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K.Naveenraj, Department of Electronics Engineering, Anna University, Madras Institute of Technology Campus, Chennai – 600 044, INDIA. E-mail : naveenrajkk@gmail.com

Abstract— Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is an

T.Subashri, Department of Electronics Engineering, Anna University, Madras Institute of Technology Campus, Chennai – 600 044, INDIA. E-mail : subarathi@yahoo.co.in

checks for the authenticity of the signature, employing only publicly known values ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) is a new public key cryptosystem. It is an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was suggested independently by Ne al Koblitz [3] and Victor S. Miller [4] in 1985. Compared with other cryptosystem, ECC has the highest security capability per bit. It became an actual standard and will be widely used in information security system in no time. But ECDSA couldn't be used in some devices that have limited compute and store capacity directly, such as PDA, ATM and Smart Card. So it is necessary to amend it. In section II provides the mathematical background behind elliptic curve cryptography. In section III, the improved scheme was presented. The improved schemes reduce the computational cost while keep the same security as original algorithm. II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND

algorithm which is developed based on the ECC. It generates signature to provide authentication to the users in the network. Most of the real time implementations of the network security were based on ECDSA. In this paper, we propose a new variant to the existing ECDSA scheme by introducing a dynamic key exchange mechanism and also using a 32 bit hash value instead of 64 bit hash value to provide system level optimization. The modified ECDSA algorithm reduces the computational cost. Also, it provides better security to the network users than the existing algorithm. It is useful for the users with limited computing resources.

Keywords— ECDSA, ECC, SHA-512, Private key, Public key and Message Digest.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Preliminaries on Elliptic Curves The domain of operation of the ECDSA algorithm is the set of integers modulo p denoted usually as Zp. For clarity, in the remainder of the paper we use the mod p notation which will be omitted and the modular reductions will be implicitly assumed for all the coordinates of the points of the curve. The key mathematical object employed to build a computationally hard problem in the ECDSA cryptosystem is a particular algebraic group employing as a support the points of an elliptic curve deﬁned over Zp. Given a ﬁeld (Zp, +, ·), where p is a large prime number, an elliptic curve E is represented by the set of points with coordinates over Zp×Zp where the following relation holds: y2= x3+ ax + b with the discriminant of the Weierstrass equation 4a3+27b2≠ 0

Digital signature is a crucial technology to secure information systems but it is different from data encryption. The need to provide a secure way to warrant the authenticity of digital contents is nowadays a growing requirement for modern computing systems. This need is fulﬁlled by cryptographic digital signature protocols. Security problems such as data integrity and authentication can be resolved with digital signature. Among them, the most innovative and standardized cryptosystem which is able to provide a signature scheme for digital contents is represented by the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), which has been standardized by both NIST [1] and IEEE. In particular, it has also been recommended to sign top secret information in the NSA Suite B. The ECDSA cryptosystem is composed of two primitives: a signing and a signature veriﬁcation algorithm. The signing algorithm is able to produce an authenticated token, the digital signature, employing a secret value known only to the signer, while the signature veriﬁcation algorithm

