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TOP SECRET "U,I
FINAL INTERROGA1'ION OF
WAGHTlAEIS'rEH 01''1'0 BUGCIiJCH tOICH/IN.
. Att[lohed is a report on the final interrogatio:n of BUGGISCH carrie9 .out by Maj or Bundy at OberurfJel on 25th AugU6 t, 1945. 8 Ttl.e'report supplements and conoludesthe notes in TICOM!r-5 and 1,.:64, arid also covers questions raised by BUGGISCH's written
NO. of Pages
3. D.D.4 5.
4. D.D. (N..
6, D. D. (A. S.
11-12. OP 20-~ (2) (via 1'c. Pendergrass) 13. G~2 (na Lt. Col. Hillslil) 14-15. S:S.A. (2) (v:V.,l. Major seaman) 16. Dl.rector, S.Ln. DSFEl' (via Lt. col. Johnson) 17. col. l#wifl Powell
9. Lt. Col. Leathem 1 D. Mi'J,jor organ M .
--~"-.--.32. Mr. Twinn 33. Lt. Col. P1'i tch6rd
18. 19-20. 21. 22. 2).. 24. 25. 26.
28. Capt .• cowan 29. Lt. Fehl 30-31. Ticorn File~
Ohairman ~~.AA_C. .. ! _(.z.)_ Cdr. Bacon Cdr. Maokenzie Cdr. Tandy Lt. Col. Johnson Lt. Cdr. l.fansou Major Sear,.an
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FIN.A.L INTERROGATION...2I .. WACHTMEISTER TTO BUGG1SCH(IN 7/lf1 O ctJ'J1J OKW!CHI)
AT 9BERD2J1:j.E._;_L, AUGU~ 25
1. M40. 1940 and-never
" hi T:ts into llBe) •.
1- 5 d.
wa s a m9.Ghine designed "
by MENZER in
'. t . oy linder with Thb was mechaniGal in operatlon. I was a .. t d by about 30" slots for cipher alphabets. These slots. wer:a~~ ~e~teI'. a hand crank and might mOve from a to 3 slots after , 1 The plain te~t alphabet was mi.xed and was in a fixed h07'J.zonU:slot. The plain text was enciphe.red by reading from thJ.s plaln t to text alphabet to the cipher al!3ha.bet which had been brought ns,'t, it. Buggisch described the prinoiple as that of the "THITTHEIM TABLE, a historic cryptogr~phic principle from tl,e 17th Century ( = U.S. "po Iya Lphabe tri.c"},
Tlilc moti@n was governed by 3 (or possiblY 4) wh~Gls wi~h positive and negative lug settings as :with the Hngel:m maoh:l.lle, The motion was the BUIll of the positive settings, subject to an overlap ]1Irinciple ail with M 209. Buggisch did not Imow the c~cle of the motion whe<;Jls or the details of the conat ructri.on by which they· acted to "rary the motion when the:: cr-ank v;as turned.
Additional sec~i'\;y was provided by lming only 36 strips at one time leaving about 4 slots blank. When bhes e slots reached the enci~hering positioFJ. a random l.:;tter was chosen and inserted the cipher,text, and the plain te~t letter was enciphered by the neri strip that came to the enciphering position.
No ideas were ever formulated on the total number of strips to be used, or the frequency of se1l:.ting ehangee , Preliminary tests by L<lER1NG ana BUGGISCHgave the machine a high security .ra t Lng. HoWever it was just as bulky as the ENIGMAand could not p.rint letters, which was then the chief improvement a.esired. For these reasons it was reje-cteGi., and only a lab model was ever built. 2. SoIuti0n of Croat Enigma. This was not an outstanding cryptanalytic achievement. The machine UBea ,vas the K model~ with three wheels and no stecker. The machines were made for the Croats by the firm of KRONSKY and KRUGER, Ber,lin, whioh gave the wirings promptly to OKW/WNV about 191+1or 1942. in A single key was used throughout the enti::6 Croat Army ~n,d area, and this consisted only of a list of 1?O ae t t i.nga for a per~od of a month. As far as Bll.ggisch knew the R:l.ngstellung stayed always at .AAA. and the wheel order at 1 J 2, 3. Just ~o mak sure, the Germans paid for One of the first keys used, and Wl. th t hi.s decoded traff'io were able to establish stereotypes and solve almost tOa,1o from the first.
