SDI 2008 WHAM!

1 States/Fism Core

States/Federalism Core – SDI 2008
States CP States/Federalism Core – SDI 2008.........................................1

States/Federalism Core – SDI 2008..............................................................................................1
States CP 1NC..........................................................................6

States CP 1NC................................................................................................................................6
States Solve – Alternative Energy............................................7

States Solve – Alternative Energy.................................................................................................7
States Solve – Alternative Energy............................................8

States Solve – Alternative Energy.................................................................................................8
States Solve – Cap And Trade..................................................9

States Solve – Cap And Trade.......................................................................................................9
States Solve – Environment....................................................10

States Solve – Environment.........................................................................................................10
States Solve – International Modeling....................................11

States Solve – International Modeling.......................................................................................11
States  Federal Modeling....................................................12

States  Federal Modeling.........................................................................................................12
States  Federal Modeling....................................................13

States  Federal Modeling.........................................................................................................13
AT: States Don’t Have Money...............................................14

AT: States Don’t Have Money....................................................................................................14
AT: States Race To Bottom....................................................15

AT: States Race To Bottom.........................................................................................................15
AT: Federal Preemption.........................................................16

AT: Federal Preemption.............................................................................................................16
AT: Perm................................................................................17

AT: Perm......................................................................................................................................17
California Economy Alt-Causes.............................................18

California Economy Alt-Causes..................................................................................................18
Lopez CP 1NC........................................................................19

Lopez CP 1NC..............................................................................................................................19
Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit 1NC.......................................20

Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit 1NC............................................................................................20
Ext – Court Can Devolve.......................................................21

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2 States/Fism Core

Ext – Court Can Devolve.............................................................................................................21
Ext – Federalism NB..............................................................22

Ext – Federalism NB....................................................................................................................22
Narrow Ruling Solvency........................................................23

Narrow Ruling Solvency..............................................................................................................23
AT: No Test Case...................................................................24

AT: No Test Case.........................................................................................................................24
AT: ESA DA – No ESA Overturn..........................................25

AT: ESA DA – No ESA Overturn..............................................................................................25
AT: ESA DA – ESA Bad Turn...............................................26

AT: ESA DA – ESA Bad Turn....................................................................................................26
Feds Will Preempt CP............................................................27

Feds Will Preempt CP.................................................................................................................27
States Can’t Get Modeled.......................................................28

States Can’t Get Modeled...........................................................................................................28
Federal Key – General............................................................29

Federal Key – General.................................................................................................................29
Federal Key – Environment....................................................30

Federal Key – Environment........................................................................................................30
Perm Solves Best....................................................................31

Perm Solves Best..........................................................................................................................31
California Economy DA 2AC................................................32

California Economy DA 2AC......................................................................................................32
California Economy DA – Links............................................33

California Economy DA – Links.................................................................................................33
Federalism Link Turn 2AC.....................................................34

Federalism Link Turn 2AC.........................................................................................................34
Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Congress.................................35

Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Congress......................................................................................35
Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Executive................................36

Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Executive.....................................................................................36
ESA DA 2AC..........................................................................37

ESA DA 2AC.................................................................................................................................37
ESA DA 2AC..........................................................................38

ESA DA 2AC.................................................................................................................................38
ESA DA – Energy Link..........................................................39

SDI 2008 WHAM!

3 States/Fism Core

ESA DA – Energy Link................................................................................................................39
ESA DA – ESA Based On Commerce Clause........................40

ESA DA – ESA Based On Commerce Clause............................................................................40
ESA Good – Species/Economy..............................................41

ESA Good – Species/Economy....................................................................................................41
Economy DA 2AC..................................................................42

Economy DA 2AC........................................................................................................................42
Economy DA – Yes Legal Predictability................................43

Economy DA – Yes Legal Predictability.....................................................................................43
Economy DA – Predictability Links.......................................44

Economy DA – Predictability Links...........................................................................................44
Federalism DA 1NC...............................................................45

Federalism DA 1NC.....................................................................................................................45
Federalism Brink....................................................................46

Federalism Brink.........................................................................................................................46
Yes Federalism – General.......................................................47

Yes Federalism – General............................................................................................................47
Yes Federalism – Roberts/Alito..............................................48

Yes Federalism – Roberts/Alito...................................................................................................48
Federalism Links – Alternative Energy..................................49

Federalism Links – Alternative Energy.....................................................................................49
Federalism Links – Preemption..............................................50

Federalism Links – Preemption..................................................................................................50
Federalism Links – RPS.........................................................51

Federalism Links – RPS..............................................................................................................51
Internal Link – Slippery Slope...............................................52

Internal Link – Slippery Slope...................................................................................................52
AT: No Spillover – Single Decision Key...............................53

AT: No Spillover – Single Decision Key....................................................................................53
Federalism Is Modeled – General...........................................54

Federalism Is Modeled – General...............................................................................................54
Federalism Good Impact – Hegemony...................................55

Federalism Good Impact – Hegemony.......................................................................................55
Federalism Good Impact – Democracy..................................56

Federalism Good Impact – Democracy......................................................................................56
Federalism Good Impact – Wars............................................57

SDI 2008 WHAM!

4 States/Fism Core

Federalism Good Impact – Wars................................................................................................57
Federalism Good Impact – AT: Secession..............................58

Federalism Good Impact – AT: Secession..................................................................................58
2NC Russia Impact Module...................................................59

2NC Russia Impact Module........................................................................................................59
Yes Russian Federalism..........................................................60

Yes Russian Federalism...............................................................................................................60
Russia Models US Federalism................................................61

Russia Models US Federalism.....................................................................................................61
Russian Federalism Good – Civil War...................................62

Russian Federalism Good – Civil War.......................................................................................62
Russian Federalism Good – Democratization........................63

Russian Federalism Good – Democratization...........................................................................63
Russian Federalism Good – Russian Economy......................64

Russian Federalism Good – Russian Economy.........................................................................64
2NC Indonesia Impact Module..............................................65

2NC Indonesia Impact Module...................................................................................................65
Yes Indonesian Federalism.....................................................66

Yes Indonesian Federalism..........................................................................................................66
Indonesia Models US Federalism...........................................67

Indonesia Models US Federalism...............................................................................................67
Indonesian Federalism Good – Indonesian Economy............68

Indonesian Federalism Good – Indonesian Economy..............................................................68
Indonesian Instability Impact – Global Economy..................69

Indonesian Instability Impact – Global Economy....................................................................69
No Federalism – General........................................................70

No Federalism – General.............................................................................................................70
No Federalism – General........................................................71

No Federalism – General.............................................................................................................71
AT: Slippery Slope Links.......................................................72

AT: Slippery Slope Links............................................................................................................72
AT: Energy Policy Links.......................................................73

AT: Energy Policy Links.............................................................................................................73
Federalism Is Not Modeled....................................................74

Federalism Is Not Modeled.........................................................................................................74
Federalism Bad Impact – Ethnic Conflict..............................75

SDI 2008 WHAM!

5 States/Fism Core

Federalism Bad Impact – Ethnic Conflict.................................................................................75
Federalism Bad Impact – Secession.......................................76

Federalism Bad Impact – Secession...........................................................................................76
Federalism Bad Impact – Economy.......................................77

Federalism Bad Impact – Economy...........................................................................................77
No Russian Federalism...........................................................78

No Russian Federalism................................................................................................................78
Russia Doesn’t Model US Federalism....................................80

Russia Doesn’t Model US Federalism........................................................................................80
Russian Federalism Bad – Civil War......................................81

Russian Federalism Bad – Civil War.........................................................................................81
Russian Federalism Bad – Economy......................................82

Russian Federalism Bad – Economy..........................................................................................82
No Indonesian Federalism......................................................83

No Indonesian Federalism...........................................................................................................83
Indonesian Federalism Bad – Indonesian Economy..............84

Indonesian Federalism Bad – Indonesian Economy.................................................................84
Indonesian Federalism Bad – Secessionism...........................85

Indonesian Federalism Bad – Secessionism...............................................................................85

SDI 2008 WHAM!

6 States/Fism Core

States CP 1NC
The Fifty States of America and United States territories should _________________________________________________(Insert Mandates Of Aff Plan) ( ) States can solve any alternative energy mechanism as well as the federal government – they have experience with everything Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015 The decisive action of many states — 27 currently have or are developing comprehensive climate action plans — is taking on added importance for another reason: Innovative state climate and energy policies are showing skeptics in this country and in Congress that, rather than being a burden, groundbreaking energy conservation and renewable energy programs can create economic opportunity. Many of the more than 300 climate policies and mechanisms devised by various states will provide new business opportunities, as all sectors of society — housing, industry, commerce, energy, agriculture, forestry, transportation, waste management — adopt greater energy efficiencies and move to alternative sources of energy. Against the backdrop of inaction by the Bush administration and Congress, the states have moved farther and more rapidly than most people realize. Indeed, this September, ten mid-Atlantic and Northeastern states will begin implementing a cornerstone of effective national or global climate policy: A so-called “cap-and-trade” system under which emitters of greenhouse gases — in this case, power plants — must begin steadily reducing carbon emissions and can sell a portion of their emissions allotment once they begin implementing efficiencies. Power plants that fail to meet their emissions targets could buy allotments from more efficient utilities.

SDI 2008 WHAM!

7 States/Fism Core

States Solve – Alternative Energy
( ) States have tons of experience with alternative energy programs – they can solve Barry G. Rabe, University of Michigan, November 2002, Pew Center, “Greenhouse and Statehouse,”
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states_greenhouse.pdf States have been formulating climate change policy for more than a decade, although their efforts have expanded and intensified in the past several years. In some cases, states have considered climate change mitigation explicitly while in others it has been an incidental benefit. Reflective of the vast scope of activity that generates greenhouse gases, state policies have been enacted that reduce these emissions in such areas as promotion of renewable energy, air pollution control, agriculture and forestry, waste management, transportation, and energy development, among others. In almost all cases, there have been multiple drivers behind and multiple benefits from these state policies. In Texas, for example, the desire for energy independence, economic development, and air pollution control drove the state to promote renewable energy. Not all states have demonstrated interest in these initiatives and some legislatures have taken steps to prevent state agencies from pursuing any efforts that are designed to reduce greenhouse gases. Nonetheless, there has been a remarkable increase and diversification of state policies since the late 1990s, reflected in their current operation in every region of the country. Collectively, they constitute a diverse set of policy innovations rich with lessons for the next generation of American climate change policy.

( ) State incentives programs solve – they can drive the market towards widespread alternative energy acceptance Elizabeth Brown, Patrick Quinlan, Harvey M. Sachs, and Daniel Williams, Am. Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy, March 2002, “Tax Credits for Energy Efficiency,”
http://aceee.org/pubs/e021full.pdf?CFID=1059758&CFTOKEN=72603414 States play a fundamental role in addressing energy use and the adoption of energy efficiency measures at the regional and local level States can provide tax incentives that foster technology options matched to the needs of their residents. This report describes the current status of energy efficiency and “green buildings” tax incentives that states offer. Our goal is to assist state policymakers in designing and evaluating their own programs by providing insights about current programs in other states. A properly designed state tax incentive has both short-term and long-range benefits. In the short run, the incentive can effectively increase market share of an advanced technology or practice that otherwise would be harder for the state’s residents, businesses, and other organizations to find. By itself, the state’s action increases the visibility of the technology or practice and validates it with the state’s credibility. Greater market share bunches a “virtuous circle.” As market share increases, more market actors (salespeople. specifiers. installers, etc.) become vested in the technology or practice because it can be more profitable than the status quo and can increase customer satisfaction. This vestment induces more firms to enter the market and the resulting competition can drive down prices and further increase market share. At some point, market share is large enough that the technology or practice is clearly cost-effective and has broad support from those who profit from it. By then, a state tax credit is no longer needed and building codes and other regulatory mechanisms can be revised to make use of the technology or practice mandatory. State-funded energy efficiency incentive programs increase consumer choices by inducing innovation in the private sector. The programs thus benefit state energy, economic, and environmental objectives. The private sector needs encouragement to provide products and services that address broader energy security, system reliability. environmental, and economic goals. In particular. marker failures limit private investment in cost-effective efficiency measures: for example. projected returns may be lower than for other, non-energy investments or technology deployment timeframes may be too long. Tax credits can accelerate customer acceptance and increase market share for high-efficiency products and services. Benefits accrue to the state and its residents. the United States and its citizens, and the global climate.

SDI 2008 WHAM!

8 States/Fism Core

States Solve – Alternative Energy
( ) State tax incentives foster alternative energy technology Elizabeth Brown, Patrick Quinlan, Harvey M. Sachs, and Daniel Williams, Am. Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy, March 2002, “Tax Credits for Energy Efficiency,”
http://aceee.org/pubs/e021full.pdf?CFID=1059758&CFTOKEN=72603414 The objectives of state-funded energy efficiency incentive programs are to foster consumer choices that benefit statewide energy. economic. and environmental objectives. Market barriers impede the ability of the private sector to provide products and services to address states’ energy security. system reliability. environmental, and economic goals. Tax credits can accelerate customer acceptance and enlarge the market share for high-efficiency products and services, which leads to earlier high-volume production and resulting cost- reductions for efficient alternatives. Once the new technologies become widely accepted and produced on a significant sale, costs decline and the tax credits should be phased out or updated to more advanced technology or efficiency levels.

( ) States have lots of options for renewable energy incentives Sanya Carleyolsen, PhD candidate Public Policy @ UNC, Summer 2006, “Tangled in the Wires,” 46 Nat.
Resources J. 759, ln State legislatures also have a variety of tax incentives at their disposal to help bring down the costs of RE projects and make them more cost-competitive with other fuel methods. Many states have adopted tax incentive systems that can be applied to corporate, income, property or sales taxes. n90 Such corporate and income tax incentives provide deductions or credits for purchased RE equipment. For
instance, some states provide Investment Tax Credits (ITC) for either centralized or decentralized wind energy systems. n91 Property and business owners who invest in wind energy systems are granted ITCs equal to a [*778] percentage, as established by the state legislature, of the amount invested in the project. n92 Some states have adopted sales tax incentives that either exempt or reduce the sales tax on RE equipment. n93 Sales tax reductions may be placed on land assets, materials or equipment, and energy transfer. Yet another, comparatively popular, option is a property tax reduction, granted to RE facility owners. n94 Property tax incentives include property tax and special assessment exemptions based on value-added RE additions, calculated as a percentage of the total assessed value of the facility. n95

( ) State governments are taking the lead on warming Peter H. Koehn, Poly Sci Prof @ Montana, 2008, Global Environmental Politics 8.1, “Underneath Kyoto,” muse
Scholars and the media have emphasized the US national government's failure to adopt international agreements and stringent forwardlooking national policy and legislation in the face of climatic destabilization. While domestic and international critics have focused on national government inaction, direct and indirect state and local governments efforts to mitigate GHG emissions

have intensified and expanded. By 2007, more than 20 states had adopted legislation or issued executive orders "expressly intended to reduce greenhouse gases."55 California (a state that produced roughly two
percent of the world's annual GHG emissions) and New Jersey have been in the forefront of these initiatives. In June 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued an executive order calling for the state to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.56 Denver stands out as a city government that has explicitly integrated emissions-mitigation considerations into its core policies and organizational structure.57 In 2006, voters in Boulder, Colorado, approved a carbon tax based on kilowatt hours that will generate revenue for a climate-action plan aimed at reducing the city's carbon emissions by 24 percent from current levels.58 Such

subnational policy prescriptions serve to promote public awareness that climatic change is a serious problem and that unsustainable organizational and personal consumption exacerbates the problem. However, durable state/local
policy and population behavioral changes that limit or reduce GHG emissions remain the exception rather than the rule in the United States (and China) because the benefits of global climatic stabilization are not immediately discerned or appreciated by most consumers and policy makers.59 In some policy-making situations, visible emphasis on GHG-emission reductions alone would be counterproductive. For instance, one of the strongest supporters of the Texas effort to require utilities to provide renewable-power sources as part of their total [End Page 61] electricity package reported that "if we had characterized this as something to do with greenhouse gases, it would have hurt the bill's chances. So we didn't."60

SDI 2008 WHAM!

9 States/Fism Core

States Solve – Cap And Trade
( ) States can solve cap and trade – they’re already setting it up Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008, “Climate
Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal, http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1 Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, there are several efforts underway to establish state- or regional-level trading systems. These follow not only the model of the EU-ETS, but also other successful domestic cap-and-trade programs administered by the EPA, including the Acid Rain Program.23 California is in the process of establishing its own capand- trade program. In September 2006,
California adopted the Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as A.B. 32.24 This law, in part, allows the state to establish a cap-andtrade program to help meet the goal of capping the state’s emissions at 1990 levels by 2020 and eventually reaching eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.25 The program would be administered by the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which is in the process of adopting a scoping plan to identify California’s primary strategies for reducing GHG emissions under A.B. 32. The goal would be to have the cap-and-trade program operating by January 1, 2012.26 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has openly expressed an interest in linking any cap-and-trade program, once it is open for business, with the EU-ETS market.27 In addition to California’s intrastate efforts, three interstate groups are currently in the process of establishing carbon markets. One project, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),28 was initially formed in 2003 and is now made up of ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. In addition, several eastern Canadian provinces have expressed interest in joining RGGI. The consortium administering RGGI has published model rules for each of the states to adopt, and all ten states are in the process of adopting them in statutory or regulatory form. The goal is to have the market operating by January 2009. At this point, it appears likely that the market will be ready to open at that time, although all ten states may not be participating at the outset, as a few may have outstanding issues to resolve in the early stages of the program. The second multi-state group, known as the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), consists of seven Western states and two Canadian provinces: Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, and Manitoba. The WCI was established in February 2007, and as a result is not as far along in the process as RGGI. WCI is currently in the design phase, having completed basic design principles and established a year-long work-plan.29 Its goal is to have the design of the market-based mechanism completed in August 2008. Based on this timeline, it is unlikely that the WCI will be able to establish a functioning market before 2011 or 2012. A third group, consisting of nine Midwestern states and the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord in November of 2007, which is designed to establish greenhouse gas reduction targets, a regional cap-and-trade protocol, and a regional system to track and manage greenhouse gas emissions.30

State’s solve cap and trade – they can impose stronger requirements on emitters Franz T. Litz, Esq., Senior Fellow at the World Resources Institute, June 2008, World Resources Institute for the
Pew Center, “TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY”, rks, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf Although a state cannot directly impede the workings of the ARP cap-and-trade program, the Clean Air Act does allow a state to impose more stringent requirements on the plants subject to the ARP program. A state may, in fact, implement a statewide cap-and-trade program that requires reductions more stringent than the federal ARP from the same sources. The State of New York chose to implement an aggressive statewide cap-and-trade program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants in the state—from the very same plants subject to the federal program.40

States solve cap and trade – they will be able to find the best solvency mechanism and will be specific to the state itself Franz T. Litz, Esq., Senior Fellow at the World Resources Institute, June 2008, World Resources Institute for the
Pew Center, “TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY”, rks, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf The Heavy State Role option presents some advantages. The federal action would deliver two key benefits: there would be clear national reduction targets and all states would have to contribute their share to the effort. Beyond these benefits, all 50 states would be allowed to experiment with individual state approaches to reduce emissions, much as many states have done to date. This would tend to be positive for those policy mechanisms that are best tailored to specific state circumstances. The approach would also engender a potentially productive competition among states to develop policies that best achieve the results while meeting other state goals.

SDI 2008 WHAM!

10 States/Fism Core

States Solve – Environment
( ) Decentralization is net better for the environment – enhances effectiveness, experimentation, and studies prove states will effectively fill-in Jonathan H. Adler, Assoc. Law Prof @ Case Western, Jan. 2005, “Judicial Federalism,” 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, ln
Decentralized approaches to environmental protection have many potential advantages over centralized regulatory regimes. Decentralization can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental controls. 582 No less important, decentralization can allow for experimentation with alternative approaches to environmental protection with which there is relatively little practical experience. 583 "By decentralizing environmental decision making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing circumstances and new information," notes Professor Farber. 584 There is no reason, a priori, to view the decentralization of environmental protection as a threat to environmental protection, as opposed to a way of making it "more effective." 585 The potential environmental benefits of decentralization are not merely theoretical. The history and current practice of state and local environmental protection provide ample reason to question the assumption that lessening federal environmental regulatory authority necessarily results in [*465] lessened environmental protection. While the federal government is the most conspicuous actor on the environmental stage, state and local governments are the avant garde, developing innovative efforts to enhance the ecological and economic performance of environmental protection. 586 From brownfield redevelopment plans and audit privilege rules to property-based water management and unified, multimedia permitting systems, states are trying to find ways of maximizing the return on investments in environmental policy. 587 The conventional wisdom holds that federal environmental regulation was necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental measures. This view ignores the substantial environmental progress in many areas due to state and local efforts adopted prior to the enactment of most major federal environmental laws. 588 The EPA's first national water quality inventory, conducted just one year after adoption of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), found that there had been substantial improvement in water quality in major waterways over the preceding decade. 589 While water quality problems persisted, the evidence suggests that states began addressing those water quality problems that were clearly identified and understood well before the federal government. Several studies of air pollution similarly find evidence of significant environmental improvement prior to the adoption of federal environmental regulation. Historically, the first municipal smoke ordinances were adopted in the late nineteenth century, and the number of cities with effective local controls increased dramatically in the postWorld War II period. 590 In a comprehensive study of air pollution trends, Indur Goklany documents that levels of key pollutants were in decline prior to adoption of the 1970 Clean [*466] Air Act Amendments. 591 More significantly, the rate of improvement for some pollutants was greater prior to the adoption of federal controls than after. 592 A study by Paul Portney of Resources for the Future also found that "at least some measures of air quality were improving at an impressive rate before 1970." 593 Research by Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution similarly concluded that pre-federal air pollution control efforts were more successful than is typically assumed: "Pollution reduction was more effective in the 1960s, before there was a serious federal policy dealing with stationary sources, than since the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments." 594 These studies suggest that state and local governments had the ability and motivation to address identified environmental concerns, such as air pollution. 595 As with water pollution, once a given air pollution problem was clearly identified and understood, state and local governments began enacting measures to address these concerns before the federal government got into the act. Indeed, in some cases the early state efforts became the model for subsequent federal measures. In others, federal regulations were adopted, with the support of industry, to preempt more stringent or less uniform state regulatory standards. 596 While it is common to suggest that federal intervention was necessary because state and local efforts "failed" to protect environmental quality, the historical record is more ambiguous. Prior to the 1970s, the federal government failed to fulfill many of its preexisting environmental obligations. Yet, as discussed above, some state and local governments were beginning to make substantial progress in addressing local environmental concerns. 597

SDI 2008 WHAM!

11 States/Fism Core

States Solve – International Modeling
( ) States solve international modeling and perception arguments – they’re perceived just as much, even if it’s not national action Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015 Individually, the size of many of these state economies rivals those of most countries. State climate policy initiatives — though not yet implemented on a national scale — are collectively among the most advanced anywhere in the world. They provide a profound but largely unrecognized platform for national action, and for a potential reassertion of global environmental leadership by the United States. Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided hope to those in the global community who have waited patiently for the United States to engage meaningfully in international climate efforts.

SDI 2008 WHAM!

12 States/Fism Core

States  Federal Modeling
( ) States are empirically modeled by the federal government on environmental policies – and new policies will provide experience for the feds Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015 The states’ record of fostering groundbreaking environmental policies that ultimately evolve into national law is well established. State innovation was, for example, at the heart of the battle against acid rain. State laws served as models for the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and legislation creating Superfund sites. In addition to the cap-and-trade program that will be launched in September by the ten Eastern states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), two other regional groupings of states are working to establish carbon trading — the Western Climate Initiative and the Midwestern Governors
Association. They have rolled up their sleeves, convened key stakeholders, and are hammering out the actual details of how to establish and implement an effective cap-and-trade mechanism. This is wisdom that would go a long way in Washington as lawmakers debate Lieberman-Warner, which would create a national cap-and-trade program. One important element of the debate on Capitol Hill concerns the formula for allocating or auctioning carbon credits, and a number of states have developed valuable expertise on this issue. A RGGI expert working group, for instance, conducted an in-depth analysis on the subject, and many states have already made the crucial choice to auction 100% of carbon credits under RGGI trading. Under this system, northeastern utilities would purchase credits, or allowances, permitting them to emit CO2 at current levels, with requirements for steady reductions. As the utilities lower CO2 emissions, they can sell the credits to utilities that have made slower cutbacks. The RGGI auction proceeds would be used to help vulnerable citizens defray higher energy costs, to support energy efficiency programs, and to invest in renewable energy projects — all preferable to offering free emission allocations to major polluters. As it now stands, Lieberman-Warner calls for doling out a significant percentage of free emissions permits to major emitters of greenhouse gases. But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar two-pronged benefits. These policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many states — chief among them California — have

shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards, leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the states in court.

