The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company: Technical Intelligence in the Southwest and Western Pacific Areas, 1942-1945.

The outbreak of war in December 1941 found the United States Army generally unprepared, especially in the field of technical intelligence. Enemy equipment captured in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was, until 1942, only given brief examination by Ordnance or Chemical Warfare Service officers before forwarding to the Australian Army General Staff, Intelligence (10) for examination and testing. Training Circular No. 81, issued in November 1942, established proceedures for the evacuation of captured materiel, but responsibility for analysis remained with the Theater staff officers of the services and, to a large extent, with the Australian Army. The situation began to improve in late December 1942, when five Ordnance officers and ten enlisted personnel, all trained in technical intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., arrived at Headquarters, US Army Service of Supply (USASOS), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia. On 30 December, Major Alan C. Johnston, the ranking officer, was tasked to organize an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit for the Theater. The unit was to be under the control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USASOS, in accordance with policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (ACofS,G-2), USASOS. The original organization called for an Administrative Section, an Ordnance Analysis Section, and several Technical Intelligence Field Teams. The latter were designed to operate from an advance base or with a regular combat unit. The Field Teams usually consisted of one officer and one or more enlisted personnel, and had the mission of collecting enemy equipment and sending it back to the Ordnance Analysis Section for examination and evaluation. Assignments were flexible and personnel were often used interchangeably in the different sections. Responsibility for technical intelligence was turned over to the US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) in February 1943, and Major Johnston was appointed USAFFE Technical Intelligence Officer, under the direct control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Except for an enlisted assistant, all other Ordnance technical intelligence personnel were carried under the T/O's of the Ordnance Office, USASOS, and the various USASOS Base Sections. Until February 1943, Chemical Warfare Service staff officers made preliminary examinations of captured chemical equipment and munitions, but evacuation and technical analysis remained the responsibility of the Australian Army. With the formation of USAFFE in February, a Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed from locally available personnel. The Section originally consisted of two officers and one enlisted man, designated the Chemical Intelligence Section, USASOS, and three field teams of one officer and one enlisted each. On 27 May 1943, Headquarters USAFFE directed the Commanding General, USASOS, to establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment near

S5um*-av 13y OPT Roiesr A. NAra-O




the Australian depot at Base Section 3. Although the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Analysis Sections were still separate from
the salvage depot, its establishment was the first step toward a coordinated technical intelligence effort. Coordination for the analysis of equipment captured by US and Australian forces after it reached the joint salvage depot area was the responsibility of the newly established Joint Allied Captured Enemly Equipment Board. During this period both Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service field teams operated with

Allied forces in New Guinea. On 29 September 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferred from USAFFE to USASOS control. Headquarters USASOS began planning for the establishment of a Technical Intelligence Depot with sections from all services except Signal and Engineer. Before the plans could be implemented, a 22 December 1943 USAFFE directive, "Responsibility of Technical Intelligence," delegated the responsibility for ground technical intelligence to the CG, USASOS, and directed him to establish a Technical Intelligence Depot along slightly different lines. After study of the directive, the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, recommended the formation of a Technical Intelligence Composite Company utilizing personnel from all technical services except Transportation. The company would operate under defined T/0's and T/E's and would provide for greater centralization and flexibility of the technical intelligence effort. The recommendations were forwarded to the CG, USAFFE, on 7 December 1943, and were approved. General Orders No. 2, Headquarters USASOS, dated 3 January 1944, announced the organization of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), under the T/0's submitted in the 7 December recommendations. Personnel were to be carried on Detached Service from their source units, and each service section was to operate under the general supervision of the chief of the service concerned. The problem of provisional organization was that personnel detailed to the 5250th were still carried on the rosters of their source units, making promotion difficult. The formation of the 5250th as other than a provisional unit was unfavorably considered by USAFFE on 10 January. The ACofS, G-2, USASOS, directed the chiefs of all six services to furnish qualified personnel for the 5250th on 20 January 1944, and all transfers were made by February 1944. The 5250th was organized with a Coordination and Administration Section, and a Technical Section for each of the represented services. Each Technical Section was to be composed of a Laboratory Element and several Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams. However, on the Ordnance, Signal, and Quartermaster Sections operated analysis laboratories at this time. Chemical analysis was done at either the 42d Chemical or the Victoria Munitions Supply laboratories. Engineer and Medical Services did not have teams in the field until the hlollandia operation in April 1944. General supervision over the 5250th was furnished by the ACofS, G-2, USASOS. Major Johnston continued as Acting Commanding Officer, having
no orders appointing him to command as yet. Ile also served in the Office

of the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, as Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

The Combined Field Team was authorized but Sixth Army would not allow it forward of Finschhafen.31 August 1944) operations. although a three-man Ordnance Team did get to Saidor from January to March 1944. Manley. 24th Infantry Division. Letter. This was the first campaign in which members of more than one technical service's operations were coordinated and it proved that a larger area could be covered in less time using this method. 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company. and one officer and 14 enlisted personnel from the 234th Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company arrived at the Finschhafen Depot. Technical Intelligence Composite Unit #1 was formed between 13 and 23 April and consisted of nine officers and three enlisted men representing the six technical services. The first technical intelligence personnel landed on 6 March (D+6). Engineer Field Team #3.3. and a composite unit were to be formed for the operation. The combining of the Laboratory Analysis Sections and the Receiving-Shipping Section at both Finschhafen and at the tempory Composite Unit #1 field deport at Hollandia resulted in more efficient operations. Various Field Teams participated in the Biak Island (27 May 20 August 1944) and Sansapor (30 July . Separate (Provisional). was officially appointed as Commanding Officer. dated 25 March 1944. and as the Technical Intel- . the first Engineer Team to operate in the field. Separate Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Technical Intelligence Teams supported the 41st Infantry Division.-3- In December 1943.18 May 1944). On 25 August. CE. Major Eugene 11. In July. Planning began for the Hollandia operation. During July and August the various laboratory analysis sections moved from Brisbane to Finschhafen. while a combination of Chemical Warfare Service and Naval Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit Teams were attached to the CIC Team in support of the ACofS. joined the Composite Unit for a short time. For the Admiralty Islands operation (29 February . authorized the establishment of a US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen effective 20 April 1944. Sixth Army-a move which greatly enhanced the technical intelligence coordination effort. HQ USASOS.3. just prior to the organization of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. Four officers from the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie. which also included personnel from the Naval Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit. Both separate service and combined teams. dated 28 March 1944. then departed for operations on Biak Island. had been requested to ask Sixth Army to permit a Combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit (Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Services) to participate in the Cape Gloucester operation. Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Technical Intelligence Field Teams were attached to the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Teams supporting the 1st Cavalry Division. and Letter. The CIC officer was in charge of each of the combined teams. Unit #1 landed on 30 April (D+8) and went into operation. GSB 323. and became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator with Hteadquarters. 386. thus reducing the distance between collectors (field teams) and evaluators (laboratories). USAFFE. the G-2. one officer was placed on detached service from the 5250th. FEGB. Maryland. HQ USAFFE. G-2.

with Unit #3 again functioning as the forward provisional depot. was formed to collect data from Japanese equipment nameplates to satisfy a requirement from the Military Intelligence Division in Washington. The Officer-in-Charge of Unit #2 also served as the Technical Intelligence Coordinator to Sixth Army. 2. USASOS. In November. Field Units #1. In addition. Experience soon demonstrated that greater flexibility could be obtained by assigning units to corps. to collect and repair weapons and equipment for issue to Filipino guerrilla forces. Unit #1 returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen. After eight days of operations. Base K. G-2. where they functioned under the corps G-2 and technical service staff officers.Technical Intelligence Unit #1 (Ordnance. assumed coimnand of the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Section for thle forthcoming Phil ippine Islands operation. after the return of the Technical Intelligence Composite Units to Finschaffen. A special team. Unit #2 also returned to the Finschhafen Depot. . 24th Infantry Division. Plans for the Leyte phase envisioned three composite technical intelligence units . Signal and Engineer) with the 24th Infantry Division. By March. Personnel from Units #1-3 were used as nuclei for the formation of Units #4-7 for the Luzon Campaign. and 9 (the latter having been formed during the operation) remained on field duty with their combat units. Unit #3 landed on 21 October (D+l) and acted as a forward provisional depot for Units #1 and 2 until their return to Finschhafen. 6. G-2. In December. and from which they could be assigned to the areas of most need. emphasis was placed on preparations for the Philippine Islands operations. 8. Although technical intelligence units continued to support the island hopping operations. the 5250th consisted of 16 officers and 25 enlisted personnel from the War Department and 30 officers and 30 enlisted personnel from Theater technical service units. Initially. the former CO. Field Units #1-7 moved out to join their combat units for the Luzon operation. and landed with the second wave. a Technical Intelligence Composite Unit was attached to each division under supervision of the division G-2. Unit #2 (all six technical services) with the 1st Cavalry Division. By 31 August 1944. On 1 November.-4- ligence Coordinator to the ACofS. The limited quantities of captured medical and quartermaster equipment made it unnecessary to assign technical personnel from these branches any lower than corps level. Eighth Army for the remainder of the Leyte operation. Field Units #1-7 took part in the initial Luzon operations. 3. and 7 had been relieved of field duties and had returned to the Depot. at Tacloban. Field Units #4. One Ordnance technican was detailed to special duty with the Special Intelligence Section. first at San Jacinto and then at Angeles. Sixth Army. one unit was designated as Sixth Army Headquarters Unit. designated the JAPLAT Team. On 14 November. the Technical Intelligence Coordinator and a reorganized Unit #1 were attached to Headquarters. 5. Leyte. another reorganization of the 5250th took place. Major Johnston. and Unit #3 (all six technical services) with the Army Service Command and further detached to Headquarters. Unit #1 was attached with the CIC Team under the ACofS.

composed of Ordnance. Signal. departed Manila for Japan during late August and early September 1945. reassigned the 5250the to the direct control of GHQ. Most of the Victor teams had completed their missions by June 1945 and had returned to the Depot. Chemical. The "A" units. The type "B" field units would consist of four officers and eight enlisted. with nine field units attached to Sixth Army (36 officers and 60 enlisted). administrative. LTC Manley remained as the Comimanding Officer and LTC David S. GO #369 dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company. the new US Army Technical Intelligece Depot was established there on 26 March.-5- With the opening of the Luzon Campaign. once again reorganized. GO #337 established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a Theater overhead installation with an authorized strength of 90 officers and 261 enlisted personnel. At this time. Headquarters AFPAC tasked AFWESPAC and Sixth Army to provide 52 officers and 97 enlisted men divided into a "field depot". AFPAC. five "A" and five "B" units. and the move began on 12 March. steps were talen to close down the US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen and to move it. dated 10 May 1945. except for a rear-echelon force. The 5250th had 68 officers and 139 enlisted personnel in February. designated as Field Teams #51-55. The Field Depot Unit would consist of two officers and seven enlisted. and would include teams from all six technical services plus a JAPLAT team. directed that the the technical intelligence teams in its area of operations would come under the operational. After the capture of Manila. was split into various teams--referred to by the prefix Victor and a number--for mopping-up operations in the southern Philippines. the 5250th was augmented by the arrival of HHD. . and JAPLAT teams. to Manila when that city should be captured. and technical control of the respective technical service chiefs and would coordinate with the G-2 of the unit tho which they were attached. Planning was begun for Operations Olympic and Coronet--the invasion of Japan. Field Unit #1. and would include Ordnance. The 5250th was further strengthened with the arrival of 38 officers and 58 enlisted personnel. Operations at Finschhafen ceased 28 February 1945. 98th Quartermaster Battalion. but the 5250th was alerted to move the field units to Japan on 23 August. GHQ. with eight officers and 38 enlisted personnel. the "B" units. dated 20 and 30 November 1945. and JAPLAT teams. Engineer. The type "A" field units would consist of six officers and ten enlisted. The Field Units were assigned to the subordinate corps of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and the Field Depot Unit was attached to Sixth Army Headquarters. designated Field Depot Unit #71. Quartermaster. The original organization was modified slightly and the total strength of these units was 53 officers and 100 enlisted. AFPAC General Orders #337 and 369. and the depot. (Separate) Provisional. but by March had grown to 90 officers and 185 enlisted personnel with a total of 72 field teams. designated Field Teams #1-5. Japan's surrender put an end to the invasion planning. Headquarters Eighth Army Circular #138. and three field units attached to Eighth Army (16 officers and 27 enlisted). Tait became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

The WDIT decided what captured enemy equipment and which enemy installations would be exploited under the provisions of General Orders #9 and 15. GHQ. Upon arrival in Japan. G-2. the personnel departed Manila between 6 and 9 November. on the lessons learned from the 5250th. GHQ. The end of hostilities saw the beginning of the demise of the 5250th and of the decline of technical intelligence in the United States Army. which was headed by COL Walter S. and the unit closed in Tokyo on 20 November 1945. Technical intelligence organizations were revived during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and were based. LTC Tait became the head of the Technical Intelligence Section for WDIT operations.-6- The 5250th was also assigned responsibility for the United States Army Technical Intelligence Center. The Technical Intelligence Depot began to shut down operations in October. the 5250th personnel were assigned to Special Troops. Wood. SCAP. The 5250th examined a number of installations and a large amount of Japanese industrial and military equipment. SCAP. but technical intelligence remained almost dormant between actual hostilities--an extremely valuable but neglected field of intelligence. which had been established under the G-2. in large part. Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). 2 October and 9 November 1945. . GHQ. although they worked under the control of the ACofS. They worked through the War Department Technical Intelligence Targeting Section (WDIT).

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. Arny Tech Intcll Depot: Oct 44 -. . Japan 7 Deceiber 1945 . . . . ... . . . . .Fcb Chapter VII . . . . .. . . Cha'pter II . . . .. . * * *. .. . . . . . .. .. . . ... . . .. . ... . 5250th Tech Intoll Cornp Co. . . . . .Jan 44 . Biak to Yorotai: .. Japan: Oct -. . . . I tokyo. ... . . . Oct -Dec 44 . 86 . .. . Sop (r): Jt. . . . .Nov 45 VOLUME II Inclosurcs 1 .. . . . . . . . . I *. 12 ChnptcrIII . . . .. . .112 Southern Philippine Caapaign: Dec 44 -- Chapter IX . .. . .. . . . . :ay -. Chapter I . ........Oct 44 . . .100 ..hilippines: Chapter VI . . . . The 52b0th at. Chapter VIII ..Ilaila: Iar -. Operations on Luzon: Jan -- . Chapter V .. .. .. . . . .n -. . . .. . . . . ..* . . . .34 inclusive ATbY GSC gCo1101 - ITdN3:H. . . i Comtlanding . . . .. . ... . . . . . 54 63 67 Return to the . . . .. . . . . Tech Intoll By Ord and CVS: Dec 42 . . * *.. . 24 36 Hollandia: 4^pr -.. . . . . . . . . . . July 45 July 45 ... Tecmical Intelligence Center. . . . . . ...Sept 45 Chapter X. .525Oth TFmrI TLIGENCE COMPANY VOLUI7 Introduction . . .Jul 44 Chapter IV. . .May 44 * * .

Hong Kong. except their terrific effect. expected.p we came fne t½ fac.. 'Singapore. and we paid for underestimating his strength with a series of strategic withdravals to the south.Tith Japan by the bo:-:bing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Our Technical Intelligence vas practically non-existent -. Over three thousand miles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands lay between us and Tokyo. Borneo.le had a war on our hands ye t vwe were uncertain of the onemy's capabilities.'eaponsvwould the Japanese fight? Many of these questions in the early phases of the war were found the enemry much more potent than -most strategists had. :!e now kne1. -apire. but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy's materiel.US.l: fie:j-7 ":'sUr . 'JIith only trwo American and trro Australian tween them-and a completion of the conquest of tern Pacific.7hat about their Mariana. . '.s outposts and the other and Jap mandatad islands? Hov' and with What -. equipment and vieapons. the Japs vrere finally stopped on (Yap. divisions bethe whole 'besthe Tfokoda Trail base at Port The comeback look3d long and hard.holo home economy had been geared to total war. 0 E UC T _ N_ _N When the United States rras plunged into a Far Eastern war . and vie almost lrost the war asaresult. '7e lost important bases for a counter offensive -.the Philippines. '-hat had Japan in the wzay of an Army a iavy? . :-Lth the fact that vie knew little or nothing about that Tslanc. Incl 1) in their drive toward the Allied Moresby.. even the northern portion of New Guinea itself. Java.f'TTE t HI OHYH [ GiCGIUiOAL = NG NIELLIGx ~T THE SOMEST ANM lWESTEZ 1942 -PACIFIC WIEAS 1946 T .r the enery's capabilities and how absolutely his . the entire group of islands to the north of New Guinca. ARhMY XAinVTAt. These were among the major objectives of the Allies: knowr what weapons the enemy had so that ?eo c6uld devise to pRPoET v Us AP VMY .

Then Technical Intell. vital into operation and bLacklogs of enemy supplies were consequently rwell depleted. This is the history of the pioneers of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific. surronder on masse.when the war was over.. . dependent for training upon the iaJstralian Army. the Yapanese foughtw in many cases. The 470 technical exports cadministered through this company Xkpt the JAllied Forces infoimod of Japanose progress in arms. then. reaching to the various island sections of the United States . beginning in a small ray.i) under the supervision of their respective service chiefs. was unklown in the var with Japan until the sunmer of 1945 -. to exploit important discoveries for our owvn benefit. an integral. 2 .r.Vgonce was" talkn over by the Ordnance and Chemical I7arfare Sc. :. The following pages trace the development and operations of Technical Intelligence from NeM Guinea to the Philippinos to the occupation of Yapan.indispensable part of the history of the Uhited States lJrn. As differentiated from the enenm in Earope. such as occurred in Eiropel with the accompanying seizure of large stores of cnepy to rrin the technological raceO In the earliest months of the war the United States had a mere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific Theater.Company. culminrates 3 YJiz. on a shoestring.and norr we know -. were generally severed before the llied troops .HIMSORY Ca TECHNICAL INELIGENCE countermeasures and countertactics of our own.jor services.: operations. the 5250th Technical Intelligence Coi oDsit Soparate (Provisional). They oere the oyes and the cars of the army in the battle of the Pacific. arminition and equipmsont. their tenuous supply lines. The capture. Thi.rxmy Forces Far East (USAf.944 in the formation of a coordinated organization ofC th s:' m. of any considerable quantity of Japanese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence inportance.

ion plus a few items of Chemical l7arf'a.TCHDNICembeIL BY O>IMOWCE 4I2IGE -Deconiember 1942 -- a jai`Ra1'I Jamary 1944 From the opening of the Pacific W7ar until._mIlnt viere turned into the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for exanination and tien forwarded by both American and Australian forces to the . each service hmndling its own equipmennt. Simultaneous3y. to have Technical Intelligonce carried into the field by a team of men skillod in collecting and analyzing captured onemy equiEent. rintenance and supply service personel delivered captud equipat. (AO of S) to the War Department. Flow of informational reports uas through channels from the combat troops to the S-2 or G-2. as relL as interchangeably with the service troops handling the mriteriel.ctivity in the Southwost Pacific areoa (S)SJ. with no maintenance other than the application of proservatives. direct to the Theater spooial staff officor of the . to the Assistant Chief of Stmff. however. to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service. G-2. Technical Intelligence in 4ccordance with Traliin GCircul.ustralia.'). 81 establihied a more closely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of Intelligence value. c ¢p . and pertinent information.l 4rmr for examination. Novemiber o 81 In November 1942. Combat personnel capturing equipment of ow design sent it roarward through normal recovery channels together th accassories. smrz: L armr3 and some amnuni.. test and report. No organized attormit hLd been rade. The flow of materiel was/Mom combat troops (there were. a report ams rendered through channela. as yet. Training Circular No. f:. no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops in the combat zone. anrminition. to the (Shief of the appropriate service in the United States. . there was little Tochnial Di 'olligonco c.

and at Wvishington.l. Based upon.thoy rmade prelirninary deductions as tothe state of enerey resources for as evidenced by the nrateriel.. Theatcr staff officers . Those repcrts.ere rospons ble for preliminary expert anl!ysis as to the characteristics of the n-teriel. small arms.. DO 0.tralim3ns half to the MTJited States) -7ere then transmitted to the chief of the am or service concerned in the tUited States. and e cossary arrangemonts were rmde when possible to exploit the ener.Zan1-1 s _ As the battle for BAna and Gona. Complete reports were also made by the Theter staff officers to the G-2 of the Theater staff. 'Tsdrawing to a close in Dacember 1942.l s. LLrd rmtoriel (half of the capsnirod riateriol mr. MNw Guinoa._d be usedbiy tUnited INtiors troops in the field. ith instructi=cs on Jiu:. artillery. These meon ioere specialists in armunition.ind.cations that could bo =Mde sothat the capturod oqcipe-t CCoJ. merely transnittod inforntion on the equip- ment end had no responsibility in its processing. a group of five Ordnance officers and ton ennlisted men rds preparing to leave the &hited States for the Southemst Pacific Area. . Ordinance ohanica!. fire controL equilimmt.T:? li~cd prc-limina:/T o".r :-tor's and maintenance -anue.nmateriel vrhen captured in quantities. Both combat and maintenance porsonnel recovrring a now type of = teriel of a class supplied by another aervice delivered it to the nearest organization of the appropriate service.EISTOfRY aF ICIgICAL INIEI E same arm or sorvice or to his dosignated establisfmaut (such as a base Ehop or dopot). eidge The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zore of the Interior made final analysis and deductiona and prepared final operator's and maintenance mamuals azdvisuaL training aids.v. Peport nas adie at the sane timeto the G-2 of their corm. under the provisions of this circulea. it will be noted. together rith the cap. Previous to their dpeparture they had been given an intensive indoctrination ir.1L rc:ii. and traccld and rheoled vehicles. Ordnanoo Tochnical Intelligence at Abcrdeon Proving Ground. Intellijence:: .nt ta the Au. and pube. 194Z -. Mryl&ard. The Theater G-2. this.

t Adninistr. in ilborne).rea and the 'iestcrn Iacific assigned to Headquarters 2Adrinistration throughout the var arc slhorn in Incl 2).m into three sections: nhe besides being respcrsibla for the general ntelligence activities. las the Ordnance wnalysis Section. (Personnel assigned to analysis work in the Tcchnical Itenolligence Depots are shown in I4ol 1) . and maintained liaison v:ith Technical Intelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the Allied Tranlator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters. division or corps. (Technical Intelligence personiel in the South-vwest Pacific . W7ashirngton. (10) of the 'us- tralian Army at A'ustralian Land Headquarters and with the Wsater General of ordnance. on 30 December 1942.. in accordance '-ith general polii:tos cstablished by the Assistant Chief of Staff. identify. S:ctioon. (Technical Intelligence perassigned to sonnol in the S7JP 4 and 'Jesteorn Pacific Jarea (EWSPAC) field teams and the operations in which they participated arc shovn in Incl 3).sin other theaters. Brisbane.r-nlanc:: withi i~ntainm d liai. USJISOS*. C. tfited States Arr Service of %ppl'y (tSA3Q0). with General supervisicnr of G0. and forwvarded this inf'ormation to the Chief of &C'ibance.Ji izatIntel. and maintained liaison -ith Technical investigation and training.ian Technical . of that headquartors. Fited Statas and ALutra. G-2. vas placed in diarge of the group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organization for the Theatere The program was to operate under the technical ccntrol of the Chief vCklnance tfficer. The second section consisted of Technical Intelligeneo Field Teams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted nen. issued reports. prepared end shipped Japanese Ordnance materiel toJUnited States troops in the Theater for training and to the Uited States for Technical investigation and traizing. The detacilhrnt w&sc . Their duties were to collect. rankidng officer.dvwnce base or with a task frces. iustralia. analyzed and prepared reports on new: items. Australia. Intelligence. Base 3. located at The third Brisbane. D. (GHQ3) 3PA.aalysis Section. _repare prolininary reports on new iters. rho operated from an .Ligence orgaa broken do-.HISTIM F IC WlEGA On arrival at Headquarters.' . and hfip captured Japanese materiel to the Ordnance .. collected new data issued in. the P-ciflc Thicater on Yapmnese Crdn:lonce tiateriel. WJor Alan C. which roceived rLteriel fron field tcems.

JYUclary until July.snicrek worc lwith Headquarters U3iSf3OS till Fobruary 1943 . Tisnicrek C. 'As it turned out. at the Office of the Ihster General of Ordmnnce in VFesley College..3't Georgc W.. Fronr. lookinp. Lisd&alk SSt Clcnrnt JT. 4 . apart.-..9 days in Tblbou-nc in January 1943.. except in 1t saeo capacity as other lbhitcd States forcos were attached for esrly operations.apons Though Technical Intelligence.. -. studyinG and analyzing then.ple.. se an cxai. T/4 Ra>yf.v. and contained 30 photographs.nt into the field arnd vice versa. Xs-t '"C..Lara Theorc -.L IITrELLG1TCE This first detach-rl-nt of Technical Intclligence personnel assigned to thc Pacific -dcsipglated beloT: all Ordnance -- rT.p1 Harry R.r~ 'LeC_. headquarters and snalysis section personnel :-. O'V. Capt hidigan and two enlisted rnn spent 1. Crdntl ce ! nalysis Section Lt Eugenc D. Loveless T/3 John L.viere transferred to the analysis section at 3risbane. .hoen pTt of the personnel :fas pulled for field :-irk. w. Tchnmical Intelligence pcrsonneol received training and inforriation fronl the Aiustrali an AryV in the carly days.ich was h quite valuable.HI3TORY OF TECHMIC. the alliince and cooperation twas close and -ms of great benefit to both arraios. lst S/SEt Paul F..C. OUI. W7hit' T/. They issued 26 complete tchinical reports -.. . i.vas nover actually under the Yistralian Arny for administration..onec report on the 75rm1 Aj gun. Lt EL's' V ' T/4 Yobhn B.e.OQick. over 50 pagecs long.:in T/Sgt C-lei: Eo T. Bruncr 3S/3gt Roethell ..hniical .hen the . Capt Donald fr. sh.ce allocated as Hecdauearters Section aj ..i:. 1st Lt T I:n _ .s considorable flexibility in these asifLn:-:nts and a they vrero often used intcrchngecably. .. over their coiapleto collection of Japanese Ordnance. S/Sgt Loveless and !3t Cu. Chf Clk CD1 Ulbcrt BeveridEco Clk Intoigjcnec Tcat:! IsDvy r7.. Capt adigan.lan Co Johnston.cnd J. taking the c. :..a.. the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail cn practically all of the rlatericl that -as captured.

Major Johnston vfas appointed Technical Intelligence officcr. and frcl b . in February 1943. Capt I\dig?:r Incl 1) took charge of all field! h. opcrating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnanco Officer. This was improved sormc-hat in. fBase "B".. P x'tspC: 9. Now Guinea Forces. wJhen arrangements mere for liited Sta*tes GChemiical i!arfare Intelligonce made Officers to be notified of rmatoriol sent back fron the for. ILustralian (later.1 .t they could work -ith Land Cuine . Bay. The only personnel assigned to Hoadquartcrs U3AdVFE at that ti:. Oro a". the Chemical Yiarfarc Intelligence Section was formrd locally. I11 r other Ordnance Tcohnical Intelligence personnel -. It was Molbourno. Advance Land Headquarters. Intelligence personnel had booen sent directly to the Pacific froa the Uaitod States. Lus6Wrch to 11 July 19i.! :... fmustralia. norr types of captured eney equipment were sent to the Chcri.ard area by United States forces so th.bility for investigating the Japaneso he also L-S'ufE Ordnance mt. Brisbanc) for Technical Intellicenco.January 1943.. USASOSs and various Soections.HISTORY OF TECHNIC L INTELLrtGETCE Later.e carried Base on. USFAF E . the T/O of the Ordnance Office.!arfaro Service : j Dec _19} - in -=1 1 'Whereas Ordnance Technical. then sent to Land Headquasters. the disposition of that rnton Headquarterst. Land Headquarters then issued the equiprment to the appropriate arra or service for complete technical ncalysis and e report. Chomicall arfarc rmunitiors -. iustralirin eriel. Throughout 1942. . MryV.'tiat tie operating put. Marybyrnong.. The entire channel of ovacuation wa ALustralian.aboratoryCoanp. to idoe the prolidinary examination und determined its oporatiornal significanco.arfer Service Intelligence Officer. Headquarters. Victoria.. Newuv Cherical '. when Technical Intelligence mas turned over to United States Army Forces Far Ea~st (USJFFE).ny to investigate duty -rvith the 42d3 ChoLical Japancse explosives and eurnunitions.43 went on tcmaporary tralian 4r:%r.. Australia. re sent to either 42d Chemical Laboratory or the Victoria Manitions Supply Laboratory.y the Ihastor General of Ordnance.were Major Johnston and S/Sgt (Qick.

rta. IQ . Garner C01S Intellimence Tearl No. Schier On 27 May 1943 the Comranding General. arfaro Service analysis sections were still separate fron the depot. Circular No. Ijeadqu1.HISTORY CF TECAITICAL IUTELLGENCE There . 2 2d Lt Robert 1.aii. responsible for docurents research and publications~ In addition. Riddick.r. The work 7ras cnrried on as one of the functicnsof the chemical laboratories under the suaprvision of the Technical Intolliecnce officer of the Chenical Tarfare Section. 1st Lt Orrio P. I u February 1943. MDdical Corps. was placed in charge of the depot. 3 2d Lt Donald B. It becamn apparent that in addition to the laboratory analysis. sot up in that H aadqu-r ters with an Intelligernce officer .rtes. methods and prcparat ions for chemical warfare. Going riich was used only for shipping and receiving equiprrent.:. To these was added another officer. Bond Pfc John P..izacltion was needed which could collect equipment and stIdy >'Panese tactics. a Chemical Wsarfoae S..JS Intellir:ence Team No. 2d Lt Janmes D.ere assigned to three field Chemical .-as. and S/3gt Vernon G. and still there . nevertheless. US&ISCS. three officers and three enlisted zion . 1st Lt . 6 . Roberts.t-ion -.. Their analysis consisted merely of exanining and report. 1 2d Lt Jilliam J. Henry Cpl Leen C. conveniently located in rclzition to the captured encry equipment depot of the 4Australian Army now located in Base Section 3". At this tiLntthereo -icre two officers and one enlisted rTan in the Chonical Inteilicenco Section. Jtr. no established Chemical ?Tarfare Intelligence organization. USASCS: Major John on Japanese chemical materiel.orps. Phipps.illiaon . Headqliarters. Sell. 4Qartornastcr or Signal '.-t '. Barry Pfc Paul R. however. Assignmncnts were as follows: CJS Intellir-ence Tean No. an c.iza. Headquarters UStAFF (Incl 5) to "establish at Base Section 3 a salvaGe depot for captured enemy equipment. when USLA@E rwias activated. The Ordnnnce and Chermical . Intolligere to foxr2ulnte plsans for rnrre conprehensive ord ln.arfuorc Intelligence teams rorkine under the direction of Headquartors USdFIE£ in the foruard areas. 31.on. it was the first stcp toanrd coordination. 7asson. was directed by par 5.s no Technical Intelligenco by Engineers. UtSA(B.

1 -. and to provide that such chonnels were function:as to be prepared to ing properly. At the same tirm.LLvance Pasct rort .:L 'tod both forces to obtain itor. Lt Barry and Durinrg the pczi.ry e1l Guinea (htp duty to United Statca . 194.icre scnt on tempor.cre to clarify the ch. and Headquarters NTc.' ber of this boa.tates. Lt B3isop and $r. In June. Fifth . natcricl received at both the United States and cquipment. Naval Intelligence. chocked by the Allied Ea:iy Equipment Board Australian depots :-. -. Guirnea Forces. 6 Juno to 8 Scptember 1943.brosbyt Pfc Goi.s w-hich night inn: nccd.rn Incl 1).spcstion.inels through Trhich enevy materiel and Intelligence reports cnd equipmcnt would go. and Capt Madigan left irmmediately to go north to join the field detail in Guinea.t Loveless in the analysis section. e. 7 . the final disposition of captured AlL.-li in inc.Gona. Their missicn was to establish liaison with Technical Intcllitenco units from United Sta. end four enlisted men wrere sent to Port MNoresby Durinr the next six months to stage for tro weeks for Puna -. with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting. tions vrere conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps.-iso bo avc.-].ir Forceo.tes Army Ordnance. itl Lt Force.3 md a£Cainr.~s for dispcsition of matoriel b_. They -. Naval Fordc-sp. New Guinea (I!.ras appointed as a rennot othcr-.scd on T3chnicaL trainThq s IJr. M-jor Yohnstor '. Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in the Theater in December had a team in the field by 18 January.. The Board. .t Peterson returned to Brisbane to relieve Capt DMdigan and S/.o blc. Technica-l Intclligenco of the United States and Australia was morc closely coordinated through the activation of the Joint Allied Captured Eoney Equipoent Board wh.HISTORY CF TECHNICAL INTELIIGENCE At the same time. Bunas-- Gona -- Sanananda: Gona -- 9 Dec 1942 -- 22 Jan 1943 Incl 1) opera- The Buna -- Sanananda. Lt Bishop.S ::nrcllitenc Tc:m No. in Decemb-r l9i3.ll of C. Lt Cameron. the team rmtters of interest to Chemical proceed to any area to investigatc Jarfar e . they covered this entire area and shipped back Y'mdi valuable Ordnance equipmnent to Brisbane fror analysis. the Royal iustralian A. and one from fallied -tvo Uni ted .ich replaced Land Headquartors in determining.. consisting of two mmnbors from the from the gLtstrLalian forces.ap.

3... Lt H-Ienry and Cpl Schier. carmn up from the Pina --..might be on hand bef'c-:. 41st Infantry Division.-o -7eeks -oinr. Levy and 'Tirm left durililr Aullu st for 3. T/4 '. and spent t.!o=rr. a large Aiustralian f'orce landed and established beachheads fifteen miles northeast of I. ard T/4 Levy. thence across the Oen Stanley Rarne to Doboaura..n in the field.'s line of cor. o. Lt Canm-ron. the north coast of Nev Guinea. cuttinC the enenr. garrison -there. Incl 1) and quickly moppid Lup.ed up the coast. fccr 'c. -i~a-n joined a -. 136 196 On 4 September 1943 under cover of heavy air and naval dispatched with the Chemical 0lrfare captured equipment to the Chemical Officor.inn. their mission cormpleted.Gona area where they contacted the men :7ho had taken part in the action and who-'re at this tire established in defensive positions alorIg the beach (the operation had "closed# 22 January. Cpl Schior attached to the Chemical Sectior..? 1 .). Te2n con. On the following day. O'iJ Intelli[. near Oro Day (Map Incl 1).et armd materiel could be destroyed or souvenired by UTritod States troops. and Lt Henry left 28 July for Cro Bay. 7is 1 ?l t ai. I..3adquarters 41st Infantry Division. covered the Nassau Bay o. landed at Nassau Lay (!iap. the equiwr.ence Te-ua No. On 22 July.crsornl. Afir trarnsortation from Brisbano was obtaixrd by the team on 25 Jurie to Fort tMoresby.ter by S.risbrne and Caplt I..s.Gona area in early JTuly so that they . (!p Incl 1). the small ener. officer in charge.)eration for CGS. The team Was trn attached to the IMicKechnic Force and sailed 12 July for Morobe and later on up to NsJassau :3ay. Lt Car..eaa fr'-m tle Ornnanrce nmalysis ¢3ettion. preceded by heavy bombirn and the United States 8 .-inications to Finschhf en onm.t/ .vol.eek -Jas l. conposed of elements of the 41st Infantry Division attached to the 5th Australian Division. -&. I..HI3TORY OF TECHNICAL INTEIUGENCE Nassau Bay: 30 Jun 1943 On 30 Juine 1943 the McKechnie Force. Here the team r.e..eoron. Lae -Salamaua: 4 Sop 11I..ia Ordnance T. through the old battiegrounds in the Buna -. Teamn ontinmed operations with the corabat zz'oops. H. furnihinG a turnover of p.a~nd Cpl O'"e. reDorting to Hoadquarters 41st Infantry Division and from there flew to Brisbane. (Ttp Incl 1).luty.sistirng of Capt i bL~diLan. the nevJy' . .As tof offensive follo.. Ain Ordnance T.

No. On 8 'September orders were issued attachingr Lt B. Airborne troops vere quickly roved in. Mean-whilo. In the event that Lae fell prior to the completion of the Salaaua nission. at this tiLne. They returned to Headq[uarters USiFFE 2 December 1943 for duty 7vith one of the other field teams.. During 3epteober 1943 operatiorn around Lae '-wore intensified and with the greater part of the avail-ble transport plcnes being used to fly in troops and supplies. to cover the Lao --.ain. totalinrg about 60 tons of weapons (including fifty pieces of artillery) c:nd ninety tons of .aldimor. the same twro onli. Lac -. Salamnua (MaT Incl 1) had fallen on 11 September and the re. 7'ho had been slightly :Ln wounced. transportation for C'TS Intelligence Team No. It rwas not thought.nition.era vrwere in the field with.Le iL.fanftry Iiv>: on. liod . su'gesting that his WiS Team.Hea~cr m:rs. bitterly contesting ever. rs until C:apt hadian3.ts of four JcpAnese divisions. Lt Camrreron then took over as cLff/ce: in cc-.strafing. which was operating in the Se alzmaua area. The tean salvaned all Japanese Crdnance materiel of interest in the area. l. Z/1r.Lie area.Lua area first and then proceed to Lae. 503d Parachute Infantry Reineint parachuted and captured the airfield at Nadzab (a few miles northw7est of Lae). arrangements wrere -rmde for C'3 Intellirgence Tean No. Chemic-al Itarfare Intelligence Team No. 9 .nx..ent up to the Hollandia operation. 41st T.len.1c et ovcr_: for Salarnau. 2 to proceed to LIe irntzdiatoly.rry and Pfc Going3. Lae fell to the 'llied on 16 September 1943.ere also large quantities of Chem.sted merl.feni a'ea. the re9 1antat. to the 5th Australian Infantry Division. and it was anticinated that Te:r -- It was reported that there . th-at Lae wrould fall in the near future. ho':ever. Capt .'arfareequiprent wore found throughout the area by Teem No. Meanwhile.. 2 proceed there at once."t Lovcless aznd Cp1 O'. operating tith the 23d Por. . Upon arrival. 1.Salnmaua was the most productive of enemy Ordnance equipr. 1st . . It -.Finsc':hh. ical T1arfare equipnent stored in the Saln~.istralian Corps.n..n.. 1 was delayed and they did not arrive in Dobodura until 16 le anoed that Lae had fallen that very day and a rzssaceo was sent to Lt Bond.d back east along. considerable quantities of eneny Chernical '. at Lae. they reported to the United States liaison officer.. and following a rapid advance by both forces. half-starved and malaria rid. were plrs·. i would be able to cover the Salaru. the coast tovrard Mrorobe.

'where transportation facilities were . Large quantities of docunent. All captured equipment collected by CS Tecan No. Lt Bond and Pfc Garner left for Port bIoresby with the equipnmnt collected at Lae and Salanmua. Port Moresby. Lt BroTn of rIobile Exip'sivcs InvostiJ ti: Unit (I. Japanese intcrpreter. This team planned to proceed to Lae and from there to Finschhafen as soon as it should transportation by wvter was oltairod to Lae.ith Sgt Bruner from the Ordnance .i derably. 23d Port Detachment. 2. Lt Bond and Pfc Garner. rine Japanese bombers cao over. lfter all this 3dely transrortation warc finally secured to Lac.anti-aircraft guns opened up over the field. it was agZain evident that the Japanose had evacuated the area in great haste.-ere nmdad for then to report to 26th Lustralian Brifrade. and also Lt 0. sea and air rvcorent an JAustrnalian force nmoved around the coast fron Leo and under cover of heavy air and naval bonbardmnt landed and established beachheads six miles north 10 .~nalysis Srction to (rdnence qTchnical Intelligance. and flew to Nadzab. they rspcrtcd to the 7th 1Australian Division ahich -mas located a short distance from the field. I vas set up with the 23d Tort Headquarters. 1. By this tinme the oloaning up of LIe had progressed con. the area. After a two-day wmit for air transportation.7ard Drone._ito'. Finschhafen: 22 Sep 1!9? -.E'IU) United States Navy. the te-a --rns transferred fror the 26th Brigade to Hcadqilarters. am-u1nition and equiprment had lkon left undestroyed. Upon landing.ustralian On 26 September. located in Lae. Capt Forcyth of A'vanced Alliod Translator and Interpreter soction iwas thero rit-h .HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTEGELLINCE After an air raid alarm on the rmrning of the 20th Septembcr. I. the closest point to Lae. and Headquarters for at Salaraua.more available. 1 in the Salamaua area was flon-m by plane from Salarmxua back to Dobodurn. Lt Bond and Pfc Garner left Le4 on 25th Scptember for Salam-ua where they .. was contactud. Shortly aftcr arrival. . took off from .2 Oct 1943 In a coordinated lnand.Lt 3t Barry and Pfc Goinf' of CJS Teau NTTo. CWS Tean No. Fifth Air Force. who had becn transferred 7.JS Tce-n No. dhile they wore awvaiting transportation to Icr. After collccting samples of all the Japanese equiprmnt foun. arran-ormnts -. There. bhit ulistaking thenm for friendly plmnes no one paid any attcntion untfl the .

. Port obresby and fin-ally to Prisbane..fl. Dobodura.s in charge of salvaging enemy equipment in that orea. 41st Division. Fierce fightinG followred the s. Lt Cameron with S/Sgt Loveless and Cpl O' control of Huon Gulf. s-rho had been covering the Nassau Bay ancd Lae aroas for capturod ordnance Imteriel.cri .liod lmndind . Lt 3Barry -. idter recovering all a.. On 2d Cctober.nd sickness.os of the cperation rnny hundreds of rr s died of sto.nridrod y^.ndinc at the equimentthe -term loft Finschhafen and returned to Lao oand then back to Nadzab.-ms notified that Finschhef on had been occupied darrl'Gemclts for transpsortation to that . boechhold I(.rently had caught the enery by surprise.rds of the yTaponcse position). The speed of the double developnrent of L!eo and Finschhclfen appa. to cover Finschhnf on.:s wvitl'i.. Lt Barry and PI' C-oing .tei . operated out of Loae.n fiv .-unds .rca were mnde io idi. (MLp Incl 1) and dislocated the cncu. n Pritish Ncv Guinea. The capture of Firschhafen insured ilJi. six miles away. 20th Asustralian Brigadce.alion. . -ihero they were attached to the 23d Port Headquertcrs.vailablo encny Cherical Wiarf..nd in the latter stia.r-7tion.. 11 . 'Af ter l. rhich vr.HISTCRY OF TECHMN1IOCL IMPELtGECE of Finschhafen (Map Incl 1) on 22 Sopterber 1943.y's gr. Here they attac! hed themselves to Conpany i&of the 13th Bat'.1itch-hikod through the junglo tc Finschhafen.

AOS.EC CCWOMSITECO LNY. and -rcot M-h -ndc. 12 .E P T E R IL 5250th TECHiWCtJC INTELLIGC..Techzr. that it would ma-1 possible the necessary flexibility operation and movement of personnel which was considered essential for the efficient functioning of the sections.3 in late October rlans 7:ere m'ade by ULSIJOS to prcvide for . dated 22 Decerber 1943. the six tmjor services. Ordnance and Chemical 'Arf -re Service. and in ad'lition. for the entire set-up -as3 changed by IUSATE directive. for the first tite. (all except Transportntion CorDs) and that was estimated to be adequate for Theater mfnrds. all Ordnance personnel were transferred by U3.ever. the responsibility for ground Technical Intelli/ence within the United States LrrVm Forces in the Far East rms delegated to the Conmarnding General.llt~y 194 On 29 Septer:ber 1943. USA. lTh. submitted a proposed plan of operation .F7F to ULS/0S. In order to Irovide sn efficient basis for operations of the various chnical Intelliigence detachments. USM. been carried on by detachfmnts of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel and supervision of activities. L.iral ti7c.. and would enable the forntion of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams. (Incl 6).1 'proposal ams foriarded to CorlandinrE General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. ho'. SEPR..ith a reconrended T/O end T/E that included. It was felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactory Technical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services.CE IROVISION._:3l Intelligence Depot consistirn of five sect-ions: Dri oe -.SOS. G-2. By this directive. No detachment w7as formed. Col Sauve'.HISTORY CF TbECHNICAL II'fELLIOENCE C H .L tI JTuary 0I914 -. Medical and Transportiation. Subject. "Respolsibility of Technical Inu telligence". in the past. a Technickil Intolligcncc oriestoe Cc-mpany be ~ictivacvd:. to provide necessary officer and enlisted personnel to operate the Uthited States Captured Enemy Equipment Depot and to furnish Technica. Qxartcrnaster. Me rwas directed to appoint qualified officers to serve as United States rm representatives on the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board.l Intelligence personnel both officer and enlisted for inclusion in task force Intelligence teams Technical Intelligence operations in SJIWA had.

