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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 1

Scholars Europe

Europe Toolbox
EU Counterplan
Europe Toolbox ..............................................................................................................................................................1
***EU Counterplan.........................................................................................................................................................3
European Union Counterplan 1NC ................................................................................................................................4
European Union Counterplan 1NC – Key to Legitimacy...............................................................................................5
EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................6
EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................7
EU Action Solves – China Relationship ........................................................................................................................8
EU Action Solves – Developing Countries.....................................................................................................................9
EU Action Solves – Economics ...................................................................................................................................10
EU Action Solves – Momentum ...................................................................................................................................11
EU Action Solves – Promoting Renewables Markets...................................................................................................12
EU Action Solves – Comprehensive Climate Policy....................................................................................................13
EU Action Solves – Global Emissions Trading ...........................................................................................................14
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................15
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................16
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership..................................................................................................................17
EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................18
EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................19
AT: EU Doesn’t Emit Enough to Solve ........................................................................................................................20
AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................21
AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................22
***AT: EU Counterplan................................................................................................................................................23
EU Action Fails – Climate Change ..............................................................................................................................24
EU Action Bad – Trade War .........................................................................................................................................25
EU Climate Policy Bad – ETS Proves .........................................................................................................................26
EU Modeling Bad – Australia Proves ..........................................................................................................................27
EU Modeling Bad – Carbon Prices...............................................................................................................................28
AT: EU Action Induces U.S. ........................................................................................................................................29
U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................30
U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................31
......................................................................................................................................................................................31
***EU Leadership DA..................................................................................................................................................32
European Union Leadership DA 1NC .........................................................................................................................33
European Union Leadership DA 1NC..........................................................................................................................34
Yes EU Environmental Leadership ..............................................................................................................................35
Yes EU Environmental Leadership...............................................................................................................................36
Yes EU Leadership – General ......................................................................................................................................37
Yes Perception of US Lagging Behind EU...................................................................................................................38
EU Leadership Brinks...................................................................................................................................................39
U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................40
U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................41
Climate Key to Overall EU Leadership – Spillover ....................................................................................................42
EU Leadership Good – Laundry List ...........................................................................................................................43
AT: EU Leadership Kills U.S. Heg...............................................................................................................................44
AT: Hard Power Pre-Requisite to Leadership...............................................................................................................45
AT: NMD Turn – Non-Unique .....................................................................................................................................46
AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................47
AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................48
***AT: EU Leadership DA...........................................................................................................................................49
No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................50
No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................51
U.S. Leadership Doesn’t Trade Off with EU................................................................................................................52
Soft Power Not Key to EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................53
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 2
Scholars Europe
EU Leadership Resilient ..............................................................................................................................................54
EU Leadership Ineffective ...........................................................................................................................................55
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony ....................................................................................................56
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................57
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................58
EU Leadership Bad – NMD Good ...............................................................................................................................59
Yes NMD.......................................................................................................................................................................60
NMD Good – Nuclear War...........................................................................................................................................61
NMD Good – Deters WMD Prolif ...............................................................................................................................62
NMD Good – Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................................63
NMD Good – AT: U.S.-Russia Nuclear War.................................................................................................................64
***Condition Counterplan............................................................................................................................................65
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ..................................................................................................................................66
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ...................................................................................................................................67
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate/Security......................................................................................................................68
Issue Linkage Solves – General ...................................................................................................................................69
Conditional GHG Cuts Good – General ......................................................................................................................70
Conditional GHG Cuts Good – Capital Flight .............................................................................................................71
Conditioning Solves – China ......................................................................................................................................72
Conditioning Solves – Developing Countries...............................................................................................................73
Conditioning on EU Action Solves Climate Change ..................................................................................................74
EU Says Yes to Conditions ..........................................................................................................................................75
R & D Issue Linkage Solves ........................................................................................................................................76
Trade Issue Linkage Solves ..........................................................................................................................................77
Trade Issue Linkage Solves...........................................................................................................................................78
Trade Issue Linkage Key to Global Trade....................................................................................................................79
AT: Lie Perm.................................................................................................................................................................80
***AT: Condition Counterplan.....................................................................................................................................81
Conditioning Fails – Climate ......................................................................................................................................82
Conditioning Fails – Power Differential.......................................................................................................................83
Conditioning Fails – R&D............................................................................................................................................84
Conditioning Fails – Developing Countries .................................................................................................................85
AT: Capital Flight – Alt Cause......................................................................................................................................86
***Relations..................................................................................................................................................................87
US-EU Relations Low..................................................................................................................................................88
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Laundry List......................................................................................................................89
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Democracy .......................................................................................................................90
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy ...........................................................................................................................91
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy/Leadership ........................................................................................................92
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Leadership ........................................................................................................................93
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................94
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................95
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................96
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Iran ...................................................................................................................................97
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Trade .................................................................................................................................98
EU Relations Bad – Heg ..............................................................................................................................................99
EU Relations Bad – Terrorism ...................................................................................................................................100
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 3
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***EU Counterplan
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 4
Scholars Europe

European Union Counterplan 1NC


( ) Text:

( ) EU action on climate is currently insufficient – expansion sets a global model that


solves climate change far better than U.S. action
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
Europe has the capacity and resources – both internally and globally – to lead the necessary
transformation to a low carbon and energy secure economy, but current European actions in this area
is not adequate to the scale of the task.
The EU cannot balance the goals of energy security, climate security and competitiveness: it needs to achieve
all of them at the same time. This requires a form of convergent policymaking which cuts across traditional
boundaries and builds imaginative and forceful synergies. Despite the existence of an embryonic European
Energy policy, it remains very weak in the face of the challenges it is trying to address.
The absence of mutual reinforcing EU policies is illustrated by the fact that, at the moment, EU climate
policy is being watered down when it should be accelerated in order to deliver energy security
objectives. In the automobile sector, for example, the difference between US and EU car efficiency –
mainly driven by climate change policies – has already saved the EU 0.5% of GDP per annum in oil costs
since 2004. High energy prices mean that similar economic gains have resulted from other climate change
polices on domestic and commercial energy efficiency and the promotion of European energy services
markets. The UK alone will reap net economic benefits of over Euro 150 billion from its current climate
change programme to deliver Kyoto; Germany has created hundreds of thousands of new jobs from its
aggressive renewable energy programmes.
Such initiatives, that have immediate ecological, economic and security impacts, should be enhanced to
encourage further and quicker investment in energy and climate security. The EU is well placed to do
this, as many of these initiatives – such as the EU Emission trading system – require sophisticated public-
private partnerships. Europe has decades of experience in creating these approaches, and unlike the US
has strong public political support for further action.
Put another way, while the US has created the world’s most effective military-industrial innovation system;
Europe is well placed to create the world’s most effective innovation and investment system for clean
energy technologies and services.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 5
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European Union Counterplan 1NC – Key to Legitimacy


( ) Action on climate change is the single most important litmus test of EU legitimacy – it’ll
determine Europe’s entire future course
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, et al., December 17, 2007, “Central and Eastern
Europe’s climate change opportunity,” online: http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/europe-articles/central-
and-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/, accessed July 16, 2008
We are living at a pivotal time in terms of Europe’s future, and taking the right decisions now could
enable decades of investment in clean technologies and smart infrastructure. This would ensure the
creation of millions of good jobs across Europe and underpin the creation of a new, inclusive social
contract. This is a one-off opportunity for the direct development of a new ‘green industrial revolution.’
The citizens of CEE member states definitely want to part of this opportunity, but can they ensure that their
leaders will look to the future rather than the past? The efforts of environmental organisations and civil
society groups will be central to making sure that they do, and they could start by focusing attention on
opportunities contained in the EU Budget Review.
The political context for action on climate change has improved over the past three years, while an upturn in
economic growth has restored some much needed confidence. The European Commission (EC) in
particular has recognised the importance of an outward-looking and future-focused European project. It has
rightly identified the environment as a core issue that binds Europeans together. Strong leadership from
former UK Prime Minister Blair, German Chancellor Merkel and EC President Barroso has helped to secure
agreement on ambitious climate and energy aims.
But, of course, it is one thing for politicians to set a policy agenda, and a distinctly different challenge to
actually follow through with action to reach those goals. Europe is now in a different phase. Its ability to
rise to the climate change challenge is the litmus test of its legitimacy and practical value. The decisions
taken now will shape the future of all of Europe and determine its place in the world.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 6
Scholars Europe

EU Action Solves – International Coalitions


Europe forms successful international partnerships to solve warming
ECF 4(http://ecf.pik-potsdam.de/Press/press_releases/ecf_press_release_300304.pdf European climate forum)
The world is watching Europe for leadership in climate policy. Currently, Europe is implementing
emissions trading, a key instrument of climate policy. After years of debates and negotiations, this is the first
large-scale experience with a practical step to address the challenge of climate change. By the end of March,
the National Allocation Plans that provide the basis for emissions trading have to be finalized. Unfortunately,
various voices - including the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe and the European
commissioner for energy - are trying to undermine that process. Today's compromise between the German
minister for economics and the minister for the environment has averted one such attempt. While we share
the concern for European competitiveness, critics of emissions trading fail to acknowledge two key facts:
humankind is currently headed for dangerous climate change, and European competitiveness can actually
be enhanced by engaging in the experience of emissions trading. Everybody understands that it is wise
not to fly an airplane in which some key components may cause disaster. The current global energy system
has become such an airplane. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well
as the recent Pentagon study on the risks of abrupt climate change show that the risks of man-made climate
change are serious beyond reasonable doubt. The Kyoto protocol has helped to consolidate wordwide
concern about climate change and it has established the idea of emissions trading in the international policy
debate. To proceed further, it will be necessary to show Russia that it is in its own best interest to join the
protocol. To reap the benefits of European climate policy, it will also be necessary to establish bilateral
partnerships between Europe and other world regions: - An energy partnership between Europe and
North Africa provides opportunities for major steps towards a sustainable energy system, using first
natural gas and then solar energy, - A partnership between Europe and China can lead to major emissions
reductions by joint developments of more efficient energy technologies, - European cities can engage in
partnerships with megacities in developing countries to harness the potential of information
technologies for sustainable urban development. All these initiatives provide large business opportunities.
Europe needs these opportunities both for environmental reasons and in order to overcome persistent
unemployment. A properly functioning emission trading system, linked to other climate policy
initiatives, will spur technological innovation in Europe in areas like renewable energy, highly efficient
energy use, and new transport systems. Rather than quarreling over the details of the implementation of
emissions trading in Europe, we should be planning how best to take advantage technologically and
economically of this system.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 7
Scholars Europe

EU Action Solves – International Coalitions


The EU can only effectively solve warming by uniting with nations
Murphy et al & Egenhofer 8, (http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/eu_objectives_climate.pdf Deborah (International Institute for
Sustainable Development); and Christian: Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Centre for European Policy Studies))
The EU has taken on ambitious climate and clean energy goals. Despite best efforts at home, attaining
the overall environmental goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global
atmosphere will depend significantly on what happens in developing countries, especially the BICSAM
nations characterized by high economic growth and rapidly growing emissions. Engaging these countries in
clean energy and climate change efforts will require a strategy that accounts for their particular needs,
including economic growth, energy investment, and vulnerability to climate change impacts. In each country,
the EU will need to acknowledge and build on domestic actions that have been taken to address the climate
change and clean energy challenge. These unilateral actions are not insignificant; the Center for Clean Air
Policy estimates that the combined emission reductions in China, Brazil and Mexico from domestic measures
will “be greater than reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (without the US), EU’s reduction commitments in
2020, and reductions estimated in current US legislative proposal in 2015” (Ogonowski et al., 2007: 2).
While historical emissions of GHGs contributing to anthropogenic climate change have been mainly
from developed countries, an increasing share is coming from developing countries. The International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2006a) reported that over the 1990–2004 period, total fossil fuel combustion emissions
of CO2 increased about 28 per cent worldwide, with four per cent of this increase taking place in Annex I
countries and 76 per cent in non- Annex I countries. The Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2007b:
73) reported that in 2004, non-OECD emissions of CO2 were greater than OECD emissions for the first time;
and by 2010, developing countries will emit nearly 20 per cent more CO2 emissions than developed
countries. Rising populations, income levels and energy use are leading to rapid increases in GHG
emissions in developing countries, which are critically important on an aggregate basis. This means that
action by the EU and other developed countries will be insufficient in preventing dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the global Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean
Energy: Building partnerships with major developing economies 15 atmosphere. Meeting the EU goal to
limit global warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels means that GHG emissions will need to
be reduced in developed countries by 60 to 80 per cent by 2050; and that many developing countries will also
need to significantly reduce emissions (CEC, 2007b: 3) notes that. The Stern Review (2006) seconds this
view, noting that the world will have little chance of effectively addressing the climate change threat
unless leading developed and developing nations act together to reduce their emissions.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 8
Scholars Europe

EU Action Solves – China Relationship


( ) The EU can get China on board for emissions reductions, which solves climate change
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
China has also set an extremely ambitious target of reducing energy intensity per unit of GDP by 20%
by 2010. It is in Europe’s interest to act decisively to help China achieve this, in parallel with
developing a more aggressive domestic energy efficiency policy; for example, by harmonising efficient
product standards in the EU and China and lowering relevant tariffs. The energy and climate security
benefits of cheap and highly efficient Chinese appliances in Europe outweigh any possible
“competitiveness” issues around tariff reduction. In the same way Europe (and the rest of the world) has a
greater interest in ensuring energy and climate security rather than overprotecting intellectual
property rights (IPR) around clean technologies. Fears around IPR protection are holding up EU-China
and EU-India cooperation in renewable technologies, coal, efficiency and other areas. However, many
European companies already successfully manage access to IPR as part of their commercial and
governmental relationships in China and India, showing a strategic balance of risk and reward can be
found if ultimate objectives are clear.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 9
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EU Action Solves – Developing Countries


EU will engage 3rd world countries
Murphy et al & Egenhofer 8, (http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/eu_objectives_climate.pdf Deborah (International Institute for
Sustainable Development); and Christian: Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Centre for European Policy Studies))
Obviously, the EU is not alone in wanting to engage the big developing country emitters in clean energy
and climate change efforts, which can not only help to meet environmental goals, but also promote
sustainable economic growth. These countries are important trading partners, and increased technology
cooperation and dissemination could help increase access to BICSAM markets for advanced clean
energy technologies. The EU has engaged with each of these nations to varying degrees on a bilateral
basis, with high-level summits and focused energy initiatives being common means to discuss issues
related to energy and climate change. Examples include: the EU-India energy panel; emphasizing biofuels
in the joint declaration with Brazil; action plans on clean coal and industrial cooperation on energy efficiency
and renewable energy with China; and promoting cooperation in the energy sector in the global agreement
with Mexico. Annex 1 includes additional information about EU relations with BICSAM nations. It makes
sense for the EU to initially focus on BICSAM nations when it comes to GHG mitigation policies and
activities. Indeed, it could be argued that initial efforts should be focused on China and India, as
emission limits or cuts in these countries have the potential to have a huge impact on meeting global
reduction goals because of the massive size of their populations and economies, and their level of
economic growth. Engaging all five of the BICSAM nations, because of their elevated economic growth
and increasing regional and international influence, would likely have important ripple effects in other
developing countries throughout the world.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 10
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EU Action Solves – Economics


( ) Europe’s economic power makes it able to affect global carbon emissions
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
But this is as much an external agenda as it is about Europe’s own energy system. Europe’s core strategic
interests lie in helping drive the global transformation to high efficiency and low carbon energy system,
not narrow commercial advantage in proprietary clean technologies or gaining privileged access to energy
resources.
Europe can use its enormous economic weight to drive change, especially in relationships with India
and China. The industrial boom in China – mainly fuelled by our investment and consumption – means that
it is currently building coal-fuelled power stations at the unprecedented pace of a major 1GW plant every 4
days. The lifetime emissions of the coal power plants build by 2030 will equal 2/3rds of total global
emissions over the last 2 decades, and will push us into levels of climate change which have a high risk of
catastrophic outcomes. We cannot stop India and China building coal power stations to meet their
energy security aims, but we could prevent lock-in to their carbon emissions by helping deploy carbon
capture and storage (CCS) technologies. The EU has already agreed to build a commercial scale CCS
demonstration plant with China. While this is a good first step, unless the planned completion date of 2020
is moved forward it will have little impact on climate stability. E3G work in this area suggests that a plant
could be built by 2010, if the right level of political and financial investment was mobilised inside a robust
commercial framework.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 11
Scholars Europe

EU Action Solves – Momentum


( ) Momentum for more stringent climate action building within Europe – capitalizing is
key
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
Various ideas have been put forward as to how things could be taken further on these issues. Of these, the
possibility of launching a campaign for clean and fair energy has specifically been discussed. This
could begin with a Clean and Fair Energy Forum and should include a broad coalition of
environmentalists, businesses, democracy promoters, economists, and academics. OSI and George Soros
could offer conveying power.
• Various participants expressed a clear interest in continuing this conversation and possibly taking it to a
further level of commitment and action. These discussions are proving that there is strong resonance across
Europe and across institutions for many of these ideas, but that there is a need to enlarge the audience
and members of the embryonic coalition. Further engagement with other stakeholders in this process is
required in order to bring to life this vision through a set of iconic choices.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 12
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EU Action Solves – Promoting Renewables Markets


EU Is Important For Opening Renewable Energy Market Opportunities

Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 4 (Jon, Tora, and Steinar, Professor University of Oslo, Senior
Research Fellow at CICERO, Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen, “The Persistence
of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States”,
Global Environmental Politics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2004, pg 12)
Thus, the promotion of renewable energy sources by the EU and the EU emissions trading scheme
represent new market opportunities for industry, in which the industry already has made initial
investments. The whole point, particularly of the emissions trading scheme, is the implementation of a
climate policy to reduce CO2 emissions within the Community. Thus, even though the costs (in relation to the
environmental improvement achieved) increase for the EU as such with the US exit, important industries
may have something to gain from the maintenance of these policies. Granted, this analysis does not give a
complete picture of the interests of all European industries. Counterforces do exist. In the current situation,
however, there are clearly European industries reaping benefits from the maintenance of current EU
climate policies. In sum, the discussion in this section suggests that there are self-reinforcing mechanisms
at work in the process whereby EU climate policies are developed and institutionalized.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 13
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EU Action Solves – Comprehensive Climate Policy


The EU is committed to a comprehensive warming policy
Dimas 3/7 (http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/11b2d9cb8e7ed8d3 Member of the European Commission,
responsible for environment, Stavros European Parliament Environment Committee)
The conclusion is clear: the international community needs to act fast. The next decade or so will
determine whether we manage to bring the situation under control or we allow climate change to reach
dangerous levels that will threaten our prosperity and the stability of our societies. The European Union
has both the opportunity and the means to lead the global response that is needed to win this battle.
The Commission’s climate and energy package provides us with the necessary tools – and I am delighted that
it has now been fully endorsed by EU leaders. The package is unique, both in its integrated approach and in
the opportunities it opens up. President Barroso has described it as heralding a new industrial revolution to
create the low-carbon economy of the future. It will strengthen not only the fight against climate change
but also our energy security and our competitiveness. 3 The targets proposed by the Commission are
essential if we are to prevent global warming from going more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial temperature. This has to be the fundamental objective of any new global agreement because
science warns us that any bigger temperature rise will greatly increase the risk of irreversible and
possibly disastrous changes. We have a duty to do whatever we can to protect our children and
grandchildren from these dangers. As we stated in our January communication, staying within the 2 degrees
limit means that global emissions will need to peak by around the year 2020 and then fall by as much
as 50% of 1990 levels by 2050. The European Council has set out key targets that need to be included
in a global and comprehensive new agreement that would take effect after the Kyoto Protocol targets
expire in 2012. The group of developed countries must reduce its emissions to 30% below 1990 levels by
2020. The EU has committed itself to take on this target in the context of an international agreement
that comprises other industrialised countries. Developing countries whose emissions are projected to
overtake those of developed countries by 2020, should also participate although in a differentiated manner.
Those among them that reach a level of economic prosperity similar to developed countries should take on
obligatory emissions reduction commitments. These should reflect each country's per capita emissions, its
potential to reduce them and its financial capacity. Naturally, no mandatory reductions would be asked from
the least developed countries, which in any case have the lowest emission levels. And as they are also the
most vulnerable to climate change, we must increase our cooperation with them to help them minimise the
negative impacts of climate change. The Commission's climate change Communication outlines concrete
options for strengthening developing countries' participation in a future regime. These include the
possible expansion of Kyoto's clean development mechanism so that emissionsaving projects in developing
countries can put those countries on a low-emissions path. The Commission also proposes improving
access to finance for new energy infrastructure. We will have to be innovative in the way we approach
developing countries. In Parliament, some have called for a strong partnership with key developing countries
such as China and India. It is certainly worth exploring this avenue.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 14
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EU Action Solves – Global Emissions Trading


EU solves cap and trade, even though it faced difficulties
MITEI 7 (http://www.iconocast.com/D1/V5/News7.htm The MIT Energy Initiative is an Institute-wide initiative designed to help
transform the global energy system to meet the challenges of the future)

Already, the EU ETS is far larger than either of the U.S. programs for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.
Further, the EU ETS operates internationally. Allowances are traded by facilities in 27 independent
nations that differ widely in per capita income, market experience and other features. As a result, "I
think the EU ETS has a lot to tell us about how a global system might actually work," Ellerman said.
What are some of the lessons to be learned from the European experience? First, it shows that the economic
effects-in a macroeconomic sense-have not been large. Second, permitting "banking and borrowing" will
make a cap-and-trade system work more efficiently. Within the EU ETS, facilities can bank (save some of
this year's allowance for use next year) or borrow (use some of next year's allowances now and not have
them available next year). Many facilities took advantage of the opportunity to trade across time. But they
always produced the necessary allowances within the required time period. Concerns that facilities would
postpone their obligations indefinitely have proved unwarranted. A third lesson is that the process of
allocating emissions allowances is going to be contentious-and yet cap-and-trade is still the most
politically feasible approach to controlling carbon emissions. In a cap-and-trade system, those most
affected-the current polluters-receive some assets along with the liabilities they are being asked to
assume. Finally, the MIT analysis shows that everything does not have to be perfectly in place to start
up. When the EU ETS began, the overall EU cap had not been finally determined, registries for
trading emissions were not established everywhere, and many available allowances-especially from
Eastern Europe-could not come onto the market. The volatility of prices during the first period reflects those
imperfections. "Obviously you're better off having things all settled and worked out before it gets started,"
said Ellerman. "But that certainly wasn't the case in Europe, and yet a transparent and widely accepted
price for CO2 emission allowances emerged rapidly, as did a functioning market and the
infrastructure to support it."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 15
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EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership


( ) Effective action on climate is the most important factor in the EU’s international image
– and independently key to global stability
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
There is a growing realisation that achieving energy security and climate security is at the core of future
global challenges, with implications that go well beyond their traditional policy spheres. For Europe, these
challenges will lie at the heart of the future success of its political project, and of the ability of
Europeans to continue to live by the values it was founded upon.
Achieving energy and climate security globally is critical to ensure Europe’s future security and
prosperity and is at the heart of Europe’s values.
The changing geopolitics of energy, illustrated by the accelerating global scramble for resources,
represents the most major threat to the international rules-based order. The increasing provision of
political and financial support to dictatorial regimes in Africa and Central Asia and elsewhere in order to
secure access to their national resources has led to democratic retreat and fuelled the destabilisation of whole
regions. The anti-democratic changes in Russia are an example of the direction the world might move as geo-
political competition for fossil fuels emboldens authoritarian regimes.
The strengthening Chinese engagement with repressive leaders in resource rich African countries embodies
an even more serious risk. If China continues further along this “hard power” path to secure its energy
security, it could lead to a world characterised by new ‘great power competition’, in which Europe
would fare badly. Europe by its very nature and purpose is ill-fitted to a world dominated by large
powers struggling for the appropriation of world influence and resources. Europe tested this approach to
destruction in two world wars and understands that it is not a sustainable foundation for peace and stability.
Europe can only thrive in a world promoting cooperation between countries and regions based on a strong
multilateral rules-based system, reflecting the European model of fair, peaceful and cooperative
development.
If badly managed, the impacts of climate change could accentuate these trends. Military planners in
many of the major powers are already predicting the need for enhanced militarization in order to counter-
act mass environmental migration in the coming decades. Some security analysts are already calling the
crisis in Darfur the first climate change induced conflict. The EU is already struggling with the pressures
of illegal immigration from North and West Africa, including the value choices around the interception of
migrants at sea and building stronger and more intrusive border controls around “Fortress Europe”. These
policy choices are already changing how our neighbours see Europe – from an open to a closed society
– and will ultimately shape the future European identity.