+ P {k times} . +) where the curve has prime order n as isomorphic to (Zn. In case r = 0 the procedure is re-run with a different random number until a non-zero ‘r’ is obtained.yQ) is deﬁned to be an associative and commutative operation. a point G of maximum order is selected as the default generator and standardized together with the other curve parameters for protocols deﬁnitions. the algorithm at ﬁrst obtains a hashed version e of the message m and a non zero random number. The operation on the elliptic curve employed as a trapdoor function is the point scalar multiplication. taking as input the deﬁnition of the group (E. The veriﬁer proceeds to compute the message hash e and compares the received r value with [e/s]G+ [r/s]Y . a pointThe Stepped impedance resonator (SIR) is symmetrical and has two different characteristic impedance . as the iterated sum of a point. which has a complexity of O(log(k)) point additions. the point scalar multiplication between the random number and the generator G is performed and the x coordinate of the resulting point is divided by the order of the curve n and stored in r. it is computationally hard to ﬁnd the value of k such that [k]P = Q. 2: Choose another prime number q to be used in the calculation..e2) and private key is d. In order to build the signature. and it follows from the deﬁnition of the operation that [−k]P = −[k]P. while the inverse of the point P = (xP. d. This problem is known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and the best algorithms known at present time belong to the O(n) complexity class (with n the order of the curve). . the signature generation algorithm (Algorithm 1) produces the signature token S. and a point P ∈ E the scalar multiplication operation is deﬁned as [k]P = P + P + . The signing algorithm of ECDSA is described in Algorithm 2. the provided signature is valid. Algorithm 2 ECDSA Signature Generation Input: curve parameters (E. where the secret value d is protected by the computational hardness of the ECDLP. given a point Q ∈ E and a generator of the additive group over the curve P. In order to construct the one-way function which will be exploited to build the ECDSA cryptosystem. Algorithm 1 Key Generation 1: Choose an elliptic curve Ep(a. Subsequently. The identity element of the operation is a particular point. which represents an ephemeral key held only during the signature procedure duration. message m Output: signature S 1: e ← hash(m) 2: k ← random ∈ [1. Finally the signature is computed through combining together the hash of the message. 6: Public key is (a. the group law is used to build an external operation as scalar multiplication. It is thus possible to regard the group (E. through substituting the discrete logarithm problem over a number ﬁeld with the one constructed over the (E. −yP ). In order to check if an ECDSA signature is valid. 5: Calculate e2 = d * e1 as another point on the curve. n − 1] 3: P ← [k]G 4: r ← xP mod n 5: s ← (e + rd)/k mod n 6: return S = (r. G). +) through the map k ↔ [k]P.b) with p as a prime number. the value obtained through the point scalar multiplication and the extracted random k. s). the private key parameter k ∈ Zp and the message of which authenticity must be warranted m. . 3: Choose an integer as a private key. . The set of points E is used as a support for a commutative group (E. The key generation algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. On the other hand. known as point at inﬁnity denoted as O. Since the group (E.and it is denoted either as E[Zp] or E.e1.p. smaller than the order of the curve. The result of [0]P is deﬁned as O. +). This protocol for digital signatures is derived from the classic DSA [1]. 4: Choose a point on the curve as e1. The signature token S is represented by the pair (r. Given an integer k ∈ Z. where the + operator denotes the so-called point addition operation. ECDSA The ECDSA suite relies on the hardness of the ECDLP problem in order to produce a signature token from a secret value k.b. private key d. It is in fact possible to compute efﬁciently the scalar multiplication operation through the use of a double and add strategy [6]. If the two quantities match.yP ) is deﬁned as −P = (xP .q. +) together with a default generator G ∈ E. It is particularly important to choose a cryptographically strong random number for k and never reuse it: it is trival in fact to extract the value of the secret key d if two different signatures are computed with the same random k.e. The point addition operation between two points of the curve P = (xP. +) is cyclic. +) curve points group. s) In particular. III. the veriﬁer is provided with the public key Y = [d]G.i.yP) and Q = (xQ.

and . and shown in Fig. (Rz = Z2/Z1). equation (2) can be rewritten as From (3). The layout corresponding to the filter schematic is obtained in ADS. IV.6 mm. Basic structure of half wavelength type SIR [2] The resonance condition can be analyzed by using the input admittance. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The resonance condition is achieved at Yi = 0.Momentum and the S parameter characteristics are obtained as shown figure 4. then Z1 is obtained as 100 Ω. FILTER SCHEMATIC AND DESIGN Fig. The layout is simulated in ADS. The response is shown in the fig. and this is realized by the following equation If we assume . 5. Whereas. The relationship between frequencies is given by [1] fundamental Thus the spurious frequencies can be controlled by impedance ratio Rz. The insertion loss in the pass band is found to be 1.013 dB. From the value of R Z. 2. III. hence. The input admittance of the half wavelength SIR is given as [2] Fig.5. the dark areas denote the conducting strip and background denotes the substrate. 6).4 and conductor thickness of 0. and spurious From the S21 characteristics. In the layout. Fig 2 shows the schematic of the filter in ADS. Schematic of the filter The filter is implemented in FR4 substrate with dielectric thickness 1. The filter is simulated in ADS tool.3. Layout of the filter . A filter with a second order Chebychev response is considered for the design. Z1 and Z2. The return loss (S11) in the pass band is obtained as 21.lines. which is defined as the ratio of the line impedances Z1and Z2.137 dB. a new parameter RZ is introduced. of admittance Y1 and Y2. the value of RZ is obtained as 0. 1. and considering Z2 = 50 Ω. For the ease of the analysis. The basic structure of the λg /2 SIR is shown in fig 1. The 3 dB bandwidth of the filter is calculated around 60 MHz.035 mm. dielectric constant 4. By taking [2]. The 20dB bandwidth of the filter is found to be 230 MHz (Fig. we obtain the following solution. Fig.3. are their corresponding electrical lengths. where λg is the wavelength.