Chiefs of 3Srvices vwere directed to furnish qualified personnel for assirnnmnt on detached service to 52350th Technical Intellidenc Composite Copanyv.HISTCRY OF TECHNIC 4 LL INELLIGEUCE Under this arrangenent. the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Colnpany. made for geater ease and efficiency in matter of cornand.ination of Technical Intelligence information. that assitnmTont of pczr-rnol1 could be ade rand operations continued.i the six services to function as one unit.a coordinatinr unit for Technical Intelligenc proved highly satisfactory in the coring months of the war. docurnnts and equimcnt cDuld be collected for all branches by all teans. the several Technical Intellieonce sections would be able to facilitate the. source units. Infomation.: prrvious!r survrestcd to US1FFE. Separate (rrovisional) "to enable the aocompnlishm-nt of the Technical Intelligence mission" (Incl 8). 2. Headquarters UJSSCS (Incl 7).s No. and eliminated the question concerning responsibility and scope of authority.hen the 5250th Technical !ntellience Composite Colspany. with perscnanel c-.rliod _in detached service fror. Evaluation of The Technical Intollipgence Setlp The principle of having.. and this equiprmnt assembled in a central spot where it cmuld be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. (A con:pleto roster of all personnel assimned to the _5250th from January 1944i. Thc transfer of personnel to the 5250th was effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. Scparate (Provisional) had moved for.Jard to sapan. 13 . until November 1945. is shomw in Incl 9. thus onabling" then to aid each other during the first days of an operation when speed was important. The fo:ratioil of a separate Technical Into'lir. Centralized control hnidc it possible for tearlas from. wre used as rguides. It would also enable them to control the distribution of captured enemy equiyrmnt according to technical and traininG noeds in the Theater and in the Utited Statess Cn 3 January 194h. Senparte (r'ovisional) was org£anized as a prcvisional comrpary by Gcneral Ordr.cnce Composite Compan y other than provislonal was not favorably considered by US1-FFE (10 January 1944). This inclosure lists the dates each man joined and departed from the Coripany and the awaards that he received). w. when it was formd. so T/O and T/L. Coordination Irovided flexibility. On 20 January 1944.collection and rapid disser.

of't its personnel still occupyin.en it could have booeen nst effective. Each Technical section. Oranization of the 5250th Tech.IL INTELLIGENCE Mbst important of all. and a technical section for each of the six major services. operated under the technical supervision of the Chief of Service and under the . conplicated its administrazio :. . This in certain ways. composed of laboratory and enerWmy equiprent Intolligence teuems. in addition to his other duties. w7as appointed informally as temporary (without orders) cooanding officer of the COoiVany and G-2 Technical Intelligence Co-ordinator.the 5250th Technical Intclligenc Cor.rrondation to USi3FFE. Ord. capabilitics 1'as secured and Technical Intollic. urndr the direction of the 5250th Technical IntelliQ. as originally outlined in the reco.hen the -. U~iSOSs.yore followed with only minor modifications. rade it gencrally impossiblc to secure -wellearned and long deserved prrmotions. 14 . . Intell. Incl 10).hjor Johnston. Co. Company cormunder on duty in the Office of the LC of S. as Co-ordinator of Technical Intolligenco. hovievcr -. e big step fo r7ard. T/0 vacancies in units which they had never . There was one very definite drawback. a conprehonsivo viec. of Joaan. sormtins ham-s-.oratod on only a quasi-acccpted basis. It -.HISTORY OF TECHINIC. co-ordination made it possible for the cormand to have adequately equipped tomns formed and trained in time for all operations and assured complete covcrage by Technical Intelligence. Sce)prate (Yrovisional).iun~ its cffox-rz vw.y oP.Da.Assistant Chief of Staff. (P) The 5250th was composod of a co-ordination and administration section. USAS30S (Orgsanization Chart. and because the con. .onco Comrosite Comprny.once entered the period w. ork of past yetrs brought in positive results. G-2. b.anizaction.enoral supervision of the . 44dministration of the Company and co-ordination of the activities of the sevoral sections.worked. Duties.lpany was established only as a provis! onal or. They were as follows: Cormnanyr Headquarters a. Nceverthelessr.

b. storage and disposition of captured enery rnttoricl. Chief Engineer IntelliGence officer. E. Laboratories for all the services were ostablishod after that..... Choreical '!arfaro Service contimnueod to have its anurlysis ?ork c'-rried on at the 42d Chemicol or Victoria Mnitions Supply Laboaratoics.pril 1944. EI (appointed later. in April) Maj . One officer on duty in the Office of the .. This responsibility was first delegated to Lt Col Jones.. trainint. His dutioe rcro: a. to conduct Tccmnical Intclligence liraison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section S?~. and toforvard such information to their respective Chiefs of Service in -lashington. Corps had no toans in the field until the Hollandia operation in .M No service Intelligence officer for Sirial Corps Administrative and fnnelysis Unit Originally. and was later turned over to his assistant....rticular service..Llan C.... D.. and Engineecr and Medical.. Riddick .HISTORY OF TECHNICLL INLTELIZG c. C'JS Lt Ctl lfalter 13.. To supervise IntelliCcnce activities for the pa. installations and procedures.. (VIartcrraster and Sign-al sections operated analysis laboratories undeor the Chief of the Intelligeonce Section of the service concerned... c. collection.. Service Technical Intclli~renc Officor A Technical Intelligence clficcr in the office of each of the services...&C of S... G-2. Lt Girard R. recording. with the Technical Intelligonco sections of d.. LorrTey. CE Maj Steinberg . To advise the Chief of Service on Intelligonco tottcrs. 15 .. includinm-. To ruvievu and issue reports on captured cnejy~ mtceriol. only the Ordnanc'. Service Technical Intellionce officers assigned werc: Maj 3ohn A. $ohnston . USO3S. C. Jones . ORD Maj l~rray Herman .... To collaborate other sorvices..

train- d.. evaluated and dissoAinatod Intellitence information as prescribed. Reviewed and issued reports on elptured enaem installations. as required. and subrittcd invontorios of captuxed enemy equiprut available to the service in the Ca-.tured Enemy Equipment Depot or service laboratories. or en rcuts to that depot. Kept current. recording. and disposition of captured enemy materiel. Interpreted. Maintained a filo of all reports -nd do ta available on Technical Intelligenceo k. Supervised the collection.llied Forces within the Theater. storage h. and collaboro tcd rwc. etc. Advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence rsmtters.HISTORY OF TECHNICL INTELIGENCE All Technical Intellieence sections. supervised.. mnintrined administrative divisions. i. Maintai ned . however. Establ. e.[t Technical Tntelligence sections of other arm and servslces a_. Carried on adeQuate and nrcessay docunment research. shed and mnintained Intellig-ence liaison. Planned. c.t. f. tl. 1. and correlated Intelligence ing activitles . cxrfoaince of captured j. enemg Obtained data on operational nEnteriel.dc-quite liaison -lth the Intelligence Office of the Chief of Service. to the TJUnited States for training and other purposes. m.. rvateriel. Coordinated and supervised Intelligonce activities. b. or in the advanced arenas 16 . g. . Lrranged for the shipmernt of selected items of captured enenr materiel. Division. which vithin the scope of their activities: a. procedure. processing.

Submittod reports on captured cnry rm. and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the task forcec c. and prepared reports thereon for forPrrding. f. b. Field Tcams Field Tcaxs of each Technical Intelligence Section. k.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE n. Cooperated with Technical Intelligence services and Allied forces. personnel of other g.tcriol for:7Tded to the Gaptured Enolmy Equipmcnt Depot. ctc..rranred for the collection and forwarding of captured enemy equipment to the Scrvice Chief for further analysis or to the Captured Enormy Equipmont Depot for shipment to the United Statos. -ithin the scope of their activities: ta Collected a:ld fcrwordcd technical combat infcrration through G-2 of the trak force. 3:. . h. . installations. d. Invostigated reports of the uao of noCr mthods. c.y equipmcnt captured by the task force.4ssisted in interrogation of prisoners of vrar when requested to do so. weapons. Collected informtion regarding enemy installations. JIranacd for the salvage of bulk supplies and materiol. Prepared rcparts of activities of the Section. Maintained current inventories of captured onawr Matcriel. Assistod and advised G-2 and the appropriate service officer of the task force on all mattors of Technical Intelligonce. i. Mado preliminary examination of and report on onc. o. and assisted in plannfnx a training progrm for United States personnel. or tactics. Proparcd prclirminary training mwnuals on tho use c captured cnemy cquipmnnt. 17 .

etc. Propecod a :inthly report containirr a list of captured oncry cquipment forwarded to the United States during the month. Dclivcrcd selected itcms of captured cncay equipment to the appropriats scrvic or force upon authority received from the dillicd Captul~d Enir-y Equipnont Board. They were to send in litcrally thousands of those items during the coning mrnths ofthe w-ar.mes. Received. 18 . received by Hoadquortcrs.) Japn oso ranufacturors of vwar nmtcriol were identified and located -. G-2. classified and maintained stock record accounts on all captured enany oquiprment formnrdod to the Depot.ianding General. or other authorized agencies. Jr. rubbings and dratrings of all nerloplatcs or namrplato data froa all captured cnemy equipment would be forwarded to that headquarters. vrhich operated directly under the supervision of the Chief Qiartornastor Intclligence soction: a.information that vas important in determining air raid targots and in studying the cnoer's economic status. The collection of nomoplates and rubbings bocamn one of the main mi~sions of Technical Intelligence personnel. Propczod and kept current an inventory of captured enery oquipr. from the Cor. USASOS. c. as directed. a directive -.HISTORY aF TECHNICiL IMNELLIGENCE Captured Enornr Equipmnt Deopot (W Intollipenco Section) The Captured EnonWr Equipment Depot. US4SOS. Packed anJd 'hippod to the United States selected items of captured cnemy ou. and from information based on their translation (na. to the effect that photographs. ctC. was relieved of duty .rray Hoerman. Go D :. -) Lt Orric P.".prlcnt. f. d. c. b. On 19 February 1944. Sell. Tntell Co=. dates.cnt and a record of the source and distribution of those items to be forwarded throuCh channels at the proper tirnc. Returned or forwardod to individuals for souvoniring such items as vwcro released on the certificate of the AC of S.s Conmnding Officer of the Depot and as a rnnbcr of the Jldliod Enemy Equipment Board when the 5250th was formed and was replaced by Major M}. Early ldministration by the 5250th Tech. USLFFE.

iJashington. These conclusions were based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recently and previously captured equipment. QMC. Sound deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war could be based on ovidence obtained from a laboratory analyses of captured materiel.) Major Johnston also informed for-ard echelons of the proccedure necessary for shipment of captured materiel. Captain Madiganr having returned from field detail in the Nassau Bay. 19 . Lae and Finschhafen areas. 'hen such changes were noted. Shelby. permission was requested from the Chief of Ordnance to have Captain Edward I. He was gone until 30 tMarch 1944 when he returned to report that great interest had been aroused in the . had departed on 17 Novembor 1943 for temporary duty to the Office of-the Chief of Ordnance. This was in conformi-ty with lar Department policy of having personnel of Technical Intelligence teoams on temporary duty from the WJar Depart-ment return period'ically for consultation. D. accompanied by one officer from each of the o+. proceeded to adw. C. all captured Japslese equipment 'ras desired and should be forwarded. D. Technical reports included. positive or negative. in Technical Intclligonce and that numerous conferences concerning the enemy materiel situation were hold.nced areas to inform base sections and army troops that as each of the six services were interested in materiel. C. On 15 December 1943 Headquarters Ordnance Intelligence Section was notified that Captain Creed would proceed to U. At the same time he informed personnel of the modification of the regulation that facilitated legitimate souveniring. Creed.Cashington. (It was hoped that this would encourage troops to turn in captured equipment.rMy Service Forces. who rwas assigned to Ordnance Intelligence activities in the Alaskan area. fajor Johnston. as to the enery's economic status. At the same time Captain Madigan left for 'ashington.-h it turned out that it had little effect on the vrillful looting and destruction of enemy dumps. when possible.ashington for six weeks temporary duty and then would be sent to this Theater.!:r six services and 1st Lt Jarios E. conclusions. . sent to the Southwest Pacific for duty with Ordnance Intelligence. these items wiere returned to the United States for furiysis. thou.HISTORY OF TECHNICMJL INTELLIGENCE Greater emphasis' was also placed on analysis of captured equipment as an additional factor for the determination of the enemy's economic position. ther laboratory ana In February 1C7'I i.

especially task small arms and machine guns. T. howrever.-. The teanm emainad dt Saidor until March 1944.more and moro that such enemy Ordn-nco raltoriel.m informa tion secured. was of considerable value to thk for co. Brushing aside the initial light P..rcs cau£ght com-pletely off guard in a surprise landinEg.. booklet as an . The campaign naried the final stage in the great swinging moverent. when the enemy v.:"sfound .44 The invasion of the Admiralty Islands (Maps Incls 1 and 11) specifically IAbmcte aiirstrip on Los Negros. Admiralty Islands: 29 Feb 1944 -- 18 Mnay 19. did secure peomission to go on the Salidor (11hap Incl 1) ooen.w' up the 11evr G:.ation 2 Janur7y 1944. USAFvE. and 'were supported by destroyers.were relieved. boats and air bombardment. thou. Lt Bishop and T/4 . Fr.h the owmbincd unit . Howeverr. 20 . opposition. the unit upon arrival at Finschhafen was not allo-.ed to go forvrard.c'qartc. t (MI.Jinn '-iere then attached to the 41st Inf antry Division for the Hollandia operation.i. T/4 . after receiving permission from Sixth :Army.irnn and Cpl reveridge.. training of combat troops in use of Japancse wcapons. the other branching ctff to the south. was begun 29 February 1944. to arrange with Sixth iLr.nea cc.. since 20 eto>. :-hich had been the basic plan of operations in the Southeest Facific. paurphlet on Jap-ancse oquipDcnt. Abn of the First Cavalry Division landed on Ma..c Intellirrence Tce m with the 32d Divid on prticipated on this and r.nmplificntion of the Allied r the tcamji Drjcp dc a .-*as not ur-d..HISTORY OF TECEH2ICAiL INTELLIGENJG Saidor: 2 Jan 1944 -10 Feb 1941 In December 1943 a request had been sent to G-2.hap Incl 1).yr to have ra combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit p'rticipatc in the Cape Gloucester operation. the force divided.-. instructing the troops on booby traps and It . islands seized the day before. programn of the 32d Division on Goodenough Island.lnus Island about one and a half miles northwcest of Lorongau. . An officer and two onl.inor operations 19:. one group heading tovrard the airstrip.'. operated as an Ordnaa-. Land FGrcs HTI They also assisted in the staging. (MaI.2 Bishop.?hen th-y. pivoting on T!evw Guinrea.p Incl 11) on 15 They wvere covered by artillery fire from small neighboring March. .istcd men. wiho had l_.

Lt airstrip. . before being sent to join the 1st fully equipped by G-2.arfare Service unit should accompany the 1st Cavalry Division in t1h .7ithin three days after their landinc. Ffc Gaddo and Pvt Street. and eight enlisted mon. Lt Bushnell.. 21 . 1. including Tcchnico-l Intelligence. of the Chemical .-gjI?-ly Tcc:.HISTORY OF TECHNIC. fonrcd a pote:. one officor.agoon of soveral islands and from MEIU No. bacso for intonsive opcr-?tions a..'arfare Intclligence Section. Lt Henry. innd on 18 March they stormied their way into Lorengau towm. The chief prize of the Admiralty victory vrs Sea Eagle Harbor.ere to be forwarded covering Counter Intelligence. 1st Lt Harold F. Frederick. (The other four services did not have trained personnel available for field operations until the Hollandia operation in ipril 1944). 1 activitios. Cavalry Division. US. A Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) officer was to be in charge of the unit and consolidated reports w. Tochnical Intelligence personnel consisted of one officer. Chemical 7iarfaro Service. The CIC team consisted of one officer. rong:au on Manus Island and bMor. 3/Sgt Loveless and Sgt Lischalk.'. of the Ordnanco Section.. (Map Incl 11) which had 55 miles of protected waterway formd by a l. and two enlisted men. iLlso as part of the unit w-ere one Naval officer. omned in Novemrber 19431. on Mnnus Island tUnited States CnvalryTmn c'rpturod Lornr. and Naval Mobile Explosive Investigation Uhnit (IEIU) No. Captured documents were to be forwtrded to AlliTd Translator and Interpreter Section.ote on Los Negros.L INI'ELLIGENCE '. :nd one enlisted .iclds in Now Britain and Ioe-w Ireland (Map Incl 1). and tTro enlisted men. They then h-ad occupied all vital areas in the . In accordance with this plan it was decided that a canmbircd Ordnance and Chemical .t the e-rliest possible morment after combat operations. and attempted for ALS crti. Ordnance.nd tuwo enlisted men each to a Counter Intelligence team for each task force..dmiraltios c>:zpaign. This provided for collection and investig-ltion of enemy materiel . be baseod on the principle of assigning a field unit composed of one off icor .lcal Intelligence field operations rere to Cap* G:Loucostcl-c. They functioned as a unit with success durinC the entire lxmirlty Islands campaign. It and the two strategic airstrips at I. The group was organized and 3FFE.Admiralty Islands.l. Lt Frederick was placed in cornmtnd of all personncl.inst the remaininr eneomy stron<.

then in comb:-t.. to Los Ne.lp so as tc arrive at Hy'ame `l.n ia Lt Henry as:sistcd ir. JNew Guinea. (D plus 6 .lry Division he-. The dumps located consisted of -.ptur.ork for the detachment and the Division.SLt Lischalk Joined the 1st Cva.teriel dumps before they ha-d been pilliracd nnd scuvenired . The lectures and demonstrations to the troops on the value of enemrr equipment for Intellijsence purposes paid hig..ltn T-he information thus obtained proved invaluubl.h dividends. On 9 Iarch. were a.. (aT.lrch.ros.ed for t'.) )nd d r. the nrea cca3red by thl.. and Lt 'icn:. 22 . aumnunition. Lt Bushnell.aqcur Iers at Sea BEogle Harbor.nxious that the te am should start inrL. Both men -were subsequently used on patrols. or .2 ties. The:y -:re attached lra to the S-2 of the 12th CavyLir delay.'as splenrlid.-e.di-ately.eron and Sgt Loveless to ie:.Tap Incl 11) -.e ur. This cTas enabled the teamn to arrive at c.. and cooperation frorm the line units and individual soldiers w.C ..pons.HISTCRY OF TIEHICAL PITELLIGEICE Lt Frederick and 3)rt ixrrnI orson (CTC). A collection dump was orgr. They Save information as to the location of dum.lthou:nh te crisis of the operation had provided wJith necessary equ iprc n t. protected and canouflar.tai roofinZ.nt.ed by canvas.r patrols. (I-ap Tncl 11) on the 6th of P}. Pvt Street wvas pt busy with photoiraphic -. and continued -rith this until the end cf the c:r:'paign. pre'pr.r'or. quartermaster -and brought in quantities of rnteriel.e troops yet very small. and sa..edical supplies of all kirss.nitions were found in this sector.rve for the cdm.e . fotlo'ing the assault back of 1-pitalai dission (i.. Chemical TJrf:re protection equipment and r. dump was usually of one class of sullies such as clcthind.ipient and n. Lt Camr.-i CeogrI'phic survey of Los NeJiros to be used by thle c1sir.ere loc"-. passed. Los Nee. TEIFJ (Tavy). -.rass. BE.i to it that it v.r:.o days and during. The top ranrkinr. Incl 1) The iroup departed frc. eq. Pfc Gaddo was izmmediately utilized in. Th departre . mdaical supplies or one type of ar-mmrnition. and .. this a Che. Many stall dumps -. subsequent action.y .ros -vher' t.tvo o2-: 'any the.nized and the first bulk shipment of caltured rnteriel twas shipped from Hyane Harbor.lm Care Sudest. The remainder of the detach'nnt arrived 16 March. officers of the Division were interested in Technical Intcllt:enc:l. ravteriel nd docunrents were received in great quantities.t L1-chrlk1 (C:Od) cornmosed' the first section of t-.ted a few yards off t'le trail.:mical dumrp h-ad been r ofrce tic 5tthn C-avaIry Regir.

Ltter it was found advantageous to wait and send exposed film to photographic lab- oratories for developing and printing. water transportation also had to be available. Not only -. Shipping back to the Depot at Brisbane offered little trcuble. dhen empty and ready to go back to the beachhead.FrISrORY OF TECHNICAL INTELIGENCE . the materiel vwas eventually returned to headquarters. The Unit had completed its mission and the personnel returned to their various organizations. and it confirrmed the fact that by combining their efforts they could cover more territory in less time. though effective. and operations in so far as possible. Only Chemical CJarf are Service and Ordnance pooled their work for this operation but their success substantiated the decision to combine all six services for the Hollandia operations By May 1944 all important areas in the Admiralty Islands had been searched and all materiel of value had been collected and shipped. This arms the first campaign in which the various services were coordinated. The problem w. transportation viwas the critical factor. photographic work-was difficult under field conditions. 23 .-as land transportation needed. This method of back loadirg for bulk shipments. but due to the insular nature of the campaign. was slovw. since. and caused considerable loss of time. Photographs Y-ere taken.. with the exception of the first difficulty. rush shipments were made by back-loading aircraft. BY the same procedure with the landing craft. developed and printed of all new typescdffqqapmrent. In this connection. It was found that due to the heat and lack of proper washing facilities for the negatives and nt by utilizing the trucks haliling supplies. fortifications.1l the documents and equipment were assembled but no atteript was made to sort the materiel in respect to services until it had reached the collecting area. captured equipment mas loaded aboard and was taken as far as the beach.


C Ei P T E R



April 1944 -- July 1944

To trap the 18th Japanese LArmy dispersed along the coast of Newr Guinea and to capture suitable air bases for the future offensive ag:ainst the Philippines, the Allies hurdled the stretch of northern New Guinea coast from Saidor to Hollandia. The map of Ne-7 Guinea had sugg-ested the five hundred mile hop, The Japanese response to our feints at \7Jevak and rMadang, (Map. Incl l) 205 and 385 miles bclowr Hollandia, had invited it.

It vwas a big step, and plans were laid to use the great est
force yet assembled in the Southwest Pacific -- two United States Army divisions -- to be involved in a single operation. It vras

furthtrmiore, the first all-.hoDric^an show in the Pacific. Staging, for the Hollandia Operation Technical Intelligence was to give complete coverage of
this operation, for it was knovm that Hollandia (ahp Incl 12)

was one of the important Japanese supply installations for
Southeastern Now Guinea and New Britain defensive areas. Indicative of the fact that Technical Intelligence vas still in

a fornmativa stage, organizationally speaking, were the various modes of operation used. Three teams and one composite unit
revere to go in.during the initial stages of the battle -- one team operating free lance, one team in a combined detaclhm.ent

patterned after that used for the ,.dmiralties campaign, and one composite unit representing all six services, This last, the Composite Technical Intelligence Unit, was an innovation, that laid the basis for organization of Technical Intelligence teams for the balance of the JaT anese war.
CI'S Teem No. 2 (Lt Bond and T/5 Going) and the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team composed of Lt Bishop and Cpl Winn were both attached to the 41st Division9 but were in no combined

HISTORY C'F TC!-TIICI.L IiTELLIGEITCE tecam durinE; this operation. The C.'S Teram had not been in ,n oper?.tion since Sal aua, but the Ordnance team had becen replaced c from duty w7ith the 32d Division ,?fter the close of the Saidor operation, just in tir.: to join the 41st Division at Finschhafen in March to stad:e for Hollandia. Chemical 'Jarfare Service Ter. NTo. 6 and a MTobile Explosives Investigation Unit, w;ere attached to Combat Te-n B of the Countor IntelliGence Corps in a combined dota.chrnnt similar to th-t used in the iZdr.iralties. The group .ras attached to the Office of the .AC of S, G-2, 24th Infantry Division. C'JS Teatn No. 6 colmposed of 2d Lt Allen 'J. rhillips, ind Dvt John TIruFer, who had been cdded to the original CT.S Technic'l Intolligence personnel, -;rcnt into staj;ing early in January for this operation, The st-.;inr area, on GoodenouL;h Island, forward echelon of the 24th Infantry Division Tnas Ne-- Guinea, Here, the teanm assisted in the tr-inin-r pror;ra,, presentindg lectures on Technical Intellioenco to all units in the Division that missed it on the mainland. This lecture series vas crordinated with the CIC trainincg ro[iracrm. .hile in the staging area, a plan for establishment of a division:.l captured onemy equipment depot wrs subllitted to the G-2 of the Division. This ;is a ccepted and a mneo w;as sent to all units, outlining; channels for forwTa.rding captured encmy cquipment to this ccntra.l collection point,

First Corm.osito Unit is Forlmed for HDollandia Onceration Mtjor Riddick, C.;S, MI4ajor Talcott 'ainwriight,, E, (new with 5250th), I.ajor Madigan, Ord (wvho ha:d becn recently promoted), and Lt. Rowe, Sigrnal, arrived at Finschhafen from Brisbane 13 · A.pril to start things rolling for st:a.-ing Tochnical Intclligence Unit No. 1 for H:ollandia. During that -eck the following personncl arrived at Finschh-.fen to join the unit: 1st Lt Bob C. .7oodson, Transportation Corps; Capt JilliarI . L:albcrt and fourteen enlisted menon fromr the 234th Quarterm.aster Salvaw.e CollectinE; Company -- these men were not Technical Intelligence personnel but wcre to acco.mny the Unit on the operation; and Lt Bartry from 'CTSTeam No. 1, who -ras hospitalized as soon as he arrived -- he recovered just in time to acCompany the Unit on the 0por:ation.


HIST(ORY OF TECthrICAL rIINThLIGENTCE On 22 Aipril 1944, four officers recently attached to the Pacific theater from th Ililitary Intelligence Training Center at CarP Ritchie, I1aryland, arrivecd: Captain Eugene H. Manley, CE, and 2d Lt I-hilip N. Van Slyck, Ord, vho were trained for Com:Lbat Inteli e;nce; 1st Lt Guy N. Birleffi, Ord, and 2d Lt Jerry ii. Ricci, (r.C, who were trained in; interrogation; of prisoners of n;ar, The last one to join the Unit 1st Lt ?.s Ed;ward S. Peck, CE, -Iho arrived 23 A.pril. Durin, the stagin:; period,, the follo:-iAn supplies typical of those t?.ken into the field by Technical Intelligence teans wore dran;: Jungle clothing., field equirpment, office supplies, Ordnance,, a'uanition, wrappin£; rmaterials. Trinining was given to unit ror.lbers on identification of ap-.neso rr.teriel, especially Ordn.nce and Che:ical .7arfare Service, -rith rMajor Riddick initiatiIv; the instruction and Izajor Ma.rdigan roview-ing and am)lif yin:; the information on Ordnance. I.jjor 7ainwright discussed tropical diseases, health and s nitation in the jungle, with emphasis on prevention of zalaria and typhus. The day that Capt ilrnley and his group arrived, personnel were infozrced of the task force objective and -,reo shovm landing points and probable locations of enemy troops and du ;is, The following day Col Sauve' arrivod from Brisbane to discuss premovement platms.. The unit was not to go in on the oporntion until D plus 8. (30 April). On 25 April at 2000 they were alerted. After a 24 ton truck, tvwo jeeps and two ' ton trcilors in a pouring rain, the unit had to scour the base for a dispersin£r gas dump, and reached lembarkation beach at 0200. Unable to secure permission to board, they slept in their vrehicles the rest of the night. The folloinz,, day, loadin,n ?Las a-;ain hold up and the group returned to their o-,.-, area to await devClopment. Finally, at about 1700 hours on 27 ;April, everyone except Lt Ricci, wtho was to telce over ?dministraition of the United States .rrzvr Technical Intelli,;cnce Depot that 7was to be sot up at Finsclhhafen, 1vts &.br.:. i and --g;l, "h0ro werCe ssinCod as Depot personrcl., and Lt Firleffi, :who w;as left as the rear echelon for the Unit to hLiring up vehicles and pIersonal baggage later, boarded an LN and proceded in convoy toward Hollandia, arrivirk: on D plus 8.


Humrboldt Bay and ThanibTerah Bay areas were single Jap bomber dropped three. H hour t'as schedule d for 0700.rll caliber reapons wThich were quickly silenced by destroyers standing off shore. the first walve hit the beaches. ith the 741st Ordnance Conmpany that first night just off . The areas did have.itape. a sep-aratu Task Force. The primary objective had boon the seizure of the Cyclops. There :-ere many lrF. (MIa?. lihite Beach l.itapo. Sentani and Hollandia -. and on that ni. Two of the bombs landed in the middle of the azaunition and gasolinQ that had been unloaded on the and w. bombs into the area. No -oposition-r. the shore and -.hito Beach 1. Api:-roxirtely 53.1rily supply insto. 120 :riles southeast.h . the ditance wrs too groet and no mraterioel .irdror-. ?.ayQ Sirultaiieously. tempcrary captured equipment duip w.000 worth of supplies were blown up that 27 .ere set up on the' beach. 1 Corps directod operations . The Hollandia.:ith a co-bined Task Force consistinr. Thc second day was spent in reconnaisance cf the area to-. of the 41st Infantry Division.ns of the retreating enemy. The naval bombardment beEan at 0600 hours and uwas lifted shortly evacuated to the durmp on this da^y. It Vas a quick and decisive illied.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Operations at Hollandia Coverin. the 163d Regiiiental Comabat Team (part of the 41st Infantry Division)> landed at A.D plus one -. Considerable materiel was recovered both in the open and also stored in caves along the sides of the hills Howevcer. with the assault troops of the 41st Division. in anti-invasion and costal defense positions. Lt Bishop and Cpl :'irnn lended on D Day at Hunboldt Bay.e durlip areas alon. The team returned to the original bivouac area that night.ere scouring the hills north of Lake Sentani (EMp Incl 13) for si-.mrd the to-n of Iiollandia. victory.lltions and v:. horrever. .s lnet in any sector and the only fire received came from smr. ( Incl Ianp 13) and by the 24th Jspril. ({Iap Incl 12) on 22 ipri1. front of about 120 lmiles.lcr?.000. little mlore than two days -:fter the initial landincs. landing at Tanah. ground troops hit the beaches at. antiaircraft gun batteries mnd elaborate air rqid shelters typical of Japanese forriard area bases. infantrymen had captured all three .. The team bivouaced -. landing at Humboldt Bay. Hollandi'i and T^nahmhrah By.p Incl 12) and the 24th Infantry Division.

cf Tanahmcrah Bay w. The Task Force at Hollandia was 500 miles deep into enermy country.ld the advancing 28 .s locatcd.mnts of the 24th Infantry Division several encmy outposts had been discovered in the beach area wihich avre evidence of hasty evacuation. On D plus the it worked out. The explosionswrer terrific..a:ny wrecked airplanes on the strips indicating the thoroughnoss of the pre-invasion bombing. By the time CGJ. only an inspection trip 7-ras made by the tea-ls into the airdrome area.unition.HISTORY OF TECTI ITNELLIGENCE TUC. This area was selected because the road Jwas open through to the drolc s and the dangier of troops movinL in and souveniring before Technical IntclliEence could recover the ma-triel -was great. arrived on Red Peach 2.3nMdia area itself could only be reached by barge.tes 50 caliber mchine . .ny slept that night.and armunition .s of .'L niiht. Not r. Dormn the beach everyone dove for ca'ves. Lt Bishop and Cpl irnnm. . Along the road the fuel dumprs had been set on fire by strafingr attacks as shcrn by spent United [Sta. On D plus three.ith oler. One-tenth of a second lter they would have missed the supply dumnp.nd the contents scattered. for the third bom-.7as detonating all throuwh the night. lv/jor RMIAdigan arrived v-ith the Technical Intelligence Composite TJnit No. rations were cut one-third.ard the three airdroses. they wore even then lte in getting: along the Pim Jetty motor track as all the durmps had' been talmpered with and nearly all the boxes opened a. Outside of the anti-aircraft gons at the strips. 6 tomether writh the MIIU and the CIC Team. Follow. the Jpanese held the coast and supplies 7ere going fast. It -was felt that the materiel in Hollandia would be safe from souveniring till the teamL could get at it in the future. 1 and a11 Ordnance activities were placed under his supervision. fires burned the destruction of the food supply.b landed on top of the cliff beyond the beach and did little dar ge. most of theo matcriel a?.zs proceeding tow..S Teami No.. Burning gasoline and oil spread to the anr.oved to Fim Jotty wheru the 186th Infantry .un bullets. Due to road conditions. If ter this area was covered the tea:1 moved to the toven of Hollandia wrhcre the 162d Infantry . whcre. There -were a gro-t . later to one meeal a Ccrps origin. Terrain difficulties betvween Red P3each 2 n.

6 reported back1 to the Comm. xround midday C.rc.:-1 the 41st Infantry Division bet. Shortly after the Hollanrdi drome had been taken. 2 in the 41st Division Sector.) attached to the 41st Infantry Division ^nd learned that lcxro quantities of onemy equin1ment had been captured in the area.a landsli<de had considerably increased the supply problem and the rains of the provious nir. but finally on 8 .iween Szntani and Holliandir aiir drems. prompted C.GS Teari No.G_ the pcriod 28 . On arrivinr. Tcchnical Intclli:-ence Co?:osite Unit No. This was co-incidcnt with the apyearanoo Cf the first sermblance of a road seen so far. On 9 Mly C'US Teamr No. for vrant of transportation to a safcr disposal arise in the future and for CIS Tcin \To.a-nd Post. 24th Infrntry Division.pril to 7 I-May.rland Post to Red Bcch 1. Contact wa.S Teasm No. 6 lcft Hollandia and reported back to Headquarters US~. 6 (Lt Ihilli-s 'n:'d Lvt 7rur. at Red Beach 1.hito Poach 1.1 I-o.revcnted aldequrate spplies reaching them and nocessitated :novinc the Division Cor. 1 cmlc in on an LST on -.osite Unit to hnldle any Technical Intellicrence functions tha-t mii. resultinc. on D plus 8.: -. the 30th of iiApril..ay. All stores were sta. Technical Intelligence Ccmposite Unit No.S3 Team No. By this tirme. This .1S Tom-. Humboldt. several more outposts werC locsated and searched. It -?was planned for this Coqmp. The fact that there a. The pcrsonnel assisted tho troops in discharrging cuaro.TS Team1 lo.OS. 6 workod continually -With CJS Team No. Durin. 6 net C..ns accormplished on D rlus 1.:er acconpanie:l a patrol which contactcd a patrol fro.HISTORY CF TECH1TICAL INTELLIGENCE infantry . C S T-eam No. 29 . 6 to join C.S Team No. C.Iay C. 1 had arrived in the operations area.. In the vicinity of Red Beach 1. 2 in order to evedite coveraLe c)f the large stcrraye areas captured in the 41st Division soctor.cked on the beach twcnty-five yards off shore. pending the arrival of labor troops. The ::ornin] of D plus 5. Hollandia fcound it i :racticdl to continue toward the air cro-.. 6 to be made available for a future operation...s -imaintained with the G-2.hts hard mde move:mnt by truck imr:ossible. 2 (Lt PConld and T/5 Goinc. the first ene:ly supply dumps were loca-tcd approximatecly three rmiles northwest -f the drorm s.-as no transaortaticn -available frorn the 24th Division an-' the appa-rent absence of Chemical equiprant in the Division's -. to takce over the encmy equipment thus far collected. Lt Thillips and Ivt Kruc. in the discovery of more equiplment.

ajor iJrn-.ubinfg the crp -.o to 7Sa-:rl1 ..7. :ro( er ordcrs .uffered injuriosO . but no attem!t ias rnde to set ' up i pei. 3o0 .s anl n f.ipiinf.-riirht ..t the. P.lp site area at -about 700 feet rand dropDed hijh explosives and anti-personnel from this bo'orin[. a. t-7c Jrnese sinle cn. t-. pereoruiel reconnoitered for Japanose dum. r'vs r-esesvod perml.si3 n il to .s loS.k.-.' located on the beach s under a bluff occupi ed by a b'ttr3' of OI40 T' l A' stora. r.n S3.HISTORY OF 3Bo. site hc -whic in th'C 7icinity of I Corps Si-.est of 'ia etty-r on Jautef a 3ay.coe tent and jwuirle han. Lt VT..iris h ht's heTans t C i 'i.-.Jain'. of 2. c _ f 1 r .aio.jor '. out the .etomirJili thcir s'atL.rters a.s onr the trail to Itln1. is ' ov. ifood and r.o-Lo south':.iand of the UIlit.THNIC. . C sl1dedr.ent reinferLcir: .t '.quirsmert '.nd -r nlative buildingn for stora co lcated in a grassy area in a kapok grov.p.irne pll-nos car-L directly over thc beaech supliy .'Tin-rri Lht xwith G-4 of the Tsk Force the day bcfore the bo-.n smervised set tin.:-sZ ca.ras moved to Brixnkrm='s Pl1antati. Onf 'b.nded MIIjor Ridclick became ill and . a riflj squad from the 24th InfYantry holdi nrg the jetty tand thei beach.. day they l..nd Shore Re i.r exncpt -rlr'.es of 'eckless Task z Force so that the stazus of the Ujnit co-ld b~ establishedo A te. i. .. r .t n.fcu I'.yc.nd c. up the c amp -.u.used to the su-l:lies.t7wo tents for cuar.he excursion that took thenm into '. iiLht machire .ry camp site for the UTnit '..'a 2-i b. i'rro i. coT.lite Perach 3 arnd on Jautef'f Py.ndical surplios were locatccd.mulatinL.'L INfELLIGENCE The..§ .tc quthoriZatJ.s or could salvpo frori Jl..nal du.e Onit 1n4 ran into tLie old.dumps-.iA battery° T-he number of killed and weoil. :. n Fi.. arounwd 2000 hours.'ti::er th_ food short'ac c-. Lt D)ck modred oquil.lor:.o ca?. nid C. Ho-i:over.rrang.oq. T. 0 The secon1d niht. up.-inal destLuction of the supply dump on D plus cno continued..l.ssumr.rmnnnent c-mp site The first' tw.:t lC ed qu-..un squad frorm the YettyJ 532.ys.rtcrs dv .helo n an: o'esontc.ckd by the ori.-ert by LCV¢ to the row cC1i.:Iuch of the Unit's clothing aind c.ras returned to Finchh.ttack exceeded that from the prQcviois one on D plus 1 -..o of vihich strdr'led the camp rea .!ank Villa'.ac. no one in the UTait .'lithout. to .c: sevcral hundrod enery dtumps of clothin[.r~m foI cri1n.ras blcw.:th o. -..a. For day3 after that they had nothi:.:i-nd ir. i.?.Vncc.ndia to-rn. the rest landin>i on top of the bluff. b y ''.had on ' thoir !. Cil t..zocks wecre eroctud.e'ments by 71ajor J.hen so -1much deistructi1on '.

ent and he also procured ad-itionanl space noer the cramp site as an Ordnance stor. .' materiel. Lt Birelffi and Tvt Ogle rejoined the Unit.ny complete :r. Lt Row.capons carriers and a one-ton trailer. area. tons of cnemy equipmcnt of -ll kinds were recovered by the l-rge MAdical durlis. reportini. days I. having 31 . Me4lay and ep a'nese.s -ot under took over lorge quantities of captured Ordnance which had been collected by corabat troops and toCgether with Lt Van Slyck and Cpl T.umembers of the Technical Intelligenc.inii.rright procured authorizaticn from To sk Force G-2 fo: r. jor loc. a rather interesting Japanese propQtCandr a ?-agazin3 printed in Enrlish. Towsscns w-'ith two w. having come up from Finschhafen on the Dutch ship. YTevertheless. Dtu:ps -ere ransacked. rmloes wore The next day thin. Major l!6div. and Lt Birleffi collected C:S.tion and.n. displosition by -ATIS.ats -. Lt Rowe established liaison :-ith I Corps Si.anges in assignment of personnel were made: Lt Van $lyck was appointed temporary troop co=r.e loc--ted items of Sitgnal Intelligence value.iL INiTELLIGENCE That niht thoere as anothcr air raid alert. who.more than on any previous oel ration -. Itj or Riddick took over corm-_ndfrcz Major IlainvrriLht.mongr the other ca. quantities of -nmateriel eore destroyod by United States 2krr souvenir hu. Co:znosi-. From time to time several ch.Major '-Tninri£. Capt LaiLlbert broulaht in supplies of Tapaenese clothing and food.adiLsan established liaison w.l Cf fice for assistance in collecting: Sigmanl equipmc nt . Nearly all the items recovered in the Hollandia areas were in the oriLinal pa-cking and in fine sh. ine shops were ruined by souvenir ch hunters picking them ipart. but no bomnbs wcre drop-ped. Lt '. on the success of "Greater East A.HISTORY OF TECHNIC. for assistance in recovcring equipr.ptured documents.-.ith I Cor:s Ordna:' of this oquipmuenteas of hijeh Intel li ence value.and ni. as left by the Japanese.foodson.ander. Lt Peck wv~as returned to Finschhafen and en route assisted in procurinrg rrwater transportation for thc Unit.e Unit to enter JTapanese duraps and remove equipment ^f IntclliLence value. vm-s turneod over by the UInit to the CIC for transl'.sia Co-pros'pirity Sphre". sig:htod. Lt anil opencd and tr. In the follow.rvoes evacuated additional Japarese equipment. Hovwever. Mlajor Ridclick 'who had recovered from his illness.ay: mj or Thain. tl?.

......rcapons carriers and the one-ton trailer.SuDp... Mess Officer e.... I Corps. Lotter reportinrg the incident vras sent to I Corps and la.... crated and lbcolled.... Bcefore imAch improvoleont was ma.. .. then to Comn.iustralila. G-2 US..KICAkL INELLIGENCE secured five c. rithout authority by 194th Ordnanco Battalion..:pleted... .de in the sarea to better the helth and sa-nitation conditions...s packed. .. . vwas released from the Unit to acomrpany Lt Pond....froa Cor nkndant Lt B3irloffi.. the two . Goin.rith three samples of each item. appointments: Major Madia.. (Pklp Incl 12) to procure Sirnal Intelligcnee aatoriel in that -rca.... scrving ~with the 41st Division.HISTOR"Y OF TE.. Ld jutant Capt Lambcrt...s. .s..)hn finally located by Lt Birloffi.aastor Salvage Collecting Cormpany and the Tcchnical Intolligence Unit were hospitalized with Dencguo fevcr..nt...rxr...Dcpot Officer Lt Van Slyck. nine enlisted mDen and ran officer from the 234th ciartcr. Lt 3Joodson..aptured Ordnonce eguipmeont dui-. . ..... sav! to it that all his cquipmcnt collected in the tollandia area w.. 2.S03 directed the followring.. brought up from Finschhafen by Major Riddick and Lt Birlcffi was dischar:eod by mistake at . Base G... he procured orders for himself from Sixth .. i c...ter to the Corranrdirnv Gonernl..·· . On 20 May.......p set up by MAajor Madigan at Brinknian's ilanutaticn -.7 Team No. and rndc arranr...ith rntciriel cratcd ard stenciled for shipmcnt to the United States... his mission at Hollandia com. *..... -..~s of Japanese Medical equipment Officcr Lt Van Slyck . 32 . I-vt John Eucer. one zeapons carrier had been taken over by a Signal unit and both truck and trailer had been looted... Executive Ca~pt 1h-1anlcyo. Report i-as rado first to Inspectinrg Gcneral.....sos. .. Troop Conrtander Lt Van Slyck ..nt.... T/5 Paul R.......ncd to 5250th from C....Jhitc Bc1ach 1.JS section 41st Divisi on.andinc General......... .. Transportation Cfficr · .. CO.. . . Base G..... . I .... . In the course of three rocks..... Kollandia tras infested with the Usual Juncle dises...coernts with I Corps transportation for shipme. joinod the Depot Officer The Unit had the usual trouble with the misappropriation of property..?as roa-oved -......ll y ?ssiC.. ..... Lt Ro:¢e left on temporary duty w'ith United $StatesF'orces at Diak... Caipt Lanmbcrt .····.. ready for shipim. . with the oquirlaent to have it translated and analyzed and to report results of Mebdical Technical Intelligence to Col S&'1vc'. terminated his detached service and flew to Brisbanc.

was . requisitioned from U$S. AOll h-ands .t Rijchrd T. arrived at Hollandia to clarify the stntus of equipment in the field depots thero and to reach an unclrstandin{% on its disposition. Depot Officer ?.y the Unit moved to Kajoabi Delta. dcy Capt Iahnlcy.. was the first Technical IntolliL. hkad no undcrgrow7th.mnt s.cnc Engincr np toamu in the field.. USSCOS and wore sent to rnet Captain Connors.TICAiL IT:L:TLIGE:TCE There fzorc. h ded. ars dcne.hibious trud&..ina.ho w. Mo.HISTORY OF TEC. .Aviation Engineer B-attalion that w.appointed A. The followin.t Finschhcf en. On the scie day. Here a display of cspturcd oneci equi. Lt Sta'r. They savcd the area before any dmal.midals.-s anple for the Units requirer.collision w-ith a 2-' ton ramp.pront was set up for visiting officers in a wihite Japaneso tent and two pyra.S03S EnCgineer a:t Hollandia on 5 June 1944. tw. Engineetr Toam.-as comnpiosed cof S/Sr. the team departed a Jeck later for that area. Shortly after the Unit had settled in their ncw -arca. Tcrwrd the Cild of M. The team ins3lcted the dump areas in Hollandi?.sualtics to be the site of the future Tochaical Intollirence Deot -. -ravelly.djutant in his place and Lt Trier was appointcd IArea Comzan3der vice Lt Van Slyck.i.s lburrncd . Lt Van of Slyck .-ing tho river banks. just evacuated by C Come any of the 842d .ed to Finschhafon as the result of a.t ot ollndia. in addition. but foound little one-y -. inventory equipment in the Technical Intellioence Depot.o other c-. Hiarirng that quantities of cnmay Engineerintg oqui-ment especially certain mobile wvater purifying ·unita were being rocovered at Piak. ha-d good dra. left by air for Brisbanc.. who h:-d been appointed AssisOn 19 June Lt Birleffi .emberrs: l-t . -ith -nd T/4 Ro. fAustralia.afen The area w=as high. a cloud burst filled and partially dad=r the arm of 1'ojcobi Delta and nearly flooded the U. He took back with hi.t t relieved froml Distribution Division at Intcrrmediate Section. 3. Connors. to inspect wa. coI:manded by Capt Donald D.ej and wc.orkod .t clearing i obstructions in the river bed and in da.ined by Unit m. U40SOS.ent on tenpor?7ry duty to Finschhafoe n tant Coordinator of Technical Tntelligence in the Office of the IC* 3S G-2.. arnd Carpt Lambert was hospita-lizccl for bone fractures and retur. It out.a truck and w-'as hospitalizedr .rith c-rbolic acid while unlo-:dini.: several items of J-panose equipz-nt and uniforms for a display pirpose at the Finschh.ger Sherwocd ¥.

ca.o Thnomas T. Dcaniel T/3 John L.Wtnc:i.t E cnjai.lbeck Ko-. 34 . Llrsor± $hc'r:an (appcintcca Unit Clerk) T/4 Robcrt J. Jackson '1/3 Ka.:d previously been rcquisitionpcrsonnel. 'Vannlulcci Ivt Richarrd E.nt and ~. Johnson Gcorge R. 'Tr. T/5 CT sp.7S Ivt Ed-r'rd T.rolU J. personnel arrived and '-cre attached tc the Depot: C. On 7 July Lt i'i'rco Butler III. ar there ts some question pertainir.tjor assumed command of the Unit and 6eneral . HagCGis Tlathanii Can)t Lrbert relicved. Clcsno C-rl H.Lt Victor Dcl CGucrcio. inf-rmally.f CheO:ic. Smitl EMI/j.. Test T/5 T/ T/5 T/5 T/5 efc Tfc Ifc rfc tvt John supervision of the Depot.n Eeckl-cr T/St Hobert L. ITilligan Cd.HISTCIOR CF T2CH-:ICILL IiTTLLLICi:CE nho h.. Ilc'lcrry Crl Nlthmn H.. C:. the Chie-. lst Lt Louis Iiccny 2d Lt Lam:-nce R.s increased ncemy activity cand thouch no one in the Co:positc Unit r. on 10 J. . ocauso the unit v-as ocratin£. M. Green n. Trir Yfc :ar G.. cExvoYy T/5 Charles T. Irony Gecreo Grirrcs Glcn .l Officcr. CE arrived and was appointed the Dopot Co-:rancder inin the vicinity.uly arnd 11 July the follo-rinj.. Rolott Louias C. of Juno thoro . The f1loriinrL: jcined the Unit 22 June: cd fro:-. al1l corsonncl wero directed to be ar-cnd -:hn leavin£. the jurc-.lillard T/4 Th/-:as E. Toward the on-. Buccklcy CRD Ifc ilbcrt L. Reynolds time :la jor Ridrfick -as relieved for another assigrLze. xrro T/3 lirchio I. Do Friotas AibLout the sam P-vt i'Tick .S 1st Lt Otis >I.lorath Ifc Robert M1I. Gorzesak Theoolhilis G. 2.rcin~ C.. 'i.. -JuSASS. HlazrlinGl Rallph F..rd T/l4 T/4 J!nmes J .to the efficiency of the unit in crforring its nission.