( ) States are best at implementing alternative energy – they’ve done hundreds of projects and spillover to the federal government in the long run Rusty Haynes, Policy Analyst @ NC State, 2005, “Systematic Support,” DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/PolicyPublications/Haynes_KIER_Keynote.pdf In the absence of strong, continuous federal support for renewable energy, dozens of U.S. states have stepped in to fill the void. Indeed, states collectively have implemented hundreds of policies to promote the adoption of renewable energy, for reasons ranging from energy diversification, to economic development, to air-quality improvement. It is important to recognize that some of these policies could become part of the “long-standing tradition in American governance whereby states serve as laboratories for subsequent federal policy.”10

( ) State programs spill over to federal action – provide a template Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015 The federal government in the Bush era has done little to tackle our most pressing environmental problem — climate change. Yet there is one bright side amid Washington’s inaction: Many states have been stepping into the void and adopting comprehensive climate change policies that can be a model for the coming federal legislation to slow global warming. The leadership of states such as California, Arizona, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida is crucial not only because it provides a template for federal climate legislation that will no doubt be adopted under the next presidential administration. State action is also vital because among the top 75 emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, half are U.S. states.

SDI 2008 WHAM!

13 States/Fism Core

States  Federal Modeling
( ) The federal government models state programs on the environment Robert B. McKinstry, Philadelphia lawyer, John C. Dernbach, Law Prof @ Widener, and Thomas D. Peterson, Exec. Dir. Center for Climate Strategies, 11-19-2007, “Federal Climate Change Legislation,” Widener
Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031552#PaperDownload This article identifies the key state/federal issues that should be addressed in any comprehensive national climate change legislation. It also provides recommendations for resolving these issues. The premise is that we cannot hope to successfully address climate change without fully engaging states and their local governments as partners in the national effort. In the early 1970s, Congress passed national air quality, water quality, surface mining, solid and hazardous waste, and other legislation based on models created by prior state action. This federal legislation created floors and requirements for states that had failed to do the job, but left a significant role for states both in implementing the federal model and continuing to act. As a result, state environmental protection and natural resource agencies have become larger, better funded, more professionally staffed, and more effective than they were in 1970. And on climate change, the federal government has delayed taking action far beyond the time in which it acted previously. State and regional actions greatly exceed in both scope and number those seen on other environmental issues prior to major federal legislation.

( ) States solve federal and international modeling – California proves Daniel B. Wood and Alison Tully, CSM, 11-7-2007, “Progress in California,” CSM, ln
The California initiative has also created international ripples. On Oct. 29, California, New York, New Zealand, Norway, and several European countries and Canadian provinces formed an International Carbon Action Partnership to create a global cap-and-trade carbon market to build demand for lowcarbon services and products. In September, Governor Schwarzenegger joined more than 80 leaders at a United Nations summit on climate change, leading some to speculate that individual US states will ultimately push the federal government into taking a firmer stand against global warming. "The governor plays a great role by being a cheerleader for global warming," says Jim Metropulos of the Sierra Club. "He's a Republican in the biggest state, and to say that ... we are going to do what we need to do to get these goals met has a big impact."

( ) State initiatives spillover to other states and the federal government Barry G. Rabe, University of Michigan, November 2002, Pew Center, “Greenhouse and Statehouse,”
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states_greenhouse.pdf When viewed as a collection of efforts, these initiatives outline possible elements of a long-term climate change strategy for the United States. Diffusion of innovation from one state to others is already occurring and clusters of contiguous states are beginning to consider cooperative efforts. Some of these policies may also serve as models that warrant emulation by the federal government in developing a more comprehensive strategy for the nation. This is entirely consistent with the long-standing tradition in American governance whereby states serve as laboratories for subsequent federal policy. In turn, the vigorous and creative nature of state innovation in this area suggests that any future federal policy initiatives on global climate change consider carefully the significant roles that state governments may be able to play in achieving long-term reduction of greenhouse gases.

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AT: States Don’t Have Money
( ) States can afford to do renewable energy – they generate money through a publicbenefit fund Rusty Haynes, Policy Analyst @ NC State, 2005, “Systematic Support,” DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/PolicyPublications/Haynes_KIER_Keynote.pdf The U.S. government has shown relatively little support for the development of renewable energy. Fortunately, some U.S. states have acted to steer the country toward a cleaner, sustainable energy future. In terms of designing a financial-incentive program for renewables based on U.S. state governments’ experiences, this paper has already outlined several “best practices” and recommendations. (See Section 4.) The establishment of a PBF by 15 states has provided substantial, continued funding to support many of the country’s most generous financial incentives—including rebates, grants, production incentives and low-interest loans—that support the development of renewable energy. These policies have had a significant impact on the renewable-energy industry, particularly in California, New York and New Jersey.

( ) States can easily raise money for renewables using a system benefit charge Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Suffolk, March 2006, Electricity Journal, 19.2, “Renewable Orphans,” p.
sciencedirect The system benefit charge is a tax or surcharge mechanism for collecting funds from electric consumers which can then support a range of activities.2 In order to support demand-side management or renewable resources, funds are collected through a nonbypassable system benfits charge to users of electric distribution services. The money raised from the system benefit charge is then used to ‘‘buy down’’ the cost of power produced from sustainable technologies, so that they can compete with more conventional technologies. The overall design of the system is to allow electric utilities to recover certain costs fromall retailelectricitycustomers. More than a dozen states have established renewable energy subsidy programs funded by system benefit charges that over this decade should raise approximately $3.4 billion.3 Between 1998 and 2012, approximately $3.5 billion will be collected by the original 14 states with renewable energy funds.4 More than half the amount collected – at least $135 million per year – comes from just California.5 The funding levels range from $0.07/MWh in Wisconsin up to almost $0.6/ MWh in Massachusetts.6 The funds are disbursed as either investments, grants, other subsidies, or R&D grants by the funding agency. Most only provide assistance to new projects, and not existing renewable projects.

( ) Public benefit funds ensure the states have a mechanism to fund alternative energy incentives Steven Nadel and Marty Kushler, Am. Council for Energy-Efficient Economy, October 2000, Electricity
Journal, “Public Benefit Funds,” p. sciencedirect The principal public policy lesson learned thus far is that it is indeed possible to establish a statewide or regional public benefit energy efficiency funding mechanism and achieve practical success in administering and delivering valued services. Another lesson is that there does not appear to be any single “correct approach” for the design of such a system. Some states are hav- ing success with utility-administered programs (e.g., Massachusetts and California), while others are succeeding with programs administered by state agencies (e.g., New York) or an independent entity (e.g., the Northwest). Likewise, most states are coordinating at least some programs regionally, while most states are also implementing some programs on their own. This translates into what might be the primary strategic and tactical lesson: Within an overall policy of public benefit funding support for energy efficiency, each state should take advantage of its own strengths and assets in designing the specific details of its energy efficiency programs.

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15 States/Fism Core

AT: States Race To Bottom
( ) States don’t race to the bottom on the environment – no evidence supports their arguments Jonathan H. Adler, Law Prof @ Case Western, 2007, 31 Harv. Envt’l. L. Rev. 67, “When is Two A Crowd,” ln
State regulatory choices are also influenced by the actions of other states. The "race to the bottom" theory posits that states will be discouraged from adopting the optimal level of environmental protections due to
interjurisdictional competition with other states. n46 The theory asserts that states seeking to encourage economic investment and industrial development will be locked into a "race" to lower existing environmental standards (or fail to adopt optimal measures) in an effort to attract investment. Furthermore, the theory states that any resulting economic gains will

empirical evidence demonstrating a race to the bottom in environmental policy is generally lacking. n48 There is evidence that state policy-makers consider the impact of environmental regulations on their states' economic competitiveness. n49 Nonetheless, most empirical studies have failed to find any evidence that such pressures result in a systematic lowering of state-level environmental measures. n50
fail to offset the welfare losses from suboptimally lax environmental regulations. n47 Though possible,

( ) States spillover to greater environmental protection, not race to the bottom Jonathan H. Adler, Law Prof @ Case Western, 2007, 31 Harv. Envt’l. L. Rev. 67, “When is Two A Crowd,” ln
States can also be encouraged to adopt greater levels of environmental protection by the actions of their neighbors. Insofar as one state is successful at addressing a given environmental problem in a cost-effective manner, other states become more likely to follow suit as they learn from competing jurisdictions. This hypothesis has some empirical support in studies showing that state decisions to adopt specific regulatory measures are influenced by the decision of neighboring jurisdictions to adopt similar measures. n52 These studies find stronger evidence for this positive "contagion" effect than for a negative "race to the bottom." n53

( ) States don’t race to the bottom – their argument is theoretically and empirically bankrupt. Firms base siting decisions on other factors, federal standards don’t stop competition, and states compete to improve the environment Jonathan H. Adler, Assoc. Law Prof @ Case Western, Jan. 2005, “Judicial Federalism,” 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, ln
A common concern voiced in environmental policy debates is that lessening federal authority will lead to environmentally harmful interjurisdictional competition. Specifically, the lack of federal regulation will set off a "race to the bottom" in which state jurisdictions compete for corporate investment and economic development by reducing [*467] environmental safeguards. 598 The theory is based upon
the intuitive notion, supported by some empirical evidence, 599 that firms are more likely to invest in states with less costly regulatory regimes. This concern is the "central

on both theoretical and empirical grounds, concerns about an environmental race to the bottom seem overstated. Professor Revesz has demonstrated that the framework underlying the race to the bottom theory has several analytical failings. 602 Firms base siting and relocation decisions on a wide range of criteria, of which environmental regulation is only one, and there is ample evidence that other factors typically play a greater role in such decisions. 603 Tax rates, infrastructure, availability, cost, skill of local labor, and other regulatory policies are also important
underpinning" of federal environmental regulation 600 and has been relied upon by courts to uphold federal environmental statutes against constitutional challenges. 601 Yet considerations for businesses. If the race to the bottom operates in the environmental sphere, there is every reason to expect it to operate to the same extent in these other contexts, suggesting that federal regulation would be necessary across the board. 604 In this way, the race to the bottom theory - if taken seriously - proves too much. In addition, the adoption

federal environmental standards to prevent a race to the bottom in environmental policy would not eliminate the competitive pressures. Rather, it would shift them to other contexts, and the hypothesized welfare [*468]
of minimum losses would remain. 605 Professor Revesz also points out that the same dynamic that could theoretically produce systematic environmental underregulation could also produce overregulation. 606 If states are more aggressive at competing for industry through tax policy than through environmental policy, the likely result would be suboptimal tax rates but superoptimal levels of regulation. 607 The theory persists, despite its flaws, because it is reasonable to assume that jurisdictions will seek to create a comparatively more attractive investment climate in order to better compete economically. Insofar as environmental regulations impose significant economic burdens on existing and prospective economic actors in a given area, it is also reasonable to expect jurisdictions to act so as to lessen such burdens. 608 Recent empirical work suggests that this is in fact the case as government officials acknowledge efforts to reduce the economic pinch of environmental regulation for economic purposes. 609 Yet for this to prove the race to the bottom hypothesis, it is necessary to further assume that reducing the economic cost of environmental regulation necessarily reduces the level of environmental protection. While such a conclusion may be justified in certain contexts, it cannot be assumed across the board. As not all environmental protection measures produce equivalent levels of environmental protection at equivalent costs, it should be possible for many jurisdictions to reduce the economic cost associated with environmental measures without sacrificing environmental quality. 610 In addition, it is

states compete for citizens by seeking to improve their environmental performance. Because many people may be more likely to move to a state with high levels of environmental quality, this [*469] creates pressure for states to adopt more protective environmental policies. 611 In practice, the race to the bottom has not been observed in environmental policy. 612 As already noted, state and local governments often
important to recognize that many regulated well before the federal government became involved. While this fact alone does not disprove the race to the bottom thesis - such state regulations could still have been suboptimal when compared to the federal alternative or some theoretical ideal - they demonstrate that competitive pressures do not preclude effective state regulation. More significantly, where the race to the bottom thesis has been directly tested in the context of wetlands, the pattern of state regulation has been precisely the opposite of what the theory would predict.

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16 States/Fism Core

AT: Federal Preemption
( ) State alternative energy programs won’t be struck down – they have to be found discriminatory Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Suffolk, March 2006, Electricity Journal, 19.2, “Renewable Orphans,” p.
sciencedirect Because there is no clear bright line separating regulation that does and does not discriminate, and the judicial test and standard applied by the court is so distinct between the two, the critical determination is the court’s initial conclusion as to whether or not a regulation is discriminatory, and if so, whether such discrimination is based on point-of-origin regu- lation.25 Even in the absence of a discriminatory intent, courts are able to outlaw Commerce Clause violations to prevent the ‘‘Balkanization’’ of various states’ regulations. 26 S o, what is legal? A renewable portfolio standard alone does not raise commerce clause issues. A limitation on the in-state location of resources for inclusion in the portfolio could run afoul of the commerce clause.27 As long as the state regulation does not discriminate on the basis of geography of energy supply, it will be evaluated under the Pike balancing test. Incidental discrimination, in fact, against interstate commerce is not impermissible if balanced by a compelling state interest and if accomplished in the minimally intrusive fashion.

( ) Congress won’t rollback state action Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
The rise in subnational foreign relations activity tells us little, of course, about the activity's normative desirability. But we should also avoid the automatic assumption that this development is normatively undesirable. This is especially true because the federal political branches have made clear that, in contrast to traditional foreign relations activities which largely have been federalized through statute and treaty, they do not always, or even usually, prefer federal regulation of these new foreign relations issues. The recent increase in state and local involvement in such issues "has occasioned little reaction from Congress or the Executive." 232 And when the political branches do react, they often choose to protect state interests over foreign relations interests when the two appear to clash. A good example is the United States' recent ratification of a variety of international human rights treaties. 233 These treaties create numerous potential [*1675] conflicts with state law. 234 In the face of international pressure, the President and Senate have consistently attached reservations, understandings, and declarations to these treaties to ensure that they do not preempt or affect inconsistent state law. 235 Similarly, California's worldwide unitary tax on multinational corporations has provoked enormous diplomatic controversy with our closest trading partners since the 1980s. 236 The President negotiated a treaty that would have preempted this law, but the Senate withheld its consent. 237 And in the face of substantial pressure from foreign governments, Congress consistently failed to enact legislation preempting the unitary tax. 238

( ) Preemption doesn’t take out solvency Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
Even when the political branches enact preemptive federal foreign relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects the interests of the states and minimizes intrusion on their prerogatives. When Congress codified the international law standards for determinations of foreign sovereign immunity, it ensured that otherwise-applicable state law would continue to govern the merits of such suits. 239 Similarly, in federal implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), "political sensitiv- [*1676] ity to state sensibilities were [sic] reflected in several ways." 240 Most significantly, the legislation "precluded the agreements from having any direct effect, and indeed required an action by the United States Government for the purpose of striking down a state law." 241 In addition, the federal government has actively cooperated with and supported the unilateral state economic activities described above. 242 The overtly political international activities of states, such as nuclear-free ordinances and state divestment movements, are more controversial. For example, Congress by statute overruled several governors' resistance to allowing the participation of national guard troops in Central American military activities in the mid-1980s. 243 But Congress declined to preempt the most notorious recent state foreign relations activity - state sanctions against South Africa - when it enacted the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 244 and Massachusetts's recent sanctions against Myanmar 245 soon led to similar sanctions by the federal government. 246

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AT: Perm
( ) The perm would force preemption – it’s impossible for the plan and CP to exist Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008, “Climate
Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal, http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1 The best case for federal preemption would arise if the federal government instituted a similar cap-andtrade system or other form of comprehensive carbon emissions regulation. Any program that created a nationwide price for carbon would likely be interpreted as directly conflicting with state programs; in the alternative, courts would probably hold that federal efforts occupy the field of GHG regulation. But lacking such a program, as is currently the case, it is difficult to see any way in which a state-organized capand-trade program could be preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Some congressional leaders are advocating for express preemption in any future comprehensive cap-and-trade bill. The Dingell-Boucher white paper,68 which discusses the role of federal, state, and local governments in efforts to reduce GHG emissions, makes the case for express preemption. “[O]nce a national, economy-wide cap-and-trade program is adopted, State or regional cap-and-trade programs may interfere with the efficient functioning of the Federal cap-and-trade program[.]”69 As a result, “Chairman Dingell has made it very clear that he believes that motor vehicle greenhouse gas standards should be set by the Federal Government, not by State governments[.]”70 In addition, the analysis finds that compliance costs and overall system costs (including regulatory overhead) are likely to be higher in any duplicative system of federal and state/regional regulation.71 While the current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill actually encourages and provides incentives for states to take actions above and beyond the federal cap-and-trade program,72 there is a possibility that an express preemption clause could be part of any final bill.

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18 States/Fism Core

California Economy Alt-Causes
California’s economy is super weak – all indicators prove Dan Walters, a journalist for more than 40 years, spending all but a few of those years working for California newspapers. At one point in his career, at age 22, he was the nation's youngest daily newspaper editor, 6-25-08,
SacBee, “Dan Walters: Could California budget gap get wider?”, rks, http://www.sacbee.com/111/story/1037445.html "Overall, California's economy looks pretty weak," the UC Santa Barbara survey declares. "Much of the state is losing jobs. The real estate market is in meltdown. Retail sales are collapsing. Tourism has been surprisingly weak. The public sector will decline. The state has no budget, and policy makers have no idea how to create one. We see little reason to be optimistic about California's economy." Watkins noted that the state is seeing "almost zero" job growth even though the pool of job-seekers has expanded sharply, in part, he believes, because stressed-out families seek more income to offset rising housing, fuel and food costs. The housing meltdown is having both direct negative impacts – fewer construction jobs, declining purchases of building materials, furniture, and so on – and indirect ones. Even Californians whose incomes have remained steady must face rising prices and, if they're homeowners, are seeing personal wealth in the form of home equity decline, so are cutting consumer purchases. The economic malaise affects income, sales and property taxes – the latter because of construction slowdowns and declines in taxable values due to market declines – and thus exacerbates the budget deficit.

California’s Economy is horrible; there’s a high deficit, high unemployment, and a horrid housing crisis. Evan Halper, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer, 6-30-2008, Los Angeles Times, “Brokaw needles Schwarzenegger
on spending, economy,” rks, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/politics/cal/la-me-arnold302008jun30,0,595673.story Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, usually a darling of the national media, found himself being told by the host of NBC's "Meet the Press" that if he ran a private company the way he has run the state, he might have been fired by now. Tom Brokaw, who will be moderating the program through the presidential election, put a series of confrontational questions to the governor in an interview taped in California and aired this morning. When you ran for governor in 2003, you ran as a fiscal conservative who would change the system, who would bring business-like techniques," Brokaw said. "Now, you are facing a $15-billion deficit here in California. Unemployment is running at about 6.8%; you've got the worst housing crisis since the Great Depression. If you were the CEO of a public company, the board would probably say, 'It is time to go.' "

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Lopez CP 1NC
The United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling that federal authority over _____________________(Insert the area of the plan) exceeds the power of the federal government under the 10th Amendment, and devolve this authority to the states. The Fifty States of America and United States territories should _________________________________________________(Insert Mandates Of Aff Plan). ( ) The Court can make this ruling and devolve power to the states –it won’t be rolled back Mark A. Miller, Lawyer @ Baker Botts, 1998, Cleveland State L. Rev., ln
The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious that afforded little protection to the states. 249 In the aftermath of Garcia, state sovereignty was left to the political processes. 250 Tenth Amendment power was reborn in New York v. United States when the Court held that Congress could not commandeer the states' legislative function. 251 This protection is decreed no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be. 252 Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act. 253 According to Printz, Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory programs regardless of the federal interest involved. 254 Whenever the structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth Amendment steps in to prevent a usurpation of federalism. 255 Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the states to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly. 256 But what happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court's enunciated protections extend to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism answers. The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcia when Justice O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited [*191] by state autonomy. 257 The door was further opened in New York when the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the interests of state sovereignty. 258 United States v. Lopez put the first nail in the coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far as to approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States." 259 The Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states. 260 Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment -- a core guardian of state sovereign interests 261 -- withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the shield of federalism with Article I. 262 Similar to the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment once provided little protection to the states when Congress flexed its Article I muscle. 263 Along with the strengthening of the Eleventh Amendment, New York and Printz add to the growth of federalism and the devolution of unrestricted congressional power. The same 5-4 majority 264 has written the opinions in New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Printz, and it is only a matter of time before the rationale in Seminole Tribe is extended to the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the Spending Clause. 265 Substantive federalism presents the argument that the Tenth Amendment will be used in much the same manner as the Eleventh Amendment was used in Seminole Tribe. If a core principle of state sovereignty will be encroached upon by an Article I power, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the intrusion. 266 On the other side of the coin, Congress must look to the Tenth Amendment and ask whether its proposed legislation will impinge upon principles of federalism. If substantive federalism can operate to block congressional action under the Commerce Clause, then it can also curtail the Spending power. 267

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Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit 1NC
( ) Extending Lopez by devolving power to the states sends a strong signal encouraging federalism worldwide – this solves global war and promotes economic growth Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

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Ext – Court Can Devolve
( ) Supreme Court can devolve authority to the states David M. Sprick, Doctoral Candidate & Lecturer in the Department of Political Science @ UMKC, 1999, 27
Cap. U.L. Rev. 529, ln Federalism is “a constitutional principle involving a distinctive territorial division of powers, usually a special approach to representation within the national government, and mechanisms both legal and political [*530] to settle interlevel disputes.” 3 Others have described federalism as that which “as a matter of law centers on the division of authority between the federal and the state governments,” 4 or as the “dispersion of political power,” 5 or “a system of authority constitutionally apportioned between central and regional governments.” 6 The Constitution sets forth the boundaries of federalism with the enumeration of Congress’ powers in Article I, Section 8; the undefined powers implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause; 7 the General Welfare Clause; 8 the Supremacy Clause; 9 and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states “or to the people.” 10 By defining to whom powers not delegated are reserved, the Tenth Amendment provides “an express federalism marker” and interrelates the amendment with constitutional and political federalism. 11 The Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 12 This amendment has been the rallying cry for devolutionists in the political branches concerned with excessive federal power. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment’s reemergence in constitutional decisions has not gone unnoticed by Supreme Court watchers. The Court seems to be reestablishing itself as the “umpire of federalism,” 13 a role it all but abdicated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 14 when it told the states they could find better constitutional protection from the “procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system.” 15 [*531] In a series of recent cases-U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 16 United States v. Lopez, 17 and Printz v. United States 18 -the Court reversed its thinking in Garcia and is umpiring the federal system once again. More importantly, the Court appears to be divided over both the meaning of the Tenth Amendment and the first principles of American federalism. “The Justices’ opposing. asymmetrical positions [on federal power] can be discerned by juxtaposing Term Limits with United States v. Lopez.” 19 It is possible to add the recent Printz decision to such an analysis because the same factions within the Court, with respect to federalism, formed to limit federal power once again.

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22 States/Fism Core

Ext – Federalism NB
( ) The Lopez precedent is critical to reinvigorate federalism Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez 2 marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty years, 3 the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national power. The Lopez Court has shown us that we can go back, if we want to, so long as: 1) we can figure out a workable theory of the limits on the federal commerce power; 2) we can agree on the propriety of vigorous judicial review in federalism cases; and 3) we can take proper account of the important reliance interests that have accrued around certain key precedents decided in the past half century.

( ) Extending the Lopez precedent restores federalism Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
The very real danger is that the Supreme Court will end up conferring legitimacy on congressional and presidential usurpations of state power that might be resisted more vigorously in the absence of federal judicial review. The advantages of constitutional federalism will not be obtainable if the Court hands down decisions like Lopez only once every ten years. National judicial umpiring of federalism boundaries will be useful only if the courts invalidate usurpations with some frequency, thus justifying the public confidence that the judiciary really is doing its duty in this category of cases.

( ) The counterplan is a symbolic victory for federalism Ernest Young, Law Professor, University of Texas, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, November 2004, pp. 135-6
The structure of the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine bears this conclusion out. The Court has conceded that the national economy has become integrated to the extent that there is no meaningful distinction between intra-and inter-state commerce; rather, there is just "commerce." And the Court has also eschewed any effort to compartmentalize the various forms of economic activity, as it once sought to distinguish between "commerce" and "manufacturing" or "agriculture." Now all of these things are "commerce"; that term, the Court has made clear, comprehends all "economic activity." Nonetheless, it is important to maintain some enforceable limit on the Commerce Clause. Precisely because these cases are so high profile, they play an important symbolic role. As I have already suggested, they may serve an important process function of reminding Congress to consider the limits of its powers when it acts. At the same time, limits on the Commerce Clause are closely linked to the states' autonomy; those limits, after all, preserve a zone of regulatory authority that Congress may not preempt. This is true even though the particular statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison were not preemptive - that is, they did not forbid parallel state legislation on the same subjects. If Congress were to attempt to supplant state autonomy to make regulatory decisions over physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage, for example, Lopez and Morrison would likely offer the most promising basis for challenging such legislation.

