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Martin Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 39-51 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539214 . Accessed: 20/11/2011 11:43
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will begin by pointing out such errorsfromhis own recent articles in this journal.1 Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirationsto transform international relationsput forwardby some criticaltheorists. Like realism. Andrew Moravcsik. 2. 1984). 20. and forthisservicewe are grateful. Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect."The Povertyof Neorealism. 39 . Organization. and thatinstitutionalists only expect interstate cooperationto occur if states have significant common interests. Inis L. escaped only throughverbal sleight-of-hand. lead readersto believe thatthereis an intellectual betweenthesetwo schools of thought. No. of HarvardUniversity. Martinis John LoebAssociate L. 1992). pp. its failureto explicatethe conditionsforthe operationof its generalizations. Professor Government.and Celeste Wallanderfortheir valuable commentson an earlierversion of this essay. propensity privilegeits own viewpoint.thework of "constructivist" as Alexander Wendteloquentlymakes a numberof argumentsthatmany institutionalists would accept. International Security. are also pleased We thathe has read theinstitutionalist literature thoroughly correctly so He asserts thatliberalinstitutionalists treatstatesas rationalegoists operatingin a world in which agreementscannot be hierarchically enforced.therefore. Powerand International Relations (New York:Random House. Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critiquein his own discussion of collectivesecurity. See Richard K. 2 (Spring 1984). ? 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstitute Technology. 225-286. The Promise of Robert Keohane t ~~~andMartin LisaL. and its logical We contradictions. affinity theorists such However. Chris Gelpi.L. then Robert Keohane Stanfield 0.The fact that Mearsheimercriticizedinstitutionalism and critical theoryin the same articleshould not. ProfessorMearsheimer'sversion of realismhas some ratherserious flaws. Hence institutionalist theorydoes not espouse the Wilsonian conceptof collectivesecurity-which Charles and Clifford to Kupchan refer as "ideal collectivesecurity"-critiqued so well by I. 39-51 Vol.Ins Theory Institutionalist Th~eory 0. Claude. 38. No. Ashley included Robert0. is Professor International of Peace. author After and of Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press. of In his usual direct way. The authorsthankMarc Busch.HarvardUniversity.Mearsheimerhas sharpenedthe theoretical issues dividingrealistfrom institutionalist theory. Claude thirty years ago.2 However. Keohane as one of the "neorealists"whose "orreryof errors"he rejected. author and of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining MultilateralEconomic Sanctions (Princeton University Press. 1962). 1 (Summer 1995). JohnJ. Lisa L. 1.institutionalist theoryis utilitarian and rationalistic.pp. Ashley.so thatin the absence its to of decisive evidence eitherway it invariablyseems to prevail."International Vol.
Professor Mearsheimerdemands proofthatinternational have us recently Yet he begins his articleby reminding thatmajorgovernments he institutions."3 the same time. . "Back to the Future:Instability Europe after Cold War. No."4Yet now that both NATO and the now the European Union (EU). John Mearsheimer. 3 (Winter 1994/95). in the J. How institutions command such resourcesfromgovernments.this is the case. 1 (Summer 1990). 47-49). Take away that offensive and theUnited Statesis likelyto abandon theContinent.p.Mearsheimer. TheFallaciousLogicofRealism the decline of NATO: Five years ago Professor Mearsheimerforecast imminent "It is the Soviet threatthat holds NATO together. and under what conditions. 7. Not all international but some do. he abandons specificity the equally falsebut more difficult falsify to that"institutions have minimal generalization stability prospectforpromoting influence statebehaviorand thushold little on in a post-Cold War world. John Mearsheimer. It is difficult 3.he predictedthat "the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War] to grow weaker. "Correspondemnce: to the Future. p." International J. Back Security. No. No. "The False Promiseof International Institutions."5 institutions matter. 52. 199. divide between security and economic issues. Vol. whereuponthe threat At defensivealliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate. 2 (Fall 1990). not strongerwith time. for memberships."International Security. Subsequent references thisarticleare in parenthesesin the text." and empiricalwork (admittedlyin its early stages) that provides We conclude that evidence of the significanceof internationalinstitutions. p. JohnJ. and also in organizationssuch as the General Agreementon Tariffs to Trade (GATT." International 15. the muddled question of "relative gains. Vol. could have added been emphasizingthe value of international materialand reputationalresourcesin NATO. 5. Security. and thatit is a worthytask of social science to institutions sometimesmatter. 15. such institutions nificance? Mearsheimersuggests that the answer lies in an ideological blindness of Americanpolicymakers.and hardly in decline. are expanding their European Community. to 19. whose hostility toward realismdrivesthemto to the more congenial institutionalist framework(pp. discover how.International Security 20:1 | 40 We consider the illusory examine his major claims about institutionalism.Part II. Vol. are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in are lacking in sigif expanding internationalinstitutions. recentlystrengthened create the World Trade Organization) and the NorthAmericanFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA). the that theyinvest significant and EU. 4.
