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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 Federalism Neg

Federalism DA

Federalism DA...........................................................1 ***INDIA***..........................................................36


***UNIQUENESS*** ..............................................2 India 1NC ................................................................36
States In Power Now .................................................2 India 1NC ................................................................37
***LINKS*** ...........................................................3 India Decentralizing Now........................................38
Links – Generic Renewables/Alts .............................3 Indian Fism Key to Econ .........................................39
Links – Cellulosic Ethanol.........................................4 Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict .........................40
Links – Cellulosic Ethanol.........................................5 Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict .........................41
Links – Cellulosic Ethanol.........................................6 Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict .........................42
Links - Electricity Generation ...................................7 Indian Fism Solves India-Pakistan War...................43
Links – GHGs............................................................8 ***RUSSIA*** .......................................................44
Links – RPS...............................................................9 Russia Models US ...................................................44
Links – Preemption..................................................10 Russian Federalism Impact Module ........................45
Link Booster - Jurisdictional Control ......................11 Russian Fism Key to Economy................................46
Federal-State Power Zero-Sum................................12 Russian Fism Solves Civil War ...............................47
***INTERNALS*** ...............................................13 Russian Federalism Solves Democracy...................48
US Federalism Modeled ..........................................13 Russian Democracy Impact .....................................49
US Federalism Modeled ..........................................14 Russian Fism Solves Nationalism ...........................50
***Domestic Impacts*** ........................................15 Nationalism Impact..................................................51
Tyranny ...................................................................15 Russian Fism Solves Nuclear Leakage/Terrorism...52
Tyranny ...................................................................16 Russian Federalism Solves Prolif ...........................53
Tyranny ...................................................................17 Russian Fism Solves Ethnic Genocide ....................54
Tyranny Impacts ......................................................18 AT: Russian Fism Impossible..................................55
***Generic War Impacts*** ...................................19 ***2NC ANSWERS TO AFF ARGS*** ...............56
Fism Solves Global War..........................................19 AT: Federalism => Disintegration...........................56
Federalism Solves Globar War................................20 AT: States Hurt Rights ............................................57
***DEMOCRACY***............................................21 AT: “States Are Racist”...........................................58
Democracy – 1NC ...................................................21 ***AFF ANSWERS***..........................................59
US Model Key to Democracy..................................22 N/U – California Emissions.....................................59
Fism Key to Democracy ..........................................23 N/U – Centralization Now - Environment...............60
Federalism Key to Democracy ................................24 N/U – Centralization Now – Environment ..............61
Fism Key to Democracy ..........................................25 N/U – Centralization Now .......................................62
***Self-D/Secessionism*** ....................................26 NU – Centralization Already Modeled....................63
***Self-D/Secessionism*** ....................................26 Fism Bad – Externalities..........................................64
Fism Solves Self Determination ..............................26
Fism Solves Self Determination ..............................27
Fism Solves Self-Determination..............................28
Federalism Solves Self-Determination ....................29
AT: “Federalism Accelerates Secessionism”...........30
AT: “Federalism Accelerates Secessionism”...........31
Secessionism Impact - Genocide .............................32
Secessionism Impacts - War....................................33
Secessionism Impact – Economy ............................34
Secessionism Impact – Turns Solvency...................35

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***UNIQUENESS***

States In Power Now


( _ ) Balance of Power has shifted towards the states
Linhorst in 02 Donald M. Linhorst, PhD, assistant professor, School of Social Service, Saint Louis
University Federalism and social justice: implication for social 2002 p.
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=107&sid=9ccfe626-7294-49f0-8aba-
6fc3b7f3ea65%40sessionmgr109

Federalism is a system of government that divides power between two or more levels of government. During
the current conservative political climate in the United States, power has shifted increasingly from the
federal government to states, a move that has implications for the achievement of social justice. Consequently,
it is now necessary for social workers to engage in political activity at the state and local levels, in addition to the
federal level, to promote social justice. Implications for social work policy practice, research, and education for
advancing social justice within the federal system of government are explored. As we enter the 21st century,
the current conservative political environment of the United States is likely to continue and possibly
become more entrenched. One outgrowth of this movement is increased responsibility placed on state and
local governments for social programs. The dismantling or underfunding of many federal social programs and
the devolution of more social programs to states have serious implications for social justice.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***LINKS***

Links – Generic Renewables/Alts


( _ ) States are implementing major renewable initiatives that rival many international
programs.
Rabe - professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan –
1/2/2008
(Barry G., “Second generation climate policies in the United States,” The Encyclopedia of Earth,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:N3Tuqu2xHdEJ:www.eoearth.org/article/Second_generation_climate_poli
cies_in_the_United_States+RPS+has+become+very+popular+with+states&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us )

This familiar tale, however, fails to provide a complete picture of the evolving U.S. engagement in climate
policy. Indeed, at the very time federal institutions continued to thrash about on this issue, major new initiatives
were launched, with bipartisan support, in such diverse state capitals as Sacramento (Calif.), Carson City (Nev.),
Santa Fe (N.M.), Austin (Tex.), Harrisburg (Penn.), Albany (N.Y.), and Hartford (Conn.). By the middle of the
current decade, more than half of the U.S. states could be fairly characterized as actively involved in climate
change policy, with one or more policies that promised to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Virtually all states were beginning to at least study the issue and explore very modest remedies. A growing
number of these—such as California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York—were every bit as engaged on
multiple policy fronts as counterparts in European capitals and far more active than all Canadian provinces
except Manitoba. These programs are beginning to have some effect on stabilizing emissions from their
jurisdictions. Indeed, many states are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus state programs offer
considerable potential for reducing emissions. If the fifty states were to secede and become sovereign nations,
thirteen would rank among the world’s top forty nations in emissions, led by Texas in seventh place ahead of the
United Kingdom.

( _ ) State capacity has grown with active engagement in environmental protection.


Rabe - professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan –
1/2/2008
(Barry G., “Second generation climate policies in the United States,” The Encyclopedia of Earth,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:N3Tuqu2xHdEJ:www.eoearth.org/article/Second_generation_climate_poli
cies_in_the_United_States+RPS+has+become+very+popular+with+states&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us )

Bottom-Up Policy Many accounts of U.S. public policy are written as if the United States operated as a unitary
system, whereby all innovations and initiatives emanate from the federal government. A more nuanced view of
U.S. federalism indicates that states have often served a far more expansive and visionary role. The potential for
early and active state engagement on policy issues has intensified in recent decades, as the capacity of most state
governments has grown markedly. This has led in many instances to dramatic increases in state revenue and
expansion of state agencies with considerable oversight in all areas relevant to greenhouse gases, including
environmental protection, energy, transportation, and natural resources. Even in areas with significant federal
policy oversight, states have become increasingly active and, in some cases, fairly autonomous in interpretation,
implementation, and innovation.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – Cellulosic Ethanol


( _ )States are leading in cellulosic ethanol production.
US Depeartment of Energy – 2/21/2007
(“Cellulosic Ethanol Facilities Planned for Louisiana and Georgia,” US Department of Energy,
http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/state_news_detail.cfm/news_id=10581/state=LA )

Celunol's pilot facility follows in the path of the Bioethanol Pilot Plant, which opened at DOE's National
Renewable Energy Laboratory back in 1994. Southern states may be taking the lead in cellulosic ethanol
production, as efforts are underway in both Louisiana and Georgia to build the first large production facilities. In
Jennings, Louisiana, Celunol Corporation broke ground on February 16th on a demonstration-scale facility
designed to produce 1.4 million gallons of ethanol per year from low-cost crops and sugarcane wastes. The
company has also just completed a pilot-scale facility, capable of producing 50,000 gallons of ethanol per year.
Massachusetts-based Celunol holds exclusive rights to a technology developed by the University of Florida and
has licensed the technology to a Japanese company that is currently producing ethanol from wood waste in
Osaka, Japan. Celunol's patented production process employs a combination of microorganisms and specialty
enzymes to convert up to 95 percent of the available sugars in biomass feedstocks into fuel ethanol. Celunol
expects construction on its Louisiana facility to be completed before the end of the year. See the press releases
from Celunol and the Renewable Fuels Association. While Celunol is employing a biological process to convert
biomass to ethanol, a Colorado-based company plans to produce ethanol from wood waste using gasification.
Range Fuels, Inc. plans to build a facility in Georgia that will employ high temperatures to convert the biomass
into "synthesis gas," which will be converted into ethanol in a separate step. Located in a rural area west of
Savannah, Georgia, the facility is expected to create 70 new jobs. See the press releases from Range Fuels and
Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue.

( _ ) Michigan is developing cellulosic ethanol technologies.


Energy Current- News Agency – 7/1/2008
(“Michigan to host Mascoma's wood-based ethanol plant” Energy Current,
http://www.energycurrent.com/index.php?id=3&storyid=11543)

LANSING, MICH.: Boston-based Mascoma Corp. intends to build its first commercial scale wood-based
ethanol plant in south of Sault Ste. Marie city in the Chippewa County of Michigan. Mascoma will be eligible
for a US$15 million grant from the state government that will go to financing the new plant. The state
government has also granted the biofuel producer a choice of two locations to site the new plant. Mascoma said
Michigan was selected for its vast forest resources and agricultural materials. Mascoma will work with
Michigan State University (MSU) and Michigan Technology University (MTU) to develop and hone scientific
processes that utilise Michigan feedstocks for cellulosic ethanol production. MSU will provide expertise in areas
primarily relating to pretreatment technology for cellulosic ethanol production and assistance with renewable
energy crops that can be utilised by the biorefinery. MTU will contribute its knowledge of sustainable forestry
management practices and access to its automotive engineering laboratories for analysis of the biofuels produced
at the site of the new plant. The new plant is also backed by Mascoma's alliance with natural resource company,
JM Longyear.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – Cellulosic Ethanol


( _ )Oklahoma is working on cellulosic ethanol projects.
Associated Press- 6/17/2008
(“Farming for cellulosic ethanol gets started” MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25121471/ )

GUYMON, Okla. - Work has started on the planting of a 1,000-acre switchgrass field in the Oklahoma
Panhandle that researchers plan to use in the production of cellulosic ethanol. The field is being touted as the
world's largest for switchgrass, a drought-resistant perennial plant that grows even on marginal lands. Scientists
at the Noble Foundation in Ardmore are overseeing the project and hope that switchgrass proves to be a viable
substitute for corn in ethanol production. Hitch Enterprises, a Panhandle-based company, began planting the
field earlier this month. Smaller fields of switchgrass also will be planted in central Oklahoma near Chickasha
and Maysville. Rising food costs recently resulted in a pushback against renewable fields," said David
Fleischaker, the state's energy secretary. "However, cellulosic ethanol from sources like switchgrass and
sorghum are noncompetitive with food sources for animals and humans." The crop from the field will be cut and
sent to a new biorefinery that will be built by Abengoa Bioenergy of Hugoton, Kan., just across the state line
from Guymon. The biorefinery should be ready for use by 2010. The Noble Foundation is working with the
Oklahoma Bioenergy Center, the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University on the switchgrass
project.

( _ ) Georgia is leading in the cellulosic ethanol revolution.


Bello – Staff writer – 6/18/2008
(Marisol, “Midwest, move over: Ga. joins the ethanol gold rush,” USAToday,
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070823/a_ethanol23.art.htm)

With its 25 million acres of forest second only to Oregon, Georgia is setting itself up to lead the ethanol
revolution. The state not only wants to produce and sell corn ethanol, which until recently has been confined to
Midwestern corn-growing states, it wants to lead the way for cellulosic ethanol, which is made from organic
matter such as trees, plants, peanut shells and sugar cane. Amid concerns over high oil prices and the
environmental impact of fossil fuels, Georgia is among a handful of states outside the Corn Belt that are joining
the gold rush for ethanol, an alcohol fuel that many hope can lessen the country's dependency on gasoline.
Backed by federal subsidies for producing and selling ethanol, the states are adding their own incentives to
attract ethanol producers and convince retailers to install pumps selling the alternative fuel.

( _ ) States are starting to develop their own cellulosic ethanol plants.


Bello – Staff writer – 6/18/2008
(Marisol, “Midwest, move over: Ga. joins the ethanol gold rush,” USAToday,
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070823/a_ethanol23.art.htm)

New York offers a 15-cents-per-gallon tax credit for producers of biofuels, including E85, after they produce
their first 40,000 gallons. Georgia has tax credits for equipment and expedites permits and other paperwork. Next
year, South Carolina will return to drivers the first $300 they spend on E85. The number of gas stations offering
E85, a blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline usable in engines modified for it, has almost tripled in the past
two years to 1,200. The market, though, is still less than 1% of the nation's 170,000 gas stations. Colorado has 29
stations with E85 pumps and expects to see another 21 open by the end of the year. New York just opened two
retail E85 pumps. South Carolina, with 37, has the most outside the Midwest. Several states — including Texas,
California and Georgia — are attracting corn and cellulosic ethanol producers. Louisiana is opening its first
cellulosic ethanol plant, which by 2010 is slated to produce about 20 million gallons of ethanol a year from the
pulp left over after sugar is extracted from the cane. "All the stars are lining up," says Michael Olivier,
Louisiana's economic development secretary. "It's an evolution. … In the long term, those states that are engaged
in the biodiesel, biomass energy process, they will be the winners."

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – Cellulosic Ethanol


( _ ) Georgia is leading in ethanol production.
Bello – Staff writer – 6/18/2008
(Marisol, “Midwest, move over: Ga. joins the ethanol gold rush,” USAToday,
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070823/a_ethanol23.art.htm)

Last year, the USA produced almost 6 billion gallons of ethanol, according to the Renewable Fuels Association.
Construction of 77 more plants is expected to double production by next year, says Bob Dinneen, the
association's president. Georgia wants to lead the pack. It is launching a dizzying number of projects to
eventually help the state produce about a quarter of the fuel used by its residents, says Jill Stuckey, the director
of alternative fuels. Before Hurricane Katrina hit two years ago and threatened Georgia's oil pipelines and gas
supplies, Stuckey was a bit like the Maytag repairman; there wasn't much buzz around her work. After Katrina,
"Suddenly I was popular," she says. Stuckey traverses the state for locations to entice biofuel companies, which
make fuel derived from organic matter, to invest in Georgia. One of her big catches is Range Fuels, a Colorado
company that plans to open a plant next year in southern Georgia that will make 20 million gallons of ethanol a
year using the state's vast timber inventory. Right now, Georgia has only one ethanol producer, in Baconton,
where Wind Gap Farms has been churning out about 500,000 gallons a year for two decades. Ethanol is a
byproduct of its primary business, drying yeast from beer waste that it sells to make pet food.

( _ ) States Fund Cellulosic Ethanol

Walsh, Staff Reporter 6/27/08, p.


http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080627/COL06/806270405/1081
(Tom, “State races to be 1st big wood ethanol maker”, Detroit Free Press)

As corn prices soar and the food-versus-fuel debate over corn-based ethanol rages on, the State of Michigan and
Mascoma Corp. of Boston are finalizing details of a deal to create the world's first commercial-scale plant to
make millions of gallons of cellulosic ethanol from wood chips. Today in Lansing, Gov. Jennifer Granholm
and Mascoma CEO Bruce Jamerson are to spell out key details and partners in the project. Mascoma has homed
in on two possible sites in the Upper Peninsula's Chippewa County, near the former Kincheloe Air Force Base,
south of Sault Ste. Marie. The State of Michigan will provide $15 million from the 21st Century Jobs Fund to
support the project, which eventually will entail investment of $250 million or more by Mascoma and its
partners. The Mascoma project will be the first of what Granholm hopes will be as many as 10 "Centers of
Energy Excellence," special zones where the state works with universities to help finance commercialization of
new energy technologies. Michigan State University and Michigan Technological University are partnering with
Mascoma. Tax credits also will be offered to attract supply chain partners to cluster around projects like
Mascoma's in the UP. J.M. Longyear, a Marquette-based firm that owns more than 65,000 acres of forest land in
the UP, has signed on as a joint venture partner in to the project. General Motors Corp. and Marathon Oil have
made equity investments in Mascoma, along with Khosla Ventures, a major Silicon Valley venture capital firm
specializing in green technology. "Michigan, for us, is becoming one of the power alleys" in biofuels
development, said Jamerson, Mascoma's president and CEO and a University of Michigan graduate. The UP's
vast tracts of sustainable forest land, plus equity stakes in Mascoma taken by GM and Marathon, ensure that
resources and expertise in fuel distribution and vehicle design are available. Mascoma currently has a small pilot
plant starting up in Rome, N.Y., and a larger demonstration plant planned in Tennessee. Mascoma officials said
they hope to be producing ethanol in big quantities for distribution in the Midwest by late 2010 or early 2011.
Fifty to 100 high-paying jobs will be created at the plant and laboratory on the manufacturing site; another 200 to
300 jobs are expected in cutting and preparing the wood feedstock and another 150 to 200 jobs in transportation.
"We're in a race," Granholm told me Wednesday, to become the first state producing cellulosic ethanol from
wood in high volume. Range Fuels, another firm in which Khosla is an investor, has announced plans for a plant
in Georgia, using feedstock from the state's pine forests.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links - Electricity Generation


( _ ) States have jurisdiction over electricity generation subsidies in the status quo
Ferry in 06 (Steven Ferry, March 2006, law professor, Electricity Journal, p. 122)

More than a dozen states have established renewable energy subsidy programs funded by system benefit
charges that over this decade should raise approximately $3.4 billion. Between 1998 and 2012,
approximately $3.5 billion will be collected by the original 14 states with renewable energy funds. More than
half the amount collected – at least $135 million per year – comes from just California. The funding levels range
from $0.07/MWh in Wisconsin up to almost $0.6/MWh in Massachusetts. The funds are disbursed as either
investments, grants, other subsidies, or R&D grants by the funding agency. Most only provide assistance
to new projects, and not existing renewable projects. Normalizing all incentives to a five-year production
incentive equivalent utilizing a 10 percent discount rate, states have subsidized large-scale renewable energy
projects in a range of 0.1–7¢/kWh.7 Wind power has been a major beneficiary of these subsidies. The subsidy
level in California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island ranges from 0.59 to 1.95¢/kWh for wind and
hydroelectric projects, and from 0.11 to 0.57¢/kWh for landfill gas projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission suggested that states have jurisdiction to implement the charge.