( ) Climate action is the critical litmus test for the EU’s international engagement
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
The stark geopolitics of climate security will force Europe to take a lead to prevent and manage these
pressures in non-military ways. As a recent Pentagon study explained, in the event of rapid climate change
the US always has the option to retreat behind its natural borders of the Atlantic and Pacific. Europe has no
such “defensive” option to remove itself from the destabilising impacts of climate change in Africa, the
Middle East and Asia, and the resulting migratory and other pressures.
Europe’s leadership in managing global energy and climate security is not an issue of economics or
moral philanthropy, but an essential component of European strategic interest. Such leadership is
required in order for Europe to preserve its future prosperity and stability while living in accordance
with its fundamental values.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 16
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EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership


( ) Demonstrating that no other nation or group can lead on climate change is critical to
EU leadership
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
The EU has great potential for action, but has failed to make the necessary political choices to act. The
key barrier has been a failure to see the strategic importance of global climate and energy security to
Europe’s future, and therefore the need to lever a much higher level of political and financial investment.
European energy policies and strategies tend to be formed in a narrow framework of perceived national
interests. These seem based on a backward looking view of sovereign security which ignores the growing
reality of interdependence. German energy policy is a good example of this paradox; as it has focused on
securing unilateral access to Russian gas over the concerns of its European neighbours for their security.
Does Germany assume that it could thrive on its own by securing access to energy resources while sitting in
the middle of a European continent struggling to meet its energy needs? Member State responses to the EU
Green paper showed how the initial acknowledgement of the needed for stronger common purpose became
quickly eroded by narrow national views and an unwillingness to look to the long term.
However, and despite all these problems, there is no other major power with the interests, resources and
potential political will to take the lead in promoting global cooperation in the area of energy and
climate security. Europe needs to play this role as it not only goes to the heart of its system of values
but will also help determine its future place in the international system.
The conversations E3G has held across Europe suggest that these issues, more than any other, have the
potential to engage European citizens with a new sense of purpose and vision for a renewed European
project. Energy and climate security and the maintenance of democracy are issues that cannot be dealt with
in silos and have thus to be made central to the EU project to mobilise the scale of political and financial
energy needed to drive it forward.
Generating the political energy needed to overcome these national barriers, and the institutional silos in
European policy making will require a new powerful coalition of actors. Building a convergent agenda
around energy and climate security, framed around its importance in the European project and to
securing peace and democracy globally has the potential to animate a coalition powerful enough to
drive this agenda forward. Certainly no individual policy silo has the political strength to drive these
changes at the scale and pace required.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 17
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EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership


( ) Wide-scale European action on climate change would demonstrate substantial
international leadership
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, et al., December 17, 2007, “Central and Eastern
Europe’s climate change opportunity,” online: http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/europe-articles/central-
and-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/, accessed July 16, 2008
The key to securing all of these objectives will be effective investment, which will come from both public
and private sources. By taking a positive stance on the EU Budget Reform, CEE leaders could leverage
funding that will provide their economies with the low carbon foundations that will be needed in an era
of increasingly severe energy and climate constraints. Used this way, EU money would pave the way for a
major deployment of climate compatible electricity generation, low carbon transport systems, domestic
and commercial energy efficiency improvements and widespread deployment of renewable energy
technologies.
Such an approach would solve many political problems. It would demonstrate the EU’s relevance and
added value, and would reduce the vulnerability of economies to energy price shocks and the political
influence of energy exporters. It would also be a major step towards meeting climate targets and jobs and
competitiveness goals, and would also strengthen the EU’s leadership capacity on climate change.
Finally, it would be a major driver for greater prosperity and improved quality of life throughout the EU and
beyond.

EU action key to EU’s international leadership


Dimas 3/7 (http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/11b2d9cb8e7ed8d3 Member of the European Commission,
responsible for environment, Stavros European Parliament Environment Committee)
The European Union is not waiting for others to take action. Even before negotiations on a global
agreement start, the EU leaders have agreed that the EU should make a firm, independent
commitment to reduce our emissions by at least 20%. There are compelling reasons for making this
independent commitment. First, this will enhance our leadership position internationally. In the current
climate, countries are waiting for the others to move first. Only EU leadership can break the impasse.
Our commitment to act, combined with the growing pressure for action coming from science and public
opinion, can be the catalyst for change. 4 The economic cost of making this independent commitment is
limited. Our analysis shows it will cost between 0.02 and 0.09 per cent of the European Union's annual
GDP. Compared to the consequences of inaction, this is a reasonable price to pay, especially if the
important co-benefits of action in other areas are taken into account. These include increased energy
security, efficient use of resources, improved competitiveness through innovation, and significant
health benefits from reduced air pollution. An EU independent commitment will help in another way too.
It will give a clear signal to economic operators that we are serious about moving towards a lowcarbon
economy. This will provide the long-term certainty that our industry has been asking for. It will create a
secure basis for the future of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and will give industry a clear
incentive to invest in low carbon technology beyond 2012.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 18
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EU Modeled
Europe sets the example for fighting warming
VROM international 7 (http://www2.minvrom.nl/pagina.html?id=10618 netherlands ministry of housing and special planning)
'Europe must set a good example in combating the threat of climate change'. Environment State
Secretary Van Geel is pleased that the European Commission is now proposing to drastically cut greenhouse
gas emissions in the EU. The European Commission wants industrialised countries to collectively
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 30% in 2020. Van Geel sees this as a positive development. If
other industrialised countries do not participate, the European Commission wants the EU itself at any rate
to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20%. According to Van Geel, this is a minimum. ‘What exactly the
Netherlands will be doing within the EU is up to the new cabinet’, says the outgoing state secretary. Van Geel
sees it as very important that Europe shows leadership and sets a good example: ‘Climate change is one of
this century’s greatest threats. The melting of the polar ice caps and the thawing of the tundra are
particularly alarming. Quick action is necessary to combat climate change'. Sending a clear signal The
state secretary also finds it important that wealthy countries set a good example, because otherwise
developing countries will not follow their lead. Europe cannot solve global climate change by itself. Other
countries, with the United States in particular, will have to assume their share of the responsibility. Fast-
growing developing countries, such as China and India, will also have to make a contribution. Van
Geel sees it as positive that by establishing a minimum a clear signal is being sent to the business sector. This
will allow CO2 to retain a price after 2012 as well. ‘This will boost CO2 emission rights trading’, says
Van Geel. In order to keep the large risks of climate change in check, the European Union has taken
the stance that the temperature must not rise more than two degrees Celsius in comparison to the pre-
industrial level. In order to remain under that level, Van Geel proposed ambitious goals during the Dutch EU
presidency back in 2004. He is pleased that the European Commission is now following this ambitious
course.

The EU is a global model in climate change


Dimas 7 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6670_en.htm "Climate Change: Why a Global Response
needs European Leadership" - Speech by EU Commissioner Dimas Stavros, Member of the European Commission,
responsible for environment)
Damaged economies, refugees, political instability, and the loss of life are typically the results of war.
But they will also be the results of unchecked climate change. It is like a war because to reduce emissions
something very like a war economy is needed. All sectors - transport, energy, agriculture and foreign policy
must work closely together to meet a common objective. And it is a world war because every country in
the world will be affected by the results of climate change - although it will be the poorest who are hit
hardest.] In today's world of accelerating globalization there are many challenges that nations simply cannot
address working on their own. Fighting terrorism, pandemics such as bird flu, poverty in Africa, nuclear
proliferation and energy security. These are all areas where countries have to find a way of working together
if their policies are to have any chance of success. Political challenges are increasingly global in their
nature and there can be no more obvious case than climate change where there is no alternative to
global cooperation. No country can tackle climate change in isolation. The UK's emissions of greenhouse
gasses are responsible for about 2% of the global total. EU emissions are responsible for about 14%. A
global response is the only possible solution and there are five clear reasons why this will need a strong
and effective European Union. The first is because effective "climate diplomacy" will be essential if we are
to convince the United States and key developing countries to come to the negotiating table. As Margaret
Beckett said in her recent speech in Berlin, and I quote, "… today being a credible foreign minister means
being serious about climate security". The EU has over 450 million citizens and has the largest market in
the world. It is self-evident that by acting together we have a much greater diplomatic influence than by
acting alone. The second reason is leadership by example. The EU has provided the world with a
demonstration of how it is possible for twenty-seven very different countries to act together to reduce
emissions and without damaging national economies. A third reason is because the EU has developed the
world's first example of a cross-border Emissions Trading Scheme to reduce greenhouse emissions.
This is the most effective policy tool that exists for reducing emissions - and it is a model that the rest of the
world is already looking to as we work towards a global approach to emissions control.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 19
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EU Modeled
EU takes the lead in a war against climate change

EurActive.com 7 (http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/eu-defends-leadership-world-war-climate-change/article-160848
European news source)

On 10 January 2007 the Commission invited EU members to endorse a 20% reduction in greenhouse-
gas emissions by 2020 in a bid to reduce its dependency on imported fuels and trigger a new "industrial
revolution" (EurActiv 11/01/07). But the proposal was criticised by UNICE, the European employers
association, which said that unilateral action "could jeopardise the future of business within the EU". "Our
proposals are not easy," Dimas told a group of British MPs in London. But he added that they were
"essential" if the economic damage from climate change is to be kept "within manageable limits", as shown
by the Stern Review in the UK. "Damaged economies, refugees, political instability and loss of life are
typically the results of war. But they will also be the results of unchecked climate change," Dimas said.
"It is clear that the fight against climate change is much more than a battle. It is a world war that will last for
many years." "It is like a war because to reduce emissions something very like a war economy is
needed," Dimas added, saying that benefits would come in terms of "increased energy security and
public health". The Commission, he continued, is already working on new measures. These include:
Extending the EU carbon trading scheme "to cover more sector and more gases" and linking up with similar
schemes such as Japan's voluntary system and the emerging state-based policy in the United States, and;
tackling car pollution, saying that the EU will "shortly" review its strategy on CO2 emissions from new
vehicles. "It is clear that further action will be needed to reach our 2012 target of average emissions of 120
grammes per kilometre," Dimas said, adding that "the Commission will propose legislation later this
year". Meanwhile, in Brussels, Commission President José Manuel Barroso met with a group of 15
business leaders telling them it was "to their advantage to lead and not to be led" on the way to a low-
carbon economy. Most of them agreed. "Climate change is business and will lead to new jobs," said Lars
Goeran Josefsson, chief executive of Swedish power company Vattenfall. "Combating climate change …
is a business opportunity," agreed Fulvo Conti from Enel, saying the Italian utility and other energy groups
were already investing billions in energy research and energy efficiency. "Acting now brings advantages:
higher productivity from increased energy efficiency, new markets, new jobs," Barroso said as he
presented the Commission's proposals on 10 January. "European Union companies can take the lead".
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 20
Scholars Europe

AT: EU Doesn’t Emit Enough to Solve


The EU’s emissions history is similar to the US
Bruton 7 (http://www.eurunion.org/newsweb/euinmedia/jbsfchron022807.htm John, EU ambassador to the United States)
American energy companies, many of them having been in denial about global warming, are coming around
to face the facts. Exxon Mobil Corp. announced in September that it may stop funding a think tank that has
sought to cast doubts on climate change and that it will contribute more than $1.25 million to a European
Union study on how to store carbon dioxide in natural gas fields. As the United States begins to wake up to
the harsh realities of global warming, the European Union stands ready to assist with the knowledge
and expertise European nations and industry have gained over the years. Since the early 1990s, the
European Union and its 27- member states have worked to slow the rate of global warming. Many of the
policies recently adopted in California, such as caps on greenhouse-gas emissions and market-based
programs to reduce greenhouse gases, have already been tried and tested in Europe. The European Union
keeps working to develop new policies and systems as the region continually seeks to limit greenhouse-gas
emissions and reverse the alarming rise in global temperatures. Since 2000, the European Union has launched
more than 30 initiatives to address climate change, including research on energy efficiency and renewable
energy sources such as wind, sun, water and waste. The 15 nations that were EU-member states when the
Kyoto protocol was signed in 1997 are on track to meet, as a joint commitment, the EU's 8 percent
reduction target of greenhouse gases by 2010 compared to 1990 levels. This, while keeping our
economy growing. The European Union and the United States were at similar greenhouse-gas emission
levels in 1990, but between 1990 and 2004, the EU economy grew by 32 percent and the greenhouse gas
emissions went down by almost 1 percent compared to 1990 levels. By contrast, the U.S. economy grew
by 52.6 percent between 1990 and 2004, but its emissions grew by 15.8 percent and are projected to
increase to 32.4 percent above 1990 levels by 2010. The 27 nations of the EU aim to reduce emissions
further by at least 20 percent collectively by 2020 and are also committed to significantly reducing energy
consumption while increasing energy efficiency. The EU today accounts for 14 percent of the world's
greenhouse-gas emissions, but intends to reduce that figure to around 8 percent by 2050.

The EU Russia and the US are the worlds biggest emitters


Planet ark 7( http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/41809/story.htm environmental news agency)
Combined emissions by the United States, Russia and the EU, accounting for about half the world total,
rose by 0.4 percent to 14.55 billion tonnes in 2005 from 2004, according to data compiled by Reuters from the UN Climate
Change Secretariat. "Emissions trends are continuing upwards, which contradicts political rhetoric
globally," Bill Hare, a Greenpeace adviser who also works at German Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, said during
166-nation UN climate talks in Bonn. And experts say that emissions by developing nations led by China and India, which do not have
to report 2005 data to the Bonn-based Secretariat, are rising far faster as they use more coal and oil to power their fast-growing
economies. A report by UN climate panel last week said the world was running out of time to make the deep cuts needed to combat
global warming, which could bring widening droughts, heatwaves, floods, spread disease and push up world sea levels. It said world
emissions would have to peak by 2015 and fall by 50 to 85 percent by 2050 to reach a goal of limiting
temperature rises to 2 to 2.4 Celsius (3.6 to 8.6 Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels. "Deep emissions cuts by industrialised
countries are needed," Yvo de Boer, head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat, told 1,000 delegates at the opening of the May 7-18
talks in Bonn on ways to slow warming. And Germany wants to use a meeting of leading industrialised and developing nations it will
host next month to push for new commitments to cap greenhouse gases. US RISE US data submitted to the Secretariat show
emissions rose by 0.7 percent in 2005 to a record 7.24 billion tonnes and were 16.3 percent above 1990
levels. Russia's report shows that emissions, which plunged with the collapse of Soviet-era smokestack
industries in the 1990s, rose by 2.2 percent in 2005 to 2.13 billion tonnes. But they were still 28.7 percent
below 1990 levels. Emissions by 27 EU members dipped by 0.8 percent to 5.18 billion tonnes and were 8.0
percent below 1990 levels, with big 2005 cuts by Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. "The figures could still
be adjusted slightly," said Andreas Barkman of the European Environment Agency. The United States, the EU and Russia
are the main emitters among industrialised societies. Nations including Japan and Canada have not sent in data for
2005.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 21
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AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership


( ) The EU’s ability to differentiate itself from the U.S. on climate is key to its soft power
John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and
Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores
University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html
There are a whole range of questions relating to the above and to the intriguing development of a pan-
European and potentially expanding Community emissions trading system. The focus of this paper is,
however, more narrow. It is upon the capacity of the EU as an actor to lead the global climate change
regime and to operate effectively in the absence of the US. This will be a crucial determinant of the
future of the climate regime - and arguably already has been, for much of the analysis below rests upon
evidence of the Union’s performance over a decade of climate politics.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 22
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AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership


Perm doesn’t solve – when the EU acts with the US, it is perceived as placation and as
acting two-faced.
Deva Mohd Ridzam, former ambassador to EU, 07 [May 6, Comment; LOCAL; Pg. 24, “EU can use past for
future benefits,” new straits times, l/n]
Among the reasons why the EU is not a political giant is that it is Janus-faced (two-faced) about
democracy and human rights. The way it reacted to the democratically-elected Hamas government leaves
the Palestinian people wondering why they are again and again being pushed into further misery. This
causes extreme anger. The EU's credibility is on the line as never before in the Middle East and
elsewhere. It refuses to introduce sanctions against Israel for its atrocities over the years. The EU even
supports Israel's withholding of Palestinian money, including its tax revenues. The EU has not been fair
and even-handed in that region, including Lebanon and Iran. It should stop playing "bad cop, good cop"
with the US.

Perm can’t solve – EU soft power is dependent on the US ceding international leadership
Irish Times 07 [March 26, OPINION; Opinion; Pg. 14, “Was the Treaty of Rome meant to found an economic,
and not a political, union?,”
In order to examine the Rome Treaty in greater depth, it is useful to see how the enterprise has developed in
the last 50 years. For example: the European Economic Union became described as the European
Community (or Communities) and now European Union. These changes in terminology are a conscious
removal of the limiting notion of simply an "economic" identity; from six member states at the outset, the
union has now grown to 27 members with more to come, thus unavoidably obtaining greater political
influence; these new members include former communist states and former dictatorships that have chosen
democracy as required by the final preamble that calls upon "the other peoples of Europe who share their
ideal to join in their efforts"; there are increasing demands from the people that the EU should do more
in environmental policy, aid to developing countries, human rights and other areas beyond the
economic, especially as the United States has developed different priorities, thus ceding international
leadership in these areas to the EU; development has continued through treaty changes, eg the Single Act,
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and continues with the ongoing debate about a constitutional or institutional
treaty that could profoundly change the nature of the European construct. This point is fundamental to an
assessment of its future wellbeing.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 23
Scholars Europe

***AT: EU Counterplan
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 24
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EU Action Fails – Climate Change


EU’s efforts at solving climate change are weak and fail to solve
WWF 8 (http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/wwf%20pr%2020080123%20energy%20package%20reaction.pdf, press release world
wildlife fund)
Brussels, Belgium – Today the European Commission presented draft laws to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in Europe by only 20 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. WWF says that Europe should
have been more determined and aim at a 30 per cent reduction, in line with the European Council
decisions of March 2007 – which included the option to achieve 30 per cent if other industrialised
countries engaged on climate change too. A higher target is also essential to keep global warming below
2 degrees Celsius. The conservation organisation says that, as a global leader on climate change, the
European Union should be planning for success, not for failure, of international negotiations to cut
climate pollution. The 20 per cent target is not even in line with the latest Bali agreement – that developed
countries should cut emissions by 25 to 40 per cent by 2020. Drastic improvements of proposed measures are
therefore needed by the European Parliament and Council. “The European Commission presented a
relatively weak proposal and not a single European country supported more ambitious targets,” says
Dr Stephan Singer, Head of European Climate and Energy Unit at WWF. “As the European Union has
already reduced its emissions by about 10 per cent since 1990, the 20 per cent target is much softer
than it apparently looks. Overall, it is a very small effort to cope with a threat that might lead to Arctic
melting and displacement of millions of people in developing countries because of increased floods.”
Similarly, the proposal still gives too many pollution permits for free to carbon-intensive industries
under the Emissions Trading Scheme. WWF pleaded for full auctioning of allowances to reward cleaner
companies as well as to provide funds for sustainable and clean energy development and for adaptation to
climate change in developing countries.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 25
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EU Action Bad – Trade War


( ) EU action on climate causes global protectionist backlash that undermines the entire
multilateral trade system
Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore,
February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis
The European Union aims to become the world's leader in the fight against global warming and climate
change.
But in doing so, it may trigger a green trade war of retaliation and litigation from China, India and
other leading carbon polluters in lower-cost Asian economies that refuse to follow the new environmental
and energy use standards set by Europe and perhaps soon by the United States as well.
If this were to happen, it would complicate the plans of Australia and New Zealand to make themselves
honest brokers between developed and developing countries in the contentious international negotiations on
climate change.
It would also undermine the multilateral trading system policed by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and add momentum to protectionist pressures that already pose a significant challenge to the open
international trade regime that has helped bring prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 26
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EU Climate Policy Bad – ETS Proves


ETS is flawed and alarmist
Heritage foundation 2/8 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1800.cfm
The EU's History of Failure The
EU has long engaged in the politics of alarmism about climate change and
even used it to justify further centralization of power under the European Reform Treaty.[5] The EU wants
to globalize its precautionary-based approach to risk management and even threatened to boycott a key environmental conference in the
U.S. if the American hosts failed to agree to specific numbers for emissions cuts.[6] The Guardian notes that the EU is aiming for
"the moral high ground" with its Climate Plan Package, pledging to cut emissions by an additional 10
percent by 2020 if the United States signs on to a Kyoto II deal.[7] America should be wary of adopting
European-style policies in light of their documented failure. When the EU introduced the ETS in 2005 as the main
pillar of European climate policy, it claimed to be a "world leader" in this area.[8] By December 2007, the trading
price of carbon completely crashed after it was revealed that permits had been vastly over-allocated,
and the project has since been grossly discredited. However, it remains the primary policy vehicle for achieving the
goals of the Climate Plan Package. Several NGOs and think tanks have warned that the next phase of the ETS
will not fare any better, because vast quantities of imported credits agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol will grossly distort the
market.[9] Energy-intensive industries such the steel and cement sectors have already threatened to move production offshore.[10] An
in-depth study of the ETS by British-based think tank Open Europe concluded: …Far from creating a credible basis for EU level action
on climate change, the ETS has instead established a web of politically powerful vested interest groups, massive economic distortions
and covert industrial subsidies. It will do practically nothing to fight climate change.[11] The ETS is fundamentally flawed
because it puts the cart before the horse: It demands greenhouse gas emissions reductions well before
the technologies capable of economically meeting them exist. The result is either ruinous economic consequences or
failure to reduce emissions via continued over-allocation of permits. The EU originally chose the latter and is now choosing the former.