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Narrow Ruling Solvency
( ) The court can issue narrow rulings without linking to precedent disads Stephen F. Smith, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, April 2002, Texas Law Review,
Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1057 The end result after decades of case-by-case refinement (and frequently revisionism) was a considerable change in Miranda doctrine, but not a complete evisceration of Miranda. Neither Warren nor Rehnquist got to have his first-best preference. What they did get was a second-best approach in which the suspect must be given basic information as to his rights and has the power, by making (and sticking to) an unequivocal request for counsel, to stop all questioning. Of course, the police have ample latitude to use persuasion or clever, noncoercive means to cause suspects not to exercise that power and, ultimately, to make incriminating statements that can be used against them at trial. n213 After Dickerson, it would appear that Miranda law is finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices - including supporters and critics of Miranda - can accept, as shown by the fact that seven of the nine Justices signed onto without comment an opinion reaffirming both Miranda and all of the limitations and exceptions adopted over the ensuing three decades. n214 This is the advantage of reactivism - it provides an effica-cious means by which a Court that fundamentally disagrees with earlier precedents, but is unwilling or unable to overrule them explicitly, can move the law (and, with it, actual case outcomes) back in what it believes to be the right direction. The legal system and the public thereby gain, to varying degrees, the benefits of the overruling. At the same time, reactivism allows risk-averse Justices and the Court as an institution to avoid the unpleasant consequences of overruling that have historically made Justices so reluctant [*1112] to overrule even the most indefensible decisions. n215 Thus, the law gets "fixed" in a way that avoids sharp doctrinal shifts.

( ) The court can issue narrow rulings without overruling past precedent Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer, April 1, 1996, p.105
Third, the

court may create an exception. This is an explicit, but only partial, repudiation of the prior case. The prior case remains good law, but it no longer controls all of the situations it once did. The last example
could be used to illustrate this technique as well. Assume that, in the first case, there had not been adequate assurances that the store’s claim was well founded. In that situation, the second case, rather than overruling the prior case sub silentio, might simply create an exception—holding that, although prior notice is generally required, subsequent notice is sufficient if the court has adequate assurances that the store’s claim to a right of seizure is well founded. Obviously, lawyers may differ at times over whether the second case represents an exception to the first case or an overruling of it sub silentio. To the extent that the two cases are truly different, the second case may well be carving out an exception to the general rule set forth in the first case. To the extent that the two cases seem indistinguishable, however, then the conclusion is almost inescapable that the first case has been overruled sub silentio. As has been seen, lawyers may differ over whether two cases are distinguishable, and thus they may differ over whether the second case created an exception to, or overruled sub silentio, the first case. Any exception changes the law with respect to those situations embraced within the exception. Moreover, by defining the factual predicate of the exception broadly, the court can bring large numbers of cases within the exception. Eventually, the exception may become more widely applicable than the so-called general rule, with the result that the exception is said to swallow the rule.” At the time it was created, the exception seemed a minor change in the law. but over time it proved to be a virtually complete repudiation of the earlier rule. ‘

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AT: No Test Case
( ) The court can always find a case David Adamany, Professor @ Wayne State, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment, 1990, p.9
Since Congress adopted the Judges Bill of 1925, most cases on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets have been by writ of certiorari — a request for the justices to hear cases that they may, but are not required, to hear. Under Supreme Court Rule 17, which gives broad categories of cases that the Court may hear, at least four justices must agree to hear a case before it is considered by the Court. Some cases on the appellate docket have been “appeals by right,” certain cases involving the constitutionality of state or federal laws or state constitutional provisions. By law, the Court was required to hear these cases; but the justices developed broad discretion by rejecting cases that failed to pose a substantial federal question as defined by the justices. In 1988, Congress revised the law virtually to eliminate appeals by right, thus giving the justices almost complete choice about what cases to decide. With more than 5.000 cases pending annually, the Supreme Court can almost always find a case to raise any policy issue that the justices wish to decide. Chief Justice Earl Warren apparently asked his law clerks to fmd a case on the Court’s docket that would allow the justices to overrule a previous decision holding that there was no right for the poor to have an attorney in every criminal trial. The clerks found such a case, and the Court used it to announce a new constitutional rule guaranteeing the right to counsel (Danelski and Danelski 1989, 508). The Court has sometimes gone to great lengths to find the issue it wants to decide. In the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 617 [1961]), the Court held that illegally seized evidence could not be used in state criminal trials. But the dissenting justices accused the majority of “reaching out” to find that issue in the brief of amicus curiae, because the jurisdictional statements, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties had all been devoted to First Amendment free speech issues. Where the Court cannot find an issue on its docket, it may order parties to argue an issue that the justices want to consider. Over the strong objection of four justices that the majority was raising “a question not presented” by the parties, five justices ordered the parties in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (485 U.S. 617 [1988]) to rearue the case to determine whether the Court’s 1976 interpretation of a federal civil rights statute should be reconsidered and changed. The majority pointed out four previous cases within the past twenty years when the Court had also ordered reargument to determine whether an earlier decision should be reconsidered and changed.

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25 States/Fism Core

AT: ESA DA – No ESA Overturn
( ) The ESA will be upheld on treaty power grounds, even if it violates the commerce clause Jacalyn R. Fleming, JD Albany, 2001, “The scope of federal authority,” 65 Alb. L. Rev. 497, p ln
Under Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the power to make treaties is expressly delegated to the United States. 167 Treaties made pursuant to the Constitution are "the supreme laws [*519] of the land." 168 In addition, statutes that are both "necessary and proper" to execute a treaty are deemed valid. 169 Thus, treaties and their implementing statutes may preempt state law. 170 For example, in Missouri v. Holland, 171 the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against a state's challenge that the Act was interfering with rights reserved to the states. 172 In so holding, the Court discussed the limits of the Tenth Amendment and stressed the importance of the national interest at stake. 173 In addition, Justice Holmes explained the special nature of the treaty-making power: We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found... . [especially] where the States individually are incompetent to act. 174 The Court further explained that the Constitution should not be read as a static document but as an organism that could evolve with a changing nation. 175 A national solution was needed to protect the great value of migratory birds and the Court refused to find "some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment" to hamper national action. 176 In addition, the Court began the process of chipping away at the states' power over wildlife by explaining that wild birds belong to no one, 177 while also [*520] recognizing that "but for the treaty" the state could regulate the subject itself. 178 The authority of ESA is based on federal treaties. Section 2 of the ESA acknowledges Congress's pledge to the international community to protect species from extinction. 179 One express purpose of ESA is to "achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth." 180 Six treaties are specifically listed in the statute, in addition to a general reference to "other international agreements." 181 One of the named treaties is the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Western Convention). 182

( ) ESA won’t be overturned – Court will find it constitutional under both the commerce clause and the treaty power Jacalyn R. Fleming, JD Albany, 2001, “The scope of federal authority,” 65 Alb. L. Rev. 497, p ln
Congress's authority to enact the ESA under the Commerce Clause has been questioned, particularly in the context of wholly intrastate species, because it is unclear how the taking of an endangered species could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, has held some activities, such as the growing of homegrown wheat, to be within the realm of interstate commerce due to the aggregate effects of the activity. 292 The question remains whether the Supreme Court will require that the regulated activity itself be commercial, but even if so, the economic and commercial nature of protecting endangered species and maintaining biodiversity should not be difficult to defend. All citizens depend on these species for food, medicine, and every other economic measure independent of minerals. Biodiversity is an untapped economic potential. As a renowned biologist has explained, "the more the living world is explored and utilized, the greater will be the efficiency and reliability of the particular species chosen for economic use." 293 Someday the nation may come to appreciate fully the harm resulting from the loss of biodiversity, and seek to prevent further loss. The ESA may be upheld as constitutional, even without Commerce Clause authority. As an issue of critical national and economic concern, endangered species protections fall well within the treaty power of Congress, and the ESA is a necessary and proper statute adopted domestically to implement provisions of treaties with other nations. Consequently, the ESA is a valid act of Congress under the treaty power and thus may preempt state and local laws to the extent local laws conflict with the ESA pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.

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26 States/Fism Core

AT: ESA DA – ESA Bad Turn
( ) ESA is on-balance worse for species – empirics prove it doesn’t stop extinction, and the parts that would be struck down provide economic incentives to destroy habitat, resulting in net losses Jonathan H. Adler, Assoc. law Prof @ Case Western, Jan. 2005, “Judicial Federalism,” 90 Iowa L. Rev. 277, p ln
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is the federal regulatory statute most at risk under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it would be a mistake to assume a threat to the Endangered Species Act necessarily poses a threat to the survival of endangered species. Enacted in 1973 to save species from the brink of extinction, the ESA has hardly been a success. In over thirty years, fewer than forty of over 1,000 species have been delisted as endangered or threatened. 553 In this time more species have been delisted because they went extinct or never should have been listed as endangered in the first place than have been legitimately "recovered" due to the Act. 554 Among the various factors that contribute to the ESA's ineffectiveness as a conservation tool are the very regulatory strictures most at risk to Commerce Clause challenge. Section 9 prohibits the "take" of endangered species, including significant modification of listed species' habitat. The presence of a listed species can freeze the use of private land, barring everything from timber cutting and ditch digging to plowing a field or building a home. In Riverside County, California, the ESA even prevented private landowners from disking to clear firebreaks on their own land lest they disturb the habitat of the Stephens' kangaroo rat. 555 Consequently, private landowners are penalized for owning endangered species habitat. 556 In this fashion, the ESA creates economic incentives for private landowners to engage in the deliberate destruction of actual or potential wildlife habitat and to forego or prevent future habitat creation on privately [*460] owned land. 557 Professors Lueck and Michael report that forest owners respond to the likelihood of ESA regulation by harvesting timber and reducing the age at which timber is harvested. 558 Such preemptive habitat destruction could well "cause a long-run reduction in the habitat and population" of endangered species. 559 In some instances, it is likely that the economic incentives created by the Act result in the net loss of species habitat. That is, in some cases the ESA may be responsible for more habitat loss than habitat protection. 560 Professors Lueck and Michael are not alone in their findings. A study in Conservation Biology further reports that just as many landowners responded to the listing of Preble's meadow jumping mouse by destroying potential habitat as undertook new conservation efforts. 561 It also found a majority of landowners would not allow biologists on their land to assess mouse populations out of fear that land-use restrictions would follow the discovery of a mouse on their land. 562 The Fish and Wildlife Service also acknowledges that its own regulations can lead to habitat loss on private land. In the Pacific northwest, landuse restrictions imposed to protect the northern spotted owl made private landowners fear the lost use of their land and that "this concern or fear has accelerated harvest rotations in an effort to avoid the regrowth of habitat that is useable by owls." 563 Insofar as ESA regulation discourages private land conservation, it is undermining species conservation efforts. The majority of endangered and threatened species depend on private land for some portion of their habitat, 564 so by discouraging private land conservation, the ESA could well have a devastating impact on species conservation efforts. While there is no conclusive evidence as to the net effect of the ESA on species conservation on private land, there is more than enough evidence to challenge the prevailing [*461] assumption that limitations on ESA regulation of private land will result in net harm to endangered species. If courts hold that the Commerce Clause limits federal regulation of private land, it may even prompt the federal government to adopt alternative approaches to species conservation that do not produce the same unintended consequences and conserve species in a more effective and equitable manner. The imposition of federal priorities on unconsenting states can also have negative environmental results. In many cases, the assertion of federal regulatory authority to advance environmental goals will safeguard important environmental concerns. But in other cases, federal authority can prevent states from adopting environmentally preferable alternatives. Federal preemption of more protective state environmental standards can inhibit more effective environmental protection, as well as experimentation with new approaches of addressing environmental concerns. 565

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Feds Will Preempt CP
( ) Congress would preempt the counterplan – they regulate energy Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Suffolk, March 2006, Electricity Journal, 19.2, “Renewable Orphans,” p.
sciencedirect A. Balancing and the ‘‘per se’’ court test The generation and transmission of electric energy is an activity particularly likely to affect more than one state. Congress could federally preempt energy policy under its powers over interstate commerce, if it so chose, and often does so. It has reserved certain energy matters to federal jurisdiction. Under the Federal Power Act of 1935, the federal government exercises regulatory power over the wholesale power market, while the states are left alone to regulatemost retail transactions.11 The regulation of utilities is a traditional function of the local police power of the states.12 While the Commerce Clause grants affirmative powers to Congress to regulate in a variety of areas, the so-called ‘‘dormant’’ Commerce Clause also is interpreted as a limitation on the power of states to regulate in particular areas. The Commerce Clause provides that ‘‘[t]he Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce among the several States.’’13 In creating this power, the framers sought to ‘‘avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’’ 14 Although the Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of power, the Supreme Court also interpreted it as limiting the states’ ability to ‘‘unjustifiably . . . discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.’’15 The construction of the dormant commerce clause is one of the most litigated environmental and energy issues before the Supreme Court in the last quarter century.16 State statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely found to be impermissible.17 Under the dormant Commerce Clause: This ‘‘negative’’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regula-tory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.18

( ) The federal government will preempt the CP – negating the effect of any state action Jonathan H. Adler, Law Prof @ Case Western, 2007, 31 Harv. Envt’l. L. Rev. 67, “When is Two A Crowd,” ln
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity. The net effect of federal preemption is often for there to be less regulation than there would have been otherwise. n70 Federal laws precluding state regulation
of automobile or oil tanker design mean that manufacturers need only comply with one regulatory standard. Federal regulations in such cases serve as a regulatory "floor" and a regulatory "ceiling" at the same time. In other cases, preemption may serve to ensure that there is no regulation governing a particular subject matter, where federal law precludes states from adopting particular rules but the federal government does not adopt rules of its own. n71 Where implied preemption is found, this will typically preclude any state or local regulation whatsoever. n72 Where Congress explicitly preempts state regulation, however, the scope of the preemption usually will be limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text. n73 Given that preemption operates to reduce aggregate regulatory burdens, it should be no surprise that federal preemption of state environmental regulatory standards is often sought by

business interests seeking to establish regulatory uniformity, a "ceiling" on regulatory stringency, or both. n74 [*85] Federal preemption of state automotive emission regulations, for example, resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing the potential for different emissions standards to be adopted in different states--and believing that federal standards would be less stringent than those developed in the states. n75 This is not to say that there are not sometimes economic justifications for preempting variable state standards with a single federal standard, only to note that this pressure for federalization often comes from industry rather than from environmentalist interests.

( ) State programs will be struck down by the court – they’re used to discriminate against interstate commerce Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Suffolk, March 2006, Electricity Journal, 19.2, “Renewable Orphans,” p.
sciencedirect There are serious Constitutional trip-wires lurking before some of innovative state initiatives. While the many varied state programs create wonderful laboratories for experimentation, only by fostering renewable energy without Constitutional violations can the energy future be founded on a sustainable base. Some of the states through these initiatives treat interstate power sales as a piggy bank to subsidize in-state enterprises, while beggaring their neighbors. The U.S. Supreme Court consistently strikes down as unconstitutional similar programs involving interstate goods taxed by states so as to provide local subsidy. This article parses which of the key state renewable energy initiatives commit Constitutional violations and are not legally sustainable, and how to remedy this so that these renewable programs aren’t orphaned by legal challenge.

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States Can’t Get Modeled
( ) Attempting to link state programs internationally would make them unconstitutional under the Compacts Clause – either they don’t solve modeling or the CP is struck down Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008, “Climate
Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal, http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1 However, it is difficult to see how a linked international cap-and-trade framework could be crafted so as not to constitute a compact or even a treaty, which would be impermissible under Article I, § 10, cl. 1, regardless of the presence or absence of congressional approval. In order to have a properly functioning linkage between markets, there would need to be guarantees regarding enforceability and permanence. Without legally enforceable guarantees about the quality of the credits being traded, the markets are unlikely to succeed. There would be a serious problem, for example, if an offset project in California created credits that were purchased by a steel manufacturer in France, and California de-linked itself from the markets. The problem of how the French manufacturer would account for the credits in the absence of a monitoring or verification mechanism to account for what is happening in California is a significant one. The only way to ensure the integrity of the credits being traded in the marketplace is to create a framework that is robust enough to protect all of the parties involved. This would presumably include the inability to voluntarily leave the program and would be most easily accomplished with some sort of central emissions registry that aggregates and processes data from all participants. These components are almost certain to create a compact under the Compacts Clause, which would then require congressional approval in order to be valid.

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29 States/Fism Core

Federal Key – General
( ) States are worse for alternative energy than the feds – hostility, lack of resources, and patchwork increases compliance costs Barry G. Rabe, University of Michigan, November 2002, Pew Center, “Greenhouse and Statehouse,”
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states_greenhouse.pdf There are, however, significant limitations facing any long-term strategy that relies primarily on the initiative of states. Many cases of state policy innovation in climate change are matched by other states that have proven indifferent or hostile to the issue. In turn, limited fiscal resources deter innovation, particularly given the current fiscal distress facing many states. Moreover, the very notion of a purely decentralized approach raises basic questions of efficiency. A potential tapestry of standards and programs that varied markedly from state to state could serve to heighten compliance costs for regulated parties as opposed to a more uniform approach. Nevertheless, the recent evolution of state policy poses a fundamental challenge to conventional thinking about the design of and political prospects for climate change policy in the United States and, in the process, offers a variety of policy options for possible adoption at the national level.

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Federal Key – Environment
( ) Federal control of environmental regulation is key – states have failed, stops race to the bottom, and checks interstate spillover Dan L. Gildor, JD Berkeley, 2005, “Preserving the Priceless,” 32 Ecology L.Q. 821, p ln
Though much ink has been spilled on this question, 11 the answer is quite simple: there is a pressing need for federal regulation of the environment, not only to make up for the inability of states to regulate the environment themselves, but also to control for and prevent the "race-to-the-bottom" 12 and to prevent interstate spillover effects. 13 [*825] These reasons, in fact, were the exact reasons Congress set out when it adopted the bulk of the federal environmental statutory regime. For instance, in considering "federalizing" air and water policy, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress was concerned with controlling interstate spillovers and preventing races to the bottom. 14 It is also clear, however, that Congress was specifically motivated by the inability of the states to otherwise perform. 15 For instance, the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution heard testimony that "the states simply have not moved." 16 Regarding air quality, Representative Vanik noted, "to date, [*826] the States have been left to establish their own air quality standards. In all too many areas, there has been delay and foot dragging - and ridiculously low standards set to accommodate local industries and interests." 17 It was necessary, therefore, to federalize environmental policy. Revisionist economic theorists led by Professor Richard Revesz, however, have challenged these rationales for federal environmental regulation and advocate, instead, that environmental regulation devolve back to the states. 18 Importantly, though, the revisionists' arguments fail to account for the general and continuing ineffectiveness of the states in regulating the environment. 19 For instance, an analysis of state endangered species laws demonstrates that these acts "fall far short of what is needed to adequately protect a state's imperiled species." 20 Likewise, an analysis of state efforts toward attaining the Clean Air Act's goals found that only three states were "steadily making progress." 21 By contrast, federal environmental law is generally considered quite effective. 22

( ) Federal control over endangered species is key to effectiveness – centralization, uniformity, resources, and checking race to the bottom Jacalyn R. Fleming, JD Albany, 2001, “The scope of federal authority,” 65 Alb. L. Rev. 497, p ln
Despite this history of deference to Congress, however, the Supreme Court is currently taking a hard look at whether the federal law in question is within Congress's constitutionally delegated authority. 11 Yet in the midst of this states' rights movement, one should remember that there is a need for a national policy in key areas beyond national defense. For instance, federal authority is needed for issues that require a centralized solution due to their national significance. Environmental regulation is one such area. The centralization of environmental laws has numerous benefits, including uniformity and an increase in the pool of resources available to resolve the [*499] problem. 12 Similarly, federal laws are needed to provide minimum standards because states may face strong disincentives to enact or enforce environmental laws. 13 For example, states may focus on the monetary benefits from the added taxes and jobs gained from allowing development while ignoring the less obvious environmental effects such as cumulative impacts. 14 In turn, this may result in a "race to the bottom," where each local jurisdiction chooses short-term economic gain over the long-term health of the nation and the planet. 15

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Perm Solves Best
( ) Coordination between state and federal governments solve alternative energy best Sanya Carleyolsen, PhD candidate Public Policy @ UNC, Summer 2006, “Tangled in the Wires,” 46 Nat.
Resources J. 759, ln A transition to wide-scale RE deployment will require continued government efforts to develop feasible and consistent economic incentives, comprehensive national- and state-level energy plans, and a stronger regulatory environment. State governments need to enhance their energy plans with tighter environmental targets and more extensive initiatives. Local governments need to expand the scope of planning initiatives to include policies that protect, legitimize, and advance RE development. All levels of government and public actors need to coordinate RE efforts in order to advance a more effective, cohesive movement.

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32 States/Fism Core

California Economy DA 2AC
A. The California economy is on the brink because of budget deficits – the plan would force shortfalls or raising taxes, ensuring there’s no change a budget gets passed Evan Halper, LA Times, 7-1-2008, “State will pay,” ln
Legislators are making little progress closing a $15.2-billion shortfall. Democrats demand new taxes. Republicans say that is out of the question. Meanwhile, their inability to strike a deal threatens millions of Californians who rely on the government for healthcare and other services. Budget delays are not unusual. But the consequences will be particularly harsh this year. Many of the healthcare clinics and other service providers that have used private loans to get by during past budget stalemates are unlikely to have easy access to such cash this year, as a result of the ongoing credit crunch brought on by the mortgage crisis. Independent service providers aren't the only ones that could soon be scraping to find money. Short-term bonds that finance officials rely upon to replenish state coffers cannot be sold without a budget in place, and getting them to market takes at least a month. The state may have to turn to a syndicate of investment banks for short-term financing, on terms that could prove costly, said H.D. Palmer, deputy director of the state Department of Finance. The financing could cost $140 million more than bond borrowing would have, he said. "In this budget environment," he said," I can think of a lot better uses for that money." Despite the grim state of affairs at the Capitol, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and lawmakers Monday played down their failure to get a budget together and the dim prospects of reaching a deal soon. "I don't know at what stage they are in at this time," Schwarzenegger said at a news conference. "I know one thing, they are all working. . . . Everyone knows we are short on time. I think everyone knows it is a complicated, difficult budget." Schwarzenegger, who has been playing only a minor role in budget deliberations of late, turned the microphone over to Assembly Speaker Karen Bass. "We have been working," she said. "We spent four hours yesterday working." Democrats in both houses have released budget plans that call for as
much as $11 billion in new taxes. But so far they have not identified which taxes they would like to raise. Bass demurred again Monday. "We will see what happens as the process moves forward this week," she said. The governor later joked about his optimism that the state will not run out of cash by pulling out a personal money clip full of bills. "I still have some left," he said. Not all Republicans were in such good spirits. "Until we get to a spot where Democrats realize that taxes are not going to work, it will

be tough to move the budget forward," said Assembly Republican Leader Mike Villines of Clovis. Credit agencies will be watching closely: California has the second-lowest credit rating among states in the country, and some economists say a downgrade could be coming. The last time the state's creditworthiness was
downgraded was during the budget crisis of 2003, when its bond ratings fell to nearly junk status. The shortfall lawmakers faced then was roughly the size it is now.

B. California is key to the US economy Nutting, 11-9-2007, MarketWatch, “Could California be in recession?” lexis, tk
The state of California isn't taking any chances. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger has ordered state agencies to plan for a 10% cutback in their budgets for next year, figuring that tax receipts could fall significantly along with home prices. California matters to the national economy, but trends in California do not necessarily presage what will happen nationally. About one in every eight Americans live in California. Its state gross product was $1.6 trillion in 2005, representing about 13% of the nation's economic output, slightly more than its 12% share of the population. In 2006, the median household income in California was $54,385, compared with $48,023 nationally. Between 1997 and 2005, California household incomes grew 4.4% annually, the fourth fastest growing state. Some of that growth came from the technology boom of the late 1990s, and some came from the housing boom, which, in just five years, doubled average home prices in the state to about $500,000. Now, of course, home prices are falling nationally, but especially in California. California's economy has a lot going for it. It's incredibly diverse, from the highest of high tech and Hollywood to the basic old-economy industries of agriculture, retail and manufacturing. California is by far the biggest farming state, with its annual output nearly three times its nearest competitor, Texas. California's agricultural output - nearly 20% of the nation's total -- matches the output of all the Farm Belt states combined. California accounts for about 11% of U.S. manufacturing output by value and 13% of construction. California accounts for 19% of the country's information services including media and software. And it contributes 12% of the national output of financial services, trailing only New York in the financial sector.

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California Economy DA – Links
( ) The counterplan would force California to raise taxes to pay for it – hurting their economy Rich Saskal, Bond Buyer, 7-10-2008, “California Democrats,” ln
The budget conference committee approved the plan on a party-line vote, with Republicans voting "no." A final budget won't be so simple, because minority Republican votes are needed in each house to obtain the required two-thirds majority. GOP lawmakers have said they will stand firm against tax hikes. "As the conference committee concluded tonight, I have to say that I am disappointed," said Sen. Bob Dutton, ranking Republican on the Senate Budget Committee. "With the California economy struggling, now is not the time to raise taxes."

( ) The counterplan would raise taxes to cover budget deficits in California – jacking their economy States News Service, 7-10-2008, “Maze Reacts,” ln
Assemblyman Bill Maze (R-Visalia) reacts to the Democrats proposed billions in tax increases on businesses and high earners to help bridge the California's budget shortfall. "California already has the fourth-highest tax burden in the nation," said Assemblyman Maze. "We pay enough taxes and with our economy struggling this is the wrong time to raise taxes, which will only hurt our families and kill jobs in California. I cannot believe that during these tough economic times the Democrats want to solve the budget shortfall on the backs of businesses and California's citizens."