( _ ) States have dominated in electricity regulations, building bipartisan coalitions for


action.
Rabe - professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan –
1/2/2008
(Barry G., “Second generation climate policies in the United States,” The Encyclopedia of Earth,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:N3Tuqu2xHdEJ:www.eoearth.org/article/Second_generation_climate_poli
cies_in_the_United_States+RPS+has+become+very+popular+with+states&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us )

Extending such resources and powers into the realm of climate change is a fairly incremental step in some
instances, such as electricity regulation, where state governments have been dominant for decades. But the
burgeoning state role must be seen as not merely an extension of existing authority but rather a new movement
of sorts driven by a set of factors distinct to the issue of climate change. These factors have proven increasingly
influential in a wide range of jurisdictions, overcoming inherent opposition and building generally broad and
bipartisan coalitions for action. In some jurisdictions, this dynamic has advanced so far that one of the greatest
conflicts in climate policy innovation is determining which political leaders get to “claim credit” for taking early
steps. The following factors appear to be pivotal drivers behind action in numerous states.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – GHGs
( _ ) States have implemented policies to regulate greenhouse gases.
Rabe - professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan –
1/2/2008
(Barry G., “Second generation climate policies in the United States,” The Encyclopedia of Earth,
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:N3Tuqu2xHdEJ:www.eoearth.org/article/Second_generation_climate_poli
cies_in_the_United_States+RPS+has+become+very+popular+with+states&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us

Continuing Proliferation Perhaps the most evident trend in state policy engagement on climate change is that the
number of states involved as well as aggregate number and range of policies continues to expand on a monthly
basis. As of mid-2006, this trend showed no signs of slowing; it may in fact be accelerating. More than half of
the states have enacted at least one piece of climate legislation or passed at least one executive order that sets
formal requirements for reducing greenhouse gases; 18 states have passed multiple laws designed to achieve
such reductions. Forty-seven have completed greenhouse gas inventories and 22 have set forth “action plans” to
guide future policy. In six cases, states have formally established statewide commitments to reduce production of
greenhouse gases over future years and decades, linked to policies designed to attain these reduction pledges.
Renewable energy, discussed further below, has been a particularly popular area of engagement, with 22 states
enacting so-called “renewable portfolio standards” (RPS) that mandate a formal increase in the amount of
electricity distributed in a state that must be generated from renewable sources. Fifteen states have established
their own version of carbon taxes, through so-called “social benefit charges” that allocate their revenues to
renewable energy development or energy efficiency projects. In transportation, 10 states have agreed to follow
California in establishing the world’s first carbon dioxide emissions standards for vehicles and 12 states are
engaged in some form of capping carbon emissions from electrical utilities.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – RPS
( _ ) RPS has become the most popular state level policy to support renewable energy.
Clean Energy States Alliance– 8/12/2005
(Northeast RPS Compliance Markets: An Examination of Opportunities to Advance REC Trading,” Clean
Energy States Alliance, policy.rutgers.edu/ceeep//images/Northeast%20RPS%20Compliance%20Mark
ets%2010-12-05.pdf)

Renewable Portfolio Standards have become the most popular state- level policy to support renewable energy in
the United States. Of all of the state- level policies, the RPS is proving to be the most important in stimulating
large amounts of renewable energy additions. Massachusetts was one of the first states to enact an RPS, in 1997,
but Connecticut has the distinction of having one of the earliest effective dates for any RPS, January 1, 2000. In
the northeastern United States of America, nine states and the District of Columbia currently have RPS policies,
and nine of these recognize the trading of RECs as a compliance mechanism. The states are Connecticut,
Washington D.C., Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island. Vermont currently does not have an RPS, but the General Assembly recently passed a bill that directs the
Public Service Board to implement an RPS in 2013 if certain conditions are not met, concerning the load growth
in the state and the voluntary acquisition by Vermont utilities of renewable energy sufficient to cover the growth
in load from the period of 2005 to 2012. Within the northeast, there are three Independent System Operators
(ISOs) that facilitate open access of the electric transmission system, administer a robust energy market, and
ensure the reliability of the nation's power grid. The ISOs do not develop or enforce any renewable portfolio
standards upon their participants, but ISOs are well suited for tracking the trade of RECs, as they operate
regional market settlement systems that perform billing and settlements for their respective wholesale electricity
markets and have the capacity to track the deliverability of electricity. The northern-most ISO is ISO-New
England (ISO-NE), which oversees the competitive wholesale electricity market in the regional power grid
created by the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) that now includes more than 350 separate generating plants
and more than 8,000 miles of transmission lines. Of the northeastern RPS states, four are served by ISO-NE –
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Directly to the west of and adjacent to ISO-NE, is NYISO,
which serves all of New York State. New York is among the northeastern RPS states, although it does not
recognize REC trading as a compliance vehicle. To the south of NYISO is PJM Interconnection (PJM), which
operates the largest competitive wholesale electricity market in the world. PJM coordinates the movement of
electricity as far south as North Carolina and as far west as Illinois. This ISO serves four of the northeastern RPS
states and Washington D.C., which also has an RPS, – Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Links – Preemption
( _ ) Federal pre-emption of state issues undermines federalism

Young in 04 (Ernest Young, law professor, Texas, Texas Law Review, November, 2004, p. 32)

Second, limiting preemption seeks to address certain process defects that may render the national political
process less protective of state autonomy. Professor Hoke has argued that the sort of concentrated interest
groups that often seek preemption of state regulation have certain organizational advantages at the federal level
that offset state representation. More fundamentally, I have already emphasized the extent to which widespread
preemption threatens the state autonomy necessary to maintain a viable system of political checks on
central power. Limits on preemption thus address problems that undermine the self-enforcing character
of the system.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Link Booster - Jurisdictional Control


( _ ) Federal energy requirements supplant state jurisdictional control

Ferrey in 04 (Steven Ferrey, law professor Suffolk, New York University Environmental Law
Journal, 2004, p. 403)

States can segment the market to promote renewable energy. FERC expressly acknowledged a state's
ability to promulgate regulations favoring particular generation technologies over others, in holding that a
"state may choose to require a utility to construct generation capacity of a preferred technology or to purchase
power from the supplier of a particular type of resource." FERC suggests that the mechanism to do this may be
for "a state [to] account for environmental costs of all fuel sources including an all source determination of
avoided cost." This provides a means, as long as the price paid is not more than the general market or
administratively set price. While states may not violate federal law, they retain jurisdiction to structure the
resource composition of the power supply market.

( _ ) Supplanting state actions erodes federalism

Lack in 95 (James Lack, Senator ’95, New York, Serial No. J-104-31, 7-11, p. 11)

Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider cases
that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in nullifying
state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may address. The
threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Federal-State Power Zero-Sum


( _ ) Federal exercise of power reduces state power

Yoo in 97 (John Yoo, law professor, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, v. 70,1997, p.
1352)

It is important to note that Justice Kennedy did not differentiate between laws that regulated states qua states and
those that regulated private parties in areas that might be thought to lie within state power. Following Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence treated the exercise of any federal
power as a diminution of the power of the states and hence a reduction of state sovereignty.

(_ ) Any expansion of federal power undermines state power

Bybee in 2k (Jay S. Bybee, Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, 2000, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spring, p.
557)

Although the context for Tenth Amendment litigation has involved disputes between states and the federal
government, residual state authority also inures to the benefit of "the people." In any contest between Congress
and the states, a decision that favors expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors the states and the people.
When Justice Souter wrote in Alden that "the commerce power is no longer thought to be circumscribed," he
meant, implicitly, that the people have reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it.

( _ ) Even if the plan doesn’t explicitly restrict state power, federal action in an area still
discourages state action and autonomy

Oakley in 96 (John B. Oakley, professor of law at University of California at Davis, 1996, ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, January,
p. 115)

In the absence of such justifications, the federal enthusiasm is likely to do more harm than good, distracting
federal efforts from areas where it has a distinct comparative advantage, complicating accountability for areas
that have long been considered the responsibility of state and local government, and discouraging the
development by those governments of the capacities needed to carry out their responsibilities.

( _ ) Federal and state power trades off


Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring 2000, p. 565-6

The new term actually gives us a new perspective on the enumerated powers. No power granted to Congress -
think of the Commerce Clause - may be so construed as to preempt entirely the states' power over the people. I
employ the phrase "power over the people" for two reasons. First, this phrase emphasizes that the reserved
powers of the states must somehow reflect general sovereign powers, which are powers over people. The "States
qua States" cases preserve the states' power over some people - those who are state employees. A state that may
resist commandeering so as to retain only the power to exist in name possesses no meaningful powers. Second, I
refer to the states' power over "people" because the Court has overlooked "the people" in its arguments over the
Tenth Amendment, and "the people's" rights are also reserved. The Tenth Amendment expresses a triangular
relationship among the federal government, state governments, and the people. Although the context for Tenth
Amendment litigation has involved disputes between states and the federal government, residual state authority
also inures to the benefit of "the people." In any contest between Congress and the states, a decision that favors
expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors the states and the people. When Justice Souter wrote in Alden that
"the commerce power is no longer thought to be circumscribed," he meant, implicitly, that the people have
reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it.

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***INTERNALS***
US Federalism Modeled
( _ ) US federalism and constitutionalism are globally modeled
Mallat in 03 (Chilbi Mallat, Ph.D., University of London, CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Winter 2003, p. 9)

Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices, summarized what he calls the underlying political ideas of the
American system into a list of six categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers,
equality before the law, individual autonomy and procedural fairness. America has shared many of these traits
with other democracies for a long time, but two constitutional features stand out on a world level as
typically American -- federalism and the Supreme Court. The American people deserve credit for both
inventions which brought new dimensions to democracy and the rule of law for the rest of the planet.
Perhaps America does not know it, but the world has been a consistently better place wherever her two home-
grown intellectual products have found anchor.

( _ ) US federalism model is accepted worldwide but it isn’t static – changes are recognized

Tarr in 05 (G. Alan Tarr “United States of America” ” appearing in John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr,
editors Constituional Origins, structure and change in federal democracies” McGill
Queen’s University Press, Montreal and Kingston: 2005 pg 382)

The United States of America is the world's oldest, continuing, modern federal democracy. Indeed, the framers
of the United States Constitution are widely regarded as the inventors of modern federalism, as distinct from
ancient forms of federalism, especially confederalism. The US Constitution has been influential as a model of
federal democracy, and key principles of the Constitution - such as federalism, the separation of powers, an
independent judiciary, and individual rights - have gained acceptance worldwide. Americans believe that the
nation's success owes much to the brilliance of the Constiution's drafters. Yet neither the Constitution, nor the
federal polity it created, has remained static. Amendments adopted after the Civil War (186 1 -65) altered the
federal-state balance, and the authorization of a federal income tax in the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) greatly
augmented the fiscal power of the federal government. The Constitution has also both influenced and been
influenced by political and social developments, including the transformation of the United States from a few
states hugging the Atlantic Coast to a continental nation and also from a country recently liberated from colonial
rule to an economic and military superpower.

13
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

US Federalism Modeled
( _ ) US federalism modeled globally
Calabresi in 95 (Steven Calabresi, Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., 1995, Michigan Law Review,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, p. lexis)

At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily
large number of very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-
states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India,
and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the
ones they replaced. Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have
chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia,
Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the
world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the
forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining
highly centralized democratic nation-states like Great Britain, France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or
devolutionary crises. Other highly centralized nation-states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as
well as a democratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face serious
pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all
have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been
so great that some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. All of this still could be threatened, of course, by a
resurgence of nationalism in Russia or elsewhere, but the long-term antinationalist trend seems fairly secure.
There is no serious intellectual support for nationalism anywhere in the world today, whereas everywhere people
seem interested in exploring new transnational and devolutionary federal forms. The democratic revolution that
was launched in Philadelphia in 1776 has won, and now it seems that democrats everywhere join Madison in
"cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists."

( _ ) US is the key global model federalism – examples prove

London in 2k (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute and Professor Emeritus at NYU
“The Enemy Within” April 1st, 2001
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=1398&pubType=
HI_Articles)

Fourth, the United States possesses a sense of moral universalism that exists nowhere else. When one talks
about some sort of example—a model of human rights, constitutionalism, subsidiarity, rule of law, and
property rights—the United States stands alone. It is the model. Not long ago several Hudson Institute
scholars had the opportunity to spend some time in Indonesia, and we found that Indonesia does not turn for
its models to China or Japan; it looks to the United States. The new Indonesian president is very keen on
establishing a form of federalism. What does he look to? The American Constitution. Fifth and last, the
rest of the world looks to the United States for answers. Very recently, an American deputy secretary of state
said, “Everyone’s crisis is America’s crisis.” Why? Because the world looks to the United States as its
model. As a consequence, there is no question that the United States will maintain its extraordinary leadership.

14
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***Domestic Impacts***

Tyranny
( _ ) Federalism a key check on tyranny

Robinson on 07 (Nick Robinson political editor of the BBC “ Akron Law Review” 2007, p lexis)

Second, federalism provides a check on the over-centralization of power. Federalism embraces a


"conception of justice" that implies that a diffuse political ordering is both "necessary and desirable." 175
In Federalist 51, James Madison reassures his readers that a federalist [*681] republic provides a "double
security" against usurpations of power because power is not only divided between the different branches
of the federal government, but also between the federal and state governments. 176 Justice O'Connor picks
up this theme in Gregory v. Ashcroft where she remarks that "just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in
any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 177 As areas of traditional local governance increasingly
become objects of international concern there is an increased danger that localities will be weakened in their
ability to act as a counterweight to federal and international power. Further, localities can play an active role in
checking abuses of federal foreign policy in areas not traditionally associated with local governance.

( _ ) Federalism solves tyranny, protects rights

Gardner in 03 (James Gardner, Professor of Law, State University of New York,


GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, June 2003, p. 1007-8)

"The accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands," wrote Madison "may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny." To protect liberty, then, power must be divided. Federalism serves this
guiding principle of American constitutional design by parceling out government powers among different
levels of government. Federalism, it must be borne in mind, is a creation of the national Constitution, not state
constitutions. It is not the result of a fortuitous series of agreements reached one by one by the separate peoples
of the original thirteen states; on the contrary, federalism represents the deliberate decision of a single national
polity to divide governmental power for the purpose of protecting the liberty of all. Federalism protects liberty
by giving the state and national levels of government substantial powers sufficient to allow each to
monitor and check the abuses of the other. n14 As with the horizontal separation of powers that divides
governmental power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each level of government in this
vertically fragmented system is given the power and incentive to struggle against the other: "Ambition,"
as Madison put it, "must be made to counteract ambition." nThe result is a compound federal republic in
which power is deeply fragmented, reducing as far as possible by structural means the likelihood that a
tyrannical measure of power can be accumulated in a single set of hands: In a single republic, all the power
surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that
each will be controled by itself.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Tyranny
( _ ) Federalism is a key check against tyranny

Young in 04 (Ernest Young, Law Professor, University of Texas, TEXAS LAW REVIEW,
November 2004, pp. 59-60)

More fundamentally, our federalism has always been justified as a bulwark against tyranny. Madison
extolled federalism as part of the "double security" that the new Constitution would provide for the people; just
as the three branches of the central government were to check one another, the state governments would check
the center. As Lynn Baker and I have discussed elsewhere, Madison's discussion in Federalist 46 emphasized
worst case scenarios, in which the states would have to oppose the national government militarily, and this
emphasis has sometimes distracted critics of federalism from more prosaic - but also more relevant -
mechanisms by which federalism protects liberty. Even in the Founding period, however, state autonomy
buttressed individual liberty in other, less dramatic ways. States may oppose national policies not only
militarily but politically, and in so doing they may serve as critical rallying points for more widespread
popular opposition. Madison and Jefferson, out of national power during the Federalist administration of John
Adams, worked through the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures to oppose the Alien and Sedition Acts. The states
thus, as Professor Friedman puts it, "serve as an independent means of calling forth the voice of the people."
More recently, "Some state and local governments have proven themselves formidable lobbyists and
indefatigable litigants" on issues such as affirmative action, benefits for the disabled, and environmental
policy

( _ ) Decentralized governmental structures maximize individual freedom

Cross in 2k (Dalton Cross, Law Professor, Texas, 2000 (HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &
PUBLIC POLICY, Fall, p. 165)

Government can be made more responsive to the popular will by keeping the policy-making unit closer to the
people. As a matter of simple arithmetic, the smaller the policy-making unit, the fewer the number of
people who will be discontented by any policy choice. Individual freedom means leaving policy choices
with the individual; if a choice must be removed from the individual by government, individual freedom is
served to the extent that it is removed no farther than necessary.