EU’s climate policy shouldn’t be modeled


Heritage foundation 2/8 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1800.cfm
Not only is there serious concern about the second phase of the ETS, but many other parts of the EU's
Climate Plan Package are highly questionable. Under the Plan, Britain has pledged to increase its use of
renewable energy to 15 percent from the current level of about 1 percent.[15] Remarkably, nuclear power will not be
allowed to constitute any part of that target. As The Heritage Foundation's Jack Spencer notes, nuclear fuel reprocessing
is safe, affordable, clean, and technologically feasible.[16] Meeting its renewables target without nuclear fuel reprocessing will be a
multibillion-dollar experiment that will require the government to build tens of thousands more wind turbines, including up to 7,000
offshore giant turbines.[17] As British writer Christopher Booker notes, "To build two turbines a day, nearly as high as the Eiffel Tower,
is inconceivable."[18] With prohibitive financial costs, unreliable technology, and public opposition, the British plan does not make for
effective or efficient environmental policy. In order to prop up the regional carbon market, EU President Jose
Manuel Barroso has threatened to impose a European "green tax" on imports from countries that are
not part of a future Kyoto Protocol-style deal.[19] Having failed to sign the U.S. up to its growth-sapping measures
through moral posturing alone, the EU is ready to compel them this time around. Furthermore, any such trade-interfering measure is
likely to includeblatant acts of protectionism. The BBC has described such tariffs as "the nuclear bomb of climate
negotiations,"[20] and they would have a profoundly negative effect on transatlantic relations. Rather than
equalize trade, they will simply distort it. The United States should send Europe the message that it will not tolerate such a move and
will challenge it at the World Trade Organization if necessary.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 27
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EU Modeling Bad – Australia Proves


Countries that model the EU ETS face the same mistakes

The Australian 7 (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22770268-5014340,00.html, Australian news source)


EMISSIONS trading scheme is a market-based mechanism for trading permits -- known as "allowances" -- to
emit carbon dioxide. The European Union ETS is no trivial market. In 2006, the value of allowances
traded in the EU ETS reached around $A30 billion . However, the introduction of the EU ETS was not
without significant problems. Now, Australia is planning to implement its own ETS. So, are we taking the
best of the European scheme and improving on it? Unfortunately, it seems we are set to repeat some of its
worst mistakes. If there's just one lesson to take away from the introductory phase of the EU ETS, it is
this: governments are not very good at making allocations based on forward projections of industry
activity. Consider this. In May 2006, over just a few days, the price of an EU allowance plummeted
from around 30 euros per tonne of CO2 to less than 10 euros per tonne. The immediate trigger for the
crash was the unofficial release of data on companies' actual emissions performance in 2005, but the
root cause was that governments had flooded the market by giving away too many allowances for free
-- before trading even started. Prior to the release of emissions data, most analysts believed the market
faced a shortfall in allowances. When the actual data were released, the market collapsed and never
recovered. It's easy to point the finger at governments for getting the initial allocations wrong, but it's
actually unreasonable to expect them to be able to get it right. European governments over-allocated
because they wanted to avoid penalising sectors that were exposed to international competition, so cuts
in emissions -- where required at all -- were applied to the electricity sector only. In theory, forecasts of
industry activity can be used to determine the appropriate allocation to each industry sector, thereby avoiding
over-allocation. In practice, governments will always be at an information disadvantage with respect to
industry when forecasting sector-specific emissions, and industry will always have a strong incentive to
inflate projections in order to increase their allocation. In the end, a familiar battle was played out in
every European capital between environment and industry departments. Most often, when faced with
tremendous uncertainty in modelling future projections, industry departments won. The result, in the first
phase of the EU ETS, was massive over-allocation -- up to 50 per cent in some industry sectors. The
Australian ETS is heading down a similar path, using free allocation as a means to compensate for
"disproportionate loss of asset value" and "trade exposed energy intensive industries". Both of these methods
will rely on inherently uncertain economic modelling, which in turn will be highly reliant on sector-specific
commercial information. Once again, the government will be at an information disadvantage; the end
result is likely to be over-allocation. Whether or not this floods the overall market will depend on how
many permits the government makes available to other sectors via auction, but ultimately any over-allocation
will simply lead to a larger than necessary cash contribution from those who will ultimately pick up the tab
for higher energy and commodity prices: consumers. Further, unlike the European over-allocation,
which at least became transparent after fairly soon after emissions data were released, the true extent
of "loss of asset value" or "trade exposure" will remain somewhat murky, even after the fact. And
because the compensation for loss of asset value is "once and for all", there may never be an opportunity to
correct the mistakes that will almost certainly be made.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 28
Scholars Europe

EU Modeling Bad – Carbon Prices


The EU model kills carbon economies

HOURCADE 6 (http://www.epe-asso.org/pdf_rapa/EpE_rapports_et_documents7.pdf Jean-Charles Centre International de


Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED) EU ETS review)
The EU directive on carbon-trading is critical for the future of climate policies both because it opens a
“real-life” test before the 2008-2012 period, and because of its role as a model for other Parties to the
UNFCCC. It may be misleading, therefore, to consider that the introduction of a price-cap is premature given
the anticipated low costs of carbon: current modeling exercises by general equilibrium models conclude
that the withdrawal of the US and the permanence of a risk of ‘hot air’ in former USSR will lead to a
very low world carbon price. But the two assumptions on which these results depend may not become
reality. The first is the capacity of EU25 to import carbon from Russia and Ukraine (due to the claimed
political reluctance of the EU to do so). As of now, EU industry would not have access to ‘hot air’; the
second is the fact that appropriate measures may not be taken in time to control emissions trends in the
transportation sector (due to a mix of technical and institutional difficulties and of the political sensitivity of
these measures), thus pushing the carbon prices upwards. Moreover the European carbon market is a
prototype and there is no certainty that its behaviour will not demonstrate large fluctuations around
an average value, in particular by the end of the period in case of a low number of exchanges. 19/19 despite
these uncertainties, it is not very likely that carbon prices in Europe up to 2012, will reach levels capable of
strongly changing the product competitiveness of the European industry (the expected changes of production
prices in carbon intensive industry will be around one tenth lower than the one triggered by the large changes
in €/$ exchange rate during the three last decades); however, in an increasingly globalised economy,
economic analysis shows that moderate increases in production costs may affect far more significantly
profit margins and stock values. The resulting lack of investment in new capacity during the medium
term may have long-term implications as to whether these businesses remain within the EU. in a
context of harsh international competition from large developing countries on labor intensive industries and
services (including skilled labor), the political sensitivity to employment issues may not lead governments
and the European authorities to impose really strong carbon constraints on carbon intensive industry (which
is generally capital intensive) if pessimistic assumption about carbon prices prove to be right. As it stands,
the EU ETS does not provide for an emergency measure operating as a safety valve (except for art.29
Force Majeure when a Member State can ask the Commission for the right to issue more credits. The
Commission judges if it is a case of Force Majeure.). The penalties for non-compliance are not meant to
be price-caps, as non-complying installations need to pay back the excess emissions in the next
commitment period. The response by industry will simply be imports from non-constrained countries
and political lobbying against significant targets in the future.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 29
Scholars Europe

AT: EU Action Induces U.S.


( ) The U.S. would never take action on climate in response to international demands
Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003,
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 8
To sum up, there is little indication that the decision to move on with the Kyoto Protocol will induce the
United States or other significant emitters of greenhouse gases to join the climate regime or, for that
matter, take on other binding commitments to combat climate change. Note that we do not deny that the
US might take action to combat climate change. What we are saying is that such action is unlikely to be
caused by the remaining parties' decision to move on with Kyoto. 30 Hence we dismiss hypothesis 2 also.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 30
Scholars Europe

U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now


The US and Europe are working together to decrease warming

Graffy, 6/8 (Foundationhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm Colleen P. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs Remarks at the Heritage)
Both the U.S. and Europe recognize climate change as a serious problem, and we share a common goal
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are both committed to negotiating, under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, a new post-2012 climate change framework by the end of 2009.
And we are committed to working with all international partners, including the major economies, to
reach agreement on this post-2012 framework. Last May, during the U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, our
leaders agreed to a series of commitments to ensure secure, affordable and clean supplies of energy, while
tackling climate change. But the Summit commitments are only one example of our ongoing and robust
transatlantic cooperation on these issues. Another example is our High-Level Dialogue on Climate
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, which was last held on March 7. Not only do the U.S.
and EU cooperate closely bilaterally, but we also work together multilaterally. Last September, the
President launched the Major Economies Process (MEP) as a way to support and accelerate the UN process.
We believe that when you gather around a single table the 17 economies that represent 80 percent of the
world’s economy and 80 percent of the world’s emissions, you can make a significant contribution to the UN
talks. The EU and several European countries participate in the MEP, and France just hosted the latest
meeting in Paris in April. The result is that for the first time ever there will be a Major Economies Meeting
(MEM) at the time of the G-8 Summit where MEM countries will be represented at the leader level.
European countries also played an important role at the recent Washington International Renewable Energy
Conference (WIREC), which brought together government officials, civil society and private sector leaders
from around the world to advance the development and commercialization of renewable energy And let’s not
forget the World Trade Organization (WTO). Last year, U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab
announced that the United States and the European Union had submitted a proposal—in the WTO—
to increase global trade in environmental goods and services. This initiative places priority on
technologies that are directly linked to addressing climate change and energy security. The U.S. and EU also
proposed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental technologies and services in the
Doha Round. In addition, the U.S. is forming several other international partnerships to pursue clean and
renewable energy, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP,
which includes Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea and India, has endorsed more than 25 new renewable
energy projects. There are also other international partnerships and initiatives, including working with
Sweden to advance biofuel and clean vehicle technologies, and working with the private sector and the
United Kingdom's Wave Hub to harness the power of the ocean. And of course we have the agreement
reached under the Montreal Protocol to speed the phase-out of hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that
deplete the ozone layer. If you leave today with only one message from my remarks, I hope it is the message
that the United States is actively engaged and working with other countries in a multilateral way to
find solutions to these energy issues that the whole world is facing.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 31
Scholars Europe

U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now


The EU and US are working to stop climate change
Graffy, 6/8 (Foundationhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm Colleen P. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs Remarks at the Heritage)

Another example is USAID’s Global Climate Change Program, which has been working in more than 40
countries in Europe and Eurasia and has dedicated over a billion U.S. dollars to fund environmental programs
that have reduced greenhouse gas emissions while promoting energy reforms. They are helping developing
and transition countries achieve economic development without sacrificing environmental protection. To give
you one example: A recent USAID forest conservation project helped our ambassador in Bulgaria bring
together American and Bulgarian volunteers to plant more than 500 trees to help replace those burned
in forest fires in 2007. I’ve captured a small sampling of our green diplomacy in this Green Newsletter
which will be available on our website. So, when I am posed the question: “Does America have friends in
Europe with regard to trade and climate change?” I would say not only does the U.S. have friends, the U.S.
also has partners. Let’s remember that the transatlantic market today makes up nearly 55 percent of
global GDP and about 40 percent of world trade. So there is a strong incentive to work together as friends
and partners. Both the United States and Europe believe in strong and effective regulation to protect our
citizens and the environment. However, in some cases, unnecessary differences in our regulatory
approaches have made our companies less competitive, raised consumer costs, reduced consumer choice and
slowed job creation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and BusinessEurope believe that if we could align
our economies better, we could generate $10 billion in saved costs and potential growth for the
transatlantic economy. And so, working together, we are trying to do exactly that, by creating the
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which met for the second time today in Brussels. The TEC was
created in April 2007, under the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, and was
signed by President Bush, Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Barroso during the U.S.-
EU Summit in Washington, DC. The goal of the TEC is to promote regulatory cooperation, eliminate
barriers to transatlantic trade, advance capital market liberalization, and strengthen support for open
investment regimes. In short, it is trying to reduce barriers to trade and investment. In the area of the
environment, the Transatlantic Economic Council is recommending that the June 2008 U.S.-EU
Summit consider joint efforts in clean energy technologies that will help us address our shared
concerns about energy security and climate change.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 32
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***EU Leadership DA
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 33
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European Union Leadership DA 1NC


( ) The EU utilizes the lack of U.S. action on climate change to bolster its international
leadership – but the plan would decisively undermine EU leadership internationally
Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003,
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 18-20
In line with hypothesis 1, the US exit seemed to mean the end of the Protocol. What was the point in continuing the process when the
largest emitter—and the most influential player—was out of the picture? This may have been exactly what the US had in mind.
However, in the EU the Kyoto Protocol was not seen only through economic and environmental lenses.
The political lenses were of equal, if not higher significance.
When the US announced that the Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in March 2001, the other main parties essentially had two choices:
(i) to move on with Kyoto and possibly try to get the US back on board, or (ii) to start all over and negotiate a new international climate
treaty. Most countries wanted to try to convince the US to rejoin. This was also the official view presented by the EU, but this "co-
operative window of opportunity" proved to be closed.
The option of starting negotiations on an alternative regime with the US gained some ground in academic circles, especially in the US,
77 but in Europe this never emerged as a real policy alternative. 78 Here the Kyoto Protocol was the"only game in town"—irrespective
of US participation. It was the result of 12 years of intense international diplomacy. Although it was hardly more than a "baby-step"
towards solving the problem, it was nevertheless a start. Potential alternatives were regarded as even more uncertain, as well as more
time consuming.
When the attempt to bring the US back failed, the EU invested a lot of political energy to mobilize
sufficient support for the Protocol among other Annex I parties to enable the Protocol to enter into force
even without the US. The crucial challenge in this regard was to persuade the reluctant "Gang of Four"—
Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia, all previous allies of the US in the climate negotiations—to ratify the
agreement.
The EU embarked upon a two-pronged strategy. Internally, it set a "good" example by heading for
swift ratification. Externally, it sought to persuade the reluctant "Gang of Four" to ratify the Protocol.
While the EU's internal strategy was highly successful, the external strategy was only moderately so. True, Canada has ratified the
agreement despite significant domestic opposition, e.g., from the powerful fossil fuel lobby. 79 After much hesitation, Japan has also
[End Page 18] ratified the Protocol. But Russia's ratification is still uncertain. At best, the agreement will be presented for ratification by
the Duma late in 2003. And Australia will not ratify.
Clearly, the EU has had more of a leadership role after the US exit than before, particularly in the mobilization of
continued support for the Kyoto agreement. On the other hand, the EU's mobilization of support essentially amounted to giving in to the
requirements of the "Gang of Four." Both at the resumed COP 6 in Bonn, and at the COP 7 in Marrakesh, considerable concessions by
the EU were required to reach agreement. Thus, while the result of the resumed COP 6 was a "Kyoto-light" agreement, this result turned
into a "Kyoto ultra-light" after the Marrakesh meeting. 80 Curiously, the EU now gave concessions on issues where it had previously
refused to concede to US demands. Thus, the revised Kyoto Protocol came very close to what the previous US administration had
actively worked to achieve.
Would the "Gang of Four" have reacted differently in the absence of EU influence? Needless to say, this
counterfactual question cannot be easily answered. However, it seems fair to conclude that had it not been
for the EU, the Kyoto Protocol might have been dead. Japan and Canada would most likely not have
ratified without pressure from the EU. Still, Russia remains the key to success—or failure—of the EU's
efforts to save Kyoto. The EU has assisted Russia to make it eligible for emissions trading under the
Protocol. There are, however, remaining problems. Russia's most important incentive to ratify is the opportunity to sell "hot air." But
the potential for making good money here is presently bleak. First, the largest potential buyer, the US, is out of the market. Second, the
EU has been strongly opposed to buying "hot air." This implies that there is no strong economic incentive for Russia to enter the
agreement. Nevertheless, the desire to gain political goodwill might tip the balance in favor of Russian
ratification. 81
In sum, the US exit seems to have represented an opportunity for the EU to realize its leadership
ambition. It was important that the EU took the lead. Otherwise, the fate of the Protocol would have
been far more uncertain. At the same time, it is important to note that the EU's indulgence in accommodating the requirements
of the "Gang of Four" suggests that it was political benefits associated with leadership, rather than a sense of responsibility for the global
environment, that was the major driving force for this course of action.
However, major stumbling blocks remain. One potential stumbling block is Russian ratification. But even
if Russia does ratify, and the Protocol enters into force, events at the COP 8 in New Delhi in 2002 may be
interpreted as strategic moves to sidetrack Kyoto. In particular, the potential alliance between the US and
developing countries may be seen in this light. 82 If an alternative approach [End Page 19] centered
around the US, China, India, Australia and others is attempted, it will represent a serious challenge to
the EU, now the major proponent of Kyoto's targets and time-tables approach.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 34
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European Union Leadership DA 1NC


( ) Strong climate leadership is key to overall EU leadership, which solves many scenarios
for global extinction
Parliament of Ireland 2 (Joint Committee on European Affairs, February 4, 2002,
http://www.irlgov.ie/committees-02/c-europeanaffairs/future/page1.htm)
As the Laeken Declaration put it, "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of
globalisation" adding that Europe must exercise its power in order "to set globalisation within a moral
framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development". 2.6 Only a strong
European Union is big enough to create a space, and a stable set of rules, within which all Europeans can live
securely, move freely, and provide for themselves, for their families and for their old age. Individual states
are too small to do that on their own. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with the
globalised human diseases, such as AIDS and tuberculosis. Only a strong European Union is big
enough to deal with globalised criminal conspiracies, like the Mafia, that threaten the security of all
Europeans. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised environmental threats,
such as global warming, which threaten our continent and generations of its future inhabitants. Only a
strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised economic forces, which could spread
recession from one country to another and destroy millions of jobs. Only a strong European Union is big
enough to regulate, in the interests of society as a whole, the activities of profit seeking private corporations,
some of which now have more spending power than many individual states. 2.7 These tasks are too large for
individual states. 2.8 Only by coming together in the European Union can we ensure that humanity, and
the values which make us, as individuals, truly human, prevail over blind global forces that will otherwise
overwhelm us.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 35
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Yes EU Environmental Leadership


EU leadership on the environment high
EC`8 (European Commisson, European Forum, Young global leaders are key to tackling climate change" says Stavros Dimas,
July 18, 2008, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/20047)
It is largely thanks to Europe's leadership that negotiations on such an agreement are now well under
way. At the Bali conference last December, the EU succeeded in convincing other Parties not only to start
these negotiations and to agree to an ambitious roadmap to guide them, but also to conclude them at the
end of 2009 in Copenhagen. The importance of this process cannot be overstated if we are to avoid a
crippling environmental and economic burden on future generations. Developed nations should lead
by example. The European Council of March 2007 set out the European Union's leadership vision
clearly for the world to see. The EU committed to two new targets for reducing EU emissions from
1990 levels by 2020. The first is a cut of 30% that is conditional on other developed countries
committing to comparable efforts under the future global agreement. The second is a reduction of at
least 20%, independently of what other countries do.

Climate change leadership high-Climate targets


EC`8 (European Commisson, European Forum, Young global leaders are key to tackling climate change" says Stavros Dimas,
July 18, 2008, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/20047)
Once agreed upon by Council and the European Parliament, which I hope will happen by early next year, the
climate and energy package will reaffirm EU leadership in view of the UN negotiations. By
implementing the most ambitious set of climate and energy targets anywhere in the industrialised
world, the EU is demonstrating to our partners that making the deep emissions cuts necessary to avert
dangerous climate change is fully compatible with continued economic growth and prosperity. This is a
vital message if we are to succeed in rallying all countries behind a global agreement. The climate and
energy package will create conditions for increased innovation and investment in cleaner technologies.
This opens up great opportunities for entrepreneurs to gain a "first mover advantage" in developing
and marketing the solutions that will be in increasing demand in an ever more carbon constrained world. The
environmental sector contributes over 2% of the EU's GDP and this figure is bound to increase. And as
I have already mentioned, implementing the measures in our package is essential for safeguarding sustainable
economic growth and improve energy security. It is estimated that the package will reduce the EU's energy
imports by 50 billion Euros per year by 2020. These estimates were made at a time when oil prices were
expected to be 61 dollar per barrel, the benefits are likely to be much lower still if today's prices around 140
dollars are maintained.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 36
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Yes EU Environmental Leadership


EU Leadership High Now Especially In Environmental Performance
Seventh Space 8 (“Action plan for sustainable action, consumption, and industry”, July 16, 2008,
http://7thspace.com/headlines/286935/action_plan_for_sustainable_consumption_production_and_industry.html)
Our current patterns of consumption and production have significant environmental impacts, including
greenhouse gases, pollution and the depletion of natural resources. Much can be done to make the way we
consume and produce in Europe more sustainable, without additional costs for companies and
households, and can bring benefits. The European Commission therefore today proposed a package of
actions and proposals to improve the environmental performance of products and stimulating the
demand for more sustainable goods and production technologies. EU industry will be encouraged to
take up new opportunities and innovate in order to ensure its continued leadership in environmental
performance. The Action plan also explores means for promoting sustainable production and consumption
internationally.