~he ao l.ub i.cna ,were done entirely by hand with wiring chart.s aasumang ~ pet begJ.mting (one third of all messages began wi th uimfORS ") and aaeumang the leTt ha n d whId E an T'-'r . .. ee Umkehrwa La unmovang (only one notch per. whee.1 as an the comnez-cda.L model) Th.., C.root s a 1 80 00"" pe t . di, t d .., ~ u. an oa or-s an ~o would f'urrd.ah depths in case this method did not w~rlhc. The sethng WB..sndicated i rlirectly by a two digit nurriber unenCl.pered so that thett· . ' ao ~ngs were so Iv ed almost as fast as the\' came an d the traffic .d • rea currently from then on. Buggisch dj d not z-eca the contents a.n detail. 90"" of' . t .' t . .. . -W""C;.s0<oG :tt\~o"'''''':I:'YI It l. was Ll1UJl ~rQ.st.l ng. there P: IT''''Q<W-!,!''''' oho,,'l; """,:-ion..,, ~g,,;i.rl9't TITO.
'. , -d' ing the Crca ts Buggl.sch aa Ld the Germans had ooned.dez'c eqUJ..PP. 1<'INLAND WJ. th the military Enigma, as they did for HlJNG.ARY, ROlTh1ANIA, ~ and ITALY (and JJ.PAN he thinks) in about 19Lf.2. however, they decided aca.ins t this I as they believed the corrupt CROATS would.."go right on selling the keys to British agents, while they, the ~~~s,. would have to pay as well instead of solving free. (~he posa~ 1l. Y of a BRITISH solution obviously did not occur to Bugg;l.I~ohdurl.ng this discuss ion of the K model. )
3. Complioations in 036. Buggisoh oould recall no ncolnp~io~:~or enciphering device " unleflshe had mea.nt t~ refer to the new l.ndi method introduced in January of 1944. The old indioator system, changed in its details in 1942, had been a letter substitution table, which had b(;;ensirnple. The new system was based on nurnbe~s, but he could give no details. Relative inte:rnal settings oontlIoIued to be recovered and a high percent of the traffic solved on cr:-bs and statistios (for anY roe~sage over 400 letters) until the indicator system was broken in the late sw:rmer of 1941+.
About the same time in 1944 the French had adopted a system of' sending internal settings by mean, of an ordinary sentence for each, wheel. of which the first so 'i1S.DY nonz-epea't i ng letters gave the .actlve lug positions. This system was first reported in u broken oode mea .. sage j the knowledge that it existed Vias of academic interest only, as no keys were gained from, other systems. Buggisch spoke e.speoially of ths succsl3sful solution of' C3b in 1943, on de GAULLE traffic to CORSICA. He also said that the Southern France la.ndings were largely given away as to date and strength of foroe by broken 03b traffic. 4. 1'W-S9.llil.ral! -- After some pondering Buggd.ach finally came to the ohvLous solution that it was a mistaken reading fa!' Omega Square. This was a well-known statistical test used in probability calCUlations. bad been invented by GEBELiEIN,e. Gen'1S.n mathematician, who had pubhshed a full desoription of it in the "Zeitschrift fuel' Ang~ndte Mathe:rna. tik" shoit'tly before the war. The tea t was a great fa.vonta of' v. DENFFER of OKH, who preferred 'it to the alternative CHI test of the American Mathematician, PIERSON.