lacking qualificationsabout the conditionsunder which theymay be valid. 12). takinginto account geography. Our theorymay therefore have less appeal to theoriesshould but purportedly scientific those who require simple "truths. 12. . Mearsheimer writes that "states in a realist world . must be motivated primarily relative gains concerns when considering cooperation" (p.In lightof states' investments international tutions. by emphasis added). (such as secure second-strike in Mearsheimer'srealistworld. tions. But since no one thinks that or Britain actuallyseeks to become "the Switzerland.when defensivetechnologies of nuclearforces)are prevalent(pp. zations. benefits Mearsheimerindicates.and domesticpolitics. in Institutionalism. contrast. but thefactthatstatesinvestin international this stance quite problematic." As specifythe conditionsunder which the theoryis expected to hold a priori.it is fairto turnMearsheimer'squestion around: could we not legitiare deluded or mately demand evidence eitherthat leaders of governments that NATO and the EU are designed to deceive unsophisticatedobservers? Mearsheimerassumes that his view is privileged. Second. but did not seek such a position.Confronted fromuniversal rhetoric post to tions and anomalies." what Mearsheimerpresumably means to capabilitiesalways pursue this goal.ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 41 | square this assertionof a collectivedelusion with the dominantrole of realist theoryin policy discussions.or with realism's own preceptsabout the forces instiin that drive state behavior. "everystatewould like to be the most formidable militarypower in the system" (p.in the sense that we must convincingevidence is presentedforan accept realismunless overwhelmingly institutions make alternative view. percephoc and ad hoc qualifications. But he lateradmits thatthis propositionmay be false when the threat aggressivewar is low-for instance. Even argue is that states with sufficient thisstatement oftenfalse:forexample. . 9) typicallyare not well-specified. Let us consider two examples fromMearsheimer's own article.we do not expect cooperationto occur.First. realism typicallyretreats history.when stateelites do not foreseeself-interested fromcooperation. 23-25).one of the Institutionalism most significant which concernshow theyapproach social science.theUnited Statesduringtheinterwar is period could reasonablyhave expected to become the most powerfulstate in with such contradicthe world.Argentina.nor the institutions . contemporary most formidablemilitarypower. in and realism differ a numberof otherrespects.A central of theory-ratherthan as rhetoricfaultof Mearsheimer'srealismas a scientific is thatthe conditionsforthe operationof its "grimpictureof world politics" Realism is repletewith global generali(p. seeks to state in advance the conditionsunder which its propositionsapply.
