade systems will force ineffective hybrid systems.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

Some stakeholders have argued for a downstream point of regulation for at least some emissions sources.25 If downstream regulation of some facilities is
allowed, broad coverage of emissions will require a hybrid point-of-regulation approach, in which some sources are regulated
upstream and others downstream. As commonly proposed, such a hybrid approach would involve upstream producers surrendering allowances for some but not
all of the fuel they sell, depending on whether or not the fuel is sold to sources subject instead to downstream regulation. This approach has two significant
problems. First, a hybrid system may fail to provide complete coverage. Some emissions sources may fall through the cracks, covered by neither
downstream nor upstream regulation. Second, there would need to be two classes of fuel in the market, one for which allowances have been
surrendered, and one intended for use by facilities subject to downstream regulation. This would increase administrative complexity
and the potential for noncompliance.2

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AT Banking adv
There’s no net increase in money in the economy its just a transfer of money.
Ross McKitrick 2008 Associate Professor and Director Graduate Studies Department of Economics University of Guelph
Committee on House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES CQ
Congressional Testimony
It is a fallacy to refer to the monetary value of permits trading systems as a new market to be exploited. Instead, the
value of permits being traded is a measure of the wealth transfers created by the policy. For example, if the US uses cap-
and-trade to reduce its CO2 emissions to 1.2 Gigatonnes (the Kyoto target), and the permits end up costing $100 each,
the windfall gain to permit holders would be $120 billion. This is not new wealth, instead it is the transfer of wealth
from the general public to the members of the newly-created cartel who hold the permits. When industry leaders lobby
for a cap-and-trade system, they are asking the government to create a highly profitable industry cartel that would be
illegal for them to create themselves.

Cheating Turn – There is no incentive for honesty with the large sums of money created by the plan, this
undermines the effectiveness of the system.
Dr. Michael E. Canes July 20, 2007 Senior Research Fellow at the Logistics Management Insti-tute in McLean, Virginia PhD in
Economics from UCLA and an MSc in Economics from the London School of Economics. Is Cap & Trade the Wrong Policy to Curb
Greenhouse Gases for the United States? George Marshall Institute

Now it isn’t like no one else has said there are going to be problems in dealing with the international offset market. People have been saying this for years.
Richard Cooper at Harvard, Bill Nordhaus at Yale and others have been looking at this for some time and have been warning about it. I quote a short clip out of
one of Nord-haus’s pieces: “Cheating will probably be pandemic in an emissions trading system that in-volves large sums of
money. There are very poor intrinsic incentives for hon-esty in a cap and trade system. The purchasing unit gets a permit whether
or not a true reduction takes place by the selling unit. Emissions evasion is a posi-tive sum game. If tax evasion in the U.S. is 10-20
percent of taxes, is there reason to believe that emissions evasion in Ukraine, Romania and other places would be
substantially less?” The answer, I think, is no. This is going to be a problem. And how is it going to be dealt with? Well, the thinking is that we
will have international monitoring; we will have entities that guarantee whether offsets are real or not. But all of that
involves very serious costs and in some cases, where governments are involved, may be politi-cally difficult if not
impossible. A government may, for example, propose a project which is pretty energy inefficient. It might then say, “We have come up with a
new design, a much more efficient way to do the same thing. We are eligible for offsets by changing the approach.” Well,
if that government had anticipated the possibility of gaining offsets at the very beginning, it might offer the initial
proposal with exactly this in mind, that it is going to offer a more energy efficient version at a later time in order to
claim credit. How is the international monitoring system going to deal with that? It will have to figure out ways to deal with exactly those kinds of things
on a worldwide basis for cap and trade to work.

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AT: Banking Adv


The massive amount of created wealth causes extreme market manipulation hurting the economy.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

An international system of permits involving tens of billions of dollars a year also will give rise to extensive permit
trading through private securities markets. Already, entrepreneurs have created private funds that invest in emissions instruments, and
established the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and a European subsidiary, the European Climate Exchange (ECX), to trade these instruments.16 As
private trading grows, it will give rise to derivatives, options, calls, short selling and more exotic financial transactions,
all based on the emissions permits. These developments could produce a more efficient global allocation of the permits, but normal profit-
seeking by financial institutions operating on both sides of every transaction will reduce the overall economic benefits
from the system. In an era of financial deregulation, especially in commodity markets, the trading of financial instruments based on
emissions permits also creates the potential for financial manipulation. As recent scandals in the United States
demonstrate, even countries with very sophisticated financial markets and enforcement systems attract practitioners
eager to develop ways to influence or manipulate market prices. For example, cap-and-trade requires accurate measurements of energy
production, and manipulators have deliberately supplied inaccurate information to illegally influence prices in the U.S.
market for natural gas futures, at a cost to consumers of billions of dollars.17 None of these issues arise in a global carbon-tax
program, since tax obligations and collections are not and do not give rise to tradable financial instruments.

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AT Bali
Bali roadmap will fail-industrial countries are reluctant to cut emissions and too many conflicts between
rich and poor countries
Jakarta Post, July 1, 2008
(The Journal and Resource Center Of Indonesia Today ,"SBY TO TELL G8 LEADERS TO STICK TO THE BALI ROAD MAP",
Lexis,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4205873337&format=GNBFI&so
rt=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4205873341&cisb=22_T4205873340&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=22717
1&docNo=24, Accessed July 21, 2008)

Despite international praise for the Bali meeting in December last year, which brought the 
United States to the table of an international discussion to create a new climate deal, progress 
has since been slow.  There has been little preparation for the global climate meeting in 
Poland by the end of 2008 and the Copenhagen meeting.  Progress has been hampered by 
persistent wrangling between rich and poor countries over the necessity of setting explicit 
targets to limit emissions of carbon, as well as claims that China and India ­­ two of the world's 
major polluters ­­ have brought little to climate negotiations.  Indonesia has repeatedly called 
on the international community to stick to the Bali road map after a series of negotiations 
preluding the Poland global conference failed to reach the expected results.  The latest round 
of UN­sponsored global climate change negotiations in Bonn, Germany, failed to reach a 
consensus on new binding emissions cuts for wealthy nations, which are widely blamed as 
the main contributors of carbon dioxide causing climate change. In March, an international 
conference held in Thailand similarly failed to set a binding target for emissions cuts.  The Bali 
road map stipulates that nations must come up with new binding emissions cuts during the 
Copenhagen summit in 2009 to replace the Kyoto Protocol.  The protocol requires 36 wealthy 
nations to each cut 5 percent of their emissions by 2012. But apart from the eastern bloc 
countries, most are on a pace that will not reach anywhere close to the target by the 
deadline.  Dino said the President would stop by in Kuala Lumpur to attend the Developing 
Eight meeting (D8) on Thursday next week before flying to Hokk

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

AT Bali

Bali Conferences Not Working

Developed countries are being criticized for not living up to their commitments, despite negotiations in
the Bali conferences.
Khor - journalist, economist and Director of the Third World Network – Feb. 2008
(Martin, “South criticises North for not fulfilling climate commitments” Third World Network,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/twr209-210.htm)

At the Bali conference, developing nations criticised the lack of commitment by the rich countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
and provide the finance and technology needed by developing countries to address climate change. DIFFERENCES of views on what
are the priorities in tackling climate change and for the Bali climate meetings were evident when the major groupings of countries presented their
initial statements on 3 December, the first day of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Group of 77
and China called for 'immediate, deeper and effective cuts' in greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries, without which all
efforts to address climate change will remain fruitless. The group also criticised the lack of fulfilment of commitments by developed
countries to reduce their emissions, and to provide finance and technology needed by developing countries to address climate change.
The G77 and China also said additional financial resources for climate change are needed by developing countries, estimated at US$200 billion for emission reduction
and hundreds of billions of dollars more for adaptation activities. The Africa Group, represented by Nigeria, gave a sharp rebuke to developed
countries for failing to live up to their commitments, especially in assisting developing countries. 'Africa believes that walking into a new
regime with all the present difficulties in implementing the already agreed commitments is totally unacceptable. It will mean only one thing, that nothing is going to
happen in future, and the suffering of our people continues.' The major developed countries made clear they wanted the Bali meetings to lead to
formal negotiations for a new climate regime in which developing countries have to make commitments. The European Union wanted a
global comprehensive post-2012 agreement which includes 'further, fair and effective contributions' from non-Annex I members, which are the developing countries.

The Bali conferences have failed to set clear emissions targets.


BBC News – 12/15/2007
(“US sets terms for climate talks,” BBC News,
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:srIIwC_K_5gJ:news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/7145608.stm+bali+climate+conference+fails&hl=e
n&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us)

Delegates at the UN summit in Bali have agreed a deal on curbing climate change after days of bitter wrangling. Agreement was reached
after a U-turn from the US, which had wanted firmer commitments from developing countries. Environment groups said they were disappointed by the
lack of firm targets for reducing emissions. The "Bali roadmap" initiates a two-year process of negotiations designed to agree a new
set of emissions targets to replace those in the Kyoto Protocol. We said we needed a roadmap, but this conference has failed to give
us a clear destination The EU had pressed for a commitment that industrialised nations should commit to cuts of 25-40% by 2020, a bid that was implacably
opposed by a bloc containing the US, Canada and Japan. The final text does not mention specific emissions targets, but does acknowledge that "deep
cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective" of avoiding dangerous climate change. It also says that a delay in reducing emissions
will make severe climate impacts more likely.

The Bali conferences have failed to address of GHG reductions.


Sharma - Prem Bhatia Memorial Award winning journalist in environmental and social affairs – 12/17/2007
(Ashok, “Bali Climate conference has a message for rural community,” The Financial Express,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:H5Xr1YZuJrMJ:www.financialexpress.com/news/Bali-Climate-conference-has-a-message-for-
rural-community/251129/0+bali+climate+conference+fails&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=us)

A group of small island communities led by Biotani Indonesia Foundation has urged that the adaptation fund should include a special corpus to cover their initiatives.
The Bali conference succeeded in adopting a resolution on technology tranfer and also Its monitoring. It, however, failed address the vital issue of cut in
GHG emissions and deferred it till 2009. It also postponed until next year any consideration of a plan to fund an untested technology
which captures and buries the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, emitted from power plants that burn fossil fuels. It also failed to agree
whether or not to allow companies to sell carbon offsets from destroying new production of powerful greenhouse gases called
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Benefiting factories have been the biggest winners under a UN scheme to reward companies which cut greenhouse gas emissions.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Safety Valve block intl markets


The plan’s safety valve will kill international carbon Market development.
Henry D. Jacoby and. Denny Ellerman 2004 Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA Energy Policy Volume 32, Issue 4, March 2004, The safety valve and climate
policy

Under any multinational agreement with quantity targets, the marginal costs of control will differ among the parties.
Thus, just as trade among individual emitters can lower the costs of a national emissions cap, cross-border trade can
reduce the costs of an international agreement. Such exchange is provided for under the Kyoto Protocol, and the potential value of this device is
indicated by the fact that some international transactions are occurring even before the Protocol has gone into force.12 A question that needs to be
addressed, therefore, is whether the existence of a safety valve in one or more of the trading partners may create
barriers to international market development. The concern is the potential for sales under a safety valve to create a new
source of international “ hot air” that drives out credits based on real reductions, an emissions trading variant of Gresham's
Law.13 Suppose, for example, that the market-clearing price in the international permit market rose above the safety
valve price in one of the participating countries. Private agents, whether firms or individuals, could purchase permits at the government
“safety valve” window and either sell them directly into the international market or use them in place of other permits transferred abroad. If permits
were freely exchangeable, as would be desired for a well-functioning market, the lowest safety valve price among the
trading partners would set the international emissions price. Even short of this outcome, difficulties could be created for market trading.
This problem might be controlled in several ways. First, all international transactions could be limited to government-to-government
exchange of quotas. This restriction would, of course, sacrifice many of the efficiencies expected from international
permit exchange. Second, if permits were devolved to private parties who were allowed to trade internationally, a web of restrictions could be imposed to
attempt to prevent exchanges of hot air. All national regulations would need to forbid permit sales from any country whose safety valve level fell below the
international price. In a market where the prices of traded permits are likely to fluctuate over time, and banking of permits is allowed, this approach seems
clearly infeasible. Finally, each of the countries participating in the international trading regime could impose its own cap-and-trade system and safety valve,
and then agree on a common safety valve price. International permit trade would then occur only in times when the market price was below the level of the
global safety valve. This idea is close to that introduced earlier of a globally agreed compliance penalty, to be paid at the time of summing up at the end of a
compliance period ( Kopp et al (2001) ). As in a domestic implementation, evaluation of this proposal depends on the relation of
the negotiated safety valve price to the expected marginal cost of meeting the negotiated caps, country by country. If the
price is low enough to be triggered frequently, then in effect the agreement is a globally harmonized carbon tax, and if
such a multi-nation agreement were achievable (which we think not), the whole system of negotiating quantitative emissions
targets would not be needed in the first place. It is worth noting that these problems of emissions market development in the presence of a
safety valve can arise in the domestic context as well, if different systems are applied across sectors of an economy. In the US for example, proposals have
been made for the imposition of cap and trade only in the electric power sector alone, perhaps with a safety valve provision ( CBO, 2001 (2001) ). Separate
proposals have been made for designing a system of trading of permits under the US system of regulating the corporate average fuel economy of motor
vehicles, again with a safety valve included.14 If these two systems, perhaps designed under separate bodies of legislation, were (as
anticipated in some proposals) to be joined in a domestic trading system, then the same problems as noted above would
arise, and a similar menu of corrections would have to be considered so long as a safety valve was somewhere in use.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits = market manipulation


The plan will result in massive market manipulation killing solvency.
LA times May 28, 2007 Time to tax carbon A carbon tax is the best, cheapest and most efficient way to combat cataclysmic climate
change. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-carbontax28may28,0,2888366.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail
To understand the drawbacks of cap-and-trade, one has to look not only at the successful U.S. acid rain program but the failed
European Emissions Trading Scheme, the first phase of which started in January 2005. European Union members each developed emissions goals, then
passed out credits to polluters. Yet for a variety of reasons, the initial cap was set so high that the polluters fell under it without making any reductions at all. The
Europeans are working to improve the scheme in the next phase, but their chances of success aren't good. One reason is the power of lobbyists. In
Europe, as in the U.S., special interests have a way of warping the political process so that, for example, a corporation
generous with its campaign contributions might win an excessive number of credits. It's also very easy in many European
countries to cheat; because there aren't strong agencies to monitor and verify emissions, companies or utilities can pretend
they're cleaner than they are. The latter problem might be avoided in the U.S. by beefing up the Environmental Protection Agency. But there's reason to
suspect that many of the corporate interests pushing for a federal cap-and-trade program are hoping for a seat at the table
when credits are passed out, and they will doubtless fudge numbers to maximize their credits; some companies stand to make a great deal
of money under a trading system. Also hoping to profit, honestly or not, would be carbon traders. Large financial institutions would
jump into the exchange to collect commissions on carbon trades, just as they do with crude oil and wheat. This presents
opportunities for Enron-style market manipulation.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Grandfathering bad

Richard D. Morgenstern March 5, 2008 Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce Climate Change Competitiveness Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing Countries
The principal case against free allocation is that it misses the opportunity to auction allowances and use the revenue to
provide broad, offsetting benefits for the economy as a whole. From the standpoint of maximizing economic efficiency, it
would make more sense to auction all allowances and use the proceeds to reduce taxes on income or investment.
Compelling arguments can also be made for auctioning allowances and using the revenues to support other public policy
objectives, such as funding energy R&D, offsetting the impact of higher energy prices on consumers (especially low-income
households), and supporting efforts to adapt to the impacts of climate change. 13 Another concern is that if too generous, free
allocation based on historical emissions (grandfathering) risks conferring windfall gains on some firms, especially if a firm can
pass along most of the costs of regulation in the form of higher prices for its products. In that case, giving the firm free
allowances would amount to a transfer of wealth from consumers—who pay higher prices for the firm’s goods—to
business owners or shareholders, who do not really bear a substantial share of the cost burden associated with the
policy. An updating free allocation that subsidizes domestic production gives rise to the same concerns noted in
connection with other targeted responses that distort behavior relative to what would happen under a broad CO2
pricing policy. Namely, allocation decisions in practice may fail to target truly trade-sensitive firms or industries and
thus end up subsidizing emissions-intensive industries that are not really at risk of shifting their operations overseas,
such as electric utilities. In that case, an updating allocation will create efficiency losses and increase the overall cost of
the policy to society while providing only limited benefits in terms of maintaining domestic production, preserving U.S.
jobs, and reducing the potential for emissions leakage.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits increase emissions


Cap-and-trade backfires, carbon dioxide emissions increase
Christian Science Monitor 2008 (Justin Danhof, research associate with The National Center for Public Policy Research, a
nonpartisan, nonprofit educational foundation based in Washington, “Why cap and trade could backfire Credits remove stigma – and
may increase pollution.”, July 16, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0716/p09s02-coop.html, Accessed July 16, 2008)

Washington -Environmentalists claim that capping greenhouse-gas emissions and creating a market for emissions trading – a policy
prescription called "cap-and-trade" – would reduce carbon dioxide output and with it the risk of global warming. But it could achieve
the opposite. Here's how: By turning carbon emissions into commodities that can be bought and sold, cap-and-trade policies could
remove the stigma from producing such emissions. In the late 1990s, Israeli researchers Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini performed an experiment that
provides a useful model. They chose six random day-care centers in Haifa at which parents sometimes arrived late to pick up their children. Intending to reduce the
frequency of tardiness, the two imposed a fine on late parents. Mr. Gneezy and Mr. Rustichini explain that, typically, "when negative consequences are imposed on a
behavior, they will produce a reduction of that particular response." But the experiment did not produce the anticipated results. Instead, the incidence of late arrivals
increased. In fact, the percentage of parents who were late more than doubled. Behavioral law and economics help explain this counterintuitive
result. Prior to the imposition of the fine, parents – recognizing it is wrong to make a teacher stay past normal hours with their children – experienced feelings of guilt
and shame when they were late. In other words, some parents were motivated to arrive on time by the stigma attached to arriving late. Imposing the fine reduced the
stigma. The fine created a good, and a market where none previously existed. Parents were no longer "arriving late," but rather, purchasing extra child-care hours. A
similar situation could occur under a cap-and-trade regime. Under cap-and-trade rules, the government places an artificial cap on the
amount of carbon each regulated facility may emit. Facilities producing more carbon than they are allowed are required to purchase
additional credits to make up the difference. The opportunity to purchase these credits creates a market where none previously existed.
As in the example of the fined parents, the purchase of the right to emit greenhouse gases would likely reduce any stigma associated with doing so. Emission levels,
consequently, could rise. This phenomenon is already seen on an individual level. Al Gore says the risk of catastrophic global
warming is so great that Americans should act immediately to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Yet his home uses 20 times more
energy than the average American home, according to the Tennessee Center for Policy Research. That's OK, the former vice president
assures us, because he purchases offsets to ensure that he lives a carbon-neutral lifestyle. His message – albeit unintentional – is simple: Produce
carbon to your heart's content; just pay a carbon broker to "neutralize" your carbon footprint and your guilt. If Mr. Gore could not purchase offsets, would he feel more
pressure to reduce his energy use? The likely answer is "yes." Columnist Charles Krauthammer explains in Time magazine that "purchasing carbon credits is an
incentive to burn even more fossil fuels, since now it is done under the illusion that it's really cost free to the atmosphere." Perhaps
that helps explain why most European nations have increased their carbon emissions since adopting the Kyoto global-warming treaty
in 1997. By most accounts, the European Union's cap-and-trade system isn't working. In its first year of operation (2005-06), emissions covered by the trading scheme
rose 0.8 percent. During the same time, according to the Energy Information Agency, emissions in the US – which hasn't ratified the Kyoto Protocol or adopted a cap-
and-trade system – dropped 1.8 percent. Samuel Bowles, a professor at the Santa Fe Institute, has noted that "[p]olicies designed to harness self-regarding
preferences to public ends may be counterproductive. These failures occur when conventional self-interest-based policies compromise
the beneficial effects of intrinsic motivation and ... a desire to uphold social norms." The social stigma of carbon emissions grows
stronger each day. As this stigma grows, companies are increasing their investments into research and technologies to reduce and store
carbon. If Congress removes the stigma associated with these emissions by assigning a price to them, it may not like the results.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits increase emissions


Emission trading hurts long term environmental solvency and halts all future progress
Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse, 1998
(David, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

This article focuses on a very serious problem facing the international community, global climate change, and a very important idea in
environmental policy, achieving environmental goals more cheaply through emissions trading. n2 Emissions trading programs allow
polluters [*3] to forego otherwise required pollution reductions at regulated pollution sources if they produce or purchase equivalent
reductions made elsewhere. n3 Since a polluter will only choose to purchase a reduction elsewhere when doing so saves money,
emissions trading tends to reduce private sector compliance costs. Recognizing this, some very prominent scholars have analogized
emissions trading to a "free lunch" and this analogy has influenced many policy makers. n4
The United States has made international emissions trading a centerpiece of its climate change policy. n5 Trading issues commanded
the attention of delegates to the recent Kyoto conference on climate [*4] change, and they promise to play an important role in the
future evolution of international law addressing climate change. n6
This article argues that the cheap fix metaphor describes emissions trading better than the free lunch metaphor that some scholars have
applied to it. The "free lunch" metaphor captures emissions trading's theoretical capacity to meet a short-term goal at less cost than
traditional regulation. But emissions trading, and environmental benefit trading generally, may increase the risk of long-term
environmental damage. For example, trading may facilitate avoidance of initially expensive or difficult investments in innovative
technology. Avoidance of innovation may raise long-term costs and make future progress more difficult. The cheap fix metaphor
captures significant problems with emissions trading that have received relatively little attention.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits increase emissions


Emissions trading creates incentives to emit more.

Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse, 1998


(David, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

Broadening the analysis to include all of the pollution sources eligible to trade casts grave doubts on the theory that emissions trading
encourages more innovation than a comparable traditional regulation, as some economists have realized. n235 An emissions trading
program creates two incentives: an incentive for the cheaper facility to emit less pollution than the government will authorize; and an
incentive for the more expensive facility to emit more pollution than the government will authorize under a comparable traditional
regulation. n236 In emissions trading, foregoing normally required emission reductions at plants with relatively expensive control
options finances "additional" reductions (reductions going beyond requirements) at cheaper facilities. n237 The money saved by
foregoing emission reductions at one facility finances the "extra" emission reductions at another. n238

Emissions trading prevents any net reduction in emissions because of double coutning and puts the
environment at a greater risk of damage
Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse, 1998
(David, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

Emissions trading with developing countries also involves double counting, which is detrimental to the environment. Without trading,
developed country compliance with the treaty generates two sets of reductions: reductions from projects developed countries finance
in developing countries and reductions developed countries (or their nationals) make at home. Trading allows the developed country
(or its nationals) to take credit for reductions financed abroad to justify not making required reductions at home. This involves double
counting reductions made abroad to satisfy both the financial and domestic emission reduction obligations. Since this generates only
one set of reductions instead of two, the double counting trading fosters generates less net reductions than the treaty calls for.

Cap and trade doesn’t decrease emission

Carbon Trade Watch,03 (The Sky is Not the LimitTNI BRIEFING SERIES)
http://www.tni.org/reports/ctw/skytext.pdf?

Emissions trading threatens to reduce sustainable renewable energy to a decorative by-product. The project requirements of CDM and
JI contain obstacles for small renewable projects. These include difficulties in measuring and determining ownership of energy
production.1 Large multi-national corporations find it easier to overcome these obstacles than smaller firms. Companies such as Shell
or BPAmoco, which have both renewable and fossil-fuelled facilities can offset within one corporate structure, have clear ownership
and can achieve emissions reductions which are easier to measure. from demand to fulfil Kyoto reduction targets, but from
companies wanting to buy permits to build an environmentally friendly image. Frank Van Der Vleuten of Free Energy Europe, a
manufacturer of solar panels, believes that, “The Kyoto mechanisms are far away from practical application and relevance Hardly
anybody has a vision how they can be put into practice for small renewable energy systems.” He adds “before establishing abstract
market based mechanisms, the first and most significant step is recognising the real and many renewable energys

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permit  leakage /c tax solves


Permits globally cause emissions leakages, this kills solvency only the CP solves.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The second important difference is that uniform, net


carbon taxes have generally comparable effects from country to country, while
a global cap-and-trade program usually does not. When slow growth or mild weather reduces the energy use and emissions of a country or an
industry, it will pay less carbon taxes; but in good times or bad times, a uniform net carbon tax will impose comparable costs and provide comparable
incentives from country to country to develop and adopt climate-friendly technologies and strategies. By contrast, a global cap-and-trade system
creates a wide range of effects and incentives in countries, depending on the base from which it calculates the emissions
targets for each country. Once a cap-and-trade agreement determines that a country’s emissions should be reduced by a
certain percentage relative to its current emissions or to its emissions in some previous base year, the country may be
able to meet its target without taking any steps if its economy slows – or it could take serious measures to reduce
emissions and still fail to meet its target because its economy grows faster than normal. This particular drawback of cap-and-trade
has cost the Kyoto program most of its potential effectiveness. The agreement includes emissions targets for 2012 averaging about 8
percent below a country’s levels in 1990, the year chosen as the base. 1990 was just prior to the final collapse of
communism and the closing of thousands of inefficient and high-polluting state-owned enterprises in Russia and
Eastern Europe. The result is that Russia and the Eastern European countries are not subject to any real caps or
incentives to reduce their emissions, because their caps are calculated from an outdated, high base. On the flip side are the United
States, Australia and few other countries which experienced unusually strong growth and energy use since 1990. For
them, the 1990 base year produces 2012 caps which they could not meet regardless of how much they invest in new
technologies and alternative fuels, unless they pay Russia and Eastern Europe tens of billions of dollars for their excess
permits. In contrast to the constant incentives of a carbon tax, the availability of excess permits under cap-and-trade
weakens incentives 8 across the system to develop and use alternative fuels and more-energy efficient technologies.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits  leakage
Unilateral action leads to international emission leakage
Stavins, Professor of Public Policy, Harvard, 1997
(Robert, The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1997 U Chi Legal F 293)

Can a unilateral policy by one country alone or by a group of cooperating countries prove effective in abating global greenhouse gas
emissions? The answer depends on how the other (non-cooperating) countries respond to the policies adopted by the cooperating
countries. These responses in turn reflect two phenomena--free riding and leakage--that can undermine any international greenhouse
management initiatives, whether they be market-based or conventional. n94 Free riding arises when countries that benefit from global
abatement do not contribute toward its provision; and leakage arises when abatement by cooperating [*318] countries alters world
relative prices in ways that lead non-cooperating countries to increase their emissions.

As long as participation in an international greenhouse policy is voluntary, countries will have incentives to free ride, leading to a less
than optimal level of aggregate abatement. n95 The threat of a ban on trade between cooperating and non-cooperating countries in
carbon-based fuels and products could work to support full participation in a greenhouse management scheme. n96 Of course, a ban
on trade introduces distortions in the global economy. On the other hand, free riding is itself a distortion, and if trade restrictions
reduce free-riding, they may yield positive net benefits. This issue, like so many others, invites empirical inquiry.

There are two main channels for emissions leakage. First, since a carbon abatement policy by cooperating countries may shift
comparative advantage in carbon-intensive goods toward non-cooperating countries, production of such goods and emissions may rise
outside the coalition. Second, a unilateral policy may lower world demand for carbon-intensive fuels and thereby reduce the world
price for such fuels traded in international markets. As a result, demands for such fuels (and emissions) can rise outside the coalition.

Carbon trading blocks all climate change by endorsing more emissions and increased use of fossil fuels
RisingTide UK, March 2002
(The Case Against Carbon Trading, http://www.risingtide.org.uk/pages/news/case-carbon.h.tm)

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL HAS BEEN HIJACKED BY CARBON TRADERS Corporations, the finance industry, and their government supporters demanded the
insertion of carbon trading throughout the Kyoto Protocol as a condition for their continued support for the process. The intergovernmental negotiations are now
concerned almost entirely with the structure and management of this vast international carbon trading regime.
CARBON TRADING IS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID REAL EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS The hopelessly compromised Kyoto Protocol
now allows countries to meet all their emissions reductions with carbon credits bought through three forms of carbon trading; Joint
Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism, International Emissions Trade. Some countries will certainly choose to buy credits
rather than make any serious attempt to reduce their underlying dependency on fossil fuels.
THE REAL SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE ARE UNDERMINED BY CARBON TRADING
· Educate the public on the urgency of climate change and the need for dramatic solutions Carbon trading is a false solution and undermines individual responsibility
· Set a schedule for cutting global fossil fuel consumption by up to 60%. Carbon Trading is an excuse for avoiding any significant net
cuts
· Recognise the moral (and political) imperative for fairness and social justice by allocating targets to every country on the basis of
equal per capita emissions Carbon Trading institutionalises existing inequalities and rewards the largest polluters
· Reduce the supply of fossil fuels with an international ban on all new oil, gas and coal development. As a first step, cut the $200 billion per year global subsidies for
coal and oil power. Carbon trading is not concerned with the supply of fossil fuels, which is why oil companies support it. As a result,
government subsidies are increasing, reducing the price of energy and swamping any attempts at demand management.
· Invest heavily in renewable energy to replace all fossil fuel supplies Although Carbon Trading promotes itself as funding renewables,
this is far more expensive per ton of carbon than credits from bogus "hot air", tree planting, or outright fraud. These cheap carbon
credits will set the market price and soak up the capital.
· Involve people at all levels of society in solutions Carbon trading is an inherently elitist, corporatist, technocratic solution. It provides
no role for civil society, and fails to deal with the 50% of emissions from houses and personal transport.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits = Rent seeking = wars


Permits create rent-seeking behavior causing resource scarcity causing conflict.
William D. Nordhaus 2007 Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
volume 1, issue 1, winter 2007, pp. 26–44 To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming

An additional question, applying particularly to international environmental agreements, concerns the administration of
programs in a world in which governments vary in terms of honesty, transparency, and effective administration. Quantity-
type systems are much more susceptible to corruption than price-type regimes. An emissions-trading system creates valuable assets in the
form of tradable emissions permits and allocates these to countries. Limiting emissions creates a scarcity where none
previously existed. It is a rent-creating program. The dangers of quantity as compared to price approaches have been demonstrated frequently
when quotas are compared with tariffs in international trade interventions. Rents lead to rent-seeking behavior. Additionally, resource
rents may increase unproductive activity, civil and international wars, and slow economic growth—this being the theory
of the ‘‘resource curse’’ (Sachs and Warner 1995; Torvik 2002). The scarce permits can be used by the country’s leaders for nonenvironmental purposes
rather than to reduce emissions. Dictators and corrupt administrators could sell part of their permits, and pocket the proceeds.
Calculations suggest that tens of billions of dollars of permits may be available for foreign sale from Russia under the
Kyoto Protocol. Given the history of privatizing valuable public assets at artificially low prices, it would not be surprising if the carbon
market became tangled in corrupt practices, undermining the legitimacy of the process. We might also imagine a Kyoto Protocol
extended to developing countries. Consider the case of Nigeria, which had carbon emissions of around 100 million tons in recent
years. If Nigeria were allocated tradable allowances equal to recent emissions and could sell them for $20 per ton of
carbon, this would raise around $2 billion of hard currency annually—in a country whose nonoil exports in 2000 were
only $600 million.

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Miami Debate Institute 08 Permits Neg

Permits = cheating and corruption (terrorism IL)


Bad regimes could sell permits to finance terrorism.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

By creating tradable financial assets worth tens of billions of dollars for governments to distribute among their
industries and plants and then monitor, a global cap-and-trade program also introduces powerful incentives to cheat by
corrupt and radical governments. Corrupt governments will almost certainly distribute permits in ways that favor their business supporters and
understate their actual energy use and emissions. By doing so – with no one to stop them -- they could potentially make billions of
dollars in hard foreign currencies trading “excess” permits, and in the process undermine the program’s environmental
purpose. A global cap-and-trade program also has no way to prevent radical governments from using such transfers to
finance whatever purpose they choose, whether that’s education or domestic oppression, foreign assistance or foreign
terrorism. Corrupt and radical states can use carbon-tax revenues for such purposes as well, but the resources come not
from other, democratic and lawful countries but from their own economies.

The plan funds dictatorial and hostile governments.


Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

Cap-and-trade programs create new financial opportunities and temptations for countries as well as companies, because, as
Nordhaus notes, “limiting emissions [through caps] creates a scarcity where none previously existed – in essence printing
money for those in control of the permits.”14 A global cap-and-trade system necessarily will include countries ruled by
corrupt or radical regimes – as Kyoto does – presumably eager to trade their permits and so raise billions of dollars or
Euros for their own purposes. For example, under Kyoto’s current terms, Russia will be able to offer permits worth tens of
billions of dollars for international sale; and if the United States had ratified the agreement, much of those funds would
have come from America. Under a global-capand- trade program, countries such as Iran, Syria and the Sudan also
might be able to raise international capital by selling permits; and even under Kyoto, they can receive credits for clean-
energy investments which can be traded like permits to raise funds.15

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Permits = cheating
No way to implement a permit system globally, incentive for cheating too high.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The subsequent trading of the permits introduces additional problems. Any


global cap-and-trade program will have to cover hundreds of
thousands of installations in scores of countries, and trades will require accurate measurements of energy production on
both sides of transaction, before and after the trade.13 That may be plausible in advanced countries with elaborate,
professional regulatory systems, but it’s considerably less so in transitional economies such as the Czech Republic,
Romania and China, and frankly implausible in places such as Russia and the Ukraine. Cap-and-trade systems may provide
incentives as well as opportunities for cheating and corruption in the measurement of the energy and emissions subject to trading, because the buyer and the
seller can gain by understating their actual energy production and emissions as doing so raises the seller’s income and reduces the buyer’s per-unit cost. Even
if only the seller cheats by understating its energy production and emissions (creating or increasing the permits it can
offer for sale), the buyer has no incentive to discover or reveal the fraud. Companies will try to cheat under a carbon tax
system as well; but the government on the other side of that transaction has strong incentives to discover and stop it.

Cap-and-trade leads to corrupted management of permits, undermining reduction in emissions


Matt Stoller (Writer for My Direct Democracy News Source) 2007 (“The Cap and Trade Scam,” MyDD.com, April 24
2007, http://www.mydd.com/story/2007/4/24/114618/053) July 15, 2008

The 'cap and trade' system is the other model, and the main sponsors are Joe Lieberman and John McCain. This system sets an overall cap on carbon
emissions, creates a fixed set of carbon credits which add up to this cap level, and then allows companies to trade credits with each other. There
really is no
upside to this system, though proponents will argue that it does have a firm cap on carbon emissions. The downsides are that industries will cheat,
price volatility will be really high, counties will cheat and the system privileges insiders: By creating tradable financial assets worth
tens of billions of dollars for governments to distribute among their industries and plants and then monitor, a global cap-and-trade program also
introduces powerful incentives to cheat by corrupt and radical governments. Corrupt governments will almost certainly
distribute permits in ways that favor their business supporters and understate their actual energy use and emissions.

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Permits hurt trade

A global trading regime will create trade conflicts.


Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward and, Kevin A. Hassett 2007 Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes Friday, June 1, 2007
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OUTLOOK AEI Online Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K.
Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. June 1, 2007
Establishing allowances and accounting systems for GHG emissions across industries is going to be vastly more difficult and
highly politicized. The forest products industry, for example, will reasonably want credits for creating carbon sinks in the trees it plants and harvests, but the
manufacturing sector that uses these wood products as a raw material will want credit for sequestering carbon. The difference will have to be split in some arbitrary
manner that will surely introduce economic distortions in the marketplace. The auto industry will want credits for GHG innovations, while industries and businesses of
all kinds will lobby for credits for reducing mobile source emissions from changes to their auto and truck fleets. There are going to be winners and losers
in this allocation process. Multiply this problem across sectors and industries and it becomes evident that a GHG emissions-
trading system is going to be highly complex and unwieldy, and too susceptible to rent-seeking influence in Washington. The
problem of politically adjusting competing interests will be compounded on the international scale. The long-running diplomatic conflicts that can be
observed over purported subsidies for aircraft (i.e., Boeing versus Airbus) and the European Union's agricultural subsidies
and trade barriers are examples of the kinds of conflicts that will be endemic to any international emissions-trading scheme.

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Permits = Biz as Usual

It is impossible to solve through cap-and-trade, trading allows companies to escape reducing emissions,
abuse human rights, and exploit the ecosystem
Carbon Trade Watch 2003
(“The Sky is Not the Limit: TNI BRIEFING SERIES No 2003/1”
http://www.tni.org/reports/ctw/skytext.pdf?)

The only instance where an emissions trading scheme could work, for more than the free-market economic system,is if it were small,
highly regulated, tightly defined, had no copollutants side effects, had rigorous independent monitoring and verification and vibrant
community consultation, participation and assessment. However these are not features of any emissions trading system currently
functioning or planned for the future. Another inescapable reality of emissions trading is that toxic co-pollutants are inherent in the
production of most emissions of local and global pollutants. Therefore in no imaginable reality, could emissions trading ‘work’ for
people and the planet. In answer to those criticisms, greenhouse gas emissions trading proponents, and moderate critics, claim that the
market is a transitional solution to give governments and corporations time to make the real changes that are needed. However major
oil corporations such as BP and Shell, both enthusiastic initiators of internal trading schemes, have never voiced any serious intention
to curb their main activities of oil exploration or production in the future. In fact, at the same time as the company claim reductions in
emissions internally, BP predicts that it will increase future oil and gas output by 3 per cent annually.3 This will take their total
emissions over that of the UK. Furthermore, BP’s investment in renewable energy is a mere 1 per cent of the US $8 billion it spends
on fossil fuel exploration and production every year.4 Corporations, motivated by profit, will not voluntarily cease damaging the
planet and destabilising the climate if that practice provides the main source of their income. Emissions trading allows big
corporations to dodge their responsibilities, by gaming a system they helped design and making superficial changes in their behaviour
while continuing harmful ‘business as usual’ practices. Resistance to corporate power is in danger of being distracted by engagement
with emissions markets. Many NGOs will take up their role as verifiers and monitors, ultimately resulting in divisions between those
for and against emissions trading. The woefully inadequate regulation of emissions markets ensures that it will be difficult and time-
consuming to check the veracity of corporations’ claims that they have reduced their pollution levels. Meanwhile it will be tragically
clear how much their emissions have increased through continuing to invest in fossil-fuel projects, which often result in gross abuse of
human rights, such as the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, and the further destruction of pristine ecosystems like the soon-to-be
exploited Arctic.

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** Politics/Elections Links **

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Cap/Trade helps Mccain


Plan makes bush look good and is key for mccain

Slate Magazine June 13, 2008 “Ducking the Climate Debate” Lexis

Lieberman-Warner is dead now-defeated by a wide margin in the vote Obama and McCain missed-but its approach to controlling
global-warming pollution, known as "cap and trade," lives on. Both candidates support cap and trade, which would set mandatory
carbon reductions and create a market for carbon permits, making companies pay for the right to pollute. McCain sponsored two
important early cap-and-trade bills, in 2003 and 2005; Obama joined him as a co-sponsor of the latter. Both have reason to campaign
on the issue because it matters to the independent voters whose support they need to get elected. And for McCain, climate change is
especially good politics: Bucking his party on the issue appeals to his sense of personal drama and offers his best evidence that he's
not Just Like Bush. "I will not shirk the mantle of leadership," he vowed in a climate speech last month in Oregon. "I will not permit
eight long years to pass without serious action."

Mccain under pressure from party leaders to drop cap and trade plan helps him with swing voters.

Slate Magazine June 13, 2008 “Ducking the Climate Debate” Lexis

McCain was under massive pressure from party leaders not to appear. The Republicans were using delay tactics to obstruct
Lieberman-Warner, calling it the "Boxer Climate Tax Bill" and claiming it would wreck the economy; the last thing Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell wanted to see was McCain riding in on a white horse to step on their story line. For McCain, that meant passing up
an opportunity to burnish his maverick brand with climate-sensitive swing voters. But since large swaths of the GOP base are climate
skeptics and this bill wasn't getting a serious debate anyway, being a no-show was the low-risk option. So, brave Sir John left his
gallant steed in the stable and went to some fundraisers instead.

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Cap/Trade hurts Mccain

McCain is trying to back away from cap-and-trade-it can hurt his Republican base
The Oregonian, July 9, 2008 ( Is McCain downplaying cap and trade?
http://blog.oregonlive.com/mapesonpolitics/2008/07/is_mccain_downplaying_cap_and.html, )

The National Review's Larry Kudlow reports that Sen. John McCain is backing off the cap-and-trade proposal he made in Portland in
May to combat global warming. Marc Ambinder says that's not what he hears from the McCain campaign. And WWB humbly notes
that cap-and-trade is still quite prominently mentioned on McCain's web site, both in his sections on energy and climate change. Still,
Kudlow notes that McCain makes no mention of the proposal in the 14-page economic plan he released on Monday that appeared to
be aimed at solidifying small-business support for McCain. (In fact, the campaign gathered small-business leaders in Portland to talk
about his plan; mostly they liked the fact he wants a low estate tax).The plan does include several of McCain's energy proposals,
including more domestic oil exploration and more coal, nuclear, solar and wind. After seeing the absence of the cap-and-trade
proposal in the program, Kudlow, said, he did a little further digging: I picked up the phone and dialed a senior McCain official to
make sure these old eyes hadn't missed it. Sure enough, on deep background, this senior McCain advisor told me I was correct: no
cap-and-trade. In other words, this central-planning, regulatory, tax-and-spend disaster, which did not appear in Mac's two recent
speeches, has been eradicated entirely -- even from the detailed policy document that hardly anybody will ever read. So then I asked
this senior official if the campaign has taken cap-and-trade out behind the barn and shot it dead once and for all -- buried it in history's
dustbin of bad ideas. The answer came back that they are interested in jobs right now -- jobs for new energy production and jobs from
lower taxes. At that point I became satisfied. Even though a McCain presidency might resurrect cap-and-trade, it will be a much
different format. More important, the campaign is cognizant of the conservative rebellion against it. Marc Ambinder reports that
McCain spokeswoman Jill Hazelbaker calls the idea that McCain is dumping cap-and-trade is "totally false."I can see why the McCain
campaign might want to play down his climate-change plan, which would likely raise carbon-based energy prices, in favor of talking
about his ideas for easing gas prices - particularly when he's still trying to solidify the Republican base. But McCain has too long a
record of supporting the concept of cap-and-trade to entirely back away from it now.

Mccain trying to separate from bush now plan makes them seem connected

Slate Magazine June 13, 2008 “Ducking the Climate Debate” Lexis

Two things could put climate back on the agenda by fall. One would be a run of heavy weather-the heat waves, droughts, and
hurricanes that argue eloquently to Americans that the climate problem is real and that inaction will cost far more than action. And the
other would be McCain. He's planning to talk about energy issues next week, and whenever he needs to put more daylight between
himself and Bush, you can be sure he will turn to the climate-and Obama will reflexively move to block him. ("Global warming?"
Obama said the other day. "I don't care what he says, John McCain is not going to push that agenda hard.") That might just lead to
real debate since there are important differences between the two candidates when it comes to climate solutions.

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Cap/Trade hurts McCain coal states


Plan causes MCCAIN TO LOSE

Greenwire July 11, 2008 Friday CAMPAIGN 2008: GOP labels Obama's energy plan a 'coal tax' in bid for mining states

Seeking to solidify his support in coal-mining states, Republican presidential candidate John McCain is saying Democratic
candidate Barack Obama 's energy plans would impose an economically devastating "coal tax." During campaign stops this
week in the Midwest, McCain and his surrogates opened a new line of attack against the Illinois senator, who has struggled in coal-
producing states, saying Obama 's energy policies would dramatically drive up costs for consumers by taxing coal and other
"dirty" energy sources. The issue came into focus this week as both campaigns turned their attention to Ohio, a pivotal state where
coal is both an important fuel for electricity and the state's economic engine. Coal could become a major political issue in the
mining areas across southern Ohio -- a swing area that could mean winning or losing Ohio's 20 electoral votes. Obama fared
poorly there during his Democratic primary battle against Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York. He lost by large margins in big
coal counties. Obama is scheduled to discuss energy during a campaign stop today in Dayton, Ohio. McCain stopped in
Portsmouth earlier this week to focus on energy -- and coal in particular. Both candidates have promised to provide substantial
cash for "clean coal" research, with McCain proposing $2 billion a year in funding for such research and Obama stating that it
would be a major part of the $150 billion that he intends to spend on advanced energy research and alternatives. Still, coal
industry officials have said that they are wary of both candidates -- in large part because of their support for cap-and-trade climate
legislation. The McCain campaign, however, has increasingly tried this week to further raise questions about what Obama
's policies would mean to the industry, arguing that their impact would be far more negative. "When you want to tax coal, and
when you want to tax natural gas and you don't want to explore more domestically here in America ... Ohioans are going to react
pretty negatively," Rep. Pat Tiberi (R-Ohio) said on a conference call organized by the McCain campaign yesterday. "I think
[Obama] is in for a rude awakening that his energy policy, or lack thereof, is out of step with Ohio." Republicans elsewhere
-- both in Ohio and in other coal states -- have been hammering the same message. A press release from the Ohio Republican Party
says Obama 's plan would "raise the price of electricity for families and kill job creation" in southern Ohio. Similar press releases
have come from the Pennsylvania Republican Party and from Republicans across the region.

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Cap/Trade hurts Mccain base


McCain risks losing base on global warming leadership
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 18, 2008(LexisNexis News, “WARM TO THE TASK;
MCCAIN REJECTS BUSH'S INACTIVITY ON CLIMATE CHANGE”,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4168903773&format=GNBFI&so
rt=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4168903776&cisb=22_T4168903775&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=14457
7&docNo=7, Accessed July 15, 2008)

It is not news that presumptive Republican nominee John McCain acknowledges global warming and supports a cap-and-trade
program to reduce carbon-fuel emissions -- he has been on record for saying so. But news is also about timing and emphasis -- and
the presidential campaign, now gearing up for the main battle, makes its own news. What Sen. McCain said in Portland, Ore., about
global warming Monday deserved to make headlines. This was good news. For one thing, he put distance between himself and the
Bush administration. Mr. McCain's strong words amounted to an accurate indictment of the White House: "I will not shirk the mantle
of leadership that the United States bears. I will not permit eight long years to pass without serious action on serious challenges. I will
not accept the same dead-end of failed diplomacy that claimed Kyoto. The United States will lead and will lead with a different
approach, an approach that speaks to the interests and obligation of every nation." The written version of his speech even included a
call for punitive action against China and India if they flouted international standards on emissions, but this was omitted in order not
to be seen as compromising his support of free trade. Mr. McCain did include a personal anecdote about how he had seen for himself
in the Arctic region evidence of a glacier's retreat over 20 years. Taken as a whole, the speech was a sharp break with the global-
warming amnesia of the recent past. Not that environmentalists were impressed. Mr. McCain has a somewhat checkered
environmental record and his goal on reducing emissions is not as ambitious as Democrats Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Still,
the devil in the details should not eclipse the angel in the big picture. Mr. McCain gets it. While a political calculation no doubt fed
his headline-making stance in environmentally conscious Oregon and in the nation at large, where he is viewed as McBush, a
soulmate on most other issues, Mr. McCain also risked offending some of his base. Just last week, the Pew Research Center
announced a poll that found Republicans are increasingly skeptical that the Earth has been warming over the past few decades -- just
49 percent think so, down 13 points since January 2007. The news in Monday's speech is that, whoever wins the November election,
there will be what has been missing on global warming during the Bush administration -- leadership.