16
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Tyranny
( _ ) Federalism preserves liberty by stopping the concentration of power

Hastings Law Journal in 02 (January, pp. 439-40)

I have a different perspective. Federalism is not a dysfunctional anachronism, a nostalgic symbol of a


pre-industrial America. Rather, when properly viewed and applied, it is crucial to preservation of individual
liberty and a valuable device to preserve a healthy balance of power among governmental institutions.
The institutional benefits of federalism are not simply preservation of state autonomy as a counter to
federal power but also operate less directly to preserve the scheme of separated powers within the federal
government.

( _ ) Federalism promotes diversity and stops tyranny

Hastings Law Journal in 02 (January, pp. 439-40)

Federalism is often claimed to serve many diverse values. It "increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes," will better satisfy citizen preferences by catering to tastes at a state
level, provides citizens with the option of moving to a state with public policies perceived to be more
congenial, enables states to experiment with innovative public policies, preserves a government structure
that inhibits a potentially tyrannical concentration of power in the central government, insures the
continuance of discrete political and social communities, and ensures clear political accountability for
government actors in each of the central and state governments. Federalism is not, of course, an unqualified boon.

( _ ) Proper balance of power between states and federal government best protects liberty
Chemerinsky in 04 (Erwin Chemerinsky, law professor, DUKE, BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW, Summer
2004, p. 1325)

Another frequently advanced justification for federalism is that the division of power between federal and
state governments advances liberty. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "This constitutionally
mandated division of authority 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental
liberties.'" Similarly, Justice Scalia declared: "The separation of the two spheres is one of the
Constitution's protections of liberty." Justice O'Connor likewise wrote: "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the State and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."

17
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Tyranny Impacts
( _ ) Protecting freedom is a priori – it cannot be sacrificed for anything

Petro in 74 (Sylvester Petro, professor of law at Wake Forest, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p. 480)

However, one may still insist on echoing Ernest Hemingway – "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it
is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at
once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because
there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the
end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenstyn, Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a
supreme value and proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material
welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

( _ ) Loss of freedom is worse than nuclear war

Rummel in 01 (RJ Rummel, Political Scientist, University of Hawaii, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT,


2001, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DBG.CHAP1.HTM)

Consider also that library stacks have been written on the possible nature and consequences of nuclear war and
how it might be avoided. Yet, in the life of some still living we have experienced in the toll from democide (and
related destruction and misery among the survivors) the equivalent of a nuclear war, especially at the high near
360,000,000 end of the estimates. It is as though one had already occurred! Yet to my knowledge, there is only
one book dealing with the overall human cost of this "nuclear war"--Gil Elliot's Twentieth Century Book of the
Dead.

18
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***Generic War Impacts***


Fism Solves Global War
( _ ) US federalism is modeled worldwide, and solves global wars
Calabresi in 95 (Steven Calabresi, Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., 1995, Michigan Law Review,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, p. lexis)

First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the
best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot
be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse
Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the
Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine
of stare decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause
case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. Elite opinion holds
that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national
codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states
should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is
likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very
good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path.
Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should
encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a
better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has
swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and
emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an
enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade,
economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It
depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those
deals will be kept. The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by
enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the
Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

19
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Federalism Solves Globar War


( _ ) Federalism solves global wars

Ornstein in 92 (Norman Ornstein, resident scholar in social and political processes at American
Enterprise Institute, Jan-Feb 1992, The American Enterprise, v3 n1 p20(5))

No word in political theory more consistently causes eyes to glaze over than “federalism.” Yet no concept is
more critical to solving many major political crises in the world right now. The former Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Eastern and Western Europe, South Africa, Turkey, the Middle East, and Canada are
suffering from problems that could be solved, if solutions are possible, by instituting creative forms of
federalism. Federalism is not a sexy concept like “democracy” or “freedom”; it describes a more mundane
mechanism that balances the need for a central and coordinating authority at the level of a nation-state
with a degree of state and local autonomy, while also protecting minority interests, preserving ethnic
and regional identification and sensibilities, and allowing as much self-government as possible. Federalism
starts with governing structures put in place by formal, constitutional arrangements, but beyond that it is a
partnership that requires trust. Trust can’t be forged overnight by formal arrangements, but bad arrangements
can exacerbate hostilities and tensions. Good ones can be the basis for building trust. Why is federalism so
important now? There are political reasons: the breakup of the old world order has released resentments
and tensions that had been suppressed for decades or even centuries. Ethnic pride and self-identifica tion
are surging in many places around the globe. Add to this the easy availability of weapons, and you have a
potent mixture for discontent, instability, and violence. There are also economic considerations: simply
breaking up existing nation-states into separate entities cannot work when economies are interlinked in
complex ways. And there are humane factors, too. No provinces or territories are ethnically pure. Creating
an independent Quebec, Croatia, or Kazakhstan would be uplifting for French Quebecois, Croats, and
Kazakhs but terrifying for the large numbers of minorities who reside in these same territories. The only way
to begin to craft solutions, then, is to create structures that preserve necessary economic links while providing
economic independence, to create political autonomy while preserving freedom of movement and individual
rights, and to respect ethnic identity while protecting minority rights. Each country has unique problems that
require different kinds of federal structures, which can range from a federation that is tightly controlled at the
center to a confederation having autonomous units and a loose central authority. The United States pioneered
federalism in its Union and its Constitution. Its invention of a federation that balanced power between a
vigorous national government and its numerous states was every bit as significant an innovation as its
instituting a separation of powers was in governance—and defining the federal-state relationship was far
more difficult to work out at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The U.S. federalist structure was,
obviously, not sufficient by itself to eliminate the economic and social disparities between the North and the
South. Despite the federal guarantees built into the Constitution, the divisive questions of states’ rights
dominated political conflict from the beginning and resulted ultimately in the Civil War. But the federal
system did keep conflict from boiling over into disaster for 75 years, and it has enabled the United States
to keep its union together without constitutional crisis or major bloodshed for the 125 years since the
conclusion of the War Between the States. It has also enabled us to meliorate problems of regional and
ethnic discontent. The American form of federalism fits the American culture and historical experience—it is
not directly transferable to other societies. But if ever there was a time to apply the lessons that can be drawn
from the U.S. experience or to create new federal approaches, this is it. What is striking is the present number
of countries and regions where deep-seated problems could respond to a new focus on federalism.

20
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***DEMOCRACY***
Democracy – 1NC
( _ ) Federalism is key to global democracy

Wright in 97 (Robin Wright, a contributing correspondent of The Washington Quarterly, covers the
patterns of democratization and other global issues for the Los Angeles Times,
Washington Quarterly, Summer 1997, p ln)

The most dynamic political trend promoting democracy worldwide in the 1990s is devolution, the transfer
of power beyond capitals and traditional elites in ways that are in turn redefining democracy's scope and
application. It is now the frontline of democratization in Latin America, Central Europe, Africa, and Asia.
The most radical experiment in Latin America is Bolivia's new "popular participation" program, which is devolving power and resources long concentrated in
three urban centers to 311 municipalities. The project effectively expedites democracy. Towns and villages no longer have to appeal to regional or national
authorities for everything from electricity to school desks. The goal is for communities to provide services and handle problems according to local needs and
priorities as a check against the abuse of power at the national level. Before the transition to democracy began in the 1980s, Bolivia witnessed 189 coups in 162
years. For the first time, popular participation has included the country's majority -- the 65 percent indigenous population that has long been excluded by
descendants of Spanish colonials. Many of Bolivia's Aymara and Quechua Indians, whose civilizations date back millennia, are getting their first taste of modern
power. In Africa, Mali's first democratic government contends decentralization works because it forces engagement. The West African state, which is twice the
size of Texas, has shifted control of key administrative and financial functions, including education, health, and development, to more than 500 rural and urban
communities. Each locality fixes tax rates and allocates revenues. To allow local direction and limit corruption, each area also negotiates directly with foreign aid
groups. Devolution also helps block democracy's undoing by dispersing power beyond the reach of armies
or strongmen -- a recent problem among Mali's neighbors. Democratic progress in Niger and Gambia has been reversed by military intervention, while
Nigeria's army stepped in to void results of the oil-rich state's first democratic elections. Former dictators have won democratic elections in Benin and Burkino
Devolution can also provide a
Faso. And irregularities have marred elections in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea.
mechanism to ease ethnic or sectarian disparities. Ethiopia boasts one of Africa's most radical experiments in devolution in an attempt
to prevent further dismemberment. Differences among its 80 ethnic groups -- which use a dozen major languages and three alphabets -- have spawned a host of
conflicts during both monarchial and communist rule. (Eritrea broke away in 1993.) As part of its still-tentative transition to democracy, Ethiopia has introduced
a new constitution that divides 55 million people into nine ethnic-based states. It also bestows major powers of self-administration and even the right to secede.
The motive for transferring power is not always altruistic. Devolution often also represents an attempt to transfer the onus of solutions beyond central
governments no longer able to provide services or answers. In reaction to the strong centralization of communism, democratic Poland is moving in the opposite
direction as the state devolves power to gaminas, local communities of various sizes run by councils now locally elected. Warsaw has several gaminas, whereas a
rural gamina may include several villages. Among all the units of government, gaminas now have the highest public support. n15 In 1996, the state began to
transfer control of education to gaminas, which are now allocated about 10 percent of national revenues. Gaminas also collect local taxes, although income varies
widely depending on local resources. But the combination of local and state funds is often insufficient to pay for schools and other services the federal
government once provided. As a result, some communities have actually appealed to Warsaw to reassume responsibility for schools. Devolution is also not
without basic conceptual problems. In many places, shortcomings include poorly educated or inexperienced new officials, including some who can barely read or
who know virtually nothing about budgets and managing a municipality. Initial projects have often been flashy rather than thoughtful infrastructure schemes.
Local areas are also not immune to corruption, which in Bolivia led to installation of "vigilance committees" to oversee its mayors. Yet as in many places, the
government in La Paz contends devolution is still the best mechanism for both the initial democratization process
and subsequent stabilization. Devolution shares problems as well as power. It introduces a wider array of
players to shoulder the burdens as well as to have a stake in the outcome. And by embracing men and
women in the most remote rural corners of countries, devolution also prevents or defuses the flashpoints
behind competition and strife.

( _ ) Democracy solves extinction

Diamond 95 (Larry Diamond, Senior Researcher @ Hoover Insitute, Promoting Democracy in the
1990s, pp 6-7)

This hardly exhausts the list of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of
illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the
global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to
security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with is provisions for
legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

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US Model Key to Democracy


( _ ) Domestic federalism key to global democracy signal
Broder in 01 (David S. Broder, The Washington Post, June 24, 2001 p ln)

Even more persistent were the questions about the role the United States would play, under this new
administration, in supporting democratic movements around the world. It is sobering to be reminded how
often, during the long decades of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic
regimes, simply because we thought military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against
communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a
target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and,
especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's future and America's role in it, earned him
grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority human rights and promotion of
democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy. Another great lesson for an American reporter is that the
struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative government in the eyes of the public is a worldwide
battle. Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar
participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as
smacking too much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential
agents of democracy -- are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as
being tied to special interests or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective
instruments for tackling current challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you
organize and sustain representative government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the
seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes
to pressing for her country's admission to NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her
quest for freedom. She is a member of no party, chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and
bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders are there? Meanwhile, even as democracy is tested
everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new and perhaps tougher accountability
examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has operated so far with a strong
council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But with its membership
seemingly certain to expand, the age-old dilemma of democracy -- majority rule vs. minority and individual
rights -- is bound to come to the fore. The principle of federalism will be vital to its success. And, once
again, the United States has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and
vital in our own country.

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Fism Key to Democracy


( _ ) Enhances legitimacy of democracy

Diamond 04 (Larry, Sr. Researcher @ hoover Institute, “Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?”,
Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad,
February 12, 2004
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm)

Second, federalism or devolution of power is adopted as a means of sharing power among lots of different
political parties, which may or may not have some basis in ethnic or regional ties. If democracy is to survive, it
cannot be a winner-take-all system, particularly not one in which one party is always going to win, and thus
take all. When some governing responsibilities and resources are devolved to lower levels of authority, and
when there are a lot of different provinces and municipalities whose governments will be chosen through
elections, parties and groups that cannot win control of the central government may win the opportunity
to exercise power in some of the lower-level governments This increases their confidence in and
commitment to the political system, and the sense among citizens generally that the system is fair and
inclusive. If groups with strong bases of support in the country are completely and indefinitely excluded
from any share of political power at any level, they are likely to question and even challenge the legitimacy
of the system. Third, democracy has swept throughout the world as a basic value and framework of governance
over the post three decades. And decentralization is increasingly coming to be seen as a fundamental
democratic principle. It is not enough for people simply to be able to choose their national leaders in
periodic, free, and fair elections. In countries of moderate to large size, a good democracy requires that
people be able to elect their own local leaders and representatives, and that these local governments have
some real power to respond to the needs of the people. In short, decentralization is increasingly being
demanded from below, through pressure from the grassroots, and is embraced for its potential to enhance
the depth and legitimacy of democracy.

( _ ) Federalism prevents secessionism, increasing participation

Diamond 04 (Larry, Sr. Researcher @ hoover Institute, “Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?”,
Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad,
February 12, 2004
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm)

I have already begun to suggest, then, how federalism and other forms of decentralization can strengthen
democracy and enhance its stability. They may help to hold the country together by giving each group
some control of its own affairs. They may help to sustain the political system by distributing power
among a wider array of political parties, each of which finds that it has some tangible stake in the system.
And it speaks to the aspirations of people and communities who simply want government to be closer and more
responsive to their needs.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Federalism Key to Democracy


( _ ) Federalism increases responsiveness and accountability to citizen concerns,
strengthening democracy

Diamond 04 (Larry, Sr. Researcher @ hoover Institute, “Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?”,
Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad,
February 12, 2004
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm)

Let me continue with the functions that decentralization serves. When government is closer to the people, it is
more likely to be held accountable by them for its successes and failures in the provision of basic services, the
maintenance of order, and the fair resolution of local issues and disputes. Government tends to be more
responsive when it is closer to the people. That is why democracies are more and more embracing the
principle of subsidiarity: that each government function should be performed by the lowest level of
government that is capable of performing that function effectively.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Fism Key to Democracy


( _ ) Federalism increases participation in government, trains better leaders, and prevents
corruption

Diamond 04 (Larry, Sr. Researcher @ hoover Institute, “Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?”,
Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad,
February 12, 2004
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm)

When there are multiple layers of elected government, as in a federal or politically decentralized system,
there are other benefits for democracy. Lower levels of elective office can constitute an arena for training
and recruiting new political leaders, including women and young people who have not previously had a role in
political life. And these lower levels of democracy provide a more accessible means for citizens to become
active in public affairs: to question their local officials, monitor what they do, present their interests and
concerns, and learn the skills and values of democratic citizenship. Typically, it is difficult for most citizens
and organized groups to get access to the national parliament or the central ministries. They need decentralized
opportunities for access to decision-making power. And those points of local access are more likely to be
responsive if they are accountable to the people through elections. Finally, decentralization of power
provides an additional check against the abuse of power. Of course, checks and balances are needed within
the central government itself. This is why there must be an independent parliament and judiciary, and effective
auditing and counter-corruption mechanisms. But federalism can provide an additional bulwark against the
concentration and abuse of power.

( _ ) Federalism key to democracy

McGimsey in 02 (Diane McGimsey, Law clerk to the Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Chief Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, California Law Review, October, 2002, 90
Calif. L. Rev. 1675)

Finally, federalism enhances democracy. 42 Smaller units of government encourage participation because
citizens perceive a greater ability to exert meaningful influence. 43 Furthermore, because state and local
governments tend to be smaller and are closer to most citizens, it is easier for citizens to hold those elected
representatives accountable for their actions. This potential for increased accountability in turn increases
the incentives for officials to respond to state and local preferences. 44

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***Self-D/Secessionism***

Fism Solves Self Determination


( _ ) Federalism solves conflicts over self-determination

Hawkes in 01 (David Hawkes, former Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs for the Province of
Saskatchewan and Associate Director of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s
University, “Indigenous peoples: self-government and intergovernmental relations,”
International Social Science Journal, March, 2001, p. 159)

In summary, the right of self-determination of Aborigina1 peoples within states often branches in two
directions: (1) a drive for more autonomy for indigenous nations; and (2) a demand for greater
participation in the decision-making institutions of the state. These two branches of aboriginal self-
determination appear to fit very closely with the twin pillars of federalism-self-rule and shared-rule. There
are many aspects of federalism that can provide a context for accommodating the self-determination of
indigenous peoples within federal states. Federalism can provide a fundamental respect for diversity, and
the different cultures, languages, laws and ways of life of indigenous peoples. It can accommodate multiple
identities and loyalties within a state, as well as different “levels” or orders of government, some with
shared sovereignty. Federal systems can adapt to change, and are capable of great innovation. Federalism
has ancient roots in both Western and indigenous traditions, as does treaty-making. Treaties between states and
Aboriginal peoples should be considered as federative instruments, binding the parties together in an association
of autonomy and interdependence.