untilone recognizes that thereis an escape clause: "NATO was basically a manifestation the of bipolar distribution power in Europe duringthe Cold War. the and in general facilitate operationof reciprocity. matterswhetherthey exist. Realism's proclivity bold. theotherhand. It is in this sense thatinstitutionalism claims to subsume realism. although for rhetoricalpurposes he shiftshis effects can ground to attacka view thatwe do not hold: thatinstitutions preventwar in regardlessof the structure which theyoperate. seeking to specifythe By conditionsunder which institutions can have an impact and cooperationcan occur. not argue thatNATO do could have maintained stabilityunder any imaginable conditions. Mearsheimeris forcedto admit the truthof institutional with regard to NATO. Hence Mearsheimer'sversionof realismis repletewith analyticalproblems. that provided the key to maintaining who see instituon stability the continent" 14). 13-14). (p. PoliticalEconomy Security theIssue ofRelative vs. and that NATO played a role in preventing (p. and the researchdirections thatwe hope will help to realize thatpromise. These propositionssound like a classicallyfallacioussyllogism. that on NATO is an institution 13). we expectgovernments attempt construct on to to such institutions.make commitments morecredible. tions as rooted in the realitiesof power and interest.institutionalist theoryshows under what conditionsrealistpropositions are valid. 7). not NATO per se.therefore. version of our argumentrequires correction . meaning that theirimpact on outcomes varies.What we in argue is that institutions make a significant difference conjunctionwith power realities. establishfocalpointsforcoordination. World War III and helping the West win the Cold War (pp. it is not our duty here to correct realism's copy-book.In the restof thisbriefresponse.International Security 20:1 | 42 that facilitatecooperation to develop. unqualifiedgeneralizations for not only generates anomalies but gets its proponentsinto logical difficulties. Mearsheimerholds that "institutions have no independent effect state behavior" (p. They also have an interactive effect. However. depending on the nature of power and interests. When states can jointlybenefitfrom cooperation.Institutions important"independently"only in the ordiare for the effects power and nary sense used in social science: controlling of it interests. and Gains AlthoughMearsheimerhas provided an admirablesummaryof several aspects on of institutionalist his theory.Institutionscan provide information.and it was that of balance of power. focuson thepromiseof institutionalist we theory. reduce transaction costs. But liberalinstitutionalists.
thatanalysis of these two sets of issues requirestwo separate analyticalframeworks. relationships are typicallymore institutionalized ones. Charles acteristicsassociated with anarchy than do political-economic has recently observedthatpolitical-economic Lipson. Worst-caseanalysis 6. argument pertinent realistsecuis to This which oftenrelyon worst-caseanalysis."Situationsof coordination. ." KennethA. forinstance. Keohane.. do in to our focusis not exclusivelyon "cheating. Secondly. ed. 15-16). 227. Cooperation UnderAnarchy. "AchievingCooperationUnder Anarchy: and Strategies Institutions. Realists contendthat rityarguments. Keohane wrote: It has oftenbeen noted thatmilitary-security issues display more of the charones. Institutionalist theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argumentrevolves around the role of in institutions providinginformation. THE PURPORTED SECURITY VS. POLITICAL ECONOMY DIVIDE Mearsheimer's assertionthat institutionalism employs a "neat dividing line" to separate politicaleconomyfromsecurity in issues is surprising. although we do not base our view on the overarchingrole of relative gains.p. This does not than military-security mean. As RobertAxelrod and Robert0. view of the attentionthat he devotes to the volume edited by KennethOye.6 We share Mearsheimer'sview thatthereis no clean analyticalline between economic and securityissues. however.when making policy choices.First.'Cooperation in Princeton UnderAnarchy (Princeton: University Press. Althoughsome institutionalists have made this assertion. are equally important. Oye. major argumentof Cooperation A UnderAnarchy thatinstituis tionalisttheorycan be applied to bothsecurityand political economy issues.ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 43 | two majorpoints. RobertAxelrodand Robert0. Indeed.anarchic world.particularly about others' intentions. in an uncertain. one of the major purposes of the presentcollection is to show that a singleframework throwlighton both[emphasis can added]. states must assume the worst. Mearsheimer assertsthatinstitutionalist theory based is on "theassumptionthatinternational politicscan be divided intotwo realmssecurityand political economy-and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter"(pp. we certainly not accept it.it is not the predominantview of the institutionalist and literature. contrast Mearsheimer'sassertion. 1986). which in cheating is not a problem but distributional issues are serious. althoughtheywere underemphasized(but not absent) in the early institutionalist literature.