EU Is Taking A Leadership Role To Reduce Aviation Emissions


International Herald Tribune 8 (“EU parliament votes to include airlines in emissions trading, despite U.S.
concern”, The Associated Press, July 8, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/08/europe/EU-EU-Airlines-
Carbon-Trading.php)
U.S. officials say the EU will likely break international aviation rules if it insists on including non-European
airlines in the program — even though the EU says it is certain its system would be legal. The EU wants to
use the new rules as a base to reach a broad international agreement to reduce emissions from aviation.
"We are taking a leadership role and we are making it clear that we are open to dialogue with our
partners with a common goal of getting an international agreement," said EU Environment
Commissioner Stavros Dimas.

EU Is Taking The Lead Role On Greenhouse Gas Pollution


Daily Dispatch Online 8 (“East-West Rift At EU Carbon Gases Meeting”, July 7, 2008,
http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=221330)
Europe has taken the lead role in curbing greenhouse-gas pollution that stokes climate change.
It championed the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol after that pact was nearly destroyed by a United States
walkout in 2001 and last year promised to deepen its 2020 cuts to 30 percent if other rich economies
followed suit. British Environment Secretary Hilary Benn stressed the EU plan to incorporate “tangible”
mechanisms enabling the 20 percent cut to be deepened to 30 percent. “The single most important thing
Europe has got to do is to show leadership, by the package we’ve got before us, and not just with the 20
percent commitment, but the very clear commitment to do three percent within an international deal,”
Benn said.

EU Is The Climate Hegemon


John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and
Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores
University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html
Over the past decade, its increasingly robust performance in climate change negotiations has prompted
claims of a leadership role for the EU in global climate politics. After Bonn and Marrakech, and with the
Union's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and development of its own scheme for emissions trading, there
has even been the suggestion that the EU could now act as international climate hegemon (Legge and
Egenhofer, 2001).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 37
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Yes EU Leadership – General


EU Soft Power Now
The UN Dispatch 8 (“The Mediterranean Union”, July 15, 2008,
http://www.undispatch.com/archives/2008/07/the_mediterrane.php)
The ability of Europeans to use soft power through practically-based international unions to slowly
end conflict and spread democracy is exemplified by the success of the European Union, and I hope that
this new Mediterranean Union will create the same turn-around in Middle Eastern diplomacy that the
European Coal and Steel Community (which later became the EU, of course) created for European
diplomacy.

EU Soft Power Is Real


Europa 8 (“Benita Ferrero-Waldner European Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood PolicyAt what point will global warming force lifestyle changes and what will those changes be?”,
July 1, 2008, http://www.edubourse.com/finance/actualites.php?actu=43054)
This brings me onto my next point – External Action. Climate Change is of course a global phenomenon
and therefore requires global action. As I have said, our international influence depends on the
credibility of our internal agenda. The environmental standards we are setting will set the standard both for
imports and exports driving more environmental production in other parts of the world. Europe’s “soft
power” is real. Just look at the way in which the Mercosur countries have emulated the EU in creating
the possibility for free movement of citizens between countries in the block.

EU Leadership Is High And Sustainable


Reuters 8 (“Poland Tells France Won’t Be Obstacle To EU Treaty”, July 4, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL0447720820080704)
Kaczynski said earlier this week it would be "pointless" to sign the Lisbon treaty after it was rejected by
Irish voters in a referendum on June 12 and that Warsaw would not ratify it unless Ireland managed to
overcome its voters' opposition to it. The treaty, which needs the backing of all 27 member states to come
into force, aims to give the EU a stronger leadership, a more effective foreign policy and a fairer
decision-making system. It would create a powerful new foreign policy chief and a president of the
European Council, its highest political body.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 38
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Yes Perception of US Lagging Behind EU


( ) The U.S. is perceived as lagging far behind the EU on environmental issues
John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and
Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores
University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html
The ending of the Cold War had enormous overall significance for the development of the EU’s
external roles. Routine objections from the Soviet Union to EC participation came to an end and new
relationships were forged with countries in Asia and Latin America, so that the potential influence of
the Union is now truly global. The EU has also benefited in terms of opportunity, from the way in which
some very high-profile environmental negotiations on stratospheric ozone, climate and the Rio process
coincided with the ending of the Cold War. During the negotiations for the 1987 Montreal Protocol the chief
US negotiator could make out a credible (but disputed) case for American leadership (and that the whole
agreement had been delayed by the inability of the EC to resolve its internal difficulties) (Benedick 1991).
Whatever the merits of Benedick’s case at the time, during the past decade, as climate change has come to
the fore, the idea of US environmental leadership has, to put it politely, ceased to be credible. As one
Commission official referring to a range of environmental negotiations put it, ’the US has raised sitting on
its hands to the status of an art form’ (Interview DGXI Brussels 6 June 1996). US obstructionism and
disengagement across a range of negotiations left the EU with a leadership opportunity that it was, in the
view of Commission officials uniquely qualified to seize: The US is a strong political actor whereas the EU is
a slow moving but weighty ship. The Community position has more weight in the long term. The US often
cannot define a credible negotiating platform - they cannot think of all the ramifications, on North -South
issues for example as the Community can. In climate, forests and biodiversity the EU is the only leader
while the US is absent, blocking or destructive (Interview DGXI Brussels 4 June 1996).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 39
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EU Leadership Brinks
EU Leadership In a Delicate Phase
AGI 8 (Agenzia News Online, “EU: Marcegaglia, Need Leadership Which Talks About Real Issues”, June 23,
2008, http://www.agi.it/business/news/200806231436-eco-ren0040-art.html)
President of Confindustria Emma Marcegaglia identified the lack of a real leadership as the basis of the
problems of a common European vision: in the EU, said Marcegaglia to the 2008 Assolombarda
Assembly, "we are in a delicate phase, with a deficit in popularity which needs to be tackled seriously";
the 'no' vote from Ireland to the EU treaty "is a symptom of the uneasiness that exists in Europe. We
need to find a leadership" was the suggestion of the President of Confindustria "which will make Europe
go back to talking to its own citizens about real issues: immigration, the high cost of living." Marcegaglia,
reminding the assembly that Europe "is our point of reference" said that "heads of Government must no
longer offload unpopular decisions on Europe, but should leave some sovereignty and arrive at a different
Europe which no longer talks about vetoes but about the well-being of its people and their own
achievements."

EU Climate Policy Leadership Is Fragile


Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 4 (Jon, Tora, and Steinar, Professor University of Oslo, Senior Research
Fellow at CICERO, Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen, “The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other
Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States”, Global Environmental Politics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology 2004, pg 12)
The development of an EU climate policy has taken place over a relatively long time period, it is the
result of a complex internal negotiation process, and the process has, at least in periods, been
characterized by a relatively high level of conflict. Thus, the climate position the EU has today has
been hard fought and rests on a delicate balancing of diverging interests. Are there mechanisms at work
in this process that may have generated an institutional dynamic that in turn has served to limit the EU’s
climate policy options when the US withdrew from the Kyoto agreement?
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 40
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U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership


( ) U.S. inaction on climate change creates a critical void that’s key to the EU’s leadership
– the plan shuts the window
Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003,
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 15-16
On the other hand, the EU has, since the beginning of the climate process, attempted to play a lead role in
the drive for international regulatory policies to reduce GHG emissions. In this section, we explore the
hypothesis that the US exit in 2001 represented a "window of opportunity" for the EU to succeed in this
ambition.
4.1. EU leadership in a Strategic Policy Perspective
When the climate issue surfaced internationally towards the late 1980s, it represented a very suitable
candidate for EU leadership. Other key actors, most notably the US and Japan, were either outright
negative (US) or not very enthusiastic (Japan). The EU's ambition was to use this opportunity and fill the
existing leadership vacuum. The climate issue was seen by the EU not only as a serious environmental
problem, but was also perceived in a strategic policy perspective, as a means to project itself as a united
leader on the international political scene. Thus, EU climate policy not only represented a strategy to confront
the climate problem. It can also be understood as a strategy directed towards the development and
reinforcement of an EU "foreign policy."
The efforts to develop a coherent EU (then EC) strategy towards climate change took place during a period
when the EU underwent major political and institutional changes with the development towards European
integration and the 1992 Single European Market. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty implied a shift in sovereignty
away from separate member states in several issue areas including environmental policy. For instance, the
Treaty implies a fundamental change towards majority voting on EU environmental policy decisions.
This process generated some internal turbulence and controversy especially after the Danish referendum
voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. National resistance against increased monetary and
political integration was to some extent directed towards the development of environmental policy in the
sense that some countries, for instance the UK, targeted this issue area as a particular candidate for
repatriation. 64 However, despite the controversies generated by the integration process, there has been a
significant momentum within the EU towards concerted foreign policy-making. As pointed out by Wynne
"the EC member states share a common interest in creating a sufficiently united identity to be recognized as a
global power in foreign policy, security and trade agreements in the new, post cold war world order." 65 The
internal [End Page 15] dimension of this ambition should be noted, however: "in order to fulfill ambitions as
a credible global actor, the EC needs to secure greater internal institutional and political cohesion." 66 In the
beginning of the 1990s, therefore, the EU needed an international issue both to make its mark as a
united and strong global actor as well as to reinforce its (internal) institutional and political cohesion.
The climate change negotiations offered an opportunity for the emerging European Union to establish
such a position: "the international concern over climate change provided an opportunity for the EC to
develop its own institutional presence in international environmental matters, [and] hence foreign policy
more generally."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 41
Scholars Europe

U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership


( ) U.S. action on climate undermines EU leadership
John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and
Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores
University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html
It is possible, however, that the period between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 2001 was
singularly propitious for EU actorness. Despite demands that the EU should assert or increase its influence on
the world stage, and in particular should strive for an identity and roles which sharply distinguish its stance
from that of the USA, the contemporary period is undoubtedly dominated by the US-led ‘war on terror’. It
has been characterised by significant disregard for international law and the authority of the United Nations,
by sustained efforts by the US government to undermine the newly established International Criminal Court3
and by widespread contravention of civil and human rights norms on the part of the USA and its allies. To
the extent that ‘security threats’ dominate the agenda of international politics, the EU may encounter a
diminution in opportunity to develop a distinctive posture – and, more specifically, to maintain a
leadership role in climate change diplomacy. Here it is interesting to note that US observers at COP 8
(in New Delhi, 2002) attempted systematically to undermine EU leadership (and the emerging
principles of the climate change regime) by supporting developing countries in fending off the EU’s
‘unreasonable demands’ for broader participation in post-2012 emissions reduction targets (Ott
2002:3). This represented, of course, a complete reversal of the former US position on developing country
participation.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 42
Scholars Europe

Climate Key to Overall EU Leadership – Spillover


( ) Strength on climate spills over to bolster EU leadership in other areas – and US action
on climate undermines EU leadership
Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003,
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 20-21
Finally, we found some support for the assumption that the persistence of Kyoto can be explained by the
ambition of the EU to stand forth as an international leader in climate politics. This ambition was
rooted not only in a concern for the environment. It was also as a means to unify and strengthen EU
foreign policy more generally. While the EU was not very successful prior to the US exit, this window
of opportunity was quite effectively utilized, although at the expense of the environmental integrity of the
Protocol.
Needless to say, there are a host of factors not explored here that may also help explain the persistence of the
Kyoto Protocol. Notably, the perspective adopted in this article has been rooted in the "logic of
consequences" rather than the "logic of appropriateness." 83 In other words, we have focused on explanations
based on the assumption that Annex I parties' choice of climate policy is determined by a concern for the
consequences of these policies. We have not considered, say, the possibility that decision-makers are
primarily motivated by a desire to "do the right thing." Obviously, including this and yet other explanations
in addition to the ones discussed above might have enabled us to present a more complete picture. However,
doing so would have required more space than available here. [End Page 20]
Are there any more general lessons to be learned from this case? A first observation is that economic costs
and benefits do not always determine action in international negotiations. Internal political strategy and
institutional dynamics matter as well. Second, economic and environmental concerns are not necessarily
the only or the most important driving forces, even in climate negotiations. Finally, it is important to
recognize that the present climate agreement at best covers some 1/3 of global emissions. The Kyoto Protocol
may be a considerable political achievement, but its environmental impact is slim. A more effective regime is
likely to require the creativity of the US as well as the ambitiousness of the EU.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 43
Scholars Europe

EU Leadership Good – Laundry List


EU Soft Power Is a Precondition To Solve Climate Change, Proliferation of WMD’s,
Economic Tension, International Terrorism, Energy Security, and Poverty
Hellenic Foundation For European And Foreign Policy 7 (“The European Union’s Soft Power: A
Force For Change”, Regeringskansliet, October 24, 2007, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7417/a/90906)
If we look at the big issues confronting our world in the years ahead - climate change, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, economic growth through trade and reforms, international terrorism,
energy security, building bridges between civilisations, trying to lift the bottom billion of our world out
of despair - it is very difficult to see them being moved towards some sort of solution without more
active engagement on the part of the European Union. I would say that an active role for the European
Union is a precondition for moving all of these issues in the direction we all seek - although it is
obviously not enough. We must reinforce our cooperation across the Atlantic with the United States - our
traditional and firm partner - but we must also intensify our efforts at building truly strategic relationships
with the rising and responsible powers of - to name just a few - India, China and Brazil. With the Reform
Treaty now agreed, we are creating new possibilities for our Europe to live up to its responsibilities as
well as its opportunities in these important areas.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 44
Scholars Europe

AT: EU Leadership Kills U.S. Heg


EU credibility key to heg-The credibility’s of both are intertwined
Ischinger`4 (German Ambassador to the United States in Washington DC. This article, which represents the author's
personal view, is an expanded version of a speech delivered at an Aspen Institute conference on Transatlantic Relations in Lyon,
France, "Transatlantic Power, Legitimacy, and Credibility" - Speech given by Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger at the Aspen
Conference in Lyon on 30 January, 2004 http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/013004.html)
The European Union also suffered. Europe was divided in 2003, regardless of how large a popular majority
existed in Europe - "old" and "new" - against the war in Iraq. It will not be easy for the EU to regain
influence and credibility as a foreign policy actor any time soon. Creating the office of a European foreign
minister and vesting it with the necessary powers seems to be a necessary, albeit insufficient, step if Europe
wants to be taken seriously as a political player in Washington. In what was probably one of the most
negative results of 2003 in terms of the transatlantic relationship, mistrust of European intentions and of the
EU as such has become rampant in Washington. European governments that opposed the Iraq war believe
that, on most of the "war issues," they were right and the US was wrong--in saying, for example, that there
was no imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction and that creating post-intervention stability in Iraq
would be difficult and costly and would require a long-term US commitment. The fact that these
Europeans were right, however, has not been of much help in restoring US trust in Europe, and in the
European Union. It is to the credit of these European governments that they have generally resisted the
temptation to say I-told-you-so. It is even more to their credit that they have instead begun to offer assistance
in the rehabilitation of Iraq, recognizing that restoring stability and supporting modernization in the region is
a key European interest in the current situation. Credibility As the EU's credibility has suffered, so has the
credibility of the United States as a "benign hegemon"--and not just because weapons of mass destruction
have not been found in Iraq. Polls by the highly respected Pew Research Center reveal a rather dramatic
drop in US standing, and by no means in Europe alone. Can Washington be trusted? Specifically, can it
be trusted to lead with reasonable regard for the interests of allies and partners? Does Washington
respect its obligations under international law, or is it defining itself as above the UN Charter? The
transatlantic partnership is about more than just relationships between nation-states and international
organizations. It is about the very principles of the international order, and about the evolution of this
order. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer asked the key question: "What kind of world order do we want?"
Essentially, the centuries-old fiction of the sovereignty and equality of nations under international law
is being challenged today. If international law protects the state even when that state is ruled by a barbaric
dictator, then international law itself must be changed so that dictators are no longer protected; this is a
popularly held view in the US and is shared by some in Europe. Americans also question the legitimacy of
the Security Council, including the "power monopoly" Europeans claim the Security Council has. It cannot
be right, these critics argue, that a body that includes dubious dictatorships should vote on, and decide, the
course of the world. And they ask how many times the Security Council has actually mandated military
operations in the last 50 years. Rarely, is the answer--not even in the 1999 intervention in Kosovo that
NATO, including the Europeans, supported. Indeed, to the dismay of many Europeans, some in Washington
appear to have concluded that it is power, and not the UN Security Council, that legitimizes.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 45
Scholars Europe

AT: Hard Power Pre-Requisite to Leadership


The EU will soon develop the military power their evidence assumes
Harding`3 (Gareth, United Press International EU specialist, Analysis: EU talks tough, goes global, June 17, 2003 Tuesday,
Lexis)
The stark facts are that EU members -- with their 375 million inhabitants and a combined gross domestic
product of nearly $10 trillion -- spend only $150 billion a year on defense, while the United States, with
280 million citizens and a GDP of nearly $7 trillion, is set to fork over $380 billion on defense in 2003.
Steven Everts, an analyst at the London-based Center for European Reform, believes "Europe will acquire
the tools of hard power and the will to deal with tough security problems, but don't expect it to become
the sort of behemoth the United States is." Curiously, given his gloomy assessment of the EU's current state,
Robertson is more upbeat about the bloc's long-term prospects. "By 2015 the EU will have moved beyond
the economic powerhouse it already is. By the middle of the next decade, the Union will also be a
political force to be reckoned with." If the last few months of hyperactivity are anything to go by, the
"flabby giant" is at last shedding its puppy fat and learning how to flex its biceps.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 46
Scholars Europe

AT: NMD Turn – Non-Unique


NMD not coming-Poland won’t cooperate
Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile
Shield, July 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)
Ms. Rice is on a European tour that includes Bulgaria and Georgia, but not Poland. The United States
hopes to base 10 interceptor missiles there, but the governments in Warsaw and Washington have so
far failed to reach agreement on the terms. Unlike the Czech Republic’s government, the Polish center-
right government led by Donald Tusk has taken a tough negotiating stance. In return for hosting the
interceptors, Poland has asked the United States to modernize Polish air defenses so that the country can
defend itself against incoming short-range and medium-range missiles.

Even if Czech leadership want NMD the rest of the country says no
Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile
Shield, July 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)
The accord with the Czech Republic is not without its problems. The deal signed on Tuesday does not
ensure that the radar system will be built immediately or that the next American administration will
stick to the project. Negotiations are still taking place on a second treaty, to deal with the legal status of
American troops to be deployed at the planned radar base. Both treaties require ratification by Czech
legislators, many of whom are skeptical about the project, while the public is largely opposed. Mr.
Topolanek’s coalition government does not have enough seats to assure support for the plans and may
need opposition votes. Legislators from the Green Party, the government’s junior coalition partner,
have indicated they may block the proposals, and opposition parties have demanded a national
referendum. About two-thirds of Czechs oppose the radar deployment, according to opinion polls.
“Ratification will be difficult,” said Jiri Schneider, program director at the Prague Security Studies Institute.
“The missile defense plan has sparked a national debate about how exposed we want to be on the
international stage.” Czech political analysts said that, for the older generation, the missile defense plans
had tapped into a deep suspicion of security alliances that stretched back across the past century.