( _ ) Global secessionary conflicts will go nuclear


Shehadi in 93 (Kamal Shehadi, Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
December 1993, Ethnic Self Determination And the Break Up of States, p. 81)

This paper has argued that self-determination conflicts have direct adverse consequences on international
security. As they begin to tear nuclear states apart, the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the hands
of individuals or groups willing to use them, or to trade them to others, will reach frightening levels. This
likelihood increases if a conflict over self-determination escalates into a war between two nuclear states.
The Russian Federation and Ukraine may fight over the Crimea and the Donbass area; and India and
Pakistan may fight over Kashmir. Ethnic conflicts may also spread both within a state and from one state
to the next. This can happen in countries where more than one ethnic self-determination conflict is brewing:
Russia, India and Ethiopia, for example. The conflict may also spread by contagion from one country to another
if the state is weak politically and militarily and cannot contain the conflict on its doorstep. Lastly, there is a
real danger that regional conflicts will erupt over national minorities and borders.

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Fism Solves Self Determination


( _ ) Federalism resolves indigenous rights dilemmas

Hawkes in 01 (David Hawkes, former Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs for the Province of
Saskatchewan and Associate Director of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s
University, “Indigenous peoples: self-government and intergovernmental relations,”
International Social Science Journal, March, 2001, p. 153-154

Several characteristics of federalism suggest that it may be promising in developing a framework for
accommodating the aspirations of indigenous peoples within states. First, federalism provides a
fundamental respect for diversity — perhaps even the “deep diversity” which Canadian philosopher Charles
Taylor describes as different ways of citizens belonging to the state (for example, some mediated through their
national community, others unmediated; Taylor 1991: 75—76). Federalism has the potential to demonstrate
respect for the cultures, languages, laws, and ways of life of indigenous peoples. The institutions of federal
states can also embody this diversity in their public symbols and practices, and thereby demonstrate respect for
indigenous peoples in their political cultures (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal peoples in Canada,
the relationship between peoples should be founded upon the principles of autonomy and interdependence: To
accommodate indigenous notions of nationhood and cease its interference in indigenous communities, the state
need only refer to the federal principle (Alfred 1999: 53). Second, federalism can accommodate multiple
identities and loyalties within a state, as well as different “levels” of government, some with shared
sovereignty. In Australia, for example, both the Commonwealth and state governments are sovereign within
their respective spheres of jurisdiction. In the United States of America. in addition to federal and state
sovereignty, American Indian tribes assert their sovereignty, recognised by the federal government and based
upon the principle that they are “domestic, dependent nations”, a doctrine which emerged from a landmark
decision of the US Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 183 l.~ In Canada, the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples has concluded that: the inherent right of Aboriginal self-government is recognised and
affirmed in section 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as an Aboriginal and treaty-protected right. The inherent
right is thus entrenched in the Canadian constitution, providing a basis for Aboriginal governments to function as
one of three distinct orders of government in Canada (Volume 2. Part One, 213). The government of Canada
recognises that the inherent right of self-government is protected in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
It can be argued, therefore, that federalism can accommodate a pooling of sovereignties — federal, state, and
indigenous. Although the basis may be there in Canadian law, few concrete examples exist to demonstrate how
this approach might work in practice. This matter will be addressed later in this article. Intergovernmental
relations in federations have proved to be highly adaptive to changing circumstance and capable of great
innovation, a third trait which suggests that federalism might provide a promising framework. For
example, between 1983 and 1987, four federal-provincial-territorial First Ministers’ Conferences were held with
national Aboriginal leaders in Canada to address Aboriginal constitutional matters in an unprecedented, albeit
unsuccessful, exercise in Canadian politics (Hawkes l989).

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Fism Solves Self-Determination


( _ ) Federalism empirically solves secessionist movements

McGarry in 98 (John McGarry, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, 1998,
National Self-Determination and Secession, p. 225)

While states are often reluctant to decentralize, for fear it will promote secession, there is evidence that
timely and genuine decentralization achieves exactly the opposite effect. While Francoist centralization
coincided with a significant increase in support for Basque separatism, the granting of autonomy to Basques in
1979 resulted in support for independence dropping from 36 per cent to 12 per cent.38 The long-time
existence of the Canadian and Swiss federations also show that extensive decentralization is consistent
with state unity. Canada’s current troubles do not undermine this argument. To a considerable extent, the rise in
support for Quebec separatism since the 1970s can be traced to a move away from the concept of a hi-national
partnership on the part of English-speaking Canadians towards a view of Canada as a nation-state in which all
individuals and provinces should be treated equally. Similarly, the breakup of several Communist
multinational federations should not cast any doubt on decentralization as a strategy, as these states were
in fact highly centralized.

( _ ) Multiple emerging democracies prove that federalism can solve secessionism

Lake and Rothchild in 96 (Richard Lake and Anthony Rothchild, Professors of Political Science at
University of California, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 1996, p.61-2 )

Regional autonomy and federalism. Political and administrative decentralization can play a role in managing
political conflict. By enabling local and regional authorities to wield a degree of autonomous power, elites
at the political center can promote confidence among local leaders. Measures on decentralization, regional
autonomy, and federalism featured in peace negotiations in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Sudan, Angola,
Mozambique, and South Africa. In each, they provided insurgent militias with an important incentive for
responding positively to the government or third-party mediator's proposals for settling the conflict. The
U.S.-brokered peace initiative in Bosnia achieved a key breakthrough in the September 1995 negotiations,
for example, when the Bosnian government agreed to recognize an autonomous Bosnian Serb entity, called
Republika Srpska. In exchange, Serbia and Croatia accepted the legal existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina with
its present borders and endorsed the division of the country, 51 percent of the territory to the Bosnian
government and Bosnian Croats, and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. All three parties perceived control of
Bosnia's territory to be critically important for their survival once peace came into effect.

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Federalism Solves Self-Determination


( _ ) Federalism solves violence, economic inequality and nationalist secessionism

Kymlicka in 2k (Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, July 2000, Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p lexis)

I believe that this trend has been beneficial, and indeed quite successful, as measured by any of the criteria which
should matter to liberals, such as: [use a bullet here and below]- peace and individual security: these multination
federations are managing to deal with their competing national identities and nationalist projects with an
almost complete absence of violence or terrorism by either the state or the minority. [*213] - democracy:
ethnic conflict is now a matter of "ballots not bullets", with no threat of military coups or authoritarian
regimes which take power in the name of national security; n10 - individual rights: these reforms have been
achieved within the framework of liberal constitutions, with firm respect for individual civil and political rights.
- economic prosperity: the move to multination federalism has also been achieved without jeopardizing the
economic well-being of citizens. Indeed, the countries that have adopted multination federalism are
amongst the wealthiest in the world. - inter-group equality: last but not least, multination federalism has
promoted equality between majority and minority groups. By equality here I mean non-domination, such
that one group is not systematically vulnerable to the domination of another group. Multination federalism has
helped create greater economic equality between majority and minority; greater equality of political influence, so
that minorities are not continually outvoted on all issues; and greater equality in the social and cultural fields, as
reflected for example in reduced levels of prejudice and discrimination and greater mutual respect between
groups. On all these criteria, multination federalism in the West must be judged as a success. Indeed, this trend
is, I believe, one of the most important developments in Western democracies in this century. We talk a lot (and
rightly so) about the role of the extension of the franchise to Blacks, women, and the working class in
democratizing Western societies. But in its own way, this shift from suppressing to accommodating minority
nationalisms has also played a vital role in consolidating and deepending democracy. These multination
federations have not only managed the conflicts arising from their competing national identities in a peaceful and
democratic way, but have also secured a high degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their
citizens. This is truly remarkable when one considers the immense power of nationalism in this century.
Nationalism has torn apart colonial empires and Communist dictatorships, and redefined boundaries all over the
world. Yet democratic multination federations have succeeded in taming the force of nationalism.
Democratic federalism has domesticated and pacified nationalism, while respecting individual rights and
freedoms. It is difficult to imagine any other political system that can make the same claim.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

AT: “Federalism Accelerates Secessionism”


( _ ) It’s try or die for the neg – minority secessionist movements are widespread and
inevitable – federalism is the best chance to prevent outright violent conflict

Kymlicka in 2k (Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, July 2000, Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p lexis)

Given this success in the West, one might expect that there would be great interest in multination
federalism in other countries around the world, from Eastern Europe to Asia and Africa, most of which
contain territorially-concentrated national minorities. The phenomenon of minority nationalism,
including the demand for territorial autonomy, is a truly universal one. The countries affected by it are to be
found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France),
North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries
that are old (United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich
(Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist
(China) as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma),
Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic (Israel)." Indeed, some commentators describe the
conflict between states and national minorities as an ever-growing "third world war", encompassing an
ever-increasing number of groups and states. We need to think creatively about how to respond to these
conflicts, which will continue to plague efforts at democratization, and to cause violence, around the world.
I believe that federal or quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy (hereafter TA) are often the only or best
solution to these conflicts. To be sure, TA is not a universal formula for managing ethnic conflict. For one
thing, TA is neither feasible nor desirable for many smaller and more dispersed national minorities. For such
groups, more creative alternatives are needed. So it would be a mistake to suppose that TA can work for all
national minorities, no matter how small or dispersed. But I believe it would equally be a mistake to suppose
that non-territorial forms of cultural autonomy can work for all national minorities, no matter how large
or territorially concentrated. What works best for small and dispersed minorities does not work best for large,
concentrated minorities, and vice versa. Where national minorities form clear majorities in their historic
homeland, and particularly where they have some prior history of self-government, it is not clear that there is
any realistic alternative to TA or multination federalism.

( _ ) On balance, federalism helps to curtail secessionism by giving secessionist parties a


political voice – at worst, it smoothes things over

Kymlicka in 2k (Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, July 2000, Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p lexis)

My point is not that federalism inevitably leads to secession. Just the opposite. I believe that democratic
federalism reduces the likelihood of secession. But I think democratic federalism only works (or best works)
to inhibit secession when secessionist political mobilization is allowed. (Indeed, federalism is only democratic
if it allows this.) Minorities will only find TA an acceptable form of self-government if they have the right
to freely debate their future, including freely debating a range of options from assimilation to secession. If
the state decides for them which options they can debate, and which parties they can vote for, the minority has
neither freedom nor democracy, and this will just increase their desire for true independence. On my view, then,
in order to get the full benefits of federalism, we must accept the legitimacy of secessionist parties, and that
entails accepting the possibility (however slim) of a democratically-mandated secession. Federalism of this
form reduces the chance of secession actually taking place, but it legitimizes the presence of secessionists
in the political debate, and institutionalizes the possibility of choosing secession. And it facilitates secession,
if that is ever chosen in a referendum, since it provides a clearly demarcated territory and political infrastructure
that can be used as a basis for a seceding state. Attempts to promote federalism while prohibiting secessionist
mobilization are likely to be undemocratic, illiberal and in the end counter-productive.

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AT: “Federalism Accelerates Secessionism”


( _ ) Secessionist indigenous peoples won’t push for full secession if federalism gives them a
safety valve – regional autonomy solves

Kymlicka in 2k (Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, July 2000, Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p lexis)

However they were incorporated, both stateless nations and indigenous peoples have typically fought to
maintain or regain their own self-governing institutions, often operating in their own language, so as to be
able to live and work in their own culture. They demand to maintain or regain their own schools, courts,
media, political institutions, and so on. To achieve this, they typically demand some form of autonomy. At
the extreme, this may involve claims to outright secession, but more usually it involves some form of
regional autonomy. And they typically mobilize along nationalist lines, using the language of
"nationhood" to describe and justify these demands for self government. While the ideology of nationalism
has typically seen full-fledged independence as the 'normal' or 'natural' end-point, economic or demographic
reasons may make this infeasible for some national minorities. Moreover, the historical ideal of a fully sovereign
state is increasingly obsolete in today's world of globalized economics and transnational institutions. Hence there
is a growing interest in exploring other forms of self-government, such as federalism.

( _ ) On balance, federalism solves secession best – even if it causes some, it solves the
impact

Kymlicka in 2k (Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, July 2000, Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p lexis)

Why have Western countries become less hysterical about secessionist mobilization? One reason, as I've
noted, is that allowing secessionists to mobilize freely may actually reduce the likelihood of secession.
Secession is less likely in a democratic multination federation where secessionists can mobilize freely than
in a centralized state where illiberal measures are adopted to suppress minority nationalism. But there is
another factor, namely that adopting multination federalism reduces the stakes of secession. After all,
relatively little would change if Flanders, Scotland or Quebec were to become independent states. In traditional
nation-states, where all decisions are made in forums where the dominant group forms a majority, and
where all public institutions throughout the territory of the state operate in the majority language, secession
would involve radical changes. It would entail dramatic changes in the distribution of power between
majority and minority, and in the language of schools, media, courts, government services, and in national
symbols..

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Secessionism Impact - Genocide


( _ ) Secessionism causes genocide and spills over into interstate ethnic conflict

Horowitz in 98 (Donald Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke
University, 1998, National Self Determination and Secession, p. 190)

Although the incentives to secession may be changing, the demographic and political relations of ethnic groups
within secessionist and rump regions are not changing. The assumption has usually been that secession
produces homogeneous states. In point of fact, neither secessionist states nor rump states are
homogeneous. They can be made more homogeneous only by the clumsiest and most unfair methods of
population exchange or by policies of expulsion, always carried out with a massive dose of killing. Like
Bosnia and Croatia, even after ethnic cleansing, the Southern Sudan, Eritrea, and areas claimed by the Tarnil
Tigers in Sri Lanka and countless other secessionist movements are ethnically heterogeneous, and so are the
states they would leave behind. There used to be a tendency to think of secession as a form of ‘divorce’, a neat
and clean separation of two antagonists who cannot get along. But if a crude household analogy could be applied
to large collectivities, then, as in domestic divorces, there is nothing neat about it, and there are usually children
(smaller groups that are victims of the split). Sometimes secession or partition is the least bad alternative, but it is
rarely to be preferred. As I shall suggest, the opposite course, international regional integration and the
amalgamation of states, is likely to produce far better results in many (though not all) cases of ethnic conflict.
Unfortunately, it is a course unlikely to be pursued. Secession or partition usually makes ethnic relations
worse, because it simplifies intergroup confrontations. Instead of six groups, none of which could quite
dominate the others—call this Yugoslavia—it is possible, by subtracting territory, to produce various bipolar
alignments of one versus one or two versus one, together with the possibility, even the likelihood, that one side
will emerge dominant. Simplification by secession reverses the benign complexity of states such as India or
Tanzania that are fortunate enough to contain a multitude of dispersed groups, none with the power to control the
others or to take possession of the state for its own ends. Furthermore, not only are secessionist regions
heterogeneous, but secession is often conceived as affording the means of ‘dealing with’ precisely that
initating heterogeneity. For if Group A, no longer in the undivided state, now holds power over the
secessionist state, it can regulate the rights available to Group B, expel Group B if it is an immigrant group,
oppress it, or even take genocidal measures against it. It is insufficiently appreciated that concern about
demographic changes from in-migration to the secessionist region often motivates secessionist sentiment, as it
has historically, for example, in the Basque country, in Catalonia, in the southern Philippines, and in the Shaba
province of Zaire. None of this should surprise observers in the United States. The secession of 1861 in the
United States South was, in part, designed to permit Group A to ‘deal with’ Group B, without impediments from
the North. Theories that rest on the reduction of the incidence of domination by means of territorial separation
need to be treated with utmost scepticism. There is no clean break.

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Secessionism Impacts - War


( _ ) Secessionism and movements create wars

Gottlieb in 93 (Gidon Gottlieb, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy University of
Chicago Law School, 1993, Nation Against State, p. 1-2)

Making room for nations trying to break loose from states that rule over them is a pressing issue for world
stability and peace; but so is the avoidance of global fragmentation. Paradoxically, the struggle for the
creation of new states is taking place at a time when older states are moving toward broader associations and
when the very notion of statehood has lost substance. Both phenomena are aspects of the eroding sovereignty of
states: an erosion that reflects the declining utility of borders in an era of missile technology and of the
unstoppable flow of ideas and capital. Yet Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Armenians, Azerbaijanis,
Abkhazians, Georgians, Sikhs, Kurds, and Palestinians are currently consumed by cruel wars to realize
national aspirations. These are nations that do not issue directly from the old colonial empires of the West.
Their emergence is an aspect of the transformations in the world system as a whole. A new space for these
nations must be found without aggravating disorders in the society of states. The issue is: What kind of
space? Must it take the form of conventional statehood? And, as a corollary, what can the international
community do about ethnic strife? A territorial approach to ethnic conflicts, granting self-rule or statehood in a
given area to most of the nations and peoples that want it now, would result in scores of new sovereign states.
While the creation of some new states may be necessary or inevitable, the fragmentation of international
society into hundreds of independent territorial entities is a recipe for an even more dangerous and
anarchic world. Moreover, a territorial approach to the resolution of ethnic conflicts often involves harsh
components: the partition of territories the revision of international and internal borders, the transfer of
populations, and the establishment of ethnic homogeneity. It offers “clean” and simple “solutions,” but it also
seeds new conflicts. In Africa, in Asia, and in Europe, challenges to existing international boundaries to
make room for new states could have catastrophic consequences. Past efforts to redraw the map of the world
were not particularly successful. The 1919 Versailles peace settlement established borders that did not satisfy the
peoples of Europe. The treaties of Sevres in 1920 and of Lausanne in 1923, which disposed of Ottoman lands,
failed to bring peace to their inhabitants.