( ) California can’t afford to spend more money – they’d have to raise taxes Dan Walters, Fresno Bee, 7-6-2008, “State faces budget crisis,” ln
The budget, meanwhile, has become a markedly more complex document, largely because Proposition 13, passed by voters in 1978 to slash local property taxes, thrust much more responsibility for financing schools and local services onto the state. And Proposition 98, a school finance measure enacted in 1988, made the process even more complex and rigid. Its effects were just beginning to be felt when Wilson was governor. Finally, the fiscal problems that troubled those other governors primarily resulted from economic recessions, but today's crisis primarily stems from voters and politicians spending more money than the revenue system can produce, even in a good economy. It is what those in the Capitol call and what California Forward identifies as a "structural deficit." This is, in brief, a unique situation and what any governor did in the past means absolutely nothing today. Until California resolves its underlying crisis of governance, the budget crisis will continue to bedevil us.

( ) California is key to the economy Katherene Hansen, Exec. Dir. Los Angeles FEB, 6-26-2008, “Locality Pay,” CQ, ln
Given the regional complexity, national economic significance and large population, California is critical to the security and economic health of the nation. Many of the Nation's most critical infrastructures exist in California's high-cost cities. To protect them and the millions of residents in these mega-cities, the full complement of Federal agencies is needed to keep them safe and secure. However there is no incentive within the existing Federal pay system for employees to serve in these high- cost cities.

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34 States/Fism Core

Federalism Link Turn 2AC
( ) The counterplan tanks federalism by over-delegating federal powers to the states Stephen G. Calabresi, Law Prof @ NWU, March 2001, Annals of the American Academy of Political And Social
Science, v574, p. 33 I fully agree that the Court ought to approach enforcement of the commerce clause and Section 5 power with restraint and that only in cases of egregious overreaching should acts of Congress be struck down. Congressional efforts to enforce the commerce power or Section 5 deserve to be given the benefit of the doubt both because of Congress’s greater information about the real world and because Congress is a coequal interpreter of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. But giving Congress the benefit of the doubt does not mean rubber-stamping everything that Congress has tried to do, as happened from 1937 to 1995. Sometimes in extreme cases, it is valuable for the Court to remind Congress of the constitutional values of federalism, and this is what I think happened in Lopez, City of Boerne, and Morrison. In each of these cases, Congress was attempting novel federalism solutions to problems that a majority of the states seemed to be handling very well. It was accordingly appropriate for the Court to slow Congress down by forcing it to take a second look at what it had in haste done in each of these areas (Calabresi 1995).

( ) Sudden court extension of Lopez triggers a social backlash that undermines federalism Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
First, I do not think the federal courts can ignore the powerful reliance interests that have grown up around the statutes enacted during and after the New Deal in reliance on a broader understanding of the Commerce Clause. Congress itself can repeal statutes for federalism reasons, as it is now doing, without worrying about considerations of precedent. The legislative process is such that new laws can be phased in over a period of many years thus accommodating reliance interests quite readily. The judicial process is much more rigid, however, and sudden mass overrulings would cause social disruption that the Court could do little to soften. The likeliest social reaction, in my view, to a sudden judicial abrogation of the New Deal would be a constitutional amendment formalizing the currently flawed case law understandings of the scope of congressional power. This result wrongly would upset the public while setting back if not destroying the cause of federalism. I therefore think it would be a grave mistake for the Court to overrule abruptly key New Deal precedents, many of which even may be defensible under the functional theory of federalism set out in Part I.

( ) Enforcing Lopez won’t restore federalism H. Geoffrey Mouton, Law Prof, April 1999, Minnesota Law Review, ln
Despite the Court's apparent nostalgia for a dramatically smaller national government, no judicially enforced federalism doctrine is going to undo the last quarter of the nation's history. And while cases like New York, Lopez, and Printz may on occasion stimulate important debate, such as the examination of federal criminal law that has followed Lopez, they will never have more than the most marginal relevance to the allocation decisions that matter most. Those who truly believe in the instrumental values of federalism should therefore focus not on persuading courts to undo congressional "mistakes," but rather on promoting wise institutional choice in the political process.

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Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Congress
( ) Congress can override the Courts devolution Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse consequences of state-by-state regulation in the face of federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all things being equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. 213 Finally, the federal common law of foreign relations is designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect. Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the development of such law.

( ) Congress will roll back contravening judicial decisions Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
Moreover, even when the Court is determined to resist the policy objectives of a lawmaking majority, Dahl demonstrates that "Congress and the president do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy issues." 193 Dahl shows that when the Court strikes down a major national policy initiative, Congress and the President typically repass the law in defiance of the Court. These arguments, confirmed in recent scholarship, 194 constitute an important rebuttal to those who profess fear that national judicial activism someday might lead to a dangerous weakening of the constitutional powers of the national government.

( ) Most Lopez rulings are overturned Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Fall 2003, p. 770
Unfortunately for the judiciary, despite Lopez and its progeny, the drive to federalize crimes continues. And though Lopez has been used to challenge many of these federal criminal laws, "to date, [Lopez] has been of assistance to few defendants." In fact, as of the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal statutes, only three had been upheld.

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Lopez Will Be Rolled Back – Executive
( ) Executive can rollback Lopez decisions Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
The executive branch has special monitoring capabilities and preemptive lawmaking powers when foreign relations is at issue. As for monitoring, it is inconceivable that the executive branch will be unaware of a state's action that adversely affects U.S. foreign relations or unduly burdens the federal government's ability to conduct foreign relations. The President is the primary agent of U.S. foreign relations and the primary organ of communication with foreign governments. 266 And the executive branch receives all foreign government complaints about state activity. When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign relations activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to address it. Foreign relations is (and is perceived to be) the President's responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign relations problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in redressing state-created foreign relations difficulties. The President also has a massive executive branch bureaucracy at his disposal to monitor and redress such difficulties. Importantly, the executive branch's ability to respond to these difficulties is not burdened by collective action problems to nearly the same degree as Congress. 267 In addition, the President's unique role in foreign relations enables him to redress unacceptable state foreign relations activity in a variety of ways. First, he exercises special influence on the congressional foreign relations agenda and the content of foreign relations legislation. 268 Second, he or one of his subordi- [*1685] nates can communicate directly with states on behalf of the federal government in order to influence or alter the offensive state activity. 269 Sometimes this communication is nothing more than an informal telephone call to the proper state or local official. Other times the State Department will send a formal letter to the state urging it to cease its offensive behavior. And sometimes the executive branch will file an amicus brief in state court. 270 These means of "informal" presidential control are often employed and often, though not always, successful in changing the offending state behavior. 271 Third, the President has limited but important federal lawmaking powers that enable him, on his own, to preempt state law that adversely affects the nation's foreign relations or the political branches' ability to conduct such relations. Some of these powers derive directly from the Constitution itself. For example, incident to his power to recognize foreign governments, 272 the President can enter into international agreements that preempt state law. The most famous instance is the Litvinov Agreement, which officially recognized the Soviet Union and assigned all Soviet property in the United States to the federal government. This "executive agreement" preempted inconsis- [*1686] tent state property and creditor law. 273 It also ended state court uncertainty about the domestic effect of the Soviet Union's extraterritorial confiscations. 274

( ) The President can quickly roll back the counterplan Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
Much more significant than the President's constitutionally derived powers are the broad and numerous foreign relations lawmaking powers delegated to the executive by Congress. 275 Congress has delegated these powers to the executive precisely because the President has access to superior expertise and because structural advantages allow the President to take quick and decisive action. The broadest such delegation is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 276 Presidential lawmaking power under IEEPA is triggered by "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." 277 IEEPA enables the President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law whose application would interfere with or impede the federal government's conduct of foreign relations. The best known example is President Carter's invocation of IEEPA to lift state-law judicial attachments on Iranian assets and suspend private (largely state-law governed) claims against Iran as part of the deal to secure the release of the hostages in Iran. 278

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ESA DA 2AC
A. Striking down congressional power to regulate energy would require overturning all of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause Peter Moyers, Princeton, Spring 1998, “Drug Legalization,” Princeton U.L.J., v. 11, iss. 2,
www.princeton.edu/~lawjourn/Spring 98/ Wickard v Filburn (1942) affirmed the decision in NLRB and granted additional power. The respondent in the case was found
guilty of violating a law prohibiting the production of more than 11.1 acres of wheat. Even though he did not sell his extra wheat, the Court found that the respondent along with others could possibly substantially affect the wheat market were they all to violate the quota. Although Filburn’s acts did not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce, many "Filburns" could do so. The risk of substantial effect was enough for congressional regulation. Therefore, Congress’ interest in stabilizing prices on the wheat market required farmers not to exceed the quota, even if the surplus was not used for commercial purposes. This decision granted Congress the power to regulate non-commercial, local activity if it presents the risk of "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." These cases bring us to the most recent decision of U.S. v Lopez (1995). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that three categories of activity may be regulated by Congress under the power of the Commerce Clause. First, the channels of interstate commerce are open to congressional regulation. Second, Congress may regulate the persons or things, the instrumentalities, of interstate commerce. Third, an activity may be regulated if it has a substantial relation to interstate commerce, or more specifically, substantially affect interstate commerce. In Lopez, the government argued under the third category, attempting to show that the presence of firearms on school grounds has substantial relation to interstate commerce. The Court found the argument to lack force, asserting that the definition of substantial relation or effect the government was putting forth would transform Commerce Clause power into "a general police power of the sort retained by the States." This decision does not categorically reject the federalization of police powers but rather affirms the doctrine of substantial relation or effect. The Court was unwilling to build "inference upon inference" to see a substantial economic effect; the presence of firearms on school grounds was found to be too far removed from interstate commerce to come under the third category. The Court would be faced with a similar case in the congressional policy of outlawing the use,

sale and possession of drugs. In order for the congressional policy to prevail, it must show that the possession and use of drugs, sanctioned by the state policy, substantially affect interstate commerce. However, in order to be consistent with Lopez and Wickard, whose doctrine of substantial risk of effect has never been overturned, and in the absence of empirical evidence, the Court must recognize that even the risk of an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce is sufficient for legitimate congressional regulation.
I find the activities sanctioned by the state policy to be of sufficient risk of substantially affecting interstate commerce to find the congressional policy a constitutional regulation denying the practice of the activities sanctioned by the initiative.

***Continues***
The state policy demonstrates the risks involved in allowing states, in the case of drug policy, to pursue different policies. As I argue above, the legalization of drugs within one state almost certainly will substantially burden the effective pursuit of drug use and possession prevention in other states. A neighboring state would have to create nearly impervious borders in order to remain faithful to its anti-drug policy; one wonders if the free flow of people to and from the state, let alone commerce, would remain a possibility. By upholding the constitutionality of the congressional policy, the Court would recognize and condemn the substantial burden a state pursuing an independent drug policy places on neighboring states. Admittedly, to the casual observer, the Court’s decision would appear to be a significant usurpation of states’ police powers and a step toward a unitary system. I agree that the Court ought to be wary of assaults on federalism. The decision should not be looked upon by future Courts as a precedent for allowing the nationalization of police powers, but rather as an affirmation of Congress’ power to regulate any activities, including crimes, that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case, the state policy creates a risk of substantially affecting interstate commerce. To deny Congress’

power in this case would be to overturn nearly all Commerce Clause precedents as well as Marigold. And to overturn Marigold would be to all but eliminate any non-enumerated means Congress requires to pursue its powers and duties. Although to find for the federal government might blur the line of federalism, to find for the state would strip Congress of its power, granted in Marigold, to act beyond its enumerated means to pursue its enumerated duties. The latter I do not think our system can tolerate.

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ESA DA 2AC
B. That would require striking down the ESA – it’s based on the commerce clause Mollie Lee, 11-1-2006, Yale L. J., “Environmental economics,” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_01996199333/Environmental-economics-a-market-failure.html When Congress enacted the ESA, it did so with very little debate and with overwhelming public support. (11) The environmental movement was at its peak, (12) and a nation of newfound environmentalists was eager to respond to well-publicized stories about threats to the bald eagle, blue whale, polar bear, and other "charismatic fauna." (13) Endangered species already received some protection from statutes enacted in the prior decade, (14) but these statutes were limited in scope, and it soon became apparent that they were inadequate to prevent further extinctions. (15) Thus, in 1973 Congress adopted the ESA as a comprehensive approach to protecting threatened and endangered species throughout the nation. Congress relied chiefly on its Commerce Clause powers in passing the statute, (16) but the legislative history contains no explicit discussion of this constitutional authority. However, congressional findings and testimony suggest that Congress understood species extinctions as a problem with both commercial causes (17) and commercial consequences. (18) The causal link between commercial activity and species extinction is particularly prominent in the legislative findings for the statute. There, Congress noted that "various species offish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation." (19) While this finding suggests that Congress understood economic activity to be a primary cause of species extinction, Congress did not choose to protect endangered species by directly regulating economic activity. Instead, the ESA prohibited any activity that would jeopardize the continued survival of threatened and endangered species.

C. The ESA is critical to prevent species extinctions Union of Concerned Scientists 06 http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/restoring/science-in-theendangered.html Biological diversity provides food, fiber, medicines, clean water, and many other products and services we depend upon every day. Yet nearly one-third of native species in the United States are at risk of disappearing. "As children, small creatures endlessly fascinate us; as adults, we can protect them so as to inspire future children." - Les E. Watling, Marine Ecologist It is clear that the ESA has given new hope for sustained survival to numerous species that were on the brink of extinction—less than one percent of species listed under the ESA have gone extinct since 1973, while 10 percent of candidate species still waiting to be listed have suffered that fate. In addition to the hundreds of species that the Act has protected from extinction, listing has contributed to population increases or the stabilization of population declines for more than 30 percent of listed species, as well as the recovery of such signature species as the peregrine falcon.

D. That causes extinction Paul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life Sciences, 1994, p 177
Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.

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ESA DA – Energy Link
( ) It’s unquestionable that the federal government has the right to regulate energy under the Commerce Clause – the CP would require eviscerating Congress’s commerce clause powers Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Suffolk, 4-14-2007, N.Y.U. Envt’l L.J., “Sustainable Energy,” p. ssrn
Energy policy has been a primary domestic news story during the last two years: the Enron scandal,1 terrorist threats against nuclear power plants,2 the California electric energy market collapse,3 and the August 14, 2003 blackout affecting fifty million people in the eastern United States.4 Electric energy, although seldom analyzed in the literature (especially compared to the column inches devoted to the geopolitical role of oil) is the critical resource underwriting the modern post-industrial economy. Without adequate and reliable electric energy, the computer age, the information society, many industrial processes, and even highrise or moderate height buildings would be impossible. Electric power is the critical energy input in the American economy. We are embarked on a significant and ultimately inevitable transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy resources, by far the fastest growing source of new electric power in the U.S.5 The leverage for these renewable power resources is fulcrumed at the state level by a host of renewable electric power subsidies and requirements.6 Eighteen states, including every large state except Florida, are deregulating their electric power sectors.7 The socalled “renewable resource portfolio standard” is adopted in most of these deregulated states, as is the renewable energy system benefit charge trust fund subsidy.8 These state policies drive American energy policy into the twenty-first century. This energy transition has profound effects on the decentralization of power in America. It diversifies and strengthens the U.S. energy system against attack and failure in the post-September 11 era. But despite the beneficial environmental and national defense implications of this state-subsidized push into a renewable power future,9 there are serious Constitutional tripwires lurking before some of these innovative state initiatives. This Article critically analyzes application and violations of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution posed by these state renewable energy programs.10 In twenty-first century America, power is the quintessential good (or service) in interstate commerce. Yet, some of the states through these initiatives use interstate power sales to subsidize in-state enterprises, while beggaring their neighbors. The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down similar programs involving interstate goods taxed by states to provide local subsidies.11 This Article attempts to determine which of the key renewable energy initiatives commit constitutional violations and are thus not legally sustainable. Given the pivotal role of power in the American economy, this Article charts and outlines how states can accomplish a range of renewable energy promotions without running afoul of Constitutional and other legal limitations. It also suggests federal solutions. While the many varied state programs create wonderful laboratories for experimentation, only by fostering the renewable energy future without constitutional violations can the energy future be founded on a truly sustainable base.

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40 States/Fism Core

ESA DA – ESA Based On Commerce Clause
( ) The ESA is based on the Commerce Clause – the CP would open the door to striking it down Mollie Lee, 11-1-2006, Yale L. J., “Environmental economics,” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_01996199333/Environmental-economics-a-market-failure.html When Congress passed the United States' major environmental statutes in the 1970s and early 1980s, (1) it acted under its constitutional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." (2) At the time, courts and Congress shared an expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. (3) The idea that there were limits on Congress's Commerce Clause authority was an "intellectual joke," (4) and the standard law school treatment of Commerce Clause powers boiled down to the explanation that "Congress can do whatever it wants." (5) However, congressional authority to enact environmental legislation has been called into question by recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that Commerce Clause regulation is valid only if Congress is regulating "economic activity." (6) While lower courts applying this new doctrine have held that environmental regulation is valid Commerce Clause regulation, they have had difficulty explaining why. In particular, they have struggled to identify the economic activity regulated by certain environmental statutes. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is especially vulnerable under the Court's new Commerce Clause analysis. Many environmental statutes may be upheld because they directly regulate industrial activity, which courts regard as sufficiently "economic" for Commerce Clause purposes. (7) This logic is more difficult to apply to the ESA, however, because the statute seeks to protect threatened and endangered species by prohibiting any actions that harm designated species, rather than by regulating specific types of commercial activity. For decades, the wide reach and strict prohibitions of the ESA have generated resistance, (8) and the Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine has created an opening for a wave of legal challenges to the statute. In response to the Court's renewed attention to the economic nature of Commerce Clause legislation, opponents of the ESA have challenged applications of the statute that have only a questionable link to economic activity.

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ESA Good – Species/Economy
( ) ESA is key to check global species extinction and the economy, and doesn’t stop development Robert Perciasepe, chief operating office of Audubon, SF Chronicale, 12-23-2003, “The ESA at 30”,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/12/23/EDGJ33S6TO1.DTL Americans recognized the danger to their natural heritage and collaborated across party lines to find a solution. The Endangered Species Act slowed and halted a seemingly inexorable slide toward extinction for too many of America's wild birds and animals. Signed on Dec. 28, 1973, by President Richard Nixon, the act is a model worldwide for protecting wildlife and habitats. The ESA's effectiveness is obvious
today. California species such as the brown pelican, peregrine falcon and gray whale are again abundant enough to have been removed from the endangered list. The state's sea otters and condors would simply not be here without this landmark bill. The bald eagle is among the act's most dramatic success stories. Down to only a few hundred breeding pairs by 1973, this bird has bounced back thanks to ESA-mandated programs, bringing the number of nesting pairs into the thousands. Now, American schoolchildren once again have a chance to see this most majestic of our birds flying over their communities. No myth, no symbol on a flag or seal, but a living, breathing embodiment of our national spirit. It is something to be proud of for many reasons, not the least of which is a lesson in the potential of American lawmaking. Though effective, the ESA is not without detractors. Critics want it gutted, claiming it protects

the act allows almost any development to go forward, as long as provision is made to protect imperiled species it affects. The law sets the bar high when a developer or polluter wants to remove the last of a species from the planet forever, and it should. Despite critics' arguments, the act actually pushes both the national and California economies forward. U.S. consumers spent nearly $39 billion on wildlife watching in 2001. That year, $2.6 billion was added to California's economy by wildlife
"unimportant" species and halts development. In fact, watchers, many of whom took trips to see gray whales, condors, sea otters and other animals that can be viewed nowhere else in the country. That they can be seen at all is to the act's credit. When naysayers make claims for weakening the law, they also reveal indifference to what we nearly lost forever -- and what is still at risk. Since

the inception of the act, human impacts on wilderness have snowballed. Bird populations such as the cerulean warbler (a species we believe should be listed as endangered) have declined by as much as 75 percent since 1973. Sprawl increases daily, wetlands disappear and special interests seek to undermine environmental protection to increase their short-term profits. The ESA needs to be in place to act as a balance. Perhaps the best example of why is found in two species that haven't recovered. The act was needed, but came too late, for the
dusky seaside sparrow, a small bird found in the Cape Canaveral area. Its habitat was destroyed by unchecked coastal development in the 1960s; the last bird died in captivity in 1987. But the California condor may yet be saved. Captive breeding, field studies and identification and removal of toxic threats, along with the reintroduction of individual condors to Central and Southern California -- all mandated by the ESA -- are taking place to resurrect this bird. It's a victory in progress: Nearly 50 of these imposing and stately creatures are back where they belong, when only a decade ago, this bird was officially extinct in the wild. This is owing completely to the ESA. Why we would weaken a demonstrable success that has only positive benefits to wildlife and to the economy -- and to the health of us all - is something the act's enemies have a hard time defending convincingly. Earlier this month, a celebration played out on Capitol Hill in Washington. Lawmakers, conservationists and even wildlife came together to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Endangered

the act is needed now more than ever. They celebrated because, when supported, the act does what it was designed to do: save species from extinction. Significantly, the wildlife representing proof of the act's effectiveness was a bald eagle -- there thanks to the ESA.
Species Act. They celebrated because it is a success. They celebrated because

ESA is key to economy –empirical studies prove SCOPP, Editor-in-Chief, U.S.F. Law Review, Volume 40, 05 (David W. Scopp, University of San Francisco of
Law Review, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 789, Spring, 2005, Lexis) As Congress comprehended, preserving biodiversity positively impacts interstate commerce by providing valuable resources, as well as by contributing to the availability of ecosystem services. A rich variety of genes, species, and biological communities provide our economy with food, wood, fibers, energy, raw material, industrial chemicals, and medicines. 201 For example, a species' genetic information not only allows it to adapt to changing environmental conditions but is also used in genetic engineering to produce new types of crops, foods, and pharmaceuticals. 202 These contributions funnel billions of dollars into the world economy each year. 203 Furthermore, eco-tourism generates at least $ 500 billion per year worldwide. 204 Empirical evidence supports these contentions and shows that the ESA actually affects the national economy. In fact, an empirical study performed by a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology indicates that the listing of a species under the ESA may have a positive impact on the agricultural sector's performance. 205 Furthermore, another empirical study indicates that the critical habitat designation under the ESA may enhance recreational activities and economic development in other areas through the reallocation of water resources. 206

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Economy DA 2AC
A. The CP would be send a massive signal of unpredictability and confusion from the court Matthew Ford, Law Student at St John's University School of Law in New York. 9/15/05. “John Roberts, Stare
Decisis, and the Return of Lochner: An Impetus to Jump-Start the Labor Movement.” Mr. Zine Magazine, A Project of the Monthly Review. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ford180905.html Our common law system is based largely on the idea of "stare decisis," the idea that the rulings of judges are generally binding. Such a system is designed to create continuity so as to send a signal to society about what sort of behavior society will or will not tolerate, to avoid confusion certain to arise if laws are constantly changing, and to diminish the likelihood of agitating society as a whole or creating a backlash by overturning laws that are widely valued. However, as
Judge Roberts put it, "[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). The Supreme Court can overturn precedent when it sees fit, or, in the words of Roberts, "You have to consider whether [precedent has] created settled expectations that should not be disrupted in the interest of regularity in the legal system" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). If Roberts sticks to his word, large, well-organized, militant groups such as the Women's Rights Movement should find comfort in the fact that Roberts has implicitly acknowledged that the overturning of such a key

precedent as Roe v. Wade would likely lead to large-scale upheaval by the well-organized feminist movement that would shake society so forcefully that to even fathom overturning the ruling is to start trouble.

B. Legal certainty is key to the economy Lars-Hendrik Röller, European policy perspectives, 2005, Economic Analysis and Competition Policy
Enforcement in Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_011_en.pdf
The second challenge to economics and economists in competition policy is legal certainty. Predictability and legal certainty are important aspects of competition policy law. There is real economic value to transparency and predictable procedures. Running a successful businesses is all about the ability to be forward looking. Management decisions about technology, markets, competitors are complex and determine the success or failure of companies. Increased regulatory uncertainty raises costs, threatens survival and potentially reduces economic growth. More generally, clarity and credibility are likely to increase the effectiveness of a policy. The effectiveness of an antitrust agency is not solely determined by the decisions that it takes. To a large extent, the impact of an antitrust agency can be attributed to the decisions that it does not have to take. Indeed, if competition rules were well understood, and the consequences of breaking these rules are reasonably unattractive, less antitrust action would indeed be needed. In this sense, the credibility of the antitrust agency is a significant determinant of its effectiveness. The challenge to economics is to ensure that economic analysis does not come at the expense of legal certainty and predictability. As John Vickers recently pointed out,24 legal certainty and economic principles are not substitutes but complements. In other words, given the current state of affairs, we can get more of both, in particular in the context of guidelines. By enhancing predictability and legal certainty guidelines contribute towards the

effectiveness of competition policy.