. returned to Brisbane for conference with the Chiof Orc'nance Cfficor. arrived to surveyr the --ork that hadi booen by the Unit anld to adlvise the ircrsormul thot capaccom1plishcl nase G ae F. l. M. Coordin.HISTORY COF TCHI:IC*L.y be ship>ped fro:i.: completcd his ilission. and tureCd mntoriel r ud.tor cf Technical The fcllowinr.SOS.eLnce U3ASO03. norw that most of the enemy equipment in the area had becn rocOVvc ha-in.agjr Madi. clty MIjor Joh:ns t Intelli. 335 . ly a tratnsshipr'rnt would bc i:rimcic. Mhjor Johnston.hy arn Lt Butler confcrrcd -!.ith Gencral Ycrer on the clispositicn of the Madi£:an. Lt Fhrlr. !iAjor Shull. IEZLLIGEDNCE on. US*. On 9 October he reported to Dase F to assulme charg:e of the Ordnance %n alysis Section of the Tccbhlical Intelligonceoepot.a jor That daty dopot.& larTel.

se as the Depot bu.rehouse turned over by the base Chemical 'T.t first. During .'Qi. 25 Ilarch 1944 and letter F22B 386-.quarters at Brisbane to 2. alls for the buildin.!..e as dropping.n 'ebruary 1544 strc-t.:3e the lines of conir. . effective 20 4. authority -was grranted to establish the United States . was appointed Depot Cfficer.ilding.erds and 1st Lt 2dw. mC: CR OiAI..rr.iler.ii !L. 28 lihrch 1944. This cor. too far behind the front lines.ACD.Iii3TOCY OF T7CHIC C :_ ii P T L IITT-i-LI lTr'TC2 1R IV RYI i:.nent Depot at 2risbar.:ar mo77ed fori'ard it gPainred mo7-entum_. . who hVa.liinirng of the analysis sections 36 .a longe ways by convey. were constructed .. iThe United States Captured Snei.000 miles -. &is The Technical IntelliL:ence Depot Is Toved to Finschhafen In accordance .pril 1944. unichtion w-ith heoui.Jldhiralt. 3tan.Jnit sta[ed 'or TIcll-adie in Ipril was relieved of duty 1wi-th thie 5250th Technical Intellirence Company shortly af'ter.3 leadquarters US1iTE.d been left in charge of tnhe Depot when the Coomosiite .hafen.ds ca-apaifn .e .nd it iwas mlcade rain and burglarproof. For Technical Technical Intelligen ce Depot at Firnschhafen. -. and for quarters for their personnel..Tuly and A£i1ust the analysis laboratories of the Technical IntellifL.y Equipm. wa-i.ith letLer GSB 323.Islan.3 Headquarters USA30S.ard R. .ence sections vwere moved from nBrisbane to Finsc1. the suctions utilized the facilities of the base for their ainalysis laboratories. The omcninE. the rapidity of collection and processing of captumred enermy Nateriel and disse-rination of information is one of' the prime missions. nrld scopo. Lt Rlcci.. of the .- October 1Q4 4 th'.rf are 3ervice ':ras conlverted for u.

Si. Australian. who had particularly in the matter of supllyinr complette information on thle plce and circumstance of recovering equiprment. 'rr.nt that h . This personnel was delayed in arriving until the sun. General Somervell -rote a letter (Incl 14) that clearly established the status of Techniical Intelligence specialists on temporary duty to the theater. ith 7 other depot personnel at Finschhalfn to expedite the ship.Iernte for th-e -:ove from Bris3bne to Finschh'afen.rer of 1944. Biak.rere 1st Lt Jack 7. and handling of equipalent and personnel and iwa3 conducive to gtreater collaboration amonrg the services. in regard to secu. ke.was a new and more efficient set-! ..d stocked up there from the Trollandia. In p.rmy Service Forces enewy equipm.Tay.nd -3Jarmi operations.-vard to the Derpot at Base F shortly afterwards to be briefed by Lt Santilli in methods of coiloctinr and evatluating senemy.nal : lateriel on operations w. It cent:-alized control eliminated certain phases of dxlj lic -te administra tion.7ere desired.arch. operated the S3inal analysis laboratory at ?risbane until the end of I. h.Jrrly T'echnical Intelligence Depot wvould not only be a center for the anualysis and shiperent of captured materiel bt also thle location for a training school for orientatioen of nefJ personnel assigned to Technical Intelli!~ence duties. Lt .ad offered the icl'rvices of . D)anielo and 2d Lt /acob Overholt.ith field teans. rmade a special trip to lMelbourne to contact the Mh. Sig-nal Corps.nts for the chan-.lcide Santilli. lrong the first to receive this instruction .llated t.both at the main Depot at Finschhafen and the temporary fielrd depot at Hiollandia -.. T/')i Plackledge and Tj5 Traub.HISTORY OF TCHNiIC4'L IPiTLLLIGENCE vith the receiving and shippir. Lt Col .ent of captured ene: y equip:.'illiara Ait. SC. . Bexrc. worked overti:_e -.pose of ca-ptIured equip-ment that '-had accum. and had received iLmiodiate concurrence that they -.00C p ulnrds of organJ za.e in location of the a-alysis la' oratory aund to di.. vith emihasis laid on correct m-nethod of reportinu. Depot -. It was 1-lJanned that the United States . assigned to the 52C5th in June and se-nt f'or. General Brehon Somervell.tion i-. Briefing included stuldy of technical data and identification photographs. 37 .rin s3armples of captured Japanese Signal Corps equip:ent rwhich had been r-aported in the Alustralian depot there.ent specialists to the Pacific The ater earlier in the year.cked soime 2.sster Gereral of Crdnance. and re-emphasized the inmportance of Technical Intelligence in the rwar effort.:' Comranalding General Army Service Forces.r ara kde.y. when he departed for Finschhafen to make arraniLnme.

:. to t c ic l field dr. 5zho To nic~ . 1 ca... ...' ..~f~.. to caproturned fromr the ?.r .~' . c~ '-t to) i.' .u tri'.ou:ti.'?s th.d to h the or' h: i'bl o h e. L -T1..i oi. 7 ..r.1^ .rnt. '. on '~ "'. lso Lt B3n' .s a stag.' -... O''' (desiralr1c to pub1is i i..1l h .rt .L__r1Ioyvin i berl. l~~~ o-' )--da l .ceqt .:-...'. i . ion f'r :...o r u..'s nid..rt rs du t the '~p t -..l ?izu'?.iel d teamns.. HTl'o1ilerdi? :3pe'"r.. 1 _. 2iCCh-p.nitei T..jer . . 7:procoeo.11e eelpho. Co.ic.telli T.). !.lr thor > l ' t li 'I .ore easterly auses in . . t pt. n....rC- (' .. .. . 1booklet hke was 7t'.di i . .it'..c:. lom-ie dri:zr to the Deot from -.r-ve" .'eC?:)r.t~rio...." 0C:di ^. rf ?. . ' '"'.' tor.-: t'r_Q .'1 .' t 0 1 i". -- S >.ider .. : 4epo ' h-lf f'/ -~~~~ _~ . i l C r.-_ h-..'o be. C c e''~ atinih tr--tivc am ./lfD.vy t ty cf :.. I '.d for additional hel) C'.bor '::et-.T1 .uu recL equilent to t'th z -c. Li is. f'th '<.' ' t et1~{d fr h c..."nMedicines.:ie _r-1.~r.eot1 e (--=/ IT::cl i 2 and 13) .:C i-l~ ~ ~ ~ ilc .rleirrI... . L II.ns +' the t h25Cth -chIi1OCU~~.?!".C_...n"my hai~. ..-s.:_ 1'i" . 1 r . dc-ed iC:o r..':l_ .tioi .'-i lh -. .:..:'i:.!. !. . . ... .-. _' di-:f .. _-'t ...3 0 .- ais nd 1.~t. "":oi. pt Til-Y s.-id -'it' -the .:. ' . 4. Ib:t it .... ar Irt_ li c-e1 '-ri .. a e'"" <>. .:!o. .cw ..--..< T + .uin ea . repr s c r h rt-r .-I .nCee +' .tcrises in -Prisbane.. and rsu1t of .2.1 .Irte it h nf'o-ation to t~~e X e.0-. cOi. - tr.... wo i L 1 pllaccd -t.'i.J1 lni cal 2tL03e . l C..t.1 e t:.- .1 ' j ' e tce the repor t '. rCoort on the analysis of SO' ' r . : o:-: for on. Urutin<.rc rrmpar d _n i su 1. . Lt p to sutit a just as ::ajor in'.:STORY OF TECi2TIC. C..pertaininr. . 11..i .T. ' n rI.. olver his posic CC r taire :' . adminis]_di irore:.t..h r -. co .IQ'. o i ..TELLGENCE rin t'1 t 011r of 19.n.ptu r on thtl o1) r..s dsip. o1. J_ C rts. h.. ero.u.. ... r.r -i ic.n .i0 1 ' n. -hi.s : U!:o-niO.'" .n -..i'.... trip -= lore ' .. r:'.. c... t oi * r1 .aryl~d_ . :c. .._'o'1 .1 (I J . o r d iseinai3. .':'e-1 :'-riT.'%ify. u:.'C 'b c rrot'l officer )nt -rend enli.sis was .. 1 r-.itioi rd d'rltr'L -'..i.. 2 Sa 104I.. f c::.. t inr-c -. i "4t1 .. .. rsorn sinod "..'li once Co:"-ay e-<p-1. -Li."nd s"-'lie.:'hr . f' '.:~ nieJ !ntelli-..cSiatl... ^.y to bri.. '-.! . ' 'ish ...directed tircraft t: the ::.i y -'c other services... Ch O>ical are TechC1..ilkde-' .._~:..~'i -".sr" ~ n3 :a the .ecinical .sttd men ucre added ^ro r y t t:t iratiqc:i.ta cn Yap. .:.-sn .:~ ~ hdm l :ma. o o ba-c7. I.

flnn for Thrc-e liays later a second Ordnance team.xn Contact vr-.overland to the rwest. Lt ITowakowski's arrival.siderablc Japanese Ordnance The rcnmainilnn. combat persormel for the cominEg operation. Lt Bishop and They wiere attachod to the 6th T/4 'jimu. over svwac2p -m.HISTORY OF TLC7' going to relieve the 6th Division at Sarti.s his first officer. rCportCt at Sarrmi.rded to the United States Tway days later the Yaps lost the 194) Division on 17 Sarmi position writh the United States seizure of nearby WTakde Isond. still at Brisbneo and accom panied the section -hon it was shipped to Finsc'!hafon. there Bay and the fully completed. *Lt pleted their ruisosion in Aunust. 1April. arackcing and shipping.or Twhose construction h. equipment was turned over to MTajor equipm-.hore it was found the CIC had shippod out con. been ordered to the United States on jor '!. 39 . During the staging period the team assisted in trainin?. by the talies in were signs that the two airdrours. whole area con- Th is threat luas nipped with the surprise l-ading at ixrara by the 163d Regi. returned to the Ordnance analysis . and T/4 TLvy and continued to recover Tapancse equxiplment. when they had comat ri.akcw:r-ski and T/4 IP. rotation.rithdrre.sld as a Technical Intelligence '. Division.. -is toee.d untravcrsed jungle ranges.n cooperated -with Lt Nm. 1st Lt Nc-:ak-kowski and T/4 Rayromlnd Lbvy also reported in to 6th Division from tHeadquarters Lt Bishop's temn pulled out for the US/ISOS four days later. most of wrhich wras Depot for-w. zwhich never been might be built up for general operations and the vorted into e? defense sector. Ordnance team cohpDostd of ITajor Ifigrion Penn and Sgt John Linchalk left Hollasdia on 17 June 144 to stage -ith the 31st Infoetry Division -rhich . They part of the Divisiont arriving at loft then with the first Sarmi on 12 yuly. . w-.. Later in this operation the l63d PCT was reinforced by ele:-ents of the 6th and 31'st Infantry Divisions.akowski. PRenmants of the Yap carrison from A1ara -.JL IMTELLGETICE When ITollandia vas3 cTturei.lental Combat Teeml (RCT) of the 41st Infantry ?T. was replaced in iAuLtust by Capt Sternal w-rho took this as:-idlulent in the fI..lschhafcn.rnry Tcchnical Intelligence rNo-. across country belicved to be inhabited by headhunters. one at Maffin other at Sa. iSother Ordnance scction.s mde with the 6th Divisio.n G-2. Sansapor operation shortlJy -fter having hPcn.

k Islaland o'-artion was ovCer except for maoppirJ up. Signza Corps. they still held it.mny the 41Lst Division on this opera. ap-roachs t CGeelvink Bay. Lt Daniels.rrangem-. or okoe amnd Sorido.boen the Sinal Technical Intelligence hlt. by 2 . une ?after Tfnitod S-'iSataes forcceq in ca sustained movor. The cdiui.lro in a surprise fl-nk move(amrnt to t1o enels roe'ar h Bi-!. 'SC. other to a. . 40 .s tulned over to hi-.ent of envelopzlent.-. a-nd landLed .ents to . had broken stubborn Tap resistance to seize the.ccon. ho-rwever. hci:fhi.tion. cn his ovwn initiative had nrde a.t 3Biak on H plus 50 m.inutes 27 ay..ird. . itaek-: 27 MaLr -- 20 . Having complited his 7iission at Eoll-andia. until he w!as relived of tcmorarvy dut.. 4 Cn 27 ?lvy 194i Unitod 3tates ground forces 1raled on Biak Island (hFi/a Inci 12) which driLnates the northerr. after a three hour battle on 3 Tunc.HISTORY OF T2C-Li'L I.'ter a tcwr o-day boattle ending 2 not st:cthiin tor be r-itten off the 1books in a few days.ant factor of the rpcration rwas th high combat efficiency of the onaerLThe 1lst Infantry Division (minus 163d RCT) carried the early operation at Diak. and the port faciltieos of Sorido Village.errh Tho ha.ilable information pertaining to this area .idce. and by 16 June tkhey had captured o-kI-h. at Finschhafen. with the 31st Infantry Division in Seapteirer. r aroesrntta ive in the area left . .Jithin trwenty-forur hours after landicr: it was clear that back t the Dopot... Bick's3 captu. Lt o o.: r .re. United States infnlltrygr n :on the c _c1=rz-ndU .:ith the 6th Division to go on the $3ansapor oper-tion. he departedc from that base with the Division 23 Iay as conayding off'icer of the Signal ntelligence Tera. -. The seizure of this island iarked the practical en. joined the 31st Division to carry one ill av.Lup. called Mo I rr ?.d of the NeJ Guinea cmc. vance to the thtree airfiolds -would not be easy. He continued collecting cquiplernt and iirain. GETCE ILI Lt . Urniteo States groxLd f'orces htld the initiati-ve but it reaulired soi:P of the fiercicst fizh`tir in the history of Pacific -azrfare.irstrips..pein.

in.lly in the first few days -of opcr?..cov-r thu cquipmr-lnt fromz¢ the field (this -.i-pping of ll11 tea).Sarii operation for the Sansapor operation.cto ry arrango-Ent as thlcy provided hi-m ith for it wxas found that this .omnt either at opeortinii positions or in dumps. ontrance to onc of the largo c-aves. 2 C...t"side ision Sig. operation that the desire to help of the officers in charge of troops hiad . . in thcir . It arrived in good condition.bos. Toiioe of the cquiprelint reco-vercd had been booby-trapped although the Japancsc hadl h-d suifficient timeo to trap or dostroy the cquipament in the vicinity of the air strips. Ynhere the Division .tecly 4.area. to ::et oll the equipment rc-emoved from the durmps ^ the rmost satisf. but by the tiime this ca. bcfre the fighting wras completed. anft rockets. they wore orcdered by the Sixth frri:v to report to the 6th Division in the \kYffin Bay . It wras oftn fouind im.mipany.-e casoline.-approxima.?avc valuable assi. when hc returned to Base F (Finschbafcn) with all of thz Signal equipacmnt capturod -. Howover.l to do writh the success of the Technical Intellipgnce mission. they arrived carly in July. operation to aid.tion. ot3tlh .fast as they were reported or loc. dumps nmd (It -ms noticeable from. hvo-never..dia. Thc activities of Lt o.adigan at Holloandia. pl.ipy cxtended overy effort to facilitate the recovery and return of cnci. located in thi.was before 5250th . so "Off Limits" signs .1ajor Mc.was being.ho shipped the equipmQnt for thon by water to .nition..) aid the Divof cli-ient for the storaD dodot .Je weore also closely coordinated with the Division G-2 ana the Counter Intolligcnce Corps toem.. oz. relieved from the ^rara -.rcro posted to help prevent the lootili of dtumps before itcrls of Intelligence value cculd be removed.rce3 burmuJl beyond recCg.nal ccrL. Th. however. There no re ri lr Koll wore found at .ore . ) eofixed radio stations at Biak such as Thorec was one smaller station. espocia.J equipment.ns. s no evidence of the a. 4-5 . Lt Rorec rcmaincd ant Biaak unltil 3 Tuly.ted. Lt Bishop and T/4 JTinn were the first Ordnance Tceam to be sent into the Biak oper.-s in thoe Signal supervisd tl:e c. Considerable heavy Ordnance uratricl they had collected on Biak had to be turned over to the task force Ordnanco officer w.possiblo.tteLmptiing to destroy an1 of their cquipr. gresat do.opcrtatin and nrecessary pirsomnol to re.ith the task force Signal c.sJt l nce in reporting SinJ. the scts .atI-ITORY CT :>C uo'w I:1TLLIcGNC2 e opocrtteod closely.?aikde -.s cleared of Tcaps by usoi.500 pounds.r.

not .f HISTOPRt OF TEC'T -ICiL II:TUjIGETCE Lt Claude F.iakz opcr--.technical ranailysists.Lheoy aeln had nc conce-)tion of its ission.tion hard been doclared "practically vwon" by various ncs cow: entators in the St-tes.-ion of leon waho had never heard of Tec!hnical Intelli. the hardcst fightinf --ams still to co.. 1toc over eneny equiplmoent frci:m~whuom.:e.atericl ¥?as still avail:tl Finschha fc n. Eninorecr eouip-ent -. Thoy had takeln off.rwood. Technical Intelligence tcEan.enccn . and . L c~nsiacr-clC quantity of o.. to ship it to the Technical Intelligence Dcpot at Finschhafcn.menm.-e 'authority from the i. Jthouh.l b ._cessarily :. .e OrnncC C. P:cca!uso of orders. .d . secured trans-port-rtion. . wras to recover the equisin.only hacd to be cci. arrived.the Hollandia operation 10 June. arrived at Fiak fro-. rm. for this invaceont. ..cchhl. 3.hopped a plane ride '.). Ccntain Conimors. this Ornalnce tlaial'3o was unable to rurn. Pope.ble all equiprent at one point. Pvt Richard E. ald then turn it over to 42 .Thy ta-llced thloir vay throurgh.erc sent to Biac durii-: an. .-c.. . operated under Gcneral Orders froml trcr i:Hteadaquarters. They planned their oim itinerary.ops still had on-ly an unsteady hold on the origina-. at that tielD strcing for the coning Philippine Islands ?p*ration. but arranrigctnts -.-ii. that thncy were "te proceed wh-crver necessary to socurz' captured enemry cquip"nt".ttachod. 'tien Cajptain Co-:. Early in tie acific :Jar.IHeadquartcrs Basoe "f (..troops to combat they .ftcr Lt Bishop and T/4 7inn had left to join the 6th Divisi amde with S-4.ias S3ptembo'er to take over to the Depot at a. shipired by theo Cn 28 3Scptc-ber Ordnrancc TeacNo. Unitecd States tro..sse. lxt ^also first class sales. l. c^r:?psir Ordnance No.. on their own initiativec -.teriel had beeoon shipped. sub-mit a report. . . S/Sgt Srith and T/4 Sh.nt.nd did all -t'his by crather co. Engincer Teala being ca. the '-.nors and hi's teau.r-ly scroungecrs of tlhv first ordcer.pturod in that arCea.Then they heard that considecrablce encr.bat i n.1 prccedod to 24th Division..pre-nas i.r-. like Lt at Bia-k until all the captured m:a. .l the Japs took the beach road away -- a. Roynolds (all newly assie:gnr Torni to 52Cr0t). that tiine. ?They oftcn had to win the cooc er-. Ptvt Allbrt L.rer not n.

therefore. Dutrino this post operational'hhafen to finish collectirg the equipnont ald to return that on hand to the Dcpots.::s. the following adcditional tee..'.zoor.3 .mre specific authority to t'~kl over equipment fron troops in the area. The tjal~i left Bia.:pany in June along wiith Capt Connors. Lo Garner . arrived at Bi :k: 2l Lt Allen ]f!illips Pvt Robert Dennigan T/T J..r Technical Intelli~.nld left it with the task force Enr. This tii.T -I4C!L HI3TCRY OF T.inoer Tea to leave Biak b f ore the equ'ipnment -. Tv.-ho had the only othor Enuino.Tdei cl 1 2d Lt Earl Raab Qsrtr:Laster C. who had. Capt Connors.crnce tmaxn in the Thheater..To.k c-:rly in Tulyr and Capt Creed called Maijor Har:zood's Enginleer Toaez: (T/3 Ellyott and T/3 P. cratcd the matericl o. i.jer Har7rood. as the wfar procecded.t Charles ::right Lotz ". inc r3 .inschhafon.coald be shipped to the Depot act . -!ator purifier unit. boon assigned to the 5250th Technical intolliscnco Co'. for the teams to safehand equipnent back to the Depot to insure its arrival Yosuph 1"llvoy PvJt Loon yrcers SiTcial 2d Lt :-eI43nry Sarnvis T/3 Tohn entire Japanese inichine shop.ris) tQ go up to Diak fro3m Fii. 3.ugust). mines. crrived at Biak in Septeliber after the close of oper-tions (20 ..'CH- ILT~ELLIGEENCE the base transportation officer. like the other twro teams. etc -. It was found more and more desirable.7C. to be vested with r. and '. all personnel nevs in the field. ho.. had EnL.ic arrancements hatd been mrade through the 5230th for the tear.


Thsco tenams not ornly reco7eorcd equipment re.mininfv in the Lialk 'x;i-, but :.lso .iriod expocrience in Technical Intollieonce work uLnder ficld conditions as preliL-:inary training for csarbat duty during, the coain.j. Ih.ilipine canpaitn. Late in September the follaiowLV ter--. received or'ders to report to Hollandia to
stcie .:ith the 24th Infantry Division for the IThilippines:

Lt Phillip!s C'iW Tc.ran.; Lt Ra.ab of the Medical Corps; Capt ilvcy's Quarternmaster Team; and Lt TarvJis' Signal Team.

A Tochunical InteUlliPLnce

Coordinator is

,p:!ointed to Sixth jAry

2It th.e bocinninL of the .w.r, Techrical IntelliEence had been -!opendrent upon concurrenc of the r..ry before they coald .. r o into aIy opeor.tion; the ,r-iry caild refuse, or havinCg gramted

permission, could chamCn

its mind.

Upon the formtin of iTS.E~'E another link was added, and the request to 'o into combat had to be sent to them. They in turnl requostod perm.ission from the tr'r. Even once h.Virg- gaiedd pca-iission, all not 1-as smooth sailingS. The totams frequently w-ould arrive at the Division Cor p;sr for stagiIn;, only to discover thet the, k Force lhal not been notified that the Technicel Intelligence teams wcre to be -ttached to their ho;adquerters. Not nowj-ing anything about it, the Corps ::'ould som:eotils order them back or si.aply lick up and go off on operations, leaving the tcals.. Thi, is w;hat had happened in conl:-!ection with the Cape Gloucestcr opiratiln w;rhen a qpcially fcrlmei unit, cent up for stag. in,, after per:i:ssion 'al:d orif:inally betrn ;ivon by th;trrr, w/as cdenied permission to go on the operation:-. Late in juoe 1944 Col N. B. Sauve frwrardecl a letter to Sixth .~r-,, outlining; a plcn for a Technical Ini;elligence officr to be atachl-le to Sixth Lhr- to supervise training prograri-so and to coordi-ate the activities of Tochnicol Intcllie;once personnel supulicc. by USlASOS to Sixth LyXrzr. Sixth 4iry agrceed. fAuthorization was then obtained fronr US'JFE for direct com:miication betvween Sixth Airziy and USASOS on Technical Intclli-gence matters (thus skiApping; the US3FFE link), and authority was granted for TSJ,SO.S to issue orders attaching TechnicrJl Intelligence porooinel to Sixth 1irvy.


HISTORY OF TECiT-TIC'.JL IiT .;LLIC--DTCC3 Captain Crccl had': arrivedl in the Theater durin: Jtune and had born lplaccd on deta.ched service with the 5250th. He and T/3 rtcorson .wore rplceod -t fir::t oni te:':-orary duty to Headquarters ilara.o Force to ilrstruct the 112th and 158th Cavalry Pegimrntal Co::lbat Tea.-s, which were to particip te in the Tlhodla.rk and Kiri;,rirr. Islris -operationls, in the identific-ation and operation of cnc:-V Orrcn -nce equi-:7ent. The first ;;eol^; of July 1544, Capt Creed ;-;asp -ced on detacheo._s0rlvice with the Sixth Ir.~r as the first Coor-.inator of Technical Intelli,:,ence f:r an ixry in this 1Theater . Attached tc the Office of the Asrisctant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth .rmy, his 'wrk was to coordinate activities of all Techmical Intel1 it;ence units placed on te.porr ut- with the 'rTrry; to mainuty tl.dn liaison betwrecn the AC of S, G-2, Sixth 'rny .nd AC the of I3, G-2, US'30S; to advise G-2, U 33SOS, as to the number and coi.:osition of Technical Intelligernce units requcir&d by the Ir.:!y; to coordlin-te the activities of Sixth m:r-Y-g's Technical Intlli.-;enne units; to supervise the trainiinrg pro-'ro:. for troops on Tochnical Intelliei::nce r-ntters; and to act as liaison officer with the United States r r Technical Intellirpence Depot. -y

2/3 Jolm Lotz was assinedrl t- G-2, Sixth .rlly, to ha-dle
the clerical -work, and Car-::t Stcrnal and T/:>i-t I'etercsn Vrere attached to the r-rgr to assist Capt Creed in conl'uctin a trainirng program on the use of TJatpan;se wce p1aons. Ultogether, the efficiency of the sclt-up was irlproved one huLndrcd percent. Early in Septe:imber Capt Creed cal- do-m fror Sixth lr-.y for a conference with Col Sauve' on the nu-mber and composition of' tea_.s for future operations, an-' arrzangeenentswere rar-dce to supp3,ly the requisite person- el. Task Forces then lmcv ah:-. :' f timne what Technical Intelligence tea.7ms to expect and h':.wrtheir work was to be coordinarted vith the plans of the Divi.sion or Corps. Preli:-Jinary aIrrangceents :'re also made for th6 'Tecmical Intolli 'ence teams to assist in the pre-combat training program. As it tutrned out, closer coordination was established betwe-ln the teo:lis and key peorsonnel at Task Force headquarters as well as with the troops, and the flow of infor.lation and :materiel between the teams in the field and the Depiot vrs conideorably expeited.


HI3TCORY 0? TECEUC-,L I IC-.T.E at toot irnschhc.Ien Is Enln-.r.,


The D In

i.-uTtly Major Onakle Bullock, Corip3 of En:;,inoers, frca enlist:.. -men, -,;sre tr.nsferred to -n. to-, Soi.uth Pacif ic ,cz, ny, -.rnc' after a few nte t2qOth T c:aiczl, Intellilence Co.: d.ays orientatio':, -,erc transferred to Finscfhiafern to process jczr ?__ FIarood I's -lequipimcnt seint in by the tzo EnT:ineer toas -- sent out into the field. By this tilme and- Copt Connor's ll ca?.,turcd e nemy cquii'e-t ,;a-.s bcint fJcrvT-ardced to Finschhfcrn rather than to Brisbane f or analysis .andc trans-ship:clent to the Un1tited St.atoes. Lt Col Jon:Is, Encincer Intellif inc2c Of0icr fr.om1 U;3.'30S, to studly cllndi ::s- :nt fr:iBrisbvz;.nc1 t Finbs.chhafcn :of o 'i '.1csp.?ition cap.r Deiot, t-o -' the facilitics of the nwc n. turocd .r._invcir equipmont, to conrfer -- ith th new' n in c'r Ar1:y liaison Sixth Intolliceonce te.^s arn the ncily..poirnted officer, Cao t Croc o vq.;s '.-b c interested in In .Jgujst Captain Gordon Bess, anes equip---e.t, reucsteod transfer of Jao. .,dl h:-d I :'lTicd:e tem1, he wvas ficed to a ::nt to tho 5250thh. '.'; atssi ;i dctailed to the Ordnance section tc relieve Capt Birleffi, of the Assist.ant ?h~o ;7:s being transferredo to t'he 0ffi-c; r .-eek of Soptcmhri-, :Sv2'C0 thlc first * G-2, ~Ci;if of Staif', men, cormprising dre-; MII. Ncff ailnd thre;.cnlisited ber, ;aj or 4 .l CJS Team LTo. & (to.-: nu.:bcrs, in s',e casus fr-m,hero on, unof Occup pafr:-y til t1hey -vra rye--esi•.:n.ted byCf20th' for the . d by the W7ar Depart-:re designated ti'o2n fo'r JapaIn . y.-:r lato:, .already or:'er those ot .id nanl. fellow in chronolfical ;:&nt left BrisbaCne on tec:mporary ? duty assi01oJ2l in this Tln:~ater) Vwith the Doepot at Base F. .n United States Na.y M.obile Expo1sives Investigation Unit composed of one officer and one mnlisted -m%, was attaoh;.r'y Tcc!hlicC'l Tntelli'Once :Depot at


ed ico the United Status

The orders s -,ritton fcr this "F" at .about the s.ome tij: . the Technicel intelligence porsonnel pcrmitted the-r. to acc-p.r:r -;ith the Sir;th ,.rr.r. teeams in tho ficld It was decided that all Technical Inteligflence teamls for m:ould star;: at the Technical Intelligence Sixth and Eighth frmiies tna t therefore the housinlg facilities andr Depot at Finschhafl n would need to be expanded so thalt personnel mi{;ht train,, amd


i.rters for Technical In. atnd Sid. but thcre :eCrc no sides. S.once De.. but by the end of &ug.ii.-cdiate str.31 'L.ry-one as-sistedr in cor. labor d:tail fro:! the Ia.ell as for oua.tcgic geaii .1. 7T1ch floc'r -.:icl '. a eanese troops a(nd to push the Unite d St-.nd six erlijstsd mlcon to FinscEhhfnfcn in charge.nd enlisted .tc. Engiieer.HISITCY ODF MCOTICI'L ITiL. sent forTard with three officrs a.:!aster. fre.5.7SA be stationed at the Technical Intellid...t than one hun1 hore drOd Tchinic3al IntclIig:nce fficers ?.ansaalr: . 20O muiles closer to the Thili. Captainr Creed had arrivcd on 23 July..: with hi.-. The Or'drLnco Intlli~e:once Section -s doel91o in moving until . ship:-1ents of alL natoriel pjort. (l a.ter -v'a.000 ya. TLhe no'. arrivoce ..n t ha'. on North 21st Street. Deo-t iriovod to Thle Che.X.1. -by th.! location of the Depot covere.:: iocltiOn sitiuatued four .pl1.' T ciC iicc. sa p frol fli.ricl on l:-n-l 1a boon shipfed to the Unitcd St3tes. 19L IT.Tly. 20 foot wide and 15 f'et high. -thcr . c-p':bleo f --ccomodratin.--. ?aJor M.of the sCrvicos' 'ept n.hting alnd' pipin-. d r. c ach .. a fi-e acre area.l te isol e . lif. to their sections that had accu:ml1!ited at Brisbarn .2.ybly . er dical.roximt-tcly 100 fect l. roof had been eroctcd writh the help c-f n..Yl -.c:oy and Cv<tain Oreed. S sr (7larlip I. The site for the Deyot was sclected by IMajor J'omston.:ht still be carried on riu'ing the staging pecriodl It v.l Intelligen ie 1nc. I Jhon co lltod he nrew -Lited 3Sttes lr:ty Techniccal te InDtoi-eJ nce Deot cn-rtainr1d f :ciiitios for tihe an.. a leare shliprvint --f enc':-y eoAuip-: nt frorm Si3th f'r~:'y.IGENCE ennalytic : . Firschhraftn 7il 25 .rzs e. one.: 'on ul.lysis lboratories as w.telligence pcrsoniel at thle jDpsot mu'_ frorm' the field.7in to Sa. Thre builJin. foncini and protection of the buildinlgs and in the install-:tin of se>anitation. six large lbuil<dins.s cod1teo.?.nil.s.n lrbcatory co-ciort.nal . brirD-in.ust '.30 .tts . partitions or fencingrrhen the nalysis sections arri-ved frtron Erisb'rmo.'ot at one ti:.inlysis labor.structure. (p .ithin its om. thel Thlitod St I.tti'i construction.d r r nearby 70 foo-t -watorfll).rt'.-'..?lated.i1Cs north of iou pdq:urtErs Base "1W".cl 12).rs established with the rother sections at Finschhlfcrn :-!ith Lt C0amero:--ho had laid.n.tes effensive front The 'llic3 leapfrvogWe:L ->. equi< mnt. and contairSd.ap.'i1ns 47 . havning co:-..3 On 293 Jly./)rk mi. torios. ro.

to£Eic centers along the northern coast of Dutch New Guinea and establisheid allied air bases from Milne Bay along.. r 4118 .^ able to operate either by air or se. T/5 Garner and Pfc Dtnoni. Elocrnts of the 6th Infantry Division directed operations. and returned from Sansai:or operations 20 . no prelirminary b^oibardnnt was necossry. The unit reported thero on 10 AuLust 1944.rlposed of Lt Bishiop and T/4 7inn. the Japnoese Second Lrrly withdrew in beGeos and by overland trails tovTard the south and west. cruisers. for reports from the infretry patrols.rrvy which was char-e. stanscod with 6th Division at ILffin Bay with a CIC Tearl. and nlthourh destroyers.iahlra-Philippine line. Lt Overholt located a quantity of enonr oquiprlont of Intellic:enco valueo.a beyond the Hal.nm Islands and the adjr. Offioers and onlisted :r.i£rfare Scrvice Tce-Mn o.HISTtRY OF TECrP1ISCL ItELLIGEICE L'idc'elbur aend i~nstcrde. and received orders to return to Hcadqu-. who had recently been recalled from. Chemical . Rather than orCanize for an attack against A'Lomrican forces at Sansanor.rcdiate qroa sho'wed no si-:ns of any Crdnancc rntcrioC and upon w-ritinL. The Division G-2 and the CIC Tcaro wereo co-operative and the Division Ordnanco officor with the c'ofensc of the entire territory. Tho occupation of Sansapor concluded Illiod re-occupation of str?..n tf tho Dutch irxyr assisted on patrols and it was found that their nothcd of oporation and experience ere very tnetructive.'ith the 6th Division and landed in the Sansapor operation c:n D-Day. The unit then rrocoeedod back to Sixth 1xrAy Headquartors VOCG. 30 July 1944. 'Sir.ntcricl was recovorod.F Kittyhl.nal Technical Intelligoenoc representative. the entire coast of ITevw and Lt TJcob Overholt. Reconraisannce of the i.ith virtually no opositim.ain defense cover for his conquered empire in the Southrwest Facific.&.oncral froml all the one-time Yapanese strongholds in Geelvink Bay and in up)er Vo:.rters USSOS.nd R?1. 6 (Lt phillips.cont shoreline knowm as Sansapor -were seized by J:oric"n anphibious forces on 30 July w. which had 'y. the Bis. still no. which was the r..oved up to Hollandia.wt on this risaion. The enery was no lonC.wks -'ore on hand to provide sea and air cover. (I-p Incl 12) J quick end had been put to the effoctivenss of the 3apaneso i'. '1 objectives were occupied by nid-rnorninE. The retreat was C. m. The Ordnnaice Tear co.this tim-e r.ak operation. loaded out of Maiffin Bay .

w troi:J13 t...nt could often be fealr in tho vicinity.) o~. .ndle eqouii-'ent fou. haed to be lai.inforrlati-n concerni he locttisn of . The foll.. olJi'stod :cn shul-d receive a rQfresher course in scuticg :nd la'tr1iinl. ith side-r' s s --ell -s c..cre found.ny oqui. posts ro.3~ 'd ti. Signal.LL. or roead ?.uld brin.lrhibi :. oe t'lrned over to the Tr)-vsisn f-. n in tu.vw.u ps . for by litghtinc.he various units of the Divisiona contacted thrh-ugh theo.c.1uble cquip:e.-hts endl t..tG2TE On r s. thoy . a. vehicle trail.c.:ey :U. -.-iin.7il be giveI to G-2..thoe --ro-er officer.rds couldr ofton be locnatcc nearbyr.cri. usually there wv.7ore ic:rrdcl on tilis op)cration: for the in fcm..r use rn the . t should '. i:>. here thore wore fc. U.ortcd ts G.. officers :nd enlisterd :-eon sh-uld -.i:o:.y or tvfo coul. ctc.2r_ · vTry often a c'r?.itnhin 'O yards -f .d bc s:szzc bry GottinC... deolaye.L I12. c arces of ITewi CGuinea r sha-ul.erols..-uld.~icration in the Division. be equi. ber -.rbincs or to a.tii-n such -. ad Alcqu.-2 should be be irvesti£:. e:.^?S r -.-eont fPundq other thon that nertainin2 to the individual tear. b'it tyyica-l a7nd rather transporta-ticn intercst-inL. _i. -orkl.-for airoxl'-.o.. 'u .mchine runs btcouse thc i'rc:er r. COfficer.s c"-i'oreratlvcly little enc:. ancd. s t'lis .rchli:.a~rtiuvlo-r instruct.tin i .vorel se. evcr-rthin-g fiound should be reported to the Divisinn Scr-ice officers (Ordnance.anizin:f and directinclucdin:[ inf£ search pn.stcr. in case a dur:i for one service s.l by CIC at intcrzediotc bcsecs.rc sh.. -:init-unli Ton cccurarCo coofperti.pc3o the Allied lnur. should be turned over t.sent back Sby essenbor .locsoins incir 1cntal.pe1 .. firin and uneaesiness would be oter. 4 ad&aptive to the Theater..intance of nsatives in the for.s .rccr.d isido to oxcapturecd nz:inCo r h . the viciniCty should be scoutcd durxe775s for other services .HI3S'CRY Oi' 'MMECWIX Technii. For bost csc..-!:S it ilthout having oqui :. it direct..-uld boe -.ted -.iy eqiip--.:-d ii. enemiy coi)nd.h tr::kL._. 149 ..:ere usually fr'und -.utely 100' u nncessorry up the brcug.ions in rcgr.cl11 sirpriso y-cer.ont recovered -of Intellifjcrctcs val uo .l Into1]i_ cncc.

Ero 3S fr. Lt . COF TEC7'TIC.r. Holland.:i thi3 Thceatoe listed en. :as cffici lly al>ointod Cor.ero Dirring.cG+C Deoot.iC. LLent as field to-nrs to task fcr-cs.-t .orrcn c Sternal r] lot Lt Ihilli-. .":illi-: L irnco.nLt.}-'iokrell..ai1 .r. rcquest fr porsonnl l:y Sixth l wore rttached to . scho'lulod for assirL::.C0fi.ssir. C Crrldnmnco I!. T/4 R:-lph T. t )t:k oveor a.tor of Tochnicni" Intol].. nil i-atters porto 4tclhnical Intclltigence with the 'itchnical Intclltaijringi sup'crvisicn of the -assistant i.7:nt to a field tea.nct dutios as of 31 .3tant Coordinator i.r C. UJ)on recuest.wi.ned to the 35250th for Techc nical Intcllij.e of the . T/5 . fro. Thi ipjiino Islarnds caLt irl1effi as dcsi-nSted aLSi.'.s op ..itl.-:ron.(3lyck an.dor the cenor.^as ro1.ondin[.urzcl requestoed an -I.-in. 5o .n-rnlinC and Cnorin. TEI.tclli£onece fCr the co.sssi.olicy w-mas ccnltinudl Tho nu:loecr of pcorsnnrel nssic.T. Clinton 1. T/5 Johon .sco Si Mooro wore detailed for duty with the lo Vonr..orarzy duty from Qofiftcrs an. 1st r.l). ein on )oftho b250th Ho roli-ved 8..e. C--2._' r Technical Intollif. . . the lntc sT.r-cnt wore :an. personnre. S-2. e.ll.:ance anra. B-ase F ^nda ur..c ( revisiina.. iu. who had : rccontly beon :ro-::utod.n.s rfficor in char. to tho 5250th in Ordnanco Intoli Thittir'crt-n". i. the iad-al. Orr.tcncc a cduly fall cf 19J4 dclitional e. Exccutivc. ic.d ch'-nros of assin.4r Eiyhth the 'r:oies fer a. tvt Ioendorson.l .do pcrsonncl wr.. and ivvt Tl.'ucust 1944 .-. ork.a.-:rty-f-iLv enlistQd.:rwtc. USSOS.ned to the anlysi3 section.Ur:ust !'tajor ?T-nley.nistrative section and ficlJd tea-ls -?.'jr 'Tohnst:-n.. T/5 Pichrd T. with Ei-hhth 'rlr. 'G-2 ad.Jl :7rocurdc ?.Van . ncc Co'ficc 'f the . Tos-. On 25 ..4to d 4dzi-nistrattive Officcr for the 5250th fo.. ?vt Haynvo3od L. officers oanc7 thirty onlisted ron thc .aly Coi:-arndr.. -rsorSoel no't on duty of hav:nv -. thtl TS..r rn f±r the 5230th Tecimical Intcllieonco C2'osite Co-r-1nllY7 SoD. -.llnist~ tiv -elerical -.cre assigrLod /4 .nas: Six:tecn Lc~.iiros.iL IiLTELLIGENCE] Tcripo_-f Incroescs ctivits:.: .cAl-in.'C Twho tarrnd his full atton'ti-n to dircctinrg IA.HIoTTOR. who ropartod to the Dopot deoal of the Off ice./iilio Re.'...acod ?. Ba:o.lysis section by Tinjor '. thirty t-tal: 44 officers rnd 55 cn'no asiz.dor the direction of Headquarters 'f Lt C:.

. rather than by sections.ic.s distributed in SCLttcr. Ttchnical The dissQ:ination of writton infor. M. and to vitness a firing deQoznstration cf 'a.ence . that necessary directives be issued .e . which publicized up to date Cheoni'cal as it was received.).nitions..:ancso wTea)pons. imediete 3ection.. 83 (Incl 15) a standard operating procedure recon ne..siderably expedited. 51· .nilc .rfaro.atin eralizod descriptions of captured Cher.rkinL.Jarfali Intollit. requestinc.uide in distinrjiishing Japanese Cherdcal 'Jlarfare !MnitionsBom Japanese regular decided that tho Depot this tire would be r.bcr.ders and Technical Intclligence units was con. and S-2. I.3OS3. dopErtod fromn Brisbneo to Finschhafen to inspect the Depot there. ahead.arfare notebook. Its pri.s was -ublishcd in Novem..r TCE Late in September. safe guo.JCO 501 to XP0 '.once Digest also went to press. and the first numbe. lmnitions rnd reports from other theaters.lber and Decosmber l944.-ias constantly r'oin..nary function was to serve as a g. US. to confer with the e. provided pertinent informati:n until it could be consolidated in loro perr.anent forri in the Yapanoso Chemical U.nley sub'i-tted a check sheet to G-4.torotai. .as selected as the nQxt site) and it . coordination between troop con. from there plans were already be in mande for the next iove of the United Stqtes Ar:' 7 Technical Intclli. In Soptemborr USZF7E published Circular No.rf are mrateriol. extensive report on Jap riunition rr.on: 4 .this timle to the Philippines. The last operation for Technical Intelligence in the southern islands would be .onco Dcnot -.HISTORY OF TSCHMICA'C L IN:.rdiLng arnd turning over captured mteriel and established a control policy in regard to souveniring. This circular set forth the responsibilities of troop comranders in collecting.oved as a unit.aati'on -nr Intolli. Lodkinc. acc -. As a result of the clarification of both these phases of Tochnicnal Intelligence.:m transferrirn the Headquarters cf 5250th f ipaniod by the G-2 InterCol Saiuvo'.r of the Chemical .LLIG. 707. This report was the result of almost two years! research through captured oneny docurmnts.ajor J1.notebook japanese on Cheo-4cal Ja.farfare IntelliEcnce inf or.?l WT. :~t this tile-. This dicest.nded by PT jor T:ainl1y to clarify rmthods of disposition of captured one-y equipnent and documents.

-hen the 31st and 3211 Tnfantry Divisions under coi:. United States troops capitalized on the eleent of surprise.orotai. the prelimLinary naval bombardment.Morotail northErImnost of the Halinahora Islainds. all objectives had boeon seized by H plus four hours. T/Sot Ela:ence T'. and rvt ITick os the Ordnance . dominatinc: ern HaLmlahera... was but lidhtlyr efended. the Central Iacific struck 500 r:iles to the northeast to invade Paleu. the resistance . Casualties to UJnited States rocuncd forces -ere extremely light and there vere no air and sea losses. 52 .'Te. Heavy air bo. were assigned .HISTORY OF TECT7TICAL I1T:rLLIGENCE Mlorotai:_ 15 Sep -. of 15 Selte:-ber 1. In takin:: l.intorstein w.244 · On Itorotai. Lt 'Tiillien LE. 3 (S/Sort Sr-ith.d decoived the enelyr into concentrating rmost northof his stren-th alone-. Ccnncr'ts Ei:. Rossi. .iand of )XI Coris seized . On . both landing s occurred on the mornn/. rotai. as EnZineer Technical iltellience Officer ReaI Echelon Services of Supply. the coastal flats of Iaoe Bay in' the approaches to this 'T!'rotail.rntclli-ence Team at Varnnucci.Guinea. -nit io.w Eny.inds operation at Morotai. 'hilippine Islands. and marines and iinf'a_'try.-abard:ent durinc the preceedinrf w:eeks h?. 1h (personnel present on Technical Intellicene are listed in Incl 3) left for Lita. and 300 mLiles southeast of ILindanao.ith Xi Corps to stag7e for the : 15 Seteto er Trade '.anese En:..rhich lies sonm 315 iiles northwvest of Sansepor. ?.cineev Teamal iio.. and -!hat fcv J £.4 'Oct 194 The Illies moved into position for the drive on the t P'hilipfines .2ras as tou.. Jas zere Bay. . lTetherlands 3ast Indies (Maip m1.:h as . left !'itape on 9 SepCaptain ter:iber and landed with the fourth vnave at Morotai.ho had just recntly reported to the 5250th.SC:.arriso:led there retreated into the hills duriin.4lerican troops had come up a. The Unit.11 Septeol:ber Capt Connors ::as oassigned to Hoadoquarters. .ineering staidards and for tificaticols. 7lt'h Clpt ivorrott Ce Lary in cnm-and.lso reported no no-.:en fror. items reqovcread and returned in o October to the Technical Inteligenc Depot at Finschhafen. US. On Yalau.ineer equipment on this operation but did o1btain inforaticn on Ja. Beautifully coordiuated.12). T/4 Shervood) founld little on 28 this oporasio:i Auc:'-st 14>4 for te-aporary duty -.Cainst.