( _ ) Secessionism is the most probable scenario for war


Amoretti in 04 (Ugo M. Amoretti, researcher in poly sci at University of Genoa, 2004 [Federalism and
Territorial Cleavages, p. 6-7)

Shaped by a complex mix of long-term and short-term influences, territorial cleavages are one of the main
causes of conflict in today's world. Following the end of World War II, they have been increasingly mobilized, turning into a
powerful source of turmoil that has modified the political landscape in all of the world's regions. Like other sociopolitical phenomena,
territorial cleavages seem to acquire salience in waves and, after their political eclipse during the centralizing trends of the 194os and 1950s,
they entered an upward trend during the 1960s. The centrality of territorial cleavages as a source of conflict, nonetheless, has produced
different consequences in the advanced industrial societies and the rest of the world. In the developed West, despite the presence of
territorially based minorities in most countries, conflicts have been less bloody and deadly than elsewhere. Excluding conflicts related to
Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and—to a lesser extent—Corsica, territorial cleavages have generally been managed peacefully,
channeling political action and participation through the conventional avenues provided by democratic institutions (Newman 1996,1-9). In
the less institutionalized, unstable political regimes of the former communist and developing countries, the mobilization of territorial
diversities has instead led to very different out comes. Often based on ascriptive features, territorial cleavages have given way to deadly and
bloody confrontations where, to quote Donald Horowitz (1985, 684), "ties of blood" have produced "rivers of blood." The growing numbers
of these armed conflicts reached an unprecedented high in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and its future evolution
is far from being easily predictable (Gurr 2000, 281-88; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). The contemporary relevance of territorial
conflict is best understood through some simple facts. Between 1989 and 2000, in armed conflicts-33 of which were still
ongoing in 2000 - took place in 74 different locations. While only 7 of them were interstate, a full 104 were
fought between the inhabitants of a single state. Out of these 104 internal conflicts, 46.6 percent were
ideological and 53.4 percent concerned territory instead (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). In other words,
disputes over controlling part of the territory of a certain state are the prevalent source of conflict in
today's world.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Secessionism Impact – Economy


( _ ) Secessionism causes economic collapse

Kolodner in 94 (Eric Kolodner, currently completing a joint degree at New York University School of
Law and Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Fall 1994, Connecticut Journal
of International Law, 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 153)

Justified concerns exist that granting the right to secede in today's world would effectuate an incessant
cycle of demands for external self determination where alleged peoples within peoples within peoples would
petition for their right to independence from a multi-ethnic State. The ensuing international system would be
highly fragmented, politically unstable, incapable of addressing global problems, and economically unfit
to provide the necessities of life to many of the world's inhabitants. The international community should,
therefore, continue to maintain that an unfettered right to secede simply does not exist.

34
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Secessionism Impact – Turns Solvency


( _ ) Impact turns solvency – secessionary conflicts degrade the capacity to manage all
other international crises

Gottlieb in 93 (Gidon Gottlieb, Director of the Middle East Peace Project and Visiting Fellow
at Council on Foreign Relations, 1993 Nation Against State, 127-7)

Self-determination unleashed and unchecked by balancing principles constitutes a menace to the society of
states. There is simply no way in which all the hundreds of peoples who aspire to sovereign independence can
be granted a state of their own without loosening fearful anarchy and disorder on a planetary scale. The
proliferation of territorial entities poses exponentially greater problems for the control of weapons of mass
destruction and multiplies situations in which external intervention could threaten the peace. It increases
problems for the management of all global issues, including terrorism, AIDS, the environment and
population growth. It creates conditions in which domestic strife in remote territories can drag powerful
neighbors into local hostilities, creating ever widening circles of conflict. Events in the aftermath of the
breakup of the Soviet Union drove this point home. Like Russian dolls, ever smaller ethnic groups dwelling in
larger units emerged to secede and to demand independence. Goergia, for example, has to contend with the
claims of South Ossetians and Abkhazians for independence, just as the Russian federation is confronted with
the separatism of Tartaristan. An international system made up of several hundred independent terriatorial states
cannot be the basis for global security and prosperity.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***INDIA***
India 1NC
( _ ) India models US federalism

Smith in 06 (Adam M. Smith, Chayes Fellow, Harvard Law School, Berkeley Journal of International
Law, 2006)

Modern India has also been strongly influenced by many states that never ruled its territory. For instance,
American influence can be found both in the state's judicial process and its constitutional text. The Indian
Constitution's express declaration of fundamental rights coupled with the introduction of judicial review
marked a radical departure from the British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and thoroughly
"Americanized" the system. 85 In addition to judicial review, the framers of the Indian Constitution explicitly
used the American Bill of Rights as a starting point in their discussions. Moreover, India even adapted its
constitution upon the recommendation of an American jurist. Following the terror of partition and Mahatma
Gandhi's assassination, many representatives to the constitutional convention began to argue for carving out a
constitutional allowance for preventive detention, placing "citizens' freedom at the disposition of a legislature for
the sake of a public peace." As a result, constitutional guarantees to due process were removed from the
document, a change supported by (and potentially instigated by) U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter,
who served as an unofficial - though evidently persuasive - legal consultant to the assembly.

( _ ) Indian decentralization avoids ethnic conflicts that escalates into war over Kashmir

Kohli in 04 (Atul Kohli, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University, 2004 [Federalism
and Territorial Cleavages, p. 282)

Finally, the simple answer that is most readily compatible with this essay's thesis is that it is still too early to
predict how the Kashmir crisis will end. If Pakistan's role diminishes (a role which, at the time of writing,
seems to be actually increasing) and if government maintains a firm but flexible set of policies, the ethnic
conflict in Kashmir may well decline over the next few years. However, if the BJP government attempts to
curtail the autonomy of Kashmir, moving farther in the direction of centralization and/or if Pakistan's role
in the conflict escalates, the regional conflict may well be exacerbated. <continued…> This volume seeks to
understand why territorial cleavages are accommodated better in some states than in others. While the editors of
the volume will provide the broader, cross-national generalizations, the Indian case alone also sheds some light
on this central question. First, for the most part, Indian federalism works. Sharing of power within the
framework of a relatively well-established central state has enabled the accommodation of a number of
ethnic groups within Indian democracy. Ever since the linguistic reorganization of the Indian federal system in
the late 1950s, it is a notable fact that most of India's large states have accepted the legitimacy of the system.
When they have not, the resulting political conflict has been mostly peaceful. The case of Tamilnadu discussed
above underlined the general process of how such successful accommodation has been achieved. A well-
institutionalized federal democracy both encouraged ethnic demands to emerge and provided firm limits on how
far such demands can go. Concessions by secure but accommodating national leaders, in turn, gave ethnic
elites what they wanted most, namely, enhanced power. As a result, the ethnic movement lost its radical
edge and settled down as part and parcel of politics of peaceful negotiation within a federal structure.

36
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

India 1NC
( _ ) Indian ethnic conflict causes war over Kashmir

Pocha in 02 (Jehangir Pocha, Indian Journalist, Fall 2002


http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/jehangir.html)

But over a million troops still remain mobilized along India's 1,200-mile border with Pakistan and militant
Hindu and Muslim groups within India remain geared to take each other on in yet another round of ethnic
violence. No one is certain when which conflict will erupt next, or where. Though the India-Pakistan nuclear
standoff was ostensibly driven by the continuing terrorism that New Delhi accuses Islamabad of fomenting in the
disputed region of Kashmir, there is another story behind India's new belligerence. Recent history has shown
that both India and Pakistan routinely use international crises to manipulate domestic politics. Border
tensions inexorably build whenever the ruling party in either nation is threatened politically, only to
dissipate fortuitously after a hold on power is reestablished. It is hard to ignore that Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee's calls for a "decisive war" against Pakistan came hard on the heels of Gujarat's Hindu-
Muslim violence-violence that the ruling Bharatiya Janta Party, or BJP, stood accused of planning and
executing.

( _ ) That goes nuclear

Pocha in 02 (Jehangir Pocha, Indian Journalist, Fall 2002


http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/jehangir.html)

In a nation yearning for self-respect and recognition as it struggles to catch up with the developed world,
Kalam's speech enthused many even as some worried that it heightened chauvinism across the nation. With
people like Kalam, and a rising number of retired army generals joining the BJP, India's previously apolitical
military establishment is becoming increasingly nationalistic. Their support is giving the BJP added
credibility. Many of these officers openly call for war, even nuclear war, with Pakistan. While talk of war
usually arouses conservatism amongst fighting men, India's armed forces have been so long thwarted by
Pakistan's "war of a thousand cuts" against them that their hatred appears to be overcoming their good
counsel. If international analysts puzzle at the popular support for their warmongering, it might help to
remember that few Indians really know what the costs of war can be. The longest of India's wars lasted three
weeks and all of them were mostly confined to the border areas. Even during the Second World War, India was
one of the few nations to have escaped any direct assault by the Germans or Japanese, though Indian soldiers and
resources contributed to the allied effort.

37
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

India Decentralizing Now


( _ ) India Has a Decent Amount of Decentralization

Sadanandan, Ph. D. candidate at the Department of Political Science at Duke, 5/26/08, p.


http://www.duke.edu/~ass21/DecentralizationinIndia.html (Anoop, “Decentralization in India”, Duke University)

This ranking is a result of a measure of decentralization I calculated. The degree of decentralization is,
according to my formulation, a composite function of decision-making powers and fiscal devolution. In
drawing up this measure, I have given greater significance to democratic decentralization and to devolution of
decision-making powers than to fiscal devolution. My theoretical interest is in democratic decentralization -
bringing governance closer to people. Why place greater significance on devolution of decision-making powers?
An illustration would bear this out. In 1996, Bihar spent through local councils an amount close to three per
cent of its Net Domestic Product (NDP) - over three times as much as Kerala. Kerala, for the same year,
spent at the local level an amount that was around 0.85 per cent of its NDP. But, at this time, Kerala had
elected local councils and was mobilizing locally elected members and citizens to engage one another, vet and
approve programs locally through its "People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning". Though Bihar was
spending more through it local councils, it did not hold elections to these councils until 2001; most of the
governmental functions were carried out by state departments. A mere reliance on fiscal devolution would
mean that Bihar in 1996 was more decentralized than Kerala. Therefore, I give greater significance to
decision-making powers that are devolved to local councils. My measure of decentralization is, however, much
more limited in scope than the one proposed by the government. For instance, I do not take into account
revenue decentralization. Therefore, devolution of the authority to tax and collect other revenues to local
councils does not enter into the composite measure presented here.

( _ ) India Wants to Expand Their Decentralization

The World Bank, 4/4/08, p.


http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&rlz=1T4GWYE_enUS232US233&q=india+decentralized+now&as_
qdr=y (“India - Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments”, The World Bank)

Given India’s size and diversity, it is not easy to achieve effective representation. But from the first central
initiative to establish local governments in 1957 to the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1993, there have
been advances in this direction. There have also been, at every step, administrative and legal problems, or
incomplete understanding of the concepts involved. Overall, decentralization in India is unfinished: it has
put local governments in place but not endowed them with the means to deliver results. The effectiveness
of decentralization requires the calibration of the administrative, political and fiscal dimensions. Without
political decentralization, participatory decision-making is not possible. Administrative decentralization is
necessary to implement political decisions, and an important precondition for fiscal decentralization.
Efficiency in the delivery of public services depends on administrative efficiency and accountability. To assess
rural local government finance in India, it is useful to compare the system with current thinking on a well-
functioning intergovernmental fiscal system.

38
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Indian Fism Key to Econ


( _ ) Federalism boosts economy
The Hindu 07 (The Hindu 8/11/2007 “Federalism is also good economics” p.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2007110856221300.htm&date
=2007/11/08/&prd=th&)

Noting that during the last few decades the spread of democracy and the relevance of federalism have been
growing in the world, President Pratibha Devisingh Patil on Wednesday said democracy and federalism
should be the guiding principles for a new world order. Describing federalism as a concept rooted in ‘self-
rule’, she said: “Federalism is not only good politics. It is also good economics.” She was delivering the
valedictory address at the 4th International Conference on Federalism here, organised by the Inter-State Council
Secretariat and Forum of Federations. The President said federalism went beyond being a mere legal-
constitutional mechanism for the distribution of powers, both legislative and fiscal, among different levels
of the government. “Power-sharing arrangements between different units of government gives a sense of
belonging to various groups within the political system. It facilitates the deepening and widening of the
democratic process. By equipping the different units to take appropriate decisions, federalism helps in the
judicious use of resources, increasing efficiency and better targeting of policies. Federalism, thus, is not
only good politics. It is also good economics,” the President told the delegates. Outlining problems like
poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and disease along with new challenges like the effects of globalisation,
climate change and international terrorism that face humankind, Ms. Patil favoured using federal system
of governance as a strategic tool for the fight against inequality and for building an equitable global order.

39
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict


( _ ) Devolutionary federalism solves ethnic conflict in India

Muni in 99 (SD Muni, Professor of South Asian Studies, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in India,
1999 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee0j.htm#s.d.%20muni)

In a very significant way, federalism has fuelled ethnic conflict through the use of the Union's special provisions
over the states. The use of article 356, which provides for imposition of presidential rule in a state in the "event
of the failure of constitutional machinery," has been the subject of considerable controversy and debate in this
regard. Political use of this provision has been extensive, particularly by the Congress-ruled centre. It can be
employed to dismiss the state government of an opposition party or to manipulate political advantages for a
ruling party or a particularly favoured political leader. In such manipulative machinations, the centre-appointed
governor has played a decisive role, bringing the status and integrity of the governorship into considerable
disrepute. The victimized party and leaders have sought to project this abuse of power as an instance of
suppression of the political rights of the dominant ethnic group in the given state. This has been an important
factor behind the alienation of the Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam.35 Nagaland, where presidential rule was
imposed in April 1992, is a recent example of the alleged misuse of article 356. In reaction, Nagaland's Chief
Minister Vamuzo, who was ousted, said: The 'imperial character' of the Delhi government has manifested
itself in its most perverted and brutal forms in the north-eastern states. The latest act of perfidy by the
Congress government has come at a time when, with the knowledge and approval of Delhi, I was engaged in an
effort to persuade the underground insurgents in Nagaland to give up arms and join the political process.
Obviously, such efforts were not to the liking of certain sections of the political leadership in the state who have
a vested interest in a violent underground movement... Let me, however, sound a note of warning. The entire
North-East is in a state of turmoil. Frustration because of unemployment is driving the educated youth of this
region to desperation. The sense of alienation due to the overbearing presence of the army is being compounded
by the lack of opportunity. And the denial to the people of their right to govern themselves in accordance with
the Constitution is creating situations that will ultimately convince the people of the entire North-East, from
Arunachal to Mizoram, that they have no hope of a life of peace and dignity under the present dispensation. 36
While the abuse of some constitutional provisions by the centre against the states has tended to alienate the
states-based ethnic leadership, the creation and use of other specific provisions at the local level by the army,
state governments, or police have resulted in distancing the common people from the Union. (Such provisions
include the Disturbed Areas Act, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 for the Eastern region and of
1983 for Punjab and Chandigarh, and the act relating to "Terrorist Affected Disturbed Areas.") As a
consequence of their application, the social bases of ethnic conflicts have widened and deepened. The Sarkaria
Commission blamed those in charge of the centre for this misuse and centralization of power in the Union,
saying: Those in power at the centre, have been obliged to use diverse strategies and tactics which were not
always sound from [a] long-term [point of view] to maintain their control over state level forces. Many a time,
the actions of the centre, its discriminatory approach towards some states, its lack of understanding of local
problems, its abject insensitiveness (sic) and the blatant misuse of authority vis-à-vis the states, have all
distanced it from the people. This in turn has, it is believed, reversed the process of national integration...37
Based on federal experience in India, it may not be out of place to assume that the structure of federalism
and its inherent resilience can cope with the pressures of ethnicity and conflicts. It can even help resolve,
or at least contain, some of these pressures, if the imperatives of federal devolution of power and obligations
of mutual accommodation and adjustments are observed sincerely. The diffusion of Tamil militancy and
separatism during the 1960s and instances of moderation of tribal insurgencies in the North-East and Assam
during the 1980s may be recalled in this regard. Against this, politically motivated distortions and manipulation
of federal powers and institutions can worsen ethnic conflicts.

40
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict


( _ ) Indian federalism localizes ethnic conflicts and prevents escalation

Singh in 03 (Mahendra P. Singh, University of Delhi, Douglas V. Verney , University of


Pennsylvania, Publius, Fall 2003 v33 i4 p1(20))

It has also managed to indigenize its political institutions in a variety of ways, not least through mass protests
against governments, dating from Mohandas Gandhi's use of non-violence as a technique of dealing with the
country's colonial masters. What is interesting has been the continuation of this strategy in a country that proudly
claims to be democratic, arguably because the federal system is slow to respond to popular demands. While there
is always the possibility that these protests will get out of hand, usually they stop short of violence, and
because of India's federal system, both peaceful and violent protests have rarely spilled over from one
state to another.