The Czechs are the first step-So far they’re saying no


Kuchtova`8 (Dana Kuchtova is the 1st Vice-Chair of the Czech Green party and former Minister of Education, Czechs to
U.S. Missile Defense: Keep Out, July 8, 2008,
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2008/07/czechs_to_us_missile_defense_k.html)
Secratary of State Condoleeza Rice is in Prague today to ink the U.S. Missile Shield Treaty, but the
question remains, who invited her? The U.S. National Missile Defense project is a complex, far-
reaching system involving the production of new weapons and the installation of U.S. military bases
around the world. In Europe, the first step is the installation of an advanced radar facility in the Czech
Republic, as well as a base for interceptor missiles in neighboring Poland. But Czechs want no part of it.
Polls have consistently confirmed that 70 % of the Czech population are against building even “defensive”
radar installations on their soil (the Polish numbers are not much different). And thus far all attempts to
allow referenda have been blocked. This disregard for the will of the people could lead to a breakdown
of the governement’s tenuous coalition. Despite that, Czech and U.S. leaders are continuing their
negotiations, which will reach their formal climax today when the Secratary of State signs the treaty. And
while the American public may have accepted the idea of immediate threats and continuing danger, the
situation in Eastern Europe is not so black and white. Korea and Iran, the supposed impetus for the
Shield, are at best hypothetical threats to Europe. Clearly there must be other motives.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 47
Scholars Europe

AT: NMD Turn


The EU needs the U.S.-They won’t reject NMD
Valasek`2k (Tomas, Senior Analyst for Weekly Defense Magazine, Europe's NMD Deliberations, June 8, 2000,
http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue23.html)
But for Europe, the choices are less clear. Senior politicians in Germany, Italy, and France did speak out
against NMD. But their main criticism is that it will weaken U.S. -- European strategic links by
fostering a siege mentality in the United States. Implicitly, the European NATO allies make it clear they
want to remain under the United States' protective umbrella. This makes it unlikely that they will
wholeheartedly embrace Russian proposals and disregard the possible rift with Washington. Russia's
dreams of teaming up with Europe to counterbalance the United States are likely to remain just that.
As the war in Chechnya demonstrated, the EU's values and interests lie much closer to those of the
United States than to Russia's. Regardless of Russia's overtures, Washington can ill-afford to ignore
Europe' s reservations. The EU's outright opposition to U.S. deployment of an NMD system -- a possibility,
although not yet a reality, as the EU has not formulated a joint position on NMD -- would put in doubt the
future of NATO. But there is another very practical consideration: NMD, especially in its later stages, simply
won't work without cooperation from Europe.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 48
Scholars Europe

AT: NMD Turn


( ) NMD in Europe means U.S.-Russian nuclear war
London Times, June 4, 2007
President Putin has warned the US that its deployment of a new anti-missile network across Eastern
Europe would prompt Russia to point its own missiles at European targets and could trigger nuclear
war.
In an exclusive interview with The Times, the Russian leader says: “It is obvious that if part of the
strategic nuclear potential of the US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will have to
respond.
“This system of missile defence on one side and the absence of this system on the other ... increases the
possibility of unleashing a nuclear conflict.”
Russia has been alarmed at America’s plans to install a network of defences in Eastern Europe to shoot down
incoming missiles it fears that Iran might launch.
Mr Putin expressed scepticism of this motive, arguing that “There are no such missiles – Iran does not have
missiles with the range”. The US was insisting, he said, that the defence system was to be “installed for the
protection from something that does not exist. Is it not sort of funny? It would be funny if it were not so sad.”
He speculated that the US’s real motive was to provoke Russia’s retaliation and so “to avoid further
closeness of Russia and Europe”.
Mr Putin’s tough warning comes days before the start of the G8 meeting of the world’s most powerful
industrialised economies.
His uncompromising stand on America’s missile defence, Kosovo, Iran and climate change was partly
blamed for the failure of last month’s summit between Russia and the European Union.
Mr Putin had warm words for the “cordial reception” that Tony Blair had given him, and for Gordon Brown,
“a high-class specialist”. But he offered little room for compromise on Britain’s request for the extradition of
Andrei Lugovoy, the former intelligence officer, wanted on charges of the murder of dissident former agent
Alexander Litvinenko by radioactive poisoning in London.
“No matter from what angle we look at this problem, it’s all stupid, stupid nonsense”, he said of Britain’s
extradition request. “I will not see any single positive component. It’s complete nonsense.”
Russian authorities were investigating the case and if enough evidence were found, the case would “certainly
be sent to court”, he said. In theory, he added, “there are possible circumstances” in which Russia would
comply with the extradition “but it would require an amendment to the Constitution.”
But Britain had not provided justification for such a dramatic move, he said. If heads of British law
enforcement agencies “did not know that the constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens to
foreign states then their competence is questionable” and “they should work for parliament or newspapers”
because the request was at heart “only a political public relations step”.
He also gave no quarter on the cases of Shell and BP, the British oil giants, who have recently seen the terms
of their investments in Russia rewritten because of alleged breaches of their licences.
Mr Putin insisted that he wants “cooperation not confrontation”, repeatedly blaming the US for its
intransigence. But of all the potential clashes at the G8 meeting, which begins on Wednesday in Germany, it
is his warnings on Russian retaliation to the US missile defence plans that are likely to cause the
greatest friction.
He called on “our American friends to rethink their decision” and warned that ”We cannot be responsible for
our reciprocal steps because it is not us who are initiating an arms race in Europe”.
He added: “We will need to establish such systems which would be able to penetrate the [US] missile defence
systems... What kind of means will be used to hit the targets that our military believe are potential threats –
ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, or some kind of new weapons system – this is a purely technical issue?
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 49
Scholars Europe

***AT: EU Leadership DA
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 50
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No EU Leadership
EU leadership low
Right Side News 8 (“As the earth cools: What does it mean for the energy industry?”, June 18, 2008,
http://www.rightsidenews.com/200806181211/energy-and-environment/as-the-earth-cools-what-does-it-mean-for-
the-energy-industry.html)
The ability of the West to act unilaterally on carbon management is quite limited. The U.S. and Japan will
not tell Asia and Africa to choose poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy over electricity. Europe may but
Europe’s hard, soft and moral power are now negligible. Europe has no ability at all to make credible
military threats; its soft power compares unfavorably with a wet noodle; its moral authority is
imperceptible given that it will miss its own Kyoto targets by a considerable margin.

EU Leadership Is Fragile Going Into The World Trade Organization Talks


Business Week 8 (“EU: Trade pact would raise economy”, Business Week, July 17, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D91VMV1O3.htm)
Global trade talks present a crucial test for how a new world order can handle future world challenges
such as climate change and food supply, the EU's trade chief said Thursday. EU Trade Commissioner
Peter Mandelson said next week's World Trade Organization talks in Geneva would test the ability of
members to strike a deal at a time of "huge reordering of the global economy and politics." "If
collectively we fail this test in Geneva, it will reduce our ability" to tackle future tests to negotiate a
pact limiting greenhouse gas emissions or tackle food scarcity, energy security or other world
problems, he said. "Rising powers are reshaping the postwar world," he told reporters. "The risk we face is
... the absence of coordinated global action and leadership." The Doha round of trade talks -- under way since
2001 -- "happens to be the first test of global leadership in this new order," he said, describing it as a test of
responsibility for fast-growing countries like Brazil, China and India. Mandelson said a deal to create more
trade opportunities was even more essential as the world economy slowed, saying the last 15 years of rapid
expansion had relied heavily on an earlier WTO agreement that opened up world markets. "Failure will be
very costly," he said, calling on developing nations to make concessions. The EU expected strong exporters
like Brazil and China "to make the contribution that reflects their growing strength," he said. The EU's top
farm official Mariann Fischer Boel said an agreement on farm subsidy cuts needed to be made this month or
talks would likely be frozen for the foreseeable future. Expectations are low, however, for negotiations
whose framework reflects the world of 2001 without focussing on new problems such as biofuel tariffs
and energy supplies. U.S. President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Brazilian
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva have called for a breakthrough. The round has been touted as a key hope
for developing countries since its inception in Qatar's capital, Doha, in 2001, shortly after the Sept. 11 terror
attacks. Early estimates said a deal could boost global wealth by hundreds of billions of dollars a year, with
great gains for poorer countries. But experts now say the most that can be hoped for is a watered-down pact
with numerous loopholes. The standoff boils down to a simple scenario: the U.S., EU, Japan and other rich
nations would cut tariffs on imports of cheap goods and produce from poorer countries. In exchange, Western
manufacturers, banks and service providers would get new openings in emerging markets such as Brazil,
China and India. But both sides have balked at the grand trade-off. A binding treaty would have to be ratified
by all 152 WTO members.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 51
Scholars Europe

No EU Leadership
EU Leadership Low- It Has No Game Plan
Turkish Weekly 8 (“In Praise of Euro skepticism”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, July 17, 2008,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=57564)
The EU has no coherent strategy on many issues. It has only sketchy economic policies toward Russia;
ambitions, but no game plan, to become a player in the Middle East; and, despite its original
leadership on the Kyoto Protocol, no successor program on climate change. And the biggest question of
all – how to engage with China, India, and other giants of the future – has received virtually no attention
from EU-level policymakers. These issues require attention now, and an integral part of the EU’s search for
new global strategies should be to invite, rather than avoid, criticism of its activities. If the EU is to lift its
gaze from its navel to the horizon, it must reconcile the very different views that exist across Europe of its
place in the world and its own best interests. That means engaging with those shades of political opinion
that the European Commission and the European Parliament consider “Euroskeptical.”
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 52
Scholars Europe

U.S. Leadership Doesn’t Trade Off with EU


EU/U.S. soft isn’t zero-sum-It can also help
Nye`4 (Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, SOFT POWER 2004, p 82, DRG/E48)
Not only can European soft power be used to counter American soft power and raise the price of unilateral
actions, but it can also be a source of assistance and reinforcement for American soft power and
increase the likelihood of the United States’ achieving its objectives. Soft power can be shared and used
in a cooperative fashion. European promotion of democracy and human rights helps advance shared values
that are consistent with American objectives. The Islamist extremists of Al Qaeda are fighting against
Western values, not just American values, and European public diplomacy that counters their appeal is
beneficial to the United States.

Soft power is not zero-sum.

Grant 3 [Charles, Center for European Reform, “The Decline of American Power,” CER Bulletin, Issue 29,
April/May, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/29_grant.html]
President Bush could do wonders for America's image by adopting a more diplomatic style and by focussing
on the Middle East peace process. Tony Blair will need to show his European partners that Britain's support
for the US is not unconditional and that it has a European destiny. Jacques Chirac should accept the reality of
EU enlargement, learn to make friends in Eastern Europe, and abandon the idea that the rationale of EU
foreign policy is to resist the US. The example of the European Union shows that soft power is not a
zero-sum game: it has enabled all the member-states to enhance their influence and well-being. A
stronger West needs countries with more power hard and soft on both sides of the Atlantic.

European and US interests are not zero-sum.

HM Treasury 1 [“Britain, Europe and America - the challenge of globalization,” July 26,
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/Press/2001/press_91_01.cfm]
It is in the interests of British business and British jobs not to detach Britain from Europe or from America
but instead to build stronger links in both directions. And it is in the interests of Europe to build a long-
term relationship with America based not on an assertion of complete independence from one another,
but on a frank recognition of our interdependence.
For we will succeed in this new century only if we succeed together. This is what some theorists are
calling - non-zero - thinking - non-zero-sum solutions in which both sides win.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 53
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Soft Power Not Key to EU Leadership


The EU needs hard power to have true influence
Landaburu`6 (Eneko Landaburu, European Commission’s Director General for External Relations, EUROPE’S WORLD,
Summer 2006, p.
http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue3/EW3_1.3_Landaburu_hard_facts_about_Europes_soft_power.pdf)
The EU is therefore a real player on the world stage because of its wide-ranging and comprehensive set of
“soft-power” tools. Nevertheless, the EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never get the ability to
shape world events that most of them say they want unless they are prepared to pay the extra cost,
either in financial terms, or in terms of institutional and political reforms that will give them the kind
of hard power enabling the EU to act entirely independent of the US security umbrella.

The EU needs hard power to make it’s soft power effective.


Hyde-Price 4 [Adrian, Professor Department of Politics, The EU, “Power and Coercion: From ‘Civilian’ to
‘Civilising’ Power,” October, http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Hyde-Price.pdf]
The central theme running throughout the paper is that if the EU is to become an effective and credible
international actor able to shape its immediate environment and contribute to global peace and
security, it must develop the military capabilities and political will to back up its diplomacy by force
when necessary. As experience drawn from the Balkan wars of the 1990s suggests, the EU can only
engage in effective ‘milieu shaping’ if it develops credible capabilities for coercive diplomacy and
military crisis management. In this sense, it is argued, the EU can only be a ‘civilising power’ if it is also a
‘Centaur’ – half-man and half-beast – willing and able to use force as part of a comprehensive security
strategy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 54
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EU Leadership Resilient
( ) EU leadership is resilient – if they’re displaced by the U.S. they’ll work twice as hard to
regain leadership
Gerard Baker, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, September 22, 2003, “Against United Europe,” The
Weekly Standard
It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have
spent much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and
Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were
traded, and the tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who
can fear a united Europe?
But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national
differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be
breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European
strategists are animated by the bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and they
have no intention of falling off.
In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the
weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the
British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge,
and the design for the new euro was unveiled.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 55
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EU Leadership Ineffective
The presidency cycle makes EU soft power fails
Roth`7(Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, 07 [Jan 12, Financial Times, Asia Edition 1, comment; Pg. 11, “Europe
must pull its weight on human rights,” l/n)
Even when a common position is reached, the EU's insistence on working almost exclusively through
its "presidency" often undermines its clout. It is difficult to imagine a less effective way to
maintain continuity or build expertise than the EU's rotating blur of six-month leaders, even
when bolstered by the incoming president and other EU officials to form a leadership troika.
The refusal to assign long-term responsibility on certain issues to the governments best
placed to address them is a recipe for dysfunction.
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EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony


( ) Strong, assertive EU would undermine U.S. hegemony globally
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at
Johns Hopkins, 2004, The Choice: Global Leadership or Global Domination, p. 124-125
America has played so central a role in world affairs during the last sixty years that currently it is
almost impossible either for the Europeans or for the Asians to envisage any international arrangement
that does not somehow politically involve America as well. For Europe, that reality has been enshrined in NATO, and in
the years to come probably also will be cemented through the overlapping responsibilities of NATO and the EU’s own slowly emerging
military capabilities. In the Far East. American defense ties with Japan and South Korea, as well as informally with Taiwan, have made
these three states’ security inseparable from America’s. Even China itself for decades critical of America’s military presence in Asia, has
in recent years moved to a recognition (as a PRC official put it) that “the purposes of China’s policy and that of the United States on
maintaining Asian stability are generally identical.”
That condition could be undermined if Europe and Asia were to he swept by a populist anti-American
movement that defined itself as Pan-Europearnsm in the west and as Pan-Asianism in the east. Each has its
forerunners, though neither has so far succeeded in mobilizing the hearts and minds of most Europeans or Asians. Both are nascent
forms of supranationalist regionalism. In Europe, a Pan-European movement surfaced after the calamities of World War I, but it failed to
overcome the nationalistic particularisms of the European peoples. During World War II, Hitler tried, especially during his attack on the
Soviet Union, to enlist the loyalties of Fascist-minded Frenchmen, Belgians Dutchmen, and Norwegians on behalf of the defense of a
common “Europa” against the Bolshevist hordes. The effort met with minimal success. In the Far East, the Japanese militarists promoted
the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” exploiting the idea of Pan-Asianism to appeal to the anti-colonial sentiments of the
Chinese, Thais, Javanese, Burmese, and Indians. Again the effort foundered, though it did contribute marginally to the rise of anti-
colonial passions.
One cannot entirely dismiss the possibility—remote as it currently may be—of an anti-American
reaction that cloaks itself in European and Asianist garbs. It could happen if Pan-Europeanism and Pan-
Asianism become the rallying cries for those who view America as a common menace. Anti-
Americanism would then be deliberately defined in regionally nationalistic terms, and the effort to
reduce or even expel the American presence from the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia would
serve as a common platform.

( ) European leadership enables the EU to undermine U.S. hegemony


Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at
Johns Hopkins, 2004, The Choice: Global Leadership or Global Domination, p. 91
A politically powerful Europe, able to compete economically while militarily no longer dependent on the
United States, would inevitably contest American preeminence in two regions that are strategically vital
to America: the Middle East and Latin America. The rivalry would be felt first in the Middle East, given not
only its geographic proximity to Europe, but especially Europe's greater dependence on its oil. Given Arab
resentment of U.S. policies, European overtures would find a sympathetic reception ",while Israel would
stand to lose the privileged position it has enjoyed as America's favored client state. A European challenge in
Latin America 'would likely come next. The Spaniards, Portuguese, and French have long-standing historical
and cultural connections with Latin American societies. Latin American nationalism would be quite
responsive to intensified political, economic, and cultural ties with an assertive Europe, whim would
diminish the traditional U.S. domination of the region. Thus a Europe that became simultaneously an
economic giant: and a militarily serious power could confine the scope of U.S. preeminence largely to the
Pacific Ocean.
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( ) EU global leadership kills U.S. unipolar dominance
Gerard Baker, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, September 22, 2003, “Against United Europe,” The
Weekly Standard
If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of the highest order. The events of the last
year should have demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united Europe.
The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld hailed in the run-up to the Iraq
war--an alliance of Atlanticist nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe. It
is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a self-
appointed counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are likely to be the main drivers of its
political direction.
CALM DOWN, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons why the United States should not get agitated at events
across the Atlantic. For starters, there is the "It will never happen, so why worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist
superstaters at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful
European foreign policy identity?
It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of
the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over
a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the
tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united
Europe?
But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on.
Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face
of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and they
have no intention of falling off.
In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the
weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the
British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge,
and the design for the new euro was unveiled.
There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U. that tilts the whole process strongly towards closer integration--and towards a
particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the most federalist country, and France, which supports European union
on French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see an opportunity to punch way above their weight in
international affairs if Europe is united.
These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U. security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core.
In neither France nor Germany is there any talk of reorienting policy post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously
Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the United States.
Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic at work--one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the
Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's
Spain, and the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving in our direction.
This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including
Blair. If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes, Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly
surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted most European moves towards integration have been the least influential.
In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed Europeanists who make up
the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win this game.
As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has
powerful economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the
United States offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official Europe was vicious. "One cannot entrust his purse to
Europe and his security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission.
All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows,
thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really
interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one
conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?"
This "Europe as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to turn itself
into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not
multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution
into a single nation--with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United
States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do
believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check.
Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of
U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could
make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all
corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United
States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa.
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EU leadership hurts hegemony
Harding`3 (Gareth, United Press International EU specialist, Analysis: EU talks tough, goes global, June 17, 2003 Tuesday,
Lexis)
But in recent months, the 15-member bloc appears to have got tired of taunts about its weakness and
started taking the diplomatic equivalent of steroids. The result is a far more aggressive foreign policy
that threatens to challenge the U.S. global hegemony. A year ago, the idea of the EU sending
peacekeepers to the Congo without NATO back-up would have been unthinkable. Today, there are
close to 1,400 European troops stationed in the northeastern region of the war-torn African state in an
attempt to stop bloodletting between rival tribes. In addition, the EU has taken over policing operations in
Bosnia and peacekeeping duties in Macedonia and next year plans to replace NATO as the leading
peacekeeping force in the Balkans. "We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiques and
declarations ? full of strong nouns and weak verbs ? to something more substantive, more muscular, more
focused, that can have more impact," said EU foreign policy commissioner Chris Patten recently.
Monday's meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg underlined the bloc's beefier approach to
world affairs. Ministers slapped tougher travel bans on members of the military junta in Myanmar, the
former Burma, told Cuba to release all its political prisoners ? earlier this month it imposed mild sanctions
on the communist regime for the first time ? and warned Iran to immediately sign an international
nuclear protocol or risk seeing trade talks suspended. But it was the statement on weapons of mass
destruction that raised the most eyebrows. In a move that brings the EU closer into line with the U.S.
position on WMD, the bloc said it was ultimately prepared to use force to make sure rogue regimes did
not get their hands on lethal weapons. Contrasting the ease with which the policy on WMD was agreed
with the torturous discussions about Iraq earlier in the year, the Financial Times newspaper noted: "It took 45
minutes on Monday for European Union foreign ministers to wrap up a debate that six months ago would
have torn them asunder." At the Luxembourg meet, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented ministers
with a "European Security Strategy," setting out the new threats the EU faces and the instruments it needs to
tackle them. "We are a European Union of 25 members with 450 million people, producing one quarter
of the world's gross domestic product," Solana told reporters. "We cannot close our eyes to what is going
on in the world. The EU has to be a strong global actor."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 59
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EU Leadership Bad – NMD Good


The EU doesn’t want NMD in Europe- They’ll use leadership to kill NMD
Valasek`2k (Tomas, Senior Analyst for Weekly Defense Magazine, Europe's NMD Deliberations, June 8, 2000,
http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue23.html)
On the heels of President Clinton's visit to Europe, Russia's President Vladimir Putin traveled to Italy with
a proposal to create a continent -wide missile defense system. The plan -- clearly designed to counter the
U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system -- is finding many sympathetic ears among European
leaders. NATO allies seemed to have embraced the Russian proposal as a possible way to diffuse
tensions within the alliance stemming from European opposition to NMD. Europe is virtually
unanimous in its criticism of NMD, despite President Clinton's recent offer to share missile defense
technology with "civilized nations." The Department of State, commenting on President Clinton's proposal,
concluded that "Mr. Clinton's defense of NMD fell on mostly deaf ears in European media outlets, where
editorials continued their drumbeat of criticism. Only a right-of-center German newspaper argued against
the 'wholesale rejection' of the U.S. proposal." European politicians criticized the plan in terms that were
perhaps less verbose but no less firm. President Putin's counterproposal comes at an opportune time both
for Russia and Europe. Russia is equally opposed to NMD, so reaching out to the European Union (EU)
countries will bolster the critics' strength. Moreover, Moscow senses a chance to regain its influence on the
continent. The war in Chechnya has put a strain on EU-Russian relations, particularly after the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe reproached Russia for its conduct in Chechnya and Moscow withdrew from the Council in
protest. Mutual opposition to NMD gives Moscow an opening to mend fences with EU countries. Lastly, Russia's long-
term objective, as stated in the 1999 draft National Security Concept, is to change the balance of power in the world
currently dominated by the United States. "If the EU and Russia were to get back together," said Paul Beaver, an expert at
Jane's Missiles and Rockets, "it would bring the world back into a bipolar situation again."

b) NMD key to solve prolif


DeBiaso`6 (Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Director, Office of Missile Defense Policy, U.S. DOD, Comparative Strategy, 2006, vol 25. p.
165)
The presence of effective missile defense makes it more costly for a rival to compete militarily or wage
missile warfare against the United States. Defenses would pose a direct counter to the buildup of
ballistic missiles by negating advantages an adversary hoped to achieve by acquiring missiles in the
first place. Political leaders and military planners could no longer expect that ballistic missiles would
have a “free ride” against their targets in the United States or in the countries of allies. Rather, they
would now face the certainty that missile defenses would inflict losses during the conduct of a military
campaign. Furthermore, the approach the United States is taking to missile defense, fielding multiple layers of systems to intercept
ballistic missiles throughout all phases of their flight, imposes additional demands on the offense if it is to be successful. It must now
penetrate several layers of defense each having different technical and operational characteristics. Under these conditions,
defenses should reinforce the perception of ballistic missiles as an unwise investment by making it
more difficult, time consuming and expensive to counter the defenses and create new incentives to shift
military competition into other, nonballistic missile, areas where the U.S. may enjoy distinct
advantages.

c) Nuke war
Seaquist`3(Larry former US Navy warship captain, has been the custodian of nuclear weapons at sea and a contributor to
nuclear deterrence strategy in the Pentagon, April 3, 2003 (“Listen to the Nuclear Chatter”,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0403/p11s02-coop.html)
The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about
countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists
who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention
of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just
writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of
safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats
ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and
shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A
mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited
violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind
must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 60
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Yes NMD
NMD coming-Poland’s cool with it
China Veiw`8 (China Veiw, Yan Liang, Chinese News service of Xinhua News Agency, U.S. seeking to reach missile
defense agreement with Poland, July 18, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/18/content_8565009.htm)
The United States is mulling meeting Poland's demands with regard to a missile defence base, local
media reported on Thursday. According to daily Dziennik, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice
discussed the issue with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Monday. The U.S. is seriously considering
placing a Patriot missile battery in Poland. In return it wants Poland's assurance that the missiles
could be used at any other place any time, according to the report. Poland is ready to accept such offer,
according to earlier statements by Poland's defense and foreign ministers. The United States plans to install
a base for 10 interceptor missiles in northern Poland to protect the U.S. and Europe from possible
future attacks from Iran. Talks later became bogged down over Polish demands for more military aid.
Warsaw has been lobbying Washington to provide a THAAD or Patriot-type air defense system in exchange
for a Polish green light for hosting the silos.