8.030 m1 2 m 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 1.11 and fig. freq)=-1. freq)= -20.137 Min Fig. freq)=-21.1)).602E9 m1 plot_vs(dB(S(2.0 m1 m2 dB(S(2.4 2.5 Ohms.1)) freq.6 1.1)) -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 1. in the pass band.043 indep(m1)= 1.2 2.027 indep(m1)= 1.1)).572E9 plot_vs(dB(S(2. These values are close to the ideal values and will lead to better filter performance.8 and fig.1)) Fig.1)). GHz Fig. A higher value of insertion loss is seen in the measurement owing to the non uniformities of the substrate material.The return loss is found to be 30 dB.8 2. freq)= -20.6 1.8 3.2 2. dB(S(2.542E9 plot_vs(dB(S(2.2 1.An Agilent E5071C Network analyzer (8 GHz) is used to measure the filter characteristics.4 1.0 2. GHz Fig.6 2. 3 dB bandwidth m2 indep(m2)= 1. The insertion loss is found to be 7dB.0 The photograph of the fabricated filter is shown in fig. They indicate an SWR value of 1.0 2.0 1.6 2.8 3.7.0 freq.0 1.695E9 m1 plot_vs(dB(S(2. S-parameter characteristics m2 indep(m2)= 1.571E9 plot_vs(dB(S(1.4 1.8 m2 indep(m2)= 1.4 2. GHz Fig. Photograph of the fabricated filter 2. Measured S21 response freq. The measured S21 and S11 response of the filter are shown in fig.1)). 6.4 1.7.0 2.4 2.1)).0 1.1)).8 3. Fig. freq)= -3.216 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 1.10 shows the group delay of the filter which is almost constant around 5.9 respectively.6 ns.2 1. The impedance and SWR of the filter is shown in fig.1)) dB(S(2.12 respectively.2 and impedance value of 48.013 Max m1 0 -10 m2 dB(S(1.465E9 plot_vs(dB(S(2.4.m1 indep(m1)= 1.5.2 1.6 2. freq)= -3.6 1.8 2.2 2. 20 dB bandwidth .

M. H. impedance of 48 Ohms and SWR of 1.11. Recent Advances in Space Technologies. © Johon Wiley & Sons 2005 [2] M.Measurement shows an insertion loss of 30 dB. Measured Group Delay of the filter. Theory Design and Application”. V.Makimoto and S. Second Edition. and a microstrip bandpass filter using stepped-impedance resonator has been proposed. R.10.9. M. Measured Impedance of the filter [3] Alkan. GALILEO and GLONASS satellite navigation systems & GPS modernization´´ Proceedings of 2nd International Conference.. Page(s):390 .Fig. Measured S11 response Fig. Fig. ´´ Fundamentals of Global Positioning System Receivers: A Software Approach´´. ´´ GPS. CONCLUSION A method of designing a BPF suitable for GPS L1 band with SIR is established.Yamashita. 394 . Measured SWR of the filter. Karaman. Sahin. REFERENCES [1] James Bao-Yea Tusi.. Springer 2001.12. “Microwave Resonator and Filters for Wireless Communication.2 at the desired frequency . Fig. 2005. designed and fabricated ..

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