( _ ) Decentralization key to undercutting the insurgency in Kashmir

Mathew in 02 (George Mathew, the Director of the Institute of Social Sciences in Delhi, India., Vol 2,
No 3, April 2002 [http://www.forumfed.org/publications/pdfs/vol2_no3_apr_2002.pdf])

The last, given the stance of the current Indian government, is the most likely. But there could be another
approach that might respond to the Kashmiri need to preserve its distinct identity and fortify Indian
federalism as well. Civil society organizations, pro-federalism thinkers and practitioners are of the view that
true and genuine democracy is the only answer to the Kashmir problem. Free and fair elections at the State
and federal levels are a necessary condition. But more significantly, democracy and democratic values must
percolate down the line. Village councils (Halqa Panchayats) hold the key. If Jammu and Kashmir had a vibrant
local self-government system, would the situation have been different? Everyone with whom this writer
discussed this issue during a recent visit to the State was of the view that democratically elected local self-
government would have made a lot of difference. Deprivation and frustration are the main factors that draw
the young and old towards the extremists’ demands. With people-oriented developments and community
participation, militancy could be contained considerably. It is an open secret that Pakistan tried its best to
subvert the recently held village council elections in Kashmir, for they didn’t want the people of Kashmir to
participate in any political activity in the Valley. It must be said to the credit of the ruling National Conference
that in the last five years it has brought some of the fragile State institutions back on the rails. The fact that the
State government could hold the 2001 Census operations successfully in spite of serious threats from the
militants is no mean achievement. The Halqa Panchayat elections to the local democratic institutions took
place with extraordinary enthusiasm of the people. This was a major political initiative and took some of
the sting out of the militants. In the light of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, and the subsequent
international developments, the Kashmiris were hopeful that militancy would subside in the Valley. This has not
happened. Jammu and Kashmir is facing the painful reality of marginalization. Those at the helm of affairs
in Delhi somehow refuse to recognise it. Kashmir and its multifaceted problems are often misunderstood and
misinterpreted, resulting in people’s misery and their further alienation from the rest of India. Vibrant democratic
institutions and decentralization of power in a true federal spirit are the best way to arrest that alienation.

41
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Indian Fism Solves Ethnic Conflict


( _ ) Indian devolution key to accommodation of minorities, prevents instability

Bagchi in 03 (Amaresh Bagchi, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Publius, Fall 2003 v33
i4 p21(22))

Relations between state and national governments are difficult everywhere, and in India the Center has to tread
with caution, following clear rules and acting transparently. Fortunately, federalism allows for flexibility and
adaptation. Maintaining an appropriate balance between the Center and the states in a federation is, to
quote Buchanan again, "like keeping a satellite in place, with centrifugal and centripetal forces keeping
each other in check". (51) The game is surely worth the candle especially where, as in India, the stakes are
large. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the stability of India as a nation depends critically on the
strength of its federal structure. Any weakening of that structure could be disastrous for the subcontinent,
if not for the world.

42
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Indian Fism Solves India-Pakistan War


( _ ) Devolution and strict division of federal/state power key to prevent India/Pakistan
conflict

Muni in 99 (SD Muni, Professor of South Asian Studies, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in India,
1999 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee0j.htm#s.d.%20muni)

In the debate on India's national integration and ethnic tensions, the nature and functioning of the federal power structure occupies an important place.
The foundations of federalism were laid down on the grounds of concern for the unity and integrity of a
culturally diverse nation. In view of historical experiences of disruptive and disintegrative sectarian forces and the political context of partition
prevailing at the time of independence, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution wanted to strengthen the Union against possible disintegrative pressures.
Introducing the draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar said though India was to be a federation, the federation was not the result of an
agreement by the states to join in a federation. Not being a result of an agreement, no state has the right to secede from it. Though the country and the people may
be divided into different states for convenience of administration, the country is one integral whole, its people a single people living under a single imperium
derived from a single source... The Drafting Committee thought it was better to make [this] clear at the outset rather than leave it to speculation...2 Thus the
perceived basis of structuring the federation was "administrative convenience." Unlike the American and the (erstwhile) Soviet constitutions, the states had no
inherent, not even notional, right to secede from the Union or demand self-determination. In fact the Union in India was empowered to frustrate any such
separatist or secessionist pressures if and when they arose With administrative convenience the avowed guiding principle for designing the federation, not much
weight was given to the need for reflecting India's cultural design. No specific provisions for religious or cultural minorities were incorporated, except that they
were given equal rights. The principle of "preventive discrimination," applied in the case of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, was designed more to undo
their social and economic backwardness than to help them preserve and promote their cultural distinctiveness The Constitution's initial provisions and subsequent
amendments provided for self-government under special administrative provisions for Jammu and Kashmir (Schedule IV, article 370) and to the tribal areas of
North-East (Nagas, Mizos, Manipuri, Tripura, under articles 371 and 371A-I), but the Constituent Assembly refused to endorse proposals for constituting states
on a linguistic basis. Nehru even went to the extent of threatening his resignation if that was to be done, as he apprehended that such a provision would endanger
India's unity and integrity. Nehru was soon to revise his position on this vital issue under the force of circumstances when, in 1953, the linguistic basis of
reorganizing states was accepted and Telugu-speaking Andhra emerged as the first such state. The Commission Constituted to Reorganise States in the Indian
Federation nonetheless continued to emphasize that "it is the Union of India that is the basis of our nationality."26 Explaining the criterion of language as the basis
for constituting a state, it said Linguistic homogeneity provides the only rational basis for reconstituting the state, for it reflects the social and cultural pattern of
living obtaining in well defined regions of the country The congress leadership, including Nehru, which had earlier opposed the idea, conceded, saying that,
being democrats, they had to respect people's wishes The process of linguistic reorganization of states initiated in 1953 has been carried forward under the
recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission since 1956 and was broadly completed by the end of the 1960s.27 This was a major development
toward incorporating cultural identities into political and administrative units. The federal devolution of power strengthened this expression of cultural diversity
The devolution of powers between the Union (or the centre) and the states was laid down in separate lists
prepared for this purpose. Accordingly, the list of the states' "exclusive" powers includes: public order;
police; education; local government; roads and transport; agriculture; land and land revenue; forests; fisheries; industry and trade (limited); state Public
Service Commissions; and Courts (except the Supreme Court). The states can also make laws along with the centre (provided the two do not clash), on subjects
included in a "Concurrent List." These subjects include: criminal laws and their administration; economic and social planning; commercial and industrial
monopolies; shipping and navigation on the inland waterways; drugs; ports (limited); courts and civil procedures. The arrangement for distribution of powers
between the Union and the states has remained generally stable. One of the controversial aspects of centre-state relations has been the allocation of economic
resources by the Union to the states. Such allocation is carried out by the Planning Commission in the area of developmental expenditure and has led to
complaint by the states that the resources provided are inadequate. The states also have their own power to raise revenues. The "Gadgil Plan," regarding financial
relations between the Union and the states, was not acceptable to the Sarkaria Commission, which was appointed to review the whole gamut of centre-state
relations in view of the state's growing unhappiness in this regard. The Commission reported in 1988, but successive Finance Commissions have gradually
enlarged the scope of devolution of taxes to the states. (These later Commissions were appointed under articles 280-1 of the Constitution to decide the
distribution of taxes between the Union and the states as well as grants-in-aid to the states out of the Consolidated Fund of India.) The Eighth Finance
2
Commission raised the level of such tax revenues in favour of the states from 55 to 85 per cent. Such an elaborate structure of power
devolution has combined with the linguistic basis of federal unity to facilitate the management of cultural
diversity in India and help mitigate pulls toward separatism and disintegration. Centre-state relations, whether based on
ethnicity or otherwise, have not been peaceful or tension-free, but the competition has tended to focus on securing resources and greater power. States of
diverse languages and cultures have often joined together to enhance their bargaining power. In some cases the
Indian federal structure even provides for such bargaining through bodies such as the Inter-State and National Development Councils. Examples of bargaining
coalitions include that of four Southern Chief Ministers joining in 1983 to negotiate with the centre. Similarly, in 1987 a conclave of nine opposition parties held
near Delhi under the leadership of the Andhra Telugu Desham leader, N.T. Rama Rao, demanded the restoration of "co-operative federalism enshrined in the
Constitution."3 In 1992, the Sikkim Chief Minister and his regional party, the Sikkim Sangram Parishad, asked for membership in the North-East Council (of
NorthEast States and Tribal Areas) for this same purpose.31 Some scholars have described the federal system in India as one of "coalition and administration," or
one with a "high degree of collaborative partnership."32 In addition, both at the central and state levels, a consciously followed approach to preserve and promote
the cultural specificities of diverse groups has helped such groups identify with the national mainstream.33 All this has contributed to the secularization of
ethnicity and has thus helped strengthen integrative forces It is interesting to note that most of the ethnic conflicts are between
one given ethnic group and the Union of India, as if there were no ethnic contradictions and
incompatibilities between individual groups. As noted earlier, the issues involved in such conflicts are invariably mixed with questions of
sharing economic resources and decision-making power

43
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***RUSSIA***

Russia Models US
( _ ) Russia models US federalism

Lynn and Novikov in 97 (Nicholas Lynn and Alexei Novikov, University of Edinburgh and Institute for
Urban Economics, Publius, Spring 1997)

One of the most important political debates in Russia since 1990 has been over the basic principle that
should underpin the organization of federation in Russia, namely, the idea of federalism in Russia itself. In
these debates, three competing federal models have been proposed, which ascribe to three different organizing
principles: a territorial principle; a national territorial principle; and a principle of local self-management. These
are considered in turn below, before an assessment is made of more recent shifts in the process of refederalizing
Russia. Territorial Federalism The first of these models envisages a strictly spatial division of power. This can be
achieved by either a fundamental reorganization of the administrative-territorial composition of Russia into a
federation of a smaller number of larger regions, or an equalization of the existing eighty-nine units (and the
removal of any expression of national self-determination from Russia's federal structure). One of the best-known
plans for a reorganization of the Russian Federation into territorial units was Oleg Rumyantsev's (1990) proposal
for establishing twenty regions (zemli) on the lines of the Landers of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Rumyantsev was the secretary of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation, and his ideas had wide influence. He adopted the liberal democratic view that the federal government
should establish a constitution that guaranteed basic individual rights and freedoms: a constitution that
established a "contract between the individual, society and the state."'5 Early constitutional drafts were strongly
influenced by liberal writers (like the former dissident Andrei Sakharov) and by ideas about federal evolution in
the West. Many proponents of a territorial principle looked to the United States as a model of successful
federalism. Gavril Popov (at that time mayor of Moscow), for example, was one of several leading
"reformers" who proposed a system of territorial federalism in Russia that adhered to a United States
type model. He called for the creation of 10-15 largescale regions and for the abolition of Russia's ethno-federal
hierarchy. In order to provide for the right of national self-determination, Popov also proposed the formation of
Councils of National Communities at both the regional and the federal levels for organizing policies on non-
Russian language education and the "development" of non-Russian cultures, for example." Another advocate of
a Lander-based model of Russian federalism was the nationalities minister, Sergei Shakray, who supported the
creation of a dozen administrative units. His "February Thesis" in 1993 proposed an eleven-point nationalities
policy which stressed the importance of tackling national questions outside of the federal structure of the Russian
state.'7 Another, but less tolerant, view of territorial restructuring was also provided by the leader of the "Liberal
Democratic" party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who proposed abolishing all the republics and national-formations in
1991.18

44
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Federalism Impact Module


( _ ) Federalism key to stop Russian dissolution and loss of nuclear arsenal control

Hahn in 03 (Gordon M. Hahn is a visiting research scholar with the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University, Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2003 v11 i3 p343(20))

Where did Russia's federal state come from, where has it been, where is it going, and why does it matter beyond
a small circle of Russia specialists? Taking the last question first, the success or failure of Russia's
transformation into a stable market democracy will determine the degree of stability throughout Eurasia. For
such a large multinational state, successful political and economic development depends on building an
efficient democratic federal system. Indeed, one of the main institutional factors leading to the demise of the
Soviet partocratic regime and state was the considerably noninstitutionalized status of the RSFSR (Russian
Republic) in the Soviet Union's pseudofederal, national-territorial administrative structure. Only a democratic
federal system can hold together and effectively manage Russia's vast territory, the awkward
administrative structure inherited from the failed USSR, and hundreds of divergent ethnic, linguistic, and
religious interests. Dissolution or even any further weakening of Russia's federal state could have dire
consequences for Russian national and international security by weakening control over its means of mass
destruction.

( _ ) Russian collapse causes global nuclear war

David in 99 (Steven David, Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs,
Jan/Feb, 1999)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In
a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher.
Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half
the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or
contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive
devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic
Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed
forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal
friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in
spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard
in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used
as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local
governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to
emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however,
since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow
ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even
that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little
in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by
shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar
movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should
Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does
not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of
refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage
from the fighting,
particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within
Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a
second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could
lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even
without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear
weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the
government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on
nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups
and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces.
And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a
Russian civil war.

45
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Fism Key to Economy


( _ ) Federalism key to Russian economy

Kupchan in 2k (Clifford, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the
U.S. Department of State., http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf)

Devolution has hastened the breakup of the Soviet economic system and has created conditions under which
private entrepreneurship has a chance to take root and grow. The centrally planned economy of the
former Soviet Union left Russia with collective agriculture and huge enterprises, some of which employed
entire cities. Few of these enterprises can be salvaged or restructured to function in a market economy. Their
immediate closure, however, would result in massive unemployment and is simply not an option. Russia’s
economic future thus depends on the emergence of new productive activities. Devolution promotes market
reform and new productive activities in several ways. It has allowed the creation of successful regional
models of economic reform. The process gives progressive ideas at the regional level a better chance of being
turned into policy. Indeed, the policies of forward-leaning regional leaders are creating a canon of success
stories and models for other regional governments. The best example is Governor Prusak in Novgorod.
Reform in Novgorod has produced a more favorable tax climate, more transparent budget procedures,
streamlined licensing procedures, and clear land titling. As a result, the number of new small businesses
and foreign investment has dramatically increased. Samara, where roughly 20 percent of the workforce is
employed by small business, is also a success story. Governor Titov has strongly championed small business and
passed a groundbreaking law permitting the privatiza-tion of agricultural land. The Siberian region of Tomsk is
also implementing many of these same reforms.

( _ ) Development of Russian federalism key to continued economic stability

Filippov et al in 04 (Mikhail Filipov, Assitant Professor of Political Science and Fellow at the Center in
Political Economy at Washington, University in St Louis, Peter Ordeshook, Professor of
Political Science at the California Institute of Technology, and Olga Shvetsova, Fellow at
the Micro Incentives Research Center at Duke, Designing Federalism, 2004 p. 306-307)

Prescriptions for encouraging federal stability in Russia are typical of the advice offered political leaders
elsewhere: “[T]he future of the Russian Federation [RF] depends on a well-designed intergovernmental
system that matches expenditures and revenues… the fiscal system is at the heart of any solution (Wallich
1994: 249) and “until markets integrate Russian regions and hence locally based political interests, the
country will fail to develop… a federal system which stimulates economic growth and imposes
selfenforcing restrictions on counterproductive discretion of public officials” (Polishchuk 1996). We are not
surprised that, for an economist, “political structures are of less importance: what is crucial for him is simply that
different levels of decision-making do exist, each of which determines levels of provision of particular public
services in response largely to the interest of its geographic constituency” (Oates 1972), or that when attempting
to treat the political-economic transformation of the Soviet Union and Central Europe, “ economic reform
theorists discounted politics. They focused on inflation, deficit spending, and exchange rates, and considered
political issues a distraction” (McFaul 1995: 87). The explanation for this focus is not that economists easily
succumb to disciplinary blindness. Political elites also give special emphasis to economic matters, if only
because the issues they confront that require immediate attention are typically economic in character – balancing
a budget, ensuring the collection of taxes, privatizing industries, sorting responsibilities for social welfare
programs, and controlling inflation. In contrast, the problems that require a political institutional resolution often
appear either as intractable redistributive matters or as things susceptible only to speculative long-term solutions.