The Czech’s are warming up to the NMD idea


Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile
Shield, July 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)
The United States and the Czech Republic signed a landmark accord on Tuesday to allow the Pentagon
to deploy part of its widely debated antiballistic missile shield on territory once occupied by Soviet
troops. The accord, the first of its kind to be reached with a Central or East European country, was signed in
Prague by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Czech counterpart, Karel Schwarzenberg,
despite strong opposition from Russia. It also needs to be ratified by Czech lawmakers, many of whom
oppose it. Russia warned on Tuesday that the accord could lead to a military response, which the Kremlin
had previously threatened but never specified. President Dmitri A. Medvedev and his predecessor,
Vladimir V. Putin, who is now the Russian prime minister, have told the United States that the Kremlin
sees a missile shield in this part of Europe as a threat to Russian security. Mr. Putin has said it could
even lead to a new cold war. But American and Czech officials said the system’s radar component, to be
stationed south of Prague, would defend the NATO members in Europe and the United States against
long-range weapons from the Middle East, particularly Iran. “Ballistic missile proliferation is not an
imaginary threat,” Ms. Rice said Tuesday after meeting with the Czech prime minister, Mirek Topolanek.
She said Iran continued to work toward a nuclear bomb, along with long-range missiles that could
carry a warhead.
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NMD Good – Nuclear War


( ) NMD is critical to deter countless nations from nuclear attacks on the U.S. and allies
Investor’s Business Daily, 11-7, 2007
Is it possible that Democrats are still skeptical that a missile shield will actually work? If so, evidence
that it will has reached the point that it can no longer be denied.
Or is their lack of support simply due to a reflexive opposition to the military and toward symbols of what
they perceive to be projections of U.S. power?
Either way, their actions could leave us vulnerable to nuclear attack from a rogue nation such as Iran
(see editorial at left) or North Korea, which is supposedly backing down on its nuclear weapons program
but will remain a threat as long as its communist regime stays in place.
The risk doesn't end, however, with those two legs of the Axis of Evil, both of which are on the State
Department's list of terrorist states.
Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now an ally, yet it could become an enemy depending on how its internal
turmoil is resolved. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban have powerful bases in the region. What if the Musharraf
government one day falls and one of those terrorist groups suddenly has the keys to a nuclear arsenal?
It's just as plausible that the threat could come from any of the Mideast nations that want to keep up
with Iran's nuclear program. With Egypt making its announcement last week, there are now 13 countries
in the region that have in the last year said they want nuclear power.
They can claim, as Iran has, that they want it merely for energy. But the step from nuclear power to nuclear
weapons is not that far. Given the volatility of the region, it would be wise to make sure that all
precautions — and that includes a missile defense — are taken.
Even Russia, with its extensive nuclear weaponry, could be a threat. President Vladimir Putin has raised
objections to America's allying with former Soviet satellites to place U.S. missile defense components in
their countries.
This, warns Putin in language reminiscent of the Cold War, will turn Europe into a "powder keg." For his
part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has declared: "The arms race is starting again."
Are congressional Democrats prepared to leave us only partly protected in a world where nuclear arms
might soon begin to spread like a Southern California wildfire? Some have looked at the Democrats'
actions and said, emphatically, yes.
"Their aim," Heritage Foundation defense analyst Baker Spring said earlier this year, "is to force the U.S.
to adopt a position that prohibits it from developing — much less deploying — missile defense
interceptors in space under any circumstance and for all time."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 62
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NMD Good – Deters WMD Prolif


( ) European NMD is key to deter ballistic missile and WMD prolif
Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at
the Heritage Foundation, 11-8, 2007, online:
http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E2E0BCA0-8DDF-484C-B974-22FE89CF0715, accessed
November 8, 2007
If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing
effect on the security environment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be
destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missile defense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to
rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against
it. To make America and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to
incur further proliferation. As President Bush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's
a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool for counterproliferation."[8]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 63
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NMD Good – Key to Heg


Lack of NMD hurts power projection-There’s no protection regional ballistics
DeBiaso`6(Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Director, Office of Missile Defense Policy, U.S. DOD, Comparative Strategy, 2006, vol 25. p.
159)
As a result, states possessing even a small missile force could project devastating power regionally, and
may prevent the United States and its security partners from intervening to defend an ally or friend
against such aggression. Ballistic missiles armed with WMD could hold at risk regional U.S. and allied
targets, e.g., staging areas, bases, troop concentrations, political-economic targets, or population centers,
making it possible for relatively small aggressors to deny access to the United States into a contested region
or theater of conflict. North Korean ballistic missiles, for example, allow it to directly threaten the
capitals and population centers of Japan and South Korea, as well as U.S. forces stationed in those
countries. And in the Middle East, Iran has already attempted to limit the ability of the U.S. to operate
militarily in the region by threatening missile attacks. As Iranian officials have recently observed,
“today America has no base in Iraq, or the Middle East and the Persian Gulf which is not within firing
range of our missiles.” 3
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NMD Good – AT: U.S.-Russia Nuclear War


( ) No chance of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war – rational policymaking on both sides prevents
escalation
St. Petersburg Times, 11-6, 2007
In reality, however, the nuclear factor plays an increasingly minor role in U.S.-Russian relations. And,
paradoxically, its importance began to diminish after the Cuban missile crisis, when it became clear that
neither side was willing to use its nuclear weapons against the other. Despite having 20 times more nuclear
weapons than the Soviet Union, the United States rejected any plan involving a first strike against
Moscow. In the late 1950s, Robert McNamara calculated the probable losses in the event of a Soviet first
nuclear strike against the United States. After becoming defense secretary in the early 1960s, however,
McNamara acknowledged that Soviet nuclear weapons were not capable of inflicting the level of damage that
he had earlier estimated, and he thus ruled out any plan for a U.S. first strike.
For nuclear weapons to be an important factor in politics, there must be a real fear that the leader
possessing the weapons is crazy enough to actually use them. That is why the nuclear programs in Iran
and North Korea have generated such heightened concern around the world.
Putin, however, has shown — whether he intended to or not — that he is a rational leader. And even
drawing unfounded, exaggerated historical parallels with the Cuban missile crisis can’t ruin that
reputation — at least not yet.
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***Condition Counterplan
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 66
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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate


Intl cooperation is key to reducing ghg emissions
Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade:
assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)
The greatest success of international climate control policy was the
establishment of the Kyoto protocol. It is one of the leading and most important
international environmental agreements in the history of global negotiation and bargaining
policies. However, recent climate change negotiation processes confirm that
the initial climate change control coalition was not stable: The United States,
the world’s largest economy and emitter of GHGs left the coalition and now
acts as a singleton and free rider. The reason for this behavior can be explained by
game theoretic validation: Economic payoffs for free riding are higher than
joining the coalition.1 This paper confirms this by global modeling results.
Because the remaining climate coalition partners still intend to reach an
international climate control agreement, the environmental effectiveness is
potentially diminished. International greenhouse gas reductions imposed by
the Kyoto protocol can most likely not be met.

Conditions are key to creating benefits to reducing GHG emmissions globally


Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade:
assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)
Scientific investigations will most likely reveal that continued accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse
gases (GHGs) will ultimately have severe consequences on the climate as well as ecological and social
systems. Irreversible climate changes induce significant costs, and no future efforts can reverse the resulting
damage. International climate control agreements intend to relieve this process. A substantial reduction of
GHG emissions requires cooperation between countries. However, greenhouse gas emissions reduction is
still an international public good necessitating long-term and global economic efforts. The formulation of the
Kyoto protocol and its ensuing negotiation attempts represent one initial outcome of cooperative international
climate control policiy actions. Latest negotiation outcomes confirm that individual countries are mainly
concerned with potential economic disadvantages resulting from emissions reduction. Maximization of
national welfare leads to either unilateral operations, a formation of small coalitions or ‘‘free rider’’
actions.Whether a stable coalition can be reached depends on the opportunities to reduce interest
conflicts regarding a minimum agreement. A bargaining situation contains opportunities to collaborate for
mutual benefits. As real negotiation processes demonstrate, a full agreement of all players is unlikely. More
realistically, some players may act independently or unilaterally to maximize their own welfare and self-
interests, while other players create small and stable coalitions (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992; Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993); Hoel, 1994). The decision to join a coalition or initiate a partial coalition depends on
the difference in net benefits of a cooperative and a non-cooperative strategy (Barrett, 1994). As long as
the environment and climate are treated as a public good and there are no penalties or sanction
mechanisms for polluting entities, there will be no economic incentives for unilateral or cooperative
action to protect the environment. Moreover, as long as cooperative behavior is imposed by voluntarily
actions, finding a common or global agreement will be driven by the varying interests of negotiating
countries. These interests must be harmonized between nations or groups of countries.
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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate


Conditioning ensures agreement – it allows both sides to net-benefit from a deal that they
would otherwise reject.
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
The seminal works by Tollison and Willett (1979) and Sebenius (1983) redirected attention toward a second
possibility, namely that issue linkage might be used to generate mutual gains for both (or all) parties in a
bargaining situation in which at least one party would stand to lose from a single-issue agreement.
Negotiating simultaneously two or more issues might thus enable the parties to reach agreement on
both or all issues, whereas otherwise, negotiating the issues singly, the parties might not reach an
agreement. In particular, a party might accept a loss on one issue if this sacrifice enables it to obtain a
(greater) benefit on the other issue(s). Used in this way, issue linkage is akin to a side payment.

Conditioning common public goods like warming is the only way to achieve international
action.
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
In the past two decades, a third possibility has received extensive scholarly attention, particularly in the
economics literature (see, for instance, Folmer, Moucher, & Ragland, 1993). Some argue that issue linkage
can be used as a tool to overcome the free rider problem associated with provision of international
public goods (such as abatement of GHG emissions). A public (or collective) good is characterized by
nonexclusiveness, meaning that if such a good becomes available to one member of a group, it is unfeasible
to exclude other group members from consuming it (Olson, 1971). This creates a situation where a group
member might benefit even more by not participating in providing the public good (free riding).5
However, if many group members free ride, the result will likely be suboptimal provision of the public
good.
Avoiding free riding might be possible by linking each country’s access to the exclusive benefits of a
private good to its contribution in providing a public good. Such linkage would entail that a party receive
a private (exclusive) good if and only if it were to contribute in providing the public good. Thus, the general
idea is that linking issues will not only “change the balance of interests in favor of a negotiated
agreement” (Davis, 2004, p. 153), but will also do so in a way that ensures greater provision of the
public good.

Conditioning overcomes differences in policy interests.


Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
Finally, issue linkage can resolve the problem of asymmetric preferences and varied geo-economic
conditions, by allowing countries to link together issues in which they have dissimilar interests.
Institutional linkage operates in this context as an indirect form of side payment. If cooperation on an
individual issue benefits country A but hurts B (or is simply not of interest to B), then linkage allows
country A to compensate B by offering cooperation on a different issue that benefits B. Linkage thus
utilizes the mechanism of economic exchange to bridge between different worldviews (regarding, for
example, the value of natural resources). The use of linkage as a form of side payment when there are
asymmetric benefits across countries is especially important in the context of the relations between Northern
and Southern countries.
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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate/Security


Energy-security issue linkage key to solving climate change
Froyn and Bang 7 (Camilla Froyn and Guri Bang, "Issue linkage: Energy security and climate change concerns as triggers for change
in U.S. climate policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago,
CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 Online <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179102_index.html>)
This article explores the relationship between public concerns about energy security and climate change, and
climate policy development in the United States. Federal climate policy has been following a different path
than in most other industrialized countries, a path of not accepting mandatory limits to greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. As the world’s largest emitter, however, the development of policy response to the
climate change challenge in the United States will be decisive for the global response (Bang et al,
2007:1288-9). It is therefore interesting to investigate whether U.S. climate policy stands to be altered
through linkage of the energy security and climate change issues. If public concerns about these issues
increases, calculated issue linkage by policymakers could potentially lead to new policy programs that
aim at both increasing energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Energy and climate
change are closely related policy areas, through factors like a country’s energy source mix, involved actors,
and economic interests. Energy policy decisions have consequences for climate change issues, and climate
policy decisions invariably take into account energy issues. In the long term climate change might become a
huge influence on economic growth, but in the short term it is limits to GHG emissions that cause economic
concerns. In terms of political salience, energy issues are generally considered much more important
than climate change issues because of the direct short term coupling between energy use and national
economic development. As the largest energy producer, consumer, and net importer in the world, as well as
being home to the largest coal reserves in the world (EIA 2004a), the United States is very dependent on
fossil fuel energy for its short term economic growth. Because of this, and because of growing fossil fuel
import dependence, energy security has risen to become a top- prioritized issue in U.S. politics. At the same
time, 82.4 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 consisted of carbon dioxide from the
combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas (EIA 2006b). In effect, therefore, U.S. emissions
trends are driven largely by trends in fossil energy consumption, and with strong fossil fuel dependence the
United States is constrained in energy policy choices for the near future. Energy use and production are key
components for understanding the climate change issue. The balance of evidence in climate science points to
the relationship between fossil fuel use causing increasing emissions and rising temperatures as the main
cause of climate changes expected to occur over the next century (IPCC 2007). However, the domestic
resistance to mandatory emission limits in the United States has been robust because of fears that it
will incur economic loss for both individual consumers and the national economy (Victor 2001: 4; Victor
2004: 1-4; Jacobson 2002: 422-3). Energy security concerns and climate change concerns are coupled in the
U.S. political discourse on both energy policy and climate policy, and currently the debate focuses on how
fossil fuel consumption, in particular coal, can continue and greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced
without adverse economic effects. 8 This article study the close relationship between energy and climate
policy, investigating under what circumstances changes in public concerns for energy security and climate
change can cause a new, mandatory federal climate policy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 69
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Issue Linkage Solves – General


Issue linkage solves asymmetrical enforcement capabilities.
Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
Spagnolo argues that under this highly stylized model any rule which constrains the ability of governments to
link several issues in one agreement (e.g., by punishing the violation of rules—defection—of one agreement
through the introduction of retaliatory measures in another regime) is strictly welfare-reducing, since it
constrains the optimal design of international agreements. The basic logic is the following: issue linkage can
facilitate cooperation by allowing countries to use the surplus or slack enforcement power that may be
available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains. Surplus enforcement power is
defined as the expected losses from punishment (in response to defection) minus the expected gains from
one-off defection (free-riding), that may be available in one domain to discipline cooperation in additional
domains.19 Spagnolo argues that a single “grand international agreement” may thus prove superior to any
fragmented structure, because it aggregates available enforcement power, allowing for its more efficient
allocation to additional policy domains. This basic intuition holds in cases where policy issues are
separable and countries are assumed either symmetric or asymmetric.20 In Section 6, I provide a more
detailed exposition of Spagnolo’s argument, which I also use to clarify my critique of some of his
assumptions.

Conditioning solves best – ensures stringent enforcement and benefits all parties.
Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
The idea of linkage provides an alternative framework for thinking about the relationship between
international regimes. It replaces the narrative of conflict, which dominated the “trade and ――” debate with
a narrative of synergy and collaboration. The linkage literature highlights three possible advantages of cross-
regime linkage. First, by allowing countries to use the surplus enforcement power that may be available
in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains, linkage can extend the set of
sustainable (or self-enforcing) agreements.31 Second, linkage can be instrumental in resolving the
problem of free-riding by bridging the negotiations regarding a global public good dilemma and
negotiations on a club good.32 Finally, by allowing countries to engage in cross-regime bargaining,
linkage provides a (welfare-enhancing) mechanism that can bridge distinct world views and
preferences regarding various global dilemmas.33 There is tentative and very preliminary empirical
support for these arguments,34 which give support to the claim that the WTO should extend its involvement
in the resolution of transnational environmental dilemmas.35
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 70
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Conditional GHG Cuts Good – General


Strong U.S. action on emissions can bring other countries on board – conditioning on strict
commitments is key.
Ubide et al 8 [Angel, Director of Global Economics for the Tudor Investment Corporation, Tom Burke, Environmental Policy Adviser,
“Symposium on America, Europe, and the World: Session Two [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” April 23, Council on Foreign Relation,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16095/symposium_on_america_europe_and_the_world.html]
First has been the obvious reluctance to embrace and enact domestic CO2 emission reductions. Like I said, I
think this is poised to end. But the other issue that's been divergent has been a difference between the EU
and the U.S. in terms of willingness to pursue international agreements with limited commitments
from developing countries. The EU has been much more willing to accept a framework that either had
vague or weak commitments from developing countries, whereas this has been a very primary issue in
the United States. It's a primary issue regardless of the administration, it was a primary issue in 1997 in the
Byrd-Hagel Resolution, and if you look at the debate in the Senate right now over the form of regulation, it
goes to the points that Adam was talking about, there's a lot of emphasis on trade restrictions or trade
compensation to deal with the concern that China and other countries, key trading partners, are not going to
take action.
So figuring out whether or not we can have a common front on that and perhaps the EU can talk us off of the
plank we're walking off of in terms of, you know, trade restrictions, but perhaps if we can encourage the
EU to act a little more forcibly with developing countries, I think that could be very, very profitable.
So I think once the U.S. acts, I think there'll be a huge opportunity for potential convergence on this
international stuff as well.
I'll also just note that, you know, the Bush administration's efforts with the major emitters' meetings that
have been taking place, I think that is a very important forum as well. I think it's a little questionable
exactly how much progress that can make absent more action in the United States, but the idea of
getting the major emitters to the table and thinking about sectoral as well as economy-wide policies, I
think has a lot of legs.

Conditioning our reductions on international reductions gives us a powerful source of


leverage.

Ubide et al 8 [Angel, Director of Global Economics for the Tudor Investment Corporation, Tom Burke, Environmental Policy Adviser,
“Symposium on America, Europe, and the World: Session Two [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” April 23, Council on Foreign Relation,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16095/symposium_on_america_europe_and_the_world.html]
[T]o the United States, it means as we're writing that legislation and we're thinking about the structure
of our policy, we should be thinking about how we can insert hooks into that legislation and policy that
give us more leverage and more opportunity when we return to the international table. Whether this is
some sort of a conditional agreement like Europe has right now where it says, well, we'll do 20 percent,
we'll do 30 percent if everybody else does something adequate. Putting that sort of thing into law so that
Congress doesn't have to come back to revisit it would be quite valuable. A colleague of mine at RFF who, I
think may have been at the Council for a little while, Nigel Pervis (sp) has work he's done recently on the
idea of Congressional Executive Agreement, trying to turn climate change negotiations into something more
akin to trade negotiations set at a lower hurdle in the U.S. Senate and the executive has a little bit more power
could be very useful in terms of thinking about how the U.S. process can be ready for engagement.
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Conditional GHG Cuts Good – Capital Flight


Intl coop key to prevent capital flight
Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for
Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development
Programme at Chatham House. “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June
2007.)
In the final analysis, one of the best ways to address competitiveness concerns is to achieve international
agreement on an approach to combating climate change, ensuring broad participation in any
international regime, and helping ensure that different modes of national implementation do not
unfairly tilt the playing field in anyone’s favour. This, of course, is more easily said than done, and efforts to get broad
participation are dogged by a version of the old chicken-and-egg problem: broad participation would help ease competitiveness
concerns, but it is difficult to achieve precisely because of those concerns. As such, any steps at the national and
international level that might be taken to address competitiveness concerns will certainly contribute to
building a stronger multilateral regime for addressing climate change.

Stringent environmental regulations will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and billions of
dollars as companies relocate to places with lesser regulations

Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate
Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.)
A rich body of work in the last ten years or so has corrected for these problems in various ways, and has consistently
found a statistically significant pollution haven effect.14 On the first question – does environmental stringency affect
terms of trade? – the few good studies to date (those correcting for the problems surveyed above) find that increases in
compliance costs do affect trade patterns, with one analysis finding a rather improbable 30% increase in
import penetration for every 1% increase in pollution abatement costs.15 SQW Ltd (2006) summarizes two
studies that seem to show that trade effects will depend in part on the regulating country’s factor endowments and on how intensively the
industry uses that factor. For firms that intensively use a scarce factor of production (e.g. timber), even marginal
tightening of environmental regulations will have an impact on market share. Firms that use that factor
intensively in countries that have abundant stocks will not be so significantly affected by regulation. On the second question – does
environmental stringency affect greenfield plant location decisions? – the recent studies using panel data
are in agreement that it can and does, particularly for heavily polluting firms.16 One study found that
in the first 15 years after rules were introduced to more heavily regulate highly polluting US counties,
those counties (relative to others) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in capital stock and $75
billion (1987$) of output in pollution-intensive industries. All of these studies are based on US state- and countylevel
variations in regulatory stringency, and subject to data availability.
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Conditioning Solves – China


Chinese action is conditioned on US action
Hald-Mortensen 8 (Christian Hald-Mortensen, Danish Institute of International Studies, Master in
Political Science, University of Copenhagen. “Transatlantic Climate Policy: Towards a Copenhagen
Protocol in 2009” Energizing Europe Conference, London.)
After 1997, the Europeans and Americans diverged on the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU gained
importance globally because the U.S. rejected the Kyoto Protocol34. This rejection was a major
disappointment for Europeans who saw the U.S. as a “rogue state” in global environmental politics35.
The U.S. remains crucial for the effectiveness of any climate regime with 20% of world emissions, and
because China have made their participation conditional on U.S. participation36. The U.S. debate on climate
policy has been highly focused on economic competitiveness. In the late 1990’s a group of major economic interests launched the
“Global Climate Information Project”, and spread fear regarding Kyoto’s economic impact37. Such concern was codified into law, when
the Senate enacted the Byrd-Hagel Act, stating that the U.S. would accept no agreement that did not subject major developing countries
to reductions, or that would hurt the U.S. economy. In 2001, this rationale for voluntary defection was echoed again by President George
W. Bush. The President declared in March 2001 that the U.S. defected “because (the Kyoto protocol) exempts 80% of the world,
including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy”.