McCain pushing cap-and-trade causes him to lose support from American Conservative Union and
public
NewsMax 2008( July 7, “Conservatives to Fight McCain at Convention”,
http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/McCain_vs_conservatives/2008/07/07/110551.html)

Another hot button issue is McCain's acceptance of global warming theory. Many conservatives feel the theory of man-made global
warming is a hoax, and the current platform more or less skirts the issue by talking about using "markets and new technologies" to
solve possible climate change. McCain on the other hand supports government action to address global warming, which the Post
described as "a centerpiece of his campaign." McCain, the newspaper reports, supports a cap-and-trade emissions plan that many
conservatives oppose, and he has talked about trying to reach a global-emissions agreement that includes China and India. "It is
something that we are very concerned with," Donald J. Devine, vice chairman of the American Conservative Union (ACU) told the
Post, which reports that the ACU will have a convention operation to monitor proposed changes to the platform. In past years, the
ACU has produced an alternative conservative platform as a guide to those working on the real one, the Post recalled. Devine told the
Post he is hopeful that the environmental planks in the platform will focus on McCain's support for nuclear power plants and his
willingness to revisit offshore oil and gas drilling. But he is prepared for the worst. "There's no question it's going to be changed
radically," he said of the platform. The Competitive Enterprise Institute's Myron Ebell, told the Post that McCain should be careful as
he and his allies seek to change the platform to reflect his political sensibilities. "He attracts a lot of votes in the middle —
independents and moderates," Ebell said. But "if he pushes on each one of these issues — campaign finance, immigration, or global
warming and energy issues — he's likely to keep a lot of people at home on Election Day."

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Middle Class Link


Using liberal climate policies against Democrat helps McCain with the middle class, the plan takes this
away from them.

Douthat and Salam July 14, 2008


is a senior editor at The Atlantic. Mr. Salam is an associate editor at The Atlantic and a fellow at the New America Foundation
National Review Battle for the 'Burbs - How Republicans can compete for the upper middle class

The Greening of Conservatism. For the moment, Democrats own the environment as an issue, in large part because Republicans have
conceded it to them. That needs to change. For many upper-middle-class voters, the environment is as much a values issue as abortion
is to social conservatives. And as the consensus surrounding the role of human-produced carbon emissions in climate change has
grown stronger, conservatives have often taken a head-in-the-sand approach, which in turn has fit neatly into a larger left-wing
narrative of a know-nothing, anti-science Right -- a narrative that has become one of the many drags on the GOP's ability to woo
professionals. John McCain deserves credit for recognizing these realities. Unfortunately, with his support for cap-and-trade, he's
pulled a Chafee on the issue, copying Democratic proposals rather than advancing a conservative alternative. By aping liberalism's
call for a regulatory approach to climate change, the McCain approach allows Democrats to continue to pose as visionaries on the
issue, rather than exposing them for what they are: top-down statists who are imposing a distaste for industrial society and the
suburban lifestyle on what is fundamentally a question of problem-solving. (More encouraging is McCain's proposal to build 45 new
nuclear power plants by 2030.) By debating liberals on the best approach for fighting climate change, conservatives can make the
case for an environmentalism that is pro-growth and pro-jobs. One approach, advanced in these pages by Jim Manzi and elsewhere by
reformist liberals Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, is to eschew punitive approaches like carbon taxes or a cap-and-trade
system -- which would be a messier and more complex form of carbon taxes -- and instead embrace large investments in alternative
technologies. For instance, conservatives could propose an agency dedicated to funding alternative-energy research -- modeled,
perhaps, on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which has sparked dramatic advances in the realm of defense
technology. Here, too, McCain has a good idea with his proposal of a $300 million prize for the inventor of an improved automobile
battery. The threat posed by global warming is real, the Right should argue, but massive new regulatory burdens will undercut the
growth and innovation we need to build lasting and effective solutions. That message -- that we should innovate, rather than regulate,
our way out of our energy dilemma -- will resonate with upper-middle-class voters, particularly when they understand how the costs of
cap-and-trade will impact their lives.

The middle class is key to the election.


Douthat and Salam July 14, 2008
is a senior editor at The Atlantic. Mr. Salam is an associate editor at The Atlantic and a fellow at the New America Foundation
National Review Battle for the 'Burbs - How Republicans can compete for the upper middle class

The biggest problem facing any flailing political party is its need simultaneously to accomplish two seemingly contradictory feats: re-
energizing its core supporters while cutting into the other party's natural base. Over the last four years, the Democratic party has
managed to do both. First a shared hatred of George W. Bush and then a shared enthusiasm for Barack Obama has made the party's
base -- blacks and white, well-off, web-savvy liberals -- more excited about being Democrats than they've been since 1992, or possibly
even 1964. Meanwhile, the national party has pursued an initially derided, eventually lauded "50-state strategy" aimed at rebuilding
itself in solidly Republican regions as well as swing states. The result has been a slew of successful local candidates who have
expanded the definition of what it means to be a Democrat, and in the process swiped votes from constituencies the GOP was
supposed to own.
For Republicans, the road back to power involves pulling the same feat off in reverse. On one hand, the GOP needs to consolidate and
energize its base, especially the middle-class and working-class voters in flyover states who formed the backbone of George W. Bush's
majority. (This task will be made more difficult by the fact that many Republicans seem to think that "energizing the base" means
appealing to a set of D.C.-based interest groups rather than actual voters.) But on the other hand, Republicans need a set of issues and
candidates that can do what Democrats Travis Childers and Don Cazayoux just did in Mississippi and Louisiana, respectively -- win
elections in areas that have been trending to the other party for years or decades. If the challenge for the Democrats' 50-state strategy
has been to win over the vast middle-American constituency that has been termed "Sam's Club conservatives," the challenge for a
Republican 50-state strategy is to win over a very different demographic: the affluent, well-educated, increasingly liberal upper middle
class.

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Cap/Trade hurts Obama

Obama risks losing his base in support for cap-and-trade


Economist 2008 (“Sharing credit for carbon credits”, May 2,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2008/05/sharing_credit_for_carbon_cred.cfm)

This is actually a bit misleading: The early EPA experiments with emission trading began under Gerald Ford, as did transport
deregulation, supported by conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute. Mr Carter, wisely, caught the
momentum and picked up the pace. It is true, of course, that the idea of protecting the environment via market mechanisms has long
since been accepted by many Democrats as preferable to micromanagerial command-and-control regulation. Joe Barton, a Republican
representative, now attacks cap-and-trade programmes as the spawn of Nancy Pelosi. But that is precisely why Mr Obama's answer is
so deft, as Mr Krugman would probably notice if he could contain his sputtering rage at hearing a word of praise for the other party.
The dilemma for Mr Obama is that, of course, if you are going to present yourself as a new kind of politician who wants to rise above
partisan bickering, you must occasionally demonstrate that you actually are willing to learn from your ideological opponents. But in a
Democratic primary, this is tough to do without alienating some crucial part of your base—and in a race this close, they're all crucial
parts. Mr Obama's ingenious solution is to seize on a proposal that clearly has been supported by Republicans, that has a recognizably
conservative ring to it, but which has long since been embraced by Democrats. This is a bit like praising, say, Friedrich Hayek's
analysis of the unworkability of centrally planned economies: It makes you sound ecumenical, insofar as Hayek is typically regarded
as a conservative, but in the current climate amounts to little more than affirming conventional wisdom.

Obama doesn’t want to talk about climate policy.

Slate Magazine June 13, 2008 “Ducking the Climate Debate” Lexis

Obama had other reasons to duck the debate. After pleasing the environmental left in the primaries with his strong, detailed climate
policy, he is showing signs of regarding the issue as a liability for the general election. As America's economic troubles mount, the
stump time he devotes to climate change dwindles. Maybe that's because cap and trade will boost energy prices over the short term, at
a time when voters are in deep economic distress and apoplectic about the price of gasoline.

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Cap/Trade Unpopular
Support for cap-and-trade would tank political support
The Australian, July 2, 2008 (“Blow to good intentions”, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23954821-
7583,00.html, Accessed July 15, 2008)

FORGET Iraq. The politics of petrol will dominate the coming presidential election in the US. As much as one hates to upset the lofty
foreign policy sensibilities of the Left, you need only set foot in the US for a nanosecond to see that the campaigns of Barack Obama
and John McCain are consumed by grassroots concerns over the rising cost of fuel. Just as in Australia, it is clear that the hip pocket nerve of
working families may haunt the next US president, confounding efforts to address climate change. And the advocates of climate change are largely to blame. The
debate in both countries has been a phony one. But the political parallels don't end there. Obama, the fresh-faced 46-year-old Democrat, is
wooing voters across the continent with his promise of change. Sound familiar? He was recently described by Daniel Henninger in The Wall Street Journal as the "Hey
Jude candidate, the man who can somehow make things better". Sounding more familiar? Both the Republican McCain and Obama support an
emissions trading system yet remain quiet on how a cap and trade greenhouse gas emissions system will affect American working
families. Boy, does that sound familiar. And, if debate in Australia these past few weeks is any indication, whether it's McCain or Obama who wins in November, they
are in for one scary climate change ride. The same ride that confronts the Rudd Labor Government here in Australia. To be sure, had the Coalition been re-elected last
November, it would have faced a similar problem of mismanaged voter expectations. Pushing an emissions trading system without warning people
about the cost increases was always going to create a tricky political problem. But our own Hey Jude Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, exacerbated the
inevitable political backlash. By framing climate change in soaring terms as the single biggest moral issue of our time, Rudd ensured that the climate change roller-
coaster was always going to crash down to earth when cost finally entered the equation. It's only in the past fortnight that Labor cabinet ministers have been admitting
that the introduction of an emissions trading system will be the single biggest change to our modern lifestyle in decades. Forget opening up of the Australian economy,
they say. Forget workplace deregulation. Forget the GST. This is going to be the most daunting challenge for the Prime Minister if the Government sticks to its guns
over mitigating the effects of climate change. The sledgehammer realisation of the costs of the emissions trading system and other measures has kicked off a renewed
call for a genuine debate over nuclear energy in Australia. While the Rudd Government has said "N.O." to nuclear power, this issue will not go away. At the Australian
American Leadership Dialogue in Washington last week, climate change dominated discussion. One participant was the 26-year-old new boss of the Australian Workers
Union, Paul Howes, who took over when Bill Shorten went into parliament last year. Howes says that the support for an emissions trading system is not as
strong as many people think. "Once you educate the public about the costs they will have to wear, voter support will drop away. We
need to be realistic about the subsidies that will be required for business. Handing out wads of cash to working families is not going to alleviate the
pain of a loss of jobs. If we are going to reduce emissions and have jobs in society, we need to secure baseload power, and until the technology for that is available we
need a genuine bipartisan approach to developing nuclear power in Australia." Unfortunately, as another dialogue participant, former treasurer Peter Costello,
remarked, we are still locked in a frothy climate debate to the point where the Oscars in Hollywood now claim to be carbon neutral. Huh? A huge light and sound
extravaganza that is beamed to 100 million TV sets, where stars fly in on their private jets, travel in stretch limousines? We all love being climate change advocates,
Costello said, as long as it doesn't affect our lifestyle. Access Economics director Chris Richardson cut to the chase yesterday, telling ABC radio that "the whole idea of
carbon pricing is that if it doesn't hurt it won't work". A politician serious about climate change ought to welcome higher fuel prices to change
our behaviour. Drive less, use less fuel, emit lower levels of carbon gases. You haven't heard any politician say that. The political
backlash would be too scary. No wonder it wasn't raised during the election last November in Australia. Exactly the same dynamics
are playing out in the US for the next president. To raise these issues now, with ever-increasing fuel prices, would be political suicide.
Hence McCain and Obama are ducking any real discussion of the costs consumers will wear from policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Instead,
McCain is pushing for oil drilling off the US coast and another 43 nuclear reactors by 2030 in an effort to relieve US dependence on greenhouse gas-emitting fossil
fuels. Obama plans to slap a tax on oil companies: "I'll make oil companies like Exxon pay a tax on their windfall profits and we'll use the money to help families pay
for their skyrocketing energy costs and other bills." So the phony debate on climate change continues across the Pacific. Charlie Cook, editor of the highly regarded
Cook Political Report, who shared his thoughts on the political contours of the looming presidential election at the dialogue, tells The Australian: "Americans have
never seen energy prices this high or been more attentive and concerned about the economy. (But) the conversation about cap and
trade, as far as the public is concerned, hasn't even begun. They wouldn't know cap and trade from cap and gown. All they know is
that energy prices are skyrocketing and they don't like it. The debate and their thought process have not moved beyond that point. "This is complex stuff,"
he adds, "and complexity and campaigns do not mix. On November 4, election day, the percentage of voters who have a clue what cap and trade
mean will be very small and not much bigger than today. Americans vote on themes and impressions, not on specific issues. And the truth
be known, I doubt if Australian voters are very different." Cook is spot-on. But the swing against the Rudd Government at the weekend Gippsland by-election suggests
that themes last only so long. Against a background of rising petrol prices, the first key test of the Rudd Government delivered a devastating blow to Labor's climate
change agenda. It turns out that sometimes when you vote for a theme, you later wish you'd asked for more detail.

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Climate not key to election


Climate is not a key issue in election
.
CRISTINE RUSSELL JULY 2008, is a freelance science journalist, president of the Council for the Advancement of Science
Writing and a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Columbia Journalism Review, Climate Change: Now What?

And there is some urgency. Despite increased coverage of climate change, it is still not at the top of the media or public priority list.
"If you don't have climate change as a headline in the press," says Nisbet, who writes the blog Framing Science, "it's unlikely to be a
top-tier issue in the public or among policy makers." A 2007 ranking by the Project for Excellence in Journalism found that among all
media, environmental coverage ranked nineteenth, at 1.7 percent of the newshole--just behind sports and celebrity coverage. A Gallup
report last November found that only about four in ten Americans believes that immediate, drastic action is needed to deal with global
warming, and just one in four says there will be "extreme" effects of global warming in fifty years if efforts are not increased. Is this a
failure of the experts and politicians to communicate the situation or a failure of journalists to dig and report? Yet journalists should
not be cheerleaders. As climate change moves further into the policy and political arena, the traditional wall between analytical
reporting and advocacy is in danger. The issue is coming to the fore at a time of major change in mainstream journalism and the
growth of opinionated Web sites and blogs that have helped to blur the old lines.

Environment not the key issue in this election

USNEWS.com July 10, 2008 Thursday Is McCain Dumping Cap-and-Trade?

McCain's support for cap-and-trade was really the last obstacle preventing him from giving Americans a clear-cut choice on the energy
issue. Barack Obama is for making Americans pay more for energy in an effort to fight climate change; McCain wants to make energy
more affordable. At the same time, McCain can say he's for reducing carbon emissions and energy independence by focusing on
technology and innovation (and more drilling in the short term) as solutions rather than costly and growth-killing regulations. So what
will Americans care more about, global warming or jobs? I don't think that's much of a contest these days, especially when 60 percent
of us think the global economy is in a recession. (As I write this, I am listening to the theme from Band of Brothers. Maybe this will
be McCain's Bastogne moment, a critical turning point for his campaign.)

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Obama will do the plan


Your plan gets done in Jan.
Slate Magazine June 13, 2008 “Ducking the Climate Debate” Lexis

But for Obama, cap and trade is the best way to reduce dependence on foreign oil and lower energy prices over the long term. (By
putting a price on carbon, cap and trade offers built-in incentives to all clean energy sources.) It would impose a relatively modest
upfront cost to get that done-2 cents per gallon of gas per year between now and 2030, according to the EPA-and that's a deal worth
taking. Will Obama have the guts to make the argument? He has stood up to political posturing over energy prices before. In April,
when McCain announced his gas-tax holiday and Clinton rushed to embrace it, Obama called it what it was: an empty pander that
would do nothing to solve the problem. Cap and trade isn't just the key to Obama 's climate and energy policy; it's a crucial plank
in his economic policy as well. When he talks about investing "in the research and innovation necessary to create the jobs and
industries of the future right here in America," as he did in his economic address this week in Raleigh, N.C., cap and trade is his
unspoken vehicle-the unmarked armored car that delivers the cash. It is by auctioning pollution credits that Obama would raise most
of the $150 billion he proposes to invest in alternative energy over the next 10 years, a policy that he said would "end our addiction on
foreign oil, provide real long-term relief from high fuel costs, and build a green economy that could create up to five million well-
paying jobs that can't be outsourced." But in the Raleigh speech, these worthy and crowd-pleasing goals were divorced from cap and
trade, which was never mentioned, and from the climate crisis, which merited only a brief nod.

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McCain won’t do the plan


McCain cap and trade is horrible

Reich,08(Robert Reich is the nation's 22nd Secretary of Labor and a professor at the University of California at Berkeley
http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2008/04/obama-bitterness-meet-press-and-old.html

With McCain now on board for a “cap-and-trade” system, it's a certainty that we'll have a president next year who
wants to address global warming by imposing an overall cap on U.S. carbon emissions, which will drop annually.
The “trade” part of the equation is that companies finding efficient ways to cut emissions can sell the unused
portions of their permits to others. But look more closely and you see a big difference between McCain and Obama
(and HRC, for that matter)on how the permits are allocated. McCain’s proposal would give the lion’s share to
companies that are now the biggest polluters. This does have some logic to it: after all, as the overall cap tightens
each year, the biggest polluters face the largest challenges in cutting emissions. By contrast, Senators Obama and
Clinton have both proposed allocating permits through an auction. Under this system, every company - large or
small - would have to buy rights to pollute. As a result, biggest the polluters would have to pay the most - thereby
providing them with the greatest incentive to cut emissions. There is political work to do, given a March poll that
found 13 percent of Americans believe Obama

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Politics Link cap pop tax unpop


Carbon tax is massively unpopular.
Washington Post April 1, 2007 Tax on Carbon Emissions Gains Support Industry and Experts Promote It as Alternative to Help
Curb Greenhouse Gases

As lawmakers on Capitol Hill push for a cap-and-trade system to rein in the nation's greenhouse gas emissions, an
unlikely alternative has emerged from an ideologically diverse group of economists and industry leaders: a carbon tax.
Most legislators view advocating any tax increase as tantamount to political suicide. But a coalition of academics and
polluters now argues that a simple tax on each ton of emissions would offer a more efficient and less bureaucratic way of
curbing carbon dioxide buildup, which scientists have linked to climate change.
Carbon tax is politically radioactive. Prefer our evidence its comparative.
LA times May 28, 2007 Time to tax carbon A carbon tax is the best, cheapest and most efficient way to combat cataclysmic climate
change. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-carbontax28may28,0,2888366.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail

There is
a growing consensus among economists around the world that a carbon tax is the best way to combat global
warming, and there are prominent backers across the political spectrum, from N. Gregory Mankiw, former chairman of the Bush
administration's Council on Economic Advisors, and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to former Vice President Al Gore and Sierra Club head
Carl Pope. Yet the political consensus is going in a very different direction. European leaders are pushing hard for the United States and
other countries to join their failed carbon-trading scheme, and there are no fewer than five bills before Congress that would impose a federal cap-and-trade
system. On the other side, there is just one lonely bill in the House, from Rep. Pete Stark (D-Fremont), to impose a carbon
tax, and it's not expected to go far. The obvious reason is that, for voters, taxes are radioactive, while carbon trading
sounds like something that just affects utilities and big corporations. The many green politicians stumping for cap-and-trade seldom
point out that such a system would result in higher and less predictable power bills. Ironically, even though a carbon tax could cost voters less, cap-and-trade is
being sold as the more consumer-friendly approach.

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C tax popular
Carbon taxes are gaining political credibility.
Carbon Control News June 30, 2008 CARBON TAX GAINS SUPPORT AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS,
CONSERVATIVES
Long heralded by environmentalists for his early outspokenness on the dangers of anthropogenic climate change, Hansen
was invited to testify to the
global warming panel on the 20th anniversary of his landmark congressional testimony citing human activity as a chief cause
of global warming. His endorsement of a carbon tax could prove influential in building support for the idea in the
environmental community, which outside of the environmental justice movement has for the most part backed cap-and-trade
due to its perceived superior political viability. A new report from the economic advisory firm Sonecon, headed by former
Clinton administration economic adviser Robert Shapiro, makes much the same case as Hansen in endorsing a carbon tax over
a cap-and-trade system -- a development that could prove equally influential in shifting the climate change debate. Noting that all
climate policies will eventually lead to higher energy prices, the report's authors argue that by "capturing those price increases in a tax, [the government] can recycle or
rebate most of the revenues through other forms of tax relief, sharply reducing the direct costs for almost everyone." The report is available at CarbonControlNews.com.
Returning revenues from a carbon tax to consumers in the form of rebates or lower payroll taxes could also be a way to
address Republican claims that climate change policies will simply increase the tax burden on Americans. "That idea seems to
have some political currency," says a source at Friends of the Earth of returning 100 percent of revenues to the public. "I think there's a lot of appeal
politically."

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**** States CP ****

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1NC States CP
State cooperative action will set up a highly effective cap and trade for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
Kirsten H. Engel 2006 The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law January 2006 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW JOURNAL [Volume 14 Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach

A regional program should lead to greater emissions reductions than programs that are limited to individual states for two reasons. First,
and most obviously, a regional program is likely to encompass a larger geographic area and more centers of population, and thus is likely to have the potential
to result in a larger contribution to climate change mitigation than an approach limited to a single state (though this obviously depends upon the size and
population of the states involved). Thus the staff recommendations of the West Coast Governor’s Global Warming Initiative note that “the [three] states’
combined carbon emissions, if compared against other countries in the world, rank seventh globally. A significant
reduction in regional greenhouse gas emissions would have a measurable global impact.”54 Size matters, not only
because of the potential for greater greenhouse gas emission reductions by virtue of the larger geographic area
encompassed by a regional program, but also because, in an emissions trading regime, a greater number of sources
makes possible a greater number of trades thus making the market more competitive.55 RGGI’s proposal for a greenhouse gas
emissions trading scheme is a case in point. It was developed after New York Governor George Pataki invited other northeastern states to join him in creating a
regional emissions trading scheme;56 the Governor apparently believed that such a scheme would not be feasible in New York State alone.57 A regional
approach should also lead to greater emissions reductions because it is more likely to employ a uniform approach to
regulation. Such greater uniformity may, in turn, overcome industry resistance to greenhouse gas regulation. Even
assuming such regulation will impose unwanted costs, to the extent the industry does business in more than one state
within a region, the benefits of a uniform regional approach is likely to outweigh the benefits of particular “pockets” of
less stringent regulation. Similarly, the opportunity to join in a more uniform regional approach may overcome political
resistance to greenhouse gas regulation within the participating states by rendering such programs the regional “norm”
against which nonaction might be seen as the aberrant regulatory response.

State cap and trade solves market integration and competitiveness.


Henrik Selin and Stacy D. VanDeveer 2007 Political Science and Prediction: What’s Next for U.S. Climate Change Policy?
Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of New Hampshire Review of Policy Research, Volume 24, Number 1 (2007)

Often, advocates of climate policy seek to exploit and/or alter market dynamics. For example, many state and local level
initiatives mandate greater use of renewable energy and the purchase of higher efficiency products by public authorities
(e.g. appliances and vehicles). Many firms and NGOs have similar policies in place designed to regulate their internal purchasing. Such policies can
expand markets for more energy efficient products, offering the potential to push down prices and make such products
more economically competitive. As states and municipalities mandate higher energy efficiency standards, this can be
expected to increase the size of related markets. If energy efficient products and techniques decline in price relative to less efficient ones, this
too would undermine claims about the economic and social disasters engendered by GHG emissions reduction policies made by many opponents of climate
change policy. Market issues are also central in efforts to develop cap-and-trade schemes. If the RGGI effort among the
Northeast states and California comes to fruition, it would help reveal an actual price for particular CO2 reductions,
thereby moving beyond existing assessments that often only estimate these costs. This, in turn, would allow companies to
better budget costs and benefits associated with particular GHG reductions. Also, if there were an effective carbon
market in the United States, more firms that believed they would be competitive on the market are likely to join the
trading scheme, given relatively low entry and transaction costs. Similarly, additional states may seek to join a regional trading
mechanism if it is successful, thereby expanding its geographical coverage. The experience in the northeast with the development and
expansion of the NOx trading scheme suggests that this is a distinct possibility (Aulisi, Farrell, Pershing, & VanDeveer, 2005).

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States solve generic

States are doing cap and trade now, they can coordinate action, it solves.
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

US climate change policy is far more complex and rich than what is commonly thought. A wide
variety of subnational initiatives are underway.
Many are leading to direct and significant emission reductions. Others are setting the stage for future incentives and
enforceable policies and rules. Out of the soup is emerging a consistent US policy structure. States (and cities) inventory their
emissions, investigate GHG mitigation action plans, and commit to future emission reductions. These governments then choose
from a menu of available policy alternatives, such as vehicle GHG standards, fuel standards, appliance efficiency standards, and renewable electricity portfolio
standards, and innovate with particular policy instruments that are tailored to their specific locale. State governments cooperate and coordinate
their actions via multi-state regional initiatives, which appear to be on the way to eventually establishing emission-
trading markets. These actions are beginning to add up to a sizable portion of US population and GHG emissions and substantial potential GHG emission
reductions. The commitments of lower governments on climate action are steadily amounting to substantial emission-
reduction commitments. Sub-national US mitigation efforts represent engagement by 43–89% of the affected populations and responsible parties—
including 53%coverage of GHG emissions by state climate change mitigation action plans; 43% coverage of emission sources by state or city emission-
reduction targets; 58% coverage of US electricity production by state renewable electricity standards; 47% coverage of US vehicle sales by state vehicle GHG
regulations; and 89% coverage of US GHG emissions by multi-government partnerships supporting the establishment of GHG market mechanisms. If the 17
states that have set their own GHG emission-reduction targets (generally to 1990 levels by the year 2020) in fact were to achieve those targets, nationwide US
GHG emissions would be stabilized at 2010 levels by 2020—without any serious mitigation action taken by over half the states. Governments have
largely overcome the ‘‘commons’’ problem in dealing with climate change, with a broad range of effective state- and
city-level policy mechanisms being put in place. They are gaining much experience about what works, how to leverage
each others efforts, and how to link across jurisdictions and sectors. Of course, governments (and industry) are still at the bottom of the
learning curve, though now perceptibly moving up that curve. Even so, these efforts should not be overstated. The adoption and pursuit of targets, goals, and
potential reductions should not be confused with actual mitigation performance, and what has been accomplished still falls far short of the much deeper longer-
term cuts that will be needed for global climate stabilization. Moreover, even the best intentions of multiple multi-government partnerships developing
consistent emission-tracking systems does not ensure that a cross-jurisdiction and crosssectoral emissions trading mechanism will come to fruition anytime
soon, never mind function well. What is clear, though, is that lower-level government policy structure need not preclude, and can
certainly advance, federal policy in the area of climate change. Broad efforts of states and cities are so pervasive at this
point that future federal policy will benefit by adopting the most popular and best functioning GHG mitigation
programs and by coordinating the many existing initiatives. Whether and how nationwide and worldwide emissions markets evolve
remains highly uncertain. All this experimentation may well result in an assortment of diverse markets and policies, though
founded on common metrics and protocol. That may turn out to be the best approach of all. We will see.

The states influence the generation of GHG across multiple areas.


Selin and VanDeveer - Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston
University, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire – 2007
(Henrik and Stacy D., “Political Science and Prediction: What’s Next for U.S. Climate Change Policy?,” Review of Policy Research,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/6/1/pages179613/p179613-1.php)

State Action—A great deal of progressive climate change action is developing within and among U.S. states (Rabe, 2004; Selin & VanDeveer,
2005). Furthermore, large U.S. states emit as much GHGs as many major industrialized countries. Texas emits more GHGs than United
Kingdom and Canada. California emissions are higher than Brazil’s and Spain’s. U.S. medium sized and smaller states emit as much as most
European countries and many larger developing countries. For example, Massachusetts emits GHG emissions roughly equal those of Austria,
Greece, or Egypt (Rabe, 2004; Selin & VanDeveer, 2005). State policy makers can influence the generation of GHGs across multiple areas,
including energy and electricity production and use, transportation, land planning and use, agriculture and forestry, and waste
management (Rabe, 2004). The Pew Center on Global Climate Change lists programs in over 30 U.S. states related to climate change (http://www.pewclimate.org).
Many state leaders explicitly argue that states should lead because of lagging federal policy making (Selin & VanDeveer, 2005). In these cases,
state officials often act based on an acceptance of the science behind anthropogenic climatic change and information about local consequences of a changing climate.
Examples are found in many states that are traditional leaders on environmental policy development, including those in the Northeast,
the Great Lakes regions, and along the Pacific coast.

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States solve cap and trade


States working cooperatively solves best.
Kirsten H. Engel 2006 The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law January 2006 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW JOURNAL [Volume 14 Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach
As a previous work by the author deals with the first two mechanisms for aggregating the influence of a single state or local government’s climate change
program,9 this essay will focus on the third method: the aggregation of state or local government responses to climate change through regional cooperation.
Indeed, some of the most promising climate change initiatives currently under development are being pursued by states
acting as a group. Such approaches are proceeding without federal oversight or approval, but instead upon simple
cooperation. This is in contrast to most environmental regulation, which generally proceeds on a state-by-state basis,
much of it according to statutory programs delegated to the states by the federal government.10 It is also contrary to most examples of regional cooperation on
environmental matters. Such cooperation is usually observed with respect to the use or preservation of natural resources whose location spans the boundaries
of more than one state 11 or where cooperation is necessary to remediate a pollution problem resulting from regional economic or social patterns.12 Even here,
the federal government is usually intimately involved in the creation, oversight or approval of such programs.13 The involvement of the federal government is
to be expected given that these regional programs involve a commons, and a central regulator is often thought necessary to prevent the over-exploitation of the
commons.14 This essay argues that, because a regional interstate cooperative approach will likely lead to greater emissions
reductions, it constitutes a more effective and efficient approach to climate change than leaving the matter to individual
states. The prediction of greater emissions reductions follows from the opportunities, under a regional program, to
aggregate the efforts of individual states. It also follows from the potential for more uniform regulation across a
multistate area, which lowers the costs of emissions reductions. Finally, because there is “strength in numbers,” a
regional approach may enhance the resolve of individual state policymakers to address climate change.

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States Solve Cap and Trade

States are developing cap-and-trade systems to reduce 10 percent emission by 2019


Anna Shoup (Staff Writer of News Hour) 2006 (“The Global Warming Debate-Emissions Trading Ins and Outs,” June 5
2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/science/globalwarming/emissions.html) July 15 2008

The number of states interested in creating a cap-and-trade program is growing and some have already taken steps to set
up statewide or regional programs. In the Northeast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative would establish the first
collective effort in America to adopt mandatory controls for carbon dioxide emissions. The governors of Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Vermont signed a memorandum to create a cap-and-trade
program covering all power plants that includes a trading program. In April 2006, Maryland passed a law requiring the
state's participation as part of its Healthy Air Act. Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the
Eastern Canadian Provinces and New Brunswick are observers in the process and may join later. The RGGI cap will be
set at current emissions levels when the program begins in 2009 and reduce emissions 10 percent by 2019. It allows
companies to use offset allowances. California, Oregon and Washington also are developing trading systems as part of
their climate change policy.

States cap-and-trade systems reduces emissions by 2020


Robert Stavins (Professor Harvard University) 2008 (“US should adopt a comprehensive cap-and-trade system,” EU
Information, May 6 2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/us-adopt-comprehensive-cap-trade-system/article-
172136) July 15 2008

Cap-and-trade systems have been used before in the States, reducing sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide in 1995, the phase-
out of leaded gasoline in the 1980s and CFCs, according to the author. Despite the cap-and-trade system's relative success
in cutting conventional air pollutants, it has made "very limited" progress in cutting CO2 emissions, claims Stavins. He
continues by explaining the EU trading system, describing it as a "considerable success", but warns it is too early to assess
it accurately. A number of regional proposals have been discussed in the US, including a yet-to-be-implemented cap-and-
trade system involving ten north eastern states, due to be realised in 2009. California has approved a Green Gas Solutions
Act due to start in 2012, which seeks to bring emissions down to their 1990 levels by 2020, and it might employ a cap-
and-trade approach, reveals Stavins.

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States Solve Cap and Trade


States collaborate to establish a regional cap-and-trade system to reduce coal-burning emissions while
launching meetings with the EU
Barry G. Rabe (The Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 2008 (“Second
Generation Climate Policies in the United States,” January 2 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Second_generation_climate_policies_in_the_United_States) Assessed July 16 2008

Perhaps the most vibrant regional initiative that involves U.S. states is the so-called Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI was launched in 2003, when
New York Governor Pataki invited his counterparts from 10 neighboring states and Washington, D.C.’s mayor to explore the possibilities of establishing a
regional cap-and-trade program for reducing carbon dioxide emissions from all fossil fuel-burning power plants located
within the region. At this point, states such as Massachusetts and New Hampshire had already taken formal action to cap
greenhouse gas emissions from their own coal-burning plants and similar steps were under consideration elsewhere. New
York completed a multi-year review to confront climate change, which included a number of renewable energy initiatives and a pledge to reduce emissions five
percent below 1990 levels by 2010 and 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. But state policy analysts concluded that a regional approach to cap-and
trade would be more cost-effective given the strong inter-state linkages in regional electricity distribution New York
reached agreement in December 2005 with six other states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
Vermont) on a regional cap-and-trade program. Maryland joined RGGI in 2006, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were active in
negotiations but have decided for now not to join, and Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and the province of New Brunswick continue as formal observers
and may ultimately decide to join the initiative. Development of a model rule addressing all key provisions continues through 2006, with the goal of formally
launching the cap-and-trade program in January 2009. RGGI would cap regional emissions at 2009 levels through 2014, and then reduce
these 10 percent below that level by 2018. The RGGI process emulates some of the framework for interstate coordination in reducing nitrogen oxides
emissions in the northeastern Ozone Transport Region, but entails exclusively a negotiation among states without any input from federal officials. Consequently, a
major RGGI goal is to establish and implement a regional carbon emissions cap while “accommodating, to the extent feasible, the diversity in policies and programs in
individual states”. In that regard, RGGI bears a rather significant resemblance to Europe’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) that was launched in February 2005 and
has triggered “informal contacts between state officials and representatives of the European Commission and European
member states”.

California establishes a state wide cap-and-trade system while working towards the nation and globally
Los Angeles Times (News Source) 2007 (“Time to Tax Carbon,” LA Times, May 28 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-carbontax28may28,0,2888366.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail) July 16 2008

The first is the simplest, and the least efficient: Just order the polluters to clean up. Unfortunately, that's the strategy
favored by the Legislature, which last year ordered that greenhousegas emissions in California be cut by 25% by 2020 and
is now coming up with ways to meet the goal through conservation and regulation. The law isn't specific about how to
achieve the reduction, opening the door for Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to pursue Method No. 2: a cap-and-trade system.
Under this system, the government decides how many tons of a given greenhouse gas can be emitted statewide and passes
out credits to the emitters. Polluters trade credits among themselves; those for whom it's relatively cheap to cut emissions
sell credits to those for whom it's expensive. In the last year, Schwarzenegger has been traveling around the country and
the world signing cap-and-trade deals.

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States Solve GHG Emissions

States are taking role in climate change policies nationally and globally
Barry G. Rabe (The Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 2008 (“Second
Generation Climate Policies in the United States,” January 2 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Second_generation_climate_policies_in_the_United_States) Assessed July 16 2008
This familiar tale, however, fails to provide a complete picture of the evolving U.S. engagement in climate policy. Indeed, at the very time federal institutions continued
to thrash about on this issue, major new initiatives were launched, with bipartisan support, in such diverse state capitals as
Sacramento (Calif.), Carson City (Nev.), Santa Fe (N.M.), Austin (Tex.), Harrisburg (Penn.), Albany (N.Y.), and Hartford
(Conn.). By the middle of the current decade, more than half of the U.S. states could be fairly characterized as actively involved
in climate change policy, with one or more policies that promised to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Virtually all states were beginning to at least study the issue and explore very modest remedies. A growing number of these—such as California,
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York—were every bit as engaged on multiple policy fronts as counterparts in European capitals and
far more active than all Canadian provinces except Manitoba. These programs are beginning to have some effect on stabilizing emissions from their
jurisdictions. Indeed, many states are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus state programs offer considerable
potential for reducing emissions. If the fifty states were to secede and become sovereign nations, thirteen would rank among the world’s top forty nations in
emissions, led by Texas in seventh place ahead of the United Kingdom.

States are important motivators behind environmental policy advocacies


Barry G. Rabe (The Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 2008 (“Second
Generation Climate Policies in the United States,” January 2 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Second_generation_climate_policies_in_the_United_States) Assessed July 16 2008
Many states worked intensively in recent decades to build in-house capacity on the environment, energy, and other areas that
now have direct relevance to climate change. Consequently, state agencies have proven increasingly fertile areas for “policy
entrepreneurs” to develop ideas that are tailored to their state’s needs and opportunities. These ideas can then be translated
into legislation, executive orders, and pilot programs. State officials also have proven effective in forming coalitions, often
cutting across partisan lines in the legislature and engaging supportive interest groups where feasible. No two states have assembled identical climate
policy constituencies, nor have any devised identical policies. But state agencies have been significant drivers behind
innovation, whether in the stages of developing policy ideas or seeing them through to policy formation. In more recent
years, state-based environmental advocacy groups and private firms that might benefit financially from climate policy
have become increasingly visible and active in bringing about far-reaching initiatives. This has created broader supportive coalitions for
new policy development, although some have begun to emerge, such as between competing providers of renewable energy.

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States Solve Carbon Tax


States are capable of implementing carbon taxes meeting national standards
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

The federal government has used pollution taxes to phase out the production of various chlorofluorocarbons n133 and to
encourage auto makers to manufacture fuel-efficient cars. n134 The federal government has also considered adopting a
carbon tax, or other energy tax, to spur energy conservation and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. n135 However,
most pollution taxes, charges, and fees have been implemented by states rather than by the federal government. n136 The
Clean Air Act specifically endorses pollution taxes as a tool for states to comply with national air quality standards. n137

Emission trading fails as an incentive for new tech development, emission reduction, and environmental
justice
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

Part III criticizes emissions trading by drawing on the Los Angeles experience and examines the immorality, injustice,
and ineffectiveness of pollution trading. Pollution trading undermines moral claims that pollution is wrong by creating
a "right' to pollute. It creates environmentally unjust outcomes by placing a disproportionate [*236] burden of the
region's air pollution on low-income communities, a majority of which are ethnic and racial minorities. Finally, as
demonstrated in Los Angeles, pollution trading makes for ineffective air quality policy in at least four ways: 1) it does
not significantly reduce air pollution; 2) it does not spur technological innovation; 3) it decreases public participation
in environmental decision-making; and 4) it increases the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing emission reductions.

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States  Fed policy


State climate policies can be modeled for national policies
Barry G. Rabe (The Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 2008
(“Second Generation Climate Policies in the United States,” January 2 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Second_generation_climate_policies_in_the_United_States) Assessed July 16 2008
Much of the existing infrastructure of state climate programs has been individually tailored to the needs of a particular
state. However, there is increasing evidence that some policies enacted in one state ultimately are being replicated in one
or more additional states. There is, in fact, precedent in other policy arenas for such “policy diffusion” to spread across the
nation and become, in effect, de facto national policy. Under such circumstances, it may be possible for the states to
simply negotiate interstate differences and implement these inter-related programs. There may also be some tipping point
at which diffusion reaches sufficient numbers of states that the federal government concludes that it should respond by
drawing from these state models and establishing some version of this on a national basis.

California leads the way in cap-and-trade and its programs spillover nationally
MarketWatch 6/26/2008
(The Wall Street Journal,“ California unveils draft carbon cap-and-trade plan Proposal also calls for one-third of state's electricity to
come from renewables", http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/califonia-unveils-draft-landmark-cap-and-
trade/story.aspx?guid={C4130336-AFA2-414C-976D-F8506C32F642}&dist=msr_1&print=true&dist=printMidSection, Accessed
July 15, 2008)

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) - California released a draft plan on Thursday to reduce the state's projected greenhouse gas
emissions by nearly one-third, in part by creating a cap-and-trade program that could serve as a blueprint for a national carbon
emissions market. The 77-page "climate change draft scoping plan" lays out the framework for California to meet the goals of a 2006
law signed by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger that requires the state to slash its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. This
target means electric utilities, industrial users, fuel refiners such as Chevron Corp. (CVX) and ConocoPhillips (COP) and builders will
have to lower their combined output of carbon dioxide by one-tenth from today's levels and 30% from projected 2020 emissions of the
gas thought to contribute to global warming. The success of California's efforts to scale back greenhouse gas emissions using a mix of
regulations and market mechanisms could provide a roadmap for a national standard, largely thanks to the state's size and the
aggressive goals it has set. "It certainly paves the way," said Milo Sjardin, head of the North American division of New Carbon
Finance, a carbon emissions research and analysis firm. "Any federal program may take some of California's experience on board," he
said. The California plan also seeks to expand the amount of electricity utilities such as PG&E Corp.(PCG) and Edison
International(EIX) generate from renewable resources to 33% by 2020. Today, just 12% of the state's electricity comes from wind,
solar, geothermal and other renewable sources.

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States solve intl coop


State action is necessary for US participation in a global climate regime.
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

On the other hand, several researchers have underscored the growing importance of lower-level US government action in the
formation of federal US climate change policy and on US re-engagement in international climate change policy. Rabe
(2004) finds that US state initiatives could help promote the development of federal US climate policy in a bottom-up
fashion. Other researchers predict that future US federal climate policy will evolve from and be motivated by major state and
regional US climate policy adoption trends (Selin and VanDeveer, 2007). Purvis (2004), on the general practice of the US ‘‘to act first at home,
and then to build on that approach at the international level,’’ suggests that present environmental developments in the US could
eventually spur a new international climate change regime (i.e. non-Kyoto Protocol) in which the US would participate.
Bang et al. (2007) find that domestic ‘‘push’’ of lower-level US government actions could offer an alternate path toward
international climate engagement for the US; they conclude that two preconditions for US participation in any global
climate regime are the gathering of more experience and the crystallization of US policy preferences. Perhaps most
importantly, lower-level engagement is key to real, longterm progress. There must be a local commitment, down to
individuals, to accomplish the type of economic and societal transformations that will be necessary to achieve very large
reductions in carbon. The more engaged and the more powerful the commitment, the more likely it is that actual change
will occur.

State action provides action that can lead US participation in a global climate change regime.
Guri Bang 2007, et al Center for International Climate and Environmental Research The United States and international climate
cooperation: International “pull” versus domestic “push” Energy Policy Volume 35, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 1282-1291

At the local level,


212 mayors from 38 states representing a total population of 43 million citizens have joined a bipartisan
coalition to curb GHG emissions, an implicit rejection of the Bush administration's position on climate change.24 Their goal is to meet what
would have been the US requirement under the Kyoto Protocol—GHG emissions 7% below 1990 levels by 2012—through
actions including changes in land-use policies, increased use of renewable energy, public information campaigns, and efforts to change state and national
policies.25 The coalition is unusual in its open embrace of an international agreement spurned by the federal government
and significant because the cities are large contributors to the country's GHG emissions (New York Times, 2005a New York
Times, 2005a. Rebuffing Bush, 132 Mayors Embrace Kyoto Rules. E. Sanders, May 14, 2005, p. A9.New York Times, 2005a). It is possible that
initiatives at the state and local level confronting the issue of climate change could provide an avenue for a revised
international climate regime for the United States. A regime that extends action that has already been undertaken at the state level may achieve
more support at the federal level than newly proposed federal initiatives. For example, a national RPS has been included in recent federal energy legislation
and may have received serious consideration because 20 states have already enacted RPS rules. In addition, the array of different state and local
regulations that are being developed to cut GHG emissions may encourage development of a comprehensive national
climate policy and constitute a “bottom up” development path for federal climate policies (Rabe, 2002).

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States solve intl


States are already in international agreements on climate change.
Barry G. Rabe 2008 REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: REVISITING MULTI-STATE
COLLABORATION AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT TOOL University of Michigan Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, April 2008 SSRN

Ironically, greenhouse gases may present a particularly strong opportunity for this unique brand of regionalism. Unlike conventional air pollutants which
follow particular deposition patterns and raise enormous cross-border tensions, any reduction of 5 greenhouse gases from any source affords a global benefit.
As a result, as legal scholar Kirsten Engel has noted, “States are thus not limited to their geographic neighbors when searching for
climate partners and can enter alliances based upon economic or social advantages and compatibilities” (Engel 2005).
Indeed, states may not be confined to alliances with subnational units within American boundaries, further stretching the
potential geographical boundaries of regionalism. This is most evident in a series of evolving partnerships between
clusters of American states and neighboring Canadian provinces on climate policy (Selin and VanDeveer 2005). On the East Coast,
the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers have agreed to common but nonbinding greenhouse gas reduction targets for the region and for
their individual jurisdictions, building on their long-standing history of collaboration on environmental protection, economic development, and energy matters.
Somewhat similar relationships are emerging between the central Plains states and Manitoba through an initiative called “Powering the Plains” and also among
West Coast states and British Columbia. As with some forms of interstate collaboration, subnational policy engagement involving
states and non-American governments raise numerous questions and yet there is abundant precedent for formal and
semi-formal entities that further expand the realm of what is possible under the umbrella of regionalism (Zimmerman 2004).