Harvard University.. realists should see them as significant. institutions can provide useful information.7 Realistwriters if fromKautilya on have stressedthe significance information of (intelligence)."paper preparedfordeliveryat the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. is true thatwhen only two statesexist and It will but theyhave perfectly conflicting interests.to use Axelrod's phrase. or in any contextinvolving more than two states. See Celeste A. Keohane."manuscript.Chicago. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: Contemporary The Debate (New York: Columbia UniversityPress. Hence.8 Duncan Snidal has shown thatrelativegains are unlikelyto have much impact on cooperationifthe potentialabsolute gains fromcooperationare substantial. The major lesson of the recentdebate on relativegains is that theirimportanceis conditional factorssuch as the number of major on actorsin thesystemand whethermilitary or advantage favorsoffense defense. Baldwin. Duncan Snidal. pp. . 85. institutionalist gradually "invade" the studyof security issues. Two issues are more significant: the conditionsunder 1) which relativegains are important. if Mearsheimermeant to offerus a "loophole" throughwhich to escape his criticism-thatinstitutionalist theory only applicable to non-secuis rityissues-we emphatically refuseto avail ourselves of his generosity the On we theorywill contrary. RobertPowell. ed.9A valuable aspect of the relativegains debate is thatit has made distributional and bargainingissues 7.Celeste A. especially chaptersby JosephGrieco. No. Wallander. "RelativeGains and'the Pattern International of Cooperation.February22-25. Illinois."American Political ScienceReview. "Toward an Institutional Theoryof Alliances. 1995. See David A. 8. 323. Keohane. It is importantto understand the great variation in the extent to which relativegains matter. The logic of institutionalist theoryis directlyapplicable to security problemsas realistsdefinethem. p. and Robert0. 3 (September1991). 1993). is. 9. Vol. Wallanderand Robert0. Duncan Snidal. helping to explain variationin institutional formwithout denying the validityof many realistinsightsinto power and interests. hope that. institutions not be significant.International Security 20:1 | 44 implies followingpolicies that do not maximize expected utilityforthe sake of avoiding terrible outcomes. RELATIVE GAINS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The conclusions we draw fromthe "relativegains" debate are different from those of Professor Mearsheimer. and 2) the role of institutions when distributional issues are significant-that when relativegains are at stake. 701-726. But if one can secure more information. this point is obvious. may it be possible to followpolicies thatmorenearlymaximizeutility."Balance and Institutions German-Russian in Relationsafter Security theCold War. 1994.
However. "Cooperation and BargainingUnder Anarchy.Vol.Stephen D. Usually morethanone cooperativeoutcomeexists.it is essentialto distinguish To between two problems that states face when they attemptto cooperate."Modeling the Formsof International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information." manuscript. Morrow. 387Vol. in complex situationsinvolving many states. just as institutions mitigatefears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge.see JamesD. No. Unless some coordinating mechanismexists. Institutionsdo not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism.pp. No." International Organization. Institutions can facilitate cooperationby helping to settledisand by assuring states thatgains are evenly divided over tributional conflicts 10. information and about the distribution of gains fromcooperationmay be especiallyvaluable if the relative-gains logic is correct. 3 (April 1991). 3 (Summer1994).ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 45 | more salient than they were in early neoliberal thinking. We need instead to ask under what conditionssuch distributional conflicts are severe.Liberal theoryargues that institutions provide valuable information. 11. They oftenworry about the potentialfor othersto cheat. 48. pp. as in a Prisoners'Dilemma.The statesinvolved may not agree on which of theseoutcomesis preferred. 336-366. 423."Global Communications and National Power: Life on the PairetoFrontier. each as has different distributional implications.11 However.statesmay fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation. But they also face the problem of coordinatingtheir actions on a particular stable cooperative outcome (solving the problem of multiple equilibria. What is the role of institutions when distributional issues are important? Contraryto the assertionthat institutionalist to theoryis irrelevant distributional issues. and JamesFearon. thatvalue will be dissipated.Disagreementabout the specificform of cooperation is the principal barrierto cooperation in such coordination games. we argue thatdistributional conflict may renderinstitutions more important. 1993.10 if the debate but becomes one of "whether"relativegains matter.international institutions step in to provide "constructed can focal points" thatmake particularcooperativeoutcomes prominent. Realists interpret the relative-gainslogic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partnersare can gaining more fromcooperation than it is. Stephen Krasner has argued that coordinationproblems can be solved by the unilateralexerciseof power by the strongest state. ."WorldPolitics. in gametheoretic terminology). of University Chicago.so can they alleviate fearsof unequal gains fromcooperation. For development of arguments about the relationshipbetween international regimes and distributional problems. understandthispoint. Krasner. For example. 43.