China will surely agree to meet reduction conditions – multiple reasons.

Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61]
As climate change rises up the list of American foreign policy priorities, incentives for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions need not directly involve climate policy. Russia, for example, only ratified Kyoto after
European countries agreed to support its bid for WTO membership, a carrot from outside the climate sphere.
With a large slate of bilateral issues on the table, particularly in the case of China, the United States
might find opportunities for deal making by linking the climate issue to a wide array of other concerns.
Climate change will be one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the century; as such, it merits
status as a central foreign policy objective and efforts toward climate goals should include trade-offs
against other goals where needed. The United States and others could also target more general desires
among leading developing countries to become central players in international politics, a particularly salient
issue with both China and India. The United States has recently focused on making China a ‘‘responsible
stakeholder’’ that would play a positive role in the international system. That approach, which implicitly
ties together Chinese actions in different areas, has been widely accepted as an effective way of
engaging Beijing. The United States has similarly sought to help India further integrate itself into the
international mainstream. That approach to India at once appeals to Indian desires to be a great power, but is
difficult for those Indians who are still focused primarily on maintaining their country’s independence.
The United States could emphasize that being a major and responsible power entails a growing commitment
to curb greenhouse gas emissions. So long as the United States takes only voluntary and relatively mild
actions to reduce its own emissions, it can hardly argue that China and India are being irresponsible
by doing the same—indeed, it might suggest just the opposite. But as the United States takes more
aggressive action at home, it will be in a much stronger position to ask the same of others.
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Conditioning Solves – Developing Countries


Conditioning climate policy on emissions reductions will lead to an international
snowballing effect. ???
Khor 7 [Martin, Third World Network, “Bali Climate Talks to Decide Fate of Kyoto Protocol,” December 5,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/twn.ipr.info.120702.htm]
The European countries are determined to get the US involved in the next phase of commitments. The US’
well-known argument for staying out is that the large developing countries do not have to commit.
Thus Europe and Japan are doubly keen to get the developing countries to make commitments –
because they themselves desire this, and because the US requires it.
Several European countries, having woken up to the realities of climate science, desperately want the US
to be part of a post-2012 set of targets for emission cuts, and to somehow also pull in some developing
countries either to commit to cut their emissions or to undertake some semi-hard commitments.
Third, the developed countries are lagging behind in meeting their emission reduction commitments and
have failed very badly in fulfilling their finance and technology transfer commitments. In their next phase of
commitments, they want a “comprehensive” agreement in which developing countries have to make some
payment, in order for they themselves to be ready to commit again.
Bringing in developing countries and pressurizing them to commit in a “comprehensive agreement”
can help the developed countries to reduce their embarrassment of not having fulfilled their first-period
commitments, and reduce the pressure on them in negotiations for the second-period emission-reduction
commitments.
The developed countries would then have something to “trade off” – to have an agenda that includes
new and more binding commitments of the developing countries, to balance off the new commitments
of developed countries, while the latter also hold up as carrot the promise of finance and technology transfer
(which they are supposed to provide anyway, which they have not provided satisfactorily, and which they
will once again use as an “incentive”).
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Conditioning on EU Action Solves Climate Change


US – EU cooperation key to addressing climate change

Hald-Mortensen 8 (Christian Hald-Mortensen, Danish Institute of International Studies, Master in


Political Science, University of Copenhagen. “Transatlantic Climate Policy: Towards a Copenhagen Protocol in 2009” Energizing
Europe Conference, London.)
Without proper new R&D investments in clean power technology, stabilizing the climate below a
dangerous threshold would be very difficult, because the capacity to make cheap cutbacks 20 years from
now will not be available. High-carbon infrastructure could increasingly be “locked in”. A first step could
be to enact binding clean energy R&D commitments in a Post-Kyoto regime. But much stands in the way for
the EU as an energy R&D powerhouse. The EU first needs to build experience in pooling its research efforts across borders. The EU is
experimenting with new R&D collaboration models for the future; one successful platform of research collaboration has been the
Galileo satellite project, which connected the efforts of several member states. The idea has been to develop a community instrument
from this collaboration model. Today, the EU budget has allocated about $400 million will sustainable fossil fuels, carbon capturing &
sequestration and clean coal under the 7th Framework Programme71. The 7th framework opens up for allocating funds to research
collaboration with non-EU countries such as the United States, and this is a possibility that could be pursued. Historical analogies in
research cooperation teach that large-scale cross-country efforts can be successful. In agriculture, the “Green Revolution” 8,500
scientists from more than 100 countries developed higheryield crops. A bargain on energy R&D could help the
transatlantic partners capture emerging clean energy markets, create high-value jobs at home, and set
a moral example for emerging economies such as China that have made their reductions contingent on
the leadership of the developed countries. The legitimacy of such a transatlantic bargain is underpinned by
the Protocol’s “problem-effectiveness” problem72. A final reason why the EU and the U.S. could forge a
new “grand bargain” on clean energy is the extent of future benefits flowing from such a policy.
Allocating a share of BNP to energy R&D is an investment to position a nation to capture market shares:
Markets for low-carbon energy sources are estimated at $500 bn at minimum per year by 205073. Binding
transatlantic commitments in energy R&D could help reduce emissions in the long term, but also
create job growth and business opportunities.
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EU Says Yes to Conditions


If the US conditioned emission decreases on EU reductions the EU would act.
Rehn 8 [Olli, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, “Europe Leading the Global Combat, Against Climate Change,”
February 14, Seminar of the Tanner Academy
The package aims at reducing greenhouse gases by 20% independently of what other countries do. But
the EU is even ready to a 30% cut on the condition that other developed countries commit to
comparable efforts.
This is crucial. We need a 30% cut in collective emissions from developed countries by 2020, if we are to
have any chance of stopping global warming before it reaches dangerous levels.
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R & D Issue Linkage Solves

Issue linkage on R & D for alternative energy encourages action

Cosbey 7 (Aaron Cosbey, Associate & Senior Advisor, Trade and Investment Associate, Climate Change and
Energy “Trade Policy Tools and Instruments for Addressing Climate Change and Sustainable Development” Trade
Ministers’ Dialogue on Climate Change Issues, 2007.)
One possible candidate for analysis is R&D subsidies, given the increasing recognition of the
importance of new technologies as a key solution to climate change challenges, and the understanding
that private sector innovation will need to be substantially supplemented by public support. State
support for low‐GHG retrofits or the purchase of new technologies might also be considered for carve‐out,
though again it would be important to understand whether these sorts of measures were likely to be employed
in the first place. Subsidies for investment in the area of renewable energy, where there are high up‐front
outlays, might also be considered. Some have suggested that initial allocations of permits under cap and trade
regimes could be considered actionable subsidies under certain conditions, and it might be important to
clarify this question proactively. 21. The shape of any post‐2012 architecture for climate change would
be directly relevant to the scope of reform needed. If there were, for example, an international
commitment to double national R&D spending on low‐GHG technologies, this would clearly be an
area for action. On the other hand, if the commitment were to contribute to a multilateral fund for R&D, this
by itself would not imply a need for reform.

Conditioning on private goods is key to international action.

Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
Much of the interest in linkage of cooperation on climate change to cooperation on technology R&D can be traced to an influential
contribution by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997). They use a formal model connecting two symmetrical N-player games—a Prisoner’s
Dilemma-like game that takes protection of the environment to be a public good, and a cooperative game on technology R&D. Their
model assumes that technological progress benefits only parties, not nonparties, to the technology
agreement. Linkage makes participation in the environmental agreement a necessary condition for
obtaining the benefits from technology R&D. In this model, therefore, linkage has dramatic
consequences for participation: a self-enforcing environmental agreement without linkage admits only
three participating countries; however, a self-enforcing environmental agreement with linkage to
technology R&D admits up to 100 participating countries. Consequently, it seems that by linking
cooperation on an environmental problem to the exclusive benefits resulting from cooperation on technology
R&D, one might effectively remove incentives to free ride.

International cooperation on R&D is necessary to solve.

Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61]
International cooperation on research, development, and demonstration of climate-friendly
technologies addresses important gaps in national level efforts. Just as public-sector investment in RD&D
is made necessary by the fact that firms cannot fully capture the benefits of their own early-stage
investments, so international cooperation addresses the fact that RD&D funded by one country will
benefit others. Intensive international RD&D cooperation—among advanced industrial countries as
well as with major developing-country emitters—can dramatically ease the task of mitigating
emissions by speeding the development of technologies that would reduce the costs to developing
countries of cutting their emissions. Eventually, all nations might be expected to contribute to an
international RD&D program. However, only a small number of nations account for the vast majority of
energy-related research—these countries include all of the largest emitters from energy use—and a
program that begins with them would achieve most of the benefit of a concerted global approach.
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Trade Issue Linkage Solves


Environmental issues should be conditioned on trade liberalization
Carraro and Marchiori 3 (Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International
Negotiations" (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=419060)
Different policy strategies have been proposed to increase the number of players who decide to join the equilibrium coalition. Transfers
and issue linkage are probably the most popular proposed strategies, even though negotiation rules and treaty design can also be used to
achieve equilibria in which large size coalitions form at the equilibrium (Cf. Carraro, 2001). In this paper, we focus on issue linkage.
The basic idea of issue linkage is to design a negotiation framework in which countries do not negotiate
only on one issue (e.g. the environmental issue), but force themselves to negotiate on two joint issues (e.g.
the environmental one and another interrelated economic issue). Pioneering contributions on issue linkage are
those by Tollison and Willett (1979) and Sebenius (1983). They propose this mechanism to promote cooperation not only on
environmental matters, but also on other issues, e.g. security and international finance. They also emphasise
the increase in transaction costs that can result from the use of issue linkage. Issue linkage was introduced into the economic literature
on international environmental cooperation by Folmer et al. (1993) and by Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) to solve the problem of
asymmetries among countries. The intuition is simple: if some countries gain from cooperating on a given economic
issue whereas other countries gain from cooperating on another one, by linking the two issues it may
be possible to obtain an agreement that is profitable to all countries. Issue linkage can also be used to mitigate the
problem of free-riding. To do this, negotiations that are affected by free-riding -- i.e. negotiations concerning public goods -- must be
linked with negotiations on club or quasi-club goods. The intuition is that the incentives to free-ride on the non-excludable benefits of 3
public good provision can be offset by the incentives to appropriate the excludable benefits coming from providing the club good. To
address the free riding problem, Barrett (1995, 1997) proposes linking environmental protection to
negotiations on trade liberalisation. In this way, potential free-riders are deterred with threats of trade
sanctions. In Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997) and Katsoulacos (1997), environmental cooperation is linked to cooperation in
Research and Development. If a country does not cooperate on the control of the environment, it looses the benefits of technological
cooperation. An empirical analysis of this type of issue linkage in the case of climate negotiations is contained in Buchner et al. (2002).
Finally, Mohr (1995) and Mohr and Thomas (1998) propose linking climate negotiations to international debt swaps.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 78
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Trade Issue Linkage Solves


Issue linkage reduces free riders and improves the strength of coalitions
Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade:
assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)
The USA’s free riding position is (among others) a major problem for international climate policy.
Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help increase incentives to join a coalition and overcome
free riding. The concept of issue linkage has been introduced to abolish potential asymmetries among
counties (see Folmer et al., 1993; Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1996). The idea behind this proposal is that countries
benefiting from different issues should combine all issues to obtain a stable, symmetric and favorable
coalition. Pioneering issue linkage studies are conducted by Tollison and Willet (1979), Haas et al. (1993)
and Sebenius (1983). They propose issue linkages with a public good such as the environment, and other
issues, e.g. international security and finance. Barret (1995, 1997) proposes linking environmental
protection negotiations with trade liberalization. Free riders would have to pay a trade sanction
penalty. He finds that the threat of penalties can enlarge the coalition; a grant coalition is therefore hard to
obtain. The grant coalition means that coalition where all negotiating parties agree. Carraro and Siniscalco
(1995, 1997), and Katsoulacos (1997) propose linking environmental negotiations with increased
expenditures in R&D. Technological cooperation is only possible if countries collaborate on
environmental issues. Issue linkage could be an incentive for free riders to join a coalition. Issue
linkage is based on the idea that, regarding a public good, the benefits of free riding must be offset by
the gains of a jointly provided club good. Tol et al. (2000) explore the incentives of joining a coalition by
issue linkage through side payments as capital and technology transfer. They find that technology transfer
increases the incentive to cooperate. Model results of this study confirm that finding.
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Trade Issue Linkage Key to Global Trade


( ) A deal conditioned on the participation of developing countries is key to global trade
Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore,
February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis
Of course, the EC proposals, and the way they are to be phased in, are part of a bigger game plan. Europe
hopes the United Nations climate-change negotiations, launched in Bali in December, will result in a new
global agreement from 2012 on limiting greenhouse gas emissions that covers all major emitters including
China, India and other developing countries not covered by the current Kyoto Protocol, which expires in four
years.
The threat to punish economies that refuse to join any new accord may induce them to sign on. But it may
also backfire. WTO head Pascal Lamy told the Bali meeting only a multilateral deal on climate change
that included all major polluters could set the right environmental context for global trade.
It would then be incumbent upon the trading system to respond to such environmental rules as soon as
they were crafted, he said. The alternative outcome would be a real spaghetti bowl of unilateral
measures that would achieve neither trade nor environmental goals.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 80
Scholars Europe

AT: Lie Perm


For conditioning to succeed parties must believe that the conditions are absolute.
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
Second, both (or all) parties must “believe that agreement on one issue is conditional on agreement on
the other issue” (Davis, 2004, p. 156). Thus, for issue linkage to effectively induce the United States to
reengage in the Kyoto process, the Kyoto countries need to convince the United States that cooperation
on the linked issue will be terminated (or not initiated) unless the United States reengages. However,
several scholars are skeptical concerning the prospects for successfully using issue linkage for this purpose
because the threat implied in using linkage would likely not be credible. We discuss this problem in more
detail in the following sections.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 81
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***AT: Condition Counterplan


Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 82
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Conditioning Fails – Climate

Issue linkage encourages cooperation on the condition, but not on the environmental issue

Carraro and Marchiori 3 (Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International
Negotiations" (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=419060)
Let us consider an example. In the case of global environmental issues, incentives
to free-ride on emission abatement are strong and cooperation is unlikely. In
addition, there is no supra-national authority that can impose the adoption of
issue linkage. Negotiating countries therefore decide independently whether
or not to link the negotiation on a global environmental problem to the
negotiation on a different economic issue. This decision is a strategic choice that
players make. A game therefore describes the incentives to link the two issues. This game is
also characterised by free-riding incentives. The reason is that issue linkage may indeed
increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a global
environmental good; however, at the same 4 time, issue linkage may reduce
the number of cooperators on the second issue (the one linked to the
provision of the global environmental good). Hence, even if issue linkage
increases the number of signatories -- and therefore the amount of global
environmental good provided -- it may not be an equilibrium outcome.

Conditioning only works on small issues – climate is too big.

Perroni 0 [Carlo, Department of Economics Warwick University, Paola Conconi, “Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in
in Multilateral Negotiations,” April, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp558.pdf]
Our results also suggest that conditionality can only play a positive role with respect to small"
environmental problems (small in terms of the associated welfare costs and benefits in comparison with the
costs and benefits of trade policies), but is more likely to be an impediment to cooperation for broader
issues such as climate change. This provides a rationale for what seems to be the prevailing position in
policy circles with respect to global climate treaties.27
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 83
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Conditioning Fails – Power Differential

The international power differential between conditioning countries dooms the stronger
country to back out.

Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
In the remaining part of this section I want to discuss in further detail some of the papers that explored these
varied mechanisms. Giancarlo Spagnolo explores the synergic potential of linkage in the context of regimes
with asymmetrical enforcement powers.17 He considers a model of two countries, interacting over n policy
issues. The interaction over each policy issue takes place within the strategic structure of an infinitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma with complete information. Countries are assumed to be individual, rational
players.18 Underlying Spagnolo’s model is the view of the international domain as anarchic space, in which
law has no independent force. This means that international agreements are meaningful only to the extent
that they are self enforcing. That is, the agreement will be implemented only if there is a possible
equilibrium in which (given the incentive structure pertaining to the concrete regime) no party has an
incentive to withdraw (defect) unilaterally from the cooperative equilibrium. Another simplifying
assumption in Spagnolo’s model is that it disregards the transaction costs associated with the expansion of
the transnational regime through issue linkage. These simplifying assumptions raise various difficulties,
which will be explored in the next section.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 84
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Conditioning Fails – R&D

Conditioning R&D fails – the U.S. has nothing to lose and other nations have too much to
gain.

Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
Their results, which rely on computer simulations, indicate that issue linkage is unlikely to be effective in
inducing the United States to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. The intuition for
this finding is as follows: the benefits from technological cooperation are much higher for the European
Union, Japan, and above all the former Soviet Union, than for the United States. The threat of these
three countries (the environmental coalition) to exclude the United States from R&D cooperation if it
does not comply with the Kyoto agreement is therefore not credible, because the European Union,
Japan, and the former Soviet Union stand to suffer a bigger loss when the issue linkage threat is
implemented. In addition, the environmental benefits arising from cooperation on climate change
control are smaller than the technological benefits from R&D cooperation. Therefore the European
Union, Japan, and the former Soviet Union concludes that improved coordination from expanded trade may
thus represent a benefit to weigh against the environmental costs of trade liberalization (e.g., the pollution
havens effect). Her paper does not trace the causal path through which trade promotes environmental
cooperation. She hypothesizes that trade may promote cooperation by providing opportunities for implicit
side payments if explicit side payments are politically difficult, and by providing contractual opportunities
for “linking” between environmental and trade concessions (economic threats support bargaining over
environmental objectives). Economic integration also allows countries direct leverage over each other’s
production, as, for example, through pollution content tariffs. Finally, intensive trade relationships may instill
a perception of shared goals that helps resolve disputes in other arenas.29

Conditions on R&D inevitably fail.

Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
Barrett (2003) lists two possible explanations for this nonrestrictive approach. First, it may be impossible to
deprive nonparties of such benefits. Second, it may not be in the best interests of parties to deprive
nonparties of such benefits even if they could. Indeed, Barrett argues that it might be a good idea for
parties to share their R&D with nonparties. If he is right, linkage to cooperation on technology R&D
cannot overcome the free rider problem associated with environmental cooperation.
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Conditioning Fails – Developing Countries


( ) Developing countries would say no
Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore,
February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis
EC President Jose Manuel Barroso says Europe wants industry to stay in Europe, not export its jobs to other
parts of the world. The US appears to be moving toward a similar system to pricing, capping and
trading carbon emissions. But China, India and other big emerging Asian economies are extremely
reluctant to put this kind mandatory restriction on their industries, fearing it would drive up costs and
give competing economies an edge in foreign markets. They are likely to retaliate against environmental
protection measures imposed by the West or challenge them in the WTO.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 86
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AT: Capital Flight – Alt Cause

Recent studies show no connection between capital flight and regulations

Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate
Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.)
On the third question – is the pollution haven effect strong enough to induce industrial migration? –
most of the studies that have addressed this question have failed to account for other explanatory
factors.17 A few recent studies that try to control for previous errors, however, seem to find little
evidence of regulation-driven migration of industry (SQW Ltd, 2006). These studies seem to show that, at
current levels, pollution abatement costs inherent in stringent regulations are not as significant as a
host of other determining factors: access to markets (the primary driver in most studies), labour costs,
access to resources and other such variables. This is not to say that regulatory costs are not influential at the
margin, however.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 87
Scholars Europe

***Relations
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 88
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US-EU Relations Low

The Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq has collapsed US – EU relations

Asmus 3 (. Executive Director Transatlantic Center and Strategic Planning in Brussels. Foreign Affairs.
September/October 2003) online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82502-p40/ronald-d-
asmus/rebuilding-the-atlantic-alliance.html
One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the
collapse of the Atlantic alliance. Long considered America's most important alliance and a benchmark
by which a president's foreign policy skill is measured, the U.S.-European relationship has been shaken
to its foundations over a series of disputes that culminated in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. To be sure, there have
been rows across the Atlantic before: American opposition to the seizure of the Suez Canal by French, British, and Israeli troops in the
1950s; France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in the 1960s; the battle over Euromissiles in the early 1980s; and
the deep acrimony over how to stop war in the Balkans a decade ago. Still, the current rift has been unprecedented in its
scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.
Several factors make the recent collapse in transatlantic cooperation surprising. The crisis came on the heels of the alliance's renaissance
in the 1990s. Following deep initial differences over Bosnia at the start of the decade, the United States and Europe came together to
stem the bloodshed in the Balkans in 1995 and again in 1999. Led by Washington, NATO expanded to include central and eastern
Europe as part of a broader effort to secure a new post-Cold War peace. This initiative was also accompanied by the creation of a new
NATO partnership with Russia. As a result, Europe today is more democratic, peaceful, and secure than ever. For the first time in a
century, Washington need not worry about a major war on the continent -- a testimony to the success in locking in a post-Cold War peace
over the last decade.
Moreover, although the Bush administration got off on the wrong foot with Europe during its first year
in office over issues such as its spurning of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International
Criminal Court, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, unleashed a powerful wave of support for the United States in Europe.
Tragedy had handed Washington an opportunity to start afresh and reinvigorate this relationship. For the first time ever, NATO invoked
the defense clause enshrined in Article V of its charter, and U.S. allies offered to join the fight in Afghanistan. But the opportunity was
then squandered. Instead, the decision to make Iraq the next target in the war on terrorism -- and the manner in
which the administration chose to topple Saddam Hussein -- led to a spectacular political train wreck across the
Atlantic.