C. Economic decline causes extinction Lt. Col, Tom Bearden, PhD Nuclear Engineering, April 25, 2000,
http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/042500%20-%20modified.htm
Just prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable that some of the [wmd] weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then---as all the old strategic studies used to show---is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles,

nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we will get the great Armageddon
we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.

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Economy DA – Yes Legal Predictability
The Supreme Court is predictable now. The Economist, 12/13/06, “Shrinking Supremes”,
http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8413080
Modesty is at the core of Mr Roberts's judicial philosophy. It is first and foremost the antithesis of “judicial activism”. Mr Roberts strongly believes that judges should restrict themselves to interpreting the law rather than solving society's problems. But modesty entails some other things as well. Mr Roberts favours legal minimalism: deciding issues on narrow grounds wherever possible. He favours predictability, or deciding cases on the basis of rules that can be used in the future. And he puts a strong emphasis on building consensus. The best way to forge consensus among nine headstrong jurists is to adopt a limited view of what the court is doing. During his confirmation hearings Mr Roberts hit on the metaphor of a baseball umpire. “It is a limited role,” he explained. “Nobody ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire...It's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” And he has dropped more hints since becoming chief justice. He argued at Georgetown University law school that “If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more.” He told an interviewer that he re-read the constitution at the end of the court's term in order to see how close the court was to the original document. Asked which founder he would most like to have been, he said he would like to have been the one who “brokered the great compromises”. The most striking evidence that Mr Roberts is stamping his philosophy on the court is the dramatic decline in business. The New York Times reports that the court has taken 40% fewer cases this term than last, leaving big gaps in its calendar for late winter and early spring. The number of cases which the court decided with signed opinions last term, 69, was the lowest since 1953, and fewer than half the number that the court was deciding in the mid-1980s. Constitutional law professors are even complaining that they have too few new cases to get their teeth into. Opinions are more often unanimous, too. In the 2005 term, according to the Cato Institute, a libertarian think-tank, the court decided almost half its docket without dissents—a big improvement on recent terms. In cases with dissents, Mr Roberts was most often in the majority. Some of these decisions concerned issues where court-watchers had predicted fierce battles—most notably abortion, the death penalty and religious freedom.

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Economy DA – Predictability Links
( ) Roberts has been clear that he won’t do anything crazy – plan makes him look inconsistent and unable to maintain legal stability and predictability. Michael J. Gerhardt, Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. Minnesota Law Review, May, 2006. 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204. “THE FUTURE OF THE
SUPREME COURT: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND BEYOND: Essay: Super Precedent.” Chief Justice Roberts was a model for avoiding pitfalls in the confirmation process. It is possible he may have been too good a model. He constantly espoused respect for precedent throughout his hearings. He may or may not have been a firebrand when he
worked in the Office of the Attorney General, the White House, or in Office of the Solicitor General, but he was not a firebrand when he appeared in front of the Senate [*1228] Judiciary Committee. He no doubt understands that President Bush would love to see him not only vote as Chief Justice Rehnquist did but also move the Court further to the right. Yet, John Roberts the nominee accepted some judicial decisions inconsistent with that political agenda, including those recognizing a marital right of privacy, 98 the framework for analyzing separation of powers conflicts, 99 the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 100 and heightened scrutiny for gender classifications. 101 Roberts even acknowledged Roe as "settled law," and recognized that overruling a precedent would be "a jolt to the legal system." 102 One has to assume that some overrulings would produce more of a "jolt" to the system than others, and some might fatally electrocute the system. While Chief Justice Roberts suggested it was not unthinkable for the Supreme Court to overrule settled law, he made abundantly clear that his philosophy of judicial modesty is grounded, at least in part, on respect for what came before. Roberts acknowledged that predictability, stability, consistency, and reliance are values to be taken into account in constitutional adjudication, and it would seem to follow that these values ought to count in most cases. 103 It further follows that there may be at least some instances in which the values promoted by fidelity to precedent become compelling. A Court that overrules too many precedents not only sets a bad example for the Courts that follow (because it provides no incentive to respect the work of its

predecessors), but also signals permission for other branches to view its decisions with the same lack of respect with which it views them. A healthy respect for precedent means learning to live with decisions with which you disagree.
When Roberts went further to describe himself as a "bottom-up" kind of judge, 104 he signaled that his inclination is to decide cases incrementally and to infer principles from the records of the cases below. A bottom-up judge is willing to learn from experience, which necessarily means that a good deal of our experience has to be left in tact.

( ) Businesses are watching Roberts closely – predictability is key. Financial Times (London, England), June 29, 2006. “The Supreme Court has been bad for business.”
It is not that business wants every decision to go its way: many did this term, including an important ruling limiting securities class action lawsuits. The most important thing for corporate America is to know what the rules are: certainty even the certainty of a loss - reduces litigation. Chief Justice Roberts has spoken of the need for judicial modesty: he thinks courts should not decide more than is necessary, and he is right. But what they do decide, they should do so clearly, if at all possible - or they risk deciding nothing at all. The court has plenty of time to rectify this situation in the term that begins in October: the justices have already agreed to hear critically important cases in the area of punitive damages, antitrust, patents and environmental regulation. As Miguel Estrada, a former Clinton administration lawyer, says, this Supreme Court seems

willing to give the business community a hearing, but it is not clear yet whether they will also give business a break - or even more importantly, some answers to its questions.

( ) Legal uncertainty kills business confidence. Thomas Healy, Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Washington D.C. Former Law Clerk to Judge Michael Hawkins on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. West Virgina Law Review, Fall, 2001. 104 W.
Va L. Rev. 43. “STARE DECISIS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.” The most frequent claim made on behalf of stare decisis is that it fosters certainty in the law. 498 By agreeing to follow established
rules, the courts enable individuals to predict the legal consequences of their actions. 499 A person who writes a will according to accepted procedures can be confident that the courts will enforce that will after his or her death. Likewise, a corporation developing a new product can anticipate its liability for potential defects. This certainty is desirable in its own right: it satisfies a basic human need for security and stability. 500 Certainty also has instrumental worth. When individuals and businesses are able to predict the circumstances under which courts will enforce contracts, impose tort liability, or extend the protection of bankruptcy laws, they are more likely to engage in the kinds of activities that lead to a prosperous and productive society. By contrast, if courts routinely change legal rules, people will hesitate to risk their time and money in pursuit of goals that might ultimately be thwarted.

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Federalism DA 1NC
A. Unique internal link – federalism is on the brink, but state rights are winning because of leadership over energy Raymond C, Scheppach, Exec. Dir. Of Nat. Gov. Assoc., 7-9-2008, Stateline.org, “Will the 2008 election
improve state-federal relations?”, rks, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=323921 While it is always risky to look into the crystal ball, I sense that we are at a major turning point in the role of the states in our intergovernmental system. Essentially, the long-term trend of increased centralization of authority in Washington, D.C., may slow dramatically or even be reversed. Two reasons will drive this change. First,
the next administration and Congress will have to focus more on international issues, ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to terrorism, to Iran and North Korea and to

the next administration and Congress will face huge international challenges that could dominate the agenda. Second, on many of the domestic issues such as health care, energy and climate change, states and governors have been providing national leadership over the last decade.
global economic issues such as the price of oil and other commodities and the value of the dollar?all in an increasingly fragile international financial system. In short,

B. Current federal environmental programs leave a role for the states – the plan reverses this, destroying federalism Robert B. McKinstry, Philadelphia lawyer, John C. Dernbach, Law Prof @ Widener, and Thomas D. Peterson, Exec. Dir. Center for Climate Strategies, 11-19-2007, “Federal Climate Change Legislation,” Widener
Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031552#PaperDownload Most major federal environmental laws preserve a significant role for state and sometimes local government. They create overarching federal goals and minimum standards and provide for implementation by states, often leaving the design of implementation mechanisms to the states. Preservation of a significant state role in federal programs reflects political reality in the United States. Constitutional limitations on federal power have been reinforced by long political tradition of local decision-making epitomized by the New England town meeting and concern that centralizing power would undermine political freedoms. There are also concrete advantages to giving state and local government a significant role in implementation of environmental policies. These are evident from consideration of the progress of climate change initiatives in the United States to date. As noted by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), states have greater flexibility that allows them to innovate with less severe consequences and provide models for future federal legislation. State and local government programs can allow bottom-up decision-making with greater stakeholder involvement. This allows the development of more precisely
focused targets and strategies that are tailored to local conditions and are more likely to succeed.

C. US federalism is modeled worldwide – continued respect for state’s rights is key Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.
We have seen that a

D. Federalism prevents violence and war Steven Calabresi, Law Prof @ NWU, December 1995, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752.
Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of the
reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter

federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb
or a quaint historical anachronism. American-style more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Federalism Brink
( ) Federalism is in a state of flux – Roberts and Alito are on the side of states rights, but only future cases will determine whether they succeed Denise C. Morgan, Law Prof @ NYU, 2006, “A Tale Of (At Least) Two Federalisms,” 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
615, p ln But the sexiness of the new federalism has come at the price of confusion and instability. Everything about the area of law now seems to be in flux. The most obvious example is that the composition of the Supreme Court is changing for the first time in eleven years - gone are both Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who played a strong leadership role in the Court's federalism cases, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, another consistent member of the States' Rights Five. 2 We can only speculate about the positions their replacements will take in future federalism cases and how the interplay of new personalities and judicial styles on the Court will affect the work of the Justices. Chief Justice John Roberts's dissenting opinion in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, written when he was a circuit court judge, suggests that he is willing to read Supreme Court precedent narrowing Congress's Commerce Clause powers and expanding [*616] facial challenges to federal statutes broadly. 3 Then-Judge Roberts, however, also allowed that he would be open to find "alternative grounds for sustaining application of [Commerce Clause statutes] that [would] be more consistent with Supreme Court precedent." 4 Harriet Miers, President George W. Bush's next pick to fill a Supreme Court seat, had no record that would betray her leanings in federalism cases. 5 Judge Samuel Alito, however, Bush's next selection for the Court, had expressed hostility towards many of the assertions of Congressional power that we have grown accustomed to since the 1930s in his position on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 6 Since Justice Alito is now a member of the Supreme Court, only time will tell if a new Court majority will coalesce to police strictly the boundaries of federalism.

( ) Federalism jurisprudence is at a unique juncture – new justices and conflicts between cases make this the key time for the future of federalism Christina E. Coleman, JD Loyola, Summer 2006, “The Future of Federalism,” 37 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 803, p ln
With the passing of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 1 some observers have wondered what will become of the former Chief Justice's "Federalism Revolution." 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist's Court restrained Congress's authority to enact federal legislation under the Commerce Clause for the first time since the New Deal era. 3 When the [*804] Court struck down federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, critics heralded a new era of federalism. 4 It appeared to certain commentators that the Court would continue in this direction in deciding Gonzales v. Raich, in which the Respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in the context of medical marijuana - these observers predicted the Court would not uphold such an attenuated exercise of the federal commerce power. 5 However, in Raich, the Court held that Congress had the power to regulate the purely local, noncommercial cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal medical use. 6 Chief Justice [*805] Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas vigorously dissented, insisting that such an extension of the federal commerce power was unprecedented. 7 The majority, including Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who voted with the Raich dissenters in earlier decisions limiting the commerce power, maintained that Raich was not analogous to those prior cases, and found a rational basis for congressional regulation. 8 With this apparent departure from earlier limitations on federal power set by the Rehnquist Court and the addition of two new Justices, 9 it is unclear whether Raich marks a shift away from federalism or simply a trumping of current drug policy over federalist concerns. 10 Part II of this Note will provide an overview of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with special focus on the three central cases discussed in the Raich opinion: United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and Wickard v. Filburn. 11 In addition, Part II will briefly outline Justice Rehnquist's efforts to turn the Court toward federalism. 12 Part II will also outline the history of drug regulation in the United States and describe the main provisions of the CSA and state legislation governing [*806] medical marijuana use. 13 Part III then will discuss the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich. 14 Part IV will argue that the dissenting judges were correct in asserting that the purely local, noncommercial cultivation of marijuana for personal use as defined by state law is a class of activities beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. 15 Part V will evaluate the impact of Raich on future Commerce Clause challenges, as well as on CSA enforcement, and will consider the future of federalism. 16 This Note will conclude by asserting that with the majority decision in Raich, and the replacement of two confirmed federalists on the Court, the future of the new federalism is uncertain.

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Yes Federalism – General
Federalism is alive and well – states are making domestic policy and not being crushed by the feds John Dinan, Executive director of the National Governors Association, 6-22-2008, Publius, “The state of
American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation,” rks, lexis By any measure, state governments were at the forefront of domestic policy-making in 2007 and early 2008. Not only were state officials more successful than in any prior year of the Bush presidency in securing relief from burdensome federal directives regarding the National Guard, homeland security, education, and welfare policy, but they were also as active as ever in adopting policy innovations in areas such as illegal immigration, health care, and environmental protection.To be sure, state influence in the national policy process was not so strong as to bring an end to other contested requirements in the NoChild Left Behind Act (NCLB), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), and REAL ID Act or to fend off new federal directives in other areas. Nor were state officials free of federal constraints as they targeted illegal immigration, expanded health care coverage, and addressed climate change, given that state acts generated federal lawsuits and agency rulings preempting state authority in each ofthese areas. Nevertheless, states were more influential than in recent years in gaining flexibility in implementing federal legislation, and they continued to be the main innovators in policy areas where the public was especially desirous of governmental action.

( ) Federalism is high – states are winning court battles over rights Ilya Somin, George Mason University - School of Law, 6-23-08, Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy,
Vol. 102, pp. 365-373, 2008, “A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of Constitutional Rights in Danforth V. Minnesota,” rks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150417 Few doubt that states can provide greater protection for individual rights under state constitutions than is available under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. More difficult issues arise, however, when state courts seek to provide greater protection than the Court requires for federal constitutional rights. Can state courts impose remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights that are more generous than those required by the federal Supreme Court? That is the issue raised by the Court's recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota. By a 7-2 vote, the Court decided that state courts could indeed provide victims of constitutional rights violations broader remedies than those mandated by federal Supreme Court decisions. I contend that this outcome is correct, despite the seeming incongruity of allowing state courts to deviate from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court should establish a floor for remedies below which states cannot fall. But there is no reason for it to also mandate a ceiling. Part I briefly describes the facts and background to Danforth. In Part II, I provide a doctrinal justification for the Supreme Court's decision. It makes sense to allow state courts to provide more generous remedies than those mandated by the federal courts in cases where restrictions on the scope of remedies are not imposed by the Constitution itself, but are instead based on policy grounds. State courts can legitimately conclude that these policy grounds are absent or outweighed by other considerations within their state systems, even if they are compelling justifications for restricting the scope of remedies available in federal courts. State courts are in a better position to weigh the relevant tradeoffs in a state legal system than federal courts are. Part III explains the potential policy advantages of allowing interstate diversity in remedies, most importantly inter-jurisdictional competition and an increased ability to provide for diverse citizen preferences and local conditions across different parts of the country. The optimal remedy for a constitutional rights violation in New York may well be different from the optimal remedy for one that occurs in Mississippi.

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Yes Federalism – Roberts/Alito
( ) Roberts and Alito will keep the new federalism going – prior case history proves Casey L. Carhart, JD can. Whittier, Spring 2006, “Note and Comment,” 27 Whittier L. Rev. 833, p ln
Chief Justice Roberts' limited experience leaves great speculation as to where he will stand on not only the Commerce Clause, but on a multitude of other issues. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Roberts served for two years as a federal appellate judge. The only insight we have into Roberts' standing on Federalism derives from a dissenting opinion that he authored in 2003. 273 In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 274 the majority upheld an order issued by the Federal Fish and Wildlife Service under the Commerce Clause. 275 In his dissent, Roberts noted that the majority's definition of "commerce" was inconsistent with the precedent set forth by Lopez 276 and Morrison, 277 as the activity regulated on private property did not substantially affect interstate commerce. 278 Such a holding alludes to future rulings consistent with the foundations set by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. In addition, since his appointment, Chief Justice Roberts has had little opportunity to rule on similar issues. However, his votes thus far appear to be compliant with Federalist principles. 279 [*864] Similarly, prior to his appointment, recently confirmed Justice Alito demonstrated a willingness to enforce constitutional limits on federal power. In United States v. Rybar, Justice Alito voted to strike down a federal law banning the mere possession of machine guns. 280 In his dissent, Justice Alito analogized Rybar to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, 281 concluding that a federal law which does not require prosecutors to demonstrate movement in interstate commerce was a violation of the Commerce Clause. 282 The two recently appointed Justices seem to approach issues of Federalism in a manner which comports with the ideals of former Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. However, the impact of the recent restructuring of the Court remains unclear. If history is any determination, the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause may never be clearly defined.

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Federalism Links – Alternative Energy
( ) The federalism balance over alternative energy has decisively shifted to the states – it’s a key part of decentralizing government Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Harvard, Fall 2003, “Nothing But Net,” 14 Duke Envt’l. L. & Pol’y F. 1, ln
With state governments at the barricades of federalism, an energy revolution has been launched. Perhaps usurping federal law, thirty-eight states recently mounted a statutory and regulatory charge to establish "net metering," a regulatory innovation to implement decentralized renewable power. This innovation fundamentally shifts the regulatory balance as well as the energy mix in America. Net metering profoundly reshapes the energy landscape, providing the most significant boost of any policy tool at any level of government - both qualitatively and quantitatively - to decentralize and "green" American energy sources. While only twelve states have passed statutory initiatives to implement renewable energy system benefit charges and eight have elected to implement renewable portfolio standards, n1 thirty-six states to date have implemented net metering. n2 Net metering enables consumers with small generating facilities, for example solar panels, fuel cells, or wind turbine systems, to offset their electric bills with any excess [*2] power produced at their facility, running the retail utility meter backwards when the renewable energy generator funnels power to the grid. Net billing, or net metering, is the cornerstone of state energy policies encouraging private investment in renewable energy sources. n3

( ) Current federal energy policies still let the states run the show – giving them a significant boost Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dernbach, and Thomas D. Peterson, Winter 2008, Natural Resources &
Environment, Volume 22, Number 3, “Federal Climate Change Legislation as If the States Matter,” rks, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ewebeditpro/items/O25F17686.pdf States are at the forefront of climate change efforts in the United States. These efforts involve more and more states and are becoming increasingly ambitious and regional in scope. Most observers, even at the state level, see state and regional efforts as a next-best strategy in the absence of serious national leadership. The growing prospect of comprehensive national climate change legislation, however, raises many important questions about the role of state efforts in a national climate change program. This article identifies the key state/federal issues that should be addressed in any comprehensive national climate change legislation and provides recommendations for resolving these issues. We cannot hope to successfully address climate change without fully engaging states and their local governments as partners in the national effort. In the early 1970s, Congress passed national air-quality, water-quality, surface mining, solid and hazardous waste, and other legislation based on models created by prior state action. This federal legislation created floors and requirements for states that had failed to do the job but left a significant role for states both in implementing the federal model and continuing to act. As a result, state environmental protection and natural resource agencies have become larger, better funded, more professionally staffed, and more effective than they were in 1970. For climate change, by contrast, the federal government has delayed taking action far beyond the time in which it acted previously. State and regional actions greatly exceed in both scope and number those seen on other environmental issues prior to major federal legislation. The federal government’s failure to take significant action has not been due to any desire to allow states to pursue independent action without federal interference. But the states have responded to climate change because they believe their shorelines, water resources, key industries, and people are at risk. Much of what the states have done, moreover, falls squarely within their traditional police power roles, including public health and safety protection and regulation of land use. Massachusetts and other states challenged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) refusal to exercise jurisdiction over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, precisely because they saw themselves and their citizens as threatened by rising sea levels from global warming.

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Federalism Links – Preemption
( ) Federal preemption undermines states’ rights Ernest Young, Law Prof @ Texas, November 2004, Texas L. Rev., p ln
Second, limiting preemption seeks to address certain process defects that may render the national political process less protective of state autonomy. Professor Hoke has argued that the sort of concentrated interest groups that often seek preemption of state regulation have certain organizational advantages at the federal level that offset state representation. More fundamentally, I have already emphasized the extent to which widespread preemption threatens the state autonomy necessary to maintain a viable system of political checks on central power. Limits on preemption thus address problems that undermine the self-enforcing character of the system.

( ) Every instance of preemption risks federalism James Lack, Senator NY, 7-11-1995, Hearing Before Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, p. 11
Inordinate reliance upon the central government for problem-solving feeds the misconception that uniformity for uniformity’s sake alone is a concept that justifies preemption. However, in a federal system strong reasons compel acceptance of diversity among states. Our federalism anticipates diversity; our unity does not anticipated uniformity. By definition, every preemptive law diminishes other expressions of self-government and should be approved only where compelling need and broad consensus exist. While proponents of preemption may claim expected benefits, these must be balanced against the potential loss of accountability, innovation, and responsiveness.

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Federalism Links – RPS
( ) Federal RPS programs directly infringe on states rights James W. Moeller, August 2004, Public Utilities Fortnightly, “Leave Green-Power; Quotas to the States,” ln
A federal RPS would require that a specified percentage of electric power sold by electric utilities into retail markets be derived from renewable resources. A federal RPS is predicated, therefore, on the assumption that the federal government regulates retail markets for electric power. Congress could, of course, authorize the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate wholesale as well as retail electric power sales and services. However, in the Federal Power Act of 1935, the organic statute for federal regulation of electric utilities, Congress authorized FERC to regulate just wholesale electric power. The regulation of retail electric power was left to the states and to the state public service commissions. The regulation of retail sales and services also was left to the states under PURPA, Title I, which established numerous retail policies for electric utilities. The policies were intended to promote the conservation of electric power and the efficient use of generation facilities and fuels. The retail policies were not imposed on electric utilities. Indeed, PURPA left the adoption and implementation of the retail policies to state public service commissions, which could choose to adopt or reject each standard. The statute guaranteed that nothing therein precluded the adoption of state policies different from the retail policies of PURPA. In this regard, PURPA reinforces the traditional jurisdictional divide between federal regulation of wholesale sales and services and state regulation of retail sales and services. This jurisdictional formula has worked well for almost 70 years. There is no compelling need now for Congress to interfere with the traditional state prerogative to regulate the retail rates and services of public utilities. The experiment with green-power quotas began with state legislatures and state public service commissions. The experiment should continue not on the federal level but on the state level. Congress should not impose a federal RPS. Instead, PURPA should be amended to include an RPS among the retail policies that can be adopted or rejected by state public service commission. Leave the green-power quotas to the states.

( ) National RPS would crush federalism – it’s too one-size-fits-all Marlo Lewis, Senior Fellow @ Comp. Ent. Inst., 8-17-2003, “Killing Energy,”
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/mlewis/030817 Second, a nationwide RPS is an unfunded, one-size-fits-all federal mandate. What is the point of requiring states to devise implementation plans to meet federal clean air standards if Congress is going to dictate the details of those plans? States are already free to subsidize and mandate the use of renewables if they wish, and many do. A nationwide RPS tosses federalism out the window. Third, if Congress forces the power sector to use more non-fossil energy, utilities will have less reason to resist Kyoto or McCain-Lieberman, since they will already effectively comply with a carbon cap. Indeed, some may even lobby for McCain-Lieberman, calculating that their renewable portfolios will make them net sellers of carbon credits under a cap-and-trade program. Instead of mollifying the Kyoto crowd, enacting an RPS will simply tee up McCain-Lieberman for the next round.

( ) National RPS would override state programs, jacking federalism Marlo Lewis, Senior Fellow @ Comp. Ent. Inst., 9-23-2002, Deviant Standard,
http://cei.org/gencon/019,03215.cfm More importantly, a national RPS will make a mockery of the Clean Air Act and our federal system. What is the point of states devising "state implementation plans" if the Senate can mandate one-size-fits-all "solutions" that take no account of local economic and environmental circumstances? Indeed, why pretend we have a system of dual sovereignty if the Senate can overrule the 34 state governments that have not enacted renewable portfolio standards? Because the Senate bill's RPS is a floor, not a ceiling, its potential to exploit consumers, distort energy markets, and supplant state policy regimes is vast. Better to have no energy bill this year than one that incorporates a renewable portfolio standard.

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Internal Link – Slippery Slope
( ) Each intrusion on federalism erodes the balance of power James Lack, Senator NY, 7-11-1995, Serial No. J-104-31, p. 11
Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider cases that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in nullifying state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may address. The threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.