It . No new equipr.-.-ont fron the operation was reported and nothing whatsoever wr-as shlip.ton.there sim-ply was no equipiment of Intelligence value to send back. the sort of unproductive rs operlation from an Intelli:oence stand point that was so inco-::proehnsible to /Jashin.)ed to the Uniterl States Army Technical Intelliprence Depot at Base F. yet --.HISTORY CF TECIT=ICAL INrELLIGENCE lMorotai had turned out to be one of those Cook's Tours. '53 .

hoelini: that Tacloban.tes ix-.December 1944 By October 194W!. Somae had been bloody . job had becen com:lpleted with cxceedingrly m-eaer resources. .y this time. "I shall return". The g-roup was escorted by air and sea by units of the Far East . olit pillboxes and isolated stronEg points had been developed into a the opening blow wThen they seized tvwo islets guarding the entrance to Loyto Culf (ihp.ten and in less 1c thcan t. Incl 17) was captured with loss of loss than a dozen .ht.dy to embark on the t-hilippine caalpaign.000. by means of island hoppine. 54 . H?:o-over. Hollandia. the United States Forces were re. Il:o. for behind the do-urfhfuet laoy such campaigns as Bu. knocking. the initial attack was so ovcrw.:tnation to carry the v:ar through to a successful conclusion. Storniiln the beaches was also far from no. oefore the firish of the operation._mqda that was to mt7rz £ood the prorise. Gcncral 1Macrthur was in personal coemaand of the ar. the 6th Ranarger Battalion str. InCl 16 & 17) and on the mrorning of 20 Cctober. the science of fiighttir.r.1-oollmldia and west-ward from the :':liralties. as well as the odtcer n.L IUELLIGEI1. Lcyte. Qn. troops of thQ Sixth l.g 'ut a big.wo weeks the United Sta'ies forces held tao-thirds of the island of Loyte.E ( thin X and OjIV Corps. This timle the United St?. a new type of warfrce. hlac the ren and the matcriel. HAP T E R V TTTRN TO T _I :ILTT IIrES ^^tober -. !Aboard were. unloadingr bcg. (MIap. V picturoe the . including reinforcements broucht in from the other islcnds.s completely chan-:ed.HISTORY CF TECHNIC. enemy forces on the island had risen to 1$30. lanmding crfaft and -.and discouro.arships moving northward on four beachheads along Loyte's cast 17 October.ith the Thilippines ('ilap ncl 16) in si. The 13th of October 194! sa-w a gigantic two-pronged convoy of 60o trans-o4'ts. Liak and :a-any others.iirForce and the ' and cloe'-nts of' the United States Third and Seventh Fleets.

and be:. a2lnutrition. and coordination in ad.d be 1heard was one long con-. -. the naval bom- bardi. m Clothin: Dand houlsehold effects -werevirtua.inuous r. the lines of the first composite unit that participated in the Eollndia operation. 1 was place..intrl roar co. a few pro.:. of tLe Ya)s.d -ereisitio.ent.the islan. Fric. and the 1st Cavalry Divis ion s8.'t 0900 hcurs3. CoQ-i' lete covera:. Late in SeoterSbr. Fafinilies hadL been turned out of their in poor e physical colcdition.:t reacned. lJith the except-ion of the childron the natives .e of the desir*:nated combat sector.. Each unit was attached to a division anrd was conrposed of teeas cf all -. They were overjoyed at their at Hollandia? to sta.-.. the I-each.ence field units .ard the beach. Technical Intelligence Unrit .'hile the heavy units still continued thieir or co3mt-anderred al ost every item. This UTnit was con- posed of th'e followinn: personsnel: 555 .d on terporary duty wit-h the 24th Irfantty to nmaim room for the billeting.c.roxi 'rtely 2600 tons of explosives on that isl. tl)e rocket launching' LCI's moved up for the f'iall blo-w before the actual assault troops boi'an landin.-e for the Leyte operation.ers fLied a:i..HI3TQiRY OF TECTHNIC4L I. .-rith the com!Dat trcops.nd. Fr-nl 0600 h-^l!rs until 0900 hours the battleships and crui.'Qapnese nativecs who acted as spies for the eneyr. They . having suffered fro. There were. There was no doubt of the sincerity of the natives. the LCI's coas. Th'ne initial landings .lly non-existent as the Jparesi ha'.' 24th Infantry and operation were thus as sured.mdnb.:g.'. EBy this time the first assault wave had al.'ence _on LeYte Tt was tLe plana for the Leyte operation to have three Technical Intel'. Operation of' Technical Intelli.ent of Layte befran..0G00 till 10C0 hours all thtat roul.ent inr areast of each other in a long line to-.ces.LTILLIGENCE Landinr Opr-ations and Enel::v Tactics On the mornirr: of 20 October at 06C0 hours. inevitably.ere made by tne 7th an.. ffo0 -..anr lalmchinr their oppositio.o.or nearly all -of the servi..ed their fiire -:nd the first wave landed oni lfyte atdai-ast only sli-. They were organized alone.

_t with the AC of S.enco Ordnance Tc. 1 1st Lt Claudes . andc dre replacecments for shortae-s. G-2.iba-t to the .250th.Iorth Sin:rl Team 2d Lt Te4ry -Tarvis rT/3 John Lo Lotz Leyte was the fil-st operation for the Si-ralj Tea-. 1 i-.J¥IU had the best facilitics for rapid disscminaticn to tzhe co.56 . but it -as their first co. uembers of Tcchnicl Intelli£~ence Unit Mo. 1. officer for this Intelli-en-co. tog. thods of . E llyrett.)ibat a Ssi.c for the operation. the Unit sailed wJith the convoy from Hollandia to Lcyto.cther.orking. prie ority in the ccluction of enory gquip-:1ont.rfor Technical ITtolliCeoncc teCuIs to :o in a-..-. 14 m1a or :-ennreth C. to whom they -wrce at bTaUched w-ith r?_. It bc-ac a standard policy throu'ho~ut the rest -f the for the Unit to gc ashnore in the second wave. !Tajor Heorwood's team which w-as to operato as part of the advanc base depot tem.l bricfin::.. T/3 Elsvrorth F. thus destroying its usefulness for Technical Intellil'ence. imlansr weroe a. hadlainel 's sose expoerenrc_ in the field durin-. hor had becn a ssi-mned as '.lvor..e:o. -.neer ^TeaiM No. Tearm TcR*.bers of TT!S. IDuri7n st>ainir. Paris T/3 .scr. to prevent troops from scuvenirin i valuable eouipmlcnt. next highcst priority.d -. . Capt Joseph1sIL I. -'EU No. . 13 Octceor. -as dellrod and did not arrivc at the aoborkatiun pointr in tiir. At 1800 hours. etc. The Tcchnsic.TJaes T.rly -. anrd Lt -c'-pe tca-L.ELLIGESJ-NCE EnriLJ. 'is .artcrmazstcr h Inteliconc.woJl0. J. JTr Orlhance.nel receintly asci.within one hour if possible -.a. During sta%:in. thle 'sti-operaltions period at Eiak.. it -:as decided that thy worculld dct firest c ll on all explosive .matoriel captAured.ith l'cchric. of the Division._rn1. the Unit checked teca and individual cquipi rimot. composed of p rsDo.HISTORY OF TEC]LYTlCAL IiW.. and the CIC rteoas.after the first wave landed. wero thorouC£hly covcrod.ood. 'ope Pvt Richard E t Reynolds t:fc AtlJbert L.

-ut a t .i: lditin. inefr Tor L Cap4tain Donaldl C.:K'_ilc nd.-ltain Robert S. it ras -s little ocqui_:_ent -._:7-U4f: LiT!:2EIOEDE: ' HIST0?`Y OF TEo 1'>iir.rdf'nanco Team. 11 i on "S/Sot !illiaJ.l in the iYn-llysis sections of the United States Lrrny Technical Inteoljigcence Depot. .:r % it .ro. t m Uc 2ured. -.>-7 ulld.ica -r2mi -To 7 tulius Team i'--.J. Shcrwood ITIost of this porsonnel.I'ence Dct t binschhiafIsn aftsr only Ft :hoy -tk bck e with thol: thle equipci2J iu.zerr ndl unlc-dincl Becri c by Soervice Lr/ Scc.ris.:nt tlh-._:C :sfirs.3 zion.hich had beon a t ZHollanila r. Loyte Voaloy . ist Cavx. '.-houi' ht::y return to F..on t-is cpe. S'[Crnl T/'S :t I-'ul F. 2 whiclh iws'sattrachod to n.. :. in the field.od's t'o7r enlisted Tnitcd St-.t har b_-on recovorec. Horton apt.inr. REoer E. /~ L.. Conn-rTrs . 1 c ovrolC C j.l .nrd Biak.enco TUnit iTh. 2 i -vt Robert Do -o reitas T/!i.l1ytc .i.Tc:. PicConrk.'ri. Gunll crson T/Sj..'tC/S.Jillis .:. T%-' i.Ci Tinit T .':rf. ~lliclc En.lry Di-visirn f-or thno LTyto c.~he1d thcmiselves on Red a. Ho7-in! > 0.ii T!'i ...: ti.. l.t "-iELu_. c-rqti'~ns. R-:ssi Sir nrel Section 1st Lt .in rxrris Acle Quarterrraster Sct Ca.' IC'z-ilit . bI'>ier T-rrw. 57 .. '. Toch Captin DLurence A.?t Robert J.a nn cnc. .'.t C%.catl Inr-tclli. poss 'T/$S.rLtian was comrposed *thcof te fotlol.cre nerw to Technical InntelliLonce and had only n short period of traini<..pt2.te wa°s !_oci !ord tit A2: ! Tcc'Lnc..: l-. to:tLrns: Chermica-l ~Ev.7. vpith the cxcoption of Copt Connors' teci' v.

the absence of authtra.t FinschL:. :t. t -ls tT-op. -chI'. . ttc-:.s F_ .S Intellience Teaml NoR 5 &f:cE!'".with ( r--.r: rd ship a Tchcnical Tntlli c-nce it _i. (v-hich hd:! to e sent up lnter) t.rna.i.tions to bhc detained to!li"onc.a.ti: s e. -ist 'ch:i '" . tt s'.o .ortfati.L. i' .. . Storor·ail c .i..-n ceverelr h r. r .... l .:> .:L T'ISTOPY OE . ica t.. .:.. I. '*n .!.f thc. 3: Cl.-l ttcs 'r. ileriis to. .. focar ecai. Of "ic r.a-r of Technical to his duties as '.UnL fro fo r Sixth ii.heir -7hiilel roccerecd to I'hnus .. -f .Techanial n.f n0 cos3i-osod . o2 . 3. an ?.nte'li -cncv 'Jnit No.... '.or rily ror ' .... ssion as N7o 1 h''d c. bl'i . :l _.vance: .Wl ia:y a rear Ce .-. Ti Xc.week 1st C-.r hi r . 2 as v-oll o?'.. werte i~nuorea. hrm. b.i.-ch... .3 a in I1...i'.i' . 1thc rth:)r i. -t:.c'-li an Or. u.'t units. plarticvlarly Ordnarce.ision sailoa.j.chn.ttd by rt s:).llr for return to t-he Uzi-tbd .`.rovLs'. ilil .-.cir.: ti-n o-f ic_ .. _7Lny -!. l-CE -ft Cir . s.. . i i .-.t HClllan.~ :. lc T.:. .1 pcpera.r c ll-lorated ..:. . .~. c:c 0.v!alry Div!st Y ni:•enL1 TI:'k... . tcax:Unit No. to_ bor. - c rorthorn C7ili nce Uo it 2W t 5z-d Int . n.o ecuiirpientt..-y . "-. -oion td m i i ' . sooi to r--u.eLLL. .. Licai to t I.ateo to elnabl e ic is and vwii'l_ thIe Ur' :r. f r . l.Ui.rin hl t4 '..:rdir-.r .ct '..hniioC'al an'l hl ad itt .. ai ci'n u... '11 i cc ir C.' 'ni n'-c * ticula~rly on! 27 The preoscncc of a o--. rri s " l'e-. S:..lli£.irected to Capt the course :. be shil':edi orizvd 58.rlt t_. 1 il t ll c By 1 iTOvoroear -c.i c ...7 nce coordinator at an o i_' . .cco:. thl i . a1 Ca :" C111ti 7.i.. :vL cc it .'.al vehiclos. r-.. -l._zIicati.anrl too ls...s . o: rction -.i'. C.qscsios ..i: c..9 rc place l ' .efsore t-he Div.. chn.) ..Tii ..Co Depot "-.. t s J.rP -2 In tvlli 2d Lt Vic'Tor Dc5l §ueci. an..rhir ' t .adx-..til 03C 2 had not been attached -a litle cvLr a.i.vt .'.:ia.tO -ri -'a-./5 C-as!:lar(e '-.cicol... ha'.vnalr._ S sll. The followinn.t i.vcti-r tl -.

En-irner Intellir nce C't
-... lr

o', To.




>It Henry Carson

. CZtain -AS.:.-rI

1... . .


Intolli-'-onc :kI-7licQ.
6- t:r.n No^rris ,tlc

Toa:1 i-?


OrcdrLnce 7ntoil.i;ence Cc -t,.ii GordrLn Bess n-,,-...c... Tr:ti ' Caztcai; .,

eC. i :oD. 2 /SC,;.t C-lenn E. Peterson

cnce Te:: ni



,-, .!ick -l

qi,.rtor-:-':.ster Tntlli... ec11 Te-:: ?J.-...[ e. : }{a.j r ji S.ni3dny K. 2;.'e Sig.l lli1a ':eotli;:' .e n2 'e Tc

T/ Roboert S. 1_anub

21J L;;c J¢co../.

Go verlirlt Intelisan

3 No. placed o-n ter.porary :7as c -plo.i' lduty :..tit .rl, oService Cor-z nnd nd on flrttle teiiporary duty to i-o,dmortqrs, Base Tr 'I, ibclobn, Leyte ';here' they arrived on :r p.-21ntt ';as, Vrs or'anized here from hich trips ,pc, D p1-:s one. to all i;-tl;s of is1o.r -are .... l, Iv. IIt~-±.ik;_ne, TBCi^:'o. y S a i.,rrcvi; ipri.:'rily shipn.'ents ofi' ctured oner nical Intelliigence Units 1 ares,. troo7ps in the for-,rc.

3 iat first Unrt{itt eOot unit 'to rcc ivs equi::e nt :rcurlht in n-d! 2 c erting rith

functioned and :.ake by Techthe co:lbat

During: the first1
tcl1iL,cCQ Jil

ton :oays a ; ter arriv--l,

Tsclhical1 In-

N;;,u 3

n .. a - (n d


'iT,: ,.' the field

cnth, po....f th " i -. shijn Dipot for the receiviili turex'd equi.meunt. This w.tas a tconporary idva.nco dopot si.ilar


HISTOCY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE to that at Hollandia. Except for certain bulky equipment shipped directly to the United States, most of the captured materiel was trans-shipped to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen for further analysis. Part of the time was also spent in checking the arunition dumps im the vicinity of Tacloban and Palo. A short time later when both Technical Intelligence Units No. 1 and No. 2 had been withdrawn from the operation, Unit No. 3 was left as the only Technical Intenligenco unit on tIyte island. As such, this Unit had the dual rosponsibility of running the depot and keeping contact with all combat organizations engaged in this operation. On the sane day Technical Intelligence Unit No, 2 departed from Loyte, Ordnance Team No. 4, ccuposed of Capt Edward Nowmkowski and T/SC;t Cgick arrived. This team, which was originally assigned to Field Unit No. 2 had had to return to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen because of some confusion in shipping arrangements and had taken a later ship. They reported to 1st Cavalry upon arrival, but were relieved from that organization a week later and plaeed on temporary duty with Army Service Comniand. Since Technical Intelligence Units 1 and 2 had left, Capt Nowakowski and T/Sgt QWick functioned with Technical Intelligence Unit No. 3 at the depot and aided in collecting materiel. After ccnpletely covering the area in the vicinity of the depot, this teaja and Technical Intelligence Unit No. 3 went into the field with the 24th Infantry Division, covering the whole front of the Leyte campaign. MAch equipment and materiel wvas recovered during this drive and field reports on nany new items were prepared. Considerable equipment was recovered after the $apanese reinforcement paratrooper attack near San Pablo and in the (rmoc area- in the 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions' sectors. However, the lack of time, the large area involved, and the rugged terrain features, prevented the evacuation of large quantities of the material captured. Besides maintaining liaison with the previously mentioned units, liaison was also maintained with the 1st Cavalry, the 11th Airborne Division and the 24th, 32d and 96th Infantry Divisions, If any outstanding recoveries of enery equipment were made by these organizations, trained Technical IntelliGence personnel were made available to handle the field analysis of the equipment.


HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGEN=C There wvre no shipments of enemt equipment from the field depot at 3ayte until towards the end of November since routing to Finschhafen.:had been stopped and no ships left for the United States until then. Technical Intelligence for the boyte operation as a whole was not as productive of captured enorn equipment as had been anticipated.. It had been assured that large stores of enemy equipment would be uncovered there, but that assumption proved to be false. Due primarily to terrain and weather conditions, the typo of fighting encountered on oiyte throughout nearly all of the early phases of the operation was spasmodic. Few enemy dumps wore captured and proportionately, the quantities of equipment recovered intact were .liited. Upon the completion of the Ieyte operation, fcur new Technical Intelligence Units, 4, 5, 6 and 7s were formed for the "M 3 operation. (PersonDel of these units are shown in Incl 3) 411 three Technical Intelligenca Units were disbanded and the personnel used as a nuclei of experienced men for the new teams which were to be formed. During December Engineer Intelligence Team No. 7 (Lt John F. Keane,. Pvt James W. Stephens; IVt Christophcr;7. Tarar) of the re-organized Technical Intelligence Unit No, 1 engaged in collecting specimens of all available captured enemy Engineer equiprmnt from the Sixth AXW Enrineer teams in the field with a view to setting up a training progran for Eighth Army EnSpecial attention was given to land mines, gineer units, Ot 28 December the training traps and demolition5s booby materiel was turned over to the Engineer Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army.r Operations oin .yte Are Turned Over To Eighth Arm

As the control of all operations on Leyte was to be turned over to Eighth ArLM, Lt Col Erle HE. ulian who had been assigned to Eighth Army h late October as Technical Intelligenoe Coordinator and a reorganized Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1, joined that Headquarters on 14 November 1944. (Personnel composing the Unit are shown in Incl 3). As Eighth Arrfr had not participated in any combat the tine was spent by Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 in alking contacts with the X and XXIV Corps and with the associated service chiefs, Plans wore made so that upon Eighth lrmy's takint cormzud of the remainder of the Leyte operation, there would be no time lost in taking to the field. They were ordered to report to 38th Infantry day Eighth Ary took Division on 26 December 1944,. the ersa operational control.


helrovr TIe Japnmnoso rlnced greoat emphasis on destroyin-{ United States artillery piecest For this. 6 (Capt C0armeron.ere destroyed in thse -untains below. .. Depot at Finschhafen. trans-shipme.unition w7as found in the captured dury so Japanese Lar:unition and :natericl -. w-as excellent in th. blocks:. leirnr. to ag-. suicide tactics were employed. '. Captured d. .as rade of all cap~turod Ordnance equipr.the chor. Linon.ere cn-.ovC:ent of Illitarr supplies. nountain to dispose of the. Cnly' twr..rouchout this <area lar1e gquarnititics of equipolent wver. never-the-'ess. tyi.troyrl thmci as a safrety ?r-caution as they L. They sup-. utilized as harassing fire against the nemly.HISTOT'Y OF' TEC-i!YICAL TIT'iLLiO--ENCE A surveyr '. for instaince.-ilo.bor to -'et the job done.. Tochn-ici rro h Intelligence.s those tank's formnd ro2a. Pvt Nick Vannucci) vwas allse assijgned to tbhe 38th Division.o-d in moppin-. up activities at the ti:me Cooperation fromi rXTI Corps. .doto-atin:.imuniti-n .-ero lsed by United States troopi's _ ossibile Jrapnese 81 m. co-nsid!erable a'.ered.Cand in that area.. but as that division was not to be co-nmittecd to co.-.-eam lmracticUlly iocrAd on the road.mnt in western TJrtYt' Tb.. cleared the roads3 for .~:e into the field piece. in co:.~inmlar tacctics were used against taki:rs. as ..e icnts were m-ade for this tear.e evacuation of equipront. re:luincd in a position such as3 'oi.n:i mortar am. for ..-ice Orr.y of the dceipts wr.ntity of renovated Americon a. 95.l.-cumnents on antitank tactics described this procedure as a part of their training.. 62 .uunition. I JrIp soldier w-ould strap an ex losive charge to his body andll chC. r cov. . During: the first half of January 1945 Ordnance Intelligence To.mbat for soeic time.anceo cnlisted men 6(3 tons Cf one-ry r-tcriol -s supervised thle 'wrorvk a ra t4oti was3 evacua ted 1 d shiil :i to as> E Ta cl oban.. ~ovever. cr'a. w. Enough alrmuiition of all tyres.. thley -r-e shovc over th_ si-ics -f the ruc. the :ineeors ded.s ncountered in lar:e luantities.ain cover the combat areas of tihe 7-th ai:!d 77cth Divisionrs in -restern Lyte. Thel Technlical IntclliLo.nt to thel United Stcates .Toed . arrangc.?e. for thoir evacuation. destroying: it and him-self as he pulled the irnitea. Eii:hteocn lic'ht tanks.'lied all the necessary trucs and la. T/3 Carl Pc SiiaLons. re:--:inod in Good condition tc satisfy the rcqucsts for its use in analysis and test firin.d allow.:.i:. These two divisions w-. . Leyte.

Far East Air Force. the Chiefs of Services prohibited the rermoval of namcplates fron equipment to be shipped to the UInited States. an artdlysis section lunder the technical super- vision of its respective service chief.. directed that all nanraplates should be of Intelligence.d considerably during October. November and December.-. So. IAnalysis Sections or postal censors. A1t the sam.nal Corps and Ordnance materiel .nd iLzxteriel recovered by the teamls -. uhere the personnel were intcrgratce into the analysis section staff. unless 63 . with each service olJer-tinC.'MY TEICAIL INTELLIGEhET. ial equipment .:e confusion in The Uar Department had nailed to the Director 'Jashington. Howrver.. Japanese aircraft equipment shipipd from Aitape and other New Guinea bases was transshipped to -ir Technical Intelligence.time a steady strea-. Shippinc from outlyin-.HISTORY OF TECI. Shipp-inc. DEP OT October 1944 -. for operation sta. AFrIy Service Forces. Sansapor and Mlorotai. A quantity of equipuent particularly Si&.February 1945 The United States Ary' Technicual Intelli!-cncc Depot .7as received fron the Ne-w Guinea operations. and as a result of the rapid advance of United States troops during January and February :n Leyte. US!SOS.m f small items confiscated by base censors and base Intelligence officers flowed in. an unusually large quantity fro:l all the services was recovered. Diak. Technical Intelligence units 7preparinL. It was administered clirectly under the control of G-2. brought or sent to the Technical Irntelligence Depot for study and research. for disposition. Tochnical and econo:ic warfaro Intelligence requirersDnts couldc both be satisfied by double distribution of namleplate inforration and therefore. bases was sloA. D. but the handling of name plates was evident.'L NITTELLIGENCE C H 4" PT E R VI UNITED STQ'OT3 . the following procodure aent into effect: narmeplates received from Technical Intelligcnce at the Depot anEl upon teriaination of duty in the ficld returned there. from the Depot at Finschhafen to the United States improv.l Intelligence the nerve center for Technica.

In view of coarents fron consignees in the United States.lashington. No. which staged during November at the Technical Intelligence Depot.llied Translator and Interpreter Section with the task forces. 4. and the prints.ailod to 4Army Service Forces. Hq.ashington. ArWr Service Forces. Additional precautions were taln to insure adequate labeling of crates and inclosing of sufficient copies of vouchers and packing lists to facilitate recognition of equiprent and acknowledgennnt of receipts Lt Stancer was relieved as Depot Officer for another assignment 15 December 1944. No. negatives or rubbings . when it should be talkn. packing and crating of equipment for shipment was conducted with greater care for durability. Iaykendall.ence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Unit Unit Unit Unit No.. Nar3plates of extreme technical significance. . Mirtz and Kenneth li. sections and six analysis laboratories (except for a rear-echelon force) to aLnila. G-2. were forwarded to the AC of S.5 TJith the opening of the Luzon operation. Philippine Islands.HISTCRY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGECCE cleared by the . moved forward during December and January to join divisions participating in the M-1 (Luzon) operation: Technical Technical Technical Technical Intellig. US$C3S. On tenporary duty with the Technical Intelligence Depot as Acting Iroperty Officer and Assistant Administrative Officer were 2d Lts Edwin A. Throughout this period nardplntes and operating instruction panels were received roteularly in quantity from Technical Intelligence teaMs in the field and fron. 6. from where they were air milod to the Director of Intolligonce. No. Preliminary translntions were rendered for the benefit of the analysis sections and the plates were then transmitted directly to the United States. '. were photo(graphed or duplicated by rubbings. 6th Division 43d Division 37th Division 40th Division The Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen is Closed: 28 Feb 19. Luzon. postal censors. 64 . integrral ports of the oquipment. steps were tarwn to close dovm the Depot at Finschhafen and to prepare to rmove the entire shipping and receivinr. Intelligence officers assigned to Base "Fn · The following Technical Intelligence Units. 7. 5.

dditional tools and instruiments were acquired.ho Depot were tr?. to facilitate preparation of technical reports.:tediate shiplicnt to the now depot area in .v 3-2. lately thirty-five tons of captured equiprent to the Ordrinance Officer.the various an?. labeled and stored.oence.s.raphic caeras for use in the field and¢ in the sections. Vehicles and ooquip"':ont of these tcais -vere safehanded lator when shi'ppinac space . and the Ordnance Intcllir:ence officer. while anmlysis section personlel .inod under supervision of tea-a comanndors with the assistuice of analysis section oadquarters. US3$SOS. ov-er approxi.HI3TORY OF TEiCHICiML ItELJCE In the ia-. teaal personnel rernaininr at. Capt " irleffi.manila.iil'kes. ceased 28 February 1945...ired.nti. Incl 1) to cobtain -nc:j :m. rnths before.mtely ten . Thoc Acssistant Coordinator of Technical available.. Complete arrange!lents were made for expeditinE:g the loadin. visited the Technical IntelliGence Depot in January to expedite forward ::lovor.omre occupiocd principally with v:'ritin£: technical reports !and disposin-: of captured equipmernt on hand in preparation for the 'conteimppllted r. Operations at the Technical Intelligence Depot. Only the linil:u. serve-d as Capt. Captain Octave F. Base "F".. Enerir Equiipo.i require:'-nts in tools were roetined in the shops as operting oquii"ert.ateriel which hae. D.ld be needed and as .nt Officer for the base and naintained liaison with the Ordnance 65 .love.rj'y Technical Intclligence officers and ton lmoved forw.o.mnt of Technical Intelligcnce tca:. Ba3e 'F". Office cf the Assistant Executi.rd by air during Jamlary to join units in the field. Finschhafen.ated equipment that vJor.. Gutinca. chlsts wrere constructed. British Civil Affairs units were of creat assistance in this operation. Tho--as. (. Eighteen Ei-:htbh . Bajor . The closing of the Technical Intelligence Depot necessitatod turni.-Je.nncned 6 _'March and the detachni:nt was scheduled to sail 12 Ilarch. They cr. Iew.proxirt. iersonnel from:.lysis sections m:ede a trip to Sio.'p. ial analysis and organizational equipmont was readied for ir. sar. been left there by the je. LoadinL: co. They brought with then a shiprnent of speed 4.lpameea-... of this equipment by the first available water transpcrtation..

fiase "F" beforo rnove:rnt cf the Depote Technica. sailed for for?/arcl areas fro. . Luzon. co:-poosod of 8 officers _and 38 enlisted men.:onths .. durilxt' thc tibru-. rxyhdut.' to .. . and the transfer there of Iedquarto-rs T. .lishcJ i n CoSo-si-tu Co ±G ri. A total 'of .r~-.. rnine Technical Ir:il .r7y duty t~ the Ei.posd of 15 of:±'icers and 27 eillistod i.c (1ro. $l rc.ctiv-ities in the i:. departed from TPinsc:haf.licicc: unriits.e¢ster. Technical IntolliL:encQ in the '.lr tCrc.r: .7hile the now Depot was gettins. cstp'`.at the Base had! been shipped.l intellir-:ence Deipot is Est::blished at Jkhnila The Headqua'ters of' the Tjnited States Ar.39 enlisted r-.2-Oil Technical Inte-lj. of afro and wa5s opera tinc.(K Officecr9 :nd 1. for Manila. '.iL IJTLE=LIGCENCE officer until all captured mate:iel . c.-£nt of the De!oot to }MIanila..n Technical Intclli.. ihilipp ine Islanlds.s.bnii?.p)or-.equip:rnt at Base "F" t would cr foor two .rd!ditional Tcchnlic!lJ.ry .j'htn Armly.nce a.nyr previcus tise. 1i:clc uni. n -r.y y tthe and Lrore eCTVhnical Intc?.i·oe .cific theater.. 'To Guinea. pu~ Ll ~tn~ ~o ~6 . on 12 !rch. Intc'lli'enu ce teas . the hub of Technical Intelli!c..7mre sn toi.n.thich had been sta-'ing-. that city bec~a'.:xn.s on detach° ed scrvicc. 'oro efficiently than at . f t hes e..Iith the mrovcr.n iacific area had cor..IIISTORY OF TECTV-IC.US. vY&rme .1oS.: . cc. It was antlci-cte:1hart rcceirts of eoerir. osei cf 36 offlceis r=ni 60 enlisted .encoe D:pc-t.

cnd it doveloeed into the 1st Cavalry Divisi-n struck c.mrrow's imilitry situation". Incl 16 andc 17) On 15 Doconbor thc noxt strategic landing.ixccd on Mirndorc thoy encountored little Jap resistance.loved rapidly dcl-.aycn Gulf.ways lo. In five dys.. the 1st Cavalry Division or the 37th Division. .n.. r 15 maile bcachhead was sccured and soon expanrlod to over 40 -liles. As the 37th -. the three hih.ihp o Incl 18) Tlcn on 9 January. five days aftcr the landinC. Tarleac.t Sa-rr. was Made on Mindoir. Capture -f Urcanrctn oppened the northorn sectinn of the HiGrJhway 5 ancd snapped the enely's su-ply line through tho central Dizeon plain.. ro-l..ain n.* (rap Tncl 18) . (. -n Iayto.tanila-Baguio I:{. :Sith the Seventh Flcot aircraft actiinf as cover.cro on the r. alth-ur-h Tokyo radi. rail conter of tho contral plain was overrun.iP:hole ipaij.Fobruary 194.valry drovc down Hic. 288 diles ncrthwest of Lpyte.rve toward ~tnila alon.HISTORY OF TECTHUICAL INTELOLIGEUCE CH A T ' R R' VII O1TIO ONS ON LIJZON Tanuory 1945 -. 100 rdilcs to the n-rthw-cst of Mimila (MTap Incls 16 ind 18) the point of thc initial Jo. morre than 400 square oniles had boon retakon and arl-rrod colunmns .hvway 5. On the 25th Octobor 1944. the race was on. (i.arincuquc -wastalkn with little opposition in the interval between ITindcro arnd Luzon by cloe:-nts of 3ixth Ari:r in the first :-rovc to clear thc Sibuyan 'a.5 Alth-ough the Iioytc operation was a bold and dicisivo str-ke.t.proclaimed Trindore the key to "control of tor.hway 3 fron San Fornaldo and the 1st C. 'Ls the parntroopers lao. On 5 Jmrou-ry 19145 i. lay straight arhcad.ce to see who would nrrivo thore first. (mp Inci 18) 67 . 82 days after Loytc. it was only a small part of the Philippine cc.panosc landinc. to the south.hni-.n Hic. ra.os in Docciabcr 1941.arzyinC Sixth 'riy trc-ps appcoreod in the Lin. 600 ships of an armadac c. in the £hilippir. (Iap Incl 16 and 17) by the 503d Parachutc Infantry rcirforcc.

EnerW troops totePod about 18. east. In March. officer candidates.000 to 18. After the Fall of Manila After the fall of Manila.the. they vero used by the Japarnse as best suited their tactical needs: As screens against attacking troops.nd one-third of army troops.. No more unorthodoxz battle was ever fought and seldom had such a fanatic foe been encountered. Roughlly two-thirds of this heterogenous fighting face consisted of naval personnel . releasing 5. naval personnel from the sunken shipping in the harbor.000 counted dead and had loft nodern Manila a shambles. 68 . A mixed arnoy of from 16. This a. newly inducted civilians and the like.tea forcs had cost the enemy 17. Tne Fall of Mnila The battering down of the gates of Santa Tomas by 1st Cavalry troops heralded the opening of the battle for Manila. Army organizational equipment of the defenders vras supplemented by armanent from the battered planes from the surrounding airfields. With minor exceptions they fought to the death according to the original plan of defense.000 men defended the city. Manila w-as taken in thirty-five days.000. Its these forces had T 4bnila to the end. and from the sunken ships in the harbor. and as a means to enable their forces to infiltrate the American lines. the remaining Japanese in the area retired to a previously constructed defense system to .HISTORY OF TECfTMCAL INTELLIGENCE 0n 3 February at midnight the 1st Cavalry Division's advanced units crashed the gates of Santa Tomas internment carp and Bilibid Prison in Manila. Nor had any plans been formulated for the evacuation of the civilian population. elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions began a strong thrust which finally cracked the line. The units involved consisted of a strange array of hospital patients.000 internees. These troops were organized into provisional units of company or battalion size. for the forrtidarblo Shimbu Line. The mission of delaying the United S-a. air oorps personnel.. Rather. little attempt becn ccmm>itted to defend was made to withdraw into the hills to the east.

Ipo and Otawa. The Field Unit was composed of Technical Intelligence Teams selected from each of the six major branches of service concerned vith supply. the efficiency was immeasurably increased. as units were released from the divisions. to the extreme southern tip of Luzon. Team. On 17 MTay Ipo fell. It became the practice in the middle of this operation. was gradually cleared of organized resistance. Liaison between C--2 and the unit was one of the functions of the officer in charge and each team in turn maintained liaison with its respective branch of service at division headquarters. Later in Mray. the area south of Mianila. all enemy materiel captured was processed by trained personnel. In a:dition. Operating in this fashion. (Map. however. I. vhich stored a major portion of l. Certain items of equipment requiring labatory analysis were collected by the team and shipped to the Technical Intelligence Field Depot Unit. Initially. The Technical Intelligence Field Unit was the basic organization of Technical Intelligence. in the Luzon operation. operated only in the division area. In the meantime. By making this shift. During the Luzon operation there were generallr six teams to a unit. the 38th closed in on 11awa and also secured that dam intact. to the Armies. Recapitulation of Technical Intelligence Organization vAth Sixth Army A proper understanding of Tlchnical Intelligence at this point in the war requires a recapitulation of the manner in which it had evolved in its organization and its relationshi-. This practice made available the entire corps area to the unit rather than the comparatively small division area. The senior officer from those on the various teans functioned as the officer in charge of the unit. and for them to function under corps G-2 and staff officers. still remained entrenched around two dams. 692 . Incl. a unit was attached to each division and. One officer and two enlisted men normally composed a T. one unit was assigned as a Sixth Army Headquarters Unit. acting under division G-2. to assign thfem to corps.anila's water supply. 18) The blow was so unexpected that the Japs failed to demolish the dim with their previously planted explosives.HISTORY OF TECH-ITICkL INTELLIGENCE The Japs. It was the function of the Depot Unit to orperate a provisional depot in the field until the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot wras permanently established in the Philippines. Experience demonstrated that the original assignment of the units to divisions had a tendency to make this type of work inelastic.

.I.o'v-. a -ncl given first w.. Sixth Army (distinguishcd'from areas under control of the Commanding Guneral.rGTCE Based on.SCOS.ntured mratori._ance techniciia:i.ction and. am irade anvail able to .-iss-. Conmmnding G:nerol.nistcr:<. Sixth Army Technical Intelli..nd medi.c Ivr-.allconcerned and wjr_ of iLinoci.eo-. Si:xth A my G-2 Toeekly Report prepared by the Sixth A.te t-. .ir -we..nical.. iincnt.1 in ev :ry unit. Cnoy: One ordn.on of thi. ained.not ne.nical renorts pbi.lligecnco officer with the cmaturing unit si..:ufficiert..-eonce units on lal'-r ovratotionf consist-ed only of Intcl'igt-rnco.tion of c.riernce gained iIn the early A)hase of the Luzon ope~r'titon) it vwas lec.l reports were widely dissemi. in the lechnical Intelligcncc. lnrly of the l.y :-r. Technicrl Int.cticall cases: Tlichical the.rcctl?.tional control of the.arfare pcrsonnel. tc ''. Cix-tEh Arin.lligenc aguncics wer..ning progr. Th. tie ex-:.. 7o .i-ious Chiefs of Servic. :['v '-:rtermnnstcr nd ono iL'edical officer assigned to onprate d:i._-. Signal Corps alJd Che. usual. to guerrill... i!'.c].l of nec.y reports of the corps to d-'. their inci .vr. line troops tlhrough the G(-2 OF' TFCITTICAL :rNT Ca:. bh.n'Iid.ry ite.:riel was made by Sixth Army in all but the foll.t the Technical Intel..'.tuff'cient wrork to w...'iting th. Besides ni..pturd food. vi th information c'on-is :adeC ava-ilab1le to G-2.gnified termination of his interest in these items.~ authorized to with ctapturcd oqui. T.7:.ct andi rcp.r nt. possed to controcl of Philippini Civil Affairs Unit (P CAU) aft r th. in -are s undr opera .uchnical Intclligenc Uinit activities reports wrere submitted monthly through G-2 channcls. to coll.... clothi.w for Ilntl.iC.. UST:L2. '`ccgnizeodcivil go-clrmnent.igence : UInit sh'ic.) decision for or disposition oJ' 3alva~. personnel_ f the Technical Intclligence units loroo-..rm.rily include 2uau'terr aster and Miedical teams d as th:.d tr-i.y 1'ocln:i. Tests madc. Enginc-r. 7.luilber of reports for dissemination to the front.idenq Intclli.ligencc and tr-ining p-arposcs anyr iteoms of cap-tured suppulies and cqui.r_~ was not .luu to the Si::th Army Special Intolligonco S. S. a.x.Snc Coordl.unrder the control of the coordinating office (the corps '-2) . smu-' lie -nd cquips mcnt wir. Technic. Ccpics wrlre fcrwvrrdcd directly to the vl. tn rcr..uorrilla forces. irunits operati.< and arLri. n.pcns !and other eq'li-oment to 'b issued -'o .iy wore advised promptly of tha loc-.t troops.ess.c-t-.ns.s rAl]_aced on duty with rnd priority for on the use and roefir of equlipment for Sixth Army comba.

' i'.f th. particul. m s-. 4. Capt Creed.rly Ordnance.4-iol.nfcrn:f tion .cted as the Provisional depot unit in Iuzcn as it had dcnce in the Le-to cperation.z7n Vi''old ~Units o:. over to CIC or to.d at $Sn Fabian ('ap. ouaenl-r than ir .T/5 Garrett...ence activitios. Fi:ld Unit No. sup lmcented cr rclievcd by row t (i crsonnel comprising these and other (-ms.Engincr Team NTo*3 (Capt Johnson.. oper {.rt in the -niti:l.nd tr. I. Icc.ations of Jap. 2.. Li~r..m. ICero.ios ofcthler i. Tochrnic.y.. a-ndcl th.rn in Incl 3).muficturrers.nese Army units.o h. n._.g.cved to San Jacintc. as Sixth Army trc.ndividualls .pnr.y .cl Intceliigence Fi-eld Depot Un:it Fi.and.this unit covered the 25th Division sector in the early stages of the Luzcn cperation. _hich supolied infcrmati.Pvt Carson) recovered a quantity of mines. Duie to the r. 6 7nd 7 took pa. The advance sectian cf this Unit 1..(1.lndcent ur:nts coi._cll it.old Unit No. but was latcr m.on on Ja-n("l nse 2il. ner. l:nlttellirnc anld . joined one of th.l Int.ic!d advance of United Statcs troops on Luzon.dr.r^.sin.od by -:.them necessary for tl-' rcs. 3.i~. which ererturned.-mt St.:s of th.ncc Depot in including many new itri:ls of J-.r rer. ag. T.any rmviolus o.:.of which some were stored for shipment to the Depot at Finschhafen and others werc released to Sixth Army units to be used for training purposes.nila.s .cut. In tVl-: course of their rr T'r chnc'.. 5. vast quantities of matoriel werc captured by thc Technical Intelligelnco field units.n I'rovince.nd arrive.r.tion 7aS liadI 'v-iliblc to tactical ccmmuanders concerning this no.uon opcration ancd _'t. Incl 18) in thb. tcms in the field..eso equipment..ted oni Luzo1 areL sLio. v i. on 11 January 1)1!5. b F'-ny items -e:ore discovered. s. Luzon. 3: Tochnl .d from his shinr-nel to-mis colle:icted dt-.eft Lryte -.nd diaries.-ly disccvered equinioent. vrho had ben Acting Sixth Arirr T._rn!l. such as records. '. divisions or other major ind.Cominanecnders of' c-ptvri.nd orcamiiizations that had donated supplios tc th.:. T. the provisional depot remained until it vwas p: ssible to estaol.r n of iruncdiate combat.t.gnyen Gulf region.suw l iesird :qu--rr :nt considered b .nslation.ish the Uiniteid Sta.riarl. iore informa. F anga.ATS for i..ti. 1.. unzits th-.ini tock over as CcorCinantor cf ''chlnec-. utilized any cm0t'lr.<c o:l I-. *7i . Medical Team Nol (Capt Able) of this unit recovered a variety of drugs from small Medical dumps scattered throughout the area and turned thcm over to PCAU to be used for civilian relief.. l]. 3 again .nra!l officers. i.-es mocverd rapidly inl.J sta-. n::... recov. .tes Army Technical Intelig.o-<. Besides acting as a depot unit.r Ca.

forIepot tc be n'.lly -)lainned. the materiel that had beo::n col..:'al . collected...tates..lectc a.o piro-..T/5 Gar'eott and Pfc Carscn.. The iopot zmunit attcmpted to k -::pcontact with the various unf'ts. In Fcbruary.vz-as temiporarily maintained t.e aLs ecquilpment received from the tea.'_-1. T/Sgt Peterson.l : . '.HISTORY OF ?E"T ' .angiaracina.ning a depot at San Jacinto proved to be vlnfrvorab. returned to the Technical Intelligence Deot except Capt Ncvmkowski.tvard thalt. Tc taken further -ma.'r location.. L.r r warded later to thU. .cin. Clark Field and the country surrounding Angeles were readily accessable.zn.ti. ' "7. By this time quite a few changes hnac been made in the personnel cf the I)epot Unit: Capt Bess had bcen v-'c. M'larch produced only a moderate vras brougllt up tc cco.. i.up cperations during quantity of captured equipment)..a. operating socetimes under enemy fire.(. ' i.t. All.cnr...y frfcm imanila instead of vorking. b. facilitate the handling of the flow of captured enoeiy rlatoricl comliing in at that time. moppin. Shortly after the Depot had been established in Manila.. reoporting on the inferior machining parts. the Angeles Depot tof. The origi. r- .'.:noe .ls wa3 b.a.eJori i:'po h.. From their ne. but distances became tco grCat.nli plan of mairi.e . Engineers. Field Unit No.i + from 3an Jacinuc to .. later.:ndcd by rifle fire while attempting tc render '1uisable a Japanose 12'" hovitzer and had been evacuated to Loyte. all othor personnul had. The team also broke dovin two Japanose diroctrrs.eft ..l repairetl a yersonnel carrior by going out and finding another one sc that parts could bo obtained. cstablishud at .of Ordnmnc.igina.o. where the advance i'ield depot had been tempcrarily in operaticn...i. and T/5 and shlipped to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Yanila or to the '.. Lt Abbott was added to this group.nited . the field depot unit wThich had roved to Angeles ho-:vcr. Ch(hmical Wairfaroehe alsc returned to the Depot shortly thereafter.-rwvi:. DI. 72 .:'s !a:tanfi :.. g-l. F'ield Unit No.. .ty as or.Much equipment had been buried by the Japanese in this vicinity so that in addition to their usual duties at the!.unt their transportation facilities. and T/5 mlcorc. matericl. 3 had considerable field work to handle. ci. Japan* ose mrateriel recovered in Luton during proceeding operations was brought in to thle Ilanila Depot from San Jacinto.1.

g.:T"'TO'IY 01' ?C'-7TZCT.c-eJi ib%.c -:lrUn'. I.:'sine( to Ordnance Team No. ]ignece Depot into WTTadquarters. N(. a'ni]a. landed at Lingayen beach 9 January.37th Division aS_:¥ · ntil the Uni rekahed C]irk Field and ocr t jt S+oti:rn... '. I. w's sent from the United States .chnlcal Ir .n 'ch. re+'-n" * mane nm.rations.1 .-.:Ls'tt. accompanied com. ' th. fc:i o 1. oifc ranking.. No 7 was attached to the )rOth Division early in Decrmber 19L11il atr.j. r.'q:'-t.rl-e of the tcmporary. 3 all the way from that poirt' throiuh th].%-..n.trols so they would }). of TField Unit No. T/?i fTs9 Dr Garner) in the. I.ibt.ll others in the field during op. i the Tan:l'l arl. and operateod wi. . This unit.....ri.5' Peterson.i-¢ : _ .s It.edln sm:i.nm..n on hand rrhen equipment was rccovared. th.a.s dii..'c.1r7!y to (racaL. 6: 37th Division Personne].lt._g :neo Q. : . "W:r.Qj wv-n i. n. I'7 T I'( 'l"I During .antla.I. Field Unit No... The division left No-w Y!ritain 9 pecember to conrluct a dry-run landing opecration at Ir`l:mnus T:3land in the Adcniraltties.ineer. r .e ?lani l operation.l qu. drepot until June.y l9 .4.. -''inol 1 t.oen onl thli drive do'n Hiilrhway No.. under ?i fire. befor¢c Yaliny' .. iLd tnit No! 7: ilOth Divnsior Piel(J TTnit. RB 29 January they had ndvanced as far as Bamball. r. at 1900 hours.bster w-s assistcd by T/5 Garrett and Pfc Carsonj th. ' T .lcM . where stubborn enemy resistance fromi well-fortified cnves slowed down their advance.-ct.ui)jnt'.i-lc 1i cql. was hoLp itanized for yellom.e0i 1J'i.~ ano~ ~. C:n rc'.failfre equipment was uncovered by CiwS Temn No' 3 (Lt !ax Ljo Hilbbs.' T(cchn-ic-l i:.n'. was i. tCpc Glnuco-str New -3ritainl. T-.i:. tct'.lic. 73 .o' . lr. when 2d 1.a( the :ipmcnt rcnmaining at the provisional Lq depot. like a. although many oi the supplies had been looted by the civilians. 'w iYJ :.n 6 by t. nt. that time returning to the Technical V-t-.Li::. -i o < L z~r p:r seI't. ':'l'. r]. at . and considerablc TntJligernce materiel for all the serviccs was uncovered in the Ft. with enemy planes flying low over th(: LST they were aboard. They. l " Lt hbbott returned to the Depot at Tanila] l and Capt NMwakows!<li.t Stots'enburg and Clark Field areas. erdt.. T/'. 1'. i w. 6 landed at Lingayen Gulf 22 and 23 janua.abat pa. ~No enemy Chemlcllc1 . Sixth A. T.~Jld: o ]ai'-i. the Unit joined the 37th Diisiion 'at Conchpion on 27 Januar.ry° After reporting to C-2 of Sixth Army.llhctu the city.

t where other equipnent of Intelligence value was recovered. howercr. A. 3 of this Unit (Capt r. tests onl a newly recovered and very iip. itself.HTSTOnRY CF TEC'ITTrC'"L T'\ "A. Press -ireless mad:: for Capt Clyde R.Sm roknt launcher.Inia cn. good gas No war gases.TG'YNC.nortant trpe . Jr.ctat. 7T . Woodworth to operatec withthe 37th Division Surgeon t s office. however. Tar Dcpiartlmnt. :. Ordnarnce Teaml`To. the prilary cause was the fact that the encemy did not have extensive supplies of either liedical equipment or were carrying their gas masks.-s troops. burned-out Signal equipment. T/ VTinn) conducted firin. Arrngements w. During! the early days of th. cvidenccd by the fact that few Japancse casualti. 'pparently the Japan se cer. b'a tle for Manila. No large du.tinrl of mcdical. w. and it was believed that t he Japanese chemical vwarfare. The latter wer? used with good acffect in portions of Manila already taken by United . the equivalent of the U.oere not capable of' initiating or maintaining deduced thatthe enemy did not anticipate the United waas Alrther Statcs . Accordin.mylair States forces.'J'panese DrUgs and . was discovered. and the port area. and miscellaneous items consisi.. were used..edicine". Tntrr-. Bratt) located atthie I. T/h Tobert R..nother important factor was that M. C n Capt rinterstein's re:prts on these rockets were later published by Sixth Army and by the. . Tinterstein. The iianila area? was covered as sections of it fell. part of the Japanese 5Kit' short -wave radio telegraph receiving equipment.uros./h r:. 3 (Lt Daniels.ell supplied with smoke bombs and incendiaries.. During the latter stages of the Inila operation. other than a limited supply discipline wa-s apparcnt. of approximatcly 200 items of drugs materiel recovered consisted not listed in the Filipino accounts.edical :Mlatcriel not burned by the rctre:'ting J-apanese was looted promptly by the natives. T.illimm E. S.rmy intiating the use of war gases. '. a lazity of gas discipline war nthed among the encmy troops. 20 cn and a hh. except th: portion immediately ncnmy around Intramuros.nother ralio station was located in the San ?'iguel Brewery.. for there was no sector after the entry of United activity in the . notes and pharm:laceutical texts written in Japanese. Siignal Te'mu No. of toxic smoke. Tt .ar.anila Golf Course a transmitter station.'ps ware found. the Union Theologicalh Seminary. _Ap-.