US – EU relations are low in the status quo

Heritage 2 (The Heritage Foundation Leadership for America. “The Future of Transatlantic Relations” August
6, 2002) online: http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/hl756.cfm
The transatlantic partnership is under serious strain with the United States and our European friends
having more and more disagreements. Our differences run the gamut from economic disputes on steel
and farm subsidies to limits on legal cooperation because of the death penalty here in the U.S. There are
charges of U.S. "unilateralism" over our actions in Afghanistan and our decisions on the ABM Treaty,
Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Protocol, and so on. There is no
agreement over what to do about Iraq or other state sponsors of terror or the crisis in the Middle East. After
September 11, European critics have switched from complaining of U.S. "isolationism," to worries about
"preemption." Add to this the decade-old doubts about the utility of NATO in the post-Cold War world, and
one could conclude that there is today a real question as to whether Europe and the United States are
parting ways.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 89
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Laundry List


Transatlantic cooperation is essential to prevent bioterrorism attacks that are highly
probable, quick timeframe, and as dangerous as nuclear war

Hamilton 3 (Daniel Hamilton, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins
University, 6/11/2003 FDCH Congressional Testimony p. lexis)
Transatlantic Homeland Security. We must develop transatlantic approaches to what Americans call
homeland security and what Europeans call societal preparedness and protection. When the United States
was attacked, our allies invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’s mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was
an attack on a shared security space—a common “homeland.” It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen
homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one’s allies. The United States may be a primary
target for al Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe. A terrorist attack on
Europe using weapons of mass destruction would immediately affect American civilians, forces and
interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself
in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is a mild portent of what could come. A
bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a
nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and international responses. Europeans and
Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges. After the September 11 attacks, it is clear that
controlling borders, operating ports or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of
identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which
European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Americans and Europeans approach this issue, of course, from different
perspectives. But unless there is systematic trans-European and transatlantic coordination in the area of
preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack.

US – EU partnership is crucial to confronting warming, terrorism, and disease

Kenen 4 (Peter B. Kenen. Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance Emeritus
Adjunct Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Transatlantic relations
and the global economy. June 9th, 2004)
Finally, the many new problems facing the Atlantic partners and, indeed, the whole world, are different
in nature and complexity from those they used to tackle. Some, such as problems posed by demographic
trends, require major changes in national regimes. Others, such as global warming, terrorism, and disease,
cannot be addressed by national governments individually but cannot be addressed by the Atlantic
partners without the active cooperation of other countries’ governments.

US-EU relations are key to preventing proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
that threat US national security

PDGS 00 (Partnership for Democratic Governance and Security. Strengthening Transatlantic Security. A
U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century. 2000) online: http://www.pdgs.org/Archivo/sts-cap6.htm
NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons and their delivery systems pose a major threat to
international security. Over 20 countries-several of which are virtually on Europe's doorstep-already
possess or are developing such weapons and/or delivery systems. The continued proliferation and
potential use of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States, its Allies and friends, and could
destabilize other regions of critical importance to us. American military superiority cannot shield us
completely from this threat. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena will likely encourage
potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas
and Americans at home. U.S. defense planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt U.S.
operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare. To address the NBC weapons threat, the
United States pursues a multidimensional strategy. Each component of our strategy depends, to varying
degrees, on close cooperation with our transatlantic Allies and Partners, backed up by active bilateral
and multilateral diplomatic efforts.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 90
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Democracy

US-EU relationship is key to promoting human rights and democracy, which is critical to
national security

Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the
Transatlantic Economy 2003)
The United States defines its "vital interests" as those interests of broad, overriding importance to the
survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Chief among these are the physical security and territorial integrity
of our nation and those of our Allies, and the protection of our critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack.
In Europe these vital interests-and our enduring commitment to the principles of democracy, human
rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law-are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and
the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European
security in the 21st century. The promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights remain
core objectives of U.S. national security strategy. Strong and vibrant democracies already exist in
much of Europe. Thus, our efforts to further these objectives focus on those states that are making the
difficult transition from closed to open societies. We seek to strengthen their commitment to human
rights and enhance their capabilities to implement democratic reforms. We are therefore working with
Allies and Partners to institutionalize democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and to integrate the
states of that region into Euro-Atlantic structures. Such reforms can help avert or resolve problems that, if
left unchecked, may lead to ethnic conflict and regional violence, threatening the security of Allies and
Partners. Our goal is to build and strengthen the pillars of civil society throughout Europe. By helping to
build civil societies, we are building peace and prosperity, which helps to strengthen U.S. security. By
joining the Western democratic family of nations, states that once lived under totalitarian or
communist rule are today working to strengthen the forces of democracy and reform, enhancing
security for the United States and all of Europe. Our abiding commitment to human rights and
democracy is not only the right thing to do, it is also in our own best national interests. Grave violations
of human rights, in the Balkans or elsewhere, challenge our values and our security.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 91
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy

US – EU relations are key to preventing global economic collapse

Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the
Transatlantic Economy 2003)
Neither party can afford a transatlantic split. Nor can the rest of the world. Should the U.S. and
Europe become regional antagonists rather than global collaborators, the global economy will suffer as
a consequence. In that the U.S. and Europe combined account for roughly 40% of world GDP and over
one-third of global trade, transatlantic disputes invariably taken on global dimensions. Without U.S.-
European cooperation, the new global trade round launched at Doha could fail. Aid and assistance to the developing nations—notably
Africa—will flounder. Europe’s enlargement process could become more fractious, as evident by the most recent split between “Old”
Europe and “New” Europe regarding America’s intent to wage war with Iraqi. When elephants dance, in other words, others stand to be
crushed. Moreover, the significance of a transatlantic split goes beyond the global economy. A serious rift would compromise and
undermine bilateral cooperation in other areas that require U.S.-European collaboration, rather than competition. The range of global
issues that require U.S.-European leadership ranges from the war on terrorism, talks on climatic change, peace in the Middle East, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and rising nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula. In the end, cracks in the
transatlantic economy represent a clear and present danger to the U.S., Europe and the global
economy. The sooner opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic come to recognize this dynamic, the
better for all concerned.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 92
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy/Leadership


( ) U.S.-EU relations are key to the global economy and U.S. leadership
Smith 06 (Mitchell P Smith, associate Professor of Political Science and International & Area Studies and Co-
Director of the European Union Center at the University of Oklahoma, Jan/Feb 2006, World Literature Today,
Vol.80, Iss. 1; pg. 20, Proquest)
So how do we assess the rising soft power of the European Union in comparison, say, with the supreme
military power of the United States? Above all, it must be kept in mind that in terms of trade, flows of
capital, and international rule-making, the United States-EU relationship is the most densely
interdependent on the globe. The United States and EU, in other words, are in fact more partners than
rivals. An economically weak European Union is not in the interest of the United States, nor is it
helpful for the global economy. The same may be said for a diplomatically weak EU. Pressing global
problems cannot be resolved without international leadership, and mounting evidence indicates the
United States can no longer lead alone.

<< INSERT BEARDEN AND/OR KHALILZAD >>


Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 93
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Leadership


( ) European relations are key to U.S. leadership
Ward 05(“The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective and Prospective” Ian
Ward Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle. Spring 2005 Tulane Journal of International and
Comparative Law, accessed 07/13/07Lexis)
Moreover, whilst Hutton and Soros might welcome a new European-led world order, others are less
sure that the isolation of an "exceptionalist" United States is likely to make the world a better, more
stable place. 271 According to British Prime Minister Blair, any EU-U.S. schism would be "profoundly
dangerous" for global security. 272 The same doubts are voiced by Timothy Garton Ash, who believes that
the transatlantic relationship may not be entirely harmonious, still less perfect, but it is the only
credible means for pursuing the goal of a free, or at least a freer, world - a goal that both parties share.
273 A similar conclusion is vigorously pressed by William Wallace, from whom "Europe remains the
indispensable partner" for "American global leadership." 274 According to Wallace, the apparent
transatlantic divergence is a misconception, representing a critical and dangerous "gap between perception
and reality." 275 The same conclusion is advanced by Antony Blinken, who has likewise characterised the
much-vaunted "crisis" as a "myth manufactured by elites," both political and academic. 276
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 94
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism


EU-US relations are key to combating global terrorism
Ward 05(“The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective and Prospective” Ian
Ward Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle. Spring 2005 Tulane Journal of International and
Comparative Law, accessed 07/13/07Lexis)
At the same time, however, it must never be forgotten that, in the real Hobbesian world, power talks. It is
for this reason that the European Union's relations with the United States will retain their central
importance. Whilst the organs of security must remain multilateral, the tools will, for the foreseeable
future, be supplied by NATO and, in reality, by the United States. The European Union must work within
this context. As the European Union's new Coordinator for Counter- Terrorism has recently
confirmed, the effectiveness of an international response to terrorism will be geared by the strength of
the EU-U.S. partnership. 383 It has become fashionable to argue for the continuation of a "good cop,
bad cop" approach, with the European Union sweet-talking the terrorists and dictators, whilst the
United States and NATO hover menacingly in the background threatening apocalyptic intervention.

Strong EU-US Relations are key to stopping Terrorism


Catto 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” Henry E. Catto Chairman
Atlantic Council Policy Paper December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_9-
11_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf)
Since the attacks of September 2001, the United States and the European Union have worked to build
effective cooperation in fighting terrorism, especially in law enforcement, border and transportation
security, and terrorist financing. This has not always been easy, as demonstrated by disputes over the
screening of shipping containers, and information about airline passengers. But despite these differences —
and the severe tensions in transatlantic relations generally — the effort to build cooperation against
terrorism has been widely regarded as one of the success stories of the U.S.-European partnership.
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism


EU-US relations are key to combating terrorism –multiple agreements on security issues prove.
EC 06 (European Commission, “Justice, Freedom and Security high on US-EU Transatlantic Agenda,” June,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/external/usa/fsj_external_usa_en.htm)
EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security after 11 September
2001 has been very successful. Concrete results were achieved with the signature of several agreements:
two Europol-US agreements in December 2001 (PDF File 27 KB) and December 2002 (PDF File 308
KB), the latter allowing for sharing of personal data. Following these two agreements, Europol has posted
two liaison officers at the European Commission's Delegation in Washington DC. In June 2003 the EU-US
Summit signed two criminal judicial cooperation agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and
Extradition (PDF File 83 KB). In addition, contacts have been established between the EU body for judicial
cooperation in criminal matters EUROJUST and US law enforcement authorities and a cooperation
agreement is under negotiation. The EU and the US further signed an agreement on the transfer of
passenger data (PDF File 83 KB) in May 2004. The annual EU/US Summit and the Ministerial
meetings regularly discuss terrorism/justice, freedom and security issues. The EU-US Summit of 26
June 2004 (PDF File 22 KB) adopted a comprehensive joint declaration on combating terrorism
including financing, preventive measures and transport security.

Strong EU/US ties are key to fight terrorism through border security, financing and
nonproliferation.
Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en)
Moreover, the two sides agreed in September 2004 to hold an annual Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial
meeting. Integration and enlargement make Europe a stronger partner, with which it is more efficient
for the US to deal with. In the economic field, US firms can now do business in a single market of 25
states. The EU can and does tackle more and more issues that are relevant for the US. For instance the
fight against terrorism - including terrorist financing, legal assistance and extradition, as well as
transport and border security - or the fight against proliferation. As for the world’s hot spots, the EU's
developing Common foreign and security policy makes it a more and more capable partner for the US.
EU-US relations are a top priority for EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Foreign policy decisions in
Europe are increasingly taken in the framework of the EU. The EU is part of the "Quartet" co-
ordinating international peace efforts in the Middle East, along with the US, Russia and the UN. In
December 2003, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy. The EU is implementing a Strategy
against the proliferation of WMD. The EU also developed civilian and military crisis management
capabilities, used in operations notably in the Western Balkans - where the EU launched operation
Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004 following the decision by NATO to terminate
its SFOR mission - and Africa. The Constitution will further strengthen the EU's foreign policy
structures and instruments.

Both the EU and the US prioritize the fight against terrorism—cooperation is key.
Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en)
The fight against terrorism is a top priority for the EU as for the US. Terrorism is identified as one of
the key threats in the European Security Strategy. In the wake of both 9/11, 2001 and 3/11, 2004, the
EU adopted a wide range of measures to intensify and better co-ordinate the fight against terrorism. A
Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, Gijs de Vries, reporting to HR Solana has been appointed. EU-US co-
operation is crucial in this regard. See Speech by G. de Vries in Washington on 13 May 2004 and speech
by G. de Vries at Clark University on 17 October 2004.
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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism


Counter-terrorism remains a high priority for the US and the EU.
Council of EU 05 (“The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy,” 10/30
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf)
Across the four pillars of the Union’s Strategy a horizontal feature is the Union’s role in the world. As
set out in the European Security Strategy, through its external action the European Union takes on a
responsibility for contributing to global security and building a safer world. Acting through and in
conjunction with the United Nations and other international or regional organisations, the EU will work to
build the international consensus and promote international standards for countering terrorism. The EU will
promote efforts in the UN to develop a global strategy for combating terrorism. Continuing to make
counter-terrorism a high priority in dialogue with key partner countries, including the USA, will also
be a core part of the European approach.

EU-US relations key to terrorism- cooperaiont


Aaron 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” David L. Aaron Senior
Fellow, Dir. RAND also- Ann M. Beauchesne Exec. Dir. U.S. Chamber’s Homeland Security Frances G. Burwell
Dir. Transatlantic Relations Richard Nelson fmr Dir. Development at the Atlantic Council. K. Jack Riley Assc. Dir.
RAND December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_9-
11_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf)
Over the next three years, the growing U.S.-EU cooperation in combating terrorism would come to be
widely regarded as one of the true success stories of transatlantic relations. That cooperation would
grow quickly, bringing together agencies and institutions in the United States and Europe that had
never worked together before — and in some cases, had not even existed. At U.S.-EU summits, terrorism
would become a primary topic and the subject of key declarations. At the June 2004 summit, the Declaration
on Combating Terrorism laid out an ambitious agenda for cooperation in this area that was widely
seen as reflecting the close and successful partnership built since September 2001.

EU-US cooperation is imperitave to fighting terrorism


Aaron 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” David L. Aaron Senior
Fellow, Dir. RAND also- Ann M. Beauchesne Exec. Dir. U.S. Chamber’s Homeland Security Frances G. Burwell
Dir. Transatlantic Relations Richard Nelson fmr Dir. Development at the Atlantic Council. K. Jack Riley Assc. Dir.
RAND December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_9-
11_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf)
Over the next decade, and perhaps much longer, the United States and Europe will continue to face the
very real threat of large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated by global organizations and networks. To
date, they have taken the first steps against that threat by building a strong partnership using a range of
resources and tools — law enforcement, judicial policy, trade and financial measures, border security, and
transport and facilities protection. They have done so despite other tensions in the overall transatlantic
relationship and very real differences in their approaches to the nature and causes of terrorism. They
now face the task of deepening that partnership and constructing a truly comprehensive, joint anti-
terrorist effort. This will be a severe challenge, but real progress in fighting terrorism will only happen
with that stronger U.S.-EU partnership.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 97
Scholars Europe

U.S.-EU Relations Good – Iran


A.) EU/US cooperation is key to stop Iranian proliferation.
European Parliament 4/26/07 (“Economic ties, missile defense and visas highlighted in debate on EU-US
relations.” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-5737-113-04-17-903-
20070420IPR05683-23-04-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm)
On environmental and energy questions, the US is pressed to reconsider its position regarding ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol and both parties are urged to develop alternative energy production methods and pursue
greater energy efficiency. Among a wide range of international issues, Parliament calls on the Council and
the USA to intensify efforts, through the Middle East Quartet, to foster negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians for a peace solution on the basis of two secure and viable states. It welcomes the formation of
the Palestinian national unity government and urges both transatlantic partners to engage in a constructive
dialogue with it. On Iran, Parliament welcomes the close cooperation between the EU and the US on
the Iranian nuclear issue, encourages both partners to continue cooperation in strengthening the IAEA
and underlines the value of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

B.) Iran Proliferation causes a global nuclear war


The Daily Texan, 2004 (September 8, accessed 07/13/07 “Iran Nuclear Program Should Not Be Ignored”
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2004/09/08/Opinion/IranNuclear.Program.Should.Not.Be.Ignored-
712197.shtml)
A nuclear Iran would be a geopolitical disaster for the United States. It would pose a direct nuclear
threat to Israel making the prospect of nuclear exchange between the two greatest powers in the region
an ever-present fear. It would put pressure on other nations in the area, fearful of Iranian aggression,
to develop their own nuclear programs. Regional faith in the American security guarantee would wane
as local leaders questioned America's willingness to become involved in a nuclear exchange far from its
borders. We would be left with the most unstable region in the world simultaneously becoming the
most nuclear. This is in addition to the obvious danger that Iran would always be able to covertly
supply a terrorist group with a small nuclear device that could one day be detonated in America.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 98
Scholars Europe

U.S.-EU Relations Good – Trade

US – EU trade relations are key to world trade

CRS 3 (Congressional Research Service. Raymond J. Ahearn. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division U.S.-
European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges) online:
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10087_06092003.pdf
The United States and European Union (EU) share a huge and mutually beneficial economic
partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest in the world, it is
arguably the most important. Agreement between the two economic superpowers has been critical to
making the world trading system more open and efficient. Given a huge level of commercial interactions,
trade tensions and disputes are not unexpected. In the past, U.S.-EU trade relations have witnessed
periodic episodes of rising trade tensions and even threats of a trade war, only to be followed by
successful efforts at dispute settlement. This ebb and flow of trade tensions has occurred again last year
and this year with high-profile disputes involving steel, tax breaks for U.S. exporters, and the EU ban on
approvals of GMO products.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 99
Scholars Europe

EU Relations Bad – Heg

EU-US Relations kill US Military efficiency key to Hegemony


Schake 01(“Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?” Kori N. Schake a senior research fellow in
the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 184 August 2001
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sck03/sck03.pdf)
The U.S. Government and most military advisors from NATO members have concerns about duplicating
planning structures and processes that exist in NATO. The concern most frequently raised is that
duplication of NATO planning will divert resources from the Alliance; this already is occurring
because of the cost of building EU military staffs. However, although this use of assets may not be
optimal, it should not prohibit support by Washington— if only because the United States has long had a
planning staff separate from NATO in U.S. European Command. More problematic in terms of coalitions
will be managing competing approaches to military planning that are likely to emerge if the European
Union seriously attempts to replicate defense and operational planning done by NATO. If EU and
NATO staffs plan in different ways to utilize the same forces in managing crises, political leaders are
likely to be faced with competition. Even in the unlikely event that these staffs retain a common
approach, processes probably will be confusing to political leaders and delay decisions. Furthermore,
the staffs are unlikely to maintain a common approach over time because EU military staffs will
assume that they cannot rely on the breadth of U.S. military assets. The problem of separate planning
is thus a serious one, both politically and militarily. But it is not insurmountable. It simply requires
careful and dedicated work to determine how to manage the emerging EU decision structures in ways
that do not impede the ability of U.S. and European forces to work together, which they are likely to do
in most cases. Military planners manage these kinds of competing demands routinely, whether the context is
distributing scarce assets across different contingencies or deconflicting regional plans with drawing rights
on the same forces. For NATO, the risk of duplication is probably worth running if it produces a
European Union more willing and able to manage crises without relying so heavily on the United
States.

EU kills U.S. Hard Power


Serfaty 03(“Studies Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership” Simon Serfaty director of European Studies CSIS
May 2003 http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030718_bxl/serfati-transatlpart.pdf)
A generation ago, it will be recalled, it was a perceived “decline” of U.S. power that was said to be
causing an endangered Europe to rebel against an alleged U.S. “arrogance” in order to insulate the
allies from the consequences of failed U.S. policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. By comparison, today’s
arguments respond to the same general goal—this time, however, aiming at the rise of U.S. power,
especially military power. The goal, it is argued, is no longer to help Europe grow but to make U.S.
power shrink by imposing upon the latter the same institutional discipline—at the United Nations and
within NATO—that the countries of Europe accepted in the context of their union. In other words,
Europe’s fear now stems from an excess of U.S. power that is reportedly inviting a neo-interventionism
à l’américaine, that is, sans the Europeans. Indeed, it is now argued in the United States, if the “old” alliance
is fading for lack of followership, something “new” may have to be organized in its place—with new NATO
members from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which have not yet been corrupted by membership in the
EU, or with late EU members like Britain and Spain, which have not succumbed to pressures from core
members like France and Germany.3
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 100
Scholars Europe

EU Relations Bad – Terrorism


EU-US Relations hamper US counter-terrorism abilities
Archick and Morelli 06(“The United States and Europe: Current Issues” Kristin Archick and Vince L. Morelli
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress November 21, 2006
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf)
European countries and the EU have been active partners with the United States in the fight against terrorism
in the years since September 2001. Washington has welcomed EU efforts to boost police and judicial
cooperation among its 25 member states, stem terrorist financing, strengthen border controls, and improve
transport security. The EU and the United States have concluded several new agreements on police
information-sharing, extradition, mutual legal assistance, container security, and exchanging airline
passenger data. Nevertheless, some challenges remain. For example, European opposition to the U.S. death
penalty may still impede extradition of terrorist suspects. Some differences also persist in U.S. and EU
terrorist blacklists; most notably, the EU does not recognize the Lebanese-based Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization. Many Europeans also fear that the United States is losing the battle for Muslim
“hearts and minds” as a result of the war with Iraq, past prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and the
detention center at Guantánamo Bay. The EU has expressed its strong desire to see that facility closed
as soon as possible because the Europeans believe it degrades shared values regarding human rights and
disregards international accords on the treatment of prisoners. President Bush has acknowledged European
concerns but stated that some of the remaining prisoners cannot be released because they are
considered too dangerous. U.S. policymakers are working on forging agreements with foreign
governments that would receive some of the prisoners eventually released.

Unilateralism key to fighing terror – the alternative is hard headed multilateralism


Stewart Patrick, researcher at the center for international cooperation at NYU, 02 [feb 5, “MULTILATERALISM
AND US FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT,
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/127.html, accessed 7-17-07]
We now find ourselves in dramatically different political and economic circumstances, especially in the
wake of the September 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. While Congress may
be much more open to the use of multilateral instruments and to meeting our legal obligations, the current
administration’s approach to global engagement appears far less ambivalent, indeed highly selective,
based on an overriding conviction in the right and responsibility of the United States to go it alone as
circumstances require, a position reinforced at the World Economic Forum by the statements of both the
Secretary of State and of Treasury. Indeed, we may well be seeing a convergence around the quintessential
"selective" processes defined earlier by Richard Haass as "a la carte multilateralism" and more recently as
"hard-headed multilateralism."