( ) Expansion of federal power is a slippery slope --- each violation key Virginia H. Johnson, JD Candidate, November 2001, Cardoza Law Review, lexis
Although the Lue court agreed that the "plainly adapted" 139 standard was the appropriate test to be applied to the Hostage Taking Act, it found that, contrary to appellant's interpretation, the Act was "plainly adapted" to the Convention, in that "it tracks the language of the Convention in all material respects." 140 [*380] Specifically, the court found that the Act satisfied the means-ends relationship required by the prevailing view of the Necessary and Proper Clause because the statutory language did not stray too far, if at all, from the terms of the treaty, thus insulating the legislation from appellant's Necessary and Proper Clause attack. 141 Based on the judiciary's long-standing treatment of the Necessary and Proper Clause as conferring upon Congress broad implementation powers, 142 it is not surprising that the Lue court premised its opinion on the presumptive validity of treaty-implementing legislation. 143 However, what this analysis fails to take into account is the slippery slope toward a limitless treaty power that could ultimately result in the over-expansion of federal power, especially in the area of human rights. 144 The reasoning employed in Lue therefore provides a useful example of the typical but flawed understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in that the Lue court simply assumed "necessary" and "proper" to be interchangeable constitutional requirements. 145

( ) Small decisions are the greatest threat to federalism Cynthia C. Lebow, Associate Dir – RAND, Spring 1997, U. Tennessee Law Review, ln
n162 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining opinion of O'Connor, J.); FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining in opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice Powell filed his own partial dissent in FERC that also deserves mention. FERC, 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Lauding the "appeal" and "wisdom" of Justice O'Connor's dissent, Powell stated that PURPA "intrusively requires [states] to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration and potential adoption of federally proposed standards.'" Id. at 771, 775 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While finding that precedents of the Court supported the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of PURPA "on this facial attack," Powell also evoked principles of federalism to warn against the encroachment of federal authority into state affairs: But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state-prescribed procedures that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to pre-empt state-court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." Id. at 774-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978)). Despite his warning, Justice Powell could probably never have envisioned the degree to which Congress would attempt to preempt state court procedures with respect to tort and product liability actions, areas so traditionally anchored in state common law.

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AT: No Spillover – Single Decision Key
( ) Single big federalism decisions are key – they send an important signal that shapes politics Stephen G. Calabresi, professor of law @ Northwestern, Mar. 2001, The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 574 Annals 24 When the Supreme Court decides a big federalism case like Lopez, it does a lot more than simply resolve the immediate case and issue at hand. In some fundamental sense, it sets up a symbol for the American people of the importance that is attached to a constitutional value or norm. Symbolism is terribly important in constitutions and in constitutional case law. Symbols help citizens organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization. When powerful symbols issue from the Supreme Court of the United States, those symbols help to set the national agenda, and they affect the flow of our politics. Lopez, for example, caused devolution and federalism concerns to become more prominent in Congress than they otherwise might have been. This may well have played into the last Congress’s decision to devolve part of the federal welfare entitlement to the states.

( ) Specific policies that strengthen federalism are modeled world-wide Michael S. Greve, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. “Federalism Values and Foreign Relations,” Chicago Journal of International Law Fall, 2001
Domestic federalism may set precedents or provide competitive models that can be scaled internationally. For example, successful and highly efficient state competition for corporate chartering 6 demonstrates why international agreements on corporate chartering should probably take the form of reciprocal recognition of domestic charters rather than harmonizing standards. For another example, successful federalist regulation of internet privacy and consumer marketing information here in the United States might well show that appropriate choice-of-law and contractual rules are preferable to an international regulatory "privacy" cartel.

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Federalism Is Modeled – General
( ) American federalism is modeled worldwide – laundry list proves Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995
The fifty years since then have seen the birth of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, the British Commonwealth, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the GATT, the NAFTA, and countless other transnational "federal" entities of varying degrees of importance. 24 Many of these were openly inspired by the success story of American federalism, which, for example, led many Europeans to want to build a Common Market that could become a "United States of Europe." While many of these new democratic transnational entities are very weak, they nonetheless have developed important powers: they have helped to keep the peace, and in some instances, as with the European Union, they show real potential for some day attaining essentially all the attributes of sovereignty commonly associated with a federal nationstate, like the United States. The growth and success of transnational confederal forms since 1945 is truly astonishing and rightly is viewed by many - either with alarm or with hope - as holding out the eventual prospect of a future global federal government or at least the prospect of several continental-sized federal governments. At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of [*760] very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. 25 Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-states like Great Britain, 26 France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or devolutionary crises. 27 Other highly centralized nation-states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a democratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face serious pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union.

( ) Federalism is modeled Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law Arkansas Law Review, 1995
In addition to judicial review and presidential government, the United States has also had an enormous influence on global notions of federalism and of the value of a written constitution. Thus, it is not an overstatement to say that the United States is perhaps the world's leading exporter of concepts of public law.

( ) New policies that empower the states to protect rights from the incursions of the central government will lead to a worldwide federalism revolution Robert B. & Helen S. Meyner, Gov Prof and Dir. Meyner Center @ Lafayette, 1995, Camden Rutgers L.J.
Given that it is increasingly necessary to think globally while acting locally, it is pertinent to suggest that this American experience with the new judicial federalism, however muddled, may have useful implications for an emerging federalist revolution worldwide. n132 This potential utility lies primarily in the concept of independent and adequate state constitutional powers that enable constituent governments to protect rights not available from a national government, thereby providing multiple and potentially competing forums for citizen access. The new judicial federalism shows that rights protection cannot be entrusted to a monopoly guardian, whether it be the national government or each constituent government acting monopolistically and
autonomously within its jurisdiction. If the American historical experience has been one of overcoming state tyrannies against individual rights, the historical experience of much of

The new judicial federalism, moreover, is situated at a critical intersection between individual rights and local autonomy, a matter of increasing importance and conflict in the post-Cold War era.
the rest of the world has been one of overcoming central government tyrannies against individual rights.

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Federalism Good Impact – Hegemony
A. US leadership is preserved by the balance of federalism Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution, Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, The States, and the Federal Government, 1992.
The inexorably rising frequency and complexity of U.S. interaction with the rest of the world add to the stress on federal decisionmaking processes and underline the need for making those processes simpler and more effective. If the United States is to be an effective world leader, it cannot afford a cumbersome national government overlapping responsibilities between the federal government and the states, and confusion over which level is in charge of specific domestic government functions. As the world shrinks, international concerns will continue threatening to crowd out domestic policy on the federal agenda. Paradoxically, however, effective domestic policy is now more crucial than ever precisely because it is essential to U.S. leadership in world affairs. Unless we have a strong productive economy, a healthy, well-educated population, and a responsive democratic government, we will not be among the major shapers of the future of this interdependent world. If the American standard of living is falling behind that of other countries and its government structure is paralyzed, the United States will find its credibility in world councils eroding. International considerations provide additional rationale, if more were needed, for the United States to have a strong effective domestic policy. One answer to this paradox is to rediscover the strengths of our federal system, the division of labor between the states and the national government. Washington not only has too much to do, it has taken on domestic responsibilities that would be handled better by the states. Revitalizing the economy may depend on restoring a cleaner division of responsibility between the states and the national government.

B. Nuclear war. Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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56 States/Fism Core

Federalism Good Impact – Democracy
A. US leadership on federalism is essential to democracy worldwide David Broder, Washington Post, June 24, 2001, “Lessons On Freedom.”
Even more persistent were the questions about the role the United States would play, under this new administration, in supporting democratic movements around the world. It is sobering to be reminded how often,
during the long decades of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic regimes, simply because we thought military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and, especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's future and America's role in it, earned him grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority human rights and promotion of democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy. Another great lesson for an American reporter is that the struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative government in the eyes of the public is a worldwide battle. Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as smacking too much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential agents of democracy -- are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as being tied to special interests or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective instruments for tackling current challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you organize and sustain representative government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes to pressing for her country's admission to NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her quest for freedom. She is a member of no party, chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders are there? Meantime, even as democracy is tested everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new and perhaps tougher accountability examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has operated so far with a strong council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But with its membership seemingly certain to expand, the age-old dilemma of democracy -- majority rule vs. minority

and individual rights -- is bound to come to the fore. The principle of federalism will be vital to its success. And, once again, the United States has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and vital in our own country.

B. That solves extinction. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995, “Promoting Democracy in
the 1990’s,” http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, accessed on 12/11/99
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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Federalism Good Impact – Wars
Federalism solves multiple theaters for war and conflict Norman Ornstein, resident scholar in social and political processes at American Enterprise Institute, Jan-Feb 1992. The American Enterprise, v3 n1 p20(5)
No word in political theory more consistently causes eyes to glaze over than “federalism.” Yet no concept is more critical to solving many major political crises in the world right now. The former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Eastern and Western Europe, South Africa, Turkey, the Middle East, and Canada are suffering from problems that could be solved, if solutions are possible, by instituting creative forms of federalism. Federalism is not a sexy concept like “democracy” or “freedom”; it describes a more mundane mechanism that balances the need for a central and coordinating authority at the level of a nation-state with a degree of state and local autonomy, while also protecting minority interests, preserving ethnic and regional identification and sensibilities, and allowing as much self-government as possible. Federalism starts with governing structures put in place by formal, constitutional arrangements, but beyond that it is a partnership that requires trust. Trust can’t be forged overnight by formal arrangements, but bad arrangements can exacerbate hostilities and tensions. Good ones can be the basis for building trust. Why is federalism so important now? There are political reasons: the breakup of the old world order has released resentments and tensions that had been suppressed for decades or even centuries. Ethnic pride and self-identifica tion are surging in many places around the globe. Add to this the easy availability of weapons, and you have a potent mixture for discontent, instability, and violence. There are also economic considerations: simply breaking up existing nation-states into separate entities cannot work when economies are interlinked in complex ways. And there are humane factors, too. No provinces or territories are ethnically pure. Creating an independent Quebec, Croatia, or Kazakhstan would be uplifting for French Quebecois, Croats, and Kazakhs but terrifying for the large numbers of minorities who reside in these same territories. The only way to begin to craft solutions, then, is to create structures that preserve necessary economic links while providing economic independence, to create political autonomy while preserving freedom of movement and individual rights, and to respect ethnic identity while protecting minority rights. Each country has unique problems that require different kinds of federal structures, which can range from a federation that is tightly controlled at the center to a confederation having autonomous units and a loose central authority. The United States pioneered federalism in its Union and its Constitution. Its invention of a federation that balanced power between a vigorous national government and its numerous states was every bit as significant an innovation as its instituting a separation of powers was in governance—and defining the federal-state relationship was far more difficult to work out at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The U.S. federalist structure was, obviously, not sufficient by itself to eliminate the economic and social disparities between the North and the South. Despite the federal guarantees built into the Constitution, the divisive questions of states’ rights dominated political conflict from the beginning and resulted ultimately in the Civil War. But the federal system did keep conflict from boiling over into disaster for 75 years, and it has enabled the United States to keep its union together without constitutional crisis or major bloodshed for the 125 years since the conclusion of the War Between the States. It has also enabled us to meliorate problems of regional and ethnic discontent. The American form of federalism fits the American culture and historical experience—it is not directly transferable to other societies. But if ever there was a time to apply the lessons that can be drawn from the U.S. experience or to create new federal approaches, this is it. What is striking is the present number of countries and regions where deep-seated problems could respond to a new focus on federalism.

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Federalism Good Impact – AT: Secession
Federalism solves violence, economic inequality and secession – prefer this evidence, it is based on empirical examples Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, July 2000
I believe that this trend has been beneficial, and indeed quite successful, as measured by any of the criteria which should matter to liberals, such as: [use a bullet here and below]- peace and individual security: these multination federations are managing to deal with their competing national identities and nationalist projects with an almost complete absence of violence or terrorism by either the state or the minority. democracy: ethnic conflict is now a matter of "ballots not bullets", with no threat of military coups or authoritarian regimes which take power in the name of national security; n10 - individual rights: these reforms have been achieved within the framework of liberal constitutions, with firm respect for individual civil and political rights. - economic prosperity: the move to multination federalism has also been achieved without jeopardizing the economic well-being of citizens. Indeed, the countries that have adopted multination federalism are amongst the wealthiest in the world. - inter-group equality: last but not least, multination federalism has promoted equality between majority and minority groups. By equality here I mean non-domination, such that one group is not systematically vulnerable to the domination of another group. Multination federalism has helped create greater economic equality between majority and minority; greater equality of political influence, so that minorities are not continually outvoted on all issues; and greater equality in the social and cultural fields, as reflected for example in reduced levels of prejudice and discrimination and greater mutual respect between groups. On all these criteria, multination federalism in the West must be judged as a success. Indeed, this trend is, I believe, one of the most important developments in Western democracies in this century. We talk a lot (and rightly so) about the role of the extension of the franchise to Blacks, women, and the working class in democratizing Western societies. But in its own way, this shift from suppressing to accommodating minority nationalisms has also played a vital role in consolidating and deepending democracy. These multination federations have not only managed the conflicts arising from their competing national identities in a peaceful and democratic way, but have also secured a high degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizens. This is truly remarkable when one considers the immense power of nationalism in this century. Nationalism has torn apart colonial empires and Communist dictatorships, and redefined boundaries all over the world. Yet democratic multination federations have succeeded in taming the force of nationalism. Democratic federalism has domesticated and pacified nationalism, while respecting individual rights and freedoms. It is difficult to imagine any other political system that can make the same claim.

Federalism prevents secessionist warfare Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, July 2000.
Why have Western countries become less hysterical about secessionist mobilization? One reason, as I've noted, is that allowing secessionists to mobilize freely may actually reduce the likelihood of secession. Secession is less likely in a democratic multination federation where secessionists can mobilize freely than in a centralized state where illiberal measures are adopted to suppress minority nationalism. But there is another factor, namely that adopting multination federalism reduces the stakes of secession. After all, relatively little would change if Flanders, Scotland or Quebec were to become independent states.

Minority rights protection prevents secession Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state, Foreign Policy, March 22, 2000.
The best way for an ethnically diverse, geographically sprawling stare to protect itself against separatism is to protect the rights of minorities and far-flung communities. Democracy is the political system most explicitly designed to ensure self-determination. Democracy can be a vehicle for peaceful secession, but it is also the best antidote to secessionism and civil war, since, in a truly democratic state, citizens seeking to run their own lives have peaceful alternatives to taking up arms against their government. This principle is global. It can, and should, be applied to conflicts deriving from demands for selfdetermination in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.

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2NC Russia Impact Module
A. Russian federalism prevents economic collapse and state failure. Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. Department of State. The Washington Quarterly 23.2 (2000) 67-77. “Devolution Drives Russian Reform.”
Acting President Vladimir Putin's sudden ascendance, his stern calls for a strong state, and vigorous prosecution of the war in Chechnya have once again raised the specter of authoritarianism in Russia. At the same time, the weakness of Russia's central

government, coupled with ethnic strife and economic failure, have led to predictions that the Russian Federation will fall apart. It is hard to say which haunts U.S. policymakers more: the nightmare of the violent implosion of a nuclear power or the rebirth of a totalitarian antagonist in Europe. Fortunately, both expectations are off the mark. They miss one of the most important trends in Russian politics since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991--the devolution of power to Russia's 89 distinct regions. The Russian state is not moving toward collapse, and it is far too weak to revert to authoritarianism. Instead, Russia is undergoing a historic devolution of power that is likely to lead to a more stable and open polity. In this sense, devolution within the Russian Federation is a very positive development and in the interests of both Russia and the United States. This essay makes three points: First, that devolution of power in Russia has promoted democratic and market reform, enhancing political pluralism and allowing economic success stories to appear in the regions. The election of a moderate Duma in December 1999 and the prospect of an activist president
may well provide a more stable environment in which these reforms can flourish. Second, that despite these positive aspects, devolution does pose formidable dangers to Russia and the West, in that it has given rise to [End Page 67] autocratic power structures in many regions and has increased certain security risks. Third, that U.S. policy will need to focus more on issues raised by devolution of power, allotting a larger share of its diplomatic resources and economic assistance to Russia's regions. 1

B. Russian economic collapse causes nuclear conflict Steven David, Prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins, 1999, Foreign Affairs
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the
GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

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Yes Russian Federalism
Russia is become more and more federalist. Alexander N. Domrin, former Chief Specialist of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Spring, 2006. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 515.
“Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia.” Even though complete abandonment of federalism in Russia is very unlikely in the foreseeable future, one may argue that the current expansion of Russia's federal government activity in virtually all spheres of life can be considered a sign of a shift in the model of federalism Russian follows. Specifically, it signifies Russia's transition from "fragmented" federalism based on treaties between the federal center and subjects of the Federation, implying a relationship more reminiscent of political equals, to "balanced" federalism that is based on the Federal Constitution and strict compliance with it by the federal units. In essence, it is a transition from the current "asymmetric" federation to a more structured union, with presumably one type of subject of the Federation rather than six different types.

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Russia Models US Federalism
Russia models American federalism. PR Newswire US, 4/7/05. “Members of Congress to Address Russian Federal and Regional Leaders at Moscow
School of Political Studies Seminar; Annual Event to Focus on Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and U.S.Russia Relations.” Members of Congress, including Senators Joseph Biden, Carl Levin and John McCain and Representatives Ron Kind and Tom Lantos, will be among the speakers at a special seminar for high ranking Russian political and civic leaders sponsored by the Moscow School of Political Studies to be held April 11-13, 2005 in Washington, DC. The seminar, American Federalism and Public Policy, is part of an intense sevenday visit by 30 federal and regional Russian elected officials and civic leaders, including members of the State Duma and local parliaments, party and civic leaders, business leaders and journalists. The Russian delegates will visit Washington, DC and St. Louis, Missouri for a week-long program focused on U.S. public policy, with a particular emphasis on the American model of federalism and democracy.

Russia models American federalism. Publius, 3/22/97. “Refederalizing Russia: debates on the idea of federalism in Russia..”
Many proponents of a territorial principle looked to the United States as a model of successful federalism. Gavril Popov (at that time mayor of Moscow), for example, was one of several leading "reformers" who proposed a system of territorial federalism in Russia that adhered to a United States type model. He called for the creation of 10-15 large-scale regions and for the abolition of Russia's ethno-federal hierarchy. In order to provide for the right of national self-determination, Popov also proposed the formation of Councils of National Communities at both the regional and the federal levels for organizing policies on non-Russian language education and the "development" of non-Russian cultures, for example.(16) Another advocate of a Lander-basedmodel of Russian federalism was the nationalities minister, Sergei Shakray, who supported the creation of a dozen administrative units. His "February Thesis" in 1993 proposed an eleven-point nationalities policy which stressed the importance of tackling national questions outside of the federal structure of the Russian state.(17) Another, butless tolerant, view of territorial restructuring was also provided by the leader of the "Liberal Democratic" party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky,who proposed abolishing all the republics and national-formations in1991.(18)

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Russian Federalism Good – Civil War
A. Russian federalism is key to prevent Russian civil war. Yuri Krasan, Director of Social Programmes, the Foundation for Social and Economic Reform, 1994, Federalism
and the New World Order, p. 67 Even the idea that regional separatism will save Russia has recently been expressed. It has been suggested that, given the likelihood of a collapse of federal structures, it would be possible to preserve a sound social element only at the regional level, which could become the foundation for a renewal of Russia itself. Whatever the positive motives may be in support of regionalization, such an approach undermines the foundation of Russian federalism—the very basis of Russian statehood. Its implementation would turn Russia into a con-glomerate of peculiar independent principalities without any guarantees that they would again merge into a single federative organism rather than drifting even further apart, joining different geopolitical centres. Within the current confrontational political environment in Russia, without an agreement on a federal structure, Russian territory will become an arena of hostility and struggle, sterile soil for the development of modern democracy. Given Russia’s nuclear military capability, this instability has serious implications for the global community. The shaping of a stable Russian Federation is, thus, a cornerstone for the success of democratization in post-totalitarian Russian society and for Russia’s transformation into a responsible and influential member of the world community. At the same time, the development of the Russian Federation is unthinkable outside the context of society’s democratic reformation. Stability is only possible through improvements in the democratic process and institutions, including a reform of the federal system that provides for an effective distribution of powers between the centre and the rest of the federation.

B. Russian civil war leads to nuclear war with the US Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs Jan 1999
Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

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Russian Federalism Good – Democratization
A. Federalism is vital to Russian democratization. Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. Department of State. The Washington Quarterly 23.2 (2000) 67-77. “Devolution Drives Russian Reform.”
Taken together, these four trends promote democracy by institutionalizing the expression of regional interests and checks on central power. Structural checks impede the rebirth of authoritarianism and leave the political arena open for a variety of pluralist interests to grow. Given the weakness of the central government, it will be a very long time before any Russian president will be able to reverse these gains. Moreover, since devolution has been a primary agent in weakening the authoritarian state, it has helped create and protect "political space" in Russia. Basic freedoms essential to democracy, and unheard of in the Soviet Union only eight years ago, are now virtually taken for granted. Examples include ready access to the Internet, unrestricted contacts with foreigners, freedom to travel, freedom of artistic expression, and increased--if incomplete--freedom of religion. Many Russian universities, including those in the regions, are centers of creative and spontaneous thought. 3 Since devolution checks central power, and since the center is currently and is likely to continue to be very weak, this political space will be very difficult to take away.

B. Without democratization the risk of a Russian accidental launch greatly increases. James M. Goldgeier, scholar in foreign policy and international relations at the Library of Congress. AND, Michael McFaul, professor of political science at Stanford University. 10/1/05. Policy Review. “What to do about
Russia.” Today, Russian state weakness itself also threatens American national security. U.S. policymakers must worry about the possibility of nuclear technologies and weapons being stolen or sold on the world black market. The Russian state's inability to construct an effective early-warning radar system increases the likelihood of an accidental ballistic missile launch in response to faulty information. Russia's inability to defend its borders in the Caucasus has opened a new front on the global war on terror.

C. That sparks a global nuclear war and billions of casualties. PR Newswire, 4/29/98. “NEJM Study Warns of Increasing Risk of Accidental Nuclear Attack; Over 6.8 Million
Immediate U.S. Deaths Possible.” An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an "accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

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64 States/Fism Core

Russian Federalism Good – Russian Economy
Russian devolution is vital to economic growth. Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. Department of State. The Washington Quarterly 23.2 (2000) 67-77. “Devolution Drives Russian Reform.”
Devolution has hastened the breakup of the Soviet economic system and has created conditions under which private entrepreneurship has a chance to take root and grow. The centrally planned economy of the former Soviet Union left Russia with collective agriculture and huge enterprises, some of which employed entire cities. Few of these enterprises can be salvaged or restructured to function in a market economy. Their immediate closure, however, would result in massive unemployment and is simply not an option. Russia's economic future thus depends on the emergence of new productive activities. Devolution promotes market reform and new productive activities in several ways. It has allowed the creation of successful regional models of economic [End Page 70] reform. The process gives progressive ideas at the regional level a better chance of being turned into policy. Indeed, the policies of forward-leaning regional leaders are creating a canon of success stories and models for other regional governments. The best example is Governor Prusak in Novgorod. Reform in Novgorod has produced a more favorable tax climate, more transparent budget procedures, streamlined licensing procedures, and clear land titling. As a result, the number of new small businesses and foreign investment has dramatically increased. Samara, where roughly 20 percent of the workforce is employed by small business, is also a success story. Governor Titov has strongly championed small business and passed a groundbreaking law permitting the privatiza-tion of agricultural land. The Siberian region of Tomsk is also implementing many of these same reforms.

Devolution is making Russia’s economy more productive and efficient. Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. Department of State. The Washington Quarterly 23.2 (2000) 67-77. “Devolution Drives Russian Reform.”
Devolution has also helped to promote market reform by producing economic stratification and competition among regions. Roughly 10 or so "winner regions" are emerging, either because of reformist policies or the presence of natural resources. Stratification leads to competition, increased efficiency, and the emulation of successful regions. At least 30 regions have sent delegations to Novgorod to study the success of its reform. Anecdotal accounts indicate that success in Novgorod has led to competitive innovations in Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg. Officials from many regions have also visited Samara to study successful reforms.

Russian devolution sparks small business growth. Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of U.S. assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. Department of State. The Washington Quarterly 23.2 (2000) 67-77. “Devolution Drives Russian Reform.”
Finally, devolution has helped create the space in which, slowly but surely, basic entrepreneurial, rational economic activity can occur. To Western observers the extent of this activity may not look impressive--for example, small business accounts for 12 percent of Russian gross domestic product (GDP), compared to roughly 50 percent of U.S. GDP. Efficient market behavior certainly remains the exception, not the rule, across Russia's regions, and there is great variation among the regions on reform. While I have cited success stories, Kalmykia, Kursk, and Krasnodar are examples of areas that lag well behind. But devolution of power has given rise to economic opportunities of which certain regions and many Russians have taken advantage. There is a palpable economic vibrance in many of Russia's regions. Ordinary Russian citizens and local government officials across Russia list the growth of small business as a top priority. 5 A concrete indicator of this ferment is the demand for small-business starts among Russians, as demonstrated by several Western-supported loan programs. Before the August [End Page 71] 1998 crisis, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Russia Small Business Fund had $300 million in outstanding loans placed through Russian banks, mostly in the regions, with a 99-percent repayment rate. Bank management believes it could have significantly increased its exposure were it not for resource constraints. The fund is reorganizing as a result of the crisis, but demand from Russian banks and entrepreneurs remains strong. The U.S.-Russia Investment Fund, funded by the U.S. government, is expanding the number of regions where it offers loans to small businesses, and current lending volume exceeds pre-crisis levels. Over time, small business is likely to grow and become a major political force for governmental reform.