He further stated that in (a nrw br o3f c. C-i. The next dLay all. froc:' the T.: on n-the Ccstolajos airstrip on the n:'.poration. they landed with the 38th Divisi. comllondinfr their e.chlmical Intelli-ecnce standpointwas not t.the Co:mmanding Gcneral. XI Corps headquarters vwas in ccrnandl.HIST(ORY OT TTCI.ay to prepare for another sucossful.!nthusiasmcnergy and initiative while worrking under ccnsid:rablc hlasards from enery fire. T:hl.r cf c-!:mmndatinl on' the actt-i. tlhe t:.y to return to I.) join the task forco fcr the next operation.d rapnidlly fcrnvrd and the TWieold Unit set up locati. rocket. Iic wzroteo that tllri. XI Crps Field Unit !c.ence value was co:-llect(-d. first encountered in M' ari. 1.: anld -thl-r equipnmnt was obtained through tht efforts vf th]e te. :Luzn.-'n at La Paz.a'.day t.elte to prepare for anoth. They load'ed the follciwirig (.inental Corbat Team of thc 2lth T. covyera[o by the tvar.(l 1lv (y hll iOsce bec-n lost weore obtained. I:('NCF. USISOS.l rcported to-38th Division. the little equipment of Intellig. Eirghth Arry. The ::isciin.!ht of 30 January..units under cor 's r.29 January.XI Corps in ccnfcrmity with the policy of shifti.. 1 were placed on tempcrtarer duty with G-2.and secured per. As there was no oppcsiticn.H-7 pcerlation. 75 .IC:.lL of Uni.(Incl 19).: c rllrisinr:' Technical Intelligence Unit No.e:cforfr thLe lUnit was directed by Ei(:hth .ral of the 37th Infantry Divisi. citing particularly thu 4lh7 1.l.rrm.lkPeil't1]cr. of the entire operation and allotwed corlpleto.staging on Leytc fcr the Iuzon operation.ther than division headquarters. Major G.thc 3ith r--v.n: T. Field Unit No.hlwhso r:ission was to cut off Bataan Penninsula mand to join f:rces 'wi. R.. During..issicon to go into the i'ield wrh!re they operated in the 7th and 77th Divisions' sectors. nines and booby traps.On .th the XIV Ccrps coming down frmcn the ncrth.brrt of January 1945 the Unit was preparing for the . They left fromn CSubic B.zarnding Gcnu.scs the first inf-:rmAtion on itens cf JapLanese ([: at EiL'hth Arm-y Hcadquarters c¢n 1_5 Fcbruary3 with only one dc.I.uah1 their efforts much equipment and many supplies wvhich Twrul.6.vties of this unit in their search for new itCols cf cncny cquipment.a.The corps at that time was directingl the operaiticn rf the 38th Drivision and the 3)1th lerr. ZmabalCs.ter p..-ncral.r) rc-tc a l-'tt.

: had be..te I Stat:s t.tction. co-roborat. These irnc-ludecd q'arp it ie:s oi' pr. n!e. Roberts.lni'a..a. T/5 Ilaull I.-mie :L . Technical Intilligcmnce per.up exhibits and t-l:incd Arm..:rnal.:n used in mod-v:.nd of' February.e mip.sonl.that of th:se munitions. sJurvwy on thh .HIS. s troops.-ns lnd booby tr:aps.illiam J..n t!ie Ilanf]i..roops ari by the 3s:me method was :" cold be. 2: lst Cavalry Division Fielld ninit Tio. eqluipment non--lethal Chem.tion whi.lli.'.. t. the entir': Philippine Campaign. . . s in -an :f.t c:ity h?..nd th..:ral important O-rdnancce items. :tmoval work when it exp.:.lligence teams and thei En:illlne n:lysi:.l-ound 'anila and the . ('rapt .. rGoJig).: 1'cTlam o. which to join I ..amount of mine.ia.t.: Enginee:r Intc-. on 8 K-:lrutar1ys lt915.!ppeci by lack of 11.': :a teha the .lls eastIin:3 southeast of IMlanila (ifap Incl 13). t arc.first p::riof o!' the Luzon opcrAtion..:u-r·-' of' Ordnance -tlhaL. Engineer IntellThroughoutl igence teams did 'a ltre ~.ln us::: a stora-e for Th'l iLnvcsti:'utiolj. hills to the (a :'r Team No.h handiica. Sction :lso assisted in settil-.d in the. Gt)'s...s using :d o m.-ctically ev'. 1 on tcmnporary duty to Si. my . '.a.clcs aindq 'i'Lpr:1(nt.are!inmit-.ons and :rotect.-:tus of Japanese Intelli. c:ntr-al plainof Luzon.m: J.v-'t. enlisted m(en (lid lo. hi.n:cmn.around Ymanila but clinu-h qunti ]. 'Th.TORY OF TI'PC NIT'AL IN'FLLIGENCE I..n . to indic:tie th-t the Japan-se not in latr: e ' were prep'. *ilso rad. 2' D. th. Lanila./ Divisions on J. made ammni w'ver.' le seve..le t1o United Stat.l flown with vehhi..lrdidenrtified th: t ype ot artJllery beiig F'rom shell used a 'ainst Un i.ive._: h.hou'. The onl: ::t.. for Divi7lion Engineer troops to clear tbh: -re:as. rather than waiL.. which ended thi. Ch. ? was attached to t ::Ist Cavalry Division and opcL'ated in anrd ...:p mni. i'..l!:ionos in . 3y 76 ..xth Armry had ope:r'It. ('.i)'.orps.! qu:ntitI.rfirt.:ry type of`:d oiff'rnsii-vl or id::tO ively for Chemical Afairf-re. Reports -u1 ll abl: tLo d t.Lt. Sgt Chaxrl:::s B. CorripFidor. Field ITnit N! showed that others CIVS Intligenc .dited combat .of dumps ot availab. that sNvcrl plOaces in th.iccal .d b. ncu had reports Chezmical Warfir(. atis '-ssignt:d the mis:sion of conductIjn ' .

h-wewrr.l'li::l :ls.r units vrwrec also) in thll field after M(arch: Field Unit N:o . and 5. 8.oinlel1 on operations with XIV Corps.ith analysis sectiuns.ateriel Instuction teams.. and 9 that were in the field during rpril.rle t. those teamrs novered all areas occupied by Sixth ArTmy com:bat units on LuzOn. aided by his team training in the field.ience DTnp':b for luty v. and the rnemy Equipmrent and !. ngineer Team No.IG2.:Is. In addition to Units 11.1 'ie] 1 Tniits-. h:. Branigan which worked directly out of Sixth ArRy He adquarters and was assigned to the collection of JY.Units 1. Panpanga province. and h -.7on Teams.NC Tecchnicil T tel ito ncro on Tuzon a fter cebruary 1945 All tie previoussly dicunse. I Cor. 3. 4.T Teun consisting of T/.i.. nine Technical Ilntell]i-enc temps. functioned as an Enemy 7Weaponls Team workin. 2.le t inc later.5. T/3 Lischalk and Pvt Thevenot. Ordnance technicin..nmunition. respectively.'arfare Team No. continued to supply the troops with we-pnns and a. desi~gn tecd as tt"ne-'y rquipment and Materiel Instrll+. Ficl:l lUnit No. collecting and ropairi'l. landing:s.1. Fil. Due to his work considerably quantities of Japanese Ordnance materiel were utilized bythe guerillas in the N rthern Luzon area. prt:icipatud in this program. 8. 9. 6(-3.3t Lischal].: duty by farch and returned t. but S.fromi Field Units 9..d iarticipated in the original Luzon ' assi:. also assigned to T C rps. instituted . rc:. Instead of being confined to certain sectors..Y OF T. newly assigned to XT Corps.k.. and three Signal teruns -. 5. directly under the Spcinl Tntellience Section.tnay.Sgt Julius I. 8.s. 6. con- ducted under the: direction of the AC of S. anc 9.s. 6 from Field Unit No. 4. v.composed of personnel from Field Units 5.HTLST0. nent for its troops durinS the month of .tld Unit NC. Teeclricn ITntelli.had lbeen relieved f'r.~. and 7 -. Pvt Thevwenot was hospitalized so. and 11 -.ther.CTINTC XL INTTLT. T. code name for nameplates and rubbings from captured 77 .':T.n extensive training course on enemy equip. To assist the guerrilla forces in Northern Luzon in locating.:: fiell. thl(-. three Ordnance tcam:s -. Three ( ti .. 5. new in the field.items of equiprment.PI. 8. The rorr-ups included: Chemical a. Teams with Sixth Arry ITeadqularters Sixth ArcyY located at San Fernando. there were addedJ two individual tenas operating directly under Sixth Xrny G-2 on special assinnments. Special r. 2 from Field Unit No. The othr special tearm *was a JAPLI. and Ficld Unit No.Tforton an-l Sgt Illen J. 7. Sixth Army Headquarters. Alto. 2.

it namrpl. TUSA0S. continuine with the !43rd and some telams with the 32nd and 33rd Divisirns. 8 6 . . offict-r was app.-.ltration parties planted mines and depth char.-:. plates d-aily foi.t~o. G-2. T/L[ vooney) of Fi-:ld Unit .. whiceh . On 21 T'.. ?. . '1S.Si3'!: d]L. i On 1. ' throwers. Thi.tcr in the 33d and 32d Divisionns' sectors.. ll.t o.rith '" .r .es at bridges and along the shoulders of prcvirusly cleared roads.e ..'-f .:. Field Unit No.-.3. 3 ehbru-ry 19115 (Inl 20()). :2mintenance and testing kits.'ashington). 4d i. but they wcre poorly conceAled and easly recognized.or or oIntel]i. Sub ject: Nameplates and Technical Intellig.. £fl.. Sct Pranigan.i.To. !nd p rsonn3l to collect and advise direc tod Tcchnireal Int(. T.. to A. .Lnce. . is v-S:' es in the Phi]. con:. I. from whom they were sent to t h'n Direct.Tniel. o'ihc r thaon airc. souith oJI' 1 'anila. During the period of 9 to 31. 'vith the 13tdd Division the morning of D-Day. s t scnd Simpl' FEG(-3 Capttured Jap:ln.'] t!r < ollection of This tean.with T:.noJid :rable quantity of Jap equipment in the: hf3d and l!.e. -'SA SOS.kings on c.tei respornsibility for the i..ippines were designated the coordinating ag. 's. lrmy S-rvice on '(.thir t wi. b-)th in Cavite Province. the Office. d:. of the AS oi S.?r wcrc attached on procossing nameplates and marking dat.ollI.1.. This include-d:. cio]i 0. Forces.ying of mine fields in the l3d Divisiln sactor. Sinc. o C-.ted 13 Ft bruary 19b5 (Incl 21). 7 (Crtpt Lary. Which resulted in sonme casualties and made it necessary to rcsweep the roads every morning.ct: Eamb.s team processd ez:nemy equipment.. There se.)f o.eice. were placed in brokcen spots in the Pa'crmcnt. Field Unit No.C(. t-aon:omittal..d a c. co :rdinai \n of T..i tI oto ht-. .eneies for Techricxal intelligoncr' whihin those bases. was responsible for of Lake T Scril.nt. : I f& XIV Corps T..5.j.--d at e-_ch base . ptured collection -nfl proc 3ss ..exp.tected.. nl)t si: easily d. Ftruary th. F'SASOS.F lott r. hite Beach No.ct.:teis wvrs orL'ti:.HI. CLnei''ht. T7 .'rrT enemy quipi'nent ini S'. 3 at the town of San Fabian. proleetiv. . At ni.::med to be no systematic l.3.TORY OF TECMIHNICAL INTTELLJLENoFC -i larre quantity of name Thl.s '.r. .:d.c thecommands to which'i.i. infi.:ligenc. I.d or -. c. re-ponlsibilitv for' cell.. t.. Otherss. 5 had lar.ry th s Unit )perlted in the h3rd and )ccasionally in the 25th Diviions' areas.chnical Intelligence includi. an(' mi:r. lieadquarters !'3A20OS.2 JAPL'T. as his sole function (lett::.. where contacts were made with thc 1st Cav/l-ry and the ~lth Airborne Divisions.. operating in Batanfgas Province in Southern Iuzon e:... detector dits.:_s masks of various types.ebruarv they were rtli(cved from duty with Sixth Ar!ly to be sent t.o XIV Corps. smokoe candles and .' plaec: on tmporary duty with I Corps. d.ubj". :ashi.ta fron. Janu...uc.. A fiw tape measure mines were found lying on the concr:te hihw...ty . the .):i' n.ligence to 'iJl ( Ground rn(di st y Sectio!n. S-2 offices of var. Chemical ilarfare Team 1No.

Thonpson Lt James Molthan) recovered the following iternswhich wrere either put for United states troops or turned over to PCAU fcr civilian a portable X-Ray unit. with T/5 Storckx (from Field Unit No. San Jacinto made a convenient base for shcrt trips into the surrounding operational areaswhore considerable equiprment was recovered. He resuned operations on the 25th of March and then was transferred in April to Field Unit No. 5 as officer in charge of the Unit. Turcotte).Capt Sternal a'ain headerd( up Ordnance Team No.oarchlights. types was recovered. IHaIncr lA/4 Roeor 1'. but on corlplction of landin4g operations on D-Dayvrcrked independently as a team lccated at San JacintoLuzon. In April.l11 assisted by T/4 Blaney and T/5 Gabage from Field Units N.HISTORY OF TETC'(-TqJICAL INTELLIGENCE Several booby traps reported by civilians to PCAU were removed or neutralizcd by the Engineer Tntelligence Team (Capt J6rdan A. bull dozorsroad rollersgasoline locomotives and lmnly other itels6I'Also. In Liaythis personncl . Medical Temn No. This tean also turned over assorted items of Intelligence value to the Depot and released a few weapons to the Ccordinator of Technical Intelligence for guerrilla supply. 2 portable surgical tables..Garcia) in December rwas attached temporarily to 43rd Division.lathus.they were joined by Capt Sternal. 8 and 9 respectively.(ILt Philip C. In the 11th 'Airborne area a great dcal of heavy Engineering equipnment of transferred to Headquarters Sixth 'rmyyagain operating as Ordnance Tear. Echord) uncovered soveral large food dumps containing the usual riceo fishycrackers and cotmon condinents.which were turned over to the 43d Division Quartermaster and PCAU for distribution to the civilian Populaticn. L. mostly bombsjshells and dtepth-chargos vith pressure ifnitersjwere found in this area. a report on their descrirtion and method of neutralization was submitted by the team to 43d Division C-2 and thence tc the S-2 of all battalions and ro-imonto..and numerous drugs and dressinl-s. Later. including diesel and gasoline engines.2.o. No.Sherwood. He had-been in contact with the eneny east of Mlanila throughout March. stool sharpeners. 5 (Capt Frederick B. TWurzelPvt Ben T. because cf the enomyls use of mines and booby traps. a culture cubator. se. flowcr pots conical boat1 and lunge mines with a light metal shelloyrero also found throuLhout this area. and Pvt Enile M. thousands of mines.this team submitted an instructive report on Japanese tactics and equipment used in the Luzon area which -vrs disseminated to the trcops.ccncroto mixers. air ciclrossors.5.AndorsonPvt Kenneth S.cxcept for a ten-day rest period. to use use: in- Ordnance Intelligence Teoan No. By request of G-2 33d Division. Many yardstick. (Lt Philip A. Quartermaster Tean No. 8 ) added as a second enlisted rian.well drilling rigs. 79 79 . Previous to this Capt Sternal haOc operated alone as the only tean in the field from Field Unit No.

Gaddo) of this unit supplied information to Headquarters. along with other equipment. 25th. Field Unit iNo.. ETnemy Equipment and ciaterial Instuction Teams.nrfare Team No. however.latto) covortd thc )13d Division region south of !. including: the perccnt:l. workinc: in t'he nne of th.anila during. I Corps. to instruct in Chemical Uarfare with the Enemy Equipment and Mfateriel Instruction To(ams conducting the Sixth /. The Chcilical ?. -ith the exception of connon type smoke candles. returnec on 25 'ipril.. T.s. T/3 Paris). During webruary. In May. transferred to Headquarters sixth r. T/5 Riayllond D. 3'3d. con- trolling the -approaches to the Cagaya. this tean wa. this Unit alsfo ailed in conducting a short course on Japanese equipment for -irriored units under I Corps. 80 .ge of enemy troops carryin. Phoad lay Balete Pass. T. L4: T Corps %'lilc M. Engineer Temam No. The city fell on 29 ^. this teanm found little Chenicrl TlTarfare equipment. which enabled them to make an estinate of the enemy Chemical '. United States Forces wheeled and struck northward toward Baguio. Chemical . 1 (Major Harwood. sectors. Shorwman. Thic iten was reported through the XIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report. ?ralsh. h (Lt 1'Tllir.:irfaroe. and a report on the fact that Japanese tanks and holding (ictachments wore carrying smoke candles for screening purposes. and Capt :7alsh and 9St Gaddeo wcre transferred to Headquarters.5anila was being cnptured to the anuth. Considoerble equipment and materiel were recovered as the Unit worked its wny up the Lingayen Valley. TVTNLLTGJ7"1 Simnarl. a notation of the presence of Chemical -lirfare munitions and devices used in offensive action. Richter. Tam ?l. J.rmy .Arfare situation.pril. I.nuary and February.n VTa]3ey. ./.HTrSTCmY 01' TCUTNTC'T. ITar:in. and 37th Divisions. In June. around which centered one of the most bitterly protracted battles of the entire carpaign.rny training pr ogra. Sixth Armry. 2 (Capt Paul J.gas masks and protective clothing. ETngincer and 'odical te'n-s from this Unit returned to the Depot carly in Trarch The rest of the teai. T/4 Robert J. 4 which had landed in the Lingayen Gulf area on D-Day.i 1. a record of the r'as-proofing of eneny enpl'accllents. T/4 Shovnman wvas rocall-:d to the Technical Intelligence Depot. was nttached to I Corps.l T/3 lnurt ':. with the exception of those transferre I to Hcadquarters Sixth rrny. T/3 Ellyett.Julius J. Field Unit No. securing. i suitcase radnio viilently intended for espionage work. Japanese broad basket in the philippines.

also incre-ased aimounts of 10i5 and 150 . T/. dumps cr diur:ps of nlew equipment were . ]iekl :si-mr) founl little Signal equipment until the f.-£s sea.J. T/Sgt Robert J. -. Team No. were evidently recl aimed.ncc. been e+..I encountered by Ouartermist-r Tear No.:izumnta_ ir prevent.ITTSTO01Y OF TTCIrTINTCALT. hfc .reo of f.. A Jnr. an-L reissue. 1 (T.ateriel Instruction Teeams. Other irtprover-ents . plainly indicating the lack of supplics of the enemy: cw)pcurrct m. a no:Adel 94 mark 6 radio oet~. ITN'rLT?'ITTCr in a 'lition toi tlli r utine recnv1'ry of enrey equipment.ral items o. peters.-iey . the quantity and s tyle of items recovcre . who in turn distributed then to needy natives.sualtlcs from sack mines -`wo and suffL..t Roy H.stlajt c-.! in the 6(th infantr-y Divisionrs sector by Ordnance Te.ncL nevr trpe Or Inance nnted: an incrcesedl number of medliwi artilAlery guns (105 mm and 150) rmm cnlibcr) over the li. as one of the lneny 7quipmr:nt and T..arfare Brnnch.. public addlress srystem %with a 100watt output. T15 mm . ' b r. McConkic. Americ:n-made GI shoes that had been captured ha. Some rm!ios wcore turned over to United States troops.-htcr cnlibr:rs (70 mm end 75 min types).-as used by the 37th Division for intercept work. hifgh vclucity field glln. discovered and neultraliz1 th'n nv7 s1.l by the Japs.r. T1he renor'r. and one.bbott) and st.ters such as raincoats and blankets sherwed evidence of wear and.)idly looted by the Filipinos. Enemry st. "To lar-e f .strl TT. Curry and pvt Harold E·. washed. . -vi.&e by i. were casualties in tec !iivisions in wlli. servlng.vare. and a tye 90.lall durmps were ra. the team recvere-l a feLw Quarternaster itemsl rff c'-.runs and tanks. Sirnalt. In June.. 1 (Capt ?op.. Around E.:ian type.^ffrirs Units.nnaissanc:: car by personmel of this team for use by the Sixth Ar. in the 33d and 37th Division sectors.1: for lissemination to.-luje to equ-ipment:. w-hich were taken were turned over to A the Philippine Civil .p.:tns ' ns in :l'! istrtL!Cti handling irnprovi.-nl boc. pvt Robert ?:To reTmrietas).oa.y tyrips wic:z i:. The bulk of the captured equipment was shipped to the Technical Intelligence Depot.~.'/ the uppors cut away anl tlle edges remade so that they also might be re-issued to the Japanese.. If ccmmrtnic'tions ha . Sev.'y psycholuo)ica]J -.front line units on :r!:. Wierst. 1s 'rhave bcOl saved in the 2hth Divisi on.vwhi.'ll o.ynom-:ic sdeal:er.s odit.. was installed in a corn :and and rmirunitior.sll jf T:muic:. ITer.nUl h'dl n . 2 (Capt 're1d '. completc with I '-. and mrny improrvsed mines .. These included flramec thrw'ln-.p trps3. 81 .~ cavzes and other storage points.i' enemy Ordn:. this entire term was tr'ansferre TIeadquarters d to Sixth rnry. large quantities of equipnent were rccovrre!: fri.s.'k n~in.5kstill . of which little was known.

ooperated in conjunction .operated 'idth the 32d and 25th Divisions in the Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass areas of Northern Luzon absorbed at first in beccring far. including division officrs.IFiold Unit N<c. 8: I Ccrns Of the seven ori!ina3 Field Units that had launched the cporaticns in S.Lt John BiMuddilan.7' 24 }March on through A. They ovrcr callcdl ui. Sar.a rCcd de. Wcins) found a considerable quantity cf mines and booby traps. Engineer Tcam Nos6 (Lt Frank JDiPhillips.a Tcchnic.ril¾ In addition to their rcegular dutiesall sections of this Unit cooperated to collect nurercus items of enemy equipr.rch 1945.only Field Units 4 and 5 rernained in the field during March and ALpril. . Lt Muddiman also identified the ener.iliar vrith field operaticns in pre-iaration fcr future assignlontso Field Unit Noc8.on to fariliarize the troo% s vrith this equipment and to subl:mit rel:orts which wore published by G-2 for the interest of all ccnccrnoedLater in May they w-ere called in to Sixth 'ArLm Headquarters to assist in the Enemy Equiprment and Matoricl Instruction Tea. 13 (1st Lt Louis 1}.lS/.s within the I Corps sector to I.'ith Field Units 4 and 5..Pvt Rudy GoColby. Pvt Euseno F. J accidental discharge of a 45 caliber pistoland was evacuated from the area.l Intclligence Depot and rwere replaced by Field Units 8 and 9..:s sector. surgical.t T/5 Charles H..edical officer.acting uion instructions of G-2.just before the DeoIot clbsodl in 1-reparaticn for the transfer tc Manila0 As the Unit was now in the field".T.y drugs stcred at PCALU hos-iital.:uthern the I Cor.lst training prorgranm The m.ical lWarfare officers of I Corips.I corps.S-t Bcker received a headvwound as a result of the In March. it operatcc in conjuncticn with Field lnd in the case of ncw peras Unit No.ernit their use by PC.togother with sanmples of Jap-anese rledicl.S !. C7S Teal No.IlISTORY OF TEC1IiIIC..U physicians.4 until the end of MSarch. INTELLIGENCE T. in order to concur vwith a new procedure of operation for C1. Field Unit No.rles of 195 Ja>panese mcdicinals and laboratcry reagents ireo recovcred. The rest were returned to the United States !.cny.ent to be added to the I Corps Informnation andt Educ.rr.ticn Conterts display° Benjamin A Becker.l of its ti:ne v.rrmy and I Comrs. scnncl. 8 left Finschhafon on 5 I.S Technical Intelligence teoms as directed by the Cheiical officers of sixth .delntaland X-Ray equipment recovered from around Baguio. Johnson) of this Unit had spent considerable tire contacting the Chr.^.

l. the Ba'lete Pa¢ a.. ns-.1D. guns were found... eI J..covering the 28th and 43d Division arcas.l cn ':i c ner...e5s roi j.lCE Ordnan~.9 JXI orps Field unit No.a 70 rm battalion hcvtrit.e'ar-t-:.:eous .l--: mlincd . Gabage)Pfc Robert PShinn). 83 ..e Tumn No. Philippine AL. .L' concerning enemy Ql.tured along the Viila Ve.. items were processed through the technical Intelligence Dcpoto Several types of heavy erquli.Smith.el...Pvt Ponciano LoredDP-rt .as completed.:.. e '.lt..'re-. of enemy Ordnance co.-p)ropelled mount. i'. .tc-i T.r.. .L IHTiTETI. GCTVS Intelligence Team NJoh14 (Capt ILussel To.ipciad in the Sixth A Army Enrimy E. the Ordnance tean. s.oe I)e-:ot in research on United States quartcr.My.HISTORY OF TCHIT'l ^.y by U.r:Cpl John P.ilstcr itei!s ..lckx) Ordnancc :Lr.8 (Capt Jack K.s .ny M.Robert 3. used in .:: .: L* :Ln : o .azr .l..r.-?'':. ..' was tu. m c T . na.SramllwoodPfc Charles R.-'.rry ura . Glenn E.lart. Hovover.c -id Vc'..allimnlrt arni Fl cc'p:.ic new equipment° Good examples 6f Ja-anose heavy Enrincer equipment woere located by Engineer Teamr Nco6'(Lt Frank G.da.enms .ni?. . .Reagan). Omian rcu-niu to the Tech.vrcroec 'r".funswrc cfficer.velod .:''.ited Staeo. bbottT/i5 Victor J.found so:.-T/5 S-'c?:' Garcia. Blaney.h had b)een ' . .of this team devoted rnach of their time to assistin.ment were recovered by Ordncance Team Ioe.e.! +tci t tre limrted ac'ti-. six services comprised the teams of this Unit.7 (Lt Henry 1 s..]l i:W. Pvt Frank M.hl..edical materiel fror alarzre sxupply hJnm19: a r:ncrosc-o-~ejan anesthesian mLachinealibhGL:. OnanSt.~ to a coio.neCd in to cfJi at lnd t.L eoL No Ii. ..3 and.9'was attached to XI Ccrps coerating in the central Luzon sectors All.ieo. The quartcrmast.:rte-d to pt r Sternal onr O~clnar~ :. c :-. cn e T07.This included a 15 cm sel...rdoT.1.s.I.. ' t.'.l u. a-c ".9 (IT.'o-!. i-.. thsogh Ls in cellancouls i-. LeCdesr.noe amounr.tCe'-. an:-r.hire .of i'...eir ur':y . l ..ia) The }.ce a'7re o"'. PospisilS/Sgt Richard T.Two type 97 Jap tanks mounting 47 rmr..c. Btola.rsifreranc assorted quantities of drugs and medicines. d P. ot f.hh.Cat.-ical Intelligen.h. Kabele) anda ordnance Tear No c. f'c . .rde Trail -'.JerbyCpl Willian HDavidsonPfc George B..CJp.O..era 75 nrm Lamaa truck and all t3yes of arnmunition.s . f . T/5 Allen LI':itc:. Field Uni' No. yrep:.I GT'.as eIsizni.1. rm..:se ma.if.' -e . Picoli.t lu"-k reccvcring eauiprent as nc er. arr.. iest.' 'lrZ-1 rby tP .ror units in 'I. i'.t Earl )D.anyp Mn.. bandagecs a..Raabrecovered some M..t L-..-rMast(o--r iteri:i. Non-expendabl.'l.±: sect-Lon ha. Glmnderson .nCd .arren D.rotrar .Ioy .nd dressingslysola cdental kit a water l.

&t'teh :rj irC hosp-Ltai .. On froni their cave positions along Balete Iidge...::h.aL wais cs italized fcr a1o...!lrnko :.3 fell.slta1i: c. upn baling reaease-d fu . strongly entrench--d.r.r'i..turrned to the Tuchiiical Intclliigence Depot but .u.on Sixth Army operations in central and northe-rn Luzon during TMay moved slowly but sttadily forwrard° East of f'anila.rits aSl for disposition. Or.. A cormbined American and Philippine f)rce cl)s-ed in on Jpmarri.. and though the Japs stage. . I-vt ri. as 0'aJwa Dg. sev.rJ: t!tK"J.s pj'.nrin the -Lnemrv Ecq.. 3.l chori> s itrpers')rnel were made within thi:" ceam an c 5.rt.o I r .ton peri:o1 was ^ returne t. In the north.' ...)e. Sixth 5rmw's 37th Division made co-ntact with leading elements of . Teaim N'.'-nLn'..ip. t /. :. -end rvt ' rceccv.lning -if Juln. Therc(f'ore.yies Pvt X¥atkins Signl:."ryJ C. I1 .red by S/Sgt William J. where the enemy -. Close of' Operti-ns on Lu. Sign4l T'eam No..nts by June. . their r sistarmce was stubborn.ligence Depjt. 'et the northern end of the Cagayan Vae-lluy aInd secured the tomn without opposition on 21 June. 5.:d :... as well. fa.. Tceam No.-be.flr .. in n. u'lld th-..e Sixth Arry forces hadl ma.ll r'e!·jrted to Sixth Army Heedfcquarters as Dre of tl Ord. progzL.C!.rns. i1' Cpt t{ rnaii's ' pro . .tr.r::-er erequirlent w.d to renar..r't Oi:dn irJ 't. . v. Pf^ Anderson reoGurned -o the Technical Inte].d strong counter-attaoks against United States f-rces along the Villla Verde During April.:s.)ar'Lc'iPa '.... Pcts.. e value.-yan Valley Was the only large area in Luzrn remniaiing in :rnemy hands.HISTOI¥Y TFTCGitE'J/L IN JLLIGEFTvE . iatkins oi Quarterr naster Telm NT.ri.'O Durin? ..ent and ''ate-riel Iistructli_.. L[ and northeast along Highway N. 4 Oif).a.. t eer . they were turned r. . c re:. r -ti.' tt :i r.) the Cag.rt. we-re ro:.ll r:f' .ra-j a.r ..ptj Ja.o 6.crctud handl. Ipo and wili.h the training rnc. . near A]cala. tra'ii ri:.n i.rd raI. A : rt'' t in (:1 .':s relievw..r (4p1 '. vrere secured intact. t. a'd 'the Japanese fP rccs here. Yanila..pusherd bl.c ixth Arny7r to assis+. lo salVel' . and Baletc Pass its:elf was taken.u. and T/3 LDtz was sent to Sixth Armry Ho:-dqu:rrters a. Bsgui. c .. 1 in th:.bic dvy.:1 and . the h:' hoipitaJ. ':. tre.s Ordnance tean No 7 with Lt.1:'(.cd' the Iianila water supply.chi contrr-ll.r. As most of th se had n: Int. le . 1 (T/3 Lotz. -:r ts. Pfc Anderson) found that areas re- cently evacuated by the enem'y yielded only smnall ramouilts of Signal equipment. as in Southern Luzon. .Enenmy Equipment and Materiel Instruzcivn program. At th(e bugi..n pincer drives from Balete ~ass at the southern end :f t+he Valley n)rtlhwest atong IIighway No...el]_iier.t:_li-: .d of duty with this team. hwvrever.:..c::ii.. were e:ncircled Ind redtllci. wi. they ivere.

ry rcsist"nce which had been bypassed. ?roLm then t :.rnc invasi)nln nc(.in an airb(.l in liquidatin..Fihtin7 consisted mainly w. This Juncti.parri. which by the end of the -w.. 85 . th. the cntire len-th of the Ca-ay.HISTOTlY OF TECH1INTCAL TIT"LLTJ'TNCE..n terrnillnt. p wvkets of cnir. the 511th PFrachute Tnlfantry which htd advanced south along Hi'jhway No.r r. 5 fC.ll(.. f. n effP:ctivoly secureo. clr!sre of the tuzo n operation.r..

-rectsi tnat echnical Intelligence teams att-chled to that. l>77 inv-aded by Sixth Army -. sdm'. i deq..e to kill until the ill of the energv to res:ist hacl been ttterl: broken. j'Tindoro.orzarized and well intai:rateo force n tin e ir~1-r'areas.:le.HISTORYL OF .n operati.. Headquarters.Inat-ed anl orderl reir ent bac. in LyteC.on andl the crr beca.-ec Clt._V . dited 13 L. 1Iowever.s:L ned the Luz:. or burninrg out of the enety wi F':b troops fi--hti n forwa Ld by inc'es 'ailnst the mud and terrain on r. Eighth Arnry. Close coordinlatlon was maintained Arith G-2 of' the Alzvr. intc thie !our.i'erent t:an with I xt'rmy.. FighthiAr-y had a fine base ror future operation.d.ruoellinr dig~.: t .ta-ns. h:.all of t+hese had to be cleared of 3aps ('taps.h Eight.'h sor:e of the islands had bl->n ini .A of a series of p-'l'os ard cave stroric7 points: each censi sted of the sare rrim and . rcc.rir r..ces.s t. The Solthern Philippine Campaicn sonsisted of landing operation after landint ope~ati n.?n attaLched to un. ThovT.. Incls 16 and 17 ).liy ._ny occasions. vi.r.! 'l. ei .-inst fanatical stan?.c 'i-·xh . ECA.y to live of'f the land. The fi'htinz -:eve½o.jical contrrol of the chiefs of their -espec::..::is rati :Lrn of nec. Army was somewhriat di.. operatirra! and t+.r. service chiefs of the units to vvhici a.TC I T .f.ics in the field. leadJquartes wculd be olaced dircectly under the adriiiJstra'-ve.r Circular 138.:'it' k iLLPLrr' .er a '.ng the followin-7 months.ier%. Rec.on and their full eflorts were needed to be focused to the north. '36 ._itll The tl -in of Tc'-r'inal II1tel'. .io.i ot.d -'. _vc scrv:.u ~:ad.ese resistance in the South. the Ja-ancse thn-. Duri.''-ni rornizati-on -iith Ei-Thth Army Intel inee1ce " it.TI T -j- rv>^ T 1PE ki VIiL '..a. .S<U? ' byc tehe ene .-T t. Japanese were ullshed pack in all sections -nd the Japanese supply lines .t thle Jap:'.Sa.rci-.ted to Ei'ri:th 'rmv (26 December 19LL).t-tac'.. ... s:ie ag.. One characteristic st-Žod out.ern FPhilippines was dele:!. some asa nrst little oip-oition.v.ste. 'iarinduque -. i . the task of clean.ieci...d e-rn -- w)v 191!V 1umst . n!ainteining a o coord. the teams worker: n t. intbo a routine ed of destr cti.e6.-erm cornt:olied by th.dtird a well .each island corsi.

were dissominnatd..vidcd f-)r th. coordinatcl..:. con m:!rus-e rf rines.h Technical divisi n -or cven c.s but this iws hold t.rcili:-vc th. th:. thcy n-ccs:'itqt... . u : Tn the S.bctwc.Th-e i.n rprat-i.!uthcrn hilippir.f imprevicd mines and ont'1 r Ordninc.ic 1nI.-nsiderable informr.vailablc to Division units. Corrcspondenc.+. Lt Col Julian.ith '.nc': tc"-s wvith Ei hth A. Technical repo:rts pprrnvcd by chiefs r..rts. :~ivrisins and to attach the.[ c.:lit --n7.hth 'r:ay T-chnical Ibt lli'-cnc¢ Coordinator. lth-uh n"-! tr"inin:: t-: . as the . 87 .urnc..nncl.the tr. c. t.. Tnfnrmation c-ric-rnin. Tcchnical TAeclli-onco activitcs with the chiefs of services anli .s this 7-7s d. nnd dfcscrintinns ^.q.: ot' ir. l. r T.n nc~. 'rntcllirZ-ncc mattcrs.f s-rvic-s w.. c.. 7ighth '. mn Addition to the r f:ular field technical raports and'r.tinn was passod -n t.: puli shed in the Eihth 'rmy mrrchnical Tntellir.nri mT . o s.r andr C.rn.SO.srs 1iaS a7lso madc .:pzr ti n.ops in the form of reorts -.. by 'i.ry.sub-rissi':n of ton-day ictivit::s rreTrts by each tc.chi.r frequently it a rcgim:ntal -was necrssary to. mbat tecam to each .n. and the Command ing Officcr.neliato combat i-oortancc.llir -nc^ ncrs ..'as norvt t. th-. "ith S'xth 'ryr.' a rininur: s. this circular 'also pr-.'h the Technical Tntelli!encc Coo-rdinators.-2.-mpny.css extent. waTs .: C.:rtein scrvic .. --hen nercssar-y. t nd.S. t+-ccr-.ns w-r smnll.!u.ncv h-i breen..chnic71.e T _ch iical Intelli-cncc units from tmpora~r duty .--ntin.ruted by G-2 channcls thr.ror7rarm vs crricd n by the Tcchnical Intelli-.:n 7ifhth 'rli.:incc Bullettin. n-rwb-r o'f unit ncrsrnnlel wias cut. c. Equipromnt forr trai.i. Since ihrtth '. UT.ct-ld as an 'dvisor iin T..'r in sc7?oe than those rf the Sixth rm7.po-rrtirn nro!r:-sscid in Lzzpon. fr. !. impnir the f::'firicncy of the unit.rnthly activitos rep'..~ rquipent recovered..

1 was again redistributed by Eign+'-l ^Army and its personnel assigned to the various Victor a oreroicative of the Armies thenlselvos. d'oty to tilh Arr/. Hawkins. and s. Information on the ty'pes of booby traps found was given to the Task Force Intelligence officer. Personnel of the Unit werc: Capt. (Complete roster of the Simmons and Pfc.e assignmrent of personnel on temporarT. irxludirq grenerator sets. Philippine Islands (ifaps. there was considerable reshufl'.rere identified according to the operation in vwhicii th-ev participated tlrou-hout the Southern Philippines Division The Technical Intellirence urits. T/3 Carl R. Irncls 16 and 17).1 HISTORY OF TE'CL'i CtL INT T! IEvFCE Victor 3 -- Palarvan: l]. Southern Philippines campaign is included in incl 3)..o the tactical units for immediate use. 19L5. The balanee of' the equipment was shipped to Headquarters Eighth Arr: for inventory ai:d shipmdnt to the Unite-ld States . Walter E. wiere turned over t. The reor-nanized Technical Intelliarnece Unit No.mbers.ary.hth irny had a definite policy of mobility for Tecn ic:al Intelligence personnel.visi3n Lor the V-3 operation against Palawan.rmy' Technical Intclligence Depot. lathes and radio repair parts. of 28 Febr. the Unit landed on Palawan with the 186th Re:iniental Combat Team of the 4lst Division.ling of teans under Eighth Army control. Ingrahm. A Technical Intelli. stead of beinRg desigratcd by nl-.h. r. Serviceable. 88 . Robert J.zs :.gence Unit composed of one officer and two enlisted men was placed on temnporary drty with the li1st Di. . Since . standard items of captured eq lipmert recovered. On the morrin.rInce Ei.

Zr .. ..: as if Ivory pvt Janes 1'r Stephens rd. [.n on the morning of 10 Ma.:aiLnst 1] 2nS Lt (. they waIs stagin2 for a As t '!e. at H plus 4. cn i 't :' ~{1Mindl~.. . iSion t': L..?. with the infantry cccupyiLng areas after they have been thoroughly shelled and bombed. t t' : .fl~ . .ld cr. -. ]2 . ? -& i Ln .-1 ' "n. -.: odMfter an uneventful trip. 'ore n. was turned over to PCAU to aid in supplying and processthe civilians.::.l.tei'iigence Tom:i .:. .L. C ch::"_cl that op7t.. ?:!.rC'L_ .4 .. :.Lr. :. :1 O|.arch the group boarded afn 'LST and depan.a r:2.. Team 89 . The Japs uxploited every possible ameans to supply their troops with weapons andi improvised every conceivable item that could be made l)ca.. ?'l.:t.:c ..lly. (lban personnel fi th2s T . This equpipliernt.?.'i .. . when captured in serviceable condition. Intell. r .r'"_ . Cameron Signal Intelligence Team 1st Lt George P. _ ... \. .7.anddd on Red Bcach under enemy shell and mortar fire which cnntinued throuhout the day. 1st Lt Travis L.Zmb.r ~1O i't :7v1 1 .7. and on 6 m.: ..rch.c on the scene of the empending acti ..-iLr %.ina ..iyOved was texrrific9 Finally.'-.f cal It.. .Lli-u: li. The Technical Intelligence Unit set up its headquarters on Zamboanga' and proceeded to cover all the areas taken by the combat troops.. the Unit l... Ford A week was spent in preparation for embarkition.. B:nwden Ordnance.LJ rT lw.1I*-. r -' ' .nd more automotive equipment was captured as the enemy was driven int(j the interior wrhere the reads were impassable.s:.~i. This operation yielded a considerable quantity of old and many new weapons never seen before. mortar and dive bombers played the more important part.HISTORY 0F T7CHT'ICAL INTELLIGENCE Victor -...':-. The operation was one in which the supporting units of artillery.r"nl' T/5 ¥. ..ience Capt Ernest V.?':-.. Tne bom'bnrdment that fol.

frequency modulated SCR-610 end 9CR-300 sots at distances of 2 300 to in the past had fre3000 yards. type 93 mines. Navy depth charges. the. that some of +he equiprent taken was of Germran manufacture and some of it had been made in the United States.ral Hospital. artillery. the Technical Intelligence TUnit returned to the hlst Division Headquarters. Zamboanga. As a ?raat deal of this was Navy eqliipiment. a Japancse machine run opened fire from the side of the road. but did recover some interesting older types of equipment 90 . The party proceeded on fo t back to Headquarters where t'ie injured were admitted to the 133rd Gen. thou-h. As no new it::ms of el.HIfISTORY Or TE':. S. (Lap Incl 17) Philippine Islands. troops but very little Yedical equipmenrt of technical interest was found. and on 31 March the Unit embarked with the Sulu-'hite force for an operation on Sanea and Bonqa Islands of the Sulu Archipelago.lipment were being employed by the ememy. During Rkay. and the Division artillery were given t'his information. This was import:nt. The List Division Signal officer. With this landing. S. 1 was called in to identify and examine it. Lt Yelchor and T/5's Ivory and Moore secured no new Chemical fWarfare items in this area.'NICAL INJtEIGENCE Ground mines were extensively employed in this area and were made from every available material. as Lt Sowden was proceeding to a guerrilla aid sta:tion zweith t:ro guerrillas and a driver in a weapons carrier. on 26 April. Lt Brwden an: the driver were both hit. It was noted. few new items of eq'iprrent. A Filipino doctor stated that the Japarese had taken everything of medical vulue into the hills. 0C-2. Tncludec were wooden box mines.s quently been sent in the clear on these two sets. On the morning of 13 !Larch. torpedo war heads ar6 a new marine mine. certain members of the Unit had made three D-Day amphibious landings in a little over one month. the Nav!l Yobile Explosives Investigation Unit No. shells rif-ed as mincs. as nCass"r. By the end of 'arch only mopping up operations remained on Zamboanga. Lt Bowden made trips to all installations held by U. No great stocks of equipment were found on this operation and ver. Lt Ford found that the Japaresc type 97 portable wireless telephone set could receive signals clearly from Ur.