46
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Fism Solves Civil War


( _ ) Federalism key to averting Russian civil war

Petrov in 04 (Nikolai Petrov, Carnegie Moscow Center, What the Papers Say, 12/21/04 p ln)

Numerous democratic institutions have already fallen victim to the war on terrorism. Now it's federalism
and the Constitution under attack. A revision of Russia's territorial administration structure is the focal
point of the "response measures" produced by the Kremlin after the tragedy of the school hostage siege in Beslan.
Regional borders play a sound organizing role in Russia, forming and developing the whole socio-territorial fabric. This role would have
been less important were it not for the extensive centralization replicated at all levels from Moscow to some godforsaken district center. This
system is consistent with the mobilization model for politics and the economy. Relations between the federal government and
the regions have been dramatically revised in Moscow's favor during the war on terrorism years. Regional
leaders lost their Federation Council membership and moved out of federal politics in general; the financial independence of the regions was
substantially weakened, Moscow took over regional courts and law enforcement agencies; and direct elections for regional leaders were
abolished only recently. There have been sweeping changes in security and law enforcement as well. Centralized
and unitary, like everything else in Russia, this field was taken over by the regions in the 1990s because
the weak federal government couldn't even afford enough funding for these activities, let alone oversight.
A great deal has been done over the last several years to fortify and reorganize the law enforcement
agencies and withdraw them from regional control again. The system of horizontal rotation for senior officers in security
and law enforcement, abandoned in the Brezhnev era, has been reintroduced. This system assures their loyalty to Moscow. And yet, the
system does backfire every now and then. Seeking to minimize the dependence of senior officers on regional elites, Moscow appoints people
who don't "belong" - and who are patently unable to maintain control of the situation, as evidenced by the recent crisis in the Caucasus. The
lack of horizontal coordination between numerous security and law enforcement agencies in Russia is one of the problems the Kremlin has
encountered. With an emphasis on vertical subordination, any interdepartmental coordination or cooperation requires permission from above.
But all too often, nothing can be achieved without horizontal cooperation. All this takes time, and there is never enough time in a crisis. This
is what happened in Beslan, even though the office of head of a counter-terrorism commission with broad powers had been introduced in the
Caucasus (nationwide, in fact) barely a month earlier. Things weren't much better during the Moscow theater hostage-taking two years ago,
where casualties among hostages were caused by the lack of coordination between the organizations participating in the hostage rescue
operation. And how are things in other countries which have also encountered the terrorist threat? Is Russia's approach consistent with what
is being done abroad? Yes, in terms of reforming security and law enforcement bodies and promoting interdepartmental cooperation. No, in
terms of centralizing political power. The United States is a vivid example. It restructured its secret services in the wake of September 11, but
it didn't try to force all of society into marching columns. Does Russia have its own unique path? Do Russia's own past
experiences indicate that centralization is helpful? The year of 2004 stands as evidence to the contrary.
The measures concerning security and law enforcement are a matter for the authorities, but restrictions
on democracy and federalism demand broad public debate. The authorities should formulate their goals
and objectives, set deadlines, and outline oversight mechanisms. Instead, our society is being offered more
reforms - without so much as an attempt at an explanation. In the meantime, any reform implies a loss of
control - at least temporarily. Excessive centralization implies the risk of losing control over the entire
system. This is the risk of having too many powers and being unable to perform all functions. In any case, there is the risk of losing public
oversight for the activities of the authorities. A unitary state does not mean a stable state; a centralized state does not mean a strong state.
Total surveillance over the citizenry may do away with terrorism - after all, surveillance over crime is perfect in jails. But is our society
prepared to pay this price? Dismantling federalism is leading to a loss of oversight, and weakening the state - in the
face of the terrorist threat. It's a lie that regional leaders can be appointed in federations. Appointment (and dismissal) of regional leaders by
the head of state, a state with a weak parliament, bears no resemblance to federalism. We are told that Russia is at war. It is; but this is an
argument that should be used by the opponents of unitarism. Centralization may be effective during a war against another country, but not a
war on terrorists. A strictly-organized simple mechanism is only effective against another mechanism of the same kind, not against acts of
sabotage.

47
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Federalism Solves Democracy


( _ ) Russian federalism is key to democratic consolidation

Filippov et al in 04 (Mikhail Filipov, Assitant Professor of Political Science and Fellow at the Center in
Political Economy at Washington, University in St Louis, Peter Ordeshook, Professor of
Political Science at the California Institute of Technology, and Olga Shvetsova, Fellow at
the Micro Incentives Research Center at Duke, Designing Federalism, 2004 p. 306-307)

To this point our assessment of Russia’s problems are not necessarily at odds with President Putin’s early
initiatives, which seem aimed more at a consolidation of the Kremlin’s position in the face of otherwise
seemingly anarchic federal relations. What seems not to be understood, however, is how democracies
function and how bureaucratic centralization as opposed to the cooperation encouraged by an integrated
party system can undermine that integration and exacerbate the anarchic relations it is designed to
resolve. Admittedly, the temptation is great, especially in disruptive political-economic circumstance, to try to
implement change through central directive – a temptation that seems irresistible, given Russia’s political
traditions. However, without entering into a discussion of the legitimate policy domains of federal subjects
versus the national government, we notice that this view has at least two spillovers into the arena of political
institutional design: A common assumption is that regional and local politics are more readily corrupted
than are national politics; hence the argument for federal regulation if not outright federal control of regional and
local elections. On paper at least Russia, once again, abides by this assumption. Ideally oversight of those
elections should lay in the hands of a politically independent court, which can rely on constitutional guarantees
of republican or democratic regional governance. But even if the judiciary is poorly formed, central regulation
and control have distinct disadvantages. First, as we note earlier with respect to regional elections in Dagestan,
innovation and creative adaptation to local circumstances is stifled. Second, with respect of the development
of meaningful regional parties, such parties can develop only when the offices being filled control real
resources. And from the perspective of political elites one of the most important resources is control of the
methods of election. Third, as with inefficient markets, there is only one long-term solution to the elimination
of political corruption – competition – which can arise at the regional level only if there is something
worth competing for, including the right to regulate (or manipulate) regional elections. There is, moreover, no
good theoretical or empirical reason for supposing that central directive will be any less subject to corrupt
manipulation than some decentralized process. Finally, in countries such as Russia that use single-member
districts, a critically important process is that of drawing district boundaries, which is laden with political
meaning since boundaries can be drawn to favor one party or candidate over others. This gerrymandering
process is, of course, very much like a constantsum game among parties (the constant being the number of seats
in the legislature), which, if played at the national level, keeps conflict from bubbling up to the federal center so
as to encourage institutional renegotiation at the national level.

48
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Democracy Impact


( _ ) Impact is nuclear war

Goodby, Buwalda, and Trenin in 02 (James E. Goodby, former fellow @ US Institute of Peace,
Petrus Buwalda, former ambassador to Egypt, Sweden, and
USSR, and Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of Carnegie
Moscow Center, A Strategy for Stable Peace, 2002, p. 27-9)

A decade after the Cold War was solemnly buried, there is still no stable peace between Russia and the
Western countries. Moreover, from the late 1990 the dynamic of the relationship has taken a negative direction.
NATO’s expansion to the east, the Kosovo crisis, and the second Chechen war stand out as milestones of the
gradual slide toward something alternately described as a cold peace’ and a ‘new cold war’. Frustration is
steadily building on both sides. Mutual expectations have been drastically lowered. In the Western world and
in North America in particular, public expectations for Russia and Its affairs have plummeted. ‘Russia fatigue’ is
widespread In Europe as well. In Russia itself, Western, especially U.S., policies are often described as being
aimed at keeping Russia weak and fragmented with a purpose of subjugating it. it would appear, then, that today
is anything but a propitious starting point loran effort to chart the road toward a security community centered on
Europe that would include Russia. But such an effort is necessary and should not be delayed. At worst, a Russia
that is not properly anchored in a common Institutional framework with the West can turn into a loose
nuclear cannon. If conflicts arise between Russia and its smaller neighbors, the West will not be able to sit
them out. And a progressive alienation between Russia and the Western world would have a very negative
impact on domestic developments in Russia. Now that the German problem has been solved, the Russian
problem looms as potentially Europe ‘s largest. The United States will not be able to ignore Russia’s
strategic nuclear arsenal, and the European Union can hardly envisage a modicum of stability along its
eastern periphery unless It finds a formula to co-opt Russia as Europe’s reliable associate. RUSSIAN
DEMOCRATIZATION In the decade since the demise of the Soviet Union and the communist system, Russia
has evolved into a genuinely pluralistic society though it ss still a very incomplete democracy. To Its credit,
Russia has a constitution that proclaims separation of powers; It has a working parliament, an executive
president, and a nominally independent judiciary. Between 1993 and 2000, three parliamentary and two
presidential elections were held; for the first time in Russia’s long history, transfer of power at the very top
occurred peacefully and in accordance with a democratic constitution This is already becoming a pattern. Power
has been decentralized vertically as well as horizontally. Power monopoly is a thing of the past. Russia’s regions
have started to form distinct identities. The regional governors, or presidents of republics, within Russia are
popularly elected, as are city mayors and regional legislatures. The national economy has been largely
privatized. The media, though not genuinely independent either of the authorities or of the various vested
Interests, are free in principle. There is a large degree of religious freedom, and ideological oppression is
nonexistent. Finally Russians are free to travel abroad, These achievements are significant, and most of them are
irreversible. Yet. Russia’s development is handicapped by major hurdles to speedier societal
transformation, as is occurring in Poland or Estonia. One hurdle is poor governance, stemming from the
irresponsibility of the elites as much as from sheer incompetence. Toward the end of the Yeltsin era, the state
itself appeared privatized, with parts of it serving the interests of various groups or strongmen. Corruption and
crime are pervasive. Accustomed to living in an authoritarian state, many Russians began to associate
democracy with chaos and thuggery. Another major problem is widespread poverty and the collapse of the
social infrastructure, including health care. Too many Russians believe they have gained little or nothing
from the economic and social changes of the past decade. Taken together, these factors work toward the
restoration of some form of authoritarian and paternalistic rule.

49
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Fism Solves Nationalism


( _ ) Federalism key to checking Russian Nationalism

Sitnikov in 05 (Alexei Sitnikov, senior researcher at the Institute of Open Economy in Moscow,
Moscow Times, February 4, 2005)

Could Russia be governed as a unitary state? The answer is a definitive no. First, the sheer size of the
country calls for some degree of regional autonomy. This autonomy should not be limited to everyday
management but should give regions enough room to maneuver in domestic policy matters within
constitutional boundaries. Regional leaders should be elected by direct popular vote. Supporters of centralization
argue that elections are corrupt. However, even an incomplete electoral contract with a regional leader serves the
interests of the people better than a hierarchical system of bureaucratic subordination. Second, economic
diversity among the regions also demands a significant degree of fiscal federalism and the ability for the
regions to control their fiscal base. Right now, the regions bear huge responsibilities for funding federal social
programs but have hardly any say in how the taxes are distributed between the regions and the center. Should
social problems similar to the current benefits protests arise in the future, regional leaders will have no other
option but to transfer all responsibility to the federal government and the president. According to a number of
recent opinion polls, the majority of Russians consider governors safeguards against the center's attempts to
extract and redistribute regional resources. The appointment of regional leaders will eliminate these safeguards
and increase the hostility between the center and the regions. Appointed governors will have no incentives to
foster horizontal competition and create favorable conditions for business and labor. The only incentive they will
have is to serve their master well. Third, there is the issue of nationalism. The nature of popular mobilization
is such that protest driven by nationalist sentiments spreads much faster then dissent based on social
factors. In a unitary state, any nationalist grievances immediately expand to the global level, as the central
government is the only source of public authority. Russia is home to hundreds of different ethnic groups
with a multitude of interfering interests. Popularly elected and legitimate regional leaders address many of
these conflicts far better than federal authorities.

50
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Nationalism Impact
( _ ) Russian nationalism causes nuclear war

Israelyan in 98 (Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and
leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter)

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option
would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies.
Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the
outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of
nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify
both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons
Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional
intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles
such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the
denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by
alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift
Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a
threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its
unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear
weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS
countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly
magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political
ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other
issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out.
Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could
carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin,
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and
fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO"
deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when
Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty,
Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the
world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the
economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in
the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's
would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would
"dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures
on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian
ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases
the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the
United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that
Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite
dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch
their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all
the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we
all fall down together." n12

51
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Fism Solves Nuclear Leakage/Terrorism


( _ ) Federalism is key to Russian stability and solving nuclear terrorism

Hahn in 03 (Gordon M. Hahn is a visiting research scholar with the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University, Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2003 v11 i3 p343(20))

Growing tension in Russian-Muslim relations and the federation's weakness or collapse would have grave
international security implications. On the most obvious level, the fate of Russian federalism touches on
the political stability and integrity of a nuclear power. But it also impinges on issues such as the successful
integration of a stable, prosperous, and democratic Russia into Western and other international economic
and security structures; the threat of Islamic terrorism; and the proliferation of weapons and other means
of mass destruction. Russia is vulnerable to illegal as well as legal infiltration of Islamists from abroad. The
titular Muslim republics border on and/or maintain close business, educational, and cultural ties to Chechnya, the
Transcaucasus, and Central Asian states. Russia's own borders are extremely porous. Thus, these republics are
subject to infiltration by and lending support to revolutionary Islamists from Muslim and Arab states. On 28 June
Russia's Federal Migration Service reported that Russia is now a major transit corridor for illegal international
migration and hosts from 1.5 to 5 million illegal immigrants. With Wahabbi infiltration among Russia's Muslims,
Putin's support for the U.S.-led war against terror, and the pressure that federative reforms are putting on federal-
regional and Russian-Muslim relations, Russia is less stable and provides more fertile ground for the support of
Islamic terror. A small number of militants can cause great havoc. It is well known that Russian sites
holding nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials are far from fully secure. There have been
several attempts to penetrate such sites and seize weapons or materials. Several years ago, Chechens claimed
responsibility for leaving a small quantity of nuclear-grade uranium in several Moscow parks. In April 2002 a
team of journalists made their way into a high-security zone near a nuclear material warehouse to highlight lax
security.

52
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Federalism Solves Prolif


( _ ) Russian federalism key to prevent disintegration and WMD prolif

Hahn in 03 (Gordon M. Hahn is a visiting research scholar with the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University, Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2003 v11 i3 p343(20))

Where did Russia's federal state come from, where has it been, where is it going, and why does it matter beyond
a small circle of Russia specialists? Taking the last question first, the success or failure of Russia's
transformation into a stable market democracy will determine the degree of stability throughout Eurasia. For
such a large multinational state, successful political and economic development depends on building an
efficient democratic federal system. Indeed, one of the main institutional factors leading to the demise of
the Soviet partocratic regime and state was the considerably noninstitutionalized status of the RSFSR (Russian
Republic) in the Soviet Union's pseudofederal, national-territorial administrative structure. Only a
democratic federal system can hold together and effectively manage Russia's vast territory, the awkward
administrative structure inherited from the failed USSR, and hundreds of divergent ethnic, linguistic, and
religious interests. Dissolution or even any further weakening of Russia's federal state could have dire
consequences for Russian national and international security by weakening control over its means of mass
destruction.

53
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Russian Fism Solves Ethnic Genocide


( _) Russian federalism is key to preventing genocide of ethnic minorities

Dugin in 2006 (Alexander Dugin, political scientist, What the Papers Say Part A (Russia) “RUSSIA'S
FUTURE: A UNITARY STATE OR AN ETHNO-FEDERATION?”)

Experts and political scientists were prompted to consider such questions by reforms to the hierarchy of
governance in the course of 2005 - especially the abolition of elections for regional leaders. For example,
Alexander Voloshin, former head of the presidential administration, spoke about a possible scenario for
transforming federative Russia into unitary Russia, noting that the ethnic republics, as self-sufficient regions
of the Federation, are hotbeds of tension. Therefore, the process of expanding regions might end in erasing
the borders of the ethnic republics. Meanwhile, Boris Nemtsov agreed with other Russian liberals in naming
"the curtailment of federative principles and local government, leading to a unitary state," among the
negative trends of the past year.

I'd agree with the liberal opposition here, but from a completely different standpoint - a Eurasian standpoint. Russia
as a unitary state would be the worst of all possible options, precisely because it would happen at the expense
of genocide for the native ethnic groups comprising it. This genocide doesn't just threaten ethnic minorities
that are assimilated into the majority people; it also threatens the majority people, which loses its unique
ethnic qualities, its native characteristics, originality, traditions; its members become mere citizens of the
nation-state. Consequently, Russia ought to take the federalist path, but with one substantial proviso:
federalism should change from the territorial federalism of today to ethno-federalism - that is, a federation of
ethnic groups, or Eurasian federalism.

54
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

AT: Russian Fism Impossible


( _ ) Now is the key time to reverse centralization trends - Russian federalism is still strong

Sitnikov in 05 (Alexei Sitnikov, senior researcher at the Institute of Open Economy in Moscow,
Moscow Times, February 4, 2005)

However strong the centralization trend might appear, the history of Russian federalism is hardly over.
Many of the current policy choices are made in an ad hoc manner, without broad societal discussion and
consent. The power vertical, so cherished by the administration, will begin to buckle under the weight of
corruption, popular dissent and administrative inefficiencies. Then the authorities will realize that central
control is not the best governing option. For now, the rules of the game have changed. But the game itself is
far from over.

55
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***2NC ANSWERS TO AFF ARGS***

AT: Federalism => Disintegration


( _ ) This argument goes the wrong way – federalism is more likely to prevent
disintegration and secessionism by ceding authority to localities and solving minority fears

Diamond 04 (Larry, Sr. Researcher @ hoover Institute, “Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?”,
Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad,
February 12, 2004
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm)

A very legitimate fear of many who are wary of federalism is that, in a context of deep ethnic and regional
divisions, it can lead to the break-up of the country, as in the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia.
These fears are real, but they are based on a mistaken reading of other experiences. Divided countries
have disintegrated at crucial moments precisely because they did not develop over time democratic means
for the devolution of power that knitted groups together in a more authentic, voluntary, and legitimate
political union. When groups are held together in one nation mainly by force and fear, anxious minorities
may seek to secede at the first sign of a weakening of central government power. By contrast, when the
national government, under the fresh political circumstances that attend the formation of a new democratic
system, makes an early and sincere grant of autonomy, the consequence is almost always greater stability
and unity, rather than secession. This has been the case in India, Spain, Mexico, and Nigeria, for example. By
contrast, countries like Sudan and Sri Lanka have paid a heavy price in civil war and massive violence for the
failure to accommodate aspirations for devolution.