both specificand diffuse. like any other theory.12States using strategiesof reciprocity engaged in exchangewith one anotherand so requireinformaare tion about the value of theirexchanges. 10. 1 (Winter1986).1989). Keohane."13 Institutional theoryhas a coherentaccount of both the creation of institutions and theireffects: institutions createdby statesbecause are of theiranticipatedeffects patternsof behavior.Far fromleading to the conclusionthatinstitutions not significant world politics. . 40.and the on changes in expectationsand process thatresultcan exertprofoundeffects statebehavior.examiningthe conditions as under which theyare created. 13. 26). Institutionalist theoryconceptualizes institutions both as independentand dependent variables: "institutions change as a resultof human action.the relative-gains in debate has led us to understand yet another pathway throughwhich they substantiallyinfluencethe course of international relations. for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members.Recentresearchhas sought more systematically Vol. Relations. International Institutions StatePower(Boulder.Colo. Robert0. only has value insofar as it generatespropositionsthatcan be testedagainst real evidence."International Organization. 1-27.: Westview.Early researchby institutionon alists focused on institutions dependentvariables. "Reciprocity International in No.International 20:1 | 46 Security time. pp. Keohane.A crucial step in the institutionalist research can program will be to understand the conditionsunder which institutions provide the information necessary to serve as reliable solutions to distributional problems. Institutionalized reciprocity and distributionalconcerns are simply two sides of the same coin. The point of a new theoryis to generate testable hypotheses: liberal institutionalism. Robert0. 12. In our view the successfulfunctioning institutions of depends heavilyon the operation of reciprocity. and p. reflecting the of and difficulties cooperatingin a system lacking centralized enforcement if pointingto the need forreliablesources of information statesare to achieve are gains fromcooperation. Empirical Work theImpactofInstitutions on We agree withJohnMearsheimerthat "more empiricalwork is needed before a finaljudgmentis renderedon the explanatory power of liberalinstitutionalism" (p.
ever. tions are not perfectly correlated. .and regionaltradingorganias when states act rationally zations. Rarely. Accordingto the preceptsof realisttheory. since theyanticipatethatinstitutions constructed so strainthem.14 In view of this research program. althoughtheyknow thattheseinstitutions have 14. posits that international against institutionalist theory. perspectiveleads us to expect patternedvariationin the types of institutions will constatesconstruct. Since institutionalists not claim thatinstitutions do always have a major impact on outcomes. is experimental do However.describedby Keohane in Princeton UniverAfter Hegemony: Cooperation Discordin theWorld and Political Economy (Princeton: sityPress.One resultof theinterdependence and underlyingforcesis thatresearchdesigned to isolate the impact of institutionsis difficult design and execute. and leaves it withouta plausible accountof theinvestments thatstateshave made in such international institutions theEU.Hence it may be worthwhileto search for instancesin which underlyingconditionshave changed rapidlywhile institutions have remained relativelyconstant. it should be clear that evidence that institutions change in response to underlyingconditions is hardly a blow afterall. 1984). have only marginaleffects rendersits Realism's insistencethat institutions account of institutional creationincompleteand logicallyunsound. NATO. should thereforeprovide valuable evidence for evaluating institutionalist theory.Thus findingthe ideal quasisituationto testthe impact of institutions not possible.Analysisof institutional such as variationsin theinstitutionform. is hardlythe damning evidence thatMearsheimerclaims.or where similar structural changes confront institutional endowments. will theyconstruct institutions.The real empiricalissue by of is how to distinguishthe effects underlyingconditionsfromthose of the of betweeninstitutions institutions themselves.Anothertactic regions that have different The institutionalist may be to considerthe level of institutional variationitself. and to determinethe conditionsunder which thisis the case. these difficulties not make it impossible to test the argument thatinstitutions since changes in underlying conditionsand in institumatter. GATT.will institutions to vary if while the "rest of the world" is held constant. finding weak institutions hardly constitutesa refutationof institutionalist theory Hence the weakness of the International EnergyAgency during the 1979 oil crisis. That theory.ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 47 | for to demonstratethat institutions are sometimes significant political outcomes. thattheircharacter are structured theprevailingdistribution capabilities. and is institutions createdin response to stateinterests. alization of alliances or in the legalizationof the international tradingsystem.