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States can link to intl markets

States can link into international markets and provide a precedent for further Market work
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

The tacit agreements between individual states are steadily giving way to formalized agreements between sub-national
US governments. The US partnerships of western states, mid-western plains states, northeastern states, and cities across the map now represent over 80%
of the US population and GHG emissions. These partnerships bind their climate-mitigation efforts with coordinated research into
mitigation technologies, work toward consistent emissions inventory protocols, and seek to ultimately merge those
emission-reduction sub-markets. This trend toward committed partnerships, often involving emissions trading, offers
the prospect of overcoming cross-boundary jurisdiction issues (e.g. electricity generated in one state is consumed in another), and also
crosssectoral issues (e.g. farm-grown ethanol blended in gasoline in other states). Furthermore, US multi-government initiatives are even
creating bridges with countries outside the US. New Jersey and the Netherlands signed a letter of intent to develop joint
mitigation initiatives and establish a framework for a crediting and trading system for GHG emissions (New Jersey, 1998).
The US states and Canadian provinces are forming alliances to permit emissions trading between electricity plants and
perhaps other sectors (WCI, 2007; RGGI, 2007; NEG/ECP, 2001). California and Canada policy-makers had numerous discussions on the stringency
and consistency of their vehicle GHG programs as they both broke from federal US vehicle emissions policy (NRCan, 2005; CARB, 2004). The agreement
between the governments of California and the United Kingdom to collaborate on climate change mitigation even aspires to work with other countries like
China and India for further reductions outside their borders (California, 2006). While these agreements and discussions may be hampered or even stopped by
constitutionality questions, these pacts between US state governments and foreign governments challenge the conventional
wisdom that state-level action is incompatible with international involvement, and at a minimum facilitate later
agreements between the national governments.

Wrong, states are already connecting with international markets.


Henrik Selin and Stacy D. VanDeveer 2007 Political Science and Prediction: What’s Next for U.S. Climate Change Policy?
Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of New Hampshire Review of Policy Research, Volume 24, Number 1 (2007)

At the same time, international policy developments on climate change can also influence U.S. perceptions of national interests and policy options. In 2005 and
2006, for example, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the launching of a cooperative U.K-California climate change effort highlighted climate
change issues on the U.S. domestic agenda (Blood, 2006). In addition, many U.S. public, private, and civil society actors are well
connected with international experts and policy advocates through a host of professional networks, programs, and
organizations. U.S. states have also looked at efforts and experiences in European countries to reduce GHG emissions as they have developed climate
change action plans. The RGGI initiative moreover draws inspiration and design lessons from the European Union’s cap-
and-trade system, and RGGI participants are in frequent contact with European counterparts.20 In addition, many U.S.
municipalities engage with foreign cities under ICLEI’s CCP program. A growing number of U.S.-based companies also look to foreign
companies and/or their foreign subsidiaries as they seek to reduce their GHG emissions and adjust their operations to a more carbon constrained economy.
These different transnational connections between U.S. private sector actors and public sector actors at the sub-national
level and non-U.S. actors and policy developments can be important for climate change debate and policy making in the
United States and may contribute to changes in the domestic political constellations deemed necessary by Bang, Tjernshaugen, and
Andresen (2005) for changing U.S. foreign policy in the area of climate change. Yet, we believe that domestic policy changes at the sub-
national level—rather than intergovernmental policy events—will be most critical in re-shaping U.S. federal climate
change policy.

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States can link to intl markets

States cap and trade programs are linked to each other and other countries.
Pew Center on Global Climate Change- 2/2006
(“Question 3 - International Linkage,” Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
http://www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/analyses/sec/q3.cfm)

Yes. The ability to link to other programs is critical in order to minimize mitigation and transaction costs, and to harmonize obligations
under various systems. Companies whose obligations differ in the many nations in which they operate will have a much harder time complying with the
requirements. For this reason it is crucial not only to link programs, but also to minimize the differences between relevant aspects of the programs as they are
developed. This position is corroborated by the extensive and ongoing discussions the Pew Center has had with member companies of the Business Environmental
Leadership Council (BELC ) and other domestic and international corporations about U.S. and international greenhouse gas (GHG) markets. Those that have
expressed an opinion unanimously support designing U.S. cap and trade to allow for linkage to other national and regional trading
systems. They cite several reasons. • Most note that a well-functioning global trading market is perhaps the most critical mechanism for
minimizing the long-term costs of GHG reductions for firms and society as a whole. • Among cost-containment approaches, the linking of global GHG
markets is among the least distortionary. • Generally, larger trading volume and greater liquidity of GHG allowances will result in clearer, more
stable prices. More stable prices will allow firms to project future prices more accurately and provide the certainty to plan and invest appropriately for the future (for
example, in breakthrough technologies). • Globalizing GHG markets supports the goal of encouraging all countries, including China and India,
to participate in making real and verifiable reductions. (Companies note that offsets originating in large emitter developing countries will be among the
lowest cost reductions and can be combined with export opportunities for U.S. firms.) Note that the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) will accept
EU and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowances if certain price triggers are reached, but that under the Kyoto Protocol the EU can not accept RGGI
allowances because the United States is not a party to Kyoto. RGGI analyses indicate that international agreements that enable two-way linkages would be
economically beneficial. Clarifying Question 3b: If linkage is desirable, what would be the process for deciding whether and how to link to systems in other
countries? Pew Center Response In order to link a U.S. program with other systems, reductions would have to be considered real and verifiable by the
respective systems. Deciding whether to link would involve evaluating the inventory, methodologies, monitoring protocols and compliance
mechanisms of the other systems, and as well as the design of these programs to make sure that the environmental effect of a given reduction is roughly
equivalent across the two programs. In addition, care should be taken to design a U.S. program that other countries will be interested in linking with. In particular,
mechanisms that alter the environmental integrity of the program (e.g., a low safety valve) would make reductions in one program not necessarily equivalent to
reductions in another, jeopardizing the ability to link the two. Federal legislation will need to address the state and regional GHG cap-and-trade
programs now under development, some of which may be linked to each other and to other countries. As with any area of federal
policy in which the states have taken the lead, Congress will have to decide on the extent to which the federal program will
defer to pre-existing state programs, for example, governing allowance allocation.

Illinois is now harmonizing with international cap and trade systems.


Illinois Climate Change Advisory Group- 6/30/2007
(“Policy Name: #16 State-level cap and trade program,” Illinois Climate Change Advisory Group,
http://dnr.wi.gov/environmentprotect/gtfgw/documents/ILstatelevelcaptrade.pdf)

5. Linkages with other programs outside of Illinois: The preference is for an independent cap and trade program (e.g. not RGGI or the emerging Western
states program) that will be linked to other emissions markets. Efforts would be made early in the design process to harmonize an Illinois
program with existing and emerging state and international systems. Linkages or regional market development would be explored with
Midwest states in particular. Modeling Assumption: The All-In modeling run won’t include linkages to other states; a sensitivity run will be done that includes
linkages to RGGI. Under the RGGI linkage sensitivity run, regulated entities in Illinois (and the RGGI states) could buy EU allowances if the RGGI allowance price
exceeds $10. Allowances can flow between Illinois and the RGGI states but cannot flow from Illinois and the RGGI
states to the EU.

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States Go Global
State climate policies can be modeled internationally, rivaling Kyoto Protocol
Barry G. Rabe (The Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 2008
(“Second Generation Climate Policies in the United States,” January 2 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Second_generation_climate_policies_in_the_United_States) Assessed July 16 2008
Despite these potential impediments, all indicators suggest that climate policy has not only reached the agenda of
most state capitals but is actively moving ahead with fairly broad political support. It appears reasonable to
anticipate continued state climate policy engagement in coming years, giving a growing set of states a level of
climate commitment and expertise that rivals the most aggressive nations pursuing Kyoto. All of this suggests that
the U.S. context for climate policy is far more complex—and far less fruitless—than many conventional depictions
would suggest. Moreover, there are abundant precedents in other policy areas whereby states take the lead and
remain active in long-term policy development and implementation. Consequently, there is ample reason to suspect
that states will remain central players in the evolution of U.S. climate policy, with considerable potential for
achieving emission reductions and providing lessons and models worthy of consideration in Washington and around
the world.

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States cap trade now


The states are doing coordinated cap and trade now.
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

Table 4 summarizes the scale and coverage of major multi-government climate mitigation alliances in the US. These initiatives are listed chronologically in
order of their particular statements or commitments that relate specifically to GHG mitigation. The alliances engage in standardization of
emissions inventories and tracking, development of region-specific energy and emissions technologies, and development
of emissions trading or cap-and-trade mechanisms to integrate the diverse mitigation programs of the participants. Two
important features in these multi-government developments are (1) the mandatory aspect of the cap-and-trade system
for participants of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and (2) the setting of a specific time (i.e. August 2008) for
establishment of a multi-sector market-based emissions trading system in the Western Climate Initiative.

Federal failures have forced the states to make their own cap and trade system.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9)

In the absence of a responsive federal policy, regions, states, and even cities have moved forward with their own proposals to reduce
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Ten northeastern states, for example, have developed a cap-and-trade program under
their Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and California’s Assembly Bill 32 may do likewise for the nation’s largest state.
Partly in response to fears of a fractured set of regional policies, an increasing number of large corporations— sometimes acting individually, other times in coalition
with environmental advocacy groups— have announced their support for serious national action.2 Building on this initiative is the April 2007 U.S. Supreme Court
decision that the administration has the legislative authority to regulate CO2 emissions,3 as well as ongoing demands from European allies and other nations that the
United States reestablish its international credibility in this realm by enacting a meaningful domestic climate policy. Indeed, in June 2005 the Senate balanced its
distinctly negative view of the Kyoto Protocol with an aggressive sense-of-the-Senate resolution, adopted by unanimous consent, regarding domestic climate policy.4

RGGI will be implemented in 2009 in ten northeastern states.


Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

In the United States, RGGI, a program among ten northeastern states, will be implemented in 2009 and begin to cut emissions in 2015.
RGGI is a downstream cap-and-trade program intended to limit CO2 emissions from electric power sector sources. Beginning in 2015
the emissions cap will decrease by 2.5 percent each year until 2019, when it will be 10 percent below current emissions, or about 35
percent below the business-as-usual (BAU) estimate, and 13 percent below 1990 emissions levels. Because RGGI limits emissions from the power sector
only, incremental monitoring costs are low, as U.S. power plants are already required to report their hourly CO2 emissions to the
federal government, under provisions of the SO2 allowance trading program. The program requires participating states to auction at least 25 percent of their
allowances; the remainder may also be auctioned or distributed free. It is obviously not yet possible to assess the system’s performance, but several problems with its
design are examined in the online appendix.

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State cap/trade now

California already has a cap and trade program which will begin in 2012.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

Finally, under
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 32), signed into law in 2006, the state will begin in 2012 to
reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and may employ a cap and- trade approach. Although the act does not require the use of market-based
instruments, it does allow for them, with restrictions: they must not result in increased emissions of criteria air pollutants or toxics, they must maximize environmental
and economic benefits in California, and they must take localized economic and environmental justice concerns into account. This mixed set of objectives may interfere
with the development of a sound policy mechanism. The Governor’s Market Advisory Committee has recommended a cap-and-trade program,
with a gradual phase-in of caps covering most sectors of the economy, and an allowance distribution system that uses both free
distribution and auctions, with a shift toward more auctions in later years.

New England states are already committed to RGGI.


Selin and VanDeveer - Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston
University, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire – 2007
(Henrik and Stacy D., “Political Science and Prediction: What’s Next for U.S. Climate Change Policy?,” Review of Policy Research,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/6/1/pages179613/p179613-1.php

Many states are also working together to establish and implement GHG reduction goals and support energy efficiency and renewable
energy development. Eight different regional groups of states have such efforts underway, while the most ambitious are found in the
northeast (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2004). In 2001, the six New England states committed to reduce their GHGs to 1990 levels by 2010 and 10%
below 1990 levels by 2020. They moreover pledged to ultimately decrease emissions to levels that do not pose a threat to the climate, which according to an official
estimate would require a 75–85% reduction from 2001 emissions levels (Selin & VanDeveer, 2005). A second effort, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
remains in development. In 2006, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware were RGGI
members. Maryland is committed to join in 2007 (http://www.rggi.org). RGGI was proposed by Governor Pataki of New York in April 2003. After lengthy
negotiations among state officials and extensive data gathering and analytical modeling, a joint Memorandum of Understanding was adopted in December 2005.
RGGI will create a regional emissions inventory, registry, and trading mechanism for CO2 emissions from power plants (states may also
get credits for emissions reductions achieved outside of the electricity sector). A detailed “model rule” was finalized in August of 2006. RGGI is designed to stabilize
CO2 emissions from the start of the program in 2009 through 2015. From 2015 to 2018, each state’s annual CO2 emissions budget will decline by 2.5%
per year, achieving a total 10% reduction by 2019. The RGGI states have committed to issue necessary state regulations (and in some
cases seeking legislative authority) before 2009. RGGI members also agreed to attempt to recruit additional states’ participation, and Governor Schwarzenegger in
October 2006 announced his intention to link California to RGGI (Young, 2006).

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States solve warming


States can substantially reduce emissions.
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

The critique that states do not have sufficient leverage on climate change—an example of the well-known ‘‘commons’’ problem in
environmental policy—is undermined by the expanding initiatives by lower-level governments in the US. Victor et al. (2005)
commented that state-level actions like emission target-setting, which at that time involved 10 states with 14% of US electricity generation, lacked the
necessary leverage for serious impacts. Earlier statements such as this did not anticipate the snowball effect now underway or the
creative use of a variety of policy levers to effect change. The state renewable electricity standards cover more than half
of US electricity generation, and states representing about half of US vehicle sales are poised to adopt the California
GHG regulation for vehicles. A pivotal US Supreme Court (2007) ruling opens the door for more state and regional initiatives, including vehicle
regulation. The overall US GHG emissions effect of the state and city emission targets could, if realized, stabilize US emissions at 2010 levels by 2020. The
two major sectorspecific mitigation efforts, those targeting vehicles and electricity, could put modest dents in national
GHG emissions for their sectors with the current level of state involvement—and substantial reductions if extended to
the entire US. Although these reductions are nowhere near the deeper longer-term reduction that would be required for
climate stabilization, they are nonetheless substantial and significant relative to federal inaction.

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SQ Solves

California’s influence in pushing for a cap-and-trade system will eventually go national


Robert Collier (SF Chronicle Staff Writer) 2007 (“‘Cap and Trade’ gaining favor, Congress taking up business-friendly
proposals to reduce global,” March 21 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/03/21/BUGVQOGJM4135.DTL) July 15 2008

California regulators are drawing up plans for an emissions trading system under a state law enacted last year calling for the reduction
of greenhouse gas output to 1990 levels by 2020, a cut of about 25 percent. And California recently signed agreements with
Oregon, Washington, Arizona and New Mexico -- as well as with British Columbia -- to form a cross-border emissions
market. "California is really establishing a de facto national standard, and it's likely to heavily influence the shape of whatever
action Congress eventually takes," said Blas Perez Henriquez, executive director of the Center for Environmental Public Policy at UC Berkeley's Goldman
School of Public Policy. Many environmentalists had long supported traditional forms of top-down government regulation, especially
what is known as a carbon tax, which would levy a tax on energy sources that emit carbon dioxide. "Most people believe that the
two big alternatives out there are a carbon tax or cap and trade," said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., speaking at a climate
change conference at UC Berkeley last month. "I fall into the cap and trade thing, largely because I don't see a carbon tax ever
getting enacted in the United States."

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AT no state cooperation
States can and do work together with consistent policies.
Nicholas Lutsey and, Daniel Sperling Energy Policy 36 (2008) 673–685 America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California,

Lower-level US governments are learning to avoid the problem of creating a patchwork of diverse regulations for
industry. They are accomplishing this by following consistent sets of mitigation actions prescribed by state policy innovators and
adopting approaches that do not dictate particular technologies. Government action on climate change mitigation is generally following
the steps of establishing an emissions inventory, developing a mitigation action plan, setting an emission reduction
target, enacting sector-specific policies, and partnering with other governments to integrate their efforts and leverage
their reductions. To accommodate further adoption by other states, principles of flexibility and incentives are being widely adopted. The California
vehicle GHG regulation, the California low-carbon fuel standard, and renewable electricity standards are all performance standards that allow individual states
(and industries in those states) the flexibility to choose the emission-reduction technologies that suit local circumstances. The ‘‘commons’’ problem is
falling away as more subnational governments learn to work together. Early pioneering state actors saw themselves as models and
leaders to be followed by others. For example, the first state-level emission target-setting, by Vermont, was advanced with a stated objective to demonstrate
that ‘‘there are things individual Vermonters, the state and the nation can do’’ (Vermont, 1989). When California was developing its vehicle
GHG regulations and later its low-carbon fuel standard, state leaders very deliberately watched and coordinated their
efforts with other governments, within and outside the US. The vehicle regulatory report cites the importance of the
combined impact of the adoption of similar mitigation measures for vehicles in other US states and other countries
(Canada, Japan, and in Europe) (CARB, 2005), and the lowcarbon fuel standard was developed through continuing
discussion with leaders in other US states and the European Union, which proposed to adopt a standard nearly identical
to California’s just weeks after California’s initial announcement (EU, 2007; California, 2007).

Cooperative states efforts now.


Henrik Selin and Stacy D. VanDeveer 2007 Political Science and Prediction: What’s Next for U.S. Climate Change Policy?
Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of New Hampshire Review of Policy Research, Volume 24, Number 1 (2007)
Many states are also working together to establish and implement GHG reduction goals and support energy efficiency
and renewable energy development. Eight different regional groups of states have such efforts underway, while the most
ambitious are found in the northeast (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2004). In 2001, the six New England states committed to reduce
their GHGs to 1990 levels by 2010 and 10% below 1990 levels by 2020. They moreover pledged to ultimately decrease emissions to
levels that do not pose a threat to the climate, which according to an official estimate would require a 75–85% reduction from 2001 emissions levels (Selin &
VanDeveer, 2005). A second effort, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), remains in development. In 2006,
Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware were RGGI members. Maryland
is committed to join in 2007

States coordinate now.


Rabe 2007, Barry. "Environmental policy and the Bush era: the collision between the administrative presidency and state
experimentation.(George W. Bush). ." Publius. 37.3 (Summer 2007): 413(19).
States appear to be taking some steps to coordinate their policies, reflected in multi-state collaboration in such areas as
greenhouse gas and mercury emission reduction, to either fill federal policy voids or counter federal decisions. They have also
made expanded and intensified use of organizations that represent their collective interests. Organizations that
represent state environmental agency heads such as ECOS and more specialized units such as the State and Territorial
Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials (STAPPA-ALAPCO)
have historically seen the promotion of state interests as their primary function. However, they have become increasingly visible
during the Bush years, frequently taking the bully pulpit to attack Bush proposals, countering with their own ideas, and joining forces with larger organizations
such as the National Conference of State Legislatures on key issues. In effect, they serve much like an opposing body would under a
system of executive federalism, even though many of their members belong to the same political party as the president.

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Federalism U
State actions on emissions reductions now are acting as a counterbalance to federal control. The perm
links.
Barry G. Rabe 2008 REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: REVISITING MULTI-STATE
COLLABORATION AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT TOOL University of Michigan Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, April 2008 SSRN

Perhaps the single most surprising dimension of RGGI is that such a complex, multi-state endeavor is being undertaken
without any significant state government conversation with, much less engagement by, the federal government. There is, of
course, ample precedent for multi-state ventures to operate without federal involvement, including the experience of neighboring RPSs to attempt to work out
common terms of definition and trade. But RGGI represents, in many respects, an extension of existing federal clean air
legislation and experience in emissions trading to carbon dioxide. It involves a conscious decision by a collection of
states to act in the absence of current or imminent federal action, as well as a decision by those states to bypass any
formal interaction or negotiation with Washington, D.C.

We control uniqueness the states have developed unilateral environmental policies over the last ew
decades. The perm links.
Rabe 2007, Barry. "Environmental policy and the Bush era: the collision between the administrative presidency and state
experimentation.(George W. Bush). ." Publius. 37.3 (Summer 2007): 413(19).

Aside from some early federal efforts to provide technical support to state policy development that were launched in the George H.W. Bush administration and
sustained during the Clinton years, all of this involves unilateral state action in the absence of any significant support or
encouragement from the federal government. In fact, states have designed a number of these programs so as to minimize
the likelihood of possible federal opposition. State officials involved in RGGI development, for example, readily note that they would benefit
handily from federal collaboration and would normally work with the administration and Congress to set up an interstate compact to support this regional
effort. But their experience with Washington to date suggests that most federal engagement has been designed to derail
their efforts, hence the focus on a loose structure of memoranda-of-understanding among states who then pledge to take
identical but unilateral steps rather than a compact that would require federal government approval. Taking the Lead in
Other Areas Greenhouse gases were not the only environmental threat animating new levels of state engagement during the Bush administration. Virtually
every area of environmental protection has been addressed through some form of state action in recent years, whether it
entailed policy development where no federal role currently exists or direct challenges to federal policy interpretation.
Such engagement is not unprecedented and instead reflects trends that have emerged over past decades. However, states
have generally accelerated the pace of policy engagement in recent years, whether attempting to either fill policy vacuums or push back against Bush
administration decisions.

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Perm links to federalism


Federal cooperation with the states destroys federalism.
Rabe 2007, Barry. "Environmental policy and the Bush era: the collision between the administrative presidency and state
experimentation.(George W. Bush). ." Publius. 37.3 (Summer 2007): 413(19).

The federal government has long-weighed the set of regulations and incentives it can establish to secure the policy response it desires from states. In
environmental policy, Washington has gradually shifted from a strategy emphasizing financial carrots in favor of one
laden with regulatory mandates. Whereas federal grants covered approximately 70 percent of state environmental protection expenditures in the
early 1980s, that level had declined to about 30 percent by the beginning of the Bush Presidency (Keleman 2004, 62). This transition occurred
alongside an accumulation of federal rules and mandates that expanded the state government workload and narrowed
its ability to pursue priorities. As a result, a major emphasis of 1990s initiatives such as NEPPS was to give states greater flexibility in their use of
federal funds and establish a method of federal-state deliberations that would enable states to concentrate on areas of utmost concern. NEPPS has continued to
operate during the Bush years but has been overshadowed by a dynamic whereby the federal government has reverted to its earlier pattern. States continue to
be called upon to play a central role in most areas of policy implementation. They operate about three-quarters of the federal environmental programs which
can be delegated to states, according to a 2005 ECOS analysis, "constituting about 90 percent of the environmental protection service workload" (ECOS 2005,
16). States also conduct approximately 90 percent of all environmental enforcement actions and collect nearly 95 percent of the data used by the U.S. EPA. At
the same time, they have been called upon to assume additional duties by the federal government during the current decade. This includes more than 250 new
rules that must be implemented, even in cases where states oppose the rule or lack resources to assure oversight (ECOS 2005). In turn, the Bush
administration has created approximately three dozen new voluntary programs in environmental protection, including
a range of technical assistance and innovation initiatives, and put states in charge of implementation. At the same time
that the federal government has sought to impose more control over states through these expanded duties, it has
maintained its level of transfer funding for implementation below the level of the early 1980s (Gormley 2006). The overall
funding provided to EPA has declined modestly in constant dollars during the current decade but a number of reductions were concentrated on programs that
transfer dollars to states and localities. Cuts have been particularly significant in more recent years in the clean-water revolving loan funds and some of the
categorical programs that were essential to the NEPPS program and its vision of expanding interprogram flexibility via Performance Partnership Grants. As a
result, EPA funding for its own operations has actually increased somewhat in the last few years, whereas states have literally been ordered to undertake
expanded duties without receiving commensurate federal funding to cover costs. This has exacerbated long-standing tensions over the
intergovernmental balance between "money and mandates" in environmental policy. Consequently, the entire NEPPS process has
lumbered along but has not approached its initial expectations. This initiative experienced a number of problems in the 1990s, including the difficulty of
securing cooperation across media and programmatic lines at both the federal and state levels and the confusing overlap between negotiated agreements and
ongoing statutory obligations (Scheberle 2005). But any potential for using this mechanism to establish a meaningful federal-state
partnership in environmental governance has been poisoned by an overriding state expectation that federal mandates
will continue to accumulate amid declining funding support. As one state environmental agency director has stated,
regardless of those steps that federal and state authorities took toward a more collaborative relationship in earlier
years, "now it's just blown to hell" (Arrandale 2006, 68).

The perm doesn’t reward “first movers”


Barry G. Rabe 2008 REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: REVISITING MULTI-STATE
COLLABORATION AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT TOOL University of Michigan Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, April 2008 SSRN
There is, of course, no guarantee that any future federal program would be so accommodating of early state movers,
and significant precedent from other examples of preemption to suggest that “first movers” are not always rewarded in
later rounds of federal policy. For now, considerable uncertainty remains about next steps, due in part to the paucity of
serious intergovernmental conversation between state and federal officials during the current decade (Rabe 2007).
“What if, under RGGI, our states get 10 percent below a baseline and have plans to cut even more?” asked one senior
state official. “And then the feds come in and say 5 percent is enough or what we did doesn’t count. What happens then
and how do we work that out? Right now, no one knows.”

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Aff – Perm for States CP

The federal government and state governments should do cap and trade.
Lewis - chairman and chief executive officer of Bank of America – 6/27/2008
(Kenneth, “Market alone can't take us to a more sustainable economy,” Mercury News.com,
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_9716296)

Second, policy leaders need to work across jurisdictions to determine which incentives or regulations are appropriate at the state level
and federal levels. We need to strike a balance between the benefits of states acting as laboratories of innovation and the inefficiency
that results from a patchwork of regulation across geographies. Third, Congress must pass cap-and-trade legislation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. A system that gives companies "emissions credits" they can trade on an open market will create financial
incentives to reduce emissions. It may sound strange to hear a banker calling for government intervention. It's not a position I take lightly. But, landmark laws
like the Clean Air and Clean Water acts have been environmental and economic successes. And it's estimated that California's climate change legislation will create
nearly 90,000 new jobs statewide by 2020. There is a strong connection between our willingness to diversify our energy sources and our ability
to grow the global economy sustainably. The good news is that we have access to the financial markets, scientific knowledge,
technology and human ingenuity needed to succeed. Just as important, all of us - entrepreneurs, bankers and policy leaders - are working together to
preserve our planet for future generations.

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** Carbon Tax CP **

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Carbon Tax CP 1NC


CP Text: The United States Federal Government will implement an upstream tax on carbon emissions.
The tax will be calculated to include all environmental externality costs of global warming by the
Congressional Budget Office. Tax revenues from the carbon tax will be used to offset costs of the tax on
individuals in the lowest tax brackets.

CO2 tax is the most efficient means of reducing emissions.


Ian Parry and William Pizer 2007 senior fellows at Resources for the Future. Ph.D. in economics from the University of
Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University “Combating Global
Warming” Regulation

To maximize opportunities for cheap emissions reductions, a CO2 tax would be imposed upstream in the fossil fuel supply chain, as
this encompasses all possible sources of emissions when fuels are later combusted. Limiting the tax to a relatively small number of
fossil fuel producers eases administrative burdens on the government. The tax, which would be levied in proportion to a fuel’s carbon
content, would be passed forward into the price of coal, natural gas, and petroleum products, and therefore ultimately
into the price of electricity and other energy-intensive products. Higher energy prices would encourage the adoption of
fuel- and energy-saving technologies across the economy and promote switching from carbonintensive fuels like coal to
less carbon-intensive natural gas and to carbon-free fuels such as nuclear and renewables. In these regards, a CO2 tax closely
resembles an upstream emissions-trading system where firms require permits to cover the carbon content of fuels they
mine or process and the market price of permits is passed forward into fuel prices. Moreover, through tax credits or emissions offset
provisions, both approaches can incorporate incentives for downstream activities that partly offset emissions releases, such as carbon capture and storage at
power plants and industrial facilities, forestry expansion on farmland, and other fugitive emissions reductions. And from a standpoint of reducing emissions at
the lowest possible cost, market-based instruments like CO2 taxes and emissions permit systems are typically superior to “command and control” approaches
(e.g., vehicle fuel economy requirements, emissions standards for electricity generation, energy efficiency requirements for household appliances). By
raising fossil fuel prices, market-based instruments encourage all options for low-cost emissions reductions across the
economy; in contrast, command-and-control approaches tend to overly burden specific sectors, firms, or abatement activities, while failing to take advantage
of abatement opportunities elsewhere in the economy. PRICE According to standard economic theory, the appropriate CO2 tax, or
permit price under emissions trading, should reflect the world consequences from the future global warming potential
per ton of current CO2 emissions. Those consequences encompass damages to agriculture, the impacts of rising sea levels and increased storm
intensity, health effects from the spread of tropical disease, the risks of major disruptions to world output from more extreme climate scenarios, and so on
(though account should be taken of our ability to adapt through, for example, improving farming practices or constructing levees). Predicting and estimating
the impacts is extremely challenging and controversial, not least because of the difficulty of valuing very long-term damages given that the atmospheric
lifespan of today’s emissions is around 100 years. Most mainstream economic assessments value the damages from today’s
emissions at around $5 to $15 per ton of CO2. Obviously, damages could be much greater if, as many argue, more weight should be given to
ecological effects, the well-being of future generations, or the risk of abrupt climate change. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that CO2
emissions were priced at $10 per ton over the next few years, either through a tax or permit policy. This would reduce
nationwide emissions by perhaps 5 percent relative to forecast levels in the near term, which may sound fairly modest.
However, ideally the emissions price would be ramped up each year in coordination with other countries, implying a
progressively larger reduction in emissions below levels that would occur without the CO2 price.

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Carbon Tax CP 1NC

A carbon tax is much easier to implement globally, cap and trade inequalities make taxes much more
appealing to China and other developing countries.
N. Gregory Mankiw 2007 is a professor of economics at Harvard. He was an adviser to President Bush and is advising Mitt
Romney One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax The New York Times September 16, 2007
The international dimension of the problem also suggests the superiority of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade. Any long-
term approach to global climate change will have to deal with the emerging economies of China and India. By some reports,
China is now the world's leading emitter of carbon, in large part simply because it has so many people. The failure of the Kyoto treaty to include these
emerging economies is one reason that, in 1997, the United States Senate passed a resolution rejecting the Kyoto approach by a vote of 95 to zero.
Agreement on a truly global cap-and-trade system, however, is hard to imagine. China is unlikely to be persuaded to
accept fewer carbon allowances per person than the United States. Using a historical baseline to allocate allowances, as
is often proposed, would reward the United States for having been a leading cause of the problem. But allocating carbon
allowances based on population alone would create a system in which the United States, with its higher standard of living, would buy allowances from China.
American voters are not going to embrace a system of higher energy prices, coupled with a large transfer of national income to the Chinese. It would amount to
a massive foreign aid program to one of the world's most rapidly growing economies. A global carbon tax would be easier to negotiate. All
governments require revenue for public purposes. The world's nations could agree to use a carbon tax as one
instrument to raise some of that revenue. No money needs to change hands across national borders. Each government could
keep the revenue from its tax and use it to finance spending or whatever form of tax relief it considered best. Convincing China of the virtues of a
carbon tax, however, may prove to be the easy part. The first and more difficult step is to convince American voters, and therefore political
consultants, that ''tax'' is not a four-letter word.

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C tax Generic solvo

A Carbon tax efficiently captures the cost of ghg emissions.


Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The first burden for any tax-based regulatory approach is the general proposition than taxes make an economy less efficient by affecting its “relative prices.”
The gist of this point is that whatever is taxed becomes more expensive relative to what remains untaxed, so what consumers and corporations buy and use is
no longer determined simply by market prices reflecting the costs to produce them. Since every government needs revenues, the challenge is to design taxes so
they distort those relative prices as little as possible. Part of the answer is to make the base of the tax as broad as possible, so its rate can be low and most
people and activities are affected equally. Carbon taxes generally meet this criterion, although not as well as broad income or
consumption taxes. However, their economic drawback of raising the price of carbon-intensive products and operations,
relative to those which are not carbon-intensive, is also their environmental purpose. A close analysis shows that concern about the
efficiency effects of carbon taxes on relative prices is largely misplaced. Efficient markets depend on not only the government’s disturbing relative prices as
little as possible, but also on a close correspondence between the prices of goods and services and the total costs to produce them. Economists have long
recognized, however, that the pollution created by the production and use of fossil fuels is a cost of those fuels not
captured in their price. These “externality” costs fall not on those who purchase fuel or the goods produced with it, but
on those who live or work close to where the fuel is produced or used, usually in the form of higher health-care costs. In
the case of greenhouse gases and climate change, these costs are borne today by almost everyone, but again based not on
how much fuel a person uses but on where he or she happens to live. A carbon-based tax could capture the externality
costs of those pollution emissions and embed them in the market price of fuel, creating what economists call a market-
perfecting Pigouvian tax (after Arthur Pigou, the English economist who first wrote about these issues). Using a Pigouvian tax that raises
the price of a fuel to accurately reflect its externality costs would improve economic efficiency by better aligning the
relative prices of things with all of their costs, especially if the revenues were used to offset the costs borne by those subject to its pollution.65
While we do not know what precise level of carbon tax would capture all of these costs, a tax which embeds a significant
part of those costs should still improve the efficiency of prices.

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Pricing feasible
Pricing for taxing carbon is feasible.
Charles Komanoff & Dan Rosenblum, Carbon Tax Center March 22, 2007 “Implementation”
http://www.carbontax.org/issues/implementing-carbon-taxes/
We propose to tax fuels as far upstream as practicable, i.e., at the point where possession of the carbon-bearing fuel
passes from the "producer" (e.g., coal mine; oil wellhead or tanker; gas wellhead) to the immediate next entity in the supply chain
(e.g., coal shipper or utility; oil refiner or importer; natural gas pipeline). Presumably, each such transfer will be codified in a contract,
or at least a bill of lading, specifying the attributes of the fuel. This will minimize the number of points in the economy at which the tax
would be levied. It will also simplify tax treatment of potential downstream carbon control technologies such as CCS (coal capture and sequestration), as
discussed below. Carbon Variability Requires Taxing by Btu, not by Fuel Weight or Volume The tax rates will be stated in
dollars per million Btu of heat content for each fuel. A more familiar approach based on physical quantities of fuel isn't tenable, due to wide
natural variations in carbon content within each fuel type. These variations are most stark for coal. A ton of lignite typically contains around 40% less carbon
than a typical ton of bituminous coal, for example. To tax the two respective tons at the same dollar rate would be grossly unfair since combustion of the lignite
ton releases 40% less carbon into the atmosphere than for the bituminous ton. Actual disparities would be even more pervasive and pronounced on account of
variations in carbon content per ton within each major coal category (bituminous, subbituminous and lignite). Fortunately, variations in carbon
content of coals correspond fairly closely to variations in Btu contents. This isn't surprising, since it is the combustion of carbon into
carbon dioxide that produces almost all of the heat energy released by burning any type of coal. Thus, lignite and bituminous coal differ by only 5% on average
in carbon content per million Btu; differences in carbon per Btu among different batches of coals within the same category are probably less still. Our
approach, therefore, is to specify standard (and slightly different) tax rates for the three categories — bituminous, subbituminous and lignite — and to offer
coal purchasers the option of applying for a lower tax rate than given in the standard schedule, on the basis of a coal assay performed and substantiated by a
licensed, bonded entity, subject to random spot checks for accuracy. Petroleum (Oil) Taxing the carbon content of petroleum presents a
different set of issues because of the dozen or more different petroleum products, each of which has its own carbon
profile. For example, a barrel of residual fuel oil contains roughly 15% more carbon than a barrel of gasoline. This variability can be circumvented by (i)
expressing the carbon tax for petroleum in the same terms as the tax for coal, i.e., in dollars per million Btu of heat content, and (ii) levying the carbon tax on
crude oil as possession passes from the producer to the refiner or pipeline. (Where one company owns both entities in the transaction, the tax can be charged at
the point of transfer from the producing "business unit" tothe refining or pipeline "arm.") This approach has the added virtue of maximizing
incentives to refrain from flaring and venting of carbon-bearing gases and liquids and thus to maximize energy outputs
per unit of carbon emitted. At the same time, however, the United States imports significant quantities — several million barrels per day, overall —
of refined petroleum products such as gasoline, heating oil, residual fuel oil and jet fuel. Because each has a distinct carbon profile, it is advisable to establish
individual product tax rates, also in dollars per million Btu of heat content, to apply to imports of petroleum products. (Crude oil imports would be taxed at the
standard "domestic" crude tax rate.) The assay option noted above for coal, whereby coal purchasers could apply for a lower tax
rate on the basis of a certified assay, and again subject to random spot checks for accuracy, would also be available to
oil pipelines and refiners. Natural Gas This fuel exhibits very little variability in carbon content per million Btu of heat content, and thus one figure
should suffice, with the assay option still available to cover special cases. [I will check to ensure that LNG arriving by tanker has the same carbon-to-energy
ratio.] The tax would be charged at the wellhead in order to maximize incentives to refrain from flaring. Rebates for CO2 Control The bill
should provide the opportunity for partial or total rebate of the tax payments if the paying entity can prove that some
or all of the carbon dioxide emissions will be kept from entering Earth's atmosphere for millenia. This rebate approach
has several virtues: * It provides fair and workable treatment of "partial combustion" which will vary by user and use
(e.g., unburned coal in ash that is returned to the mine for underground disposal; possibly also cement manufacturing,
and plastics manufacture). * It creates positive incentives to minimize emissions. * It puts the burden on the fuel
producer to demonstrate emissions avoidance (as opposed to a partial tax which allows the producer to reduce taxes
unilaterally and burdens the government with substantiating a rebuttal case). Procedures for producer documentation of CO2
avoidance and/or sequestration will be spelled out in the next iteration of this memo. Tax Rates Following are tax rates consistent with
charging $50.00 per ton of carbon (not carbon dioxide) emitted. Consistent with the intent of phasing this level in over a
five-year period, the rates for years 1 through 4 would be calculated by multiplying the rates in the table by 20%, 40%,
60% and 80%, respectively. These amounts are derived in a spreadsheet developed by Charles Komanoff. All rates are
expressed in dollars per million Btu of fuel. Bituminous coal $1.40 Subbituminous coal $1.45 Lignite
$1.47 Crude Oil $1.12 Gasoline $1.07 Residual Fuel Oil $1.18 Natural Gas $0.80

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C tax solve over time


Carbon taxes can change over time.
Ian Parry and William Pizer 2007 senior fellows at Resources for the Future. Ph.D. in economics from the University of
Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University “Combating Global
Warming” Regulation

But still, what


would be the point of developing an elaborate emissions trading system if its main purpose is simply to
mimic the effects of a CO2 tax? One possibility is that policymakers may prefer the certainty of progressive emissions
reductions over time provided under cap-and-trade, perhaps because (in conjunction with other countries) their objective is to stabilize
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at some level deemed “safe” by scientists, rather than basing policy on a contentious balancing of the benefits and costs of
slowing global warming. But this is no reason to reject the CO2 tax out of hand, as the tax rate could always be raised in the
future if targets for emissions reductions are not being met, perhaps because of unexpectedly rapid economic growth. Similarly, although
a domestic emissions trading system might ultimately be linked to similar systems in other countries to create a global
regime for emissions control, nothing prohibits a global tax-based system from emerging where taxes are eventually
harmonized and set jointly.

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C tax solve emissions best


Carbon taxes comparatively reduce emissions more.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

Another critical economic issue is the degree to which a carbon tax would focus environmental improvements where
they can be achieved most cheaply or efficiently – getting the biggest environmental bang for the dollar, Euro or yen.
Cap-and-trade programs achieve this by using tradable permits: In principle, companies that can reduce their emissions enough to achieve their caps for less
than the price of a permit can be expected to do that; while companies that would have to spend more to reduce their 65 Nordhaus, op. cit., states this
goal in describing an ideal carbon tax as one that “balances the discounted social marginal costs and marginal benefits
of additional emissions.” 23 emissions that the price of a permit will buy the permits from those who can do it more cheaply. In practice, Kyoto’s 1990
base year sharply reduced this benefit by effectively relieving companies in Russia, Eastern Europe and Germany from making these calculations, along with
companies in every developing nation. A global cap-and-trade program’s special vulnerability to cheating will further reduce
these potential gains: Many companies and countries are likely to bring their emissions under their caps by simply
understating them, without bothering to invest in energy-efficient technologies, shift to alternative fuels or buy permits
from others who have done so. Carbon taxes can achieve this form of economic efficiency without a cumbersome
trading mechanism susceptible to cheating and other distortions. The tax would raise the price of carbon-based energy
in proportion to its carbon content, so that countries and companies that can reduce their carbon emissions for less than
the cost of the tax can be expected to do so while those which find that reducing emissions would cost more than the tax
will pay it. The consequent reductions in emissions should be greatest where the cost of achieving them is lowest, both
within each country and worldwide, assuming that the world’s major greenhouse gas producing countries sign on.

Global carbon tax reduces more than cap and trade.


Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

For all of these reasons, a carbon tax regime should be more effective and less economically disruptive than a cap-and-trade
program. This expectation is supported by recent econometric modeling that compared the impact on CO2 emissions of the Kyoto version of cap-and-trade,
with and without U.S. participation, and a hypothetical global carbon tax that limited CO2 concentrations to twice their pre-
industrial levels by 2075.70 By 2025, the hypothetical carbon tax would reduce worldwide CO2 emissions by 17 percent
compared to their 1990 levels, while Kyoto could reduce those emissions by 12 percent with U.S. participation and by 3
percent without the United States. By 2045, the carbon tax would bring down emissions by 30 percent from their 1990 levels,
while Kyoto would produce reductions of 15 percent with U.S. participation and still 3 percent without the United States. By 2075, the hypothetical
carbon tax reduced emissions by fully 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels, while Kyoto could achieve only a 16
percent reduction with American participation and less than 4 percent without it.

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C tax solves innovation


Carbon taxes incentivize alternative energy investment directly, cap and trade comparatively fails.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

Carbon taxes also should provide greater incentives for companies to develop new, environmentally-friendly
technologies or abatement strategies than a cap-and-trade program. The tax would provide “a continual incentive to
reduce the costs of carbon abatement,”66 as a leading energy economist put it, because the permanent increase in the cost of
carbon-intensive energy would raise the rate of return on the development and use of technologies that reduce the
consumption of those forms of energy. Cap-and-trade provides less powerful incentives in this respect, because its
impact on energy prices is less constant and more volatile. And under flawed versions of the cap-and-trade strategy, such
as Kyoto-based targets, the availability of excess permits further weakens the incentives to develop and use alternative
fuels and more energy-efficient technologies.

Carbon tax guarantees innovation in alternative energy, the plan results in price volatility resulting in
decreased investment.
Sylvester Johnson, 7-14-2007 Ph.D. Applied Physics “Carbon Trading and Offsets Counterproductive Compared to Politically
Possible Carbon Tax” http://www.climatehealth.net/ArticleCarbonTax.html

Cap-trade results in increased variation in the market price of energy. Such energy cost volatility hampers companies’
strategic planning. A defined tax rate makes it more feasible than does cap-trade with its associated market variation
for businesses to predict the future impact of climate policy on their bottom line, allowing businesses to fully focus instead on
production, service and innovation. Reducing at least this regulatory aspect of energy cost volatility also lessens concern among
shareholders about the uncertainty and risk that currently surround planning regarding climate change. Reduced
volatility makes it easier for investors to estimate the possible returns from investments in the energy sector. Therefore more
money from the private sector could become available under a carbon tax than cap-trade for funding renewables and efficiencies. People in favor of
cap-trade have made the argument that the uncertainty introduced by climate change is the major factor influencing
investments. That argument is misdirected since investments may get postponed due to risk assessment that was
primarily negatively influenced by price volatility, which cap-trade increases, but a tax does not. A carbon tax doesn’t
favor or disfavor one part of the economy over another, or one competitor over another. It minimizes complexity and
administrative costs. Businesses may consider straightforward predictability more desirable than the scramble for marginal
advantage in emissions costs set in motion by cap-trade, a scramble that distracts management from making
fundamental value-adding improvements in productivity critical to competitiveness. Taxing fossil fuels to levels appropriate to
their negative “externalities” motivates investments in renewable energy sources by making them more competitive. Carbon taxes provide direct,
transparent and understandable price signals. The benefit of a tax is that it provides continuous motivation to reduce
the fraction of energy supplied by fossil fuels as energy demand increases, unlike trading. With a tax, increasing energy
demand transforms into increasing demand for efficiency and renewables.

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Carbon tax solves innovation

Carbon taxes most effectively incentivize alternative energy.


Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward and, Kevin A. Hassett 2007 Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes Friday, June 1, 2007
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OUTLOOK AEI Online Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K.
Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. June 1, 2007

Incentive Creation. Putting a price on the carbon emissions attendant on fuel use would create numerous incentives to
reduce the use of carbon-intensive energy. The increased costs of energy would flow through the economy, ultimately
giving consumers incentives to reduce their use of electricity, transportation fuels, home heating oil, and so forth.
Consumers, motivated by the tax, would have incentives to buy more efficient appliances, to buy and drive more
efficient cars, and to better insulate their homes or construct them with more attention to energy conservation. A carbon
tax would also create incentives for consumers to demand lower-carbon power sources from their local utilities. A
carbon tax, as its cost flowed down the chains of production into consumer products, would lead manufacturers to
become more efficient and consumers to economize in consumption. At all levels in the economy, a carbon tax would
create a profit niche for environmental entrepreneurs to find ways to deliver lower-carbon energy at competitive prices.
Finally, a carbon tax would also serve to level (somewhat) the playing field among solar power, wind power, nuclear
power, and carbon-based fuels by internalizing the cost of carbon emission into the price of the various forms of energy.

Price Volatility under cap and trade deters investment in low-carbon tech, carbon tax solves.
Ian W.H. Parry AND William A. Pizer 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of
Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University, 1996 Emissions Trading
versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20382

One potentially important advantage of a CO2 tax is that it establishes a well-defined price for emissions of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases. The price may rise over time, but it is known. In contrast, allowance or permit prices under a cap-and-
trade system can be volatile because the supply of allowances is fixed, whereas demand will vary considerably at
different points in time. Changes in energy demand, fuel-price fluctuations (like, spikes in natural gas prices), and a
variety of other factors can cause demand for allowances to fluctuate significantly. Price volatility in allowance markets
may in turn deter both long-term capital and R&D investments in lowcarbon technologies that have high up-front costs.
The longterm payoffs of making such investments will be very uncertain if the future price of CO2 is unknown.