(_)

56
Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

AT: States Hurt Rights


( _ ) Federalism key to protect rights – their turns assume an old, inapplicable federalism
model

Rotunda in 03 (Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor of Law University of Illinois, 2003, Arkansas


Law Review, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 795, p. 844-5)

The Framers created federalism not simply or primarily to protect the states but to protect the people.
The Court's New Federalism should not be confused with the old states' rights federalism, because the
New Federalism is about freedom, not about Jim Crow laws. It is incorrect to conclude that the modern
commerce cases show that the Court is deferential to the states. On the contrary, taken in context, they
show quite the opposite. During the same term that the Court decided important federalism cases, it also invalidated a state law that
intruded on the parental relationship by mandating grandparents' visitation rights. This same Court threw out state laws that interfered with
federal power over international affairs and motor vehicles. The Court upheld federal privacy laws that regulated state motor vehicle
departments and placed upon them the same restrictions imposed on private parties. The Court, in short, has shown that when
it is protecting civil rights and liberties it is willing to override state laws and regulations to meet that goal.
This New Commerce Clause does not prevent the Federal Government from enacting any commercial
regulation that would be necessary for a central government to enact, as even liberal commentators concede.
Nor do the New Federalism cases prevent Congress from using its considerable power under the Spending
Clause when it speaks clearly. Indeed, these New Federalism cases do not overturn any prior case law.
The New Commerce Clause cases also do not undermine federal power to enforce the guarantees of equal
protection, but they do guard against a central government of unlimited powers. Although the Court in
Katzenbach v. Morgan upheld a broad congressional power under Section 5 to determine that state practice interferes with Fourteenth
Amendment rights, it also examined the federal statute for consistency with constitutional requirements. The Court's analysis in
later cases confirms that federal courts will scrutinize congressional action under Section 5 in order to
protect basic principles of federalism. These precedents herald a greater protection for the structure of
the federal system and for the liberty that this structure protects. They should not be read to herald a
Federal Government stripped of its important powers that are necessary to protect suspect classes.

( _ ) Courts will check state infringements on rights

Rotunda in 03 (Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor of Law University of Illinois, 2003, Arkansas


Law Review, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 795, p. 844-5)

Modern-day federalism should not be confused with the "states' rights" slogan that the slave owners adopted in the pre-Civil War era or the
Dixiecrats adopted in the 1940s and later. This New Federalism has nothing to do with racism or with sanctioning state violations of
constitutional rights. In fact, the same Court that has authored the modern cases has also reaffirmed the power of
the central government to protect civil rights, including the power of Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation enforcing federal laws against racial discrimination, and the
power of the federal courts, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the provisions of
that amendment. The modern Court realized that the Framers created federalism not so much to protect
the states but to protect the people.

( _ ) Turn – federal power undermines civil rights more – it isn’t the 60s anymore, states
are more proactive

National Law Journal in 2k (12/4/00 p. A27)

Federal hegemony also threatens to undermine state protection of civil rights, which often exceeds federal
guarantees. As Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan noted, the states' extra protection is made possible by
federalism. Liberals would probably embrace federalism again if the issue involved state guarantees of partial-birth abortion or gay
marriage in the face of a federal ban.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

AT: “States Are Racist”


( _ ) It’s not the 60s anymore – states’ rights doesn’t mean racism

Zick in 04 (Timothy Zick, Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. William and
Mary Law Review, Oct 2004, 46 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 213, p lexis)

Perhaps it was not institutional incompetence or necessity that led the Garcia Court to purport to leave the
federalism area, and that has led the Court more generally to avoid, at least until recently, an expansive rights
regime for states. Perhaps, as Baker and Young contend, individual rights like abortion and sexual privacy are
simply "normatively more attractive than states' rights." After all, the phrase "states' rights," for many,
conjures a host of negative associations, including, for some, virulent racism. It is possible, therefore, that
the Court, and many scholars as well, have been "read[ing] particular values out of the Constitution simply
because popular opinion at a given point in history finds them normatively unattractive." This proposition
cannot, of course, be tested empirically. There may indeed have been some residual judicial ill will toward
"states' rights" due to its association with bad actors, both public and private, in our nation's past. It
seems unlikely, however, that in 1985, when Garcia was decided, the Court rested its decision to curtail
fundamental "states' rights" federalism on these sorts of negative associations. It probably gives too little
credit to the Court, and to scholars, to suggest that modes of judicial enforcement or scholarly support are
based primarily upon "changing normative preferences" or mere popularity. Even if one is not willing to
give judges and scholars such credit, it is surely a stretch to paint the "states' rights" of National League
of Cities with the same brush as the old "states' rights" of segregationists. The "states' rights" of what
might be considered the modern era--freedom from federal wages and hours regulations, for example--are
hardly the sort that invoke segregationist ghosts.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

***AFF ANSWERS***
N/U – California Emissions
( _ ) Not unique – Bush administration pre-emption of California greenhouse caps

Simon, Wilson, Staff Reporters, 12/20/07 p. http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-


epa20dec20,0,1603760.story?page=1&coll=la-home-center (Richard, Janet, “EPA Denies California’s Right to
Mandate Emissions”, The LA Times)

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration Wednesday denied California's bid to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles, dealing a blow to the state's attempts to combat global warming and
prompting an immediate vow from Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to take the decision to court.
Environmental Protection Agency administrator Stephen L. Johnson denied the state's request to
implement its own landmark law, noting that an energy bill signed by President Bush earlier in the day
would go a long way toward reducing emissions throughout the United States. The bill provides the most
significant increase in vehicle fuel economy standards in more than three decades. "The Bush administration is
moving forward with a clear national solution, not a confusing patchwork of state rules," Johnson said in
announcing his decision. The decision infuriated public officials and environmentalists from Washington to
Sacramento, who fired the first shots in what is expected to be a pitched legal and political battle through the
2008 presidential campaign. At least 16 other states, with nearly half the nation's population, have adopted
or are considering California's emission limits and could join in challenges to Wednesday's decision.
Schwarzenegger assailed the EPA for "standing in our way" to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. "California
sued to compel the agency to act on our waiver, and now we will sue to overturn today's decision and allow
Californians to protect our environment," he said in a prepared statement. California Air Resources Board
Chairwoman Mary Nichols, whose agency requested the waiver two years ago, said there was no "patchwork" of
standards. "There is a California greenhouse gas standard . . . which 16 other states would adopt, whereas
there is no federal greenhouse gas standard," she said.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

N/U – Centralization Now - Environment


( _ ) Federal government has massively centralized power under Bush
Pear in 07 Robert Pear, writer for New York Times January 30, 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/washington/30rules.html?pagewanted=2
(“Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation”)

President Bush has signed a directive that gives the White House much greater control over the rules and
policy statements that the government develops to protect public health, safety, the environment, civil
rights and privacy. In an executive order published last week in the Federal Register, Mr. Bush said that each
agency must have a regulatory policy office run by a political appointee, to supervise the development of rules
and documents providing guidance to regulated industries. The White House will thus have a gatekeeper in
each agency to analyze the costs and the benefits of new rules and to make sure the agencies carry out the
president’s priorities. This strengthens the hand of the White House in shaping rules that have, in the past,
often been generated by civil servants and scientific experts. It suggests that the administration still has ways to
exert its power after the takeover of Congress by the Democrats. The White House said the executive order was
not meant to rein in any one agency. But business executives and consumer advocates said the
administration was particularly concerned about rules and guidance issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In an interview on Monday,
Jeffrey A. Rosen, general counsel at the White House Office of Management and Budget, said, “This is a classic
good-government measure that will make federal agencies more open and accountable.” Business groups
welcomed the executive order, saying it had the potential to reduce what they saw as the burden of federal
regulations. This burden is of great concern to many groups, including small businesses, that have given strong
political and financial backing to Mr. Bush. Consumer, labor and environmental groups denounced the
executive order, saying it gave too much control to the White House and would hinder agencies’ efforts to
protect the public.

( _ ) The federal government has taken away all state authority, especially for
environmental issues.
Schoenbrod - professor of law at New York Law School and former-senior attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council – 1996
(David, “Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards,” CATO Regulation)
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg19n4a.html

The solutions to most local environmental problems are no longer in the hands of the state and municipal
officials elected by the people most directly concerned. Instead mandates issue forth from Washington in
tax-code-like abstractions, their terms dictated by the complex interplay between Congress, the White House,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the federal judiciary, and various special interest groups,
including the self-described public interest groups. Just who is responsible for which aspect of any given
policy remains a mystery to the local citizenry. Even if they did know, it would be hard to pin responsibility
on officials who are accountable at the polls. And, even if the responsible officials did have to face reelection,
any local concerns would count for little in the welter of issues in national elections. So, as a practical matter, a
federal aristocracy imposes environmental controls on localities, regardless of local wishes. The
nationalization of environmental policy is both radical and recent. Washington sets mandatory
environmental quality goals, specifies standards for categories of pollution sources, and dictates deadlines
and procedures for states and cities by which to implement them. Yet the regulation of pollution was almost
entirely the province of state and local governments before the early 1970s.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

N/U – Centralization Now – Environment


( _ ) EPA partnership programs eviscerate balance of power
Schoenbrod - professor of law at New York Law School and former-senior attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council – 1996
(David, “Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards,” CATO Regulation)
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg19n4a.html

EPA officials call the national takeover "a dynamic state and federal partnership," suggesting that in
Washington "dynamic" means "heads I win, tails you lose." Given the palpable unfairness of this
condescending partnership, elected state officials often resist federal environmental mandates. In the
ensuing drama, state officials are cast as the environmental bad guys, rounded up by the EPA cavalry and,
if need be, hauled before a federal judge. That such typecasting is a function of the structure of the federal
statutes, rather than some peculiar environmental insensitivity of state governments, is made clear by one
federal environmental statute in which federal officials bear responsibility for most cleanup costs—Superfund.
Then the shoe is on the other foot; state officials perennially call for cleanups that cost more than federal officials
are willing to pay. In sum, the record does not show that federal officials are more environmentally sensitive, just
that they have the power to act more opportunistically.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

N/U – Centralization Now


( _ ) Federal pre-emption destroys state power now - the Supreme Court has pretty much
made the worst balance possible, handicapping both states and the federal government
Bayer – Attorney and comment author – 2005
(Jared, “RE-BALANCING STATE AND FEDERAL POWER: TOWARD A POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
OF SUBSIDIARITY IN THE UNITED STATES, American University Law Review)
www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/53/bayer.pdf

Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law when a state statute directly conflicts with a federal
statute.30 Federal law also preempts state law by implication when Congress intended to occupy a particular
field of law.31 Congressional intent to occupy a field arises either from an express congressional statement or
from the nature and scope of the federal enactment.32 Federal power to enact legislation and preempt further
state action in a field of law causes a two-fold problem.33 First, Congress enacts uniform national solutions to
differentiated local problems.34 Federal preemption limits the ability of the states to tailor unique solutions
specific to the local sub-issues of these problems.35 It also prevents the states from revisiting ongoing problems
that may arise as the issues underlying these problems evolve differently over time in distinct parts of the
country.36 Second, in response to the expansion of federal legislative authority, the Supreme Court established
new limits on federal authority, thereby preventing the federal government from addressing issues of national
concern that the states cannot resolve effectively by themselves.37

( _ ) Federal government controlling states now – unfunded mandates


FoxNews – 2/17/2004
(“States Rebelling Against No Child Left Behind,” Fox News)
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,111675,00.html

The Republican-controlled Utah House voted 64-8 last week not to comply with any provisions for which the
federal government has not supplied enough money. The bill, which now goes to the Senate, represents the
strongest position yet taken by lawmakers around the country. Elsewhere, lawmakers have passed or introduced
legislation or nonbinding resolutions challenging the 2002 law's tougher standards for student testing and teacher
credentials. Many legislators are angry over what they see as a federal takeover of education that leaves
states to pay the bill. "We gradually give up our state sovereignty when we accept our tax money back
into the state with strings attached to it," said Republican state Rep. Margaret Dayton of Utah.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

NU – Centralization Already Modeled


( _ ) Centralized environmental regulation is already modeled overseas – Europe proves

Faure and Johnston, Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, 3/08, p.
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=upenn/wps (Michael and Jason, “The Law and
Economics of Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United States Compared”, Penn Law)

To many people, American environmental regulation means federal environmental regulation. In turning
to Congress rather than the states, environmentalists of the 1960s and 70s were simply reflecting the dominant view about
federal-state relations that prevailed from 1945 until 1980: that any serious change in policy could only be effectuated by the federal
government.8 In this preference for federal action, Environmentalism was but another form of Regulatory Centralism – the view that in any
hierarchical governmental system, the regulatory ideal is to transfer as much authority as possible to the highest level of government.
Environmentalists enjoyed unprecedented success. For those accustomed to legislative gridlock, it is worth recalling that within just a few
years, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act,9 the Clean Air Amendments,10 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments,11 the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,12 the Marine Mammal Protection Act,13 the Noise Control Act,14 the
Coastal Zone Management Act,15 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.16 It is fair to say that twenty-first century
American environmental law is primarily federal. But this is not to say that all federal environmental
regulatory schemes are the same. There is indeed significant variation among the various federal statutes,
and variation too in the role that the courts have played in determining the way that environmental
regulatory federalization has played out. Indeed, the role of the courts in American environmental
federalization has been paradoxical: on the one hand, the courts have been an important forum for citizen
participation in federalized American environmental governance; on the other hand, the courts have actively
encouraged environmental federalization even at the expense of likely more effective state and local
regulation. As in the US, in most European countries, the 1970s was a period during which many
environmental laws were enacted.17 But at the level of the European Community, there was as yet no formal
legal authority, or competence, to issue environmental regulatory measures. Eventually, however, the European
Commission found the authority for environmental regulation in Articles 100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty.18 Article 100
allowed for European measures to harmonize national legislation in order to remove or prevent barriers for the internal market. Article 235 to
the contrary was the (limited) legal basis for issuing legislation with a ‘pure’ environmental goal stating that if action by the community
should prove necessary to obtain one of the objectives of the Community and the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers then The
Council shall, acting unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission and after concerting the European Parliament, take the appropriate
measures. The ECJ broadly interpreted Article 235 in 1985, stating that that environmental protection is one of the Community’s essential
objectives.19 However, only with the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987 was the EEC Treaty revised to include
provisions20 that specifically authorize the EC to promulgate environmental directives.21 Since then, the European authorities
have increasingly used the competences granted to them by these Articles to issue a great many directives
with respect to environmental policy.

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Miami Oxford Scholars 2008 File Title

Fism Bad – Externalities


( _ ) Federalism creates Fiscal Inequality
Mueller in 2006 Dennis C. Mueller Prof. at University of Vienna “Federalism: A Constitutional
Perspective” http://rdc1.net/class/PublicChoice/Mueller-on-Federalism.pdf

Fiscal Inequality If public goods are normal goods, then the quantity demanded of them increases with the
income of the community. If the quantity demanded is determined by the median voter, then it increases
with the income of this voter. Communities with high incomes will demand and presumably be supplied
greater quantities of public goods than low-income communities. Such inequalities may be deemed
unacceptable when they appear for public programs like education. That is, everyone in a nation may
agree that every child should be able to obtain an education of a minimum quality. If some communities
are too poor to provide such an education, a Pareto improvement may be forthcoming by transferring funds
from members of 7 rich communities to the poorer communities so as to increase the capacity of the poorer
communities to finance these minimum levels of public services.

( _ ) Federalism creates geographic externalities


Mueller in 2006 Dennis C. Mueller Prof. at University of Vienna “Federalism: A Constitutional
Perspective” http://rdc1.net/class/PublicChoice/Mueller-on-Federalism.pdf

B. Geographic Externalities The consumption or production activities of one community may have
positive or negative external effects on another. If, for example, an upstream community dumps sewage
into a river, it may adversely affect a downstream community. Such externalities can in general be resolved
in a Pareto optimal fashion by Coasian bargaining between the communities. The downstream community offers
the upstream community a bribe to reduce the amount of sewage dumped into the river. Intergovernmental
grants are again required to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, but now they are between
governments at a local or regional level, rather than from the central government to lower levels. Only in
the case where the number of externalities across local communities became so large and complex as to
make Coasian bargaining among communities prohibitively costly would intervention and grants from the
central government become optimal.

( _ ) Federalism creates Migration


Mueller in 2006 Dennis C. Mueller Prof. at University of Vienna “Federalism: A Constitutional
Perspective” http://rdc1.net/class/PublicChoice/Mueller-on-Federalism.pdf

C. Migration Externalities When local governments offer different bundles of tax and expenditure
combinations, individuals may respond to these differences by migrating to those communities, which
provide the best match for their preferences. Such migration can improve allocative efficiency à la Tiebout
(1956), and is thus an important justification for creating a federalist system, but it can also bring about
certain externalities, which lead to Pareto inefficiencies. These externalities are of three types: crowding, fiscal
capacity and redistributive
externalities.

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