1994). for example. into legal issues withthe aid of transforming political transnationalnetworks of lawyers and judges.Anne-MarieSlaughterBurleyand Walter Mattlishow how the ECJhas had an unexpectedly large impacton the politics of European integration.Geoffrey Garrett in and BarryWeingast. Keohane. guided by institutionalist theoryand recognizingpotential problemsof endogeneity and omitted-variable bias. Perhaps institutions satisfythe ideological demands of statesmen. 1994). "Clear causal links unambiguously demonstrate that treaty rules independentlyinfluencedbehavior." International Organization. 17. have had a dramaticimpact on intentional dischargeof oil into the oceans. Anne-MarieBurleyand WalterMattli. Mitchellshows that on three different issues involving oil pollution at sea.Intentional Pollution Sea: Environmental Oil at Policyand Treaty Compliance (Cambridge. 16."Europe beforethe Court: A Political Theoryof Legal Integration. 1993). 47. Mitchell. with the resultthat for EU law now reaches deeply into the domesticlaw of memberstates.pp.realistsmust mean thatinstitutions have some effect otherthan that assumed by liberal institutionalists. The European Court of Justice(ECJ) has also proven a fruitful ground for the study of institutional influence. 3 (Summer Vol.) . See also Ronald B. 1994). anotherstudyof the ECJ.we challenge realiststo construct an account of institutional variationand effects thatcan be tested against the institutionalist alternative. Mitchell. it lies in contrasting understandingsof whyinstitutions created are and howtheyexerttheireffects. 48. On such issues see Gary King. Whateverthe rationale. 425-458. Robert0.17 The ECJ has gone far to convertthe Treatiesof Rome intoa constitution the EU. Ronald B. and Sidney Verba.But what could be the rationalebehind devoting resources to structures that will make no difference? Rather than assertingthatinstitutions have no impact."16 New rules on the kinds of tanks that ships are allowed to use. The difference between realism and liberal institutionalismdoes not lie in whetherinstitutions independentor dependent are variables.15 Ronald B. (Anne-MarieBurley now goes by the name Anne-MarieSlaughter.show how it resolved problemsof multipleequilibriaforEU memberstatesby providingconstructed 15.Designing SocialInquiry: Scientific Inference Qualitative in Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press.or help to pacify inattentive publics. No."Regime Design Matters: Intentional Pollutionand Treaty Oil Compliance.with otherplausible factorscontrolledfor or absent. 41-76. 1 (Winter Vol. No. A number of recent studies establish institutional effects throughcareful empiricalresearch. whether states complied with institutional regulationsdepended on the nature of the rules.International Security 20:1 148 no impact on patternsof cooperation."International Organization.: The MIT Press.Mass. pp.
pp."Ideas."International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels. Lisa L. they also reduce transaction costs. 21."in Judith Goldstein and Robert0. Geoffrey Garrettand BarryR. and Institutions: Constructing the European Community'sInternalMarket. In fact. Vol."ReviewofInternational Studies. "ExplainingtheLong Peace in Europe: The Contributions RegionalSecurity Regimes. Institutions.demonstrating the ments and making them credible. of 19.He findsthatNATO made an independentcontribution the U. pp. Martinshowed thatthe involvement international organizations in economic sanctions is stronglycorrelatedwith high does not establishcausality. John Duffield. 143. 1993).20 In Coercive of Lisa Cooperation. No. 20. No. commit"Long Peace" in Europe by drawingboundaries. 369-388. p. 819-855. 1992). 173-206. 46. Furtherevidence for the 18. 22. 25)."9 also findsthatthe stable norms and rules of NATO led to stability levels of conventionalforceswithinthe regimethat in cannotbe explained by structural theories. N. Ideas and Foreign Policy:Beliefs. PoliticalChange(Ithaca.JohnDuffieldhas consideredNATO as a regional to security regime. Keohane. The institutionalist perspectivehas also been applied with success to the analysis of security regimes.includingEC sanctionsagainst Argentinaduringthe Falklands War.Y: Cornell University and Press. CoerciveCooperation: ExplainingMultilateralEconomicSanctions(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.. in the form of taking advantage of the situation to profitfromtrade with institutionof came through Argentina. 4 (Fall 1992)." International Organization. Weingast. JohnS.21 Since such a correlation also did qualitative work on several cases involving sanctions.S. 4 (October 1994).ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 49 | focal points in coordinationproblems. pp. S. to They change the incentivesfor states to cheat. 20. and provide focal points forcooperation.themajoreffect institutions a alized linkagesthatwould otherwisehave been nonexistent: linkagebetween of EC budget contributions and the sanctionsissue. she levels of cooperation. Martin.Martin does to findevidence that states used the EC framework reduce fearsof cheating.they allow for more effective retaliationagainst cheatersand also create scope formutually-beneficial exchanges. .link issues.and facilitating augmentationof NATO allies' military He capabilities. Ibid.. Interests. Prevention cheatingis not the only mechanismby which institutions facilitatecooperation.18 These studies show that institutions have the wide range of effects attributed them by liberal institutionalists.22 However.Mearsheimerconsiders the Falklands case in isolation fromthe restof this research. eds. Vol.and dismisses it on as "less thana ringing endorsement liberalinstitutionalism" thegrounds for that concernsabout cheatingwere not involved (p. Duffield.By creating issue linkages.
sheimer's characterization conflict world politicsmakes institutions of in appear essential if states are to have any hope of sustained cooperation. much less that they operate without respectto power and or interests. More researchon this subject.and will be most welcome. under what conditions. The Falklands case cannot be dismissed on grounds that. the only othersignificant support Britainreceived came fromCommonwealth nationsand theUnited States.government could impede cooperation.and took only minorsteps following 23. Japaninitially U. refusedBritishpleas to impose sanctions. Conclusion the irrelevanceof international MearFar from demonstrating institutions. deal was "not difficult. Claiming too much forinternational institutions would indeed be a "false promise.by students of world politicscritical institutionalist of theory well as by thoseworkingfrom as it." But in a world politics constrainedby state power and hierarchicalgoverndivergentinterests. case. striking includingpublic protestsin The historicalrecordshows intenseconflict. constitute panacea forviolentconflict.but we do not adequately understand in what domains they mattermost. This necessityforinstitutions does not mean thattheyare always valuable. international operating on the basis of reciprocity componentsof any lastingpeace. always reduce the likelia hood of war. impositionof sanctions." some countriesand challenges to the sittinggovernmentin others.as Mearsheimerclaims.and of reaping its benefits.International Security 20:1 | 50 EC's role in coordinatingsanctionscomes fromthe factthat outside the EC.S.In the U. a 24.S.24 Institutions sometimes matterfor state policy.23 Mearsheimer'sdismissal of international institutions implies thatlinkages are easy to forgewhen a statedesires cooperation. The Thatchergovernment believed thatits survival was at stake in the Falklands War.and how theireffects are exerted. and unlikelyto experienceeffective will be institutions ance.is essential. Even in isolationfromthe robuststatistical reportedin Coercive the the centralrole Cooperation. . in distinctcontrastto the behavior of EC members. supportwas delayed untilafter the outbreak of war.While perhaps not a "core interest" survival is surely a fundamentalconcernof policymakersthat by realiststandards.much laterthan EC members. Falklands case illustrates of formalinternational in institutions enabling states to cooperate to impose multilateral economic sanctions.and thatcooperationis easy to coordinateeven withoutinstitutions. Britaindid not findeitherto be the yet resultsand othercase studies case.
appears solid. considerations distributional criticisms betterintegrating by furtherspecifyingthe causal mechanisms by which institutionsexercise influence.In comparison theory seems bright. promiseof institutionalist the . Both the questions raised and the provisional during the relativelyshort life of this reanswers given by institutionalists.indicate that these tasks may be rewarding. and buildingon existingempiricalwork to provide moreconvincing evidence of institutional effects. Institutionalists into theirmodels. search program. The logic of institutionalist should respondto Mearsheimer's of institutions.ThePromise Institutionalist of Theory 51 | is relations a promising researchprogramin international The institutionalist withits focuson theinformational role theory. one. withtheextantalternatives.
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