HISTORY OF TECTNIC. preparing a chart showing Japanese electrical Signal instrulrents with the onrercan counterparts.and17) landed with the combat troops of the Division on D-Day. Vannucci Quartermaster Int-lli-encc Team Capt Kenneth H. Technical Intelliyence personnel who participated on this operation.CE At the and.ce Technic±al Intelligence Teams. ':k rdnance Officer.ihrrent of a future operational prDcedure for Eighth Arr:.prary duty he returned to X Corps Headquartsrs to supervise3 Corps Technical Intelligence t ams arnd to take -.'JS Intelligence team Sgt Harvey Bylsma Pvt Homer Blankenship Engineer Intclligence Team 1st Lt d. This included.inatnti)n of this terr.Yaps.L INTELTIIS'.. Kost 91 .ver as Corps Ordnance Technical Intelligernce 3fficrr and as officer in charge of Ordnance Team No. Personel of this Unit were: C. 6. returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot with the exception of tvTo ofi'ic. ITpon te-r. assisting in the e.n to Headquarters Eighth Army for staff work with the Chief Signal Officer.taeblj.illiam Purnell Ordnance Intelligence Team Pvt Nick P. of bay. Capt. Ford reported i..y Ordrns. Capt. at H plus thirty minutes. alon. Incl 16 . Victor 1 -Panay -Negros: 4Oth Infantry Division The Techrical Intelligence Unit attaclhed to the 4Oth Infantry Division for the Panay operation (. In early July. 18 March. with othecr work. Bowman Signal Intelligence Team S/Sgt John P. Cameron spent the early part of June in the office o( . Eifghth Army Headquarters.

There had been a small garrison of Japanese there. A Jap microphone and one radio.anese ma'-c wcre virtually non-existent. took :q!:iprert that was of value with ther and burned the re. a company size water filtering plant. auto tires. as on Panay. The Technical Intelli?-:nre Unit with the vision also followed thro'gzh on this operation. in the Philippines the Japanese were apparently unprepared to successfully conduct or defend themselves against chemical warfare. both All ed and enemy. received help during Lay from Signal Team No. as they evacuated the city of Iloilo. other than foodstuffs. auto parts. S. The lo:-ge warehouses alone the docks were bare. lathes.d gasoline motors. Sgt Bylsma and Pvt Blankenship found practically all Chemical diarfare m. 7.LLTGEFCE Operations were carried onin the vicinity of Iloilo City. but little additional Signal equipment was recoverEd as most of the equipment left behind by the retreating enemy had either been destroyed by them or by U. of Aneric-. the enemy made little use of aeavyr Engineer equip:rent. Capt Bowman (4Y) found a small supply room in a ruined chapel. Afew pieces of cnlisted men's clothing were collected. with the rest of his team as-3i nead to the 24th Division.n commercial make and which had been destroyed beyond repair. heavy rmort~t and artillery barrages. 92 . gasoline driven ro-d rollers and tractors. and only a few dumps with convontional ite-ms of Japanese equipment were uncovered. tools. recovered on this operation was turned over to the combat troops. Lt Purncll was Enginecr ciefjic'r on this operation. shapers.te!?ial encotnrntered on Negros destroyed or damaged. S/Sgt Kost. The Japs. Little ene-y equipment of Intelligcncc value was recovered in this operation. was left. which wars. Mumerous radios. As correctly reported by Paroay. were found in the Oapanese radio station. togethcr with mixed amnunition and printed matter. planers.c generators.. M!uch of this equi:mert. which opened 2y March. In the town of Tigbauan. and only a limited amount of supplies. Included were American-mr. as wiell as other teams. and small Enrineer items of Ja. On Negros. The IlOth Division.-cu. hay ni s.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL I)TV. shifted its attention to ending the Japanese occupation of Ne7rom Philippine Islands. with the exception of fertilizer and empty beer bottles. a few phonograph records and an electrodynarmic speaker were recovered from this the only man assigned to Signal Intelligence with the 40th Division. regularly with the 24th Division. The largest e:nemy damp secured up to the end of April contained only one Enrineer itrem of tc chnical valbie. electr..

:l1:aence activities for the V-1 op.:. or.l rnti.:m No.-.d rztvrne!' to the. Tier2 '. It hcl. Technical IntCel i:'enc. a&'d 'a - =Xi i -n.HISTORY OF TC.ration hId hben concluded. cdl.]. Keane Pvt Christoher !J.dual Japanesn observ-d carried gas masks i (probably due to tho eC.w Dum.. st'r t=:v.:ts atd r. e.. thc.e scctGc Io located sonme.-rtr:o. a' .aLi :. the land. P-rsoin.-.iTn i-nk tr"ck writh aui:Li: contairKr.3. ard '11 purs:mncl. orpaniz:. nti. t t. QluartcrmiwstctT/Sgt. Rlossi Intellig.init were: CWS Intcll:i.f{NI]C.'na'i-n..kE. Borchers Tean 93 . and ev-on in tnc c vas !sed.. rrri rain co.v..'.proofed. Ta·mer Ordnrancr Intelligence Tear 1st Lt qIrady J.t. conpr: sse' ai ": :'~ o -:.i :tii.s of C1.vcze a i.a.. as c'~erz.d sU.v3rc' no lrc7T c--ncentrations of s. i/'.:pmh >rls by States troops).achncd to thc Amcrical Division oin 1' ¼!arch.= V V'sc rf i:its 1UnitAed . ly P a? chc -..thl t.3'c: points.c'-'" . .ho was trar-7fc'-"J to H :araquari'ers X Coris for assignment +o Or'lna:. Division A Tcc'ini-al Intcllignc_ Unit was att. Jr.'TELLjiq 'CE E Although most of .1nd.n the .'i'e -. In th.. -.?s..Ves.i'aO ::'r. '-t ' a:i!n . . XDept.'l in tine new U.enc Team Si rnal Intelliienc T/3 Donald R.?i r *... 6% ha.r' : . W CV:e-tr'tl By t:he end -f June all iicchniic.:u-. the.. Bell.r' rot t.[r.r She'.zer ce Team Capt Robert Ingrahm Engincer Inte:l.. suprliel w-re scant.: 'iac.o auipment s-upl 'r off .:~. rpacks. except Pvt Vannuc -. :nd s from As no atteript at liaairn. 'n Grifr-rn Ccros Ca-t tcwm3n .n1. igenco Team 1st Lt Jomn F.r.( .. n. rs wt.aileil.: h '2u.v-. confis atir? foo :surlii.d ir aiso-2o'r. an o £C7c f ct 'ft r ^le: cIrop 'enr r.s:.w. W j v:'.. Nco it-'s cls-)l. Iilfantr. L I.. Eugene F. qianitn+i. Victor 2 -Cebut: Americal.

Enginecr Team No.r.HISTORY . Some of these were foumd on Japanese who werc ateminptinc to irfiltrete to A.ted on the number . 7.iatoi. The mortar was apparently a field expcdient devised t:~ use the ammunition left behind when la.rce qlantities of weapons were t::kcn from Cebu to reirnforce Leyte.. 9)4 .ils.iv off a grecnish. Capt In!7rahl-m.! the p. recovered intact were shipped to the Technical Intelii. na. As severUl irprovised weapons and types of explosives were encountered..d .nition used against l'nit.--.Gric'n artillery positions.ssibiiity of the cney's use of such agents. fo..t. Lt Keane and Pvt Tamner. J i. preslnmably for use ag-. 0-2. The landinr was made at Tal say.tates troops which was reported tc . Areport was also made on an im. investigated the Japanese r.nd variety of enemy improvised mines.rte'. r. In addition.iind:.F T'~TfC:I:I L INTELLIGENCE Emb2rkln! with the D:ivision..n to sec if VT fuzes could be activated by iaavcs froin these sets.put to use by Division Ordnance.lay any fears conccrn.~. Items recovered included improvise d ibolotov coct. Philippine Islands. 'o lar-e supplies of Chemical Warfare materitl were found. the Unit r:-ached Cebu. an effective counter-measure against UTnite St-tes weapons. -n'tornation :)n the .inst U.. made a rep)rt to the Division G-2 rugirding iriprovised b )mros -and demolition charges that were being used in destroying glns. tanks.roops to l.ll of Ordr!ance.. Intelligence activities in the I. Thesc sets w-reo inspected by T/3 Borchers (Signal) and arran-emcnts made in conJi-nction with the Ordnance and Si!nal officers of Eichh irmyrr 'Ieadquartc'rs to have the radios tosti d in the field witil aztual Aif. Division Headquarters was established. also ropo'. ('aps. S.? used and the fincings were disseminated to the t. Lt B:..enerators mounted on trucks.n very high frucqency directior::l radio trans'it. Th.ers having the same frequency banns as the Unites Sta-tes VT fuzes were captured near Cebu City. Though no nrsw Ordnarc.dict zi that no toxic gasses were bei.v eq-.: invest.r s: lke.. 26 }arch.1ei-ht ruberized protective clothing.firi.encc Depot minus the generators and trucks which wer:..-. from wvl'rc the tronps moved in to capture Cebu City. h:.iplrcnt was reccvered. since this woultd provw.S.d been given to th_ Div:Lsi. Towards the er!d of~ay. L t Bell was transferred to Headquarters X Corps to coor'inate Ordnance Technical. Hcr. two landinr field lights with .nao area.provised 130nimr! iaortar. and -ight suits of light-?. Incl 16 and 17) on D-Day.

-rin.. located necess. Neither T/Sgt liossi. Signal.y that their stocks of materiel were becornin.ore for the Unit. 6 which operated in the Seran. The enenly. wer'e turned over lo the division for its use -. Yo new items were recovered and most standard items. destroyed all supplies left behind. leaving the bulk of their equipment in caves alone' th road. and it waes roted by the end of J.r of these parts when thev we'e recalled to Ei-hth Army Headquarters.critical. 95 . and who was then assigned to staff wvor the Chief Sin:l Officer at Eighth Army: and Lt l .:lience Depot. because of' lack of certain mechanical parts y for the power pli =nt. as in all cases where eq.VD.lay had reached the point where the enemy had retrceated north to the hills. and foodstuffs. Nameplates. who was retained to clear up the unfinished '. consisting by then mainly of small arms ammunition. principally rice and sugar. trarsferred to ::. including one on a cement plant which was found inoporativ.jence Depot with the exception of thr'ee men: Lt Keane.ry parts at a su 2 plant.HISTORY OF 7TCHNITr . During the latter part of the month the team also made an extensive reconnaissnmce of the ftcilities in captured areas on Cebu and submitted particular to the Si-mncl Dpoct to be i'sed . .nt was t-rned nver to the troops. were forwarded to the Un ited Statos "Army Technical Int. Quartermazster.L INTFLiIGENCE The tactical situation by the end of .. w.ssis[t Lt Col J'llian at Eighth Arra. The team then travelled to Nezros.ipmo.. Tl'his equipment was also secured. withdra-wing steadily.Headquarters: T/3 Borchers. The project was ther-efore turned over t) and completed by Capt In grahm. an-T :-. fo nd large stores of material and eauipDrlent. nor T/3 Borchers..s ne-otiating for a loan :'.ihicl were of no technical value. By the end of June all personnel present on this operation were returned to the Technical InrAtll.a parts in constructing the division broadc stin~ station.sitvh Belil who was trnsferrcd to X Corps Headquarters to take charge of a combined Ordnarce Team No.ani Bay area of h`indanao d.July with the 2S!th Division.

Barkowski Pvt Philip Zarahn i aence Tearn Tc. 31st and 2Lth Divisions to X Corps for t. 96 .Tecm Efc Joseph F.rr .h The followini T'echnical Intel. the last bdinr b7.. Pollack Pvt Jean 0.ried in shallow caves. Harding 1st Lt Alcide Santilli Pfc tlaltcr E. at Parang. on 18 April 19L.ind. consisted of rice.]:C:L IfiTELLIGENCE Victor 5 -- . Leslie Sinl:al Intelligence Team No.n. ammunition cmd Signal Equipment.t elli ecnce Team Sgt Paul R.aterial of Intelligence valLe in the 31st Division area. from there proceeded to the X Corps area.ll T/Sct John G. 6 (part) T/3 Carl R. second largest island in the Philippines (i. Going Capt iilliam J. landed. Incl 16 and 17). Hawkins These three officers and twelve enlis-.uart.o. Prior to the outbreak of the war this area had been the center of Japanese colonization in the Philippines a/nd the laraest number of Japanese in the Islands still lived there. nc. which was distributed amon. 8 (part) Pfc Edward Burnstein Ordnance Intelliaence Team ITo.HISTORY OF TRC`. Roberts Engin-cer Int<. X Corps.. Lillis and Leslie and wcre turned over to PCr!rWU and Quartermaster Salvage.with that Division. R-)sen .5 and.igence personnel were assigned \Victor 5 oper. Gornzales Pvt Thoodore D.. . The materiel.ster Intelliq.. As reconnaissance of the area resulted in the recovcry of little mrr. where they reported to the 0r-2. Sirmons Pfc !. Quantit-ies of fond and clothing were found btr Pvts Gonzales. Iindanao.ed men.aps.five huts apparently used as living qlarters. A large Japanese storage dump was located. Lillis Pvt Bertrarr L. Julian T/5 Bruce A.tion: GCS I.. representing all services except the Ledical Corps.'orton H. 7 Lt Col Erle H.. while the ±emaining eleven operated with the 2hth Division around Davao. only four men functioned.

while all mines and explosives were collected and later dcstroyed by Ordnance authorities since they constituted a hazard to surrounding personnel and materiel.though none exploded. a considerable quantity of Signal. some interesting improvised equipment. discovered in a cave in the Davao area. Lt Santilli. Fifty rocket motors for launching 60kg gcneral purpose bombs were located within the 24thn Division perimeter at Devao. It was apparent the enemy did rot anticipate a retreat of sunh depth: however.ped to the Tchnical Intr-lligence Depot aftaer it was no longer needed. fol-nd quantities of Ordnance equipment. T/3 Simmons and Pfcs Pollack and Rosen. Of much practical use . especially r:.rise.HISTORY OF TECHTICAL INTFELIGE NCE Turned over to tie Surgeon. and others made from gas pipe.7" artillery proj ctiles were made from lengths of Ias pipe. officer in charge of this team was on duty writh the lOth Division) recovcred several n'ev E~ngineer itemis. T/Sgt Barkowski and Pvts Burnstcin and Zarahn (Lt Purnell. obtained from dismantled aerial bombs. The Japs also improvised land mines armed with bomb fuzes. fewer land mr nes and sirmilar devices were encol!nterid.o and in the Midsayap sector. pigeon comrunications were discovered and turned over to the 31st Sinal Company. As in all other sectors. enemy fortificatinns antl defense systems showed a tendency toward hasty construction. operated in and around Dav. T/5 X-lrding and ifc Hawkins. eortars c pable of firing standard 75mm and i.da-r. and a considerable quantity of standard materiel. operating in the Davao area. Signal. In one secto'r. Some of thLs equipmcnt was put into irmediate operations. An entire multiple transmitter installation. to scatter around and utnder equipment.. This captured equipment was used by troops in X Corns and was shi. evidently placing considerable importance on the destruction of this equipment. sent back infiltration parties who were able to demolish the entire installation. hand grenades made from hiollow wooden blocks wrapped with wire. Thay used United States ration cans filled with picric acid. X Corps.< Southeastern Mindanao during June. Ilike. they showed appreciation of terrain End utilized it to the best advantage. Lt Col Julian. the Japs showed a marked ability at improvising weapons from other cannibalized equ:ipraent. were four to five tons of captur~ed medic l supplies for distribution to various hospital units for use for civilians and prisoners of war. in this same operation. equipment was located. twenty of these projectiles were fired at Unitec'] St-:te:s troops and could be seen tumbling through the air as they approached -. As the Division moved forward i.rere twvo complete water purification units mounted on 1! ton trucks. wos oxarinod and photo:raphed. 97 . In the latter place. Later. The enemy.

Lt Santilli and Pfc iawkins recovered no enemy Signal dumps. One was inspected by Lt Santilli and Pfc Hawkins prior to its being blovw'. up be an Intelligence and Reconnaissancec squad. Four items. Pfcs Pollack and Rosen and Pvt Vannucci.n of a Japarnese telephone central near Davao disclosed maps and documents which were appr:. Japs had already burned it out and it was still partially burning when inspected. Lt Col Julian returned to Eighth Armr Heaiqlart.namri-car. Dutri:-g the remaining time they se. but rwas walled up before a complete survey could be made. 6 with X Corps Headqlarters. invasion. 98 .panese secret documents bearing information on )reoosed disposition cf Japanese forces in Central Mindanao in the event of . Examinati .l Intclligenc Unit on the V-5 operation was bcin? disb'-ndc:.) No. who formed Ordnance T a. By the end of June the Technic:. The second cave was walled up 'with several Japs still operating inside. T/3 Simmons joined Capt Cameron from the List Division on Ordnance TSlam 'No.rkins were assigned to staff work with the Chief Signal Officer at Eighth Army. An accompanying map showing the wire lines of the sector was translated. Lt Bell.ised with minimum delay. It had been withdrawn to other islands in the Philippines where United States troops had attacked and also. Three radio cave install' t'ons in tnis area had to be walled up for tactical protection. These documents were inmm. The third was hastily reported with incompleta information. rctuirned to the Technical Intelligence Depot. little equipnmernt of new design or with new modifications was recovered by this team. 6: Pfcs Pollack and Rosen joined Lt Bell from the Victor 2 operation and Pvt Vannucci from the Victor 1 operation and all of them transferred to X Corps Headquarters as Ordnrnce Team No. including a Japanese radiosonde. were turned over to th. Consequently. quantities had been depleted because of the distances involved in resupply. together with m:arking tags from incoming lines.-rs. ved with the 2l4th Division.' United States troops for immediate use. though they found an appreciable quantity of Sixnal equipment scattered througnout the sector. Lt Santilli and Pfc Ha-.indanao had by this time little equipmient. 6: the rest of the Technical Intclligence personnel on the Victor 5 operation. except Lt Santilli and Pfc Hawkins. found that the Japanese on Mv.HISTORY OF TECHiIC'iL INTELLI1ENCE The Si-nal team sc coilected Ja.ecdiately turnerd over to the 19th Regimental Combat Team and thrnce to ATIS. Upon termination of' service with X Corp at the end of June.

6. P. 9 weapons. Oth r itcms r covercd in this area inclvuded: 4 type 96. 7.7.-troyed by 24th Division troips because of its d2ngcr'-)s condition arid because of the possibility of be+lhg reca pturtd by the enclrry.HISTORY OF TECHNIC. 7-5 :rmi rpntain guon (inoperr:. ) f i spected and.-novid for storage such 'muniti-i -j wras rcFqulrerd for tactical problerms sponsored by the .5 mi ri. nuval 7uns w/36h0 rounls of shells 1 typJl 95.2 r.5 mmrrifles type 39.i !45 caliber D.L INTELIGENCE Quantiti. naval runs type 20 Air-.5 rin liIhit machine guns type 89. 13. re.:ar and Navy Depart>:- ts.2 mm 2 1 3 1 1 1 r.:s of Uaoanese 'i-munition wrec de.achine cannon turned in to 310 Ordnance Cormpuny Depot) tpecs 11 and 96.mrn heavy rachine gun type 92 recciver type 93. shell (modified for use as a hand grenade) 81 mrm rmortar (turned over to Eighth Arimr for training purposes) variius culiber.tive) complete w/sight 28 motor vehicles (rcDpoired .rd turned over to the 2 type 10. 1 Oerlikon 1 type 99. Philippint Army) 12 c. 50 mm grfnade discherger type 38.fles to 13.mi machine carnon w/tripod 99 . Howevcr. Ordnance To !). 6. 25 mrn sinpgl m-ount. from: 6.

! sufi. an.. the after its capnt:re' T. .svrell as shon.hile drivring about the city looking i'or a suitable lcca-ior. It was a 500 by 1. This is typical o.or. shipped. ii nrivate home nearby.'ere selected in the city of Yan'.ose by..-y the Oriental Print.. and recreational fac.In. receiving derartnment.ray in which 'rn'1 7a+ion locations .rch anc'.-roxir'atUeiy 90 officers anld 2.anila. the grounds were on one of the highest elevations in i.'rry T echnical Intelligence D'pt--t arrived at Janlla. on 26 a. The tzwo three-story vl.en-'. Iir arch -- September 1945 IIea-iquarters 52.:fications rfr the loca. from Finschafen. owned '.. iHe-w rf-uinea. sufficiently re. arrivlr in an-.lysi:s laboratories for each of the six serrices.o fcr the si-._iernt frcm +. had. and adequa'ely housed the analysis laboratories. eizlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence tears). in and out of the Denot cl.ties for a-. 1he relincquished the house and tool: another he preferred in another nrart of tomn.J. Situated in San Juan TIeirhlts.i'anley. space :cr ana. to and receiving iarch tno select a site for the Headcuarters.tion vwere that it contain housing.' 5250th. ajor . Separ-. T"nen the general found' out there would be a traffic of captured guvns. ic. The place he had found turlned out to be ideal. had preceded the organization forward. the enlisted men's and certain of the officer's Offij.pany. the ..'ential. Commandc... jaj<Jo]Tanley spotted two large warehcuses on ton of a hih. Srec.rivacy..a. but had already been requisi- ment beirv.ent officers cltb and quarters'. Incl 22) four and a half miles east of do-rtown T ani.e twsrenty-five miles arcmcnd to find a br1df:. atny.ii.? (Prcvisicnal) and] the United States . 100 .th' T chnical Intelligence Ccmnosite Company.cer of the Co:. looled like an e:czell. tanks.000 foot area "Blue print of Derot. were unoccunied. I CST INTELLIIG1JFCE H'APBTER XI Tl:. a cr. ror.HISTORY OF fH:`If. everything wrorked out smoothly.p-.iet resi.. ancd other heavy equippreviously had been occuiped by a Ja-'aneso general. mess-.nd space for a motor pool and an Ordnance area for heavy eull.he dust and traffic of the destroyed city to afford p. which tioned for a general of the United States ererthees.:T.-. district.e to cross to the area. Pilsipm ne Islands.

. l atrines..n and struck an oneny nine.:qipment at the Depot) in ia. .:t :tr.i 1.rage The houlse wasa c ivcr .omen personnel from despite the l-s. as worked out by 101 .f the Dec'ot weo-e p icled durini . 26 x 30 feet in the mrtor pool..t:e ianulin rere c Stal.ent.ete I with i . ned " space.nt.: t ia l ter :bh.LT.HTSTOi. ±'ro)n_.I :Lr.rence constr'1cti:n '.n enlist.en.ll be enl. the 72 TI'echlical IttetL]iiEnce te:us at that time assigned tD tue ti..ce Depots in hil. an.f the Technical Intelli ence Phuotoraphic Laboratory became one lar:. ce.rship Jetach.f the reauired number {)f copies for 5250th.nil a consisted of a stea-.f neos.f capture..i. fro: ri-.est in the the.n' the r Collectian and analvsis 'wer. were assi..y facilit es..' r:nta!inint nuch imp .ints of the analysis he processin? of ph::. had to 1len' and. portion o:f' lay under peni.:hu. facilities for as . Secti.hath Airmy.b':th records and personal p.rtant shop oit !::. r-f the equipnment from tie siip.s!_ and iLecfivin.ents.. T'chr._dquarters rTi. Luzon.rI.i .nther ] ocati . the United States.:n LeeceC-pts of' :..iic er. the vari us secti:rs. quarters.:n cf all . ana c.ntry . corn+tinue '. who was named as.dure f. followi ni Oc-t I". ?iitn appr val o' th-e .r t' :.:and f *'.] pre-lp'rticrn tne shipF Ln6 of Intelli .-f o)f the material salva-md until the lber. with corn struction ... c:.tographs taken by t':: is.rt Cemr.f.r. washin. msateriel...ri shipments of f cmn:rl.ab:ra.l nt-llr-tl:ence Field$ thre hol. as w..L raiso.tory work was ayain in f'l11 swin-.ttractive officers club and 1'.tc.han]dle the require!.cl fror.the maj or . Ship.>.. sectioris .ic.lnnir -·'aj.'-:.jects. the shipn on which Depot Jreadquarters had arrived wns movled t) a..t-y .t construct-'ion pr-.:..Lp)ine bases. wa.rand fi. :. a .nr the -svLisi nal TechnicL Intl].time v'r Dia. were sj.ty flr. Frior to corrpleti-n .CIINICAL INTEL.rntly . operatinz pr cap tureO.-i t.crr:3tiin club 26 x 72 feet.Y OF T:L. fr'om cens :.rg.manl]er 1 Van Jlyack. istrative .rla Lso.J. The that they were unable to carry the 1 'ad. continuw:cd as adc.raphic laboratory ! was later constc' . construct.sistant .. i.ene sarp-)les. Then trhe I.i conw'any cnrl. arranfemments .i rllen... car:ry'in.te to. the onalysis sections . a phto':.GEtNCE into an . t.:-diin.rt. 'rld a burden on existing forwardi. reanrvnile. theater f'-cilities .. and.nin.ear.. . This ship.-.Nar Department.n arrival at r'nila.ri..

were pr-?rared by ail analysis section chiefs a7d set up at the Technical Intelligence Depot. These kits. i. AIP:AC.abora-le dis-lay-s of rerressn.. In ac.e ho(nt in fTriliarizing the troops .No. Gfner.:r-.l InteIte.-re many new types of equim-. Sixth Army. t of 15 Noveber 19)14 concern. into elf'ect at Lthe T chnical Intelligence Depot. second and third iteml: of Jan-anese grolvnd force equ:rm'elr upon reovery of the first.was move dodi. .-. 13. iras issued to tlhe . Technical Intelligence units in the field had access to similar puiblicatieons origJrat!-n. thle slimVent of capt.litary Intelligence.irment. wvra r. another permanent exhibit of Ja. Chief Ordnance accompanying descript..with Japanese infantry 102 .e i'rect to Tritish destinations u-lcn notif. As set forth1 :in the ritish'ica r. >3ritishll ar Off'ice.igence Bulletin.rters.serl dclring a training orogran instituted by eplacement Co:-mand.ith tar Denartnent Circular. Al1so indicative of th the t.l as large shipments for training !. ce-pturcd.. Information Disse:iina-ted to Troops Thr'ch.ith Chiefs of Services.:' ed2tede and rublished by the AC of S.ment not -previously analyzed.'out th.3anrd__ Goneral.` as vell.ll!igen:ce matee±ial to the United States for Orcdnance kits in these shit rents v.:C.ive reading matter.oe.>:. re-zarrinT. thrc-gh t'-e Com-andin.>oses..formation was disseninaUed to srubordinate cocrrhands tiercurh the media of the "G-2 lr.eekl-y iRe-ort.'e.ith anc distributed by the various ccr-ps G. and initial shiprents from the I anila area to the United States were accomp.lent not previously carptured.rc-. -iglith Army. G-2." published by G-2.'?.aC.'7ES'-'. Later.i on r'ight be cabled to Wash in'ton. this complete displa.rcorchance v.A as requested by Ge neral .ncee i.'. 11 January 19h5.HIST3rY CO 'iCTcIn7TIC:TI IITVIIIGW-TCE t.tative articles of Jal. andc th'-e "'"echnca.'cation by the DIrector of i. of the unit.C HeaCquarters (oictures of thLis disrlay are shovm in Incl 23). shipments were al.7F. consisting of 33 pieces of Ordnance equipment and 17 piec-s of q'uartermastcr equir-ent.nese Cro l d 7Ior-es equ-ipment and C 1 Technical i. :ncl.anese equilroent writ. play requested by the Cc/'m.rmy Service "Forces. -w.ajor Y:anlcy in conjurction ^. oeriod Teclhnical Intelhig. and a third rr sinilar exhlibit wras assermbled a't C. to .. rwhlich vwere of considerabl. uan. Z-7.Iolman..anese eqa. so that this inforra'-. A perrmanent display of Japanese Ordnance was _iso placed at Grnance' aid given to troops were the thirty spec. Hpeadquarters.ished.'S.lth Commrriand fcr a rrominent disAi.2 sections. e. reroorts were mace to the theater cormi:ander i...lT-~ . m.

ight On 20 1April 19-!. DuLring the sane period. Battle of the Phiiieoines continued and thousands of Japs still remained scattered throughout the Islands. to July 19. The success of the Technical Int. developed that was ne:: equ-iptment and techniques in hald been the Blacklist Operations. a survey of the rc:su3lts of Technical Intell.. OGerations in thie P'o. li-.that is.7 mr. to all i-:t.r 5n chlr m bloth ir: the field and at the .ze.he.7. analyzed -ande thla' information dissem- inated to United States troops.5. '.ence Service. Iliantities of enemy equipment had been captured and were bein7 shinmecd to the Unitecd States for training eurposes. u-nits . :ajor talcct-t C. contained NTJI¶'TLTIGETTTCE the followving itenms: 2 .he Unite+r States '. returned to headquarters.l of all branches of servi ce and were 103 .ilfr-pznes P2egin to Close Dy the enc' of May 19k4. "FainwTrrihbt vrho had been with the 525Oth as an offi. -:as to a great extent due to his oitstanding professional kmowled-e and ability as a soldier.7.81 .5.7 rr'rif es 1 .light '( 6 .5 . 2l[[ technical rerorts wer. and stc ed f. Al.'eclmical Intclligence had.7.HISTORY OF TiECIIIT. With the"official" concliusion of the Thilie-pine camraign in July. i. field -rlth the troorps -cf the men ooerating directly in the :rs drawi. -f'-fir-.ilitarr Intellig.ents andc nurecses the mission of Technical Intelligence -.lliCre. Durin: the fol- lowing two months.000 namaeplates andz reproductions were shipped to the Ground Industry Section.lligence rission in the Pacific Theatre.rmy Technical Intelligence Depot was established in anila.CAL gradual'!r -ithdcravm from the field. Wrashington. particularly as pertained to thl rimedical field.Though the.gencc activities from 27 I.cance had been recovered in the PhilipDine Islanmds campaign. die LCroj:! heart attack. '. studied. secured a compreheinsive anc fairly det-iled Kiro¥:led'-e of all teclhnical developments used by the enermy in the i iip-r--ne caa=r-^ these covered a wide variety of both new and nreviously reported Japanlese materie.-. :-.nce signifi.ajor Talcott C.. edical Analysis Labcrator?-.7 hm heavy I:G 1 . r.n rif'les L. indicated that 952 new items of Inte.a-rch 19!.nm mortar I mumna mortar 1 .ng to a close.Thatever the Jdpenese h.6.submitted by the ana-Jlysis sections of the Depot. over h.

ding officer. personnel present a-. (Pa-.AC the require:ments of Sixth Airmy for Technical ln'tcl igoncr.nce persor-nrl for future onerations.tion of verious . . was rmladc Deputy Co i.r Derarrtment for a Technical Intll. . incluc'ed lectures.. The corna.y recoairements.ed at the Depot under tihe direction of the senior field officer of each'..II'STO)rt. Tntell'ignce Coimanar under l.l Tcc'. ". which preparzd Technical Int-:l.. and a compl'te disnlay of enc.. 98th Qluartermaster Battalion.Xrmy o-eraticns. . larfare analysis section held s1u:. one Field Depot Unit -a total of 52 Co:c'. C..mel arriving in thc theater was establish. and as an orientation ccurse for the.fajor i. New Persom-nel Join '.ent. The company wvras also augrio-lted 1 Julr... These requirerments wrere incorporated in the logist-ical instructions issueU by mrl'soIinn1r. Ant.nley and vwas received v. The redical. ?voe type ")"''rod ' y th.ti men were requisitioned fro-m the . units for the coming operation.or.>adoluarters Det-. i -C F. one hundred arnd t." irntellge"_nce personnel to the Depot in the ensuing mo.n thle ClOilpic and Coronet Operations on the Japanese mainland.. based upon -?ractical es-ericnce in the field.entyfive en..a:rnmunition ccurse at lHIT iro.-l-... vras opened 1. xth.""!tl In June AFF''.anley..sted ren wrould be needed for comni. loh .ng...uctoryadcdress by '. Ordnance.-ncntary specialist training progra:-s for their nren acnd certain nersonnrl also attended a weak-Qon..z riod. The r-uarterimister .'YES.C for'rarded to iL.'. and OCh?... Five t-'yoe "^.no 107 enl2. Collie. Depot except L the those needed for section . seven-ty additional officers anc. by the arrival from New GCuinea cf ETeLeacq-tr-ners an id'.-ander of thn 5250 tl.meos n. and was responsible for the ccmrpnny acli:n-stration. The seiven-day progr'.ntls.8 August _i. '. published as apr.n-cal.e 1h of Tncl 1 to Incl 2h : def:nes cor.en¢ded by . Classes 1iure at-.raor ma.Rattalion also furnished of fice personnel dl:'ing th'Is .-t These figures covered only preliminary'Sixth The course.? chiefs of services. an e-'tensive training 'progrmm as a refreslher course for t.-osi.Y (I" ZC7 T Technical Int'ellim-nco erso:.igence dutyr in this theater.ith an ......i.nits). charts.aajcr Ja..cipatl.Jith enthusiasm (schedule of classes is shoVmn in Tncl 25). ..introd'.'S 1?'. WTith the return of Tec'hn'.ent. ._cers a.

ifor a Tchnical I ntclli. scientil'ic and tecn.o7ical resources of the Ja-paness c For so7:' m. ended that to ini.ey.. m -. 0(-2 ij.cuicd bje totally u:nfmaniliar vrith Technical intelligence as established in S.entsto provide f.Lhir rcco -.mcl. Cae..'v enmeirzcd poln.^ tiviJties r.ew h'.ire -rere opened for... a nd pointing out that ad¢ditiolnal armies col. US.:. ...A't the -nrd of -.i. area corr.-ed control not on 'fo -e TUnite.onths past.. diraf'ed (25 iay !?i.aS abrua-t+.d St-'ies Aty but Ifor all Allied -Tad'. ..!an for operati.S.ce.. ora.J. ...later shelved br-. or:: 3.-nce umcncr tha-t 'hladquarters and had subrm:it-'t~c it.. to fi.ates A1 rnir Forces restrn PJacific (. thi t. . incdustri !.'2A.r renuest -7as mar!.or all' '-rersno -n.ed control under 2l':IC be establ:. e. both.1lnce .--da`-: on an Cn .:_s u!n-der one coordinatinri cor:i. t . G:.UI!OS to UTnited 5t.?-ny.quarters or h wras mrnndatory.ei.'iend at' .hns v. soe.Assum. consolthe idation of all Tccl-hnical Inteli ..i s . -05 . . th-~r recor.7P:I'.-.c cn±C: s::d..i y rer.-.e.n the Philipoines and southwrard (t is caire into effect 7 June w:-lhen headqu.. ) b-.ernce pass '. ancd ajor "anl.. a:.u t':ctrity !ras'csedf a.. (. scln~e) vh. v-as aeo'tied 'en thle atoli. invesitiation. .tll .lv .auv-.. i'cordina-tor of Tochnicai Ilntolligei.C ocncal Inteliiconce passes vr: ich ccnsidera'ly expeditecd thieir in-tll i-jlc-c Coi. service with the 5250thl Technic.1 Officers of 5?O0th .ng uLmder i'itC tha.t r.:ara-ie. comnplete l. cantralizc..ze confusion delay and d-u..:.".~nl? be form) d for o'era'-ions r-:ithi. tothl. Irrt -' rnce officers orprat-ing in the nlig Pacific t ..!.r.. Pacific.rg. Col F.Tthhat authority be ? grantcd .ing tj·a.o be authorized for issue by'AFI'AC to all Tecl'rc?'1.].ed fro. issuier.d.m'.: Shortly aftr th acih.')). '3 cUtire -'on -rs '-t . core.a-nd :oIl nue course of ti.l.on of Tocl~nic~l -t.e SCa..e on ic.cnce activit:.:d -ha.e sm.ication of effort. Con so] id&tiln of 11 T'chnical Intel-. centrali.arters acliinistration :mas charn.-at ionr cf Tte( tates Ar+: Forces. riee 'vTrA v .~) ' z.j .rith a ..t .

rancri held early in the rmocnth vwith the Srecial Scientific Cnsultant from the irar Department. . .._ust l4L).w. Th.l .rhbouse P-r th.:'T broadccst tha. rhich formerly served as a poss hall and by using the I cdical analsi.all intended. i.ara"rar e Board.'uglsst.on..ere ade to attach adcditional . anal--sis section was delayed p-ending d:cocisicn on the future ac c tC ' -t'b rrTs.* At the s-rae tiMle arngorents.HIITORY 'S'7TUC'I.turs c thle lUnited States AIrmy Tec'-hnical Int -11iienco Dre-oot in the Fh -.'.L troeendous turnover of personn. of . bD:n mate for th-IiicL-i:nding Olynpic Operan tionl -uas sus-rnduc1 . enlisted mon airnd officer mess halls and t-rc 'obLi1.ica lI....le rrnics m..s of' thle iapanese surren dor -vas officially confir'med in 'I' -ni. warre ordered iiriedi::tIeoy into th Unl. 1.s building as additionrl officers quarters. Signal..occl. tl:. needed. Cro rded conditions i. Ive. end c3nstruction of a stor.-Le -wr.:. lo6 . thle enlarged ..urir7 tlhe crurse of the month.rg-. and -the Office of the Counter-Intelligence.-ni that haa. anese Ironrwrial Govormlen't hac indicated they -oullc3. ' The movament of a raijcrity cf f'ield u nits to -inec or...:!il. the Pacific . persornnel to the 52l50th so that more teams could.L. zat.'"'r.n connection r-ith ul.tion.Tn-t.a-. I T LT'JIG'TC T( End of thc "-'ar Friday evo:>:.oadclu. All. trained and a" .-y -:!..l Intcll. field.n thie enlist-dc. Technical Intetlio.. Prclirinary plans .h e .:t.i-pine sector.c 23 August.t it 1-ac becn "tuncfficially" ' arrouneecl th-. be organized. ..fmr the i:edical analvsis secti. the Y:anila radio station.^. PracticIly and 8 enlisted ren from: -all branches of service joined t '.gence .en into the sectir:n.rroximately 5O0 enlisted .. Aitet r the long wait Saturday nighlt. around 2100 hours. t l i.arters.s ''wr? erted to move to Japan . Thirty-eiLrTht ne. a~r -rO1OmC2i.d c-t.jor construction projects finished dclririAugust were ne-w n..d by --oveying ar. Techn:ical Intelligence units werers ready to move out on the dotes set by Ge ' eu-'ecd and. tlj. With the suc'den :.. rso. lO :u.:-nizzstions eliminated qalarteri.boratory was no'. ' th-e end of . GHO. a.neon's nd o:fficers' quarters caused by the additional npeisonnel reo:orting in fromn the field rere .imate operations were discussed at a confe.-7 " :rnrff 19 Aurust.-ove to Japan..din-rs ori'in.1 al 1cersonnel in th.for coorcdin-.el as a of scientific investigations and Tedhnica.a -u.e a rn4'id shi:-t of weight from combat fcrce to ar:-? o.+e an.ited States Arnrr~ Tcchnical Intelligence Drot.. naccssittt.

wiath G-2 and Chief Engineer. GHQ.tion from Chief Engineer.raslhington of material recquired. again came to the fore. I.HISTORY ' TECTrIICAL IiTTEi T Ii:jCE The recor. on the disposition of captured enemy -materialin the Pacific theater. Little was done about Japanese material at this tire. . in the Philippines requirements could the problem of be one of local Few·. kept the matter open. to T. as it was anticipated that all be met more satisfactorily in Japan ahd that Japanese ratcrial in the Ai7ES?AC area would disposition. advising the same set-up. 1l!4h.I.AC should be attached to GTQO for operational control. SaSarate (?Prvisiornal).arters that the 525Cth Technical Tntellignnce Composite Companyr. bookings vwere placed -withPort Cormland because of a tendency of services involved to stop all shipments until clarification fror . due to the change caused by the surrender of 83. and at another conference. 107 . at that time under the control of J7L'TESP. The draft cot-ained a recommendation for retention of various items as souvenirs by individual soldiers since hostilities had been termrinated. It wras decided that no action could be taken inreodiately but that GHQ w-ould arrive at a definite decisition in the matter. recor-Ien-. G!-TQ.-:endaticn t}hat had been made earlier in l. Lt Col i:anlcey submritted to G-2. a draft of recommended regulations to prccode USAFi:FE Circul. units originally intended for Sixth Army alone. in the latter part of August. GiQ.'ay by Col Sauve and Lt Col Ia nley(recenttly prcr-ooted) to G-2. General Teadqu. GI-O. Personnel Depart for {Occuwation of Ja-)an Personnel from ten Field Units and Field Depot Unit were assigned from 5250th to Sixth and Eighth Armies during August as part of the occupation forces for Japan (Blacklist operation) This split betwee:n both Armies the T. it becamne increasingly evident that Technical Intelligence -vouldbe able to operate much more effectively out of higher headceuaters.

1. i!o.Io.s arn-ji. Si.also distributed to the tCarns. EiJlty Arrm. Lst Lt THorb!:rt J.irn.'lbebr.. 3).d p rcsidont of the officers club upon the departure of 1 Maj er Harry E.-gm'l n.. Ar.s a:lCintdd assistant adcninistrative and :oCss officer.aila de-pct had ceasred by S3pte. " Unit . Sixth . reports alrcady undor vray. I". . re formed and placed on orders as follows: c Field Field Field Field Airr.Sullo reported early in Septcmber' to take charge of the Si.v.Jniub '£ Un-. . 5. 1 Corys. Eighth Ar:iy ( " " Field Unit No..rture of Tnajcr Ceollit and It V-n '.cld T anila 4 Seb Unit iTo. Technical IntclligE7ncc target objective folders woer published and distributed to the Units as they left the Depot as well as to all corps and divisions under S:ixth A'rmy. 5. Er:rin Ji. 5L. TTilliar I[fi wtrs ahTpointcd Cxocut1:.d the quantity of new capture.-ila 1! ocptcenbcr 3.HIST01YT Or' TC}IP'IC:L INTELI: IGENCE ou-F. I Corse. 2. 5:3.(de. X-VL Corps.195.:r-:n. 71 wars.ianila 29 J:ug hS) " (A roster of pcrscnncl of these field units comprising a total of 53 officers and 100 enlisted reon.<.lined by areas various targets of . Jubeliror (l-atcr nrormloted to Captain) wa. officer of the 5250th. 4.crctLi-. 1 Cor!s. These fold. exccpt for clearing up 58.:lysis Section.( " TIX Eighth Army ( " " s shcin in Incl. and 1st Lt Ed-in K-.ur 45) 28 Lug 45) 2lug 45) 25 Field D)cpot Ulit i. FIcr:ls for reporting on Janancse industrial installations v-er. 'he was also clect.y (departed J'anila Unit 3..i-'th 45) 20 Son 45) 28 . Eighth Army ( " AIV Corns. 108 . 30_Aug hS) 25" ug 5) 25 ug 45) 2h Aug 45) Ficld Unit To.tien . '1(.ercst to Technical mncl Tcchlnological Intelligence on the Islands of I ( 5o. Upon tlLc d-a:z.type "A" bUnits . Lt Col. 3ixthL Army (departed . 'nalysis of cnony equiprent at thle Tm. Sixth Army ( " _X Cors.rtz w-. li.(' Corps. 3ha. Ei:-hth A-rmy ( " Unit INo.nted sunply officcr..'c:i:c forricd and placed on ord..aJ . Carnos tc the United Stat(s. Five tpeTJ Field Field Field Field Unit Unit Unit .ts No.nd assigned to Sixth Army Ieadquartcrs. lCols.'yc(lk on o!orations. depalrting i a-.ith the w'ar on&d. Capt fl.d cnerny cquipment receivecd at the Depot durinr the rmcnth was ncrligiblo. EquipL)rlent and Tnf.

fcr further distribution to Sixth and Eighth .n ca-pturcd aboard the Japanese hospital ship "Tachibana !l.7 rn heavy machine guns 9 anti-aircraft adapters 109 .F. It was hold ocr -Use by the *"arCrir-es Branch.1. left tlafila 5 August. Sta. h-wcv(. in po.IIIS'iRY OF T1iCtII1CU.ns frclm the Cor. G G-2.'L .s 'Turopcan Theater.ent s. pending rocospt of instructi:.ttcd to the Office of the Assistant Chief of St-:..i s and riscollaneous rubbings wer sent to Grcund Industry Section. drurls for 70 r~i· battalion guns 35 tyIp 96 6..c 92 70 r.030 pounds of enecr. France. 'll Tcnty-nrlc cC-opies cf colpilaticn on Ja. Army Forces Pacific.L INT1I.IS). mld additi. to the UIriit.vL-:renade dischargers 1 battnlicin guns (incorplete) 13 I:ounts f or heavy machine guns 22 sparc barrels for heavy machine guns 4 rargc.ancso cconomic data from the S.r. AFPArC. riflcs 2 tyrpc 93 field light range finders 1 tpe 93 tripod bar light range finders 4 t%:1.y material were shippied.ce.14 type 92 7.clolMts to '?77850" vas turned over to the United States kAr.:. hMd baen al:l-Arwed to souvenir much of the equiprment before Technical Intelligence was notified. be invontcried. photographed.:raterrial vmrc fcrx:'r. : .:i' :enemy Ordnar.ssible v crines trials. C. D. 10 50 i':r flare discharger 257 type 38 6. Incl 26) inclldes: 27 bayen:ts 56 typc 8') 50 . Ordnnricc m. and rctaicrlcd in st._urier s:ervice.nal Secti.5 r r light nachino guns 73 i'agazincs for light machine guns 4 clip. and 15C il)'.ny Forc T:.nandor-in-Chief. Equipm. the same pIriod a. during the sa.c: riateria'..oe period.cuncs by .d.020 nounds by air. 2.lvaged (I. Air ship:icnt . .tu(s by watcr.:ns to the Ja -:ancso Chemical VWarfaro Notebook v-cre se:nt to tiCe nrintoers. rclcrto. YTfatcr bookings during.-crgc vrwith its original packaging. WIashingtonr.'f.lcaders 62 spatre barrels for light michine guns . (fIqS) 1 Uni.ArrJies.e.rdud tc 1lap and Photo Division. In th_ monthl cf 'u-ust 19h.n werc sub:i..ctcgraphs.9S. '1To hundred tJwenty-eight photographs of capture enmiy . c1' Troops that had seized the hospital' ship. iteriol which hzd b. (. an( 283 namerplate.ted States Arr.'rrr c:.SP:'C.5 rn-. Paris.igcncc Sorv-. .L IGENCE equipnont on hanre was dispscd cf as soon as possible.chnical I nrSplligernce Dnpot t.rry Iatell.

packedt in straw matting bundles containin ..:il'rbf [.nr tLhe . 20 an' 30 Nover.:n han. -messing an.j:r ':?ncral Charles resr onsible fa:r the Uninted States Airrmy Technical Intelligencc Clenter unlJr `.ati.f Shippin. .in ur . C:r..:ttes fAri2y Technical Intelli -ence cJ at. b'. T'h rifles wer.!vm the Unite! St.' fr'r.-nnel remainin.were cl: se 1 Oct ber 1945.!quarters Advance in 1 Japan. Lt C1. its normal functions. technl -~ical].. GHQ.ttali :n -iuns were disasseiabel an.. I-nila. Tait ~vas a. teceivin.fTl1) un:.nsfer of the 5250th for direct a: :inistrati an und-er GHQ. which.STOrY 01 TMCHNICAL INTE.rl in the fie] I rep:'rtel in to the Dep:)t.K.l'. in a: 'iiti-n t:.l.-ti-n -f Japan.'quarters (Incl 27).i ws shi.n.recreati n acc-ci.nted. Intelli ~ ence rP.Lt.'f?.lli -ence undler G-!Q was . H2..r officer.tky: In -ubrittin'.y t General R.ateri:l was dispose .sue 1 by GiiQ when thlt h.ber 1945 Incl 28 .s alpiiltel C . villou7hby. 'ecor:enJati . a series :L' c. technical. C-l Woo lteft sh rtly th.Dalvi' S. pers. t-.-). reLative to the tr.inferences were hel' wi th Col 17falter S.e t was shi-Fed in from the fiel:-7. cl se . G-2 Sectiron.ivcn . and. Int.ero ta .e Cr -s 5250th Or'.'e ].. Sutherland Chief' 'f Staff GHrQ aFKi. C>-ss. i).gence Tar-ets . Thne TD:chnical Tntellipence Center was t:..r-::.iinat)r of all Techrnical Tntelli:-ence: a.ersonnel for all Technical Intelli.~ 369.. N-o new analysis of enemry equipment was lunlertaken.le h'-usir-:.r for G.LLIGENCE This Ordnance minatericl was peckc and mar'eed as enemy . Col anley continue-' as Cr:.i. 0-2. c):)ri. innl visitino f rei 'n :-. . f ur to ten rifles with each bundle labele1 with a . and ta transfer it.. Col . l1. .artmelnt Intelli.ner the ccml.-2. prop sed directive t-) be i:. rivili3n.. adquarters s.C (GO 337 . wa. .. w3:s t. packed in b-xes beari.rilabl:-.:<-th!r wlrith the 5250th T:chnical Intellilence C.ination :) a:Ll scientific.:neral T-ea.nt -!f trfhe 5250th Technical Intellicence Cormnp.d.. a reprrt (17 September 194h) on the disposition cf pers )nnel :. C31 Sauve' and Lt C^l 'anley a :-.FiAC.if in acc'orlance with theater policy. 110 . GHQ.n: 29). SCA . All enermy equiprmeiet .ny to GHQ and.eJ the centralization of Technical Intelli 'ence a-'rinistratimn under Gener-l lHea.J.'retsent twith the 525Oth Tcohr:ical.. ence within the theater.. The '70 r. new equin':.r 1 rinatar of 'v'ar Dep.Accounts .11 salvaue :. t:o okyo.?pr:wvi.'edical equipr:ent with packa es anl b xes markedc with lare Redl Crnsses.cti n was taken t-. .-)any include.o-ulrl assure -tirect rcsp:nsibility fo-r 'ecimical In telli -once in the ?acific theater. :li ence Colmpany.ns f. enliste '. Finall aj. -e!l to the United States.n"in-i Officer )f the 5250th Technical Into .val fcr reassi -nm:i.