. , Von DEN1i'FE~(aad Buggisch On occaa i on] had used the test in prehrm.na.ry .analysl.3. Of, any traffic thought to be machine, or indeed for any W:UW0wn trafflc ~ncluding codes. In the beginning of 1944 he had ~ed,l.t on C36 truff~c in an ~ffOl't to find out if the old internal ..ett7ng,per±od (10 dayS, BUgg~ach thought) had been altered along with ~he l.ndicator, system. He thought that he ooul.d establish a change of l.nte~nal settl.ng by letter count; in fact the results bad been inc onclus~vej and the new period established by a tool It. rapidly ,'" " c· so u ~Ons more 5. Oonversa tiona wi th KorvettcnKa i tne . ' , sidered thi.3 D. very foolish incident alto e~hJAECI\IE. Bugg~8ch COna cq uain ted wi th J'I ""'''Trl'"t;< '. .194 ,g d , -""""',u..a:, h had very br~efly. (31'.- " "He ha W!l..t.Ibecomeordinary Ul .,3 ,'I'lInrr,;w ~e '" Nava.l SJ.gnals Officer . Jd.<', ..... !1..U!:I 'In , We 0 UiJ. got hold of' D. d 1 f th 2 had worked out a "solution" while '.+t' ,ruo eo" e M 09 and solution was in fact chilaish a' d SJ. - :ng Ld.Ie in a French port. '1'he study of the theoretical workin; con:~sted ot nothing uore than a had talked hia way to SKL and had efa~k a.on of the machine. JAEGKLE of 200 men to work On the U>9.chi :d a lot .about getting a section and sent back to sea ~-. t"hr ne," Ac Wllly he had been exposed '-'uiC'l,.l" "er aG Or four tl-.. "'- "-L.J nothing of him. sinc~. !DOn.~. Bugg~sch bad Been
6. RUssian Systems. 1.37 and OK 40 were . .. 1· ~shed from captured mater1al. The successor K1. he believed.
ames est-ab_ ._"
7. Tlpex anti Enigma Documents. The documen:~s left i"':the hoto~~TTHEIKIRCHPLATZ were only reports on mathamat~oal s~ud~es, p stats of reports alrfiiady referred to in Buggisch's vrnte-up, and photostats of the British documents captu.red at DUNKIRK.
8. American strip Traffic. Buggisoh does not know what l~nka Were broken in 1942. but be thinks they were chiJ;fJ.y dip~tJ.C. aJ:;ld recalls the mention of CAIROin parti.ou1ar.
9. OKW AnalYtiC Machinery was last seen in the cellar ~ the DES FREWEN VERl\EHRS on l1e 24th of Januar.v, 1 945. J3ugg~sch
it was to go to HALLE with HUETTENHAIN.
10. K37 differed fr0l'i1 B211 in lacking theJlSurchiffreur", or l'UeberschlU6sseler" a sort of Enigma wheel by wi1i:b the path of the current was tur~ed to another channel at one point. crossing , over and exchanging positions with another path instead cf coniinll:l.ng parallel. Baggisch called this an X effect, and said it gr6at~ co~ated analySiS, as it was hard to tell vlhen it was being employed in piaoe of the paraThll s • • 11. Securit Col'lferences with General GIMMLER These "!look:place .. over a period three months rom Nove er 944 th~oughJanuar.r 1945. GIMt.rr.ER insisted. on them, though HUETTENHAIN felt it Vias a waste of time simp.ly to gather f"ormallY to hear reports. In spite of this feeling HlJETTENHAIN was in the chair at the sessions. 'Four different subjects were covered, with a day allotted to each. These were: a) Speech Encipherment b) Security of Teletype Cipher Machines o} Seourity of ENIGMA Security of Hand Systems. Buggisch himself d) attended only the sess..i.ons on Speech Eneipherment and on ENIGMA. However, he had a hearsay account of the other seasd.ons from PIETSCH and DOERING, who attended all. a) .Speech Encipherment. 24 Jan .. 1945. This was a most inoonclusive session, and H.a:rdJ,y any discussion was ar-oused, papers were read by l.JlETTIG on the use of cove r names for 'protecting ordinary phone conversations, by LIEBKNEGHT on the technical aspects of speech~orambling ~evices, by Bugg;!.sch· (after lunoh~ alas!) on the mat he matLoa'I ana],ys1s of speech scramblingJ and by LOTZE (of G.ruppe IV, lffAPRUEF7) on the technical aspects of devices for reading scrambled speech. B. said the whole affair was a farce and a. waste of time~ and led to no 010s,e1" liaison between the would-be makers and breske ra, b) Teletype Oipher Maohines. The replacement of T520 by T52d, and -13 had been discussed and approved. The SZ42 was still tho:,ght to be bet~er but the possibility was discussed of giving it an ~rregular