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C tax solve competitiveness


Comparatively carbon tax is better for competitiveness because it keeps innovation in the US.
Sylvester Johnson, 7-14-2007 Ph.D. Applied Physics “Carbon Trading and Offsets Counterproductive Compared to Politically
Possible Carbon Tax” http://www.climatehealth.net/ArticleCarbonTax.html

It’s said that a carbon tax would make U.S. businesses less competitive and “send jobs abroad”. However, cap-trade also imposes a cost on the
hitherto free service of the atmosphere in accepting carbon emissions. By delaying the development of a robust
manufacturing base for renewable energy devices, letting other countries gain the expertise instead, we’ve been
“sending jobs abroad”. Furthermore, the proceeds of a carbon tax can get invested in the USA rather than abroad as with
imported offsets in trading. Investments in improved efficiency and transitioning exercise a beneficial employment
multiplier on the economy, expanding the pie. Such investments are also more effective in reducing emissions from the high level found in
industrialized nations rather than from the already low levels in developing countries. Diligent oversight in this country is less likely to be
plagued by corruption. Therefore a carbon tax reduces greenhouse emissions and warming more than trading with
developing countries, in addition to keeping investments in the USA.

Carbon taxes solve competitiveness by reducing trade deficits and increase alt. energy innovation.
Carbon Tax Center 6-12-08 “Myths” http://www.carbontax.org/myths/
Rebuttal: This argument assumes a static economy, sans adaptation and innovation. In reality, increased energy taxes
will shrink the trade deficit (by cutting both volumes and pre-tax prices of foreign oil), while reduced reliance on oil
imports will make it harder to justify military expenditures and activities on grounds of protecting foreign supplies. The
higher prices will also spark innovation in clean, efficient technologies better suited for world markets than, say,
supersized automobiles. Finally, taxing energy will create parity with our traditional competitors -- the EU and Japan --
while encouraging like-minded actions in the emerging powerhouses of India and China.

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C tax most equitable


Burdens of carbon reductions spread most efficiently across the economy.
Ian W.H. Parry AND William A. Pizer 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of
Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University, 1996 Emissions Trading
versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20382

Aside from possible differences in economic efficiency, revenue to the government (and its potential uses) is likely to have
different distributional consequences—in terms of costs and benefits to various individuals and firms in the economy—
than a free distribution of allowances. Under the latter approach, benefits flow primarily to the recipients of free
allowances—typically businesses and their shareholders and/ or regions of the country with higher emissions. Revenues
that flow to government as the result of a tax can be redistributed more broadly across the population: for example, to lower tax
rates for all income groups. Critical questions, therefore, include the degree to which the burden of a market-based CO2
program is broadly spread across society (or, conversely, concentrated among a particular group of carbon-intensive
businesses or regions) and how the government could, and would, spend any tax revenues.

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C tax upstream solves


An upstream carbon tax solves.
Ian W.H. Parry AND William A. Pizer 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of
Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University, 1996 Emissions Trading
versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20382
A CO2 tax imposed upstream in the fossil-fuel supply chain (with rates reflecting the amount of CO2 that will be emitted when the fuel is
later combusted in automobiles, during electricity generation, and so on) minimizes the number of entities subject to the tax and therefore
has administrative advantages. Roughly speaking, the tax would be passed forward into the price of coal, natural gas, and petroleum products and
therefore ultimately into the price of electricity and other energy-intensive goods. These higher energy prices would encourage the adoption
of fuel- and energy-saving technologies across the economy and promote switching from carbon-intensive fuels like coal
to natural gas and renewable fuels. In these regards, a CO2 tax closely resembles an upstream emissions-trading system,
where the price of allowances is passed forward in the form of higher fuel prices. Neither policy has to be implemented upstream:
CO2 taxes and emissions-trading programs can be implemented anywhere in the chain from fossil-fuel production (upstream) to ultimate fuel combustion
(downstream).1 Upstream programs, however, are typically more efficient—in the sense that they lead to lower costs per ton
of emissions reduced—because they can encompass virtually all emissions sources with minimal administrative burden,
thereby maximizing low-cost mitigation opportunities. In contrast, downstream programs necessarily exclude small sources, as does the
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). And either a tax or tradable-permit program, upstream or downstream, can—via offset and crediting
programs—incorporate incentives for downstream carbon capture and storage at industrial facilities, for forestry expansion on farmland, and for other
downstream activities.

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C Tax solvency - faster

A carbon tax solves much faster than the plan providing price signals that create investment. Permit
market would provide such signals by 2020 at the earliest.
Michael J. Zimmer 2008 attorney at Thompson Hine LLP Sustainable Development Law & Policy Winter, 2008 8 Sustainable
Dev. L. & Pol'y 67 EXPLORING HOW TODAY'S DEVELOPMENT AFFECTS FUTURE GENERATIONS AROUND THE
GLOBE: IN THIS ISSUE: CLIMATE LAW REPORTER: CARBON TAX: READY FOR PRIME TIME?
A carbon tax can be implemented much more quickly than a cap-and-trade program. This factor is critical to the
effectiveness of any CO[2] emissions reduction policy because time is of the essence from a scientific performance basis.
10 So far, cap-and-trade has proven to be unsuccessful in reducing carbon emissions in the European Union and other global markets. 11 Although a cap-and-
trade system has been extremely successful in the United States for reducing SO[2] emissions in the past decade, the SO[2] model is not dispositive for carbon.
A carbon cap-and-trade program will have to be designed one hundred times larger in scale than its SO[2] counterpart, which creates an enormous problem of
scale, complexity, administration, and cost of compliance for cross-border purposes. In a comparable example, the success of the U.S. acid rain program
required solid data collection and transparent verification combined with the use of continuous emissions monitoring technology. Readily available technology
does not currently exist for filtering or capturing CO[2]. Carbon storage or sequestration will likely take another decade to become cost effective and will
create operational de-rating of ten to thirty percent, water supply demands, fuels shifting, and higher operating costs to succeed. Cap-and-trade
systems are also complex and difficult to design. Issues concerning the proper level of the cap, timing, allowance
allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures, standards for use of offsets, penalties and regional conflicts must all
be addressed before the system can be implemented. 12 These issues require complex operational and political
considerations that surely would hinder any timely solution to regulating U.S. CO[2] emissions. Further, while this design and
implementation process is taking place, polluters are free to continue unchecked while uncertainty reigns for another decade. A cap-and-trade
approach for CO[2] will not be as effective as a carbon tax in the [*69] short term because it will lag behind the needs
of the marketplace, scientific inquiry, and global policy making. It would not offer transparency, nor a clear stable price
signal to support capital investment and new investment decision-making until 2020.

Carbon taxes are comparatively faster to implement.


Carbon Tax Center “Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade”July 1 2008 http://www.carbontax.org/issues/carbon-taxes-vs-cap-and-trade/
Carbon Taxes Will Provide Quicker Results. The taxes themselves can be designed and adopted quickly and fairly. Cap-and-
trade systems, by contrast, are devilishly complex and will take years to develop and implement. Thorny issues must be
addressed intellectually and resolved politically; the proper level of the cap, timing, allowance allocations, certification
procedures, standards for use of offsets, penalties, regional conflicts, the inevitable requests for exceptions by affected parties
and a myriad of other complex issues must all be resolved before cap-and-trade systems can be implemented. During this time,
polluters will continue to emit carbon with no cost consequences.

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AT C tax doesn’t reduce CO2


A cap on emissions isn’t necessary to solve, taxes can be raised to reduce emissions gradually.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

A carbon tax produces no price volatility, because it raises the cost of energy by the constant amount (depending on its carbon content) regardless of how fast a
company, industry or a nation’s emissions are growing. The predictable cost of a carbon tax also simplifies government and business
decisions about the investments and other steps they can take to reduce their emissions and the additional burden of the
tax. Its drawback is that no one can predict how much a particular carbon tax will reduce emissions, especially since economic demand also affects its impact,
and the tax may be too low to achieve the desired effect on emissions. However, this shortcoming should matter less than the price
volatility of cap-and-trade, since it’s correctable: the environmental costs of greenhouse gases are long-term, and
governments can raise or lower their carbon taxes, year by year, to achieve the desired reduction in emissions. While
some prominent proposals for a U.S. domestic CO2 cap-and-trade system include provisions to auction or distribute
additional permits when permit prices increase sharply, this addresses the price volatility only once it has already
occurred – and in the case of the acid rain program, making more permits available by auctions has not tamed its price volatility. Depending on how
sensitive the distribution of new permits is to the rising prices, it also may sacrifice much of the cap-and-trade system’s
environmental benefits.

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US leadership on C tax solves


A US carbon tax creates an international model for a global tax system that would overcome negotiating
problems of permits.
Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward and, Kevin A. Hassett 2007 Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes Friday, June 1, 2007
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OUTLOOK AEI Online Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K.
Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. June 1, 2007

Keeping Revenue In-Country. Unlike an international cap-and-trade regime, carbon taxes--whether done domestically or
as an internationally agreed-upon value--have the advantage of keeping tax payments within individual countries. This
could strongly reduce the opposition to international action that has, until this point, had a strong implication of wealth
redistribution overlaid on the policy discussion. This dynamic leads to a second reason why a carbon tax is a better
fit for U.S. climate policy: it offers an international analogue to our federalist approach to public policy innovation
within the United States. As we have seen, there is reason to doubt the long-run effectiveness and sustainability of the
EU's emissions-trading program. If the United States adopts a carbon tax approach, we will be able to compare the
effectiveness of tax versus emissions trading in short order.

US leadership on a carbon tax would kick start a global carbon tax regime.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The risks of climate change continue to grow. Global, harmonized net carbon taxes could contain those risks in an economically-
efficient and politically-feasible way. The task is to persuade the world’s major energy producing and energy consuming countries to adopt them.
The United States has a singular role to play in this regard. As the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases, the
United States has a special responsibility to implement an effective and efficient strategy for reducing those emissions.
Moreover, as the leading developer of new technologies, the United States can use its technological capacity to develop alternative
fuels and more energy-efficient and carbon-reducing technologies. A carbon tax would both directly reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and provide powerful incentives for technological progress in this area. It offers best way forward in the
national and global debate over climate change.

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US leadership on C tax solves

A carbon tax would make the US a leader on climate policy.


Christian Science Monitor October 26, 2007 A Tax on Carbon to Cool the Planet
Indeed, caps may put the US on a knowable track to, say, an 80 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2050. But as the previous Monitor's View pointed out,
the flaws in cap-and-trade plans as experienced in other nations - their complexity and vulnerability to fraud and
special-interest lobbyists - would reduce the intended effect. They also take a long time to set up and get working right. And, in the end, they
also raise energy prices for consumers, just not as directly as a tax. Economists agree that the real cost of burning fossil fuels - damage to the environment and
health, not to mention the cost of replacing them as they run out - isn't reflected in today's prices. A carbon tax would directly send a market
signal to reduce carbon use. And it would provide an incentive for investment in renewable sources, especially if the tax
is set at the source: for natural gas, at the wellhead; for coal, at the mine entrance. Oil would be charged at the refinery because
petroleum products create different levels of emissions when burned. The World Resources Institute calculates that a tax of $15 per ton of carbon-dioxide
emissions would double the costs for coal use and raise gasoline prices about 13 cents a gallon (or about 5 percent, at today's prices). Natural-gas prices would
rise less than 7 percent. That would result in a 12 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. Have enough Americans been persuaded by Mr. Gore and unusual
weather to accept such pocketbook sacrifices? Nearly half of them now see the danger of global warming. Yet polls indicate strong opposition to higher taxes
on gasoline or electricity. But wait: What if the carbon-tax revenues were returned to most taxpayers, canceling out the effect on pocketbooks but retaining the
market incentives? Under one plan, every worker would receive a tax rebate of about $560, cutting the tax bill by 18 percent for those earning $20,000, or by 4
percent for those earning $90,000. The burden on consumers would shrink, but the US would achieve greater conservation and
a shift to energy alternatives. And the tax could be fine-tuned to meet rising targets for reducing carbon dioxide. With
Europe's cap-and-trade system faltering, the US should be a leader in using a carbon tax, even if big polluters such as China don't
follow. As a last resort, the US could tax goods from countries that fail to cut their carbon emissions. A carbon tax is not the
whole solution. Regulations will still be needed, such as stiffer fuel-economy standards for cars and trucks. And the US should fund research into alternative
fuels, too. All it takes is the political will to act.

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US leadership on C tax solves

US action on a carbon tax will spur others to act.


Carbon Tax Center 5-23-08 “Why a Carbon Tax?” http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/#no-tax-increase
The imminence of China’s leap-frogging the U.S. as the World’s #1 annual carbon emitter — it may happen as early as this year or next — is being cited to
defend American inaction on carbon reductions. This stance ignores several central points. For one thing, the U.S. will continue to be the world’s
biggest contributor to global climate change long after China, or even India, surpasses us in annual emissions. That’s
because carbon dioxide molecules, once emitted, remain “resident” in the atmosphere for approximately a century. Considering the many decades in which
America’s carbon emissions dwarfed everyone else's, of the CO2 now warming Earth, more than three times as much is the product of American emissions as
Chinese emissions. Based on present trends, the earliest that China will surpass the United States as the leading source of CO2 is mid-century, i.e., around
2050. (See Slideshow, slide #8.) Second, the United States will continue to dump the most CO2 into the atmosphere on a per capita basis for years to come.
The average American is responsible for creating as much CO2 in a day as do people in developing countries in an entire workweek. Third, just as
corporations here use China’s inaction on carbon to justify U.S. inaction, so too are industry and government in China
using our temporizing on carbon to rationalize theirs. The way out of this “alliance of denial,” as The New York Times terms it, is to stop
delaying and start acting. Breaking this cycle should be easier for the United States, insofar as our per capita use of energy
(and emissions of carbon) is many times greater than China’s, and given our well-developed political and administrative
institutions. Last, while it is true that only concerted action by all the world’s nations and peoples can meet the climate
crisis head-on, it is equally true that every action that reduces carbon emissions helps protect and stabilize climate. The
injunction that the perfect must not become the enemy of the good has never been so apt as it is here and now, in
Earth’s climate emergency.

US inaction drives climate reticence in the rest of the world. We need to step up and act the CP solves.
International Herald Tribune 2-6-07 Economist Paul Volcker says steps to curb global warming would not devastate an
economy http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/06/news/FIN-GEN-Egypt-Volcker-Global-Warming.php/
Measures to reduce global warming would not be devastating economically, and the United States has been "particularly delinquent" on the
issue, Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, said Tuesday. Speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, Volcker said
the argument that taxes on oil or carbon emissions, for example, would ruin an economy was "fundamentally false." "First of all, I don't think (such a step) is
going to have that much of an impact on the economy overall. Second of all, if you don't do it, you can be sure that the economy will go down the drain in the
next 30 years," Volcker said, referring to the impact forecast by a U.N. report last week. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported that global
warming is "very likely" caused by mankind and that, if it were not reduced, world temperatures and sea levels would rise, as well as the frequency and
severity of catastrophic storms and droughts. Volcker told some 200 Egyptian and foreign business executives that he had been surprised by the warm winter
in New York and the cold weather in Cairo, where temperatures dropped to 48 F (9 Celsius) on Tuesday. "Global warming seems to be catching up with us
pretty quickly," he commented. "What may happen to the dollar, and what may happen to growth in China or whatever," he said, raising his voice, "pale into
insignificance compared with the question of what happens to this planet over the next 30 or 40 years if no action is taken." "The scientists seem
pretty well agreed that (global warming) is still potentially manageable if we act decisively, beginning now into the next
decade or so, by taking measures that are technically and economically feasible." Leadership had to come from the
United States, "and I don't see much evidence of that happening at the moment," said Volcker, who as Federal Reserve chairman in 1979-87 applied
politically unpopular measures that brought U.S. inflation under control. The United States, which produces about one-quarter of the
world's greenhouse gases, is widely criticized for refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, a 1997 pact that requires
industrial nations to cut global-warming gases by an average 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. Volcker said taxes either on
emissions or on petroleum could be effective in reducing global warming, although it would be difficult to reach an international consensus on the desired
levels. "It's an area where in my view the United States has been particularly delinquent," he said, adding it would be wiser to impose a tax on
oil, for example, than wait for the market to drive up oil prices. A tax would give the government "some leverage that
you can use for other things."

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C tax solves global


The US’s leadership on climate is destroyed by inaction on climate, the CP takes a big step which means
we have as much impact as the plan on US credibility in negotiations.

Carbon tax creates a better global emissions regime because it’s a level playing ground, create revenues
for all countries and easier to create compliance under WTO rules.
Sylvester Johnson, 7-14-2007 Ph.D. Applied Physics “Carbon Trading and Offsets Counterproductive Compared to Politically
Possible Carbon Tax” http://www.climatehealth.net/ArticleCarbonTax.html

The many negotiable features of cap-trade take longer to implement than a straightforward carbon tax that can be
implemented rapidly. Cap-trade is complex and subject to scandals that could undermine public support. For an international accord, a
carbon tax would be more appropriate because it's simpler to administer. Weak governments might not be able to provide effective
oversight to prevent the many opportunities for corruption inherent in cap-trade. In addition a carbon tax could be accepted more widely for
a worldwide protocol than emissions trading since each country’s revenue from a tax would remain in that country with
minimal impact by foreign countries on national sovereignty. A key point is that a tax delivers revenue to the
government rather than to private entities, thereby motivating the government to enforce compliance. With cap-trade, the
U.S. would pay developing countries many billions of dollars not to pollute as much, a step possibly not palatable to many Americans. With a carbon
tax, every country would collect internal revenues and disburse most or all of them internally. Presumably World Bank loans
could be made to developing countries for meritorious projects. The international competitive playing field could be kept even by
imposing a border tax adjustment on goods upon import from countries without a tax or cap. The adjustment could increase
costs of products according to estimated energy input. Cap-trade would do the opposite, paying for offsets from abroad. For legal reasons, a tariff would
be more feasible with a carbon tax than cap-trade under the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Quotas that would be consistent with cap-trade, because a cap is a quota, would not be allowed under WTO-
GATT, whereas a border tax adjustment that would be consistent with a carbon tax would be allowed.

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C tax solves Bali better


Only a carbon tax’s equity can get developing coutries on board for a global agreement in Bali.
Joseph Stiglitz 2007 Nobel laureate in economics. “Showdown in Bali” Project Syndicate. Dec. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz94
One concrete action that should be taken at Bali is support for the initiative of the Rainforest Coalition, a group of
developing countries that want help to maintain their forests. These countries are providing environmental services for which they have
not been compensated. They need the resources, and the incentives, to maintain their forests. The global benefits of
supporting them far outweigh the costs. The timing of the conference is not propitious. George W. Bush, long a skeptic about global warming,
and long committed to undermining multilateralism, remains America’s president. His close connections with the oil industry make him loathe to force it to
pay for its pollution. Still, the Bali meeting’s participants can agree on a few principles to guide future negotiations. These
include, first, that solutions to global warming require the participation of all countries. Second, there can be no free
riders, so trade sanctions – the only effective sanctions that the international community currently has – can and should
be imposed on those not going along. Third, the problem of global warming is so vast that every instrument must be employed. Better
incentives must be part of the solution. But there is a raging controversy over whether the Kyoto protocol’s cap-and-
trade system or taxes work better. The problem with the Kyoto system is assigning caps that will be acceptable to
developed and developing countries. Giving emission allowances is like giving away money – potentially hundreds of
billions of dollars. Kyoto’s underlying principle – that countries that emitted more in 1990 are allowed to emit more in the future – is
unacceptable to developing countries, as is granting greater emission rights to countries with a higher GDP. The only
principle that has some ethical basis is equal emission rights per capita (with some adjustments – for instance, the US has already used up its share of the
global atmosphere, so it should have fewer emission allowances). But adopting this principle would entail such huge payments from
developed countries to developing countries, that, regrettably, the former are unlikely to accept it. Economic efficiency
requires that those who generate emissions pay the cost, and the simplest way of forcing them to do so is through a
carbon tax. There could be an international agreement that every country would impose a carbon tax at an agreed rate
(reflecting the global social cost). Indeed, it makes far more sense to tax bad things, like pollution, than to tax good things like work and savings. Such a tax
would increase global efficiency. Of course, polluting industries like the cap-and-trade system. While it provides them an incentive not to pollute,
emission allowances offset much of what they would have to pay under a tax system. Some firms can even make money off the deal. Moreover, Europe has
grown used to the concept of cap-and-trade, and many are loathe to try an alternative. Yet, no one has proposed an acceptable set
of principles for assigning emission rights. For some, this is not a concern. With developing countries standing to lose even
more than developed countries if nothing is done about global warming, many believe they can be cajoled, threatened,
or induced to be part of a global agreement. Developed countries need only figure out the minimum price they have to pay developing countries
to go along. But developing countries worry that a new global agreement on emissions, like so many other international
agreements, will leave them in a disadvantageous position. In the end, Realpolitik may rule. But the world today is different from the world
of 25 years ago, or even 10 years ago. Flourishing democracies in many developing countries mean that their citizens demand fair treatment. Principles do
matter. The Bali meeting’s participants should bear this in mind: global warming is too important to be held hostage to
another attempt at squeezing the poor.

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Tax more feasible intl


It’s comparatively easier to have a global carbon tax regime because of revenues.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

A global carbon tax sufficiently high to affect climate change might be much less difficult to achieve than generally
believed, because governments could use its revenues for other good and popular purposes, such as reducing existing
payroll or corporate taxes or financing popular spending programs. If the world community intends to take serious
measures to slow and ultimately reverse climate change – as it must do – a global, carbon tax would be preferable to a
global cap-and-trade program on economic, environmental and political grounds.

Global carbon tax is more equitable.


Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

Some analysts question whether a carbon tax system could or should be truly global, arguing that fairness dictates that poor
countries not be expected to increase their tax burdens at the cost of dampening their growth, in order to produce distant
benefits for other, richer countries.71 Yet carbon taxes could help direct development in poor countries towards more
energy-efficient technologies and approaches, while supporting the education, infrastructure and business development
vital to their long-term growth. If fairness concerns nevertheless move nations to link participation to a country’s level
of economic development, countries might be expected to participate when their per capita income reaches a certain
level, such as $5,000.

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Price stability solves trade


Carbon taxes reduce protectionist tendencies created in a permit regimes.
The World Bank 2008 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / International Trade and Climate Change
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/11/15/000310607_20071115153905/Rendered/PDF/41453op
tmzd0PA101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf

Nordhaus (2007) argues that if carbon prices are equalized across participating countries,there will be no need for tariffs
or border tax adjustments among partic- ipants. While much work on the details would be required, he suggests that this is
a familiar terrain because countries have been dealing with problems of tariffs, subsidies,and differential tax treatment for
many years (through the WTO).The issues, according to Nordhaus, are elementary compared to the complexities of a
quantity-based regime as in the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol also specifically mentions “progressive reduction or
phasing out of market imperfections and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors”as one of the measures that
parties could adopt to help achieve their emission targets. The issues also are consistent with multilateral trading
arrangements. Equalizing carbon prices will also help avoid the perception and reality that climate measures might be
used as an excuse for protectionist discrimination.

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C tax solves Competitveness


Carbon taxes solve competitiveness more effectively. The plan can’t impose tariffs on non-complying
countries because it’s a quota which is illegal under WTO rules. The CP can.
Sylvester Johnson, Ph.D. Applied Physics Federal Carbon Tax.org No Date “Debate”
http://www.federalcarbontax.org/Debate.html
What about the effect of emissions reduction on America’s international competitiveness? The playing field could be kept even
by imposing a border tax adjustment on goods upon import from countries that do not have a carbon tax (carbon tariff). That
adjustment could not be made under emissions trading. A cap is a quota, and quotas are not allowed under the World Trade Organization’s
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Therefore cap-trade would damage America’s international competitiveness.
Furthermore, cap-trade would not be applicable as a model in China for political reasons: The monolithic Chinese government no
longer exists. China has decentralized, so that regional governments now make their own decisions about energy generation. Those
governments see continued economic growth as essential to their survival because hundreds of millions of subsistence farmers
expect to rise out of poverty by working in manufacturing. If the central Chinese government attempted to impose caps
on regional governments, they probably would reject them firmly. Therefore cap-trade is not a useful model for effecting the
necessary long-term reductions worldwide. However, imposing a U.S. border tax adjustment could influence regional
governments in China (and India) because of the effect on their competitiveness and growth. Therefore a carbon tax could both
maintain U.S. competitiveness and effect worldwide policy changes to reduce fossil fuel emissions. Moreover, the central
government of China probably would succeed in imposing a national carbon tax, because it would not set up an internal battle
as would setting caps region by region. After all, corporation taxes have long been collected nationwide, and the personal income tax has recently
been initiated.

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Border adjustments solve


Border adjustments mean that the CP solves competitiveness.
Joost Pauwelyn 2007 Professor of Law, Duke University U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits
and Options of International Trade Law Prepared by the Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University

First, a carbon tax or emission credits requirement on imports could be framed as WTO permissible “border
adjustment” of a domestic, US tax or cap-and-trade system (Section V). Crucially, if such “border adjustment” does not
discriminate imports as against US products, and does not discriminate some imports as against others, this type of
competitiveness provision could pass WTO scrutiny without any reference to the environmental exceptions in Article
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Second, even if “border adjustment” would not be
permitted for process-based measures such as a domestic, US carbon tax, regulation or cap-and-trade system, and/or
such “border adjustment” would be found to be discriminatory, the resulting GATT violation may still be justified by
the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX (Section VI). Such justification would then most likely center on
whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX, a US carbon duty, emission credit requirement or other
regulation on imports is applied on a variable scale that takes account of local conditions in foreign countries, including
their own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic development in developing countries.

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Permits = rollback
Cap and trade will become increasingly unpopular once the public understand they don’t receive any
benefits and bear all the costs, this means the plan is likely to be rolled back .
Charles Komanoff 22 May 2007 energy-policy analyst, transport economist and environmental activist Strange bedfellows in
climate politics A Nation columnist goes contrarian; GM goes the other way http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/5/22/7926/58739

Yet cap-and-trade seems a curiously unpromising way to put a price on carbon. Making fossil fuels cost more portends a
radical overhaul of the American way of life: people will drive and fly less, industries will rise and fall, cities will
redevelop and suburbs will stop sprawling. To make that transition requires a pricing mechanism that's simple,
transparent, and equitable. A straightforward, ecumenical carbon tax meets that standard; devilishly complex cap-and-
trade does not. The old Hollywood maxim that a story line can't exceed 25 words should disqualify cap-and-trade systems from the get-go. And as
Americans get wind of the legions of legal and financial functionaries swarming around carbon trading, they'll likely
feel disillusioned if not hoodwinked -- and ripe for a reversion to unfettered carbon-burning. There's no mystery to General
Electric's and General Motors' embrace of cap-and-trade. Daily, the climate handwriting on the wall grows clearer, and corporate America knows it's only a
matter of time before it is made to pay for using -- and making products that require consumers to use -- climate-altering fossil fuels. And unlike a
carbon tax, which would resist gaming and could be started quickly, a cap-and-trade system would take years to
formulate as powerful interests carved up the revenue pie. Moreover, that revenue pie -- a concomitant of "putting a price on carbon" -- will
eventually total hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Yes, the carbon price has to be high to internalize the costs of climate damage and for renewable solar
and wind power and energy efficiency to be in position to displace and ultimately eliminate fossil fuels. Under a carbon tax, those revenues
would be known in advance and could be dedicated to public purposes such as progressive tax-shifting and transition
support for affected communities. In contrast, the costs of cap-and-trade systems are likely to become a hidden (and
regressive) tax as dollars flow to market participants.

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AT Biz con

Businesses prefer a carbon tax because it makes energy prices predictable.


Roberta Mann 2007 Professor of Law, Widener University, J.D. Arizona State University, LLM Georgetown University Law
Center. Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 2007 20 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 111
Symposium - The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises: Another Day
Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming

Pollution taxes are another type of market-based instrument. Pollution taxes work to cap the cost of abating the environmental hazard. One commentator called
pollution taxes "the presumptive first choice for optimal environmental regulation." 228 Restricting GHG emissions in a cost-effective way calls for a carbon
tax. A carbon tax would be simpler, more flexible, and more effective than a tradable allowance program. One commentator
noted that cost restrictions, such as a carbon tax, work better than quantity restrictions when "health or environmental damages are not very sensitive to short-
term emissions levels or when concerns exist about potentially high costs." 229 Short-term increases in GHG emissions do not cause environmental damage -
rather, cumulative exposures eventually result in climate change. 230 Concerns about high costs have been a recurring justification of the Bush
Administration's past refusal to deal with increasing GHG emissions. 231 [*138] Accordingly, carbon taxes appear to be the best choice of
instrument for GHG cotrol. Carbon taxes are simpler than tradable permit systems. In a permit or allowance system, the
administrator must determine the target emission reduction, the number of permits, to whom the permits will be issued, and the initial cost (if any) of the
permits. 232 Unless unlimited costs are acceptable, a cost cap, and its method of implementation, must be determined. For a carbon tax, the administrator need
only set the amount of the tax on the carbon emitted. If the emissions fail to decline rapidly enough, the administrator raises the tax rate. On the other hand, if
the cost of the tax is deemed to be too great on the economy, the administrator lowers the tax rate. A carbon tax would also be more effective in spurring
technological change. In the case of the coal industry, the cost of CO<2> controls on conventional plants greatly exceeds the cost of CO<2> controls on IGCC
plants. A tradable permit scheme for GHG emissions would reduce the pressure on power companies to make the switch to IGCC, thus ultimately endangering
GHG limits. 233 Businesses are in favor of the carbon tax idea as well. Duke Energy has been the most vocal business
advocate for a carbon tax. 234 Richard Osborne, group vice president for public and regulatory policy, wrote: we
don't need complex, prescriptive regulation, but rather an economy-wide solution that provides price signals for
companies and individual consumers alike to reduce the carbon they emit from all sources." 235 He notes that "by setting a
carbon "price,' a carbon tax would encourage firms and households to take least-cost steps to shift or reduce
consumption and thereby reduce emissions. 236 The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") agrees that a carbon tax
would be relatively simple to administer. 237 The CBO examined the effect of an "upstream" tax on carbon emissions. 238 An upstream tax
would be imposed on producers and [*139] importers of fossil fuels on the basis of the carbon emissions that would be released when their fuel was burned.
Accordingly, goods and services produced by carbon-intensive processes would be more expensive, thus creating an incentive to conserve or develop
alternative technologies. In addition, a carbon tax could raise revenue that could be used to pay for credits for renewable energy, advanced energy technologies,
or carbon sequestration. 239 The rate of tax in dollars per ton should reflect the damages caused by emitting a ton of carbon. 240 The CBO, using figures
developed by Yale researchers William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, used a $ 12 per ton (of carbon) tax, and estimated that the tax could raise $ 208 billion
from 2006 through 2015. 241 Recent experience and new studies have raised more issues with carbon cap and trade programs.
In implementing the limited carbon trading scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, Europe has already faced extreme
volatility in carbon allowance prices. 242 The complexity of a carbon trading program makes it vulnerable to manipulation by special interests and
cheating. The voluntary carbon cap-and-trade program currently has already generated large profits for certain companies, while producing little environmental
benefit. 243 Aside from outright corruption, the development of a carbon trading program, with its many complex parts, will take a long time. In fact, one
might suspect that the political popularity of a cap-and-trade system may be due to the ease of postponing action. 244
Carbon taxes could be quickly implemented and easily adapted if problems arise.

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AT Biz Con

Businesses prefer the ability to value their assets only the predictable price of carbon in the CP solves.
Roberta Mann 2007 Professor of Law, Widener University, J.D. Arizona State University, LLM Georgetown University Law
Center. Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 2007 20 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 111
Symposium - The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises: Another Day
Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming

The current regulatory approach in the United States may ultimately cost carbon-emitting electricity companies dearly. One commentator suggests that the
recent proposed building boom in conventional coal plants is an effort to beat the clock on carbon restrictions. 119 A coalition of investors, power
companies, and environmental groups have concluded that controlling sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and mercury first,
and adding carbon dioxide controls later, would be more expensive than controlling carbon dioxide at the same time as
the other pollutants. 120 The coalition further concluded that financial markets would impose a penalty because electric
companies cannot accurately value their assets when they cannot determine the future price of carbon dioxide
emissions. 121 For this reason, as well as compliance concerns, at least one electric company advocates imposing a federal
carbon tax. 122 Another company, while not going so far as to advocate a particular carbon reduction instrument, noted that "the answer to this problem is
not 50 different approaches to greenhouse gases in the United States. That makes no sense at all." 123 [*125] Professor Perry Wallace has
explored the effect of business' climate change response on the liability of corporate boards and officers. 124 He notes that
shareholder proposals submitted to a number of public companies assert that management has a fiduciary duty to assess and disclose to shareholders all
pertinent information on significant risks associated with climate change. The Ford Motor Company responded to one such shareholder proposal with a report
dedicated to the issue of climate change. 125 Wallace concludes that both traditional laws on fiduciary duty, such as the business
judgment rule and securities laws on environmental disclosure, as well as ethics, may apply to climate change issues.

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AT: kills the economy


Carbon taxes don’t distort the economy, they help it.

Ian Parry March 23, 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago Should We Abandon Cap-and-Trade in Favor of a
CO2 Tax? Yellow Line A Weathervane Commentary
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/policy_design/taxes_and_subsidies/Should_We_Abandon_Cap_and_Trade_for_CO2Tax.cfm

Leaving aside the benefits from slowing climate change, CO2 taxes also distort the economy in different ways. In particular,
they induce costly investments throughout the economy to conserve on energy, and they induce industry to use cleaner, more
expensive fuels than they otherwise would. In addition, by driving up energy costs, CO2 taxes would have a harmful
impact on economic activity and employment, which exacerbates some of the distortions crated by income taxes.
Nonetheless, recent research studies suggest that, up to a point, raising extra revenue from CO2 taxes involves smaller
overall economic costs than raising that extra revenue from income taxes. This means that shifting some of the tax
burden off income and onto CO2 would reduce the overall distortions created by the tax system, providing a positive
economic benefit (in addition to the climate benefit); in this regard, moderate CO2 taxes, up to around $15 per ton, can be a
win-win policy.

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Carbon tax  pay for Entitlements


A Carbon tax solves the budget deficit and pays for entitlements.
Ian Parry March 23, 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago Should We Abandon Cap-and-Trade in Favor of a
CO2 Tax? Yellow Line A Weathervane Commentary
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/policy_design/taxes_and_subsidies/Should_We_Abandon_Cap_and_Trade_for_CO2Tax.cfm

But the debate over what to do with the revenues from a CO2 tax goes beyond offsetting incomes taxes. Some analysts have
suggested that the revenues should instead be used to reduce the federal budget deficit, which would lower the burden on
future, rather than current, taxpayers. However, when new revenue sources accrue to the Treasury, rather than being
automatically offset by tax reductions elsewhere, there is a risk that some of the extra revenue will ultimately finance
more public spending, which may not have the same social value as cutting distortionary taxes. Moreover, cutting the
deficit might have the perverse effect of reducing pressure for badly needed reforms to the entitlement system.

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Tax switching
Can use a carbon tax to eliminate other taxes to reduce the burden.
Interview with Daniel Rosenblum 4-11-07 Newhour PBS Carbon Tax Aims to Cut Greenhouse Gases environmental attorney
and cofounder of the Carbon Tax Center http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june07/climatechange_04-11.html

RAY SUAREZ: Do you have plans for that revenue? Is there something that that money collected for burning inefficiently gets spent on? DANIEL
ROSENBLUM: Oh, yeah. This is a revenue-neutral tax. We're proposing that all the monies that are received from the carbon
tax go back to all Americans, either by offsetting the payroll tax or through a rebate to all Americans, kind of like the
Alaska Permanent Fund. Alaska rebates all of the oil royalties they get. So, in fact, most customers, most people who use fuel for home or for driving
will end up coming out ahead, but the economy benefits. Under other programs -- for example, cap-and-trade. Cap-and-trade also has a price
signal. It puts a price on carbon. The big difference there is, under cap-and-trade, that money doesn't go back to the
people who are paying it. It's going to go to the people in the market. It's going to go to the lawyers, the consultants, the economists who
are all trying to make the market work. So it's a big difference. But in a carbon tax, even though it has that "tax" word, the money
actually goes back. It's called progressive tax shifting. Raise one tax, reduce another. You tax the bad, you tax pollution
instead of productive work.

Using a carbon tax to swap with income tax solves economic disruptions.
Ian W.H. Parry AND William A. Pizer 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of
Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University, 1996 Emissions Trading
versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20382

Another potentially important advantage of CO2 taxes is that they directly raise revenues for the government, whereas
under past emissions trading systems, the government has traditionally given away free allowances. At current emissions
levels, for example, a tax of $10 per ton of CO2 on all greenhouse gases would raise about $70 billion of revenue per year for
the federal government, or about 9 percent of federal personal income taxes. This extra revenue could be used to lower the
rates of other taxes, such as those on individual income, thereby producing important benefits for the economy. (Such a
“tax swap” was implemented by the United Kingdom in conjunction with its 2001 climate change levy, and was proposed in
the 110th Congress by Representative John Larson (D-CT) in H.R. 3416.) Income taxes cause a variety of distortions in the
economy. For example, by taxing away some of the returns to working and saving, income taxes deter some people from
joining the labor force and encourage others to consume too much of their income. Income taxes also induce a bias
away from ordinary spending towards items that are deductible from taxes (owner-occupied housing and employer-
provided medical insurance, for example). These economic distortions could be reduced if CO2 tax revenues were used
to lower income taxes.

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AT Permits Raise Revenue


Auction revenues are doubly paid by consumers meaning the money doesn’t go back to help them.
Charles Komanoff 2/13/07 Don't trade carbon, tax it Why carbon taxes trump cap-and-trade energy-policy analyst, transport
economist and environmental activist http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/2/13/83257/5462

Another serious drawback to cap-and-trade is that its inherent complexity leaves it open to exploitation by special
interests, not to mention perverse incentives to "bank" pollution now against future credits. Carbon taxes are relatively
immune to manipulation. Ironically, Chameides' hesitancy about trusting the government with tax dollars applies more aptly to his cap-and-trade
proposal. Since the tax proposed by CTC and most other carbon tax proponents is revenue-neutral, there are no tax dollars to spend and potentially misuse. In
contrast, even an optimal cap-and-trade system such as the Northeast's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in which
emissions allowances are auctioned, would saddle end-users with the functional equivalent of a tax, along with the same
conundrum Chameides raised about how to spend the money. Except worse, because the cap-and-trade model necessarily
requires that a chunk of the "tax revenues" be used to provide market participants with a profit paid by consumers. And
that's under a relatively benign cap-and-trade, in which the allowances are auctioned. The alternative, giving polluters the allowances
outright, combines the worst of both worlds: a hidden tax on energy users, with all the increased energy costs given to
the polluters or other market participants. An explicit tax that offsets other taxes is preferable to a covert tax that goes
into someone else's pocket.

Carbon taxes create more revenue than auctions because of fewer administrative costs.
Christina K. Harper Spring 2007 Morgan Lewis's Business and Finance Practice. Ms. Harper received her LL.M. in commercial
law from the University of Cambridge and her J.D. from the University of Southern California Law School. Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2007 30 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 411 CLIMATE CHANGE AND TAX
POLICY

Carbon taxation may also make more sense in economic terms than the alternative permit trading system. There
is enormous uncertainty
regarding the costs and benefits of carbon abatement and, therefore, "it can make a big difference whether you regulate
by quantity (that is, caps) or with price (that is, with taxes)." 346 Economists argue that the per-unit benefits of carbon abatement change
little relative to the amount of the overall carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere. 347 Conversely, the per-unit costs to factories and utilities change a lot. 348
Therefore, economists reason the tax is preferable to a trading system because the tax, theoretically, can be set at a rate
that can never greatly exceed the benefits. 349 (Extensive research would be required to achieve the correct tax rate.) The trading system,
on the other hand, [*459] depends on a volatile market with much less certainty. 350 In other words, "a reasonable
carbon tax would never impose unreasonable costs on the reduction of carbon emissions, but a quantity target could" 351
and "preserving the cap at all costs is simply not worth it." 352 Carbon taxes also have the ability to reduce other taxes. 353 Theoretically, the permit
trading system may also raise revenue which may in turn be used to reduce bad taxes. In practice, governments simply
give away permits to polluters, raising no public revenue. 354 Moreover, while both carbon taxes and permit trading
systems carry administrative burden, the permit market may turn out to be more costly because of the need to develop
a complex secondary market. 355 For example, hiring brokers and developing expertise in the secondary permit market is
expensive. 356

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AT Permits raise revenue


Administrative costs are huge.
Dr. Michael E. Canes July 20, 2007 Senior Research Fellow at the Logistics Management Insti-tute in McLean, Virginia PhD in
Economics from UCLA and an MSc in Economics from the London School of Economics. Is Cap & Trade the Wrong Policy to Curb
Greenhouse Gases for the United States? George Marshall Institute

U.S. monitoring costs alone could be large. Since I really don’t know how many firms are going to be involved, I will
suppose 10,000. If it were 10,000, what would be the cost of the system? I figure that this is pretty important to any single firm.
It has to know how much carbon it is emitting. It has to know whether it has the number of allowances that is equal to
the carbon it emits, because there will be fines and penal-ties if the numbers don’t balance. A firm will need to know
whether it should be a buyer or a seller. So it will have to follow the allowance markets and develop strategy each year and
for future years as to what it should be doing. So the notion that a firm might put a person to work fulltime on this seems
reasonable. I costed that at $75,000, since this is a professional person with some training. If we had as many as 10,000
firms and they each put a person to work on this issue, then we are talking about $750 million a year, on that order. The
cost of a government monitoring apparatus will depend on its size. If it is strictly for domestic purposes, probably $50-$100
million. But if the monitors were involved in checking international offsets, then it would be higher. It could be as much
as $100-$200 million a year. I am not sure; it could be less. But I am including costs to audit compliance by each affected
firm, establish the legitimacy of offsets and moni-tor trading activity. All of that has to be done. So maybe total annual costs
would be in the several hundreds of millions of dollars. If only a few thousand firms are involved, then it is going to be
less than what I am estimating here, but if it involves 10,000 firms, it is going to be about this order of magnitude.

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Auctions don’t solve tax-switching


Committee structure means that the revenues from auctions will not be spent on solving distributional
issues. DA to Perm.
Gilbert E. Metcalf 2007 Tufts University National Bureau of Economic Research D I S C U S S I O N PA P E R 2 0 0 7 - 1 2 O
C T O B E R 2 0 0 7 A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap An Equitable Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change The
Brookings Institution

A final advantage of carbon taxes over cap-andtrade systems relates to the congressional committee structure. Cap-and-
trade legislation is in the domain of the Committees on Energy and Commerce (House) and Energy and Natural
Resources (Senate). Tax legislation is in the domain of the Committees on Ways and Means (House) and Finance
(Senate). Any effort to construct a distributionally neutral cap-and-trade system will require coordination across the
energy and tax committees. A distributionally neutral carbon tax, on the other hand, falls entirely within the domain of
the two taxwriting committees in Congress. It may be difficult to design cap-and-trade legislation with auctioned
permits in a way that doesn’t avoid using the revenues for increased spending on the environment, given the proclivity
of congressional committees to retain budget authorization responsibility within their committee if possible. This is not
to suggest that the congressional tax committees will necessarily make efficient or distributionally neutral tax cuts, but rather
that a necessary condition for a distributionally neutral cap-and-trade cum tax-reduction policy is that the energy committees
share responsibility with tax-writing committees.

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AT C tax hurts the Poor


A carbon tax helps the poor by redistributing revenues and creating jobs.
Carbon Tax Center 6-12-08 “Myths” http://www.carbontax.org/myths/
New taxes on carbon emissions or energy will hurt the poor and middle class. Who says? Some low-income advocates, some civil rights groups, some conservatives
masking as populists. Rebuttal: The wealthy use more energy by far. For example, for every gallon of gas used by the poorest quintile
(20%) of households, the richest quintile use three to four gallons. (See Slideshow, Slide #26.) The same holds for electricity, jet fuel, even diesel
that fuels the trucks that deliver goods. Energy taxes can therefore be made progressive, i.e., beneficial to people of below-average
means, by redistributing the tax revenues equally to all. As an alternative, the carbon tax revenues could be directed to "tax-
shifting" -- reducing regressive taxes such as state sales taxes and federal social security check-offs. (See our Issues page, Managing the
Impacts.) Energy-efficiency measures can be targeted to subsets of the population that stand to be harmed, such as the rural poor
who must drive long distances for work. What's really regressive is the ongoing laissez-faire rises in fuel prices, not a penny of
which is rebated to the public. CTC is committed to ensuring that carbon taxing is progressive, not regressive.

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Carbon tax solve cheating


Carbon taxes comparatively solve manipulation and cheating.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The third important difference is that cap-and-trade


programs are more difficult to administer and more vulnerable to evasion,
corruption and manipulation than carbon taxes. The administration of a new carbon tax is relatively straight-forward: Each country would
apply to every energy source a tax rate which, after counting the country’s current energy taxes and subsidies, produces the global net carbon tax rate; and
collect the receipts using the same mechanisms it relies on for existing energy or business taxes. Under cap-and-trade, each country first has
to
create a new system to distribute its national cap among its energy-related industries and their thousands of companies
and plants, in the form of permits; and then set up a new monitoring system to track energy production at every site
both before and after any permits are traded. Cheating also poses a more serious problem for cap-and-trade than for a
carbon tax. While some companies will try to evade their carbon taxes, the government on the other side of the
transaction has a strong interest in discovering and stopping it. Under cap-and-trade, when a company fraudulently
understates its energy production and emissions so it can sell some of them, the buyer on the other side of that
transaction has no incentive to uncover or reveal the fraud. The difference helps explain why one expert has concluded
that “cheating will probably be pandemic” under cap-and-trade.9

Carbon taxes solve industry incentives to cheat.


Carbon Tax Center “Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade”July 1 2008 http://www.carbontax.org/issues/carbon-taxes-vs-cap-and-trade/
A Carbon Tax’s Simplicity Inoculates it Against the Perverse Incentives and Potential for Profiteering that Will
Accompany Cap-and-Trade. In contrast to the simple and straightforward process of implementing a carbon tax, the
protracted negotiations necessary to implement a cap-and-trade system will provide constant opportunities for the fossil
fuel industry and other invested parties to shape a system that maximizes their financial self-interests as opposed to an
economically efficient system that maximizes societal well-being. If allowances are allocated based on some type of baseline
reflecting past pollution (which has been the practice with NOx and SO2trading programs), rather than being auctioned,
polluters will have perverse incentives to maximize emissions before the cap-and-trade system goes into effect in order
to "earn" those pollution rights. (The voluntary carbon cap-and-trade system currently operating has already been criticized
for questionable offsets that have produced huge profits but little environmental benefit. See Outsize Profits, and Questions, in
Effort to Cut Warming Gases, New York Times, Dec. 21, 2006.)