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2NC Indonesia Impact Module
A. Federalism prevents the dissolution of Indonesia. Dana Dillon, writer for the Heritage Foundation. “INDONESIA AND SEPARATISM: FINDING A FEDERALIST SOLUTION.” April 19, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM670.cfm, No. 670
The lack of revenue is also an increasing source of tension. The provincial governments have limited power to tax or raise revenue. The central government's principal source of revenue--which funds 75 percent of the national budget--is oil, primarily from the outer islands. Yet very little of that revenue is given back to them. Money that does return to the provinces usually benefits Jakarta-appointed bureaucrats or government-owned businesses. Indigenous populations find it difficult to get jobs in the local government, and the military controls most of the state-owned enterprises. Most Indonesians feel that members of the military are more interested in protecting their business interests and institutional political rights than in national security. The repression of civilians by the~i’my and the national police has made them the country’s most hated and distrusted institutions. However, none of the insurgent groups that arose to battle the injustices has met with much success. In some cases, insurgents have practiced indiscriminate killing, kidnapping, and intimidation of innocent civilians and destruction of foreign-owned property and businesses. Rather than build support for their causes, this behavior strengthens the hand of Jakarta. Separatist grievances focus on access to revenue and the inability of the provinces to pass and enforce local civil and criminal laws. Relieving the causes of the endemic insurrections will be difficult, but not an insurmountable task. The adoption of a system based on federalism could resolve the grievances and weaken the insurrection movements.

B. Indonesian collapse destroys the signal of US leadership. Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. Fall, 2001. The National Interest.
“Another Year of Living Dangerously?” The consequences of Indonesia's breakup would affect American interests, as well. American energy and raw materials companies (Exxon-Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Newmont Mining, Conoco and Freeport-McMoRan, among others) operate in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, Riau, and West Papua, and many of the ships that traverse the Strait of Malacca are American-owned. The United States is also a major trader and investor in East Asia and is to some degree hostage to its fate, especially now that the American economy is slowing. Moreover, if Indonesia fractures, worst-case thinking and preemptive action among its neighbors could upset regional equilibrium and undermine the American strategic canopy in East Asia. The United States has a network of bases and alliances and 100,000 military personnel in the region, and is considered the guarantor of stability by most states-a status it will forfeit if it stands aside as Indonesia falls apart. America's competitors will scrutinize its actions to gauge its resolve and acumen. So will its friends and allies-Australia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea-each of whom would be hurt by Indonesia's collapse.

C. Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Yes Indonesian Federalism
Indonesia is moving to federalism now. Paul Smoke, Associate Professor of Public Finance and Planning @ NYU Wagner. 2005. The World Bank Report:
East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Decentralization reforms in Indonesia include both devolution of authority and, to a lesser extent, deconcentration of functions. Deconcentration to provincial authorities was the dominant form of decentralization before 1999, when the emphasis shifted to devolution to city and district governments. Local governments have broad functions and receive substantial intergovernmental transfers, but have limited revenue authority. The country has increasingly developed the legal framework (most recently through Laws 32 and 33 of 2004), but functional responsibilities and subnational revenues require further elaboration and regulation.

Indonesian federalism is already working – health care proves. Samuel S. Lieberman, Staff Associate at the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council. Joseph J. Capuno, Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics. AND, Hoang Van Minh, Vietnamese Doctor. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government
Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf In Indonesia, Yogyakarta province showed how to use the country’s still immature decentralized framework to introduce health sector reforms and elements of a health insurance system. The province used donor funds to secure technical assistance and conduct assessments, trials, benchmarking, workshops, training, and coordination meetings with districts, as well as advocacy events. The province established a board of trustees and new fund-holder institutions, as well as a benefit package and an insurance premium.

Indonesian federalism is working now – health care proves. Samuel S. Lieberman, Staff Associate at the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council. Joseph J. Capuno, Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics. AND, Hoang Van Minh, Vietnamese Doctor. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government
Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Decentralization in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam may help sustain overall improvements in health that have occurred during the last two decades. Decentralization has appeared to spur local initiative in planning, delivering, and financing services. Users are now participating in planning in many regions, leading to more appropriate and better-targeted health services. Volunteers supplement limited local financial and technical resources. More important, perhaps, citizenship and trust in local government have deepened. The resulting efficiency gains and social capital support the decentralization of health services.

Indonesia has already completely decentralized key sectors like education. Elizabeth M. King, lead economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. AND Susana Cordeiro Guerra, of the World Bank. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local
Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf In Indonesia, Laws 22 and 25 of 1999 transferred governance and management of primary and junior secondary education to district governments, and the upper secondary level to provincial governments, while the central government retains control of the tertiary level. The Education Law 20 of 2003 takes decentralization a step further, moving control of basic levels of education from districts to schools (World Bank 2004a). In Cambodia, recent laws have transferred functions and powers— including the provision of public services—to communes, and the country plans to boost accountability further by increasing the “operational autonomy” of schools and postsecondary institutions (Royal Kingdom of Cambodia 2001).5

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Indonesia Models US Federalism
Indonesia models US federalism The Washington Times June 19, 2000. “A Loss of Nerve.”
"During a visit to Paris, I listened to French president Jacques Chirac deliver a speech in which he talked about everything that was wrong with the United States. It is decadent, he said, a terrible place and Americans do not understand what is going on in world affairs. 'But,' he continued, 'I greatly admire the advances that the United States has made in the technological realm. . . .' "The United States possesses a sense of moral universalism that exists nowhere else. When one talks about some sort of example - a model of human rights, constitutionalism . . . rule of law, and property rights - the United States stands alone. Not long ago, several Hudson Institute scholars had the opportunity to spend some time in Indonesia, and we found that Indonesia does not turn for its models to China or Japan; it looks to the United States. The new Indonesian president is very keen on establishing a form of federalism. What does he look to? The American Constitution.

Indonesia will model American federalism. Samantha F. Ravich, fellow in the Asian Studies Program at CSIS. Summer 2000. The Washington Quarterly.
“Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh.” Obviously, whether or not to reconfigure the Indonesian state in the mold of a federalist system is a matter for the Indonesian people to decide by and among themselves. A closer look at the evolving experience of the United States in creating a balance between federalism and the rights of the individual states may be instructive for Indonesia. It is interesting to note that, although Indonesians fear that a federalist system will weaken the central government, those who argued for or against federalism in America at the dawn of this country's foundation thought exactly the opposite. The federalist system, as proposed during America's Constitutional Congress, enshrined a strong central government.

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Indonesian Federalism Good – Indonesian Economy
A. Federalism is key to an economically healthy Indonesia. Roland White, Senior Public Sector Specialist with the World Bank. AND, Paul Smoke, Associate Professor of Public Finance and Planning @ NYU Wagner. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making
Local Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf East Asia’s remarkable achievements in economic growth and poverty reduction over the past 30 years can be attributed largely to significant public investment in human capital formation and infrastructure, and to the establishment of a regulatory environment conducive to private enterprise.1With decentralization, subnational governments are now at the heart of a range of investment, fiscal, and regulatory activities that affect both the pace and quality of economic growth. For example, they are now responsible for planning and financing economic infrastructure, such as local roads and irrigation schemes, and for regulating and taxing businesses. In some East Asian countries, such as Cambodia, the role of local and regional authorities in these areas is still limited. But in most, including China and Indonesia, it has become crucial.

B. An unstable Indonesian economy brings down all of Southeast Asia. Samantha F. Ravich, fellow in the Asian Studies Program at CSIS. Summer 2000. The Washington Quarterly.
“Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh.” But what if the reforms fail? Quite simply, Indonesia will be swallowed by an extinction-level event. Foreign investment, which has slowly returned to the country over the last year, will flee. Foreign donors (most notably the International Monetary Fund) will likely suspend their loans, and foreign lenders will refuse to restructure the $ 70 billion of sovereign debt under which Indonesia struggles. The National Unity cabinet, already showing signs of fracturing, may implode and the military, seeking an opportunity to strike back against those who humiliated it during the last two years, could try to orchestrate a coup. Into this mix, some of the outlying provinces (Aceh, Riau, and Irian Jaya) could attempt to formally secede, leading to the dissolution of the republic. Aside from Indonesia being lost in an economic and political collapse, a black hole would be created in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, a country of 210 million people, would begin to siphon off the hopes of smaller countries in the region that wish to regain their economic prowess of the early 1990s. Foreign investors would become skittish about Indonesia exporting economic instability beyond its borders and pull their money out of the entire region. Regional governments would be destabilized by thousands, perhaps millions, of Indonesian refugees flooding the coastlines. The regional organizations established to handle problems in the area would crumble from infighting and blame-laying over who forgot to establish the contingency plan. For those who doubt this last point, post-East Timor discussions at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum have ratcheted up tensions among participant states.

C. That causes the end of the world. Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1997.
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave most of the civilized world devastated.

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Indonesian Instability Impact – Global Economy
( ) Indonesian instability kills the global economy. Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. Fall, 2001. The National Interest.
“Another Year of Living Dangerously?”
Indonesia's size and location are the reasons why. The three major straits that slice through it are pivotal passages for the global economy. Malacca is by far the most important, particularly for energy shipments. Some 450 vessels and about 10 million barrels of oil pass through daily, and East Asian demand, driven by China, is expected to rise from 12 million barrels a day in 2000 to over 20 million barrels in twenty years. Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea would suffer severely and soon if fallout from turmoil in Aceh (at its northern end) or Riau (at its southern end) blocked this passage. Its narrowness, 1.5 miles in the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, and ten miles between Singapore and the Riau archipelago, adds to the danger. The Lombok Strait, which ships use to sail to northeast Asia through the Strait of Makasar between Borneo and Sulawesi, is next in importance, although it handles a far smaller volume of traffic than Malacca and is of negligible importance for energy shipments. The Lombok-Makasar route is, however, a critical corridor for Australia's coal and iron ore exports to northeast Asia and for manufactured exports moving south from there. It is also the most likely detour were Malacca rendered impassable or hazardous. By comparison, Sunda is a minor shipping channel; the consequences of its closure would be minimal for transcontinental trade. Rerouting Malacca traffic through Lombok would strain the capacity of the world's merchant fleet, increase transportation costs, and create severe bottlenecks. The problems would be even worse if all three straits were unusable and ships had to transit northeast Asia by skirting Australia's northern coast. Market signals would eventually add other carrying capacity but the question is how quickly and smoothly the adjustment occurs, and what the economic and political consequences would be in the meantime. The ramifications of blocked or delayed maritime traffic, or even just panic over the possibility, would spread speedily throughout globalization's many circuits. Insurance rates would rise; coverage may even be denied if underwriters deem the risks excessive. The effects of obstructed energy, machinery and manufactured goods would register in capital markets, shortterm investors would be scared off, and the flow of much-needed foreign direct investment into a region still convalescing from the blows of 1997 would slow. Piracy in the seas around Indonesia would also worsen if the Jakarta

government either ceased functioning or were so busy holding the country together that it could not police its waters. The hijacking of ships has increased since Indonesia's upheavals began. There were 113 incidents in its waters in
1999 compared to 60 the year before, and between January and March of 2001 alone, pirates attacked ships in Indonesian waters 29 times and on nine occasions in the Malacca Strait. The vessels victimized near Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia included several oil tankers and ships carrying aluminum and palm oil. The three countries began to coordinate operations against the menace in 1992, and in 2000 Japan proposed that its coast guard join the effort along with China and South Korea. Yet how serious piracy becomes, and how effective any joint solution is, depends primarily on the extent of Indonesia's stability. Refugee flows will also accelerate if Indonesia starts to break apart. The refugee population of one million already within its borders will soar, dragging the economy down further and aggravating communal violence. Refugees could also be driven beyond Indonesia into neighboring countries that are neither prepared to receive them nor able to bear the burden of caring for them. Malaysia, which lies across the water from Aceh, has already seen rising illegal immigration from Indonesia, and its officials worry about the social tensions that could result. The refugee problem also figures prominently in Australian and Singaporean discussions of Indonesia.

( ) That causes extinction Lt. Col, Tom Bearden, PhD Nuclear Engineering, April 25, 2000,
http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/042500%20-%20modified.htm
Just prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable that some of the [wmd] weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then---as all the old strategic studies used to show---is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we will get the great Armageddon we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.

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No Federalism – General
( ) Despite high state action and activity, states are still in need of more power. John Dinan, Executive director of the National Governors Association, 6-22-2008, Publius, “The state of
American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation,” rks, lexis States have long been the primary policy innovators in the US federal system, and as Dale Krane has noted, state policy activism "appears to be increasing at an accelerating pace" during the Bush presidency (Krane 2007, 462). State officials continued to take the lead on anumber of issues in 20072008, at times acting when federal policy was not forthcoming, at times expressing disagreement with federal policy, and at times proceeding independently of federal policy-makers (Greenblatt 2007b; Tubbesing 2008). In fact, as John Kincaid and Richard Cole suggest in their article for this issue, public awareness andsupport for continued state policy innovation may well account for the post-2005 uptick in public support for state governments recorded in their annual opinion surveys. As Kincaid and Cole report, their 2007 survey saw a continued drop in the percentage of individuals responding that state governments "gave them the least for their money" and a notable increase in the percentage of survey respondents saying that state governments "need more power."

( ) The Supreme Court is limiting state power, even under federalist justices. John Dinan, Executive director of the National Governors Association, 6-22-2008, Publius, “The state of
American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation,” rks, Lexis Nexis Academic. The Supreme Court had various opportunities in 2007-2008 to pass judgment on state and local acts in the face of claims that they ran afoul of the dormant commerce clause, preemption doctrine, and due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a number of cases, the Court sustained the state and local acts. However, on some notable occasions, including in four preemption cases and a case concerning school integration plans, the Court limited state and local discretion, and in the process provoked sharp complaints from dissenters--most notably Justices Stevens and Ginsburg--about the majority's lack of respect for state sovereignty and authority. In fact, in a development that might seem surprising in light of his votes in constitutional federalism cases but is predictable in light of his votes in recent preemption cases (Staab 2006, 243), Justice Stevens in 2007-2008 was the most willing of any Justice to offer extended defenses of state sovereignty and authority in his opinions.

( ) Non-Unique: The Supreme Court ruled against the states in many key cases John Dinan, Executive director of the National Governors Association, 6-22-2008, Publius, “The state of
American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation,” rks, Lexis Nexis Academic. The Court also ruled against state authority in three key preemption cases decided in early 2008, and by significant margins in each instance. In Riegel v. Medtronic, No. 06-179 (2008), in a ruling from which Justice Ginsburg alone dissented, on the grounds that it amounted to a "constriction of state authority" and "a radical curtailment of state common-law suits seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed or labeled medical devices," the Court held that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) preempted state common-law challenges to medical devices that had been given premarket approval by the Food and Drug Administration. Then, in Preston v. Ferrer, No. 06-1463 (2008), with Justice Thomas issuing a lone dissent, the Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California's Talent Agencies Act to the extent that it called for legal questions arising from a contract dispute to be initially referred to an administrative agency rather than an arbitrator, as specified in the federal law. Finally, in Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn., No. 06-457 (2008), with Justice Ginsburg concurring and Justice Scalia concurring in part, the Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 preempted a Maine law imposing various requirements on the transportation of tobacco products with an eye to reducing youth smoking. The Court reasoned: "to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar, state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations."

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No Federalism – General
( ) Congress is nearly tyrannical in its use of the commerce clause – there’s no check on what they can do Sarah J. Farley, JD Seton Hall, Spring 2006, “Gonzalez v. Raich,” 2 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 621, p ln
At first it seems that the ability to prosecute such child sex offenders is a natural offshoot of the ability to prosecute child pornographers because both involve the serious issue of child exploitation, but in reality there is a huge leap from one to the other. Mainly, intrastate child pornography occurs in the United States, while obviously, the foreign child sex trade occurs outside the United States. If Congress were given the power to prosecute crimes that occur wholly outside its own borders, there could be no natural stopping point for any crimes, even if they are wholly intrastate or wholly foreign activities. Because Congress has been given so much leeway to legislate via the Commerce Clause, there are valid and reasonable fears that Congress is becoming the tyrant the Founders feared when they carefully drafted the Constitution. Based on the Supreme Court's newest decision there really is no limit on Congress's ability to legislate under the Commerce Clause, because as defined, an economic activity is one that involves "the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." 270 There can hardly be imagined a more broadly construed definition and there is hardly any product or activity that does not have something to do with producing, distributing, or consuming a commodity. Without the valuable check provided by the Judiciary, Congress will continue to expand its jurisdiction over areas that are traditionally and constitutionally reserved for the states. Unfortunately for the Judiciary and defendants, the Raich decision reiterated the belief that as-applied challenges to Commerce Clause statutes cannot be entertained, leaving the courts only facial challenges, which are "the most difficult challenge sk to mount successfully." 271 With only this one particularly difficult challenge to statutes, presumably the courts are going to be more hesitant to strike down whole statutes and will defer more to the will of Congress, leaving Congress to stretch and manipulate the reach of the Commerce Clause unchecked.

( ) Bush and the conservative court have abandoned federalism – laundry list David Boaz, executive vice president of the Cato Institute and author of Libertarianism: A Primer, “No Federalism on the Right,” May 19, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,156260,00.html
Federalism has always been a key element of American conservatism. In his 1960 manifesto, The Conscience of a Conservative, Barry Goldwater called for the federal government to "withdraw promptly and totally from every jurisdiction which the Constitution reserves to the states." Ronald Reagan ran for president promising to send 25 percent of federal taxes and spending back to the states. As Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, Newt Gingrich stressed that "we are committed to getting power back to the states." Lately, though, conservatives -- at last in control of both the White House and both houses of Congress -- have forgotten their longstanding commitment to reduce federal power and intrusiveness and return many governmental functions to the states. Instead, they have taken to using their newfound power to impose their own ideas on the whole country. Conservatives once opposed the creation of a federal Education Department. Congressional Republicans warned, "Decisions which are now made in the local school or school district will slowly but surely be transferred to Washington…. The Department of Education will end up being the Nation's super schoolboard. That is something we can all do without.'' But President Bush's No Child Left Behind Act

establishes national education testing standards and makes every local school district accountable to federal bureaucrats in Washington. President Bush and conservative Republicans have been trying to restrain lawsuit abuse by
allowing class-action suits to be moved from state to federal courts. The 2002 election law imposed national standards on the states in such areas as registration and provisional balloting. A 2004 law established federal standards for state-issued driver's licenses and personal identification cards. President Bush's "Project Safe Neighborhoods" transfers the prosecution of gun crimes from states to the federal government. The administration is trying to persuade federal courts to block implementation of state initiatives on medical marijuana in California and assisted suicide in Oregon. Perhaps most notoriously, President Bush and conservatives are pushing for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage in all 50 states. They talk about runaway judges and democratic decision-making, but their amendment would forbid the people of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, California or any other state from deciding to allow same-sex marriage. Marriage law has always been a matter for the states. We should not impose one uniform marriage law on what conservatives used to call "the sovereign states." Most recently, we have the specter of the Republican Congress seeking to override six Florida court decisions in the tragic case of Terri Schiavo, intruding the federal government into yet another place it doesn't belong. Asked on Fox News about the oddity of conservatives seeking to over-ride states' rights, Weekly Standard editor Fred Barnes responded: "Please! States' rights? Look, this is a moral issue."

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AT: Slippery Slope Links
( ) No risk of encroachment that’s substantial enough to alter federalism Ernest Young, Law Prof @ Texas, May 2003, Texas Law Review, ln
One of the privileges of being a junior faculty member is that senior colleagues often feel obligated to read one's rough drafts. On many occasions when I have written about federalism - from a stance considerably more sympathetic to the States than Judge Noonan's - my colleagues have responded with the following comment: "Relax. The States retain vast reserves of autonomy and authority over any number of important areas. It will be a long time, if ever, before the national government can expand its authority far enough to really endanger the federal balance. Don't make it sound like you think the sky is falling."

( ) Courts will check any snowball Robert F. Nagel, Law Professor, University of Colorado, March 2001, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 53 In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system, the Supreme Court has recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the national government. Some of these decisions, which set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish areas that are subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of state governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state governments to suit in either state or federal courts and to "commandeer" state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these decisions seem to reflect a judgment held by a slight majority of the justices that the dramatic expansion of the national government during the twentieth century has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional structure.

( ) Congress checks a destruction of federalism Justice Breyer, 5-15-2000, “United States v. Morrison et al.,” Dissenting Opinion,
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=99-5 The majority, aware of these difficulties, is nonetheless concerned with what it sees as an important contrary
consideration. To determine the lawfulness of statutes simply by asking whether Congress could reasonably have found that aggregated local instances significantly affect interstate commerce will allow Congress to regulate almost anything. Virtually all local activity, when instances are aggregated, can have "substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption." Hence Congress could "regulate any crime," and perhaps "marriage, divorce, and childrearing" as well, obliterating the "Constitution's distinction between national and local authority." Ante, at 15; Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558; cf. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 548 (1935) (need for distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects lest there "be virtually no limit to the federal power"); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 276 (1918) (similar observation). This consideration, however, while serious, does not reflect a jurisprudential defect, so much as it reflects a practical reality. We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State--at least when considered in the aggregate. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U. S., at 251. And that fact makes it close to impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter categories that would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary Commerce Clause "aggregation" rules without, at the same time, depriving Congress of the power to regulate activities that have a genuine and important effect upon interstate commerce. Since judges cannot change the world, the "defect" means that, within the bounds of the rational, Congress,

not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985); ante, at 19-24 (Souter, J., dissenting); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. , (2000) (slip op., at 2) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Framers designed important structural safeguards to ensure that, when Congress legislates, "the normal operation of the legislative process itself would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement"); see also Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000) (focusing on role of political process and political parties in protecting state interests). Congress is institutionally

motivated to do so. Its Members represent state and local district interests. They consider the views of state and local officials when they legislate, and they have even developed formal procedures to ensure that such consideration takes place. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U. S. C.). Moreover, Congress often can better reflect state concerns for autonomy in the details of sophisticated statutory schemes than can the judiciary, which
cannot easily gather the relevant facts and which must apply more general legal rules and categories. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §7543(b) (Clean Air Act); 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq. (Clean Water Act); see also New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 167-168 (1992) (collecting other examples of "cooperative federalism"). Not surprisingly, the bulk of American law is still state law, and

overwhelmingly so.

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AT: Energy Policy Links
( ) The feds can regulate greenhouse emissions because of the commerce clause – the plan doesn’t hurt federalism Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008, “Climate
Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal, http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1 The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal and state governments to share power in certain areas, while each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regulate. The power of the
federal government is constrained by the Constitution and does not include general police powers, which are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power. When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions generally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions. Commerce Clause The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce, invalidating the state law by negative implication.49 Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it altogether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court, state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied preemption by federal law.

( ) Federal control over renewables is justified – it’s a national issue, climate change requires coordination, and emissions are international Robert W. Eberhardt, JD NYU, 2006, “Federalism and the Siting of Offshore Wind Energy Facilities,” 14
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, ln
The potential environmental benefits associated with climate change mitigation raise somewhat distinct questions about the theoretical justifications for state environmental regulation

because greenhouse gases disperse evenly in the atmosphere and climate change stands to affect local environments in locations across the country, climate change clearly is an environmental concern of national dimensions. Emissions reductions resulting from the development of a facility have the potential to generate positive horizontal spillovers, and thus a state-based siting regime could lead to the construction of fewer facilities than justified by efficiency criteria. n145 This could justify national regulations with a preemptive effect over restrictive state siting standards. Second, the sheer scale of the mitigation effort required
of offshore wind energy facilities. First, to stabilize ambient greenhouse gas concentrations requires the implementation of multiple mitigation measures at a large scale. This sets up a classic prisoner's dilemma among the states, and the resulting coordination problem provides a theoretical justification for national regulation. One offshore wind energy facility (even if it completely displaced electricity generated by an inefficient conventional coal-fired power plant) would result in emissions reductions dwarfed by total regional emissions and the scale of reductions required to stabilize ambient concentrations. n146 As a result, an effective climate change strategy likely would require the [*408] development of multiple facilities under the regulation of multiple states and, without assurances that other states will follow suit, a state may rationally conclude that climate change mitigation benefits do not justify the acceptance of scenic or aesthetic impacts or other environmental costs. Furthermore, coordination problems are intensified by the fact that offshore wind energy is only one of many potential climate change mitigation measures, and an effective climate change strategy undoubtedly will require other measures in other sectors and in other states lacking offshore wind resources. n147 General inattention or hostility by other states to climate change mitigation could offset any reductions resulting even from the large-scale development of offshore wind energy

The need to coordinate activities among states, and to prevent states from making collectively irrational regulatory decisions, provides a theoretical justification for federal regulation addressing climate change mitigation measures that would have a preemptive effect over more restrictive state siting criteria. n149 Third, climate change is a problem of international dimensions; emissions from all sources contribute to climate change, and climate change stands to affect local environmental conditions across the globe. In the U.S. federal system, the national government, through the Senate's power to ratify treaties and the President's inherent powers over foreign affairs, has the power to negotiate and enter into agreements with co-equal sovereign governments to address issues of international dimensions. n150 Given the national government's role in international affairs, federal regulation of climate change mitigation measures may be theoretically justified by the potential for state actions to affect the ability of the national government [*409] to meet treaty obligations or secure commitments from other countries favorable to the nation as a whole. n151 Depending on the relative positions on climate change taken by the state and national governments, preemptive effects prohibiting more restrictive or more permissive state regulation may be justified.
facilities, further intensifying coordination problems. n148

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Federalism Is Not Modeled
( ) American federalism isn’t modeled – multinational states prove Alfred Stepan, Professor of Government at Oxford and Columbia, 1999, Journal of Democracy 10.4, 19-34,
“Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” muse
In seeking to understand why some countries are reluctant to adopt federal systems, it is helpful to examine what political science has had [End Page 20] to say about federalism. Unfortunately, some of the most influential works in political science today offer

incomplete or insufficiently broad definitions of federalism and thereby suggest that the range of choices facing newly democratizing states is narrower than it actually is. In large part, this stems from their focusing too exclusively on the model offered by the United States, the oldest and certainly one of the most
successful federal democracies. One of the most influential political scientists to write about federalism in the last half-century, the late William H. Riker, stresses three factors present in the U.S. form of federalism that he claims to be true for federalism in general. 1 First, Riker assumes that every longstanding federation, democratic or not, is the result of a bargain whereby previously sovereign polities agree to give up part of their sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective security and to achieve other goals, including economic ones. I call this type of federalism coming-together federalism. For Riker, it is the only type of federalism in the world. Second, Riker and many other U.S. scholars assume that one of the goals of federalism is to protect individual rights against encroachments on the part of the central government (or even against the "tyranny of the majority") by a number of institutional devices, such as a bicameral legislature in which one house is elected on the basis of population, while in the other house the subunits are represented equally. In addition, many competences are permanently granted to the subunits instead of to the center. If we can call all of the citizens in the polity taken as a whole the demos, we may say that these devices, although democratic, are "demosconstraining." Third, as a result of the federal bargain that created the United States, each of the states was accorded the same constitutional competences. U.S. federalism is thus considered to be constitutionally symmetrical.