5 October Lt Ccl Trtnl.Authcrity fcr ncvel. pecr verbal orders -fLt Ccl ITanley.?L1SPiAC. take their place i-.C.tine of arrival in Tokyo.'.) In Octaber. Deoot headquarters. and per:onnel were alerted.ible f:r release frcn the A'rmy under the point systen wore returned to the United States.'.lbor 33 officers cf the 5250th left for Tckyo on the ship. . instructins ware^dditicnal personnel required t(. On 1. .ey was sent to Tckyo to imalo necesstry arrangeonents fir the rlcvo:eent of the 5250th Technical Intelli:o-ncc Cllnpany to Ja.dquartcrs. with 60 days rations and organio transportation. sup-?lies were drawn.that the crgalizaticn be n.945 were turned in t-L Ht.??inC and receiving secticn reclained e-on until just befcre the ccr.rpany depparted.. i11 . On 6 Ncvr..rl Tlanila to Tokyo. (Incl 29). .lOss. all analysis secticns cf the Depoct wore closed and -re-. .FD.ith the :rganizaticn wore requisiticned.ared for shinnent. 20 Ncvember 19h5. On 18 October :i .eont havinr boon cobtainod. dir:2ctin. ved fith ATIS fr-.HISTORY OF' TECiNTIC L INTELLIGENCE New adjusted service ratings as of 2 Septcmber 1. (Dates of joininc and departing fron the organization for all personnel of 5250th are included in Incl 9.DVAI' T CE (in T-kyc). a rceting cf officers vas held. "Kinkad" and on 9 Nov-rmber the balance of the personnel of the 5250th Tecmhnical Intclliiunce Corpany rmn--d t.-vclient ordors wore sent by radiogran from GHQ . surly.ith all crganic equipment -n the "Frxancis Ogden" -. and shi-. 'and shortly thereafter non frcn the C:-1 pany cli. .

s 7or iie trani'er of the unit to Japan. SCAi)i The IrrTperial Japanese Government was di rected that all items of sup.s~ition (of Certain Facilities of Tokyo Arsenal No.ay. G-2.t.emrnnts to have a representative of their office at building 395 at 10CC .)1 cqu. samitary.: by the 52rotij r'e . Tol-yo (memorandum AG 601 (19 Oct h5) GD.anley met with the Japanese representatives at the Arsenal 20 Oc-ober and directed them as to the installation of batthing. be "colrmlunicatedl t) your representative at thae tmr. Lt C. It was further directed th-tt the Imperial Japanese Government make rnecessary arrany:. to . 20 Oczcober i945..Y. Subject: Acqu::.L andt the . 2635 269..n: 0f' cer Thu IiLperial Japanese Government was notified through the Central Liaison Office.HISTOiLY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CHA T ER X TECHNiFTCAT.linz e wi'-. 276.Arsenal wouuld be "-ml. INTFLL!:GS32NCl. kyo: TI'he Cclter vas 'tc h..nake prelininary arransemtn :n.-ies.t 'okro .u. L8.ved.o the Sunreme Commander for the Allied owers designated the items rE:qlired for use by the Allied P Forces and those items which mi'ht be rem. directed tiat a United .rserai No.tat!es .'anley T Lt Col as Commnncti:.-2 -ad:inistered . C.ishinrs and fixtureas wouli rumain in the buil din.ield lwers'' (CH 2. 1.rrmy Tchnical Intelligenc' i be o stbabl:. The detcils pertainin.November 19'5 JAPAN A.pen ar-eas aljaccnt to these buildings of the . CETTER: E October -.s until a representative of General H-cxdqaleriers . for a mceting with the :-eprasentative of' Gerne-al Headquarters of the Supreme Comnlan ler for the Allied Fowers. to the work to be accornil±shed C and the iJnstallation cf tthe facilities referr'ed to above would. datied 19 October 1945) that buiidings 255.ipment.zi a'a Intel. furnituire.nce Comrany sa. available inizlediately for occupancy by an agency of General Hesdcuarers of the Supreme Commander for the all.shcd r.. Shimoju". messing and other facilities which would be required and directed that buildin-s and . h75. 1.rounds requisitioned 112 .ild f-om l':-u'.t Col lanley had florim to Tokyo before the 5250th Technical IntellP~. furn.

L INTELLIGENC E would( be thoroughly cle:.n Document Center. .949 square feet floor space.)nfercnce with G-l.f Depot.lldings ant har' the premises set up so that when the ships with the bi:lance :. lea. C:' 1r!anl. and Ca'. and G-3. comprised eir. Ad. andi for the c mbin(-. was usedr for mess hall. quarters. an-. Assistant Pdcrinistrative Officer. In a c.anization. wvhich housed tw scientific laboratories with testing equipment intact.nila.n and Hirst. They arrivel 26 October supervised the clearance 'f the bu.7 scti:)n. part of which was 5 sturies high. -cnd recreation center for officers.-y for'occupaency. use. and a ground area 1000 by 1500 feet square. They follwe.nother building. I:aj rs .vingm Capt V. which ha-' formerly been used as the administration centcr for the T:ky.i for the shippino( and r(eceivin. for company supply. One 2-story building was converted into laboratories and offices for the six analysis secti:Dns . The seventh building was a theater f-r c)mr.ary i.use was utilize as gara-e and mrltor pool.any frcrm AFWESPAC to GHQ.iiitin t': the seven previously requisitioned and wras available f r use by technical personnel for analysis of Intelli..vance.any. where all vehicles coulr . GHQ. One builidin7..f the Comnpany.IMi. G-2.rtion )f' the Unit(:d Sta-tes Army Technical Intelligence Center.pany perslnnel.nmpony aboard docke·d in Tokyo Bay the Pirsenal was renl. Kurtz.HISTORY 01' TECHNIC1. Description of the Ars-nal T.f the C-. was takn over for adminOne 3-story building was istration hcactquarters for the 5250th. A larcye buildings (iicturis andRlucprints . Incls 28 and 29) with a totl if 157.. Lt Col Mtanley apyointecd Lt C:-l Sullo. as rear echelon for the Shaw as forward echelon comrlete arrnletemnnts f-r the arrival of the Cornpany. 'irmy-Navy library of the Washingt.adiai-. fly t::.ence samples ol Japanese materiel.kyo Arsenal No. Lt After the C-.ey flew Chave. . T ky.ommy sailed from 'Manila.menc prior to occupancy by the 5250th Technical Intelli fence Com. was taken -ver in al. Lt Edwin A. in regard to the transfer -ofthe Technical Intlligence Com.. The main builtding.Arsenal. Assistant Coordinator of to Tokyo. Technical Intelligeince... be stmrtA indiors.? 22 Noverber. 1 turned over for use as The p.7 wiras desi nato. it had been recon:mendel that the personnel be assigned to 113 .d for similar use f: r enlisted l men. Transfer -of the 5250th t~ GHQ Upon his return t-. and a similar buildin..

(Provisional)" Company under USASOSs AFPAC assigned the company to Special Troops. dated 30 Nov 45. General Headquarters. General Headquarters. Gernera. United States Army Forces. General Order 369.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE GHQ. Orders 337.ieet. and it was suggested as desirable to preserve the entity of the organization in its name. dated 25 September 1915. dated 20 Novemnber 1945. Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Lt Col 3 IMajor 10 Capt 23 1st Lt 4O 2d Lt 13 Total 90 Warrant Officers: CWO: Enlisted 1st 1 1 iven 1 (grades as shown): 3d 17 4th 35 5th 46 6th 48 7th 10 170 261 2d 12 Aggregato Occupation Instructions No. Special Troops. Supreme Command for the Allied Powers. Sib. established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a theater overhead installation and stated that grades and ratings would be authorized by separate communication. dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company.sanila. allotment of theater overhead grades and ratings was made to the 5250th Te^hnical Intelligenre Company as follows: Officers: Col ]. 114 .. upon their departure frc. "!'5250th". Pacific. 2 Occupation Instructions No. This was the broad outline. Separate (Provisional).Allotment of Theater Overhead Giades ond Strength) dated 29 November 1945. the number assigned it under the orders establishing the organization as a "Separate. outlined to the occupation forces for Japan the general instructions governing the collection and disposition of enemy equipment of the Japanese armed forces. The disposition of enemy equipment collected for Intelligence purposes was governed by later directives. General Headquarters. By let+er order AG 32K03 (2 ° Nowv 4) GA. Army Forces Pacific. same headquarters.a i. 2.

a. G-2. G-2. Under this General Order. safeguarding and evacuation of captured enemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical and training purposes. Intelligence so obtained was exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United States and llied Armed Forces. the exploitation of materiel. General Head. United States Army Strategic Air Force. of the state if Japanese resources for war. Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designed e to accomplish th foll:wing objectives: First. 9. the exploitation of targets and objectives included coordination and utilization of certain genral and technical Intelligence agencies: the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. separate Corps. Subject: Japanese Military Intelligonce Targets. and special technical missions. Each of these agencies designated plenary representatives to the Assistant Chief of Staff. GHQ. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Coordinating control and supervision over the various agencies interested in Technical I¶telligence investigations were exercised through normal command and staff channels. who operated under his control and whose mission was to coordinate and supervise Technical Tntelligence activities to prevent competitive duplication of offo)rt. OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE General Orders No. including laboiatory and field teamns Air Corps and Na. 115 .HISTORY.Vy technical units analogous to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company.quarters. dated 2 October 1945 (Incl 32) designated the Assistant Chief of Staff. to coordinate end supervise th(. Translator Interpreter Service (TIS. rHQ. Far Eastern Air Forces. These agencies included special staff sections of AFPP&C Armies. national end foreign. This included examination of Japanese facilities which might be involved in the production of materiel for war and the provision of trained personnel to assist the chiefs of services (Ground. including the examination and evaluation of available enemy materiel and deduction. exploitation of military intelligence targets in Japan and Kort. including the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and field unit personnel. from this evaluation. 9 General Orders No. Allied agencies. Commander in Chief of the Pacific. special staff sections responsible for the technical Supervision of their respective Technical sections in the 5250th. nnd speci'al missions represented in Japan and Korea. Naval and Air) in the supervision of the collection. a revised ATIS organization) Combin'd Document Center and field detachments.

including histories. tHL-).. since Intelligence targets were geographically distributed. second campaign in the Philippines in 1945.. lbrigado. t. investigations of recruiting and training .3 lf docu. G*-2.cIw:Ierst . etc. biographies and service records. campaigns in the Pacific islands from 1941 to 1945. investigations of military police. compaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area from 19)42 to 1944.Armyr Fourth objective cf Technical Intelligence was exploitation of historical records and Dfficial reports of the Japanese General Staff (Ground.c.ainirng to cl''rent targae. t.ts trained therein.1 b-i' the War ard 1aall. all foreign and national techniclal rmssl ns3 upon arrival reere registered with the Assistant Chief nof Staff.1fied the occupation authorities concelned..el1d agenc-es pf of speciarlisv agen. f. the occupation force commanders wvere responsible for the coordination 116 . operations. selectS ng militiry. who in the Pacific was nr.. etc. of Order of Battle Intelligence and -elated subjects: this involved lists of all regulcar units (Ground.'' . conducted all liaison with the Japanese Governmental aurhorities relative to the operation )f technical missions. campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942. . Intel. (Tokumu Kikian)..s J for document activity.c:r 7 accessioll reuL'. and. Naval and Air) lists of code names and nuilmers T/O''s and T.r-aned.:tr. anA.sion to. '-:.&u. GHQ. foczsizg all fi. lisL. arman. the exploit. including direct:-ries of transfers and promoti.L. reports on military societies.ients re=eived. hist-. the preparations for the War of 1941. the Groaund. the foll-. finally.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Second objrctive of Techn. lists of comrnands..'E's of all tLes of units.s of recruiting districts and Navy officers and their and uni. circ¢lAa "g personnel. investigations of military intelligence agenc es.-)ed providlLng t.ries of major units.ns.nt. Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan for war.wing policy provisions were enf -rced! To prevent compotitive duplication. lists of divisions. ava/' and Air *' Thirdl Ibject±_ve f Tcern±la in c-ielLgence was trhe exploitation .zod agencies.r:hr.h-c It eaz-n and the specifz -interests puhlie.lti ol %: d.-n g Intelligence needed for security and cnntrol by means of frap. books trans-nis. G-2.icni cit'nltif:Lc and general documents for United S ah!. and campaigns in other areas from 1941 to 1945 For effective coordination. s-". T'is dV ..a. of Home Guard and Volunteer Defense Units. dtlegatirig such liaison as was required to occupation force commanders.s and mIajor -nits of Grw-3 Na-'ai and Air Forces by components 5 strength.mentary translations or photostats.:et.iLe.renecly Jc. t. ants.. t gether with records of special and secret service organizations. to author?..t.t ~s 1S5:.

)itation . G-2. and saw that proper technical personnel were assigned to complete the reports. S. made arrangements concerning trie exploitation of tarjets of Technical Intelligence interest. which coordinated the reports submitted with War and Navy Department Intelligence targets. GHQ. Translator & Interpreter Service (2. the U. to exercise coordinating control and supervision over the exploitation of military and civilian Intelligence targets of interdepartmental and international concern in Japan and Korea. Col Walter S. This section coordinated the activities of the Chiefs of Services of AFPAC. War Department Intelli-gence Target Section The War Department Intelligence Target Section (WDIT) was established under the provisions of General Orders No. was the Technical Intelligence cection. prior to their being dispatched to locations outside the area. headed by Lt Col javid S. all reports of Technical Intelligence relating to investigations in Japan and Korea were cleared through the Assistant Chief of Staff. Operating within the Technical Intellingence Section weregl U.9. Army Technical Intelligence Center (5250th Technical Intelligence Co. was authorized to corrospond directly with the heads of the varimus interested agencies previously Ymentimned or their representatives on technical details. GHQ. Special Technical Kissions. and direct correspondence between plenary representatives and the heads of the agencie s they represented was authorized.15. Tait. Wood. To expedite the conduct of these investigations. To protect Intelligence materiel and records available in only limited numbers against exploitation by a single research agency and to make these items accessible to other Intelligence agencies their removal had to be cleared through the occupation force commander. operating through subordinate conmmanders or staffs to prevent competitive duplications. Collection and Reports Sub-Sectimn.000 personnel). the Foreign Technical Missions. coordinated. civilian and military subsections of WDIT and their relations with all other agencies. charged with the translation and publication of all Japanese dccurents and with the furnishing of translator and interpreter personnel.)f targets within their territorial Jurisdiction.). supervised and established policy for the activities -f the technical. Washington Document Center 117 . 9 November 1945. G-2. which was responsible for Technical Intelli-ence of all descripti)ns in the Pacific Theater.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE of expl. 2 October 1945 and General Orders No. Operating under Col Wcod.S. appointed chief of WDIT. The principle of reciprocal exchange of reports applying to all field technical agencies.

1. British Amphibious Mission. General Staff. were issued to authorized personnel in accordance with provisions of General Order No.l:wing policies prevailed! 118 . Included in the U. Air Technical Intelligence Group (Far Eastern Air Forces). Technical Intelligence Instruction No.S..1 Lt Col Tait. and War Department Intelligence Collection Committ (ADVON). Under this directive.that laid the foundation for the coordination of all Technical Intelligence activities relative to the occupation of Japan. report was submitted to WDIT. British Staff Section. Upon completion of target investigation. All requests on the Japanese G)vernment were funneled through WDIT. Economic and Scientific Section. in Manila. Agencies furnished weekly a list of targets to be visited. Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine and Austrialian Scientific Mission. the fAo. Oeneral Headquarters. Military Intelligence Section.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (ADVON) which selected and shipped all Japanese documents to the United States. created by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs.9 to permit the bearer to enter any restricted area in Japan or Korea South of 38 degrees north latitude for purposes of Technical Intelligence. Lt Col Tait drew up Technical Intelligence Instruction No. and Forei. which advised the Theater concerning the transmittal to Washington of Intelligence information. notifying WDIT at least 48 hours in advance so that the local commander of the area and Translator and Interpreter Service could be notified.n Technical Missi'ns coordinated under the Technical Intelligence Section were the following agencies: Naval Technical Mission to Japan. As Coordinator of Technical Intelligence under Col Wood at Tokyo.S. Temporary passes from the Office of the Supreme Commnander for the Allied Powers. Nilitary Intelligence Section. dated 20 November 19L5. U. United States Strategic Bomb Survey. AFPAC. had strongly favored coordination of Technical Intelligence when Col Sauve and Lt Col Manley had first proposed it in writing in May 1945. Japanese Antiaircraft and Seacoast Artillery Research Board. when he was assigned at GHQ.

Corps and Divisions. Special investigators temporarily attached to chiefs of services and other agencies could also be assigned to the organization for administration while in the theater. To assist in the investigations. as well as transportation and-equipmenit. notified.1. he made arrangements with Division G-2 for packing and shipping the equipment. when desired. As field units )f the 5250th comileted their work with Armies. Samples of new or modified material or equipment which was to be evacuated were handled as follows: When practicable. he notified the Division G-2. G-2 assumed responsibility for notifying other interested agencies. Photographers from the Ph.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE The United States Army Technical Intelligence Center served as headquarters f'r the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. could also be requested to accompany investigators on field trips. If this were not adviseable. and. who was responsible for safe4Eh9 . and presented a brief outline of contemplated procedure. arranged with the occupation forces the details of billeting and transportation. they were recalled to the Center for re-assigonment under G-2. Chiefs of services and )ther Intelligence agencies prepared plans for the exploitation of military Intelligence targets in their designated fields and filed these plans with G-2 for coordination with other agencies at least 48 hours in advance of execution. additional qualified liaison with G-2 and were held responsible for becoming familiar with the records and rept)rts of Intelligence investigation maintained in the Technical Intelligence Subsection of WDIT so that unnecessary duplication of effort co)uld be avoided. arranged for prrliminary interviews with Japanese officials that often materially expedited the investigations. the Japanese authorities involved. stated the transportation and equipment required. If shipment were delayed.:t-grsph Laboratry that had 'een established at the Technical Intelligence Depot in Manila and reestablished at the Technical In-elligence Center in Tokyo. The plans listed the names of personnel involved. All interested a-encies maintained a cl'. through its Japanese Liaison Section. Documents necess :ry to complete investigations were evacuated through TIS to the Washington Document Center (Advarnce) Library at the Technical Intelligence Center. the investigator personally evacuated the item to the Technical Intelligence Center. and notified the Technical Intelligence Center that it had been sent. could be requested from the 5250th through G-2 Operations (Major Henry V. Hall) on WDIT Form No.

1 Headquarters Sixth Army Field Unit No. Incl 3): Field Unit No... Corps X Field Unit Noe3 .. the Chief of Service specifically indicated in his ortekrs to the investigating personnel the questions he desired answered... the copeuration that was given by the conquered pe)ple. the j-:bs that were assigned Technical Intelligence teams in the occupied country. Assigned to Sixth Army were the followig Technical Intelligence units (personnel are included in operations roster..52 . If shipmonrt were inadvisable.... 120 . not all repirts of the teams in the field had been received at 5250th Headquarters.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE guarding it until such time as the appropriate agency could arrange shipment to the Tochnical Intelli.. Upon completion' of the investigation. on the n :rthern coast of Honshu.71 ..... apparently was not successful in accomplishing its mission due to a lack of facilities... it was necessary that a report be submitted. Sixth Army H Field Unit No..... I Corps Field Unit No. final disposition was requested from the War Department and effected by Technical Intellicence Center personnel.... Th-se available...... In all cases......ence Center. Sixth Army.. The report was mimeographed and distributed by the Technical Intelligence Center... the investigator completed such study and photographs as were ncessary and arranged with the Division G-2 for the security of the item.. eadquarters..1 was assigned to Headquarters.. which was organized along lines similar to many agencies in the United States....... where further study of the material coull be made at one of the analysis laboratories......Investigation showed that the Corps..51 . equipment mid management. indicate the conditions encountered in Japan. Corps I Field Depot Unit N.. where they investigated the Civilian Defense Corps at Tsuruga. Activities of Technical Intclli7ence Teams in the Field At the time of concluding the writing of this history of Technical Intelli ence..... Headquarters... Fukui Prefecture. Corps I Field Unit N. h wever.. and the type of information that could be secured..2 .1.. T) insure its adequacy.. Sixth Army Field Unit No.

and six other targets listed for investigaticn also could n. near Toky'o). recovered a Japanese potato peeling machine in working condition at officers quarters. but also failed to recover any equipment of Intelligence value. which the Japanese claimed was the only one existing in Japan (manufacturer unknown. 7 October 1945. Simnal Corps. Police and Japanese officials stated they hal not heard of any Df these installations in Hiroehima..t be located. anrd Pfc Ralph H. Picklesimer. with specific targ-rts accessible. Capt Edward Nowakowski and T/5 Kenneth I. Base and Ordnance Arsenal at Kure (}Yap Incl. Jr. Quartermaster Team. The branch office of the Tokyo Electric Company was not located and was believed to have been destroyed by bombing. Phili-ppine Islands. Honshu. Pfe Rudy G. Carrett. Cleary. Farnam. Army Ordnance Supply Depot at Hiroshima and Kure Naval. but no items f' Technical Intelligence value were recovered. Colby. which was reported and returned to the Technical Intelligence Center. and T/4 Estill C. Japan Field Unit No. Poss. Ordnance. Kure. At the Hir)shima Army Ordnance Supply De-. Honshu. and an amphibious tank (destroyed). The :th(r men from the Unit remaining behind with him on Mindanao. at Hirer. 2d Lt Robert E. 2d Lt Anthony G.2 was place:1 on temporary duty with X Corps. Coppola and S/S2t Wiilliam J. 1st Lt Cyril L. Spevack of the Chemical Warfare Team of this unit. Major William 0.ot. were: Cpl Robert E. rccoverel a new item. 37 mm anti-tank mun (the gun was on a mount similar to type 1. and assigned VOCG on operations with the 41st Infantry Division. 121 . 1At the Kure Naval Arsenal a new mobile 20 cm rocket launcher was recovered. Jr. ?Acdical officer for the unit. Jones. but tank was madle in Saanmi. As requested by 41st Infantry Division. and T/5 William C. Since the Unit was only all wcdc two jeeps in the first echelon of X Corps. T/5 Nick P. Martin. Japan.HiLSTORY OF TECHNIC1AL INTELLIGENCE Hircshima an&r Kure. Moore. CWS. this searched several caves near Kure. Engineer Teml. Quantities of items contain(ed in another target were received from the 41st Division. new items found included: 15 cm horse-drawn morrtar.. recovered a new type decontaminator for dry mix in the Hiroshima -rrmy Ordchance Deptt. Ord. CE. 33). checked the caves near Kure with the Enqineer Team.. Vannucci. a small jack harmner. was left in charge of a detail to bring up a 1-f-on truck and trailer with the second echelon. The first cch::lon arrived. 47 rmm AT run).

. .'i no ':: . ":mal .4trbuted .an Chemi cal Plant.Chenmical Industrial Co. u. Melchor. A list of targets n was as f-llows: investigated and inforationl obtainel therefrrm in the cock area of Nag. .uric a¢c.:t .rdla3. :...tallj. usi. but cf rr..toyed daring hos-tilities.'aj . throulgh listed as a target on available maps Tokai Sodiumn CD. Chemicaln No furth. Kaplan.ajm-: C c <.. -ra had boen r ~l±.:3. an-d nu.<p I:lc] 33) .' . l cmter.: j. of Nagoya in the vicinIty .ly dar:aged dust.nmuerpreters oz factory mana. was Niss.t targets uf inportance before the Divisi on lestruciGon teams destroyed the equliprenG.:-tO.1. Irn.n ffi::cr3 in ' was _b-truned in each case from listel f )r the N.nie .. H:nh1 . Johns. V.f found to be a brancll rplant cC.'.h .r ' . detilel ij. -.oya....Li..nt was only slih1... .rea! i: 5eFtenbo-or aw:tinrg :lllcont To the Nagoya cy.)f w#orc was heaTr.'. spn' Infri Tf.ntcrr'qation throuvlh Japanese .ier resarci-c.e unit attemptad to visit all The v:u. T/' Aloert J.'N :-lld '.c0 a W.'. t Central.ll ChcricsalJ Warfare targets r:I.ers and from physical ins-:ecotimos of the factories.l. a..'j A!: mea:?er if invastiiation was continuing operatioll f.r me-'. Poth. ' almrs$ C'm:1.' N' chemical factiire of fulrlIr sli .ath rr ald L. the Nissa..jf Nissan Cheirani-l.Y¥ 3i.f r.. but had been t ..1--:Ld T-:n.7 with m!ai.t. n.. rcre.1n +r. .am .m L' mr.2.' ilv..cials who were interro-atLd to have mosved to another part of Japan prior to hostilities. vra.' o..ty to the 25th '.-'' 5'j'I l ..ties tsnd at the ti:. j.arently conffirmed this report. .ya iarbir.o wf delayed snme 20 da-s Dt. plant offi.: I Cor.c. operatedt vr th I Corps in the SouthF ejsr IL1i 3. Tf.fHISTORY OF TTECHNICAL INTE.i. uiJer ph )sphlaoe n at t.rlg.les F.1.hods of ins car..s::.. .al .).C bDubing aid...)r the :rolu. Signcl Corps. Jey. No .. -:iu'vied ..larles 'a'.i ' Stt Carl H.:1-.ies N. a i :rnt .:. Hz'roshima.':. _ J-i . (1st Lt Char.y DLvi.s p'. !c'. vt' Ch.n.3iste-d of bulk manupr.a-e tb. 122 ..LI'GENCE 1st L+ found they ware . an1'.hat ncMnTh.. Tckai Scida Co!iany wvas forme-rly 1)catod adjacent to the Nissan FPlat.. was reported by Nissan. j e durirn h:ostilit. Plant. n.r.'er being sector (i. csh. >f). Jrc.{d d :. rViS Team No. bL.tandcl.rerq of Field Unit to the i .o&duct:i .a..a area.svtizatecd .. . As aw .--a hb ::.t ..hrn. A search of the surrounding area a.J. 5S arld 52 ts n: tempora:ry du.' infrinati n concernin-' this plant could be obtained.y dec'.2> L .e..cbwion if suiLhburic acld.le pi. T.'s in -c.c" .

Pollack without an officer in charge cf the Ordnance Team. iVellensiek.3 was still assigned to field duty by 9 November. Equipment from the secti 'n which manufactured rubber tubes had been moved to other i~lants. Groom) c-vered the Naoroya Aircraft Plotting Center.lary.ora. Jr.f Enineer Team No. Webster an:l T/3 Arnold F. all chemicals and no apparent chemical f research ha'l been .3 and ha-' been assigncd t. upon the dep..arture of T/5 J:hn M.. Wartime products were rubber tubes for airrlane :asolino hose. which was accomplished in other plants. since the only laboratories encountered were fo)r 'ro.ucti-n Ai bulk cher.C. had been relieved of duty with T..t in the i. the 11th 'Replacement Depot for return to the United States. Standard processes were use I for the manufacture -. and sheet cellophane.iedcical iemt l. Devlin for the Rel lacement Depot. made a complete 123 . combinled during hostilities under joint mana-a:Eent for the -rY. The Signal Teamn (2. and S/Sgt Robert H. Capt Robert L.uctin of finished war materiel.ed only in the manufacture 'f intermediate products and n. leaving T/4 Roecrt Vi. was 1. located in the dock area of Na. Unit NJ. 1st Lt ihil:io. rubber tubing for airp:lane hizh pressure hydraulic hcse. In stu.cntc north of NanL ya ! Castle.:rwas bein-z condlucted. (who reporte. VWith very little plant da::ia-e sustained during h:stilities. Ltd. The primary responsibility of these plaits in wartime seoiamed to be quantity production of essentially the saume chemicals which had been produced in peacetime. Henry. i.hane around 1 December 1945.rD.iich was destroyed by bombing. Only member of the . Naoya Branch (formerly Dai Ni.HISTORY OF TECHNIC. i'fc Ira A Davidson of this team had transferred to the 11th Replaccomelnt De!? t for return to the United States. continued as the only member of the Quartermaster Teal. L-tz..^1 Lt John H. The colli. was rebuilt and resumed1.ft by the midlle of November was 1st Lt Henry T.hane plant... S/Sit Max A.icals..roduction was being continued. Sakura Gum Co.. Nagoya. reorted. Anderson. Zclechosky.I. Only one member . 2d Lt Wendell S. the manufacture of cello..Grubbs and Pfc Joseph F. Evidently these plants were not char.uction control.lants were enc ag. He also acted as officer in charge of the Field Unit.ged with the res'-onsibility "f chenical research. to the Replacement Depot.L INTFLLIGE2CE Yaha-i Flactro-Chonical Plant and Showa Suda Plant. to the Replacement Depot 17 Nwvember. on Cellophane Plant). it was apioarent that these large chemical industial S(. Bratt. v. The other tw' menibers.

an. Pvt James W.m.. funnd the plant had. on temporary ... 50 mn smoke shells for type 89 grenade discharger bxes . the Kobe Shipbuilding Plant of Mitsubishi. 33..:ateol by this team includedc: Nisshin Millin. ty e 94 srall smoke candles (A) b:. Hnnshu. Rubber Comnany... comi.peace time had been shipbuilding and 124 .Ltd. franrible vomiting ras grenades e 91 'rrny -as masks 10 b xes .:anese Iirmcji Arny Disci:linary Barracks. Bylsrna. [Honshu.... Gohrinp. ty Other tari-ets investi.. found no Enginser equipment..:qrussionn was that Kobe was cornpltecly ruined... HCM fran-ible sroke rrenades boxes . The plant's main production during war and.not been damaged... Stephen. (rMap Ircl 33) 25 'e1ternberO The first il.. Osaka Division.. Nil.f 2d Lt Robrt C. Orville.. Timeji.. Payant. The Engineer Tear. 3 Chome 'WadasakichoHyogoku. during the war and was at the time of investim atimn capable of full production... Ja. and. Tokaraiuka 1Cap.51.ets listed in target folder f r the 25th Irfantry Division area. and Cpjl Homer Blankcnship.luty to 33r! Infantry Division of I Coiri:s. This sai:ie team. Honshu. Ko)be Fort Def'ense Garrison.. K)be.. Ltd. but later more tho)rouh irspections le. The CWS Team composed . . Koyosed Factory.very of considerable information and iateriel.ed important items to the Teclhnicl Intelli ence Center. Kobe.. /Mitsui vV/areh:)use No.. Kobe.. Kobe. T/4 Alvin J. Sft Harvey J. arrivf" in K be. investigatin.xes... ty. T-ky' Tnvesti-7ation J.. Himeji. tye 94 substitute smoke candles b~xes . investij..' slipi-.olired smoke cndles c 30.l to the rec-.osed of Capt VWilliam C.Nati nal Bearinrg 'Works. Kobe.t . Hineji Cavalry School.. nclb.. Takarazuka.. 324. Fiel(d Unit Noo...%ancr'se Si!nal tar.. Kobe.lo:.-Sb.. and recoverec the follwing items in the quantities inlicated: 3 16 10 8 20 10 boxes . Himeji. Himeji. Japan...... Heavy Industries. with the exception of small hand tools located at the 4th Infontry Replacement Unit. Sanyo Chemicmal Factory.Co.-in Dur.. NTa:aoka Kuchus:ai Manufacturing Company.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE inventory of all Jy.. Incl 33).e 94 flbatijn? sroke cardles (B) boxes....-ated the Cavalry School durmp at IHimeji (Mai-.

although two showed signs of possible sabotage: the wires from the instrument panel had been torn out from one. a:raasaki.led 18 Earch 1945. and even the officials (apiarently) were not well informed as to where or how the sun and tanks were used. The Kobe Steel dorks ha. and ifc.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE the fabeication of steel and iron wipes and railroad rails. officer in char-e of the entire unit. although attempts w<cre made to keep up the tank and igun production. 4th Infantry Replacement Unit.erchant cargo ships of fron 850 to 6800 gross tons. It was thought that the tank mi Lht have been m:ade by Mitsubishi as the Kobe Steel Works were making the gun and shipping it to that firm. All work steptped on 5 July as the Feople would no longer go t) work for fear of being bombed. Reort on Himeji Cavalry School (Tanks) The same Ordnance Team investigated the Himeji Cavalry Tank School the proving ground at Himeji. who was interviewed and who acted as a GTuide thr-ugh the factory 'seemed very co-oerative and answered all questions that were askedJ?". It was bombed again on 5 June 1945 and severe damage was wrought.qpany.meplate that did not give complete information. first been bo:. Incl 33) where three tanks were found of a type different from any other recovered to that (late. The plant was -overnment controlled. to factory officials. All tanks were in fairly good condition. Wvith the initial impression that Kobe was completely ruined and that factory targets were nil. and a namieplate had been removed from another. Tao Kinzuko To-yo KK. 125 . but little damage was sustaincd by the tank and tank gun sections of the factory.. Seikosho KK. Reynolds. Sweet. The tanks had no gmeans of being identified other than by a nar. The Or-lnance Team was composed of Capt Nelson J. (piay. Koyo KK. Nichio Seiko KK. Sumitomo Zinzoku Seisakusho. Unruh. Jamles E. The plant mana:er. T/5 Richard E. Oriental Steamship Cot. :ccordin. Tokyo Electric Company. there was a shortage of steel. Further investigation led to an insiection of the Kobe Steel Works. Operations at the plant at the tine of report consisted of minor repaitrs on six r. Capt Sweet at first planned for the Ordnance Team to start 1 October insl ecting equipment turned in by the Japanese Army. but labor problems kept the production at low figure. Kobe Shipbuilding Plant. Other targets investigated by this team were: Osakokikoi.

forty percent destroyed...he 5amiiiunl. ic. :: T/S2. r'. tion n .rhotoiraphs were taken and wveie .tin A SO-second nachoriculI tinc f-cze wvr. composed D)f 1st Lt. h a . Ak .l..ab. i r... The plant was aboldt...rr Kobe Anti-.ceivers. thp...orler to ... 213I..rvi.l::: .. vln : l 436 runs.' tlhe o'. rt o-ri-d.-)n stored in a i...o1".. . ele+c la:ps andl other electrical a.nna.:)'fe _?f'o)l) C a :. .. anl. Bef-)re the outbreak :.r.was r.lnl u. Approximately O150 pE.ercial raiiri.: s t. approxiimately 107 were Jacan. was allowed to make only tlarine ralio sets. L Osaka 'ir Sti n in tho K be lo-t A-ency were invrstiratc.c .'arine radio sets. Jarecs W.ficl a crol -f ..'Li'cd wlthca t l.:ten.. Elkins.n -.(.ply to the Kobe area had been>sion G--2 to pick up the resporlsk-hle .]. -.i~.lI. uniti.. -.e 9: fuze. .)r lKf-bu a. u. ancg because there was no l:on-ur a demand for .rrLlf r availab1 was .±ierits aer..3 . " efences COapt S .ola-in .. typioet$ The plant had n t been in pro(cuction since 5 Jure 1. An inrventory of the buil lin.'. 8 ? 4 r'o. taui: and to 1Lv. bLark 7 cl..ities. I.r pletely :?emi:lishe.' .]_. susi-: Llte a 86r( r . which was attributable tl the fact th-at the water and.scovered in the ammuniti n ¢areh.erCehouse . any. iirat. investL.. .lre '.e -tanks in: ruinl n r..din..ts also di.Uoci..-*.rd..f hostil...t tAis fLz.. .lld. Report on Amxi':. A' arn . .t iL'ario JLa Conata_.z rt manunfactured in Toky~o in 195... 7 c .ese scho:l b-ys and( the rest were adults employed in the office as clerlcs .the tyr..)kI-D Electric Corniarny The Si: nal Team f Unit Ni>51..i .. experi.ti.a..u Ise.ed at the factory..i TECHNICAL. a subsi(ilary of General Electric of Now York. he rlai.ated the Tjkyo Electric Coli.HTSTURY O(. Durin. r. n..enced . in r1: . personne'-io rput h. by this Ordnance personnel..e ''' operated under strict goverrniient conrD)l and. s a3 eror. It.: the war.nn of the sc.arnle Off'..'l___ . . with the receiver buil.trs . Of these.. anc T/' Edrocnd E..ppliances.! and facilities in the rest of the plant heavily danmag'ed. 126 . IPTELIG 1YENCE cr5 n e '. d eo . .oc-.:..lm..:scluse.._ c r.illt i'. 6736 rourl:Is .n 1. 7 ci. /s aLa.c-. The T. in KO:be.n.l -: )eie L. electric: su .ople were em. the Kobe branch engaged in manufacture of comr.945.. b:'Imb aivurniti-n c.lly ht th:. i.> l.tion availil..t'(i-: !r:n..

del 1.MitsubishiCco. Sheroodl.. 127 .any had its office in Osaka. in Osaka City.The Him&-ji Ca·..ap. This team locatedl near Sakai (r. rea(dy for peacetime production Osaka Seisa Zoki KK. located in of 13-ton tractors and dleisel engines. Ltd.renad e.T-)5. a lar.lua. m:.:a-azinc Stored much ceutical Ind.portation agency for delivery of raw mraterials to mranufactur.icals. destroyed. irnsected the following S'-t G.n were'~ als.5 2 the third Technical lnJelligonce Unit attached 'j . 1st Lt J')hn E. lane: Incl 33). andi Fvt B. the f-tllain. KIubta Tekkosha KK.unition tlant..bout 90% of its area destroyedc by fire bombs. and Cpi Ralph Cn setrr. Nip-:on Seitetsu KK. Dulckett. a womlesale h-use in chemicals. . was lestroyed by air raid. Ltd.G.its factories in HokuThis crm. Miki & C!. Si-nal smoke canle. demolished beyond recornition by fire bombs. CJS an-munition was stred New Chemical ~i"arfare itemls which were recovered were: a. iiispectod by the '''e!-:ber 19L5 at Wakayi.. Incl 33) twenty-three carry all scrapers with a capacity of abult ei:ht cubic yarls. w ere wh lesale idealers in rphcnol dyes.targets: Oki Denki K. Eield Unit '. proceeded to I C -ris. and much at the Uenos'-ib. Chemical Waramnrunition.. I.l incendiary-candle. This ilant was a truas.L INTELLIUGENCE . Osaka City. Mark 27. Csaka ( r The Cheni al Warfare Team.S eqgi. type 1.e supply of steel on hand in the yards .K.ustries. composed of 1st Lt Victor Del Guercio... Harmls..ed n' chem!. At the Naruo Naval iiir Base. ha.alry School anl! the !th Replacement Unit of the Kobe D'fens2. tarcets: Nissh) & Co. t. Nipl_:on So:ida Comn. ilnsnectec the followin.. .ay'.. and some of these were new items° C4. anlcd id not hancdle cheidicals. 60 kg incendiary rocket bomb. Divlsi..Ddel 1.l. and a tear gas . iianufactured machinery. Yamada & Cz. were dealers in fond ani other essential materials for civilians.. but its plant was outside the Unit's area of operati'ns. type 3.HISTORY OF' TLCT1NICI. the Nankai Buildin-r.. weapons and armnunition. T/4 R-er W. Honsh. so-le Cheraical Jarfare itemis were found. Field Unit bin.f t ree col:ective protectors.r-cen '. Ltdl.a A:im. was in excellent cortlition. Ltd. Sekimuchi YKikai Seisakusho KK.cas-proof buildin c-'ntainin.5. and h-nd1l. chemicals. includrin? somle CheroiicaJl 'iarfarc equipment. fare equi!ment was l1'catec at Tezukaya!na Girls High School. n].prent was also fiomnd at the Takeda PharmaThe Kitajima iowider i. Enfincer Tea:m f rr the Unit.pany was a manufacturer of riku District in Northwc-st Honshu.