More ev.
The American Consumer Institute February 2007 “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The
Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Carbon Taxes, Compared to
Emissions Caps and Tradable Permits,” Executive Summary www.theamericanconsumer.org%2FShapiro.pdf&ei=CpN-
SMfHHJnAgwKlto3IBw&usg=AFQjCNHg8WaoEJgSCkgnj2KGqufYcqqZUQ&sig2=-a2FdmTfRlSHSnEguhNwBg
Although both policy approaches result in significantly higher prices for fossil fuels, carbon taxes also are much less
vulnerable to evasion and market manipulation, providing a more stable and transparent system for consumers and
industry alike. A capand- trade approach also would produce much greater volatility in energy and energyrelated prices, and
be much more complex to administer. The ineffectiveness of the capand- trade system is currently exemplified by the
European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), under which European CO2 emissions actually increased in 2005. The
European Environmental Agency has projected that under the ETS, the EU is likely to achieve no more than one-
quarter of its Kyoto-targeted reductions by 2012. Moreover, much of those “reductions” will simply reflect credits
purchased from Russia or Eastern European countries, with no net environmental benefits.

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C Tax solves cheating


Tax cheating is much harder because the government will notice, under a permit system only 2 companies
will know which creates an incentive for corruption.
William D. Nordhaus 2007 Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
volume 1, issue 1, winter 2007, pp. 26–44 To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming

Problems of financial finagling are not limited to poor,weak, or autocratic states.Concerns arise in the wake of the recent
accounting scandals in the United States. A cap-and-trade system relies upon accurate measurement of emissions or
fossil fuel use by sources in participating countries. If firm A (or country A) sells emissions (or carbon-content) permits
to firm B (or country B), where both A and B are operating under caps, then it is essential to monitor the emissions (or
fuel use) of A and B to make sure that their emissions (fuel use) are within their specified limits. Indeed, if monitoring is
ineffective in country A but effective in country B, a trading program could actually end up raising the level of global
emissions because A’s emissions would be unchanged while B’s would rise. Incentives to evade emissions limitations in
an international system are even stronger than the incentives for tax evasion. Tax cheating is a zero-sum game for the
company and the government, while emissions evasion is a positive sum game for the two parties. A price approach
gives less room for corruption because it does not create artificial scarcities, monopolies, or rents. There are no permits
transferred to countries or leaders of countries, so they cannot be sold abroad for wine or guns. There is no new rent-
seeking opportunity. Any revenues would need to be raised by taxation on domestic consumption of fuels, and a carbon
tax would add absolutely nothing to the rent-producing instruments that countries have today.

More ev.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

Governments also could enforce a carbon tax system more effectively and cheaply than a cap-and-trade regime. Companies
subject to the tax may be tempted to minimize their payments through various forms of evasion or cheating; but on the other
side of this transaction, governments will have equally strong incentives to prevent it. Under cap-and-trade, a dishonest energy
producer or distributor might understate its fuel production or distribution, so it could sell permits covering the difference
between that level and its actual production or distribution; but in that case, the producer or distributor looking to purchase
permits has no incentive or interest in preventing the cheating.

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AT high gas prices didn’t reduce consumption


Not the same, a price setting mechanism like the CP solves.
Carbon Tax Center 6-12-08 “Myths” http://www.carbontax.org/myths/
Rebuttal: Three points are key. First, until very recently, the rise in gasoline prices wasn't nearly as steep as commonly
believed. The U.S. average inflation-adjusted pump price in 2007 was only 54% higher than the 2003 price, not 100% or
200% higher. Second, much of the increase was masked by price volatility. As we showed here, gas prices fell almost as
often on a month-to-month basis as they rose during that period, masking the upward trend and convincing millions of
Americans that prices would head south soon enough to make adjustments unnecessary. Third, use of gasoline and other
energy is heavily driven by economic activity, and the U.S. economy expanded vigorously over those 4 years. Thus, the
flattening in gasoline use during the recent expansion (up just 1.0% a year while GDP grew at 2.9% annually)
demonstrates price elasticity. Price-responsiveness grows over longer periods, as households have opportunities to buy
more fuel-efficient vehicles and appliances and society transitions to a more fuel-efficient infrastructure -- once we enact
fuel or carbon taxes to send clear and strong price signals. (See our Issues page, Carbon Tax Effectiveness, for more
discussion.)

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C Tax solves Environmental Justice


The plan only helps those already responsible for emissions, big companies, the CP solves.
Carbon Tax Center “Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade”July 1 2008 http://www.carbontax.org/issues/carbon-taxes-vs-cap-and-trade/
Carbon Taxes Can Produce a Far More Equitable Result than Cap-and-Trade. As discussed in our Issue Paper, Managing the
Impacts, carbon tax revenues can be returned through dividends or can be used to fund progressive tax-shifting to reduce
regressive payroll or sales taxes. The costs of cap-and-trade systems, both implementation and the costs incurred as more expensive
technologies replace older and less expensive coal-fired combustion, are far more likely to be imposed upon consumers with less
possibility of rebating or tax-shifting. Moreover, because cap-and-trade relies on market participants to determine a fair
price for carbon allowances on an ongoing basis, it could easily devolve into a self-perpetuating province of lawyers,
economists, lobbyists and other market participants bent on maximizing their profits on each cap-and-trade
transaction. As Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. stated in his Jan. 24, 2007 Wall Street Journal "Business World" column (subscription only): General
Electric, DuPont, Alcoa, Caterpillar and other industrial pigpens this week endorsed cap-and-trade limits on carbon
dioxide, which would turn their established habit of using the atmosphere as a free waste disposal into a property right,
worth billions. Talk about a low-hanging fruit. They are accustomed to treating carbon dumping as a gimme. Now they’d at least be in a position to get
paid for dumping less. The dollars that will be funneled into making the market work could be better spent reducing
regressive taxes, protecting poorer households and/or helping consumers use less energy.

Only high-income groups benefit from cap and trade.


Ian Parry March 23, 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago Should We Abandon Cap-and-Trade in Favor of a
CO2 Tax? Yellow Line A Weathervane Commentary
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/policy_design/taxes_and_subsidies/Should_We_Abandon_Cap_and_Trade_for_CO2Tax.cfm

Another advantage of using CO2 tax revenues to lower personal income taxes is that the benefits are spread over most
households as compensation for higher electricity and fuel prices. And the tax cuts could be tilted in favor of lower
income groups by extending the earned income tax credit, for example. In contrast, studies have shown that freely
allocated permit systems can be highly inequitable; the reason is that firms receiving allowances reap windfall profits,
which ultimately accrue to individual stockholders, who are concentrated in relatively high-income groups.

Carbon tax solves environmental injustice and environmental harms


Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

Pollution taxes have been proposed as another market-based approach to reduce pollution. n250 Taxes could be increased on carbon
intensive fuels and other toxic products. The more pollution a facility generated the higher its tax on emissions. A variation on
pollution taxes, called tax shifting, would move taxes away from activities to be encouraged, like wages and savings, and instead
increase taxes on polluting products and emissions to discourage environmental [*289] harm. n251 By maintaining a progressive
tax structure and using some of the tax funds generated to compensate displaced workers and communities impacted by the shift to
clean technology, pollution taxes could avoid any economic injustice in their implementation. n252

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Carbon Tax solve env Justice


Carbon tax is prefer as renewable energy incentive over cap-and-trade that leads environmental injustice
Kate Sheppard (TAPPED Archive Writer) 2008 (“Environmental Justice v. Cap-And-Trade,” TAPPED Archive-The
American Prospect, Feb 28 2008, http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/tapped_archive?
month=02&year=2008&base_ name=environmental_ justice_v_capand ) Assessed July 20 2008
Last week, environmental justice groups from California issued a declaration against cap-and-trade, stating that pollution
already disproportionately affects low-income, communities of color, and they will "fight at every turn" against
regulations that create a carbon-trading system that would only exacerbate those trends. EJ groups, long overlooked in the
more mainstream environmental movement, fear that climate legislation will once again disregard the concerns of the
communities who are already most affected by the factories and refineries responsible for global warming. In a cap-and-
trade system, poor communities, where polluting plants are most often sited, will still bear the brunt of impacts if
industries are allowed to trade for rights to pollute there. Instead of this system, they're advocating a carbon tax, direct
emissions reductions, and meaningful measures to move America to clean, renewable energy sources.

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Monitoring Net Benefit

( _ ) (Command and Control/Carbon Tax) solves monitoring and administrative loopholes

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

Command-and-control regulation and carbon taxation would also require enforcement and administration by devel-oping
nations. However, emissions trading schemes may require more structure developed by the developing nations themselves. In a
world of command-and-control regulations or carbon taxation, an international regulatory body likely would set maximum
emissions levels or tax rates. Developing nations may be responsible for enforcing these regula-tions, and this, like emissions trading
programs, will certainly draw on the limited resources of developing nations. The most significant difference between the programs
is the allocation of the costs of developing countries' inferior adminis-trative capabilities. If developing countries cannot
adequately enforce command-and-control regulations or levy taxes, the burden likely will fall on the world as a whole. Either
developing countries will emit more carbon than allowed or the international regulatory body will have to expend resources to aid
developing country enforcement. It is possible that international regulators somehow would penalize developing countries, but if these
nations simply lack the capacity to do what regulators have requested, penalties seem illogical. On the other hand, if developing
countries lack the re-sources to properly administer an emissions trading scheme, they may bear the losses exclusively: Their
lack of admin-istrative capability may allow other [*169] nations (or their own firms) to take advantage of them in trading.
Thus, in emissions trading schemes, developing countries bear all the costs of their lack of administrative capacity, whereas in
command-and-control or carbon taxation systems the international coalition as a whole will share the burden. The latter
burden allocation may give the coalition an incentive to aid developing nations in developing necessary administrative
capacity.

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Monitoring Extensions

( _ ) Cheating will be rampant – monitoring is low, and incentives for cheating are high
RisingTide UK March 2002, “The Case against Carbon Trading”, http://www.risingtidenorthamerica.org/special/Publications/CT.pdf

Carbon trading cannot work The carbon market cannot be monitored or controlled The temptation for all parties to cheat
requires that every transaction to be scrutinised and every sale to be certified. There is no global institution or accounting
system that can manage the complexity of this market. The Legal Framework Will Never Be Strong Enough International legal
frameworks are usually very weak. Countries that want to use carbon credits to subsidise their emissions are already arguing
for penalties so weak that they will not discourage cheating. Many of the Annex 1 (Russia, Turkey, Ukraine), Romania- these are
some of the most corrupt and lawless countries are corrupt or desperate for foreign currency and will happily endorse
doctored carbon credits.

( _) Administration is next to impossible – not even the most administratively complex developed
countries have the capacity to track all of the trading

Lohman in 01 (Larry, Corner House Briefing 24, Democracy or Carbocracy?, October,.


http:/ /www .thecornerhouse.org.uk/item.shtml?x=52013)

Regulating the carbon-related activities of a few utilities or big nationalized industries may turn out to be relatively easy for
centralized authorities in many countries. But trading industrial CO2 emissions for trees or carbon-conserving land use activities
will require understanding, monitoring and controlling a wide swathe of the biosphere and the societies who live on the land.
That's not a job to which national governments, UN organizations or global markets are well-suited. They'll be constantly
thwarted by their own inherent needs to reduce stubbornly complex situations to numbers and graphs so they can be
understood by administrators in offices, "improved" by experts with a vested interest in keeping an appearance of superior
knowledge, or exploited by business. These tendencies are bound to result in misunderstanding, violence and counter-
productivity. Take, for example, the extraordinarily complex carbon economy of Baan Laan Kham community in Samoeng District
of Chiang Mai, Thailand. Here, a pattern of frugal carbon emissions is tied up, and dependent on, the interpenetration of a constantly-
regenerating human environment with a constantly-evolving culture largely opaque to state agencies.

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Accountability NB

Emissions trading weakens overall accountability

Driesen in 98 (David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law, Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review, Fall, 1998, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

Emissions trading may interfere with accountability in several ways. First, it may disrupt the process of translating general
international goals into specific concrete national commitments. 314 Second, it may make it more difficult to hold government
officials accountable for meeting agreed upon national commitments. Finally, it may undermine the overarching international
principle of national responsibility for private sector emissions emanating from a country's territory, an important
overarching international norm tending to support accountability. Below, I discuss these threats to democratic accountability in
the context of the Climate Change Convention.

That crushes the credibility of international environmental law causing trade sanctions and war

Driesen in 98 (David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law, Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review, Fall, 1998, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

This tendency has important long-term implications. The weakening of accountability may, in the long-term, undermine
international environmental law. If international environmental law generates a series of seemingly concrete, but ultimately
elusive obligations, it will lose its effectiveness over time. 360 Defections from international treaties may rise and nations
seeking resolution of international environmental problems may turn to unilateral remedies, such as trade sanctions, or in
extreme cases, even war. 361 Alternatively, important global problems may simply go unaddressed, because the law fails to
generate concrete solutions to them.

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Ext: Accountability

( _ ) Complexity of emissions trading scheme undermines democratic accountability and public


involvement

Driesen in 98 (David M. Driesen, Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law, Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review, Fall, 1998, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1)

The free lunch theory's narrow focus upon democratic decision-making ignores the issue of democratic accountability for
implementing public decisions. 308 I have argued elsewhere that emissions trading may layer the complexities of emissions
trading, which usually are formidable, on top of the complications involved in setting and enforcing emission limitations. 309
This complexity may make citizen participation in designing and implementing an emissions trading program even more
difficult than citizen participation in designing and implementing a comparable traditional regulation written by the same
institution. To evaluate the issue of democratic accountability for implementing decisions made in the international arena, we
need some understanding of enforcement and democratic accountability in that setting.

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Perm fails
Quantity mechanisms, in this instance the “cap” will overshadow market benefits of the carbon tax.
William D. Nordhaus 2005 Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University December 9, 2005 Published on his website at in
the 2006 American Economics Review. Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming Policies

The literature on regulatory mechanisms entertains a much richer set of approaches than the polar quantity and price types that are examined here. An
important variant is “prices in quantity clothes” – putting price ceilings and floors on the price emissions-trading
permits.14 This was considered and rejected by the Clinton Administration in its preparation for the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. The present
discussion focuses on pure strains of the two systems partially to keep the analysis within manageable limits. Additionally, we may worry about the
tendency of mixed systems to revert to their archetype. For example, even though the Kyoto Protocol was designed as a system with
complete trading within the Annex I countries, there were strong pressures to limit trading and force countries to make much of
their reductions internally. The EU implementation of the Kyoto Protocol allows full trading within the EU but limits the purchases of emissions
permits from other countries. The lesson from foreign-trade barriers, where price and quantity limits have a much longer
history, is that the quantity limits through quotas are extremely durable.

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**Price Volatility Turn **

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Price Volatility Turn 1NC

The plan causes extreme energy price fluctuation, the EU empirically proves and it would be worse in the
US because the economy is more energy intensive.
Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

The same volatility is evident in the leading instance of environmental regulation using quantity targets, the U.S. acid rain program. The program applies cap-
and-trade arrangements to major emissions of SO2 (sulfur dioxide) and NOx (nitrogen oxide). Recent analysis found that trading prices for SO2 and NOx
emission permits have ranged from $66 per-ton to as high as $1,700 per-ton, moving up and down by an average of 10 percent per-month and 43 percent per-
year, several times the volatility seen in oil or stock-market prices.12 The acid rain program is modest in scale, and there is no research on the economic effects
of its price volatility. As we will see later, the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme for CO2 emission permits issued under Kyoto guidelines also experienced
serious price volatility in its first two years, with permit prices fluctuating up and down by as much as 80 percent over three months (see Figure 2, above).
Comparable price fluctuations for CO2 permits under a meaningful cap-and-trade program on a global scale would
have serious economic costs, because the underlying source of the permits is global energy use. The largest producers of CO2
emissions are electricity-generating utilities, especially those powered by high-polluting coal. Consider what would happen under a strict cap-
and-trade program when a particularly cold winter or hot summer occurs, or simply when an economy grows faster
than trend: CO2 emissions will rise sharply with electricity consumption; and since the quantity of emission permits
would be capped, their price would also rise sharply and be passed on in higher electricity prices. The same dynamic would
occur in oil and gasoline prices when demand for those fuels rises. Any strict, quantity-based approach to climate change will be a
source of substantial price volatility that will differ from nation to nation, depending on its cap and shifting energy
demand. This volatility would also occur in any national cap-and-trade system, and would affect prices for not only
energy but all products whose production is energy- and carbon-emission intensive. If the United States were part of
such a system, or if the United States adopts its own, strict cap-and-trade program, its volatility in permit and energy
prices would be greater than what might be expected in Japan or Western Europe, since the U.S. economy is more
energy-intensive and less energy-efficient than other advanced economies

Energy price volatility means that there will be no investment in alternative energy, resulting in fewer
emissions decreases and much less economic competitiveness. The energy price stability of the CP makes
alternative energy investment much more likely in world of the counterplan.
LA times May 28, 2007 Time to tax carbon A carbon tax is the best, cheapest and most efficient way to combat cataclysmic climate
change. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-carbontax28may28,0,2888366.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail
Cap-and-trade would also have a nasty effect on consumers' power bills. Say there's a very hot summer week in
California. Utilities would have to shovel more coal to produce more juice, causing their emissions to rise sharply. To
offset the carbon, they would have to buy more credits, and the heavy demand would cause credit prices to skyrocket. The
utilities would then pass those costs on to their customers, meaning that power bills might vary sharply from one month
to the next. That kind of price volatility, which has been endemic to both the American and European cap-and-trade systems, doesn't just
hurt consumers. It actually discourages innovation, because in times when power demand is low, power costs are low,
and there is little incentive to come up with cleaner technologies. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists prefer stable
prices so they can calculate whether they can make enough money by building a solar-powered mousetrap to make up
for the cost of producing it. Carbon taxes avoid all that. A carbon tax simply imposes a tax for polluting based on the
amount emitted, thus encouraging polluters to clean up and entrepreneurs to come up with alternatives. The tax is
constant and predictable. It doesn't require the creation of a new energy trading market, and it can be collected by existing state and federal agencies.
It's straightforward and much harder to manipulate by special interests than the politicized process of allocating carbon credits. And it could be structured to be
far less harmful to power consumers. While all the added costs under cap-and-trade go to companies, utilities and traders, the
added costs under a carbon tax would go to the government — which could use the revenues to offset other taxes. So while
consumers would pay more for energy, they might pay less income tax, or some other tax. That could greatly cushion the overall economic effect.

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Permits  Price Volatility

Permits create extreme energy price volatility.


Robert J. Shapiro 2007 From 1997 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. Ph.D. from Harvard, as
well as degrees from the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science chairman of Sonecon,
LLC, a private firm that advises U.S. and foreign businesses, governments and non-profit organizations on market conditions and
economic policy “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions
Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes” American Consumer Institute. http://www.aci-citizenresearch.org/Shapiro.pdf

While both approaches necessarily produce higher energy prices, they are very different in three important ways. The
critical economic distinction is that cap-and-trade directly controls the quantity of emissions, while carbon taxes directly control their price. The result is
that cap-and-trade can produce a designated quantity of emissions but with much more volatility in energy and energy-
related prices, while carbon taxes will produce more certain prices for energy and energy-intensive goods with greater
uncertainty about the quantity of emissions. These two tradeoffs are not equivalent. By regulating the quantity of emissions, a strict cap-
and-trade program will drive the price of its permits to whatever level is required to bring emissions under its cap. The
price of permits and their underlying energy source may rise sharply when emissions happen to increase because, for
example, an industry or country’s growth accelerates – or the winter is especially cold. This price effect will accentuate normal
energy price fluctuations but on a national rather than global basis. Under a cap-and-trade program strict enough to affect climate
change, this increased volatility in all energy prices will affect business investment and consumption, especially in major
CO2 producing economies such as the United States, Germany, Britain, China and other major developing countries.
This price volatility is evident in the emission permits traded under the U.S. acid rain program, the major example of cap-and-trade, based on the interaction of
its SO2 caps and energy demand. Over the last 13 years, the clearing prices of these permits have ranged from $66 in 1997 to
$860 in 2006, moving up or down by an average of more 43 percent a year.6 Moreover, this volatility has increased in
the last three years, when permit prices rose by an average of more 80 percent a year, despite a safety-valve provision
allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to auction permits to temper such volatility. The following graph (below) plots the
annual percentage changes in the clearing prices for these SO2 permits.

Permits destroy certainty about energy prices.


Financial Times 4-26-07 Carbon markets create a muddle http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b80ee18-f393-11db-9845-
000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1
Climate change poses a classic spill-over problem: individuals do not suffer the full burden of producing carbon dioxide, but society does. To equate the private
cost to the higher social cost, governments can create markets for carbon, by using tradeable permits, or impose a tax. So far, the preferred method
has been tradeable permits. Creating markets for carbon has political advantages. They are easy to sign into law and even easier to execute. Instead of
the optimal method of auctioning permits, governments have given them away. It is no wonder that energy producers are keen to participate in these schemes.
While short-term politics favour markets, taxes would be better in the long term, because industry needs certainty for
investments years hence. A government committing to painful taxes signals the seriousness of its intentions. Carbon taxes, offset by cuts in other taxes,
are more difficultto eliminate than artificial markets. Carbon markets have other problems. Above all, they fix the amount of carbon
abated, not its price. Getting the amount of emissions a little bit wrong in any year would hardly upset the global
climate. But excessive volatility or unduly high prices of quotas on carbon emissions might disrupt the economy
severely. Taxes create needed certainty about prices, while markets in emission quotas create unnecessary certainty
about the short-term quantity of emissions.

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Permits  Price volatility

Permits cause price volatility.


Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward and, Kevin A. Hassett 2007 Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes Friday, June 1, 2007
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OUTLOOK AEI Online Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K.
Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. June 1, 2007

The favored solution to these problems is to over-allocate the number of initial permits both to ease the cost and to encourage the rapid start-up of a market for
trades. This was the course the European Union took with its Emissions Trading System (ETS), and it has very nearly led to the collapse of the system.
Because emissions permits were over-allocated, the price of emissions permits plummeted, and little--if any--emissions reductions have taken place because of
the ETS. The over-allocation of initial permits merely postpones both emissions cuts and the economic pain involved. Economist Robert J. Shapiro notes:
As a result of all of these factors and deficiencies, the ETS is failing to reduce European CO2 emissions. . . . [T]he European Environmental Agency has
projected that the EU is likely to achieve no more than one-quarter of its Kyoto-targeted reductions by 2012, and much of those "reductions" will simply reflect
credits purchased from Russia or non-Annex-I countries [developing countries], with no net environmental benefits.[3] As economist William Nordhaus
observes: We have preliminary indications that European trading prices for CO2 are highly volatile, fluctuating in a
band and [changing] +/- 50 percent over the last year. More extensive evidence comes from the history of the U.S. sulfur-emissions trading
program. SO2 trading prices have varied from a low of $70 per ton in 1996 to $1500 per ton in late 2005. SO2 allowances have a monthly
volatility of 10 percent and an annual volatility of 43 percent over the last decade.[4] Nordhaus points out the ramifications of such
volatility, observing that "[s]uch rapid fluctuations would be extremely undesirable, particularly for an input (carbon) whose
aggregate costs might be as great as petroleum in the coming decades," and that "experience suggests that a regime of strict
quantity limits might become extremely unpopular with market participants and economic policymakers if carbon
price variability caused significant changes in inflation rates, energy prices, and import and export values."[5] Nordhaus is
not alone in this concern about price volatility. Shapiro similarly observes: Under a cap-and-trade program strict enough to
affect climate change, this increased volatility in all energy prices will affect business investment and consumption,
especially in major CO2 producing economies such as the United States, Germany, Britain, China and other major
developing countries.[6]

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Permits  Price Volatility kills economy


Empirically, permits create extreme price volatility killing the economy.
William D. Nordhaus 2007 Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
volume 1, issue 1, winter 2007, pp. 26–44 To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming

Uncertainties affect prices. Because supply, demand, and regulatory conditions evolve unpredictably over time,
quantity-type regulations are likely to cause volatile trading prices of carbon emissions. Price volatility for allowances is
likely to be particularly high because of the complete inelasticity of the supply of permits along with highly inelastic
demand for permits in the short run. The history of European trading prices for CO2 illustrates the extreme volatility of
quantity systems. Over 2006, the range of trading prices has been from $44.47 to $143.06 per ton carbon (Point Carbon 2006). The prices of
allowances fell by more than 70 percent in one month because of new regulatory information. More extensive evidence with the
trading of quantitative environmental allowances comes from the history of the U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions-trading program. This program includes
an annual auction conducted by the EPA as well as private markets, in which firms and individuals can buy and sell allowances. The comparison between SO2
prices and carbon trading prices is useful because of the similar economic characteristics of the respective markets. Both markets are ones in which the supply
is fixed or near-fixed in the short run. Moreover, for each market, the demand is highly inelastic because it involves the substitution between a fuel (such as
coal) and other inputs, where the technology is relatively inflexible in the short run and substitution is therefore limited. To some extent, the volatility can be
moderated if an agreement allows banking and borrowing, meaning that countries can draw from future emissions allowances, or save allowances for the
future. But programs are unlikely to allow borrowing, and banking provides only limited relief from price volatility. We can gain some insight into the likely
functioning of CO2 allowances by examining the historical volatility of the price of SO2 allowances. Spot SO2 prices at the annual EPA auction have varied
from a low of $66 per ton in 1996 to a high of $860 per ton in 2005. Futures prices have varied by a factor of 4.7 (EPA 2006). If we look at the private market,
we find that allowance prices have varied by a factor of 69 in the 1995–2006 period and by a factor of 12 in the 2001–2006 period. Some changes have been
induced by changes in regulatory policies, but that feature would be relevant for the carbon market as well. We can obtain a more precise measure of variability
by calculating the statistical ‘‘volatility’’ of the prices of SO2 emissions allowances and comparing them with other volatile prices. Volatility measures the
average absolute month-to-month change, and is a common approach to indicating the variability and unpredictability of asset prices. Figure 4 shows the
estimated volatility of four prices for the period 1995–2005: the consumer price index, stock prices, SO2 allowance prices, and oil prices. SO2 prices are much
more volatile than stock prices (or than the prices of other assets such as houses, not shown); they are vastly more volatile than most consumer prices; and their
volatility is close to that of oil prices. Such rapid fluctuations are costly and undesirable, particularly for an input (carbon)
whose aggregate costs might be as great as petroleum in the coming decades. An analogous situation occurred in the United States
during themonetarist experiment of 1979–82, when the Federal Reserve targeted quantities (monetary aggregates) rather than prices (interest rates). During that
period, interest rates were extremely volatile. In part owing to the increased volatility, the Fed changed back to a price-type approach after a short period of
experimentation (Poole 1970). This experience suggests that a regime of strict quantity limits might have major disruptive
effects on energy markets and on investment planning, as well as on the distribution of income across countries,
inflation rates, energy prices, and import and export values. It might consequently become extremely unpopular with
market participants and economic policymakers.

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Price Volatility Turn – Stability key to investment

Price volatility discourages investment.


Ian Parry March 23, 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago Should We Abandon Cap-and-Trade in Favor of a
CO2 Tax? Yellow Line A Weathervane Commentary
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/policy_design/taxes_and_subsidies/Should_We_Abandon_Cap_and_Trade_for_CO2Tax.cfm
The potential volatility of carbon permit prices (if not addressed through other design features) is another potentially
serious problem with emissions trading programs. Price volatility can arise because the supply of permits is fixed by the
government, but the demand for permits may vary considerably year to year with changes in fuel prices and the
demand for energy. In contrast, a CO2 tax fixes the price of CO2, allowing the amount of emissions to vary with prevailing economic conditions.
Uncertainty over the future price of CO2 may deter CO2-saving investments with high up-front capital costs, such as
carbon capture and sequestration technologies; CO2 price volatility may also deter applied R&D efforts at firms to
develop cleaner technologies for the future.

Cap and trade fluctuates carbon credits and markets, creating a disincentive for renewable energy
Matthew Hennessey (Assistant Editor of Policy Innovations, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs) 2007
(“Cap and Trade vs. Carbon Tax,” Policy Innovations, November 19 2007,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/cap_tax) July 15 2008

Despite DeVito's "colossal optimism," examples of successful cap-and-trade programs are hard to come by. Economic
guru and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has come out against cap and trade as an effective mechanism for reducing carbon
emissions. "I have grave doubts that international agreements imposing a globalized so-called cap-and-trade system on CO2
emissions will prove feasible," he wrote in his recent book, The Age of Turbulence. The 2005 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme got off to a rocky
start. It was developed in part to help meet targets set by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, but the system ran into trouble when it became clear that too
many permits had been allotted, causing their value to plummet. Distribution of permits was "grandfathered," meaning that countries
received credits free of charge based on historic emissions. Cap and trade skeptics argue that giving away permits, rather than selling
them, represents a de facto wealth transfer to large polluters. As caps reduce the size of the carbon market, the increased cost is passed along to
consumers in the form of higher prices. "This extra money flows to the companies that get free permits," writes Peter Barnes in Carbon Capping: A
Citizen's Guide. Others have noted that carbon markets are easily manipulated by industry lobbying. "When [a market] is created
through political action, rather than emerging spontaneously, business will seek to influence its design for commercial
advantage," wrote economist and Financial Times columnist John Kay in 2006. Still others point to the price volatility of carbon credits as a
disincentive to invest in emissions-reducing technologies.

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Predictability key to solve


Cost predictability it the most important means to reduce emissions.
New York Times 11-2-07 The Real Climate Debate: To Cap or to Tax? http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/us/politics/04web-
redburn.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
A carbon tax reverses the process. The government would impose a tax on carbon output, gradually raising the price of energy produced from fossil fuels to
higher and higher levels. The cost of coal would go up the most, because it emits more carbon dioxide for each unit of energy, with the price rising less for
products derived from oil like gasoline and jet fuel, and even less for natural gas. The money raised by the tax, ideally, would be used to offset other taxes in
ways that could compensate lower-income households and minimize damage to the economy. “Making the price predictable is the most
significant move you can make to control global warming,” says Charles Komanoff, a long-time environmental economist who has recently
started the Carbon Tax Center as an advocacy group. “It would tilt literally billions of energy critical decisions toward using less
carbon.” In theory, both approaches aim to achieve the same result: by making it more costly to emit carbon into the
atmosphere, the government would discourage the burning of fossil fuels, encourage producers to find alternative
energy from renewable sources and prod consumers into using energy more efficiently. Each side can make a compelling case.So
what’s the argument? Many economists line up behind a carbon tax. They argue that it is the most cost-effective way to limit
global warming emissions, that it provides a more predictable long-term price for energy producers of all kinds and
that emissions trading schemes would be subject to manipulation by special interests.

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Volatility kills the economy


Price volatility imposed on the energy market by the plan destroys the economy.
Dr. Michael E. Canes July 20, 2007 Senior Research Fellow at the Logistics Management Insti-tute in McLean, Virginia PhD in
Economics from UCLA and an MSc in Economics from the London School of Economics. Is Cap & Trade the Wrong Policy to Curb
Greenhouse Gases for the United States? George Marshall Institute
Volatility in allowance prices will add volatility to energy prices. This is a point that economists have been trying to make for quite some
time with regard to cap and trade. Their warning has had some impact in the sense that people are beginning to recognize that a safety valve may be necessary
to avoid truly egregious costs. The costs of allowances will be embedded in costs of fossil fuels, because to use fossil fuels you
will have to pay for the allowances. Experience with allowances suggests high rates of price volatility. It is not like we have
worlds of experience with these, but we do have the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program and we have the European trading system program, which has been
going on for a couple of years. So we know a little about how volatile allowance prices can be. The SO2 permit trading program has had an an-nual volatility
of 43 percent, that is, shifts in price from one year to another have aver-aged 43 percent. Prices in that program have ranged from $66/ton in 1997 to $860/ton
in 2006. That is a pretty formidable range. In the European Trading Sys-tem, the carbon allowance trading system in Europe,
monthly volatility has been 17.5 percent. The value of allowances fell by over two-thirds in just a few days in 2006 when
people learned that there had been an over-allotment in permits relative to the amount of carbon actually being emitted
by European companies. That is a pretty high-volatility experience! How much does energy price volatility matter? One person who has
studied the impact of oil price volatility, but not total fossil fuel volatility, is James Hamilton, an economist out at the University of California, San Diego. He
has written quite exten-sively on this. I looked at one of his papers that had to do with an oil price increase that occurred back in 1956. An oil price increase of
10 percent at that time caused by the Suez crisis impacted U.S. GDP growth rates by an average of .3 percent over seven quarters. It varied by quarter, as low
as .2 percent and up to .7 percent, but av-eraged over seven quarters there was a .3 percent impact on the GDP. That is just that instance. You might say that
fifty years ago the economy was more dependent on oil; we used it for industrial purposes and in the utility sector a lot. We since have largely substituted out
of oil in those sectors and maybe that impact would be less to-day. Also, perhaps a 10 percent increase in the price of oil doesn’t seem like all that much. But
the point is that volatility matters. If we impose a cap on carbon use and conditions change in some way such that demand
rises for energy or the amount set is less than had been expected, you can get abrupt price movements and that can have
an impact on the economy. That is basically the point. Professor Hamilton gives a sense of what the magnitude would be. If we had even a .1
percent impact on today’s GDP, that is $13 billion. How frequent would these impacts be and how often would you get
this kind of volatility? It is hard to say, but it is much more likely with a cap and trade system than with some of the
alternatives.

Price volatility kills the economy, not high prices.


Carbon Tax Center 6-12-08 “Myths” http://www.carbontax.org/myths/
Rebuttal: Whatcauses economic havoc isn't high energy prices or even rising prices, but price volatility. Even fairly steep
price increases can be manageable so long as they're regular and predictable, particularly now that the share of
economic activity occupied by the fossil fuels sector is at an historic low. And carbon taxes need not be draconian to accomplish their
mission. Our program of recurring annual increases of $37 per ton of emitted carbon equates to 5-10% increases in energy prices per annum (with the
percentages shrinking as the "base" rises and as non-fossil energy assumes a larger share). By comparison, the average annual real increase
in
U.S. gasoline prices in 2003-07 was 11%, and this didn't stop the economy from growing at 3% a year. Needless to say,
the true threat to the economy (and everything else) is unchecked climate change, as the Stern Report has shown.

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C tax = certainty
A carbon tax guarantees price certainty, solves comparatively better than the plan.
Carbon Tax Center “Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade”July 1 2008 http://www.carbontax.org/issues/carbon-taxes-vs-cap-and-trade/
Carbon Taxes Will Lend Predictability to Energy Prices. With carbon taxes ramped up through a multi-year phase-in,
future energy and power prices can be predicted with a reasonable degree of confidence well ahead of time. This will
make it possible for literally millions of energy-critical decisions — from the design of new electricity generating plants to the purchase of
the family car to the materials used in commercial airframes — to be made with full cognizance of carbon-appropriate price signals. In
contrast, a cap-and-trade program will exacerbate the volatility of energy prices since the price of carbon allowances
will fluctuate as weather and economic factors affect the demand for energy. The vaunted advantage of cap-and-trade — that future
levels of carbon emissions can be known ahead of time — is mostly notional, moreover, since most cap-and-trade systems under discussion
include a "safety-valve" for auctioning off additional carbon allowances if the price of allowances exceeds a
predetermined level. And even certainty in future emission levels is of questionable value, since there is no agreed-upon
trajectory of emissions for achieving climate stability and preventing disaster. The real target for which the U.S. must
aim is to reduce carbon emissions as much as possible, and then more.

A Carbon tax guarantees price certainty.


Keith Crane is a senior economist and James Bartis is a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research
organization 11-26-07 On Carbon Dioxide, a Better Alternative Washington Post
In either case -- tax or trade -- electricity and gasoline prices would rise. A tax of $30 per ton -- a level MIT suggests would make clean coal
technologies an attractive investment to power companies -- would raise gasoline prices by 35 cents per gallon and household electricity bills by 20 to 30 percent.
Under cap and trade, prices would have to rise by the same amount to get the same result. The attraction of cap and trade for its supporters is that
the cap sets a limit on emissions of carbon dioxide. But it's difficult to get the limit right. The cap may be set too high to induce
firms to make the large investments needed to reduce emissions. Or it may be set so low that costs skyrocket and political
support to combat climate change falters. The major disadvantage to cap and trade is that the price tag for reaching the
target is highly uncertain. In contrast, a tax on emissions provides businesses and consumers with certainty about costs, while
leaving the size of the reduction less certain.

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C tax solves price volatility.


The counterplan results in immediate investment in alternative energy.
Charles Komanoff 2/13/07 Don't trade carbon, tax it Why carbon taxes trump cap-and-trade energy-policy analyst, transport
economist and environmental activist http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/2/13/83257/5462

Chameides claims that the "marketplace does a better job of developing new technologies, and a tax takes money out of the marketplace." That argument was
pertinent when the alternative to cap-and-trade was "command and control" regulation of NOx and SO2 emissions, but it's irrelevant to a comparison with a
carbon tax. Both a cap-and-trade and a carbon tax provide price signals that encourage polluters to look for ways to avoid
the cost of emitting CO2. A carbon tax actually provides more precise price signals, provides them sooner, and provides
them in a more understandable and transparent fashion. To attack global warming, every energy-critical decision needs to be predicated on
a trajectory of rising energy prices. A phased-in carbon tax allows this, whereas cap-and-trade will do little to mitigate the price
roller-coaster that discourages emissions-minimizing investment. Not only would a carbon cap-and-trade system
provide less effective price signals, it would do so only after considerable delay consumed by protracted negotiations,
making a mockery of Chameides' claim that a cap will guarantee climate-stabilizing cuts. Compounding the problem, once a cap-and-trade
system is finally implemented, we're likely to be locked into the approach for years, with industry insisting, "Don't
change it until we see how it works." Carbon taxes will require no new administrative structures, can be implemented
now, and can be adjusted as necessary.

A Carbon tax creates energy price predictability.


Interview with Daniel Rosenblum 4-11-07 Newhour PBS Carbon Tax Aims to Cut Greenhouse Gases environmental attorney
and cofounder of the Carbon Tax Center http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june07/climatechange_04-11.html
RAY SUAREZ: How would that eventually reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere? DANIEL ROSENBLUM: There are costs
society incurs when carbon is emitted. And nobody pays for it right now. Because it's free, nobody cares about it. So we put a price on carbon, and people start
to use less. How? Electric generation. Electric generators will use less coal, more gas, more wind, more solar... RAY SUAREZ: In order to pay less tax?
DANIEL ROSENBLUM: In order to avoid the tax on the coal, individuals will probably get a more-efficient car. They'll drive
less. They'll do whatever they can to avoid paying for the carbon tax on their gasoline. RAY SUAREZ: So how... DANIEL
ROSENBLUM: So we're talking about a fairly low starter tax. We're talking about a $37-a-ton-of-carbon tax, which would
equate to roughly 10 cents a gallon of gasoline or, averaged across the country, maybe .72 cents a kilowatt hour, less than a penny of kilowatt
hour. And then we propose increasing the tax each year by that same amount, so it's gradually phased in. One major
advantage of that is it gives people time to adapt and gives people time to plan. We're talking about a very clear
trajectory, so businesses trying to decide what to do with their future investments will say, "Well, we know prices are
going up like this, so it makes good sense to invest in a high-efficiency motor," which...
Giving consumers predictability RAY SUAREZ: So it gives them predictability, which they crave? DANIEL
ROSENBLUM: Exactly, which they wouldn't do otherwise. They need that predictability, and a carbon tax gives it.

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AT Safety Valve Solve volatility


Safety valves fail to control price volatility.
Richard D. Morgenstern March 5, 2008 Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce Climate Change Competitiveness Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing Countries

The appropriate overall level of stringency for U.S. policy remains a subject of active debate. The Committee is well aware of
modeling results by independent analysts assessing the costs of achieving the emissions reduction targets in various legislative proposals. Interestingly, the
inclusion of a “safety valve”—a mechanism that directly limits costs under a cap-and-trade program by making an
unlimited number of additional allowances available for sale at a fixed, predetermined price—will affect the policy
differently, depending on the price level adopted. Set at a high price, the safety valve will function primarily as an insurance
policy, one intended to limit economic impacts only in cases of unexpectedly high mitigation cost. By contrast, a safety valve
price set at a relatively low level will tend to determine both environmental and economic outcomes and is generally
equivalent to adopting a weaker emissions reduction target. Put another way, if the safety valve price is set sufficiently low,
the emissions target becomes irrelevant because the marginal cost of abatement can be expected to exceed the safety
valve’s cost cap long before emissions targets are reached. At that point, program outcomes are more or less entirely
driven by the safety valve price.

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AT “Fed” oversight of market solve volatility


Oversight just causes more volatility.
Ian W.H. Parry AND William A. Pizer 2007 Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Senior Fellow and Director of
Research at the RFF Ph.D., M.A. in economics, Harvard University, Emissions Trading
versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20382

At the same time, empowering an outside agency to intervene in the market poses risks. Designed or operated poorly, such
oversight could exacerbate volatility. For example, consider a provision that requires prices to remain above a particular
threshold for a period of time before intervention occurs. As permits trade above the threshold, it becomes increasingly likely
that the government will intervene to lower prices. At that point, allowance buyers begin waiting for the intervention—who
wants to buy now if prices are going to be lower in the future? As demand falls, prices drop, the likelihood of intervention
recedes, and therefore prices begin to rise again. In this scenario, the prospect of intervention could have the perverse effect of
increasing price volatility and market instability. Alternatively, if interventions are quantitatively limited, the most valuable
role of the outside agency—addressing a truly exceptional shortage—is compromised.

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** Env. Justice DA **

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Environmental Injustice DA-Links


Nature of market-based environmental policies exacerbates environmental injustice. Command and control keeps
it neutral
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

It is well established that minority and low-income communities suffer disproportionate exposure to a variety of types of
pollution under the existing command and control regulatory approach. n40 Although the traditional ap- [*118] proach clearly has not
adequately addressed distributional inequities, market-based approaches will inevitably exacerbate those inequities.
While the traditional command and control environmental laws and regulations do not explicitly require the government to avoid
actions that disparately impact low-income or minority communities, those laws also do not affirmatively encourage unequal
distribution of pollution. n41 By contrast, as explained below, many market-based approaches to environmental protection affirmatively
encourage polluters to shift pollution to lower-income communities. While command and control regulation may be
facially neutral, but discriminatory in practice, many market-based approaches are designed in a way that will inevitably treat
low-income communities unfairly.

Market-based approaches marginalize participates, exacerbating environmental injustice


Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

Supporters of these market-based approaches cite dozens of studies which suggest that market-based approaches can reduce pollution control costs n36 and
which provide equivalent or better environmental protection than command and control regulation. n37 Despite the rosy predictions, market-based reforms have
not been implemented in the manner advocated by economists, participation in market-based reforms has been marginal, and the
reforms are not generating the substantial cost savings that economists predicted. n38 Nevertheless, even if market-based
approaches delivered all of the benefits that economists predict, governments should proceed down the economic path with caution
n39
because market- based approaches could exacerbate existing problems of environmental injustice.

Market-based reduces abilities for low-income areas to access a clean environment


Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

Classical economic theory institutionalizes and exacerbates existing social disparities that are based on unequal distributions of income. As Judge Richard Posner
suggested, in a free market economy, in which voluntary exchange is permitted, "resources are shifted to those uses in which the value to consumers, as measured
by their willingness to pay, is highest. When resources are being used where their value is highest, we may say that they are being employed efficiently." n42
Although Judge Posner defined "value" in terms of "willingness to pay," on closer reflection it is clear that Judge Posner and other economists incorporated "ability
to pay" into the concept of "willingness to pay." n43 Thus, under traditional economic theory, a pollutant trading [*119] program, tax
program, or similar market-based reform that shifts pollution to low- income communities is operating efficiently and, therefore, desirably
because resources, such as clean air and clean water, are shifted to the uses in which the value to consumers, as measured by
their willingness (and ability) to pay, is highest. Because wealthy communities are "willing to pay" more for clean air and water
than low-income communities, the market operates efficiently when it funnels those resources to those communities n44
rather than to low-income communities. In a free market, low-income communities will never have sufficient financial
resources to buy clean air, clean water, and similar environmental and public health resources from wealthy
communities or polluters.

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Env Just DA links – Hot spots

Emissions trading create “hot spots” in developing nations that are justified by environmental racism
Akers, Law Clerk, Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2001
(Nicklas, Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, Spring, p. LN)

Emissions trading programs have also drawn criticism from the environmental justice movement for their impact on poor
communities and communities of color. n85 Environmental justice can be characterized as a fusing of the civil rights and
environmental movements. The movement has maintained a concern with the distributional effects of pollution, and
particularly its effects on low income communities and communities of color. Concerns about toxic substances and their effect on
Latino communities were a constant element of Ceasar Chavez's work with the United Farm Workers. n86 Environmental justice issues were again
brought to prominence by the United Church of Christ's 1982 involvement in a land-fill siting conflict in Warren County, North Carolina. n87 The
Church's Commission for Racial Justice studied the associations between racial and socioeconomic characteristics of
communities that house hazardous waste sites. n88 The study found that poor and black communities had a greater
number of hazardous waste sites than average. n89 Standardizing for income, the study found race more predictive than
income for the location of high concentrations of hazardous waste sites. n90 The study drew criticism from some, n91 and served as a
rallying cry for others. Academics such as Professor Robert Bullard have led efforts to connect activism and scholarship in the area. n92 Some have
published work investigating the association between race, siting, and the probability of cleanup. n93 Organizations have grown up around this relatively
newly developed issue, such as CBE in California. n94 Luke Cole, a practitioner at the Center for Race, Poverty and the Environment has described the
development of a field of "environmental poverty law" n95 which draws on an integration of legal tactics, grassroots organizing, and working with
technical and scientific information. n96 Environmental and civil rights groups, such as the Sierra Club and NAA CP [*211] Legal Defense Fund have
joined lawsuits aimed at achieving environmental justice goals. n97 President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice marked an
official voicing of concern over the racial and poverty-related distributional effects of environmental hazards. n98 A number of agencies have responded
by creating their own environmental justice programs. n99 The EPA in 1993 formed the National Advisory Committee on Environmental Justice n100
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. n101 It has also established a review process for complaints that the EPA or EPA-funded programs violate
the Civil Rights Act's Title VI prohibition against discrimination by federally funded programs.
environmental permitting and regulation programs have been attacked for producing
As the environmental justice perspective has developed,
localized "hot spots." These are areas of concentrated pollutants from single or multiple sources of emissions that create areas of high
health hazard. n102 Environmental justice concerns are implicated when these hot spots fall in low-income communities or communities
of color. Some campaigns have used the EPA administrative process to bring Title VI based complaints. n103 Others have relied on a mix of political action and
conventional "NIMBY" n104 techniques such as complaints for procedural violation of the National Environmental Policy Act or analogous state statutes. n105 Some
advocates have integrated racial and ethnic issues into claims grounded in traditional attacks on agency compliance with public participation requirements. Members of
the Latino community in Kettleman City, California successfully challenged a county permit authorizing the construction of a waste treatment facility. n106 The permit
was issued without holding public forums in Spanish or considering comments written in Spanish.