and 1nteracting motion and also a daily stecker - like monoalphabetic ohange superimposed. DClERING- was w~k:ing along these lines with Uffz. LINDMEIER. c) ENIGMA.l'here Were two sessions on ENIGM.:'l., one of' Which was devoted lar~el.Y to the Naval maohfne , The Naval session was atrt ended by Kap~.t!n SINGER and another DRM officer. Hptm. PORT the head of the DKL s6curi~ section, pa~ticipated aloP-E with Reg.Rat prof. HOHEI~ (Yl~O had enterea the Ora, only in 1944 but was already rated the bra~ns 1n an otherwise weak section), ~he conference ccnf'Lrmed the deCiSion, alreaCly effective in prachce" t? drop the ''1(" and "Gil (.Abwshr) models of the ENIGMa t that the ra.1lways c0U.ld' , excep go on US:lng the "K" for routine messages at
·t tent were to be no fH'::Curi'by content. Messages of any seour'a ? con t kn enciphered twice by the irK!!machine (but. Bugg~sch ~oes no lr.o;'.a"" h .f The t!G" nachlne .was a ttaohe "V we· th' er th~s was ever done ~nao. t) . . dropped everywhere, having been replaced on a few milltary a neb, by the military model.
Worry was also e:,,:nre8sed over the fact that the militarY 't' ~" l ".S" h V ryang so u 10.""", machane had not been changed throughout t. e war. .a . . were di~cussed, Buggisoh himself approving of the OKL a.eYloe of Enigms. mill. The idea of LUCKENFULIERWALZE also approved. was
d) Hand Systems. There were no significant results at the conference on this subjeot. It was agreed by a l.L that NS 42 and 'l'S 42 (double and single "playfair") were insecure, and the introduction of RASTER was approved.
In general, the meetings were exchanges than being bound to come to a decision. of infoTma t ion rather
12. "FAU, WICHER"(:rolish solution. of Enign:a..J_ Thi.s was the name gaven to the definite proof received in 194.3 or 1944 that the Poles had read Enigma up to the outbreak of war and for some time after, in POh~ND and. later in FF~ltCE. BUggisch thought that "WICBER"was the Polish ocve r name for the solution operation. Buggisch began by relating an interesting prelude. In 1939 and early 194Q IN 7/IV (as it was then), specifically PIETSCH, STEINBERG, and one BORM (who was later re Leaaed from. the cf'f'Lce for reas ona unknown) had done theoretical work and had COWElto the eonc Lus.i.on that the doubled enc.ipherment, of indica tors -was not secure, There were, rcoz-eover g a few sea ttered bits of evidence found in the Polish cipher office at WARSAW that the Poles had possessed a section of extraordinary security. Enigma solution, however, was pooh-poohed. As a result of the theoretical work alone, IN 7/IV was able to force a change in the indicator system early in 1940. Very much later, in 1943 or 1941;., two Polish officers, a Lt. Col. and a MajGr, made aome disclosures at a German PW camp in HA1IJiBURG. a result As PIETSCH was sent to interrogate tihem, and PIBTSCH later told Buggisch about thei:l: general story without the details unfortunately. It boiled down to a c.Lear claim that the poles had rea~ ENIGMA for several years before the war (Buggisch thol1g~t that lt was very bad usage, giving depths, which oaused most of t~s. rather than the indioator system). L-\.fter the short poli.Bh ~ampa1.gn the pOl~s had. moved to FRANCE and had probably worked on 1. there. t .Soluhon had stopped, howevez-, and Buggisch could say only that l ~ was an abrupt ending $ as if caused by a change i.n the system, Th~s he mturally aaaumed ('>.1:1 presumably did PIETSCH) was the change an the indicator system. PIETSC?H told Buggisch that he did no t bother to get the details of the pallah iJ8thad. Buggisch himself rei t.e.ra t.ed his belief that it. caql~ have been done with CI. l'l!"ge Hollerith ;oocillne conp Lex' as one r.retnod, but he had n~ver hear-d any sugges t aon th'l.t the Poles had ~~c~ ~~ alpar~tus. Buggisoh also recalledOthat the officers said u G ~adl.ng work.ers were. two very YOLmCJ'.:nen rcath a tuden rs and t hi s was Linked . th th "" , . Wl e oapt ure of two auch men in YlAF.,cUW in 1939. They webre not traced so far as he knew. Buggi.sch did not know their namea , ut t honP1t PTJJ."'TS(!H wou1.rl.