: -t_. c ncoal -tlhe mancufactlurarIs identity._' .d been 0ust withl nMw teai)'ons fn)nd by'.1 al.r su..lrumrr and mantefacturer' s rnark ir'urck raff pr!ssitb1' vh) .. : but was ec two telicf. -:c. r L' .aed on pe he nacife 'iooI hla.. . .ll in _afes Os. 'D ' .ncel rmiscir>. ' -t " L'-. o r.: sc and T/JA i ~"~ 3" .T t Jack ti. Daiiels.rm le . ¢!.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTFLLIGsENCE The SiniX! Tel. ....el'' . jiured v b for se t e! iva.i -I ' S.. .a. 121R. beon iii Tlk-o a. COki la.. rjw . which -r " 3 ?.xi (.e. a-...r 21 'E *J3 -er'rioe nro r -- (Ni -- L. Eiitil hrmy Trech.ox .s Iio:s2.t-. i'Dy b6 . ijji K.ur:.ce :'. 3rd 4 on paper.'. .-.7 air-Crovurd '-ais n rCadlo recc-ier. -ruic wire-laya<ij \er.uciniz _.' .: ) had it? flf u ie'¢ ..-. f-7upi.:...n .('.--... az .7fe S.9 e r. :'. Bierl :.r. ' . . . t-ne...:e't ' 1e.a: 'c~.-' ltL .. J?: 'Irr.ha¢.. 1-.csushita .C . Boyd 11. _. t.only.'e r rdk'kal -" il ':'.'Je 'i) . .a . and T/1.:.Ilse o. ..a. E possib1r Gerrian T¶auser type.. F. tc c-.r'..- -"-t c:nr .l n:arrE--ts.o i cn rille trank '.ull. r. -'". Ds :hd.:del cmpleted oI t'l.-'c 1L t-.t LesK' Tcar1r:. '<2 '. Ccp. o -s. r.e i:t tr. c.a :'re. Slph-: 7 crT rocket !-)u a~{..fcer I A .Un :'. Doll.VH.l rs..W i2tc-'Isf 13 c .7 ay'. .n.n ..^ lo w. lr 1 C :.tF'" Denki S.r-sl:'-rt-ave radio F7'S F Lavr rc-ce(.a Nr. i-_.. by anti. purpose gUn 3 ew. i-'. had b1rc l ' L : -inly lre l iJl.redeho:fti. -m Vic t. 01.. e. ' .ria. .. ike. ' . -It ed ueltd r . y .. .. :' .r ea .oclv 1it:s -:n -e. ond - ty'-pe 18 rL-p'. .atl. -...J -. . and a pcoi receive-r ...II ' a 0 a of th:e rr'. 'I ' t E.. 2 .ce sg va:lue. i li . TR- Denki K K 't L:. p1 a.nmical Intell-iu-'rl"..- .L -'-0 ..a.JT. v between thi a organiza. viL "f dalma.::l c./]i.. Fieldt TJn-ii.i ire-i. ''j-on ' lrC..n ag 0D' n.l'y '.. set used ie Ii .. -a . ..e.-it a'..-az crcf r.). Nipij:. ..)1 ' .r". f L ..±t ti .-1.l nine. -- -' ..)n.e pro . ed to lave .ie iri of ti. .J . : - roc. '/S'rt Frederick J. .ye1s -v.d -. 12 cer A'' dual.' " 14 by boinls -.ned trJ Eji-t iAirmy weIe -vhe follDwin Tenhnical Intelliyrence units (persmorlnei are nclu:dud n oerat s rter..

irmy Ordnance Arsenal Adrnir1istrative Headquarters. 4. equipment res. .on in char-ge of all Japanese Ordnance activities (in the Japanese 'rmy this included Engineer.IU (Navy)... of all stanldard items of equipnleCnt. and Ensign Gibson from .uits w-ith a mnan showing the location of branch '!qhen .. Expe:rimr-ntal Stati..te kyo. Signal Corps officer of Unit Y#53. ixporiOnta Station :'3 (Engino.ay.o-w....a. in Japanese.. 4 and No. . he also infcrmed them that depots under their control. tracked dovn assigned targets and during the course of this work encountered a nunber of new¢ installaticrns. and a list of the Experimental Stations or Prcving Grounds and their specialtics in the XI Corps area... 53.lcido Santilli..)ap).t tNo. XI Corps Un. personnel attending were: i!ajor Jaroslav V. The equ:ivalen.. Klimn. The trip to Kokubunjl was arrsa..t No.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE F3.· XI Corps Urit No.ental Sta.rters at Yoga in Tocal Corp)s w s a separ. 53 . 5. to the U. Experi- mental Station .. vwith Lt Gen Kan in charge. 129 .ged so that the he-ds of tilhe various departments iwere present hen the Technicicol Intelligence unit arriyed. .eseat.l]ation at KeO1bunji was also by this time under rigid guard by Americal Division troops. S. Col Matsumato supplied the ih. officer in charge of Unit i'53. The co:Ti-!le:te in:3tJ.': 5 gnral. borh assigned to XI Corps in the Tokyo area.jder the dir... officer in charge of UTnit #1..'..Fperi'nmntal StVation -1i (mlachine gunsj artillery.lapi Tnc]. lNho. The units established direct lia. c' .iolns. rocket and arlmunit'ion r1'eS:L'cl). U..arch). natriE . coolc:rated cisely vrrith each o'the-?r .. 1st It A. and Exp c-rimental Station No. XIV Corps Un.jor Jaroslav :. Signal and C)rdnance) vwas the A.Corps -was small enough so that it was run as a Staff" Section of Inoperial Headquarters.!r equipment rkesearch)..4 .ci instrzm:ltss).rie. Medigagency with its headcl?. Cat rtWlllard C. Ex)erim. 5154 .an troops occupied that area... 33) 12 Septenber 19-5.. who also served as officer in charge of Ordnance wrLth Unit No.XIV Corps Unit No. Chemical Warfare.eld Field FIlel d Field 7ield Uni.ison T'i th the Army Ordnance Administrativo Headquarters through a Japanese staff officer of their Technical De3partront. (.tions at Koi. Iz-1&'. which had be-n moved to warehouses at Ko!unbunji from Kogmnci whoen Ai-n .ection of Yia. From hini the units recuivred a list. At the Tolkyo Ordlance S'.. Quartcrmasctra.S.. 2 (fire control and ..:8(rma..unj i On 21 Scotember a trip vwas arranged to the Fxeorimnental Station at Kokubun-i... the nonle of the organizati. They arrived in Yoko1hama (.ocrly Depot. while the equivalent to the UiJS.. 1IC1 3D) inside vwhose walls there vaer five of the ten sta.X Field Unit No. 55 Corns C~.

ed br '. a tr. was !Fxperimnental Station No.-a. l types t of raw rI:.sid Gibson.i cf general e t..ima.tat'.atC.oi :J r. rockets.cnr . ammrunition).HISTORY OF TLCHMICAL INTEILIGENCE After a gene~rl instruction.( ens:'lls. ..un.::i...T :. :P.5 (Sinl.s-o).V:. little infor..r.tbat. 'ar bjy . &.a'ity Statii-n No. The . abolat . the o)r.a?i..A .einiminary interview was held th. guard until Tetiil c officer v'as . oe sent to interviR: . if deaiited information ._-.on about fungus . Curps) was vaisi^*d by Lt Santilli.arehousos were placed under e sLiples c. il:-..j K.-I jnvrstagaed i3 spe-..O bsn visitedl Station No. where nmny Ordnance items of Technical Intellirence interesr.rymal 75 .. arnd an officer from Station Nr). azrti. uld be taken. ape 3 A.iLr:tted by all personreo. Holloway.le-y..1 and meimers of his staff were interviewed.rrowth on lenri s and a few eaaLm-atrions of tihe Stations activities.2T :n 'LG 6.l L. For instz-nce..llehr.A %-1. affairs..e rnu a.e..l (machinery. rockers and (raw nateru.un (c. . The last placc examinel. Another I. t-'-ye lh recoJless guns iA 90 raim recoiless guns 75 riii hand r ocket lauIncher 90 r:m hanc' rnocket la.rc ?:esml ~ '.a .. and it was found that this statLon (id 'the basic research and design on small arms. hra.tion coul-d be obtarined.nmcher T'. 75 im'i tank gun) The M.... were found. Capt H:)ilovray Fre.M.. but not the free exchangc and Ei:..T1Tn-. Many new items of fire cn-:.nim: trie'Ae1d. Station No.i.. lw:.i ' .yy loc(lte.icbl. . but as.Maj Vli. v:.Mi~e-mi8rnhilce. observe i and the . 130 .~snic c'ierLL3stfry le)al. Inciujed were the following: 15 12 75 75 crm cm cm cm mun (no type had been set) A'A *rmn..2.nminiiona The a. some inforlnat.Us 57 mrm AT (anti. the following general infolrmation was obtained: Some liaison wa mafintained with the Germans.ssi or: th .3 was vi.oes.) was invres.e C..-" l:-'mce :-:fi' of ez-rran KYK.m88 mm gun.nt. the Japanesa tepe 9. In addition to specific data on various weapons..ctual prooffiringr was done at Fu!.. Calt.szir. eter sec) 75 'ii. ar .i'( wal. )r use by -Joe -. cf .'o c]ifi led pcrson. each officer separated from the Proup an. ' Technivcal 'n:K.ajor oi Koganei.m .s 'to .fsu (for rsmall arms) and Ichi prefecture.lli.. a'. and Ensign a scpalate report on %his Station. 7uns.y.. (fire control equipment a.'es v..

chnica.t. ":. ?.ward t'he . c :ivredi tjllu)b.:. bt vr'.r-v thbv did nct adopt thmrn.iaison S.(l:c. mo t i pmr.ti..ctur~ls a -rI..h -was a. ch v-..btain.1.:-ct nLs. S-:r. in Jnpancso the characteristics of all standard prcxeillenmt pwcders manufa:ctur_.ancse to turnl c''r to h m ccmplete.t. plus the German r) PAK hl.eau '. when they hC. T' i.:ith the drsicners rrngc.'TT :.annose e oqu:.t't. -rrnged th!te Arry OCrdnncne 'dvlinistr :ti-.fficers c. ".c rece::ivd charts sho. . ThroCu.arf-i.`s Ih-d b(een rijnrvC.. 2nd was at th'. t"-wc b. ison ir.-l J. T.r. orursuud rtil the GovI'Irn.. -'ient in vw' ch the U.e ' fri'"sheld. at that tU-ra Cih . blt was net. i rr' Il.:lntr.:ci :ls lcun r-s_ r.-a.t .. Ituch ir'.re! .cdif:iid bty the Jaaznese. 5 n direct conry of the T'i]' T' 1i8 Grim1r 8.m under devrclcpment.nd.rters.. S.rcduictien f .ed by the Japaneseo 131 . arrancrinents for thl.ont-tives to be csccrt<..t tirce u.l Tntcll..undare-l entol Ph-rs c'l 1 Rt.tcd I.o til4 .1 Ava.r) and Exm0ri-ri?..TORY OF j7''. .n Bur.t was uncuero: d.wring.ters tc disc s the IIistcry of s te 15 cm AL gun .-i cul] r Ja.. ccmplctcd 't " se:parate cf "1L it.U:tiLng be'twecen the vari.Ja... b1u .d to x.. .'e'l f Lthb r. C. He alo. .anise.. mv:dce their inv. c..nbn] tss 0..f Cenf. both t Olkub:.r lr'cllt.rir:mental . includiiq 7T m7 r-c i. ti.[f un.-iicl'n-t typos cf Ja._a. fo'lr Ordd'ne:nc.r.Is.nd Tcchln. ny -sta.n (f dvc].:. a-::ll t-.tih aly !:ar. di't n t..ite.ntal.rat-:ry.-Ajrcraft (cr:innd F ' lr(' -dc:a.. st n li. O . requir. ' Cnci ..Doe 'RicrClfiti a'rny.S nn srd .:s of h:is s ct-i n v " if c-nt-cts vrcr. PAR 3! CO( mmnl '.ws st'rtcd by the J.n.a attundod a meting at An-tJ.-cre-: lcc-.od frol tiv ½rnns Thl no7zlc dasign on roclCets ..'ls3:rcr r.'_->2 1ir.ret : . j I'[li .r. ." The ."d.1.n. rl-vwins.chl scrv. .-:stig-. gun. on thu )!O clm r _ckAt .:'y i-\tems cf nov: o'uinrmont wore discovered.S3 Ruscerch I ab-. II.rIs cf . as & TI'T1'.. a.nd ". wa.w frocm the experimental stitions aLt 'bhtr.ents -ore made for rr. St. the..d . C ls D'. ra:ult. War e. was established with n the v rcivs st-Lff crTr Co c..mns cf oei.xre:.earch Jabrortcrrr). -red PAR hO 7( mTi' 7un.-v/ Gcrm .':r. t 1T .sl<kd -.aticn.-.hcn ^. L .cilities. models of new trne -t'm Su' s.rber.nd ..-rls or:ainu .rtr cjlt 'ws _n'terfost2e. 12th .r the control cf JT:n... .nece Tvrelfth Army t ..p . I rlmr-::cket launchers. In gliral1.Army to ascertain the lccA'ti. lable standa-rd items and dr.'.rii3p.ti-n ''6 (C. G-2 4HO (AFi'C). lu.e./. frim tho Tchnical Int.cticn. ..igcncc interest in the nr. rose-irch o.' Ilnt .' ozin!.t: rn(. c". Lt Ccl Tait.elligence Units and frrlm the J.u . ile::]e prints on this gun and.tiocn 117 (F.-vr.:Ks -rlns.:: . . r-.13 ccni3d *rom a gun captured in China "nd wrls nl(t c.:i..ri 011. .T HI.b)aw iw further the f.t th tt.'cnt cf T. and recoill mneclhlanisms for 7?5 mrn WK. The Ja't:!n.Lus cff c .rC ]heomica-rl and 'j .i.

:awa. Ka'wesaki).shi Yoko:suka }Na val Arsenal rL. 30 AA rr..l arrms and cm rmnition. Tokyo A rsrnal iN). er .phto cheimicals t FVl - a. -fuzes. Inteii.'raw) Kaiagawa).s collected . To-kyo Shibawva (forrierly L'atsuda): (Kanara. lar :e Ulai'. Tokyo Arsenal No.:'S Intelligence.aterial auJnunition.-once -. this was the install]atl:. searchli:ht. l:. Incl 33).Japan Broad1castin7 Company: vievved but little information secured. irector inter- L&Lbo)rat.n latr t'ki. manufacL'.f' Itabaz.. Sumitomo Commnrunication C'cm)pny (TTamaawa..ry.2: explosives.sta..ll+ti -ns Investi .rscnal- sall.-ieYnc untis with XI CDri.A C.ntcrest r'-cover-edj Jyuja Or nance diareh:)use: no equinient of st-'r_: l amrunition.thiir! . in Urawa (Lap. Kawasaki).ns with af. t .roa6. IeJ.ry.iay Che. UJIiv!. Oji Factory -.LIGENCE Other imnpFrtant fcr C. :l:.areh:use: Itabashi i..2: c2. Fact .nstriction r. reco!vereId..J!ISTORY OF TECHI TICfL IN'EI.n wver as the TechnicalIntellieali e Center. Korakuen Stailuu'l: o-n th.ll:Jir r installations which they inves.. rec.lical Sarfare Scho)-l Teluvisior (NTarash:..a. . Gas mask factory in To-kyo: Tokyo . Warehouses.K 'j i:hysics Dc. Fuji Communicatim)n Corp1any ( l. OJiku Aikrabane iArrrmy Cli.m rnt. Tokyo Shibaura e(l1atsudca): ra'io tules (Kana. Kanaa..rsnal '...-iain . to clothing marnufacture.. etc.t-o:.'te' The )WTTei c2:.nv(crted. all Quartermaster supplies. Imperial Guard Grmunds. 1: pr : luce amr.unitin. -f ecujipr-nt at the f£. Konishi Ph:.'sity of T'kio. cfre8·~i1 hr /0 °.r-c aerial camaeras .mruniti n.

gafuchi Tractor Msrnufacturin. Tokyo l. Jmohair. Sanyo Machinery C. Knle. rmarufacture I dluc!?.-:ratin.r. pistols and 12. . rt.: Toakiki MTachinery Co. loading stati)n for lan-rl inos and artillery ammunition. in prdlucti)n. plaster. cril'. o. FS smoke generat rs. lumber.: -lant in Soka: manufacturel 90 h.ny: Akamnatsu Wed1 Co.'.l brushing manufacturing.lored half-track manufacturing plant. Tokyo Tanabe Iharmaceutical Co.: Shimada Aluminuml Co pa.. bronBe alloys. caterpillar tractors.). C . lubricantsj electrical sup:. Storate area near Soka (Mlap.. lpaer marmnfacturin-.. mines. It' sh . refininj.'ayeda Heavy 2?acYhicrr floats.atanabe :Sebtai Co.: L t extensive sur.. not operating. Toku..lies of explosives.: Tokyo Mletal Refining Ce.iln [to I:aint an.ILISTORY OF TECHINIC L INTELLIG(ENCE Hino ilrrorel Car CI. type 94.shiboschin: bearin. Lt. air-frames and. scrap. Incl 33): fr bar steel." Lacqu. Tama Gun Pow.veeiing L. Dai Nilmpiin Bicycle Co.s.3er F' vitamin manufacturing. brass.plies. 133 . Navy 40 k. Tana Suipply Offire: comprised ap-:roximately 100 builcdings.: }.: airplane -as tanks. Co.7rmn type 1 aircraft Thuoko Gyo Cs.r. automotive parts.-r C.: neiw type arm. 8rir.p. -aint. floats..: Nippin Airp'lanto Fact-)ry: nrit operating..)F: turret lathes. L: which ap lroximately 100 were in the assembly 4gachine iuns.ry: n't o.

t je .'ipj Incl 33).hl.f cl'thin.: . n zh..ver by 42nc Geniral Hospital V!aval Medical C 11oee:.f Chofu Air Strip: nleu items . Chigoski Radar Installations: S:ina-. .. 134 . lti Tokyo irmxy Airfield: Sur)ply Hqs.~a. Great Japan Fcrtili-cr C ): vit.thin.i.ine-d Oaganese NIaval officers: o-er-ated Naval l:.r Suijly r cquC:i pmalnt as we lIl as sosin Crcdnarlc equipment. Tokyo Su 3 liarr honsecs #23. Sonniko Te:el Co. ]..'_-.. mretc:}r :loi.' dyes.ine. %11Wes4. > Un i.y of Engineer En.-luCed.O0..ildns.. '".. la r±zt.Jy j'/. Imperial Institute of Infectious"Disease3s . con'iensedl fe.. and iLi.: dry batteries . inventory ficial. papers translated.CHI'1NCAL.suP.ustar. large amounts of p-rD.HISTORY OF T.-.technics.u L. Ichinoiiiya Gas Factory: r.. Bagani Arsenal: OrInance equipment. now Ordnanc'e equipment. Yvas malde ly a :.' JtaS -as bombs. St. I!NT1EThLLICENCE Narimasu 'irfi el: cl . rese-arch conducted. qulnti--. E. Koza Su'pnly Dump: Or !nance items.:uti ~lwtsiar Gv ri). Puirii S' nr: pills.l .. Luke's Hrspital: taken -. containel special purjose veh-:.ical College.J -~.000 in 194b. ~sted . ate be0 sent t) :. Matsushita Dry Battery C0.F ChiLa:.S. civilian.. smlall tools. blastinr caps.ry Naval Hospital: invent Showa Tsen Hospital: taken.::iC.'1CJ . Tokyo Chanty Hosl-itJ. tra.. hal gpas -rotected equipment. explosives.cle.L.

. of the followinr: limo-nitr)-?enf calcium carbide. few supplies secured. nolJ. -)me nwr ammunition frunc.. ts. Incl 33): considerable quantity of neaw En-ineer equipment. entry into Jas n. of nruch technical interest from powder analysis stal diJ.hllly an(t systematically d!estroyed by thl( Jlys.l ?..: Kawasaki: Kan:se: parent compary of a syndicate consisting YarnUfacture2ls of sulfate of ammonia. !: su:'IlvY )if Siftnnal equipment including some now . projectiles. ArLr: nal: 1 f' ur.arfare rCscarch.hotoch<. MIatsushita 'ry Battery C. Hiratsuka IJava. c( Hq.IISTORY' OF TE'C{IIHITCL INTELLIGCENCE Fvuttsu ! rsrenal: q!lii. Unit su-reste. k r rm an ' small quantities of prrintinrt papur and bullk ill'redionts frr -.iap.S. in-t. Lt. Okuba: .-ineer) Scho-. Chemical Seventh Lilitary Laboratory.o'. -f silver bullion.t Yatsudo (T.s-urmlmry: DI' projects ldl.)nia. all precision instruncnts and rec-!rds dispCseIL of before U. Sixth Mlilitary Laboratory.ation be iaade of a considerable quantity. an civilian use (reconverted). TI. Army Meodical Suppl. Nippin Gun Lvvrler C . ?. {7as bombs.ertaken (translation by GHQ) socu. f-)rwar:led to Naval authorities. docurment on un.un!ler (unarmel ) Jaanese Tuarcls. liquid amr:. -Csaka Factory: prjoducing flashlight batteries. inoperative.teOvlo(l.r. information scur.. but c:ul:.42. Japoanese liceno:r (En.l Tro-!uce qulito a nIm. Okuba: fundiamental physical research. docu ents of this equipment. foil and wires in safe..ber of other types. Vitamin Factory: mostly burne(:.l:ent was thorou. at Yo-:ca: obltaine' information on' GI::'mims.: f:ru-s f:.dcac. platinur. nitric acid. Kokabunji lPrn. Showa-Fertilizer Co.:i o-jn hOmm rocket with built-in granpc selectnr.crvater bar es for transpolrtin7 munitions and fuel translated anr.

potassium chl-:ricle. 4.. d.. 11.i p .. e./3 Jaires 'V.All prsonlnel of Field Unit I:1. or office papers could be found (in one. mr)nvced in qrd took the place 'irranenments were intact.use ssace ac' bee(n l']e (The Technical Intelli. solium cyanid.'-a:.a: O:iachi: Kitak. Ellyette. fone-ci.koham. lben they obtained a lead from a Jap tent fPull i' -En. K)um[ . at Matsudo (.1. ~. EnAL. plus various autoiotive equip- ff.ecisicn as t-·) wareth.ets and mriarke i-e as of Technicil Intelinvesti ated no Then the tarrets were first lirence intere-st.pient -was roved. i.. secured a il the two Enri.neer Team. t Yokohan..o made with the officer in c¢har!-e for *che Japanese to inventory the and.vs. .n¢lcr lieutenant -ecner'i wh-*hch led the t+. equlmenll. NTo.. -lur. rt.f _' .idnum. oir- 1...atsluTrtc:: elc ctral]ytic irin Y. and after imich scrambling. potassium nitrate. caustic soda. No. acid.powder factory 136 .J scre<7ned' equipr.:t arrive until later). anoLlysiso nlinc-r schn-cl is Seize-I Jaanlese jrry n Within a wreFlek after 'lan-1ndin. 53 anrI.t.nerer Team .eals to the Japanese Arry lEnglneer School (their Fort Beivoei-r)..a.~'ap~ Incl 33) about fifteen miles N..HIeLSTORY OF TECT. fene-e-all. comxipiete with personnel and equipmen'.h -the .ICAL INTELLIGENCE O!citsu: Tateyaliwa: Hirt: Shiojlr-i: Chichilbu.n.!s o. andu nine -f tne heavier equi. a:luii1 nm aluJina.ent.ence Depot did n. Toyarla: alll-in Su. At that ti-ne it was estirated that appr 'citmately six --.'ys. and T/3 Elsworth P.f Unit.I.i artificial graphite.a. and Units NJoc 1-.e.r T.dctdd from the above-listed tar. T.wi. ¢otter.exception that no precisicn instruments.±uic -rahite electrles.. Paris. aluriilun.. E.)ta3s:lJm chl-rate. 'ton truck I£< a!ls of srrioll ment were re. il ite.. of Tolryo1st Lt Clinton 0.tissium chlloride.. blue pri:ts..roe.

.-l ru.!irnan by the 5250th Technical " te 15 iil.torch -)f sc-. anCd the two enlisteo men hauen d othFr Ern ineer iteizs fromn Chiha irto the School where all En-ineer equipTnent was st. 1st Lt John B.frsenal. Is Rocoverec The lelm TtSiical "f Unit Lo. mei:. l Usirn t.aj r Charles Engineer Analysis Suctir\n at the TI. follwinri articles wvere forar. Cait :i. fcr injection. 53.m 1s were burLle ).LIGENCE nthe pile of ashes where their a Japarncse ca-tajn showed the ta. Liudlimran and . t:. containing hi:h percentage of 'cepharanthin phania Cepha rantha"..Ust 1945. 1500 tabletseach containing 0OJ.I. -:f -r'hI ri. Center.. Cpharanthin. By that time all subnitt. .c.Intelli: cnce Cr.n and were mcrmb.k-/o Institute for Infections Diseases. 52S0th Technical Intelli.:ence Company... anrd T/3 Jenkins..h.ed by air to the >edeical Analysis Section. reLi rtel' an inlt.-pzany.4 efcre the end of October 1 t!sn ?n rner ui.chkj. Cre TubuerculDrsis.'a]. Geron. Jr. erniinj shippini instructions ' from the 525Sth.een riorte' efiective in -this cdisease (tuber- culosis).. .y Technical Intelli-ence Depot arrived E' ir-st.fficer in char--e -if the in To1ky·r. T/3 Charles .mr.ims.. ITh.e It. Jerkirs.. re .4evel:t.ud-._r.ratin -. ".r.1w.'. a lar-e quan-tity of equipmnent was I-tcc i..llarc CO Hi_'_l oway. each containin. 'Cepharrarntthine t hac a Special instructions issued to Lt . read1 'A drug called 1. moved the equilrment col]. C. rmy.. T:.-ky. After the Unit :i States Arr.. This prelirmnairy inrvesti-atiorn was relative to cepharanthin. i:cilt1kies available at the School.'ers i:(r shi rent to the Uriitedl Stats for (ischarge from the .rment recovered..r ce l. Lore. 2. 1. anrl Pfc Philip Zarahn.iblcd recorat the . . 137 .l. "Cepharanthin" "Cepharanthin". O.iiy ivisi'.. by Lt.e Ist awaitin.HISTORY OF TECiiNICAL IWTE. Japanese. sipecific ic forration is needei on this subject". . 10 -rams crystcalline alkaloids..f Ja~aiiese medical T/5 iNorm n T. Lt Fotter and his team en *arcA( :n res.' m:.bels of En--ine-r Ca.ecte-1 to tole T. total alkaloi'ds from "Ste-.k ovcr. u( d miran 1.)nnel ccnnected wvith the T: . Druul ui:os . 100 ampules..o pers.toac .. ..

L sur-·on--captain.0.. .~' '"us"l on. in J .sy .atoly ten Japanese civilian Lt merit.5:. 100 a. favoirLabls.l..roxi. by Shbuji iinsse-?wLLa. l ·. Larg.e : One article. Iowuver.HTMTO`2'Y' 01V' TI'Cl.rainst Tuoer'.. in Japanese 8.le Tl:. WEne nf these items ha!.these4 . 3 -yrCos. Ichikawa. 3 axes. :Si. -'u.'ntainin.:m Japanese Navy Medical ofLicers. tuberculosis Japajese. been PreviOusly reported bky Medical Technical . . h-sicians in . hDrein to estimate its i udldirnan reTop-rte .an an! '[T/5 :rer. in Japanese. fravorable results in use of cepnarrllithin arrainst .'.' u. results in the use :)f Ci. 9. (nAe zti caes. r 6. entitled "Eyper4 r:jlci:+: ... injoct2.. in German. each c:. i92ta . the team is listed' below. field .ical College.2. on the . also reported on the "'Sta. entitled.cing. it is of -reat ilorptanc: completely imipractical and no attemLrAt is The pres dent of thu Naval MIT.i Cli:.haranthin a.l at the ilaval ilelidicai C lla-e. . soime bU!lievio. 7. i. . and w'l. . Chugh". Tohyo. 'Jtaval `..ic] SL'r.. t .'L2. ':It Ccl::haranthirn has the properties some clai:: f'r it.y cf Cephararithin'' .. r.Ct'." divi. opinion was sharply . One v-liu .. 13 c reortin3.. .e Quantities of Ielical Equipment Rec.:lical Co±. . i. reijortin:. by Sillji Hasse'-ara..tutc for Chcurmtb:repy. and!D mental Insti. fr.:vc-red Jaj-anese equipment recovered b'. "Cepharanthin" for 5. th.led.)hI ranthin a. aund his tuberculosis consultant 'vero inlterviewed by the Medical Teat of Unit No.L IITVTL:T. in J apar. Onr article.ulinrry Technical Intellli-ence Team NoJ. This information was obtained.apnese One i. Tokyo. Tokyr.iI ons. a profess )r at the Imperial the r'ircct-r of the FundaP'ioneer in the research consultant fo)r the 1 Lt kud ' .:n intervicwed Institute 'If Infectious -isease. 3. rinst whoopin7 couzh. iC3 on C:.dlard I-'rocedure in the Japoanese Navy for Treatmlont of Gonorrhea and Syphilis"'.. an! a-.LINTNCF .m.. repcrtin-' favorable ruesllts in the use of cep-haraulhin azainst asthma.r.inaiysis is ar.

±for use with fluor-:scope..sper-nsjin ciolir iri chest Ozor-le ienertor Electr ... 1 ....c -f.. ite)rs wore in servicea'le condition. .ablut t. in case Blo-i.rT. 1%¢r. C. ty of n3'r.(n lassrs.!lr.ih st .'.i the te. in casc..rtr t.%crsc fo" Lunl capacity retcr ..ipet .ic chest ."s aar:i er -7.l~' . 'a wter co)ntainer rarachute f ~r ab-..f L". fo:r use with fluor'scope. with case ijly :raih.l.. nm acdi'..'_St. ..s o iakex . in cniest i7-r'r-o.meter."7 '3 . lecitz net type ilcr(. not yet been inventoried at the tir:e of -.-. m .i. .F.s .c~dror.e'iciflles 3s .a tal' Gas P . 'Army 2 c t:. 3.'nec 2 c.itioalw2 cuamiti:.hute (suli li-s) Iuo-r:.e same number of itens -. and consolidating selected items of Japanese equipment 139 . cnerZca_.was. str._n'th tester.era barmboo litter i-.dri alred ..r-drp para.i.' kt-it .¥ cte ibn ].'. arnl catory le ti.L' . fHyi po 'err.l hr. c-se IH.r rrp' :r': a.issorte1 t s ?l .at ha. .-. w'') Reservoir for storiacrh -ui-o7 Ear and n. eoul. l.sclpDe for ilse with 3'5 zri car.?se '--it.!e. r case..tter set .n rz..entirce -:crid) the latter half of Octobelr was spent by :f members of both Units No.T iTST oTlR OF 'ITIrrCAT IFf TELLI GENCE 'P Intel!i erjcF.~sJ i*. arranging to be evacuated.rr: kit r ss Indlirect blood triansfusion set Di.1 rX m..n ...s issorteO scientific paers The..i .ur e.&ras. L and NiJo 5[3 in evacuating..3 a. stcriJiz'er.{.? mei~.. type unilite:-.3 . Navy Over 100 nev c. wvrith case Eye chart case St'r r. .aliras.'.. scoIr..o..s::.

. (Lia 1 p.r thie folo. SC Pfc i-iiillf Zarahn) CE Field UniLts p an No:. 54.E N(.nter effict ive . CE 'r T. CE T/'5 Fralnk E. CE 1st Lt Nicholas Twvmsan. w Lhre equ. Ja.t :.i efnd~ of Oct-l-). 54S and No. Rlchiter. T/.-:o wvrere equi-iruent was '.urtt 1[. Akabane .C. T'lese places vwere: the Cherj. Tuehn..l:lc.h XUh7 oF vTEC['Lq[.lsl-lu.!vre1 t' i. Gonzales..'enee v arc oiouse at Ist Cacvalry D`ivisi :n ( .J Xa.:lt-. otj recently establz 's. Davidson. rr: ' ~. : Cazt GeCorg-ce I Ford.2 of T'echnical Inte2lli -enee value. (Ma~p. by . Jr. >. Par-is CE oi.)r close c:)ntrol and r.ledr tlj:.C e.lI.rera:redCl f: r shiieenat by -nhe E-ih'th A.rry Cherlmical uf:f:].rps HUcduarteri.:t fdrillard CWS i fc Juan O. Bovarlrl.C Field Unit N. Sgt V. .i kyo 3) y Ye)'t. T:.'illiam N.. investi:. Ord 1st Lt Francis K.: 5 with XIV Corps Techrlic1l Intell. Q.Sch-:l . Cureton. 'we!.-t Lt Clintern 0.'Iri'are Scho ) at NtTra-.uarering to help preoecnu prerrmture (offi7cial:ly -rdered) dest. CiS S/Jrt K. T/'3 Eiw SWl-th -. area.ated the Army and Navy Arsenals at 1J40 .cfnck Fiel. Browmn. and both units operated H out of that area in the encuingr mont. h! and 3] la haen iaede available on the poirnt syctem and had either left or were atbout to dei art for the United States: Field Unit 4N:. 2d Lt Robert Ao iorltius..t ns ]'-ni. /T/..H. i.. Incl 33).ipr.nt was bc -n' rn m.>.iimunition Depot. Honslh't. H )1ll.raY. Q.2 Uni'ts ho. Incl 33). Q otter. CI¢S Team No.i.:es . officers and enlisted men he from the tvo fielrl liruln . c.--uc:.elli r '.he. SC Ca-t K ennel H.hs. t :isnktai. Htadquarters moved on the 1-7th. Pfc Carl C. nio. n..i'... 53!. Ellyett'.5 were on temporary duty to 7i-V C .i-.ile En 'ir. 16 anrd l'7 Setem i:er l-. Switzer. Ln-te ].": 2INELL'. wh ich landed at Shiogama.:. These were collected in various central 4 o.C I.iC. L d s ." :.ical .o.It Fta.


ScprlJai, Liut f':cAln- nui_;lr nr, Ci'.S acil -1'iit aciid Fe.l:.Jj I'
and the :xjL; ;.":I '+1 a>:Le trerW tm .'r , nc,ed ,,a~s r n 3,' rathelr thi2: f 1 Cl.icU .,. f disI:ant:ll


Thle N-rt-J Arsenal had an ti of which had been

1e e(l



Both Ars4enals

.ivi. a ]s._i o.f tvhe main Or'namnc 'ui p's s(.
n-_ ,


2rd Lt l,'rk r1:
La, N',vy S.2s Or Lockri,'

, .'




and Pce Frank


e 1-ip:.ent,

.z ated both Army and

s ;:1L -,"t -a:'ia .a

Iu-t .f.. r4 n.

1st Lit Henmy L. A^bh"ti-t.; 's/i Gerald C, whl.n t-heN j.nsoect.l -Che L't:ajo f Ci;.r'leos it, Tal.erle,l f:-, Navy ':rsc'na a-t l'i %"..... f und the pr':;cti -,n was 20C-i,ml shells, ty· 99 2Mr. air'raf't. cann 'n, t l 13 .y.e 8¢ir-raft El cxicle 7.17n.m r-st of the a.ix I a-rh:;ch-,, flarcs, b,)rs .-lry -rrns, incn raachirin nachliryr f r theo l'l.rt ha,] bc::n r:iovnod under -round. TUp)n,:-ctic,; f the Sendai. Pranch ':f Tonk-o Arsenal, they foun)l ' f the ,.lint isASi e h een 2'.-m 'r .amr..tmiti.-; n nd fue w iti po1rder s.lie ,c;-in fron )ther sD7uces. A few t) a::s of a.n Ltit,n ,hured h ion. iu r se-:-ral r-)una's ol type 90 $Sk1r and t-" 1 _e f',cs iW0 f'J- uhese shells° h.e tam3 also i uniri f : ur ty, e 2 rrii CA- re -sr ((lirecto-!rs) different fror;. thte tyTrc? 2 Navy AiiA pruv.oeusly rec,veredo These that c -;.iti:n, wi-ch tc-.t; now unCes packed0 fnr shipwere fourt. wcr: irn :,:'!

Tlo .h'.i. Tln!cee


cent, anc' tle
_5 aJ.rc..: afreo

tlh,r tw-) strippet( of


arfie'id o.uI fwast of Senda.i, Orldnance Te.nJ No. 18 :Iercv y ca99 3ir-1 dua; l d.urio;se, pedres tal mou-nt, anmti-enL,, ' in i.-an',-t cauri,,n u V 9 51i v9i!r5 . was believed. that severaJ_ oi t'l. U ere. ,s rceir,terl i.n ,hu S1,ut,1ieltl htiil i-pine iFsl:7nds C.... ,, 1 L., ', ci ''.,'cn dc'stryCidt ft+ the s a.;,.e ai-rfeld they also ,-c) k aK -.. X:L abui? 1)00) r 'n1rms of r,;oGe 100, 68.rm, aru..unitia n and . a-hW orm(DLcalttYl ,c; fmuLes tyjJc' 100C rT;Loch, irNLCa.C.1 +tj.e,AA.
The l:S t f.gN Cays- i,. Oct 1:,er this csamor team .inspected. stock piles c C,: 1 Ctut! Jqarls L O)''c-e. ;,d dertem!nI f If thiere were any ec;i.e1'i, ,'f TntlA'!.-rence alu ai; ;_ fao.lwi'ng points. h Ya] .. n.<L .. .:a, la.ata. A. kij, .n. ( ,_a /'ri In. 33). m

At an unuse-i

3 - HIa 40L',
Wl,,s st ,r-e]

5ml aircrf't cannon. This itemr at. 11th i.irb. orne Diviesion

.Vrt l erY- ACita, uni:nr the cn-rfol of, the S-L.'mtii Jdi.spo:szti. cn was given by -the r52tOth., due to arrive in Japan shortly.



1 - tye 3(), caliber 6._5mr rifle 1 - type 30, caii.ber 6.5nmi Cihbine 1 - 22 year type, c.lLber 7.,7;nrm rifle t t. enl( f Oct.)ber, .,kita irefecture had comm BY that '-,d the dostrucpla.tecl the: c 11ccti ml 'f .ll Ja'p,I-anese ee-.: ,iIenr. . .t.h.e ccl _tion "' c :-a . rc.fec ture timn ;f ar,mreuriiti -i.l iwat }. 1 a^ zrt--:itlon ].0 riby; N;ize;,ber :-'f rll Ja:! a lncse .:ilent, elq . ar.e j eiJ ,3s ' ent at sea: Yai af'-,ta i r:i'ct-;ure haCG cll duwIln:! iadJ been star'ted on in thrce citiess -'n' .is-slition c oll-catcar.mlun: ti - ri The Si neal Toarm, 2.r L-.t Leslie R. I,'1Uich..mpD5 Jr,, S/Sgt Ll yl K. Pu.'hbrs; S/Szt R-thert A' T r'ictc.r, als) investigated the Naval "rs:n ll .lt Shio ,:a. ani! the Aiir.y Arsn.mal at SMn.-'ai, but foun 1 n : - -n:A!l equirlient, UTrn checkinil the r:-vernnent--o'wned raqio. statirin, JXQ, SonIai, they i :-un`' equij:ment '.f corinercial manufacture, but n,) ne.w develDpi; nts were nc:te.' Equiimeort tolnd an' repsorts m-ere submitted o)n the Japcn Electric C>), Sl(nlai: tht Airf.rcc. rrA.. i. station near JirrimnacT.hi; .n a ra.i1: instal. t:i.l .n the island -f Kinkzza;l and the Naval fix&ed st.ti )n Ti[;iiE, n>ar 2O1o Technical Intel][i;-trnce Unit NoD 5 Tcchinical lntclligence Unit ine. 5 also larde. with HeadquarShortly after they arrived ters 1lV C. r-Ls ;-an rmve- on t. Sendale Ca&,t Ber,,l L, LIght, officer in ch rc.7 rof the Unit, returned to tht 'lUJitcu, States on the ( systenr and ist Lt ferry L, White The tw:ar rlisted men, S/S,-:t G1::nn Lo I-iau,en andt T/4 t.!k )verr, Will:i;-a J, Sau(or, the balance -..f the Si.nal that Capt LiP2ht ! has heae.e,, 3wNrc then tri;slerre for terp ..rary luty t. the 11th t a2ssist Airb:)rne DrLsi. n, XTV Cor:'s, wvhere they were -rcl7rer in co.lectin- _.ndi destr~yinT JapI:anese equipment 0 T/L Euvene 7rf. Fields, The Enn 4inefr Tear: (Lt Ferry L, 'hite, Ffc Hen:ry werte Ied by thu X.V Csr-s Engineer Section to look for and make roe-orts on the location of iingj.neer construcInvc:stigatcion of a pontoon bridge dump at Iaition mat(.rials, Honshu, revealed that minat rials weLr+: used for an Engineer yachi, School anld were in poor conditiono Tnvestigation of the dump of Tollolu 129th Cors, Sendai, was made, but niatorials had been used for training iurposcs, and no n,,w itemas wlere discovered, By Novemnber, ].fc Carson had been relieved of assignment with the te-amr.



The COE'S Taram (2d Lt John A, Wagner, Ivt 'illi " imrocirl-) recoverc4,: cqui.Fm1it Unit anmd thc 2dt C'.airy Iei.mel t bivol'ac re-ports on t,,r:i.r i'nlitngs. Invustag tl.s S"ndai arca, ovr resulted in no P,;'

Syt Lovere D. Brormn, in thu 1224 Irlnantiy aes:i, =lcd sh)bm.tbed tr unis in the Ii:..C;

Af'ter 'Ct.ln- '.,S dcSaOSiot.nlJn tCAi. .sittiL l;-i..-'J.rborne rjvi.sion in th,:! ;gLL;Cle of 3Cetobcr, th(, t: am irc:','est: .J - tl:e -rno-Ldy.a ,t Navarl Arsenal ana rocover:el it..s oI' Th'.'C; Tci:e.iJi=aeric- value froi, this arsenal and t'rom Shi:a.os'hizu Ci:i';D. _.i'rfield, These includeld: 4 Na-ry e oerimental tyeo #3 chlorine gas macks (16th ?!car model) 8 portable gas chamber tents 3 flame throrTer tanks, S-gun model gLas 3sr..yers (trackd trailer) By 10 Nov:-mber all members of thi s team, had been relieved of teaporary duty to rturn to their. pro-;er statior. Targ ets investi.-lt, 1Iby- the ' c.,dical Team) lst. Lt Harold .. , Jones and l fc Clifford E, Hiarralson, L.nluJ.eK; Japanese 2d Cavalry ReI-iment bi.vouac "area Ser:.di, th- Seri;:i Branch D.-pot n (V"ediical) at ITanakita, Army Hospjital #2 at 1Latsuda (iviyagiken), and the Yv.oac.t- .+ Ar.:y 'H-osp,ital at Yam.gata. Ordinnce equinient ol' Int, .ligcnce interest was identified T and sejregatud by the Or.inmance 'eam (lst Lt Kenneth L. (fardcrn , Jr,, T/' John R. Siallfwoos, i-fc Andren Nadas) working in con juattion with the 357th Orcl D.pot Co, at the installeations: Sc:nldai ArmvI Arsenal, Nawival Arsenal at Shoog3ama and Matsushima, Awmm.nitioll Dhmv?, YanLagata .lectrcoheaical Co, and the area o:1' thu 105th Regiliecnt a.t Fukushima (Iap Incl 33). New itenms recovered: 12, 7:Lrm ; e.x]losivwvc roul.i for Browning type gun 20) mi r., E, rou,'i for Ho 5 cannon : 201nm rr'Icticc round for tyipe 98 and 99 guns t: e 98 fuze for instantrneous or short delay action 70-mlrm. rockect launcher lig~ht 1:ersonnel ca.rier accommodating eight persons


-which wras liste-l in the target folder as at T1naklodatet (Yaap. .so Teai. osen) was placed m)n ter 2)orary duty to the Chief Ordzianc. Saip. resulte. 3/ re tL:y investigated two armrnr:ics anld lllD(.orte.4 Kapp.n the iollowin. t sut nc new cquii:imcnt wri. 33) O.LI(ENCE Unit No.proiessor at ETa1kroda--e ColEkgt.1 Infantry Regi men't in Hir!aklre illp Inci 3:-. 3.allce t'ei o.) 3..: i.::la-t.I.oc ...nvesi:. would be an authority on chemical plults of military sirnific. The CYS Tearm (1st Lt John 1.1 t . C1i BEuster B ntley)jenroute to lokkaiclo abcar-: the USS La . i:fc iorton HI. IX Cor.A recheck by members Lt K-ap cnntaote 1 a 1 ethc.rimarily an mvrmunition dump. Pfc 7vil- lianal -I Kcnn:!Oy'1 was ~t. anrd according to War DeTpartment research° The tea: l t1:ndoi nd set u..Taaan Iron Smnd In) C).s.. Linstedt.r knrwn st-.1T. 2:.. . viji'sT.:i. (lst It Ci..i"m The ilStLJ.:.cLn Beach. -was rtoF. the '.yoro. S. encountere&. Ao. Swain. INT!. 2.-r anJthur Ord!lance Team of Unit No. IX Cor.rsion f Or.s reported to the tear. by the 77th iiiafanry Division... After arrivwl Lt Sai.r: .2."ter the .3) This ce.o with Headquar-ters IX Coris.. · nd landed % witht them. b'out in Honhu of the To Io tear. S'. an-d tth..HIISTORY O? T>'.nt to inspect a'mmuni tion of which disposition was being qlaIlU Ecarly in Oct))ob.. Incl 33).ck.list mrinister who told him that a . n I-!. sent a wire to 7?th i-risioon to guard Nipp. Tney also reportedl toi..etTmber they relported to the 323rd Infaritry 1heg. T/4 John L 0 Mooney..rap Incl. S'loo. 6 Oct).) 55 was l. Hokkaid.aeJ on temporary duty with Heariqplarters.ent where Lh-iy i.T:ny was a number one priority rati.of arms.:ritc i'. Lr.G:r-.r. for insieecti. Ifc nQ al .1.J. 55 (Caopt Wvalter E..ZCHV!TC. ILokkcaido (/ar. or:el to t 32 .ers indccated that the Npp:on Sola c-).:. fL'c Ben T. -..rLc's E. 55 with IX Corps Durini Se tentber the OrInance vhe'c to bhe P11st .rea wmrerŽ an as standlarl.r. nanmce dump.ibbrI oI. 'rcviours investigation by the Divit1lin A :rllaery Ee'.on Soda Co. fo:!llowing plants: 144L .-.5.a. manuflacturers rof war gass'es.tted. c' T-!ornshtu .:mcc This profess)r obliged them by 7uidinq the tc am to thi.teiler tle: rr-i.ia jn iwas -.ober l! Intolligence Unit No. this tean or~ertae in tLe jsari Garcia.orc.. small amount of r)r-clance equipment stored there was classlt'i.'. ot Reglm.

_d.i h. a-t Sunogw'e. Hakorate..soi-nchn. with the 5250th Technical In- telligence Compariny in the iacific Thleater are shown in Inclosure 3h.yline from calcium carbinde But none Df the abhcv. ..vith the excl.-intenti :)ne!'. Further search n-l i nterrogation verified the previous report that the N4ipoIn Slda Comi'. and inde:-end. Investiga'ti n )f all other tarte. in Hakndate..u-1ing men frorl the [250th.?oint with the United States Army itself. The war is over and many in 7 DeTc(rber 1945... internoatir.rt-e1 that the lack of Engineer that in )each time Intelligernce is.the . Awarls reccived by T.iurm su'.eic an Citizen rh.s nrltable. mcmanuJ'cturers cf rsuj.'W.phoshate Toyokoatsy Chiluncal Co.super- If' are nri-t to be the blind leading the blind.not only with the ordinary Ani.ts listed in the folder. I. Technical Intellience.] nllia sul!. anl espiecially that parvenue. !_nc].']in of 25Oth Awar's given to mien who served. which has had a tentdencry to c'nsil.s HII Rig-s) r . in t-eace t.HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Nissan Chmiccil Inl!ustrial Co. . should be a chance in that -policy... And NSw.and h.iL.: plants manufactured war gases.. 1 the Army.. erable quantities of Chemical WIarfare 145 .ient .ndlini.~ at. as indicated in the War Departrment ttrget f'lo]er.ihuric acid Koatsu Kojrjyu Co.. there we flu -us..te and a:icnia a'as Konrtsuk!c') . but that it was in Honshu. C..:--ti)n f' building materials and the equipon HAkkA.iplc macy. are going home -. Ltd.. Barker.nral t. The unit also assisted in in- vestigating certain industrial plants f-rthe purrose of rehabilitatioin.. c5 nsic:lers it a menace t^ U.' a:. ment for ha. s... manlufa:t4arers of oxygen -l r'ac l. manufacturers . but what is much more peac.:!nty by the team. Japan. To-kyo. So c. slips In'to bad reaiilte -.)wve recovwry of cornsi-. resulted in the many more Lti.. ILanufacturers of Oxygun and c. th-ni wa. T/5 David L. The Engineer Tnanr (2'1 R)bert E.:-pi'ng to reach there by Christmas. Pfc Jam.. Intclli zerce.any vwis not.

.that is by an efficiently staffed.r niations . not one Jump.HISTORY OF' TECHNICAL INTELIGNCE Technical sui. effectively o. behind..eri 'rity available to a nation will be the most detcrminato factor. who is s to lose. 146 . There is only one means of finding out the technical innovations of oth.ratin' Technical Intelligence Depart ent. in dociling who is to win. next time. Next time we must bc one jury iheard.

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