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Environmental Injustice DA-Links


Federal pollution trading systems leads to environmental injustice in “toxic hot spots”
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

While the state and federal pollutant trading programs promise to reduce pollution in a "cost-effective" manner, these programs could disparately
impact low- income communities. First, while some trading programs limit trading to a specific air quality control region, many trading programs do
not
include any geographic limits on trades. As a result, while trading programs may decrease overall pollution levels,
they may increase pollution in certain areas and create "toxic hot spots." Older, heavily polluting industries may find that
it is more cost-effective to continue polluting and to buy pollution rights than to install new technologies to reduce pollution.
Thus, communities surrounding those industries will be exposed to higher levels of pollution than other
communities. Geographic limits on trades will not eliminate the "toxic hot spot" problem, especially if the geographic area in which trades are authorized
is fairly large, but the limits could, at least, reduce the potential volume of pollution that will be imparted into a toxic hot spot. Professors Bruce Ackerman and
Richard Stewart, early advocates of pollutant trading programs, recognized the "hot spot" problem over a decade ago, n94 and recent [*130] commentators n95
and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) n96 echo their concerns today. n97 Even without trading programs, "grandfathering"
provisions in environmental laws that establish more lenient standards for existing polluters than for new polluters provide incentives for old, heavily polluting
industries to continue to pollute. n98 Trading programs will provide additional incentives for those facilities to continue to
pollute and will perpetuate the distributional inequities that are already caused, in part, by "grandfathering"
provisions. n99

Pollution trading systems grounded on economic theories disables low-income communities from living in a
pollution-free community without giving up their economic abilities
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

If thetrading programs will create toxic hot spots, economic theory suggests that the hot spots will most likely occur in low-
income communities. n100 Low-income communities are disproportionately impacted by air pollution, n101 the siting of locally unwanted land uses
(LULUs), n102 and the [*131] siting of heavily polluting industries. n103 This trend will likely continue as pollution trading programs
expand for several reasons that are grounded in economic theory. First, heavily polluting industrial facilities (the facilities that may
purchase pollution credits) will more likely be sited in low-income, urban areas than in middle- to upper-income, suburban areas. n104 Second, low-
income communities may be less likely than affluent communities to urge an outdated, heavily polluting industry to
implement new pollution controls instead of buying pollution rights. Low-income communities may fear that if
they urge the industry to adopt new pollution controls, then the industry will close, depriving the community of essential jobs and
tax revenue. Finally, low-income communities often lack the political power to influence industries to adopt new
pollution controls instead of buying pollution rights. n105As trading programs have proliferated, examples of the
disparate impacts of such programs have begun to proliferate as well. For instance, Citizens for a Better Environment and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund recently challenged the auto scrapping program of the SCAQMD on the grounds that the program discriminates against
minorities in violation of federal civil rights laws. n106 Over the past few years, oil companies have scrapped 17,000 cars to generate emission reduction credits
that enable the companies to avoid installing vapor-recovery systems at oil refineries in low-income, Latino communities. n107 The auto scrapping program has,
therefore, concentrated thousands of [*132] pounds of pollution that were previously dispersed throughout the air quality control region, into several low-
income, minority communities. n108

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Environmental Injustice DA-Links


Without regulation system, market-based environmental policies neglect low-income communities from accessing a
clean environment
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

In the current era of antiregulatory sentiment, it is clear that market-based environmental reforms will continue to
proliferate and flourish. However, in a free market, low-income communities will never have sufficient financial
resources to buy clean air, clean water, and similar environmental and public health resources from wealthy
communities or polluters. In addition, barriers to collective organization or public participation, imperfect
information, or other market failures will often prevent low-income communities from even participating in the
market for those resources. Consequently, market-based [*166] environmental reforms could exacerbate the
inequitable distribution of pollution in low-income communities.

Emissions trading programs shackles low-income communities


Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

The promises of pollution trading advocates have not come to pass. Pollution trading in Los Angeles has led to
concentrated toxic air emission hot-spots that have shackled low-income and minority communities with the region's
air pollution. Pollution reductions have been far less than those promised by trading proponents. Furthermore,
pollution trading has virtually eliminated public participation in the environmental decision-making process. The
lessons learned from the Los Angeles pollution trading experiments should inform decision making in the development
and reform of domestic and international emissions trading programs.

Environmental injustice effects make pollution trading system a disincentive for gas emission
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

emissions trading as a universal policy


Criticisms of pollution trading, some empirical and some theoretical, challenge the growing support for
cure for environmental ills. Pollution trading, as practiced in Los Angeles, has produced immoral, unjust, and ineffective outcomes.
These are inherent characteristics that flow from emissions trading theory and practice. In an ideal world, one that has perfect information and is free from market
distortions, pollution trading might succeed. However, the necessary conditions for pollution trading's success appear to be politically unacceptable to the large
industrial polluters who seem to embrace trading as indefinite regulatory relief. n162What once was a wrong - polluting - is now a "right'. The immorality of
pollution trading lies in its treatment of a public resource, pollution-free air, as a private commodity. Instead of people
having the right to breathe free, businesses have the right to pollute as much as they can afford. Furthermore, pollution trading
unfairly harms minority and low income people by unfairly concentrating emissions in toxic hot-spots. Therefore, pollution
trading conflicts with environmental justice. Should this call for moral and just pollution policy remain unheeded, then, at least the ineffectiveness
of pollution trading policies must receive close attention. In Los Angeles, the emissions trading strategy has weakened meaningful
commitments to reduce air pollution; it has delivered more promises than environmental progress.

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Environmental Injustice DA-Impact: Democracy

Pollution trading systems fail to include government agencies and public decision making, undermining democracy
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

Public participation is a tenet of democratic government and environmental policy making. Some academics argue that pollution
trading enhances meaningful public participation. Yet, existing pollution trading programs effectively exclude the public (and to a large
extent, government agencies) from the decision making process about industrial pollution. Most states have permitting procedures
through which affected community members can advocate for pollution control requirements on facilities. However, pollution
trading allows facilities to avoid those permit requirements - usually without the knowledge or involvement of the affected community. Pollution trades
made pursuant to Rule 1610 and RECLAIM are not subject to public review or comment. In fact, the public faces numerous difficulties finding
out what companies are trading to avoid compliance with pollution con [*279] trol standards. n208 For instance, RECLAIM
credits can be purchased from independent brokers, without any environmental agency or public oversight. n209 A company wishing to increase or continue its
pollution need only purchase the required credits on the open market, without any public review or comment. In this way, the democratic will, as
represented in permit and regulatory requirements imposed after full public review and comment, can be reversed by a simple economic
transaction.

No link turns- Democracy and pollution trading program do not coexist


Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

Sunstein, Ackerman, and Stewart hold that pollution trading promotes democracy and public participation. However,
under Rule 1610 and RECLAIM, company management decides whether to reduce emissions or to use pollution
credits. n210 Profit, not public health, becomes the deciding factor. n211 Thus, as Heinzerling notes, "in deciding whether
to adopt a trading program or some other regulatory strategy, "democracy' cannot be counted on the side of pollution
trading." n212 As Rule 1610 demonstrates, when "pollution trading programs do not assure meaningful citizen
participation in decisions about the environment, then the distributional objection goes unmet: some non-consenting
citizens must endure greater pollution, in the service of reducing the overall costs of environmental compliance." n213

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Environmental Injustice DA-Impact: Human Survival

Industrial pollution cumulated in low-income communities risks human survival


Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

EPA should prohibit trading into overburdened communities. Because industrial polluters tend to cluster in low income
neighborhoods and communities of color, allowing those sources to increase pollution seriously threatens to further
overburden such communities. The burden on these communities should be measured by a cumulative risk threshold
that accounts for reproductive harm, cancer risk, acute health risks, and risks to the most sensitive individuals, such as
children. Such measurements should include the cumulative risk from all facilities affecting a particular community.

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Environmental Injustice DA-CT Tradesoff CC


Market-based incentives replace command and control in federal government environmental policies
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova
University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter
1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

In light of those criticisms and limitations, the federal government and state governments are increasingly
implementing market-based approaches to address environmental problems. n10 The Clinton Administration has suggested that
"[m]arket incentives should be used to achieve environmental goals, whenever appropriate," n11 and a recent report by the Environmental Law Institute
estimates that governments are using over one hundred different economic incentive mechanisms to address environmental problems in the United States.
n12
Instead of mandating uniform pollution reductions on a national basis, market- based approaches use economic
incentives to encourage polluters to reduce their pollution in the most cost-effective manner. n13 Theoretically, market-
based approaches can achieve the same level of pollution reduction as command and control regulation at a lower
cost. n14 In addition, proponents claim that market- based approaches can eliminate the information-gathering burden of
command and control regulation on the government. n15

Command and control serves as a disincentive for new strategy developments to reduce pollutions
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova
University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter
1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

command and control


Academics have criticized command and control regulation on several grounds for over a decade. n4 Critics argue that
regulation is not cost-effective because it normally requires all polluters to comply with the same pollution limits even
though one polluter may be able to reduce its pollution more cheaply than another polluter n5 and even though it may
not be necessary for all polluters to reduce their pollution to the levels required by the uniform limits in order to achieve
pollution reductions that protect human health or the environment. n6 Critics also argue that command and control
regulation (i) imposes unreasonable information-gathering burdens and exorbitant costs on government; n7 (ii) often
imposes disproportionate burdens on new pollution sources; n8 and (iii) provides no incentives to polluters to
develop new strategies to reduce their pollution beyond the levels required by law. n9

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Aff Ans: Carbon Tax-Environmental Injustice Turn


Governmental uniform tax rates creates “toxic hot spots” unless tax is proportionate
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

While variable rate waste disposal fees, energy taxes, and other pollution taxes, fees, and charges promise to reduce pollution in cost-effective ways, they can also
perpetuate environmental injustices. First, if governments impose uniform tax rates on pollution discharges based on the volume
or toxicity of the discharge without regard to the location of the discharge, pollution taxes could create toxic hot spots in the same
manner as pollutant trading systems. n147 It may be more cost-effective for old, heavily polluting industries to pay pollution taxes than to reduce their
pollution discharges, especially when the taxes are not set at rates that force polluters to reduce pollution. n148 Unless governments tax pollution in
heavily polluted areas at a higher rate than pollution in other areas, only newer, cleaner industries will have any incentive
to reduce their pollution. n149

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Environmental Injustice DA-Command and Control Solves


Command and control key to banning pollution trades, allowing the government to target areas of environmental
injustice. A perm is impossible, only trades off with government’s concentration, exacerbating impacts
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova
University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter
1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

As noted above, market-based environmental reforms and traditional environmental laws could be modified to address some of the market failures that prevent
"efficient" distribution of environmental and public health resources in a free market. However, while the modifications might enable low-income
communities to play a more active role in market-based environmental decisionmaking, existing disparities in the distribution of
wealth in society may ultimately prevent low-income communities from avoiding disproportionate exposure to
pollution. Consequently, command and control "safety nets" may be necessary to protect low-income communities in a
market-based environmental protection system. While the inequitable distribution of pollution in low-income communities has been blamed on
many factors, commentators agree that one of the major contributing factors is the failure of the environmental laws to require government regulators to consider
the distributional impacts of their regulatory, permitting, or enforcement decisions. n266 Accordingly, in order to ensure that market-based reforms do
not exacerate environmental injustice, those reforms could be modified to prohibit trades, waivers of environmental laws or
regulations, or other actions that disparately impact low-income communities. At a minimum, regulators could be required to examine the
impacts of those actions on low-income communities. More broadly, perhaps market-based and command and control environmental laws
could be modified to require governments to consider the distributional impacts of their decisionmaking. The laws could even prohibit actions under those laws that
have disparate impacts on low-income communities. However, both approaches might be difficult to implement, politically and administratively.
The narrow approach increases the government's role in reviewing and overseeing private actions in a market-based
system and seems antithetical to the rationale for the reforms. To the extent that the government prohibits certain trades or regulatory
waivers that disparately impact low-income communities or reviews the distributional impacts of trades, waivers, and
other actions in a market- based system, businesses and the regulated community may be less likely to take advantage
of those tools, which are often quite time-consuming.

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Aff Ans: Command and Control CP-Fails Now


Command and control fails to address environmental issues cost effectively
Stephen M. Johnson (Associated Professor of Law at Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. Villanova
University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law) 1999 (“Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice,” School of Law Washington & Lee University, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter
1999, 56 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 111, Lexis Nexis)

I. The Shift from Command and Control Regulation to Market-Based Reforms. For almost three decades, the federal
government and state governments have addressed environmental problems primarily through "command and control"
regulation. Under this traditional approach, the federal government establishes uniform national pollution limits ("command") that the federal or state governments
impose on individual polluters through a system of permits or other controls. n1 However, as the command and control approach has eliminated
many of the most prolific sources of pollution, the incremental cost of cleaning up the remaining pollution has risen
dramatically, n2 and command [*112] and control regulation has become politically less attractive. In addition, command and control
regulation may be too rigid to address many of the remaining major environmental problems, such as nonpoint source water
pollution. n3

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** Commodity K **

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Tradable permits commidify


Carbon trading is a new means of commodifying the environment.
Diana M. Liverman 2007 Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, CONVENTIONS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSTRUCTIONS OF DANGER AND THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE ATMOSPHERE Journal of
Historical Geography

The commodification of the atmosphere within the international climate regime has immense theoretical and practical
implications. It created a new but highly slippery commodity in the form of ‘carbon credits’ generated from excess emission
reductions and international investments in emission reduction projects in the developing world. Because the baseline for the reductions was based on emissions in
1990 the atmosphere was effectively ‘enclosed’ according to pollution levels in 1990. A meta-narrative here is that of ‘prior appropriation’
whereby those who first polluted the atmosphere then acquire a property right under international law. Any reductions in
emissions beyond the Kyoto targets could be sold and any difficulty in meeting targets could be met by purchasing credits or
making cheap investments in the developing world. The ostensible justifications for Kyoto’s market mechanisms included flexibility, economic
efficiency, and sustainable development [78, 81, 82]. But these narratives of ecological modernisation smooth over the profound
inequalities highlighted by groups such as India’s Centre for Science and Environment and Cornerhouse [83-87]. For example it is argued that
carbon trading is a new form of colonialism whereby the north is able to maintain its consumption by paying southern
communities a pittance to grow trees or by getting credit for the easy ‘low hanging fruit’ of carbon savings in inefficient
industrial projects. A growing number of case studies point to questionable sustainable development benefits of CDM projects [88]. In South Africa,
proposed CDM projects for landfill methane capture, gas pipelines and lower carbon housing have been criticised for lack of local participation, justice and long
term environmental and economic sustainability [89]. In Brazil, forestry plantations have been criticised for lack of additionality and for weak benefits to local
communities [6, 90, 91].

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Commodity K Links

A. LINKS: ALTERNATIVE ENERGY IS A SIDE-SHOW. IT OBSCURES THE WAR ON NATURE INHERENT


IN CAPITALISM. THE AFF IS TRYING TO BUY YOUR COMPLICITY. ALL THE AFF HARMS ARE
INEVITABLE WITHIN CAPITALISM.

John Bellamy Foster, University of Oregon, “The Ecology of Destruction,” MONTHLY REVIEW, 
February 2007, www.monthlyreview.org/0207jbf.htm, accessed 3­27­08.

Yet, the dominant solutions—those associated with the dominant ideology, i.e., the ideology of the dominant
class—emphasize minimal changes in business as usual that will somehow get us off the hook. After being
directed to the growing planetary threats of global warming and species extinction we are told that the answer is
better gas mileage and better emissions standards, the introduction of hydrogen-powered cars, the capture and
sequestration of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere, improved conservation, and voluntary cutbacks in
consumption. Environmental political scientists specialize in the construction of new environmental policy
regimes, embodying state and market regulations. Environmental economists talk of tradable pollution permits
and the incorporation of all environmental factors into the market to ensure their efficient use. Some
environmental sociologists (my own field) speak of ecological modernization: a whole panoply of green taxes,
green regulations, and new green technologies, even the greening of capitalism itself. Futurists describe a new
technological world in which the weight of nations on the earth is miraculously lifted as a result of digital
“dematerialization” of the economy. In all of these views, however, there is one constant: the fundamental
character of business as usual is hardly changed at all. Indeed, what all such analyses intentionally avoid is the
fact that business as usual in our society in any fundamental sense means the capitalist economy—an economy
run on the logic of profit and accumulation. Moreover, there is little acknowledgement or even appreciation of
the fact that the Hobbesian war of all against all that characterizes capitalism requires for its fulfillment a
universal war on nature. In this sense new technology cannot solve the problem since it is inevitably used to
further the class war and to increase the scale of the economy, and thus the degradation of the environment.
Whenever production dies down or social resistance imposes barriers on the expansion of capital the answer is
always to find new ways to exploit/degrade nature more intensively. To quote Pontecorvo’s Burn!, “that is the
logic of profit....One builds to make money and to go on making it or to make more sometimes it is necessary to
destroy.

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Commodity K Links
Cap-and-trade is a tool to seek the most cost effective way to reduce pollution.
Richard L. Sandor, Eric C. Bettelheim, and Ian R. Swingland (Chairman and CEO of Chicago Climate Exchange,
London Offices of Mayer Brown & Platt/Specializes in International Regulation of the Commodities, Professor in
Biology) 2002 (“An Overview of a Free-Market Approach to Climate Change and Conservation,” Philosophical
Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 360(1797), Aug 15 2002,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3066580.pdf) July 16 2008

These market-based mechanisms represent a movement away from highly prescriptive environmental policies that are thought to impose higher
compliance costs com- pared with more flexible regulations. It is widely believed that traditional 'command and control' regulations fail to exploit the
least-cost opportunities to cut pollution, and do little to reward innovative pollution avoidance and reduction efforts. The goal of market-based regulation
is to reduce the cost of achieving a given pollution- reduction target or, equivalently, to realize larger pollution reductions at the same cost. The cap-
and-trade emissions-trading approach exploits differences in pollution- mitigation costs faced by different
emission sources. Trading uses a price signal and profit motive to encourage the sources that can cut pollution
most cost effectively to take advantage of their comparative advantage and make more of the overall pollution
cut. The goal is to help society find and move along the least-cost pollution- reduction supply curve. From a political
economy perspective, by lowering the unit price of cutting pollution, emissions trading is thought to increase the quantity of pollution
reduction the public is willing and able to purchase. In addition to the transparency and accountability features of trading systems,
improved affordability of environmental protection is one of the central reasons emissions trading is gaining greater
acceptance.

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Commodity K Links
The government masquerades their attempts to benefit their own political power and markets through cap and
trade system
George Will (National Post Staff Writer) 2008 (“McCain’s cap-and-trade hoax,” FP Comment/National Post, June 2 2008,
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/archive/2008/06/02/mccain-s-cap-and-trade-hoax.aspx) Assessed
July 17 2008

An unprecedentedly radical government grab for control of the American economy will be debated this week when the Senate considers saving
the planet by
means of a cap-and-trade system to ration carbon emissions. The plan is co-authored (with John Warner) by Joe Lieberman, an ardent supporter of John
McCain, who supports Lieberman’s legislation and recently spoke about “the central facts of rising temperatures, rising waters and all the endless troubles that global
warming will bring.” Speaking of endless troubles, “cap-and-trade” comes cloaked in reassuring rhetoric about the government merely creating a
market, but government actually would create a scarcity so government could sell what it has made scarce. The Wall Street
Journal underestimates cap-and-trade’s perniciousness when it says the scheme would create a new right (“allowances”) to produce carbon
dioxide and would put a price on the right. Actually, because freedom is the silence of the law, that right has always existed in the absence of
prohibitions. With cap-and-trade, government would create a right for itself — an extraordinarily lucrative right to ration
Americans’ exercise of their traditional rights. Businesses with unused emission allowances could sell their surpluses to
businesses that exceed their allowances. The more expensive and constraining the allowances, the more money
government would gain. If carbon emissions are the planetary menace that the political class suddenly says they are, why not a straightforward tax on fossil
fuels based on each fuel’s carbon content? This would have none of the enormous administrative costs of the baroque cap-and-trade regime. And a carbon tax
would avoid the uncertainties inseparable from cap-and-trade’s government allocation of emission permits sector by
sector, industry by industry. So a carbon tax would be a clear and candid incentive to adopt energy-saving and carbon-
minimizing technologies. That is the problem. A carbon tax would be too clear and candid for political comfort. It would clearly be what cap-and-trade
deviously is, a tax, but one with a known cost. Therefore, taxpayers would demand a commensurate reduction of other taxes. Cap-and-trade — government
auctioning permits for businesses to continue to do business — is a huge tax hidden in a bureaucratic labyrinth of opaque permit
transactions. The proper price of permits for carbon emissions should reflect the future warming costs of current emissions. That is bound to be a guess based on
computer models built on guesses. Lieberman guesses that the market value of all permits would be “about $7-trillion by 2050.” Will that staggering sum pay for a $7-
trillion reduction of other taxes? Not exactly. It would go to a Climate Change Credit Corp., which Lieberman calls “a private-public entity” that, operating outside the
budget process, would invest “in many things.” This would be industrial policy, i.e., socialism, on a grand scale — government picking winners and
losers, all of whom will have powerful incentives to invest in lobbyists to influence government’s thousands of new
wealth-allocating decisions. Lieberman’s legislation also would create a Carbon Market Efficiency Board empowered to “provide allowances and alter
demands” in response to “an impact that is much more onerous” than expected. And Lieberman says that if a foreign company selling a product in America “enjoys a
price advantage over an American competitor” because the American firm has had to comply with the cap-and-trade regime, “we will impose a fee” on the foreign
company “to equalize the price.” Protectionism masquerading as environmentalism will thicken the unsavoury entanglement of
commercial life and political life. McCain, who supports Lieberman’s unprecedented expansion of government’s regulatory reach, is the scourge of all
lobbyists (other than those employed by his campaign). But cap-and-trade would be a bonanza for K Street, the lobbyists’ habitat, because it would vastly deepen and
broaden the upside benefits and downside risks that the government’s choices mean for businesses. McCain, the political hygienist, is eager to reduce the amount of
money in politics. But cap-and-trade, by hugely increasing the amount of politics in the allocation of money, would guarantee a
surge of money into politics. Regarding McCain’s “central facts,” the UN’s World Meteorological Organization, which helped establish the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change — co-winner, with Al Gore, of the Nobel Prize — says global temperatures have not risen in a decade. So Congress might
be arriving late at the save-the-planet party. Better late than never? No. When government, ever eager to expand its grip on the governed and
their wealth, manufactures hysteria as an excuse for doing so, then: better never.

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Commodity K Links
Recognizing and causing environmental crisis are products of capitalism. Reformism of current capitalism through
alternative energy leads back to the same crisis we try to eliminate
Adony Melathopoulos (Research Technician, Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada) 2008 (“Capitalism and the
Environment: Interview with James Speth in NPR Worldview’s Series ‘Critical Thinking on Capitalism,” Platypus, May
2008, http://www.platypus1917.org/archive/article111/) Assessed July 17 2008

Ironically it was the Nineteenth Century European revolutions to “eliminate or control the monarchy” that primarily enabled the age of
industrial capitalism. These capitalist social relations were far more productive and dynamic than the feudal relations that were overthrown. This
dynamism and productivity, however, is interwoven with contradictions. The current environmental crisis highlights this contradictory
character. Capitalism is not only generative of the blind runaway development that causes the damage, but also of a science which
can quantify the damage and model scenarios for its mitigation, cultural currents that redefine use-values to include
environmental parameters and even price mechanisms that warn capitalists of ecological constraints on productivity.
Ultimately, our ability to both cause and recognise the problem is a product of capital. Dr. Speth’s renewed call to “eliminate or
control the monarchy” arises from a growing gap between “how things are” (worsening environmental conditions) and “how things
ought to be” (awareness of the possibility of solutions). This gap not only results in crisis, it also provides the revolutionary germ for
transcending capitalism and, as such, the possibility of directly dealing with environmental problems. Crises, however, have been historically
averted not by revolution, but by policies of reform. The ultimate goal of these reformisms is not the overcoming of capitalism, but
rather, to make the necessary changes for it to persist. Unwittingly, by not confronting the fundamental logic of capitalism,
reformism provides the basis for renewed contradictions and crisis.

Reformation of capitalism through cap-and-trade leads to “green capitalism,” which plagued agricultural systems
Adony Melathopoulos (Research Technician, Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada) 2008 (“Capitalism and the
Environment: Interview with James Speth in NPR Worldview’s Series ‘Critical Thinking on Capitalism,” Platypus, May
2008, http://www.platypus1917.org/archive/article111/) Assessed July 17 2008

There are alreadya number of mechanisms to renew profitability in the face of environmental degradation. Speth provides an example
Using a combination
of such a mechanism in his interview. Previous to the 1970s acid emissions grew in-step with economic activity in industrialised countries.
of stringent regulations (1970s) and a sulphur dioxide cap and trade emission trading system (1990s) the ratio of sulphur dioxide/GDP fell
among U.S. firms by an average rate of 9% per year (1970–2000). The environmental crisis of acid rain, consequently, had the effect of
encouraging capitalists to adapt and determine new ways of accumulating capital. These new ways increased profitability in spite
of mitigation costs. The reproduction of capitalism in this non-polluting form, consequently, acted to restore profitability. Harriett
Friedmann points out “Just as a “coalition of enlightened capitalists, middle-class reformers and militant labor movements brought us not socialism but welfare
capitalism” so the coalition of environmental, consumer and fair-trade movements promised not a reorganization of society
around the central value of enhancing ecosystem integrity, but green capitalism.” Speth’s reformed capitalism is still capitalism and, as
such, it is subjected to the contradictions inherent in all historic forms of capitalism. These contradictions invariably sew the seeds for new and varied
crises. A good illustration of the self-perpetuating nature of reformism, and one that is of pressing relevance to the environmental movement,
is the string of crises that have plagued agricultural production from the outset of industrial capitalism.

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Commodity K Links
Lack of Leftist participation in capitalism reforms allows cap-and-trade to perpetuate environmental crisis
Adony Melathopoulos (Research Technician, Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada) 2008 (“Capitalism and the
Environment: Interview with James Speth in NPR Worldview’s Series ‘Critical Thinking on Capitalism,” Platypus, May
2008, http://www.platypus1917.org/archive/article111/) Assessed July 17 2008

Herein lays a deeper problem with reforming capitalism and one that drives at the heart of the paradox identified by Speth at the beginning of his interview: why in the
face of a looming environmental crisis does a mass movement of “common concern” fail to act? The constant cycle of reformism and crisis suggests
that an underlying dynamic is directing events rather than the actions of political movements. In the absence of an
international politics of the Left, contemporary politics are unable to fully confront or resolve crises and are, thus, understandably
disempowering. While the instruments of reform (eg. cap and trade emission trading system, redesigning corporate legal structures) have the
capacity to avert crisis, they focus on these “means” at the expense of seriously considering the “ends,” or more specifically, the “reorganization of
society around the central value of enhancing ecosystem integrity.” Speth’s “ends” are all mediated indirectly through capitalism. It is this
indirect path, I believe, that has made environmental politics resemble more a “will-less football” than the necessary and
engaged mass movement that it needs to be.

Cap and trade commodities the environment as something companies can gain profits from
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and, Shipra Bansal (Legal Director of Communities for a Better
Environment, B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. Hastings Law School, B.S. Staff of the University of California
Berkeley) 1999 (“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy,” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring 1999, Lexis Nexis)

Although it appears to have become socially unacceptable to discuss the morality of public policy, this poses an
important obstacle for pollution trading. Pollution trading removes the social stigma associated with pollution. Rather than treating
pollution as a social ill that we should attempt to eliminate to the extent feasible, trading programs turn pollution into another
commodity, to be traded when economically efficiency dictates. What is wrong with polluting, when only money for the required pollution
credits stands between socially acceptable behavior and socially aberrant activity? As Sandel points out, in a trading scheme, pollution becomes a right rather than a
wrong: If a company ... is fined for spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done something wrong. A
fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits, and rent ... The distinction
between a fine and a fee for despoiling the environment is not one we should give up too easily. Suppose there were a $ 100 fine for throwing a
beer can in to the Grand Canyon, and a wealthy hiker decided to pay $ 100 for the convenience. Would there be
nothing wrong in his treating the fine as if it were simply an expensive dumping charge? n163

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Commodity K Links

Cap and trade treats the environment as a commodity no solvency


DRIESEN, 04(2004 Boston College Law School/environment)
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/journalssubmitForm.d

Economists like CBA of environmental regulation, because they believe that it helps make regulation better conform to neoclassical
ideals of allocative efficiency. A project is allocatively efficient if its benefits match its costs. n11 This efficiency idea comes from a
model of free markets that assumes that buyers only pay as much for a good as it is worth to the purchaser. n12 Economists implicitly
analyze regulation preventing harms as the purchase of a good, and assume that the regulator should pay no more than the good
(environmental quality) is worth to the public consumers of clean air, water, and land. They treat the environment like a commodity,
rather than as a system of life upon which we depend. n13While most of the environmental statutes aim to protect public health and
the environment, policy-makers have increased reliance upon CBA in recent years. Presidents Reagan, Bush, Sr., and Clinton
promulgated executive orders calling for more CBA, and Congress ratified these orders in 1995. n14 Thus, CBA has become
influential in establishing the goals of environmental regulation. CBA depends upon quantifying the harms regulations avoid--the
benefits of avoided death, illness, and ecological destruction--in dollar terms and projecting future costs. n15 Science rarely permits
reasonably precise estimates of the amount of health or environmental damage a particular regulation will avoid. n16 In order to
facilitate comparison of avoided harm with costs, economists ascribe dollar values to consequences [*505] like death and illness. n17
The valuation methodology involves numerous controversial value assumptions

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Cap K – Links

Cap and trade systems is a form of laissez-faire capitalism.


New York Times- 4/1/2007
(“Free For All,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/books/review/leonhardt.t.html)

MOST troubling, Doherty merely catalogs the movement’s failings rather than grappling with them. He relates that Rand “notoriously testified” before the big-brotherly
House Un-American Activities Committee in October 1947, when the committee was investigating Hollywood, where Rand had worked as a screenwriter, but the
episode receives only two paragraphs. He skates over other questionable matters, too: for instance, that Friedman advised the murderous Pinochet regime in Chile; that
Merwin Hart “infected his free-market thought with anti-Semitism”; and that Rothbard supported Strom Thurmond’s segregationist campaign for president in 1948
(because, Doherty casually observes, “he admired Thurmond’s states’ rights position”). The book fails to ask why people who claim to love freedom have so often had a
soft spot for those who would deny it to others. Libertarianism has now arrived at an interesting juncture. The moment for its grandest ambitions seems to have passed.
President Bush is no longer talking about privatizing Social Security, and his free-market approach to rebuilding Iraq has proven
disastrous. The libertarians at the Cato Institute, meanwhile, are struggling to persuade people that global warming — the archetypal free-market failure — is a hoax.
Yet in an irony worthy of Rand’s collective, the solution to climate change will probably have a libertarian tinge. The global warming debate is
coalescing around a “cap and trade” solution in which energy-efficient companies would be rewarded by the market. In fact, across a range
of major issues — energy policy, health care, retirement savings — a hybrid form of laissez-faire capitalism and collectivism seems to be ascendant.
The market will be allowed to work its efficient magic, but government will step in to correct the market’s failures. “Libertarian paternalism” is the name two
University of Chicago professors, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, have devised for one version of this philosophy.

Cap and trade only furthers capitalism, limiting the transition away from our self destruction. We must
completely transition from a fossil fuel economy.
Bello- professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines – 3/29/2008
(Walden, “Will Capitalism Survive Climate Change?,” Amandla, http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/content/view/421/1/)

Among other things, this will mean placing economic justice and equality at the centre of the new paradigm.
The transition must be one not only from a fossil-fuel based economy but also from an overconsumption-driven economy. The end-
goal must be adoption of a low-consumption, low-growth,high-equity development model that results in an improvement in people's
welfare, a better quality of life for all, and greater democratic control of production. It is unlikely that the elite of the North and the
South will agree to such a comprehensive response. The farthest they are likely to go is for techno-fixes and a market-based cap-and-
trade system. Growth will be sacrosanct, as will the system of global capitalism. Yet, confronted with the Apocalypse, humanity
cannot self-destruct. It may be a difficult road, but we can be sure that the vast majority will not commit social and ecological suicide
to enable the minority to preserve their privileges. However it is achieved, a thorough reorganization of production, consumption and
distribution will be the end result of humanity’s response to the climate emergency and the broader environmental crisis.

Cap and trade systems are forms of a capitalist system.


The Toronto Star – 5/28/2008
(“Premier rejects Dion's plan for carbon tax,” Toronto Star, http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:Mr-
ViNM6d4YJ:www.thestar.com/News/Ontario/article/432060+Capitalist+cap+and+trade&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=92&gl=us)

In July, British Columbia will become the first jurisdiction in North America to introduce a consumer-based carbon tax, but McGuinty said yesterday he prefers a
cap-and-trade system. Breaking with federal Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion's proposed national carbon tax scheme, the premier said he favours a plan that
penalizes industrial polluters whose emissions surpass a certain level. "The best advice that we've received from experts – and I think there's a ...
broad consensus on this – is that you've got to put a value on carbon," McGuinty told reporters at Queen's Park. "There's a couple of ways to do that.
You can put on a carbon tax, you can put in place a cap-and-trade system or you can do a bit of both," the premier said. "What we prefer to do here in Ontario is to
move ahead with a cap-and-trade system." A cap-and-trade system allows companies that produce less carbon than their caps permit to sell
their unused quotas to companies that exceed their caps. McGuinty, whose younger brother, MP David McGuinty (Ottawa South), is the Liberal
environment critic, said "a capitalist system ... encouraging trading" is already being proven abroad. "My first choice is a cap-and-trade
system," the premier said. "It's one of the things I talked to some folks about in Europe on my recent trip," McGuinty said. "They've had some challenges, but
they think that it's starting to become more effective." The premier said the issue would be at the top of the agenda when Ontario and Quebec hold a historic joint
cabinet meeting next Monday in Quebec City.

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Commodity K Impacts

Cap and trade creates inequality, recreating a capitalist society that threatens human survival
Gloria La Riva (2008 Presidential Candidate of the Socialist and Liberation Party) 2008 (“Capitalism means
environmental destruction,” Larvia for President, January 30 2008, http://larivaforpresident.blogspot.com/2008/01/test-
3.html) Assessed July 16 2008

The Democrats call for emissions reductions, advocating market-based “cap and trade” programs, which involve selling emissions credits. Emissions
credits systems allow polluters to buy the “right” to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas. If the corporation does not use up the credit, it can
sell the credit to another corporation, allowing them to emit more gases. Under the capitalist system, working people have no say in
determining how much pollution is acceptable, even though climate change will, in the short term, disproportionately affect
working-class people and poor countries. The major candidates also explicitly or implicitly support the expansion of biofuels. These are fuels made out
of biological sources, like corn, soy or palm oil. While these sources are all renewable, they also are food sources. Diverting food to fuel has resulted in rising food
prices and other problems in countries throughout the world. In addition, the production and use of biofuels does not result in lower carbon emissions than the
equivalent amount of fossil fuels. Capitalism is the greatest threat to our environment. Capitalist corporations are allowed to
continue polluting to cut costs and make more profit. As long as we live in a society where profits are prioritized over
people’s needs, our planet will continue to be destroyed.

Capitalism undermines solutions to environmental sustainability


Adony Melathopoulos (Research Technician, Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada) 2008 (“Capitalism and the
Environment: Interview with James Speth in NPR Worldview’s Series ‘Critical Thinking on Capitalism,” Platypus, May
2008, http://www.platypus1917.org/archive/article111/) Assessed July 17 2008

A major task of this grassroots political movement is to exert the pressure necessary to transform capitalism towards an
ecologically sustainable end. Capitalism, according to Speth, presently cannot reproduce itself without concurrently
increasing the level of economic activity. This activity, he maintains, can be “less or more environmentally destructive,”
but ultimately undermines sustainable development. “This is the core of the problem. We have a system that is very
successful at creating economic growth and this economic growth is inherently destructive and is overwhelming our
efforts at environmental clean-up and environmental management.”

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K turns the case


Commodificaiton of emissions poses an environmental and health hazard
Akers, Law Clerk, Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2001
(Nicklas, Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, Spring, p. LN)

The current emission reduction credit trading system commodifies emissions, measured in amounts of substance emitted into the air
basin. Underlying this commodification is an assumption that emissions are fungible -- that a pound of VOCs emitted in, for example,
a heavily populated mixed-use neighborhood, is the same as a pound of VOCs emitted in an industrial park away from a residential
population. This view is not entirely irrational. VOCs play an important role in the production of ozone, and as a catalyst for the
chemical reactions that lead to the creation of photochemical smog in the troposphere. n117 Limiting the aggregate amount of VOCs
released in an air basin is important to any attempt to control this process. If the only outcome of interest for VOCs is their role in
ozone and photochemical smog production, a market need not look further than aggregate emissions. This focus on aggregate
emissions was an underlying assumption of the EPA's 1996 emissions trading policy statement. n118 But many VOCs do cause
localized health effects -- carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic -- in communities that surround sources of emissions. n119 Some, like
Benzene, are known human carcinogens. n120 Others, like Toluene, are not classified as carcinogens, but have the potential to cause
neurological and other non-cancer injuries and illness. n121 Aggregate emissions are but one of a number of potential bases for
establishing a market, or for testing a market's performance in avoiding inefficient [*213] outcomes. In analyzing these localized
trades, a key outcome of interest from a public health or population perspective is total disease burden. n122 In other words, if a trade
is allowed, will the net result be a greater risk of illness and injury? A simple criteria for measuring the "efficiency" of a trade is
whether it makes the effects of pollution worse. Under this view, a trade on the margin of a trading system that increases morbidity
and mortality over that without the trade is not efficient. A trading system that commodifies tons of emissions may fail this test.
Where the market trades in tons of contaminant coming out of the proverbial smokestack rather than the effect of that contaminant on
the community, the market may be blind to the real health effects of the system. This paper does not propose a trading market for
"rights" to produce chronic disorders and cancers in receptor populations. n123 But when theoretically applied, such a model is a
useful benchmark to test the performance of our current system in avoiding trades that increase burdens to health. In contrast to the
customary net emissions market, this health effects market focuses not on aggregate emissions at the smokestack, but rather on the
effects of those emissions on the receptor population.

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Cap K – Capitalism causes warming

Capitalism has forced global warming to the brink – more expansions triggers extinction.
Bello- professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines – 3/29/2008
(Walden, “Will Capitalism Survive Climate Change?,” Amandla, http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/content/view/421/1/)

One way of viewing global warning is to see it as a key manifestation of the latest stage of a wrenching historical process: the
privatization of the global commons by capital. The climate crisis must thus be seen as the expropriation by the advanced capitalist
societies of the ecological space of less developed or marginalized societies. This leads us to the dilemma of the South: before the full extent of the
ecological destabilization brought about by capitalism, it was expected that the South would simply follow the stages of growth of the North.
Now it is impossible to do so without bringing about ecological Armageddon. Already, China is on track to overtake the US as the
biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, and yet the elite of China as well as those of India and other rapidly developing countries are intent on reproducing
the American-type over consumption-driven capitalism.

Capitalist corporations are pushing the environment over the tipping point.
The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

Environmentalists started to warn of the dangers of climate change 30 years or more ago. Ignoring warnings, corporations and their
equally irresponsible governments continued to aggravate the crisis by a callous and reckless disregard for the predictable
consequences of their activities. The situation has now become urgent. The entire planet has become an ecological time bomb. The most important
problems are not technical – they are economic, political and philosophical. Governments of all persuasions ignored the warnings from many
scientific reports. The corporations continued to savagely exploit the natural resources of the planet in their criminal chase after profits irrespective
of the consequences. They made huge profits out of the earth’s natural resources while the same earth was treated as a sewer for the often-
toxic wastes produced. The Garnaut Report on Climate Change recognises this reality. It has weakened the climate change skeptics who have road-blocked the
necessary steps to meet the challenge and the possibility of devastating climate changes for many years. But they are already attacking the Report and will do nothing as
in the past. In 1994 the CPA joined the scientists and warned that some environmental changes had already reached “the point of no return.” Others have referred
to the situation as a “tipping point.”

The capitalist mindset is what causes environmental crises.


The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

Social and economic change Our


society will change fundamentally, either through our efforts to save our environment or because
environmental destruction finally overwhelms us. Difficult choices will have to be made and we cannot stand aside from these issues.
The question is, who will make those choices, and how? Will working people be the victims of change, or will they help control that change for the benefit of ourselves
and our children? But what is to be done? Ross Garnaut’s report proposing an urgent Carbon Emission Trading Scheme is one alternative but it is a
typically capitalist solution to a crisis which has been created by the very same forces that the report is relying on to solve it. The crisis
is a consequence of the capitalist philosophical outlook, the use of unrestrained “market forces” and the profit hungry drive of
capitalism itself.

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Cap K – Capitalism causes warming

Carbon taxes and emissions trading can’t stop capitalism, which is root of climate crisis.
The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

Even this limited explanation of the trading scheme is sufficient to reveal that an emissions trading scheme is nothing more than an
attempt to use “market economics” to solve a problem that has been produced by the irresponsibility of governments and the private
sector – wrong policies, a wrong philosophy and a predatory approach to nature. They cannot even contemplate that there is another
and a better way. No less than 14 years ago a CPA statement said that: “The carbon tax is a wildly off course and non-attempt at a
solution.” It does not change established economic, social and political practices. An emissions trading scheme will not control
profiteering which is at the root of the capitalist system. It will lead to massive corruption and manipulation and will actually do little
to meet the challenge of climate change.

Living in a habitable planet is impossible with a capitalist system in play.


Newman- political activist and author of Apocalypso Now – 2/2/2006
(Robert, “It's capitalism or a habitable planet - you can't have both,” The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/feb/02/energy.comment)

If we are all still in denial about the radical changes coming - and all of us still are - there are sound geological reasons for our denial. We
have lived in an era of cheap, abundant energy. There never has and never will again be consumption like we have known. The petroleum
interval, this one-off historical blip, this freakish bonanza, has led us to believe that the impossible is possible, that people in northern industrial cities can have suntans
in winter and eat apples in summer. But much as the petroleum bubble has got us out of the habit of accepting the existence of zero-sum
physical realities, it's wise to remember that they never went away. You can either have capitalism or a habitable planet. One or the
other, not both.

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Cap K – Capitalism is a crime against humanity


Capitalist exploitation of the environment is a crime against humanity.
The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

Jobs and the environment The


capitalist class asks: “What do we want:, a job, or clean air and water? We need to ask, “What kind of system
is it when we have to make such choices?” It is time we took the question of “jobs or the environment” out of the bosses’ hands. The very posing of the
question indicates that the system is rotten, corrupt, and dying. It has to be replaced! Will companies willingly introduce the necessary waste free and
environmentally safe technologies and production processes? No! not if it interferes with their profits. They are already demanding that their profits be maintained by
government handouts of taxpayers’ money or that they be issued with free certificates. Destruction of the environment is a crime which threatens
humanity and the planet. Companies that pollute and refuse to change should not be handed subsidies or allowed to manipulate the
market, escape the consequences, or even be rewarded for their irresponsible behavior. They should be jailed. “Those who have a class
interest in exploiting both workers and the environment cannot be allowed to put their interests above those of humanity any longer,”
wrote Dr. Hannah Middleton, President of the CPA in a booklet, Good Planets are Hard to Find, published in 1994.

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Cap K – Alt (Reform economic systems)

Climate change is forcing the brink to humanity. The only hope is to reform the economic system to be
based on justice and equality, not capital.
Bello- professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines – 3/29/2008
(Walden, “Will Capitalism Survive Climate Change?,” Amandla, http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/content/view/421/1/)

Threat and Opportunity In this regard, climate


change is both a threat and an opportunity to bring about the long postponed social and
economic reforms that had been derailed or sabotaged in previous eras by the elite seeking to preserve or increase their privileges. The
difference is that today the very existence of humanity and the planet depend on the institutionalization of economic systems based not on
feudal rent extraction or capital accumulation or class exploitation, but on justice and equality. The question is often asked these days if
humanity will be able to get its act together to formulate an effective response to climate change. Though there is no certainty in a world filled with contingency, I am
hopeful that it will. In the social and economic system that will be collectively crafted, I anticipate that there will be room for the market. However, the
more interesting question is: will it have room for capitalism? Will capitalism as a system of production, consumption and distribution survive the
challenge of coming up with an effective solution to the climate crisis?

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Cap K - Alt Solves

Only Marxists can adopt policies that consider humanity as a whole which key to solving climate change.
The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

To meet the climate change crisis society must find and adopt new economic and political policies and a philosophy that is based on
the needs of humanity as a whole. That philosophy is Marxism. It will be implemented by the working class who, by that very act, will
ultimately end class divisions and unify humanity. It will usher in an as yet undreamed of renaissance in human behavior and thinking. Stop emissions. Don’t trade
them!