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13. O~Chi Organization. :auggischwas unable to add. ar:Y new ~ . t' . d IDembarsh~p of names or to throw nevi light on the orgarn sa a.on an -.1 d , ., . . """"WHA gave a detal.· e th_..;I I l.ngUJ_st~c aect aona as gaven by HERZ,LI:DJ·· '"' ,t . .. fh hematical .' Hafara·. account of the growth and development o i .... ,," .... t. e ~" The origins of the ma.th Ref'erat were in the old ni in, 1939-194-0. It was then concerned with aecur i ty of Ger.nan syste,~. only (wi t.neas the job on EJl.TIGiJAl and had about a dozen roo. therre.t:LC~a~s including PIETSCH, STEHffiERG, B()HM: (see supra] later released).: .' e v ; DEl\I"FFER,HILBURG, and LUZIUS. :MOS~ of thesew~re drawn ~raln. th t statistical offices of Lnaur'ance conpard.ea, BuggJ.sch had hr s ill'S contact wi tb. this group at the end of 1940 as a z-eaul,t of his work on the C36.
n~ 7/VI was set up at the' beginning of 194-1 ,and ama.th referat created. The grouping was loose at first, as men would be detached for specific projects in security work or in some v..ational referat. The work gxad1.Ally divided i taelf into three par ta , general theory (Referat F, under v , DElIJ1'FER), hand systel1lB (Referat 7?, under Ob~t. Ltlnma)" and machine aye t ems (Referat 1.3 under Wachtmeister OOERIID). Buggisch l>..i:mself was deputy to OOERING.
At the end of 1942 (later according -to HERZFELD,but the outline is the aame) all the varied Referats were grouped into two Hauptreferats, "1..", for languages, under BAlIOVIC, and "BI', for J!Bth studies, un.der PIETSCH. The latter comprised the three former Referats, F, 7, and 13. This organization remained in effect as long as Buggisch was there. (For later orgard.satdon see HENTZ".r!; and H1illRENBERG aocount sv ) V. DENFFERls Referat included HILBURG, RINOW, and WmrSGHE as its b!:st men. Under LUnERBwere hi.s deputy, ui'f'z. JESSE, and F:'HEDE, FQPFL, and WAC!m.I'fEISTER DREESEN (helper only). DOERING'ssection had ~Bugg.i.ach himself and Waohtneiater VA.LEJIj~IN who auccee ded him . .J as deputy, and Uffze. MUELLER, DIEHL, and SAllER and Gefr. JAUSEL (hel~er~ ?nly)., ~he section also had vardoua men with partioular specaa.Ia ~1eB, LINDMEIER. and LA.CHIIt'ER on teletype securi·ty (note tha t ~l'tCill:lER a.a els~ere noted by Ki.RRENBERG as the specialist in .tl-.nerwan traffJ.c) and TROEBUCEE~ on Russian systems including BAUDOT (Troebucher spent l:i1oat of his time l'rith UTA). The above are not all the names that Buggi.sch could recalled in ti:ne, he seiil, but they inolude +ne f'oremost of all sections •. have technicians