By contrast, asymmetrical arrangements that grant different competencies and group-specific rights to some states, which are not now part of the U.S. model of federalism, are seen as incompatible with the principled
equality of the states and with equality of citizens' rights in the post-segregation era. Yet although these three points are a reasonably accurate depiction of the political structures and normative values associated with U.S. federalism, most democratic countries that have adopted federal systems have chosen not to follow the U.S. model. Indeed, American-

style federalism embodies some values that would be very inappropriate for [End Page 21] many democratizing countries, especially multinational polities. To explain what I mean by this, let me review each of these three points in turn.

( ) Emerging democracies of the past 20 years prove the US federalist model no longer holds sway – this evidence is the most historically factual and should be preferred. Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Newsweek, 1/31/05. “Dream On, America.”
Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations--free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations write a

new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model.
When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted

for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as
their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'." Much in American law and society troubles the world these days.

Nearly all countries reject the United States' right to bear arms as a quirky and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and demand broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign systems reach a
reasonable level of affluence, they follow the Europeans in treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law School, contributes to the growing sense that American law, once the world

standard, has become "provincial." The United States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist suspects, to ratify global human-rights treaties such as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the International Criminal Court (coupled with the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that America's Constitution and legal system are out of step with the rest of the world.

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Federalism Bad Impact – Ethnic Conflict
A. Federalism sparks ethnic conflict Willy Mutunga, Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, The Nation, May 20, 2001.
Federalism promotes localism, ethnic and racial xenophobia and undermines the sense of nationhood. Unsurprising the United States and Nigeria are living survivors of debilitating separatist wars between their regions; India, despite its federal miracle still bleeds from secessionist movements. The introduction of ethnic-based 'quasi-regionalism' in post-Mengistu Ethiopia has fuelled the conflict over the proposed Oromia state by members of the Oromo ethnic population. Majimboism in the early 1960s had let off the lid of secessionist movements, particularly by Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province and the clamour for an autonomous "Mwambao" on the Coast. There is no guarantee that this time around, majimboism will not trigger ethnic recidivism and separatist movements, especially in North Eastern, Coast and Eastern province where the Oromo population may lean towards the movement for an Oromia state. Federalism's main weakness is that it is a very expensive system that duplicates services and office holders at the regional and federal levels. It lacks uniform policies on such issues of national concern as laws regulating marriages, divorce, abortions, liquor, voting rights and public education. Rather than ensuring economic equity, as many proponents of majimboism assume, it sets those regions, states or cantons with a weak market-base, capital, and resources down the spiral of economic decline. It subjects local governments to double subordination-by the central and regional governments-and the citizens to triple taxation. At a time when the country's economy is on its knees, the feasibility of a well-financed transition is highly doubtful.

B. This risk of ethnic conflict outweighs. 1. Risk World Policy Journal March 22, 1999
"The defining mode of conflict in the era ahead," Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan declared in 1993, "is ethnic conflict. It promises to be savage. Get ready for 50 new countries in the world in the next 50 years. Most of them will be born in bloodshed."Moynihan's apocalyptic vision is not untypical of the prevailing wisdom. History, it seems to many, has exacted its own revenge on what Francis Fukuyama so rashly suggested was the posthistorical world, in the form of conflicts sparked and sustained by ancient and incomprehensible hatreds and bloodlusts. To many analysts, class conflict is passe; the "proxy wars" of the Cold War era can, by definition, no longer occur; and even realpolitik, with rational states pursuing their clearly defined interests, seems dated. Ethnicity, it seems, is the new, dominant causality.

2. Magnitude Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1993
It is federalism and confederation that we should be pushing -- not ethnic independence. We should be tentatively exploring whether some type of Yugoslav confederation is a solution that would make it easier for different ethnic groups to live together in the new states. The problems we see in Bosnia are nothing compared to the bloodshed -- and the danger of fascists coming into control of nuclear weapons -- that would occur if huge multiethnic countries like India, Pakistan and Indonesia start disintegrating.

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Federalism Bad Impact – Secession
A. Federalism leads to secessionist fragmentation Michael Kelly, Director of Legal Research, Writing & Advocacy at Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, 1999, Drake Law Review
However, as political sovereign entities, federations are inherently susceptible to fragmentation. Indeed, the fault lines along which a potential break can occur are usually already in place-fixed politically, historically, or both. This flows partially from the inherent internal inequality of their collective constituent parts. In the international legal system, individual nation-states are formally accorded equal legal status vis-avis each other. The reality, however, is that nation-states are clearly unequal in both power and ability. Likewise, federations generally accord equal legal status among their constituent parts, be they states, provinces, regions, or oblasts. And just as in the international system, the reality is that those constituent parts are often unequal in terms of development, population, and economic power. For example, just as France and Fiji share equal legal status on the international plane but are vastly unequal in reality, California and Rhode Island enjoy equal legal status under the United States Constitution, but are [*242] unequal in reality. The same comparisons can be made between many internal regions of almost any federation: Nizhniy-Novgorod and Yakutia in Russia, Uttar Pradesh and Manipur in India, Amazonia and Rio in Brazil, or Ontario and Prince Edward Island in Canada. Consequently, inequality is a fundamental feature in almost any federation, whether or not it breeds secessionist ideas on its own. Just as devolution has been seized upon by nation-states, federal or otherwise, as a way to address the self-deterministic aspirations of communities within their borders, so too has federalism been attempted by non-federal nation-states as a self- preservationist move toward the middle ground between separatists and advocates of stronger centralized government. The examples, however, of Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zaire (now Congo), Nigeria, Kenya, and the Cameroons bear out the conclusion that these efforts, at least in post-colonial Africa, have generally failed, except for the notable recent example of South Africa under its new constitution. Consequently, while federated systems of government can work in multi-ethnic states, with the appropriate degree of top-down devolution of administration and self-government, it seems that they cannot be universally extrapolated to work in every instance. A. Recent Federated Break-ups Nonetheless, when inherent inequality is added to other, seemingly dormant, fragmentary ingredients such as historical, ethnic, religious, customary, or linguistic differences, a divisive stew can come to brew in which one of the potatoes may try to jump out of the pot. Indeed, the recent federated crack-ups of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia demonstrate that the pot itself may burst, allowing all of the elements previously held together to spill forth and go their separate ways. While this Article does not address the political, theoretical, economic, or social failures of the communist philosophy that was applied to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it does take note of the fact that these were all federal systems, at least on paper, that spun apart into separate, smaller, more ethnically homogenous nation-states after the fall of communism in Europe. Table 3 delineates some previously federated nation-states that have broken down into smaller successor states during this decade.

B. Unbridled secession leads to global war and WMD use Gidon Gottlieb, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy University of Chicago Law School, 1993, Nation Against State, p. 26-27
Self-determination unleashed and unchecked by balancing principles constitutes a menace to the society of states. There is simply no way in which all the hundreds of peoples who aspire to sovereign independence can be granted a state of their own without loosening fearful anarchy and disorder on a planetary scale. The proliferation of territorial entities poses exponentially greater problems for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and multiplies situations in which external intervention could threaten the peace. It increases problems for the management of all global issues, including terrorism, AIDS, the environment, and population growth. It creates conditions in which domestic strife in remote territories can drag powerful neighbors into local hostilities, creating ever widening circles of conflict. Events in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union drove this point home. Like Russian dolls, ever smaller ethnic groups dwelling in larger units emerged to secede and to demand independence. Georgia, for example, has to contend with the claims of South Ossetians and Abkhazians for independence, just as the Russian Federation is confronted with the separatism of Tartaristan. An international system made up of several hundred independent territorial states cannot be the basis for global security and prosperity.

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Federalism Bad Impact – Economy
Federalism hurts economic stability. Sudarshan Gooptu, Economist with the Debt and International Finance Division in the International Economics Department of the World Bank. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local
Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf International experience since the early 1980s, especially in Latin America, suggests that without appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms, decentralization can encourage dangerous opportunistic behavior by state and local authorities. If left unchecked, such opportunism could undermine macroeconomic stability. The most vivid manifestation of this phenomenon is the softening of subnational budget constraints (Rodden 2000a; World Bank 2002). Avoiding this risk depends on the ability of the central government to prevent subnational authorities from passing their liabilities to higher-level governments.12 This, in turn, requires institutional mechanisms to discipline borrowing by state and local governments.

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No Russian Federalism
( ) Russian federalism is already weak – total lack of federal control Gregory Shvedov, director of media in Kavkaz, 6-19-2008, “Hearing,” FNS, ln
The first thing I want to touch base would be the lack of federal control. We saw this map on the screen, when we observed the video which was made by Memorial, and it was good to recognize that the Northern Caucasus is a small part of the south of Russia. But it was also good to recognize to what extent this is a part of Russia. Unfortunately, during the last year is we do see that it is less and less a region which is under the control of federal authorities. What do I mean by this? I don't mean that the separatist movement is really developed very much in the regions of the Northern Caucasus. Not this is the main point. The main point is that the level of control, the level of federalism in Russia in general is really very weak. And especially in the Northern Caucasus, we can hardly see that. These regions are part of a bigger Russia.

Russia isn’t federalist now – extensive central power proves. Alexander N. Domrin, former Chief Specialist of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Spring, 2006. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 515.
“Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia.” Adopted in December 1993 in the aftermath of a violent, bloody confrontation between the Russian Federal Parliament and the President (occurring in September and October 1993; with Yeltsin's troops killing hundreds of protesters and defenders of the Parliament and the Constitution), 32 the new Constitution of Russia created an "imperial presidency" (or "superpresidential") form of government in the country. As to the federal model, the Constitution essentially introduced a centralized [*523] federation with elements of a unitary system. Unlike in the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 33 the units themselves are formally defined as "subjects" rather than "constituent units" of the Russian Federation. 34 Article 71 of the 1993 Constitution defines the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. 35 The area is extremely broad. It would be fair to say that most of contemporary Russian law is federal law. It includes the main Russian codes of legislation: the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Code of Arbitration Procedure; as well as almost all commercial law. 36 The areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction also include control over federal property, the federal budget, federal taxes, transport, communications, power generation, currency, the treasury, financial institutions, postal service, armed forces, defense and security, foreign policy, and foreign economic relations.

Russia is following a highly centralized path now. Alexander N. Domrin, former Chief Specialist of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Spring, 2006. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 515.
“Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia.” On December 8, 2004, the Federation Council (by a vote of 145-1, with two abstentions) approved new legislation that eliminates direct gubernatorial elections across the country. Three days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the bill into law. The newly adopted Federal Law No. 159-FZ on Amendments to the Federal Law on the General Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Organs of State Power in the Subjects of the Russian Federation and the Federal Law on the Main Guarantees of Electoral Rights and a Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation 114 legislatively confirmed the practice of the de facto appointment of heads of Russia's regions. The Law No. 159-FZ became another significant step in the series of measures aimed at reforming the Russian federal structure. Vladimir Putin announced the new principles for forming regional authorities on September 13, 2004, after the tragic events in Beslan. 115 The proposal to nominate heads of Russia's regions by the RF President, instead of electing them by direct vote, was voiced along with other initiatives that were supposed to mobilize the society, strengthen the Russian nation, improve administration of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and make them capable of responding appropriately to modern threats and challenges. These moves toward the greater centralization of power are seen by the Russian federal government, its political elite, and the general public as necessary to keep the country unified. 116

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Russia Doesn’t Model US Federalism
Russia won’t model American federalism, if they’re federalist at all it’ll be Russian style. Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council Apparatus. Kazan Federalist, 2003. Number 4 (8). “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.”
http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/ The current state of federal relations in Russia requires practical steps aimed at its fundamental modernization. However, we should not forget that Russian federalism is a national product. It will not and should not look like the American or German models. Understanding of the foreign experience is important only to produce an essentially new model of federal relations at the next stage of selfdevelopment, which the researchers will later call “the Russian model of federalism.”

Russia models Britain federalism not American federalism. Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council Apparatus. Kazan Federalist, 2003. Number 4 (8). “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.”
http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/ If we can find the optimal variant of territorial power organization for Russia in the vast foreign experience, it would probably be the devolution processes that are on the way in Great Britain, Spain and a number of other states. This experience is much closer to Russia than the experience of federal state in Germany or America. Devolution is also not a panacea but a way or a method to solve state building problems.

Russia’s model accords different powers to different states making it incompatible with the US model. Alexander N. Domrin, former Chief Specialist of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Spring, 2006. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 515.
“Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia.” Unlike in the United States and some other federations of the world whose states, provinces, or lands enjoy equal political status, subjects of the Russian Federation have varying statuses. Even though the Constitution proclaims that federal units have equal rights and responsibilities and "enjoy full state power outside the limits of jurisdiction" of the Federation or the spheres of "joint competence," 4 in practical terms, some subjects enjoy "full state power" more than others. In this respect, it is fair to say that some component units of the Russian Federation (always those with a relatively significant percentage of ethnic minorities in their population) are more "equal" than others.

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Russian Federalism Bad – Civil War
A. Russian devolution will lead to secession and civil war Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs Jan 1999
Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate nonRussians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.

B. Russian civil war leads to nuclear war with the US Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs Jan 1999
Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

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Russian Federalism Bad – Economy
Centralization is crucial to Russian economic growth and preventing corruption Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer, MIT Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic
Research and Harvard University, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research. “Federalism with and without political centralization. China versus Russia,” Working Paper No. 00-15; Harvard Institute of Economics Research Paper No. 1889 Feb 2000. Over the last decade, China's GDP has grown at one of the highest rates in the world, Russia's at one of the lowest. The di®erence has come mostly from the growth of the new private sector. In China, the new private sector has thrived. In Russia, it has stagnated. Why this sharp divergence between private sector evolutions? In both countries, the evidence points to the importance of the behavior of local governments. In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new ?rms (Oi [1992], Qian and Weingast [1997].) In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption (Shleifer [1997], Johnson et al. [1997], McKinsey [1999], and EBRD [1999].)1 There are two main hypotheses for the attitudes of local governments in Russia: The ?rst, call it \capture", is that local governments have been captured by the initial rent holders, primarily by the old ?rms which dominated the Russian economy before the transition. In that view, local governments have worked both to generate transfers to these ?rms, and to protect them from competition by new ?rms. In this ?rst view, their hostile attitude vis a vis the new private sector has been deliberate. The second view, call it \competition for rents", is that the behavior of local governments has been instead the unintended result of administrative disorganization. Too many agencies have tried to extract rents from new private firms, making it unprofitable to create or run a private business, at least legally.2 These two lines of explanation are plausible, and not mutually exclusive. But they raise the obvious question of why things have been di®erent in China. Here again, there are two main hypotheses: The ?rst is that the initial rent holders were weaker in China than in Russia. China started its transition from a very low level of economic de- velopment. Its agriculture did not rely on large collective farms, and its industry had relatively few large entreprises. Russia, in contrast, started its transition as a fully industrialized economy, dominated by large state ?rms and collective farms. According to this view, the potential for capture was simply more limited in China than in Russia. The second points to the strength of the central government in China. Transition in China has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both to reward or to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rents (Huang [1998]). By contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a fledgling democracy. The central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth (Shleifer and Treisman [1999], Treisman [2000]). As a result, local governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents. The aim of this paper is to explore this last argument, and more gen- erally to explore the role of federalism in transition. The question is an important one: Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism could play a central role in development (see in particular Qian and Weingast [1997], Roland [2000].) Indeed, a new term, \market preserving federalism" has been coined to emphasize the bene?ts of decentralization for Chinese growth. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredi- ent is crucial, namely political centralization. In doing so, we echo a theme ?rst developed by Riker [1964]: For federalism to function and to endure, it must come with political centralization.

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83 States/Fism Core

No Indonesian Federalism
Indonesian decentralization is failing now – health care. Samuel S. Lieberman, Staff Associate at the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council. Joseph J. Capuno, Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics. AND, Hoang Van Minh, Vietnamese Doctor. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government
Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Indonesia has not clarified the health roles and responsibilities of central and lower governments after three years of decentralization. Nor has the country moved to emphasize core public health functions, or seen marked improvements in specific areas such as infectious disease control, pharmaceuticals, and human resources. Sectors besides health also have indeterminate policies, prompting advice to clarify assignments across levels of government and sectors (World Bank 2003a).

Federalism won’t happen in Indonesia – historical legacy. Anthony Smith, lecturer in international relations, Faculty of International Studies, International Pacific College, 9/1/2001. New Zealand International Review.
Aside from these specific cases of regional turmoil, the centre-province relationship has changed since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. The provinces have universally demanded some degree of power sharing after the demise of the very dominant centre that characterised the New Order Regime of Suharto. The provinces and districts now elect their own leaders, and are no longer subject to Jakarta's interference. To undercut antiJakarta sentiment it has been a political imperative to consider autonomy. Indonesia's situation would, on the face of it, lend itself to federalism, but there are some powerful barriers to the adoption of such arrangements. Indonesia was briefly a federal polity after the Dutch left Indonesia in 1949. In less than a year, however, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was abandoned. It was seen as a colonial legacy, one designed to weaken the fledgling state.

The colonial legacy hampers any chance of Indonesian federalism. Andrew MacIntyre, Professor at Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, March 7 2000.“Does Indonesia Have to Blow Apart.” http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/speeches/spmacintyreDRT030700.html
So there are all sorts of questions being asked. Anybody looking at Indonesia from the outside would quickly say, "What this country clearly needs is a good dose of federalism." And yet federalism is a curiously dirty word in Indonesia. Which goes back to historical reasons, the way in which the Dutch meddled in Indonesia and tried to foist a federal system on them that was clearly designed to fail. There are very bad memories of federalism. It's a word that's not legitimate in public debate.

There is no move towards Indonesian federalism now. Samantha F. Ravich, fellow in the Asian Studies Program at CSIS. Summer 2000. The Washington Quarterly.
“Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh.” The proposed solutions intended to co-opt the four constituencies of Aceh may only prove a short-term fix if a systemic change to the relationship between the center and the provinces does not occur. One possible option that should be considered is a federalist system. It is unfortunate that the word "federalism" is a loaded term in Indonesia. It is reminiscent of the offer made to Indonesia by the Dutch in the late 1940s as a weak substitute for independence. Despite this historical resonance, the idea is once again being debated in Indonesia. At the moment, most members of the policymaking community are against it. They argue that an archipelagic country is not conducive to a federalist system; that the nation-building process must be completed before the conceptualization of the nation is substantively changed; that the threat of disintegration rises with a weak central government (the result, they believe, of a federalist system); and that national security will be compromised because the armed forces will not have the flexibility to contain sea-based infiltration.

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84 States/Fism Core

Indonesian Federalism Bad – Indonesian Economy
( ) Federalism in Indonesia undermines growth across the board. Jose Edgardo Campos, Senior Strategy Advisor for Public Sector Reforms, Department of Budget and Management, the Philippines. AND, Joel S. Hellman, Political Counsellor at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local
Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Not surprisingly, in neither country has decentralization fulfilled the governance goals predicted by the most optimistic theories. In Indonesia, which is still in the early stages of its reform, the initial impact on perceptions of governance and selected outcomes has not been positive. There is a widely held view that decentralization has exacerbated corruption and significantly increased policy uncertainty across different levels of government. Decentralization has also led to a greater regulatory burden on firms and questionable financial management practices. These problems have contributed to a general weakening of the investment climate, which has harmed Indonesia’s growth prospects. In the Philippines, which has a longer record of decentralization, the picture is more mixed. Overall, perceptions of corruption have declined, and service delivery standards have improved somewhat. However, the link between these outcomes and improvements in the accountability of local politicians is weak.

( ) Indonesian federalism creates a fiscal nightmare and capital flight. George E. Peterson, Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute and former Professor at Harvard University. AND, Elisa Muzzini, of the World Bank. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local
Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia have opted for political decentralization, with local authorities formally recognized as autonomous bodies. Inherent in their powers is setting priorities for local budgets, including capital budgets. Concern has arisen in both countries as to whether this type of decentralization can sustain capital investment and maintenance. In particular, the transfer of large numbers of central government employees— subject to wage protection—to local rolls, and the legal and political difficulties of raising local revenues, subject subnational governments to budget pressures. In the face of such pressures, local governments are thought more likely to maintain employment levels rather than adjust their budgets to sustain investment. Within capital programs, spending on maintenance and repair is believed to be particularly vulnerable. Displacement of local investment has potentially serious consequences. The World Bank has estimated that, in Indonesia for example, some 60 percent of total development expenditures are now a local responsibility (World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2003; World Bank 2003b, 2003c).

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85 States/Fism Core

Indonesian Federalism Bad – Secessionism
( ) Indonesia federalism sparks separatism and causes state dissolution. Manila Standard, 7/28/05. “FEDERALISM NO PANACEA.”
As in Japan, a federal union of semi-independent states in Indonesia would have encouraged separatism, as indeed the weakening of the central government after the fall of Suharto has encouraged separatist movements in Aceh, Manado and elsewhere. (Largely Catholic East Timor separated from predominantly Muslim Indonesia during Suharto's watch, with the active encouragement of the western [i.e. nominally Christian] media.) Federalism is more suitable for countries with large, contiguous land masses - such as Russia, Canada, the US, Brazil, Australia, India, Mexico and Germany - where centrifugal forces have less appeal. Yet even among these examples, there are separatist movements in Canada, Russia and India. Archipelagic countries (Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines) are better off with unitary states. The recent threat of certain Filipino mayors and governors, to secede from the Republic if President Arroyo is forcibly removed from power, may be dismissed as harmless political noise, but they may be aberrations of our personalistic culture, in the absence of a nationalistic one. In which case, federalism will just lead to the break-up of the Republic on the whim of regional political bosses.

( ) Federalism in Indonesia stokes secessionist tendencies. Catharin E. Dalpino, fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. September 2001. Brookings
Institution, Policy Brief #89. “Indonesia at the Crossroads.” http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb89.htm The greatest challenge to Indonesia's internal stability is the management of the numerous communal conflicts and secessionist movements in the provinces, which have erupted or become worse in the postSuharto era. Each is a unique situation, but all have been exacerbated by a lack of attention by the Indonesian government in recent years as political elites have struggled among themselves for power in a changing system. The 1999 law to decentralize government is beginning to take hold and could lay the groundwork for more equitable and amicable relations between Jakarta and the provinces in the long-term. But in the short-run, because central government controls have loosened while provincial controls are not yet established, decentralization may only be pouring fuel on the flames of these conflicts.

( ) Secession in Indonesia sparks secessionism throughout Asia. Catharin E. Dalpino, fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. September 2001. Brookings
Institution, Policy Brief #89. “Indonesia at the Crossroads.” http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb89.htm Once a critical 'domino' in the cold war Asian security arena, Indonesia has new significance in the post-cold war world as a model for other countries in the process of rapid political and social change. As a Muslimmajority country, Indonesia's democratic experiment offers lessons for other societies with significant Muslim populations that are emerging from authoritarian rule. As the most ethnically diverse country in Asia, Jakarta's ability (or failure) to accommodate communal differences while maintaining national unity will influence stability in its neighbors with sharp internal divisions. If the fundamentalist province of Aceh withdraws from Indonesia, it will embolden separatist groups in the Philippine province of Mindinao and leaders of Malaysia's Islamic Party, which is gaining strength at the local level. Indonesia's experience in establishing democratic civil-military relations could have some influence on the course of political development in Burma, where the military is hinting it may restart political dialogue with the civilian opposition. The junta in Rangoon has publicly drawn parallels between the Indonesian and Burmese systems.

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