The Commons - nature, community and culture - precedes capitalism and only through that can we
actually find true value. The government can never solve for this.
Morris - co-founder and vice president of the Institute for Local Self Reliance in Minneapolis – 1/5/2007
(David, “The Next Stage of Capitalism,” Alternet.com, http://www.alternet.org/story/46146/?page=3)

We need a new set of operating instructions, Barnes argues, that will usher in and guide the creation of Capitalism 3.0. In a remarkably brief
166 pages, Peter addresses and rather astonishingly, largely answers his question, "How do you revise a system as vast and complex as capitalism? And
how do you do it gracefully, with a minimum of pain and disruption?" Capitalism 3.0 grew out of a life of social and political activism
and market entrepreneurialism. In the 1970s, Barnes started a profitable solar energy company. In the 1980s, he helped launch the much more profitable and
enduring Working Assets phone and financial company. He opens his book with this self-description. "I'm a businessman. I believe society should reward successful
initiative with profit. At the same time, I know that profit-seeking activities have unhealthy side effects. They cause pollution, waste,
inequality, anxiety and no small amount of confusion about the purpose of life." Barnes' key solution to the unhealthy side effects of profit-
seeking behavior is to revive the idea of -- and reclaim the value -- of the Commons. Over the last few years, hundreds of meetings and thousands of
conversations have taken place among those who are actively involved in protecting the popular culture from the encroachment of private intellectual property, those
who are involved in trying to maintain the internet as a public network, and those who are trying to curb corporate power and restrain the increasing tendency by cities
and states to privatize public goods. Many of these conversations have been stimulated by a small California-based organization called the Tomales Bay Institute, aided
and abetted by its increasingly well-visited web site. Among its fellows are David Bollier, Harriet Barlow, Jonathan Rowe, and Peter Barnes. Capitalism 3.0 is the first
comprehensive book on the Commons issued by the Institute. The Commons, Barnes insists, should no longer be viewed simply as a pasture where animals graze, but
rather as a generic term, comparable to the terms "market" or "state". The Commons is the gifts we inherit or create together. "A gift is something we receive as oppose
to something we earn," Barnes writes. "A shared gift is one we receive as members of a community as opposed to individually". Think of the Commons as a
broad river fed by three principal tributaries: nature, community, and culture. This river precedes and surrounds capitalism and adds
immense value to it, and to us. The land as Commons is an idea that has had its advocates from the earliest days of the American Republic. For Thomas Paine,
"there are two kinds of property. Firstly, natural property, or that which comes to us from the Creator of the universe -- such as the earth,
air, water. Secondly, artificial or acquired property -- the invention of men." In the natural property, Paine maintained, "all individuals have
legitimate birthrights ... Since such birthrights were diminished by enclosure, there ought to be an 'indemnification for that loss." Paine
propose the establishment of a national permanent fund where every person at the age of twenty-one would receive money as partial compensation for his or her loss of
"natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property."
In the late 19th century, economist Henry George launched an influential movement also based on the concept of the Commons. That movement argued that the value of
land is almost entirely derived, not from the landowner's investment, but from public actions. Value comes from easy transportation access, good parks and schools,
quiet and safe streets. All of which are created from public investment. George and his followers advocated a significant tax on unimproved land, to compensate the
public for its investment that created that land's market valuable. But what if the government upzones the land to allow for higher concentration? What if it builds a
freeway near the land? What if it transforms an unsightly section of the neighborhood into a park? All these actions would substantially increase the value of the land.
Shouldn't the public be compensated for its investment? Even a cursory investigation suggests that the level of givings in this country is 100, perhaps even 1000 times
greater than the level of takings. Barnes is reluctant to rely on governments to protect the Commons, especially on an ongoing basis.
Governments change. Laws, regulations, and taxes are easily rescinded or weakened when powerful financial interests get involved.
The public interest rarely if ever is represented with the same level of resources and feral energy as the private interest. This imbalance is
inherent in the costs and rewards of involvement. An individual gains little by stopping private interests from encroaching on the Commons. An individual corporation,
on the other hand, is handsomely rewarded when it enables poaching.

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Cap K - Alt Solves

Only by breaking up corporate power can we stop the environmental crisis.


Newman- political activist and author of Apocalypso Now – 2/2/2006
(Robert, “It's capitalism or a habitable planet - you can't have both,” The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/feb/02/energy.comment)

There is no meaningful response to climate change without massive social change. A cap on this and a quota on the other won't do it.
Tinker at the edges as we may, we cannot sustain earth's life-support systems within the present economic system. Capitalism is not
sustainable by its very nature. It is predicated on infinitely expanding markets, faster consumption and bigger production in a finite
planet. And yet this ideological model remains the central organising principle of our lives, and as long as it continues to be so it will
automatically undo (with its invisible hand) every single green initiative anybody cares to come up with. Much discussion of energy,
with never a word about power, leads to the fallacy of a low-impact, green capitalism somehow put at the service of
environmentalism. In reality, power concentrates around wealth. Private ownership of trade and industry means that the decisive
political force in the world is private power. The corporation will outflank every puny law and regulation that seeks to constrain its
profitability. It therefore stands in the way of the functioning democracy needed to tackle climate change. Only by breaking up
corporate power and bringing it under social control will we be able to overcome the global environmental crisis.

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Aff Ans: Political Approach Key


Despite capitalism’s damages, a political approaches is needed to solve environmental destructions
Adony Melathopoulos (Research Technician, Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada) 2008 (“Capitalism and the
Environment: Interview with James Speth in NPR Worldview’s Series ‘Critical Thinking on Capitalism,” Platypus, May
2008, http://www.platypus1917.org/archive/article111/) Assessed July 17 2008

The contradiction, according to Speth, results from the U.S. environmental movement focusing too narrowly on working
“within the system.” They lobby, litigate and educate the public to the neglect of an “equally powerful effort to change the
system itself.” “We haven’t challenged corporate power and the domination of wealth in our political process, we
haven’t… challenged the deep subsidisation of environmental destruction… we haven’t challenged growth itself, we
certainly haven’t challenged our own hyperventilating lifestyles.” The environmental movement, he continues, must move
beyond the victories of the 1970s that led to technocratic environmental regulation. It needs to go from being “basically…
an inside the Beltway business” towards an “environmental movement that is far more committed to building grassroots
political power. We need a real movement and we need to get real political about it.”

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** Development K **

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Development 1NC (1/2)

Emissions trading is a uniquely powerful vehicle for the transmission of development and neoliberal
values into the developing world – the counterplan is a comparatively better option

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

Foisting Western Values onto Developing Nations. Some development scholars see the importation of Western structures as
problematic in itself, apart from other sec-ondary harms it might cause. Pouncy, for example, argues that Western institutions often
function like Trojan horses, serving "as instruments for deployment of European cultural values, including European
economic values that judge a process based on its efficiency and view institutions based on their ability to protect property rights."
n148 Emissions trading programs may serve as another vehicle through which developed nations attempt to foist neo-liberal
economic ideas upon the developing world. According to Kenyan professor Calestous Juma, emissions trading embodies the
characteristics of Western rationality: "efficiency, reductionism, selectionism (survival of the fittest) and quantification." n149
Juma argues that it is these "epistemological underpinnings of [emissions trading] that make crit-ics uncomfortable." n150 A
number of other scholars have opposed economic incentive programs like emissions trading on ethical grounds, asserting that by
attaching a price tag to pollution, these programs wrongfully commodify the envi-ronment and legitimize pollution. n151
Besides offending moral sensibilities, this commodification [*160] might help to force Western notions of markets and
efficiency onto developing countries. Emissions trading might then seem more dangerous than command-and-control
regulation or carbon taxation. Though each of those policies would require some oversight by international regulators and
some importation of West-ern values, they do not embody the Western ideal of markets and efficiency in the way that
emissions trading does. Unlike those potential programs, emissions trading is inextricably linked to what Juma calls the
characteristics of West-ern rationality. Developing nations could participate in mandated reductions or levy taxes on carbon
emissions without embracing Western notions of market-mediated efficiency. Under a trading system, this would be much
more difficult.

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Development 1NC (2/2)

This neoliberal project converts the developing world into populations for sacrifice at the alter of
progress – it makes global collective suicide inevitable

Santos in 03 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Director Center Social Studies @ University Coimbra, “Collective suicide or
globalization from below?”, 3/26/03 http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2003-03-26-santos-en.pdf)

According to the German philosopher Franz Hinkelammert, living in Costa Rica, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save
humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to fulfill radically all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political
reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African
slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other
colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in
neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in
progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the
radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it.
Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the
present−day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to
its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied.
If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This
political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is
ultra−conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced
three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable
efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first
two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour.
I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is
found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the
idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and
the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its
death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers,
to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the
Non−Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war against Iraq and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the
Is it possible to fight this
war will cost 100 billion dollars, − and much more if the costs of reconstruction are added − enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years.
death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources
and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the
totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing
the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's
version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The
machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction. In opposition to this, there is the ongoing movement of
globalization from below, the global struggle for social justice, led by social movements and NGOs, of which the World Social Forum (WSF) has been an eloquent manifestation. The WSF has
been a remarkable affirmation of life, in its widest and most inclusive sense, embracing human beings and nature. What challenges does it face before the increasingly intimate interpenetration of
the globalization of the economy and that of war? I am convinced that this new situation forces the globalization from below to re−think itself, and to reshape its priorities. It is well−known that the WSF, at its second
meeting, in 2002, identified the relationship between economic neoliberalism and imperial warmongering, which is why it organized the World Peace Forum, the second edition of which took place in 2003. But this is not
enough. I believe that a strategic shift is required. Social movements, no matter what their spheres of struggle, must give priority to the fight for peace, as a necessary condition for the success of all the other struggles. This
movements against neoliberal globalization
means that they must be in the frontline of the fight for peace, and not simply leave this space to be occupied solely by peace movements. All the
are, from now on, peace movements. We are now in the midst of the fourth world war (the third being the Cold War) and the spiral of war will go on and on. The principle of non−violence that is contained in
the WSF Charter of Principles must no longer be a demand made on the movements; now it must be a global demand made by the movements. This emphasis is necessary so that, in current
circumstances, the celebration of life can be set against this vertiginous collective suicide. The peace to be fought for is not a mere absence of
war or of terrorism. It is rather a peace based upon the elimination of the conditions that foster war and terrorism: global unjustice,
social exclusion, cultural and political discrimination and oppression and imperialist greed. A new, cosmopolitan humanism
can be built above and beyond western illuminist abstractions, a humanism of real people based on the concrete resistance to the actual human
suffering imposed by the real axis of evil: neoliberalism plus war.

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AT: Perm

( _ ) The perm can’t solve – no amount of modification of the plan can prevent the transfer of Western
development ideals under an emissions trading scheme – the disads to this colonialism outweigh the
benefits of the plan

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

However, there are some potential harms to developing countries that no amount of policy modification can elimi-nate.
Emissions trading programs inherently embody Western ideals of markets and efficiency. Any attempt to prevent trading
programs from imposing these ideas upon developing nations would likely destroy the very efficiency gains that make trading
such an attractive policy option in the first place. This raises a more difficult question: Do the overall cost-savings and
potential benefits to developing countries from emissions trading justify the remaining harms to developing nations? On one
hand, modified emissions trading programs may offer the best of both worlds, allowing massive worldwide efficiency gains and a
theoretical creation of great wealth (in the form of emissions credits) for developing countries while creating only a minimal,
ephemeral harm. In fact, some might assert that [*176] the imposition of Western market ideals onto developing countries is
not a harm at all, as these ideals have significant value. Modified trading programs, then, might offer the best balance of
development, cost savings, and environmental protection. On the other hand, some development scholars might assert that the
ideological infiltration of Western ideals through trading programs remains a very significant harm and that the policy
modifications suggested above do not alleviate the burdens imposed on developing nations fully.

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Development Links

( _ ) Racism and colonialism undergird tradable permits – rejection of the plan is the only way to unmask
and resist colonial neoliberal exploitation

Coalition for Climate Justice in 03 (Rising Tide Coalition for Climate Justice, a justice advocacy coalition of 26 international
NGOs, posted on Monday, October 27, 2003 11:19:38 AM at http://www.risingtide.nl/issues/colonialism.html)

Where colonialism met the climate Historically, the industrialised nations have emitted 80% of the greenhouse gases that have resulted in the impending
climate catastrophe we face. This is due to the rapid expansion of industrialisation in Europe and America. Industrialisation was made possible by the flow of cheap
raw materials from the colonies. Slaves, coffee, steel, minerals and cotton were among the commodities that the colonialists extracted from the ‘third world’. Having
free labour, cheap food and metals allowed the colonisers to invest in and develop the new technologies that appeared at home. It is fair to say that the social and
economic developments in the industrialised world happened at the expense of the colonised world. While Europe and America developed, the continent of Africa was
devastated by the loss of generations of people through slavery and the Americas through extraction of natural resources. This generally resulted in preventing
industrial development in the colonies, from which these countries still feel the effects. The exploitative relationship between the colonisers and colonised continues
today in more subtle ways. The comparative advantage that the colonisers achieved through warfare, fear and violence during the
days of rampant colonialism is still apparent in the way that the global market place works and the environmental problems
that result from an economic system put in place by the powerful and maintained for the benefit of the few. Historically it can
be seen that industrialisation, which is largely responsible for the causes of climate change, was itself fuelled by colonialism. The
three factors that have shaped the way the world looks are deeply connected to each other and will continue to be in the future
if the relationship goes unnoticed and unchallenged. Modern day colonialism Even though the history of climate change can be traced to the
industrialisation of the colonial powers, the first and most severely affected by the results of this human interference with the gentle balance of gases in our atmosphere,
are those who did not benefit from industrialisation in the first place. The fatal irony in the sad story of climate change is that current climate related disasters have
occurred predominantly in ‘developing’ countries.... 1998 CHINA: Melting snow 4,150 dead INDIA: Melting snow 1,400 dead PHILIPPINES: Typhoons 500 dead
BANGLADESH: Cyclones 1,300 dead INDIA/NEPAL: Monsoons 3,250 dead CARIBBEAN/ CENTRAL AMERICA: Hurricanes 14,000 dead 1999 INDIA:
Cyclones/floods 30,000 dead, 7.5 million people homeless and another 15 million people affected. VIETNAM: Floods 535 dead, homes flooded numbered about
582,180, and 5,823 schools were destroyed. VENEZUELA: Rain/floods 50,000 dead CHINA: Floods 800 dead and more than five million were displaced throughout
the country. 2000 MOZAMBIQUE: Rain/floods 700 dead, 250,000 made homeless Climate change in these countries is a reality and not something to be debated
and procrastinated over. In the first instance, the impacts of future climate extremes are expected to fall disproportionately on the poor. The link between racism and
climate change appears here when it is taken into account that within industrialised countries, people of colour are disproportionately represented in poor communities.
This can also be seen on a global scale. Further, when these changes occur, the poor have very little to fall back on. They have no insurance, savings or adequate social
welfare structures to cope with such dramatic events. So they are killed, get sick, or become homeless and seek refuge in other areas or countries. Countries like the
USA, Canada, Japan and Australia are the main blocks to progress in the United Nations climate change negotiations fearing the economic advantage they hold over
other countries will be reduced. As these countries act out of pure self-interest, poor people all over the world will continue to suffer. Carbon Colonialism As climate
change really gets going -we are only feeling the effects of greenhouse gases pumped into the atmosphere 50 years ago which were a lot lower than the levels we are
currently emitting - the pressures will increase for the poor. Additionally the solutions proposed by governments, big business and some NGOs include aspects that
will, at best, reinforce existing inequalities between rich and poor and fail to address the underlying causes of climate change, or at worst exacerbate those inequalities.
One proposed solution is a system of ‘emissions trading’¹. Emissions trading is based on the neo-liberal notion that the market will solve
climate change. However an economic analysis of the history of climate change demonstrates that its causes are deeply entwined with the
activities of the consumer market place, based on growth and the increasing use of products. How can a solution based on these principles ever hope to be
adequate? If we are to solve climate change we need to reduce our consumption of energy drastically. This does not only mean
replacing current usage with a renewable energy supply. There are many other environmental problems associated with
unlimited consumption of energy and products such as soil erosion, deforestation, water pollution and decreasing biodiversity.
We have an excellent opportunity to tackle associated environmental problems when proposing solutions to climate change.
Therefore we can not allow a solution that is based on market forces, when these same forces have wreaked devastation upon
the fragile ecosystems of this planet. There are ideological problems associated with market based mechanisms as seen above, but
also problems rooted in the hard cold reality of international politics and human behaviour. For a country negotiating a climate change treaty with emissions² trading as
an option, there is an opportunity for profit making. The best way to make money out of emissions trading is to make sure that the reduction targets are very low so that
they can be easily achieved and then sell the remainder. Before the UN had even started discussing the implementation of flexible mechanisms, the World Bank
estimated that the brand new carbon emissions market would be worth US$33.3 trillion³. Also countries had already begun making deals with each other. The UK
made a deal with the USA to sell the 8% difference in its target of 12% reduction and the 20% it actually achieved, for £100 million4. So what has this got to do with
colonialism?

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

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COALITION FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE, CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE, NO TEXT REMOVED

In the current global political and economic context exists extremely unequal relationships between countries - due mostly to
the aforementioned colonial devastation of many peoples through history. Emissions trading will not exist in a vacuum. It will
operate in this system, established through hundreds of years of oppression and inequity. Emissions trading does not
challenge this system, it was borne out of it. The financial benefits that developing countries will reap from selling the unused
quotas of greenhouse gases they have gained, through not industrialising, will be far smaller than the costs they will incur when there
are no cheap credits left to sell and they will have to pay according to the fluctuations of an unstable carbon market. As
happens with any other market commodity in today’s global economy, the rich and powerful nations of the world will be able
to afford to pay the prices for pollution and poor countries won’t. The status quo remains. Not only will this happen, but also
the rich nations will have no incentive to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions at home and climate catastrophe will not be
averted. Climate related disasters will increase and it will be the poor that pay for them. Not only disasters will kill, but as the UK
Ministry of Defence report5 concluded, the majority of future wars will be caused by conflict over resources - mostly water - as a result of climate change. And who
will profit from the sale of weapons.....?
Climate change is colour blind - people aren’t So when we analyse climate change, it must be in the context of social justice. The
relationship between rich and poor permeates the past, present and future of climate change. If it is ignored then we are
doomed to make the same mistakes and further enhance an economic and political system that exacerbates and reinforces the
unequal relations between the peoples of the world. Nothing will change, nothing will improve, things will only get worse.
There is a further dimension to the links between social and environmental justice - racism. Globally the majority of the world’s poor are
people of colour as well as within the industrialised nations themselves. Not only do these communities suffer from poverty which is
inextricably linked to prejudice, but they are increasingly exposed to the environmental hazards created by a system benefiting
the few. In the USA during the 1980s a movement began gaining strength when the Commission for Racial Justice released a revealing report in 19876. This report
highlighted the disproportionate location of hazardous waste sites in areas populated by poor and people of colour in the majority. It also found that fines levied on
companies violating environmental regulations in these areas paid less fines than in more affluent white areas. Thus began the mobilisation of local people around the
United States, which included lawyers, academics and community activists. This was the beginning of the environmental justice movement. This
movement is now in an exciting phase. It is becoming global and applying the principles on which it was founded to the international relationships
between the peoples of the world. The environmental justice movement sees the links between race, economics, politics and the
environment. The local and global environment is an expression of the relationships between people. Just as hazardous waste
sites are primarily located in poor areas populated by people of colour, so the effects of climate change reflect similar patterns.
Additionally, another proposed solution to climate change is the use of nuclear power. The plan is for the rich countries and companies to build nuclear power stations
in the developing world in order to gain credits to pollute carbon in their own country. Not only do carbon emissions remain the same in the rich countries, where it is
most needed to be reduced, but the developing world is landed with the potentially devastating effects of nuclear waste and disaster. Challenging climate injustice
What is needed to really resolve the issues raised by climate change is to recognise and accept them first. We must see the
links between the environmental issue of climate change and social injustices like racism and economic inequity. Climate change has been a
single issue for too long, for people, governments and NGOs alike. Climate change is one of the most frightening and life threatening
challenges we face, but it is also an exciting opportunity to realise some fundamental changes to the society which created it.
Unless we account for and resolve all the issues which climate change represents, then we are merely postponing the problems
for another day and another disaster.

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Development Links

( _ ) Cap and Trade programs enable shifting the burden of emissions reductions from the developed to
the developing world, abandoning responsibility and causing punitive measures

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

Development critics contend that neo-liberal Western development policies, like the structural adjustment programs of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, saddle developing countries with the burden of making up for their own
underdevelopment, which was caused, at least in part, by centuries of exploitation, colonialism, and Western dominance. n182
Structural adjustment policies mandate that developing nations make painful sacrifices to correct the problem; n183 and when
these policies fail to bring much needed economic relief, developed countries blame develop-ing countries for faulty
implementation, rather than reassessing the utility of the policies themselves. n184
Emissions trading programs might similarly allow developed countries to avoid making painful sacrifices them-selves by
exporting the hard work to developing countries. Much of the problem of global climate change resulted from the dirty
industrial revolutions of the developed world. Today's developed countries grew rich by burning fossil fuels with impunity,
immune from international regulation (and even most domestic regulation) until the last quarter-century. Yet, emissions trading
programs would place some of the burden of addressing the problem on developing nations.

( _ ) Power asymmetries mean that negotiation over implementation will allow the imposition of Western
development values onto the developing world

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

As discussed above, development scholars have long argued that the imposition of Western policies and structures upon
developing countries does not help and may actually impede their development. n126 This criticism can be ex-tended to the
imposition of emissions trading schemes upon developing nations.
Emissions trading schemes may impose Western structures upon the developing world because the schemes them-selves will
likely embody the goals and values of Western nations. Significant asymmetries in bargaining and informa-tion between
developing and developed nations suggest that developed nations will dominate negotiations over the de-tails of any future
emissions trading program, successfully crafting the international agreement to suit their interests. Many developing nations
are ill-equipped to evaluate emissions trading programs thoroughly and to judge if and how they might benefit from
participating. According to Alfred Mumma, developing [*156] nations, particularly African countries, have the resources neither
to determine the potential emissions trading program rules most favorable to them, nor to bargain with other nations to have
these favorable rules incorporated into the larger regulatory scheme.

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Development Links

( _ ) The aff’s emissions trading scheme assumes elides the contested history of development into a single,
universal Western narrative, increasing exploitation and masking the interrogation of colonial power and
inequality
Rosales in 04 (Jon, Prof. of Environmental Studies St. Lawrence University, Renditions of Progress,
http://202.28.18.234/multim/3124754.pdf)

Arguably the most contested aspect of sustainable development is the implicit assumption that all peoples, all economies, are
marching along in one developmental path with Northern (Annex I) countries at the forefront. Southern (non-Annex I) countries
lag in their efforts to develop in the fashion of Northern countries. Such groups of countries are separated and cast as developed and
developing. This one history separates peoples by chronology and the concerns about unequal distribution of development and
wealth are simply a matter of time, time to develop, and not injustice (Sachs 1999a). "The West possesses the expertise,
technology, and management skills that the non-West is lacking. This lack is what has caused the problems of the non-West.
Questions of power and inequality, whether on the global level of international grain markets, state subsidies, and the arms trade, or
the more local level of landholding, food supplies, and income distribution, [are not] discussed" (Mitchell 2002: 242-3). The most
contentious value categories about emissions trading pick up on this profound critique of sustainable development.
Responsibility, power, fairness, and security concerns expressed by the critics are motivated largely by the disproportionate
and unequal distribution, access, and control of resources. Many critics regarded emissions trading as a continuation and
deepening of this historical injustice. As Lohman (2001: 7) suggests, "Current carbon trading schemes not only entrench
inequalities in access to global resources. They make them worse." This is the main reason for the chasm between critics and
proponents of emissions trading and it comes from a long history of fighting for equality and justice; emissions trading is merely
a current form of this debate.

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Development K – Emissions trading = colonialism

International emissions trading schemes are a form of colonialism on developing countries.


Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

…A number of economists and legal thinkers have asserted that an international emissions trading scheme is the most efficient way to
reduce the carbon emissions that cause climate change. ... Costs of negotiation represent a tiny fraction of a developed nation's GDP, but could consume a
far greater percentage of a developing country's meager finances (and would drain these resources away from other pressing development concerns). ... " In other
words, emissions trading might allow developed nations to buy up developing country resources in the form of emissions credits. ...
Finally, and perhaps most concretely, emissions trading encourages developed nations to avoid developing pollution reduction innovations that will make emissions cuts
cheaper for everyone. ... " Developed nations may seek to meet early emissions reductions obligations by transferring already existing
technology to developing countries (because this is the least expensive option), instead of investing in the development of new and better emission reduction
technologies. ... However, trading might also impose serious costs on developing nations: It might foist unwanted Western values onto
developing countries, provide a vehicle through which the developed world may exploit the resources of the developing world,
impinge on developing nation sovereignty, strain the administrative resources of developing states, and allow developed nations to
shirk the responsibilities embodied in the developed country leadership principle. ...

Emissions trading schemes impose Western structures on developing countries by taking advantage of the
other’s underdevelopment to craft rules most favorable to the West.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Emissions trading schemes may impose Western structures upon the developing world because the schemes themselves will likely
embody the goals and values of Western nations. Significant asymmetries in bargaining and information between developing and
developed nations suggest that developed nations will dominate negotiations over the details of any future emissions trading program, successfully
crafting the international agreement to suit their interests. Many developing nations are ill-equipped to evaluate emissions trading
programs thoroughly and to judge if and how they might benefit from participating. According to Alfred Mumma, developing [*156] nations,
particularly African countries, have the resources neither to determine the potential emissions trading program rules most favorable to them,
nor to bargain with other nations to have these favorable rules incorporated into the larger regulatory scheme. n127 As Mumma noted, successful
negotiation requires financial, technical, and human resources "to develop, popularize and consistently articulate a position." n128 This
process must "start long before the actual negotiations, be intensified during, and continue after, the negotiations whether one has 'won' or 'lost' the point." n129 The
United States, for example, has demanded binding obligations for developing nations and thus consistently raised the issue of the lack of such obligations at major
international meetings, whether or not the issue was on the formal agenda. n130 In contrast, some developing country negotiators were forced to develop climate
change positions off the cuff as conferences progressed because their home nations simply lacked detailed stances on important issues. n131 Furthermore, developing
nations have far fewer non-governmental organizations, which, pursuant to international agreements, can intervene in negotiations by
presenting their views on the floor for a limited amount of time. n132 This is particularly significant, considering that non-
governmental organizations representing developed country business interests at the Kyoto negotiations claimed that the ability to
intervene allowed them to manipulate the course of the negotiations and ultimately affect the shape of the agreement. n133

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None of their evidence on international emissions trading take into account the affects of their plan on
developing nations.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

TEXT: [*133] Global climate change is a complicated issue, both politically and environmentally. Though some uncertainty remains, scientists have come to a general
consensus that carbon emissions released in fossil fuel combustion are causing the earth's temperature to rise. Despite this scientific agreement, policymakers and
economists continue to debate the best way to alleviate the problem. A number of economists and legal thinkers have asserted that an
international emissions trading scheme is the most efficient way to reduce the carbon emissions that cause climate change. These scholars
have filled hundreds of pages evaluating the efficiency gains of emissions trading and comparing trading to other potential policy instruments, including command-and-
control regulations and taxation of carbon emissions. Unfortunately, however, they largely have ignored an important element of any
international policy: the effect of emissions trading programs on the development prospects of the world's poorest nations. Emissions
trading poses special problems for these nations that economists' equations and politicians' rhetoric seem to leave out of the picture. A
few scholars, notably David Dreisen and Joyeeta Gupta, have identified some of the potential threats to developing nations posed by emissions trading programs. But
even with their work, the extensive literature on emissions trading seems to lack any systematic analysis of the impact on developing
nations or any thorough comparison of the development effects of emissions trading with the development effects of other potential
climate change policy solutions.

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Development Impacts

( _ ) Development is inherently violent and genocidal – it relies on constant affirmation and acquiescence
to persist
Estava in 92 (Gustavo, Frmr Mexican ministry and planning, Chr of ANADEGES, Development Dictionary, ed. Sachs)

Expanding the Reign of Scarcity


During the 19th century, but in fact starting much earlier in Europe, the social construction of development was married to a
political design: excising from society and culture an autonomous sphere, the economic sphere, and installing it at the centre of
politics and ethics. That brutal and violent transformation, lust completed in Europe, was always associated with colonial
domination in i he rest of the world. Economization and colonization were synonymous. What Truman succeeded in doing was
freeing the economic sphere from the negative connotations it had accumulated for two centuries, delinking development from
colonialism. No more of the 'old imperialism', said Truman. In retrospect, it is possible to see that the emphasis on economic growth
of the first post-Truman developers was neither a detour nor a mistaken interpretation of the Truman proposal: rather, it was the
expression of its very essence
As a conceptual construction, economics strives to subordinate to its rule and to subsume under its logic every other form of
social interaction in every society it invades. As a political design, adopted by some as their own, economic history is a story of
conquest and domination. Far from being the idyllic evolution pictured by the founding fathers of economics, the emergence of
economic society is a story of violence and destruction often adopting a genocidal character. Little wonder, resistance appeared
everywhere.
Establishing economic value requires the disvaluing of all other forms of social existence.22 Disvalue transmogrifies skills into
lacks, commons into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into burden, wisdom into ignorance,
autonomy into dependency. It transmogrifies people's autonomous activities embodying wants, skills, hopes and interactions with
one another, and with the environment, into needs whose satisfaction requires the mediation of the market.
The helpless individual, whose survival now becomes necessarily dependent on the market, was not the invention of the
economists; neither was he born with Adam and Eve, as they contend. He was a historical creation. He was created by the economic
project redesigning mankind. The transmogrification of autonomous men and women into disvalued 'economic man' was in fact
the precondition for the emergence of economic society, a condition that must be constantly renewed, reconfirmed and
deepened for economic rule to continue. Disvalue is the secret of economic value, and it cannot be created except with violence
and in the face of continuous resistance.

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Development Impacts

( _ ) The discourse of underdevelopment places billions into a position of inferiority. This homogonizes
the third world and creats a self-fulfilling prophecy of subjegation.
Esteva, Board Member and Interim Chairman of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1992
(Gustavo,“Development”, Development Dictionary, pg. 6-7)

At the end of World War II, the United States was a formidable and incessant productive machine, unprecedented in history. It
was indisputably at the center of the world. It was the master. All the institutions created in those years recognized that fact: even
the United Nations Charter echoed the United States Constitution. But the Americans wanted something more. They needed to
make entirely self- explicit their new position in the world. And they wanted to consolidate that hegemony and make it
permanent. For these purposes, they conceived political campaign on a global scale that clearly bore their seal. They even
conceived an appropriate emblem to identify the campaign. And they carefully chose the opportunity to launch both — January 20,
1949. That very clay, the day on which President Truman took office, a new era was opened for the world. We must embark
[President Truman said] on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism — exploitation for foreign profit — has
no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. By using for
the first time in such context the word, 'underdeveloped', Truman changed the meaning of development and created the emblem, a
euphemism, used ever since to allude either discreetly or inadvertently to the era oft American hegemony. Never before had a word
been universally accepted on the very day of its political coinage. A new perception of one's own self, and of the other, was,
suddenly created. Two hundred years of social construction of the historically political meaning of the term, development,
were successfully usurped and transmogrified. A political and philosophical proposition of Marx, packaged the era of
development. American-style as a struggle against communism and at the service of the hegemonic design of the United States,
succeeded in permeating both the popular and intellectual mind for the rest of the century. Underdevelopment began, then, on January
20, 1949. On -that day,-two billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what
they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others' reality: a mirror that belittles them
and sends them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and
diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority.

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Development Impacts

( _ ) Development justifies a project of ongoing violence that is doomed to failure - the question is not
whether a specific development project will succeed or fail, but how to escape from a political logic that
dooms the world to death and destruction.
Rahnema, Fmr. UN ambassador and professor @ American University of Paris, 1997 [Majid, ‘Towards Post-Development: Searching
for Signposts, a New Language and New Paradigms’, The Post-Development Reader]

The first generation of schooled elites who started building their newly `independent' nations belonged to the strange universe
that Matthew Arnold once described as being 'between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born'. For centuries,
their people had been overrun, aggressed, mutilated and humiliated in their minds and bodies, and their countries plundered
in the name of progress and civilization. The 'elites' were actually among the few who had received 'proper' education, often combined with social and
economic privileges. These turned out, however, to be a poisonous gift, for they carried with them an HIV-type legacy. The founding elites of the emerging
nations were, quite often, harbouring within their cells some of the 'genes' of their former masters. Like them, many of those elites now
believed, deep in their hearts, that only the model of society incarnated by the North – and the kind of power associated with it
– could now allow their populations to wipe out the consequences of their 'underdevelopment'. Thus they shared with their former
masters, at least, two certainties, which formed the cornerstones of the emerging construct of development: (a) that, regardless of the many
'positive', though outdated, aspects of indigenous cultures, everything composing their present life was bad, and that they were no longer in a position to
address the complexities of the modern world without a sustained programme of developme; and (b) that the only way for their people to re-emerge as
dignified human beings was to prepare them for all the sacrifices necessary to 'catch up with the West'. The facts and testimonies
gathered in this Reader show that development did not prove to be the panacea those elites believed it to be. Despite the new
governments of the 'Third World' according it absolute priority for fifty years, at least in their official discourse, the great majority of them
soon realized that the objectives they had set for themselves were unrealistic and impossible to achieve. As it stands now, they have also to admit that not
only did development fail to resolve the old problems it was supposed to address, but it brought in new ones of incomparably
greater magnitude. Not only did development prove to be simply a myth for the millions it was destined to serve; the very
premisses and assumptions on which it was founded were misleading. Teodor Shanin's analysis of the idea of Progress; Marshall Berman's
metaphor of Faust as the first developer; and Arturo Escobar's analysis of the development discourse – all offer insights as to why the development discourse
was bound, from the beginning, to cause the tragedies it did in fact bring about. Had development achieved its ends... The
authoritative and often well-documented books listed at the end of this Reader show that the failures of development can no longer be attributed
solely to the inability of the governments, institutions and people in charge of implementing it. In fact, if they had been
successful in fulfilling all the promises they made to their peoples, and had there been enough money and resources to bring about the development of all the so-
called underdeveloped countries of the world to the level of the 'most advanced', the resulting deadlocks and tensions would perhaps have taken
an even more dramatic turn. For example, it has been estimated that a single edition of the New York Times eats up 150 acres of forest land.' Other
figures suggest that, were the rest of the world to consume paper, including recycled paper, at the same rate as the United States (with
6 per cent of the world's population), within two years not a single tree would be left on the planet. Moreover, considering that the number of private
cars in the USA by far exceeds its population, an efficient development machine, capable of taking the levels of newspaper reading and car ownership in China and
India up to those of the USA, would pose to those countries (and perhaps the rest of the world) problems of traffic, pollution and forest depletion on a disastrous scale.
It is thus perhaps a blessing that the machine was actually not as efficient as its programmers wanted it to be!4 The issue is, therefore, not that
development strategies or projects could or should have been better planned or implemented. It is that development, as it
imposed itself on its 'target populations', was basically the wrong answer to their true needs and aspirations. It was an
ideology that was born and refined in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers in search of a more
'appropriate' tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion. As such it could, at best, transfer on to the new nation-states
the contradictions of their own socio-economic systems. In fact, the ideology helped a dying and obsolete colonialism to
transform itself into an aggressive – even sometimes an attractive – instrument able to recapture lost ground.

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The exportation of better technology to the poor only pushes the developing world deeper into an inferior
and self-perpetuating dependence.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

II. The Development Critique Critics of colonialism and exploitation have existed as long as colonialism and exploitation themselves. But what I term the "development
critique" began in earnest in the late 1950s with two pioneer theorists, Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch. Economists had long struggled to explain why some
nations prospered and others languished in poverty. Until the late 1950s, many viewed the problem of underdevelopment through the lens of classical
economic theory: Economists clung to the Ricardean assumption of comparative advantage and attributed underdevelopment to undercapitalization. n88 Thus, they
believed that developing countries could get rich by producing a specialized commodity for export and that Western nations could help
them along, as they had helped to rebuild Europe under the Marshall Plan, by simply sending money. n89 Prebisch and Singer challenged the simplicity and
optimism of these earlier models. They contended that developing countries were not slowly converging with developed nations through
specialization and external capitalization; instead, they were trapped in a relationship of dependence and domination with the
developed world. n90 They further asserted that colonialism and historical dominance by the Western world had pressed the developing
world into an inferior and self-perpetuating trade relationship. n91 According to another economist, Theotonio Dos Santos, "dominant countries
are [*150] endowed with technological, commercial, capital and socio-political predominance over dependent countries - the form of
this predominance varying according to the particular historical moment - and can therefore exploit them, and extract part of the locally
produced surplus." n92 Rather than getting rich through comparative advantage, developing nations continually were producing the cheapest raw
materials and agricultural products while developed nations continually developed new and better technology to export to the poor
developing world at high prices. n93 This, argued Dos Santos, created "an international division of labor which allows industrial development to take place in
some countries while restricting it in others, whose growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centers of the world." n94

The West imposes it’s values and structures on developing nations – creating a medium to exploit the
country and it’s resources further.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Development critics also assail the equation of development with Westernization, arguing that "the
intellectual dominance of the Western model has
derived not from its inherent and unequivocal superiority," but rather from the political and military dominance of Western powers. n99
Marglin and Pouncy have both contended that defining development and social progress in terms of Westernization is harmful to developing
nations on several levels. n100 First, they argue, it limits the development options open to these nations, foreclosing alternative development paths more
compatible with indigenous cultures and traditions. n101 Second, it imposes Western structures and ideas onto developing nations. n102 These
Western structures, according to Marglin, infect developing nations with some of the negative aspects of Western culture, including
environmental despoliation and obsession with work. n103 Western structures also supplant valuable local customs, understandings,
and technologies. n104 Pouncy has asserted that "Western legal regimes have totally rewritten traditional understandings of family
relationships, gender and sexuality, and real property interests, to name but a few areas of cultural contamination." n105 Marglin likens
development to coercion, as Western powers impose their views and structures onto developing nations. n106 [*152] He notes as an example
that in colonial India, British officials introduced smallpox vaccination despite the existence of a viable indigenous inoculation method known as variolation. n107
Rather than using vaccination and variolation as complements to each other, the British outlawed the local method entirely. n108 Further, scholars assert, the
imposition of Western structures creates a conduit through which the developed world can exploit the resources of the developing
world. n109 According to Pouncy the creation of Western-style stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa has not served the intended purpose of establishing capital
markets to fund domestic African enterprise. n110 Instead, it has allowed Western powers to buy up African resources to use for their own benefit. n111

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Development K – Plan  exploitation


International emissions trading schemes allow the developed world to exploit developing nations’
resources in the form of credits.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

C. Potential for Exploitation of Developing Countries If


these harms seem ephemeral, the development critique suggests that the imposition of
Western structures may serve as Trojan horse in another, more imminent sense as well. Emissions trading schemes may allow the
developed world to enter and then exploit developing countries. n152 As soon as a viable international emissions trading program takes shape,
emissions credits will become very valuable. Developing nations have no binding obligations under Kyoto, but through the various trading mechanisms of the Kyoto
agreement, they theoretically will have access to a massive supply of these very valuable credits. As both Driesen and Gupta have noted, international emissions
trading schemes might allow developed nations to buy the cheapest emissions reductions opportunities en masse, before developing
countries acquire binding obligations [*161] of their own. n153 The idea here is that the price of emission will rise over time as cuts become more and
more difficult to make. According to Driesen, allowing developed countries to purchase all the early, cheap credits will "raise the price of future
emissions reductions in the credit generating countries." n154 In other words, emissions trading might allow developed nations to buy
up developing country resources in the form of emissions credits.

The structure of Western dominance allows the West to blame the developing world for economic failures
and this justifies further exploitation.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

F. Shifting Responsibility from the Developed to the Developing World Development critics contend that neo-liberal Western development policies,
like the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, saddle developing countries with the burden of making up
for their own underdevelopment, which was caused, at least in part, by centuries of exploitation, colonialism, and Western dominance.
n182 Structural adjustment policies mandate that developing nations make painful sacrifices to correct the problem; n183 and when these
policies fail to bring much needed economic relief, developed countries blame developing countries for faulty implementation, rather
than reassessing the utility of the policies themselves. n184 Emissions trading programs might similarly allow developed countries to
avoid making painful sacrifices themselves by exporting the hard work to developing countries. Much of the problem of global climate
change resulted from the dirty industrial revolutions of the developed world. Today's developed countries grew rich by burning fossil fuels with
impunity, immune from international regulation (and even most domestic regulation) until the last quarter-century. Yet, emissions trading programs would
place some of the burden of addressing the problem on developing nations.

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Development K – Plan  underdevelopment

Aid from the developed world only exacerbates underdevelopment by helping the indifferent, wealthy
class.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Prebisch and Singer found that rather


than being helped along the development path by developed nations, developing countries were
actually in an antagonistic and losing relationship with their so-called benefactors. n95 Since the late 1950s, subsequent theorists, including Stephen
Marglin, Ozay Mehmet, and Charles Pouncy, have expanded upon this hypothesis to form what I call the development critique. n96 According to these development
critics, aid from the developed world often helped only the so-called comprador class in developing nations: wealthy elites who, often
as a result of past colonialism, were tied more to developed countries than to their home countries and who cared more about lining
their [*151] own pockets than about facilitating domestic development. n97 Further, under the "false paradigm" model, theorists argue that
underdevelopment often was caused or at least exacerbated by "faulty and inappropriate advice provided by well-meaning but often
uninformed, biased, and ethnocentric international 'expert' advisors from developed-country assistance agencies and multinational
donor organizations." n98

The domination of the developing world by Western societies stunt actual development.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

[*134] In contrast, another body of writings makes the special problems of developing nations its sole focus. What I call here "the development critique" seeks to
analyze the effects of developed countries' policies on developing nations. The development critique contends that the developed world often
dominates and exploits the developing world. Development critics carefully have assessed the often negative effects of development
aid from wealthier neighbors on poor countries. They assert that the very development assistance intended to foster growth in
developing nations actually stunts development by imposing unwelcome Western structures, offering new avenues for exploitation by
the developed world, and blaming the developing world for its continuing poverty. Development critics have not, however, applied their criticisms
to emissions trading in any systematic way.

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Development K – Plan  structural violence

Capitalism justifies underdevelopment and reforms in the West have caused structural violence in
developing countries.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Development critics attack structural adjustment programs on two grounds. First, critics like Mehmet argue that [*153] these programs,
though hidden behind the guise of development assistance, are actually motivated by the economic goals of the Western organizations
that imposed them. n115 Similarly, in an article on Africa's economic woes, Richard Sandbrook argues that "it would be na<um i>ve to treat ... the World Bank and
the IMF[] as non-ideological agencies open-endedly searching for cures for Africa's financial disequilibria, stagnation, poverty and oppression." n116 Instead, he
contends, the World Bank and the IMF have structured economic reform programs to meet their longtime goals of "integrating as many national economies as possible
into multilateral global capitalist economy." n117 Thus, according to Sandbrook and Mehmet, the policies of so-called development assistance
organizations are often aimed at furthering the goals of their Western managers rather than their developing country beneficiaries.
Second, critics argue that this allegiance to Western interests has resulted in economic reform programs that are often harmful to developing
nations. n118 Sandbrook argues that although "open, export-oriented development may meet the needs of international capital and the
advanced industrial countries[,] it does not necessarily advance the interests of the poor within low-income developing countries." n119
Mehmet goes even further, asserting that structural adjustment policies have contributed to falling real wages, rising food prices, ethnic
violence, and political instability in several African, Latin American, and Asian countries. n120 He contends that while the West can simply
reformulate its terms "to ensure that foreign debts are repaid by borrowers, the true social costs ... are [*154] borne by Third World victims." n121 According to
Mehmet, despite years of sacrifice, many developing countries have yet to see any of the promised benefits. n122 The criticisms of structural adjustment programs echo
the "false paradigm" argument that Western policy makers and development advocates, who formulate policy programs based on economic theory and Excel
spreadsheets, often do more to harm developing nations than to help them. The development critique, then, indicts developed countries for creating a
system of dominance and dependence with developing nations, imposing Western structures and values upon nations that may not
welcome or know how to manage them, exploiting the resources of developing nations, and pushing often wrong-headed development
policies that force developing nations to make major sacrifices for little gain.

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Development K – Plan  capitalism

Emissions trading programs act as a medium for developed worlds to force unethical Western capitalist
systems, which justifies environmental commodification, on developing countries.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Emissions trading programs may serve as another vehicle through which developed nations attempt to foist neo-liberal economic ideas
upon the developing world. According to Kenyan professor Calestous Juma, emissions trading embodies the characteristics of Western
rationality: "efficiency, reductionism, selectionism (survival of the fittest) and quantification." n149 Juma argues that it is these "epistemological
underpinnings of [emissions trading] that make critics uncomfortable." n150 A number of other scholars have opposed economic incentive programs
like emissions trading on ethical grounds, asserting that by attaching a price tag to pollution, these programs wrongfully commodify
the environment and legitimize pollution. n151 Besides offending moral sensibilities, this commodification [*160] might help to force
Western notions of markets and efficiency onto developing countries.

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Development K – Plan  infringes sovereignty

The imposition of Western structures infringes the developing country’s sovereignty.


Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

D. Infringing on Developing Country Sovereignty The imposition of Western structures through emissions trading may infringe on developing
country sovereignty by imposing external rules and structures, thereby limiting developing country governments' already limited
policy options. According to development critics, developed nations already create "institutional, political, and economic rigidities, both
domestic and international," for developing countries, constraining their policy choices based on dynamics established by the wealthy
developed world. n163 And, as a number of critics contend, the autonomy of developing country governments is further restricted by structural
adjustment programs imposed upon debtor nations by the World Bank and the IMF; as noted above, these programs, justified by neo-liberal
economic theories about development, prohibit developing nation governments from many interventions in their domestic economies,
including trade restrictions and industrial subsidies. n164 Developing nations' leaders have also argued that general international environmental
standards impinge on their countries' sovereignty, asserting that "decisions concerning trade and environment, [*165] such as whether to
allow the overexploitation of their natural resources or higher levels of pollution to gain market advantage, are theirs alone to make." n165 Arguably, emissions
trading schemes further would infringe on the already compromised sovereignty of developing nations. Developing nations already have
bristled at the possibility of external, international standards for determining the eligibility of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol,
claiming that it is their sovereign right to make such decisions. n166 Emissions trading programs might add another layer of complication, further
constraining the already limited policy arsenal of developing country governments. According to some development scholars, this is
problematic because developing countries desperately need more autonomy and less intervention. n167

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Development K – Plan  diverts key funds

The imposition of Western structures would force the developing countries to divert money away from
more pressing needs of the nation to create new infrastructure for the emissions programs.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

E. Administrative and Resource Problems The imposition of Western structures would also pose administrative problems for developing
nations. Initially, many [*166] developing nations would lack the resources and administrative capacity to administer emissions trading
schemes on a domestic level. n169 According to William Andreen, developing country agencies often contend with "a shortage or lack of adequately trained
staff, poor management capacity, lack of certain professional skills such as financial accounting, limited fiscal resources, and inadequate equipment or facilities." n170
Further, Andreen argues that government personnel in developing nations "often lack access to necessary information - statutes,
regulations, reports, and studies." n171 Even telephones are "in scarce supply as are computers, printers, and copying machines." n172 According to many
development critics, the failure to increase developing countries' administrative capabilities remains what Andreen terms "one of the major
causes behind the failure of development programs." n173 Pouncy, for example, contends that Western-style stock markets in Sub-Saharan
Africa floundered in part because the host nations simply lacked the expertise, detailed legal structure, and experienced personnel
necessary to manage local stock markets to their benefit. n174 In the emissions trading context, developing countries might make
detrimental trades because they have not developed the infrastructure and managerial capabilities necessary to evaluate and negotiate
potential bargains. n175 Furthermore, the development of the infrastructure necessary to manage emissions trading on a domestic level will be very costly and
difficult, requiring the extensive training of personnel, development of detailed domestic laws, increased access to relevant information, and purchase of facilities and
equipment like [*167] computers and telephones. n176 Developing nations are largely ill-prepared to make large investments in capacity
building. In fact, Africa's position paper on global climate change expresses that region's desire for funding to help it pay for the "training and capacity building
[necessary] to deal with sustainable development and the development and implementation of [the Clean Development Mechanism]." n177 The development of
infrastructure and managerial capacity, then, costs money that developing nations often do not have. And even if developing nations
are able to scrape together or borrow the money to develop such capabilities, this diverts money away from the potentially more
pressing needs of these nations: growing their domestic economies, feeding their people and, unfortunately, servicing their debt. To take
the argument a step further, this may be an example of what Pouncy deems "the neo-colonial project [of] redirecting resources to functions that
primarily serve the interests of foreign investors and domestic elites, rather than the less specialized needs of the general population."
n178

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Development K – Plan  substitutes real development

Emissions trading programs allow developed nations to take credit for funding reductions in developed
countries. These programs act as substitutes to actual development assistance.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Emissions trading may conflict with the developed country leadership principle in several ways. Most obviously, it allows developed countries
to avoid making the early and deep cuts that they committed to at Rio. Though they committed to make the first sacrifices in pollution, and thus
production, developed nations can claim that they are meeting their reductions obligations through trading. Though the Kyoto Protocol
requires that Annex I parties make some reductions at home before they are permitted to trade, it does not specify a minimum amount of domestic reduction. n187 Even
under the Protocol's restrictions, developed nations could still earn the vast majority of their emissions reductions credits through trading, while making only minimal
reductions domestically. Further, trading allows developed nations to claim credit toward their leadership obligations for funding of
reductions in developing countries, reductions that also earn credits for developed nations themselves. In other words, emissions trading
enables developed nations to "double count" trades as both domestic reductions and assistance to developing countries required by the
leadership principle. This also increases developing countries' fear that developed nations will attempt to use emissions trading
projects as a substitute for, rather than an addition to, official development assistance. n188

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Development K – Plan  destroys protection from exploitation

Emissions trading encourage developed nations to have developing nations make trades that conflict with
the very laws that protect them from exploitation.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Thus, developing countries have reason to fear that, as Dreisen has suggested, "trading will make their future pollution reductions
more expensive because developed countries [will] purchase the world's cheapest abatement credits in a regime's evolution, before
developing countries' obligations become effective." n155 History is replete with examples of developed nations buying up the
resources of developing nations for their own advantage. Unfortunately, the revenues from these resource sales often do not purchase
development in the selling nation. n156 Nigeria, for example, sold large amounts of domestic oil to developed country interests, but
still languishes in poverty. n157 Clearly, developed nations have a right to buy, and developing nations a right to sell, emissions credits
to each other if they so desire. And arguably, it is paternalistic to argue against such transactions. But not every market-mediated
transaction is fair or equitable. Developing countries are so often desperately impoverished that they are willing to sell off resources
that will be necessary for their development in the future. Further, developing nations likely will have far less information than
developed nations about the value of emissions credits in the long term. In fact, emissions trading schemes may encourage trading
contracts that developed countries' courts would find unenforceable for unfairness. Many developed countries invalidate exploitative
contracts between parties of widely disparate bargaining power. It seems odd, then, that emissions trading schemes would allow
developed nations to [*163] make trades that conflict with the very laws those nations use to protect their own citizens from
exploitation.

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Development K – Plan  diversion of polluting technology

Emission trading schemes encourages developed countries to transfer existing polluting technology to
developing worlds in order to avoid making reductions by trading with developing nations.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Finally, and perhaps most concretely, emissions


trading encourages developed nations to avoid developing pollution reduction innovations
that will make emissions cuts cheaper for everyone. n189 The developed country leadership principle requires not only that developed
countries make the first emissions [*171] reductions, but also that they use those cuts as an opportunity to develop new pollution
reduction technology that will allow developing countries to increase production without dramatically increasing pollution. n190
According to Driesen, however, emissions trading "increases the risk that countries and industries that have the capacity to develop new technologies will fail to do so."
n191 Developed nations may seek to meet early emissions reductions obligations by transferring already existing technology to
developing countries (because this is the least expensive option), instead of investing in the development of new and better emission
reduction technologies. The risks of developed country shirking exist under command-and-control regulation and carbon taxation as
well. Developed countries may still refuse to accept regulations significantly restricting emissions or imposing high carbon taxes. This shirking, however, is more
visible than shirking under emissions trading. It would be difficult for developed nations to portray their opposition to stringent reduction obligations or high tax rates as
cheerful cooperation. In contrast, under emissions trading developed nations may be able to appear to be fulfilling their leadership
obligation while they actually avoid making reductions by trading with developing nations. Furthermore, command-and-control regulations and
taxes may create more desirable incentive structures in terms of innovations in pollution reduction technologies. Under command-and-control or taxation
schemes, developed nations will have significant incentives to develop improved emissions reduction technologies in order to meet
regulatory standards or avoid excessive taxation. They will not have the option of deferring innovation by meeting their reductions
obligations by exporting existing technology to developing nations.

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Dev. K C tax CP Solves

( _ ) (Command and Control/Carbon Tax) solves – it creates an intermediary body and structure less
likely to enable exploitation

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

Command-and-control regulations and carbon taxation schemes are far less likely to promote such unfair transactions
between the developing and the developed world. In each of those programs, developing nations likely will deal with an
international regulatory agency, rather than with developed nations directly. While this body may be influenced by developed
country interests, the incentives driving command-and-control regulation and taxation programs are far less likely to induce
exploitation of the resources of developing countries. Furthermore, neither of these two alternative programs will create an
international market structure through which such exploitative transactions can occur. Thus, emissions trading schemes seem
more menacing to developing countries in this context.

( _ ) Counterplan solves responsibility transfer to developing nations – it forces reductions in the area of
pollution

Richman in 03 (Emily Richman, J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, Fall, 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133)

The risks of developed country shirking exist under command-and-control regulation and carbon taxation as well. Developed
countries may still refuse to accept regulations significantly restricting emissions or imposing high carbon taxes. This shirking,
however, is more visible than shirking under emissions trading. It would be difficult for developed nations to portray their
opposition to stringent reduction obligations or high tax rates as cheerful cooperation. In con-trast, under emissions trading
developed nations may be able to appear to be fulfilling their leadership obligation while they actually avoid making
reductions by trading with developing nations. Furthermore, command-and-control regula-tions and taxes may create more
desirable incentive structures in terms of innovations in pollution reduction technolo-gies. Under command-and-control or
taxation schemes, developed nations will have significant incentives to develop improved emissions reduction technologies in
order to meet regulatory standards or avoid excessive taxation. They will not have the option of deferring innovation by
meeting their reductions obligations by exporting existing technology to developing nations.

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Development K – Alternative

Policy makers must recognize the effects of emissions trading on developing countries in order to reshape
these emissions trading programs.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

IV. Conclusion A look through the "lens" of the development critique, then, reveals that emissions trading has special implications for developing countries that most
economists and policymakers have failed to address. Emissions trading may help developing nations by creating an extremely valuable commodity--the right to emit
carbon dioxide--which developing nations [*174] would possess in large quantities. However, trading might also impose serious costs on developing
nations: It might foist unwanted Western values onto developing countries, provide a vehicle through which the developed world may
exploit the resources of the developing world, impinge on developing nation sovereignty, strain the administrative resources of
developing states, and allow developed nations to shirk the responsibilities embodied in the developed country leadership principle. It
is extremely important to recognize the potential effects of emissions trading on developing nations. However, the potential burdens on
developing nations do not render trading an entirely unattractive policy option. In fact, identifying these potential burdens actually may be the first step
toward reshaping emissions trading into a more development-friendly program. In other words, if policymakers consider the burdens of
emissions trading on developing nations, they may be able to modify trading programs so as to minimize these harms. For example,
regulators may be able to prevent developed nations from exploiting the resources of developing nations by prohibiting trades that
violate general principles of fairness. Though developed nations' laws, such as the U.S. prohibition on unconscionable contracts, would not necessarily apply,
regulators could develop their own scheme to prevent exploitative contracts. An international trading scheme could permit developed nations to buy
up developing nations' emissions credits only at approved prices and only under established, fair trading procedures.

Modified emission trading programs offer the best balance for both worlds.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)
However, there are some potential harms to developing countries that no amount of policy modification can eliminate. Emissions trading programs inherently embody Western ideals of markets and efficiency. Any attempt to
prevent trading programs from imposing these ideas upon developing nations would likely destroy the very efficiency gains that make trading such an attractive policy option in the first place. This raises a more difficult
, modified emissions trading
question: Do the overall cost-savings and potential benefits to developing countries from emissions trading justify the remaining harms to developing nations? On one hand
programs may offer the best of both worlds, allowing massive worldwide efficiency gains and a theoretical creation of great wealth (in
the form of emissions credits) for developing countries while creating only a minimal, ephemeral harm. In fact, some might assert that [*176] the imposition of Western
market ideals onto developing countries is not a harm at all, as these ideals have significant value. Modified trading programs, then, might offer the best balance of
development, cost savings, and environmental protection. On the other hand, some development scholars might assert that the ideological infiltration of Western ideals through trading
programs remains a very significant harm and that the policy modifications suggested above do not alleviate the burdens imposed on developing nations fully.

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Framework

( _ ) We concede that our alternative is never being implemented, but our arg has value on its own – the
role of the intellectual should be to intervene against established political representation and institutions
of power on the standpoint of the unrepresented
Said in 94 (Edward, Representations of the Intellectual, 994 pp 19-23)

Bazarov, Dedalus, and Moreau are extremes of course, but they do serve the purpose, which is something panoramic realistic novels of the nineteenth century can do uniquely well, of showing us intellectuals in action, beset with numerous difficulties and temptations, either maintaining or

The intellectual's representations, his or her


betraying their calling, not as a fixed task to be learned once and for all from a how-to-do-it manual but as a concrete experience constantly threatened by modern life itself.

articulations of a cause or idea to society, are not meant primarily to fortify ego or celebrate status. Nor are they principally intended for service
within powerful bureaucracies and with generous employers. Intellectual representations are the activity itself, dependent on a kind of
consciousness that is skeptical, engaged, unremittingly devoted to rational investigation and moral judgment; and this puts the individual on record
and on the line. Knowing how to use language well and knowing when to intervene in language are two essential features of intellectual action. But what does the intellectual represent today? One of the best and most honest answers to this question was given, I think, by the American

independent intellectuals were


sociologist C. Wright Mills, a fiercely independent intellectual with an impassioned social vision and a remarkable capacity for communicating his ideas in a straightforward and compelling prose. He wrote in 1944 that

faced either with a kind of despondent sense of powerlessness at their marginality, or with the choice of joining the ranks of
institutions, corporations or governments as members of a relatively small group of insiders who made important decisions irresponsibly and on their own. To become the "hired" agent of an information industry is no solution either, since
to achieve a relationship with audiences like Tom Paine's with his would therefore be impossible. In sum "the means of effective communication," which is the intellectual's currency,

is thus being expropriated, leaving the independent thinker with one major task. Here is how Mills puts it: The independent
artist and intellectual are among the few remaining personalities equipped to resist and to fight the stereotyping and
consequent death of genuinely living things. Fresh perception now involves the capacity to continually unmask and to smash
the stereotypes of vision and intellect with which modern communications {i.e. modern systems of representation} swamp us.
These worlds of mass-art and mass-thought are increasingly geared to the demands of politics. That is why it is in politics that
intellectual solidarity and effort must be centered. If the thinker does not relate himself to the value of truth in political
struggle, he cannot responsibly cope with the whole of live experience.11 This passage deserves reading and rereading, so full of important signposts and emphases is it. Politics is
everywhere; there can be no escape into the realms of pure art and thought or, for that matter, into the realm of disinterested objectivity or transcendental theory. Intellectuals
are of their time, herded along by the mass politics of representations embodied by the information or media industry, capable
of resisting those only by disputing the images, official narratives, justifications of power circulated by an increasingly
powerful media—and not only media but whole trends of thought that maintain the status quo, keep things within an
acceptable and sanctioned perspective on actuality—by providing what Mills calls unmaskings or alternative versions in which to the
best of one's ability the intellectual tries to tell the truth. This is far from an easy task: the intellectual always stands between loneliness and alignment. How
difficult it was during the recent Gulf War against Iraq to remind citizens that the U.S. was not an innocent or disinterested power (the invasions of
Vietnam and Panama were conveniently forgotten by policy-makers), nor was it appointed by anyone except itself as the world's policeman. But this was, I believe, the intellectuals' task at the time, to

unearth the forgotten, to make connections that were denied, to cite alternative courses of action that could have avoided war
and its attendant goal of human destruction. C. Wright Mills's main point is the opposition between the mass and the
individual. There is an inherent discrepancy between the powers of large organizations, from governments to corporations,
and the relative weakness not just of individuals but of human beings considered to have subaltern status, minorities, small peoples and states, inferior or
lesser cultures and races. There is no question in my mind that the intellectual belongs on the same side with the weak and unrepresented. Robin

Hood, some are likely to say. Yet it's not that simple a role, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed as just so much ro-mantic idealism. At
bottom, the intellectual, in my sense of the word, is neither a pacifier nor a consensus-builder, but someone whose whole being is staked on a
critical sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made cliches, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating
confirmations of what the powerful or conventional have to say, and what they do. Not just passively unwillingly, but actively
willing to say so in public. This is not always a matter of being a critic of government policy, but rather of thinking of the intellectual vocation as maintaining a state of constant alertness, of a perpetual willingness not to let half-truths or received ideas steer one
along. That this involves a steady realism, an almost athletic rational energy, and a complicated struggle to balance the problems of one's own selfhood against the demands of publishing and speaking out in the public sphere is what makes it an everlasting effort, constitutively unfinished and
necessarily imperfect. Yet its invigorations and complexities, for me at least, make one the richer for it, even though it doesn't make one particularly popular.

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Framework

( _ ) Our framework is superior – we should embrace an amateurism that challenges and mobilizes
audiences, transforming professionals in a radical manner – our hands won’t be on the levers of power,
and we should admit as much
Said in 94 (Edward, Representations of the Intellectual, 994 pp 19-23)

In other words, the space for individual and subjective intellectual representation, for asking questions and challenging the
wisdom of a war or an immense social program that awards contracts and endows prizes, has shrunk dramatically from what it
was a hundred years ago when Stephen Dedalus could say that as an intellectual his duty was not to serve any power or authority at
all. Now I do not want to suggest as some have—rather sentimentally I think—that we should recover a time when universities weren't
so big, and the opportunities they now offer were not so lavish. To my mind the Western university, certainly in America, still can
offer the intellectual a quasi-utopian space in which reflection and research can go on, albeit under new constraints and
pressures. Therefore, the problem for the intellectual is to try to deal with the impingements of modern professionali-zation as I
have been discussing them, not by pretending that they are not there, or denying their influence, but by representing a different
set of values and prerogatives. These I shall collect under the name of amateurism, literally, an activity that is fueled by care and
affection rather than by profit and selfish, narrow specialization. The intellectual today ought to be an amateur, someone who
considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a society one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart of even the
most technical and professionalized activity as it involves one's country, its power, its mode of interacting with its citizens as
well as with other societies. In addition, the intellectual's spirit as an amateur can enter and transform the merely professional
routine most of us go through into something much more lively and radical; instead of doing what one is supposed to do one
can ask why one does it, who benefits from it, how can it reconnect with a personal project and original thoughts. Every
intellectual has an audience and a constituency. The issue is whether that audience is there to be satisfied, and hence a client to
be kept happy, or whether it is there to be challenged, and hence stirred into outright opposition or mobilized into greater
democratic participation in the society. But in either case, there is no getting around authority and power, and no getting around the
intellectual's relationship to them. How does the intellectual address authority: as a professional supplicant or as its unrewarded,
amateurish conscience?

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Framework/Alt Solves

( _ ) Resitance to development is forming at the margins now – our critical awareness can help to catalyze
changes to the status quo
Estava in 92 (Gustavo, Frmr Mexican ministry and planning, Chr of ANADEGES, Development Dictionary, ed. Sachs)

Struggling to limit the economic sphere is not, for the common man at the margins or the majority of people on earth, a
mechanical reaction to the economic invasion of their lives. They are not Luddites. Rather they see their resistance as a creative
reconstitution of the basic forms of social interaction, in order to liberate themselves from their economic chains. They have
thus created, in their neighbourhoods, villages and barrios, new commons which allow them to live on their own terms. In these
new commons, there are forms of social interaction that have appeared only in the post-war era. Still the people in these new spaces
are the heirs of a diversified collection of commons, communities and even whole cultures destroyed by the industrial,
economic form of social interaction. After the extinction of their subsistence regimes, they tried to adopt various patterns of
accommodation to the industrial form. The failure of both industrial society and the remnants of traditional forms of interaction
to effect this accommodation was the precondition of the social inventions whose consolidation and flourishing has been
further stimulated by the so-called crisis of development. For people on the margins, disengaging from the economic logic of
the market or the plan has become the very condition for survival. They are forced to confine their economic interaction — for
some, very frequent and intense — to realms outside the spaces where they organize their own modes of living. Those spaces
were their last refuge during the development era. After experiencing what survival means in economic society, they are now
counting the blessings they find in such refuges, while working actively to regenerate them. By equating education with diplomas,
following the economic definition of learning, they lacked teachers and schools. Now, after re-embedding learning in culture, they have the affluence of constantly
enriching their knowledge with a little help from friends bringing to them experiences and remedies from outside their tradition. After equating health with dependence
on medical services, they lacked doctors, health centres, hospitals, drugs. Now, after recognizing health again as the autonomous ability to cope with the environment,
they are regenerating their own healing capability, benefiting from the traditional wisdom of their healers and from the richness of the curative capacity of their
environments. This, too, with a little help from their friends, when something beyond their reach or their traditional realm requires external help. After equating eating
with the technical activities of production and consumption, linked to the mediation of the market or the state, they lacked income and suffered scarcity of food. Now,
they are regenerating and enriching their relationships with themselves and with the environment, nourishing again both their lives and their lands. And they are usually
coping well with the shortages still affecting them — as a consequence of the time and effort required to remedy the damage done by development or their temporary
Inability to escape from the damaging economic interactions they still have to maintain. It is not easy, for example, to step out of commercial crops or give up the
addiction to credit or industrial inputs; but intercropping helps regenerate both land and culture, in time providing an improvement in nutrition. Peasants and grassroots
groups in the cities are now sharing with people I orced to leave the economic centre the ten thousand tricks they have learned to limit the economy, to mock the
economic creed, or to refunctionalize and leformulate modern technology. The 'crisis' of the 1980s removed from the payroll people already educated in dependency on
incomes and the market, people lacking the social setting enabling them to survive by themselves. Now the margins are coping with the difficult task of relocating these
people. The process poses great challenges and tensions for everyone, but it also offers a i reative opportunity for regeneration, once they discover how mutually
supportive they can be for one another. The basic logic of human interactions inside the new commons prevents II arcity from appearing in them. People do not assume
unlimited ends, since their ends are no more than the other side of their means, their direct expression. If their means are limited, as they are, their ends cannot be
iinIimited. Within the new commons, needs are defined with verbs that describe h tivities embodying wants, skills and interactions with others and with the
environment. Needs are not separated into different 'spheres' of reality: lacks or expectations on one side, and satisfiers on the other, reunited through the market or the
plan. One of the most interesting facets of the ongoing regeneration in the new commons being created by ordinary men and women is precisely the recovery ol I heir
own definition of needs, dismantled by development in perception or in practice. By strengthening forms of interaction embedded in the social fabric and by breaking
the economic principle of the exchange of equivalents, they are recovering their autonomous ways of living. By reinstalling or regenerating Iim ms of trade operating
outside the rules of the market or the plan, they are both enriching their daily lives and limiting the impact and scope of the commercial operations they still have to
maintain, and also reducing the i uinmodification of their time and the fruits of their effort. The leading actor of the economy, economic man, finds no feasible
answers for coping with the 'crisis' of development, and frequently reacts with desolation, exhaustion, even desperation. He
constantly falls for the political game of demands and promises, or the economic game of carpetbagging the present for the future,
hopes for expectations. In contrast, the leading actor of the new commons, the common man, dissolves or prevents scarcity in his
Imaginative efforts to cope with his predicament. He looks for no more than liee spaces or limited support for his initiatives.
He can mix them in political eoalitions increasingly capable of reorienting policies and changing political i vies. Supported by
recent experiences, the new awareness emerging from the margins can awaken others, broadening those coalitions towards the
critical point in which an inversion of the economic dominance begins to be feasible.

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Development K – Key to analyzing impacts

This K is key to analyzing the development impacts on international policy.


Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

III. Emissions Trading and Development Despite its flaws,


the development critique is valuable both for its challenge to the dominant neo-liberal
model of economic development and for its close attention to the interests of developing countries. It is a useful tool in analyzing the
development effects of international policy. Scholars of emissions trading, in their quest for efficiency, largely have overlooked effects
on developing nations. While they have given [*155] some lip service to development, they have not undertaken a rigorous analysis of the
potential harms to developing nations. Even David Dreisen and Joyeeta Gupta, who have pointed out some of trading's threats to development, have not
systematically identified the effects on developing nations. n125 This Part undertakes a rigorous analysis of the development effects of emissions trading. It will use the
development critique as a lens through which to identify the potential problems that trading poses for development. It will apply the same sorts of criticisms that
development scholars have made of Westernization and development aid to the context of emissions trading. In so doing, it will expand upon the work of Dreisen,
Gupta, and other scholars, placing their isolated criticisms into a broader framework.

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Development K – West always dominates

Developing countries inability to affectively negotiate with developed countries on climate change issues
creates an opportunity for the West to dominate – Africa proves.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Africa's inability to stake out and lobby for a distinct position at the Buenos Aires Conference on Climate Change provides a
particularly striking example of the disparity in resources, and thus bargaining power, between developed and [*157] developing
countries. n134 Mumma noted this disparity while serving as an observer at the Conference. n135 While the United States boasted a contingent of
eighty-three people and the European Union forty-five, Mumma observed that a typical African state sent only two to four people, most
of whom were able to attend only by availing themselves of the free plane tickets provided by the U.N. Secretariat. n136 He found that "the 'developed
country viewpoint' was supported by a whole array of publications distributed by 'think-tanks' ... which had been at work for months (perhaps
years) developing and clarifying their positions on the pertinent issues," along with "hundreds of 'manned stands' and 'side events' at the Conference venue," where
developed country advocates could explain and argue these viewpoints. n137 In contrast, Africa had no stands, no side events, and very few non-
governmental organization or business representatives. n138 In fact, according to Mumma, the African representatives spent much of the
conference at poorly attended internal meetings, trying to develop an African network and position on climate change. n139 Africa's lack
of resources, then, seriously impeded its ability to develop, much less advocate, a position on climate change.

Even if developing nations are successful in negotiations, their lack of resources limit their actual
advocacy. The developed nation still controls most actions of the developing world.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

But while some developing nations successfully have taken a distinct stand on global change and developing countries as a group may
have exerted more influence in negotiations than expected, these nations clearly have fewer resources to dedicate to advocating their
positions. Successful negotiation is a far greater drain on developing country coffers than on those of the developed world. Costs of
negotiation represent a tiny fraction of a developed nation's GDP, but could consume a far greater percentage of a developing country's meager finances (and would
drain these resources away from other pressing development concerns). n145 Further, the developing country success that Hunt alludes to seems to be in large part a
byproduct of U.S. policy decisions. n146 Thus, while the developing world may be able to take advantage of what it sees as developed world
policy blunders, its influence arguably remains reactive, dependent upon the actions of the developed world. n147 The developed world
continues to hold the trump cards, as evidenced by the U.S.'s devastating refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in large part because of
its lack of developing country obligations.

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Development K – West always dominates

No matter how much developing nations may alter the details of emissions trading, it still remains a
Western structure and will continue to force unwanted Western values onto the developing nations.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Developed nations, therefore, had and will likely continue to have significant influence over the development of the details of any
emissions trading scheme. Moreover, even if developing nations can exert their influence to modify particular details, emissions trading
itself is a Western structure, originally designed by Western economists in accordance with [*159] Western conceptions of efficiency
and market-based allocation of resources. The question becomes, then, how will the imposition of this Western structure affect developing nations? Arguably,
it will pose a number of problems: A trading scheme may foist unwanted Western values onto developing nations, provide a vehicle
through which the developed world may exploit the resources of the developing world, impinge on developing nation sovereignty, and
strain the administrative resources of the developing states.

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Development K – Emissions trading is worse than carbon tax

Emissions trading programs are more dangerous than carbon taxes because they are inextricably linked
to Western rationality.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Emissions trading might then seem more dangerous than command-and-control regulation or carbon taxation. Though each of those policies
would require some oversight by international regulators and some importation of Western values, they do not embody the Western ideal of markets and
efficiency in the way that emissions trading does. Unlike those potential programs, emissions trading is inextricably linked to what Juma calls
the characteristics of Western rationality. Developing nations could participate in mandated reductions or levy taxes on carbon
emissions without embracing Western notions of market-mediated efficiency. Under a trading system, this would be much more
difficult.

Mandates and carbon taxes do not create a structure in which a developing nation would have to deal
with developed nations – making these programs less likely to induce exploitation.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Command-and-control regulations and carbon taxation schemes are far less likely to promote such unfair transactions between the
developing and the developed world. In each of those programs, developing nations likely will deal with an international regulatory
agency, rather than with developed nations directly. While this body may be influenced by developed country interests, the incentives
driving command-and-control regulation and taxation programs are far less likely to induce exploitation of the resources of developing
countries. Furthermore, neither of these two alternative programs will create an international market structure through which such
exploitative transactions can occur. Thus, emissions trading schemes seem more menacing to developing countries in this context.

Developing countries do not suffer penalties if they lack capacity to enforce mandates but do bear losses
exclusively if they lack resources to do emissions trading schemes.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New York University School
of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Command-and-control regulation and carbon taxation would also require enforcement and administration by developing nations. However, emissions
trading
schemes may require more structure developed by the developing nations themselves. In a world of command-and-control regulations
or carbon taxation, an international regulatory body likely would set maximum emissions levels or tax rates. Developing nations may be
responsible for enforcing these regulations, and this, like emissions trading programs, will certainly draw on the limited resources of developing nations. The most
significant difference between the programs is the allocation of the costs of developing countries' inferior administrative capabilities. If developing countries
cannot adequately enforce command-and-control regulations or levy taxes, the burden likely will fall on the world as a whole. Either
developing countries will emit more carbon than allowed or the international regulatory body will have to expend resources to aid
developing country enforcement. It is possible that international regulators somehow would penalize developing countries, but if these nations simply
lack the capacity to do what regulators have requested, penalties seem illogical. On the other hand, if developing countries lack the
resources to properly administer an emissions trading scheme, they may bear the losses exclusively: Their lack of administrative
capability may allow other [*169] nations (or their own firms) to take advantage of them in trading. Thus, in emissions trading
schemes, developing countries bear all the costs of their lack of administrative capacity, whereas in command-and-control or carbon
taxation systems the international coalition as a whole will share the burden. The latter burden allocation may give the coalition an incentive to aid
developing nations in developing necessary administrative capacity.

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Development K – Policymakers must consider consequences

Emissions trading masks its potential effects on sovereignty. Policymakers should be wary of the
consequences.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

As compared to command-and-control regulations and carbon taxation, emissions trading schemes seem like far less of an
infringement on developing nation sovereignty. Each of the alternatives to trading would entail rules set or taxes levied on developing countries by
international regulators, which seemingly would impose much greater restrictions on domestic policy-making in developing nations. However, the sovereignty
implications of those policy choices seem fairly clear up-front. Emissions trading, on the other hand, masks its potential effects on sovereignty.
Trading seems at first glance to allow developing nations to make all of their own choices with minimal intervention from the
developed world. The development critique, as noted above, would caution against such a simplistic view. n168 Thus, although emissions
trading may intrude less on developing country sovereignty than other policy options, policymakers should not assume that trading
imposes no constraints on developing country governance.

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Aff Ans – Development K is colonialist

The development critique denies the developing world any agency to affect its own fate which is colonial
on its own.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Arguably, the development critique is overly critical. In its quest to condemn Western influence, it ignores many positive contributions
of the developed world and romanticizes many unfortunate traits of the developing world. Marglin, for example, condemns Western work as
meaningless, while praising the often back-breaking work of the developing world as filled with "transcendent meaning." n123 In his haste to denounce
everything Western, he ignores the developed world's success in affording its citizens greater job security and choice, and offers a
na<um i>ve and overly sunny picture of manual labor in developing countries. n124 Further, the development critique often denies that
developing countries have any agency to affect their fate, a position which is arguably neo-colonial itself.

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Aff Ans – Developing nations benefit

Developing nations may benefit from emissions trading negotiations more than any other negotiations
with developed nations.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

As discussed above, developing countries seem to have significant difficulties in bargaining for a favorable emissions trading framework.
n192 However, according to Hunt, developing countries were able to exercise more power in climate change negotiations than they would
be able to assert in other types of negotiations between developed and developing nations. n193 As noted above, she argues that the U.S. Senate's
insistence on binding obligations for developing countries increased the bargaining power of those nations, forcing U.S. negotiators to depend on the cooperation of
developing nations to advance U.S. policy interests. n194 This reversal of fortune stems from several factors. First, because developing country participation
is central to the cost-savings associated with emissions trading, developed countries seem willing to pay a premium, so to speak, to
ensure that developing countries agree to participate. Second, developing countries might have benefited from their lack of resources in
the negotiations. The U.S. Senate Resolution insisting on developing country participation was motivated at least in part by intense pressure from constituent groups
(probably including wealthy interests like fossil fuel and automobile producers). Hunt notes that most developing nations, on the other hand, "did not face
this same pressure, as their constituents did not have the knowledge or means to exert such pressure." n195 Third, developing nations
have a powerful fairness argument that developed nations should take the lead in reducing emissions because their dirty industrial
revolutions caused the climate change problems in the first place. Developing countries, then, may be able to organize enough to take
advantage of their increased freedom from constituent pressure, developed countries' desire for developing country participation, and
strong fairness arguments. Despite the significant disparities in information and general bargaining power, developing nations might be able to
bargain for favorable emissions trading rules.

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Aff Ans – Improve economy and infrastructure

An emissions trading scheme would help developing nation’s economy and infrastructure.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

[*173] Furthermore, once a trading system is established, developing nations likely will have numerous, very valuable emissions credits.
Arguably, this would constitute a massive wealth transfer to the developing world. According to Robert Stavins, "a tradeable permit scheme
would tend to reallocate world production ... . Poor countries would receive compensation, whereas rich countries would have to pay
... ." n196 As noted above, these credits might fall victim to developed country exploitation. n197 But developing nations are not completely lacking in
agency: They may be able to prevent exploitation and instead use the emissions credits to bargain to reduce their foreign debt or
promote internal development. This would create a significant benefit in terms of development, as external debt currently serves as a
major barrier to upgrading internal infrastructure and improving domestic economic conditions. Finally, as noted above, the initial
distribution of emissions permits in a trading scheme could create large revenues. n198 Rather than allocating permits based on past emissions, as
in the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program, or based on population, as some economists have suggested, the program could auction permits to the highest
bidders from developed nations. As noted by the proponents of the "double dividend" theory, an auction of the rights to all the carbon emission by the developed
world will create enormous revenues. n199 The rules of the trading scheme could require that this money be used to create new development
programs, pay off debts of developing nations, or provide assistance to the developing countries potentially most affected by climate
change.

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Aff Ans – Alt can’t solve

Alt can never solve – any attempt to stop the imposition of Western ideals can never alleviate all burdens
imposed on developing nations.
Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

However, there are some potential harms to developing countries that no amount of policy modification can eliminate. Emissions trading
programs inherently embody Western ideals of markets and efficiency. Any attempt to prevent trading programs from imposing these
ideas upon developing nations would likely destroy the very efficiency gains that make trading such an attractive policy option in the
first place. This raises a more difficult question: Do the overall cost-savings and potential benefits to developing countries from emissions trading justify the remaining harms to developing nations? On one hand,
modified emissions trading programs may offer the best of both worlds, allowing massive worldwide efficiency gains and a theoretical creation of great wealth (in the form of emissions credits) for developing countries while
creating only a minimal, ephemeral harm. In fact, some might assert that [*176] the imposition of Western market ideals onto developing countries is not a harm at all, as these ideals have significant value. Modified trading
some development scholars might assert that the
programs, then, might offer the best balance of development, cost savings, and environmental protection. On the other hand,
ideological infiltration of Western ideals through trading programs remains a very significant harm and that the policy modifications
suggested above do not alleviate the burdens imposed on developing nations fully.

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** Other **

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Biopower link
Tradable permits are biopolitical.
Thornes, J.E. and Randalls, S., 2007: Commodifiying the atmosphere: ‘pennies from heaven’? 1 School of Geography, Earth
and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, UK 2 Department of Geography, University College, London, UK Geogr.
Ann., 89 A (4): 273–285.

Emissions trading Barnes (2001) suggests that the sky should be transformed from being a global commons to a globally
owned commodity within which emission credits would have to be purchased by polluters. This concept underlies the EU
emissions trading scheme (ETS) for reducing CO2 emissions, by requiring credits for emissions which, though no material exchange takes place, should
directly affect the quantity of CO2 in the atmosphere. It has been estimated that since 1751 approximately 305 billion tonnes of CO2 have been emitted into the
atmosphere from the use of fossil fuels and the production of cement, and in 2003 approximately 7.3 billion tonnes of CO2 were added (Marland et al. 2006).
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen from pre-industrial levels of 280 ppm to 381 ppm in 2006. A target for maximum levels is 450 ppm which it is
hoped could restrict enhanced global warming to no more than 2°C. Whilst there is much uncertainty about levels of CO2 and the political question of what is
considered ‘dangerous’ climate change (Oppenheimer 2005), recent studies (Hansen et al. 2006) suggest that a further rise of just 1°C could be sufficient to
permanently change the Earth’s climate due to the melting of Arctic sea ice and the melting of huge permafrost areas in northern latitudes such as Siberia.
Thus it has become imperative to reduce the amount of CO2 being added to the atmosphere to prevent further
warming. These fears have spawned a ‘carbon economy’, in which CO2 has become an important commodity, valued
through the artificial imposition of a limit. The carbon economy started to boom in 2005 following the ratification of the Kyoto agreement and
the start of the EU ETS, which is a cap and trade system whereby a total emissions cap reduces over time to bring down total emissions. Three areas of growth
are evident: firstly in the trading of CO2 (carbon trading, emissions trading or climate trading); secondly in the promotion of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM); and thirdly in the Voluntary Offsetting Market (VOM). The EU ETS has 11 500 industrial emitters involved, with each individual
company set a CO2 target by their government. If they fail to meet that target they will be fined €40 per tonne and have to purchase additional emissions
credits in the marketplace. In 2005, 799 million tonnes of CO2 worth €9.4 billion, were traded in all carbon markets and this rose in 2006 to 1.632 billion
tonnes worth €22.458 billion (PointCarbon 2007) as prices rose on the market to as high as €30 per tonne (though this price was not sustained). This
commodification also meant opportunities internally as the CDM provided a mechanism for countries to reduce their emissions at lower prices by purchasing
credits from, predominantly, developing countries. This has spawned an international business brokering deals, one example being the investment bank
Climate Change Capital (CCC), which has raised nearly $1 billion to start trading in carbon dioxide emissions. Robertson (2006) reports that CCC will invest
in Zhejiang Juhua, a Chinese chemical company, which it estimates will cut 29.5 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in the next six years, by building a new
incinerator. Centrica, the owner of British Gas, has invested in CCC and will therefore gain access to the carbon credits without having to enter the open
market. The VOM is not regulated like the CDM market and allows companies or individuals to offset their CO2 footprint (particularly from transportation)
with ‘environmentally friendly’ projects like planting trees or investing in alternative energy projects (Lohmann 2005; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). By the
time it takes the trees to grow and consume the carbon it could be up to 100 years before your offset is completed, showing the timescales over which this
commodification is acting. This way companies try to become ‘carbon neutral’ which provides increasingly good publicity. For example Swiss Re, one of the
world’s largest re-insurance companies, has calculated that 43% of its greenhouse gas emissions come from business travel, 44% from electricity needs and
13% from heating offices and other property. In an attempt to go carbon neutral over the next 10 years it is investing in renewable
energy schemes in developing countries with the World Bank and hopes to eventually offset about 37 000 tonnes of CO2
per annum. Oels (2005) suggests that this is symptomatic of a shift in the way that governmental power has been
exerted to manage climate change. Climate change was first rendered governable by biopower, which justified global
management of spaceship Earth in the name of the survival of life on Earth. Since the mid-1990s, climate change has been
captured by advanced liberal government, which articulates climate change as an economic issue that requires market-
based solutions to facilitate cost-effective technological solutions. (Oels 2005, p. 185) With market-based solutions and the expansion of
free market environmentalism, the atmosphere becomes a commodity, a tradable resource. As Oels (2005) states, the Kyoto protocol focused
policy on the use of market forces thereby reducing the influence of the arguably bio-power oriented Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the possibility of direct government interventions. The value to industry of being able to
pollute waste products into the atmosphere is huge and current taxes are small by comparison. At the current penalty rate of €40 per tonne, the 7.3 billion
tonnes of CO2 emitted last year would be valued at about €300 billion. Climate change has become as much of an economic issue and
resource as an environmental issue.

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Other – Tax Credits fail

Tax credit programs fail because the measurement in emission reduction is arbitrary.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

Cap-and-trade should not be confused with emissions reduction credits or other credit-based programs, in which those reporting emissions reductions
receive credits that others either may or must buy to offset obligations under some other policy. Credit-based programs have often been considered as a
means of encouraging emissions reductions from activities outside the scope of a cap-and-trade system, emissions tax, or standards-based policy. But an
important limitation of credit-based programs is that they typically require measurement—or, more likely, estimation—of emissions
reductions, which, unlike emissions themselves, cannot be directly observed. Hence these programs generally face difficulties in
establishing that reported reductions would not have occurred in the absence of the program. This is the so-called baseline or
“additionality” problem: how to compare actual outcomes with an unobserved and fundamentally unobservable hypothetical. Despite
this obstacle, cost savings still may be achieved through the selective use of credit-based programs targeting certain activities. As discussed later, these include various
types of carbon-saving land management that otherwise would be too costly or infeasible to integrate into a cap-and-trade (or a tax) system.

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Other – Carbon taxes fail

Cap and trade programs are more effective than carbon taxes.
Stavins - Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Ph.D. in economics – 10/2007
(Robert, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie46bdIrqi3S7Kk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6trUmzpb
BIrq6eTLiptlKyqJ5oy5zyit%2fk8Xnh6ueH7N%2fiVbCmtEyxrrVRrqykhN%2fk5VXj5KR84LPfUeac8nnls79mpNfsVbCttk%2bxrLJ
JpNztiuvX8lXk6%2bqE8tv2jAAA&hid=9

The evaluation must also consider how certain it is that the proposed policy will achieve its emissions or other targets. Different policy designs may be expected to
achieve identical targets, but with different degrees of certainty. A cap-and-trade system can achieve emissions targets with high certainty because
guaranteed emissions levels are built into the policy. With a carbon tax or technology standards, on the other hand, actual emissions
are difficult to predict because of current and future uncertainty about future energy prices or how quickly new technologies will be
adopted. Such policies may aim to achieve particular emissions targets, but actual emissions may either exceed or fall below those targets,
depending on factors beyond policymakers’ control. Moreover, the tendency for exemptions to be granted from taxes and standards so as
to address distributional issues weakens the environmental effectiveness of these instruments (Ellerman 2007). By contrast, distributional
battles over the allowance allocation in a cap-and-trade system neither raise the total cost of the program nor affect its climate impacts.

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Other – Economic incentives solve better than mandates

Economic incentive regulations solve much better than mandates.


Richman - J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999 - 2003
(Emily, “Emissions trading and the development critique: exposing the threat to developing countries,” New
York University School of Law, Fall 2003, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 133, Lexis Nexis)

Economic incentive regulations are appealing to economists for two reasons. First and foremost, they are more efficient than command-
and-control regulations because they allow the countries or firms that wish to emit carbon to treat it as just another cost of doing business.
Economic incentive regulations force emitters to internalize the cost of pollution and thus determine exactly how much they are willing to pay for
it. In other words, economic incentive programs allow individual firms or nations to choose how much to spend on carbon [*141] emissions,
rather than having an amount dictated to them by national or international regulation. n35 Economists believe that the internalization of the
externality of pollution will force a reduction in emissions but at a lower cost to businesses than pre-determined, uniform reductions promulgated through command-
and-control regulations. n36 Second, some economists, notably Lawrence Goulder, have suggested that economic incentive regulations will create "double
dividends." n37 Besides reducing pollution, there is the possibility of such regulations raising revenues that can be spent to finance climate
change research, alleviate the effects of climate change, off-set the expenditures of polluters, supplement national or international
regulatory agency budgets, or for any other purpose that regulators select. n38 Under a carbon taxation scheme, revenues would accrue
in the form of tax payments. n39 An emissions trading scheme could generate revenues through the initial distribution of the permits if
regulators auctioned permits to the highest bidders, rather than allocating them for free based on past or current population. n40 Economists suggest that because of the
creation of "double dividends," carbon taxation is arguably the least expensive reduction alternative, n41 with emissions trading through auctioned permits not far
behind. n42

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Other – Global Warming

Only the US can solve global instability from warming if we start NOW.
Center for American Progress – 1/23/2008
(“Cap, Auction, and Trade: Allowance Auctions and Revenue Recycling Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade,” Center for American Progress,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:JmlqWdMuS6YJ:www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/podesta_testimony.html+states+act+as+international+models+for+ca
p+and+trade&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=us)

We face a climate that will inflict severe damage on the coastal wetlands of Bangladesh and its groundwater supplies, thus driving more people
inland and fomenting instability as the resettled population would have to compete for scarce resources with the established residents. Others would migrate
abroad, creating heightened political tension not only in South Asia, but Europe and Southeast Asia as well. Increasing water scarcity
due to climate change will also contribute to instability throughout the world. Although we are not likely to see “water wars” per se, countries
will more aggressively pursue the kinds of technological and political solutions that currently enable them to exist in regions that are
stretched past their water limits. This is likely to be the case in the Middle East where water shortages will coincide will a population boom. And this, as I
mentioned, was before we learned that the rate at which the western Antarctic ice sheet is melting means that the sea level rise this century may be measured not in
inches, not even in feet, but in meters. Clearly, global warming presents the United States with multiple foreign policy and economic
challenges, and not just from our deepening dependence on oil. Worldwide, we are already beginning to feel some of the consequences of climate
change—ranging from more intense storms to droughts to sea level rise to food shortages. And as economies continue to grow, countries will
become more like the United States—meaning big-time polluters—unless we change the trajectory we are currently on.

We are stuck in a double bind of global warming and peak oil in the squo – we must pass plan to avoid
utter destruction.
Newman- political activist and author of Apocalypso Now – 2/2/2006
(Robert, “It's capitalism or a habitable planet - you can't have both,” The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/feb/02/energy.comment)

We are caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of climate change and peak oil. Once we pass the planetary oil production spike (when
oil begins rapidly to deplete and demand outstrips supply), there will be less and less net energy available to humankind. Petroleum geologists
reckon we will pass the world oil spike sometime between 2006 and 2010. It will take, argues peak-oil expert Richard Heinberg, a second
world war effort if many of us are to come through this epoch. Not least because modern agribusiness puts hundreds of calories of fossil-fuel energy into
the fields for each calorie of food energy produced. Catch-22, of course, is that the very worst fate that could befall our species is the discovery of
huge new reserves of oil, or even the burning into the sky of all the oil that's already known about, because the climate chaos that
would unleash would make the mere collapse of industrial society a sideshow bagatelle. Therefore, since we've got to make the switch
from oil anyway, why not do it now?

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Other – Energy Policy Key to Solving Economy

Energy policy is key to reversing economic downturn.


Center for American Progress – 1/23/2008
(“Cap, Auction, and Trade: Allowance Auctions and Revenue Recycling Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade,” Center for American Progress,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:JmlqWdMuS6YJ:www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/podesta_testimony.html+states+act+as+international+models+for+ca
p+and+trade&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=us

Thus, it is clear that energy policy is economic policy: In order to reverse the economic downturn we are currently facing and to
capture the opportunities provided by a low-carbon energy transformation, we must put energy at the center of our nation’s economic
growth. The U.S. economy is currently dependent on a few high-carbon, increasingly expensive energy sources like oil. Fundamentally changing how we
produce and consume energy, investing in low-carbon innovation, and transforming our economy to a low-carbon model are key to
promoting economic mobility, growth, job creation, and re-gaining technological leadership in the global innovation marketplace. The
U.S. Congress obviously realizes the importance of energy policy to the U.S. economy—last year’s passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act is a
demonstration of this—and I congratulate you for your leadership on this achievement. But we must do more, both to reduce our national greenhouse gas emissions and
to jumpstart the technological innovation and investment needed to get us on the right track, not only to stimulate and grow the economy but also to avoid the worst
effects of global warming. The longer we wait to act, the costs to our productivity growth, our national security, and our environment will
only continue to skyrocket.

Doing nothing will jeopardize the economy, the environment, and international security.
Center for American Progress – 1/23/2008
(“Cap, Auction, and Trade: Allowance Auctions and Revenue Recycling Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade,” Center for American Progress,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:JmlqWdMuS6YJ:www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/podesta_testimony.html+states+act+as+international+models+for+ca
p+and+trade&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=us

Placing energy at the center of our economic strategy and making smart public investments will also build new workforces—world
class green-collar as well as science and engineering workforces—providing good jobs and pathways out of poverty for Americans,
including those who were left out of the high-carbon economy. We cannot continue to wait on jumpstarting this energy transformation
—waiting will only reduce productivity growth and jeopardize our nation’s economic, environmental, and international security.

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Other – Stopping war solves the environment

Stopping war solves for environment and poverty.


The Guardian – 7/13/2008
(“Stop emissions: Don’t trade them!,” The Guardian, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7103/)

7. Peace and the environment are linked. The production of weapons and their use in wars has not only destroyed lives and property
but is one of the world’s most dangerous polluters. War, as a means of settling disputes, must be outlawed forever and the manufacture
of armaments drastically cut now and eventually completely eliminated. This step would release huge funds for the development of a
liveable environment for all and lift the living standards of hundreds of millions of people now living in poverty.

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